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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91111
Folder ID Number: 91111-003

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/1/89 - 10/23/89

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of Turkey (2 pp.)	8/1/89	(b)(1)	C
02. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with the Pope (3 pp.)	8/1/89	(b)(1)	C
03. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to President Kenan Evren of Turkey (3 pp.)	8/1/89	(b)(1)	C
04. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Margaret Thatcher (3 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	C
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (3 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	C
06. Telcon	Re: President Bush's Telephone Call to King Hassan II (2 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	
07. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Bendjedid of Algeria (3 pp.)	8/2/89	(b)(1)	C
08. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Sultan Qaboos of Oman (3 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	C
09. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany (2 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	C
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, International Commission - Red Cross (2 pp.)	8/4/89	(b)(1)	C

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File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 8/1/89 - 10/23/89

Pinksheet Number: cap938
OA/ID Number: 91111-003
Date Closed: 2/2/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Telcon	Re: Phone Call to the President from the Pakistani Prime Minister (2 pp.)	8/5/89	(b)(1)	S
12. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Guillermo Endara of Panama (3 pp.)	8/7/89	(b)(1)	C
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel (3 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	C
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	8/9/89	(b)(1)	C
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Virgilio Barco Vargas, President of Colombia (3 pp.)	8/21/89	(b)(1)	C
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela (3 pp.)	8/22/89	(b)(1)	C
17. Telcon	Re: Memorandum for Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	8/22/89	(b)(1)	C
18. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Francois Mitterrand of France (3 pp.)	8/26/89	(b)(1)	S
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Virgilio Barco Vargas, President of Colombia (3 pp.)	8/28/89	(b)(1)	C
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (2 pp.)	9/5/89	(b)(1)	C

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21. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (4 pp.)	9/5/89	(b)(1)	C
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (2 pp.)	9/9/89	(b)(1)	C
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Pope John Paul II (2 pp.)	9/16/89	(b)(1)	C
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call to Francois Mitterrand, President of France (2 pp.)	9/16/89	(b)(1)	S
25. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Virgilio Barco Colombia (2 pp.)	9/26/89	(b)(1)	
26. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Former Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte (1 pp.)	9/27/89	(b)(1)	C
27. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (2 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	C
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey (2 pp.)	10/2/89	(b)(1)	C
29a. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to G. Philip Hughes Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (1 pp.)	10/12/89	(b)(1)	C
29b. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (3 pp.)	10/3/89	(b)(1)	C

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30. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (3 pp.)	10/16/89	(b)(1)	℄
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (2 pp.)	10/18/89	(b)(1)	
32. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	℄
33. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	℄
34. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Francois Mitterrand/President of France (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	℄

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AUGUST 1989

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME August 1, 1989, 3:40 - 3:47 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call and began by saying he had received President Evren's letter about the terrible situation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal said it was a very bad situation. The number of those who have emigrated to Turkey is now up to 230,000. (U)

The President said he would call President Evren later to assure him of U.S. support. The President said he also wanted to mention Cyprus, which had been discussed at the Paris Economic Summit and which several West European leaders had asked the President to discuss with Prime Minister Ozal and President Evren. The President said that the U.S. and Turkey want the same thing: a Cyprus settlement that will unite the island and protect the security of all Cypriots. The talks led by the U.N. Secretary General have been delayed. The President expressed the hope that they can get underway again. Cypriot leaders seem to be committed to work with the Secretary General. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ozal said that everything had been going alright until the demonstrations by the Greek Cypriots. Marchers had crossed the border and were detained by Turkish Cypriot police. All have now been released. The Turkish Cypriot people, however, feel the talks should be delayed. (Ø)

The President replied that the U.S. view is strongly in favor of getting the talks going again. This is the best opportunity for a settlement. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal agreed, but said that every time they begin, something happens -- on the other side. The Prime Minister did feel the talks would resume, however. (U)

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The President noted that the U.S. special Cyprus coordinator is in Ankara and will be going to Athens and Cyprus, and expressed the hope that his visit would be useful. The President said he would also mention to President Evren his appreciation for the letter and also touch on Cyprus. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal expressed his concern over the situation in Lebanon and his sorrow over the death of Colonel Higgins. (U)

The President said that the American people are shocked. It is very hard to know what to do, because these people act in very shadowy ways. (U)

The Prime Minister said that Turkey would help in any way it can. (U)

The President thanked the Prime Minister and asked that he call immediately if the Turkish Government learned anything through intelligence sources. If anyone could find a way to free the hostages, he would be a great hero to the American people. (C)

The Prime Minister said that he would try, perhaps through the Iranians, who may be able to help. (C)

The President agreed that Iran may be in a mood to be more helpful and repeated his request for any assistance Turkey might be able to provide. (C)

The Prime Minister assured the President that Turkey would help as much as possible. (U)

The President repeated that he would try to call President Evren later in the day. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal, concluding, asked whether the President could help in dealing with Bulgaria, perhaps through the Soviets. (C)

The President replied that the United States does not have much influence with Bulgaria but promised to mention the matter to General Scowcroft and Secretary Baker. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with the Pope,
August 1, 1989; 4:13-4:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Pope
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 1, 1989, 4:13 p.m. - 4:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President began the conversation by apologizing for calling His Holiness so late and saying that he wanted to discuss the situation in Lebanon and the hostages. He stated that the United States was in a state of shock and sadness over the death of Colonel Higgins, who was serving with the United Nations in Lebanon but in fact was a U.S. citizen. The American people were shocked to the core. (U)

The President then suggested a statement or a word from the Vatican would encourage those who did it to return his body. Since the Pope was well respected and committed to peace, the President thought his intervention in this regard would be helpful with Hizbollah. (U)

The Pope indicated that his first concern was the suffering in Lebanon. (U)

The President acknowledged that but said if the Vatican could join with the UN to ask that the body be returned to the family, it would mean a lot to the American people. He noted that the UN Secretary General had just sent an envoy to get the body returned. (U)

The President said that it was the question of the body, of when he was killed, and the pictures of the hanging that were so horrible for the loved ones who had no one to lay to rest. The President felt that a Vatican call for the body's return would be well received. (U)

The Pope said he had spoken to the UN Secretary General saying that it was necessary perhaps to reunite the UN Security Council on Lebanon. The Secretary General said he would try but perhaps, the Pope speculated, this situation and the recent provocation made it a good reason for this reunion. (U)

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The President agreed that on the big picture that might be possible, but he noted we had two problems. First, there was the short-term focus on the death of our hostage and the threats against Terry Waite and Joe Cicippio which dominate our concerns. Second, the President continued, there was the Pope's overall concern on Lebanon. The President then mentioned that he was aware that our Charge' had met with the Vatican Foreign Minister, Monsignor Tauran, who had shared the Pope's concerns with us. The President reiterated to the Pope that we share that concern. (Ø)

The Pope acknowledged there was also the matter of Higgins which was a big provocation from the Shiites. (Ø)

The President then turned to the overall situation in Lebanon, stating that he wished the Arab League Foreign Ministers had had more success, but it appeared they had run into a brick wall. However, the President said he was prepared to try to revive the Arab League effort by speaking to the three Heads of State and the UN Secretary General. He continued saying that we were thinking hard and hoping to find a way to help. (Ø)

The Pope commented that Arab League intervention was not enough. (Ø)

The President agreed, but said that he wanted to try to get it going again. He indicated that he would try to encourage them to continue their efforts. He noted the United States had little influence over the parties in the area. The President told the Pope that he wanted him to know that he was aware of the readout of Monsignor Tauran's meeting regarding the Pope's concerns about Lebanon, and he also recalled them from their previous discussions. (Ø)

The Pope said that he would see the Monsignor tomorrow and speak with him to attempt another try. (U)

The President encouraged him to also discuss with the Monsignor the return of the body to the family. He said that he would appreciate any thoughts either the Pope or the Monsignor had on getting the Arab League going again. (U)

The Pope then added there was the question of the hostages. (Ø)

The President acknowledged this, saying this worried the U.S. He noted that we had indications that the executions of Waite and Cicippio would be postponed for now. The deadline had been today, but it was delayed. The President stated that this was very cruel for the families and for the world. (Ø)

The Pope agreed, noting that the whole attitude of these people is one of cruelty that was destroying Beirut. The Muslims are behind the Syrians and Iran. (Ø)

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The President mentioned that we were trying to work with the Syrians to have them get Iran to stop supporting Hizbollah. (C)

The Pope expressed his concern about their attitude of destruction against the Maronite Christians and democratic western institutions. (C)

The President noted that they are antagonistic against everything, but assured the Pope that we would keep trying, saying he respected the Pope's leadership and that we would help where we could. (C)

The Pope then stated that it was also necessary to save the hostages. (C)

The President agreed, saying he appreciated the Pope's taking his call, which he wished could have been more cheerful. He again stressed two specific points to the Pope: that he respected the Pope's concern about Lebanon and that anything the Vatican could do to encourage the killers to return Higgins' body would be appreciated. (C)

The Pope responded that we should continue the same line to save Lebanon and all the hostages and persons involved in this troubled spot. (C)

In conclusion, the President thanked the Pope for taking his call so late and offered his respects. (U)

The call concluded at 4:25 p.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONMEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to President Kenan Evren
of Turkey (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Kenan Evren, President of Turkey
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME August 1, 1989, 4:26 - 4:46 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call, noting that he had received President Evren's letter concerning the terrible situation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The President said he had told Prime Minister Ozal when the President called in July and again today that the United States is very concerned about the situation and will continue to use every opportunity to condemn the Bulgarian Government's actions. (U)

The President said that Prime Minister Ozal suggested the U.S. speak with the Soviet Union on the matter. The President said he did not know whether the U.S. could help but would see what could be done. (U)

The President, continuing, said that he had issued a strongly worded statement on the situation of the Turks in Bulgaria on June 26 and supported an equally strong NATO statement on the subject. He expressed the hope that international pressure of this kind would bring some relief to Turks in Bulgaria as well as to those who have sought refuge in Turkey. (U)

President Evren said he wanted to take the opportunity to thank the President as well as the Congress for the sensitivity they have shown and the support they have provided. (U)

The President expressed his thanks, adding that Bulgaria is not a country the U.S. is close to, putting it mildly, but that the U.S. would like to help if it can. (U)

President Evren said he had no doubts about that. (U)

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The President said he would also like to mention the situation on Cyprus, adding that he knew President Evren had seen Ambassador Abramowitz earlier in the day. The President said that he was gratified that President Evren was lending his support and prestige to the Cyprus negotiations. (U)

The President, continuing, observed that Turkey and the U.S. want the same thing: a Cyprus settlement that will unite the island and protect the security of all Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots. The President said that the main point he wanted to make was that the U.S. wants to see the UN Secretary General backed as much as possible. The negotiations have been delayed by the demonstrations, but the U.S. wants to have the two sides meet the September target date for an outline agreement. The President said that he would appreciate anything President Evren could do to back the Secretary General's plan. The President also noted that the U.S. has a very able special Cyprus coordinator, Nelson Ledsky, who will be in Ankara working to help if possible. (U)

President Evren said he understood Mr. Ledsky would be in Ankara the following day. (U)

The President said that Mr. Ledsky would then be going to Athens and Cyprus. The President repeated that the U.S. wants to get things going. The U.S. does not have much influence, but the President wanted to assure President Evren of U.S. interest. There had been much discussion of Cyprus in Paris, and some leaders have already weighed in with President Evren. The President repeated that the U.S. is ready to help if it can. (U)

President Evren said he also hoped that the issue will be resolved through the negotiations that the two groups will attend. He expressed the view that the best way to resolve the situation is for the two Cypriot leaders to meet face-to-face, because indirect meetings yield no results. He understood that the first meeting was to have taken place July 24 but was then delayed to July 26. Now there has been a further delay because Greek Cypriot women marched to the other side. (U)

The President said he understood that the demonstrations had stopped the negotiations. (U)

President Evren replied that they were not really demonstrations. About 150 women along with two ministers crossed the border to the Turkish side without permission. He understood that the court system was quite flexible, handing down very mild sentences. Those individuals who could pay their fines were released immediately. The only two who remained were the ministers, and they were able to pay their fines the next day and were released as well. President Evren commented that the biggest barrier to negotiations is the other side, which is using tactics to delay the process. (U)

The President replied that if the two sides can resume negotiations, there may be an historic chance for settlement and achieving peace in that troubled part of the world. (U)

President Evren assured the President that Turkey is not pursuing a cancellation of negotiations. The only debate is over the date of resumption. Originally August 15 was mentioned, but because of a celebration that is scheduled, August 17 has now been mentioned. (U)

The President, concluding, said that he had expressed to Prime Minister Ozal his concern about the hostages in Lebanon. He said that he would appreciate hearing from President Evren if he had any ideas on how to help. (U)

President Evren thanked the President for his call and expressed his concern for the murder of Colonel Higgins. Turkey has issued a statement condemning those actions and said to let him know if there was anything else Turkey could do. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME August 2, 1989, 10:11 a.m. - 10:21 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Thatcher concerning the situation in Lebanon. (U)

The Prime Minister commented that the President was having an extremely difficult time. (Ø)

The President said he had been thinking of the Prime Minister, and of his affection for Terry Waite, and wanted to call, wring hands, and talk about U.S. thinking on the issue. (Ø)

The Prime Minister expressed sympathy for the family of LTC Higgins and said she thought the President had been handling the problem extremely well. The real culprits, she said, were those who take hostages. There was no magic wand; direct action would imperil lives. (Ø)

Continuing, the Prime Minister said her government was worried about Terry Waite, and about others. The key was a sustained diplomatic and public offensive, targeted at the UN, Syria, and Iran, to condemn such terrorist activities and make it clear that these hostage-takers were uncivilized, operating contrary to all rules of international behavior. (Ø)

The President said a more concerted international effort was a good idea and that we could do a better job of keeping this issue before world opinion. (Ø)

