

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91111
Folder ID Number: 91111-005

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/90 - 3/15/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	1/4/90	(b)(1)	C
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Pope John Paul II (2 pp.)	1/4/90	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memo	Adrain Basora to G. Philip Hughes Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, January 4, 1990 (1 pp.)	1/8/90	(b)(1)	S
03b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)	1/4/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Endara of Panama (3 pp.)	1/25/90	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (5 pp.)	1/26/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy (3 pp.)	1/26/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand of France (3 pp.)	1/27/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (4 pp.)	1/27/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/90 - 3/15/90

Pinksheet Number: cap940

OA/ID Number: 91111-005

Date Closed: 2/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (3 pp.)	1/28/90	(b)(1)	S
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (4 pp.)	1/31/90	(b)(1)	S
11. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (2 pp.)	2/5/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with State President De Klerk of South Africa (2 pp.)	2/10/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	2/13/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	2/13/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	2/13/90	(b)(1)	S
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (4 pp.)	2/22/90	(b)(1)	S
17. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Tishiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan (2 pp.)	2/23/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/90 - 3/15/90

Pinksheet Number: cap940

OA/ID Number: 91111-005

Date Closed: 2/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, of United Kingdom (8 pp.)	2/24/90	(b)(1)	S
19. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (4 pp.)	2/24/90	(b)(1)	S
20a. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to G. Philip Hughes Re: Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand, February 26, 1990 (1 pp.)	3/7/90	(b)(1)	S
20b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand (3 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	S
21. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	C
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (3 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	C
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica (2 pp.)	2/26/90	(b)(1)	C
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (4 pp.)	2/28/90	(b)(1)	S
25. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (3 pp.)	3/1/90	(b)(1)	C
26. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (6 pp.)	3/8/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/90 - 3/15/90

Pinksheet Number: cap940

OA/ID Number: 91111-005

Date Closed: 2/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
27. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	3/14/90	(b)(1)	✓
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	3/15/90	(b)(1)	✓

Page 4 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/1/90 - 3/15/90

Pinksheet Number: cap940

OA/ID Number: 91111-005

Date Closed: 2/2/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

MITTERRAND JAN 1, 1990 - MITTERRAND CALLED THE PRESID
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA. MONITORED BY HUTCHINGS
INTERPRETED BY ALEC TOUMAYAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0072

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME January 4, 1990, 9:50 - 9:59 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
Jr 8/21/09

The President: Brian! (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: How are you? I'm here near your
mother. (U)

The President: I was really moved by your visit to my mother.
On Panama, you were magnificent. I know that a number of people
in Parliament jumped on you for your support of what we were
doing. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: As Prime Minister it was my job to
decide the Canadian government's reaction, and I decided based on
what I believed was right. What happened last night was a
further vindication of your actions. (Ø)

The President: It was a superb military operation, but I had to
overcome my instinct not to intervene in Latin America. What
made me decide was Noriega's victimization of U.S. military
personnel. So I had to act. I am very sad of course about the
human cost; as you know I just visited some of our injured boys
when I was in Texas. But I don't want to cry on your shoulder, I
just want to wish you the great success I know you will have in
1990. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You yourself brought 1989 to a very
successful conclusion, and now 1990 is off to a very fine start.
Now, two weeks after your action in Panama, there are proven
beneficial results. (Ø)

The President: I know that I will now have a lot of personal
diplomacy to do with Latin American leaders, and I am planning to
do this. Regarding Noriega, we will ensure that he has a fair
trial. The indictments against him do not call for the death
penalty, and there were 10,000 people in the streets of Panama
calling for his hide. This may have helped persuade him to turn
himself over. Brian, I want to thank you again for your support.
(Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Prime Minister Mulroney: I think you are right about the need for diplomatic efforts in Latin America. I was glad to be able to help, and please give our love to Barbara. (Ø)

The President: The same to Mila and the kids from us. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Pope John Paul II
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Pope John Paul II
Notetaker: Stephanie Sullivan

DATE, TIME January 4, 1990, 10:23 - 10:27 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Good afternoon, sir. May I wish you a happy new year? (U)

Pope John Paul II: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: I was calling to express my appreciation to you and to your able diplomats in Panama and the Vatican for your total cooperation on the Noriega matter. I am very grateful to you and your people for the way the matter was handled and resolved. (U)

Pope John Paul II: We tried to do the best, mindful also of the humanitarian aspects. (U)

The President: Thank you. You did resolve it that way. The fact that he left of his own free will was good. I guarantee you that he will receive a fair trial, knowing your humanitarian concerns. He will be treated as he should be under American laws. There will be no tormenting of the man. He will be treated as innocent until proven guilty. (U)

Pope John Paul II: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: Thank you. There were times I was afraid at lower levels we might be getting crosswise with the Vatican. Your people handled it in a professional and caring way. You have my profound thanks for being so professional. (U)

Pope John Paul II: Thank you. The same to you, Mr. President. A very happy new year. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
32 8/21/09

The President: Same to you. I hope our paths will cross this new year. (U)

Pope John Paul II: There are many new situations. (U)

The President: Yes, so many new situations. I hope to be helpful to democracy in Poland and to developments in Panama. (U)

Pope John Paul II: That is also my suggestion and desire. For you and your big country, the United States, best wishes for the new year. (U)

The President: Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. We'll be in touch. Goodby. (U)

Pope John Paul II: Goodby. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0128

January 8, 1990

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, January 4, 1990

At Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for the President's telephone call to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain on January 4. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the Telcon to State.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve *✓ AAB* Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I which transmits the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to State.

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memorandum for Roy
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation with Gonzalez

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By 91 NARA, Date 8/2/10

~~SECRET~~

MEMCON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0128

January 8, 1990

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Interpreter: Barbara Phillips
Notetaker: Adrian Basora (U)

DATE, TIME January 4, 3:20 - 3:35pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

The President telephoned Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain concerning the Panama situation. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Fine. I just returned from four days of vacation. (U)

The President: I know that because I had tried to call you earlier in the week to wish you a happy new year. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The same to you and to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: Do you have a few minutes to discuss Panama? (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I have been following the situation closely. (S)

The President: We have moved forward on all of the fronts that we discussed 10 days ago. Civil authority has been reestablished and certified by the electoral commission. A significant number of PDF officers have been reincorporated and the new Panamanian security forces are maintaining law and order. And, on the point you so strongly made, we have provided humanitarian aid, especially medical assistance. We are pleased to have Noriega in custody. He will be given a fair trial and treated as innocent until proven guilty. I called the Pope today to thank him for the magnificent work of the Vatican and to single out Monsignor Laboa who, I understand, is a Spaniard. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, yes, he is a Spaniard. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

The President: I just met with Colin Powell who is on his way to Panama. His mission is to establish a timetable for the prompt return of U.S. forces. I have assured the new government that we have every intention of carrying out the Panama Canal Treaty. We've just had an economic mission in Panama looking into their problems and we will be making as generous as possible an effort to solve them. The process has already begun with the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions. I realize that both I and the U.S. Government have much diplomacy to do in Central America and Latin America, because of the past history of use of force. But given the almost euphoric reaction of the Panamanian people, this task should be made somewhat easier. I value your judgment and want to solicit your help in this effort. I would consider it a personal favor if you would keep in touch and give me your views. That is my message. I would be happy to discuss any reaction you have now, or to hear your thoughts later after further reflection. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thanks for your words. There is a need to normalize the situation in Panama, and we want to help. There are 20,000 Spanish citizens in Panama, and Spain is, therefore, engaged. I think the climate will improve as normalization proceeds, but I will reflect further and give you my comments, perhaps in a written note. (S)

The President: As I have said, the Latin Americans put you and Spain on a pedestal. I hope that when you talk to Latin American leaders, you will help to make it clear that the U.S. intervened for two reasons: to restore democracy and to protect U.S. lives. I am not sure that the latter point is fully understood by most Latin Americans. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, I will be talking with some Latin American leaders. (S)

The President: Adios. (U)

Prime Minister Minister: Thank you. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BARCO

JAN 10, 90 - PRES CALL TO BARCO INITIATED AT 1504.
PRYCE AND BEERS MONITORING -- TERMINATED 1526.

DE CUELLAR JAN 19 - PRES INITIATED CALL AT 0828 -
TERMINATED 0839. DYKE MONITORED.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
36 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Endara of Panama

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Guillermo Endara, President of Panama
Notetakers: William Pryce/Eric Melby, NSC staff

DATE, TIME January 25, 1990, 9:58-10:08 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Endara concerning the U.S. economic package for Panama. (U)

The President: I wish you well. I wanted to thank you for your letter of January 9 about Panama's economic needs. And I also want to assure you of my personal interest and continuing support of your efforts to firmly establish democracy in Panama. I had a long talk with Ambassador Hinton; I have a lot of respect for what you're trying to do. (C)

Following Larry Eagleburger and John Robson's visit with you, we have been working hard to develop an economic assistance package to help stimulate Panama's economic recovery. (C)

It is based on your commitment to reform Panama's economy and your recognition of the important role of the private sector in Panama's future. We are impressed with the emphasis you're placing there. (C)

But you have a tough road ahead. And today I intend to announce what we are prepared to do to help. (C)

Our plan, which I'm told is valued at over \$1 billion, has four main parts:

- Humanitarian assistance for housing, for emergency public works and to help businesses, that is worth \$42 million;
- \$500 million of loans, guarantees and export opportunities to strengthen Panama's private sector and to help create jobs;

- A \$500 million assistance package for balance of payments support, public investment and restructuring and to assist Panama normalize its relations with the international financial institutions; and
- Rebuilding the U.S. Government working relationship with Panama. (Ø)

These are the steps I'm taking. In addition, I have asked Secretary Cheney, to resume purchases of Panamanian goods and services by the U.S. military authorities in Panama, the Panama Canal Commission, and other U.S. entities. (Ø)

And we will return our military dependents to Panama as soon as the military situation permits. (Ø)

We are going to work closely with Congress on this package to ensure its prompt implementation. I know you don't need any delays; I don't want to see any delays. (Ø)

Ambassador Hinton has the details. Will stay in touch with him and look to him to advise me on additional ways we can help. I am interested in trying to accommodate the real needs of Panama. We don't want to look like we are running things. (Ø)

In that regard, we will make sure that our efforts in the economic realm and other areas are always responsive to your ideas about how things should be done. (Ø)

President Endara: I want to assure you that the Panamanian people are very grateful for all the U.S. people and government have done for the welfare, democracy and liberty of Panama. A recent Gallup poll in Panama shows that the U.S. is Panama's biggest friend. (Ø)

American soldiers in Panama are wonderful and friendly and mingled with the Panamanians like brothers. (Ø)

We know the U.S. is interested in Panama's welfare, and I know that Panamanians will have to work things out themselves. However, this will be a moment in Panama's history in which your name and that of all your assistants will be engraved. Something similar happened in 1903 when Panama achieved independence. (Ø)

The President: How are you doing with your neighbors? I know some were upset with me, and I can understand that. Is there anything we can do to help you? I will be glad to do whatever is right. I am sensitive because I think you deserve support and assistance from your neighbors. (Ø)

President Endara: I made a one-day visit to Costa Rica. President Arias was very supportive as were the Costa Rican people. There is good support in Central America except for Nicaragua. Some in South America think the liberation was an invasion. I have talked many times with Carlos Andres Perez of

Venezuela, he has painted himself in a corner by saying he will not recognize me until U.S. troops left Panama. I told him the U.S. is helping to rebuild the police force and could use their help, too. I said as soon as we are able to function the U.S. forces will leave. They don't want to stay any longer than necessary. We could use more help; they (U.S.) can not leave until the police force is established. I'm sure he (Carlos Andres Perez) is trying to find ways to recognize Panama. (Ø)

The President: You should talk with Ambassador Hinton about plans for the final withdrawal. I told our military to meet your needs. We need to get back to pre-engagement levels as quickly as possible. It is to everybody's advantage for us to get out as soon as possible. (Ø)

President Endara: Of course. We want to be as little militarized as possible. We don't want to return to the old days. U.S. authorities have been wonderful. We are getting all the help. (Ø)

The President: I'm glad. You should let me know if you have a problem. It would be appropriate for us to talk in person. You should speak with Dan Quayle confidentially about anything that concerns you; Dan Quayle will walk right into my office and tell me. I would also want to talk with you by phone. Then we could talk about it when we get together. Give my regards to the two Vice Presidents. I am thinking of you with great respect. (Ø)

President Endara: Thank you for calling, Mr. President. I will be looking forward to the visit of Mr. Quayle. (U)

The President: Good luck, good luck. (U)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
31 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC
Interpreter: Erika Konuk

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 26, 1990, 1:19 p.m. - 1:55 p.m. EST
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Helmut. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: All the best. I hear all is going well. I am pleased the Panama matter went so well. The scoundrel is where he belongs. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate your views very much. If you have a moment, I want to talk to you today about the way the political situation is developing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and how these events relate to our position in the talks on conventional arms in Vienna. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I would be very pleased. Take all the time you need. (U)

The President: Our proposal on the table is for both the United States and the Soviet Union to have no more than 275,000 troops stationed in Europe when the CFE reductions are complete, in the mid-1990s. The Soviets have been putting out hints the figure is completely unrealistic, and I believe, given recent events, they are correct. (Ø)

The Czech and Hungarian governments are negotiating now for Soviet troop pullouts by the end of this year or next. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I do believe they will pull out. (Ø)

The President: Meanwhile, President Havel has indicated that he plans to ask in February for greater U.S. and Soviet troop cuts than those now in our CFE proposal. (Ø)

We have heard from various people, including the Soviet negotiator in Vienna, that Moscow is moving toward our position on capping U.S. and Soviet stationed forces, but we understand

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

they'll come at us with a number well below 275,000. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is quite possible too. (S)

The President: We need to be out in front. It would otherwise seem to the East Europeans as if we were trying to keep Soviet troops where they are not wanted. (S)

In my view, nothing we do should in any way complicate or delay achieving CFE in 1990 and we should redouble our efforts to accomplish this. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I completely agree. It is of the utmost importance. I'll wait until you finish; then I'll make a proposal. (S)

The President: We believe, after talking to our military experts about this, that a force of 195,000 U.S. troops in the Central Zone in Europe in the mid-1990s is a significant and sustainable level to maintain forward defense and implement the NATO strategy of flexible response. 195 U.S. in the Central Zone (interpreter repeated only "195 U.S."). I am persuaded that the best way to make these manpower reductions and to sustain the new force levels is within an arms control negotiating process, keeping the U.S. in Central Europe and NATO strong. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I believe that is something. Do you plan to introduce this into the negotiations now? (S)

The President: I want to send Larry Eagleburger and Bob Gates over to talk to you quietly, and to Rome, London, and Paris, to be sure how key allies feel on this. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It is a very good idea, and we should soon set a date for these two gentlemen. (S)

The President: I propose early next week, or in a few days. We should get out front with our objective so it will not seem as if we're being dragged there by the Soviets or East Europeans. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is exactly the point. (S)

The President: We have pressure from our Congress, as you do with your Bundestag. We should get out front so they won't take the heart out of our defense programs. (S)

What do you think about this? How do you think the key allies will react? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: First, it is absolutely correct and right to take the initiative, and state this openly. The most important improvement in this Administration, compared to previous ones, is that you are always taking the offensive -- for the Federal

~~SECRET~~

Republic, the US, and Europe in general. This is also my view with Eastern Europe, and I'll have more on that later. (S)

