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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files

OA/ID Number: 91111
Folder ID Number: 91111-001

Folder Title:
Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandum of Conversations 1/23/89 - 5/10/89

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	5

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Conversation with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
02a. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with Italian Prime Minister De Mita (1 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
02b. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Conversation with Finnish President Koivisto (1 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
03. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak of Egypt (1 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
04. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from the President to President Alfonsin of Argentina (2 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
05. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan (1 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
06. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Conversation with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐
07. Telcon	Re: Phone Call between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain (2 pp.)	1/23/89	(b)(1)	☐

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Collection:

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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandums of Conversations 1/23/89 - 5/10/89

Pinksheet Number: cap936
OA/ID Number: 91111-001
Date Closed: 1/30/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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08. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mitterrand of France (2 pp.)	1/24/89	(b)(1)	✓
09. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)	1/24/89	(b)(1)	✓
10. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Diouf of Senegal (2 pp.)	1/24/89	(b)(1)	
11. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Schlueter of Denmark (2 pp.)	1/24/89	(b)(1)	✓
12. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and President-Elect Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela (2 pp.)	1/24/89	(b)(1)	✓
13. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation Between the President and Phillippine President Corazon Aquino (2 pp.)	1/24/89	(b)(1)	✓
14. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan of Pakistan (1 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	
15. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (2 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	✓
16. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (1 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	✓
17. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	✓

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18. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with Pope John Paul II (1 pp.)	1/26/89	(b)(1)	✓
19. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation Between the President and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo (2 pp.)	1/27/89	(b)(1)	✓
20. Telcon	Re: Telephone Call from the President to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico (2 pp.)	1/30/89	(b)(1)	✓
21. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Bendjedid of Algeria (1 pp.)	1/31/89	(b)(1)	✓
22. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hassan of Morocco (2 pp.)	1/31/89	(b)(1)	✓
23. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (2 pp.)	1/31/89	(b)(1)	✓
24. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation between President Bush and President Babangida of Nigeria (1 pp.)	2/7/89	(b)(1)	✓
25. Telcon	Re: President's Phone Call to Prime Minister John Swan of Bermuda (1 pp.)	2/11/89	(b)(1)	✓
26. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on March 3, 1989 (3 pp.)	3/3/89	(b)(1)	✓
27b. Memo	Re: G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/8/89	(b)(1)	✓

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27c. Memo	Re: G. Philip Hughes to Melvyn Levitsky (1 pp.)	3/9/89	(b)(1)	C
28. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Salinas (2 pp.)	3/10/89	(b)(1)	C
29. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	3/22/89	(b)(1)	C
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	C
31. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	C
32. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	C
33. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (2 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	C
34. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	C
35. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Conversation with President Barco of Colombia (2 pp.)	4/14/89	(b)(1)	C
36. Telcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (3 pp.)	4/17/89	(b)(1)	C
37. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	C

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38. Telcon	Re: President's Telephone Call to King Hussein of Jordan (2 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	SECRET
39. Telcon	Re: The President's Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte (2 pp.)	4/22/89	(b)(1)	SECRET
40. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (5 pp.)	4/22/89	(b)(1)	SECRET
41. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with President Arias of Costa Rica (4 pp.)	4/28/89	(b)(1)	SECRET
42. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	SECRET
43. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (3 pp.)	5/8/89	(b)(1)	SECRET
44. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (2 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	SECRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with
FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Rudolf V. Perina, NSC (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, State Department
(Interpreter)

Chancellor Kohl

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 10:07 a.m. - 10:12 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President identified himself and asked the Chancellor how he was.

The Chancellor greeted the President and said he was very well. He said he watched the President's inauguration on television with great interest. It was a big event. He wanted to wish the President good luck, much success and God's blessing.

The President said this was the first call he was placing because he wanted to thank the Chancellor for the very warm message of congratulations.

The Chancellor said that this was how he hoped the two could handle matters in the future. It would be very useful to call even when no urgent business was at hand.

The President replied that he was strongly in favor of that. He had one point to make today. Because he knew how opposed the Chancellor was to chemical weapons, he was personally outraged by some of the recent commentaries on the Libyan issue in the U.S. press. He had spoken out on this publically, and he hoped the Chancellor's staff had shown him these comments.

The Chancellor said he had seen the comments and was grateful for them. He wished to reiterate clearly that it was his intention in coming weeks to amend the legislation which had led to this problem. The present legislation had been in effect since before he came to office, and up until now it had presented no problem.

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The Chancellor said he was strongly opposed to the involvement of any German firm in the production of CW anywhere in the world. He wanted to bring the present firm to court but this required evidence, and the situation regarding evidence was not good. There was an old saying that the President perhaps knew: Before a court and the open seas, one is in the hands of the Lord.

The President said he understood. He asked the Chancellor to convey his love to Hannelore and say that he looked forward to seeing them.

Chancellor Kohl asked the President to give his love to Barbara and to tell her that she was doing a great job. She was doing things in her own way and everyone liked her for that. She should not change.

The President said he would convey that message, and the two leaders said good-bye.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with Finnish President Koivisto

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Rudolf V. Perina, NSC (Notetaker)

President Koivisto of Finland

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 10:42 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President asked President Koivisto how he was.

President Koivisto replied he was well and asked if it was morning in Washington.

The President said it was morning. He said he wanted to thank the President for his congratulatory telegram. He wanted to continue the personal relationship he had with him, and to wish him well.

President Koivisto said this was very nice of the President. He said the President had gotten a very good start, with very favorable press coverage.

The President said jokingly that that would change. He had big budgetary problems which would change the press. But he wanted to continue the good relationship with Finland and with President Koivisto.

President Koivisto thanked the President and said he had interest in keeping this connection open.

The President said he wanted to do that also. He had made this clear to Brent Scowcroft, who was of the same view. The President said he had discovered that the White House had a sauna, though it was not as good as a Finnish one.

President Koivisto said he would see.

The President said that he and Mrs. Bush still fondly remembered the hospitality of their last visit to Finland. He again thanked President Koivisto for his message, and the two men said good-bye.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Mubarak
of Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mubarak

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 11:05 a.m. - 11:10 a.m. EST

PLACE: The Oval Office/Presidential Palace in Cairo

The President: Hello, Hosni. I just wanted to call to thank you for the warm message that you sent on January 20. I really appreciated it. I look forward to working with you on both bilateral and regional issues, and to building on the good relationship that you and President Reagan had.

President Mubarak: Thank you. I watched your Inauguration on television from beginning to end. I am very pleased that we will be working together. We will continue to do our best for peace in the Middle East.

The President: I hope we can work together to strengthen the moderate consensus in the region. There are still difficulties in the path of peace, but there may also be some opportunities. I value your judgment, and would welcome your advice and suggestions.

President Mubarak: I am sure we will provide very good support for your policy.

The President: Thanks again for your message.

President Mubarak: Please give our best regards to Mrs. Bush.

The President: And please give our very best to Suzanne. How are your two boys?

President Mubarak: Fine. One is in London, and the other is here in Cairo.

The President: It was very good to talk to you. Goodbye.

President Mubarak: Goodbye.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from the President to
President Alfonsin of Argentina

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Clarke M. Brintnall, NSC (Notetaker)
Rita Boren, Department of State (Interpreter)

President Raul Alfonsin

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 11:21 - 11:25 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office - Presidential Palace

The President said he was calling to thank President Alfonsin for the kind telegram on his inauguration.

President Alfonsin thanked him and wished him "all the luck in the world."

The President asked about of President Alfonsin's health.

President Alfonsin answered that he was quite well. He said that there was a problem with a regiment which had been entered by some civilians. He didn't know their ideology. He hoped that the "final battle" was taking place at that time. He then wished the President luck.

The President wished him the same. He said that he had seen a brief report this morning and hoped that it is not worrisome in terms of the stability of "your marvelous system."

President Alfonsin thanked the President for his kind words, wished him every success and said that he will keep the President and his government informed. He hoped to have the situation resolved today.

The President said that was good, adding that he had placed the call before reading about the disturbance. He said that he was glad to hear that President Alfonsin had the situation under

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control. The President wished him luck and thanked him for the courtesy of the message of the 20th.

(At this point the signal became weak and there was interference on the line)

President Alfonsin thanked the President and again wished him luck.

The President thanked Alfonsin.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Bhutto
Shirin Tahir-Kheli - Notetaker

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 12:20 p.m. - 12:25 p.m. EST
AND PLACE The White House

President: I am calling to thank you for the very cordial message that you sent on January 20. I wish you well and I remember your father with special friendship. I also remember meeting you when I was at the United Nations and look forward to working with you. We have watched you take over in Pakistan under difficult circumstances. We want to help. General Scowcroft, whom you have not yet met, knows the area well and is also looking forward to working with you as does my Secretary of State, Jim Baker, who is a close friend of mine.

Bhutto: Thank you Mr. President. I too look forward to working with you and your Administration. Please say hello to your son. He was at Harvard when I was there. This is a difficult time for Pakistan, but with the help of the United States, we can get through it.

President: How is your brother? I remember meeting him.

Bhutto: I don't really know. I wish I could tell you and I will talk to your Ambassador regarding the subject.

President: If this is a sensitive issue, we will not discuss it. Our Ambassador, Bob Oakley, is a friend of mine. We worked together at the United Nations. He feels that you have accorded him every courtesy.

Good luck to you. If there is anything we can do, don't hesitate to let us know. Please give my regards to your mother. I hope she is doing well.

Bhutto: Thank you Mr. President. My mother is well and will be pleased to hear that we have been in touch.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with
Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Rudolf V. Perina, NSC (Notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak, State Department
(Interpreter)

General Secretary Gorbachev
Unidentified Soviet Interpreter

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 12:33 p.m. - 12:46 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President said he appreciated very, very much the cordial message of congratulations which he received from the General Secretary. He said this was a thank you call to express his appreciation.

General Secretary Gorbachev said he welcomed the call and was very pleased to speak on the telephone with the President. He again wished to congratulate him on his inauguration.

The President thanked Gorbachev and said his intention was to go forward as they had discussed on Governor's Island. He was undertaking policy reviews immediately which would come up with ideas on how to improve the bilateral relationship and the policies started by President Reagan. He could assure the General Secretary that there would be no unnecessary delay. He just wanted to take a new look at policies and would then be ready to move forward as quickly as possible for both sides.

General Secretary Gorbachev thanked the President for his words. He said that, for his part, he wished to reaffirm all that they had discussed on Governor's Island. Everything he had told the President remained valid. General Secretary Gorbachev said that he had familiarized himself with the President's speech and found new elements that were of interest and importance in it, especially on the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations. Combined with what the President had just said, it strengthened his conviction that the two would expand relations and build upon the assets which already existed.

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The President thanked Gorbachev and said he had just two points to make. He wanted the General Secretary to know that his son and grandson had been deeply moved by their visit to Armenia. This had not been a political trip but rather a way to express how Americans felt about the enormous tragedy in Armenia. The President said he and Mrs. Bush were very grateful for the warm way in which their son and grandson had been received.

General Secretary Gorbachev said he wished to confirm that this very human gesture had been very well received by the Soviet public.

The President thanked Gorbachev and said his second point was that the General Secretary had been very generous in his time with Henry Kissinger. General Scowcroft would be inviting Kissinger to the White House in the next few days, and they would listen attentively to what Kissinger reported. They would not necessarily believe everything because this was, after all, Henry Kissinger but they knew that the General Secretary had been generous with his time, and they would listen attentively to what Dr. Kissinger said.

General Secretary Gorbachev thanked the President for this information and said he hoped that the President would find something of interest in what Dr. Kissinger reported.

The President said he had one last point. He hoped that Jim Baker, after consulting in Europe with Allies, would be able to establish a relationship with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze along the lines of the one Secretary Shultz had had. The President said that Jim Baker was very close to him, and a good working relationship with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would benefit U.S.-Soviet relations.

General Secretary Gorbachev said he understood fully and would do everything in his power to assure that the relationship between the two foreign ministers would not only be maintained, but also expanded and multiplied.

The President thanked Gorbachev and said he looked forward to working with him to strengthen world peace.

General Secretary Gorbachev said the President could rely on full cooperation from him in this effort. Everything which they had discussed remained valid. The Soviet side would proceed from a position of realism but also see the broad perspectives and try to act in a manner which benefited both the Soviet and American people and the world community as a whole. General Secretary Gorbachev said he had heard that at 7:30 that morning the President had sworn in his White House team. He sent regards to all these people, and thanked the President for his call. He also wished to pass sincere regards from him and Mrs. Gorbachev to the President's wife Barbara.

