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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91110
Folder ID Number: 91110-002

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/9/92 - 12/22/92

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (3 pp.)	7/9/92	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Antall of Hungary (4 pp.)	7/10/92	(b)(1)	C
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico (6 pp.)	7/14/92	(b)(1)	C
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico (6 pp.)	7/14/92	(b)(1)	C
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Sixto Duran Ballen, President-Elect of Ecuador (4 pp.)	7/28/92	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: General Scowcroft's meeting with the Iraqi National Congress on July 31, 1992 (5 pp.)	8/3/92	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting between the President and Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	8/3/92	(b)(1)	C
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (4 pp.)	9/21/92	(b)(1)	C
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Roh Tae-Woo of Korea (3 pp.)	9/21/92	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence

Subseries: Presidential Memcons

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/9/92 - 12/22/92

Pinksheet Number: cap935

OA/ID Number: 91110-002

Date Closed: 1/30/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of United Mexican States (4 pp.)	10/7/92	(b)(1)	C
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/7/92	(b)(1)	C
12a. Memo	Jane E. Holl to William F. Sittmann Re: Memorandum of Conversation (1 pp.)	11/23/92	(b)(1)	C
12b. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (6 pp.)	11/17/92	(b)(1)	C
13. Memcon	Re: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela on November 27, 1992 (2 pp.)	11/27/92	(b)(1)	C
14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ambassador Saud Nasir Al-Sabah of Kuwait (2 pp.)	12/17/92	(b)(1)	C
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Lebanese Delegation (2 pp.)	12/17/92	(b)(1)	C
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with the Syrian Delegation (2 pp.)	12/17/92	(b)(1)	C
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Jordanian/Palestinian Delegations (3 pp.)	12/17/92	(b)(1)	C
18. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Israeli Delegation (3 pp.)	12/17/92	(b)(1)	C
19. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Dr. Abd Al-Salam Majali, Head of the Jordanian Peace Process Delegation (3 pp.)	12/17/92	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
20. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prominent Palestinians (3 pp.)	12/18/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
21. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prominent Palestinians (3 pp.)	12/18/92	(b)(1)	SECRET
22. Memcon	Re: Meeting with British Prime Minister and current European Council President John Major and European Commission President Jacques Delors (12 pp.)	12/18/92	(b)(1)	C
23. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Central European Foreign Ministers (6 pp.)	12/22/92	(b)(1)	SECRET

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Counsellor to the President and Press Secretary
W. Henson Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0649-MR

SCS 1/6/11

Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
Jozef Moravcik, Foreign Minister
Alexander Vondra, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President
Michael Zantovsky, Press Spokesman for the President
Jan Kubis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Alexandra Brabcova, Interpreter

DATE, TIME July 9, 1992, 4:30 - 4:50 pm
AND PLACE: Helsinki Fair Center, Helsinki, Finland

President Havel: Thank you very much for your recent letter.
(U)

The President: I want to express, as President of the United States, my full confidence in President Havel and my great respect for him. The American people identify with him as a man of freedom. (The press corps leaves). I wanted to get that statement out while the press was still here. I confess I don't understand what your legislature is doing with you and your great stature around the world. (Ø)

President Havel: Mr. President, let me again thank you for finding the time for this meeting. I will offer a brief explanation of our situation. After the recent parliamentary elections, developments accelerated in a way that makes it increasing likely that our State will divide. For my part, I exerted a great deal of effort to keep a common state of equal

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federal units. But this seems to have been superseded by the dramatic flow of history. It looks like the division will take place. Links will remain, though, the two republics will develop contractual links. Let me make two other remarks. First, if the division takes place, both republics will have as their objective, moving in the same direction in foreign policy, market economy, democracy and joining Europe, so the basic orientation will remain the same. Second, this will take place in a constitutional, civilized way, we will not become a hot bed of instability. Our two peoples have never been enemies, so we see no reason for conflict, although the technical process will be difficult. (Ø)

The President: What is the process? What has to take place, technically. (Ø)

President Havel: The first act will be a declaration of sovereignty by the Slovak parliament. Followed by a Slovak constitution in August. By the end of September a decision will be taken as to how the constitutional structure of the state or states is to be determined. The constitution of the Czech republic is also being developed. My days are numbered, maybe I'm the last federal President of my country. Nevertheless, maybe the offices of Czech and Slovak Presidents will be created, and I offer my services to my fellow citizens. (Ø)

The President: The vote on your reelection, with your great standing in the world, what prompted this outcome? (Ø)

President Havel: The situation in our parliament is we have two chambers, a House of the Peoples and a House of the Nations. It is not possible for the larger people, the Czechs, to out-vote the smaller. I got enough votes in the Czech lands, but not enough in the Slovak part of the House of Nations. (Ø)

The President: Were they simply doing that to assert the first step to separation? (Ø)

President Havel: It has been interpreted that way, although MPs who voted against me deny it. I don't see it as opposition to myself as a person, although some may feel that way, but rather I have been linked to the concept of the Czech-Slovak Federal State. But perhaps our foreign minister, who was elected in these recent elections, would offer a different opinion. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Moravcik: No, I agree fully. (Ø)

The President: Let me ask you something, I'm sure the answer is no, but is there anything we can do to help? First, we respect the internal affairs of peoples and don't want to interfere. But if there's anything we can do to facilitate what you want -- clearly, if there are two separate countries, we want to work with both. But I would hate not to ask whether there's anything we can do to help preserve a federal state within the bounds of proper international behavior. (Ø)

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President Havel: I think this is an historical movement. It does not make sense to try to stop it. We have not succeeded from inside, it would not make sense to try from outside. But what would make sense would be if the U.S. stressed the importance of adherence to correct constitutional procedures, and, given the geo-political importance, that the process be accomplished in a civil way. (P)

The President: We can certainly do that. And we will look for an opportunity to do so. (P)

Secretary Baker: I understood there would be another round of elections on July 16. Is it a foregone conclusion that your candidacy was voted down finally and conclusively? (P)

President Havel: The situation is as follows: on July 16th the next round of elections for the Presidency will be held, two votes will be taken. Those in the previous round are banned. But if no new President is elected in the third round, the unsuccessful candidates from the first round can run. This process can go on indefinitely. My impression is that I should not take part in this strange comedy. (P)

The President: Perhaps you can write a comedy about this. I'm afraid I have to go and give my speech. (U)

President Havel: May I call attention to the fact that Mr. Zantovsky, my press spokesman, will be the next Ambassador to the U.S. and I would be happy if the new U.S. Ambassador could come soon. (P)

The President: It is up to our Senate right now, but it should move quickly. Let's talk to Senator Biden and Senator Pell and say that President Havel has requested this. He has great influence with them and others in Congress. (P)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2009-0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Antall of Hungary

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Robert L. Hutchings, Director, European
Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Josef Antall, Prime Minister
Gyula Kodolanyi, Primary State Secretary in
the Prime Minister's Office
Dr. Rudolph Joo, Deputy State Secretary,
Ministry of Defense
Andras Kelemen, State Secretary in the
Foreign Ministry
Interpreter

DATE, TIME July 10, 1992, 11:40 am - 12:10 pm
AND PLACE: Helsinki Fair Center, Helsinki, Finland

The President: (Continuing discussion begun during photo op.)
Actually, the U.S. economy is getting better. But there is still
a perception that it is getting worse. There is an atmosphere of
negativism and pessimism in the country that should be getting
better. This fall I hope people will see the economy is on the
upturn. But its been a difficult year. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Mr. President, may I remind you that in
the White House I said if you happen not to be elected President
of the United States you would be sure to be elected President of
Hungary. But I would be very pleased to see you remain President
of the United States. We will keep our fingers crossed. (U)

The President: I really believe I will be. But it's a strange
year. In the final analysis, I believe our team's experience and
program will prevail, but it's too early to say for sure. I'm
dying to hear how things are going for you at home. Please be
frank with me. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Mr. President, first, the prestige and
image of the U.S. in Hungary is as good as ever. More than half
of our investments are from the U.S. (U)

The President: Did that GE deal ever go through? (U)

Mr. Hutchings: Yes, it was a joint venture with Tungfram. (U)

Prime Minister Antall: The Atlantic idea is of paramount
importance to us. The presence of the U.S. in Europe is the only

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I'm not only referring to Russia. Any step we can take, that will help people understand, we will take. (Ø)

The President: The fact of your statement a few moments ago before our press is very helpful. Hungarian Americans and others need to know that you consider the presence of the U.S. and NATO to be very important. This will be an issue in the fall. So the comments you made will be very helpful. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: It is very important, indeed, that you remain. I recently discussed this with Mr. Woerner and said that, among Europeans, conflicts are quite easy and whether you like it or not, America will have to make an appearance, so it's better to just stay on. (Ø)

The President: Do you think, as you travel around Europe, that any countries would prefer the U.S. to leave? I know there are some problems on the far left. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: I don't see this with serious politicians. It can not be denied that some are thinking that way in Western Europe, but it's a very limited phenomenon, in France, for example. But it's not serious if you really pose the question right. (Ø)

The President: As you know, sometimes we have our differences with the French on how much U.S. influence there should be. But I've asked Mitterrand directly, "Do you want us to stay or go?" And his enthusiastic response was that "of course we want you to stay." (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: Sometimes the French say paradoxical things. There's something in a miniature of this in Slovakia's attitude toward the Czechs. The Slovaks wanted independence, wanted sovereignty, but if the Czechs take them at their word they are frightened by it. (Ø)

The President: Are there many Czechs in Slovakia and vice versa? (U)

Prime Minister Antall: Not really, there are some Slovaks in Prague connected with government ministries. Around 20% of families are intermixed. The situation in Czechoslovakia will be peaceful, it'll be a peaceful solution. In a few years they will split. The problem is much less than in Yugoslavia. There will be a peaceful solution. It may take a few years. The problem is that about 90% of western investment is in the Czech lands. The question is what direction Slovakia will go. We keep assuring Czechs and Slovaks that Hungary wants to maintain good neighborly relations. If the division comes about, Slovakia should not be isolated, because it might choose the wrong allies. A lot of responsibility will rest on the Czechs and on Hungary and Austria and to a lesser extent Poland. May I go back to Yugoslavia? (Ø)

The President: Please. (U)

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Prime Minister Antall: There is a major, grave problem with the Hungarian minority and deportations. They are taking place as in Bosnia. Bosnia has closed its borders. Also, others are doing so. So we have gotten 3,000 Moslem refugees and 50,000 right now from Yugoslavia overall. In the past year there have been about 100,000. I must tell you, even from a military point of view, we do not feel secure enough. The Hungarian army is very poorly equipped. We have outdated equipment, and in no way represent a major military force. Being close to an adventurous army, like the Serbian Army, it is very important that we have some element of guarantee to be protected. (Ø)

The President: Can you conceive of a situation in which they might cross over your borders? (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: I would not exclude it. We are trying to keep in touch with the Serbian Army. We are observing the sanctions, although this is a major problem for us, 80% of our exports to Yugoslavia were concentrated in Serbia. There is also the important energy-carrying pipeline, though some retaliatory measures could not be excluded. The Hungarian ethnic minority is very close to the border, so it is very important to find some guarantee within the borders and outside. (Ø)

The President: How are we going with our military-to-military cooperation? (Ø)

Mr. Hutchings: It's quite active. We are doing more with Hungary than any other country. Secretary Cheney visited in December and the Hungarian Defense Minister Fur has visited Washington twice. We have also set up a bilateral working group to assist in the reorganization and restructuring of the Hungarian military. (Ø)

The President: We are ready for cooperation, but we need to be sure we define our cooperation clearly. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: One more point for you to bear in mind, the Romanian Army is moving closer to the Hungarian border. There has been a major redeployment and they are stronger on the Hungarian border now. It means we might get under some pressure. We want an army with a small number of troops, but with a certain capacity for self-defense. I recently had discussions with President Yeltsin and a major result was regarding the Russian planes for troop withdrawals. We agreed on no payments. (Ø)

The President: I'm glad they're gone. The Baltic leaders were jumping all over me a few minutes ago on this issue, they are very agitated. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: Another issue I would like to indicate is the question of a cease-fire in the Balkans. We have talked about how to achieve it and have thought about the potential incidental actions of the Yugoslav National Army which cannot be excluded. If the Yugoslav army can effect a takeover, this would create a new situation. After that, it would be hard to say.

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Political opposition is very weak in Serbia and in Montenegro. In a year or two the Baltic situation might even be destabilized because of the troop withdrawal issue, the East Prussian issue. I was interested to hear Yeltsin's remarks here in Helsinki. Emotional feelings are very intense in the Baltic regions. (Ø)

The President: Do they have problems among themselves, or are all these against Russia? (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: There is some rivalry. (Ø)

The President: That's what I thought. Landsbergis dominated our recent conversation. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: Even the situation in Finland seems problematic. The Fins try to talk them out of extreme things, but the Finnish system of argument is old fashioned. They don't seem to understand how to deal with the Baltic States. I tried politely to tell President Koivisto that. These countries have major problems. Their police and border guards have no arms. They would like the simplest machine guns. They are trying to acquire these in a subtle way, but the Fins won't do it. I advised them to try to get some arms from Russia. Why not try Yeltsin? It is obvious that police and border guards need arms. Yeltsin is a clever man, he probably could understand. It's my view that American-West European solidarity must remain. And also, our West European friends have to know that Russia will find only the U.S. impressive enough. Tocqueville wrote about that a century ago. So did Lenin. (Ø)

The President: We do have a responsibility to be a stabilizing force in Europe, also with Russia. In that respect we have unique responsibilities. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: While attention goes to Russia, some also should go to Ukraine, it is a major European country, the second largest after Germany. (Ø)

The President: We will not neglect Ukraine, we had Kravchuk over not to long ago. But I understand your point and I know they think we may be neglecting them. (Ø)

Prime Minister Antall: Many ex-Communist leaders were really only anti-Russian, but they were still part of the communist nomenclatura and they managed to set that image like Yeltsin did. But they didn't launch an economic reform as he did. (Ø)

The President: Well, I'm sorry we must break up, they are sending me a signal I must go. (U)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
John D. Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0062-F

for 5/13/09

Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico
Jose Cordoba, Chief of Presidential Staff
Fernando Solana, Foreign Secretary
Jaime Serra, Minister of Commerce
Gustavo Petricioli, Mexican Ambassador to the United States
Andres Rosenthal, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Herminio Blanco, Chief, Free Trade Negotiating Team
Jose Carreno, Advisor to President Salinas
Rozalba Ojeda, Director for North American, Secretariat of Foreign Relations

DATE, TIME July 14, 1992, 3:40 - 4:30pm DST
AND PLACE: San Diego

The President: Thank you very much for coming. I thought I would tell the people here what I told you about how much I appreciated your visit. We talked about the NAFTA, and I made clear that we're very interested in seeing the NAFTA concluded promptly. If you hear that there are people who say that it is good politics to slow it down, I want you to know that is not my view. That is not the view of this Administration. We are working hard to get it through. (C)

President Salinas: I appreciate very much the invitation. It started with a game. I didn't know what game (smiles). For us, it would be good to get a balance sheet on NAFTA. We are pleased with the experience in the negotiations. Jaime says that there

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is good progress, so good that we can say we are in the final stages. We understand the reluctance to fix the date. But the market expects that there will be an agreement, and that it will be finished and signed before the elections. We worry that if we give a number of signals to the market that this is not the case, this would be very bad. (Ø)

A second point is that November is very important for us. The Mexican people couldn't understand if the agreement was signed a few days after my "Informe." That's why it is important that there is an early opportunity to have a hand shake on it. It is not the U.S. elections, but the markets that are important. (Ø)

The President: President Salinas and I have talked about several points on oil. And, we have agreed on the urgency, but a date -- I'm not sure we can go that far as to name a specific date. We use the phrase of the "ninth inning". But, I don't know. What would you like on further elaborations. We want to get it done. (Ø)