So, first, the principle of the idea is very good and useful. We'll have to discuss the details. In Europe: Margaret will be difficult for various reasons not necessarily involved with this issue. I believe Mitterrand, if he is consulted sufficiently to defer to his psychological judgment, will probably follow my position. Let me phrase it differently: You know my old assessment -- salute the flag of the FRG once, but the tricolor three times. That is very important, because there are French domestic policy issues. But I have a very friendly feeling about that. If you address Mitterrand directly, it will be OK. (S)

Italy and Spain will most likely take the same position as we do, as will the Benelux and other countries. The most important thing is that Europeans see George Bush as taking the initiative, not just getting it from the Soviets. (S)

When your people are over here next week, in my view next Thursday would be most convenient, I'll talk to them for 3 or 4 hours and we can easily establish a German-US position. (S)

The President: Is there any way you could see them on Monday or Tuesday? I have a State of the Union message next week on January 31. If we could do it before then, we'd like to announce this idea on January 31. This will be an enormous nationally and internationally noted speech. (S)

I have one alternative proposal: If in principle this sounds agreeable, I could send it to you in writing and we could agree to work on the details after January 31, or have our people talk to your experts. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I am interested in talking to your people. I could accommodate them on Tuesday, at 1500 our time. (S)

The President: They'll be there. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That will be 0900 in the morning your time. Our talks will be complete by noon your time, and that should be sufficient for you. So, Teltschik will call on Monday to arrange the details. Then we could also talk on the phone on Tuesday evening, if that should be useful. I also agree that it is very important to announce this idea during your State of the Union address. (S)

The President: Thank you my friend. Eagleburger and Gates will call on your office at 1500 Bonn time on Tuesday, January 30. Following that, if necessary, we'll talk on the telephone. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: OK. So, I would like to add a short remark on developments in Europe. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: Yes, I am very interested. (✓)

Chancellor Kohl: I hear the problems are increasing in Moscow, but there is no alternative with the personnel -- I mean the number one. But I think the situation is one where we should think on how we can help them, perhaps simply with food, food for some major cities. Apparently he has tremendous difficulties in moving supplies of food. This would not be as a gift, but with as few conditions for them as possible. I will call you again when I've progressed further in my considerations. Perhaps I will talk about this with Eagleburger. (✓)

The President: That would be very timely. (✓)

Chancellor Kohl: On Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, they are developing. It needs much time; the problems there are serious. But I believe they can handle them. (✓)

The situation is dramatic in the GDR. The reason is, that administration is having a very hard time in pushing things forward in a sensible manner. The reason is not that they don't want to do it. They just cannot do it right. There is a considerable difference with Czechoslovakia. Havel has strong moral authority; Mazowiecki too, and the government in Hungary has much less authority, but some authority plus the support of the opposition. The Modrow administration has hardly any authority at all. (✓)

I myself am pushing necessary reforms forward piece by piece. There is some success in the economic field, but things that should take one day take weeks. The result: confidence of the population in the administration is catastrophic. People are leaving in the thousands, and the rest are sitting on packed suitcases. Since January 1, 43,000 have come over. In the long-term this is unsustainable. Those are the good people -- doctors, engineers, specialists. They cannot be replaced. (✓)

I will be meeting with Modrow a week from Sunday in Switzerland for an hour, and he will be here on February 13, and I'll do all I can to stabilize matters. Destabilization would have tremendous consequences for everyone else. I try to see this from an overall perspective, in connection with all the things to be considered like NATO, the EC, and disarmament questions. My job is now to stop destabilization in Central Europe. That is the matter I work on day and night now. (✓)

George, it's my great wish that soon we might have a few hours to talk, just the two of us, with only a few people present. I'd like you to think about whether I could come over for a few hours. In November we talked about a possible visit to Camp David. Could we realize that in the next few weeks? (✓)

~~SECRET~~

The President: I am very enthusiastic about that. Come and spend the night, perhaps on a weekend. I will talk to Eagleburger and give you some dates. It is very important that we sit down in just that setting. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I have some concrete ideas. I would have called you. I'm considering coming on a Saturday, returning on Sunday, in the evening. (P)

The President: Perfect. I'll be flexible on that. (P)

Also, let's keep this other idea in our confidence. If it leaks, the Soviets could get out in front. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: That was understood. Rest assured. (P)

The President: It worked last time. Baker is here; he sends his best. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: My best to him too. Looking at my calendar, the best days would be February 24 and 25. (P)

The President: Those look good for me. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. We'll confirm in the next few days. Please accept my best wishes. Hannelore says goodbye. (U)

(The President briefly conversed with Hannelore Kohl and assured her that she was welcome to come to Camp David and, if she came, Barbara would also be there.) (P)

- End of Conversation -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Andreotti of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Andreotti
Notetaker: Heather Wilson

DATE, TIME January 26, 1990, 3:22 - 3:40pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Andreotti concerning the present situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the Vienna conventional arms negotiations. (S)

The President: Hello. How are you? (U)

PM Andreotti: Thank-you, well. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you today about the way the political situation is developing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and how these events relate to our position in the talks on conventional arms. I have talked to Kohl, and will be talking to Mitterrand, Thatcher and others. (S)

You are familiar with our proposal on the table for both the United States and the USSR to have no more than 275,000 troops stationed in Europe in the mid-1990s when CFE is complete. (S)

Given the changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviets have been hinting that 275,000 is unrealistic. I think they are correct. In fact, Moscow may be moving toward proposing a number well below 275,000. (S)

I think we must be out in front on this issue. If we stay with a higher ceiling, it will seem to the East Europeans as if we were trying to keep Soviet troops where they are not wanted. (S)

However, nothing we do should complicate or delay achieving CFE in 1990 and I think we should redouble our efforts to conclude that treaty. (S)

We have been working with our military and I have concluded that a force of 195,000 U.S. troops in the Central Zone in Europe in

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

the mid-1990s is a significant and sustainable level to maintain forward defense and implement the NATO strategy of flexible response. After a careful review of our defense needs, I have concluded that we should propose that we seek to conclude in a manner which does not delay the CFE negotiations, an agreement that sets a negotiated ceiling on U.S. and Soviet stationed forces in the Central Zone at 195,000. (S)

Given the changes in Eastern Europe and the Eastern European calls for Soviet withdrawal, there is great pressure on me to cut defense spending. Putting force plans into a negotiated process will help preempt calls for even greater reductions coming from the Congress, and elsewhere. (S)

I think a proposal like this, if Allies will agree to it, will agree to it, will also help Gorbachev. This would facilitate Soviet reductions beyond 275,000 to 195,000. I think that a new approach like this, and I hope that you will be able to support it, will be absolutely crucial to manage the changes now underway. I do not want to see CFE overtaken by events. Our publics must continue to see this process as relevant, and responsive, to the opportunities now before us. (S)

I would ask you to study this. I am sending Eagleburger and Gates to Europe and I would like to ask you if you could receive them early next week, because I would like to announce this on January 31 in my State of the Union speech. I think it is important that the West get out in front of this process. (S)

PM Andreotti: First, I would be very happy to see Mr. Eagleburger next week. (S)

The President: Good. (U)

PM Andreotti: As far as the contents are concerned, I can tell you, as a former Minister of Defense for eight years, I agree with your proposal. As far as its technical aspects, the 195,000 deterrent force as opposed to a 275,000 force is more or less the same. Politically, it is a very important sign to show faith in Gorbachev's attempts to change. There is only one more thing to be determined. It seems to me that the reduction in forces is a very important point for Gorbachev. It will release a large number of personnel. Can we find out if Gorbachev wants to do this? (S)

The President: Yes, in fact we have reason to believe that the Soviets might be going to propose this themselves. (S)

PM Andreotti: Fine, then. I have no difficulty. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

The President: If you are willing, I will ask General Scowcroft to arrange an agreeable time for Eagleburger and Gates to see you. They will be seeing the Federal Chancellor Tuesday afternoon. If possible, perhaps you could see them before that. (S)

PM Andreotti: I have no problems at all. I will be in Rome the whole week and the weekend. And what did Chancellor Kohl think?

The President: I think it is fair to say that Chancellor Kohl agrees with us. He was very enthusiastic. I would ask you to hold this in total confidence. It is important for us to consult and then have the matter be announced on January 31, if that can be done. (S)

PM Andreotti: That is fine. No problem. My best wishes to you. (U)

The President: I look forward to talking to Eagleburger when he returns. I value your judgment on this, especially since you were a Defense Minister for eight years. (S)

PM Andreotti: Have a pleasant afternoon. (U)

The President: I hope to see you in March. (S)

PM Andreotti: Yes, I look forward to seeing you. (S)

The two parties said good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetaker: Heather Wilson

DATE, TIME January 27, 1990, 7:04 - 7:18am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Mitterrand concerning the present situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the Vienna conventional arms negotiations. (S)

President Mitterrand: Good Morning, George. (U)

The President: Good Morning! (U)

President Mitterrand: Are you awake too early? (U)

The President: No, I'm always up early. I'm here in the Oval Office with Brent Scowcroft. (U)

President Mitterrand: You wanted to speak to me today. (U)

The President: Yes, it's nice of you to take the call on a weekend. (U)

President Mitterrand: No, I am also working. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you today about the way the political situation is developing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and how these events relate to our position in the talks on conventional arms in Vienna. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I understand. (U)

The President: As you know, our proposal on the table calls for the United States and the Soviet Union to have no more than 275,000 troops stationed in Europe when the CFE reductions are complete, in the mid-1990s. The Soviets have been putting out hints that the figure is completely unrealistic. I think they are right. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
32 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

President Mitterrand: But this approach should not be confused with the neutralization of Germany, which is the Soviet objective. (S)

The President: Yes, of course. I share your concern on that. Tell me, do you worry more about the neutralization of Germany now than you did when we last talked? (S)

President Mitterrand: I think there is a drive to reunification which the West Germans want and the East Germans are not resisting very much. If, by the end of the year, we have elected Parliaments on both sides which have that (reunification) as their program, then there could be a great popular movement in favor of ridding Germany of all foreign troops and nuclear weapons. That is the only risk, and it is a major one. But I think it can be contained. I think your decision to go to 195,000 is a good one provided that it is accompanied by a speech in which this idea is set forth. We cannot allow the neutralization of Germany. (S)

The President: I think if you want to see Eagleburger and Gates, or your top officials. These concerns are extraordinarily interesting to me and I would like to hear your views from the heart. (S)

President Mitterrand: They will be received at a high level, and, in any case, I will see them. (S)

The President: Good. I will have my office get in touch with Jacques Attali. In the meantime, any questions that you have, you could let me or General Scowcroft know. I need your advice and counsel and I'm glad that, on a preliminary view, it sounds okay to you. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it makes sense. I have mentioned my concerns. Kohl's enthusiasm is not fully reassuring. (S)

The President: It might be good for you, if you have the opportunity, to express these concerns directly to Kohl. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is a good plan provided we agree you cannot go from one topic to another: the necessary reduction of forces to the idea that there will be nothing left between the Soviet Union and the two other nuclear powers (Britain and France). (S)

The President: And what do you think Thatcher's view will be? You know her better than I do. (S)

President Mitterrand: She won't be happy. But as long as it is not the beginning of the departure. Thank you for calling and I will receive your emissaries. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

4

The President: I would like to talk to you again, next month, to get your views on Eastern Europe more generally. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, of course. I am coming back from Hungary. I will speak to you about that. I think a lot about this. (S)

The President: Thank you, my office will be in touch with yours. (U)

The two parties wished each other well and said good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC

DATE, TIME January 27, 1990, 9:11 a.m. - 9:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I am calling this morning about CFE. I would like to run through some ideas, then hear your reaction, and then I would like to propose that Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and Robert Gates come visit with you to discuss these matters further. (C)

We have had a number of signals from the Soviets about their intention to propose to go below the ceiling of 275,000 on stationed troops in Europe. The Soviets have been putting out a number of hints on this, including to Colin Powell when he was in Vienna. We have heard from people, including the Soviet negotiator in Vienna, that Moscow is moving toward our position on capping U.S. and Soviet stationed forces, but at a number well below the 275 figure. They seem to want to use CFE as a way to regulate what they hope will be a stable withdrawal of their troop presence. (C)

We're in a bind, for reasons I'll tell you, but we need to be out in front on this issue. We cannot be put in the position of insisting on a higher ceiling on stationed forces, thus seeming to the East Europeans as if we were trying to hold Soviet troop levels in their countries. (C)

However, nothing we do should in any way complicate or delay achieving a CFE agreement in 1990, and Colin Powell tells me some of the delay is on our side, and we will redouble our efforts to accomplish this in 1990. (C)

At the same time, I have gone through a tough military scrub of what we need and have concluded that a force of 195,000 U.S. troops in the Central Zone is a significant and sustainable level to maintain forward defense and implement the NATO strategy of flexible response. (C)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262000-0429-F
SLC 6/6/13~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

My proposal is that we seek to conclude, in a manner which does not delay or otherwise interfere with the current CFE negotiations, an agreement that sets a negotiated ceiling on U.S. and Soviet forces in the Central Zone at 195. Other U.S. forces, such as those in the UK, are not included in this Central Zone. (S)

As you know, there are domestic political pressures I must contend with and some very unrealistic views in Congress. There is almost euphoria about the declining threat and talk of a \$60 billion peace dividend. I want to get in front so the charge is not made that we are oblivious to the exciting changes that are occurring in Eastern Europe. (S)

So, I'd like to ask Eagleburger and Gates, as before, to make a quick spin and talk with you, Francois, Helmut, and others. I intend to get out in front of the Congress by announcing this idea in my State of the Union message on January 31. (S)

We think this step is essential. We cannot hold at our existing level, and it is likely we would see a Soviet initiative to get these troops down, tied to even lower US troop levels. (S)

I know this is a bit of a surprise, but I would like to hear your preliminary reaction, just after listening to this on the phone. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Are you talking only about stationed troop levels in Europe? So the Soviets will fulfill their obligation of withdrawing from Eastern Europe by taking these troops behind or in front of the Urals? (S)

The President: We'd be talking about the demobilization of these troops. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Fewer stationed troops in Eastern Europe might be helpful to the Soviets back in the Soviet Union. (S)

The President: Why do you think they are sending these signals of their interest in further reductions? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: They may just wish to reduce their stationed troops to have more effective forces to use within the Soviet Union, instead of the conscripts they rely on now. (S)

The President: We should say these cuts are part of a negotiating process, and that would mean the demobilization of the troops. It is better to tie our reductions to lower force levels by the Soviets. If they pull out unilaterally we cannot stop that, of course. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Thatcher: My second point is, what worries me, is that it looks like we're being hustled, with piecemeal changes retiring fast from the NATO position without any political assessment of the new position we find ourselves in, especially in light of the political possibilities for German reunification. I have a telegram that says Kohl now wants reunification to occur by 1994. We should have a political assessment of the situation in Central Europe, with German reunification, and the effect on NATO strategy, and not piecemeal decisions on the withdrawal of troops without a fundamental political and strategic assessment. It doesn't look good to go this way. (S)

I am here at Chequers with my Foreign and Defense Secretary to look at the political situation and what it means for NATO. We have our pledge to NATO with significant troops, and we have this nuclear thing in Germany. The Germans are not easy over there. I don't want to be accused of proceeding without a fundamental political assessment between us -- only our two countries can do this without it leaking -- without looking at our overall defense strategy. (S)

I'm glad you'll be seeing Douglas Hurd. Our Defense Secretary will also see yours, and they will let you know about our thinking. A piecemeal approach does not make sense. (S)