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The President thanked Gorbachev and said that his wife looked forward very much to getting to know Raisa even better. The two would get along very well.

General Secretary Gorbachev said he was very pleased by their conversation and wished the President all success in his activity.

The President thanked Gorbachev and wished him good-bye.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

0019

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Phone Call between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Barry F. Lowenkron, NSC (Notetaker)

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

DATE, TIME January 23, 1989, 1:19 p.m. - 1:23 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President thanked Prime Minister Thatcher for returning his call, and for the congratulatory letter. Prime Minister Thatcher responded by congratulating the President on his inauguration.

The President said he looked forward to working with the Prime Minister on the key international issues they faced. Prime Minister Thatcher responded that the President would always be welcome in Britain. She then outlined the most pressing problems the West had to tackle: preparing for a NATO Summit, taking a decision on nuclear modernization, and maintaining a unified Western position on East-West issues.

The President said that he had put together a solid team of pragmatists like Secretary Baker and National Security Advisor Scowcroft. They shared his view on the importance of maintaining the special relationship with Great Britain.

Prime Minister Thatcher said that she had not been able to take the President's earlier call because she had been dedicating a statue to Eisenhower in Grosvenor Square, at a ceremony which was also attended by General Galvin and Ambassador Walters. She emphasized that both countries could rely on each other.

The President said he hoped he could feel free to call on the Prime Minister for her advice, and hoped that she would feel the same about calling him. Prime Minister Thatcher responded that she would indeed do so.

Prime Minister Thatcher then reiterated the "urgent" need for nuclear modernization, saying she would be discussing the issue with Chancellor Kohl next month. Prime Minister Thatcher also expressed concern about the euphoria surrounding General Secretary Gorbachev. She said that the West was responding to his words, but his deeds were what counted.

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The President said that, while he did not want to be cast as the person stalling better East-West relations, he would continue to stress caution and the need for the NATO Allies to work together. Prime Minister Thatcher said that the President's past statements on dealing with the Soviets were right on the mark.

The President again thanked the Prime Minister for returning his call. Prime Minister Thatcher said that Mrs. Bush was "going down really big in Britain." The President said he appreciated Denis Thatcher's handwritten postscript to the Prime Minister's congratulatory letter. Prime Minister Thatcher said that the United States could always rely on Britain.

The conversation ended at 1:23 P.M.

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PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Mitterrand of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Barry F. Lowenkron, NSC (Notetaker)
President Mitterrand

DATE, TIME January 24, 1989, 9:21 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President thanked President Mitterrand for his warm message of congratulations. President Mitterrand said that it was only natural for him to send the President congratulations on his inauguration.

The President asked President Mitterrand whether he would be traveling to Tokyo for the Emperor's funeral. President Mitterrand replied that he had not yet made up his mind, but that he was leaning toward going. The President then suggested that the two get together in Tokyo to renew their friendship and consult on key issues. He stressed that there would be no set agenda. The President then raised the idea of having lunch with President Mitterrand in Tokyo.

President Mitterrand said that he looked forward to working closely with the President. He characterized his relations with the President as going beyond strictly official, and joked about how friendly and "disrespectful" his house dog had been to the President. President Mitterrand then asked whether the President would be announcing his trip to Tokyo today. The President responded that the White House would issue the announcement later in the day. He then repeated his interest in meeting with President Mitterrand.

President Mitterrand replied that, in that case, he would go to Tokyo, and that he would accept the President's invitation to lunch. The President said his plan was to have his bilaterals on February 23, and proposed lunch on that date. He stressed that if President Mitterrand could not make lunch on the 23rd, they could have lunch at a later date.

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President Mitterrand asked whether the President would be in Tokyo both the 23rd and 24th? The President said yes. President Mitterrand then asked whether the President's announcement would include his specific schedule of activities in Tokyo? The President said that the announcement would be general, making no mention of specific events in Tokyo. President Mitterrand said that he would issue an announcement of his trip to Tokyo, but that it would make no mention of a luncheon with the President.

President Mitterrand said that the funeral in Tokyo was not an event that one looked forward to. But, he said he did look forward to meeting with the President. He promised that his dog would be more respectful in the future. The President said that his dog was pregnant. President Mitterrand asked that the President convey his warmest regards to Mrs. Bush. The President said he looked forward to seeing President Mitterrand soon.

The conversation concluded at 9:30 a.m.

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0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Barry F. Lowenkron, NSC (Notetaker)
Prime Minister Gonzalez

DATE, TIME January 24, 1989, 11:16 a.m. - 11:25 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President thanked Prime Minister Gonzalez for his congratulatory message. The President said he recalled his previous visits with the Prime Minister, and looked forward to seeing him again. Prime Minister Gonzalez said he was pleased with the President's victory, and again congratulated him.

The President said he looked forward to discussing key international issues with the Prime Minister, in particular developments in Europe and in Central and Latin America. Prime Minister Gonzalez said he would be delighted to exchange views with the President. He said that, in his capacity as EC President, he would be traveling to the inauguration of Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and would be meeting with various Latin American heads of governments.

Prime Minister Gonzalez asked whether Vice President Quayle would be attending the inaugural. The President said that the Vice President would be going to Venezuela, and asked the Prime Minister to meet with the Vice President. Prime Minister Gonzalez said he would do so.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he looked forward to meeting the President. The President asked whether Prime Minister Gonzalez was planning to travel to Tokyo for the Emperor's funeral. Prime Minister Gonzalez said that King Juan Carlos would be representing Spain at the funeral. He then said he would appreciate the opportunity to pay a visit to Washington during the first half of this year.

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The President said that he would discuss the possibility of such a visit with General Scowcroft and Secretary Baker. He reiterated that he was anxious to meet with the Prime Minister and promised that he would try to work something out.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he was delighted, and that he could raise the issue when he meets with Vice President Quayle in Venezuela.

The President thanked the Prime Minister again for his congratulatory message. Prime Minister Gonzalez thanked the President for the telephone call.

The conversation ended at 11:25 a.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0133

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Diouf
of Senegal

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Abdou Diouf

DATE, TIME & PLACE: The White House, January 24, 1150 a.m.

President Diouf opened the conversation by expressing his "fraternal greetings" to President Bush.

President Bush responded by thanking the Senegalese president for his congratulatory note of January 20.

President Diouf indicated the message was sent not only to "the greatest nation on earth," but also to his "close friend."

The President agreed, "Yes, we are friends, and we want to continue that." President Bush went on to say that when matters come up in bilateral relations between our two countries, he hoped that President Diouf would call him. "There have been some small things that could have been avoided if we had talked," President Bush opined.

President Diouf exclaimed, "Absolutely....I fully agree!" He said he will not hesitate to contact President Bush, and he added that he will not "abuse" the privilege.

President Diouf was asked if he knew the President's designates as Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, and National Security Advisor, General Scowcroft. President Diouf replied that he had met Baker at an international monetary meeting, but he had not had the opportunity to meet General Scowcroft.

President Bush stated that he wanted President Diouf to meet these two key people. The President stressed that he is in

"total accord" on foreign policy issues with both of them. He reiterated that he wanted Diouf to get to know them.

President Diouf responded that he would be happy to meet with the senior associates of President Bush.

President Bush then inquired as to the state of President Diouf's health.

President Diouf answered by saying he is in very good health, and then commented that having watched him on TV, President Bush appears to be very "fit."

The President agreed but said he needs to run more often. He concluded by saying he simply wished to pay his respects to President Diouf, to say how much he values his friendship, and to thank him for his kind note.

President Diouf expressed once again his "loyal friendship" to President Bush, and asked that he convey best regards to Mrs. Bush.

The President said he would indeed tell Mrs. Bush, and asked President Diouf to extend best wishes from Mrs. Bush to Mrs. Diouf.

The Presidents exchanged good byes.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Schlueter of Denmark

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Barry F. Lowenkron, NSC (Notetaker)
Prime Minister Schlueter

DATE, TIME January 24, 1989, 3:10 p.m. - 3:21 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Prime Minister Schlueter said he was delighted with the excellent start of the President's Administration. The President said that both he and Mrs. Bush were delighted with the Prime Minister's congratulatory message.

The President said that he had put together a strong national security team headed by Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft. Prime Minister Schlueter said he knew both of them. The President said that the United States would be a steady partner. Prime Minister Schlueter said he did not doubt it.

The President said that he did not want to play "defense" all the time, and that he would be interested in the Prime Minister's views on how to set the NATO agenda. He said he appreciated the political problems the Prime Minister faced, and he considered the Prime Minister a friend.

Prime Minister Schlueter asked the President for his thoughts on a NATO Summit. The President said he thought a Summit built around the fortieth anniversary of NATO was a good idea. He asked the Prime Minister for his recommendation on where to hold the Summit. Prime Minister Schlueter said that the location was not as important as the fact that it take place soon. The President said he was leaning toward Brussels, although the British were interested in hosting it as well. As for timing, the President thought late May or early June was most appropriate. Prime Minister Schlueter said that was fine with him. He then stressed the importance of the President meeting with the NATO Allies before meeting with Gorbachev. The President said he agreed completely, emphasizing that Allied consultations would precede any meeting with Gorbachev.

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The President said that the Prime Minister was always welcome to contact him on any issue.

Returning to the issue of the NATO Summit, the President said that he thought that Brussels was the most appropriate site. Prime Minister Schlueter agreed.

The President said that he and Mrs. Bush were looking forward to meeting the Prime Minister and his wife. Prime Minister Schlueter said he felt the same way, and thanked the President for the call.

The conversation ended at 3:21 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the
President and President-Elect Carlos Andres
Perez of Venezuela

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Clarke M. Brintnall, NSC (Notetaker)
Rita Boren, Department of State (Interpreter)

President-Elect Carlos Andres Perez

DATE, TIME January 24, 1989, 4:43-4:49 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office - President-elect Perez'
Office, Caracas

The President said that it was good to hear from President-elect Perez and thanked him for his message of January 20.

President-elect Perez thanked the President for the call and said he is off to a good start.

The President said he is looking forward to working with President-elect Perez and that he is sending the Vice President, the second highest official in our government to Perez' inauguration. This signals the importance the President places on the inauguration.

President-elect Perez said that he is honored that the Vice President has been designated to represent the President and that he is looking forward to close cooperation between our two countries.

The President said that their meeting had gotten them off to a good start and that he is looking forward to hearing Perez' thoughts on bilateral issues, Central America and others.

President-elect Perez said that for him, the meeting was important and encouraging and that he shares the President's concern over our problems and Central America. He promised to

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maintain close contact and will deal with the Vice President on the issues of Panama and Central America during the inauguration.

The President said that this was very encouraging and that he looked forward to hearing from the Vice President following his trip. He then wished Perez the very best for February 2.

President-elect Perez thanked him and assured the President of his close cooperation.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between the
President and Philippine President
Corazon Aquino

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The First Lady
Richard Childress, NSC Notetaker

Corazon Aquino, President of the
Republic of the Philippines

DATE, TIME January 24, 1989, 6:07 - 6:10 p.m.;
AND PLACE: 6:14 - 6:17 p.m., Situation Room

The President initiated the call and after a pro forma exchange of greetings said that the purpose of his call was to thank President Aquino for her congratulatory message on his assumption of office. He noted that while planning this call it was learned that it was her birthday and so he wanted to wish her a Happy Birthday as well as thank her for the warm letter.

President Aquino said she appreciated the call very much, especially now, knowing how busy he was.

The President said he appreciated her sentiments in that regard very much and he expressed the hope their paths would cross soon.

(The call was interrupted at this point by mechanical difficulty.)

After the call was reestablished, the President said that he thought they had gotten cut off but that he had said what was on his mind, reiterating that he looked forward to working with her very much and that he hoped she would call him on any problems that seemed insurmountable.

President Aquino thanked him for that sentiment and said that she would like to express to Mrs. Bush through the President how impressed she was with the First Lady and the coverage she has received.

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The President said that President Aquino will love her as much as he does, wished her all the best and then put the First Lady on the phone.

After greetings, President Aquino said she had just told the President that she was most impressed by the coverage of the First Lady and she now knows why the President has been so successful.

Mrs. Bush expressed her thanks and said she looked forward to seeing President Aquino soon.

President Aquino said she understood they may be traveling this way for the funeral of Emperor Hirohito.

Mrs. Bush confirmed this and said she hoped that she could see her in Tokyo if she was going to be there as well.

President Aquino said she did not know the arrangements yet but she planned to be in Tokyo and hoped very much to meet with them in Japan.

Closing greetings were expressed between the First Lady and President Aquino and the conversation ended.

NOTE: Call began at 6:07 p.m.
Mechanically interrupted at 6:10 p.m.
Contact reestablished at 6:14 p.m.
Call ended at 6:17 p.m.