President Salinas: We have said that we want it done as soon as possible. Carla and Jaime are to have a private meeting on the 23rd, and then there is the Ministerial meeting on the 25th. If we give them clear mandate to try to finish at that meeting, that would give us a date that the markets are expecting. (Ø)

The President: I would agree that's a good goal. Let's try to button it up. Who knows, let's try to finish. Shall we leave it that they will try to finish. What is the last day for you? (Ø)

President Salinas: August 1. (U)

Minister Serra: I think we can do it. Some positions won't change. We need to sit down and find a final balance. (Ø)

President Salinas: That's right. (U)

Ambassador Hills: There's no question that we want to finish the agreement as soon as possible. To initial means we must complete the legal changes and corrections, and bring along the Canadians who say that the legal questions could take a month. (Ø)

But first things first. Mr. President, you have always said that we need a good agreement. If we get an agreement that is okay on the 25th, that's okay. If it takes to the 26th, that's okay. What we need is to get a good agreement. (Ø)

The President: Do you think that oil is the remaining major difficulty? (Ø)

President Salinas: It's the main one. There are other areas. Minister Serra has more details. From the Mexican point of view, if we give guaranteed access to supply, that is giving access to Mexican oil. It is impossible and unconstitutional for us to go on that aspect. The Canadians are agreeable to have mention of

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an agreement in the overall treaty, but to have an annex, which exempts Mexico. (Ø)

It doesn't mean that in a emergency Mexico wouldn't provide oil, but constitutionally and politically, we couldn't promise it. The Canadians didn't have much difficulty with this because they don't have much oil. They wouldn't do it with water. (Ø)

The President: Do they equate that with ownership? (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes. (U)

The President: But who is it that (U)

President Salinas: You have the lawyers. They say that politically it is impossible and probably it is unconstitutional. Then there is a son of a former President who would attack us and try to make political capital. I don't want to give him that opportunity. It is very clear, and I believe it. So, we cannot accept this provision. But, we have opened up very much. Minister Serra can talk about this. (Ø)

Minister Serra: We have made great progress, first we've opened up on petrochemicals -- it is fully opened. Second, we have an interesting formula on gas. Third, there is room for performance contracts with incentives. And fourth, we have opened up on electricity. (Ø)

Some issues are not on the table, that is security of supply. The Canadian negotiator says we can have a clause in the main text and then make an exception for Mexico. We have given the Canadians concessions. They have agreed to have a trilateral agreement in the main text, and then we would have a bilateral agreement on agriculture, which would exempt the Canadians. We believe that it is a kind of thing we could do here also, where we have a trilateral umbrella and then some things are exempted. (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: They have been good on some things, but not so good on other things. (Ø)

This will be extremely difficult politically and with the Congress. If we get into a period of short supply, and we are now saying that we wouldn't get national treatment, we will be in big trouble. If we don't have this, we will have to come to more positive arrangements on many other items in order to sell the agreement. (Ø)

President Salinas: I understand the difficulties. It would make it impossible for me if I accepted such a clause. I don't want to ruin the negotiations. I did mention to the President in 1990 that energy issues could be a "deal breaker" for the negotiations. (Ø)

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The President: What are we talking about? If we have agreements where a certain amount of oil is promised then there is a reduction in supply, we are cut short? (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: PEMEX could say that we would be cut short. (Ø)

Minister Serra: We have a good set of rules. When we agree to long-term contracts, we agree to supply. Section 904 is more specific. If there is a crisis, political opposition would say that Section 904 requires that you must cut Mexico equally to the U.S. That is interpreted by the lawyers as agreeing that the U.S. has a claim on ownership of oil and this is a bomb. (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: In the situation of Canada, if there should be a need to reduce supply by one third, we would all be reduced by one third. (Ø)

Minister Serra: They wouldn't give it on water. (U)

Secretary Baker: I thought Canada gave it across-the-board. (U)

Ambassador Hills: We had a case where a pipeline was cut off in Michigan, and we faced a real shortage and it's caused tremendous problems, and that led to the agreement. One of the first questions I got in terms of energy, is whether we would get 904. (Ø)

President Salinas: When we first started these negotiations, we knew about this problem. That's why I mentioned it in Monterrey. This is part of the agreement for you. It is the whole agreement for us. (Ø)

The President: Is there no way to assert that this does not impinge on national sovereignty? Would there be no way to affirm that? (Ø)

Minister Serra: We have looked everywhere for a formula, but none were adequate. (Ø)

President Salinas: But, the rest of the agreement, we should look at the rest -- financial, agriculture, financial services. (Ø)

The President: Why don't we see if you two can talk more about it. (Minister Serra, Ambassador Hills). We will scrub hard and see if there is something we can come up with, which will protect our side of the equation but take care of Mexico's sovereignty concerns. I'm a little confused as to why something which is in a contract, impinges on sovereignty. (Ø)

Minister Serra: Contracts are kept. They provide for penalties, if not fulfilled. (U)

I think that your industry is more interested in other areas, rather than security of supply. I don't think it has that much

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importance in business. It is more of a political nature, with a very big importance for us. We are offering much which will be attractive to your business. (Ø)

President Salinas: There is a difficulty. This is a very serious problem with our opposition. That would not let NAFTA fly. We said from the beginning that Section 904 would not fly. (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: There is enormous value of security of supply in our succeeding in getting approval. It is not just the oil states who are important, it is all consumers around the country. The steps on petrochemicals and contracts are a step forward. But PEMEX can block them. If we are willing to pinch here, we will have difficulty in getting support for the agreement. We will have to build stronger support elsewhere. On tariffs, on drawbacks, which is a very sensitive subject for us. On automobiles, we are still waiting for a paper from you, and you can't just hand over a paper one day and expect a response on the next. These are difficult, complicated issues and the numbers, which result from a proposal have to be worked out. On the investment side, there has been real progress, but we still have a serious problem with "screening." (Ø)

President Salinas: What worries me is that the negotiators have been stuck on certain issues. What they need is more flexibility and a mandate. Jaime has instructions -- (Ø)

The President: Let us talk about it. We won't solve the problem today. We know that you are not just throwing up problems. (U)

Ambassador Hills: We need to build 51% support for the treaties. If we lose, we are worse off than if we had not started. So, if we lose support on one area, we have to make it up on another. So you know, we have to have more positive things in other areas to get support. (Ø)

The President: Let's try to move forward on this. (U)

President Salinas: Let's talk about Alvarez Machain. Your letter was most welcome. We understand your difficulty with revising the extradition treaty. We would like to look at the idea of developing a trilateral extradition treaty between Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Maybe we could have a meeting on this. After the election, we want to talk about how to return Alvarez Machain. After President Bush's election. (Ø)

The President: We know this is causing difficulty for you. We have tried to put this behind us. We assume there is no sympathy in Mexico for this individual. (Ø)

President Salinas, FM Solana, Mr. Cordoba -- all Mexicans: No! (U)

President Salinas: I would like to mention that we have an agreement on tuna, but shrimp is a new problem. (Ø)

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Minister Serra: We have been working for a long time to solve the tuna issue, but shrimp is causing us problems. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Send us a letter on this. Congressman Studds has been trying to be helpful, but we know it's been a problem. Let us know. (Ø)

President Salinas: On labor. Our two Deputy Secretaries have agreed to sign a document on the 28th. We need to ensure that they continue to make progress in this area. (Ø)

On the environment, Mr. Reilly and Mr. Colosio have been in contact. We will try to create conditions here and in labor to avoid problems. We have made improvements on border crossings, but still get problems with patrols and other things. (Ø)

The President: This is important. We may get a question on immigration. (Ø)

President Salinas: My answer is more jobs in Mexico with the NAFTA. The Koreans can't swim over. (Ø)

The President: Shall we go do it? (the press conference) (U)

Secretary Baker: I would like to raise one matter -- the FMLN. They are sending weapons to insurgents in Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. They also have a number of unreported ground to air missiles. The peace process is going well, but we hope that weapons would not be supplied to other movements. (Ø)

President Salinas: What do you want us to do? (U)

Secretary Baker: If you could talk to the FMLN and convince them to stop shipping arms. If you could tell them that you will censure them both publicly and privately, this would help. (Ø)

President Salinas: We will do it tomorrow. (U)

Foreign Minister Solana: We would like a document, which would tell us what the activities have been and when -- so we could use this. (Ø)

Mr. Aronson: We could do a briefing for you. (U)

Mr. Skinner: Immigration is becoming a number one political issue here. (U)

President Salinas: Growth in Mexico slowed down and immigration has increased. That's why we worry about getting an early agreement. (Ø)

The President: Let's go do it, (the press conference) then go to the ballgame! (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
John D. Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0062-F
JL 5/13/09

Carlos Salinas, President of Mexico
Jose Cordoba, Chief of Presidential Staff
Fernando Solana, Foreign Secretary
Jaime Serra, Minister of Commerce
Gustavo Petricioli, Mexican Ambassador to the United States
Andres Rosenthal, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Herminio Blanco, Chief, Free Trade Negotiating Team
Jose Carreno, Advisor to President Salinas
Rozalba Ojeda, Director for North American, Secretariat of Foreign Relations

DATE, TIME July 14, 1992, 3:40 - 4:30pm DST
AND PLACE: San Diego

The President: Thank you very much for coming. I thought I would tell the people here what I told you about how much I appreciated your visit. We talked about the NAFTA, and I made clear that we're very interested in seeing the NAFTA concluded promptly. If you hear that there are people who say that it is good politics to slow it down, I want you to know that is not my view. That is not the view of this Administration. We are working hard to get it through. (Ø)

President Salinas: I appreciate very much the invitation. It started with a game. I didn't know what game (smiles). For us, it would be good to get a balance sheet on NAFTA. We are pleased with the experience in the negotiations. Jaime says that there

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is good progress, so good that we can say we are in the final stages. We understand the reluctance to fix the date. But the market expects that there will be an agreement, and that it will be finished and signed before the elections. We worry that if we give a number of signals to the market that this is not the case, this would be very bad. (Ø)

A second point is that November is very important for us. The Mexican people couldn't understand if the agreement was signed a few days after my "Informe." That's why it is important that there is an early opportunity to have a hand shake on it. It is not the U.S. elections, but the markets that are important. (Ø)

The President: President Salinas and I have talked about several points on oil. And, we have agreed on the urgency, but a date -- I'm not sure we can go that far as to name a specific date. We use the phrase of the "ninth inning". But, I don't know. What would you like on further elaborations. We want to get it done. (Ø)

President Salinas: We have said that we want it done as soon as possible. Carla and Jaime are to have a private meeting on the 23rd, and then there is the Ministerial meeting on the 25th. If we give them clear mandate to try to finish at that meeting, that would give us a date that the markets are expecting. (Ø)

The President: I would agree that's a good goal. Let's try to button it up. Who knows, let's try to finish. Shall we leave it that they will try to finish. What is the last day for you? (Ø)

President Salinas: August 1. (U)

Minister Serra: I think we can do it. Some positions won't change. We need to sit down and find a final balance. (Ø)

President Salinas: That's right. (U)

Ambassador Hills: There's no question that we want to finish the agreement as soon as possible. To initial means we must complete the legal changes and corrections, and bring along the Canadians who say that the legal questions could take a month. (Ø)

But first things first. Mr. President, you have always said that we need a good agreement. If we get an agreement that is okay on the 25th, that's okay. If it takes to the 26th, that's okay. What we need is to get a good agreement. (Ø)

The President: Do you think that oil is the remaining major difficulty? (Ø)

President Salinas: It's the main one. There are other areas. Minister Serra has more details. From the Mexican point of view, if we give guaranteed access to supply, that is giving access to Mexican oil. It is impossible and unconstitutional for us to go on that aspect. The Canadians are agreeable to have mention of

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an agreement in the overall treaty, but to have an annex, which exempts Mexico. (Ø)

It doesn't mean that in a emergency Mexico wouldn't provide oil, but constitutionally and politically, we couldn't promise it. The Canadians didn't have much difficulty with this because they don't have much oil. They wouldn't do it with water. (Ø)

The President: Do they equate that with ownership? (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes. (U)

The President: But who is it that (U)

President Salinas: You have the lawyers. They say that politically it is impossible and probably it is unconstitutional. Then there is a son of a former President who would attack us and try to make political capital. I don't want to give him that opportunity. It is very clear, and I believe it. So, we cannot accept this provision. But, we have opened up very much. Minister Serra can talk about this. (Ø)

Minister Serra: We have made great progress, first we've opened up on petrochemicals -- it is fully opened. Second, we have an interesting formula on gas. Third, there is room for performance contracts with incentives. And fourth, we have opened up on electricity. (Ø)

Some issues are not on the table, that is security of supply. The Canadian negotiator says we can have a clause in the main text and then make an exception for Mexico. We have given the Canadians concessions. They have agreed to have a trilateral agreement in the main text, and then we would have a bilateral agreement on agriculture, which would exempt the Canadians. We believe that it is a kind of thing we could do here also, where we have a trilateral umbrella and then some things are exempted. (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: They have been good on some things, but not so good on other things. (Ø)

This will be extremely difficult politically and with the Congress. If we get into a period of short supply, and we are now saying that we wouldn't get national treatment, we will be in big trouble. If we don't have this, we will have to come to more positive arrangements on many other items in order to sell the agreement. (Ø)

President Salinas: I understand the difficulties. It would make it impossible for me if I accepted such a clause. I don't want to ruin the negotiations. I did mention to the President in 1990 that energy issues could be a "deal breaker" for the negotiations. (Ø)

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The President: What are we talking about? If we have agreements where a certain amount of oil is promised then there is a reduction in supply, we are cut short? (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: PEMEX could say that we would be cut short.
(Ø)

Minister Serra: We have a good set of rules. When we agree to long-term contracts, we agree to supply. Section 904 is more specific. If there is a crisis, political opposition would say that Section 904 requires that you must cut Mexico equally to the U.S. That is interpreted by the lawyers as agreeing that the U.S. has a claim on ownership of oil and this is a bomb. (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: In the situation of Canada, if there should be a need to reduce supply by one third, we would all be reduced by one third. (Ø)

Minister Serra: They wouldn't give it on water. (U)

Secretary Baker: I thought Canada gave it across-the-board. (U)

Ambassador Hills: We had a case where a pipeline was cut off in Michigan, and we faced a real shortage and it's caused tremendous problems, and that led to the agreement. One of the first questions I got in terms of energy, is whether we would get 904.
(Ø)

President Salinas: When we first started these negotiations, we knew about this problem. That's why I mentioned it in Monterrey. This is part of the agreement for you. It is the whole agreement for us. (Ø)

The President: Is there no way to assert that this does not impinge on national sovereignty? Would there be no way to affirm that? (Ø)

Minister Serra: We have looked everywhere for a formula, but none were adequate. (Ø)

President Salinas: But, the rest of the agreement, we should look at the rest -- financial, agriculture, financial services.
(Ø)

The President: Why don't we see if you two can talk more about it. (Minister Serra, Ambassador Hills). We will scrub hard and see if there is something we can come up with, which will protect our side of the equation but take care of Mexico's sovereignty concerns. I'm a little confused as to why something which is in a contract, impinges on sovereignty. (Ø)

Minister Serra: Contracts are kept. They provide for penalties, if not fulfilled. (U)

I think that your industry is more interested in other areas, rather than security of supply. I don't think it has that much

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importance in business. It is more of a political nature, with a very big importance for us. We are offering much which will be attractive to your business. (Ø)

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The President: We know this is causing difficulty for you. We have tried to put this behind us. We assume there is no sympathy in Mexico for this individual. (Ø)

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President Salinas: Growth in Mexico slowed down and immigration has increased. That's why we worry about getting an early agreement. (Ø)

The President: Let's go do it, (the press conference) then go to the ballgame! (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Sixto Duran Ballen, President-Elect of Ecuador

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor
Robert Gelbard, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

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PER E.O. 13526

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Sixto Duran Ballen, President-Elect of Ecuador
Alberto Dahik, Vice President-Elect
Diego Paredes, Minister of Foreign Affairs-Designate
Roberto Dunn, Minister of Government-Designate
Mario Ribadeneira, Minister of Finance and Credit-Designate

DATE, TIME July 28, 1992, 4:15 - 4:35pm DST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Before the private meeting started the two Presidents spoke briefly to the press. Copy of the press statement transcript is attached.