The Prime Minister felt the President had already enjoyed considerable success in his diplomatic efforts with Iran and Syria, since these countries did not want to be tarred publicly with guilt for terrorist acts. (Ø)

The President thought it might be too soon to be sure of success, but so far the signs were promising. He had asked Secretary

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General Perez de Cuellar and the Pope for help in recovering Higgins' body, a gesture that should be seen as humanitarian in any culture. (Ø)

The Prime Minister noted that since no body had been recovered, it was difficult to be certain about what had actually happened and when. The failure to return the body strengthened the hypothesis that the killing was done at a different time. (Ø)

The President agreed, observing that one country hoped that it had happened earlier. The President praised the courage and stoicism of Mrs. Higgins. (Ø)

The Prime Minister remarked that the President was handling this episode extremely well. She would continue to watch the situation, remained concerned about Terry Waite, and said the terrorists have little to hold them back, except for Iran and Syria. The need for a settlement in Lebanon was clear. (Ø)

The President referred to the Prime Minister's recent letter on the Middle East and said it was a good letter that would get a good reply. He wanted to keep these lines of communication open. He was concerned about escalating violence. He would talk to King Fahd soon, but the negotiating effort in Lebanon seemed to be bogged down. The King would be coming to the US later, but that would be too late for the effort that was needed now. (Ø)

On the Arab-Israeli situation, the President hoped to force the PLO to give a green light to dialogue, but there was no great progress there. (Ø)

The Prime Minister said there should be no condemnation of Israel over the current hostage situation. She noted that the President had not done this. Such a condemnation would not help. She recalled that, in defending the strike against Libya, the US and Britain had argued that if people can go on committing terrorist acts with impunity, the situation will not get better. The West should also do more to condemn hostage-taking when it was not in the news. (Ø)

The President said that even Washington's judicious statement on releasing all hostages was taken by some as anti-Israeli. This was not so, but was a little problem for the Administration. A call to release people held against their will was a valid humanitarian call, which did not bash any one country. (Ø)

The Prime Minister recalled that, after the Libya raid, two British hostages were killed. She knew what the President was going through. The real guilt was with the original hostage-takers. (Ø)

The President hoped there would be no escalation and no further

murders. (Ø)

The Prime Minister hoped the diplomatic strategy could work, carrying on to bring an end to the situation. (Ø)

The President said he felt terrible about the overall picture in Lebanon, heart-broken and frustrated. (Ø)

The Prime Minister said the President was handling the situation absolutely right and admired his approach. (Ø)

The President promised to keep in touch about any new developments, especially on the fate of Terry Waite. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

The President phoned the Prime Minister again, thirty minutes later, to suggest that the Prime Minister call Mrs. Higgins. The Prime Minister welcomed the suggestion and immediately agreed to make the call. The President provided Mrs. Higgins' phone number at the Pentagon. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME, August 2, 1989, 10:33 a.m. 10:43 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President began by saying he wanted to call to discuss the situation in Lebanon with the hostages and more generally as well. (U)

The President said that the world was up in arms about LTC Higgins. We assumed he was dead and didn't know for sure, and didn't know when he died. He knew the King didn't have any influence over the radicals, but wanted to make the same appeal he had made to the Holy Father, the British Prime Minister and head of the United Nations. The President suggested that anything the King could do to influence the return of the body of LTC Higgins would be greatly appreciated. He continued that it was brutal to keep the body there when the man's family was suffering. He told the King we had made a strong appeal to Iran through the Swiss, but we were not very hopeful there. We were asking anyone with any influence with Iran to see what they could do. We had condemned all hostage-taking and called for the immediate release of all hostages. Lastly, he mentioned the larger hostage situation. The Secretary General had dispatched a top aide to the area to help with the return of the body, to encourage both that they take no more hostages and that there be no more deaths. (C)

The President then turned to the broader question about Lebanon itself. He commended the King on his and Prince Saud's efforts with the tripartite initiative saying he felt it offered the best hope. Despite these efforts, it appeared the Foreign Ministers had come to a halt. The President said he didn't know if we could be helpful in resurrecting the initiative and offered to call King Hussein and Chadli Bendjedid if the King thought it would be helpful. He welcomed suggestions from His Majesty on what the U.S. might do, if anything. While he didn't know whether the United Nations Security Council could help, he mentioned that he and Pope John Paul had discussed it the previous day. He then asked if the King had any strong feelings

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on the UN, saying sometimes a UN meeting can be helpful and sometimes not so. (Ø)

King Fahd commented on the murder of LTC Higgins, saying it had hurt them very much in Saudi Arabia and their reaction was very bad. In Saudi Arabia it was considered to be a barbaric act. The King said he would make an effort with all parties with which he believed he had influence. First, he said he would have the body of LTC Higgins returned. Second, he would try to make an effort to have all hostages freed and returned, making that effort with all parties with which he had any influence. (Ø)

The President thanked him. (U)

King Fahd said he would mediate in these and all other matters that are abhorrent to the Saudis and other people. (Ø)

Turning to Lebanon, King Fahd encouraged the President to contact King Hassan and President Bendjedid to encourage them to make another effort on the initiative to arrange a ceasefire, remove the siege, and resolve the other problems in Lebanon. (Ø)

The President agreed to do so. (U)

The President then mentioned Prince Salman's visit, saying he had been honored to receive him. The Vice President had told him how fantastic the exhibit was. He told the King it had received wide acclaim, and he personally wanted to see it. (U)

King Fahd was pleased, saying the success of the exhibit was due to the strenuous, vigorous efforts of United States officials who promoted it. He thanked the President and the people of the United States on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia and his people. (U)

The President then said he wanted to raise one other subject. He said he had received a call from King Hussein and that he was very much concerned about his depressed economy. The President said he would be sending the King a letter asking for addition support, if possible. He said he would do this through normal diplomatic channels in a letter if that was ok with the King. (Ø)

King Fahd responded that he would be pleased to receive any letter from the President. He said King Hussein was a friend and anything he and other friendly countries could do to help they would. (Ø)

The President thanked him and said he looked forward to the King's visit. The arrangements were all set and they would have plenty of private time to discuss all these issues. (U)

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King Fahd said he was looking forward to the visit, and to meeting with the President. He was certain there would be some time to talk about all the important Middle East issues and issues from around the world. (U)

The President thanked the King. (U)

In concluding, King Fahd said he hoped and expected by the time of his visit, we would have accomplished some meaningful things in the Middle East. (U)

The President hoped so too. (U)

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President Bush's Telephone Call to King Hassan II
1:02pm - 1:19pm, August 2, 1989

Participants: The President
King Hassan II of Morocco
Location: Oval Office
Stenographer: Patty Daniel
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetaker: Ralph Sigler

After initial pleasantries, the President told King Hassan that he was calling to discuss both the situation in Lebanon, and the Higgins' case, which had shaken America to the core. The President noted that he had issued a statement condemning all hostage-taking and abductions and calling for the immediate release of all hostages being held by any party.

The President said he had talked to a number of world leaders concerning this problem, and was appealing to the world to use whatever influence anyone has to obtain the return of the body of Colonel Higgins. He also said he had appealed to the Iranians, but was not hopeful of any help in view of the state of relations between the US and Iran. He also noted the UN Secretary General had been helpful and had sent a special emissary to the area.

King Hassan said he fully shared the President's indignation and emotions and said he would help wherever possible.

The President expressed his appreciation and asked if he could turn to the situation in Lebanon.

King Hassan interrupted, saying he wanted to say a few more words on the hostage problem. He noted that the Arab leaders gathered at Casablanca had discussed the need for withdrawal of the Iranian Hizballah faction from Lebanon. He said Syrian President Assad "behind closed doors" had given his personal pledge to the other heads of state that this was Syria's problem and he would take care of it.

The President acknowledged Hassan's statement and noted that the US had seen some evidence of Syrian efforts to be helpful.

King Hassan reminded the President, however, that in this business, Syria often takes with one hand what it gives with the other.

The President expressed appreciation for anything King Hassan might be able to do. He then moved to the problem of Lebanon and the Arab initiative, saying he did not know exactly what the US might be able to do to be helpful, but he was willing to try if the King had any suggestions. The President said he had talked with the Pope yesterday and with King Fahd and Mrs. Thatcher and would be talking to President Bendjedid later today.

King Hassan said that when the mandate from the Summit was first received, all involved had agreed they would be given every facility in order to operate in Lebanon to solve the problem. Secondly, they also had agreed that should they find themselves in an insoluble situation, they would reserve the right to point the finger at the party responsible for the failure. He said the council, including Syria, had unanimously given the group carte blanche for reaching a ceasefire and for undertaking any effort to reestablish Lebanese sovereignty. Unfortunately, they had reached a dead-end street.

King Hassan said the leaders had drafted a lengthy letter to the Arab chiefs of state, informing them that their efforts had been fruitless as a direct result of Syria's failure to respect the rules.

King Hassan said a communique was released yesterday and that a lengthy letter was being signed by King Fahd and Bendjedid, and that he (Hassan) would be receiving it tomorrow and would give it to all the ambassadors. He noted that the letter was very lengthy because it outlines the entire history of the Arab initiative.

The President said he respected what King Hassan and the others were trying to do, and said he was sorry to hear that they had reached a dead end. He told King Hassan to not hesitate to pick up the phone and call him if there was anything we could do to help.

King Hassan expressed his appreciation for the President's offer. He added that some Arab leaders were calling for an extraordinary Summit to address the issue. He thought, however, that such a summit would not be fruitful. Instead, King Hassan said he believed it was now up to the UN Security Council to act. He added that his personal advice to the President, given the combination of the hostage situation and the Lebanese failure, was that the Security Council is now responsible.

The President noted that if Hassan thought the US could be helpful regarding the Security Council, he would be interested in cooperating.

King Hassan said he thought France and the Soviet Union were setting up something along these lines.

The President thanked King Hassan and observed that Admiral Crowe and Alec (the interpreter) had certainly enjoyed being there on King Hassan's special day.

King Hassan said he could not have been more pleased, and described Admiral Crowe as a "wonderful person."

Thank yous were exchanged and the call concluded at 1:19 pm.

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6051 ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Bendjedid of Algeria (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Bendjedid
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME August 2, 1989, 3:28 p.m. - 3:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President began saying he called to discuss the situation in Lebanon both as regards the hostages and the Arab League initiative which we strongly supported. (U)

On the death of LTC Higgins, the President appealed to President Bendjedid on a humanitarian basis, asking if he had any ideas on how the body, which was under the UN banner, could be returned to his family. He stated that this was of real concern to the American people. (U)

On the hostages, the President also said he had appealed to the Iranians through the Swiss but we were not hopeful. He noted the Syrians, who could be difficult, seemed to be cooperating on this matter. He mentioned that it might be possible for the UN Security Council to do something and if that were the case, he would like to feel free to talk to President Bendjedid about it since Algeria was President of the Council this month. (U)

Turning to the larger picture in Lebanon, the President saluted what President Bendjedid, Saudi Arabia and Morocco tried to do. He didn't think the U.S. could have any role with respect to resurrecting their mission but wanted him to know of his support. The President told him his phone line would be open and we would like to be helpful if possible on the big picture in Lebanon. (U)

Concluding that this was his message and these were difficult times, the President said he would like to keep that wonderful line of communication open that they had had for several years now and that he valued. (U)

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President Bendjedid replied that he shared the same concerns as the President. On the first point, he assured the President that he was trying to do his utmost to secure what the President wished. (U)

The President thanked him. (U)

Concerning Lebanon, President Bendjedid said that the Committee was issuing a statement, since they had been through the painful, unhappy Arab League experience, that concluded they were not receiving any cooperation from Syria. Speaking for Algeria, he said they were trying to go on with their efforts in order to help the people in Lebanon. (Ø)

The President said that if there was any role we could play with the countries involved, or any thoughts President Bendjedid had on ways that we could be cooperative in supporting the initiative, to let him know. (Ø)

President Bendjedid said he was very much aware of the difficulties Lebanon faced and he placed considerable hope upon Algeria's efforts. He stressed that Algeria would try to do the utmost to help the Lebanese people find a solution. (Ø)

The President said that he appreciated this. (U)

President Bendjedid then said he wished to avail himself of the opportunity to tell his good friend that he was very touched by the political and moral support the President was giving to Lebanon, particularly his support to the Arab League committee and the confidence he had in Algeria. On terrorism, they would try to do the utmost within the realm of what was possible. He wished to remain in touch on the situation in Lebanon to exchange views in case there were any changes in Lebanon in the next few weeks. (Ø)

President Bendjedid then mentioned another matter of importance (nfi) he wanted to bring to the President's attention. He said he would submit this to the President through our Ambassador or through the Algerian Embassy in Washington. (Ø)

The President replied that he looked forward to receiving it and suggested it should go through their Ambassador here to the National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, if it is was extraordinarily personal. He also suggested another way would be a sealed communication to our Ambassador asking the Secretary of State to send it "eyes only" to the President -- but either way he would get it. (Ø)

President Bendjedid said he might use a special envoy. (Ø)

The President said he much preferred to communicate like they had the time President Bendjedid invited him to lunch in his private quarters, and he hoped some day they would do that again. (U)

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President Bendjedid seconded that. (U)

The President concluded expressing hope that Bendjedid was in good health and offering his respects to his family. (U)

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6081 ADD-ON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Sultan
Qaboos of Oman

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sultan Qaboos
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME, AND August 3, 1989, 11:31 - 11:42 EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President asked the Sultan how he was.

Sultan Qaboos responded that he was fine.

The President said that he had not talked to the Sultan in a long time and that he was delighted this call had worked out.

Sultan Qaboos then said how shocked they were to hear of LTC Higgins' murder.

The President replied that this was one reason for his call. This tragedy had shaken our nation to the very core. LTC Higgins was a man wearing a uniform and a UN representative. He relayed what Sheikh Mohammed of Bahrain had said yesterday when he met with him: that made it the world's business. Everybody had expressed universal concern over this brutality.

Sultan Qaboos stated that he was really shocked, and that this was not good for international relations.

