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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91111
Folder ID Number: 91111-004

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Pope John Paul II (2 pp.)	10/24/89	(b)(1)	C
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar (1 pp.)	10/25/89	(b)(1)	
03. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (1 pp.)	10/30/89	(b)(1)	C
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan (2 pp.)	11/1/89	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez (3 pp.)	11/1/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor - Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	11/1/89	(b)(1)	C
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany (4 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	S

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Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Call - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

Pinksheet Number: cap939
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Date Closed: 2/2/2009
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	11/17/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
11. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	11/17/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	11/17/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy (2 pp.)	11/18/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
15. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium (1 pp.)	11/25/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
16. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (2 pp.)	11/25/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
17. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)	11/25/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~
18. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul Schlueter of Denmark (2 pp.)	11/26/89	~~(b)(1)~~	~~C~~

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (4 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Fenech Adami of Malta (1 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
21. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
22. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
23. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Xenofon Zolotas of Greece (1 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	
24. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C
25. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson of Iceland (2 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	
26. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg (1 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	
27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Arias of Costa Rica (3 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Prime Minister Fenech Adami of Malta (2 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C
29. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Shamir of Israel (2 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (5 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	C
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea (2 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	S
32. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (3 pp.)	11/30/89	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pp.)	11/30/89	(b)(1)	C
34. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	12/4/89	(b)(1)	S
35a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Koivisto of Finland (1 pp.)	12/15/89	(b)(1)	C
35b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Telephone Call to President Koivisto of Finland (1 pp.)	12/15/89	(b)(1)	C
35c. Talking Points	Re: Points To Be Made (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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36. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (2 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
37a. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
37b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (2 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
38. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Salinas of Mexico (2 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
39. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Perez of Venezuela (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
40. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Menem of Argentina (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
41. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
42. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
43. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C

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44. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	C
45. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (4 pp.)	12/23/89	(b)(1)	S
46. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (2 pp.)	12/26/89	(b)(1)	C

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Pope John Paul II (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Pope John Paul II
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 24, 1989, 8:40 - 8:52 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office 9:41 -

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Your Holiness, I am calling about the situation in Lebanon. (U)

Pope John Paul II: It seems to be improving. (U)

The President: We hope that the agreement worked out in Taif by the King of Saudi Arabia will hold and that General Aoun will accept this approach. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: A substantial question is also the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. That is connected with the presence of the Syrian army. It is a very delicate problem. Sovereignty means that the Lebanese can decide to elect a new President. Now this is not possible. The reunion of the Parliament in Taif has prepared the possibilities, but to realize those possibilities Lebanese independence and democratic identity must be assured. That is the key question. We shall see. The cease fire is an improvement, as is the reunion of the Parliament abroad, in Saudi Arabia. Now the task is to facilitate the next step, to convince Syria and President Assad to give Lebanon the possibility of being independent. (Ø)

The President: I have two suggestions. First, with your great influence, I would ask you to speak to the Maronite Patriarch to ask him to show his support for this peaceful path. Second, we have little influence with General Aoun, but he listens to you and respects you. He would respect your appeal to give the national reconciliation process a chance to work. I talked to President Mitterrand, who will also call General Aoun. My purpose is to ask you to place calls to the Patriarch and to Aoun. I would welcome any advice you might have about what the U.S. could do. (Ø)

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Pope John Paul II: It seems to me that the Patriarch and Aoun belong to the subjective part of the process. The objective part is also important. Aoun fights for the true independence of Lebanon. So do the Patriarch and the Lebanese people. I do not know Aoun. I do know the Patriarch and have spoken with him several times, including at the beginning of October. We prayed together for a peaceful solution. We shall see. For the moment, the principal aspect is the objective situation: the true conditions for the independence of Lebanon. (Ø)

The President: That is true, but there is a difference between the Patriarch and Aoun. Aoun has said negative things about Taif. It would be helpful if the Patriarch could persuade Aoun to help. I agree that we have to get Syria to remove its troops. If Aoun can give more support for a political solution, and if the Saudis continue to press Syria, Lebanon has a chance for such a solution. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: I shall talk with our collaborators about what is possible. I have not engaged myself in the issue in a political role. Up to now, I have shown the moral importance of the question. We shall start to see what is possible now, at this moment. I shall call my collaborators, and we shall discuss the matter. I feel also that Syria's position is very intransigent. The normal reaction would be to withdraw its troops and give Lebanon the possibility to be independent. (Ø)

The President: I agree. The Saudis feel the Syrians have agreed to withdraw. I understand your views, not wanting to be active on the political side. But if the French and others can work on the political side, we may be able to realize our common dream of a peaceful and independent Lebanon. I appreciate very much our discussion, and I appreciate your position. We stand ready to help in any way we can. (Ø)

Pope John Paul II: We shall start to see what possibilities there are. I am grateful for your call. (U)

The President: I am grateful to you and am inspired by your leadership. I hope to see you again soon. I fondly remember our meeting in May. (U)

Pope John Paul II: Every day I pray for the United States of America. You have my best wishes. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON 9042

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Perez de Cuellar, United Nations Secretary-General Notetaker: Nancy Bearg Dyke
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	October 25, 1989, 3:01 - 3:03 pm EDST The Oval Office

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, called the President concerning the reductions to the UN budget.

Secretary-General de Cuellar: I am sorry to disturb you. I am very concerned about the reductions to the UN budget made in your Congress and their refusal to not pay back arrearages. The arrearages are essential to our operations.

The President: I'm glad you called this to my attention. I will call OMB. Is State aware? I am very concerned as well.

Secretary-General de Cuellar: I am asking for your personal support on this.

The President: Yes, you have got it. I will see what we can do. I am sorry you have this worry. You have been so cooperative and I want to help.

Secretary-General de Cuellar: Thank you, thank you.

The President: Is there anything new on Iran?

Secretary-General de Cuellar: We have a three-man team going to the area. We are trying to separate the political problem from the humanitarian.

The President: I am not too hopeful. We are trying to keep this in our minds and see if any initiatives are possible. You have been wonderful. Is there any news on our men or Higgins?

Secretary-General de Cuellar: Unfortunately no.

The President: I will get right on this (budget problem) and see what we can do.

Secretary-General de Cuellar: Thank you so much, dear friend.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President

President Virgilio Barco

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 30, 1989, 2:45 p.m. - 2:57 p.m.
Oval Office - Presidential Residence, Bogota

The following is based on information supplied by Brent Scowcroft and U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Ted McNamara. NSC staff members did not monitor the call. (C)

The President initiated the call to discuss the Andean drug summit. (C)

The President suggested that the summit be limited to the United States, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. President Barco agreed. (C)

The President suggested that the meeting be held in mid-February. President Barco agreed in principle, saying that he would have to consult the other presidents and that he would offer the President alternative dates. (C)

The President suggested that a meeting of experts be held in November to begin summit planning, and President Barco agreed that this was a good idea. (C)

The President asked President Barco if he agreed that one day would be enough time for the summit meeting, and Barco said he believed that one day would be sufficient. (C)

Cartegena was discussed as the location for the summit meeting, with agreement in principle. President Barco described the facilities available there at the naval base, including security, the number of suites and travel times. But Barco wanted to assure the President of the safety of the site and invited him to send down a security team to check it out. (C)

President Barco also volunteered information on two (unidentified) Colombian drug lords, saying that he was informed that they had fled to Bolivia. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Bhutto
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 1, 1989; 9:54-9:57 a.m.
The Oval Office

The President called Prime Minister Bhutto to congratulate her on weathering a "no confidence" vote against her government. (U)

The Prime Minister: Hello, Mr. President. (U)

The President: It's good to talk to you. I want to congratulate you on the outcome of the vote in the National Assembly. (U)

The Prime Minister: That is very kind of you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: You must be pleased. (U)

The Prime Minister: It was a difficult situation. I am glad we got through it. Now I must look to the future and steps to avert this from happening again. (C)

The President: As one looking from afar, it appears the constitutional process worked. It is clearly a victory for democracy in Pakistan. I know it may be hard to look at it that way when you are fighting for your survival. (C)

The Prime Minister: You always have the right answer. (U)

The President: I hope that you will work with the President and others to develop the priorites for strengthening the democratic side and economic development. I am going through some of the same things here, working with the government and the opposition in Congress. The more cooperation there is, the better; but I don't need to give you advice. (C)

The Prime Minister: I will keep that in mind. (U)

The President: Well, I just wanted to say good going. Wasn't it by a fairly comfortable margin or was it a squeaker? (C)

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The Prime Minister: It was close, but good enough. I am happy you called. But a lot has to be done for the future. (Ø)

The President: I thought I should give you a holler to check in. I consider myself your friend. I wanted you to know I applaud you in this. And on another thing we both are cooperating on, I applaud the steps you have already taken to improve your relations with India. And if we can help, fine. We have a pleasant relationship with the Indian Prime Minister as you know. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: Thank you so much. Please give my regards to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President: I will. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez Notetaker: William T. Pryce
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 1, 1989, 8:30 - 8:45 a.m., EST The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Perez as a follow up to their meeting in San Jose.

The President: Hello, Mr. President. It's a pleasure to hear you. (U)

President Perez: It's a pleasure to hear you. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

President Perez: Fine. I was delighted with our conversations in San Jose. (U)

The President: I was too. Are you calling me or am I calling you, because I intended to call you this morning. (S)

President Perez: You were calling, but I thought it would be good to talk over the situation. (S)

The President: The first item I wanted to talk about was concerning our very private conversation in San Jose. I have decided that the correct person on our side should be my National Security Adviser and close confidant, General Scowcroft, himself. (S)

The President: Secondly, if it could be worked out, I feel it would be useful for your contact to come here almost immediately if that is possible because there is some information I want to be sure you have. If she could come here within the next 48 hours or so, the General would amplify and perhaps have one or

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two of my other top intelligence people meet with her. My problem with doing it the other way is we are now in the midst of some crash preparations for the Gorbachev meeting, and I prefer that General Scowcroft not leave here at this time, and I think it is important that we share the information now. What is your thinking on that? (Ø)

Telephone connection is broken.

President Perez: My problem is that the person I mentioned to you is not available right now. She is in Guatemala. I will see if she can leave there this afternoon or at the latest tomorrow morning. (Ø)

The President: That is great! (U)

President Perez: Okay. (U)

The President: May I raise one other subject? It relates to the announcement by Ortega where he is suspending the cease-fire. What we think would be good is if the parties to the deal were to denounce the Ortega statement. I don't want to do anything which would help the Sandinistas cancel the elections. We do not want to play into Ortega's hands. I would welcome your advice because you have the respect of the other presidents. Any advice you could pass on to use would be welcome. (Ø)

President Perez: Thank you Mr. President. I am calling the other presidents to try to get them to help me convince Ortega not to cancel the cease-fire. It would also help if you could see that things don't get worse because there are a lot of reports that the Contras are reentering Nicaragua from Honduras. (Ø)

The President: Oretega is saying that the Contras are taking the offensive. Our information is that there has been skirmishing on both sides, but there are more deaths on the Contras' side than on the Sandinistas' side and that the Contras are not taking the initiative. I hear your message though. I think that is why you can be so helpful. I think that what Ortega would like is for us to take some overt action so he could cancel the elections. I think the immediate attention of the other presidents would be extremely helpful. (Ø)

President Perez: You are exactly right, Mr. President. What you say is exactly what we should do. We should not give him any excuse. I think we have made a lot of progress so far and I think the situation of UNO is good and we need to protect it. In San Jose I talked quite a bit with Violeta Chamarro, Endara and Ford and they all agree that the situation is good now and we should be careful not to give the Sandinistas any pretext. (Ø)

The President: That is right and I know that she (Chamarro) feels that way and we will be very careful. (Ø)

President Perez: That's marvelous, Mr. President, and I will get back to you on the talks we will be having with the other presidents. (Ø)

The President: That would be very helpful. (Ø)

President Perez: And also don't forget the conversation we had about our problem - banks being very tough with us. (Ø)

The President: I relayed that to Secretary Brady. The banks should not step back from what they have already agreed to. (Ø)

President Perez: I agree with that. (U)

The President: I would like diplomatic credit from you for having talked to that beautiful Costa Rican protocol lady to get a change of seats so that we could talk together. I count on you to recognize my diplomatic ability and that I accomplished the mission magnificently. (Ø)

President Perez: There is no doubt about it and I hope that all your endeavors are as successful. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor - Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetaker: Robert M. Gates

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 10, 1989, 3:29 - 3:47PM
The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: The reforms in Poland are moving ahead. They have a new government with fine people. They are too idealistic with too little professionalism. Many of their professionals have spent the last couple of years in prison, not a place where one can learn how to govern. They are committed to democracy and market economics; we must help them. My request is as follows. I just told Margaret Thatcher and will tell Mitterrand tomorrow that we should give instructions to our representatives at the IMF that the negotiations with Poland should be completed speedily. These negotiations are not nice for the Poles but they are aware of the need and they seek clarity and clear cut conditions. We should help to get an agreement completed by the end of November. So I ask you, help us. Go and do this in the interest of the people. With respect to the rest of my trip to Poland, I will tell you next week after I return. Do you have any questions on Poland.

The President: I have no questions. I'll be interested to hear from you next week. I'm very interested in the GDR.

Kohl: I've just arrived from Berlin. It is like witnessing an enormous fair. It has the atmosphere of a festival. The frontiers are absolutely open. At certain points they are literally taking down the wall and building new checkpoints. At Checkpoint Charlie, thousands of people are crossing both ways. There are many young people who are coming over for a visit and

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enjoying our open way of life. I expect they will go home tonight. I would cautiously tell you that it appears that the opening has not led to a dramatic increase in the movement of refugees. It may be with the frontier open, people will simply go back and forth, looking, visiting and going home. This will work only if the GDR really reforms and I have my doubts. Krenz will carry out reforms but I think there are limits. One of those limits seems to be one party rule, and this simply will not work. Certainly, in particular, it will not work without pluralism, free trade unions and so forth. I could imagine that this will continue for a few weeks -- that for a few weeks people will wait to see if the reforms come and if there is no light at the end of the tunnel they will run away from the GDR in great numbers. This would be a catastrophe for economic development; good people are leaving. The figures this year -- 230,000 have come. Their average age has been between 25 and 30. This is a catastrophe for the GDR. They are doctors, lawyers, specialists who cannot be replaced. They can earn more here. This is a dramatic thing; an historic hour. Let me repeat. There were two major manifestations (political gatherings) in Berlin. One was in front of the Berlin Town Hall where there were a lot of left wing rowdies, these are the pictures that will be shown on TV around the world. The second was at the Kurfurstendamm organized by our political friends. It was at about 6:30PM and the estimates are that there were 120,000 - 200,000 people. The overall spirit was optimistic and friendly. When I thanked the Americans for their role in all of this, there was much applause. Without the US this day would not have been possible. Tell your people that. The GDR people in the protests and demonstrations have been sincere, not aggressive. This makes it very impressive. There have been no conflicts, even though in East Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden hundreds of thousands have been in the streets. I hope they will continue to be calm and peaceful. This is my short report.

The President: First, let me say how great is our respect for the way the FRG has handled all of this. Second, my meeting with Gorbachev in early December has become even more important. I want to be sure you and I spend enough time on the telephone so I have the full benefit of your thinking before I meet with him.

Kohl: We should do that. It's important.

The President: I will call Brady today or tomorrow to tell him of your suggestion for a rapid completion of the IMF agreement on Poland. Fourth, I want to see our people continue to avoid especially hot rhetoric that might by mistake cause a problem.

Kohl: That's very good of you.

The President: Fifth, I want to tell the US press of our talk, that you gave me a thorough briefing, that you did publicly acknowledge the role of the US, and that you and I agreed to talk later next week.