President-Elect Duran: As I see it, we will have two big problems to overcome. First, is to combat inflation. The second is to make the state more efficient. (Ø)

The program that we would like is one which would deal with the social aspects of the problem. We would hope to have public works which would build roads and schools and get the money to the people who need it. We hope for flexibility in the present laws involving government contracting. Part of the failure is the system of completing numerous requirements before disbursement of loans can be made. There is also the problems of procurement where sometimes the regulations are too restrictive. (Ø)

What I'm asking is that we make it possible for small contractors to be able to construct small units for a large number of people. We had this years ago when I was mayor of Quito. We had about

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2500 (as heard) contractors who perhaps built 100 houses apiece. It was a very effective program. (Ø)

The President: Why were the laws changed? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: I believe to allow for international bidding, which actually has not taken place any way. We want to go ahead with programs which have proven successful in the past. We hope for U.S. help in this. It came in '84. One thing we mentioned in our conversation on the porch (Ø)

The President: I remember the porch. (U)

President-Elect Duran: We asked for ESF funds. We are hoping that if we got funds for someone else in the past, we should be able to get it for ourselves now. If we are to do reforms, we must prove our credibility by getting to work immediately. If we call for the beginning of contracts on the third or fourth day after we take office, we perhaps could have contracts let by September. If the international agencies could all do everything possible to make this rapid process work, it would be very helpful. (Ø)

The President: Have you talked with the international financial institutions? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: We have. (U)

The President: Let's see if we can be of some kind of assistance. (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: What is the possibility of PL-480? (Ø)

The President: I'm not completely up to date on that. Does anyone have something to add? (U)

Ambassador Gelbard: We are trying to see if there is end of year money which we could use. The problem is the serious drought in South Africa which is taking up a tremendous amount of resources. (Ø)

The President: Let's see if we can help somehow to get this new administration off to a good start. Let's see if we can jar something loose. (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: We talked to Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and told him that we want to enter into the Andean Preference Agreement. We know that EMELEC is a problem. We have already talked with Mr. Scopetta. Rather than keep the attitude of the previous government that the State should run everything, we think that the private cooperation should be sought. If Mr. Scopetta wants to give part of his shares and be compensated, we could do that. My to-be-appointed Minister of Energy has met already with Mr. Scopetta. This is one of the things which is needed for a revitalization of the economy. (Ø)

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The President: I'm not completely up on the details of your new idea. Does someone have anything to add? (U)

Mr. Pryce: The dispute went to arbitration with both sides agreeing to abide by the decision. There has been a decision awarding a sum to Mr. Scopetta. (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: We have problems in that some of the sectors we are helping do not really have good entrepreneurs. We would buy Mr. Scopetta's rights, which is what the people want. They don't want state-run enterprises. (Ø)

The President: What is the solution? Do I understand correctly that a bilateral investment agreement has not yet been done? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: We are talking to Mrs. Hills on that. We are also talking about intellectual property rights. (Ø)

We need an increase in help for drug control. (Ø)

The President: That's a tough one. You have been very good on this. Are your major problems in the transshipment side and the financial side? (Ø)

We are not pointing a finger at anyone else. We know that we help contribute to the problem and I salute what has been done to help curb it. (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: Mr. Dunn has talked to your people and he will be talking more to Mr. Martinez. (U)

The President: Do you have a use problem? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: Not much. (Ø)

The President: What do you think of Gaviria and Escobar? Is there any movement on that? (Ø)

Ambassador Gelbard: Not much at the present. (U)

The President: Do you worry when you go there? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: Yes. They had tremendous security when we went to Colombia. There is not as much worry about Ecuador, where we don't have much. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: I would like to go back to EMELEC for a minute. Have you made a decision to accept the award? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: We know that the previous government was trying to appeal the award. I said we should not do that. We could tackle the problem directly. We would try to seek to get private people with possible resources. In a small economy, we want the government to do less. (Ø)

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I know you are very busy and we have talked about just about all I wanted to deal with. Does anyone else want to say anything?
(Ø)

The President: There is an historical function that we have to go to. I wonder what happened with Febres Cordero? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: He was elected mayor of Guayaquil. (U)

The President: As part of your campaign? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: No, as part of the opposition. He was for my opponent. I've never completely understood this. We were both Ministers in a previous government. But he fought against me and I finally had to decide to leave the party to found my own party -- this was very difficult for me. (Ø)

The President: How has the previous President been toward your victory? (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: I think he preferred that I win over the other choice. (Ø)

The President: (Smiling) You know Secretary Baker broke his leg playing tennis. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Now wait a minute (Ø)

President-Elect Duran: I don't play much tennis, I hike, I swim, I do many things, but I don't need to get into a tennis match.
(Ø)

The President: You look really good. (U)

President-Elect Duran: Well, yes, I walk a good bit and I've gotten tan and we keep moving. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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AUGUST

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: General Scowcroft's meeting with the Iraqi National Congress on July 31, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs
Bruce Riedel, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker
Edmund Hull, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs
Shuckran Kamal, Interpreter

Bahr al-Aloom
Massoud Barzani
Layth Kubba
Salah Shaikhly
Jalal Talabani
Arif al-Razzaq
Hoshyar Zibari
Barham Salih

DATE, TIME August 3, 1992; 4: 4:45 p.m.
AND PLACE: White House

General Scowcroft: Welcome to the White House. I bring you the President's greetings. He is busy today in California but asked me to convey his best wishes. Let me make a number of points at the start. First, we want Saddam out. We will not waver in our commitment to his removal. Second, let me congratulate you on the success of your conference in Vienna. A unified opposition is the best counterweight to Saddam. Of course the United States cannot select the next leadership of Iraq, but we do support you as a rallying point. Next, we urge you to improve your relations with your neighbors including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Here your handling of the PKK terrorism problem is especially important. We are ready to help you with your neighbors but you must take the main steps. Also, we encourage you to do all you can to get out information on Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, please bring these to our attention as early as possible so that we can get the information to the world community. That is what I want to say in opening. Again let me congratulate you on the unity you have achieved. I am looking forward to hearing your views. (S)

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Mr. al-Aloom: Praise be to God. Thank you for receiving us. We represent all elements of Iraqi society. We thank you for your assistance in bringing an end to the Saddam dictatorship. We will try to expand our unity at all stages. I want to focus on two points. First, the suffering of the Iraqi people is a threat to the peace of the international order. Second, we seek a parliamentary democracy in Iraq, one that spurns terrorism and aspires to live at peace with our neighbors. We want a modern state that coexists with the twentieth century. The local elections held in Kurdistan this spring were a step toward achieving these goals. Now we need your help to continue. We thank you for the air cover over the north that made those elections possible. We ask you to extend it to the south, especially to the area of the marshlands where we need a safehaven from Saddam. Second, we ask you to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, especially to move it from a chapter 6 issue to a chapter 7 issue. We want you to help us to stop Saddam's use of airpower against our people. Thank you again for receiving us. (S)

Mr. Barzani: Thank you, General Scowcroft, for meeting with us today. We trust this will be a good introduction for a long term relationship. We hope this will not prove to be a dialogue for a single immediate situation. For our part we understand the importance of the United States. Frankly, we have suffered from a lack of communication in the past, especially after the end of the Gulf war. If we had good communications then, in 1991, we could have done better -- both of us -- in avoiding suffering. We want a democratic pluralistic system in Iraq that protects Kurdish rights within the framework of a unified Iraq. We have the Vienna conference formula for achieving democracy and we are finishing the final draft of its program. We trust you will support it. As Kurds we have no interest in fragmenting Iraq, we understand your fears of this and those of our neighbors. General Scowcroft, let me assure you that there is an opposition to Saddam in Iraq and we represent it. We are ready to cooperate with all groups that favor a democratic future, peace in the region and peace at home. What we need is a political understanding with you and a common view of the future of Iraq. The opposition is alive in Iraq -- what it needs is a commitment that you will support us in all ways and not fail us. We thank the United States government for the protection it has given the Kurdish people and we hope that will be extended to our brothers in the south. We also need pressure on Saddam to allow the return home of the 300,000 refugees from Kirkuk who are still homeless. We are doing all we can with Turkey, we harbor no evil intentions toward its sovereignty. Our people are awaiting the results of this trip, so we can persuade them of the inevitability of change in Iraq and of the support of the United States government. Time is critical, we support a non-violent change and oppose an ethnic bloodbath. But it is inevitable with Saddam that sooner or later we will have a showdown with him. Let me finish by saying this: errors have been made in assessing Saddam in the past. Especially after the war. Let us not repeat those errors. (S)

Mr. Talabani: Let me add one thing to what has been said, all of which I agree with. Both Mr. Barzani and myself are targets of the PKK. They want us dead. We see the PKK as a terror movement, damaging our interests. We have documents proving that the PKK and Iraq have had relations since 1989. We have given those to Turkey and we can give them to you. On the way here, I saw President Ozal and Prime Minister Demeriel, so did Mr. Barzani. We have good relations with the government of Turkey. We will continue on this process. As for Saudi Arabia, we want a good relationship. Unfortunately we suffer from their misunderstanding of the situation. We want to work with them. But most of all we do not want to be the tools of anyone in the area. (S)

General Scowcroft: We understand that and we agree it is important. (S)

Mr. Talabani: We need your help with Saudi Arabia. We need your help with the 300,000 refugees who are facing their third winter in the north. This is a blatant violation of UNSCR 688. As for free elections, we had some experience now where we got your support. For eight months we have been blockaded by Saddam. We need money for the civil servants salaries. A freely elected Kurdish government needs your help. Secretary Baker said he will look into lifting some of the impact of sanctions on our area. (S)

General Scowcroft: Yes, Jim told me of this and we will look into what we can do. (S)

Mr. Talabani: Since our visit began here this week, the blockade has gotten worse. We need to be given help as you gave the people of Afghanistan. Saddam is a world threat to peace and we need your help. (S)

General al-Razzaq: My colleagues have said most of the key points. Vienna was a first step toward getting rid of Saddam. We don't want any more wars in our region. We prefer to use the international courts system to settle disputes. We have suffered too much from war. I am from Baghdad. Baghdad is home for one quarter of Iraqis. It is the center of Saddam's power. We want to act for the people of Baghdad to prevent another catastrophe. We need money to attract military forces from Saddam. Armies crawl on their bellies, as Napoleon said. We need to have the money to pay for food to attract the army to our side. This is where the frozen assets can help us. We would like your help on this. (S)

Mr. Shaikhly: Since Vienna we have contacted all of the regional states. Egypt was the first to answer with a positive reply. I went to Cairo and got positive support there. We won't take no from the others as an answer. We need some help from you with them. They are moody -- a word from you can help tremendously. We remain a bit worried by reports that the administration only

wants to get rid of Saddam, not his system. This surfaces in claims that war trials will discourage a revolt by those around Saddam. Some say it will stop a coup. But I say that you can not rely on Saddam's cronies or on his sons. We want to erode his sovereignty and authority. The next crisis should be on a broad front, not just the Agriculture Ministry or something like that. Rather the focus should be on 688. There are a great many issues to confront Saddam on. The key thing for now is to keep open communications with your staff and your government. Thank you again for receiving us. (S)

Mr. Kubba: Let me express our concern that Saddam is weakening Iraq and his continued survival will erode Iraq's ability to hold together and play a role in the regional balance. We need the full cooperation of the United States in preventing other states from taking advantage of Iraq's weakness, the weakness of its army and of its center, to gain undue influence. We believe your support for a rival national authority in Irbil will prevent a catastrophe. (S)

General Scowcroft: Thank you for your views. Let me say a few things in response. The Vienna conference and the impressive list of principles you adopted there will help us to communicate your views to a wider international audience. I fully take Mr. Barzani's point on the need for better communication. We are committed to working with you from now on. Let us establish better means of discussing issues of mutual concern. Now we can do more on that front. I can assure you we are interested in more communication and a deeper dialogue. On Resolution 688, we are trying to do what we can to focus the world on this issue and away from a narrow concern with 687 issues. We are trying at the same time to keep the struggle from being a bilateral U.S.-Iraq struggle. We are seeking to keep the UN and the coalition engaged with us. Frankly this is the more difficult route to go but one we think is essential to success. Your help there is needed. We are not going to fail you. We are determined to stay the course against Saddam. Your efforts will help enormously. We will talk to your neighbors, especially to Saudi Arabia. Iran is not one we can help with but we'll do what we can with the others. The frozen assets problem is a difficult issue. It is complicated by many tough legal issues in many countries. We will look into it more. On war crimes, we do not want to look weak by indicting Saddam when we do not have him in our hands. We are ready to look at a bill of indictment, however, if you draw one up. As for developing an alternative government in Irbil, until the Vienna conference this was not an active possibility. Now it is and we will look at your ideas. In closing, let me say we are happy you are here. Your visit makes me more optimistic about Iraq. You've come a long way and we will go forward now together. (S)

Mr. Talabani: Let me add one thing. We do not have in mind a government in Kurdistan but an alternative power center which can rally Iraqis to it. We will need your protection, including defensive arms against air power and tanks. We will create an Iraqi Liberation Army but we need your help. (S)

General Scowcroft: We can study it. We need more dialogue on this to review it in some depth. (S)

Mr. Talabani: What do you have in mind? (S)

General Scowcroft: We are looking at many things to help your cause. Frozen assets, for example, where the allies have not been helpful. (S)

Mr. Talabani: On that issue, I have been in contact with Mitterrand. Three days ago he informed me that the French would be helpful. I have also received positive indications from the Germans, Italy and the United Kingdom. (S)

General Scowcroft: We are working with them as well, although the answer is not yet as clear as we want. Again, let me thank you for coming today. (S)

Goodbyes.