The President said that we presumed LTC Higgins was dead, but we didn't know for sure and we didn't know when he died, if he died. We were appealing to everybody -- Prime Minister Thatcher, the Pope, and others -- for the return of his body. He asked if there was any possible channel the Sultan could use to encourage, directly or indirectly, the hostage holders to send his body back, saying we did not want to leave any stone unturned.

Sultan Qaboos replied they would do their best, and he would get on the phone and get his men to do their utmost. At the moment, he was in Istanbul and was going to have dinner with the President, but he would telephone his country immediately.

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The President continued saying we had another one hanging over our head -- another American hostage -- Cicippio. We had received a brutal tape, and they had suggested postponing the execution or murder for four hours. The President stated it was terrible to parade these men like this and we didn't know what they would do. We had reports the Iranians were trying to be helpful in seeing there were no more killing of American hostages. The President said he knew Oman had some contacts with Iran and that the Foreign Minister was quite forward-looking in his dealings with them.

Sultan Qaboos replied that he would talk to his people immediately about what Iran was doing.

The President expressed his appreciation, saying he had always been comfortable talking frankly with the Sultan. Rafsanjani might turn out to be more reasonable, but he had some radicals in the government like Montashemi-Pur who might make things difficult. There might be a ray of hope, and we didn't want to mishandle our affairs if there might be a change in Iran.

Sultan Qaboos agreed on these points, saying as Rafsanjani came into power, things may be more hopeful.

The President was pleased they thought alike on that. He told the Sultan he was concerned that he may have problems explaining that to many from our side. Our problem would come if they killed another hostage which would change the whole equation of what he must do. Unfortunately, he said that would change the way we would conduct ourselves if it looked like every 24 hours they would kill a hostage. He thought Syria understood that, and Iran understood or was aware that this was our position. He said we were trying to be moderate, reasonable, and restrained.

Sultan Qaboos sympathized, saying the President couldn't be expected to watch his people be killed. He also had an international responsibility to consider. He had to do what he had to do if things didn't improve. The Sultan believed everybody would understand and support his actions.

The President said that was good to hear, but we would continue to use every diplomatic means we could. He concluded, saying that it was nice talking to the Sultan, if he ever had anything to pass on to please call, and then asked about his health.

Sultan Qaboos said he was fine and told him about his current trip, which had started in May in Kuwait. He was in Turkey now, and going to Egypt next week. He hoped to see King Fahd before he went home.

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The President said the Sultan would probably see King Fahd before he comes to the U.S. and asked him to say hello to the King and President Mubarak. He added that he knew they appreciated the Sultan's friendship. He then recalled his visit to Oman, saying Barbara and he still remembered fondly the quiet little visit with the music and luncheon at the Sultan's palace in the south.

The Sultan appreciated his sentiments.

The President ended, saying a visit from the Sultan to our country would be most welcome.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
West Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME August 3, 1989, 2:01 - 2:10 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call and inquired about Chancellor Kohl's vacation. (U)

Chancellor Kohl replied that it was too cool in the Austrian Alps but that he had been swimming, hiking and thinking. He had been thinking in particular of the President and sympathizing with what must be a terrible burden. This type of terrorism [in Lebanon] is one of the worst scourges mankind has experienced. The Chancellor said that he had seen on television pictures of the kidnapped Americans, which brought to mind the kidnapping and murder of his friend Hans Martin Schleier. Schleier had conveyed a message via television to the Chancellor during that period, so the Chancellor knew what must be going on in the President's mind now. (U)

The President expressed his very great thanks and said he wanted to bring the Chancellor up to date on the situation. The tape of Cicippio is of particular concern. In fifty-five minutes the deadline will arrive for his death, so the situation is very similar to the message the Chancellor had mentioned. The President recalled an earlier conversation in which the Chancellor had expressed his great affection for Schleier and said the U.S. is going through the same anguish now. (U)

Chancellor Kohl then mentioned the Hamadei case and assured the President that he would not give in. The Chancellor would stick to what he had told the President before. (U)

The President said there was a small ray of hope. The U.S. had some information that Iran is trying to be helpful. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said that would be very good and the President should seize the opportunity. (U)

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The President said that he is not putting too much hope on it, but there have been tidbits of information that suggest the possibility is worth exploring. The President added that if another American is murdered, his hands would be tied in many ways. He could not sit idly by. The U.S. would have to take some kind of action. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he could understand that very well. (Ø)

The President said he had been making a lot of telephone calls to those who may have some influence with the kidnappers, or with Iran or Lebanon. He hope those with influence would help where they can. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said that he would help in any way possible. He would be at any time if the President wanted to call on him. (U)

The President concluded by noting that after the Chancellor's vacation he would be calling again to discuss problems with other countries in the region. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he would welcome that and repeated his offer to help in any way. He added that an important principle in his life was the help friends in any way possible. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, International Commission - Red Cross

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: August 4, 1989, 4:00 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President began, saying he was calling to say that he had seen references to the Red Cross involving a possible useful role for that organization on the hostage question. He said there were some references coming out of Iran and he didn't know if Mr. Sommaruga had seen them or if there was a useful role for the organization. He wanted to bring them to his attention and encourage him to look into it, if it was something he felt comfortable with. (Ø)

Mr. Sommaruga responded, first by expressing his sympathy for LTC Higgins and all those suffering in these moments. He said the ICRC would be interested and would respond if they were certain all parties concerned requested them to work as a neutral intermediary. That was not the case now. He acknowledged there were some signals from the press that they might play a role and he assured the President that they would do so as soon as they were requested to. (Ø)

The President was pleased, noting his "statesmanlike position." He said as far as the U.S. was concerned, we would like this to be our formal request. He continued that he didn't know what the Iranian reference to the Red Cross meant. He noted that this was of such great human interest and concern here that we would support any effort that he might care to undertake. The President also understood Mr. Sommaruga's wanting to hear from the parties themselves. But inasmuch as there were American lives involved and inasmuch as one had been killed and one might be killed, and since there was no discussion about returning the body, the President said that we would deeply appreciate it if the Red Cross mission was narrowed to just returning the remains of LTC Higgins. (Ø)

Mr. Sommaruga replied that any help they could give on LTC Higgins, large or small, would be given. He was pleased to have the President's request for them to do that. (U)

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The President responded that he should consider this a request to do anything he might feel comfortable doing. He recommended Mr. Sommaruga contact him, our Secretary of State, or our Ambassador in Geneva if he needed any information from the American side. (Ø)

Mr. Sommaruga suggested that the President might nominate a special officer or he would communicate with him using normal channels through our Ambassador in Geneva. (U)

The President noted there was a man here at the National Security Council, if the matter was of a confidential nature, named Dick Haass. If it was a matter of a routine nature or if he was seeking information, the President thought our Ambassador in Geneva, Morris Abrams, who was a personal friend of his, would be good to talk to. (U)

Mr. Sommaruga noted that he had met him a few days ago and would contact him. (U)

The President concluded, saying we would let Ambassador Abrams know that they had had this conversation. He regretted that until the remains of LTC Higgins were returned to his family, we would not continue our business in a relaxed way, and he thanked Mr. Sommaruga for his compassionate interest. (Ø)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Phone Call to the President from the
Pakistani Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Bhutto
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: August 5, 1989, 10:43 p.m. - 10:53 p.m.
Camp David

The Prime Minister began saying she was sorry to trouble the President but that he had said she should phone him if she had a problem. The reason she called was because she was having some difficulty with the President of Pakistan. Three months earlier he had threatened to directly abolish the Assembly. Without going into the details, she was calling the President to get his support for the democratic process in Pakistan and to restrain President Ghulam from carrying out his threat. (S)

The President responded that of course we strongly supported the democratic process in Pakistan, but he really needed to know the details of the problem. (U)

Prime Minister Bhutto said the problem had to do with the armed forces and the assignment of military officers. She explained that under the constitution the Pakistani President appointed officers and she retired them. President Ghulam tried to keep the current Chief of the Joint Chiefs in his job longer; she hadn't agreed with him and wanted to retire him. President Ghulam had then threatened to abolish the assembly. (S)

The President asked if she wanted a statement or something from us. (U)

The Prime Minister responded affirmatively. (U)

The President then said we would contact our Ambassador in Islamabad immediately to get the facts from him, and then we would see what we could do to try to help. He told her he would talk with our Ambassador, and report her call to General Scowcroft and Secretary Baker. (S)

The President then turned to the hostage issue, saying if she had any direct contacts or any thoughts on the hostage situation, we would appreciate her ideas. (S)

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The Prime Minister responded that they had already taken it up with Iran and Syria counseling restraint, and they would be happy to do anything we might advise. (Ø)

The President, in closing, noted that the Algerians were being helpful, and we hoped Pakistan could also help on this. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Guillermo Endara of Panama

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Guillermo Endara, winner of the May 7, 1989
election in Panama
Notetaker: David Pacelli
Stenographer: Pat Battenfield

DATE, TIME, August 7, 1989, 2:40 - 2:45 p.m., EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office - Endara Residence

The President telephoned Mr. Endara concerning the political situation in Panama. (U)

The President began by saying, "Mr. President-elect, how are you doing?" (U)

Mr. Endara replied, "Very good, so great to hear from you." (U)

The President said that he wanted to call and say although so much has happened in Panama and the OAS, as far as we are concerned, one element remains constant -- that Mr. Endara and his two Vice Presidents continue to have the unyielding support and admiration of the people. The President clarified that he was referring to the people here in the United States, and he hoped it was true in Panama. (Ø)

Mr. Endara said, "Thank you very much." (U)

The President said that we are committed to a democratic transition and that he will stand by Mr. Endara and the democratic opposition until somehow this crisis is resolved. The President said he hoped the OAS can insist on the will of the people being adhered to, adding that he sought Mr. Endara's views on that subject. The OAS Commission made clear that Noriega must go if the crisis is to be resolved and if the reconstruction of Panama could begin. Reports make clear that many of Noriega's own supporters want him out. The President concluded by saying that he had not talked to Mr. Endara for a while and wanted to learn what he thought. (Ø)

Mr. Endara said the opposition still thinks the main point in this struggle is Mr. Noriega's ouster from the Defense Forces. That is our main point, he asserted. As to a democratic solution, we still think the May 7 election is valid, he said,

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and people would like to see it accomplish what it promised to accomplish. Mr. Endara said the opposition proposed last Friday to the government under the OAS dialogue's watchful eye that this issue be resolved by plebiscite or referendum. The government feels that it has weak support and is thinking of ways not to go to the plebiscite. Mr. Endara said that he and his two Vice Presidents will probably go on August 23 to Washington, where the meeting of the OAS will reconvene. (Ø)

The President asked if the OAS would let the opposition present its case in Washington? (Ø)

Mr. Endara said they probably won't allow us a formal presentation but will allow us to talk informally to all the Foreign Ministers. (Ø)

The President said that unfortunately, he was going to be out of town, but that the meeting will be interesting. The President said he hopes the OAS makes headway, asking, "Didn't the OAS call for Noriega's being out by September 1?" (Ø)

Mr. Endara answered that the OAS had asked for a transfer of power by September 1. It did not mention exactly the ouster of Noriega. Of course, Mr. Endara said, the way we interpret transfer of power is that it can't be transferred without Noriega leaving Panama. (Ø)

The President said that our intention in going along with the OAS resolution is that Noriega leave. We are willing to back the OAS view but it is predicated on Noriega's getting out on September 1. The President observed that there was not much chance of that, and he asked for Mr. Endara's view. (Ø)

Mr. Endara said we should try to get it by September 1, or continue this struggle. One main objective in going to the OAS meeting is that the OAS recognize the need for the ouster of Noriega and that it be mentioned explicitly--not implicitly as it did last time. (Ø)

The President said, "I see." The President then inquired about Mr. Endara's health. (Ø)

Mr. Endara said he was fine, and he inquired about Mrs. Bush's health. (Ø)

The President said that she was fine and on vacation, adding that he was going up to Maine for a little rest. The President commented that this is a trying time, not only with the problems in Panama, where we'd like to be helpful, but also with the events in the Middle East. (Ø)

Mr. Endara said that events there were a sorrowful matter. (Ø)

The President said, yes, they were a "sorrowful matter"--that's a good way to put it. We'll keep trying there to do what we can, he said. The President said he wanted to pass his respects to Mr. Endara and asked that Mr. Endara pass along his respects to his Vice Presidents. If you have any thoughts, he added feel free to pass them on. (Ø)

Mr. Endara said that at the moment they were in Venezuela visiting Carlos Andres Perez. (Ø)

The President said that President Perez has been pretty good and that he hoped he stays with us on this. (Ø)

The President and Mr. Endara then exchanged good-byes and the call was concluded. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: August 9, 1989, 1:46 p.m. - 2:02 p.m.
The Oval Office

After an exchange of greetings and pleasantries, Prime Minister Shamir mentioned that he had sent a letter to the President through Ambassador Brown. Prime Minister Shamir said that he wanted to have this personal conversation to explain Israel's position better. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir expressed his admiration of the President's handling of the hostage crisis and his respect for the President's concern for the families of the hostages. PM Shamir said that he was aware of the pain of this problem and of the enormous burden on the President's shoulders. He repeated his admiration for how the President was handling the situation. (Ø)

The only reason for Israel's operation, PM Shamir continued, was the "sacred principle" of a small nation that must struggle all the time. It was necessary to show the nation that Israel protected its soldiers, Shamir added. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir concluded by saying that he thought that the result of this operation would be positive and would bring the successful release of all the hostages, "because of your brilliant diplomacy." (Ø)

The President replied that he was a little less optimistic and that he did not know how serious Iran was. The President said that he had told a recent press conference that he didn't want to miss any signals. He said that he was interested in Shamir's thought that it would all turn out positively. The President noted that the United States was upset now, as much as it had ever been in the history of this problem. The American people are unified and deeply concerned. A release would be very good, the President concluded. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Shamir thanked the President for this "optimistic note." Only America can achieve it, he continued. Thank God for the United States, Shamir said. (U)