Kohl: Excellent.

The President: Take care, good luck. I'm proud of the way you're handling an extraordinarily difficult problem.

Kohl: Thank you. Give my best to Barbara.

The President: I'm in Dallas. Same to Hanalore.

Kohl: Thank you and kind regards. Tell her to save her money that I intend to send sausages for Christmas.

Pres in Dallas

8957AO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 15, 1989

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Stapleton Roy forwarding a copy of subject memorandum of telephone conversation (original at Tab A) to State for appropriate dissemination.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A for record purposes and sign the memo at Tab I transmitting a copy of the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

Attachments
Tab I Hughes Memo to Roy
Tab A Memo of Telephone Conversation

8957AO

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein of Jordan
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 15, 1989, 9:11 - 9:14am EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Your Majesty, how are you?

King Hussein: Very fine, sir. Good to hear your voice.

The President: I wanted to call to wish you a very happy birthday.

King Hussein: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I appreciate that.

The President: I would also like to add my congratulations on your bringing off Jordan's parliamentary elections last week. That was a good thing.

King Hussein: Thank you. We are very proud of the elections. This is a new phase in Jordan. It will also be a good example to others.

The President: You have made some tough economic and political decisions. These are very statesmanlike. On another matter, I'll be seeing Shamir today. We're not letting up on the peace process. Jim Baker has been working very hard. We've tried to keep your Ambassador informed; I hope we've done that. I hope that we can get an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue started, but it will require some give on both sides. We will keep pressing, because we can serve as a catalyst.

King Hussein: I'm really very glad to hear that. We count on your efforts and pray for your success.

The President: We are staying firm on the Baker five points. The Israelis may be coming to realize that but we will know more in a few hours.

King Hussein: Our hopes are high. Noor sends her love and very best to you and Barbara.

The President: Thank you. We send our regards to you. Are you in Aqaba? How's the weather there?

King Hussein: Great -- hopefully, we will get you here again soon.

The President: I would like that. Again, best wishes and hope to talk to you again soon.

-- End of Conversation --

CRISTIANI NOV 15, 1989 - PRESIDENT CALLED CONCERNING THE FMLN'S OFFENSIVE, PACELLI MONITORED CALLED STARTED 1242 - ENDED 1247 - PRESIDENT IN WASH

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WASHINGTON 9280

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call From Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Interpreter: Gisela Mercuse
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1989, 7:55 - 8:15 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: In my talks with [new East German leader] Krenz, I raised the issues of free elections, free trade unions, and freedom of the press. I suggested that we in the FRG will give comprehensive assistance under the condition that these reforms, which the people are expecting, will be carried out. If they do not carry them out, the government will fall. There will be more movement on Saturday and Sunday. I expect more than a million people will visit the FRG. I hope that the opening of the border has had the consequence that travellers do not have to stay but can return to an improving home. (C)

In view of world political developments, we will do nothing that will destabilize the situation in the GDR. I had a long conversation with Gorbachev. Of course, the Soviets are concerned. I told Gorbachev that if Krenz does not carry out reforms as in Poland and Hungary, the system will fail. (C)

The President: Thank you for your support in your public comments. It is important that Germans see that they have the support and sympathy of their Allies. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Tomorrow night at the EC meeting, I will report on Poland, Hungary, and the GDR. I will put in an urgent plea to support the American initiative for Poland. I will pledge that if the U.S. is willing to put up $250 million for stabilization, we will put up the same amount. All in all, that amounts to $500 million as a stabilizing measure. I do hope that others will be able to put up the remainder. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/15/99 99-0393-F

The President: Let me say that we appreciate the FRG's stand and your stand personally. In spite of Congressional posturing, the U.S. will stay calm and support reforms in just the way you talk about. The euphoric excitement in the U.S. runs the risk of forcing unforeseen action in the USSR or the GDR that would be very bad. We will not be making exhortations about unification or setting any timetables. We will not exacerbate the problem by having the President of the United States posturing on the Berlin Wall. (C)

The Walesa visit went well. He was reasonable, and relatively pleased about the Congressional aid package. I have followed up on giving the IMF a push in its negotiations with Poland. It will be difficult to reach a conclusion by the end of November -- which is your timetable -- but may be possible in December. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: If negotiations are completed by mid-December, that would be acceptable, but it cannot be later than that. (C)

The President: We will push and encourage others to do the same. You might tell the EC that we have talked and push others to help. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I had hoped we might get together as you prepare for Malta, but unfortunately I cannot come before your meeting. What about our meeting in Spain, even for two hours? (C)

The President: We are in a tight time frame. I would value your judgment and would like to get together. I gather you cannot come to Camp David. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I have an enormous problem with freeing myself for two days. With the developing situation, I would like to stay here. There is also a budget debate in our parliament. You have a Naval base [in Spain]. Perhaps you could make a stopover. (C)

The President: Here is my point: I am absolutely determined to get advice and suggestions from you personally before I meet with Gorbachev. That is very important, because of the German Question. I understand your logistical problems. I want to suggest that after Genscher is here, you and I set aside an hour or more next weekend to talk by phone. Maybe we can have secure communications, so that I can understand every nuance of the German Question. I will be available for as much time as possible. Input from the FRG, from Chancellor Kohl, to Gorbachev is more important than at any other time or for any other meeting. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We should try to arrange that. Perhaps Monday we should have a long conversation. (Ø)

The President: That would be good if we cannot figure out another way. I think there are nuances of difference in the Alliance. I want to understand them. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is true. (U)

The President: I will have proper consultations. More important than large consultations, I need to understand Germany. Woerner has invited us to come to Brussels. I will do that. You and I could have a separate breakfast -- or supper if we get in early. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: When will you arrive? (Ø)

The President: Sunday night, maybe in time for dinner. Maybe you would buy me dinner. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I would be able to do that. We can arrange that, either on December 3 or December 4. (Ø)

The President: Or before the meeting, for two hours over breakfast. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: That is possible. Let us envisage having breakfast on the 4th. (Ø)

The President: Let's do it. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We can talk about it. (U)

The President: It is important, so that I do not miss the nuance of Germany's or Kohl's positions. After Genscher is here to see Jim Baker, we can talk. Brent can also talk to Teltschik. If there is any disconnect, I may request that our top people get together. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me make a suggestion. Genscher will be in Washington on Tuesday. The second part of the week I will send a personal memorandum of my position. I will call you on November 27 for an extensive discussion, and we will meet before the conference in Brussels. (Ø)

The President: We will get back to you on which time is better. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: All right. Let's envisage a meeting on the 3rd. Next week you will receive a paper from me. (C)

The President: Let me make one personal comment. When you told me that you thanked the American people for their steadfastness, I passed that along and it was received warmly. I want to thank you for that comment. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It was only natural. (U)

The President: If anything comes up that is unforeseen, call me or I will call you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I will do so. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0273-F
JL 9/8/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Adrian A. Basora, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1989, 9:33 - 9:44 a.m.
The Oval Office

The President: Comment allez vous? I'm calling because I felt it was important to discuss my meeting with President Gorbachev with you as soon as possible. Secretary General Woerner has invited the heads of NATO governments to Brussels on December 4 for a readout on the Malta meeting. I plan to go. It would be wonderful if you could be there too. I was intrigued by your invitation to visit with you at Bregancon, but unfortunately it will not be possible the week of December 4. My meeting with President Gorbachev in Malta comes in the midst of a critical point in our budget cycle where I hear final appeals from members of the Cabinet. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes, yes. (S)

The President: After Malta I really want to get together with you in a relaxed manner. I would like to propose that we meet on December 15. (S)

President Mitterrand: That would be fine, approximately; on December 15 I have an official visit to Switzerland. Perhaps we can do it on December 14 or December 16. (S)

The President: That would be very, very useful. I am anxious to talk to you in broad terms and get your philosophical view of developments in Europe. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will come to your continent. (S)

The President: We should also have a long talk before Malta. I know it's my turn to visit you, but I can't get away from Washington before Malta, and I am assuming that you cannot come here before then. But we should set aside a time to talk over the phone for at least an hour. (S)

President Mitterrand: That would be easy to arrange. As to our meeting in person, shall we agree on December 14 or 16? (S)

The President: I am sure that December 16 is OK. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, that would be fine. (U)

The President: We've got a deal! (U)

President Mitterrand: Perhaps I can arrive there on the evening of the 15th. (U)

The President: Where will it be? (U)

President Mitterrand: In one of the French territories in the Caribbean. (U)

The President: That will be wonderful. I assume we will not need neckties and it will be a small group. (U)

Regarding Malta, I am not going to give you any surprises. Seriously, I want your careful advice, and at our Carribbean meeting, we can talk about the longer term future of Europe and about the German question. (S)

President Mitterrand: Absolutely. (U)

The President: Before that, however, in our conversation next week I would like any suggestions you have as to constructive proposals that I might make at Malta, and about any pitfalls you foresee. (S)

President Mitterrand: I would be available to talk about Malta on November 28 or on November 30. (S)

The President: Either day would be fine for me. (U)

President Mitterrand: We will let you know about the specific location for our December 16 meeting. Meanwhile, I have noted December 4 on my calendar. (U)

The President: I would, of course, understand if you were represented on December 4 by someone else, but it would be great if you could come in person. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will go myself. (S)

-- End of Conversation--

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0541

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Adrian Basora, Notetaker

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1989, 9:49 - 10:05am EST
The Oval Office

The President: Hey Brian! (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I had the Number One Star here last night. Barbara was terrific! (U)

The President: You spoiled her to death up there with your gifts. That fisherman's carving was great. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The way Barbara handled herself last night, and the things she did, were absolutely marvelous. We were able to raise $500,000 at the reception and $500,000 at the dinner for businessmen. (U)

The President: Did Barbara make any remarks? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: She was the star! (U)

The President: Thanks for being such wonderful hosts to her. (U)

On the Soviet Union, I know this is an imposition, but it would be great if you could come down here and share your impressions with me after you come back from your trip to Moscow. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will call you as soon as I get back. In planning for the trip, we have been getting some interesting messages. For example, she (Mrs. Gorbachev) would like to have a lunch, just the four of us, over and above the official schedule. It seems that I will be the first head of a NATO government to visit the Soviet Union since the events in Eastern Europe. (C)

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JR 9/8/09

The President: May I ask you to convey a message regarding our shipboard meeting? It is not appropriate for Barbara to be there. This is the reason Barbara had written a letter to Raisa proposing that they meet in Italy instead. Raisa sent a warm reply but said that it was inappropriate for her to stay on in Italy and therefore she was coming ahead to Malta. Barbara has other commitments and in any case it is not appropriate for her to go to Malta. But I want to avoid anything coming out of this like the public tensions between Raisa and Nancy Reagan. (Ø)

My other message to Gorbachev is that I am feeling a lot of domestic political pressure to stand on the Berlin Wall and "beat my chest". I have avoided doing anything like this because I have wanted to hold down the emotions here in the U.S. so as to have a good atmosphere for our meeting at Malta. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Are there any other areas you'd like me to touch on with Gorbachev? (Ø)

The President: Well, on Germany, my statement should not be a problem for Gorbachev. But I know that the German reunification issue is a major concern for him. I will be seeing Kohl on December 4 or the evening of December 3, right after Malta. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Is there anything else? (Ø)

The President: I will be interested in comparing notes on how he sees the changes in Eastern Europe and on their impact on the Soviet Union. I will also be interested in knowing how he sees the situation in the Soviet Republics. I expect that he will be pressing on the economic front and I will also need to know what he is planning to do in the economic area. A combination of genuine economic reform and less defense spending could be very healthy, but I plan to take the approach of simply asking him to tell me about his economy. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What do you see as the time frame for Soviet membership in GATT -- are you thinking about years, or few decades? (Ø)

The President: I am thinking in terms of years, or even less, but I'm not fully up to speed on this issue yet. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Have you seen President Mitterrand's speech? (Ø)

The President: No. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: In it, Mitterrand proposes that the Soviet Union enter the GATT. (Ø)

The President: They are not ready for that yet. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Mitterrand and Kohl are the best people to talk to about Eastern Europe. Kohl has the best insights into Eastern Europe, although Mitterrand has an elegant overview. However, it is the nitty gritty that makes things happen, and this is what Kohl knows best. (Ø)

The President: Think about coming down with Mila for supper at Camp David. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Don't worry, I'll be getting back on Saturday and I will call you. Once again, Barbara was fantastic. She did more to advance U.S.-Canadian relations than you or I would be capable of. (U)

The President: Well, we can be second, but we will try harder! (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

.0541

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (3 pp.)	11/17/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By gl (NLGB) on 12/1/10

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Call - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

Date Closed:	2/2/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91111-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	1999-0273-F(121)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	5/13/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1989, 3:16 pm - 3:24 pm EST
Oval Office

The President: I have read the marvelous telegram you sent me. I was delighted to hear from you, and look forward to putting our feet up and having a good chat at Camp David. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I look forward to that too. We have much to discuss. I will be going to Paris tomorrow for the EC meeting, | (b)(1) (b)(1)

(C)

The President: We are thinking the same way. I am anxious to talk to you after the meeting in Paris. The timing of that meeting is good, coming before my talks in Malta. I think we see eye to eye on these questions. The danger is that there are people who want us to do more posturing. I am worried about that. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher: | (b)(1) (b)(1)

(b)(1) (S)

The President: I agree, and your message backed up this point. What are you expecting out of the EC meeting? (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher: | (b)(1) (b)(1)

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BR 5/13/09

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The President: I think we see eye to eye. I would love to get your experts' views on possible dramatic proposals that Gorbachev could spring at Malta. We have no surprises here, but we would love to hear the views of your top people on what he might do -- or things we might say to engage the public imagination, show support for perestroika. (~~S~~)

You and I should be prepared to discuss possible surprises, and possible initiatives I could take. These would not be on arms control -- SLCMs or ALCMs or anything like that -- nothing that would be for signing. (~~S~~)

Prime Minister Thatcher: Our Ambassador to the Soviet Union was in to see me about these matters this morning. You may have seen that I made a speech here recently, at the Guildhall. (~~C~~)

The President: I read it, and enjoyed it. By the way, Manfred Woerner has invited me up after my Malta meetings, and I will be glad to come. (~~C~~)

Prime Minister Thatcher: I would be so pleased if you would. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: Yes, from reading the economic reports, I wonder how he goes to work each day. Mulroney will be seeing him; that might be an interesting window on the situation there. (C)

If we consult properly in NATO, have no surprises, the results should be very good. (C)

I look forward to seeing you next week. I hope the meeting in Paris goes well. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 17, 1989, 3:30 - 3:40 pm EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call; the connection was interrupted once, but restored. (U)

The President: How are you, Hosni? (U)

President Mubarak: Very well, George. It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

The President: This is some great news about your soccer team making the World Cup Playoffs. It is very exciting and we're proud of Egypt. It's great for all Egyptians, your victory 1-0 over Algeria. You know what a sports fan -- a nut -- I am, so I love it! (U)

President Mubarak: Well, thank you very much for that, George, we too are really very proud. (U)

The President: I just wanted to give you a sense of how the meeting with Shamir went. It was a very direct meeting. I can't tell you what we succeeded in doing, but I hope it was something. It was a frank meeting, I mean really frank. (Ø)

President Mubarak: Thanks very much for your help with him. (Ø)

The President: Jim Baker has been trying very hard to get this moving. I just wanted you to know that I don't want it to die. (Ø)

President Mubarak: We are discussing with the Palestinians and we are doing the maximum for it. We are now waiting for some points from the Palestinians, as I think Esmat (abd el-Meguid) told Baker. (Ø)