The President: Yes, I agree completely. But you'll agree there are enormous changes that have occurred since we set these numbers. It would be to our advantage to take these into account and get a sustainable level for US forces. I am convinced that means reduced levels, and these have been scrubbed carefully by my military advisers so that they are not perceived as paving the way for the dismantling of NATO, but instead as an intelligent change responding to Soviet actions and putting our troops at a level that can be sustained, and not just with the Congress. There are a lot of weirdos over there who have all sorts of crazy ideas, many of them don't want any of our troops in Europe at all. I'm proposing a level that will reduce the Soviet threat, lower our defense requirements, but not cause the Alliance to unravel because of the important questions you raised. (S)

We need to talk about Germany. I started these consultations yesterday and have talked about this with Francois. He, like you, supported my proposal. He was also concerned about German reunification. There may be a nuance of difference here on Germany. (S)

If you have time to see Eagleburger and Gates on Monday or Tuesday, they could review this matter in detail. I will talk to Hurd on Monday. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I will see them with great pleasure. There could also be dramatic changes the other way as well. So we should not run anything down fatally, nor do it in a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

piecemeal way, nor put our defenses at risk. (S)

I had a long talk with Francois last Saturday in Paris. Looking around the globe, the situation is all of a piece with my concern about the need for this political assessment, or perhaps some of our partners will begin making their own unilateral reductions to the point that we no longer have an effective force. We must assess the changes in NATO if German reunification occurs and Germany wants to throw out nuclear weapons. (S)

Of course, I'll be glad to see Eagleburger and Gates, and glad to talk to them. In your discussions with Hurd, he'll be conveying my worries about a piecemeal approach. A unified Germany dominant in Central Europe is a new phenomenon with many problems that we must consider. (S)

The President: I made this decision because of the substantial changes going on and an opportunity to make the situation in Europe easier with a lower number of Soviet troops. But we will stop at that point, because we have pressures here. I say, the jury is still out on the changes we may see. We're thinking the same way; the question is how to look at this new proposal. I want you to level with Eagleburger and Gates. Our defense people will be talking next week, and we've given a lot of thought to this with our commander in NATO. (S)

I'm sorry to have interrupted your discussions, but I thought this was very important. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'm glad you got over your problem on China. (S)

The President: It was a real fight. Now Congress wants to see China become a democracy in 24 hours or else. What happened, using the Thatcher approach, was using executive power to keep our ability to move on other things in the future, including their unilateral efforts to cut our forces. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Are you concerned about the upcoming elections in Nicaragua? (S)

The President: Yes, I don't think they will be fair enough. Jimmy Carter and Elliott Richardson are there, but they are not worrying about access to the market by the opposition. We are looking for help from parties around the world. Her rallies don't have transportation, or even money for signs. She's in desperate need of funds, and it's all legal -- not that Iran-Contra sort of thing. If your party can do anything to help, we would be all for it. (S)

- End of Conversation -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0687

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
3u 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Barco
Notetaker: David Radi

DATE, TIME January 28, 1990, 9:52 - 10:10 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: White House Residence

The President called President Barco concerning the upcoming Cartagena Summit. (S)

The President and President Barco exchanged greetings. (U)

The President and President Barco discussed a recent meeting U.S. Ambassador McNamara conducted with President Barco. (S)

The President noted he appreciated President Barco's concerns from U.S. newspapers clippings about the security threat surrounding the summit. The President said he wishes to work out any problems, but that he does have legitimate security concerns and wishes President Barco to discuss these with the head of the U.S. Secret Service. This would enable U.S. security people to share their concerns and provide intelligence reports that the Colombians may not have seen. (S)

President Barco noted he and his family often travel to Cartagena and that he believes it is safe there. He said he had talked with the head of the naval base at Cartagena who also believed that President Bush could be received without problems. (S)

The President noted the strong sentiment in the U.S. Congress and among the U.S. people that he should not make the trip. He noted the courageous actions by President Barco have made the U.S. populace concerned for his safety in Cartagena. (S)

The President noted that Ambassador McNamara had talked about the carrier option. The President said the original plan had nothing to do with a blockade, rather it was to highlight to President Barco and the other presidents in the region the U.S. Navy's aircraft interdiction capability in the drug effort. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Barco said he understood, but that it would be much easier for the President to arrive at Baranquilla. He offered the adjacent air base for the arrival and said the President could then be flown by helicopter to Cartagena. (S)

The President asked if the Baranquilla option is agreeable. (S)

President Barco said he understood how U.S. security forces are concerned for the President's safety. President Barco said he did not want the President to feel that he was forcing him. He noted the geographic conditions in Cartagena are good and then mentioned "the missiles." (S)

The President noted he would like to share reports about this threat with him. (S)

President Barco noted his strong desire to have the President attend the summit, but not if it was a risk to him. He said the President should decide the arrival means that is best for him and that this would be fine with the Colombians. (S)

The President asked that President Barco see Ambassador McNamara and the head of the U.S. Secret Service in a very quiet meeting to agree on how best to resolve the arrival issue. (S)

President Barco offered to take the head of the U.S. Secret Service to Cartagena if he has not surveyed the area. President Barco noted the front page of a Colombian newspaper which indicated 5,000 men would be coming to protect President Bush. (S)

The President noted the additional problem of the large press contingent and their security. The President said he would attempt to keep the size of our delegation down. (S)

President Barco suggested use of a nearby convention hall to house the press. (S)

The President said he or General Scowcroft would call Ambassador McNamara and make a determination about how to proceed. The President noted that the favorite option of U.S. security people is use of a helicopter carrier, but that the Baranquilla option may take care of this. (S)

President Barco said that would be very good, but that he does not want to push the President. (S)

The President noted that he does not want to do anything to embarrass President Barco with regard to the arrival issue. The President indicated he did not want to signal that Colombia is in a state of siege. (S)

President Barco said he has been asked by MIT to deliver their commencement address in June, but that MIT newspapers have

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
3

indicated it would be dangerous to have him come to the university. (S)

President Barco asked if the President had seen his letter on the coffee agreement that he had given to Ambassador McNamara for delivery to the President. (S)

The President said he would get it from General Scowcroft. (S)

President Barco noted it was nothing urgent, just some issues that may come up. (S)

The President noted he had met with the President-elect of Brazil and that the President-elect had asked him to do something about the coffee agreement. (S)

President Barco noted that he would soon like to meet with President-elect Collor. (S)

The President indicated President-elect Collor was someone we want to help. (S)

President Barco said he was worried about the Avianca crash in New York and was looking forward to the results of the U.S. investigation. (S)

The President noted it appeared to be a fuel problem, not an act of foul play. He said the U.S. safety board would take a strong look and share the report with Colombia. (S)

President Barco indicated he had flown much longer flights without running into fuel problems, but that he would be looking forward to the U.S. results. (S)

The President and President Barco exchanged goodbyes. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
31 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mikhail
Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, Chairman
Interpreter
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice, NSC

DATE, TIME January 31, 1990, 7:04 - 7:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Good morning. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Good morning, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I want to thank you for taking the call. I want to start by wishing you well. There have been wild rumors here in Washington and there are a lot of interesting events. Obviously, we cannot talk about everything on an open line but I am glad to have this chance to talk to you on an arms control matter. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Good. I welcome your initiative. I understand that our possibilities on this open channel are limited -- so greetings and I welcome the chance to talk to you. As for the rumors, there are many here in my country and in yours too. (S)

The President: That's for sure. Maybe it is just best if I go through my proposal and then we can talk about it. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Good. (U)

The President: At Malta, our two governments agreed to place a very high priority on the early conclusion of a CFE treaty. Our common aim remains to sign the treaty this year. I have been considering ways to accelerate progress at the Vienna talks, and Jim Baker will be prepared to discuss the full range of CFE issues with Mr. Shevardnadze, including some new ideas on the aircraft proposal. (S)

The conclusion of this treaty is even more urgent today because of the hopeful and fast-moving events taking place in Eastern Europe. We need to do everything possible to make sure that the

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

military situation reflects the new political realities. I have been examining with my advisors, and with U.S. allies, the question of the maximum number of troops that the United States and the Soviet side should have stationed on foreign territory in Europe when this CFE agreement has been fully implemented. (S)

I have come to the conclusion that the 275,000 figure is too high for both your country and mine. I hope you agree that we should set a new lower manpower ceiling for the treaty. (S)

My proposal is that we agree to drop the 275,000 figure for the U.S. and Soviet stationed forces and revise the current position on manpower in CFE to set a new ceiling for those forces at 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe. 195,000 in the Central Zone of Europe is the proposal I will make. (S)

Tonight I will announce this proposal to the American people in a speech on the State of the Union. If the proposal is acceptable it will be a clear signal that the CFE negotiations in which we are now engaged can keep pace with the political events that are changing the continent. (S)

We have had consultations with our key allies and there is general agreement that this is a good, sound proposal. We intend to keep a substantial military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future -- that is an Alliance decision -- and it would hold regardless of the decisions you take about your own forces. I hope you recognize that the U.S. presence makes a helpful and important contribution to European stability. (S)

But for today, the issue is how to treat U.S. and Soviet manpower in this agreement and I believe this proposal is fair. It doesn't push either side too fast but it shows a readiness to change. (S)

The main thing is we want to conclude the CFE agreement. I do not want this new proposal to delay our CFE negotiations in any way. But my experts think it is possible to accommodate this change and have an agreement that is a little more in line with current conditions. (S)

I will push our side and I hope you will push your side. It is a major priority of my Administration to conclude this treaty by the time we meet in June. (S)

I know this is sudden but I wanted to give you the courtesy of telling you before my speech tonight. If you want to react now that's fine or if you want to wait until you have had time to talk with your people. (S)

Well. Over to you. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Thank you for letting me know what you will tell Congress. Let me react to two or three points. (S)

First of all, we share your approach to the talks in the context of the changes now happening in the world and I agree that the

~~SECRET~~

Vienna talks -- the pace and content of the Vienna talks -- must keep pace with the new realities. (S)

And I fully agree that we must push forward the process to live up to the hopes of the peoples of Europe. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I believe that under no circumstance should we abandon or slow down the process. We need to work to find mutually acceptable solutions. (S)

As I understand it -- your proposal envisions a new and lower ceiling. You have emphasized that the U.S. will maintain its military presence in Europe after the negotiations are completed. If I understand you, this is regardless of what the Soviet Union does. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: We'll give it thought. But let me say that we will need to talk about the Central Zone of Europe and other zones. We'll need to talk not just about U.S. and Soviet forces but other forces. Baker and Shevardnadze will have a lot to do. You and I will need to talk too. You can expect our cooperation -- our constructive cooperation. (S)

And you can be assured that my response means that I am happy that we are keeping in touch to look at the most important problems today. I fully expect you will get more detailed answers from me or when Baker is in Moscow. (S)

Let me say that I share the spirit of your approach -- we must act consistently with the changes in Europe. (S)

The President: This call is interesting for me. As you were talking I was thinking that I wish we could talk more often without a fixed agenda because there are so many problems and changes to address. I just hope we can find ways to talk more often. Baker will talk with Shevardnadze and he has our full confidence and that is a useful channel. But I wish we could talk more often. I appreciate the spirit of this phone call and I wish you well. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, I fully agree. I do believe that both of us feel the need for personal contact and work is underway to get a secure communications link for us that will allow us to talk more freely. (S)

Today the President of Brazil gave me a verbal message from you. Well, I want to thank you and I value these gestures from the President of the United States. (S)

Let me thank you -- you are just beginning your working day and I wish you a good day. Raisa and I send our best to you and Barbara. (S)

~~SECRET~~

The President: I want to say one more thing in substance. We have wrestled with the proper number in discussions here and with our allies. You'll have your own ideas on that but let me say that the number was achieved after consultations with the Allies and with the military here. This number was not pulled out of the hat. We are, therefore, attached to the number. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Mr. President, I take note of this and assure you that we will look at it carefully and seriously. (S)

The President: I did have a good talk with the Brazilian President and I'm glad he remembered me to you. My best to Raisa. (C)

Chairman Gorbachev: Goodbye (in English) (U)

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Sandra Charles, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 5, 1990; 10:48 - 10:51 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Shamir concerning the terrorist bombing incident on Sunday, February 4, 1990.

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you?

Prime Minister Shamir: Fine. Thank you for calling. How are you?

The President: I know this is a difficult day for you, but I just wanted to phone to say how sickened and saddened we are over the terrible news of what took place to the tourists in Egypt. It is a tragedy. I wanted to express my condolences to the families of the victims and to all Israelis who must be deeply shocked by this.

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you. I will convey your feelings to the families. It is really very painful.

The President: This kind of cowardly attack demonstrates that we must be making progress toward peace or we wouldn't have these attacks, and those who oppose peace are in a minority and are forced to take these desparate actions. I am trying to put a positive spin on that.

The only way to honor those who have sacrificed and to frustrate those who commit such crimes is to go forward on the path of peace. I want you to know that the Israeli people are in our prayers.

Prime Minister Shamir: We are interested in making progress. Egypt has to have improved security. This is not the first event of this kind. They are trying to do their best, but they will have to do better. I hope we can make progress in the future. I know Secretary Baker talked with my Foreign Minister today and they have made arrangements. I hope it will go forward.

The President: I would be pleased if you would convey that we are deeply concerned and that I called to express my condolences. If you agree, I would like to make a statement about our call.

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you very much. It could be helpful.

The President: All right, good luck to you, sir. Nice talking to you.

Prime Minister Shamir: All the best.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with State President
De Klerk of South Africa

PARTICIPANTS: The President
State President De Klerk
Notetaker: John Ordway

DATE, TIME February 10, 1990, 12:35 P.M. - 12:45 P.M.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President telephoned State President De Klerk concerning the release of Nelson Mandela.

The President: This is George Bush.

SP De Klerk: Good evening Mr. President. It is an honor to speak with you -- even on the phone.

The President: I want to have the honor of visiting with you in person some day. I sat and watched that historic announcement with profound interest. I am at Camp David but they had live coverage of your press conference. I want to congratulate you for the steps you have taken the last few weeks. I know it has been difficult. We have watched your leadership with great respect.

SP De Klerk: Thank you. I am hopeful about the steps I have taken today. There must really be some reciprocity that will create a climate for real negotiations in South Africa.

The President: I can sympathize with that and I understand that. I hope tomorrow things go peacefully. I am sure there will be some rejoicing in South Africa. Of course we hope that your steps will result in peaceful rejoicing.

SP De Klerk: We will handle the situation with kid gloves. There is a risk of mass mobilization which can be dangerous. I hope the atmosphere is positive and we look forward to the future with hope.

The President: The atmosphere seems good.

SP De Klerk: I realize this is difficult. I hope we can steer away from violent solutions. If the positive atmosphere can be bolstered by real international support toward the progress we are making -- and you are the leader of the free world, Mr. President -- this can and will have a profound and positive effect in South Africa. Also, I hope we can avoid having check

lists that make it look like we in South Africa are being forced by the outside world. This is a process that we are pressing.

The President: I am delighted to hear that. We will not be making any check lists. Obviously, there are further steps that must be taken, and we hope will be taken. But we salute what you have done. I hope you can come to the U.S. I stated already that you will be most welcome and so would Mr. Mandela. But you are the head of government, and your visit would stand on its own feet. I would hope for a very productive visit, in which we could have good, private discussions.

SP De Klerk: Thank you very much. In principle I would be very glad to be there and meet you and look forward to it. We would take a look at the practicalities involved. I will tell the Foreign Minister to do this and talk to your ambassador.

The President: I will instruct State Department to be in contact. But I don't want to push it. I want you to feel comfortable.

SP De Klerk: Something that is natural.

The President: Exactly. There will be some criticism here on the left and there's going to be talk about check lists. But I can assure you that this President and this Administration will not do that. We will have an opportunity in a good private environment to discuss your initiatives and your hopes and aspirations for your great country. There is no rush -- some time that suits your schedule.