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan
of Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Notetaker

DATE, TIME January 25, 1989, 9:25 a.m. - 9:27 a.m. EST
AND PLACE The White House

President: This is George Bush. I tried to get you and the Prime Minister (we had difficulty in getting this circuit to you) to thank you both for your warm greetings that you sent me on January 20. I want you to know that I appreciated the message.

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan: We were extremely happy at your election to the Presidency and your inauguration and thought it our duty to convey our greetings to you on both occasions.

President: I want you to know that we will work for continued excellent bilateral relations with Pakistan. We are grateful to you in terms of the good relationship that we have shared regarding your neighbor (Afghanistan). My good friend, Jim Baker, will be sworn in as Secretary of State this week, and General Scowcroft, here in the White House, is very familiar with the subcontinent. Both look forward to working with you.

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan: Thank you very much. We too look forward to working together in the future.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Shamir of Israel

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Shamir

DATE, TIME January 25, 1989, 11:03 a.m. - 11:07 a.m. EST

PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. How are you?

Prime Minister Shamir: I'm fine. I'm happy to be able to call you Mr. President.

The President: I just wanted to call to thank you for your very warm message of congratulations, and to say that Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft and I look forward to working with you. As you so generously mentioned in your letter, my team and I are familiar with the area and its problems, and I want to assure you of our maximum possible cooperation.

Prime Minister Shamir: Thank you very much for your call. I look forward to meeting with you and to further cooperation between us to achieve peace in the area. It is in the best interests of all of us to work together closely.

The President: I agree. We want the best possible lines of communication, with no surprises. We want to move forward along the lines of the principles that we've articulated, with which I think you're in general agreement. Thanks again for your message. I know that this is the first of many conversations between us.

Prime Minister Shamir: It was very kind of you to call.

The President: Please tell Shulamit that Barbara also appreciated your message.

Prime Minister Shamir: And please give our best to Barbara. We watched the Inauguration on television with great interest.

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The President: It was a very good start for the Administration, and produced a lot of good feelings throughout the country.

Prime Minister Shamir: I'm sure you'll have great success.

The President: Thank you, and I look forward to seeing you.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd

DATE, TIME January 25, 1989, 11:39 a.m. - 11:43 a.m. EST
PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Majesty, this is George Bush. I'm calling to thank you for the warm and friendly message you sent on my Inauguration.

King Fahd: Thank you very much for calling. I was not exaggerating in my message when I emphasized how lucky the world is to have you as President of the United States. Your experience in domestic and international affairs is truly unique. I'm happy that Saudi Arabia has such a good friend to work with.

The President: Thank you so much. I look forward to working with you.

King Fahd: I hope to see you after a few months, whenever it would be convenient for you.

The President: I'd like to do that.

King Fahd: I want to continue to strengthen relations between our two countries, and I wish you great success as President. Please accept our congratulations, and please give our regards to Mrs. Bush and your family. My wife and youngest son, Abd al-Aziz, are here with me and send their best regards too.

The President: Thank you again. And please convey my best regards to your family. I look forward to seeing you in the future.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein
of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein

DATE, TIME January 25, 1989, 2:15 p.m. - 2:19 p.m. EST
PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Your Majesty. I'm calling to thank you for your warm message of congratulations. I look forward very much to seeing you and working with you.

King Hussein: Thank you. I wish you every success. I too look forward to seeing you and working together to achieve our common goals and objectives, God willing.

The President: We've assembled a good team in Washington, with Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft and Governor Sununu. We're all sensitive to the problems of the region, the importance of the peace process, and Jordan's unique role.

King Hussein: It is a very, very good team. I look forward to very fruitful cooperation on all matters of mutual concern. I can't say how optimistic I am about the prospects for working together. We'll do all we can to help.

The President: I understand you'll be going to Tokyo for Emperor Hirohito's funeral. I would very much like to spend a few moments together with you there, if that would be convenient for you. Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft and Governor Sununu can join us.

King Hussein: I would be delighted to meet with you.

The President: Good. I'll mention that to General Scowcroft and Secretary Baker. Please tell Queen Noor that Barbara really appreciated her call yesterday. Please give her our best.

King Hussein: I will.

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The President: Where did we finally reach you?

King Hussein: I've just arrived in Cairo from Saudi Arabia.

The President: I talked to President Mubarak earlier this week.
Please give him my best regards.

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0127

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia and
President George Bush

PARTICIPANTS: President George Bush and Prime Minister
Bob Hawke

DATE, TIME January 25, 1989, 5:27 P.M. - 5:31 P.M.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President called Prime Minister Hawke to establish contact with him in his new position as President.

Prime Minister Hawke responded that it was a very appropriate moment for the President to call because it was Australian National Day. The Prime Minister mentioned that he had just been at breakfast with the Chairman of Australia Day Council John Newcombe, and that Newcombe asked to send his greetings back to President Bush.

The President responded that he hoped that Prime Minister Hawke would also send his best to Mr. Newcombe. The President continued that he wanted to call to be sure that all was going well in the relations between the two countries. He said the United States has a good team coming into office with Secretary of State Baker, General Scowcroft and a new White House Chief of Staff, whom the Prime Minister may not yet know.

Prime Minister Hawke responded that the President has assembled a very impressive team. He said the President has put his own stamp on the Administration. He speculated about opportunities to play golf with the new Secretary of State and commented on the previous secretary's skills. The President responded that he would like to play as well, and there followed a brief exchange about their respective golf records.

The President then said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would let him know if anything needs to be attended to.

The Prime Minister said he fully understands that it will not be possible to see the President in Australia during the President's upcoming visit to Asia. The Prime Minister emphasized, however, that the people of Australia would love to see the President there and he particularly stressed that it would be very helpful personally to the Prime Minister if the visit could take place this year. He then repeated his request for a visit "this year."

The President said that the Australian Ambassador had been in to see General Scowcroft that day and mentioned the desire of the Prime Minister for the President to go to Australia this year. The President said that he cannot say at this point yes or no, and that the issue would have to be staffed, but the Prime Minister ought to be aware that personally speaking the President would love to do it. He asked the Prime Minister to stay in touch and said that the American side will keep working on this request.

The Prime Minister closed by saying he sent the best regards of Mrs. Hawke to the President and Mrs. Bush and there followed a brief exchange complimenting their respective First Ladies.

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0019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with Pope John Paul II

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Paul Lebras, WHSR (Notetaker)

Pope John Paul II

DATE, TIME January 26, 1989, 12:02 p.m. - 12:03 p.m. and
AND PLACE: 12:14 p.m. - 12:16 p.m., Oval Office

The President said he was calling to thank the Pope for his warm note of congratulations. He remembered the warmth of his reception, both at the Vatican and here in the United States.

The Pope said he again wished to congratulate the President.

(At the point the connection was cut-off and resumed after a few minutes.)

The President said they had been cut off but he again wished to thank the Pope for his message. He said he had great respect for all that the Pope was doing in the cause of world peace. He wanted the Pope to know that he was welcome to call at any time to discuss things of concern. The President said he also looked forward to seeing the Pope before too long. He had a very good relationship with the Reverend Pio Laghi, the Vatican representative here. He was also well acquainted with Cardinal O'Connor. So he was very familiar with the Pope's official family here.

The Pope said he wished to send greetings to both the President's family and the entire United States.

The President thanked the Pope. He said, once again, that he looked forward to seeing him soon and that he should not hesitate to call.

The Pope said he was very grateful for the offer which should prove useful.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between the
President and South Korean President
Roh Tae Woo

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Kelly, NSC, Notetaker
Chang Ho Lie, Interpreter

Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic
of Korea

DATE, TIME January 27, 1989, 9:51-9:57 a.m.,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President initiated the call and said he was sorry to call at such a late hour. He said the purpose of his call was to thank President Roh very much for his warm congratulatory message on his inauguration. He said he wished President Roh well and that he hoped he could visit Korea and call at the Blue House on his way back from his trip to Tokyo.

President Roh thanked President Bush for his call. He said the presidential inauguration deserved blessings not only from the American people but from all people of the Free World. He will be pleased to welcome the President's visit to Korea on his way back from his Tokyo visit. President Roh said he was wondering if the President could tell him about his visit schedule now, or later through normal diplomatic channels.

President Bush said General Scowcroft will contact the Korean Ambassador here regarding his detailed schedule. He said he will consult with President Roh on subjects, but would, in principle, like to agree on a visit and say today that he is planning to stop by Seoul. It will have to be a very brief visit, he said. He would like to say that his visit will solidify our relationship, and underscore the importance of U.S.-Korea relations.

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President Roh said he will look forward to the President's visit. He said the President's visit will enhance the security of the Far East and the friendship between our two nations. He said he hoped they would be able to discuss matters of mutual interest. President Roh said he will do his best to make the President's stay in Korea as comfortable as possible. He also said he hoped President Bush could play some tennis while visiting Korea.

President Bush thanked President Roh and said he was not sure whether he would be able to enjoy sports during the visit. He said our governments can work out details, but that he looks forward to seeing President Roh.

President Roh said that all of the Korean people and he will welcome the President's visit. He thanked him very much for the phone call.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from the President to
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
of Mexico

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
David A. Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)

President Carlos Salinas de Gortari

DATE, TIME January 30, 1989, 11:00 - 11:03 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office - Presidential Residence, Mexico
City

The President said he was calling to thank President Salinas for the congratulations he sent for the inauguration on January 20. The President recalled how much he enjoyed meeting President Salinas in Texas before the inauguration.

President Salinas told the President that he was very kind and said that the President was off to a nice start.

The President observed that it was better to have a measured pace and that if you rush things you can get in trouble, at least with the Congress. He then asked how things were with President Salinas's administration.

President Salinas said that things were fine and that he had tested the waters on some issues.

The President said he was going to Tokyo for the funeral of Emperor Hirohito and inquired whether President Salinas would attend.

President Salinas said that he would not attend but that his wife would go.

The President said maybe Barbara could say hello to her.

President Salinas said he appreciated the President's call.

The President said that he had his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with him and that he had organized a fine team. The President suggested that perhaps some time his people could meet the new players on President Salinas's team. The President noted that President Salinas was already acquainted with Secretary of State Baker.

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President Salinas thought that such a meeting was a good idea.

The President thanked President Salinas for the courtesies extended to his son Jeb during the Salinas inauguration.

President Salinas said he was happy to do so and hoped that Jeb would come again.

The President said that was "wonderful," and remarked that Mexico practically has an agent in the White House in the form of his son Jeb. The President said Jeb loves Mexico and enjoyed his visit.

President Salinas thanked the President for his remarks.

The President said that he looks forward to seeing President Salinas again in the future. He said President Salinas should not hesitate to call him if saw any problems. The President said he has a good team that feels the same way he does about maintaining good relations with Mexico.

President Salinas agreed and said he also was dedicated to preserving good relations with the United States. He said it was very nice to talk to the President again and commented that it seemed as if the President had a cold.

The President said that he did have a hoarse voice and did not know where it came from.

President Salinas wished the President well.

The President wished President Salinas the best of luck.

President Salinas said that the President was very kind and thanked him for the call.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Bendjedid of Algeria

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Bendjedid
Brent Scowcroft
Sandra Charles (NSC notetaker)
Alec Toumayan (State Dept interpreter)

DATE, TIME, January 31, 1989, 09:20-09:22 a.m. EST
PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: How are you?

President Bendjedid: Well, and how are you?

The President: Very well. If I sound different, it's because I have a cold. My voice is a little hoarse.

President Bendjedid: I hope you get over it quickly.

The President: I am calling to thank you for your warm greeting on my inauguration. I recall with great pleasure our personal and special relationship which I want to continue now that I am President.

President Bendjedid: Thank you so much. It is a great pleasure for me to speak to you. Our friendship, which is both personal and professional, is important for the present and future development of our relationship.

The President: I hope you will contact me if you have any problems. I will never forget that luncheon that you hosted in your home with your wife for Barbara and me. It was very special and left me with a lasting impression. Someday soon I hope to reciprocate.

President Bendjedid: Thank you. I would be honored to contact you when the need arises for an exchange of views on issues if it is warranted.

The President: Good. Thank you again for your message. I look forward to working with you.

President Bendjedid: I too, with great pleasure.

The President: Au revoir, mon ami.

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hassan of Morocco

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hassan

DATE, TIME, January 31, 1989; 2:28 - 2:35 p.m. EST
PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Your Majesty, how are you?

King Hassan: How are you?

The President: Tres bien. I am delighted to speak with you to thank you for your very nice message and to pay my respects. I look forward to working with you. Please excuse my voice; I have a cold.