The President: That's good. I had a good visit with your colleague, President Ben Ali. He's a good man -- I had not met him before but he's an impressive fellow. (Ø)

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Declassify on: OADR

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President Mubarak: Yes, he is a good man. (C)

The President: I was frank with him about my concerns with his neighbor. I think he and you and I are on the same wavelength. (C)

President Mubarak: I agree with you. (C)

At this point the telephone connection was interrupted; contact was restored several minutes later. (U)

The President: I'm sorry, we got cut off. I had just a couple of more points about the meeting with Shamir: (C)

-- We told Shamir that we could not provide any assurances that would undermine the five point framework. (C)

-- We told Shamir Israel must be flexible when it comes to including outsiders on the Palestinian delegation. (C)

-- And we told Shamir that we wouldn't force Israel into a dialogue with the PLO, but that we also could not guarantee what the PLO or individual Palestinians might say. (C)

-- Shamir said that Israel cannot negotiate with the PLO. I told him this is not our intention, and I assured him it is not your intention. (C)

-- Shamir also said that neither side should try to transform the dialogue into negotiations on final status. I agreed and told him that I was sure you agreed as well. (C)

-- So I think the meeting was useful. (C)

-- We want to set up an early meeting of the three foreign ministers, the best venue for settling the major outstanding questions. But we need first Palestinian acceptance of the five points. Jim says we will consider seriously any assurances they may want in that context, so long as these assurances are consistent with the five points. (C)

-- I understand that the Palestinian side raised a number of questions, and that Jim Baker has relayed our answers to Abdel Meguid. What we are suggesting protects legitimate Palestinian interests as regards their participation and what could be discussed in meetings with Israel. Please convey that to the others. (C)

-- As always, we are looking to you for advice and assistance. (C)

President Mubarak: Very good. Abd el-Meguid will give them reassurances tomorrow regarding your views. (C)

The President: My best to your family and congratulations again on the soccer victory. (C)

CRISTIANI NOV 18, 1989 - PRESIDENT CALLED 1728 - PACELLI MONITORED FROM HOME - OWEN MONITORING IN SIT RM - CALL TERMINATED 1735 - PRES AT CAMP DAVID

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9274
Add-On #1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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AS AMENDED
2008-0617-MR
3/30/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Interpreter: Sim Smiley
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 18, 1989, 8:02 - 8:07 a.m. EST
Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: I am calling about my upcoming meeting in Malta. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Manfred Woerner invited me to come to Brussels on December 4 to debrief on my meetings with Gorbachev. I have accepted that invitation. I don't know if it will be convenient for you to come, but I am determined to inform our Allies about that meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I would be very happy to come. It is a wonderful idea. (Ø)

The President: I know you will be seeing Gorbachev before me. If you have any hints or suggestions you could give me, I would appreciate a phone call. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Okay. Fine. Gorbachev will be in Rome the 29th and 30th. If it is all right, I will call the evening of the 30th. (Ø)

The President: Very good. I may be flying to Malta then. There is some discussion of my seeing our ships at sea before Malta, but there would be time.... (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Okay. I will contact you either by phone or telegram directly. (Ø)

The President: Excellent. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I will be meeting President Mitterrand today in Paris. (U)

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The President: Yes. I hope the EC will discuss assistance to Poland and Hungary. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Of course. We will hope that your meeting with Gorbachev will be the best ever. (U)

The President: Thank you, my friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 25, 1989, 7:46 - 7:50 a.m. EST
Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, sir? (U)

Prime Minister Martens: Very fine. I had a Party meeting this morning. I apologize for being late to receive your call. (U)

The President: I just wanted to tell you that Manfred Woerner has invited me to come to Brussels December 4 to report on my meetings with Gorbachev. I have accepted. This is a good chance to get together. I look forward to seeing you and hope we have time for a brief chat. I am anxious to get the opinions of friends before I go. Do you have any thoughts for me? (U)

Prime Minister Martens: No. We had a good meeting Saturday in Paris. We are all agreed that the Allies must consult closely. Chancellor Kohl assured us that he will defend Germany's strong role in the EC and NATO. I have no doubt that you will defend our position in your meetings with Gorbachev. In Belgium, we see no difficulties. (C)

The President: It will be an important meeting, and very timely. There will be no surprises or deals. I was intrigued with Belgium's idea of a "second tier" closely associated with the EC which would give Poland and Hungary, and perhaps other East European countries, the chance to move closer to the Community. This is something to discuss with Gorbachev. (C)

Prime Minister Martens: The U.S. role is very important, especially with Poland and Hungary. Chancellor Kohl also mentioned your involvement. In Paris, we agreed that we should help only those countries that accept free elections. (C)

The President: It is interesting that now Czechoslovakia is beginning to move. Only Romania is swimming against the tide. I just wanted to check in with you. I believe in close consultations. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 25, 1989, 7:52 - 8:00 a.m. EST
Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine. It is good to hear your voice. (U)

The President: I am just calling to tell you I am off to Malta soon and that I will be going to Brussels afterwards. I wanted to get your advice. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We had a good meeting with our European colleagues in Paris. The atmosphere was very positive. Gorbachev is in favor of development toward democracy in central and eastern Europe. I have a feeling we should not be talking about national boundaries, which should be respected. We should also avoid talk of the German problem. Everyone agrees with that. And we should respect the maintenance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. (Ø)

The President: I understand. It is a sensitive point. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: We can work together in the economic field with Eastern Europe. There are certain forms of association, including trade and special privileges. This is very important, George. To the extent that capital from other countries goes there with the possibility to export to the European market, it will be more attractive to investors. The IMF is moving to certain conclusions in this regard. Finally, we should be ready with credits and aid in the wintertime. You asked my advice. Make this a European project for Gorbachev and you. (Ø)

The President: I think we can move in that direction. It is understandable that we not project the German Question, but at some point one of these countries will say we do not want to be in the Pact. (Ø)

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JR 3/30/09

Prime Minister Lubbers: I don't expect that to happen soon. There may be a chance for a Finnish pattern, but this is not a point for us to raise. Poland and Hungary need to know that for stronger economic cooperation and even integration with the EC, they do not have to leave the Pact. I talked with President Mitterrand two days ago. We believe it is better not to accept Austria as a full member but rather with some form of association. This would show that the same is possible also for Eastern Europe. It is in the interest of the West to sustain Gorbachev in his liberalization. I don't see much advantage in East European countries leaving the Warsaw Pact. If they do, they should go a way different from Western Europe, perhaps like Finland or Austria. It is their right to decide, but we should let them know that all forms of cooperation are possible even without their leaving the Warsaw Pact. (Ø)

The President: We cannot be publicly positioned as opposing their leaving the Warsaw Pact. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. (U)

The President: These are interesting times, aren't they? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Absolutely. (U)

The President: Congratulations on forming your new government. Are you happy with it? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes. It is a new situation, though. (U)

The President: Will you be able to go to Brussels? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, of course. I will see you there. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 25, 1989, 8:30 - 8:37 a.m. EST Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Good morning, or rather afternoon. I wanted to see if you had any words of wisdom as I go to meet with Gorbachev. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Many thanks. It is going to be difficult. Probably the best way to help him -- to get him to let us help him -- is not to insist on the elimination of the two pacts. (Ø)

The President: Good point. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: All of the policy problems, defense agreements, and border problems can go backwards if the alliances are not maintained. (Ø)

The President: I agree. The problem is that at some point one or more of the East European states may decide on their own that they want out. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I am sure that will happen eventually. But we need to hold off, to gain time, gain four or five years, until disarmament negotiations are further along. (Ø)

The President: That would be a good idea. It would make it easier for Gorbachev to move forward. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Exactly. (U)

The President: I am going over to debrief at Brussels on December 4 at the invitation of Manfred Woerner. I hope to see you there. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. I probably will be making my inaugural speech on that very day. If that does not happen, I will go. Otherwise, if I must be here, I will send my foreign minister instead. (Ø)

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The President: I understand. If you cannot come and would like me to send someone to see you and give you our impressions, I would be glad to do that. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I would be very grateful. I would appreciate that. (U)

The President: If you have any other ideas before Malta, I would welcome your advice. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Poul Schlueter of Denmark (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Poul Schlueter, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 26, 1989, 8:03 - 8:08 EST
Camp David

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Fine. It is nice of you to call. (U)

The President: I am just checking in. I have checked in with our other Allies, and wanted to know if you had any thoughts before I leave for my meetings with Gorbachev. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: The twelve in the Common Market had a very good meeting with President Mitterrand in Paris Sunday. We sent a signal that we know our obligations and will meet them. We agreed that the timing of your meeting with Gorbachev is excellent. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Is the prime purpose to be weapons reductions? (U)

The President: I am not sure about that. We have made it clear that this is not an arms control meeting per se. We have a multilateral framework and would need to consult with our Allies. (C)

Prime Minister Schlueter: But no detailed negotiations? (U)

The President: No. We will also talk on the economic side. I can hear from him what his expectations are. I also want to find out what his limits of tolerance are. (C)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Yes. This will be important. It is a big concern that the Soviet economy is so lagging. (U)

The President: Do you have any thoughts about changes in Germany? (U)

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Prime Minister Schlueter: At Paris, Chancellor Kohl stressed that reunification is not a matter that needs to be dealt with now, and that Germany will remain 100 per cent in NATO and the EC. This is irreversible, he said. (C)

The President: I just wanted to check in. How is your beautiful bride? (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: Fine. It has been very pleasant here. We have just been hunting in Jutland. (U)

The President: Give her our love. (U)

Prime Minister Schlueter: We shall meet on December 4. (U)

The President: Good. I will look forward to it. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (4 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Call - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

Document Partially Declassified
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By ___ (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	2/2/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91111-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(540)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Virgilio Barco
Notetakers: William Pryce
David Pacelli

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1989, 9:44 - 9:55 am, EST
The Oval Office - Barco's Presidential Office

The President: Mr. President. (U)

President Barco: Yes, good morning, Mr. President. (U)

The President: How are you, sir? I was sorry to hear about the plane crash. (U)

President Barco: Yes, it happened this morning. (U)

The President: Any word on how it happened? (C)

President Barco: Well, the plane left the airport and moments later it fell to the ground. (C)

The President: Uh huh. (U)

President Barco: I don't know whether it was an accident or some other reason. We are only now trying to see if it was an accident or the result of some criminal act. (C)

The President: I see. I would only observe that if we can be of any assistance on the technical side, let us know. We would be glad to do what we can. (C)

President Barco: Yes, thank you for offering that. The aviation company has a good reputation here. It is Avianca, the national airline. But we have little experience in investigations. (C)

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JR 8/21/09

The President: Yes. It does have a good reputation. I was calling you on another subject, to talk about the preparations for the drug summit. I understand that my people have talked to your people about the location. I want to confirm my acceptance of Cartagena. It is a good thing to come to Colombia and a good thing to come to Cartagena. I look forward to the meeting, with you as the host, very much, and I thank you very much. On February 15 would be a good date. I will be in the southern part of the United States the day before and so it would be easier for me to travel then. I could leave very early on the 15th and get there in the morning and leave that night. I think that we would be able to do it in one day of meetings, but I would be anxious to hear of your opinion to see if you have a different idea. (Ø)

President Barco: Yes, we can do it in one day. You can leave very well that same day. (Ø)

The President: If we can do it in one day, it would be very helpful for our side, as I can go down and get back. Congress would be back. It will be a useful meeting and I will promise to arrive as early on the 15th as you want because I will be coming from the southern United States. (Ø)

President Barco: Fine. That would be very good, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Ok, we will shoot for the 15th in Cartagena and try to complete the meetings in one day. (Ø)

President Barco: I think we should leave the date open for the moment. I don't want to announce it without checking with the others to see if it is ok with them. (Ø)

The President: Ok, we won't make any announcements up here. But if you can check with the other presidents and work everything out, I would like to firm up other plans. I would like you to make the announcement. You are better placed as host to do that. And I would be proud to come there to your country for this meeting. (Ø)

President Barco: When should we make the announcement? (Ø)

The President: Any time you want, but our system leaks so much up here, with all sorts of unauthorized information in the press. I would suggest that it come soon if the others agree. Insofar as you are the host, it is most appropriate that the announcement come from you. (Ø)

President Barco: I will call today the other Presidents and get back to you. (Ø)

The President: Again, I'm sorry about the plane. We do have technical people who can deal with this sort of thing. (Ø)

President Barco: Thank you. I will check with your experts. (U)

The President: You continue your campaign against the drug traffickers and we commend you for it. I see that you got close to getting a narco-terrorist recently. (C)

President Barco: Yes, still the operation continues. (C)

The President: We are proud of your efforts. (U)

President Barco: A committee of experts will meet in Washington today. We could talk about this. (C)

The President: Yes. If you have one more minute, there is another subject that I would like to raise with you. (C)

President Barco: Of course. (U)

The President: Again, we commend your efforts. They are a fine example. But I have been a little worried about Peru and Bolivia. In Peru, we sort of expect that and there is the question of the terrorists. And in Bolivia there has been some criticism of U.S. assistance. We don't think Bolivia is very serious about narcotics corruption as well. May be you would be able to say something to these leaders. (C)

President Barco: Yes, and come to the roots and see what they want. (C)

The President: They say that we ought to give more economic assistance. We are making a pretty significant effort already. We have already given $97 million. I don't want to be critical, and we want to stay together in all this, but I think we just have to point this out. In the middle of December, I am asking Aronson to visit Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to talk about the summit. If you have a minute, I hope that you could fill him in on the details. (C)

President Barco: I would be pleased. If you have a date I would be happy to meet him. (C)

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President Barco: The preliminary committee meeting today in Washington is to make a survey of themes. I think the president of the committee, who is Colombian, could talk to Peru and Bolivia since their principals are there. (Ø)

The President: I'll report that to General Scowcroft and have that passed to our delegation. Well, I am pleased that the meeting will work out. I am pleased with all your help. I am delighted to have had the chance to talk to you. Regarding the announcement, we will wait for you, but sooner is the better. (Ø)

President Barco: I will convey your concerns on the statements. But I will also get to my Ambassador. He is leading the team at the talks in Washington. (Ø)

The President: That is fine. Thank you sir. (U)

President Barco: Thank you. (U)

The President: Sorry to hear about the plane crash; we'll be glad to help investigate. Thank you again. Goodbye. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Call to Prime Minister Fenech Adami of Malta (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Eddie Fenech Adami, Prime Minister Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings, NSC Staff
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 27, 1989, 10:33 - 10:36 a.m. EST The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: Fine, thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I am looking forward to coming to your country. I just received the beautiful book you sent. I have a funny feeling that I should have called you before springing this meeting on you, but because of our personal contact, and your extraordinary hospitality to my brother, I went ahead. Still, I feel a little badly that I did not call earlier. My people said you are encouraged about the meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: Yes, we are excited. (U)

The President: Everyone has been telling me about the understanding and assistance your Government has been giving us. Of course, we are having this big meeting, but I also want the meeting to convey the confidence and trust you and your Government have here. (Ø)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: Thank you very, very much. (U)

The President: I think every matter, even the sensitive one, is being handled. (Ø)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: Yes. This morning in Parliament the issue was raised. I assured everyone that the decision by Parliament would be fully observed. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for your help. I look forward to seeing you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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SCS 6/20/11

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, President
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1989, 12:09 - 12:13 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? I am calling about the Malta meeting. I wondered if you had any concerns or words of consultation or advice. I wanted to touch base with all of the NATO allies and assure you that there would be no deals made over your heads at Malta. I also wanted to get advice, especially from you, since you are so geographically close to the Soviet Union. (C)

Prime Minister Ozal: I would say to be careful and cautious, but also try to help the Soviet economy and democratization in Eastern Europe. (C)