The President offered to tell Shamir what we had been trying to do. He noted that we had heard some very interesting signals from Iran. Rafsanjani's position was far from certain, since certain elements are opposed to him. As for the Syrians, the President continued, we don't know that they were involved in the hostage matter, but it was clear that they were not doing anything. The President mentioned that he had been in touch with the Soviets, the ICRC, and the United Nations Secretary General. (Ø)

Noting that he had heard of the death of an Israeli soldier in a recent terrorist incident, the President said that people all over the world shared a revulsion at this sort of brutality. (U)

Continuing, the President stated that the United States and Israel had experienced some difficulties in communication between ourselves and that he did not want there to be any differences in the period ahead. The President referred to the meeting between NSC Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arad; this meeting cleared the air and we wanted to continue along those lines. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir replied that Israel would keep the United States informed and would stay in close touch. He said they would pray for your success and for all of us. PM Shamir expressed his hope that "our connection" would continued to be strong. (Ø)

The President said that Shamir should have no doubt regarding the strength of U.S. support for Israel and for the U.S.-Israeli relationship. He urged that we take each other into confidence so that there were no disconnects. The relationship should be a two-way street. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir responded that he was happy to hear the President's views. There were no doubts about the friendly feelings and great friendship between us. Israel relied on the United States. The Soviets have told Israel that the USSR was ready to do something, but Israel relied on the United States, PM Shamir stated. (Ø)

If the USSR could be helpful, that would not bother us, the President said. He had no reservations about their help and Israel trying to improve relations with them. It was not our business (to tell Israel how to respond), but if the Soviets could help, then the United States would not object. However, the President said that so far he had not seen any results from the Soviets. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Shamir replied that the Soviets' "great interest" was to be involved, but they did not demonstrate any readiness to do something. (Ø)

The President raised the peace process, expressing his hope that some moderate Palestinians would come forward to address the Israeli government's peace initiative. He noted that the United States was trying to encourage this. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir said that the United States and Israel shared the same views and sentiments about looking for moderate Palestinian elements. Peace was Israel's great dream. Returning to the hostages issue, PM Shamir stated that with combined efforts we would achieve our goal. (Ø)

The President asked if Israel's POW's were still alive. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir replied that he did not know. We thought one was still alive, he said, but we did not know about the others. Israel wanted some sign of life. If negotiations were to begin, then this sign of life was the necessary first step. There was no reason to give anything for someone not alive. (Ø)

The President mentioned his interest in recovering Higgins' body. (Ø)

PM Shamir expressed his condolences for the death of Higgins. (U)

The President thanked PM Shamir for taking the initiative to call. He said that he was glad he had done so and that he should continue to feel free to call anytime. (U)

After parting pleasantries, the conversation concluded. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with .
President Mubarak of Egypt (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: August 9, 1989, 2:06 p.m. - 2:15 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President and President Mubarak exchanged greetings and conversed briefly about family matters. (U)

The President said that he wanted to mention a couple of matters. He recalled his meeting in the spring with President Mubarak and the suggestion Mubarak had made that they stay in frequent touch. The President mentioned that he was therefore following the "Mubarak Plan", and had picked up the phone to call. (U)

The President said that he would welcome any ideas on the hostage situation. He added that Defense Minister Abu Taleb had an excellent visit at the White House; he hoped that Abu Taleb had felt that it went well from his end. He continued that we had wanted to show Abu Taleb proper friendship and cooperation at both the White House and at the Pentagon. Returning to hostages, the President said that he would appreciate any ideas, that he was prepared to explore any avenue for the safe release of the hostages, and that he hoped someone in Egypt may have some influence. (U)

President Mubarak responded that he was doing his best and that he had made so many contacts. (U)

The President interjected that perhaps somebody with influence or a Muslim cleric in Egypt could help, as a humanitarian gesture for the return of Higgins' remains. The President stressed that he was not asking for a political solution or statement, but rather for an appeal for any humanitarian help possible. (U)

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President Mubarak said he was doing his best. He stated that he had begun to try well before the President's telephone call. He would do the maximum possible. (Ø)

The President said that the United States was speaking directly to Syria. He noted that Syria was not doing everything it could but that Syria did not control those who had the hostages. (Ø)

President Mubarak responded that Egypt was in touch with some Iranians, some Palestinians, and some Lebanese factions. He stated that it took time, but he had hope. (Ø)

The President asked what Mubarak thought of the signals from Iran. (Ø)

President Mubarak said that the President should be very cautious, "as we are with our neighbor here." But no signal should be neglected; nothing is lost by trying. (Ø)

The President mentioned that we were talking to Israel. Although Israel was willing to trade for Sheikh Obeid, the United States policy was well known. (Ø)

On the peace process, the President said that we are pressing ahead. He mentioned NEA Assistant Secretary Kelly's meeting with Mubarak in Cairo recently, and said that the United States was pushing moderate Palestinians to engage on the elections idea. We will keep pressing on this even though it has been by-passed somewhat by the emotional hostage matter. The President added that he valued the opportunity to speak to Mubarak, in whom he places great trust as a friend. The conversations were frank, without any leaks, which gave the President confidence. (Ø)

President Mubarak said that he would be seeing the Israeli Ambassador tomorrow; the Ambassador had an urgent message from Arens. He repeated that he was ready to help in any way. (Ø)

The President thanked Mubarak and added that he had also recently talked to Sultan Qaboos of Oman, who had mentioned that he was coming to Egypt. (U)

President Mubarak mentioned that he would be in New York for the U.N. General Assembly on September 28. He asked if he could meet with the President.

The President said that he would speak to General Scowcroft about working out a time to get together.

Following this, there was an additional personal exchange on family matters, following which the conversation concluded. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Virgilio Barco Vargas, President of Colombia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Virgilio Barco Vargas
Notetaker: William T. Pryce

DATE, TIME August 21, 1989, 8:04 - 8:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President: Mr. President, I am calling to express my condolences on behalf of everybody in the U.S. on the loss of Presidential candidate Galan. It is a terrible thing and we are thinking of you and your courage. I want to work with you to ensure that these Colombians and those before have not died in vain. I want to tell you that we stand ready to help in any responsible way you feel appropriate. It is strictly your call as President of a friendly country. We are ready to respond as quickly as possible to support your police and military in the execution of your new decree laws. I want you to know you have my strong support and admiration for the courageous and sweeping decrees you have adopted. Frankly, from our standpoint, not only is reinstitution of extradition an important move, but provision for the seizure of traffickers' property is critical. And again, if you request it, and only if you request it, we will try to provide assistance to protect judges and other officials who are threatened. (Ø)

President Barco: I appreciate very much your call and your interest for helping our country. I appreciate very much your expressions of solidarity with us, and by your government also. I am grateful for the offering of help that you have given. In that respect, it occurs to me that I could order the Minister of Justice, the Chief of the Narcotics Police, and some representatives of the security organizations of Colombia, like the Armed Forces and the investigative organization, DEAS, that they could meet, if you believe it convenient, convene as soon as possible with U.S. experts/government representatives. (Ø)

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This, of course, as you understand -- it is very difficult for us to accept military help if this requires the sending of troops. We are able to accept your help. We are grateful for all equipment such as helicopters and other electronic aids, etc., and of course, any of those armaments or articles of help will be only for use by our Armed Forces not for anyone else. This is a long time Colombian policy - which is very difficult to change. But, as you stated, there is much help which you can lend to us in many areas. (Ø)

The President: In terms of what you suggest, if it would be useful, I would be prepared immediately to send a team to Bogota to talk to you and law groups and I can get that team underway, people who have my confidence - (Ø)

President Barco: Or I could send the Minister of Justice, the head of the Narcotics Police, our people could come to Washington. (Ø)

The President: I offer this support in a way that is most beneficial to you I realize that you do not want, and must not have, a big overwhelming U.S. presence. (Ø)

President Barco: I don't want a problem -- if I send experts they can come without press and can make a study of what things can be done. We have this problem in the government with elections beginning and this, as you suggested, this could be used by people that prefer to make political points instead of finding a solution. (Ø)

The President: I have great confidence in Ambassador McNamara. You can work closely with him. (U)

We will instruct McNamara to be receptive to any ideas you may have, and ask State and the National Security Advisor to prepare to have a Colombian team come to the U.S. (Ø)

President Barco: There must be a low level of presence. (Ø)

The President: We will work it so your experts can come here and receive a warm welcome at a high level. You tell McNamara what you want. (Ø)

President Barco: I read this afternoon in the Daily Telegraph of what your government has said and I am very grateful for your expression and for what Thornburgh has said. I read the International Herald Tribune (Fred Harris) said that the U.S. might send troops. This would create a very difficult situation -- we are very happy to receive help. (Ø)

The President: U.S. troops send a very difficult signal. We want to do what you want. (Ø)

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President Barco: We are very appreciative of the help and we will see how much and what type. (Ø)

The President: The problem we have is that U.S. press keeps asking high level U.S. officials "What about troops -- what about troops?", all the time. We say that if they are requested, that is something we would consider. We don't want you to feel we are pressing them on you. (Ø)

President Barco: The press is very similar everywhere in the world. We will take care of that. I appreciate very much your interest about our problem. You can be sure that we are very grateful for your suggestions and for your help that we have received from you in the UN and the OAS. Many countries have sent messages of support, including the Pope. We think that the world is beginning to understand that we have a very difficult problem created several years ago when the previous government congealed (froze) the budget of the Army and took back their efficiency and morale. I can assure you people are now ready and doing a good job. There are many things we might need-technical devices and armament that you have. (Ø)

The President: We want to cooperate. Thornburgh tells me that we will be coordinating our indictments in connection with the extradition question -- we will take those we can get extradited. You tell our Ambassador there who you would like to send and when. It would be useful to have high ranking experts talk to your experts. We will call McNamara and tell him to coordinate this matter. (Ø)

President Barco: I will begin tonight on this matter. (Ø)

The President: My respect to you. What a courageous President you have been for your people. (Ø)

President Barco: I appreciate your interest and your words and the interest you have shown and your prayers about the future of Colombia; for your understanding and words of hope. We will try to meet and find what things are urgent and necessary. (Ø)

The President: If you want to talk to me in confidence, there are channels to do this, Ambassador McNamara is probably the best. Good luck. (Ø)

President Barco: My Foreign Minister, a retired Colonel, is leaving for Washington tomorrow for the OAS meeting. I will also tell him to join the group to study what to do. (Ø)

The President: Thank you very much for all you are doing. (Ø)

President Barco: My regards to Mrs. Bush. Thank you on behalf of all Colombians for the interest you have given and for your personal interest. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Carlos
Andres Perez, President of Venezuela

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of
Venezuela
Notetaker: William Pryce

DATE, TIME August 22, 1989, 1:17-1:32 p.m., EDT
& PLACE: Kennebunkport

The President telephoned President Perez regarding the
Organization of American States' action on Panama. (Ø)

The President: Hello Mr. President, how are you? (U)

President Perez: Fine, thank you. It's a pleasure to hear your
voice. (U)

The President: So glad to hear your voice. I'm sitting up here
in Maine by the seashore on a beautiful day, but I was calling
you on the matter of the Organization of American States and
Panama. (Ø)

President Perez: I'm very interested in hearing your views on
that Mr. President because I think the OAS has basically failed.
(Ø)

The President: Maybe so, but tomorrow there will be another
meeting, as you know. I would like to make a proposal that I
hope Venezuela could take the lead on or be supportive of. The
OAS Commission has a broad outline of a possible solution: (1)
Noriega out by September 1; (2) formation of a transition
government on September 1; and (3) new elections. And of course
if that takes place, the United States would, as I think I told
you, move immediately to lift our sanctions and try to be helpful
to the people of Panama. Like you, I am worried about the OAS as
you just said. I hope we do not have to say that it has failed
totally. But tomorrow we have a chance at the OAS meeting to
make it clear that if Noriega has not agreed to leave power by
September 1, that he is responsible for the lack of a solution.
Then, of course, we'd like to see sanctions which might include

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breaking diplomatic relations, withdrawal of Ambassadors or military attaches, kicking Panama out of the OAS, or applying further economic sanctions. (Ø)

And I have just hung up the phone from talking to your old friend and my new friend, Michael Manley of Jamaica, who incidentally asked me to convey his respects to you. I told him I was calling you and he said Carlos Andres Perez is the most respected figure in our hemisphere for this kind of matter. Manley said he is urging his Ambassador to get the CARICOM Ambassadors, CARICOM countries to strongly support what I have just said, a position he has taken for a long time. We're back where we were. We need a commitment from Noriega to get the hell out of there. There's no point extending, in our view, the OAS Commission unless there's a set date for Noriega. I was telling you this was our view to see if you had any different thoughts, and to encourage support for as strong a democratic action at the OAS tomorrow as possible. (Ø)

President Perez: I fully agree with your viewpoints, Mr. President. I have been talking with other Latin American Presidents myself. I am worried because I know of a great deal of vacillation and because I'm convinced it is absolutely essential that a strong decision be taken in that meeting tomorrow. The OAS must adopt a decision in the terms that you have said -- that the failure of the OAS Commission mandate be ascribed entirely to Noriega for his refusal to leave power by the first of September and there must be an agreement to set up an interim government acceptable to the opposition and that an election be invoked this calendar year. What I do not see is that there's very much spirit in the air for breaking relations. (Ø)

The President: That would be a step that might encourage Noriega to move out if we could get more support for breaking relations, even though none of us want to hurt the people of Panama. (Ø)

President Perez: I understand what you're saying. That's why I'm saying the situation is very difficult. But in the rest of today I'm going to be talking to other Latin American Presidents and to Washington to the OAS Commission to see if we can agree on some formula. I agree with you I share your view that there has got to be a strong resolution of condemnation tomorrow. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate that. I knew that you would be working on this and I just wish we could think of a good formulation to get this man out of there. Manley said "we've got to get this thug out of office." Have you had any vacation this summer? (Ø)

President Perez: It is hopelessly hard for me to take vacation with the problem of the debt. (Ø)

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The President: Are we making any progress? I have talked with my collaborators on this. We want to find a solution with Venezuela. Do you feel there's any progress? (Ø)

President Perez: There's no progress yet. But I have talked to Mr. Mulford and he told me that you were very interested in an early solution to the problem. (Ø)

The President: We were pleased with the Mexican situation. I think Salinas was pleased. I realize there are differences with each country. If you see it getting hung up, if you feel they're not being fair to Venezuela's considerations, I would like to hear about that. (Ø)

President Perez: Thank you, Mr. President. I know I can count on your support in this. (Ø)

The President: My best to you my friend, and I mean friend. I am pleased we have a good relationship where we can talk about these problems. (U)

President Perez: Thank you so much. You can count on me. I'm so pleased with the way you are handling not only our problem but the problem of Latin America in general. I hope to have something specific on this Panama business by tonight, and if so I will certainly let you know. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica (P)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli
Stenographer: Pat Battenfield

DATE, TIME August 22, 1989, 1:07 - 1:16 p.m., EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport - Prime Minister's Office

The President telephoned Prime Minister Manley to discuss the OAS meeting on Panama. (P)

The President began by saying, "Mr. President, how are you?" (U)

Prime Minister Manley replied, "Fine, thank you, Mr. President; very nice to hear your voice." (P)

The President said that he remembered the Prime Minister's recent visit with great pleasure and that he hoped things were going well for him at home.