King Hassan: You have a cold? Mrs. Bush will be the best doctor for you.

The President: We remember our wonderful visit to your country and your many courtesies to us. We haven't forgotten them.

King Hassan: How is Mrs. Bush? Is she well?

The President: Very well.

King Hassan: I will never forget my dinner and her kind hospitality. It will be remembered in my mind for many years.

The President: I want you to know the way we feel about our personal relationship, and the relationship between the US and Morocco which is also very good. I have a personal interest in maintaining that.

King Hassan: Mr. President, friendship is something sacred. And I can assure you I will put the full weight of our personal friendship and the friendship between our two countries on the scale.

The President: That is good to hear. I also want to mention that an old friend of yours is going to the FRG as our Ambassador -- Vernon Walters.

King Hassan: I am happy to know he will only be a two and a half hour plane ride from Morocco.

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The President: I understand you are meeting with President Mobutu aujourd'hui.

King Hassan: Yes, today he arrived from Kinshasa. He will rest here for four days. If you have a message to transmit to him, I will be happy to do so for you.

The President: I am trying to reach him. He also sent a nice message and is a good friend. I understand I can find him there with you someplace.

King Hassan: I am delighted to convey your message to him.

The President: Thank you. I would like to talk to him on the phone to convey my respects. I will try to reach him by phone. Thank you for your offer.

King Hassan: I will call him and tell him you are waiting to talk to him.

The President: Majesty, how is your wonderful family?

King Hassan: I am impatient to meet with you. I have many things to tell.

The President: Good. I am encouraged by the recent movement to solve the western Sahara problem. Are you optimistic?

King Hassan: In our job, we must be optimistic. If not, you can't make anything happen. Actually, I have many reasons to be optimistic.

The President: Good. Good luck on that. In any case, we will sustain our good relationship. Thank you for taking my call and for your warm message.

King Hassan: Please give Mrs. Bush my and my wife's regards and respect for her hospitality.

The President: She will be pleased you remembered. I look forward to seeing you.

King Hassan: I wish you good wishes and good health.

The President: Au revoir.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0330

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire

PARTICIPANTS: The President

President Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko

DATE, TIME & PLACE: The White House, January 31, 1989,
2:40 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.

The Presidents exchanged greetings in French.

President Mobutu asked the President if he was in good health.

The President replied that he had a cold, but he was getting better.

President Mobutu then commented, saying it was "no wonder," what with the long campaign and so many recent speeches.

President Bush said he was calling to thank Mobutu for his message of congratulations after the election, and that he looked forward to working with the Zairian president.

President Mobutu asked about the health of the Bush family, particularly Mrs. Bush.

The President replied that he had told both his wife and his mother he would be calling President Mobutu, and then said, "You remember meeting my mother, she speaks French."

"Yes," Mobutu responded, and inquired about her health.

President Bush admitted his mother was getting older, but otherwise she was in fine health.

Mobutu asked if she was in Maine, and was told Mrs. Bush was in Florida.

The President then reiterated that this call was to send his greetings.

Mobuto responded by thanking the President and then said his own wife was in Brussels, in spite of the present "quarrel" with the Belgians.

The President asked how Zaire was getting along with Belgium and was told by Mobuto the two countries presently were "fighting."

President Bush said at least the U.S. and Zaire were getting along, and repeated that he looked forward to working with the President.

President Mobuto replied with thanks, and said Zaire was counting on U.S. "cooperation," because this fits in with his program of economic recovery for Zaire.

President Bush concluded by sending his wishes for a good visit to Morocco.

The two Presidents exchanged good-byes in French.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between President Bush
and President Babangida of Nigeria

PARTICIPANTS: President Bush
President Babangida, Nigeria

DATE, TIME February 7, 1989, 5:15 p.m. - 5:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Bush initiated the conversation with some opening pleasantries, emphasizing that he was calling late in the day and had the flu, but wanted to speak with President Babangida early in the President's term in office. The President also thanked Babangida for his warm message of congratulations upon the President's inauguration.

Babangida said only that the President was welcome.

The President noted that he would be in Tokyo for the Emperor's funeral and perhaps he would meet with Babangida.

Babangida quickly agreed that this would be a good idea.

President Bush fondly remembered his various trips to Africa, including Nigeria. He looked forward to his next visit to Africa.

Babangida also recalled the President's visits to Africa and said that he hoped the President would be able to soon travel to Africa again, including Nigeria. He added that it would be nice if the President could spend more time in Nigeria and have more leisure time.

President Bush said that he felt it would be important to show United States interest in Africa. It was an important area, one that he cared about.

Babangida agreed. He added his appreciation for the President's call and sent his warmest greetings to Mrs. Bush and other members of the President's family. He looked forward to meeting with the President in Tokyo and, perhaps, later in the year in Washington.

The President closed the conversation with his best regards.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0762

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Phone Call to Prime Minister John Swan of Bermuda

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Philip D. Zelikow, NSC (Notetaker)

Prime Minister John Swan

DATE, TIME: February 11, 1989, 9:45 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: Call placed from Kennebunkport, Maine

The President offered the Prime Minister belated congratulations on his electoral win.

Prime Minister Swan thanked the President.

The President asked what the numbers had been.

The Prime Minister said that the opposition (Progressive Labor Party) won 15 seats, 1 seat went to an Independent, 1 to the NLP (National Liberal Party) and we (United Bermuda Party) won 23.

The President noted that the outcome had not been in doubt, but it was always nice to have it in the bank. The President asked how Colin was doing?

The Prime Minister said he was great.

The President said that Marlin sent his best and asked about the weather, commenting that it was freezing where he was.

The Prime Minister said the weather was wonderful.

The President asked the Prime Minister not to tell him any more about it. "We're coming," he added, "turn down the blanket in the guest bedroom."

The Prime Minister said he would be glad to welcome the President any time.

Closing the conversation, the President said he did hope to come at some point, and he reiterated his congratulations on the Prime Minister's victory.

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PRESIDENT IN TOKYO JAPAN

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1354

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with
President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela on
March 3, 1989 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Venezuelan President Perez

DATE, TIME March 3, 1989, 9:12 a.m. - 9:26 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office - Presidential Palace

The President and President Perez spoke for 14 minutes. The connection was poor, necessitating frequent repetition of President Perez's words. President Perez spoke in Spanish. (Ø)

The President began by saying, "Hello, Mr. President." (Ø)

President Perez said hello and said he was delighted to hear from the President. (Ø)

The President said he was calling to express the concern he felt about the recent difficulties in Caracas and the rest of Venezuela. He stated, "I have been thinking of you and sincerely hope that those difficulties come to an end quickly." (Ø)

President Perez thanked the President for his thoughts. (Ø)

The President said he wanted to mention some other problems. He stated, "I have been thoroughly briefed on your economic situation and I applaud the difficult measures you have taken. I know that devaluation and price increases are difficult medicines to take." The President added that he was convinced that the measures President Perez was taking will lead to economic recovery. (Ø)

The President added that he would like to inform President Perez that the United States would make a bridge loan to the Venezuelan Government in the amount of \$450 million. The President said he hoped it would provide the appropriate support while you await disbursement from the International Monetary Fund. (Ø)

The President asked how are things going in Venezuela now. (Ø)

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President Perez thanked the President for his words. He added that he and his people were very pleased by the President's response and concern for the people of Venezuela. President Perez continued by saying, "But I want to tell you, Mr. President, that the serious events in Venezuela show how grave the problem is in Latin America." (Ø)

President Perez went on to say that President Sarney of Brazil had called him recently to tell of his conversation with the President when they were both in Japan recently. President Perez said he shared the observations and comments that were made by President Sarney to the President. (Ø)

President Perez said he sent the President a letter on the day that the disturbances began [February 27]. He stated, "I want to tell you if there is no change in [international] debt policy then whatever we may do here may be useless." President Perez said he would thank the President if he would read the letter he is sending. (Ø)

The President said he would read the letter. (Ø)

President Perez thanked the President. (Ø)

The President asked when the letter was sent. (Ø)

President Perez said he just delivered it to Ambassador Reich. (Ø)

The President said, "good," and asked if President Perez had time for one subject more. (Ø)

President Perez said, "of course." (Ø)

The President said we do understand the debt problem. A study by the Secretary of the Treasury is now underway.. The President said, "Your concerns are being taken into account." The President added that he hoped that before long we will come up with solutions for this problem. (Ø)

The President said, on another subject, President Cerezo of Guatemala had just visited him. They had a good talk on the recent Central American summit. The President said he saw some positive elements in the summit agreement, but we had some problems with parts of it. He said he would ask our Ambassador to inform President Perez about the talk with Cerezo. There was no breakthrough, but it was a good talk. (Ø)

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The President said he would like to make one last point relating to Cuba and the human rights situation there. A recent report by the Cuban Working Group noted continued violations of human rights, even though there were some improvements. We believe that the situation should continue to be monitored. Certainly, those people who spoke to the Working Group should be protected against retaliation by the Cuban Government. The President concluded by saying he would appreciate President Perez's support on this issue if he agreed. (Ø)

President Perez replied that he had some papers that were just brought to him about Cuba that were sitting on his desk. He had not had time to read them. (Ø)

The President said, "Very good. Thank you and good luck." The President added, "I wish the best to you, my friend." Sometimes it was best that we call from time to time to discuss these issues. The President repeated his great personal regard for the tough decisions Perez had to take in this difficult time. He concluded by saying that we want to help if we possibly can. (Ø)

President Perez thanked the President, saying that he would be maintaining his position [on austerity issues]. But he said he wanted to say once more that Venezuela's future depends upon the decisions the United States takes on debt issues. (Ø)

The President said he understood, wished President Perez good luck, and thanked him again. (Ø)

President Perez thanked the President and said it was a great pleasure for him as well. (Ø)

The President concluded the conversation with an "adios." (Ø)

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Hughes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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1490

March 9, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call to Colombian President Barco (P)

The following summary of the President's conversation with Colombian President Barco last evening concerning the U.N. Human Rights Commission vote on Cuba is provided for the State Department's information. (P)

- In response to the President's points, President Barco explained that he had talked to his Foreign Minister and Ambassador about the Cuban human rights report and that Colombia was working with the Latin American Group to try to achieve a compromise. (P)
- The President described Barco's response as "noncommittal." Barco was clearly trying to hide behind multilateral diplomatic activity. (P)
- Barco spoke in English and was friendly and open. (P)

Since, due to technical difficulties, the President's conversation was not monitored by a notetaker, this summary was provided by the President. (P)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 8, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES 
SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call to Colombian
President Barco

The President just telephoned to inquire if we were successful in monitoring his telephone call with President Barco. I explained that, regrettably, we were not; his call was interrupted by a loss of the connection and when Signal Board established a new connection, for technical reasons that I do not understand, we were unable to establish a patch on the line to monitor it.

The President gave the following readout of his conversation with Barco:

- The President said he followed his talking points fairly closely, emphasizing the importance of the vote in the UNHRC, and sought to persuade Barco to support us.
- Barco spoke in English and was friendly and open, according to the President.
- Barco explained that he had talked to his Foreign Minister and Ambassador about the Cuban human rights report and that Colombia was working with the Latin American Group to try to achieve a compromise.
- The President said that Barco was "noncommittal" and "trying to hide behind the multilateral thing".

With your permission we will share this readout with the State Department for passage to Ambassador Valladares.

RECOMMENDATION

That we pass this information to the Department of State.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

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1588

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Salinas

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Salinas of Mexico

DATE, TIME March 10, 1989; 1:49-1:53 p.m.;
AND PLACE: Mexico City to Oval Office

President Salinas of Mexico telephoned the President at 1:49 pm on March 10, 1989.

President Salinas congratulated the President for Secretary Brady's announcement on the debt.

The President asked whether he had read it. Salinas answered affirmatively stating that he considered it a new and most important approach.

The President said the issue had been a priority one and that he would now have to follow-up on it.

President Salinas noted the Mexican Government would strongly endorse the announcement today, saying he is convinced the President is prepared to respond to the problem.

The President said he hoped the Mexico endorsement will have good reverberations in South America.

President Salinas stated his belief that the announcement will bring results. He stated he wanted to make one comment: that it is fundamental to make the proposal front-loaded. He noted front-loading is essential to debt reduction and capital repatriation. He said that his Finance Secretary Aspe would be visiting Washington on Monday to talk to Secretary Brady about front-loading.

The President asked whether the Brady meeting was already scheduled. Salinas answered affirmatively.

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The President said he would tell Secretary Brady about the call and said he looked forward to the results of the Brady/Aspe meeting.

President Salinas said it would be good to have a meeting once there are results on the issue to show that there is a good US/Mexican relationship. He added he would be making some important announcements on the fight against drugs.