The President: I think that is good advice. I just had a meeting with Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of our Federal Reserve Board. On the economic side, it is my intention to try to help, but real reforms are needed. (C)

Prime Minister Ozal: The situation is similar to our efforts in the 1980s. We had friends' help, but we made our own efforts. (C)

The President: Arms control will be for a summit and after consultation with our allies. He may bring it up, but I will say I need to consult with my allies. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I agree. (U)

The President: I wanted to touch base with you and other allies. There is a kind of euphoria now. We do want to help and are prepared to make suggestions. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I am sure they need help, but they should accept that Marxism is dead. (C)

The President: We'll be in Brussels at the invitation of Manfred Woerner to discuss Malta with our allies. (U)

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Prime Minister Ozal: Our Prime Minister will be there. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Cavaco Silva of Portugal (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anibal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1989, 12:16 - 12:34 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Anibal, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Fine. How is your family? (U)

The President: Fine. I am calling to get advice from an old friend about my Malta meeting. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It is a very important one. (U)

The President: There will be no surprises to our allies and no deals. I will be ready to talk with him on a wide array of economic things. I want perestroika to succeed, as you do. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: It is important that the allies be united to achieve good results in disarmament and other fields. We agreed on that in Paris. (U)

The President: That is good to hear. I heard that from other allies. I appreciate that the allies are meeting. I wanted your ideas. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: There should be economic reforms, not just political changes such as election laws and liberalization. Without structural adjustment, I think they will not succeed. We Portuguese understand. We had a totalitarian takeover attempt. We had to make many changes to put market mechanisms in place, adopt constitutional changes, and revise the banking system. We support the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but we should not destabilize the alliances. The EC also agreed that we should not weaken transatlantic ties. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree. This is a timely meeting. We started talking with Gorbachev last summer. I am glad to hear we are thinking along the same lines. (U)

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Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Will you discuss regional problems? (U)

The President: Yes. Absolutely. We will talk about Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and also Angola, which you are very interested in. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. I want to talk about this when I visit in January. (U)

The President: Yes. If you have thoughts about Angola before I leave for Malta, I would appreciate your personal message. You could hand it to our Ambassador. (C)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: Yes. I have been there recently and talked to President Dos Santos. I think it is time for a lasting peace. I will see about a personal message, although our Foreign Minister has come to your State Department. Dos Santos wants a solution; everyone does. He has a problem in his Party, but he is in control. He wants a dialogue with Savimbi. (C)

The President: That is encouraging. If you have further thoughts before Malta, please tell me. I look forward to our meeting. (U)

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva: All the success to your summit. We in Europe will be following it with great interest. (U)

The President: We will do our best. We won't let you down. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Xenofon Zolotas of Greece
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Xenofon Zolotas, Prime Minister Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 27, 1989, 12:28 - 1230 p.m. EST The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Mr. Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Zolotas: Yes, I am the Prime Minister.

The President: I am pleased to say hello. I am calling about the upcoming meeting in Malta. I have been touching base with all of the countries in NATO, in a spirit of full consultation. I want to assure you there will not be some major arms control deal that does not have the full approval of NATO. I would welcome any thoughts you have.

Prime Minister Zolotas: I will be coming to the NATO meeting. If I have any thoughts I will send them.

The President: I look forward to seeing you December 4 in Brussels.

Prime Minister Zolotas: I fully understand your position. I am looking forward to the success of your deliberations with Mr. Gorbachev. Thank you for your call.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Jan P. Syse, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1989, 12:56 - 1:00 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Syse: Fine. How are you? (U)

The President: I am checking with our NATO allies and looking forward to the Malta meeting. I am going to Brussels December 4 and wonder if you have any words of wisdom. (U)

Prime Minister Syse: Words of wisdom? I don't know about that. Perhaps some questions. I welcome your idea of going to Brussels. May I raise one matter of special concern to us? Gorbachev, in Helsinki, talked about arms control at sea. This is a dangerous idea. We should not weaken the sea lanes to the Atlantic. There has been a constant Soviet buildup in the north. New offensive capabilities are being added. I would ask you to consider this special question and encourage Gorbachev to start cutting down naval forces up north as he has done in the Baltic. (C)

The President: I will be glad to do it. He has pressed us for naval reductions, but we are disinclined to do so. You make a good point of the need for cutting down Soviet forces up north. I will be glad to raise this point. I look forward to our meeting on December 4. I think Malta will be a good meeting. There has been so much euphoria that it may be hard to live up to that. The meeting is not meant to be a major summit. I want to hear his views, including on economic issues. I want to help him and know our allies do, too. It is important to keep the allies together. (C)

Prime Minister Syse: I agree. Also in Eastern Europe it is important to help. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you, and I look forward to a good Malta meeting. The changes are wonderful in Eastern Europe, but there is still a need for prudence. I look forward to seeing you in Brussels. (U)

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Prime Minister Syse: I look forward to meeting you. Thank you for calling me. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson of Iceland
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Steingrimur Hermannsson, Prime Minister Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 27, 1989, 4:16 - 4:20 p.m. EST The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: How are you?

Prime Minister Hermannsson: Fine. It has been a busy period.

The President: I am calling to touch base before my meeting in Malta. I am calling NATO friends to say there will be no deals behind the backs of our allies. It will be an open agenda: he can raise any ideas, and I will raise any. I wanted to ask you for advice. On December 4 I will be going to Brussels at the invitation of Manfred Woerner. I hope to see you there.

Prime Minister Hermannsson: It is a good idea. I strongly support this meeting. I will be in Brussels and look forward to hearing your report. I have no specific advice. You are on the right track.

The President: I think so too. There is some criticism here that I am not responding to the enormous changes in Eastern Europe, but I think things are going well. There is no need for rhetoric. Gorbachev has problems enough at home. We will discuss arms control in broad terms, but this is not the place for deals on CFE or START.

Prime Minister Hermannsson: I agree. Things are very promising. Gorbachev has great problems--more than appear on the surface. The Western countries should help, but not interfere. I am just back from a meeting between EFTA and the EB. We agreed to help the East European countries. Iceland will participate in a small way in the fund for Poland.

The President: Good. I look forward to seeing you in Brussels on Monday.

Prime Minister Hermannsson: Thank you. I wish you the best of luck.

The President: Do you have many fish this summer?

Prime Minister Hermannsson: If you come, I can guarantee you will catch some.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	The President's Telephone Call to Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Jacques Santer, Prime Minister Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 27, 1989, 5:31 - 5:34 p.m. EST The Oval Office

The President initiated the call.

The President: Where are you -- off in Japan? I hope it's not too early. I am calling in a spirit of consultation about my upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. First, I have been invited by Manfred Woerner to debrief at Brussels on December 4, which I'm happy to do. Second, I would like to have your thoughts or suggestions. I am calling all the allies.

Prime Minister Santer: This is a very important moment. I back all of your efforts. It is a very decisive moment in Europe. As I have said in the EC meeting, we need to support democratization and help them with their social, economic, and political difficulties. I support your efforts.

The President: This is encouraging. I am getting good responses. This not an arms control meeting. There will be no agenda. Any topic is open for discussion, but Gorbachev must know there will be no deals without consultations with our allies. I will discuss his economic problems and also regional problems. I look forward to debriefing you on Monday in Brussels.

Prime Minister Santer: Thank you. It is an important moment. We support you in all your efforts. Best wishes. Good luck.

The President: Thank you. I will see you in Brussels.

-- End of Conversation --

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27. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Arias of Costa Rica (3 pp.)	11/28/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Call - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

Document Partially Declassified
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(541)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Arias of Costa Rica (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Oscar Sanchez Arias
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 28, 1989, 10:05 - 10:15 am, EST
The Oval Office - Arias' Presidential Office

President Arias telephoned the President to talk about the situation in El Salvador.

The President: Hello, Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Arias: Fine, fine. (U)

The President: How are you sir? (U)

President Arias: Very sad with the developments here in Central America and what is happening in El Salvador. (Ø)

The President: I am sure. (U)

President Arias: I wanted to talk to you before you go to see Gorbachev. I'm sure you will talk about Central America, Nicaragua, etc. (Ø)

The President: Yes sir. (U)

President Arias: But I wanted to encourage you to be very strong with Gorbachev because it is Fidel Castro who is the one behind all this more than anyone else. Unless the Soviets decide to put an end to this, he will go on with all this export of the revolution in Central America. I think that the Soviets have to hear from you and the Free World that they cannot go along with support to Fidel Castro if he keeps on trying to export the revolution in El Salvador. And I tell you this is something that Fidel does not deny. (Ø)

The President: Yes, he doesn't deny it. (Ø)

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President Arias: On the contrary, he boasts about it. When I went to the inauguration of Carlos Andres Perez, I talked to Fidel about his aid to the FMLN. (C)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Arias: He said that he had a moral responsibility to these guys. (C)

The President: Uh huh. (U)

President Arias: And this is something that he doesn't hide. (C)

The President: I think you have raised a good point and this will be raised strongly, directly, and positively with Gorbachev. I think he is expecting this. They have asked for evidence about Nicaraguan complicity in this and I plan to bring up the whole thing. (C)

President Arias: That would be a good thing. (U)

The President: I appreciate your call and I would like to be able to say that you called me because he respects you as well. (C)

President Arias: Yes, you can say that I called. Fidel Castro has said to many people, to Felipe Gonzalez, to Carlos Andres Perez as well as to me, of his support for the FMLN. It is well known that he is behind this offensive, and without Fidel Castro the FMLN wouldn't do such a thing. I know them, Mr. President, and talked to them many times. [redacted] (C)

The President: You mean the FMLN? (C) (b)(1)

President Arias: Yes, the FMLN. And they have been encouraged by Fidel. (C)

The President: I think this is a very timely phone call and I appreciate it. We all are concerned with the SA-7 delivery and the arms that were discovered in the American woman's house. It looks bad. A man in your position carries weight and is well respected. It would be good if I were able to say you called and I will make that point to Gorbachev. (C)

President Arias: Of course, Mr. President, you could mention this to him. Well, I wish you the best of luck. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. There is increasing interest in this meeting with Gorbachev. And it is not going to be any different from how I described it to you. It will be a good meeting, timely, and not only will we be discussing Eastern Europe, but you can be sure that at the top of our agenda will be

democracy and peace in Central America. And maybe because of the economic pressure--just maybe--I will find Mr. Gorbachev more receptive to demands on the part of our side than he has been in the past. (Ø)

President Arias: I called the Soviet Ambassador only two days ago. As usual, he said that they had nothing to do with this offensive. This might be true, but I think Fidel Castro is behind it and the Soviets still support Castro. If they stop sending oil to Cuba for their economy, I am sure Fidel Castro would stop exporting his revolution. The Soviets wash their hands and say that it is not their fault. It is very easy for them to say they have not been able to persuade Fidel to stop. But it is their responsiblity. (Ø)

The President: That is very true. Well, I appreciate your phone call. I guarantee it will be related as directly and forcefully as it can be. Thank you for your confidence in calling me. (Ø)

President Arias: Thank you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I still love that visit to San Jose. Despite all the controversy, there were many good things about that visit. I think the most moving thing for me was how at the last event--the warmth of the people for you--and how they showed their love for democracy. I am just proud to have been a part of the presentations there. (Ø)

President Arias: Thank you. It was very good to have you. The Costa Rican people will never forget it. (Ø)

The President: Good luck and my love to your wife. (U)

President Arias: Thank you sir and my best to yours too. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Call from Prime Minister Fenech Adami of Malta (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Eddie Fenech Adami, Prime Minister Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings, NSC Staff
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	November 28, 1989, 1:45 - 1:52 p.m. EST Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I apologize for troubling you, but you said in your telephone call yesterday to contact you if any problems arose. Well, there is a small problem. I understand you program has changed, that there will be a meeting between us only at the airport. Yesterday, you expressed confidence in my and my government. If we do not meet in my office, it will be extremely damaging to me politically. (Ø)

The President: I am disappointed that you feel that way. I don't see any change in my schedule. As you know, I am supposed to visit the Sixth Fleet. I am told by our security people that there are problems with demonstrations. This could be counterproductive to our meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I assure you there is no possibility of demonstrations. I have looked into this and have taken steps. I can assure you there will be no demonstrations. To meet at the airport only would be very damaging to me. (Ø)

The President: I am disappointed in what you are telling me. In selecting Malta for this meeting, we were demonstrating our support for you and your government. (Ø)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I said to your Ambassador that you could come to my office in five to ten minutes. I frankly can't understand why this should not be done. (Ø)

The President: What is Gorbachev planning to do? (Ø)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I am told he would do as you do. (Ø)

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The President: Well, I am disappointed. I will go back and look into this, but we have a complicated schedule. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I thought it was all arranged. It would only take a minute to get to my office. (C)

The President: Who told you it was set? Who told you that I would go to town. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: Well..., arrangements had been made. I understood this was on. Of course, I would be the last one to put the President of the United States at risk. I can assure you there would be no risk. (C)

The President: I do not normally get into these matters, but I will go back in light of what you have told me. I am surprised that you had heard something else. I will go back and see. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I would not put you at risk. (C)

The President: I do not need any demonstrations. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: I blocked the possibility of demonstrations. (C)

The President: Another concern is our Libyan "friends." You have stood up to Libya and ended some of those contacts, but my security people raised that concern. I doesn't worry me -- the President of the United States gets demonstrated against everywhere -- but I had hoped for something more tranquil. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: It will be tranquil. (C)

The President: I will talk to General Scowcroft, my national security adviser, but I am very surprised at this. Someone is going to be out of work for misleading you. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech Adami: It is essential from a political point of view. I am sorry to have troubled you, but you said to call if there was a problem. (C)

The President: No, I appreciate your call. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: C. David Welch, NSC

DATE, TIME: November 28, 1989, 3:29-3:32 p.m. EST
PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Shamir initiated the telephone call. (Ø)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Well, Mr. President, and how are you? (U)

The President: Well, I'm fine. Thank you very much for your letter.