SP De Klerk: Thank you very much. I am encouraged by your very positive reaction, which encourages us to continue along the road. We can move toward agreement, with your support.

The President: You have problems, like we all do in elective governments. Yours are on your right. My question is, do you think Mandela will come out in a positive mood? Will he recognize that you have made changes?

SP De Klerk: I think it will be relatively positive. There is great cohesion in the ANC, strong party discipline. He will be positive, but within the framework of the National Executive Committee [of the ANC] which will meet in Lusaka on Tuesday. I think that we should not expect too much. But it won't be negative and it won't be aggressive. He wants a little bit of distance initially so as to establish his independence.

The President: In any event, you have our respect for what you have done. I hope to hear more from you. I will instruct our ambassador to be flexible about when we can get together.

SP De Klerk: Please give my good regards to your wife.

The President: How sweet of you. The best to you and your wonderful country.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1180

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Intepreter)

DATE, TIME February 13, 1990, 1:49 - 2:00 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. Prime Minister Modrow is here today. The situation continues to be dramatic. Between the 1st of January and today, 80,000 have come from the GDR to the Federal Republic. That is why I suggested a monetary union and an economic community. We will have to urge the government that comes in after March 18 to go through with these. (C)

First, thank you for all you did in Moscow. Please convey my best regards to Jim Baker and congratulations for a great job. I do believe the letter you sent to me before I left for Moscow will one day be considered one of the great documents in German-American history. Your support is invaluable. (C)

Let me say a few words about my talks in Moscow. Gorbachev was very relaxed. He has just had a difficult week in the Central Committee, but he was confident that at the Party Congress he would see things through. But the problems he faces are enormous -- nationalities, the food supply situation -- and I do not see a light at the end of the tunnel yet. (C)

You know the text we published jointly on the German Question. It was highly satisfactory. We will go in that direction now, and in a parallel way on security policy. We also discussed the same points Jim Baker had been discussing, that the two German states should be working together with the Four Powers -- the U.S., the UK, France, and the USSR. I was informed by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who called me from Ottawa an hour ago, that the foreign ministers are discussing the same things. At Camp David, this is one thing we will have to discuss thoroughly: the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I feel we will find a solution, but it will be hard work. I told Gorbachev again that the neutralization of Germany is out of the question for me. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
5/17/99 99-0393-F

The President: Did he acquiesce or just listen? How did he react? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: My impression is that this is a subject about which they want to negotiate, but that we can win that point in negotiations. The modalities will be important, but I do believe we can find a solution. (Ø)

The President: We must find a solution. The Camp David meeting will be very important, and I am delighted you are able to come. When I heard your comments from Moscow and heard that Mr. Gorbachev had removed a longstanding obstacle to unification, I was thinking of you as a friend. It must have been an emotional moment for you. The German people certainly want to be together. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is quite true. This is a great moment for us. Today as I had a meeting at the Bundestag and with my Fraktion, I said that without our American friends this would not have been possible. (Ø)

The President: I will await your visit. We have been supporting your stated position that NATO membership would be appropriate. We won't move away from that, but we do need to talk and see where we need to be more flexible and where we need to be more firm. I think our Camp David meeting will be very important. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will be looking forward to that as well. (U)

The President: Is Hannelore coming, too? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Tell her not to bring any dressy clothes. It will be like being in your mountain cabin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Wonderful! (U)

The President: Thank you for your call. We will stay in close touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Harry Obst (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 13, 1990, 3:01 - 3:10 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, I'm back again. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I have a feeling there is a
misunderstanding. I'm in agreement with what the foreign
ministers are talking about in Ottawa. (Ø)

The President: I am glad to hear that. Frankly, I had
misgivings about that. What we wanted was that the German
Question would be discussed between the two Germanys; and then,
after that, after the elections, there would be 2 plus 4
discussions. Indeed, in the original language, which Jim Baker
read to me, shortly after the elections in the GDR the two German
states would get together. But if you agree with the new
language, I will tell Jim Baker to go ahead. We do not want to
be the only ones to stand in the way. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm in agreement. I really don't see any big
problem. It will go like this. The GDR elections will take
place on 18 March. Then we will need about four weeks before the
GDR will have established a government. Then we in the FRG will
start our dialogue with the GDR. In practical terms, the senior
advisors will have to work on the terms. By then it will be the
end of April or the middle of May. That gives the two of us
enough time. (Ø)

I want to be frank. I have a different kind of reservation.
That is why I wanted the ministers to speak today. I worry if
this question remains open. Then we may find ourselves in a
situation again where others in the East and the West want to
join up with the Four. Then we will have a big problem. (Ø)

The President: The 35 wouldn't work. My problem was with the
language -- that preliminary exchanges at the official level will
begin shortly. I fear that would open the way for any of the
Four to cause mischief. But if it's okay with you, I'll call Jim
Baker. (Ø)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

5/17/99 99-0393-14

Chancellor Kohl: That is okay. That is exactly what I think.
(Ø)

The President: Okay. We will talk about this at Camp David. I just spoke with Jim Baker and said you hadn't mentioned this language. That is why I called you back. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, George. I am delighted you called back. It is better to have one call too many than one call too few.
(U)

The President: I don't want to get crosswise with you, and I am talking about Helmut Kohl as well as the FRG. You will note in my statements that we are talking about support for Chancellor Kohl and the FRG. I don't want to get caught up in internal political matters. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand that well. Thank you. (U)

The President: Okay. I will see you in a few days. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Harry Obst (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 13, 1990, 3:01 - 3:10 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, I'm back again. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I have a feeling there is a
misunderstanding. I'm in agreement with what the foreign
ministers are talking about in Ottawa. (Ø)

The President: I am glad to hear that. Frankly, I had
misgivings about that. What we wanted was that the German
Question would be discussed between the two Germanys; and then,
after that, after the elections, there would be 2 plus 4
discussions. Indeed, in the original language, which Jim Baker
read to me, shortly after the elections in the GDR the two German
states would get together. But if you agree with the new
language, I will tell Jim Baker to go ahead. We do not want to
be the only ones to stand in the way. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm in agreement. I really don't see any big
problem. It will go like this. The GDR elections will take
place on 18 March. Then we will need about four weeks before the
GDR will have established a government. Then we in the FRG will
start our dialogue with the GDR. In practical terms, the senior
advisors will have to work on the terms. By then it will be the
end of April or the middle of May. That gives the two of us
enough time. (Ø)

I want to be frank. I have a different kind of reservation.
That is why I wanted the ministers to speak today. I worry if
this question remains open. Then we may find ourselves in a
situation again where others in the East and the West want to
join up with the Four. Then we will have a big problem. (Ø)

The President: The 35 wouldn't work. My problem was with the
language -- that preliminary exchanges at the official level will
begin shortly. I fear that would open the way for any of the
Four to cause mischief. But if it's okay with you, I'll call Jim
Baker. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

C81 5117199 99-0393-F

Chancellor Kohl: That is okay. That is exactly what I think.
(Ø)

The President: Okay. We will talk about this at Camp David. I just spoke with Jim Baker and said you hadn't mentioned this language. That is why I called you back. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, George. I am delighted you called back. It is better to have one call too many than one call too few.
(U)

The President: I don't want to get crosswise with you, and I am talking about Helmut Kohl as well as the FRG. You will note in my statements that we are talking about support for Chancellor Kohl and the FRG. I don't want to get caught up in internal political matters. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand that well. Thank you. (U)

The President: Okay. I will see you in a few days. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
C. David Welch, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 22, 1990; 10:30 - 10:50 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Shamir initiated the call to The President. (S)

The President: Hello, my friend, it's good to hear your voice.
(U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm excited to hear your voice. (U)

The President: We salute you for your strong display of leadership at the recent meeting (of the Likud Central Committee). (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: I wanted to thank you for raising with the Soviets the issues of Jewish emigration, direct flights, anti-Semitism, and establishment of diplomatic relations. We are truly very grateful. Secondly, I wanted to tell you personally what I have been saying publicly several times -- we are not sending these people to any specific place and particularly not to the territories. They have a free choice where they go. Very few are going to such places. I am very upset at the Arab campaign against this immigration on this basis. It is only a pretext, Mr. President, only a pretext. Many Arabs are against any Jews coming to our country. This has us very upset. We know your views and we will not do anything that you don't want. I know your attitude toward settlements. But these people are going to big cities and the center of the country. (S)

The President: I appreciate that representation and your gratitude about our weighing in with the Soviets. I have talked with Jim Baker after his trip and he has had direct talks with the Soviets on the four questions you listed. I don't know if I can offer you any hope on these matters, but I want you to know that we weighed in strongly and they know our views. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
Jc 8/21/09

The President: Regarding the West Bank and settlements, I appreciate what you have said. Our policy is clear: we oppose any and all settlement activity in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Our problem now is that legislation is coming up on the Hill (concerning U.S. assistance to the resettlement of Soviet Jews). Unless we get assurances that settlement has been curbed we are in a direct dilemma since such assistance would conflict with our policy. I cannot accept legislation in Congress that would conflict with our policy. If you could end direct and indirect support for settlement activity, then we could support the initiative on the Hill. If you don't make as clear a statement as possible, then I'm going to face a problem with the Hill. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you for so many efforts you have made on these issues with the Soviet Union. You know that the immigration is the main issue here; we are all thinking about it and working very hard on it. All of us are devoted to it. But we make a clear distinction between the immigration and settlements -- there is no relation between the two. We are not sending these people to settlements. Regarding the legal situation -- I know it was studied before and was a point in the past. If someone says it's (settlement) illegal, I don't know if it will help. We are doing very little anyway on these subjects; we don't have the resources. We are instead concentrating on the immigration. I repeat that we will do nothing against your will. Legally, it is not a simple matter for me to do something. (S)

The President: A cessation of the incentives and subsidies (to settlement activity) would help here, so that your policy would not fly in the face of our policy. Is Arens coming to see Baker? (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: Yes, Mr. President, he will be seeing him on Friday. (S)

The President: Well, then I will let Jim know of your call. Please take a look at the incentives and subsidies -- a statement on your part would clear the way for us to look at support for immigration overall. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: Mr. President, there are, I assure you, no subsidies for people going to these places. All immigrants get the same amount; there is no special encouragement for them to go anyplace. It does not exist. (S)

The President: Let's let our foreign ministers discuss this in more depth. That is our hang-up with this question. But I want you to know that it will not interfere with our representations to the Soviets. I hope we can iron this out. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: I am ready to send you a letter if you like, repeating what I have said. (U)

The President: That will not be necessary, but Jim and Moshe Arens should discuss this. Anything you can do on the incentives and subsidies would be helpful. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: They will do it. (U)

The President: Regarding the peace process, what I like to call the Shamir plan, I believe we are at the point where we must either go forward or fall backward. We have worked with you to protect your key concerns, such as the PLO issue, an advanced agenda, and who will be there. I think it is time to get our three foreign ministers together and convene the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. I think we should get on with it. Given your magnificent victory -- I know this is your internal affair -- we should be able to go forward now. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: I hope Baker and Arens will have a successful talk. Thanks for your concern with my internal difficulties. My hope is to move forward with the initiative, the Shamir initiative, because we want to see the peace process move forward. (S)

The President: The TV pictures of the meeting made a powerful impression on the American people. It was a strong message, strong politics, your taking a principled stand. Now is the time to go forward. Jim and Arens can discuss this tomorrow. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you for your concern with my problems within my constituency. We struggle on for our ideals-- this is politics, what happened. (U)

The President: What should we say to the press about our call? Can I say that it was constructive? (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: I will say that it was constructive and helpful, that I expressed our gratitude for your efforts on the Soviet Jewish emigration, and that I clarified that it (the immigration of Soviet Jews) has nothing to do with settlements. (U)

The President: Can I say that I congratulated you on your political stand, or is it better to remain silent on the internal matters? (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: It is better not to say anything. Good intentions are unfortunately not enough. I prefer not to mention internal political problems here. (S)

The President: We will continue to work on the Soviets, we won't lighten up. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you. I hope the talks between Baker and Arens go well. (U)

The President: Let me ask you -- are you concerned about the rise in anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe? (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: I am concerned, but I think we should not exaggerate this. We should not think that people are going to start killing people tomorrow. We must make efforts to get the people out. (S)

The President: Well, we can continue to speak out and make our concerns known. We handed over examples of anti-Semitic material to the top Soviet leadership. (S)

Prime Minister Shamir: The U.S. voice on this issue is loud and is heard. If you say it is important then people will listen. We thank you very much. I am very glad for this phone call. (U)

The President: I am also very glad to have spoken to you. Good-bye. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

1456

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Toshiki Kaifu, Prime Minister of Japan
Interpreter: John Malott, Director, Office of Japanese Affairs, Department of State
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC

DATE, TIME February 23, 1990, 9:55 - 10:05am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu to offer congratulations on the recent elections in Japan. (U)

The President: Toshiki, is that you? (U)

PM Kaifu: Yes, it is Mr. President. (U)

The President: I was calling to add my voice to the congratulations on your election victory. (U)

PM Kaifu: Thank you very much. (In Japanese) As soon as victory became apparent, I had a message of congratulations from you. (U)

The President: I was also calling to see whether, with your victory behind you, it would fit with your schedule for us to have a personal conversation. Depending on your schedule, I suggest we meet in California on March 4 for golf in Palm Springs followed by meetings on March 5. This is just a suggestion. If that does not work, we will work on another place or another time. (U)

PM Kaifu: I have to speak to the Diet on March 2, and on the 5th I need to accept the Diet's views on my speech. I could be out of Tokyo on the 3rd and 4th but I would need to be back for questions from the opposition on the 5th. It would be possible for me to meet with you on the 3rd and 4th. (U)

The President: I need to check whether the 3rd and 4th would be possible for me. I also have a second suggestion. I would love to have you as my guest at Camp David on March 10-11. Bring your wife and your advisors and we could meet there in a relaxed atmosphere. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

2

PM Kaifu: After that (March 5), we open the budget debate in the Diet, and I will need to check with my administrative staff regarding when I could get away. (S)

The President: "Let's shoot for the 3rd and 4th. General Scowcroft will be in touch with your Ambassador here or with whomever you designate in Tokyo to make the arrangements." (S)

PM Kaifu: I will ask Ambassador Murata to see General Scowcroft to work out the details. (S)

The President: I want you to know that I have no hidden agenda or special message for you. After your magnificent election victory, I wanted to get together to talk. The U.S.-Japan relationship is vital to both countries and that is what this meeting is all about. The meeting is designed to signal my personal interest in this relationship. I want to meet with someone I consider a friend on a very personal basis. (S)

PM Kaifu: I also want to see you very much. I agree about the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. I hope that we can meet on March 3rd and 4th. (S)

The President: In closing, I want to say how very proud we are of your leadership in that election victory. (S)

PM Kaifu: Thank you very much. (U)

The President and the Prime Minister signed off. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, of United Kingdom
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow

DATE, TIME February 24, 1990, 8:01 - 8:42am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I would like to talk about my upcoming visit with Helmut, among other things. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: That was what I wanted to talk to you about too. I have seen Andreotti recently, and Genscher, and Stoltenberg too. I just had some long conversations with Prime Minister Mazowiecki. It seems that one or two common features are developing. (S)

Everyone accepts that there will be German unification, and that it will come very fast indeed. All are worried about the consequences, and the uncertainty. (S)

The agreement at Ottawa, to set up the Two Plus Four discussions, will help in allaying some fears and now allow us to discuss some of these problems in NATO. Others, such as Poland and the Netherlands -- and Andreotti -- have some concerns about this process. Of course, they will need to be consulted. It always seems to come back to the consequences, for NATO, of quick reunification of Germany. (S)