-- End of Meeting --

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07. Memcon	Re: Meeting between the President and Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	8/3/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

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Subseries: Presidential Memcons

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/9/92 - 12/22/92

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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between the President and Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Douglas Paal, Senior Director for Asian Affairs

Ambassador Zhu Qizhen
Mr. Yang (Tiger) Jiechi, Deputy Director, American and Oceanian Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME: August 3, 1992, 3:49 p.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Residence

The President: Tiger, what brings you here? (U)

Mr. Yang: I am here with the Vice Minister in charge of the State Planning Commission. We are here to buy cars. (U)

Ambassador Zhu: They are buying cars from Chrysler, Ford, and GM. This has been very well reported in the media. (U)

The President: I saw it. But that was some time ago. Tiger, the first thing I want to do is see pictures of your kids. (U)

Mr. Yang: Instead of bringing pictures I wanted to bring money to buy cars. My daughter is 3 1/2. We have your picture from Chase Untermeyer's wedding with you and Chase and Diana. My daughter sees you in that picture every day. (U)

The President: What are you doing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? (U)

Ambassador Zhu: He is Deputy Director of the American and Oceanian Affairs Department. (U)

The President: You are not doing much translating anymore. How is your wife? (U)

Ambassador Zhu: She is here in Washington. (U)

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The President: As long as we are having this social visit, I would like to compare notes on the relationship. I have not changed my view that it is in the interest of the United States to have the best possible relationship with China. The relationship is not in the best possible shape. We are not happy with our trade imbalance, even though we are pleased with your car purchases. We have our problems with human rights, but I remember well your leaders who said that we should remember that the Chinese must feed 1 billion people every day. I will never forget that. As you know, we are still locked in the MFN struggle. I am also locked in a tough election fight. We are going to win. One issue for the other side, which is joined in by all the editorial writers, is the relationship with China. Clinton will demagogue the issue. We have others on our side joining in. There are congressional opponents like Nancy Pelosi, and we have our differences with them. (U)

I have to be strongly committed to human rights, as I truly am. I have to say there has been a lot of change in the world. Of course, we are champions for democracy. I believe economic change helps produce these results. You may have a difference on that. (b)(1)

(b)(1) I know you have let some prisoners out. That prison labor Memorandum of Understanding is very constructive. We don't ask that you establish a two-party system, with Republicans and Democrats in downtown Beijing. Brent Scowcroft, Doug, here, know that it will be a tougher fight this year, probably because it's an election year. The other side will try to relive Tiananmen, using film in their political advertisements. (b)(1)

Mr. Paal: Mr. President, you probably have not heard the Democratic leader is trying to schedule a vote for MFN for this coming Friday. (U)

The President: What can we do? (U)

Mr. Paal: The best thing would be no bad news, if China can control its reaction to events and if China can find a way to support pragmatically the proposal for a bilateral human rights commission, that would be helpful. (U)

Ambassador Zhu: May I say a few words? (U)

The President: Yes. (U)

Ambassador Zhu: First, we appreciate what you have done to preserve and restore the relations between our two countries. We appreciate very much that you fight almost every year for our Most Favored Nation status. You fight for its extension. This year you are doing it for the third year. As Li Peng, at Rio, and Jiang Zemin, on other occasions, have said, there is not any foreign leader who enjoys a friendship with all of China's leaders. You have met all of them. On MFN, China has done a lot by acceding to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), by observing the guidelines and parameters of the missile technology

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control regime, by reaching an agreement and signing a Memorandum of Understanding on intellectual property rights (IPR). If there is one thing that we can do in the next few weeks, that would be reaching an agreement on market access. At the same time we hope that the U.S. will continue its support for China.

(Ø)

The President: We should get these things out in public. The MOU is to be signed in Washington in two days. It's timely. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: Over the weekend, 60 Minutes ran its story on the prison labor problem. They almost did not reveal that the program was already a year old. (Ø)

The President: That's what we are up against. (Ø)

Ambassador Zhu: Another point, if we can avoid any negative developments. I'd like to take up one thing that I've read about in news reports, the issue of F-16s to Taiwan. We think that such an issue will produce a great deal of concern. I have no instructions. (Ø)

The President: This is a very complicated issue. We hope you people know that we have big problems here with jobs. We also have a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15s. You should understand that if I don't carry Texas, I am not going to be President. Now we have made no decision on this. But I have got Texas, there are 5,000 plus people being put out of work, and that is what greeted me when I went down there. China has not made it easier by acquiring SU-27s. It is appropriate that you raise this issue. There has been no decision on this thing at all. The big problem is in my home state and in Missouri, where all these people work. It's easy for the anti-PRC people to beat me on the head over this. (Ø)

Ambassador Zhu: In all candor, as I said, I'm uninstructed, I must tell you that the government will take this very seriously. You have the August 17 Communiqué. If you sell the F-16s to Taiwan, there will be a very serious reaction and damage to relations. (Ø)

The President: Let me tell you this. I don't care what Mr. Holdrooke says about Clinton's attitude toward China, if that Administration comes in, the situation must get worse. The policy then will be to have China dutifully report to the Senate. I urge you to take the broadest possible view. I have no hesitation that you report this conversation accurately. (Ø)

Ambassador Zhu: May I send your assessment to the leaders? (U)

The President: Sure. (b)(1) It is tough right now, especially on this issue where it is almost unanimously against me. I know something that you don't. All this partisan carping says that I don't care about human rights. They will probably go back to an unreal world. (Ø)

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Mr. Yang: I'm very glad to see Mr. President looking so healthy.
(U)

The President: Did you see our good friend Untermeyer? (U)

Mr. Yang: We saw them and had a dinner together in Beijing. (U)

The President: I appreciate that on short notice you came over here. I have great respect for you. Please do all that you can do. Are there meetings going on at Beidaihe? (Ø)

Ambassador Zhu: All the leaders go to Beidaihe. They discuss issues pertaining to the 14th Party Congress coming in the last quarter of the year. (Ø)

The President: Will we see a change of faces? (Ø)

Ambassador Zhu: They will decide the leader of the party. Then the change of government leaders will be four to five months later. At the Plenary Session of the National Peoples Congress, probably in April, 1993. The five-year terms will be coming to an end, and they will elect a new President and Prime Minister.

Mr. President, the situation in China is excellent. The economy is booming. (Ø)

The President: Well, thank you all very much. I have to move on a tight schedule. Very glad to have seen you. (Ø)

- End of Conversation -

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
John Bolton, Assistant Secretary for
International Organizational Affairs
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director for International
Programs, NSC (notetaker)

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Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General,
United Nations
Jan Eliasson, Under Secretary General for
Humanitarian Affairs
Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary General,
Office of Peace-Keeping Operations
James Jonah, Under Secretary General for
Political Affairs
Vladimir Petrovsky, Under Secretary General
for Political Affairs
Joseph Verner Reed, Under Secretary General,
Special Representative of Secretary General
for Public Affairs
Dick Thornburgh, Under Secretary General for
Administration and Management
Alvaro de Soto, Under Secretary General

DATE, TIME September 21, 1992, 10:25 - 10:40am EST
AND PLACE: United Nations, Indonesian Lounge,
New York City

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: Thank you for your humanitarian relief
effort in Somalia. It is very important for the U.S. to be
providing air lift support to carry the Pakistani battalion to
Mogadishu. Under Secretary Jan Eliasson is just back from
Somalia and the Sudan, and conditions are every bit as bad as
feared. (U)

The President: The articles in the Washington Post the last two
days that have been critical of the United Nations are strange.
(U)

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UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: Once troops are on the spot in Somalia, the UN will be better able to diffuse the complicated disputes among the various feuding factions. Greater security for the humanitarian workers will permit wider distribution of food, which should in turn further reduce tensions. Then I want to launch international negotiations for a political settlement. At least in Somalia, we do not face the Yugoslav problem of a harsh winter. (Ø)

On Yugoslavia, the resolution adopted by the Security Council on Saturday on the FRY's status was a compromise. The FRY will not be permitted to participate in the General Assembly, but will be permitted to address the Security Council. The member governments will then review the FRY's behavior at the end of the 47th session, and perhaps move to another resolution. (U)

The President: We have come under criticism from the Turks and Egyptians for being selective in our outrage. Is there a problem on this? I can understand their concerns. (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: I do not believe any real problem exists. Egyptian troops are now in Sarajevo and are in a position to report to Cairo about the extensive relief efforts which Western governments have underway. The criticism is a kind of emotional reaction to press reports showing civilian casualties in Bosnia. Muslim concerns can be selective, too. Burma has forced out 360,000 Muslims (Rohingyas) into Bangladesh. (Ø)

The President: I will talk in my speech today about peacekeeping. I will have a few suggestions. We strongly support UN peacekeeping. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: On Iraq, I have sent a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister and we are trying once more to have Iraq agree to let assistance go in there. If the Iraqis do not respond positively, we will have to have humanitarian corridors to bring food in from Turkey. We need results in the next few days. Otherwise, there is a risk again of mass migration, along the scale of 1991. (Ø)

The President: I worry about the radical groups in the region. (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: Yes. I think humanitarian corridors will be needed. (Ø)

The President: Is there any likelihood of further confrontations between UNSCOM (UN Special Commission) inspection teams and the Iraqi government? (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: I do not think so, but Ekeus (chairman of UNSCOM) will also be carefully following the Iraqi response to the letter I sent to Tariq Aziz. (Ø)

On El Salvador, we have a problem. The land is not distributed yet to the demobilizing soldiers. I have called the heads of the

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IMF and World Bank, and they will have money available for the land redistribution program. So, the issue is not one of resources. We do need to have the calendar respected. (Ø)

The President: We have a problem down there on the demand of the Commission that the Chief of Staff and other top military leaders be replaced. President Cristiani feels that the potential problems caused by a too-rapid change in the military leadership could destabilize the entire situation in El Salvador. (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: We want to do our best on El Salvador. (U)

Secretary Eagleburger: Maybe we could talk about this in our meeting. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: The UN needs help in Afghanistan. Najibullah is still in the UN compound in Kabul. I recently spoke with Rabbani, and Najibullah's transfer to the Pakistani embassy in Kabul was arranged. He would then travel to Islamabad and subsequently depart for India. But, because Najibullah does not trust the Pakistanis, he reneged on the deal, even though the Pakistanis had pledged to protect him. (Ø)

On Libya, Qadhafi does not trust us anymore. He thinks it is in his interest to have direct talks with the U.S. I have told the Libyans they should provide the information requested by the Perm Three on the renunciation of terrorism prior to the start of the 47th UNGA, but so far we have received none of what has been requested. (Ø)

The President: As always with them, "the check is in the mail." Where does that leave us on the resolutions? The resolutions have to be respected. We cannot just let this matter disappear. (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: We must keep up the economic pressure. As to the defendants themselves, the Libyans wanted to send them to Scotland, wanted to send an observer to the trial, and wanted a commitment that the defendants would not be extradited to the United States. (Ø)

The President: Are the Libyans seriously considering this approach or is it a charade? (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: We do not know yet. But, it is clear that Libya must comply with Resolution 731 and deliver the suspects for trial. (Ø)

The President: What is the latest on Cambodia? (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: I have spoken recently with both Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, and I believe if we can find a way for the Khmer Rouge to save face, the Paris accords can be implemented. It is a question of perception. They want to play a role in the future and they need a kind of guarantee. I will discuss this matter again with Sihanouk next week here in New

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York. I also want to argue to the Khmer Rouge that the Tokyo Conference was quite successful, and they should continue in the process or risk being excluded. Success on this also relates to ending the Thai military's money-making trade with the Khmer Rouge. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: We have raised this issue with the Thai in Tokyo and subsequently. (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: It is unclear what impact the new Thai government will have. (U)

The President: Yes, it is too soon to tell. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: Renewed negotiations on Cyprus begin October 26. I believe the extensive difficulties of the Mitsotakis government in Greece make it difficult for Mitsotakis to make any further movements, which weakens Vassiliou's bargaining position. Denktash has shown no flexibility whatever. He is very popular in Turkey at present. (Ø)

The President: The territorial issue is now down to a tiny disagreement. (Ø)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: Yes. I believe the real problems now are the future of Varosha, the question of refugee return, and the amenities that might be provided to refugees. However, during discussions on the set of principles and the map, Denktash gave practically nothing. But I do not think the Turks will push Denktash, because they too perceive that Mitsotakis is weak. (Ø)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Roh Tae-Woo of Korea

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft
Nancy Bearg Dyke (notetaker)

President Roh Tae-Woo
Kim Chong-Whi
Ambassador Hyun
Korean Interpreter

DATE, TIME September 21, 1992, 3:15 - 3:45pm EST
AND PLACE: The Waldorf-Astoria, New York City

The meeting began with warm greetings back and forth.

President Roh: I understand about the campaign and that the President was not able to meet with me. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: I want to convey the President's deep regrets that he is unable to meet with you. (U)

President Roh: I received the President's personal message before I left Seoul. (U)

Brent Scowcroft: He is in a tough fight for reelection. He is optimistic about the outcome but is spending every minute on the campaign. (U)

President Roh: Sitting in Seoul, I have been rooting for President Bush's reelection. But, as seems to be the case at the end of the 20th century, even when leaders do a good job, they are faced with difficulty at home. But I have confidence in President Bush. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: Yes, the mood is strange and difficult for incumbents. (Ø)

President Roh: When I was leaving for New York, Don Gregg came to the airport, and I asked him if I will bring good luck to the President. He said yes, he has good feelings about this. I hope my visit to the U.S. will provide an occasion to turn the tide. I am speaking to an Asia Society dinner with a large attendance. I would like to lend my support indirectly. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: Thank you. It is an influential group, and we will take your visit as a good omen. (Ø)

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President Roh: As is the case everywhere, when contending parties speak, people do not listen. But often when an outsider speaks, they listen. I will bring this message for Americans: Recover your self confidence. You have led the world out of World War II and the Cold War and saved the human race. This is the achievement of the Reagan-Bush team. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: True, and someone like you can put it in perspective. History will judge, but right now it doesn't seem to count for much. (Ø)

President Roh: The phenomenon is ubiquitous in Korea and elsewhere. They see the trees well but not the bush. I am referring to George Bush! (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: That is a good 15X point. (U)

You should be very proud of your achievements. The trip you are about to take to China is a historical development and the President wanted me to congratulate you on your success. (U)

President Roh: The normalization of the Korea-China relationship owes a great deal to President Bush. I will visit Beijing on the 27th. I invite your comments and any message from President Bush. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: Yes, the President would like you to convey a message. Our decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan has caused concern in China. It would help if you convey your conviction that we intend no change in our policy to China. We maintain the policy the same as all these difficult years since Tienanmen Square. The President will fight for MFN and he hopes to be able to improve the U.S.-China relationship in his next term. (Ø)

President Roh: I will try my best to explain the situation to the Chinese, including the F-16s. Perhaps Beijing misunderstands, but as far as I know it is a promise made in the early 1980s and the U.S. is carrying it out. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: That is exactly right. We have heard the Chinese are wondering if this is a new U.S. policy. Hearing that it is not a new policy, from you -- the President's good friend and one of our closest allies -- will be useful. We would hope they would not do anything foolish in response. (Ø)

President Roh: I will be very pleased to deliver the message to China. (U)

I have a question regarding the North Korean nuclear device. We hear that some sectors in the U.S. want ROK flexibility. But we think it makes more sense to keep balance and have slight flexibility in the number of inspections (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: The President still is concerned about the North and about its intentions, especially regarding its nuclear program. And he thinks it is important that you insist on bilateral inspections and not rely simply on IAEA. North Korea may have changed dramatically, but we should not run a risk, so the President hopes you will stay on course. (S)

President Roh: Of course, we are strictly following the principle of mutual bilateral inspections, but in the process perhaps carrots and sticks would be useful. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: I think that would be appropriate. How do you feel about the relationship? (S)

President Roh: I would not be too hopeful about the future of bilateral inspections, but the possibility has increased from before. As I understand, North Korea wants to improve relations with Japan and the U.S., but they are debating how to proceed. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: We are holding back and letting you take the lead and set the pace for improvements in relations. (S)

President Roh: Thank you very much for your comments. (U)

President Yeltsin is coming in November. I have a question about why he did not go to Japan and I welcome any comments. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: I think what happened was very strong Japanese statements before the planned visit put President Yeltsin in a difficult situation. He may have thought he could return the islands through some formula but his domestic situation did not permit it. So he cancelled rather than have a failed visit. (S)

President Roh: I agree. (U)

Brent Scowcroft: I think the fact that he wants to come to see you anyway is a sign to the Japanese that they are a little too strong in their position and that they can wait. (S)

President Roh: The overriding task before us is success in the election campaign. I want President Bush to know that a lot of people around the world want him to win. He should have confidence and courage. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: He will take great comfort in your friendship and your message. (S)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
President of United Mexican States (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of
State
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Charles A. Gillespie, Jr., Special Assistant
to the President for National Security
Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0062-F
JL 2/25/09

Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of
United Mexican States
Fernando Solana Morales, Secretary of Foreign
Relations
Jaime Jose Serra Puche, Secretary of Commerce
& Industrial Development
Arsenio Farell Cubillas, Secretary of Labor &
Social Welfare
Luis Donald Colosio Murrieta, Secretary of
Social Development
Jose Cordoba Montoyo, Chief of Staff to
President Salinas
Gustavo Petricioli, Mexican Ambassador to the
United States
Andres Rozental, Under Secretary of Foreign
Relations