Prime Minister Manley replied that he was doing well; "not too badly." (P)

The President said, "That's good." The President then said he was calling on the OAS matter in Panama, a subject that he had not discussed with the Prime Minister before. The September 1 deadline established by the Panamanian Constitution for the transfer of power was approaching. The Prime Minister knew our position--we would like very much to see the transfer of power take place and by that we mean Noriega leaving power by September 1. The President asserted that the entire hemisphere is being challenged by this man, who is trying to thwart the will of the people. The election result was clear but Noriega is holding up the election process to ridicule. The President said he had tried to stay within the framework of multilateral diplomacy. The United States, he said, is often viewed as a military power with too much muscle. But we have stayed with the OAS. The President said there was agreement in the OAS about the departure of Noriega by September 1. There was also the idea of forming a transition government, leading to new elections, even though the previous election was certifiably true. If that would take place, we would move rapidly about the business of helping Panama. (P)

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The President said he hoped to enlist the Prime Minister's support to make it clear at the OAS meeting tomorrow that if Noriega has not agreed to leave power by September 1, or shortly thereafter, then he is the one responsible for the lack of a solution. We would like to see sanctions. Noriega should not be permitted to frustrate the will of the Panamanian people. The President said he was calling to encourage the Prime Minister's support, if possible, adding that he recognized that the Prime Minister may look at it one way and we another, in terms of the size of our countries. The President said that the Prime Minister himself had been through a free election process which everyone supported and recognized as totally free. If the Prime Minister could be supportive at the OAS meeting tomorrow, it would be helpful; that was the purpose of the call. (P)

Prime Minister Manley replied, "Thank you, Mr. President." Then he said, "Can you spare a moment?" He said he did not know whether the President was aware, but the Jamaican Government had taken a very very strong position regarding Noriega. The Prime Minister said he had personally mobilized the CARICOM group to denounce the stealing of the election, that he had been a leader at the Socialist International meeting in Stockholm, and personally had been very active. So far as September 1 is concerned, the Jamaican Ambassador in Washington, Keith Johnson, on the Prime Minister's instructions, is trying to get the CARICOM group at the very least to withdraw diplomatic recognition from Panama if Noriega is not out by September 1 and arrangements made for an election. We have the same perspective, he asserted, not a different view. The thing that is sacred is democracy -- "non-negotiable in my mind." We're taking a strong view, he declared. He then asked the President to tell him exactly the position the United States wished to take, saying, "I would like to support you." (P)

The President replied that it was the position that the Prime Minister had just articulated. We would like to say at this meeting that it's time to go; September 1 is approaching. If Noriega does not go and if there is not a subsequent election, then those countries that value democracy, like Jamaica, will be inclined to do what the Prime Minister just said and break relations and pull back further from Panama. The President said, "You're way ahead of us. That position is exactly what we'd like to see come out of the meeting tomorrow." (P)

Prime Minister Manley responded, "We are of like mind." He said that he had been talking about it yesterday while getting the Jamaican team ready. The Prime Minister said he had spoken to his Foreign Minister to tell him that his own feeling was that if we cannot get our CARICOM partners to go that far, he was prepared to have Jamaica go that far. We need to make a statement about it, he said. (P)

The President said that such a move, coming from Jamaica, has much more significance than if it were to originate with the United States. The President said he remembered earlier remarks by the Prime Minister where he felt we were right in alignment. This statement goes further. The President said he was going to make a couple of other calls, including to Carlos Andres Perez, who both the President and the Prime Minister respected. If we can get 3 or 4 strong people together like yourself, the President said, hopefully we might be able to send a signal to Panama that the man must leave. (C)

Prime Minister Manley observed that it would be good if the President could enlist Carlos Andres Perez since he was a very old personal friend and had worked closely with him. The Prime Minister asked the President to tell President Perez that this is the way he is thinking and that he really would be very pleased if President Perez could think in that direction himself. (C)

The President said that if that is agreeable to the Prime Minister, he would tell President Perez that, adding that he thought it would make a difference. If that's agreeable, the President said, I will tell him that the United States and Jamaica are totally in accord and hope that he will feel inclined to be with us also. (C)

Prime Minister Manley said that the voice of President Perez carries immense weight in Latin America, adding that his own voice doesn't carry such weight, except in the Caribbean. If he came along with us in that point of view, it would be tremendous, he declared. "We have to get this nasty little man out." (C)

The President said that he would talk to President Perez and send a telegram out after that phone call if the Prime Minister was interested. (C)

Prime Minister Manley said he would be most interested if the President would do that, adding, "I hope we get the brute out."

The President said we'll see what we can do and he thanked the Prime Minister for accepting the phone call. (C)

The Prime Minister said, "My pleasure, sir." (U)

The President and Prime Minister then exchanged goodbyes and the phone call was concluded. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Francois
Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand
Interpreter: Alec Toumayan
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC

DATE, TIME August 26, 1989, 10:33 - 10:45 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

The President opened by saying he was in Kennebunkport and had thought about President Mitterrand. (U)

President Mitterrand said Kennebunkport brought back pleasant memories. (U)

The President said he wanted President Mitterrand to know that he understood what Mitterrand was doing on Lebanon and that Mitterrand had the President's strong support. (S)

President Mitterrand said he had taken good note of the President's statement and appreciated it very much; it contributed to the French position. President Mitterrand stressed that the French position was not an aggressive one. France was prepared for the very worst while hoping for the very best. President Mitterrand asked if the President had any suggestions. (S)

The President said he was very concerned about what more could be done. He agreed a ceasefire was needed and that the pressure should be kept on Assad and Aoun. Obviously there also had to be internal reforms and the withdrawal of foreign forces. (S)

President Mitterrand said that, as simple as it may sound, the first step is to extend the ceasefire. That is a must before the indispensable diplomatic approaches can be effectively made. These should be carried out through the exercise of pressure by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab countries on Syria. (S)

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The President agreed and said that France had influence with the Tripartite Group. Their efforts had hit a stumbling block and they should be gotten back into the game. (S)

President Mitterrand agreed and added that it was also necessary to push the Christians behind Aoun toward institutional reforms; these are the key to more peaceful relations with the Muslims. (S)

The President asked whether Mitterrand had much influence with Aoun; he did not think the United States had much. (S)

President Mitterrand said that France was pushing institutional reform with Aoun as much as it could. There could be no solution unless this was achieved first. It was absolutely basic to buy time and that meant to extend the ceasefire. (S)

The President agreed and added that some Muslims had been critical of recent French moves. But the US agreed and understood what France had to do. (S)

President Mitterrand said that the Muslims had a very complex mind set and were skilled at using language and playing with words; they have made up a French thesis that is not the French position, it is their own propaganda. (S)

The President expressed frustration with the hostage situation and the lack of progress on returning the body of Colonel Higgins. The US did not seem to be making headway with Iran. (S)

President Mitterrand said he fully understood, but felt that France and the US should stay the course as long as possible and work to keep the guns silent. (S)

The President agreed and said the frustration would continue. (S)

The President then turned the subject to Poland, saying he was reminded of their earlier discussions in Maine and Paris. Things were moving faster than they had anticipated. (S)

President Mitterrand agreed and added that things had been going in the direction they had hoped. It was important to determine what Mazowiecki's position was. (S)

The President said that the only thing he wanted to suggest was that he and Mitterrand stay in contact with each other and with the Germans and the British on what to do next in Poland. Many US Congressmen would be coming back from trips to Warsaw and urging more money for Poland. He did not want the money to go down the drain. It was thus important to stay in touch among the Allies on how to treat Poland. He did not know whether France

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was considering more aid for Poland, but he wanted to be able to say that the US was in close touch with its Allies. France and the US were working toward solutions for Poland and it was important to stay in close touch. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that the President could count on him in that respect. He was speaking both as President of France and President of the European Community. He would make the President aware of any new initiatives. (S)

The President said he expected the new Polish Prime Minister might want to come to Washington and other capitals in the near future. It would be important to coordinate on this subject. (S)

President Mitterrand fully agreed that it would be necessary to consult and coordinate to the fullest. (S)

The President referred to their decision in Paris to put together the Concerted Action group. Perhaps Mazowiecki should be encouraged to meet first with the Concerted Action group before visiting capitals. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that this was the thing to do. (S)

The President commented that it had been nice to talk, and reiterated his respect for what Mitterrand was doing in Lebanon. (S)

President Mitterrand said he was touched that the President had called and very pleased to speak with him. He had fond memories of his stay in the house from which the President was calling, as well as of the people who lived in that house. He had received the President's letter about Panama and had prepared his reply. He was fully ready to state what needed to be stated, on record: that one can't tolerate drug traffickers and threats to democracy. The President should be receiving his reply very soon, and Mitterrand would avail himself of the first opportunity that arose to address the matter publicly himself. He would also call the President soon; this was a very good procedure between the two of them. (S)

The President hoped he had not interrupted an important meeting, and hoped Mitterrand was getting a vacation. (U)

President Mitterrand said he had gotten a little vacation, but not too much. He was making a speech in an hour and a half, but the President had not interrupted anything; on the contrary, it was good to talk to him. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Virgilio Barco Vargas, President of Colombia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Virgilio Barco Vargas
Note Taker: William T. Pryce

DATE, TIME August 28, 1989, 3:52 - 4:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Kennebunkport, Maine

President Barco called The President to thank him for our help with Colombia's narcotics problems.

President Barco: I just wanted to call you to thank you for all your help.

The President: You are very nice to call and I hope we can be of help now and in the future.

President Barco: I want to inform you that we are making a number of further arrests of cartel members.

The President: I am delighted to hear that. I know that it has been a tremendous strain for you and your government and we admire you. We don't want to push in any direction you are not comfortable with. We are here to help you.

President Barco: We are doing everything that is possible. I wanted to let you know there are two issues where you were especially helpful. One is the troop issue and your personal comments were extremely helpful. I know that the Attorney General's statement was taken out of context. The second is I understand the Bennett Plan emphasizes consumers which is right. As you know, this is the only way to end the drug problem and I must congratulate Mr. Bennett for his plan.

The President: We are going to put a lot of emphasis on the consumer side. We have to keep after the users and do more on the education side.

President Barco: I may be addressing the United Nations on September 29 and I hope I will be able to visit you before then.

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The President: I certainly want to work that out. I don't have my calendar but I will see what we can do to get together. I will be in New York at the U.N. about that time.

President Barco: We have been looking forward to the next summit and I believe I have a very good place in Cartagena for it. Maybe your security people could look into it.

The President: We will be talking about that at a meeting tomorrow. It's a very timely suggestion.

President Barco: We can look into it -- check it out and have it ready for your people to look at it.

The President: I think that would be very helpful.

President Barco: I can talk to Ambassador McNamara so that he can make an inspection ahead of time.

The President: Yes, that would be very helpful . We will tell our Ambassador.

President Barco: I have heard from our people and they are doing very well. I am sending a very personal friend of mine who can be very helpful. His name is Raphael Pardo. He is the one who has been keeping track of the guerrillas. He will be arriving tomorrow in Washington.

The President: There are a lot of rumors on the new Justice Minister. What is the status?

President Barco: She is very smart and a very brave young lady. She was a little scared and I asked her to leave one day before the group to pacify her. She is at ease now and has not resigned at this time and is not thinking of doing so at this moment.

The President: The reason I asked about it was all of the speculation going on.

President Barco: I asked her to leave one day before the group and that led to press speculation. I believe she is very smart, very serious and she has told me she will not resign but that is as far as I know.

The President: The only reason I asked is because of the rumors on that point.

President Barco: The rumor started in Bogota.

The President: Oh, did it? Well, that is your business but I just wanted to know about it.

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President Barco: She has been very brave and very useful but she has not resigned.

The President: I would expect you would be getting enormous support in your country.

President Barco: Yes, we have been getting good support.

The President: Again, thank you very much for this phone call and I hope to see you in New York in the next few weeks.

President Barco: Please feel free to call me at any time.

The President: I'm glad we have stuck together and we have a lot of other problems to talk about later -- Panama.

President Barco: I want to thank you again for all your help.

The President: Goodbye and good luck!