The President noted his pleasure at Salinas' efforts in this area, stating his efforts and statements would be very helpful. He added that we are off to a reasonably good start on the certification process. He also said that Salinas was highly respected for his efforts on corruption.

President Salinas quickly added that his government would fight corruption everywhere. He ended by again congratulating the President.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Salvadoran President-Elect Cristiani, March 22, 1989 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Alfredo Cristiani
Paul J. Lebras, WHSSS (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME: March 22, 1989, 2:43 p.m. - 2:48 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office - Cristiani's home

The President, after an initial exchange of greetings, indicated that he did not wish to delay his congratulatory call any longer, even though the election results had not yet been certified. He asked Cristiani when he thought the certification would occur. (Ø)

Mr. Cristiani responded that the certification had taken place about a half hour before. (Ø)

The President replied that his call was even more timely then. (Ø)

The President congratulated Cristiani on his wonderful win, saying that the United States supports the government and people of El Salvador in their efforts to build democracy. The United States also understands and applauds El Salvador's efforts to defend its society against terrorism. The President said that his call had two purposes, to congratulate Cristiani, and secondly, to welcome Cristiani's commitment to democracy. (Ø)

Mr. Cristiani thanked the President and stated that the objectives of the United States were also those of El Salvador. (Ø)

The President next asked if it would be convenient for Cristiani to come to Washington soon. The President said that Cristiani's clear-cut win, certified by the U.S. observer delegation composed of both Republicans and Democrats, made it appropriate that Cristiani come to Washington at an early date and meet with members of both parties on Capitol Hill. (Ø)

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Mr. Cristiani replied that it would be a great honor and that he was planning on traveling to the United States during the first two weeks of April. (Ø)

The President asked Cristiani to suggest some specific days to make sure that he could fit Cristiani into his schedule. The only potential problem, the President stated, was an out-of-town visit he planned to make at the end of the first week of April and the visit of President Mubarak [of Egypt] early the following week. Nevertheless, the President said, he would make arrangements to meet Cristiani. (Ø)

Mr. Cristiani replied that he would work out specific dates with the U.S. Embassy. (Ø)

The President said that he had great confidence in Bill Walker [U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador] and that Walker would be here in Washington with the President and Cristiani. (Ø)

The President closed by saying that Cristiani had many friends here in the United States and that we need to dispel misapprehension by liberal elements that El Salvador will change its view on the democratic process. (Ø)

The President and Mr. Cristiani exchanged closing salutations and the call was concluded. (Ø)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
30. Telcon	Re: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (2 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Telcon Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Telephone Calls - Memorandums of Conversations 1/23/89 - 5/10/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By 3/2 (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/30/2009	OA/ID Number:	91111-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(449)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of
Saudi ArabiaPARTICIPANTS: The President
King Fahd
Sandra Charles (notetaker)
Zaki Aslan (State Dept interpreter)DATE, TIME April 11, 1989; 4:25 pm - 4:45 pm EST
AND PLACE The White HouseKing Fahd: Hello Mr President. I am happy to speak with you.President: I am delighted to talk to you. I am very grateful
for your support in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] (b)(1)King Fahd: I am only delighted to be able to help. We have done
our duty and will do more, God willing. I can assure you
everything will be fine. We will be where you want us to be. I
am happy talking to you.President: I am happy to talk to you. I would like to discuss
one other thing. I thought you might be interested in my
observations concerning President Mubarak's and Shamir's visits.
If you have a minute, I'd like to tell you about it.King Fahd: I am happy to hear this, Mr. President. It is kind
of you to do so.President: My Administration remains committed to the Peace
Process. We regard 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations.
This involves an exchange of territory for peace. I want you to
know I am not backing away from that position.King Fahd: This is a great stance. I wish you success in this
endeavor. As for us, we are ready to help in every field
possible.President: We may have some differences regarding elections on
the West Bank. We believe they offer potential for a dialogue
between Israel and the Palestinians. I hope you saw Secretary
Baker's statement of two weeks ago and my statement on the~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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occupation. I believe we laid down some markers there. There might be some room on elections -- if the parties agree to go forward, if they are free, fair and all participate. If you have any differences, I would like to hear from you, and on where we go from there.

King Fahd: All I want to say is that in any undertaking there are problems and obstacles. This matter has taken decades, years to understand. I am sure all these problems will find a solution with your wisdom. As long as you have adopted this problem, you will find a solution. We are sure and we are confident of your direction, that it is the right direction. I support you 100 percent. Another thing I want to mention is the atmosphere in the region is good, there is an opening, detente. Things are moving in a positive direction. If I have concerns, I will not hesitate; if I think of anything, I will communicate with you right away. (phone disconnected)

(phone reconnected) Let me reiterate Mr. President, anything we can do from our side, we are happy to do and we will stay in constant touch.

President: That is very helpful. I hope you will do so. I have great respect for you. Please convey the friendship I have in my heart not only for you but to Crown Prince Abdullah who was here.

King Fahd: Thank you for your greetings to Abdullah. I will pass them to him. Thank you for your call. Can we announce this call publicly?

President: I would be delighted if you do. Your spokesman should convey that it was driven by my official, personal respect for you.

King Fahd: What I have in mind is to say that there was a call between me and the American President. We talked about issues in general, issues that are good for the world, and for the success of mutual endeavors.

President: Good. I will instruct Fitzwater to use the same lines.

King Fahd: Good. Thanks.

President: Goodbye. I hope our paths cross before too long.

King Fahd: God willing. I hope so too.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
King Hussein
Sandra Charles (notetaker)

DATE, TIME April 12, 1989; 07:19 a.m. - 07:24 a.m. EST
AND PLACE The White House

King Hussein: It is lovely to hear from you. I am happy you called.

President: I am happy to talk to you. I just received a report of your meeting with our Ambassador, and I wanted to have a word with you before you arrive here. Before we get into that, I want say how much Barbara and I look forward to having you and Queen Noor here.

King Hussein: Thank you. We are delighted to be coming.

President: Our Ambassador passed on your views from your meeting with him. I can certainly understand your concerns and even the skepticism that you have felt about aspects of the peace process. I understand the difficulties that lie ahead. I am working on this with Brent Scowcroft and Jim Baker, and we realize there are no simple answers. That's why I want to have enough time when you are here to discuss in detail your concerns.

King Hussein: I appreciate that very much.

President: I understand you will be meeting with President Mubarak, is that today?

King Hussein: Yes, in a few hours from now.

President: Tell him I said he could make a great baseball player if he would practice. You know I took him to a baseball game while he was here.

King Hussein: Yes, he told me about it.

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President: It was good, a lot of fun. We had a good visit. I want to fill you in on the details. A couple of markers we mentioned have caused the other party some concern -- Jimmy Baker's statement and my characterization of the West Bank as an occupation. But these are the policy positions of the United States. I hope they help. I appreciate having our Ambassador's readout of your conversation. I am somewhat heartened -- but not naive -- after my meetings with President Mubarak and Shamir.

King Hussein: I hope to get a reading from President Mubarak and the Palestinians.

President: On elections, I want you know we won't endorse anything that hurts Jordan or your position. I hope there will be open-mindedness until we can talk more about it. I realize there are elements in it that neither side likes, but it might be the way to get talks going. There may be some differences with you. That is why, when you are here, I want to take whatever time it takes to talk with you. Not just pleasantries. But you and me alone, or with a few advisors. So I fully understand your position. That's why I am looking forward to your visit and also renewing our friendship, both Barbara and I.

King Hussein: It has been nice talking to you. I am looking forward to my visit, also.

President: Please give my respects to the Queen. Tell her that if there are any friends she wants at the big dinner we are having to let our Embassy know, and we will accommodate her. It will be a homecoming for her so we want her surrounded by friends.

King Hussein: Thank you Mr. President. Good-bye.

President: Good-bye.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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2605

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President

F.R.G.
Chancellor Kohl

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE: April 12, 1989, 7:55 a.m. - 8:05 a.m.
The White House

After an exchange of greetings, Chancellor Kohl noted that he had lots of work and lots of trouble, too. People have never been as well off as now, he observed, but they are more and more dissatisfied.

The President said he was calling about SNF (short-range nuclear forces), a thorny issue between our two sides and one that the rest of the Alliance is concerned about. The President recalled Kohl's telling him that our two sides would have early consultations and expressed disappointment that the Chancellor's national security advisor, Horst Teltschik, was not coming for this week's projected meeting in Washington.

The President emphasized that he very much wanted to have such consultations. If Teltschik -- or the Chancellor -- could come, it would be very, very helpful. The President said he recognized that the Chancellor's schedule might not permit him to come but hoped, at a minimum, that the Chancellor could send his national security advisor so that we can resolve this issue just as soon as possible.

Chancellor Kohl said he sees the situation exactly the same way but that this week and next he will be preoccupied with changing his government. The Chancellor said he was now in the midst of coalition negotiations to decide on new ministers; this was why Mr. Teltschik's visit was postponed. Two weeks ago, when he met in Austria with Ambassador Burt, the Chancellor felt there would

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be time for consultations, but the situation in Germany had changed so much that decisions on the coalition were needed now. The Chancellor said that he would call the President next week, just as soon as he had concluded the business at hand, and that he continued to believe that we can and must come to agreement before the Brussels summit.

The President replied that he hoped the Chancellor would call just as soon as possible, adding that we do not want to weaken the Alliance nor put the Chancellor, our friend and ally, on the line. The President said he found it puzzling that Foreign Minister Genscher had said there was an emerging consensus within the Bonn government in support of SNF arms negotiations. The President urged once again that the Chancellor come personally to Washington or send someone -- or receive the President's emissary in Bonn -- as soon as possible. Otherwise, the President concluded, the NATO summit will be beclouded by needless speculation.

Before a final exchange of greetings, Chancellor Kohl reiterated that he would be calling next week.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President

F.R.G.
Chancellor Kohl

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE: April 12, 1989, 7:55 a.m. - 8:05 a.m.
The White House

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The President said he was calling about SNF (short-range nuclear forces), a thorny issue between our two sides and one that the rest of the Alliance is concerned about. The President recalled Kohl's telling him that our two sides would have early consultations and expressed disappointment that the Chancellor's national security advisor, Horst Teltschik, was not coming for this week's projected meeting in Washington. (Ø)

The President emphasized that he very much wanted to have such consultations. If Teltschik -- or the Chancellor -- could come, it would be very, very helpful. The President said he recognized that the Chancellor's schedule might not permit him to come but hoped, at a minimum, that the Chancellor could send his national security advisor so that we can resolve this issue just as soon as possible. (Ø)

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Before a final exchange of greetings, Chancellor Kohl reiterated that he would be calling next week. (C)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between the President
and President Corazon Aquino of the
Philippines (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Douglas Paal, Director of Asian Affairs,
NSC, Notetaker

President Corazon Aquino

DATE, TIME April 12, 1989, 9:20 a.m. - 9:25 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President called President Corazon Aquino to inform her that he understood her reasons for being unable to accept the President's invitation to make a State Visit to Washington in June. The President explained that he had received a message from Ambassador Platt explaining her reasons for postponing the visit to the Fall, if possible. The President said that he understood that perfectly. He said that he knew that this decision was forced by matters, including upcoming events and timing considerations. He continued that the Fall would be fine if that suits Mrs. Aquino. Both sides should try to find a time in September or October that will be satisfactory. The President repeated that he understood perfectly the point that Mrs. Aquino had made to Ambassador Platt. He said that he wanted this relationship between the United States and the Philippines to be one where both sides will feel free to speak up when necessary. (Ø)

President Aquino responded that she was a little afraid that the President would think that she did not regard the invitation with due seriousness. She explained that unfortunately she had to go to Europe in June, and she was afraid that to leave so early for the United States after that trip would be a matter of delicacy. (Ø)

The President responded that he understood, that she should not be concerned about the feelings on the U.S. side. The U.S. will be very flexible. (U)

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President Aquino said that she appreciated the importance of the invitation from the President and thanked him for his gesture of the call. (U)

The President explained that he wanted to have her visit take place with the proper protocol. He explained that there would be one or two boring things to do but he wanted this to be seen by all as a first-class State Visit, one that would symbolize the importance of the relationship between the two sides. (Ø)

President Aquino said thank you and expressed her appreciation. She said she hoped all was well with the President. (U)

The President responded that he has a problem or two but in general things are going well. (Ø)

President Aquino continued that she will keep the President in her prayers. She said that God and events have been very kind to her in the past three years. (U)

The President said that on a personal note the First Lady hoped to plan a special family event during Mrs. Aquino's visit. He wants to invite Mrs. Aquino and her family upstairs at the White House to talk on the family-side of things. (Ø)

President Aquino responded that she appreciated that very much. (U)

The President concluded the call by saying that he is confident all will work out well. (U)

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SHAMIR

APR 13, 1989 CALL FROM SHAMIR TO PRESIDENT
CONVENED 1913 - ENDED 1916 (HAASS-CHARLES
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Conversation with
President Barco of Colombia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)

President Barco

DATE, TIME April 14, 1989, 4:56 p.m. - 4:58 p.m.
AND PLACE: White House Tennis Court - VIP Lounge,
Andrews Air Force Base

President Barco, speaking in English, said hello.