DATE, TIME October 7, 1992, 4:25 - 4:40pm CDT
AND PLACE: Plaza San Antonio Hotel, Victoria House, San
Antonio, Texas

The President: Well, we can get started. First let me just
mention NAFTA again, and then I'd like to hear your ideas. (U)

Well, today's events really say it all. I repeat what I said in
our larger meeting: I am going to push hard to put NAFTA into
effect. I can't touch it until December 17, but then I will
promptly sign it. I'm confident we'll win and I believe NAFTA
has enough steam behind it to make it happen. The environmental
provisions are in good shape and we can handle any criticism

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there. I see no downside where GATT is concerned. The NAFTA is in good shape and I'm optimistic. (Ø)

I would like to hear your assessment of the bilateral situation and the floor is yours. (U)

President Salinas: Mr. President, I want to thank you again for your determination and political will. Now, about signing the Agreement. Your date is December 17. We will be ready. I understand you need implementing legislation and there will be ninety days after you sign the agreement to enact it. We must also go through a legislative process. (Ø)

The President: Do you have any constraints? (Ø)

President Salinas: Not political constraints, but there are other important factors. I believe it would be very good for us to sign the Agreement in December. December 17 is a Thursday. (Ø)

The President: Are you thinking of a joint signing? Brent (Scowcroft), what do you think? (U)

General Scowcroft: Well, we haven't really addressed that. (U)

President Salinas: Yes, we are thinking of a joint signing. It would be dynamic. I will need it with the business community and other interested groups. (Ø)

The President: Would the Canadians be there? (U)

Secretary Serra: We have discussed it with them and, yes, they would like to do it. (Ø)

The President: We want to sign it as soon as we can. (Ø)

President Salinas: Good. The rest of our bilateral relations are all right, except for the case of Dr. Alvarez Machain. That is something that deeply affects Mexican public opinion. (Ø)

The President: Do you mean that case is still having an effect? (Ø)

President Salinas: Yes, it is. We know, for example, that your Federal prosecutors are assembling lists of Mexican witnesses, Mexican government people, also including candidates for office. That can hurt the relationship. I want to say that the return of Alvarez Machain to Mexico is very important. Let me leave with you an aide memoire on this and maybe we can talk again in December about his return. (Ø)

The President: All right. Meantime there will be a trial and that will raise the matter again. I had hoped that my letter to you would serve to put this to rest. (Ø)

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President Salinas: Yes, it was helpful, but there is still a serious problem. (Ø)

The President: My hands are tied under our law as to what I can do right now. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: At New York I told Foreign Secretary Solana that we could start talking in December. (Ø)

The President: The situation in El Salvador is on our minds. I know you've been working on that. (Ø)

Secretary Solana: Yes, we are working. Things are going well. We are working on it, we will be there. We will continue working together as part of the "Four Friends" (of the UN Secretary General) and with the United States. Your efforts have been especially useful. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: Mr. President, I know you're going to see the Secretary General tomorrow. It will be helpful if you tell Boutros Ghali that we are all working on the problem and that the United Nations should continue to press the FMLN and support President Cristiani. (Ø)

President Salinas: We will. (U)

The President: Do you have any new thoughts on Fidel Castro? Is there any word on the Russian brigade? (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: The brigade is not out, but it's on the way out. (Ø)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: It may be out in about six months. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: The Russians just told the Cubans they were going and that was that. (Ø)

President Salinas: We have not really heard very much. (Ø)

The President: I don't know if Castro can survive the worldwide trend. There may be strife when change comes, but Cuba has the capacity for rapid adjustment. It's really a rich country, with strong people. (Ø)

President Salinas: You're right. And Mexican businessmen are very interested in Cuba. (Ø)

The President: I guess Aldana, a high ranking official, was trying to ease things -- said "let's lighten up" and now he's out. We are worried about (Nicaraguan President) Violeta (Barrios de Chamorro). She has serious economic problems and she's being whipsawed between Cesar (National Assembly) and the Sandinistas. I don't feel comfortable about that situation. (Ø)

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Assistant Secretary Aronson: She risks being isolated, and the situation is polarized. (Ø)

The President: She has a lot of confidence in Antonio Lacayo. (Ø)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: He's her son-in-law. (U)

President Salinas: We still find her committed to democracy, freedom and human rights. The irony would be that if friends don't help she could become desperate and lean to the wrong side: to the Sandinistas. Or she might just quit. (Ø)

The President: Our position is to get funds released so that she can meet her obligations. The situation worries me. I don't want to see her weakened. (Ø)

President Salinas: I hope you can give her support. We will help, too. (Ø)

Secretary Serra: I would like to raise the tuna issue we've been talking about for some time. The bill that your House sent to the Senate contains broad embargo language that would affect shrimp and other species. That's a problem, because we've been working toward an agreement. The House bill went beyond our exchange of letters. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: Well, if the legislation is in the Senate it may never pass. (Ø)

Secretary Serra: We would like to make sure the substance is right. We'll send you a letter. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: Yes, do. I'll look at it immediately. (U)

Ambassador Negroponte: The point is that the Mexican government has gone the extra mile. To broaden the sanctions now, to move from tuna to shrimp and other species, is the real problem. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: Well, the Senate is only considering three items and this is not one of them. (Ø)

President Salinas: This is a complicated new world that we live in. (U)

The President: It certainly is, but we are doing all right. This has been a good meeting and a pleasure. Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada [FOIA exemptions redacted] (3 pp.)	10/7/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/9/92 - 12/22/92

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SCS on 10/15/14

Date Closed: 1/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91110-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0698-MR (510)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 9/30/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



7717

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter Teeley, U.S. Ambassador to Canada
Thomas M. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Eric Melby, Senior Director for International Economic Affairs, NSC

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the United States
Michael Wilson, Trade Minister
Gilles Loisel, President of the Treasury Board
Donald Campbell, Deputy Minister of International Trade and External Affairs
James Judd, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Foreign and Defense Policy

DATE, TIME: October 7, 1992, 4:40 p.m.-5:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Plaza de San Antonio Hotel, San Antonio, Texas

The President: Thank you for coming all this way. I am very comfortable with the overall relationship. I am sure we have some trade matters but otherwise things are fine. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The inter-agency Howe Group at the NSC is good news for us. Thank you for setting it up. I thought I might have to bend your ear on lumber. But I understand Derek and Brent are working on it and so it may be in hand. (U)

Steel is a looming problem. But Derek is working with Brent and Larry on it. (U)

I want to raise another issue. Jim Bolger of New Zealand, whom I saw recently, wants a Security Council seat. He is looking for a way to get back with the U.S. He is embarrassed by the actions of his predecessor. (U)

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PER E.O. 13526

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The President: With our policy on nuclear weapons, why does he still have a problem? (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He is a good fellow; he likes you. I said I would raise the issue with you. (C)

The President: What's our policy? (C)

James Baker: I broke the mold by seeing him. The security people were quite upset. (C)

The President: Brent, let's take a look at this. (C)

Lawrence Eagleburger: New Zealand is trying hard. There are three candidates for Security Council seats -- Sweden, Spain and New Zealand. We need to pick two out of three. Mr. President, as Acting Secretary I have already decided we should support New Zealand and Spain. (C)

The President: Brian, we will follow through on New Zealand. We have got a big China problem again. (C)

Michael Wilson: I was in Taiwan recently. The Chinese Ambassador in Ottawa wanted to know all about my trip. (C)

The President: China was pleased about our MFN decision. But it is threatening publicly on the F-16 sales. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

James Baker: Could Brent tell the Prime Minister the extent we have moved on the nuclear issue? (C)

Brent Scowcroft: As a matter of policy our nuclear ships won't carry tactical nuclear weapons. Only submarines will. But we still won't say which ships carry nuclear weapons. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If you don't mind, I'll follow through with Bolger as a courtesy. (C)

The President: Fine... (U)

Lawrence Eagleburger: We cannot undercut Australia. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Bolger could be the president of a Chamber of Commerce in the U.S. The attitude is changing in New Zealand. We're trying to help him in the Commonwealth and Francophonie. (C)

I know you also want to hear about the referendum in Canada. We're doing OK. The referendum is non-binding, only advisory. We have a unanimous agreement representing ten premiers and the Prime Minister. It is a generous, balanced approach. A lot of people don't like it -- some don't like the French, Jews or Indians. (C)

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We took a hit from Bourassa. Let me tell you something. We struck the deal on August 28. I told the premiers to be careful because the press was picking up cellular phone conversations with scanners. Bourassa's legal adviser called an aide in Quebec from his hotel room. He told her that Quebec had lost, that Bourassa had sold out. All this was picked up by a journalist and reported. Someone then hired two actors to read the transcript on the radio -- the only legal way to do it. It has caused a firestorm. (C)

But I think we can win. (U)

The President: What do you think will happen? (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We will get a majority in Canada. But we need a majority plus one in each province. If Quebec votes no, there will have to be a direct confrontation in the Quebec legislature. Yes or no. British Columbia and Alberta will be the toughest. The polls show that we are tied nationally at 42-42. We are behind in BC, Alberta and Quebec where the undecided are at 42%. (C)

Let me say one word on your debates. I won in '84 in space of 37 seconds during a debate. In '88 I almost lost the election during the debates. You need a series of lines to get out no matter what. Regardless of what the question is, get your message out. You've got to cut, cut, cut. And when he's down, stomp on him. (C)

The President: That's hardly Presidential! I gather you've got a meeting with Salinas now. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8500

November 23, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: JANE E. HOLD ~~X~~

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister
Mitsotakis of Greece on November 17, 1992

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Mitsotakis of Greece on November 17, 1992.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memcon

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By 91 NARA, Date 7/4/10

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8500

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis of Greece (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Jane E. Holl, Director for European Affairs, NSC
Katherine X. Stewart, Interpreter

Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister
Andreas Andrianopoulos, Minister of State
Dora Bakoyanni, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister
Christos Zacharakis, Ambassador of Greece
Loucas Tsilas, Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister
Anna Kirtsou, Interpreter

DATE, TIME November 17, 1992, 2:00-2:45pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0698-MR

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The President: I want to welcome my old friend Constantine Mitsotakis to the White House and say how much I admire and respect him. I have so enjoyed our dealings together. I am sorry that we were not able to progress further on Cyprus. I know how hard you have tried. We all got our hopes up. But be assured, nobody will give up. (Ø)

I had a chance to discuss some of the details of your lunchtime conversation with Secretary Eagleburger and General Scowcroft. But I am glad to have the chance to tell you Mr. Prime Minister how much I value our friendship -- even though issues have not always gone your way, but we have always had frank talks. (Ø)

We'll be here another two months. It's a long interregnum, and while this may be the last time we meet officially, I hope that in a private capacity, you will come back for a visit. The door is open at the Bush estate. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mitsotakis: First off, I want to thank you Mr. President, for all you did for Greece and Greek-American relations. I also really appreciate our personal contact and friendship. You managed to bring relations between our two countries to a level we wanted -- this is very important. Definitely the atmosphere is much improved since you took office.
(Ø)

I would also like to add our appreciation for your efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute. In politics, not everything is feasible. No doubt that useful steps were taken on this issue. I reviewed this with Secretary Eagleburger. We agreed that our objectives to settle Cyprus is a determined and constant one. Despite present failures -- due to Denktash and the Turkish side -- all hope has not vanished. On the contrary. Even this phase contributed something positive. We'll continue this effort into next March as you, Mr. President, have traced out. As I told Secretary Eagleburger, we need a strong, fair solution. We should not allow domestic events in Cyprus or in Greek-Turkish relations to affect that. (Ø)

The President: No, I know that the meeting in New York did not go well, but all is not lost. Is there anything else you would like to see us do? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Continue to give your support to a positive message through the coming UN resolution -- it's working. I think Secretary Eagleburger and President Vassiliou have talked and more or less agree on its elements. You know Cyprus goes for its elections in a few weeks, in January. (Ø)

The President: How will that go? Is Vassiliou popular? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Vassiliou has good chances. However, much depends on the UN resolution. Not just for Vassiliou, but also for the Cypriot population as well. (Ø)

The President: Who's the main opponent? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Clerides. He is a serious and responsible man. I hope developments in Cyprus will be positive.
(Ø)

The President: Well let me assure you that we will continue to stay involved. (Ø)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We can get a good resolution. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: You know how important Turkey is to us. But Cyprus must be settled. (Ø)

The President: We have told that to the Turks over and over again. But I think it's hard for them to stand up to Denktash.
(Ø)

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Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We believe even he realizes a settlement must come, but he's not ready to pay the political price. But we cannot allow internal developments in Turkey to affect the possibility for settlement. Demirel appears pretty stable. (Ø)

The President: We have had good relations with Turkey. They have been pleasant to work with in many ways. We'll continue to try on Cyprus. I don't see any radical shift on U.S. policy after the transition. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I also talked about Yugoslavia with Secretary Eagleburger and General Scowcroft at Lunch. (Ø)

The President: I want to hear your views. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: As I told Secretary Eagleburger, the situation is critical. My country, and me personally, are ready to help find a solution to this difficult situation. We want to place our traditionally good relations with Serbia in the service of the common effort. We're ready to take up any action you would like -- influence the Serbs to open roads, etc. (Ø)

The President: We encourage you to use your influence. We have tried. We're very worried about the situation. It is really terrible, especially for the children. Many people are encouraging me to use all kinds of military force. But I'll be damned if I'll send one American kid into a situation that is unclear and where we can't win. The humanitarian situation is our greatest concern. These are historic rivalries. Greece can't solve them; the U.S. can't solve them. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The war in Bosnia won't end soon. (Ø)

The President: Everybody hates each other so much. It's bad enough in American politics. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: In Kosovo, a very important effort should be displayed to prevent spillover. (Ø)

The President: It's like a boiling pot. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The most important thing in the whole affair is to have frontiers respected. External and internal frontiers. The solution in Kosovo could be an advanced state of autonomy without going as far as self-determination. We think the Albanians are beginning to understand this. A way should be found to the Serbs and Albanians to reach an understanding. (Ø)

The President: You are absolutely right. You may be in a better place to help this happen. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: An issue most close to our Greek hearts is the one of Skopje/Macedonia. We will be discussing this in Edinburgh. (Ø)

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The President: Are you optimistic? We have a lot of hope. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I'll make no forecasts. What I tried to explain to Secretary Eagleburger and General Scowcroft is that our approach is a positive one. We want this republic to exist and we have taken several initiatives in this sense. For one, there is the border guarantees. Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia all made this declaration. What we cannot accept is their official name to include the term Macedonia. (Ø)

I'll be very frank. If something like that were to happen, there will be real destabilization. But this issue can be settled now as a starting point for a positive approach. So far with Yugoslavia we have had a lot of failures, why not success for once? The inclusion of Macedonia in their official name is desired by less than 50% of the people. A recent poll there resulted in no more than 17% of the population wanting that name. (Ø)

The President: Then why does the administration of Macedonia get so hung up on the name? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: There is something behind it, from the period under communism. It is not easy for the present administration to release from old habits. Democracy in this area will be an exaggeration. The old line communists under Tito still hold power. But Gligorov is a serious man. A deal could be reached with him. This is why the solution like we have suggested is a good formula. (Ø)

The President: I'll make a statement, and I would like you to tell me what's wrong with it. But first, I do want to say that I value our relations. Every American knows that our relations are far, far better. (Ø)

But my statement is this: This Republic has gone about the achieving of its democracy and status in accord with Helsinki principles. It has proceeded and conducted itself in an almost exemplary way. So I'm saying two things: They've observed Helsinki Accords and their performance has been exemplary. Do you agree with those points, or do Greeks see things differently? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I would not agree that they are an exemplary democracy. But it is a republic we could tolerate. (Ø)