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SEPTEMBER 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetaker: R. Rand Beers

DATE, TIME September 5, 1989, 11:15 - 11:25 a.m.
EST AND PLACE: Washington, DC - Bonn, FRG

The President telephone Chancellor Helmut concerning Colombia.
(U)

The President: Hello. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello. How are you? (U)

The President: Well, I am fine. I hope you had as good a
vacation as I did. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, thank you. I think I enjoyed my vacation
more than you because you have all the journalists around you.
(U)

President Bush asked about Chancellor Kohl's health and hoped
that everything was okay. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well it is not traumatic. It is a necessary
operation. Very painful. Not dangerous. Nothing serious. Such
things always come at a bad time. I am having budget
negotiations in the Bundestag and a party Congress all in eight
days. I have to act very seriously, to put my foot down at the
party Congress. The operation is scheduled next week. Thank you
very much for your support. I acknowledge your friendship.
Apart from that, everything is fine. We have a gigantic problem
with the German refugees in Hungary. I expect Hungarians to
allow them to leave country soon. I don't know how many are
there. Maybe 10 or 20 thousand, maybe more. Meanwhile I am
taking necessary precautions. Hungary has been extremely
helpful. I will try to call you when I leave the clinic because
the situation in Hungary is very difficult. Perhaps together
then we can see what we can do. To put it in a nutshell, I am
fine. (U)

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The President: Helmut, I had one matter I wanted to talk to you about. That is Colombia. I have talked to Barco several times, and we are going to give him all the support we can. The \$65 million in emergency military aid was the first step, and we will announce tonight a \$260 million program for Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia for next year and a \$2 billion program over the next five years. When Mulroney came up to visit with his family in Maine, he suggested the G-7 get together to do more if possible in a concerted way to help this courageous president in Colombia. (P)

Chancellor Kohl wanted to know if this was action against the drug consortium? (P)

The President: Yes. Then what Brian and I talked about was, if you agreed, we thought you would be the ideal person to talk to Mitterrand. If he liked the idea, he could propose it as the Chairman of the G-7. It would be nice if we could get help to Barco against those thugs down there. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: I am more than willing to see what I can do. I consider it very important to act against the drug traffickers. The suffering they bring is increasing. It would be very useful if you could send me a short note about the G-7 proposal. Then I will talk to Mitterrand. The best thing would be for Mitterrand to suggest the proposal. Since the days of the Court of Napoleon, the French have liked to have ideas originate in Paris. (P)

The President: Two matters of very great international importance. First, we enjoyed the wurst you gave us. We had it in Maine with selected guests, we shared it with them. And secondly, the fishing rod that you gave me, I loaned it to Cheney, Secretary Cheney, who christened it out west with Secretary Baker. I understand that he caught a lot of fish with it. I did not get to fly fish myself, but will do so later. But they caught some great fish. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, send my regards to Secretary Cheney. I will be sending him a second fishing rod and some more wurst to you. I am afraid the Senate may be having a problem with imports though. (U)

The President: We won't tell the Senate. We will invite them to share it. Good luck Helmut and we will get the note to you. (P)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. And I will call you as soon as I am out of my operation. Give my regards to Barbara. (U)

The President: Give my regards to Lori. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good bye. (U)

The President: Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain
Notetaker: R. Rand Beers

DATE, TIME September 5, 1989, 1:15 P.M. - 1:30 P.M.
AND PLACE: White House Situation Room

The President telephoned Prime Minister Thatcher concerning the
drug crisis. (Ø)

The President greeted PM Thatcher, "Margaret?" (Ø)

PM Thatcher replied, "Hello, George, how are you? You have an
official speech tonight, don't you?" (Ø)

The President responded, "I'm just fine. I feel like a Spring
colt, I'm just back from vacation. Yes, I was calling you on
that subject (speech), if you have a minute. I got your letter
on assistance to Poland and I'm very pleased to have your views.
But I am calling on Colombia. The traffickers there have sought
to undermine the whole social fabric of that nation. The attack
on the El Espectador over the weekend is one example. Barco is
facing a terrible situation. I appreciated your letter on
Colombia telling me of your support. I have talked to Barco
several times. I admire the position Barco is taking. We intend
to give all the support we possibly can." (Ø)

PM Thatcher said, "I think your own action was exactly right."
(Ø)

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The President continued, "This \$65 million in emergency military aid offered two weeks ago was but a first step. Tonight I will announce a \$260 million program for Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia for next year and a \$2 billion program over the next five years. Remember the G-7 conference at the Paris Summit in which we talked about combined efforts to help Colombia? One approach would be for the rest of the G-7 to provide a counternarcotics assistance package to Colombia. Just last week I was talking to Brian Mulroney about perhaps getting Mitterrand, as host, to coordinate a G-7 initiative. Mulroney liked the idea. In fact, he should have credit for this idea about involving the G-7. I talked to Helmut Kohl a few minutes ago about the idea of getting Mitterrand, as he remains the host of the G-7 from the last summit and, as Chairman, I thought it a good idea to get him to coordinate with everyone. We have already charted our own course. It would be a good signal if members of the G-7 could be supportive of Barco." (Ø)

PM Thatcher agreed saying, "I have no difficulty with that at all. Mitterrand was here at Chequers last Friday. I reminded him that he was still Chairman of the G-7 and of PM Gonzales' special experience in dealing with terrorism. I have no difficulty with your proposal, George. Barco needs all the help he can get from the UN, the G-7, Europe. We need to bring more pressure on the drug traffickers." (Ø)

The President volunteered, "That is, if Mitterrand picks up the ball. We are going to go tonight with a challenge on the domestic front, and there will be an international component in the speech." (Ø)

PM Thatcher said, "Very good, there is a UN role as well. Also, we are having a conference on demand here next year." (Ø)

The President noted, "Yes, I liked your idea about the UN Resolution." (Ø)

PM Thatcher - "Thank you, and congratulations for what you are doing. We need to do everything we can do to support Barco." (Ø)

The President - "Did you see where Barco's 30-year-old Justice Minister and children were threatened? Barco said she told him she would not resign. It is tough when your kid is threatened." (Ø)

PM Thatcher - "One other thing, on my return from Japan I wanted to let you know I will be passing through the U.S.S.R. on 23 September on my way back from the IDU Conference and will talk to Gorbachev." (Ø)

The President asked if he could impose on the Prime Minister to say a personal word on "our" behalf. "I think we are in fair shape and are going to move forward. If I could impose on you, I thought that I would like very much to know how he feels. Let me think about that." (Ø)

PM Thatcher said she was glad to pass on any personal message. (Ø)

The President added, "Anything you can share with us after would be great." (Ø)

PM Thatcher, "I think your Vice President is coming to Japan." (Ø)

The President, "Yes, he'll be there. He said today that he would be meeting you there. If you could spare time to talk to him it would be great. He has been very helpful -- good speech on Latin America -- well received in our country." (Ø)

PM Thatcher, "Mr. Bennett is doing good things, I gather." (Ø)

The President said, "I think so. It's a new position, and it's tough. There is no real authority to follow except what comes from the White House. He is working well with our Cabinet people for the first time at a successful coordinated international effort. We will wait and see after the speech tonight -- 9:00 PM EDT." (Ø)

"It is lovely to talk to you and when are we going to see you?" (Ø)

PM Thatcher stated that she should be coming over in October or November for a UN environmental speech. (Ø)

The President, "Definitely available if Barbara and I could take you to Camp David." (Ø)

PM Thatcher thanked the President for his kindness. Because there is so much going on at the moment, she expressed hesitation in regard to her upcoming plans. (Ø)

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The President let her know that he will be waiting to know what her plans will be and said he would like to do it in as informal a way as possible and that he would like to talk about Poland, the G-7, China, and Hong Kong. (Ø)

PM Thatcher enthusiastically said, "Let's do it. The more informal the better. Thank you. Give my love to Barbara." (Ø)

The President closed, "Goodbye." (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Ruud Lubbers,
Prime Minister of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Condoleezza Rice

DATE, TIME September 9, 1989, 1:27 - 1:30 pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: I want to congratulate the Christian Democratic Party on its showing in the election. I realize that the government has not yet been formed but I am personally proud of you. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I too am pleased because the party has consolidated its position. This has been a referendum on me -- whether the Prime Minister should be a Social Democrat or a Christian Democrat. I now believe that I can continue with my policies. I do not see big problems though it will take some time to form a government. (U)

The President: I look forward to working with you. Are you home? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I am enjoying a Saturday evening in the garden under beautiful weather. (U)

The President: Mrs. Bush and I enjoyed a nice summer vacation in Maine and are currently at Camp David. I only called to wish you well. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: I wish you success in all the problems facing you and I am willing to help whenever needed. (U)

The President: I feel that things are moving forward. I am pleased that the "Open Skies" proposal is now prepared but I am sorry that the Alliance has been unable to table the remainder of the CFE package. I look forward to talking to you about the amazing changes in Poland. (U)

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Prime Minister Lubbers: I agree that changes in Poland are moving in a very good direction but there are difficulties still facing the Poles. I have discussed the situation with Prime Minister Carlsson of Sweden and we agree that the economic situation in Poland is worrisome. It is possible to mobilize some resources from the West but ultimately the Poles must help themselves. (Ø)

The President: I agree but I don't want to keep you further.
(U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Give my regards to Mrs. Bush. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Pope John Paul II (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Pope John Paul II
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME: September 16, 1989, 7:01 - 7:11 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President initiated the call and explained that he was calling concerning Lebanon. He said that efforts to get the Arab League to re-engage in the peace process seem to have succeeded.
(U)

Pope John Paul II replied that he hoped the Arab League's efforts would be fruitful. (U)

The President informed the Pope that the Saudi Ambassador had told the U.S. about renewed Arab League efforts. They will call for an immediate cease-fire, removal of blockades, and a mechanism to deal with arms shipments. The statement will give the assurance that others, meaning Syria and Iraq, will stop the supply of weapons -- an assurance linked to the political process. The President noted that Lebanese parliamentarians are going to meet on September 30 to discuss a new national charter. The President commented that the U.S. believes that the Arab League effort is a good first step. It is in the right direction and is the best that can be hoped for at the moment. The President added that the Saudis have asked for a message of support, which the U.S. will issue today. The message, basically, is to stop the shooting and get to the bargaining table. (U)

The President, continuing, said that he felt that the Pope could play a role. Noting that Lebanese Christians pay special attention to the Pope's words, the President expressed the hope that the Pope could use his voice to persuade Aoun to accept the cease-fire and support the political process. The President said that he was concerned that General Aoun would object to much of this, but that Aoun's "war of liberation" was untenable. These concerns are why the President was calling. It is important to encourage Aoun to seize this opportunity. (U)

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The Pope agreed, adding that it is also necessary to have security and the assurance that Syria and Israel maintain the decision to support Lebanese independence. Lebanon, the Pope said, has been nearly destroyed, so it is necessary to achieve a cease-fire so as not to destroy totally the country and its people. The people must be assured that their sovereignty will be respected. (Ø)

The President said that the situation in Lebanon was preventing the U.S. Embassy from carrying out its tasks, but that he hoped to return U.S. diplomats to Beirut as soon as it is safe. The President repeated that he had called to see what support the Pope might be able to give. (U)

The Pope said that of course a cease-fire should be respected on both sides. The first condition is that Lebanon and Syria agree to reconstruct the Lebanese state and its government and parliament. (Ø)

The President agreed absolutely and said he was encouraged by the Syrian response. The question is whether Aoun will go forward with constitutional changes. (Ø)

The Pope said he would try his best to save Lebanon, working through the Church as well as on the political side. Turning to Poland, the Pope said he was very grateful for U.S. aid. (U)

The President assured the Pope that the U.S. wants to do more and will do more to help Poland with its difficult reforms. Both the U.S. Government and the private sector will do more to help the new Polish government. (U)

The Pope expressed the view that changes in Poland cannot be so sudden as to disrupt society. Transforming political and economic structures will be a great task for the new Prime Minister. (Ø)

The President agreed and concluded the call. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Francois Mitterrand,
President of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand
Julian Wolfe, Notetaker

DATE, TIME September 16, 1989, 7:15 - 7:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I am calling in reference to Lebanon. It seems that our efforts to get the Arab League re-engaged have succeeded. The Saudi Ambassador here has informed us that the Arab League will announce the renewal of their efforts today. They will call for a lifting of the blockades, a cease-fire and an end to arms shipments. It establishes a mechanism to deal with this issue. The announcement has an assurance that others, read Syria and Iraq, will not supply weapons. There is linkage to the political process. Lebanese Parliamentarians are to meet in September to discuss a new national charter. You are more active there than we are, but we believe this is a good first step. The Saudis have asked for a statement of support and we will issue one today. In summary, it says stop the shooting and get to the bargaining table. You have influence there and a role to play. The Lebanese Christians listen to your words. I hope you can use your voice to persuade Aoun to accept the cease-fire and support a political process. Aoun may see a lot to object to. He needs to see that his war of liberation is untenable. We should encourage him to seize this chance to move the fight to the political arena. We had to pull our diplomats out of Beirut because of the demonstrations; I hope to get them back when we are confident of their safety and they can carry out their mission. I just wanted to get your views on this and see what support you can provide Aoun.

President Mitterrand: I am pleased to hear from you and hope everything is well. Thank you for these intentions. I had these same thoughts. The Arab League has made progress, I agree. I think we won't be able to end the situation without reform of Lebanese institutions, so I approve of this. I was informed of the Parliamentarians' meeting and that the Arabs and Moslems were pressuring Aoun to make concessions. I am about to call Aoun. It will be a secret call but I will make it public if necessary, so that our points of view are in agreement. I have no reservations about what you have just said. I hope the U.S. will

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return its diplomatic presence when the danger subsides. Our policy has been to bring Aoun around. We intend to show Aoun our policy and that France will remove its fleet to show support for the Arabs and to show Aoun that he cannot get unconditional support from France.

The President: I think you are way ahead of us. A call to Aoun could be critical. We have strongly supported your decisions with regard to the fleet. This will be well received. I don't believe the Tripartite members felt threatened by the fleet in the first place. We are in agreement. We do want to go back in, but only after the conflagration subsides.

I had one other item, if I may. On the NATO talks, Jim Baker has been in touch with Roland Dumas on one point. We have come up with the idea of a "placeholder" for the issues outstanding so that we can get the bulk of the proposals tabled in Vienna. There is an upcoming meeting and I hope we can get together on this and move forward. Without going into details, can you talk with Roland about getting France on board?