Andreotti and I agreed that we must start work on the official level on these consequences quickly, before unification happens. Much will depend on the results of the elections in East Germany. If there is a big vote for the Social Democrats in the GDR on March 18, there might then be a coalition government in the GDR. But they might use Article 23 of the West German constitution, that allows Laender to apply to join the Federal Republic. Then the reunification would be much quicker. (S)

We all think we should begin work in the group of Four on these issues very soon. The Poles fear that the Germans will try to wiggle out of the Oder-Neisse line. The German courts upset the agreement of Brandt on this. Mazowiecki must have a proper treaty on the borders, or we might see a return of old ambitions. I said I would support him on this. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262000-0429-F
SL5 6/6/13

~~SECRET~~

We must get a NATO position sorted out. There are not many options. Helmut has been good on NATO, and on keeping your troops in Germany. There is the problem of East Germany. If all Communist troops leave the GDR, it would be an alarming development for Gorbachev. It would seem that the border of the Alliance has moved toward him. (S)

Genscher and I discussed the Soviet troop presence. He has no problem with the Soviets remaining in East Germany for a transitory period, with no terminal date set for this period. I fear that Gorbachev will feel isolated if all the reunification process goes the West's way. He's lost the Warsaw Pact to democratic governments. He might feel isolated and I can understand that he would want some assurance on Germany. The Soviets staying there would help. (S)

We should start work at the official level even before unification. I was grateful for your suggestion that we have NATO discussions soon. This is part of our strategic political thinking. (S)

We believe too, that we now need a bigger political framework for Europe, one that will include the Soviet Union. That means the CSCE, the Helsinki accords. There are two points here. (S)

First, the Russians should not be isolated. (S)

Second, in Europe Germany is going to be dominant. It will be the Japan of Europe, but worse than Japan. Japan is an offshore power with an enormous trade surplus. Germany is in the heart of a continent of countries, most of which she has attacked and occupied. Germany has colossal wealth and trade surpluses. So we must include a bigger country, the Soviet Union, and you, in the political arena. (S)

CSCE now does well with human rights, cultural exchanges, and so forth. It now has no commitments to democratic governments and market economies. It couldn't have them; the time was not right when this was done. If we now look to extra commitments in those areas, and then give the CSCE a political structure and a secretariat, we could use that for a wider political framework. (S)

The Community is already working on the German unification problem. It will be difficult to include a new European country, with 18 million people. Certainly the Germans must finance this. We're already coping with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. There are a lot of difficulties to work out. It will upset the Common Agricultural Policy -- more subsidies. It will upset trade -- the GDR has no costs, no prices -- another subsidized economy. There are already problems with the Deutsche Mark. It will be hard to go forward with common borders and free movement of people and goods. There is no effective border between the GDR and other Warsaw Pact countries. (S)

I am also a little worried that Germany will go for the Social Democrats, with all the new East German voters. I have talked to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Giscard, and to Andreotti, and they are worried. I spoke to Stoltenberg and Genscher. Genscher is the easiest to negotiate with about these issues. (S)

The President: This is very helpful, timely, and interesting. I'll take a look at these questions. I agree that unification is a given now. When I talk to Helmut, I will seek a clear statement from him about full membership in NATO for a united Germany. This is very, very important. That would include continued integration of German forces in the NATO command and the continued presence of U.S. troops. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: He's good on that. There is a problem of East Germany as being part of NATO. Stoltenberg suggested that West German forces could be in East Germany. (S)

The President: I'm concerned about the Soviets... (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It would be a problem for them. Germany has invaded them in living memory. We need to build new structures. We must try to help the Poles and allay Gorbachev's fears. We also need to keep up a strong defense. (S)

The President: A lot of people here don't understand the need to keep a strong defense. Look, I know you saw the Genscher-Stoltenberg statement which calls for demilitarizing the former territory of the GDR. Did you discuss with the Germans the troubling questions this raises about NATO's defense responsibility for this portion of a united Germany? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Tom King did. We don't think this will suit Gorbachev in the initial stages. NATO would be moving. He's got to have some reassurance. That is the price for Germany staying in NATO. There are also problems for the Poles in moving the Soviets out. They are worried about the Oder-Neisse line. (S)

The President: I had an interesting discussion with Havel. He came here talking about getting all Soviet and US troops out of Europe. I told him we thought the US situation was different from the Soviets. When he left, he had modified his statements on this issue. I was very pleased. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I noticed his original initiative, which was quite wrong. The U.S. troops are there to provide our fundamental defense and our deterrence; we must not forget the deterrence. (S)

The President: With Mazowiecki -- I can't pronounce that name, I know he wants the Soviets to stay. But I don't think that will be popular for long with the Polish people, in spite of worries about the border. I am concerned about his position. Did he discuss this with you? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. He's quite prepared for the Soviets to stay. If the Soviets stay in East Germany, they will need troops in Poland to provide logistical support. They can't

~~SECRET~~

have them there without it. He's fearful. All are seeking a balancing factor -- that is European history. He's a good man. (S)

The President: Yes. He's coming here. I'm not comfortable with Soviet troops staying there. (S)

I really want to seek a clear commitment from Helmut to full membership for Germany in NATO. On the status of the GDR, I know Helmut's worried about the politics of the situation. That's why I just have a small group here for these talks. Genscher is not here; nor is their Ambassador. It's just Brent and I and Jim Baker. We did this because we can have a better discussion on party problems than we could with a bigger group. It's delicate to discuss. We have a lot at stake with the success of Helmut Kohl. And of the CDU. I have some fears of the SPD taking over. (S)

We have been thinking about what the Two Plus Four should be prepared to discuss, and at what stage they should begin their work. I do not want to give Moscow a forum in Germany that it will use to exploit German domestic politics to pressure Kohl to somehow accept a loose arrangement between Germany and NATO that would spell the end of the Alliance. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: You and I think the same, and Germany must stay in NATO, or all our security goes. I would give Helmut two things: How does he see unification going? Will it be immediately, with the Laender applying to join the FRG? Or will it be talks with the GDR government and the Federal Republic. He might say it depends on the election results. If it will be immediate, Helmut will have to consider how this will affect him in the general election. (S)

The President: In this forum we can be very frank ... (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Genscher is not troubled by an SPD government. (S)

The President: This Lafontaine worries me. Dick Walters had dinner with me last night and he does not take Lafontaine as seriously as others do, as a charismatic flamboyant new leader who can lead them to something bad. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: They say he is rather a buccaneer type. He has been in charge of the Saar for a while. But Helmut is a politician to his fingertips. He must have thought this out. There was this euphoria because he thought he would be the Chancellor who united Germany. Others, though, don't think this will be enough to get him through. (S)

The President: There is this effort by the CDU to show the Socialists as being against unification. They'll attack the CDU for being more kindred, in East Germany, with the regime. (S)

On Poland, I want you to know we consider the current borders between the GDR and Poland to be permanent and inviolable. The

Helsinki accord speaks to that. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Helsinki is an accord and not a treaty. It was more formal in Brandt's time, but the result was not recognized by the German courts, which say this must be determined in a final peace settlement. Mazowiecki wants a treaty most of all. He is already drawing up a draft. (S)

The President: Did you tell the Poles we recognize the border as inviolable and settled? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes. There is a difference between Genscher and Kohl on this. The borders are not truly guaranteed. (S)

It is unsettling that Kohl is moving on unification as if nothing else mattered. The Two Plus Four will be important. We should have discussions in NATO as you suggest. We have started to talk about this in the EC. The financial markets are uncertain too. (S)

The President: On Two Plus Four, we think whenever it meets, the focus should be to work out the details of giving up Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a whole. There can be a discussion with the Soviets and have them come to a common position that membership in NATO will prevail. It has to. How do you think Mitterrand feels about this? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: We talked. Privately, he is as fearful as us. If we are not too careful, the Germans will get in peace what Hitler couldn't get in the war. He is adamant on the Oder-Neisse line. (S)

He hasn't worked out the confederation idea. That is why we think we don't need a new structure, just update the Helsinki accords. If the Soviets stay on the right track with Gorbachev, and we get commitments for democracy and free markets, that can provide a new political framework. In history, if there are difficulties in a small forum, you try to enlarge it. (S)

The French fear the domination of Germany. They fear the speed with which the FRG is pushing through to unification, and not addressing other questions first. (S)

We made a good agreement at Ottawa. Delors is also working on the consequences. There is great uncertainty, as people try to understand that there will be this great landlocked power that has quarreled with most people. It is not enough to anchor Germany in the EC -- that might become Germany's new empire, the future empires will be economic empires. (S)

I talked to Mitterrand about a closer Entente Cordiale. He agrees. Dumas is along. Our officials are working closely together. The new Europe was born on a German-French axis when Germany was a junior underdog and De Gaulle was dominant. That worked... (S)

The President: I have another question on France. I talk to Mitterrand and I am concerned that he may be less enthusiastic on the NATO view. Can you help? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Of course I'll try. He'll say the military arrangements of NATO are not for him. He's along with the Franco-German brigade; we'll have to look at our situation. We have a totally different agreement with Germany from 1955, for 55,000 troops and a tactical fighter wing and dual-capable aircraft. (S)

I am pretty certain Mitterrand concurs on Germany and Europe and how to deal with that, and with the confederation. Military arrangements for NATO are for NATO. He will be adamant on US forces and US nuclear weapons in Europe. He is not as concerned about the nuclear forces because he considers the ICBMs to be available to NATO. (S)

The President: We're for keeping our nuclear weapons in Europe. I hope Francois will help on NATO. He should see NATO fundamentals as more important than ever. (S)

I saw the Norwegian Prime Minister yesterday. He was very helpful, with some concerns about naval forces. He pleaded for us to keep our commitment. We should not overlook these smaller countries. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: He's good; the Conservatives got back in office. (S)

The President: The trouble is, he's rocking along at ... (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I worry that some in the US don't see the US deterrent as so important. NATO has been and will stay our security. Mitterrand will not quarrel with that at all. (S)

Andreotti mentioned a need for a new philosophy on defense. I said: My fundamental philosophy is that you never know where the next threat will come from, and when it comes it will be too late to prepare for it, so you should always keep your defenses strong. It could come in Europe; two wars started there and there could be another if we don't stay strong. (S)

The President: When I am asked who our enemy is now, I tell them apathy, complacency... (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: That is how it has been. When I first came into office the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Then Iraq attacked Iran. We eventually had to send fleets to the Gulf. If we had not already had the ships, we could not have sent them. The Middle East is filling up with missile technology, soon there may be nuclear and chemical weapons. When you see the threat, it is too late to prepare. In the Falklands, if we had not had a strong NATO we also would not have had any ships to send. There are no differences on the fundamental reasons for defense. I told this to Andreotti. (S)

The President: I'm increasingly concerned about that chemical plant in Libya. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I've seen the reports. They are producing and filling. (S)

The President: No one seems to care. No one is anxious. We haven't done our job as well as we could. I'll be sure to raise this with Helmut. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: There is Syria too. (S)

The President: This has been very helpful. We're very close on the key questions. If you'd like, I'll fill you in when Helmut leaves. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'd be very glad. We're both together on NATO. We must discuss how to reassure Gorbachev. (S)

The President: I'm not close enough to Europe. I was thinking that you and Francois and I should get together at some point, just for half a day. With Helmut having just been here, I don't think they will feel excluded. I just think it would be useful to have a triumvirate there to review things at some point. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: If Mitterrand sees you, I could arrange to be in the US. I get many invitations from universities and so forth. (S)

The President: It would be useful to do. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I'll see Mitterrand. The thing is that, since last December, no one thought this would go so fast. (S)

The President: Me neither. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: It was Gorbachev toppling Honecker. The security problems cause fears about a reunified Germany. We should incorporate the Soviet Union in our security framework. (S)

The President: We want Gorbachev and perestroika to succeed. He seems out of the woods now, rebounding, landing on his feet. (S)

The economy there is worse than I thought. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: In communism, people work to the minimum extent. They need the incentives of a market economy. (S)

The President: Have the Soviets asked you for food aid? (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: No. They had a good harvest, but much of it ends up on the black market. (S)

The President: They have not asked us either. They also have

terrible distribution problems. But I heard from Havel, and some rabbi, that they are desperate for food. The Germans have been giving them some. (S)

Are you at Chequers? (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Yes, getting to long-term problems. I'm coming to Aspen, I believe on the 3rd and 4th of August. (S)

The President: You must come by. I'll see you before then. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher: If you could call, that would be good. I want to hear what he thinks will happen after the March elections. There are two scenarios. One if the SPD gets a big majority and another if he does well. (S)

(After a brief discussion of the First Lady and her health, the call concluded.) (U)

Pres was at
Camp David

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1837

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON
MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney,
Prime Minister of Canada (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Philip Zelikow, NSC (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME February 24, 1990, 9:28 - 9:47 am
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: Helmut is coming in to see me today at Camp David. I think we will have a good discussion. I just talked to Margaret Thatcher. I have not yet talked to Mitterrand. We will probably have to reach him after the meeting with Kohl. (S)

This will be a very small meeting between myself and Kohl. I want to get him to level with us on real plans for how German unification will play out--from his standpoint. He would not want to do that if Genscher was also participating in the meeting. And I will push Kohl on the issue of participation in NATO. For our part, we will try to hold the line on defense and maintain substantial forces in Europe at reduced levels. It will be difficult here at home; I am not naive about that. I would like to have your thinking on this subject. I know these changes have been coming faster than any of us could have predicted. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I talked to Genscher at the Open Skies Conference. Helmut called me on the phone the day before yesterday and we talked for half an hour. We are for German unification, like our allies. I was startled by the velocity of the changes in Europe. No one has predicted or can predict what the outcome will ultimately be. (S)

I am concerned personally that unification for Germany appears now to be fueled not just by the legitimate and proper desire of the two states to come together, but by the total collapse of the economy of one state and the economic strength of another. I do not know what that does to the long-term marriage; I have not had enough experience to know. I told Genscher you're not really about a merger here; this is a takeover. He allowed that that was true. As an illustration, I asked Genscher "What would you do in your foreign ministry if you unified the two German states?"

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
31 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Would you merge departments from the two ministries?" He said "No, no." I asked, "Would you take their best people into your ministry?" He said, "No, we'll keep all of mine and some of theirs." I think that says it all. This is no surprise, given the strength of West Germany. It does not appear, though, to be exactly what is suggested by the term "unification". (S)

My own view is that the problems with these developments in Germany are not immediate ones. They will appear down the road in areas like the Common Market. The Community was never designed with the possibility of having such a great European power as a member in mind. (S)

The President: I am worried about how all of this will work. Margaret mentioned her concern about East German agricultural subsidies and EC agricultural policy. We have serious trade problems with agriculture now. There could be big problems down the road. I do not think we can stand in the way of unification. Helmut has a deep emotional commitment to the fatherland. (S)

I talked to Jim Baker. He wants us to let the Soviets stay in East Germany. It gives me heartburn, though, if we suddenly, in an effort to get German stability, acquiesce in or advocate Soviet troops remaining in Germany. That is what we have been against all these years. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I don't see how, in fairness, we can accept that. The minimum price for German unity should be full membership of Germany in NATO and full membership in all the Western organizations and full support for American leadership of the Alliance. I indicated to Genscher, and I have indicated to others, and I will tell you: we are not renting our seat in Europe. We paid for it. If people want to know how Canada paid for its seat in Europe, they should check out the graves in Belgium and France. We were there in two wars, and paid an enormous cost. It is not unreasonable to say that it is fine if change comes about, but NATO got us this far. Solidarity of the Alliance will get us further. (S)

The President: There is a philosophical revulsion in the GDR to the continued presence of Soviet forces. A lot of this revolution is about imposed Soviet domination. Now some want us to reverse field and say that in a reunified Germany the Soviets can help with the reunified Germany. I told Jim Baker we should not advocate this. (S)

I agree on the importance of NATO. Manfred Woerner also strongly feels that way. He feels there is no alternative here to Germany being a member of NATO. Yes, the CSCE has its part to play, but we are having big differences politically here in getting the proper support for defense from the American people. NATO is important for keeping our troops in Europe. I think I can keep a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

reasonably sound defense. We will have trouble with the two missiles and the B-2, but we can emerge with a sound defense. But we need NATO, not because the Soviets are in Central Europe, but because of unpredictability and the need to preserve stability. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I remember Lester Pearson and his work in the Atlantic Alliance. He got NATO to include responsibilities other than the military ones. The Alliance is designed to deal with an era like that of today. NATO is no less needed now. On Poland, I can't believe the Polish people believe the way their Prime Minister does about the need to keep Soviet troops in Poland, in spite of their fears about the border issue. (S)

The President: These are difficult times, but they are fun problems to wrestle with. No one could have anticipated these challenges three years ago. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The situation does not lessen our need for prudence. We could be back where we were three years ago, three years from now. The linchpin is NATO. (S)

The President: I think we are OK with Helmut on that issue. We will talk about his domestic political situation, taking advantage of the small group of people who will be up at Camp David.