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you very much for taking the call. I know you are very busy... (U)

The President: Actually, we are very busy, getting ready for this seaborne meeting of ours. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: I was calling to wish you a huge success for Malta. (U)

The President: Thank you. Is there anything on your account or in your area that we as friends of Israel could raise? (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: We are interested in their reestablishing relations with us. After they reestablish relations, we can talk about other matters. But the first thing they should do is this. I think that is your position too. (Ø)

The President: Yes. By all means, we agree; I'll raise it with Gorbachev. We would like to see it happen and that's the kind of thing we could raise. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: The eyes of the world will be upon you in Malta. (U)

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The President: Well, I'm worried that there are too many expectations. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: I am sure you will succeed. The Soviets are in such a situation that they will accept anything. (Ø)

The President: I'm not so sure about that, but I hope it will be a good meeting. Something like that, we would be pleased to raise it. It's very thoughtful of you to call. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: It will serve our common cause. (U)

The President: This is a very thoughtful call, my friend. I appreciate it. Thanks very much for calling. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Good-bye. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 29, 1989, 8:27 - 9:02 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you, Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: It is nice to hear your voice. I am well. Things are going well. The economy is going well. But the better things are, the more difficulties people make. (U)

The President: You're a star of American TV. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to come back to my letter and discuss a few points, especially in preparation for your summit meeting with Gorbachev. Then I would like to know what our dinner would look like. Would Jim Baker be there? (C)

The President: Sure, he will be, if that's okay with you. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I only need to know whether we should bring Genscher. (C)

The President: We're talking as personal friends, but I leave this to you. Normally I would invite Baker, Scowcroft, and Sununu; but if that's any problem for you, we can do it just as White House staff. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I propose first with the White House staff, with Baker coming in later. (C)

The President: That is agreeable, but Baker can go off. Why don't I suggested Sununu, Scowcroft, and me. And you bring two people. How does that sound? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think that's a great idea, but I have nothing against Jim Baker joining us at a later point. I have great

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admiration for him. He is one of the outstanding figures of our time. (C)

The President: He understands. There will be no problem. Let's say we bring three and you bring three, then Baker comes for coffee. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I'll bring Horst with me. (C)

The President: Good. I want to hear his views as well as yours. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to come back to my message. It is extremely important now to stabilize developments. Let me turn first to the USSR. I think it would be useful for you to get Gorbachev to analyze his internal situation. I just had a meeting with his Vice Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, who told me they have enormous problems. This winter it is already minus 27 degrees, which is very harsh even by Soviet standards. They have gigantic transport problems. The main problem is not that they lack coal but that they lack the ability to transport it. To my mind, the situation is worsening rapidly. They will have a tremendous problem with supply and distribution, which will have a tremendous impact on the people and their morale. This won't for the time being affect his standing, but the number of disaffected is growing. On December 12, the Supreme Soviet will be in session again. Discussion will be very open on a number of proposals. I am convinced that the difficulties for Gorbachev in the Supreme Soviet will increase, but I still see no alternative to him. I wouldn't be surprised if he tries to get a tighter hold. The question may arise, even in your meeting, to what extent the West could provide the Soviet Union with consumer goods. My advice is that we should try to avoid anything that would destabilize him. (C)

This has implications for other states. Hungary, for example, is dependent on Soviet energy. I met their Prime Minister a few days ago for a two-hour talk. He told me the Soviets have cut energy deliveries to Hungary by 30 percent. They said they couldn't provide more. It may well be he will require help by January or February. Between the two of us, I'm going to help him [Hungarian Prime Minister Nemeth]. If we don't, if it means the downfall of the reform program, this could have catastrophic consequences. Poland also has difficulties, but the Mazowiecki Government has more public support than Nemeth. There is also the Church's role in supporting the government. In Bulgaria, it is too early for a final judgment. The present leadership has a transitional role. The economic situation is rather favorable. In Romania, there are signs of opposition, but it is weak. Czechoslovakia has been dramatic. I don't think the present regime can maintain its position, but I consider it capable of using the police to a massive extent. Czechoslovakia and Poland have one thing in common: intellectual leaders not discredited by the past regime. They are different from the GDR, where most of the intellectuals have been relying on the support of the regime. In Czechoslovakia, what is happening is of immense importance. (C)

The situation in the GDR is dynamic -- through demonstrations and peaceful means. People are shocked and disappointed at the corruption. They are not sure that Krenz will survive the December 15 Congress. The new Prime Minister may become Chairman of the Party. In a nutshell, things have changed a great deal. Therefore it is very important that as a whole the reform process keeps going. We will only be able to realize what the real structures will look like in a few weeks from now. My prognosis is that there will be free elections by the autumn of 1990 or the beginning of 1991. I believe the process has reached a stage that makes it irreversible. One reason is that they cannot avoid a mass exodus if they don't reform. They won't be able to close the borders. If they did, people would leave via Hungary. Hungary is not going to close its border. Therefore this places the GDR leaders in a very difficult situation. There are new groupings, also new political parties. It is too early to say how this will look. We will have to wait until the end of February. By that time, they will have passed a new election law -- if the opposition groups approve, which is a precondition for our supplying aid. I will see the leading people in the GDR this year but am waiting until the outcome of the Party Congress to see who's in the chair. (✓)

This was the meaning behind the ten point program I sent yesterday. There are three equal divisions. First, we must act with reason and caution. Everything in central Europe and Germany will have enormous impact. For me personally, this means everything I do will be coordinated with our American friends. The second point is the will of the people, what they desire. Public reporting on the news gives a distorted picture. It will become clear after the elections. It will be the same as in Poland. If there are genuine elections, they will throw out all in the government. Third, it will be a long-term process. They will remain in the Pact and we, in NATO. The security dimensions are of great importance. A final point: when you speak with Gorbachev, it will be important if you make progress on the agenda Baker and Shevardnadze discussed in Wyoming -- on START, the Vienna negotiations, and CW. (✓)

To summarize: I'm not pompous, but in view of the developments in Europe at the present time, we in Germany have an enormous responsibility of which I am well aware. It is very important that our American friends know everything we are doing. The same is true of our European friends in the EC. A week from now, in Strasbourg, I will see to it that we make progress with respect to the Economic and Monetary Union. I think it a great mistake on Maggie's part to think that this is a time for caution. It is an iron law that there will be no going it alone in German policy. It is our responsibility that we are anchored in a general whole. (✓)

George, I did not forget that this has been possible only because of the United States -- your solidarity, your presence in Berlin. Without this, it would not be possible. History left us with good cards in our hands. I hope with the cooperation of our American friends we can play them well. (✓)

The President: This was a very timely and full report. We have watched your statements with interest. I am very supportive of your general approach. I note your stress on stability. We feel the same way. Stability is the key word. We have tried to do nothing that would force a reaction by the USSR. We are not exhorting people. We are not conducting ourselves that way. We are on the same wavelength. I appreciated your ten points and your exposition on the future of Germany. I had our top analysts in talking about that last night. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for your good words. Germans East and West are listening very carefully. Every word of sympathy for self-determination and unity is very important now. (C)

The President: On my meeting with Gorbachev, there is hyper-interest in our country. Two to five thousand journalists will be going to Malta. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: That will mean more journalists than inhabitants. (U)

The President: We will discuss arms control items. It will be an open meeting, but we have told our press not to expect bold proposals. We are part of an Alliance and will not surprise the Germans, British, French, and others. We are not unwilling to talk about arms control, but I will not be stampeded into a broad Reykjavik game that is unsettling to our Allies. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Very good. That is completely in harmony with our intentions. One piece of information: this is very important to Gorbachev and the people around him who are not being treated very kindly at home. The meeting, psychologically speaking, is very important. If the question arises of his needing help.... (C)

The President: We recognize the Soviet Union as a sovereign nation that has great pride. Shevardnadze said recently that he didn't want America to "bail us out." I will be sensitive, but will want to see what I can do to help. We want him to succeed. In the briefings I have had, it is apparent that the Soviet economy is much worse than I realized before in-depth study. I will help, but in a sensitive way. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is the right line. There is no doubt that the meeting will be a success. Everything I heard about the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming confirms that. We will give any support we can provide. I have to go far back -- to Adenauer -- to find a relationship as strong as yours and mine. (C)

The President: We will go forward cautiously, but will be forward-leaning on arms control and other issues -- as part of a strong Alliance. I've been criticized for being too cautious, but, first, things are going our way and, second, stability should be the by-word. We don't want inadvertently to create instability. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I look forward to seeing you soon. (U)

The President: Thank you. I will see you Sunday. Love to Hannelore. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 29, 1989, 5:10 - 5:20pm EST
The Oval Office

President Roh telephoned the President from London concerning changes taking place in Eastern Europe. (S)

President Roh began by saying, "I would like to congratulate you on the historic meeting that will take place on December 2 and 3. I hope this will increase harmony and peace throughout the world." (C)

The President: "It is nice of you to call with your words of encouragement. I want to stay in close consultation with our allies." (C)

President Roh: "Thank you. I am in London on a European tour witnessing the historic changes here. As President of a divided country, I feel strongly about the changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe. I wish such changes could take place in Korea." (S)

The President: "I understand how you would be interested in changes taking place in Eastern Europe. We will have Korea's interests in mind when I meet with Mr. Gorbachev. I hope we can constructively discuss the Korean peninsula with General Secretary Gorbachev. Nothing detrimental to the Republic of Korea, our friend and ally, will take place." (S)

President Roh: "Thank you. You have already said what I was going to say. I would like to remind you in your meeting with President Gorbachev of the need to open North Korea, to make it a responsible member of the world community. In Europe I have found our Northern policy to be well received, and I hope that you will ask full cooperation from President Gorbachev for further success of my Northern policy." (S)

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The President: "Yes, I am planning to do that, and I will ask President Gorbachev to encourage the North Koreans to do what they should have done, that is, sign the NPT Safeguards Agreement. " (S)

President Roh: "I remember your warm hospitality and our fruitful discussions in Washington in October. I wish you great success in your meetings with President Gorbachev." (S)

The President: "The only regret I have is that we did not get to have that tennis game. Have a good journey and you can rest assured that we will work hard and keep very much in mind our strong friendship with Korea. Please extend my respects to Mrs. Roh." (U)

President Roh: Please give my best regards to your wife. (U)

-- End of conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Sim Smiley (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 30, 1989, 8:59 - 9:28 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Good morning -- afternoon to you. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Good morning. I want first to brief you on my talks with President Gorbachev. (C)

The President: It was thoughtful of you. Thank you. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: First of all, Gorbachev expressed great understanding for what the Western countries are doing for perestroika. He was also concerned about public opinion, which doesn't understand this is a difficult problem but an irreversible process. He believes he will convene a December 12 meeting of the Supreme Soviet. He is aware of the difficulties from conservatives and progressives but is determined to achieve success. Second, he placed great emphasis and importance to the Helsinki platform, which means the U.S. is closely linked to Europe. Gorbachev was quite clear on this point, also because the Final Act specifies that borders are permanent and cannot be changed. Third, great concern was expressed for the statements made by Chancellor Kohl on reunification of the two Germanies. This is not the time for such proposals, particularly with the difficult situation of Poland and Hungary. (C)

The President: May I interrupt? Did he made any reference to statements coming out of the U.S.? (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: No, he just expressed hope that the U.S. would support this stance of great prudence and caution. This is not a subject to be decided today. On my side, I said in my meeting with Mitterrand ten days ago at the EC, which made a specific reference to the Helsinki Final Act, that not even Chancellor Kohl made any reference to German reunification. There was importance attached that military problems be faced only by the two alliances as such, because of political changes in Eastern

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Europe, especially in the GDR and Poland. Without agreement by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, any decision would cause great problems for other countries. Furthermore, President Gorbachev expressed very great appreciation for the way the Chief of Staff of the USSR was received in the U.S. There was confidence and cordiality, which was very satisfactory also for the Soviet military. Then, great hope was expressed by both parties for accelerated progress in disarmament. The Italian side especially expressed the importance of a global ban on chemical weapons, which you, Mr. President, have stressed. (Ø)

The President: We are very interested. There are difficulties, not just on verification, but let me assure you we are very interested in working out a conclusion of an agreement on CW. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: There was a very strong commitment to enhance cooperation in the fight against drugs and terrorism. This morning during the meeting we heard news of the assassination of the President of the Deutsche Bank. Together we sent a message of condolence to Chancellor Kohl. Then President Gorbachev expressed concern that the EC might become closed upon itself, creating difficulty for those outside. I stressed that in December the EC will sign an agreement with the USSR. (Ø)

Then, the last point: regional crises. On the Middle East, they confirmed they are ready and willing to exert pressures to insure that Israelis and Palestinians meet. Also, in response to my question that they resume diplomatic relations with Israel, the response was positive. On Ethiopia, they reaffirmed their willingness to aid the process of negotiation. They said it had been a long time since they stopped supplying weapons. The news today suggests that negotiations between Ethiopia and the Eritrean rebels are going well. Finally, I raised Nicaragua, mentioning especially the accident of the two planes carrying arms destined for Salvador. I stressed that this made things more difficult, especially for the Esquipulas agreement. He answered that as he expressed to you his commitment that neither the Soviet Union nor any other Warsaw Pact country would supply arms, he stressed that he was remaining faithful to his commitment. Also, I met with Mrs. Chamorro a few days ago. Her criticism was not of a hostile person but of one who lived through the revolution against Somoza. We should all focus on the need for her election. (Ø)

This is about all. We also signed a number of agreements and also a joint statement, which was quite understated and satisfactory also for the Allies. (Ø)

The President: This has been very, very helpful. I have one question on the Middle East Is this a correct statement: Gorbachev said the Soviet Union will resume diplomatic relations with Israel, but on the condition that Israel meet with the PLO? Is that correct? (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Correct, but I want to be more precise. They are ready to do so, but with precise guarantees. As you know, for some time we have asked Arafat to recognize Israel and Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Now, when the PLO

acceded, Shamir said this was not enough and that he had no intention of talking with Arafat. Therefore the Soviet Union wants to be sure this will happen and that the two events be concurrent. Unfortunately, I'm afraid Shamir, whom I know well, does not wish to return the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza. We should remember that next month will be two years that the Intifada is going on -- a tragedy. (Ø)

The President: This is helpful. I think it would be good if the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Israel. I just wanted to make sure I understood the conditions. Thank you. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Yes, Israel is very interested. Shamir, when he was here, asked me to pose the question to Mr. Gorbachev. (Ø)

The President: This has been a very helpful briefing. I can't tell you how much I appreciate it. For your information, I've been trying to downplay some of the extreme expectations about the Malta meeting. I will not surprise the Allies. I will have an opportunity to visit with you in Brussels. You should know we are moving into the meeting in a forward-leaning position. We will not be negative. We don't want to compound his problems. We want to find ways to help him in a spirit of cooperation, giving him credit for his role in the favorable changes we have seen, and with a determination that we can move forward on arms control and other issues. I know you are interested, and I can assure you I am not going in with a negative mood. I have a good feeling about the Malta meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you very much. I wanted to ask you a question. Will our conversation remain private and confidential? (U)

The President: I would request, if it is agreeable to you, that I have our Press Secretary announce to the U.S. press that we had a good, in depth conversation, with no reference to the substance of our talk. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Exactly. I agree completely. (U)

The President: Wonderful. We will tell our Press Secretary. Thank you very much. With your experience and judgment, your comments have been very helpful to me. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you very much. Good luck in Malta. (U)

The President: Thank you. I will see you Monday. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand, President
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 30, 1989, 9:40 - 9:55 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President initiated the call. (U)

The President: Hello! Bon jour! Francois, I'm calling on a couple of things. (U)

President Mitterrand: I'm listening. (U)

The President: First, I want to solicit any last-minute thoughts before I go to Malta and, second, raise with you an area you know so well -- Lebanon. First, I think I understand the concerns Gorbachev has about premature reunification. I want to tell you we are going to go in a forward-leaning position. We hope to make progress on the economic side. We will also discuss arms control, but I think he knows I cannot commit the Alliance to some dramatic proposal. I feel comfortable on our approach, which will be forward-leaning. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Don't worry. We are in full confidence. I know that you appreciate very well what is required. I am not at all concerned about the meeting. You are engaging in explorations that will be useful. (U)

The President: It is a nice thing: when we meet in the Caribbean we can discuss all this is in a relaxed setting. I am very, very pleased that our meeting will take place. (U)

President Mitterrand: I'm not one who has been concerned. We'll be able to discuss it as early as Monday in Brussels and then discuss it in greater depth. As far as France is concerned, there is no problem. I just want to resolve problems. I am perfectly in concert with you. (U)

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The President: Do you have any thoughts on Lebanon? I am troubled. (U)

President Mitterrand: Of course we are very disturbed by the assassination. He was an independent man -- a Christian accepted by the Syrians without being under their control. I had sent a letter before his death expressing my support. I also sent a letter to General Aoun asking him to espouse legality. I also sent a message for the President's funeral. It seems that the new President is more tied to the Syrians than his predecessor. I shan't dwell on this today, but all our efforts -- yours, mine, others -- should be to prevent military action by Syria. We must speak out clearly that President Hraoui has legality on his side and that Aoun is in the illegal position. This is an internal matter for Lebanon. We don't want civil war to turn into international war. We need time for diplomatic efforts to be engaged so as to prevent Hraoui or the Syrians from mounting a large-scale offensive. We have talked about the rule of law. I will use all my influence with Aoun to make clear he is outside the law. But with fanatics such efforts are often in vain. I sent a ship -- not a combat ship -- to save the lives of French nationals at the Embassy. It was not a carrier of military equipment that might be misinterpreted. But I cannot leave many French nationals without help. I must let Aoun know that France does not support him in his attempts at rebellion. It is acceptable to French public opinion only so long as there is no big Syrian involvement. (C)