President Mitterrand: I too hope for negotiating progress. We have stressed that debate should start in a serious manner. It would be bad for the West to look as though there was ill-will in the process. It is a delicate point in East-West relations. The fact is that the USSR could come into France in a few days. This difficulty will be discussed by my ministers. We don't want the Soviets to say they were ready to negotiate and we were not. I will contact Roland.

The President: I want to say that this man Boris Yeltsin is fascinating. I might write you a letter on this character.

President Mitterrand: I would be happy to receive it. I know you must show your distance without breaking off from Yeltsin. Have a good weekend.

The President: Well, it's raining at Camp David, but it will be a good weekend anyway. Thank you my friend.

President Mitterrand: Au revoir.

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BARCO

SEP 25, 1989 -- PRESIDENT RECEIVED INCOMING CALL FROM
BARCO -- NO ONE MONITORED -- SIGNAL UNABLE TO
PUT SITRM IN CALL CALL STARTED 1501 - ENDED
1505 - PRESIDENT IN NEW YORK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Virgilio Barco of Colombia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Virgilio Barco of Colombia
Notetaker: Everett Briggs

DATE, TIME September 26, 1989, 8:45 - 8:52 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Washington/Bogota

The President initiated a telephone call to President Virgilio Barco. The conversation took place in English.

The President: How are you this morning?

President Barco: I'm glad to hear you.

The President: Your embassy here thought we were cut off yesterday. I had finished, but wondered if you had any additional items to raise.

President Barco: I'm very interested in accepting a request from several congressmen to meet with them, to support your war on drugs. I don't know if you could help with this. Maybe if the White House showed interest in my having such a meeting, I could do so. I know you are probably busy today. I'd make a 15-minute speech.

The President: Which senators? The more contact you have the better. But do you mean a joint session of Congress, or what?

President Barco: Yes, but I'm not sure if it is with all of them, or just the leaders.

The President: Why don't you let my office know, and we'll be glad to help.

President Barco: How is the best way to do it?

The President: Through our ambassador there, or through your ambassador here. When you have the names you could have someone call Bob Gates.

President Barco: I think it would be very useful to talk to Congress.

The President: We'd encourage that. The problem is a joint session is sort of formal, and I don't even know if they will be meeting when you're here. But have your assistant call Bob Gates.

President Barco: Maybe with the heads of committee?

The President: That's easy. We'll work closely with your embassy. We'd like that.

President Barco: I'll do it early this morning.

The President: I'm looking forward to seeing you - Thursday evening.

President Barco: I'm arriving tomorrow. I believe it would be useful if we asked Gates which persons will be at the meeting so I can bring their counterparts.

The President: When you call Gates he'll have the list. I can tell you that Governor Sununu will be there, and the National Security Adviser, General Scowcroft. I don't know whether our ambassador will be there, if he comes up. I expect he will. I'll invite Secretary of State Baker. I'm not sure he will be in town, but if he is, he'll attend; and maybe a couple of experts from the NSC and State.

The President: We might step into a separate room by ourselves for a moment. You know, I'll see you in the Residence, which is a nice place to meet. Something sort of special.

President Barco: Thank you.

The President: I'm looking forward to seeing you!

President Barco: Thanks for your words in your (UN) speech.

The President: We feel very strongly about what you are doing. All Americans feel that way. We're proud of you.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Former Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Former Salvadoran President Duarte
Notetaker: William T. Pryce

DATE, TIME September 27, 1989, 12:35-12:40 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned former Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte on September 27 to express concern for Duarte's health and convey his admiration for Duarte. (U)

The President: I've heard about your health problems and wanted to inquire about how you are and to send you our family love as you fight the problem. (U)

President Duarte: Thank you. I am under tension, I have a temperature, I have pneumonia. Things are not so good. (U)

The President: But you are a strong person with lots of courage. I want you to know that we are with you in your fight. Give my love to your son and your daughter. (U)

President Duarte: Thank you very much for all your kindnesses. (U)

The President: Are you in the hospital? (U)

President Duarte: No, I was supposed to go to the hospital at Walter Reed but I couldn't go because of my problem. (U)

The President: You need to overcome your problem. You have your wonderful family with its love. I want you to know that we care very much. When you do come to Walter Reed I hope to come out and visit with you again. (U)

President Duarte: Thank you very much. (U)

The President: We send our love to you and your family. God bless you. (U)

President Duarte: Thank you very much. (U)

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir of Israel (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
Notetaker: C. David Welch

DATE, TIME: October 2, 1989, 10:13 a.m. - 10:23 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I'm very happy to have this opportunity to talk
to you. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: So am I, Mr. President. How are you?
(U)

The President: First of all, let me wish you a very happy
holiday -- a Happy New Year! (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Same to you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: President Mubarak will be here in a little while,
and I wanted to talk to you beforehand, to get your thinking. We
are at a critical juncture in pursuing your plan, the peace
initiative that you thought up and presented. I plan to talk to
Mubarak about the question of meeting you to try to move things
forward. I had good talks with Foreign Minister Arens and Jim
Baker had some meetings in New York also. Jim raised with
Foreign Minister Abd el-Meguid the question of a meeting with
Mubarak on the basis of the Israeli initiative. Jim had a good
bilateral with each Foreign Minister and a trilateral meeting as
well. We sense a real opportunity here that perhaps a meeting
could help to move forward. The idea would be to start a pre-
elections dialogue, with the focus on moving ahead. We are
thinking of this as something that could be in your interest. I
hope your Cabinet deliberations will make it possible to move
forward. I wouldn't want to see the impression that Israel is
saying no to its own initiative. We don't, incidentally, see the
Egyptian effort as an alternative; we are sticking to the Israeli
initiative. I was wondering if you had any advice for me before
I meet with Mubarak? (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you very much for this call, Mr.
President. It is very kind of you to raise these matters with
me, and to have this conversation. It goes without saying that
I'm interested in pushing the initiative forward. It is our deep

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desire to see the initiative move forward and to bring peace. I am happy to meet Mubarak and discuss all this without any pre-commitment. I'm now waiting for the full reports of Mr. Arens. I do not know exactly what was proposed and your views and the views of the Egyptians. Arens returns on Wednesday. Then, we will have our Cabinet meeting on Thursday. At that time, we will have all the necessary information. You can be sure that we are very interested in the implementation of our initiative; we will not do anything against it. But it all depends on the conditions, the approach, how and whom to meet, and the subjects. This is not a simple matter, Mr. President; it is very complicated. (Ø)

The President: I appreciate this opportunity to talk. Would it be helpful to tell Mubarak that you would be willing to meet, with no preconditions? I don't want to appear to be brokering a meeting. Or, do you want to wait until you've had the opportunity to talk to Arens? (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: You are right, Mr. President, maybe it's better to see Arens first. Then, that would be the appropriate time to meet Mubarak and to have our Cabinet meeting. (Ø)

The President: Well, we will leave it that way. Any role the United States can play in encouraging the Shamir plan, that is fine by us. I honestly do believe that Mubarak is trying to help, not to steal the limelight. Jim Baker was very pleased with his meetings. I saw Deputy Prime Minister Peres, as well as Arens. I hope that my meeting with Peres, he is after all the Deputy Prime Minister, did not cause problems in Likud. But I felt that was something we must do. The next step is our talks with Mubarak. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: I am encouraged by your interest. I promise that we are more than happy to cooperate in efforts for peace in our area. I am sure the talks with Mubarak will be very helpful and useful to advance the process. Your desire for peace will help. (Ø)

The President: We will try our best. If anything else comes up, we will be in touch. Good-bye. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: Good-bye. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Turgut Ozal,
Prime Minister of Republic of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Turgut Ozal, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron

DATE, TIME: October 2, 1989, 3:32 - 3:37 pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: How are you? (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I am calling to raise an issue of grave concern. Senator Dole has introduced a resolution on Armenia that is now supported by 56 Senators. It calls for April 24 1990 to be dedicated to the victims of the so-called genocide of Armenians by the Turks. (Ø)

The President: How are you doing on the publication of the archives? (Ø)

Prime Minister Ozal: When I came into office the archives were closed. I ordered them opened. (Ø)

The President: We'll look into the resolution. We don't want to do anything to disrupt relations. Maybe we can get the archive material to carry the day. I'll talk to General Scowcroft and others. (Ø)

Prime Minister Ozal: The resolution would damage our relations. (Ø)

The President: Oh damn. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I'm trying to tell you the truth. (U)

The President: I appreciate that. (U)

Prime Minister Ozal: I'm counting on you Mr. President. (U)

The President: We'll look into it. Tell me, how are you doing in general? (U)

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Prime Minister Ozal: The Senate Judiciary Committee will act on the resolution on October 5. Can I count on you? (C)

The President: We'll try to be helpful. (C)

Prime Minister Ozal: Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you for calling me and bringing this to my attention. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 12, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BN*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the Department of State transmitting the Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation.

AAB
Concurrence by: Adrian A. Basora (Acting)

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *APX* Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab I Hughes Memorandum to Roy
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By *CD* NARA, Date *8/2/10*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Mulroney
Notetaker: Barry Lowenkron, NSC

DATE, TIME October 3, 1989, 9:36 - 9:45 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: "Brian, I'm calling to discuss two issues with you. The first involves President Salinas' visit to Washington. I was impressed with him, and, in one of our conversations, floated the idea of an informal get-together between the three of us. I wanted to sound you out on the idea, and did not want to give the impression of pushing Canada into some sort of North American trading block. I think the idea would be well-received in the US as an example of not neglecting our neighbors to the north and south. To my surprise, Salinas accepted. There's no time-frame, but I'll probably be visiting Monterrey next year."
(Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "I'm personally attracted to the idea of such a meeting. I recall that several years ago Secretary of State George Shultz had suggested a meeting among the three foreign minsters at Stanford, but that the Mexicans had backed out of it." (Ø)

The President: "General Scowcroft recalled that episode, and so was also surprised with Salinas' acceptance. I raised it over an informal supper at Camp David and Salinas jumped at it like a trout out of water." (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "Instinctively and personally I favor such a meeting. Canada is guilty of neglecting its southern neighbors, instead focusing all of its attention on Europe and the Pacific." (Ø)

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The President: "As I see it, a meeting among the three of us should not be based on trade issues, or on ganging up on Salinas. I'm also sensitive to the trade issue in Canada, and how it nearly cost you your job." (Ø)

The President: "Brian, the second thing I want to mention is East-West relations. We had good meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I saw him here in Washington, and I want you to know that I'm encouraged about the future. I understand you'll be going to Moscow later this year." (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "That's correct George. I'll be there the third week of November." (Ø)

The President: "Well, I'd love to chat with you some time before you go. We're quite optimistic about the trends in the relationship. Jim Baker found Shevardnadze quite accommodating. We covered a lot of issues. If you want, why not call me a week before you go. I could give you a message to pass along to Gorbachev so you could tell him, 'the President asked me to convey to you...' I know the Soviets value their ties with Canada, especially given the Yakovlev connection." (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "I appreciate the offer. At times it's easier for Canada to preach for a common position than for the United States. At the same time I want you to know that I'm pleased with Jim Baker's work and wouldn't want to interfere at all. I'm also delighted that you are encouraged about the future of our relations with the Soviets." (Ø)

The President: "Well, I'm strongly in favor of your trip. If you'd like maybe we can send Bob Gates or Brent Scowcroft up to Ottawa to give you a briefing on where we see things going in the Soviet Union before you leave." (Ø)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "That would be most helpful. I'm also available to carry any message from you to Gorbachev, such as, 'by the way, I've recently talked to President Bush and...'" (Ø)

The President: "Super. I'll mention it to Brent and to Bob Gates." (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "George, Mila and I saw you and Barbara on a tour White House the other night, and I now understand why you have a 70% approval rating." (U)

The President: "Brian, I want you to know that the picture we displayed during the tour wasn't just for the television cameras. I value our close friendship. We loved having you at Kennebunkport. The only problem I see on the horizon between us is my sense that the Blue Jays aren't going to make it. The Oakland club is pretty strong." (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "Well we'll see. I hope to see you at the World Series in Canada." (U)

The President: "Okay. We'll stay in touch. My best to Mila." (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: "And my best to Barbara. Take care." (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with the Amir of
Kuwait (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Sheikh Jaber, the Amir of Kuwait
Interpreter: Shuckran Kamal
Notetaker: Sandra Charles (NSC)

DATE, TIME October 16, 1989, 9:03 a.m. - 9:22 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President telephoned the Amir to discuss developments in the Middle East. (Ø)

The President: Your Majesty, how are you? I called to talk with you. I just saw a mutual friend of ours, Hosni Mubarak, who said many kind things about you. I wanted to have a short chat with you. (U)

The Amir: I am glad to hear from you. (U)

The President: If it's okay with you, I'd like to make some comments and ask for your opinion on them. (U)

The Amir: Fine, go ahead. (U)

The President: On the peace process, we see a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue about elections leading to negotiations as the way forward on the peace process. Mubarak has been a big help in generating support from the Palestinians, and we have been supportive of his initiative. (Ø)

On Iran and Iraq, we hope they will find a permanent resolution of their differences. We are encouraged somewhat by the change of government in Iran. You have close ties with Iran, so I would appreciate your insights on the current situation. On that, we are still troubled by the hostages. We have the greatest respect for your courage in the face of the threats made against you. (Ø)

I want to thank you for brokering our recent dialogue with the South Yemeni government. We are encouraged by our talks between

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our two UN permanent representatives, and are grateful to you. I also wanted to thank you for the economic support you have provided to another good friend of ours, King Hussein of Jordan. (Ø)

Also I want to encourage anything you can do for Poland following your Minister of Public Works visit. I encourage much continued interest on your part on these things. (Ø)

I would welcome your comments Your Majesty. (U)

The Amir: Thank you for your call. I will comment on your points. (U)