Prime Minister Mulroney: That would be fascinating to hear. I always thought Kohl was the most insightful of the G7 leaders in Europe. I'd like to hear what he thinks about the potential inclusion of millions of new voters in Germany who will all vote for the opposition. What will be the impact on his political future? (S)

The President: His hope is that the socialists in East Germany have more in common with his views. The Socialist Party in West Germany has opposed German unification. Kohl will try to make a campaign issue out of it. We'll see. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I appreciate your call. Jim Baker got the job done here at the Open Skies Conference here. He and Shevardnadze appeared to have a really quite indispensable relationship. It will be good for what you are trying to do. (S)

The President: My concern was that you are hosting this conference with an Open Skies agenda, and it looked like we were replacing the focus from Open Skies to this fascinating discussion of the Two Plus Four and taking it away from what Brian Mulroney wanted the conference to be. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

Prime Minister Mulroney: That was OK. I thought the conference went well. (S)

The President: I don't want you to feel that we think we are such a big deal that we leave others out. I will tell Chancellor Kohl the same thing. We all need to consult with each other. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: You might tell him that. At a Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Ottawa, there was some real irritation about a remark that Foreign Minister Genscher made to the Italian Foreign Minister, telling him that: You're not in the game. (S)

The President: Those were his words. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Foreign Minister Clark said that is what the Europeans fear. It is an attitude. The Germans should do what you do so well, which is to consult with your colleagues. (S)

The President: Genscher did go too far. His saying that to the Italians was just too much.

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

1782

March 7, 1990

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President
Mitterrand, February 26, 1990

At Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for the President's telephone call to French President Mitterrand on February 26. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the Telcon to State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I which transmits the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to State.

That the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve *Val*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memorandum for Roy

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation with Mitterrand

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *CP* NARA, Date *7/29/10*

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1782

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with French President
Mitterrand (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
Cornelius O'Leary, Notetaker

DATE, TIME February 26, 1990, 3:53 - 4:48 pm
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: The 28 hours Helmut Kohl spent with me at Camp David were very successful. Helmut believes that unification will accelerate after the March 18 election. Both the U.S. and the FRG want an orderly process of unification, but Helmut is worried about a possible mass exodus from the GDR or that the GDR will simply declare itself part of the FRG after the election. We were very clear about the FRG remaining in NATO. Helmut also wants to accelerate EC integration. We agreed that U.S. forces can stay in the FRG if everybody wants them to stay. (S)

I also explained U.S. nuclear weapons policy to Helmut and said that our policy of keeping nuclear weapons on FRG soil is the underpinning of U.S. and NATO security policy. The security of our own forces is a primary consideration. (S)

We talked about the SFN issue since he knew it would be part of his election campaign this Fall. The 2 + 4 arrangement should work out, leading to our giving up four power rights sometime after the 18 March elections. A 1 + 3 meeting is on the schedule at this time. We agreed that NATO must be fully involved in these security talks; we need to insure that the smaller allies are not left out. They must be consulted, and we must insure that we do not project an image of the large countries cutting up the world. The Helsinki Act recognizes, and we recognize, the current borders of the FRG and the GDR. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

No agreement on the Polish borders can be done without Polish involvement. However, Poland will not be part of the 2 + 4 discussions. Helmut's concern with public opinion is obviously driven by politics and by the upcoming elections. (S)

These were the key points we discussed, although we discussed several other problems as well. (S)

I am also very pleased with the Nicaraguan election. We view it as good news, and it is good for democracy. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is very important for democracy to have established itself in Latin America. (S)

The President: We believe Ortega will actually turn over control of the government and the military in April. He told President Perez of Venezuela this. It is very important that we stay in touch in this dynamic situation. I value your thoughts and your judgment; please stay in touch. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have two points to make: one is about the Oder-Neisse border, the other is on French forces in the FRG. On the border issue, I believe Kohl's silence is a mistake. There are only two legal arguments for a reunited Germany. One is Article Seven of the 1954 agreement which is not as strong, and the other is Helsinki, which could be used as a basis. Helmut Kohl must be responsible for his actions and he should use diplomacy. He must recognize the Oder-Neisse border. However, for election reasons, I do not believe he will do it. (S)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Mitterrand: I think that Helmut Kohl is looking towards Bavaria and he sees a resurgence of neo-Nazism there. I have told Kohl that he is making a serious mistake. It is a fact of life that Europeans will always be suspicious of Germany because of the War, although the Europeans may be vague in articulating this suspicion. The SPD could well win the March GDR elections. If so, it will be hard for Helmut Kohl to regain momentum, and it is in his best interest to be open. (S)

The President: Poland, in fact, wants Soviet troops to remain in Poland to show it has an ally. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

President Mitterrand: The Poles want to be full partners in an agreement. Kohl is mistaken when he says the declaration on the border should wait until after the FRG and GDR are united. Kohl misses the point that it is not up to Germany to verify the borders. The victors should have a say, presumably the World War II victors. There must be absolute clarity on this position among the UK, France and the United States. (S)

Regarding the French Army in the FRG, I don't want my soldiers to be a point of mockery for the Germans to say as they march "what are you doing here?" I instructed the French Ambassador in Berlin to organize a parade and the Berliners asked that the parade be cancelled. (S)

The President: I didn't know that. (U)

President Mitterrand: The statement must be clear. We are in Germany for the Western world, and for the protection of Germany. If we were just a conqueror and did not need to be in Germany, we wouldn't want to be like the Soviets in the GDR hiding from the people. When we speak of German unity, it is 2 + 4. When we speak of the borders, it is 4 + 2. I want you to know my thoughts. I also want you to keep my position in mind with the FRG. (S)

The President: I don't blame you. I would not want to see insults to our forces or yours. I don't want that. We will keep in touch and I will tell Helmut Kohl we talked about the Polish border. (S)

President Mitterrand: I need to have you to understand my reactions. We must not subjugate our national strategic concerns for Helmut Kohl's domestic political concerns. (S)

The President: Helmut Kohl supports you and your opinion. (S)

President Mitterrand: All of this will go very fast. Let's not believe the USSR has vanished from the scene. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1929

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Salinas of Mexico (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli

DATE, TIME February 26, 1990, 4:50 - 4:57 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico concerning Violeta Chamorro's victory in the Nicaraguan elections. (S)

The President: Hello. (U)

President Salinas: How are you? (U)

The President: Well, I'm fine. It is good to hear your voice. (U)

President Salinas: It is good to hear from you. (U)

The President: I wanted you to know that I received your letter in which it said you were coming up here for a meeting of the Business Council. It was in June, wasn't it? (S)

President Salinas: Yes, certainly. (U)

The President: Is that in Washington, D.C.? (U)

President Salinas: Yes. (U)

The President: Well, I hope you can come early. You can see Barbara and me on Sunday at Camp David. Maybe we can have a little lunch. Or come Monday, if it is more convenient. (S)

President Salinas: Oh, thank you. You are very kind. (U)

The President: Well, we can work out the exact date later. I just wanted you to know that the time is available. Let's talk about it later. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/01

President Salinas: That is very kind. I am coming to the Business Council meeting to discuss trade and new development in Mexico. (C)

The President: The reason I was calling you was Nicaragua. I sent messages to both Ortega and Mrs. Chamorro. I congratulated her on her victory. And I congratulated President Ortega on doing the right thing in accepting the election and saying he would hand over power. (C)

President Salinas: I have done the same. I have congratulated Mrs. Chamorro. (C)

The President: This is a victory for all Nicaraguans. We are talking also to President Gorbachev and he is urging Castro not to disrupt the election result. He made some sort of public statement. (C)

President Salinas: That is very promising. [Not heard.] (C)

The President: Go ahead. (U)

President Salinas: I can see a need for a Marshall Plan for all of Central America. The demographic growth in the region is very important, since it is increasing significantly. If there is not enough economic growth to keep up, there will be emigration. They will go to the United States. (C)

The President: You have raised an important point. We see the results this morning, and we will see what we can do to help. We are thinking some on this. But you raise an important point about the number of people leaving for the United States if there is not enough economic growth. (C)

President Salinas: The Central Americans look to the United States as the source of assistance. It is important that there be enough aid [not heard]. (C)

The President: I am still worried about the full transfer of power from the Sandinistas to Mrs. Chamorro on the 25th of April. Losing must be bitter for the Sandinistas. If you and Carlos Andres Perez and other leaders could encourage the Sandinistas to turn over of the military and the whole government, it would be very helpful. I must say, I am encouraging this. (C)

President Salinas: Yes, I am doing this. I am encouraging the peaceful transfer of power. (C)

The President: Very good. In asking you to do this, I want you to know I will do what I can. But your voice has greater influence with the Latin Americans and all. Any type of thing you can do to help. I will consult with the Congress on economic aid. The West Europeans can help, too. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

President Salinas: We will do what we can to promote the peaceful transfer of power. (Ø)

The President: I have one other thing. I just wanted to mention that you were very kind to Nick Brady when he was down there in Mexico. (Ø)

President Salinas: The note that you sent me that he delivered was very nice; it was very much appreciated. We had a good visit with Secretary Brady. He deserves a lot of credit for the agreement we reached with the banks. (Ø)

The President: Well, we'll keep plugging on that. On your June meeting, it would be fun to have you at Camp David. You could get to bed early and be ready for your meetings on the next day. Or we could meet at the White House for supper upstairs on Monday. We have a great little dining room upstairs in the residence. Whichever way you go is fine with me, and our people can work out the details. And this is in addition to our regular meeting in the fall, which is still on. (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes, I am most looking forward to it. (Ø)

The President: It ought to be a good one. We'll keep in touch. (U)

President Salinas: OK. Very good. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
31 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos
Andres Perez of Venezuela (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Trudie E. Thompson

DATE, TIME February 26, 1990, 7:25 - 7:46am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Perez telephoned the President concerning the results of the Nicaraguan elections. (U)

President Perez: Hello, happy to hear from you. (U)

The President: Happy to hear from you, too. I'm very happy at what looks like good results in Nicaragua. (U)

President Perez: Yes, I believe the trend is irreversible -- UNO has won. That is why I'm calling you. (U)

The President: I believe Ortega is on television right now conceding the election. (U)

President Perez: I talked to [indistinct] in Managua; that's why I called. The Sandinistas told me they would respect the results of an UNO victory even if it is by one vote. They said they would like my mediation to help in the transition so that it would not be so difficult. I also talked to Mrs. Chamorro and to her advisers to urge that any speech they give will be cordial and directed toward a process of national reconciliation. She agreed. (U)

The President: Very good. (U)

President Perez: I also spoke with [Nicaraguan Interior Minister] Tomas Borge and he expressed concern that the Contras could cause problems. I share that concern, because we've had the experience that adventurers sometimes want to take advantage of a situation. They think that the shattering of the Sandinista movement will give them room to take over in an armed coup, to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

claim victory for their movement. I believe precautions should be taken to avoid any such action. I also called President Callejas in Tegucigalpa and spoke with him about these concerns. I think you could help, Mr. President. (C)

The President: I agree. Frankly, it never dawned on me that the Contras would try to take over after a Chamorro victory. Certainly the US would strongly oppose any such action. Secondly, that they call on you for mediation is a very good sign; you are in a good position to help. I would be grateful for any specific suggestions you could make as to what the US can do to help. (C)

President Perez: I think that a firm warning from you to known chiefs of the movement would help. President Callejas has said he will take measures to prevent crossings from Honduras into Nicaragua. I also think a message from the White House after Ortega's speech, expressing your pleasure with the situation, would be useful. (C)

The President: I have already talked with my senior advisors. We will have a conciliatory statement, congratulating the winner and praising the process and Daniel Ortega for allowing free and fair elections. (C)

President Perez: Magnificent. This shows that it is good to have a measure of trust and to give the Sandinistas a chance to act. I am also sure this will facilitate a settlement in El Salvador. The Farabundo Marti asked for a meeting with me on March 8th. I think we are on the edge of resolving the entire Central American crisis. On 2 March we will be normalizing our relations with Panama, and we are encouraging others to do so. (C)

The President: That is very encouraging. It is important to stay in touch and to work together. Let me ask you, do you think Ortega will pass power of the Army to Violeta Chamorro? (C)

President Perez: There is no doubt that this is one of the most difficult problems and must be worked out as soon as possible. We have to negotiate as fast a transition as possible. I have also talked to Borge on that point. I have asked Daniel Ortega to send [Nicaraguan Vice President] Sergio Ramirez and [Nicaraguan Defense Minister] Humberto Ortega to Caracas to talk to me. (C)

The President: Is there any chance that they won't transfer power, given the size of the apparent victory? (C)

President Perez: No, absolutely not, I'm sure they will. (C)

The President: That is very important. You've played an important role. Mrs. Chamorro told me how grateful she is for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

your help, letting her use the airplane when she was in the U.S. for her knee, and for your support in general. We do not want to crow about the victory. We will not rejoice in Ortega's downfall or make anti-communist statements. We want to rejoice in the functioning of the democratic process. (Ø)

President Perez: That is very important. That's what I admire so much about you, Mr. President. It is important that we help in the transition. The Sandinistas are armed with goodwill and want all to proceed peacefully. That's why, as I said, I asked Mrs. Chamorro and her advisers to use great discretion in their public statements. (Ø)

The President: I think we are on the same wavelength. I welcome any specific suggestions you have. I would like to mention in our press release what we discussed this morning, if that is agreeable to you. (Ø)

President Perez: I agree. I think the most important thing is to help the Sandinistas. I will call Daniel Ortega and tell him of this conversation and of your mood. (Ø)

The President: That's fine. Of course, this is all predicated on a peaceful transition. If there is a reversion, it would affect every country differently. Our good will is based first on the fact that the process was fair, and secondly on the intention to transfer power peacefully. (Ø)

President Perez: Of course. (U)

The President: That's the way our attitude must be. We need to stay in touch. I appreciate this conversation, and I appreciate your role as a catalyst for democracy. Thank you and good luck. (Ø)

President Perez: Thank you and see you soon. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1559

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
32 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Oscar
Arias of Costa Rica (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Oscar Arias, President of Costa Rica
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME February 26, 1990, 6:35 - 6:38pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Arias concerning the results of the Nicaraguan elections. (U)

The President: Hello, how are you? (U)

President Arias: I'm very well. (U)

The President: I want to tell you that UNO's victory is also your victory and a victory for the peace process. I want to salute your support for the electoral process, which was clearly decisive. (Ø)

President Arias: I appreciate your call. (U)

The President: I have sent a message of congratulations to Violeta Chamorro. I feel the transition will be peaceful. President Perez of Venezuela told me that he also thinks it will be peaceful. (Ø)

President Arias: It will be a peaceful transition. Violeta will have to negotiate many issues with the Sandinistas. But we in Latin America are used to negotiations of this type. Aylwin has had to do this in Chile. We can solve the difficulties that may come up. (Ø)

The President: We'll try to do what we can, and we'll be in touch with the Europeans to help. I'll try to get Gorbachev on the same wave length. But there is no need for the contras to be fighters any more. (Ø)

President Arias: Congratulations to you for what you have achieved with President Gorbachev. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
2

The President: We have to keep working with him on this issue.
(Ø)

President Arias: I spoke to Vice President Quayle in San Salvador yesterday and told him that Violeta would win. (Ø)

The President: Yes, he called and told me about his conversation with you. (Ø)

President Arias: I learned a great deal about elections from reading the book entitled The People's Choice, about the Roosevelt-Wilkie presidential race in a small community in Ohio. I was convinced that if the Nicaraguan people were given the chance to vote freely, that they would choose Violeta. So the outcome was no surprise to me. (Ø)

The President: A lot of people here had given up on the opposition's chances in the election because of those damned polling results published in the Washington Post. (Ø)

President Arias: Those polls relied on friends of the Sandinistas. They were cheating. According to polls done by organizations here in Costa Rica, Violeta was going to win by a large margin. (Ø)

The President: I remember you told me that there had been a very good poll for her some months back. (Ø)

President Arias: We made a poll to see who was the most popular politician in Nicaragua, and she won. (Ø)

The President: She's an important symbol, but she will need lots of help and advice. This would be better if it comes from Carlos Andres Perez and you, as you know the area better than we do. But we'll try to do what we can to be helpful. (Ø)

President Arias: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good going. Bye-bye. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THATCHER

FEB 26 - PRES CALLED THATCHER AT 1433 FROM OVAL
CALL TERMINATED 1447. ZELIKOW MONITORED.