The President said, "Hello, Mr. President."

President Barco said, "How are you?"

The President said he was good. He stated that he had not expected to be in town today, but that he "had a deal" with the U.S. Senate, so he had to come back.

President Barco said he was looking forward to seeing the President.

The President said that he had heard that President Barco had given a speech and that it was "a hard hitting speech." "Everyone was talking about it." The President said he had "great identification with the problems you have down there" with drugs. He added that he had high regard for Colombia's anti-narcotics efforts.

The President said that we made an announcement about President Barco's visit in July and that the staffs of the two countries would arrange a specific date. He stated that he was looking forward to seeing President Barco and discussing topics of common interest.

President Barco said he was grateful and looked forward to the visit.

The President asked who President Barco had seen during his visit. He understood he had talked with the Attorney General and Bill Bennett.

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President Barco said yes, he had talked with them both. He had a very interesting conversation with Bill Bennett about a drug summit.

The President said, "Yes, he mentioned it." The President stated, "Let's explore that idea. It is a good idea." We want to see where we come out on it, but it is a good idea.

The President asked when President Barco was going back.

President Barco said he was at the airport and was leaving today.

The President wished President Barco a good trip and that he was sorry to miss him this trip.

President Barco thanked the President and said he was looking forward to seeing the President. He said he had heard about Mrs. Bush's medical treatments and wished her well.

The President said she was doing well and that he would convey President Barco's good wishes to her.

President Barco said he wished her a fast and speedy recovery.

The President said thank you. The President repeated that he was sorry to miss President Barco on this trip and he was grateful for his kind words about Mrs. Bush.

The two presidents exchanged goodbyes and the conversation ended.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between President Bush and President Mitterrand of France (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President

President Mitterrand of France

DATE, TIME April 17, 1989, 4:35 p.m to 4:55 p.m.

AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Mitterrand said that he hoped that he was not interrupting at an inconvenient time. (Ø)

The President said not at all; he was sorry he had not been able to talk in the morning, since he was in Michigan giving a speech. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that he would be talking at greater length next month, since President Bush was kind enough to be receiving him in his home. (Ø)

The President said that he and Mrs. Bush were looking forward to the visit. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that he saw no solution in view for Lebanon. Instead, he foresaw the danger of prolonged warfare and a real massacre. He saw no institution other than the U.N. which could play a role, although he was aware of how difficult it was to do anything through the Security Council. However, he had contacted Secretary General de Cuellar, who had agreed to take on a "mission of information" to Lebanon and Syria if he were given such a mandate by the Security Council. This could be done without a vote. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that if de Cuellar took on this mission it would lead to a ceasefire on the part of the belligerents, which could be longer than the usual ceasefires. This would provide time for the powers to reflect on a course of action. This solution was not humiliating for anyone. It would not offend Syria, provided that Assad does not view Lebanon as his

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"private hunting preserve" where no one else has a right to step in. But he should not feel that way if it is the U.N. French Foreign Minister Dumas had discussed this with de Cuellar when he was recently in Paris and he had agreed with the proviso that the Permanent Members would have to approve. (Ø)

President Mitterrand repeated that the proposed course of action would not require a vote but, instead, it would be a mission of information and conciliation. He had wanted to discuss this with President Bush before pursuing it further with de Cuellar, who would be in Luxembourg the next day. He repeated that if this mission were to be known, the result would be a ceasefire. Otherwise, he could only foresee continued warfare and continued occupation of the entire country by Syria, except in the Israeli-controlled zone of Lebanon. Lebanon would thus become the first state to be wiped off the face of the map. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that he had lunch with King Hussein earlier in the day and the King shared his feelings. President Mitterrand wanted to inform President Bush of his initiative in order to avoid a surprise, and because he was conscious of the weight that the U.S. could provide in helping to seek a truce in a country being torn apart by war, with 40-50 people dying per day. He added that this approach does not lend itself to the impression of taking sides as between the Christians and the Moslems. France has been involved in Lebanon for 50 years, knows the country well and can vouch for the urgency of finding a solution. (Ø)

The President replied by thanking President Mitterrand for bringing this proposal to his attention and by asking for confirmation that this approach required acquiescence, but no action, by the 5 Permanent Members. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that this was correct, but there was a requirement not to vote against it. On this basis, we could secure de Cuellar's consent. (Ø)

The President responded that it would be a pleasant surprise if the announcement of such a mission led to a ceasefire. He respected President Mitterrand's judgment. Although he was not optimistic, we had no better plan. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that he was no more certain than was President Bush of the success of this approach, but he saw no alternative. (Ø)

President Bush agreed. He said he would talk with Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft, but the U.S. would support this approach. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that he had talked with the Kuwaiti chairman of the Arab League's Action Committee and asked whether the Arab League opposed this approach. The Kuwaiti had said absolutely not, to the contrary, he approved of it. (Ø)

The President said that this was good. The situation was very complex and heartbreaking. He respected the French position, and wished the Secretary General well. (Ø)

President Mitterrand said that King Hussein would also be discussing the issue with the President directly when he visited Washington, however, Hussein had told him that there are many Arab countries which do not want to see Lebanon disappear. (Ø)

President Mitterrand ended by saying that he was not an enemy of Syria. He did not want to fight Syria -- but this was a question of the disappearance of a country recognized by the international community. These were his feelings and thoughts, and he had wanted to share them directly with the President. (Ø)

President Bush ended by expressing his appreciation for the call and saying that he looked forward to President Mitterrand's visit in May. (Ø)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of GermanyPARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, State (interpreter)

Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Mrs. Weber (interpreter)DATE, TIME April 21, 1989, 8:24 a.m. - 8:39 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl opened the conversation by apologizing for his unavailability the previous day, noting that he had been in Paris settling questions involving the European Community. The coalition had worked on the SNF problem last night and had sent up an agreed paper on the issue. The Chancellor promised that a copy of the paper would be sent to Washington within the hour.

Continuing, the Chancellor proposed that Defense Minister Stoltenberg and Foreign Minister Genscher come to see the President on Monday. They would stay for a day, or even less than a day, and talk to the President's officials about the SNF issue. In this way both countries could consult before the Chancellor delivered his declaration on SNF next Thursday and allow him to say that the FRG was consulting with its friends on the subject. There was no need to cast a final vote on SNF next Thursday; the Chancellor could explain that he could not say anything final while he was still discussing the issue with his allied colleagues. In summary, he hoped that appropriate U.S. officials could meet with Genscher and Stoltenberg on Monday or Tuesday.

The President said he was glad the Ministers were coming. He had anxiously awaited such a dialogue from the beginning. Although the President understood the Chancellor's internal political situation and did not wish to meddle in it, he stressed that the FRG must discuss the SNF issue with the U.S. before decisions were made and made public. The President was most concerned with the need for appropriate consultations to maintain Alliance solidarity.

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The President added that, although he would be on the West Coast on Monday, his key officials would be available in Washington for talks. He urged the Chancellor not to present the U.S. with a 'fait accompli.' Real consultations are needed.

Chancellor Kohl asked what the President meant by a fait accompli.

The President said he meant a unilateral position that the U.S. had been unable to discuss with the F.R.G., with no opportunity for each side to persuade the other which way it should go.

The Chancellor said he should explain one problem he had, which was constant indiscretion, disclosures of government information.

The President said he had that problem too.

The Chancellor replied that his problem was different, since a three party coalition left much more room for such disclosures than work within one party. He added that he would, of course, also have to talk with other allies, such as the British and the French. The Ministers would be coming with a paper that would form a basis (Grundlage) for their discussions, but there was no way to prevent people from disclosing the contents of the paper here in Bonn. The Ministers would be coming in order to talk over these issues.

The President said that was exactly what he had in mind.

The Chancellor said that one cannot prevent any debate from becoming a public debate.

The President said that was a problem in Washington too, but that a firm F.R.G. position for the Alliance should not be taken in advance. Our hope was that, when the Ministers come, there would still be some openness to work on a mutually agreed position. The President wanted to get this problem out of the way immediately so that we could have a successful NATO Summit meeting without any wedges driven into what, now, is very good Allied solidarity.

The Chancellor said that was precisely his view. His aim was a strong NATO. There was no doubt that he, the Chancellor, had linked his political existence to this goal. The SNF paper had amalgamated "all the points" and was being sent to the President today. The President would agree with part of the paper and would disagree with part of the paper; that is what negotiations are about.

Good, the President said.

The Chancellor promised to tell his representatives to come as

friends, as partners. The problem would be that the paper they would bring could not be kept under cover in Bonn. Too many people were involved. But his government needed to have procedures underway that were fair to the President as well. The Chancellor wanted to extend their friendship, not hamper it.

The President said he understood, but noted that the problem is that leaks tend to lock people into a position. It was a problem for for the U.S. too. He was pleased the Ministers would be coming in a spirit for negotiation.

Concluding, the Chancellor said his two Ministers would be coming to Washington. Then, if necessary, the Chancellor could talk with the President again on the telephone.

The President said that was good. Another conversation might not be necessary, but he hoped that both he and the Chancellor would be able to talk to each other at any time.

Finally, the President expressed his gratitude for the Chancellor's note passing his condolences for the loss of life in the accident aboard the battleship Iowa. The President observed that this was the third largest loss of life that the military had suffered in a single peacetime incident and that the disaster had caused much grief. The Chancellor's letter meant a great deal to the President and to the American people.

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Call to King Hussein
of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President

Jordan
King Hussein

DATE, TIME April 21, 1989, 3:40 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President thanked King Hussein for his visit and his flexibility on Middle East peace during the visit. He especially noted the King's public statement regarding elections and said everyone here was pleased with the visit.

King Hussein agreed that it had been a very beneficial visit.

The President said he wanted to get back to the King immediately regarding their conversation on the food and agricultural needs of the Jordanian people. He said that others will take a little longer.

The President said we will continue food aid grants at the \$27 million level. If necessary, he will issue waivers for Jordan's eligibility for assistance under food aid programs. He referred to the waivers as a technicality. Jordan will need to tell us of continued commercial purchases at current levels. He noted that there are necessary requirements in this matter. The commodity mix between PL-480 and Section 416 agricultural commodity loans and grants is uncertain at this point, but, the President said, we will work it out to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. He said it is a problem but nothing we cannot solve.

The King agreed.

The President said we will continue the GSM-103 agricultural credits to Jordan for the next fiscal year. He acknowledged that the lower interest rate and longer terms are of assistance to Jordan. The President said we have authorized \$65 million in

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credits, but we will be happy to consider additional assistance if this proves inadequate.

The President said we will get all this in writing so the King's experts can review it.

The President thanked the King again for the visit and offered his and Mrs. Bush's best wishes.

The President closed with reference to a meeting he had just had with some Lebanese people and asked the King to let him know if there is anything we can do to help bring peace in the Lebanon situation.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Telephone Call to Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte

DATE, TIME April 22, 1989, 8:48 a.m. - 8:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David - Walter Reed Army Medical Center

PARTICIPANTS: The President
David A. Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)

President Duarte

The President began by saying, "Hello, Mr. President."

President Duarte, speaking in English, said hello and asked how the President was.

The President said he was fine, but he was interested in how President Duarte was.

President Duarte said he was well. The doctors told him that the cancer was the same as before [before it began to grow again last month].

The President said that he was sorry to miss seeing President Duarte this trip. He was out of town, at Camp David. But he wanted to call up and pay his respects.

President Duarte said, "Thank you."

The President said that he realized that this may be the last trip President Duarte was making to Washington as President of El Salvador, and he just wanted to pay his respects.

President Duarte said he would come back in June for longer treatments.

The President said that perhaps he would see him then. In any event, the President said, he wanted to pay his respects and also extend his condolences over the murder of the Salvadoran Attorney General and over the attacks on other government officials. The President said it was his impression that terrorist attacks by the FMLN on government officials were getting worse.

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President Duarte said yes, they were getting worse all the time. "That is what they want." He blamed this on "extremes" winning the election.

The President said that even though Duarte's term as President was coming to an end, he hoped that he would continue to speak out, not only on El Salvador, but also for democracy in Nicaragua.