The President: Does opinion favor Aoun if there is no Syrian move? (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes. If the Syrians moved, we would have a massive reaction in France. Therefore, as for Lebanon my position is clear and well understood. If Syrians give arms to Hraoui, that is another matter. But direct and massive intervention by Syria would put us in a very difficult position. I could send you the letter I sent to Aoun. Contrary to what has been said, there have been no arms shipments to Aoun. If smugglers have done so, it was against my desires and intentions. We must apply pressure on Hraoui so that there will be no international war. I intend to do so. (C)

The President: I totally agree with what you have said. We will contact the new President and repeat what you said. It is a good time to reiterate our concern about military action. If you have any other ideas, I would appreciate hearing from you. (C)

President Mitterrand: What's important is that Syrians are well disposed toward the U.S. for now. They shouldn't feel they're benefitting from a tacit agreement. The point is not supporting Hraoui but preventing war. (C)

The President: That is very helpful. (U)

President Mitterrand: As to Malta, I trust your judgment. (U)

The President: I look forward to seeing you in Brussels. (U)

President Mitterrand: I think we will have to talk about the German issue. (Ø)

THe President: Yes. And in the Caribbean we will solve all the problems of the world. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

DECEMBER 1989

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Corazon Aquino, President of the Republic of the Philippines (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Corazon Aquino, President of the Republic of the Philippines
Notetaker: Karl D. Jackson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 4, 1989, 7:37 - 7:42pm EST
The Oval Office

The President telephoned President Aquino concerning the attempted coup in the Philippines. (S)

The President: "How are you, Mrs. President?" (U)

President Aquino replied, "How are you, George?" (U)

The President continued: "I tried to call you from Brussels but could not get through. I am calling just to see how things are going." (S)

President Aquino: "We still have a problem in Makati. We are trying in every way to persuade the rebels to give up peacefully. We have their relatives on the radio urging them to do so. (S)

The President: "Makati? Is this where the Americans are located?" (S)

President Aquino: "This is the business district where most of the plush apartments are located. I talked to Nick Platt and told him that our primary consideration, in any of our actions, would be preservation of civilian lives." (S)

The President: "Is there any way to get them out. Any President would be concerned to get them out." (S)

President Aquino: "We have been delaying this because there are so many civilians. We have taken all means to negotiate, and we will continue to take into consideration the lives of the civilians." (S)

The President: "We appreciate this greatly. How is the situation elsewhere?" (S)

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President Aquino: "In Cebu there is no fighting. There are a few rebel officers occupying the airport. The Cardinal of Cebu and the civilians have held a huge rally to get them to give up peacefully." (S)

"Here in Makati is the main problem. There are snipers on the buildings. We are trying to get the snipers first. We are taking every precaution but cannot allow the situation to continue indefinitely." (S)

The President: "How are you holding up?" (C)

President Aquino: "I'm O.K. The rebels used rockets against the Palace on Friday morning. Now, in this and most other parts of the city, life has returned to normal. Only Makati is still a problem." (C)

The President: "Good Luck, and I do appreciate anything your military can do to get the civilians out of Makati. We are proud of you and the way you have stood up with great courage throughout the crisis." (S)

President Aquino: "I want to thank you for your strong statement of support." (C)

The President: "You need not thank me. We want to see you succeed. Best of Luck." (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1989 DEC 15 PM 4:04

December 15, 1989

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Koivisto of Finland

DATE: Dec 15, 1989

PURPOSE: To debrief on the Malta Meetings

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line

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Koivisto
call
placed on
Dec 18
1133 - 1146
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Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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FG001-02

1989 DEC 15 PM 4:04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1989

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Koivisto of Finland

DATE: Dec 15, 1989

PURPOSE: To debrief on the Malta Meetings

SECURE OR OPEN: Open Line

INTERPRETER: None Required

PHONE NUMBER: 011-358-0-661-133 (Palace Office)

CONTACT PERSON: Jaako Kalela, Foreign Policy Advisor
or Esa Tarvainen, Military Aide

TIME DIFFERENCE: +7

SUGGESTED TIMES: To Be Determined

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Malta Meetings

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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POINTS TO BE MADE

-- First I want to express my best wishes on the 72nd anniversary this past week (Dec 6) of Finish Independence.

-- The session with Gorbachev was very good -- we had an opportunity to discuss a lot of issues and agreed to take some steps that will push the relationship forward.

-- I told Gorbachev that Soviet behavior in the Third World -- particularly in Central America -- was out of step with their behavior elsewhere -- including in Eastern Europe.

-- Gorbachev did not make any major new proposals. But I think that he left the meeting convinced that my Administration is committed to aggressive pursuit of the opportunities before us.

-- I told Gorbachev that we should target the 1990 Summit for completion of a trade agreement granting Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union, so that I can grant a Jackson-Vanik waiver at that time.

- I informed the Soviets that I intend to tell the members of GATT now that I will support GATT observer status for the Soviet Union when the Uruguay Round is completed.

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-- I also suggested improving ties between the Soviets and the OECD, and East-West economic cooperation through the economic basket of the CSCE process.

-- I also made a few suggestions on arms control. Among other ideas, I proposed an end to U.S. production of binary weapons when the multilateral convention on chemical weapons enters into force, in return for Soviet acceptance of the terms of my UN proposal to ban chemical weapons.

-- I proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union support holding a CFE Summit to sign a CFE treaty in 1990.

-- On the environment I told Gorbachev that the U.S. would host a conference of the International Panel on Climate Change next fall to negotiate a framework treaty on global climate change.

-- On education exchanges I suggested that we increase university exchanges so that an additional 1,000 American and 1,000 Soviet college students will be studying in the other's country by the beginning of the 1991 school year.

-- (If Asked About Gorbachev's Proposal for Helsinski II Meeting) The Helsinki process has been extremely useful in encouraging reform in Eastern Europe but I am not sure than an open-ended meeting of the Thirty-Five at this sensitive time in Eastern and Central Europe is a good idea.

-- I believe that a CFE Summit in which the signatories to the Treaty could sign a CFE Treaty would be a tangible accomplishment for all of Europe. CFE will transform the military landscape into one more consistent with the new political realities in Europe.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Virgilio Barco
Notetaker: David Pacelli

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 20, 1989, 2:27 - 2:31 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President. (U)

President Barco: Yes. (U)

The President: This is George Bush. I know it is very late but I wanted to officially tell you about an ongoing operation that commenced at 1 o'clock. (C)

At 12 o'clock, Mr. Endara was sworn in as the elected President of Panama. (U)

At 1 o'clock, substantial U.S. forces went to support the duly elected government of Panama and to apprehend Mr. Noriega. I wanted to tell you that I have run out of patience in this situation. In the last couple of days, there was Noriega's declaration of war against us. The PDF killed a Marine officer, they physically assaulted a Navy officer and sexually harassed his wife. In addition, there have been several other incidents. My patience simply ran out in view of all this. (C)

We took what action we did in the hope that we can help start Panama toward the democratic path. There have been some casualties. The operation is fairly substantial. But I wanted you to know about it. (C)

Eventually, with Panama on the democratic path, I hope that Colombia will recognize Endara as the legitimate government. We have already recognized him. (C)

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There is fighting still going on right now. I don't know about the fate of Noriega. If he is apprehended, he will try to have him come back to the United States to stand trial. I wanted to explain this all to you personally. (Ø)

We tried international consultation. We tried consulting through the OAS, and that didn't work. He ignored the OAS. And I have a responsibility for American lives. I just decided that I have had enough after those recent incidents. I hope that down there in Colombia you will be able to support the Endara government. (Ø)

President Barco: Alright. (U)

The President: But I wanted to call you and tell you this. (U)

President Barco: I wish to tell you that I hope everything goes well for you. I will convene my people early in the morning to see in what ways we can help. (Ø)

The President: That would be good. Apparently there have been some statements on the radio. He is urging the PDF to lay down their arms and urging them to support democracy. There is still fighting going on. We of course hope that it is over very soon. Well, thank you, Mr. President. (Ø)

President Barco: Thank you. It was nice talking to you and I wish you good luck. (U)

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attached - two versions

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WASHINGTON

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2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney
Notetaker: David Pacelli

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 20, 1989, 2:52 - 3:00 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Brian. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, George. (U)

The President: I hate to call you at such an hour. I want to tell you about our operations in Panama. I'm sure that you have heard of them. (Ø)

As you know, we have done this after having made a concerted effort to try to work things out bilaterally and diplomatically, working with the Central Americans and the South Americans, all of whom were outraged by Noriega's behavior. (Ø)

The reason for our actions are the declaration of war that was made, the killing of a Marine officer, and the sexual harassment of a Navy lieutenant's wife. And that incident moved me as much as anything else. I just couldn't tolerate any longer these type of incidents and the threats to innocent American lives. We have to get Noriega out. And we hope to promote the institutions of a democratic government. (Ø)

At 12 o'clock, Endara took the oath of office from a Panamanian magistrate, and Calderon and Ford were sworn in as Vice Presidents. They went on the air to ask the PDF not to fight and to ask the PDF to support democracy. (Ø)

We have recognized the Endara government. We want to help Panama restore democracy. There are lots of U.S. forces in there now. The fate of Noriega is uncertain. He has been reported in two places, in the city and in the countryside. (Ø)

There are lots of indications that the PDF does not want to fight. They also liberated a prison which contained 47 PDF officers who were imprisoned by Noriega after the last coup. They were delighted. They were PDF officers and they were delighted. And there is strong support from the people. There has been some loss of life for the United States and among Panamanians. Fortunately, the numbers are low. And I hope they stay low. (C)

So that is the state of play at the moment. I hope that down the line, you will recognize Endara. It is our intention to bring home the additional forces we sent down there as soon as we can. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: How many are down there? (C)

The President: In total? About 18,000. There were 12,000 in the Southern Command and about 6,000 in reinforcements. We sent airborne forces, and I am told that the situation is under control. Most of the PDF recognize this and say it is over. They are pulling back and laying down their arms. I hope before long it will be over, without much loss of life. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I could tell that something was going to happen earlier tonight. I recognized that the killing of the Marine and the harassment of the wife is something that you would have to respond to. (C)

The President: I hate to send in kids to fight. But I worried about what happens in future incidents. There are special rights of the United States under the treaty. There was the attack on the Marines, and a number of other incidents. Nevertheless, with the killing of the Marine lieutenant, I hope the Canadian people understand, and how hard we tried diplomacy. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We wish you well. We will be in the House of Commons tomorrow morning to answer questions and we will explain things to the Canadian people. (C)

The President: If there are any facts you need, we will be delighted to provide them. To direct our boys to go down there is a tough thing to do. But the military commanders fully supported it. This was not a macho use of force. But they had worked out contingency plans and I am told that Colin Powell is quite pleased. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I certainly hope there is no further loss of life by the U.S. military. (C)

The President: There have been 5 or 6 American military killed so far, and 12 PDF. At last report, the Commandancia was on fire. One U.S. citizen, Kurt Muse, was being held in prison without charges, and one part of the operations was to free him.

That has taken place and he has been freed. Forty-seven PDF prisoners were freed. They were being held after the coup attempt. This will help with the PDF because in this body are many officers who are respected. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well, good luck on this. Good luck to you. We will be at the other end of the phone if you should need me. God bless and goodbye. (C)

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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JR 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Notetaker: Ralph H. Sigler

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 20, 1989, 2:52 - 3:00 am EST
Oval Office

The President: Brian? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Yes, George. (U)

The President: I hate to call you at such an hour but I want to tell you about our operations in Panama. I'm sure that you have heard of them. As you know, we have done this after having made a concerted effort to try to work things out bilaterally and diplomatically, working with the Central Americans and the South Americans, all of whom were outraged by Noriega's behavior. (C)

The reason for our actions are the declaration of war that was made, the killing of a Marine officer, and the sexual harassment of a Navy Lieutenant's wife. And that incident moved me as much as anything else. I just couldn't tolerate any longer these type of incidents and the threats to innocent American lives. (C)

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The President: In total? About 18,000. There were 12,000 in the Southern Command and about 6,000 in reinforcements. We sent airborne forces, and I am told that the situation is under control. Most of the PDF recognize this and say it is over. They are pulling back and laying down their arms. I hope before long it will be over, without much loss of life. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I could tell that something was going to happen earlier tonight. I recognized that the killing of the Marine and the harassment of the wife is something that you would respond to. (Ø)

The President: I hate to send in kids to fight. But I worried about what could happen in future incidents, and there are special rights of the United States under the treaty. There was the attack on the Marines, and a number of other incidents. Nevertheless, with the killing of the Marine lieutenant, I hope the Canadian people understand, and how hard we tried diplomatically. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We wish you well. We will be in the House of Commons tomorrow morning to answer questions and we will explain things to the Canadian people. (Ø)

The President: If there are any facts you need, we will be delighted to provide them. To direct our boys to go down there is a tough thing to do, but the military commanders fully supported it. This was not a macho use of force, but they had worked out contingency plans and I am told that Colin Powell is quite pleased. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I certainly hope there is no further loss of life by the U.S. military. (Ø)

The President: There have been 5 or 6 American military killed so far, and 12 PDF. At last report, the Commandancia was on fire. One U.S. citizen, Kurt Muse, was being held in prison without charges, and one part of the operations was to free him. That has taken place and he has been freed. Forty-seven PDF prisoners were freed. They were being held after the coup attempt. This will help with the PDF because in this body are many officers who are respected. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well, good luck on this. Good luck to you. I will be at the other end of the phone if you should need me. God bless and goodbye. (U)

The President: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Salinas of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Salinas
Notetaker: David Pacelli

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 20, 1989, 3:03 - 3:11 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

NOTE: Notetaker was alerted to the telephone call while it was in progress (3:05 a.m.).