The President: No, I'm not saying an exemplary democracy, but rather that they have pursued it in an exemplary way. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I agree. Yes. This is precisely why we have no problems with this republic and we want it to exist. But we can't accept the name. After Lisbon -- which justified us -- the reaction of Gligorov has been to provoke Greece. This republic was set up by Tito and Stalin after WWII in order to

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United States; my generation remembers it. But the people in power in Skopje are the same -- when they use this name, we become very suspicious. We want them to stop using this term and implying they have claims on us. Even in their constitution they have provision for nationals abroad, including in Greece. This is why we make the single request that they chose another name. We cannot accept this -- any Greek government could not. Otherwise we would be destabilized. (Ø)

The President: I wanted to be sure, there's nothing else that would cause you problems. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Another problem I ask for U.S. to help to prevent the admission of this country in the UN because if they are admitted, this discussion is valueless. (Ø)

The President: But if you have no problem with the name, it can go ahead. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I ask if you can help postpone. (Ø)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We'll see what we can do. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is very important. It would be a tragedy. I can't afford it. I don't exaggerate, I try to compromise. But if this happens this would be a tragedy for Greece and for me. (Ø)

The President: Is there any division of opinion on this at home in Greece? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: No. It is the only issue where Papandreou and my ex-Foreign Minister Samaras and I agree. (Ø)

The President: We want to try to be helpful, maybe we can help delay. (Ø)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: It won't be coming up before Edinburgh. If a solution is found, there will be no problem. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is very important for us to delay during interim period. (Ø)

The President: When is the next big Greek political event? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I don't know. Normally, May 1994. But our economy is not doing well. (Ø)

The President: Not you, not us -- we all ought to be Chinese -- their economy is growing at 9% and here we are struggling. Germany, everybody is having trouble. Part of my demise was everybody thought we were worse off than everybody else. (Ø)

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Germany, everybody is having trouble. Part of my demise was everybody thought we were worse off than everybody else. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We are going through a graceless period, we have to take very tough measures for our economy. (Ø)

The President: Well, let us see where we can help. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I really count on you Mr. President. (Ø)

The President: Tell me, how long is the antiquities exhibit? (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Until March. (U)

The President: I hope to get to see it. (U)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Let me tell you again, to please come to Greece. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8674

November 27, 1992



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

THROUGH: CHARLES A. GILLESPIE, JR. *[Signature]*
FROM: ROBERT B. MORLEY *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of
Venezuela on November 27, 1992

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and President Carlos Andres Perez of
Venezuela on November 27, 1992.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 11/29/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MK
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela on November 27, 1992 (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
Interpreter: Patricia Arizo
Notetaker: Robert B. Morley

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 27, 1992, 9:05 - 9:10am EST
Kennebunkport

The President: CAP? (U)

President Perez: My dear Mr. President, it is so good to hear from you. (U)

The President: I am concerned about the news from Venezuela this morning. I wanted to call you and reassure you of our support for you and democracy in Venezuela. But first, how are things going? (Ø)

President Perez: Thank you so much, my friend, for your call. This is one side effect from the February 4 coup. This shows that there are links between the military and extremist groups. The situation now is under control. They took control of two military installations, one of which is El Libertador Air Force Base in Maracay. Some pilots took off in Broncos from El Libertador, and are flying over the city shooting from the air. The military garrisons have remained loyal. Tanks are attacking the air force base. The people who acted this time are not those who acted before, and we had doubts about some of them. (Ø)

The Armed Forces are loyal. We hope to have the situation completely under control within the next hour. I thank you again for your call and want to repeat my condolences on the death of your mother. (Ø)

The President: Oh, thank you for that. She had a good life, and I know that if anyone deserved to go to heaven, she did. (U)

We will put out a strong statement in support of Venezuelan democracy and you if you think that would be helpful. (Ø)

President Perez: That's fine. That would be good. You can never do too much in a situation like this. Many thanks. (Ø)

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The President: Thanks and good luck. We will be thinking of you. You are a good person and a leader of democracy. (U)

President Perez: Thank you. And a good abbraccio for you. (U)

The President: Keep in touch, if there is any way we can help. (U)

President Perez: I will do that. Thanks and good-bye. (U)

The President: So long. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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DECEMBER

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MR
JC 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Saud Nasir Al-Sabah
of Kuwait (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director, Near East
and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Ambassador to
the United States

DATE, TIME December 17, 1992; 9:30 - 9:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: We wish you well. I am hopeful the new Administration will have the same conviction we have had to stand firm versus Saddam Hussein. We don't trust him. I haven't changed my view at all. It will be important for your Government to establish contact with the new Administration. I can't see anything that suggests they will shift U.S. policy. I can't conceive they will make up with Saddam so long as he violates UN resolutions. It would be criminal to shift and I see no evidence they will but it will be critical for you to work closely with them. Brent, Have you seen any indication of a change? (Ø)

General Scowcroft: No, but we have had no real indication of their thinking. (U)

Ambassador Al-Sabah: It is a source of concern with us. We can see the Iraqis courting the new Administration. There was Tariq Aziz's meeting with the Security Council. This is all a major concern to us in the region. We are trying to understand the direction of the new Administration. (Ø)

The President: I don't think they are far along in their thinking. (Ø)

James Baker: It would be a real surprise if they changed policy. (Ø)

Ambassador Al-Sabah: We are concerned about not simply Saddam but with the alarming escalation of the Iranian threat. (Ø)

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The President: As you know we tried to bring Saddam along in order to contain Iran. What do you see happening between Iran and Iraq? (Ø)

Ambassador Al-Sabah: I don't see any closeness yet but the future is unclear. (Ø)

The President: Is Saddam saying publicly that the Iraqi-Kuwait border deal is a non-starter? (Ø)

Ambassador Al-Sabah: He says the border that has been drawn up reflects the desires of the U.S. and "colonial" powers. He refuses to accept the findings of the Border Commission. He has refused to cooperate with it all along. The problem, though, is not so much the borders but their intentions, which remain bad. Even if they recognize the border today tomorrow they could tear up any pact. We have been trying to work with the opposition but none seems viable. (Ø)

The President: They are scattered around. (Ø)

Ambassador: They refused to take a stance on the border question. (Ø)

The President: We wish you well. You have been a wonderful Ambassador and you have made a lot of friends. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Lebanese Delegation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of
State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning
Staff
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director, Near East
and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Ambassador Souheil Chammas, Head of
Delegation
Ambassador Jaafar Moawi
Ambassador Simon Karam, Lebanese Ambassador
to the United States

DATE, TIME December 17, 1992, 10:00 - 10:15 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Our position on deportations has not changed. We oppose them. There is some hope the court will throw it out, which would be a positive step. I'd love to know what you think can be done about the violence. Deportations are no answer and we will continue to oppose them, but violence is a real problem.
(P)

Ambassador Chammas: For reasons beyond your control, there are events which have slowed the peace process. There are people in the territories who could have been contained if the pace of negotiations had been quicker. There is a Palestinian impatience. Maybe the Israelis made a mistake by seeing Hamas as a counter weight. But fundamentalism brings its own dynamic. It cannot be checked. The Israelis must show patience and avoid deportation which will only increase support for Hamas and other radicals. The demographic explosion in Gaza is also feeding this.
(P)

The President: We understand your concern. We weighed in with Israel. I can't say I differ with your interpretation. But any thoughts you have on containing violence would be helpful.
(P)

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Ambassador Chammas: I can't claim to be an expert but the key is to safeguard the peace process. Whatever happens in the territories cannot be allowed to endanger the process. I suggest you talk to the experts on just how to go about this. Take Lebanon. We have a large segment that is active and opposed to the peace process. We decided to act to check them. We are re-equipping our army. We tried to contain them by working around them. Here we have been helped by the U.S Administration. (Ø)

President Hrawi asked that I convey our deepest appreciation and gratitude for your continued support as President for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and for your role in bringing about the Taif agreement. Taif is the only basis for national reconciliation. Now we have in place a business-like government. Second, I want to express appreciation for your letter supporting the Harawi government. Third, our commitment to the peace process is total and undivided. We shall spare no effort in bringing under control those opposed to it. Now that we have an operating government we will take the necessary actions for peace, security and tranquility. We will be happy to talk to the Israelis about their serious security concerns in northern Israel, but we cannot talk about security matters related to the security zone. We will accept their use of the word "redeployment." The timing is not key; they can accommodate themselves. But we have a real conviction that the peace process must succeed. There is no alternative. History will speak of President Bush; yours was the most important contribution in centuries and Mr. Baker has been a great help. (Ø)

The President: We salute you. What you said was most appropriate. Having been in Lebanon it would be wonderful to contribute to a return of its harmony and diversity. I have real affection for the people. I will leave office with some regret over what we could not finish but also with pride from what we did accomplish. Lebanon deserves to control its own destiny. I am glad we could contribute to that kind of Lebanon. I hope our successors will have the drive to continue all this. I think that they will. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Syrian Delegation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of
State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director, Near East
and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Mowaffak Allaf, Head of Delegation
Mohamad Zakaria Ismail
Dia-Allah El-Fattal
Walid Al-Moualem, Syrian Ambassador to the
United States

DATE, TIME December 17, 1992, 10:20 - 10:35 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: We will make a statement after all the meetings covering deportations. I hope you all know that we do not approve. We are not changing our position. We have weighed in with the Israeli government and hope the legal process there will prevent the deportations. I can understand your agony. All this doesn't help the peace process. I hope and pray you will stay involved. I am worried about the violence. Unprovoked violence is affecting all Israelis. I don't know how we can make our position any more clear. What are your views? (Ø)

Mr. Allaf: The violence is not helping at all. Violence only breeds more violence. The occupation is key as are the practices of the occupying power. Palestinians are wounded or killed every day. This is also violence. People see no progress in the peace process; thirteen months after Madrid we are still nearly at square one. On the Syrian track we showed our readiness by tabling our document. Yesterday Rabinovich said only that Israel would "introduce the element of withdrawal" as part of a full peace treaty. This is not serious in light of all that Syria has committed to. (Ø)

The President: Do you think the violence that leads to deportation is stirred up by those opposed to the peace process? (Ø)

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Mr. Allaf: What I am sure of is that violence will only create more violence. Also these people should not be kept in these buses until a decision is made. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: Was the treatment of these people touched in on our message to the Israelis? (Ø)

Ambassador Djerejian: No. We didn't know. (U)

The President: When is the Israeli court scheduled to decide? (U)

Dennis Ross: We don't know. I have a question for Ambassador Allaf. You say deportation is not the answer, but what is? (Ø)

Mr. Allaf: Ending the occupation is the best way but for now we need to reverse this. This will only hurt those Palestinians who favor the peace process. But this is only one aspect of what is going on. On the Lebanese track there is no progress given Israeli intransigence. President Assad made an important statement a few days ago. Our patience cannot last forever. We are basing all of our hopes on U.S. efforts. The peace process should not become a repetition of those international conferences where the parties only attack each other. We have agreed to certain ground rules on the understanding that the land for peace principle would be applied by Israel. But is not clear that the new Israeli government is really different from the Shamir government other than its style. (Ø)

The President: Do we agree with such a negative assessment? (Ø)

Ambassador Djerejian: We think the glass is "filling" and that the Syrian-Israeli negotiation is one of the most serious. Extensive discussions have taken place. A big part of the focus is on paragraph 5 and land for peace. Syria demands total withdrawal while Israel demands to hear more of what Syria is thinking about peace and security. (Ø)

Mr. Allaf: I don't want to disagree with my good friend Ambassador Djerejian. (Ø)

The President: Ed deserves credit. He has helped me understand his views. (Ø)

Mr. Allaf: We have done more than demand full withdrawal. We have discussed security guarantees. We have also said we will join the multilateral talks once the core issues were resolved. We hope your efforts will succeed. (Ø)

The President: We will keep trying up to January 20th. Please pass along my best wishes to President Assad. I will miss being involved in this. (Ø)

Mr. Allaf: We hope you will stay involved. (U)

The President: You are kind to say so. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jordanian/Palestinian
Delegations (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of
State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director, Near East
and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Jordanian

Dr. abd al-Salam Majali, Head of Delegation
Lieutenant General Abd al-Hafiz Marai
Dr. Marwan Muasher
Dr. Fayiz Tarawnah

Palestinian

Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi, Head of Delegation
Dr. Saib Arigat
Ghassan al-Khatib
Saud al-Amiri

DATE, TIME December 17, 1992, 10:40 - 11:00 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: We are concerned about the deportations. I hope everyone understands our policy. We have weighed in with Israel. I hope their courts will invalidate their decision. We are concerned also about violence and how it should be coped with. We do not think deportations are the right way. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: Violence is creating violence. But incidents of this kind are creating too strong of a reaction from Israel, which is a state. It must control itself. The real answer is to end the occupation. Once the negotiations show real potential the violence will go down. (Ø)

Dr. Shafi: We accord Palestinians the right to combat the occupation, including the use of force. But we condemn cold-blooded killing. But Israeli are killing Palestinians in cold blood. Death squads are active. All violence is linked to the

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occupation. There is a vicious circle as long as there is no peace. Hence the importance of progress. Deportations -- especially mass deportations -- will not solve anything. They will only deepen the circle of violence. It is important for the peace process to move. This meeting offers an opportunity to appraise where we are. What we have is 13 months without progress. (Ø)

The President: I keep worrying that the extremes on both sides will want nothing done. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: We obviously share your distress at this development. I worry that those who are instigating violence are doing so with the express purpose of sabotaging the peace process. It is important not to play into their hands. You were right to say that violence leads to violence. We won't depart from our long standing opposition to deportations or violence. But despite the fact that the peace process might not have made as much progress as all had hoped, the peace process is the best hope. I hope it continues and expect the next Administration to continue. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: Deportations are not an answer. These people will only be retrained and come back. The Israelis are simply adding fuel to the fire. These people will also be violent in Lebanon. (Ø)

Dr. Shafi: Early this morning I was called by a Jewish friend from Israel. He said people were saying that the Palestinian delegation was supporting the deportations and asked me if that was true. I said certainly not and that were denouncing them as a violation of human rights regardless of who was affected. (Ø)

The President: Was this person against the deportations? (U)

Dr. Shafi: Yes. I would like to thank you for this meeting. It is necessary to appraise the past 13 months. You are the author and the initiator of the peace process. We followed closely what you said in Madrid about fairness, justice, Resolution 242 and land for peace. We remain committed to the peace process despite the hard constraints we accepted as the price for getting Shamir to join. Nevertheless, we remain committed and want to see progress. There has been a frustrating lack of progress after 13 months. 242 is explicit in the terms of reference. There is no ambiguity regarding withdrawal and the inadmissability of acquiring territory by force. The problem is Israel's having established facts illegally in the occupied territories. We agreed to an interim period to deal with the human reality. I am sorry to see that we Palestinians are often accused of posturing and procrastinating. This is unfair. The difficulty is that Israel wants to legitimize what it has done in the occupied territories. I don't think we will get anywhere unless pressure on Israelis is exercised. I understand there can be no imposed solution, but given the disparity between Israel and the Palestinians in military strength (although we are strong morally and politically) we need pressure. (Ø)

The President: We will be talking about what we can do to give the process a push. I am convinced the next Administration will want to remain involved in a fair and equitable way. Governor Clinton is committed to the process. I am unclear as to what any additional pressure or push should be. I hope we are clear, however, in our opposition to deportations. I am glad to be able to receive you in the White House. It is symbolic of our involvement and respect for those who have participated in the peace process. It is a way to say thank you. (2)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MK
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Israeli Delegation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Elyakim Rubinstein, Head of the Delegation
Uri Lubrani
Itamar Rabinovich
Eitan Bentsur
Zalman Shoval, Israeli Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME: December 17, 1992; 11:05 - 11:20 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Let me begin with deportations. I've sent a message to your government with our views and opposition. But just as important is that violence is not condoned. (Ø)