President Duarte said it would depend upon his health, but he was willing to do so.

The President said, "Barbara and I are thinking of you," and that he was glad to get a chance to speak to Duarte.

President Duarte thanked the President.

The President and President Duarte exchanged goodbyes and the conversation ended.

Notetakers observation: President Duarte did not seem very communicative in this conversation.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher
of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Brenda Hilliard, NSC Staff (stenographer)

United Kingdom
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

DATE, TIME April 22, 1989, 10:17 a.m. - 10:34 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President began by noting that he shared the Prime Minister's concerns about the SNF issue and was calling to bring the Prime Minister up to date.

Prime Minister Thatcher, after observing that she would be welcoming the new U.S. ambassador on Monday, thanked the President for his call and said she was deeply concerned.

The President thanked the Prime Minister for her courtesy to Ambassador Catto, commented that General Scowcroft was with him at Camp David during this call, and said he had some points he wished to make on the SNF problem.

Yesterday, the President continued, he had talked with Helmut Kohl. To put it diplomatically, he, the President, was annoyed. He had tried to get together with the Germans; Helmut had pledged to get together with the Americans; but for one reason or another Bonn had never let it happen. Now the Germans have arrived at this position. In the President's view, things had gotten to the point where there was not full cooperation.

During their conversation, the Chancellor and the President had agreed that Genscher and Stoltenberg would be coming to Washington to meet, not with the President, but with Secretaries Baker and Cheney and, of course, General Scowcroft. The President believed that the UK had the German language. The President thought it was very bad. He asked to list some of his concerns.

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The language calls for early SNF negotiations on missiles and artillery. The Prime Minister knew our views on this. The paper leaves open the possibility of a third zero for all SNF systems. It treats development of a follow-on to Lance as a purely U.S. decision. The President knew the Prime Minister agreed that this is an Alliance position. The German paper also postponed any decision on Lance follow-on, including whether it is necessary at all, until 1992.

The President was concerned about the unilateral way in which the Germans have been proceeding on the SNF issue. He was sympathetic with Kohl's internal political situation, but he told the Chancellor that he did not want to be confronted with a 'fait accompli.' The Chancellor asked what he meant by this term and the President had explained that this meant not having a position handed to the U.S.; it also meant no leaks. Sure enough, Bonn's whole position was in the German press today.

On SNF modernization, the President thought a pledge to keep systems up to date where necessary should suffice and, realistically, was the most the U.S. could probably expect to get -- as it was at Brussels last year. The situation has deteriorated since then and specific decisions on deployment could wait until 1991 - that was reality.

The President believed this view was consistent with the points Foreign Secretary Howe had raised during his Washington visit. The U.S. will also try to get the Germans to agree that the Alliance should support continuation of the necessary development work. We supported Foreign Secretary Howe on this point.

The President continued to believe that SNF negotiations at this time would be a grave mistake. There was no change here.

The U.S. would, of course, inform London of the tenor and results of the discussions with Genscher and Stoltenberg, although the President was pessimistic about the results, in order to help prepare the Prime Minister for her own, possibly unpleasant, meeting with Chancellor Kohl.

The Prime Minister was "a pro" on Summits. She would understand that it was absolutely essential that this Summit, although its timing could have been better, be a success, that it not be dominated by this contentious subject. The President would welcome the Prime Minister's help.

The President realized this was a "handwringing" call, but he wanted the Prime Minister to see how the U.S. was approaching this problem and the upcoming meeting with the Germans.

The Prime Minister said she was just as concerned as the President. Based on her experience, she wanted to comment on

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some of the human issues involved. She did not believe the German position reflected Kohl's views; rather, it reflected Genscher's views. Genscher was using the German paper as a device to win acceptance for his positions. Kohl may actually be relying on the U.S. and the U.K. to block Genscher's effort and be firm. These German ideas were worse than anything that the Prime Minister had ever heard from Helmut Schmidt.

The Prime Minister stressed that NATO was not Germany; it was NATO. The allies could not have Germany dictating to the NATO Alliance. In the last resort, if the U.S. and the U.K. could stand firm for NATO on its 40th anniversary, Kohl would not depart from his American and British allies. The consequences would be too horrific. It was up to Washington and London to rescue NATO on its 40th anniversary. We must deal firmly with the German actions. Bonn had been wrong to make its position public without proper advance consultations. If needed, the Prime Minister was prepared also to make her position public, but as the NATO position, reflecting the recently published views of, for example, General Galvin.

This was a NATO decision and the Allies should not be pushed around by the Germans. The message coming out of the Summit could not be that there was no spine among all of the NATO allies. That would not be a success; it would be a failure.

The Prime Minister added that there was no question, no question, of negotiations on SNF. Genscher wanted it, knowing that a third zero was a likely outcome. This would reveal NATO's weakness. We are working toward 50 percent cuts in U.S. and Soviet strategic missiles, verifiable controls on chemical weapons, and reducing conventional forces to parity. Then we could go further with nuclear weapons.

The Germans know as well as the U.S. and U.K. that flexible response depends on SNF and that, therefore, these forces must be kept up to date. General Galvin has said, and will say, so publicly. The Germans agree that we need a mix of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, but they deny this principle by their position on specific weapons. That is not Kohl. It is Genscher trying to run the Alliance with his five percent of the German electorate.

The requirement for modernized SNF is a NATO requirement, not a German requirement. There should be no negotiations on SNF missiles. Our language should make clear that flexible response requires effective SNF, modernized where necessary. We should not backtrack from what was achieved at last year's Summit. SNF will remain a part of NATO forces in Europe. The U.S. should continue its work on the successor to Lance. The Alliance could leave off a decision on deployment at this NATO Summit because the U.S. and U.K. cannot get that language.

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It was bad for the German tail to wag the NATO dog. What was important was agreement between the United States and Britain, because without those two countries there would be no NATO. Washington and London should be very firm indeed. The Prime Minister had moved on the need for a decision on deployment -- that was as far as she could go. We could not turn over NATO to Genscher. Kohl needed stiffening. Helmut Schmidt would be horrified by these developments. The U.S. and U.K. must stand together. Kohl, in his heart of hearts, expects Washington and London to be firm. The idea that, through political devices and trickery, this position could simply be hoisted upon the Allies will not do.

The President said he was not surprised by the Prime Minister's reaction and was delighted with it. The U.S. would get back to the British after the meeting with the Germans.

The Prime Minister said she, and President Reagan, had faced a similar problem at last year's Summit. On the morning the Summit began she had been told she could get an agreed statement right away if she would only agree to give up SNF modernization. She had said no. It was fought out; the U.S. and U.K. stayed together, and got the communique they wanted. There would be no success through a communique of weakness. We should not give up the chance to fight this issue at the Summit itself if we could not get a satisfactory solution beforehand.

Continuing, the Prime Minister said she was horrified that the Germans had gone public with their views. There could have been good discussions behind the scenes. Would the President consider responding by agreeing to inform the press about this telephone call, showing that the U.S. and the U.K. were cooperating in dealing with this problem?

The President replied that he had asked Kohl not to go public. Kohl had answered that he could not control leaks. The President had understood and had elicited a commitment that Genscher would not be bringing a fait accompli, that the issue would be negotiable. He preferred then to wait until the talks with the Germans had occurred. The U.S. would keep the arrow of public opinion in its quiver but deal privately and in good faith with the Germans when they came. Kohl had promised that we would not be facing final official positions. The U.S. view was that we did not need to go public yet.

The Prime Minister remarked that, if the Germans publicized their view of the outcome of the talks in Washington, Washington and London could not stay silent. They could not let NATO go and allow a declaration of weakness to mark its 40th anniversary.

The President commented that other allies were beginning to

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falter, such as the Belgians and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch.

The Prime Minister said the Belgians were never strong. They are more likely to come along once they see the way the wind is blowing. They would see that one could not support flexible response without supporting SNF, which then must be kept up to date. Otherwise the Alliance would need an entirely new military strategy, which, to the U.K., was an alarming prospect. The United States and Britain had the same position, she said. The President's worries were her worries. Our two countries were, however, most powerful -- as was the U.S. alone.

Concluding, the President again promised to "get back" to London after the meeting with the Germans, to call right away.

The Prime Minister said should be waiting to hear from the U.S. and again hoped both countries would stay absolutely firm and together on this issue.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Arias
of Costa Rica

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Notetaker: David Pacelli, NSC
Notetaker: Susan Bunch, NSC

President Arias

DATE, TIME April 28, 1989, 5:21 - 5:33 P.M.
AND PLACE: Oval Office - Presidential Office

President Arias was called by President Bush. The President and Arias greeted each other and began the conversation by asking how each other was.

The President said he was calling to let Arias know that he appreciated his speaking out on the Sandinista electoral law and media reform law. Jim Baker told me of your outstanding efforts in contacting foreign leaders, the President stated, adding that it was wonderful and he appreciated it very much. (Ø)

President Arias said that the President didn't have to thank him for that. It is my strong belief, he said, that the Sandinistas are not complying with what they have promised. He had been in touch with Carlos Andres Perez, the Germans, Norwegians, and Swedes, adding, "As you know, the Nordic governments are very difficult. They don't seem to care about democracy in this part of the world." Arias said he had no problem with the rest of the countries. The Sandinistas win the battle in the media but not with the governments. The governments are very unhappy, unsatisfied with the electoral law. Unfortunately, the Sandinistas are very good at propaganda. They have obtained some support in the mass media in Western Europe, but not in the governments, for sure. (Ø)

President Arias said he was going to write Nicaraguan President Ortega and would mention how unhappy and dissatisfied he was with the election loss. (U)

The President said he thought that would be helpful. Ortega could not fail to acknowledge that and the President thought it would be helpful. We are very pleased you are doing this he said, thanking Arias. The President said he wanted to discuss this subject and he welcomed suggestions on how they could work together on this. The President added that Arias has more credibility than we did [to publicly chastise the Sandinistas]. The President explained that that is why he was thanking Arias. We are on the same wavelength, and share the same beliefs. (Ø)

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President Arias said he was very much in touch with U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton, saying, "You know he is in Washington today." (U)

The President said no, he didn't know that. (Ø)

President Arias asked if he could take this opportunity to mention one idea -- that Costa Rica was celebrating 100 years of democracy this year. Costa Rica is the oldest democracy in all of Latin America. We are planning to commemorate this occasion with several activities, he said. I have talked with Ambassador Hinton, he added, and have mentioned this to some Latin American presidents, and they all approved it. (Ø)

President Arias said the idea is to hold a meeting of all OAS presidents in Costa Rica. The last time there was such a meeting was in 1967. Arias said he understood President Johnson attended at Punta del Este. Arias believed a meeting would be successful since the President had changed U.S. policy not only in Central America but because there will be substantial change in the whole of Latin America. Arias said it would be very convenient for both governments and many democracies in Latin America (which were weak and vulnerable) to hold this conference to discuss four major issues. Arias said the issues all start with the letter "D": democracy, development, debt, and drugs. Arias said he had read in the American press the speech the President gave in Miami on drugs. Arias said he was satisfied with what the President said and believed a meeting would be convenient and important for many countries in Latin America. Arias was working it out with Venezuela now, as well as with the democracies of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and the whole of Latin America, so he wanted to share it with the President. Arias declared, "I think the time is right for such a meeting and I think Costa Rica is the right place." Arias believed that the Costa Rican celebration of a 100 years of democracy could serve as a good excuse if the President could attend such a meeting. Arias reminded the President that Costa Rica was a country that loved and admired him, recalling an earlier visit. Arias said, he had checked with the most important countries, including President Alfonsin in Argentina, Sarney in Brazil, Salinas in Mexico, and Perez in Venezuela, and all of them will accept if Arias called for the meeting. (Ø)

The President said, "I'll tell you what, it is very interesting. Let me discuss this with folks here. Have you a date set?" (Ø)

President Arias said because President Sarney in Brazil has elections at the beginning of November the best time for him is the end of September. All Latin American countries celebrate independence from Spain in mid-September. A meeting would be within the framework of the OAS. Castro would be excluded because Arias said, he didn't want Castro to come. (Ø)

The President said, "Let me discuss it here." On a personal basis, the President said, it sounds very interesting. The President asked if Arias had discussed this in detail with Ambassador Hinton. (Ø)

President Arias said, yes, I have discussed it with Ambassador Hinton and have the approval of 12 heads of state including Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain and President Soares of Portugal. Arias said they are very much interested and were pushing him to go ahead with the idea. Arias said he thought it would be a good idea if the President agreed to invite them even though they are not OAS members because both are very much in touch with Latin America. Portugal and Spain are very interested in Latin America and also support democracy. (Ø)