The President: . . .and they threatened her for 30 minutes. At that point, we couldn't tolerate their actions. I have an obligation to protect the lives of American citizens. We could not permit Noriega to brutalize Americans. (Ø)

At 1 o'clock this morning we took action. We hope to apprehend Noriega. I don't know about his fate. We have 6,000 highly trained forces there. They went to the prison and freed the PDF people who were involved in the coup. (Ø)

The key point is that Endara was sworn in as President, and Calderon and Ford as Vice Presidents, by Panamanian magistrates at 12 o'clock. They have been on radio or television, urging the PDF to support them. We have recognized the Endara government as the legitimate Government of Panama. (Ø)

We will move, as soon as the situation is calm, to help Panama return to democracy. We will lift our economic sanctions. We will permit the reflagging of Panamanian ships. (All this, so long as Noriega is out.) We will implement the Canal Treaties and confirm a Panamanian nominee to be Administrator. If all goes smoothly, we will soon remove the forces we have added in reinforcements. We want a chance for democracy. (Ø)

We have lost 6 American servicemen so far, and there have been 12 Panamanian casualties. I don't know if there are more. The headquarters, the Commandancia, surrendered, and according to one

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report, it is on fire. Kurt Muse, an American who was held by Noriega without trial, has been freed. I said, if we are going to go in there, we should free him, and he is now free. (Ø)

I just hope, after your government gets all information on this, that Mexico will recognize the Endara government. I regret calling you at 3 in the morning and not having all the facts, but I wanted to tell you this personally. (Ø)

President Salinas: I appreciate the call. You know that I have spoken out repeatedly against Mr. Noriega. Nevertheless, this action rebels against our principles. We would have hoped that diplomacy would have worked. We will apply the Estrada Doctrine on recognition. Our Ambassador is there, and he will remain. (Ø)

The President: How does the Estrada Doctrine work? (Ø)

President Salinas: It does not make any difference who is in power. We recognize everyone. (Ø)

The President: I see. That seems very strong; very sound. I know that you have problems with this, but recognize that there are certain limits. You know this -- you have been good about this -- including that Noriega is a drug trafficker. I couldn't condone his actions any longer. We may end up with different views because of our different histories, but I hope that you understand our views. (Ø)

President Salinas: I understand your views completely and you understand ours. We will be cautious in our reaction. (Ø)

The President: Very well. I am sorry to call you at 3 a.m. Forgive me for interrupting your sleep. (U)

President Salinas: On the contrary, Mr. President. I will be very attentive to what is going on. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with President Perez of Venezuela (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Carlos Andres Perez Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg Notetaker: David Pacelli
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	December 20, 1989, 3:26 - 3:40 a.m. EST The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Perez: Good morning, Mr. President. We are very upset about the reason you are calling. (C)

The President: We are upset too. But I wanted to call and to tell you what is happening. (U)

President Perez: Thank you very much. I am delighted to listen to you. (U)

The President: Excuse me. I have to turn down the television. It is a little loud and I can't hear. (U)

Two or three days ago, the Panamanians under Noriega made a declaration of war, unanimously supported by his puppet Congress. That was on Friday. On the next day, the PDF shot to death an unarmed U.S. serviceman and wounded another. They beat another serviceman and sexually harassed his wife. Indeed, they kept her up against a wall for 30 minutes until she became so exhausted that she collapsed. Somewhere in there, I said to myself, and my advisers also said, that's enough. (C)

I decided to try to apprehend Noriega and put an end to this. We have tried for a diplomatic solution. We have tried for a solution with the OAS. Many of your friends in the south have been very helpful, including yourself, in this. But finally there arrived a moment, where I feared that more innocent lives would be taken and I just had to take action. (C)

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At 12:01 this morning, Endara, Calderon and Ford were sworn into office by Panamanian magistrates. They welcomed our actions and they stated their intention to install a totally democratic government. All international observers recognize they were legitimately elected and I expect they will be asking for recognition from everyone. Obviously, we hope that others will recognize them. (Ø)

We will not only do that, but we will lift the economic sanctions, send our Ambassador back to Panama, and help in any way we can. (Ø)

The situation on the ground . . . , there still is some fighting going on. An American was being held without charges in Panama, and he was released. (Ø)

After the coup attempt, Noriega locked up a lot of the better PDF officers. This operation has now freed these people, and they were very, very happy to be freed, I might add. (Ø)

I have been concerned about the number of recent incidents, and the Panama Canal. Now, we will have the ability to support a new Panamanian Administrator for the Canal. (Ø)

Finally, I am committed to implementing the Treaty and to turn it over to the Panamanians as called for. But I know how strongly you find the principle of nonintervention. I certainly have fundamental respect for that principle. This is a situation, unique, where American lives were threatened and the integrity of the treaties was put in jeopardy. And I have a special duty to defend both. What I hope is that we can find a way to help the Panamanian regime to restore democracy. (Ø)

We hope that this military action will be over soon. I think it will. And when it is, we will remove the additional forces we sent there to save lives. (Ø)

But that is where we are. I wanted to report this to you personally. If you need any more information, we will be happy to provide it to you. (Ø)

We don't know the fate of Noriega right now, but that is the situation as of right now. (Ø)

And I hope that after you have had a chance to think about it, you will be able to support the new regime. (Ø)

President Perez: Thank you very much for your call. I knew that it would end this way. We around here in Venezuela feel guilty for what has happened. Of course, we have much regret that there has been intervention by the United States. Just a few days ago in the Galapagos Islands, I told the Andean presidents that this could happen. (Ø)

The President: Uh huh. (U)

President Perez: I thought that the declaration of a state of war could unleash these events. I have no doubt that we will recognize the Endara regime. But I feel compelled to tell you what I feel about the reaction to your armed intervention. I will try to soften reaction as much as possible because we have to recognize that we would have done much the same thing in these conditions. I will be in touch with the other presidents. I will get in touch with Endara. I will act quickly to recognize Endara and to get established clearly what our position is on the intervention part. I certainly am a witness to the open attitude you have shown through this entire process. And now we'll just have to see how these things turn out. (C)

The President: I appreciate all you have said. You have been magnificent in all of this. I wish your views had prevailed, since all of this would have been avoided. I appreciate your position, and I look forward to consulting on moving Panama down the democratic road. I am looking forward to seeing you soon. (C)

President Perez: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with President Menem of Argentina (U)
P@U@TICIPANTS:	The President Carlos Menem Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg Notetaker: David Pacelli
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	December 20, 1989, 3:41 - 3:54 am, EST The Oval Office

The President: Mr. President. (U)

President Menem: Good morning, Mr. President. (U)

The President: I'm sorry to be calling you at this God awful hour. (U)

President Menem: On the contrary, it is a great pleasure to hear your voice. (U)

The President: I just wanted to have a chance to tell you about the events in Panama, if you have a minute. (U)

President Menem: Please, I haven't heard anything about it yet. (U)

The President: First of all, the democratic nations, including you, have tried to solve the Panamanian crisis created by Noriega through multilateral diplomatic means. (Ø)

In fact, events became more dangerous recently. Last Friday, Noriega declared a state of war with the United States. The next day, the PDF killed a Marine officer, wounded another, beat up another serviceman, and sexually harassed his wife. It was our judgment that more innocent lives would have been lost and that Noriega was becoming increasingly irrational and unstable. we decided we had to -- with regret -- but now we had to take action. (Ø)

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So tonight we directed U.S. forces to deploy to Panama. The purpose is to defend American lives, to help the Panamanians restore the democratic government they elected a few months ago, and to bring Noriega to justice. (C)

At 12 o'clock, Mr. Endara was sworn in as President of Panama and Mr. Calderon and Mr. Ford were sworn in as Vice Presidents. They welcomed our actions and stated their intention to install a democratic government immediately. I am sure Endara will be contacting you and other leaders shortly seeking recognition. (C)

As for the United States, I will return our Ambassador, lift all economic sanctions, return the Canal funds which we are holding in escrow, and move forward with a Panamanian nominee of the new government to be Administrator of the Canal, because I am fully committed to implementing the Canal treaties. (C)

At this junction, we don't know the status of Noriega. But we do know that at the prison where he locked up 47 PDF officers, they have been freed. (C)

We don't know yet how many have lost their lives. We know some U.S. servicemen were killed and some PDF. So far very few, but I hope it stays that way. (C)

This is it. I know that our friends worry about intervention, but I just couldn't sit back and see more risks to innocent American lives. I hope Panama ends up with a democracy, a free democracy, and a just democracy for Panama. That is about where it stands and I just wanted you to hear it from me directly. (C)

President Menem: Thank you very much for this information. Of course, I would ask you to keep me constantly updated and I will be talking to our friends about this. (C)

The President: That is good. I have placed quite a number of calls and I have not always gotten through. But I did talk to Salinas and to Carlos Andres Perez. I will keep you informed. I am sorry to call you at this hour, but it is better to have a direct call about this matter. (C)

President Menem: Of course. Don't worry about the hour. It is not a bad time; it is a good time to call. Could you tell me again what is the situation with Noriega? (C)

The President: We don't know the situation with Noriega. We think he is in Panama [City]. He has not been apprehended at this point. (C)

President Menem: Good. In any event, please let me know if there is any mission I could perform. I want to be of help. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. I will be in contact with you. And I hope to see you in 1990. (Ø)

President Menem: I too want to see you in 1990. We await you in Argentina, as you know. I would like to say that my wife and children send you and Mrs. Bush the very best wishes for the holidays. (Ø)

The President: That is sweet. Well, my very best wishes for the coming year to you. I'll be back to you later. Thank you sir. Adios. (U)

President Menem: Thank you. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Francois Mitterrand
Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetaker: David Pacelli

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 20, 1989, 7:41 - 7:56 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Francois, how are you? (U)

President Mitterrand: Fine. I am going in a few minutes to the German Democratic Republic. (Ø)

The President: I know you are. It will be a very important trip. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I am going to spend two and a half days there. I will give you a call on any progress. (Ø)

The President: I agree that that would be very useful. Before I get into discussing Panama, I want to thank you again for your trip to St. Martin. I learned a lot from that meeting. I really appreciated your coming such a long way, and I appreciated your hospitality. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: That was the least I could do after I had the benefit of your hospitality earlier in Maine. (Ø)

The President: I would like to raise another subject if you have three minutes. (U)

President Mitterrand: Yes, Yes. (U)

The President: We have tried very hard to consult with hemispheric leaders, and other leaders such as the Federal Republic, to peacefully resolve the situation and help bring democracy to Panama. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes, yes. (U)

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The President: Last Friday, Noriega declared a state of war with the United States. The next day, the PDF shot to death an unarmed serviceman. They wounded another. They seized and brutally beat another and sexually threatened the wife of the last one. So to make a long story short, I decided we had to take military action to protect the lives of Americans and to restore democratic government to Panama (or helping to do that). Endara and his two elected Vice Presidents, Calderon and Ford, were sworn in by Panamanian magistrates. Noriega has gone underground. (C)

President Mitterrand: Where is he now? (C)

The President: I'm not sure. We are still looking. (C)

President Mitterrand: What is the situation in Panama City? (C)

The President: The situation is mostly under control. Secretary Cheney will be giving a briefing in a few minutes on CNN. I'm sure that your people will get it. It's mostly calm, with pockets of resistance. The majority of the PDF, if not in disarray, then it is heading in that direction, which is a good sign. The officers who opposed Noriega in the coup have now been released from prison by our soldiers. They are very happy, understandably. (C)

And now, I am in the process of sending our Ambassador back, of lifting all the economic sanctions off Panama, and, of course, we have recognized the government of Endara, Calderon, and Ford. I am hoping that after the dust settles, others will recognize Endara's government. I think a lot will in this hemisphere. (C)

There are a lot of unsubstantiated reports of the numbers of dead. We have some American servicemen -- we think it is nine. There have been some Panamanian deaths. So far, it doesn't appear to be many. I hope not. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, yes, yes. (U)

The President: I wanted to bring you up to date. There is sufficient force to bring the situation under control in a short period of time. That is where we stand. I appreciate your taking the call before heading off to the GDR. (C)

President Mitterrand: Thank you. Obviously, to have to intervene in a sovereign country is always delicate. The initiative taken by Noriega -- or his Army -- to kill U.S. officers is an important contribution to explaining this situation, not forgetting the drug situation. (C)

The President: Francois, what gets me the most was the interrogation and sexual abuse of the wife of a Navy lieutenant. That got to me almost as much as the death of the Marine. (C)

President Mitterrand: Yes, I understand all of this. What is necessary is for the United States position to be clearly expressed regarding the safeguarding of U.S. men and women, as well as the war against drugs. The democracy element is important, but not sufficient, because there are lots of dictatorships in the world, and it does not justify acting against all of them. (Ø)

The President: That is a very good point. I've just been on American television. And as I said, it just came to a situation where I said "enough is enough" to protect American lives. Francois, I do worry about intervention and what it will do to us in the hemisphere. I do worry also about the drugs and the threats to civilians. But I appreciate your words of caution and your words of advice. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I know you, my dear George, and you are concerned about democracy and the rights of peoples, and so I am not one of those to criticize these things. You probably thought of this. You know all too well the predictable reactions in Latin America. As for recognizing the government, I will get all the documents, but France will not cause you any problems. (Ø)

The President: Thank you. It sounds like a wonderful trip you have planned to the GDR. I would love to hear about it. (Ø)

President Mitterrand: I will send you a diplomatic note on it. (Ø)

The President: Sounds good. (U)

President Mitterrand: Good luck to you and good luck to the American people. (Ø)

The President: Thanks and have a good holiday season. Au revoir. (U)

President Mitterrand: Au revoir. (U)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
Notetaker: David Pacelli
Translator: Makiko Wororoff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 20, 1989, 0935 - 0947 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President called Prime Minister Kaifu to talk about the situation in Panama. (U)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, can you hear me alright? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Good evening, Mr. President. This is Prime Minister Kaifu. (U)

The President: I am glad to talk to you. I am calling about the unfolding events in Panama. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. (U)

The President: We tried very hard through diplomatic efforts and through the OAS and other multilateral diplomatic efforts so that the will of the Panamanian people is fulfilled, or in other words, to have democracy returned to Panama. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. (U)

The President: Last Friday, Noriega declared himself "maximum leader" and he declared a state of war with the United States. The next day, the PDF killed a Marine and wounded another, and they severely beat another serviceman and sexually harassed his wife. It was at that point that I decided that we could no longer accept this threat to American citizens. I decided that we would have to use force to protect American lives. As you know, Noriega is an indicted drug merchant. And we are trying to restore democracy, or help restore democracy, to Panama. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. (U)

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The President: The people who were elected in a free election -- President Endara and his two Vice Presidents, Calderon and Ford -- took the oath of office, before U.S. troops came in, to which they were duly elected. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. (U)

The President: We recognize the Endara government. We think others will recognize Endara. We have lifted our economic sanctions against Panama and we will return our Ambassador very shortly to Panama. Now, we will go forward, obviously, to recognize a nominee from the new government to administer the Canal, and I think this will mean that the treaty over the Canal and Panama will present no problems, that is, in the year 2000, as you know. (C)

And so, we feel the fighting is pretty much under control -- not totally, in Panama now. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. (U)

The President: We don't have Noriega in custody. He has run away. But we are determined to help the Endara government to find him. We don't believe he will be able to return to power in any way. A lot of his PDF allies have laid down their arms. (C)

I wanted to call you on this. We respect the principle of nonintervention. But with these threats we felt that we just had to take action. We are hoping that Japan will lead in helping Panama. We hope that Japan will also recognize the Endara government. We will be certain to supply you or your Foreign Minister with additional facts as they unfold. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. Mr. President, thank you for this telephone call at a very difficult time. I have been honored to receive this information from you personally, Mr. President. You have explained the background as to what is happening, especially regarding the threat to American citizens. I fully understand that situation. I hope that the current military situation will come to a close as soon as possible, and that democracy will be restored in Panama as soon as it can. As far as Japan is concerned, we always attach importance to safeguarding the lives of people. With the information you have provided, you can count on Japan to support democracy in Panama. (C)

The President: That is fine. It is a difficult one. As soon as the military situation is stable, we will take out the additional military forces that were sent down to supplement the Southern Command. (C)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Yes. (U)

The President: Thank you for receiving this call and I hope all goes will with you. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you. (U)

The President: What time is it over there? (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Ten minutes to midnight. (U)

The President: I am very sorry it is so late. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Thank you for calling me at such a busy time for you. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

Prime Minister Kaifu: Goodbye [in English]. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Chancellor Helmut Kohl Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse Notetaker: David Pacelli
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	December 20, 1989, 10:50 - 11:03 a.m. EST The Oval Office

The President: Helmut? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: [Indistinct]

The President: Well, listen, I have been following your trip with great interest and great respect. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope to be able to report to you in detail very soon. I do hope that we get ahead, a good deal, as we indicated at Dresden. (C)

The President: That is encouraging. If you have a moment, I would like to fill you in on Panama. In the first place, we had tried to use multilateral diplomacy, including the OAS. I have had consultations with the Presidents of the Central American countries, South America, and other leaders. We have become increasingly frustrated with Noriega. (C)

Last Friday, Noriega was declared the maximum leader, and then he declared a state of war with the United States. Subsequent to that, one of our Marines was killed, an unarmed Marine. Another soldier was beaten up. Another officer and his wife were brutally interrogated. He was reported to have been kicked and i abused, and his wife was threatened with sexual abuse. An obligation of a President is to protect the principle and coherence of a lot of people in Panama, and not just Americans. So I've decided that this force that you have read about had to be brought to bear on the situation, to protect American lives,

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to bring an indicted drug dealer -- Noriega -- to justice, and then to help restore the democracy that the Panamanian people voted for in a certified election several months ago. (Ø)

The military operation is almost over. We have recognized Endara as soon as he took the oath of office, which happened at 12 o'clock last night. We are lifting our sanctions against Panama. We are returning our Ambassador. And of course, we will go forward with the appointment of a Panama Canal Administrator, recommended by the democratic government of Panama, since we could not do that with a Noriega government. We are convinced that there will be widespread public support for Endara just as soon as people saw they had nothing to fear from Noriega. (Ø)

In doing what I had to do, I realized that some countries in Latin America would have concerns about U.S. force. I understand that. But given the threat to American lives, and in particular, Helmut, the one thing that moved me was the fondling and sexual harassment of a Navy lieutenant's wife. And I said, "enough is enough;" I'm going to do something about this. We have obligations and rights under the Canal Treaty and those people were there with every legitimate right to be there. I thought I must move to protect American lives. (Ø)

I am convinced that countries, as soon as the dust has settled, will start to recognize Endara, and I'm sure they will. And I am convinced the Federal Republic will recognize that government as soon as you get all the facts. We understand that Costa Rica has already recognized Endara. And Endara told me that Venezuela was going to do that. It is good to hear that. (Ø)

Knowing your political system, I have no doubt that some of your countrymen will be highly critical of us. I want you to know the facts. This has not been a reckless action. We have conducted a number of consultations. And I wanted you to have the facts from your friend. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. I really do understand what you are telling me because it is scandalous what those people did. I issued a statement when I returned from Dresden, which was published. The statement said:

> After the developments in Panama, and in particular after the events of the last few days, and seeing the danger that exists regarding American citizens, the Federal Republic of Germany has an understanding of the American attitude and the American action. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate that. I don't want to ask you to do anything that causes you problems. But I appreciate those comments. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: It is not only that I have no problems with that. Because this is a matter where [indistinct].