MULRONEY FEB 26 - MULRONEY CALLED PRESIDENT AT 1540. CALL
TERMINATED 1544. MONITORED BY RICE - OVAL

CHAMORRO

FEB 26 - PRESIDENT CALLED PRESIDENT-ELECT
CHAMORRO. PACELLI MONITORED. CALL INITIATED
AT 1744 - TERMINATED 1746

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
31 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice

DATE, TIME February 28, 1990, 7:14 - 7:51am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Good morning. How are you? (U)

President Gorbachev: Good morning. But it is good afternoon here already. (U)

The President: I have been reading about your changes and the strengthening of the Presidency. It is all over our newspapers this morning. (U)

President Gorbachev: Yes, Mr. President, yesterday was a long and difficult day. I am sorry that I could not take your call when you wanted. (U)

The President: That is alright. I fully understand and this was not an urgent matter. I wanted to talk with you about Nicaragua and to fill you in on my conversation with Chancellor Kohl this past weekend. (S)

President Gorbachev: I will listen with pleasure to your comments but first, are you well? (U)

The President: Very. I am going to the West Coast today. Barbara and I are both well. The weather is miserable and cold in Washington. But we are fine. (U)

President Gorbachev: I am pleased to hear that. I wish you and Barbara the best. (U)

The President: The same to you and your family. Now, may I read through a few talking points and then we can discuss anything you would like. (S)

President Gorbachev: I am listening. (S)

The President: The elections in Nicaragua were free and fair and this was a victory for democracy and the Nicaraguan people. This election was received well by the Venezuelan, Costa Rican and

~~SECRET~~

Mexican Presidents as well as other democratic leaders. (S)

I want to thank you and the Soviet leadership for your role in bringing about the free and fair elections. I noted the forward-leaning statement that came out of the Soviet Union, not only recognizing the results of the elections but offering to help. (S)

The initial statements of reconciliation and congratulations from Daniel Ortega were encouraging but now there are troubling signs that he will not give up the army and the police -- the Ministry of Interior. (S)

I think Perez and other leaders will impress on him the need to transfer power. I hope you will use your influence too. We will use whatever influence we have with the Contras that they lay down their weapons. The fighting should be over now. My plea is that we work together with the countries of the region to bring about the peaceful establishment of the government. If we could do that it would send a wonderful signal to the rest of the non-Latin world that we can work together. (S)

Now I intend to make a couple of comments on the Kohl visit but if you have comments on Nicaragua -- What do you want? (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me respond. We in the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that the Nicaraguans should take care of their internal problems. Therefore, we supported the electoral process. We in no way interfered with that process and we are maintaining normal relations. At this stage you can assume that we will not interfere in their internal affairs. We want the Nicaraguans to solve their own problems based on political methods. That has been our policy and it will continue. If there is a need on any point for the two of us to consult, we can be in touch on this. (S)

I can say that it is only from you that I have heard of this unpleasantness. Maybe that is because I have been so busy. We have not been approached by either side, at least I don't know of any approach. I will look into this matter after this call. (S)

The President: I am just referring to some statements that came out yesterday and maybe its Ortega trying to control his extremist elements. But there was an explicit statement about the army and the police. If you can influence them quietly. I have no specific appeal to you today, these were just general comments. (S)

President Gorbachev: Alright. (S)

The President: On the Kohl visit -- we feel it was helpful. We agree with Kohl that German unity is a positive development. We expressed our common goal of building a democratic and united Germany which -- in firm alliance with its long-standing allies and as a part of an increasingly integrated Europe -- will be one of the pillars of stability and peace in Europe for the long-

~~SECRET~~

term. (S)

The Chancellor and I agreed that the unified Germany should remain in NATO; that American troops will remain in Europe as long as the Europeans want them; and that there needs to be a special status for the former territory of the GDR. (S)

There seems to be increasing concern in West and East about what might result from a united Germany but it is our view that the unification of Germany should not abridge the legitimate security interests of any state in Europe. The FRG is ready to work with its neighbors, the Soviet Union and its allies to promote peace and stability in a rapidly changing Europe. (S)

Chancellor Kohl and I had long talks about this and I am sure that it is true. I am sure you know this but we did discuss the Soviet Union's role. Your personal role in respecting the changes in Eastern Europe has been crucial. That led Kohl to encourage me to have as much contact with you and to move forward on the arms control front. I told Kohl that you wanted to move forward in arms control too and that we would. (S)

One last point. Thank you personally for your generosity with your time when Jim Baker was in Moscow. Thank you for that. (S)

President Gorbachev: Very well, Mr. President. To this second part of your remarks let me say that we share the point of departure. This means that we agree that there should be common security as the result of the events in Europe and those connected with the unification of Germany. I believe that both of us understand that we regard this in the context of the post-war, all-European process. In this context, not everything is clear in the position of Chancellor Kohl. This provokes concern with many Europeans including with us. Even in the FRG itself it is being mentioned that Kohl has not spoken in recognition of the post-war borders. I had to mention this in my interview in Pravda. This point requires clarity. (S)

Another element is the future of a united Germany in the context of common European security. Given the fact that European security is important to world security this is a key matter. You have said that you have a mutual understanding with Kohl. I must disappoint you -- we do not yet have a common understanding with Chancellor Kohl. You have said that no one should be concerned about these changes and about the threat of a united Germany. But then if that is so, if you believe a united Germany would not be a threat -- Why do Western countries want to incorporate them into one alliance? If we find that this would negatively effect the Soviet Union, we would have to think long and hard about it. (S)

And after these remarks, I want to invite you to continue to consult with me and with Chancellor Kohl and I will do the same. (S)

Mr. President, I hope you will regard with understanding our

special situation in this. I hope we will find mutual understanding and a solution to this common problem. And of course I am pleased with Secretary Baker's impressions of our session in Moscow and also with the work we were able to do. It shows how much progress we can make when we work together. Mr. President my remarks were a little long but the points you made were important. (S)

Thank you for taking the initiative of this phone call. That is twice and I am in debt. I will have to draw some conclusions from this. I am sending my regards -- I hope we can continue our cooperation and dialogue. (S)

The President: I appreciate your comments. Some day we'll have a better line to talk more frankly. Let me assure you that the reservations you have raised -- are not just reservations of the USSR -- there are concerns throughout Western Europe. I hope you will have no reservations about speaking frankly. (S)

I wanted you to know that even with our history of loss of life ourselves, we believe a united Germany need not be an aggressive force or threat. Finally in response to your question of why we want Germany in the Western alliance -- I must say to guard against uncertainty and instability. (S)

President Gorbachev: To your last remark -- We need to continue the dialogue and I hope we can use all means available to us. Eventually I hope we can weigh all factors and find the approach that can be consistent with the interests of our two countries, the united Germany and Europe as a whole. (S)

The President: I agree. If it is agreeable to you, I want to say that we chatted on matters concerning the elections in Nicaragua and issues of Eastern Europe. You are free to say what you wish but it is better sometimes to be on the same wavelength. (S)

President Gorbachev: We will say what the subjects were but without details. (S)

The President: Good. (S)

President Gorbachev: Let me wish you a good trip West. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you. We want to make progress on the agenda that Jim and Mr. Shevardnadze talked about. I am looking forward to another visit with you. (S)

President Gorbachev: I too Mr. President am looking forward to our visit and hope for success. (S)

The President: Good day. Regards to Raisa. (U)

President Gorbachev: Goodbye, Mr. President (In English) (U)

The President: That's very good. Goodbye. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1637

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
31 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Menem of Argentina (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Menem, President of Argentina
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME March 1, 1990, 6:47 - 7:09pm EST
AND PLACE: Los Angeles, CA

President Menem telephoned the President concerning his plans to announce economic measures on Sunday, March 4. (U)

The President: "Como esta, mi amigo." (U)

President Menem: I send you an abrazo and my respects to your wife. (U)

The President: I'm in California and she's in Washington. (U)

President Menem: How are you? (U)

The President: Very well, and very pleased to hear from you. (U)

President Menem: I wanted to greet you and express my happiness over what has happened in Nicaragua. (U)

The President: Everybody is pleased with the move to democracy. Now we have to see that power is passed on to the duly elected government. But we're very happy and moved with what has taken place there. (U)

President Menem: I want to tell you, George, that here in Argentina democracy is assured, but of course we would like to base this on economic progress. We are set to start severe economic changes. The only risk is hyperinflation. We need help from the United States to help us face that risk. We are not looking for an economic assistance from the US Treasury, but signals from the US that would recreate confidence of the people in the (Argentine) government and strengthen our position in international bodies. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Menem: If you would authorize it, I would like to reveal this conversation to the media in Argentina. I await your answer on this. (Ø)

The President: Mr. President, we're very interested in seeing your economy recover and beat back the challenge of inflation. Clearly what is needed is a consistent and defensible economic program. I hope you'll be able to do what is necessary for doing this. I want to offer you my strong support in this effort. But this support would be more effective if it comes from other countries besides the US, and not just from us. (Ø)

The President: You asked if you could share with the media that we had this conversation. You can tell them that we talked and that we want you to succeed in achieving the recovery of your economy. But I want to ask if you had something more specific in mind for me to do in addition to that? (Ø)

President Menem: I would like to get a declaration of support from you for the program of measures that we're announcing on Sunday, and which will go into effect on Monday (March 5). The goal is to recreate confidence. The measures will be announced by me on Sunday and take effect on Monday. A declaration by you is fundamental to this effort. (Ø)

The President: I'm in favor of anything you can do to win the fight against inflation. You can announce that we've had this conversation. At the proper time, maybe Monday, I'll say publicly up here that we want you to succeed in the battle against inflation, that economic reform is essential, that this process is not easy, and that we respect you very much in this effort to achieve this important goal. (Ø)

President Menem: This is very good, Mr. President, and very useful for us. I hope to continue this dialogue. This is a very harsh plan; it will hit hard at the marginal sectors of our population. But it is the only way we have to fight this struggle. (Ø)

The President: You can keep in direct contact with me on any matter that concerns you. But there are also others in the Government that are very interested in the economic issues we've discussed, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury. You are my friend. Argentina must succeed in this effort. Feel free to raise with me any issue of concern. I'll be prepared to put out a statement here, and say that we had this conversation. But would it be better to wait until Monday to release the fact of this conversation when we make our statement? Whatever you want. (Ø)

President Menem: I would prefer it if you could make your statement of support on Monday, Mr. President, the same day that we put the measures into effect. (Ø)

The President: You can say we had this conversation today, then. If you need specific support on specific items, we will need to know what they are. If you only need a broad general statement of support for economic recovery and our best wishes, I'll do this for sure on Monday. (Ø)

President Menem: I would also ask that your people make efforts with international organizations so that they can help us to achieve stability. I want you to know that I have designated an Ambassador to Panama. As soon as the Congress gives its approval, we'll send him to Panama. This will be a way of showing support. (Ø)

The President: That is very good news. On Monday, then, we'll put out a statement of broad support for your reforms. I'll talk to Brady tomorrow. He'll be here for the meeting with Kaifu of Japan. I'll have him follow this very closely. I'll talk to Brady about encouraging international organizations after we know the details of your plan. (Ø)

President Menem: Many thanks. I'm available to you any time. I want to express to you the gratitude of the Argentine people. I hope that we'll be able to have you down here to visit soon. The invitation for you to visit is an open one. I'll be seeing the Vice President later this month. Many thanks, a big "abrazo" and my affection to your delightful wife. (Ø)

The President: I think the Vice President's trip is very important. Tell him everything you'd tell me. I hope I can come to Argentina. Good luck and good-bye. (Ø)

President Menem: Good luck to you, Mr. President. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

2858

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico
Notetaker: Donald C. Johnson

DATE, TIME March 8, 1990, 9:06 - 9:16 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

President Salinas: Mr. President, good morning. (U)

The President: Carlos, how are you? (U)

President Salinas: Fine, thank you, and you? (U)

The President: Well, I'm sorry not to have been available last night. They told me that maybe that would have been better for you. But this is more convenient, and I appreciate your phone call. (U)

President Salinas: You're very kind. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I want to talk about two aspects with you. First, trade issues. (U)

The President: All right. (U)

President Salinas: When we met in Houston, I remember you raised the issue of a possible free trade agreement between Mexico and the U.S. (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Salinas: We initiated a sector-by-sector negotiation process, and some important progress has been achieved since then. But I think now that what's happening in the world and in Mexico suggests that we should speed up and broaden the scope of trade negotiations. (C)

So Mexico is willing to initiate a negotiation for a free trade agreement between Mexico and the U.S. (C)

The President: Well, I think it would be a very good thing. I think it has great possibilities. Is your trade minister coming here? (C)

President Salinas: He is coming tomorrow morning to have a dialogue with Mosbacher, Carla Hills, and maybe even Secretary Baker. (C)

The President: Well, that's very good. And I think the way you put it is good, too. Mexico will initiate, because I don't want to look like we're pushing you on it, but we'd be very glad to discuss this. And you know any discussions would need to be very carefully prepared, because of the different natures of our economies. But let's talk about it. (C)

President Salinas: You're very kind. I believe that what's happening in Europe, with Western Europe getting the benefit of cheap labor from Eastern Europe and the Pacific Rim would stimulate this agreement between us and Canada, which is already participating. By the way, I am meeting Mulroney next week. (C)

The President: You're going up there, aren't you? Or is he coming? (U)

President Salinas: He's coming to Mexico. On the other hand, Mr. President, in Mexico I want to consolidate the new policies for a market-oriented economy. (C)