The President said, "Very interesting in that light, let me get back to you as soon as I have discussed this with Ambassador Hinton, Brent Scowcroft, and Jim Baker." The President said it would involve a good deal of planning. (Ø)

The President asked if he could mention another thing. President Arias said, "Sure." (U)

The President said he'd like to mention one other very important concern about the Panama elections. Intelligence reports from there look like Noriega is not going to let them be free or fair, as the people of Panama should have and are entitled to. The President said he didn't know what can be done. We are really for democracy, he declared. If there is anything that you could do--or others; it would be desirable because we don't want the status quo to continue. If the status quo continues after the election, the United States can't continue in this position. I don't know what we will do, he said, but I know what we won't do, and can't do, and that is accept the status quo. (Ø)

The President said he hoped that Arias would continue to share his views on the need for democracy and that Arias would be able to publicly assert it. (Ø)

President Arias said that he was prepared to do that. (U)

The President said, "That is good." (U)

President Arias said he had talked to [Guatemalan President] Vinicio Cerezo that day about a draft letter concerning Panama by the Central American Presidents. Arias termed it weak. Arias said he urged Cerezo to strengthen it. (Ø)

The President thanked Arias and said he wanted to commend him on his forthright statement. The President said he welcomed any further comments or suggestions and concluded by pledging to continue to work closely with President Arias. (Ø)

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President Arias asked the President to give his regards to Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President wished the same to Mrs. Arias, mentioning that he caught a glimpse of her at a luncheon and was pleased to see her. The conversation then ended. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Jackie Murphy, NSC Staff (stenographer)
Gisela Marcuse, State (interpreter)

FRG
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Mrs. Weber (interpreter)

DATE, TIME May 5, 1989, 9:16 a.m. - 9:34 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl began by commenting on his talk on May 3 with Ambassador Walters, expressing pleasure with the President's choice and noting his appreciation both for the Ambassador's personal qualities and for his closeness to the President. He hoped that the Ambassador enjoyed his service in Bonn, despite attacks from the left-wing media. (S)

His points today, the Chancellor said, were: first, that he will do his very best to achieve a reasonable compromise on the issue of the future of NATO's short-range nuclear forces before the Brussels Summit; and, second, that he will do his part in bringing such a successful conclusion about. The Chancellor thought the chances for success were good. (S)

Continuing, the Chancellor commented that he was aware of Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney's compromise proposal on the SNF issue, though he had not had time to study it. He expected that the President would soon be seeing Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, who has also given thought to a possible compromise. The kind of ideas that were being discussed seemed very good to the Chancellor, but he felt these efforts proved the truth of an old German saying -- that too many cooks spoil the soup. (S)

So, the Chancellor wondered if the President could send one of his competent collaborators to Bonn for direct talks. The person need not be a Minister, but it should be someone with direct access to the President. (S)

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The President replied that he was confident he could send an emissary. As the Chancellor knew, the President had long supported the idea of such a dialogue between Washington and Bonn. He would send someone in whom he had full confidence. He would prefer that this not be a high visibility mission. He agreed that too many cooks can spoil the broth. (S)

The Chancellor agreed that the visit could be done discreetly. If someone just came to Bonn to visit with the U.S. Ambassador, the Chancellor would seize the opportunity and arrange a meeting with "two or three of us." That would be no problem. It would be important, however, for the Chancellor and the President to maintain direct contact. Then one could go a step further and put the matter into official channels. The Chancellor thought this approach would be helpful. (S)

The President agreed it would be helpful. The U.S. was being attacked as irresolute as it was trying to work out a solution to the SNF problem. The President was annoyed, because differences had become public differences and now he was being criticized by Congress. He had told critics that the U.S. position was clear but that the Administration was trying to work with the Chancellor to have a harmonious Summit. But the Chancellor knew that the President was coming under considerable fire from the American and European press. (S)

The President said the Chancellor's proposal suited him very well. He would let the Chancellor know soon who his representative would be. (S)

The Chancellor gave two reasons for his effort. First, he wanted the Summit to be successful. Second, he wanted the President to have a success. It would be the President's first trip to Europe as President. The President was a proven friend of Europeans and, in particular, of the Germans. The Chancellor had never forgotten this fact and never would forget it. (S)

The Chancellor added that he had told Ambassador Walters of his belief that in the summer, when the Summit was over, the U.S. and the FRG should engage in talks about the burdensharing issue. The Chancellor was ready on this subject to take a step in the President's direction, so that the U.S. Congress would be able to see that Bonn was working jointly with Washington, and that the Germans appreciated the sacrifices made by the United States. (S)

We are in a historic position, the Chancellor said. He understood that the President was going to Poland and Hungary. The President would observe an enormous evolution there. It was far from the Chancellor's mind to see Gorbachev as the new hero and he did not mistake words for deeds. Deeds must be considered. However, the Chancellor and the President were

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witnessing events beyond their wildest dreams, the ideological breakdown of a political and economic system. This was the hour of our triumph. (S)

This triumph, the Chancellor added, was due not least to the efforts of the United States. That is why the Chancellor thought the President's role should be brought to the fore. This was linked to the cohesion of NATO, and with the success of the NATO Summit. (S)

Perhaps, the Chancellor remarked, it was best now to say that on Monday the President would pass a message to one of the Chancellor's collaborators; the best choice would be Horst Teltschik. Then the President and the Chancellor would call each other next week "when we know where we stand." The Chancellor wanted the President to know that he, the Chancellor, would be following this issue. (S)

The President asked what day would be best for his person to be in Bonn. (S)

The Chancellor said he would prefer to agree on that on Monday. Some of his people were "not here now." Maybe the President's and the Chancellor's collaborators could arrange this on Monday, through direct contact, especially if the President could tell the Chancellor then who the representative would be. (S)

The President said he would do that. Turning to Poland and Hungary, the President said his trips to those countries were not definitely settled, but the plans had been leaked -- something the Chancellor could understand. The governments involved had not yet signed off on the visits. However, as Gorbachev cruised around Western Europe, the President felt it was appropriate for him to show his support for the changes in Eastern Europe. (S)

Secretary Baker would be leaving soon for Moscow, the President noted. He would talk there with Shevardnadze about a number of subjects of interest to the Chancellor. (S)

The Chancellor said it was important, even necessary, for the President to go to Eastern Europe. It was important that the voice of America be heard in those countries. The Chancellor planned to go to Warsaw in the second half of July, after the President's visit. There were great expectations in those countries about these visits; we should make the best possible use of the opportunity. The Chancellor could not accept letting Gorbachev set himself up as the imitator of the voice of Europe. The Chancellor approved of progress, but not that. (S)

The President thought Secretary Baker's trip would display further engagement of the United States with the Soviet Union and would help with European public opinion. It would show that the

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U.S. was not afraid to talk to Gorbachev, and the Secretary had a useful agenda for his meetings with Shevardnadze. (S)

The Chancellor said that on Monday the President and the Chancellor would hear from one another. Things would be done very discreetly. (S)

The President asked what the Chancellor planned to say about this call. (S)

Nothing, the Chancellor replied. (S)

The President asked what would be said about the fact of the call. He said he would release that a call had occurred but make no comment on the substance of the discussion or on the possibility of an emissary to Bonn. (S)

The Chancellor agreed that he would disclose that the President and the Chancellor had talked to each other, as they do regularly. There would not be one word about the call's contents. (S)

The President thought that would be good. He said he appreciated the spirit of the Chancellor's call. The Alliance needed to come out strong and it was essential for the Summit to succeed. He thanked his friend, the Chancellor, for his call. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter/Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez

DATE, TIME May 8, 1989, 2:16 - 2:30 pm EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President said he was calling on a specific subject near and dear to his heart, and one in which he knew that Prime Minister Gonzalez has great interest: the elections in Panama. Former President Jimmy Carter was down in Panama, although he was there on his own. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez told the President that he already knew this, as he had been following President Carter's statements in Panama. (S)

The President went on to say that Jimmy Carter had told General Scowcroft that the opposition forces had in fact won a victory. There was some fear on his part that at this very minute Noriega was deliberating on whether or not to allow the election results to stand, or whether to manipulate them into a victory for himself. As a result of these events, he wanted to run the following idea by the Prime Minister. In view of the respect everybody in Central America has for the Prime Minister, would he be willing to talk to General Noriega on the following basis? Recalling that he had offered asylum to General Noriega in March of 1988, he might call and tell him that the U.S. would not seek to extradite Noriega in Panama, or in Spain or in any other country. The U.S. would make the same stipulation now as it had before, if Noriega respects the results of the elections. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez asked the President directly if his proposal was that whether Noriega stays in Panama or goes to

Spain or a third country, the United States would not seek to extradite him as long as he abandons power? (S)

The President confirmed this. In addition, the U.S. would be willing quickly to restore normal relations with the new government of Panama. If Noriega agrees to step down, the U.S. would not seek extradition and the U.S. would move immediately to restore relations, which would benefit Panama very much. This last point would also be conveyed by Jimmy Carter. Noriega should know that, if he insists on manipulating the results, the U.S. simply could not have business as usual with Panama. The U.S. could not even continue the relationship it had recently had with Panama. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez asked if he had understood correctly that the message consists of three points: the first point is that if Noriega recognizes the election results and gives up power, the U.S. would not seek to extradite him. Secondly, if Noriega leaves power there would be immediate normalization of relations with Panama. Thirdly, if he stays in power, even the precarious relations which now exist with Panama would not continue. (S)

The President stated that this was a correct understanding of his message. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that in that case he would do it. He would call Noriega and transmit this message, in addition to what Carter would do. (S)

The President went on to say that the reason he had asked the Prime Minister to do this is because of the universal respect he enjoys in that area. The President could not think of anyone better to convey this message with authority, and he personally appreciated the Prime Minister's willingness to do so. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he would immediately make this demarche to Noriega, and that he would monitor the situation closely over the next two or three hours. He would be back in touch in a day or two. (S)

The President told the Prime Minister that he was looking forward to hearing from him and thanked him very much. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that he did this with great pleasure. (S)

The President then asked the Prime Minister if he had plans for any private visit to the U.S. over the next few months. If so, he would love to see him on a private basis. Perhaps he could also talk Gonzalez into coming in the fall on an official basis as well. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez thanked the President very much. He told the President that, if he has occasion to come, he will let him know. In any case, he would see the President in Brussels at the end of this month. (S)

The President said he would see him for sure, although it would be a little hectic. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez ended saying that time would be short, but that at least they would have an occasion to see each other. (S)

The President ended the conversation by saying that he was looking forward to that too. (S)

PEREZ

MAY 9, 1989 -- CALL INITIATED 1856 -
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PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call with Prime Minister Felipe
Gonzalez of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, Director for
European Economic Affairs, NSC
Translator: Humberto Charneco, State
Department

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez

DATE: May 10, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:36-1:46 p.m.

The President said he was calling to express his appreciation of Gonzalez' effort to contact Noriega in Panama. He understood that Gonzalez never got through directly, but did get word to him through an emissary.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he wanted to clarify what had happened so far. He sent an emissary to see Noriega on Monday after he attempted to communicate with him directly and was unable to. On Tuesday, they had talked, and Noriega said he was consulting with the State Council (*Consejo de Estado*) and that he would provide his response through the Spanish emissary. So far there was no response.

The President said that in the U.S. there was considerable interest in Panama and there is a growing urgency to do something. If Noriega had stepped down the U.S. would have immediately moved to normalize relations. A package of steps was being considered which the U.S. would feel obligated to take unless Noriega took some action. Nothing would be done in Panama in the next few hours, but he wanted Prime Minister Gonzalez to know that the U.S. was soon going to need to take some steps. The President appreciated Prime Minister Gonzalez' efforts and those of President Perez, with whom he had also talked. The President asked whether, if Noriega refused to recognize the will of the people, Prime Minister Gonzalez could get others in Europe to speak out.

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Prime Minister Gonzalez said he was working with the European Community and with the Group of Seven. He was in contact with Carlos Andres Perez, and they were both attempting to put pressure on Noriega in Latin America as well as via the European Community.

Prime Minister Gonzalez continued that he could insist on a response right away but he believed that another 24-hours should elapse first to provide Noriega time to reconsider.

The President agreed and asked if the Group of Eight was still considering recognizing Endara.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that Venezuela had proposed this but Perez did not know the final outcome; at least one country did not support the idea.

The President emphasized that he wanted to stay in touch and that he appreciated Prime Minister Gonzalez' efforts.

Prime Minister Gonzalez reiterated that they were in agreement; and would wait another 24 hours and keep communication lines open.

The President agreed.