The President: Thank you sir, and I am looking forward to hearing of your fascinating times over there. The closer we stay in touch, the better off we are. Because I don't want anyone to try to drive wedges between us. I respect what you are trying to do. I look forward to hearing from you and your concerns. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much. And give my best to Barbara. (U)

The President: Thank you. I appreciate that. And the very best wishes for you in 1990. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. (U)

The President: Alright. My love to Hannelore. Goodbye. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Prime Minister Robert Hawke Notetaker: David Pacelli
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	December 20, 1989, 4:38 - 4:47 pm EST Situation Room

The President called Prime Minister Hawke as one of a series of calls to world leaders to discuss the situation in Panama. (U)

The President: Hello, Bob. (U)

Prime Minister Hawke: George. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Hawke: Very well indeed. (U)

The President: As you know, we are engaging in military action in Panama and I am calling to explain it to you. (U)

Prime Minister Hawke: Thanks very much, George. (U)

The President: The problem began with Endara winning the election on May 7 and then Noriega throwing out the election. We haven't been able to do much about that except engage in lots of consultation; consultation with the OAS. And when the Panamanian military rose up in October, we were restrained, and we suffered a lot of criticism because we did not decide to become involved. (Ø)

Last Friday, Noriega began by declaring a state of war against the United States. Now, we were cautious about that, but it alarmed people. Then he went and killed one Marine, wounding another, brutally interrogating another serviceman, and sexually abusing his wife. At that point, I said that we couldn't take this at all. (Ø)

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BJ 8/21/09

At 1 o'clock this morning, our military operations began. At 12 o'clock, Endara had taken the oath of office as the new President of Panama. We are seeking to help him restore democracy in Panama. As part of that, first, we are lifting the ban on shipping and our economic sanctions, returning the Canal fees we have held in escrow, and we will appoint a Panamanian chosen by the Endara government as Administrator of the Panama Canal. That is a key point, since I am fully committed to implementing the Canal Treaties. (C)

So we got a situation at the end of the day where the military situation is going well. Noriega has run for cover. I think we'll get him eventually, but I don't know, it is a bit like a rabbit warren down there. He has no power base. The PDF is discredited. Without him, it is nothing. You know how he had declared himself recently the maximum leader. (C)

We expect to receive some flak for this. As I told some other leaders, we tried to be patient, to use the OAS, to try harder for a solution, but when American lives are threatened, we had to act. This pattern of dangerous harassment of American citizens had to end. (C)

What we will do is help restore democracy in Panama. We will take our additional troops out just as soon as we can. (C)

I am pleased so far with the reaction I have received from the other leaders. We didn't get support for our military action, especially in Latin America, but there is understanding and that is like having psychological support. I have talked to a number of leaders, including Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. I just wanted to explain to them our rationale and to ensure they knew that we had not decided this thing rashly. We have received enormous support for this in the United States. And that is where we are as of 4:45 in the afternoon. (C)

Prime Minister Hawke: Thank you very much for calling and keeping me informed. Obviously, like you, we regret the circumstances that made your action necessary. Like you, we don't like to use force to achieve our objectives. But in these circumstances, we understand the situation and the reasons why you took the measures you did. In anything we say about the matter, you'll have no cause for concern. (C)

The President: I appreciate that. And I appreciate your weighing in on the satellite thing -- I'm talking about the China satellite deal. (C)

Prime Minister Hawke: We appreciate that. I was going to mention it if you didn't. It makes a difference of over $100 million in cost to the operation. I appreciate much you seeing your way clear on that. And speaking of that, what do you make of the events in China? (C)

The President: I hope the Chinese will take action, seeing that personally I am in a bind with the Congress. I can't tell specifically. I don't know what they will do, but they will do something. There are some indications that they will do something. (C)

Prime Minister Hawke: Things in the economic and political directorates are worse than it was. Deng's power is diminishing. It's not a pretty sight at the moment. (C)

The President: I think you are right. Well, we'll keep in touch. And my best wishes for Christmas and the New Year.

Prime Minister Hawke: Thanks. The same to you and Barbara. I hope to be able to see you before too long. (U)

The President: Yes. My best to you during the holidays. Goodbye. (U)

THATCHER

DEC 20, 1989 - PRESIDENT CALLED THATCHER RE PANAMANIAN ACTION; PRYCE MONITORED - CALL STARTED 0209 - TERMINATED 0217 - PRESIDENT AT WH

MANLEY

DEC 20, 1989 - PRESIDENT CALLED MANLEY AT 0240 - TERMINATED 0247. PRYCE MONITORED - PRESIDENT AT WH

ENDARA DEC 20, 1989 - PRESIDENT CALLED ENDARA
INITIATED AT 1010 - TERMINATED 1020; PACELL
MONITORED. PRESIDENT AT WH

ARIAS

DEC 20, 1989 - PRESIDENT CALLED ARIAS AT 1248
CALL TERMINATED 1302. PRES AT WH

CALLEJAS DEC 20, 1989 - PRSIDENT CALLED PRESIDENT CALLEJAS OF HONDURAS AT 1834 - CALLED TEF PRESIDENT AT WH

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
45. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (4 pp.)	12/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Call - Memorandum of Conversations 10/24/89 - 12/26/89

Date Closed:	2/2/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91111-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(553)	**MR Case #:**	
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Interpreter: Lillian Nigaglioni
Notetaker: Adrian Basora (U)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 23, 1989, 8:05 - 8:35 am EST
The Oval Office (U)

The President telephoned Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain concerning the Panama situation. (U)

The President: Merry Christmas! (U)

PM Gonzalez: The same to you. (U)

The President: I would like to fill you in on the situation in Panama. As you know, we made every effort to use multilateral means to solve this problem but all our attempts failed. This crazy man Noriega then issued a declaration of war. The declaration itself did not worry us, but it made us wonder where his behavior would lead. Then his people killed a U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel and a U.S. Navy Lieutenant was beaten and his wife sexually harassed. There was no way to predict what Noriega would do, and I decided that I had to act to protect U.S. lives. (S)

I very much regret the loss of life, and I want to express my personal condolences; I understand that a Spanish journalist was killed. (S)

PM Gonzalez: That is correct. (S)

The President: I hope your airplane sent to repatriate the body had already landed. (S)

PM Gonzalez: No, it has not yet arrived, and I had wanted to request that you assist us in this regard. (S)

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The President: I had instructed our forces in Panama to facilitate its landing. As soon as I hang up I will call the Pentagon and make sure that proper instructions are given to our Southern Command. (Ø)

PM Gonzalez: I have a few comments that I would like to make about the situation in Panama. (Ø)

Mr. President: Please go ahead. (Ø)

PM Gonzalez: The way things stand, it will be extraordinarily difficult to find a reasonable way out. I have talked to our Ambassador in Panama and to numerous Panamanians as well as to Carlos Andres Perez, and I will soon be calling Endara and Arias Calderon. (Ø)

We have a big problem with Spanish public opinion, and it is important that our Ambassador be able to move freely in Panama in order to look after our Spanish community there. (Ø)

I think that it is very important to set up an airlift of food and medicine from the U.S. to Panama. Otherwise, the desperation of the people will produce more disorder because of the shortages. The best method of establishing civilian control of the neighborhoods is to set up points of distribution of food and medicine, thus showing the presence of the new civil authorities. (Ø)

I believe the massive arrests of Panamanian government officials who were not closely linked to Noriega is a major mistake and could cause a deterioration of the situation. It is still possible for the new authorities to issue a call to the National Guard (PDF) to rally to the new government and rejoin the PDF. But this must be done in a non-humiliating way and with appropriate guarantees. Otherwise, U.S. forces will need to remain well beyond a month and pockets of resistance will fester for a long time. The operation has failed so far in terms of public order and in reestablishing civil authority. It is important to correct this. If you feel we can help in the reconstruction and reconciliation process, I will take the necessary measures to do so. (Ø)

The President: I am sure the Panamanians will welcome this very much. While we were talking I had my military aide check with the Pentagon and he assures me that the Spanish plane that you have sent is cleared to land. (Ø)

Endara has recruited 100 police officers to work with the military police. He has also begun to make government appointments and to begin governing, so that the Panamanian people and world opinion will see that he is in control. The problem for Endara is not the PDF but the Dignity Battalions. These people are basically thugs and are hiding in buildings and

sniping. The problem will be improved greatly if Noriega can be brought to justice, but so far we have been unable to find him.

PM Gonzalez: I agree that the problem is with the Dignity Battalions, but some PDF are fighting alongside them. This is why it is necessary to reconstruct the PDF. The method Endara is using will not work. He will not regain public order unless the PDF is largely reconstructed. (S)

The President: That is right, and this is exactly what we want to do. We have no argument with the PDF, just with Noriega. Many of the PDF officers that were in prison are being talked to about a reorganization of the PDF, and I think its new head will be announced soon. (S)

PM Gonzalez: Yes, I understand that a Lieutenant Colonel has already been named with the rank of Colonel. Spain will try to get some of the PDF officers who have not yet reincorporated to do so. But U.S. agreement will be needed to permit this to happen. (S)

I want to repeat my point that there is an urgent need for food and medical supplies. (S)

Mr. President: That is a good point, and I think this has already been started. But your suggestion is a good one and I will call right away to make sure that the airlift is on track. (S)

PM Gonzalez: It is essential to win back internal public opinion in Panama, and in Latin America, with massive humanitarian assistance. (S)

The President: The moment that Endara took office the U.S. was able to lift its sanctions. This will help the economy greatly, but it will take a few days. It will also give legitimacy to the Endara government and help the people of Panama by restoring the economic situation. (S)

PM Gonzalez: This is good, but let me stress again that food and medicine are urgently needed. (S)

The President: Thank you and Merry Christmas. You can count on us to keep working on the restoration of civil order. (S) (b)(1)

[redacted]

Mr. President: Yes, I remember. That is good and we do want to seek their reincorporation into the PDF with honor and dignity. If you have specific suggestions of officers that want to rejoin

and are willing to work under elected civilian authorities, Endara would want to see them incorporated. Perhaps you can have your Ambassador in Washington or Panama give us the specific names. (S)

What do your contacts in Panama say about the whereabouts of Noriega. Is he in the city? (S)

PM Gonzalez: I have the impression that he is not in the city but he is using the survival techniques that he knows well. (S)

Mr. President: Do you know about the things that were found in his headquarters - $2,000,000 in cash, narcotics, witchcraft, pictures of Hitler? (S)

PM Gonzalez: Yes. (S)

The President: Thank you very much and I look forward to working with you. I know that this action has caused anxiety, but it will result in democracy being restored in Panama. This is something we had to do. We can not permit U.S. citizens to be brutalized and we have rights under the Treaty. But the Treaty will go forward and now we will be able to get a Panamanian, nominated by Endara, confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Head of the Panama Canal authority. (S)

PM Gonzalez: It is very important how we come out of this. What we need is an effective way out that is conciliatory and has a civilian character. This is important for both Latin America and for the international community. (S)

Mr. President: I agree. The only thing that we cannot permit is a return of Noriega. (S)

PM Gonzalez: I agree. We will need a civilian outcome that totally eliminates a return of Noriega. (S)

Mr. President: Have a wonderful New Year. We will work this out peacefully. I am up here at Camp David for the weekend and it is very cold! (S)

PM Gonzalez: Please give my greetings to your wife. (S)

The President: Barbara is right here, and I will do that. (S)

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2000-0429-F
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 26, 1989, 10:05 a.m. - 10:11 a.m.
Camp David

Prime Minister Shamir telephoned the President to convey holiday greetings and to discuss recent developments in Europe and Panama. (U)

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, how are you? (U)

The Prime Minister: I am happy to listen to your voice. I want to wish you, Mrs. Bush and your family a happy holiday and a successful new year. (U)

The President: Thank you. It's very thoughtful of you to call. We are up at Camp David, all five children and eleven grandchildren. I hope you had a nice holiday. (U)

The Prime Minister: I did, thank you. It must be paradise to be at Camp David with your family there. (U)

The President: I hope you got some time off to celebrate. (U)

The Prime Minister: I took a few days off. I have also been following the dramatic events in Romania and Panamanian. (U)

The President: I am relieved that it is all over in Panama. I am pleased with the results. The big question is will this drug dealer be brought to justice in the United States? I don't know the answer but there is jubilation in Panama out in the streets. People are showing strong support for democracy and liberation. We are happy that it seems to be working out. I regret that lives were lost. You know how you feel when Israel loses its soldiers. I am deeply unhappy with both U.S. and Panamanian loses. But we did the right thing and I believe people will understand that. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: I share your grief, and I am pleased with your victory, a victory of democracy. And there is now a new democracy in Europe, and closer to the United States for the first time in Panama. (U)

The President: I hope there will be opportunities for Israel in all this activity in Europe. (U)

The Prime Minister: We are sending medical help. We hope to have new relations with these countries. And we hope the situation will improve all over the world. (U)

The President: We will work with you to get recognition from those countries. (U)

The Prime Minister: We are continuing our efforts to achieve further progress in the peace process... (U)

The President: Good. (U)

The Prime Minister: ... in cooperation with you. We hope to reach our goals. It is important that we move it forward. (U)

The President: I am happy that at the year's end there seems to be a little progress. Let's stay in touch. (U)

The Prime Minister: Thank you. I admire you greatly and wish you success. And my best to your family. (U)

The President: Thank you. It was sweet of you to call. Please pass my regards to your family. This was a very thoughtful call. (U)

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