The President: But in this instance, Carlos, you're talking about a bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico, right? (C)

President Salinas: That's correct. (U)

The President: I think that's the way to start. Canada has some difficulties now with their free trade agreement with us. You might want to find out from Mulroney what they are. But I'm very interested in this idea, and it's going to take a lot of preparation. And I'm so pleased that you think it's time to at least start discussions on this. (C)

President Salinas: You're right. On the domestic front, I have to show results soon that privatization is meaning benefits for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

the population. And I'm sure that a trade agreement will strengthen these policies. By the way, I announced yesterday the privatization of the steel industry in Mexico. (Ø)

The President: You did announce that? (U)

President Salinas: Of the steel industry. (Ø)

The President: How did that go over? (Ø)

President Salinas: Well, it's coming on well. It's been very well received by the business community, and even by labor. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's fine. That's very interesting, and I will tell our various ministers here, Mosbacher, Carla, and Jim {Baker} to be ready for discussions, and see if we can't get something going. (Ø)

President Salinas: Very good, to explore the possibility very quietly, and maybe announcing it in June, during our meeting. (Ø)

The President: All right, I will tell them that you prefer that. You would like no publicity for these talks? (Ø)

President Salinas: No publicity now, until we have the meeting in June in Washington. If that's fine with you. (Ø)

The President: Fine. I understand we're all set for a quiet dinner up at our house on the tenth. (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes. (U)

The President: That's great. I'll buy you a good meal. What's the other item? (U)

President Salinas: The other item relates to Nicaragua. President Ortega called me yesterday. He told me that he's having a very proper dialogue with Mrs. Chamorro. That on April 25 he will hand over power. He would like to do so on normal conditions, but he will hand over power. That he finds maturity and seriousness in the new government. (Ø)

But there is one issue that worries him very much, and that is the demobilization of the contras. He asked me, as he will do with other Latin presidents, to create the atmosphere for a faster demobilization of the contras. He feels it is not going faster, and it worries him very much. (Ø)

The President: Well, I can understand that. In the first place, we have noted with approval and interest very moderate statements -- for the most part -- by him. There have been one or two, when

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

he's dealing with the left in Sandinismo that he seems to revert back a little bit. But this is a very interesting conversation; I will be talking to Violeta, who will be in Houston for her knee, probably in the next few days. (Ø)

The problem that exists from our end is simply that when we hear about the ministry being retained under the Sandinistas, and the army staying as the arm of Sandinismo, that makes it extraordinarily difficult to encourage a more rapid laying down of arms. We have told these contras, to the degree we have any influence with them, that there must be no military action, that they will have to lay down their arms, and there seems to be no disagreement with them. But if he {Ortega} is saying "We want them to lay down their arms before power is peacefully transferred," that could be a difficulty. But is that what in essence he's asking, do you think? (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes, that what he's asking. He's not presenting this as a condition for handing over power. He says he will hand over power on April 25th, but that things would go smoother if the contras laid down their weapons before the transition of power. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's very interesting, and I'm very grateful for your call, because we've been sitting here wanting to be constructive, and by that I mean recognizing the problem of this contra movement at this point in history. And I will discuss this with our top people; I appreciate your call. I think the man has behaved pretty darn well in public, and quite differently, I might say, than I would have expected. (Ø)

If there's a way that we can have statements or encourage the peaceful transfer of power, we want to find a way to do that. (Ø)

President Salinas: Very good. I'm sure it will help. (U)

The President: I'd welcome any specific suggestions along the line here, because we want to see this power handed over. But did he talk about keeping the ministries of Defense and the Interior? Or is all that just newspaper talk? (Ø)

President Salinas: He mentioned that he believes that the Army and the Ministry of Interior should be kept, not by them, but by the new government. That is, that the new government should not disband the army totally. But he didn't mention that they want to retain it. As least he didn't mention it to me. (Ø)

The President: Well, that's an important point, because I believe she did talk about a Costa Rica-like solution, which means in the view of Violeta Chamorro that they wouldn't need a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

big standing army. You got the feeling that the power would be transferred on both the Army and the Interior Ministries? (Ø)

President Salinas: That's the idea I got. He asked me to receive Comandante Bayardo Arce this Saturday, and I will ask him more precisely about this. (Ø)

The President: You could accurately reflect our view that a visible attempt to hold Sandinista power in the Interior or in the Defense Ministries would complicate anything that can be done with the contras, certainly by us. I hope that's not what he's planning, and I get the feeling from others that is not what he is talking about, although there have been one or two statements by Borge that made us wonder about this. (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes, but he didn't mention it to me. He just mentioned the worries about the Army being disbanded, totally disbanded. (Ø)

The President: Well, we're not pushing that line at all. But I think that is one he can negotiate out with Violeta. But you know, I don't know whether they can agree on levels. They will not need that big a standing army, I don't think. And it was interesting that Cuba is saying they're going to suspend military support into Nicaragua, which I view as good. I think Castro is a little upset with the election, which is fine, but their not sending stuff in is a good thing. And I think the Soviets are going to be quite supportive of the new government. (Ø)

President Salinas: And we all in Latin America will also be supportive, because that's the government freely elected by the people. (Ø)

The President: Good. Well, listen, these are interesting times that both of us walked into, aren't they? (U)

President Salinas: Yes, they are moving fast. (U)

The President: They are. All right, we will get our people ready on the trade talks, and let me talk to our top people right away on the concerns that Ortega has raised with you. And if you would -- to the degree you can -- tell {the Sandinistas} "Here's the view of the U.S. There clearly will be demobilization. It's just a question of timing, because of some of the statements that indicated perhaps an unwillingness to finally transfer the Defense and Interior Ministries." (Ø)

President Salinas: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I appreciate your positive reception to the free trade agreement talks. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: I know it's not easy for you, but let's try.
Let's see what we can do. (U)

President Salinas: Thank you very much, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

President Salinas: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHAMORRO

MAR 12 - CHAMORRO CALLED PRESIDENT FROM HOUSTON,
TEXAS. MONITORED BY PACELLI, TRANSLATED BY
NIGAGLIONI. CALL STARTED AT 1526 - TERMINATED
AT 1552

SWAN

MAR 13 - PRES CALLED BERMUDA PM SWAN RE ANNOUNCEMENT
OF BUSH-THATCHER MEETING IN APRIL. MONITORED BY
ZELIKOW CALL STARTED AT 1528 - ENDED 1532

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2023

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
32 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Endara of Panama (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Guillermo Endara
Notetakers: David Pacelli/Eric Melby

DATE, TIME: March 14, 1990, 3:30 - 3:35 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President was returning a call from President Endara, who called at 10:30 a.m. on March 14, 1990, when the President was out of the office. (U)

The President: Hello? (U)

President Endara: President Bush. (U)

The President: How are you, sir? (U)

President Endara: I am very well. Good afternoon. It is good to talk to you. (U)

The President: It is good to hear from you. I am sitting here in the office along with the Secretary of State, my Chief of Staff, and Bob Gates. I am sorry I wasn't here to speak with you when you called this morning, but I am delighted to speak to you now. (Ø)

President Endara: I was just calling to let you know the feeling of gratitude the government of Panama and the Panamanian people have to your country, and especially to you, for your interest in the welfare of the future of our country. If you care to come to Panama and run in an election, you would win any office you chose. (Ø)

The President: Be careful, I just might show up. I went to the press yesterday and made a statement about our economic support for Panama. (Ø)

President Endara: Yes, we are very grateful. It was a good surprise. I know there were some delays when you sent it to the Congress before. We understand that. It is part of the democratic process. But in Panama, we have hard times. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: Yes, one of your Vice Presidents told me about how tough things are in Panama. We know you fully understand. We will work closely with the Congress to get this proposal approved. Some aren't focusing enough on it. We hope we will be able to get some help to you quickly. Your phone call today is useful, because I will be able to tell the Congress that I spoke to you and that you urged speedy action. (Ø)

President Endara: I also want to tell you we are doing all that is possible to cooperate with the United States on money laundering and drug trafficking. We want to eliminate the problem of money laundering. We had a good meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Kozak on this last week. We went over what we are doing and we will have in place something just as soon as we can. We understand that drug trafficking and money laundering is not only your problem, but ours as well. We want to rebuild the economy with clean money, hard-earned taxpayer money from Panamanians, not from drug money. (Ø)

The President: I know that you want to be helpful and we appreciate that. The more public statements that you can make on that, the easier time we will have up here in getting you well-deserved support. (Ø)

There is some talk that your Vice President will be up here next week. There are some very important Congressional hearings on Panama going on next week and it would be useful if he were here. (Ø)

President Endara: I was talking to Billy Ford and he said he was thinking of going next week. Just as soon as I get off the phone with you I will ask if he could go next week. (Ø)

The President: If he could, it would be good and useful. We will make sure he meets the right people in Congress. But I am not saying it is absolutely essential that he be here, but it would be very helpful. But if you said it would be alright if he came, it would be very good. (Ø)

President Endara: He is a very likeable fellow. Billy Ford has many friends in Congress. I will try to get in touch with him and I will tell Ambassador Hinton. And I want to thank you for sending Ambassador Hinton to Panama. He has true interest in the Panamanian people. He is an excellent person and is really helping us. (Ø)

The President: Well, I am glad to hear that. Deane Hinton is one of the best, and that is just the reason that I sent him to Panama. I am very pleased that you are happy with him. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: I will work on the problem because I want to get the funds released. Let me close by saying take care of your health. (S)

President Endara: I am very well. Thank you. Please, give my special regards to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: I will be happy to do so. She is very special. (U)

President Endara: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl
of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME March 15, 1990, 8:37 - 9:01 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut! Wie geht's? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Very well. It's good to hear your voice. George, I had my last meetings in the GDR yesterday. 300,000 were there. I don't think I will see that again. I had one million in the audience in all six public events. (U)

I don't know how the elections will turn out. The situation is very vague. I hope the result will bring about a reasonable coalition. The GDR still has to bear the consequences of 40 years of Communist rule, with its snooping, spying, and blackmailing. There was just another case of someone blackmailed at age 16, when he was still a student. It is very difficult to pass judgment in a situation like that. (Ø)

Otherwise, things are going well. Best regards to Barbara from Hannelore. (U)

Let me just make a few remarks regarding the overall development of Two Plus Four. First, I hope that the GDR will bring about a new government very soon -- by Easter at the latest. Then, we will work hard to bring about a monetary union. We must stop the exodus, and this is only possible through monetary union. Since January 140,000 people have left the GDR for the FRG. It is difficult under these conditions to build up the country. I hope we will make a smooth settlement and resolve the problems with our neighbors. It will remain my objective, as I told you at Camp David, that under no circumstances will we make a fait accompli. The security and foreign policy issues must be settled first. Only then will we take decisions here. I am not hectic, as the New Yorker described me, but the population here and in the GDR want movement. If they don't get it, they will run around the situation. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

5/17/99 99-0393-F

Concerning the Two Plus Four, as we discussed at Camp David, I completely agree that the Poles should be consulted in all those areas that affect them. It was correct what the Ministers agreed at Ottawa -- two on our side and four on the other. Regarding the border issue, we have taken an important step forward. After the Volkskammer has been constituted, we will very quickly -- not in a matter of months, but weeks -- make common declarations between the Volkskammer and the Bundestag. We will state once again, with the support of the two governments, that we wish to enter into obligations that an all-German government will immediately conclude an internationally binding treaty. The Poles are now making further demands. They want a sort of agreement before that; but this, under international law, would not be legally binding. The other solution is much stronger. I was amazed to hear something else floating around. This is non-negotiable for me: that the Two Plus Four discussions about the border should take place in Warsaw. If this happened, we could go to "Yalta" right away. I won't do that. I would like the border issue to run smoothly. The Left here raises it all the time. These are the same people who want a new constitution. That would mean, if we change the Basic Law, that NATO membership would have to be renegotiated. They want us out of NATO. They want the U.S. out. And they want neutrality. Membership in NATO will be a very important point. We will fight that through. It is interesting that there is a positive echo in the GDR. I wanted to say all this by way of briefing you. Once I have new developments, I will call again. (C)

The President: I have a question. Did you say that the concept of a united Germany fully in NATO is gaining popularity in the GDR? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I saw that in the public events at which I was speaking. People there are badly informed. I have tried to explain the situation. Last night I told 100,000 in Leipzig that the main advantages of what we have achieved goes to the citizens of the GDR. It is important to tell them that, because they were in the same square where the demonstrations took place in September, October, and November. The second remark I made was that our gratitude goes to our partners in the Alliance -- first and foremost to the United States. I said that without them I would not be here today. It is a pity you weren't there, George. The people applauded enormously. Then the third point I made was that it is thanks to Gorbachev's perestroika that these new developments were possible. Again they applauded. Fourth, I said I was grateful to the reform movements in Hungary, Poland, and now Czechoslovakia. The actions of Hungary particularly made possible the events of last year [in the GDR]. People applauded again. I said that the Poles need not be concerned. A unified Germany would give guarantees on the Oder-Neisse border. The last point I made was that a reunified Germany will be a part of the European Community and NATO. People applauded that, too. This is my five point program, and this is what the people want. (C)

The President: That is all very good. I appreciate your bringing me up to date. The Polish border question, as you know better than I, is still very sensitive. We will be meeting next week with the Prime Minister of Poland. I will discuss what you have told me with our top people. If there are any questions, I will call you back. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I will be pleased to hear from you. It would be good if you could call before Mazowiecki comes. When does he arrive? (Ø)

The President: Next week. I believe it is in the middle of the week. The idea of a meeting in Warsaw -- this is the first I have heard of it. We're not pushing that. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me say once again, very clearly: I am determined in these next weeks to give, from the federal government and the Bundestag, a very clear declaration and very clear assurances. I predict that the same will be done by the newly elected government and parliament in the GDR. In November, the Poles were quite satisfied. Now they want to put us in the situation of concluding a treaty, but we do not have a mandate to do that. I don't understand why they insist. It is a very strange thing to doubt declarations made by two governments. (Ø)

At no time did I link reparations or ethnic minorities to a treaty on the border. I only wish that what the Poles have already declared be declared once again at the time of unification and a treaty, so that the subject of reparations can also be dealt with once and for all. The President of the Polish Parliament (not Mazowiecki -- he didn't say this) again spoke about billions in reparations. The Israelis have also mentioned billions in the event of unification. This is an extremely difficult situation domestically. People here say it is almost 50 years after the war. They cannot understand. People here also think back to their old home towns. This is a second problem in Poland -- which Mazowiecki can solve very easily, if he only states again, when unification occurs, that the rights of minorities in Poland will be respected. He is a very respectable man, a man of integrity. There are 500,000 Germans there. They should stay and be a pillar of the bridge that links Poles and Germans. I sense, quite frankly, that the problem is not with Mazowiecki. Jaruzelski's remarks in Paris, their tenor and tone, were not favorable for unification. I would be grateful if we could talk again next week. (Ø)

The President: Okay. I will call. I think we are on the same wavelength, but I will talk to my people and will call you. I understand the sensitivities and stand by my position at Camp David. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I know, I know. You adhere to the position you took. I am not taking issue with that at all. If all our partners were as reliable as the President of the United States of America, I would have considerably fewer problems. I do think there are dividends that will arise out of this very close relationship. Remember the observation I made about people in the GDR? They set great store on the West and do not want neutralization. They feel a part of central Europe, which we are. (Ø)

The President: Okay. This has been a good conversation. I'll be back in touch early next week. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope you are not having too much work. (U)

The President: No. It's beautiful here. You ought to be here. We could go for a long walk. (U)

-- End of Conversation --