On the Palestinians, we have no clear picture about what transpired between Arafat and Mubarak on the elections proposal. We have only seen the news reports. We have no confirmation of the PLO's position on elections, however we won't object to whatever the PLO position is because the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. (Ø)

On Iran and Iraq, we do not have close relations with Iran. However, they are trying to strengthen their relations with Kuwait. I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister in Belgrade. He invited me on behalf of President Rafsanjani to visit Iran. I have accepted but will not go until they show good intentions. Tomorrow I will receive credentials from the Iranian Ambassador. If the new government becomes stable, then I expect things will improve. (Ø)

On Yemen, we are pleased that the talks on normalizing relations with Yemen progressed well. We favor this because it is good for the region as a whole. On Jordan, relations between Kuwait and Jordan are good and close. I have good, close relations with King Hussein. I am most pleased to help him, and will do my best to help in the future. (Ø)

On Poland, our Minister of Public Works just visited there. We are willing to help with some projects. A Polish delegation will visit Kuwait soon, and we will complete talks on these projects. (Ø)

The President: Your comments have been most interesting and extraordinarily helpful. I want to touch base with you and others in the region to get your view of things. Our interest in the Gulf remains paramount. I am grateful for the good relations we have with your country and with others in the Gulf. I want to feel free to call you from time to time, and I would welcome your thoughts from time to time. (Ø)

The Amir: Actually, I want to thank you for calling. The good relations between the United States and Kuwait are important to us. The times require that we continue to maintain contacts and communications. This would be necessary to continue our good relations. (Ø)

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The President: Please convey my respects to the Prime Minister and Crown Prince, my good friend who went to a baseball game with me a few years ago. (U)

The Amir: I will convey your respects. In fact the Crown Prince still has fond memories of the experience of meeting you as Vice President and how much he enjoyed his visit. (U)

The President: Goodbye and good luck. I sure enjoyed this telephone call. (U)

The Amir: I want to thank you and wish you luck and success in all the missions the free world looks to you to accomplish. (U)

The President: Thank you and God bless you. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Gandhi of India

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Gandhi
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME, October 18, 1989; 9:06 a.m. - 9:08 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Prime Minister Gandhi called the President to express his concern about the San Francisco earthquake.

Prime Minister Gandhi: George, hello.

The President: How are you?

Prime Minister Gandhi: I heard the bad news about the San Francisco earthquake and wanted to call.

The President: How kind of you, sir. We are still getting reports. There are 250 dead and lots of damage. It's an information situation, trying to find out the extent of the damage.

Prime Minister Gandhi: We were worried.

The President: It is a sad situation. I know you know the area. A bridge is down and people are trapped. There is the agony of a disaster. But in this terrible period how nice to get your call. Very nice of you.

Prime Minister Gandhi: I thought I should at a time like this.

The President: I appreciate it. How are you?

Prime Minister Gandhi: Fine. I just announced elections.

The President: I saw that. On November 22?

Prime Minister Gandhi: The twenty-second and twenty-fourth.

The President: Well, good luck to you. We'll be thinking of you. My best to Sonia.

Prime Minister Gandhi: Thank you.

The President: Good-bye.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak
Notetaker: Stephanie Sullivan

DATE, TIME: October 18, 1989; 1:17 p.m. - 1:22 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Mubarak: Hello.

The President: How are you, Hosni?

President Mubarak: How are you, George?

The President: Fine, and you?

President Mubarak: I was upset to hear about the disaster in San Francisco.

The President: Yes, it is a disaster; it concerns us a lot. Fortunately, it is not as bad as it might have been. It is bad, but our people are responding really well. The whole city is involved in disaster-relief efforts.

President Mubarak: Good, that's better, of course.

The President: It's very nice of you to call. Brent Scowcroft said he talked with you earlier. Where are you, in Cairo?

President Mubarak: In Cairo.

The President: How did the talks with Qadhafi go?

President Mubarak: Very good. I'm going right now to brief Wisner.

The President: Good.

President Mubarak: The talks were encouraging.

The President: Good. Tell Wisner to send me a copy of the brief. I'm very interested in how it went.

President Mubarak. Much better than expected and promising. He wants to do something good to remove all the suspicions. I gave Qadhafi a lesson and educated him. They're not very deep people. They do not think deeply. It will take some time to be much better.

The President: Maybe something good will come of it.

The President: I talked with Shamir. I said we want progress and that it looks like he's falling away from his own plan.

President Mubarak: We're trying from our side.

The President: The Palestinians heard Shamir's refusal.

President Mubarak: We're trying. I'm doing my best.

The President: Good job. We appreciate your efforts very much.

President Mubarak: Thank you. Best regards to Barbara.

The President: And my love to your family.

The President: Hey, Hosni?

President Mubarak: Yes?

The President: I followed your advice and I spoke with the Emir of Kuwait yesterday.

President Mubarak: He was very pleased.

The President: We had a very good talk.

President Mubarak: I had a message this morning from one of his ministers. He told me that it was a very good talk.

The President: It's good he liked it. I followed your advice and will continue to do that.

President Mubarak: Let the Kuwaitis give a lot.

The President: Thank you for calling. Goodbye.

President Mubarak: Goodbye.

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME October 23, 1989, 9:02 - 9:26 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. I am glad to hear your voice. I saw pictures of your visit to San Francisco and hope you will be able to give as much support as possible for that tragedy. (U)

The President: It is terrible, but the authorities there are doing well. We will help at this end in any way we can. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I wanted to tell you briefly how I see events in Hungary, Poland, and the GDR. In Hungary, things are going the best. The people are incredibly courageous, and very determined. The present government is taking an enormous risk: the changes have their origin with the reform movement in the Communist Party, but it is not at all certain that the reformers will be able to get credit in the course of the election. It is quite possible that the Party will come in only second, and there might be a coalition. We have supported the Hungarians quite vigorously. In December I will go over for two days to give further support, also optically. (Ø)

The President: Where will you go? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will go to Budapest and perhaps also to a second city, but that is not certain. The economic situation is relatively good there. They can make it, though the next two years will be decisive. On November 9 I will go to Poland for four days. Our negotiations have been essentially concluded. I will do all I can to support the new government, especially in the economic area. With the EC, I intend to give assistance in human resources. This seems to be the problem, if I may put it bluntly: there is a lot of good will and many good ideas, but the Poles do

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not know how to put them into practice. They have to introduce currency reforms, a new banking system, and other steps to open up a new market-oriented economy. I will be doing what I can, and I will also take into account and work on what you have suggested, so that Western activities can be homogeneous. My feeling is that our Western friends and partners should be doing more. There is a difference between words and deeds. I also want to enter into a new phase with the Poles, 50 years after the outbreak of war. (Ø)

In the GDR, changes are quite dramatic. None of us can give a prognosis. It is not clear whether the new man will have the determination and the strength to carry out reform. Gorbachev told me that he had encouraged reform during his visit, but I am not sure how courageous he [new Party and state leader Egon Krenz] is. There is an enormous unrest among the population. Things will become incalculable if there are no reforms. My interest is not to see so many flee the GDR, because the consequences there would be catastrophic. Our estimates are that by Christmas we will have reached a total of 150,000 refugees, with an average age of under 30. (Ø)

My last point concerns the climate among the media in New York, the coast, London, the Hague, Rome, and Paris that, crudely speaking, holds that the Germans are now committed to Ostpolitik and discussions about reunification and that they are less interested in the EC and the West. This is absolute nonsense! I will again and again explain and declare my position. At the beginning of January, I will go to Paris to deliver a speech at a major conference. I will say publicly -- also to the left wing in the FRG -- that without a strong NATO, without the necessary development of the EC, none of these developments in the Warsaw Pact would have occurred. I am firmly convinced of that, and that will be my message. It would also be good for you, as soon as you can, to deliver a public message that progress in disarmament and changes in the east are possible only if we stand together. (Ø)

The President: I couldn't agree more. I have seen some of those stories, but I know your position and think I know the heartbeat of Germany. The strength of NATO has made possible these changes in Eastern Europe. We are seeing a spate of stories about German reunification resulting in a neutralist Germany and a threat to Western security. We do not believe that. We are trying to react very cautiously and carefully to change in the GDR. We have great respect for the way the FRG under your leadership has been handling this situation. You have done a great job. (Ø)

I understand that Horst [Teltschik, the Chancellor's security advisor] is coming soon. We are very anxious to talk with him on this subject and also about Poland and Hungary. We are getting criticism in the Congress from liberal Democrats that we ought to be doing more to foster change, but I am not going to go

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so fast as to be reckless. On Poland, the Congress is pushing us to put forward more money, but we are moving forward. I asked our Congress to approve a \$200 million grant, which would be our contribution to the \$1 billion stabilization fund the Polish government has requested. I consider it vitally important that we help Poland as it implements its economic reform program in the context of an IMF agreement. I am also sending a high level team from the public and private sectors to consult with the Poles and help them as they decide how to implement these reforms. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I consider that a very important step, especially to have people from the public and private sectors. Let me ask you to have one of your collaborators call Horst Teltschik to talk this over. We have a similar approach, which we discussed with Mr. Delors. We want the EC to do the same. After my trip to Poland, I will send Horst to discuss these matters. (C)

The President: Is Horst here now? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: He was in New York a couple of days ago. The next time I will have him come down. (C)

The President: I thought he was coming to Washington. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: No. He is back now. (C)

The President: I will ask General Scowcroft to call him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Any time. (C)

The President: We ought to get together for an informal session, perhaps a few hours at Camp David. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will think it over and find out when I can make it. It would have to fit into one day. (C)

The President: We can do that. It is important to talk things over about Eastern Europe. I will see Thatcher around the time of our Thanksgiving. It is important to signal the importance I attach to U.S. relations with the FRG, especially when we see some of these mischievous stories around. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand and think it is a very good idea. (C)

The President: Let's stay in touch. General Scowcroft will call Horst and tell you more about our approach toward Poland and our support for the stabilization fund. Let me also say that I appreciate this call very much. (C)

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Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I will call again before I go to Poland, around the 6th or 7th of November. (Z)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Interpreter: Sanaa Azim
Notetaker: Sandra Charles

DATE, TIME October 23, 1989, 5:55-6:02 p.m.
AND PLACE The Oval Office

The President telephoned King Fahd concerning the Taif agreement on Lebanon.

The President: Your Majesty, allow me to congratulate you on the historic achievement at Taif. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you a lot. (U)

The President: We know the Lebanese deputies never would have been able to reach this agreement without your leadership, persistence and strength. We feel it is a great service for Lebanon, the Arabs and humanity...your initiative. I wanted to express our full support for the Taif results. The question is would it be better to wait for the formal announcement or should we go ahead with a statement now? (Ø)

King Fahd: Thank you, Mr. President, for your call. There is no doubt that this is a difficult problem. We have shared our opinions together on this, a problem that has lasted 15 years. We are grateful to accomplish something. (Ø)

The President: But should we wait until there is a formal announcement or go ahead with a statement now? (Ø)

King Fahd: Mr. President, the agreement was unanimous except for three representatives who had reservations and made comments. The agreement is already signed, the results are approved. What will happen will happen in Lebanon; we cannot judge it. The U.S. should support this agreement as it was announced. (Ø)

The President: Ok, we'll go ahead and do that. I'll soon be talking to President Mitterrand and the Pope encouraging them to lend their support to this agreement and more importantly to urge Aoun to do so. (Ø)

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King Fahd: Mr. President, thank you. We will continue our efforts in Taif and Lebanon. We will continue until we achieve results. We won't give up. (U)

The President: Again, congratulations. We are proud of your leadership. I look forward to seeing you. (U)

King Fahd: Thank you. I appreciate what you have done. Thank you for this call. (U)

The President: Good-bye; my respects to you, sir. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Francois Mitterrand/President of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Francois Mitterrand/President of France
Eliza Bernham: Interpreter
Adrian A. Basora, NSC Staff, Notetaker

DATE, TIME: October 23, 1989, 6:12 - 6:23 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you? My apologies for calling so late. We are convinced that we have a good opportunity for a peace process thanks to you and to the work of the Saudis. We are happy that Lebanon has reached accords. I just talked with King Fahd to congratulate him on it. I realize we have little influence on Aoun, but you know him and he listens to you. This gives France a key role. I hope you will feel inclined to call him, and you may have already have done so. (S)

President Mitterrand: I hope very much he doesn't oppose the agreement. Although it is not perfect, it gains needed time. Contrary to what you believe, Aoun doesn't always listen to me. You know, I've proposed additional guarantees--the five permanent members of the Security Council to be guarantors, in addition to Saudi Arabia. This would introduce an additional element. Perhaps it would not convince him, but it would convince the people of Beirut. This would be psychologically important. It is not guaranteed to work, but it is a logical approach. France has let Aoun know it would not go along with his rejection of the agreement. (S)

The President: That is good. (S)

President Mitterrand: I'll approach him again. But if we had additional guarantees, it would increase the chances of his acceptance. I will repeat tomorrow what I've already told him. (S)

The President: Well, he may not do exactly what you ask but you do have influence on him, which is good. We will be able to see if additional guarantees are needed. (S)

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President Mitterrand: Dumas has already talked to Jim Baker regarding the possibility of intervention by the five permanent members of the Security Council (S).

The President: I understand your people are talking with ours about an informal meeting in December. We have much to talk about and I hope it can work. (S)

President Mitterrand: Indeed, I had proposed to go to the North American continent. (S)

The President: So I had heard, and this is of great interest. (S)

President Mitterrand: Regarding Lebanon, I'll keep you informed in the upcoming days. Right now I am in Spain for a working meeting with Felipe Gonzalez. (S)

The President: I had a wonderful meeting with him. We had a small dinner which gave us an opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues. Please convey my respects to him. (S)

President Mitterrand: I will speak to him, and I was pleased to hear from you. (S)

The President: It is always a pleasure. (U)

President Mitterrand: Thanks, dear George. (S)

END OF CONVERSATION

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