Ambassador Shoval: I want to join what Eli (Rubenstein) said before the cameras regarding our appreciation to you for your efforts. What you did was historic and important. Yes, there were some disagreements but what you did will go down in history. The peace process will go on. It is inevitable. Recent events show that what is happening in the negotiating room is not sufficient. There are forces who want to destroy the peace process and indeed Israel. It would help if the Palestinian representatives would be more forceful in condemning violence and their rejectionists. We will go on. There is a consensus. (Ø)

The President: It will be important for your successor to convey this to the new Administration. I detected in Governor Clinton an enthusiasm in continuing with our catalytic role. (Ø)

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Declassify on: OADR

Eli Rubinstein: I have a message from the Prime Minister. It is one of thanks for your contribution to the peace process. The slowness of the process does not detract from its historic nature. The problems in the negotiations derived from objective constraints, from the Arab tendency to tie everything to anything, and from waiting on changes here. I am sorry that there were not talks today. You must understand the nature of the fundamentalists and the opposition. The deportation decision taken by the government is not seen by us as contravening international law. In any case it is up to the courts. Remember that the deportation is temporary, only up to two years. We are determined to continue the negotiations despite this. (Ø)

As for the Jordan/Palestinian negotiations, I am glad the Madrid structure is continuing. With Jordan we are making slow, steady progress. We are trying to reach formal agreement on an agenda, which in fact is more than that. We are also meeting in various groups. With the Palestinians it is much tougher. We are working on an agenda but the main problem is a conceptual gap. They want an independent state with Jerusalem as the capital. This is their yard stick. We argue that the yard stick ought to be change from what we now have. What we are offering to them would be a great positive change. Also, it does not preclude anything when it comes to final status. Part of the problem is the way the Palestinians are bad mouthing what is offered. They are creating a public problem for themselves. (Ø)

Dennis Ross: We have told them several times that their public pessimism is counter productive. (Ø)

Chief of Staff Baker: Could you please explain what you mean when you say the deportations are up to two years. (Ø)

Ambassador Shoval: They can return in no later than 2 years unless they create new crimes. But they can appeal after 60 days. (Ø)

Uri Lubrani: On Lebanon it is most frustrating. It should be the easiest negotiations since we have no territorial aims, but we see no flexibility and no gap between Lebanon and Syria. They are totally subservient. It will require progress on the Syrian track first. They have no control over their own situation. We are trying to sustain a friendly atmosphere and show that we understand. (Ø)

Itamar Rabinovich: I have had the privilege to engage in tantalizing negotiations. We came close to a joint statement. These negotiations were transformed by the formation of a new Israeli government. There is a business like, almost friendly atmosphere. We have come a great distance from Madrid. On October 21st we introduced the element of withdrawal to be implemented as part of the peace treaty. They want early Israel commitment to full withdrawal. We will not do this. We need to hear more about peace. The Syrian concept about peace does not include full diplomatic relations; it is more of a non-

belligerency pact. This may be a negotiating tactic on their part. Two elements are missing. We need a change in the actual Syrian position on peace and we need improvement in the realm of public diplomacy and conduct. Actually, there has been some improvement in what Assad and (Foreign Minister) Shara have been saying. Assad's recent statement was his best yet. We are not asking for a visit to Jerusalem but we need clear public statements of intent. This will allow us to move. (Ø)

Eitan Bentsur: I want to join in expressing appreciation for your role as the initiator and facilitator of the peace process. Some fully believed it would ever be attainable. It is imperative that it continue. This is the only process with the promise of reconciliation. (Ø)

The President: We wish you well. We hope the deportation issue can get resolved satisfactory and does not become a road block. The meetings here today were dominated by this issue. It is important to keep the process going. It is the key for the Middle East and Israel. (Ø)

Eli Rubenstein: We look forward to continuing. It is important that people realize that hope lies with the negotiations and not with Hamas. But I feel that progress is being made. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-04-08
0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Abd Al-Salam Majali, Head of the Jordanian Peace Process Delegation (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State
Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning Staff
Richard Haass, NSC
Edmund J. Hull, NSC (Notetaker)

Dr. Abd Al-Salam Majali, Head of the Jordanian peace process delegation
Lieutenant General Abd Al-Hafiz Marai
Dr. Marwan Muasher
Dr. Fayiz Tarawnah

DATE, TIME December 17, 1992; 11:45 p.m. - 12:00 Noon
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President received Dr. Majali and his delegation for a separate meeting after having received the same group as part of the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. (U)

The President: I had a good visit yesterday with the King. We go back a long ways together. I realize that the Madrid formula gives Jordan a headache so I wanted to have this separate meeting to show our sensitivity to this. Through my personal contacts with a number of Jordan's ambassadors I have always felt a personal interest in Jordan. (U)

Dr. Majali: This presents an opportunity for you to meet Dr. Tarawnah who is our Ambassador-select to the United States. (U)

The President: I am just disappointed that he is coming in just as I am leaving. (U)

Dr. Tarawnah: I hope to come in quickly and that my agreement will move with speed. (U)

The President: Where does this stand? It has probably been here all of two hours and not moved? (in jest) Who's to blame? (U)
How are things in Jordan? (U)

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Declassify on: OADR

Dr. Majali: There is a continuing problem with ships being searched in the Gulf of Aqaba even those with certificates. Insurance premiums are high and that raises prices. The general economic situation is still difficult. This is particularly true for the civil service whose salaries have been cut by one third. Nevertheless there is a general feeling of progress. (Ø)

The President: Is the view there that we are being too tough on Iraq? (Ø)

Dr. Majali: Yes, for public opinion as a whole and now there is much more freedom of opinion. The problem is that they perceive others being hit very hard while the Palestinian problem goes without a solution. Still, there is a realization that something went wrong with the Kuwaiti business which caused the whole area to suffer and Jordan in particular. (Ø)

The President: There is no point in rehashing the Gulf War. My feeling is that relations have been better since. U.S.-Jordanian relations have an historic basis after all. In spite of our differences, we have wanted to be helpful. We have been ready to help, for example with the Saudis and other problems. (Ø)

As I leave office, I hope we have done what we could to put U.S.-Jordanian relations on a firm footing. This is not to deny that we had our differences. I recall in Maine we had some tough meetings. You could feel the tension. And, while we can't change our views on Saddam Hussein, we don't want to needlessly harm the Jordanian people. I think the new administration will see it the same way. I know it will support the peace process. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: There are still some outstanding issues, for example the \$35 million in aid. (Ø)

Mr. Djerejian: We have got FY 91 money released, and we are now working on FY 92 given the improvement in our relations. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: We understand there is a backlog. (Ø)

The President: We wanted to be clear in our earlier meeting that we disagree with Israel on the deportations. It creates a problem, and the timing is bad. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: We appreciate the chance to brief you on our track. We have good relations with the Israelis. We are doing good work on numerous subjects like water, energy, banking, and the economy. We hope next round that we can settle the language on the Agenda and get an agreement with Israel there. (Ø)

The President: I gather from King Hussein that your economy is doing well. (U)

Dr. Majali: Yes, much better than expected. We have good growth. (U)

The President: Do you have a problem with extremists in Jordan? Are they opposing your participation in the peace process? (Ø)

Dr. Majali: We have more than thirty in the parliament. They are not so much against peace as they are arguing that the peace process will go nowhere, that it is a waste of time. That's why I am pushing Israel so we can achieve more in the process and undercut them. I spoke to Eli (Rubenstein) about it. I told him to help the Palestinians. Otherwise, Hamas will gain ground. (Ø)

The 400 they deport to Lebanon will be received by Hizballah, feted and will come back even more dangerous. (Ø)

The President: Why are we hearing so much about Hamas now? (U)

Mr. Ross: They have been operating in Gaza for some time, but now they are getting support in the West Bank. (Ø)

Mr. Djerejian: They have been around since 1985. (U)

Mr. Haass: They are also getting more external support now. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: Even from Israel. (Ø)

Mr. Djerejian: In the sense that external funding to Fatah is being cut off. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: There is significant funding for Hamas from outside, including private Saudi money. (Ø)

Mr. Haass: Does Hamas get any help from Jordan? (U)

Dr. Majali: They have an office there, but it is under our control. There is no violence. They do have good communications with the West Bank. (Ø)

Dr. Tarawnah: The Muslim Brothers have a global network, of course. (Ø)

Dr. Majali: These deportations will be a big help to Hamas. (Ø)

The President: Well, I won't keep you longer, but I did want to have this chance to talk. Thank you for coming in. (U)

Dr. Majali: Thank you. You are one person who has shown that he can succeed where others failed. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Philip Johnston President of CARE

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Jonathan T. Howe, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Andrew Natsios, Assistant Administrator of AID for Humanitarian Assistance
John M. Ordway, Director, African Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Philip Johnston, President of CARE

DATE, TIME December 18, 1992, 9:35 - 9:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Mr. Johnston: You know, Mr. President, we met once before, in Sudan.

The President: I remember that. You know, that trip to Sudan is one of the reasons why we are doing what we are in Somalia. Barbara and I will never forget what we saw there during that trip.

Mr. Johnston: Mr. President, the step you have taken will go down in history as a landmark. It is very important.

I hope you will come to Somalia. Such a trip would show the whole world how strong this humanitarian intervention is.

The President: Two points.

First, I want to salute what you have done in the private eleemosynary sector. You are the key to success.

On my visiting Somalia, I have been thinking quietly about a visit. But you know how it is here, you can't do anything quietly.

I'm not sure it is the right thing to do. We would probably do it over New Year's and visit the troops who are away during the holidays. Also, we would do it because of what you are doing, and what we saw during that trip to the Sahel.

I am delighted with your enthusiasm for the mission. It is not without controversy, with some saying that the U.S. has expanded the horizons under which U.S. military forces are used. Hearings have started up on the hill, and some are saying that the President has started an open-ended commitment. But I am convinced we have done the right thing.

Mr. Johnson: You have, Mr. President. It is important that you set the tone. It is a question of human rights, and the prevention of premature death of hundreds of thousands of people. I salute you and the U.S. military.

The President: How is Bob Oakley doing? He was praising what you are doing.

Mr. Johnston: When I volunteered for this I had no idea what was involved. I am now the coordinator for all UN humanitarian activities in Somalia.

The President: Is Americares doing anything there?

Mr. Johnston: No, not that I know of.

The President: They would, if you want them to.

Mr. Johnston: This move has reinforced the connection between the military and humanitarian relief. There are lots of good solid things going on in Somalia.

The President: Do you see any downside for a visit by the President there? There is a downside here -- a lame duck trying to do something. But do you see a downside to a visit?

Mr. Johnston: No. I am very confident that everyone would support it in Somalia. There are only upsides.

Mr. Natsios: A CDC report came out four days ago which says that the death rate in Somalia is the worst anywhere in the world in 20 years. In Baidoa, for instance, 70 percent of the under-fives have died. The situation is worse than it was in Ethiopia.

The President: There is an argument against a big group sweeping in there with a big entourage that would disrupt relief activities.

Mr. Natsios: The relief activity will be in full swing by then.

Mr. Johnston: There will be so much activity going on that it would not divert it.

I bring you greeting from Cannes Weaver. He is working to fulfill Carla's dream.

The President: That's wonderful. She was very close to us.

Mr. Johnston: We have a CARE person on that plane, who was badly injured but who survived.

The President: When are you going back?

Mr. Johnston: On Sunday.

The President: Christmas in Somalia!

Mr. Johnston: Yes. It has not met with approval from my daughter.

The President: Where do you live there.

Mr. Johnston: In the CARE compound. It is very rugged.

I was medevaced. I had malaria, amoebic dysentery and an ulcerated digestive track. But I'm taking medicine and am much better.

It is a rather unhealthy environment. There are a lot of people suffering from dengue fever.

The President: We are proud of you and what you are doing. Thanks for stopping by.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0698-MR
3L 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prominent Palestinians

PARTICIPANTS: James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Dr. Faisal Hussein, Head of Delegation
Dr. Saib Arigat
Dr. Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi
Dr. Camille Mansour

DATE, TIME: December 18, 1992; 9:40 - 10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: Office of the Chief of Staff

Dr. Hussein: I hope the U.S. can help with the peace process and protect the Palestinians. We accepted certain conditions to get Shamir in and because we trusted the U.S. Now we want U.S. help to get out from under these conditions. The Rabin government is using these conditions despite the fact that several of his ministers object. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: I wouldn't anticipate the Israelis would change the Madrid rules. You would be making a serious mistake if you conditioned continuing participation in the peace process on changes in the ground rules. Those who are purveyors of violence and opposed to the peace process will win if the process suffers. Already we see a cycle leading to the deportations which we condemn. The new Administration is also committed to the peace process and Clinton condemned the deportations. The best way to get to the Jerusalem issue is via interim arrangements. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: No agreement is possible without Jerusalem. (Ø)

Baker: You are mixing apples and oranges. There can be progress on interim arrangements. Take those steps and end most of the occupation. If you are asking for a change in conditions first, it would be a big mistake. (Ø)

Dr. Hussein: We are asking the U.S. to strengthen our position -- for example, the way you are meeting with us today. (Ø)

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Dr. Ashrawi: I don't think there are any ground rules. They were simply compromises we accepted to get Israel in. I don't see why the U.S. should adopt them. There is no rule saying the U.S. cannot meet with a separate Palestinian delegation. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: As best as I can see, we are meeting with a separate Palestinian delegation right now. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: We wanted this yesterday. (U)

Mr. Baker: But we never departed from the Madrid rules. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: Now with hindsight and after more than one year, we should reassess. There are very serious flaws that have not been remedied. All we have is 14 months of negotiations and no progress. The situation on the ground is worse, and the U.S. role is diminishing. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: You are taking "a glass is all empty" approach, which is wrong. We have taken hard decisions to get to this point, and there has been progress in terms of what is on the table. You want to know where the road will end before you start down it. Maybe it's the Arab mentality. (Ø)

Dr. Arigat: Israelis do the same thing. (U)

Mr. Baker: Maybe it's the mentality of the region. You have a process. Don't lose it. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: What can we do to enhance it? (U)

Mr. Baker: It wouldn't hurt if when someone were murdered in cold blood, you could deplore and denounce it. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrai: We do this on all occasions. (U)

Mr. Baker: This makes it easier for us to speak out against Israeli excesses such as deportation. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: Regarding the new Administration, it will be important for you to commit yourselves to come back early. They need to decide what priority to give the peace process and will be looking for evidence that the Palestinians are serious. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: There are conditions surrounding the peace process. When we are delegitimized, it becomes impossible for us to come. Israel has legitimized Hamas. We need the U.S. to level the playing field. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: Second, with the Israelis it will be important to keep in mind a few things, i.e., that your view of the legislative function would not have the power to overturn the guidelines for self-government. (Ø)

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Dr. Arigat: We told the Israelis we are here to reach common ground, but what they are offering us is not practical. They have an over-restrictive approach. We need maximum strength in order to proceed to final status. But Rubinstein refuses to agree to significant changes. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: That's part of negotiating. It's not as if nothing has happened. You have a fast track. You're talking about land, water, human rights, elections. I remember fighting for the diaspora issue; now we've succeeded in the multilaterals. Don't say nothing has happened. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: We haven't succeeded in changing the conditions in which we live. This erodes the credibility of the peace process. Secondly, the Israelis have violated the terms by not meeting the one-year goal. Thirdly, there has to be arbitration and an effective U.S. role. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

(At this point, the party departed Mr. Baker's office for the Oval Office.)

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2009-0698-MR
JL 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prominent Palestinians (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of
State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East
and South Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Dr. Faisal Husseini, Head of Delegation
Dr. Saib Arigat
Dr. Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi
Dr. Camille Mansour

DATE, TIME December 18, 1992; 10:10 - 10:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I'd like to know your thinking. I'm officially a lame duck with a vow to cooperate with the new Administration. I'm most interested in all this and in your views. (U)

Dr. Husseini: Thank you. I have three points. The first concerns Jerusalem. The Israelis are still trying to neglect our rights saying that Jerusalem will not be negotiated. We can't accept such a thing. If we accepted unjust conditions, it was to bring Shamir to the table and because of our trust in the U.S. We want to re-insist on our position regarding people from Jerusalem in the peace process. We know Israelis say they won't sit with people from Jerusalem, but we would like to see U.S.-Palestinian meetings include Jerusalemites. I appreciated the Secretary of State writing me as the head of the Palestinian negotiating team. The matter of Jerusalem is so important. My grandfather and his father were Mayors of Jerusalem. Now I am a minority. We cannot accept this. This is critical. (C)

My second point is regarding the PLO. You say you don't have any intention to divide us. But no relations with the PLO will not help the peace process, especially when Israel has an attitude that helps those who oppose the process. The deportations give Hamas legitimacy inside the occupied territories. Sending 400 Hamas people to Lebanon can change the balance of power inside Lebanon against us also. We're in need of stopping deportations and steps from the U.S. to deal with the PLO and help us versus Israel. (C)

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Third is deportations. The danger is not limited to the occupied territory or to our community. It could affect Lebanon and other states. It could strengthen fundamentalists around the Middle East. (Ø)

The President: I'd like to ask a question. Of the 400, what is the makeup? (U)

Dr. Ahsrawi: They arrested 1400 in two days and chose 400. These were not people languishing in jail. They were mainly men in their twenties and thirties. (U)

The President: I had had the sense that they were out of jails. (U)

Dr. Ashrawi: The Israelis deported them before they had a legal basis for doing so, even under their own law. But the most important aspect is that they dealt a serious blow to the peace process. (Ø)

Dr. Husseini: The deportations will affect the situation in Lebanon and increase the access of Hamas to Syria and Jordan. All this could change the political reality in the area. (Ø)

The President: Let me ask a different question. I have thought about why Rabin did this. What would you say he should do about the violence? You've got differences with Rabin but less than with the previous government. But how does he protect himself politically? (Ø)

Dr. Ahsrawi: He should work on human rights in the occupied territories. (Ø)

The President: But in the face of the killings? (U)

Dr. Ashrawi: He must deal with the real causes including the peace process and occupation. There is a double standard here. There is no parallel outrage with the undercover squads. The only real way to end the violence is to end the occupation. They can deal with any individual in court, but they cannot punish the whole people. (Ø)

Dr. Arigat: They've been deporting, demolishing, and fighting for 25 years. All have failed. Only engagement in the peace process can break the vicious circle. We are engaging despite the fact that Palestinians are getting killed. Only the moderates will be victimized by deportations. He (Rabin) is giving credibility to Hamas. (Ø)

Dr. Hussein: He (Rabin) is losing credibility. The confidence-building measures are not much. Releasing 800 prisoners is no big deal if they were due to be released. It doesn't give me anything to work with. Second, the undercover forces are killing Palestinians. This is increasing radicalism and violence. Rabin must respect human rights, release real prisoners and stop the deportations to give the peace process a chance. It would make a big change and give me a weapon to use with my people. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: It won't be productive to try to change the Madrid ground rules. An opportunity exists to accomplish something positive for Palestinians. They will be the ones to benefit most from the peace process. Even though the progress has not reached the point they hoped for, the glass is not empty. Things have been accomplished. Rhetoric is important. Be careful not to say "the peace process is destroyed." Keep the moral high ground. There are instances of excesses of the occupation, and these are reflected in the State Department human rights report. The new Administration will want to deal with all this, but you cannot focus on final status until you focus first on interim arrangements. (Ø)

Dr. Ashrawi: We are focusing on the transitional phase. We want to activate the peace process. We need a real assessment. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: There will be ways found to give vitality to the peace process. I think it would be helpful if you would talk more about progress that has been made as counter to Hamas. Second, it would be helpful to criticize violence. (Ø)

Dr. Arigat: The fate of the 418 people has created a state of chaos in the security zone. (Ø)

Dr. Haass: Don't condition participation in the peace process on a successful resolution of the deportation issue. You may not get it despite our efforts and you will not want to jeopardize your larger interests. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: What Richard is saying is don't put yourself in a box. (U)

Dr. Ashrawi: We need credibility with the people. (U)

The President: I thought you made the best point on that. The key is the peace process. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
22. Memcon	Re: Meeting with British Prime Minister and current European Council President John Major and European Commission President Jacques Delors (12 pp.)	12/18/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 7/9/92 - 12/22/92

Date Closed: 1/30/2009	OA/ID Number: 91110-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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31 11/14/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Central European Foreign Ministers

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Secretary of State
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Jane E. Holl, Director, European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC

Dr. Alois Mock, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Friedrich Hoess, Ambassador of Austria
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kazimierz Dzielanowski, Ambassador of Poland
Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Ernest Petric, Ambassador of Slovenia
Geza Jeszenszky, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Janos Herman, Head of Department of Information and Spokesman to the Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME December 22, 1992, 10:00-11:00am
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President: Welcome. I want to hear your views on this crisis. This region has many new democracies, and we are concerned for their stability and to see that they are not damaged by this crisis. As you know, Secretary Eagleburger has just returned from Europe where he took a leadership role in discussions on the former Yugoslavia. This issue has long been at the top of his agenda. This is also true for General Scowcroft. (Ø)

I'd like first to reiterate for you what our priorities are and then hear your views. First, we believe the time has come to get an enforcement resolution for the no-fly zone. Second, we want to explore ways to step-up the humanitarian aid effort. Third, we want to get agreement to issue a stiff warning to Milosevic in

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order to prevent the outbreak of violence in Kosovo. Let me invite Secretary Eagleburger to elaborate. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: I don't have much to add, Mr. President. We spent much of last week wandering around Europe discussing this crisis. At the end, NATO addressed itself to various measures -- in support of the UN's efforts on no-fly, preventing the spillover of violence in Kosovo, etc. But this problem is not going to go away. And it has been made worse by the recent elections in Serbia. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Mock: Thank you, Mr. President for receiving us today. My colleagues and I want to express our deep concern over this crisis and what we see as negative long-term effects it will have if the crisis is not contained and settled. (Ø)

For the first time after World War II, there is a member state of the UN, of CSCE that has managed to disappear from the political map. This is one of the most influential events that challenges the Paris Charter, the New World Order. Genocide, mass rapes of women. We have all different reports of the atrocities going on. When Europe was built up after the Second World War, your policies, Mr. President, contributed to the demise of Communism. The intensive effort of the UN, CSCE and the decisions of many bodies brought little progress -- they are not respected at all. We need forceful action in this crisis and the U.S. only can lead the way. (Ø)

I am very pleased to hear your statement that we need to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations. Who would have believed that it would take forceful action for Serbian troops to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina? But what is happening now, one can read in the newspapers. For us, the long-term effects cause the most concern. (Ø)

First, there is the concern that widening the conflict is a long term danger. Kosovo, Macedonia, Vojvodina, but also Albania, Bulgaria, and perhaps at a later date, even Greece and Turkey -- which belong to NATO. Second, if this conflict goes on, I don't know how long Kozyrev and Yeltsin can maintain their policies. If there is a change in Russia, and sooner than we expect a change will occur, we will have a trouble on our hands. Third, there are those who are offering their help to the UN. But what about the Islamic states? We could have a situation on our hands where the remaining Bosnians are the Palestinians of Europe. We need support for the Vance plan. Forth, after the UN example of the U.S. in the lead in rescuing Kuwait in the Iraq war, there is a tremendous belief in collective security. Fifth, the values of democracy and self-determination will not be respected and others in unstable situations in other parts of Eastern Europe might discover that force is successful. They might be encouraged by the "success" of the Serbian government. The security of the whole region is at stake. (Ø)

We were in New York yesterday to see Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and members of the Security Council. We appeal to the long

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tradition of the United States in standing up for the free world and we are sure that now, again, the United States will have to take the lead in restoring peace to this area. (Ø)

I know that if you intervene, you are criticized; if you do not intervene, you are criticized. It is a burden and plight of a superpower. So we hope that action will be taken to create respect for international law and the new world order we want to build. We must contain the present crisis. Thank you. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Jeszenszky: Mr. President, we represent a whole region from the Baltic to the Adriatic-- historic places -- we represent genuine democracies of former communist countries. We are ready to collaborate to maintain what we have achieved. There is a danger that we could all fall together. National communism exists everywhere. It is like fascism. Yeltsin is in danger. The Russians are openly supporting Milosevic. There is a Slavic alliance -- a national communist alliance that will violate NATO's southern wing. This a main threat to our security. (Ø)

The embargo that is not really hurting Serbia is also hitting the neighboring countries. But we come to speak for security in Central Europe. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Skubiszewski: Mr President, there are broader ramifications for these countries. The ideology we see as the fundamental basis of those states is exactly the phenomenon we liquidated in becoming free states. Repressive, undemocratic elements continue to exist. The developments in post-Yugoslavia have led to the liquidation of much of the CSCE Third Basket. The impunity with regard to the violation of human rights and ethnic cleansing will find imitators in Europe and beyond. (Ø)

Also in the Balkans we see a line developing between Christians and Muslims that we avoided during the Iraq war. We are already seeing the Islamicization of Bosnia and Albania. (Ø)

The use of land forces is a line one should not cross, but there are other military sanctions: enforce the no-fly zone; open, by force if necessary, humanitarian aid routes; liberate the extreme cases of those held in war camps. The issue of lifting the arms embargo must be taken carefully to prevent arms from reaching the wrong hands. We should envisage measures which guarantee the autonomy of Kosovo, such as with observers going to Macedonia. (Ø)

Finally, regarding refugees. They should be helped on the spot. Setting up safety-zones should not mean that they cannot be returned to their homes. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Rupel: Mr. President, the next thirty days are very important for this crisis. There are actions necessary in this time. I was in Sarajevo one month ago. I flew in with UNPROFOR. There is no gas, no water, no food. Sixty percent of the food disappears on the way to Sarajevo. But people have

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organized their lives. The will to coexist among the three groups is impressive. (Ø)

We know about the objections to safety zones that they contribute to ethnic cleansing. But Sarajevo as a safety zone would not contribute to ethnic cleansing. Saving Sarajevo is indeed a priority. There is no goal that can compare to it. We are asking you to do something about it. (Ø)

The President: If you were in my chair, what would you do? (Ø)

Foreign Minister Rupel: As we have discussed here: enforce the no-fly zone, create safe havens, increase UNPROFOR, open aid corridors to get into and out of Sarajevo. The images in Sarajevo were like a horror movie. Sarajevo is like a big concentration camp. I met a group of Serbs, Croats and Muslims who want to live together. The victory of Milosevic will contribute to a dramatic character of the situations. The resolve of the Serbian fighters will increase. (Ø)

My criticism of western policies -- not American policies, mostly of European policies -- is that they have not sent a clear message to Milosevic. They are saying that we should not intervene. This is a very clear message to Milosevic that he took as a guarantee that nothing would happen. If the U.S. is in a position to give a clear signal to Milosevic that he should stop what he is doing, he would listen. The West should try to encourage those in Yugoslavia who don't support Milosevic. Otherwise, I only see more horror. (Ø)

Another instrument is diplomatic isolation. Slovenia is trying to establish itself as an independent state. Yugoslavia has kept everything -- they have confiscated \$7 billion in reserves and property and nothing has happened to the Serbs. So I have come here to ask you for a clear signal. (Ø)

The President: This is a very impressive presentation. We're wrestling with these questions. But as you know we are in a bit of a dilemma because of our internal situation. We're in a changing mode. We don't want to saddle the incoming President with new burdens. We have been trying to figure what in addition, the U.S. might do in response that you have so dramatically talked about. (Ø)

But we don't see any dramatic, single U.S. act that would guarantee that Milosevic would pull back and start to behave. We've wrestled with the concept that "If you do this, this is what will happen to you," but the risks to the people on the ground are always great. -- UN and UNPROFOR personnel. It is not as clear to us as it probably is to you what would make Milosevic take notice -- no single thing we could do. (Ø)

In the Gulf War, we told Saddam to get out of Kuwait. He didn't believe us. I wish it were clearer that there was one thing that we could do. You can shoot down a few helicopters, or if there is an airfield, you can bomb it. But would those actions have

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the results you want, or would you have to set up your acts after that? And what about attacks on forces already in place? I don't ask for answers, but only to tell you that this is what we are wrestling with. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: Mr. President, there has not been one thing said on the other side of the table today that we haven't been saying ourselves for a long time. We've known pretty clearly what the consequences would be. There has been nothing said that we would disagree with. (Ø)

But any action must be a collective effort. My experience last week showed me that the Europeans are very restrained. Jim Baker tried himself for months with the Europeans. I tried very hard on the arms embargo and got nowhere. We did get some progress on the No-Fly Zone, but at the same time the Europeans are very cautious. The U.S. has had the lead, but we can't act alone. (Ø)

The President: We also have a UN problem. The other day Cyrus Vance was here urging great caution. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: This group should talk to the Western Europeans. (Ø)

The President: To be effective, we need a coalition mentality. We're not shifting blame, we have been actively engaged. (Ø)

Secretary Eagleburger: Are there some other signals we could send? It is my view that safe havens are a fine idea. I don't believe that it contributes to ethnic cleansing. But safe havens require 40,000 troops to ensure security. But we should think about what other signals we could send. (Ø)

Mr. Baker: Everyone on the other side of the table will remember that in June 1991 we were in CSCE and then I went to Belgrade shortly after that. At that time, we said that unless there was a negotiated settlement, there would be an unfortunate civil war. We all agreed. Now, eighteen months later, here we are. The United States has fought three wars in Europe in this century -- two world wars and one Cold War. We have been at the forefront of those pushing for action in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Ø)

At the Lisbon conference on aid to the former Soviet Union, I made some rather undiplomatic comments that embarrassed the Europeans, but they were absolutely true. We have the muscle, but we also have concerns for U.S. lives, and we don't have the support of the international community. (Ø)

My main point is that what we were afraid of and said a year and a half ago, has happened. That doesn't diminish the reprehensibility of what is going on, but the United States cannot do it alone and we can't do it if the Secretary of State or the President can't get strong support for resolutions. With 21 days to go, it is difficult to take a single decisive step. The U.S. has been leaning forward. (Ø)

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The President: I agree with Jim. But let me be clear. We are not going to just do nothing. But what we do must have support from around the world. I can't present my successor with a unilateral act that doesn't have any support. It would set back the whole collective action cause. If a plan and the collective will can be collected, we're prepared to act. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Skubiszewski: One last point, Mr. President. When we talked to Boutros-Ghali, he drew our attention to the financial aspect. It is difficult for him to take action when there is no money. (Ø)

The President: Did he also draw your attention to the fact that he would pull UNPROFOR out of Bosnia if we moved ahead on enforcing the No-Fly Zone? (Ø)

Foreign Minister Skubiszewski: If we could be more creative with financing, for example, one-half of a percent from each state for peacekeeping and enforcement? (Ø)

The President: I'd hate to tell you of what it is costing us in Somalia. But nobody can stand to see those children starve to death. But I'm not sure how the money issue would be worked out in practice. Our effort is very expensive and I'm not sure how we would sort it all out. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Jeszenszky: But we can't let a Lebanese situation develop in Bosnia. Appeasement of Milosevic would result in failure again. Our future is at stake. (Ø)

The President: We agree and we'll keep pushing and I want to thank you for your views. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --