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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91109
Folder ID Number: 91109-008

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Kozo Watanbe, Minister of Trade and Industry (MITI) (2 pp.)	5/1/92	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: Presentation of Credentials by Ambassador Aurel Dragos Munteanu of Romania (2 pp.)	5/5/92	(b)(1)	C
03a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Cuban-American Community Leaders (4 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C
03b. Letter	President Bush to Armando Perez Roura and Dr. Andres Vargas Gomez (2 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (6 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Rafael Callejas of Honduras (4 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk (6 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas of France (3 pp.)	5/11/92	(b)(1)	C
08. Memcon	Re: Working Lunch with Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General (6 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	C
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Patrick Manning, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago (4 pp.)	5/12/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Pinksheet Number: cap933
OA/ID Number: 91109-008
Date Closed: 1/29/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Patricio Aylwin Azocar, President of the Republic of Chile (6 pp.)	5/13/92	(b)(1)	C
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Esko Aho of Finland (4 pp.)	5/13/92	(b)(1)	C
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	5/21/92	(b)(1)	C
13. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek (3 pp.)	5/27	(b)(1)	C
14. Telecon	Re: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	5/28/92	(b)(1)	S
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Shin Kanemaru, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (3 pp.)	5/26/92	(b)(1)	S
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Brundtland of Norway (5 pp.)	6/7/92	(b)(1)	C
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan (3 pp.)	6/9/92	(b)(1)	C
18. Talking Points	Re: Points to be made to the Russian side (6 pp.)	6/9/92	(b)(1)	
19. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Guillermo Endara, President of Panama [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (7 pp.)	6/11/92	(b)(1), (b)(6)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
20. Memcon	Re: First Expanded Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on Military and Security Issues (6 pp.)	6/16/92	(b)(1)	S
21. Memcon	Re: Vice President's Breakfast with President Yeltsin (8 pp.)	6/17/92	(b)(1)	S

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kozo Watanabe, Minister of Trade and Industry (MITI)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Torkel Patterson, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Kozo Watanabe, Minister of Trade and Industry (MITI)
Noboru Hatakeyama, Vice Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
Nobuyori Kodaira, Director, North American Affairs, MITI
Takakazu Kuriyama, Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 1, 1992 - 10:30-10:45 a.m.
Oval Office

The President welcomed Minister Watanabe to the White House and the Oval Office. (U)

The President: Welcome my friend, good to see you here in the Oval Office. (U)

Minister Watanabe: Thank you, it's my privilege to be here. (U)

The President: I'd like to talk about the Uruguay Round and about the environment. We need to stay together on the environmental meeting in Brazil. We have to find a way to keep the developing countries from sending a big bill to the developed countries and to the United States. (C)

The Uruguay Round is important, and I hope you'll be able to do your best to support this. (C)

I hosted a meeting here with the EC President Delors and we discussed agricultural issues. I hope to reach a solid position by the end of June. (C)

We hope we are not put in a position of isolation in Rio. I will not slow down the economy for an anemic recovery because of the Earth Summit. (C)

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Minister Watanabe: I agree with you completely, that's exactly my personal feeling. Twenty years ago I took a strong stand on behalf of the environment. There will be technology breakthroughs. I hope we'll be able to achieve those that will help us with the environment. It is Japan and the United States which should cooperate; we can do this, we have the technology to achieve this. (U)

The President: Kind of like the old North-South issues. I do not want to see a bill to the United States, Europe and Japan to pay for past inequities. But there is something up in New York that we can agree to and should. (C)

Minister Watanabe: I am told that we will do what we can do to find a way to cooperate. The U.S. and Japan have expertise and we should make this available. (U)

By the way, I visited China and while I was in China I told them that human rights were important. (U)

The President: Good, I'm glad to hear that. I'm trying to help them, you know, with MFN. (U)

Minister Watanabe: I did discuss it. (U)

The President: Thank you very much. I've got to go now. Nice to have had you with us. (U)

Minister Watanabe: Thank you. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by Ambassador Aurel Dragos Munteanu of Romania (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Richard Kauzlarich, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Aurel Dragos Munteanu, Ambassador of Romania to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 5, 1992, 3:05 - 3:12 p.m.
The Residence

The President: I am sorry that Barbara is not here to greet you. How are things at home? We know your problems and want to be helpful. (U)

Ambassador Munteanu: We have great difficulties but are fully confident we shall overcome them. (U)

The President: What are your main problems now? Economic? Ethnic minorities? (C)

Ambassador Munteanu: In my estimation the greatest problem is the transition from a centralized to a market economy. There has to be an educational process of learning the system of private ownership. This is difficult after so many years. Ethnic problems are not so bad; they are under control. We believe Romania is a stable country and can be a stabilizing factor in the region. (C)

The President: The Hungarian problem is one concern: the better their treatment, the more we will be able to help. You know the concerns in Congress. I know it is difficult, but we are glad things are moving in the right direction and we wish you well. Where were you before coming here? (C)

Ambassador Munteanu: I was in New York as Romania's representative on the Security Council. (U)

The President: Has someone taken your place? (U)

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2009-0650-MR
3/1/11

Ambassador Munteanu: There will be someone soon. I was very honored to have been there and to have worked with the U.S. Mission. It is sometimes hard to remember that I am Romanian. I came to the United States before the revolution. I would like to thank you personally for your help. (C)

The President: I loved my service at the UN. It is so different working in a multilateral situation like that. May I ask you: what ever happened to Ceausescu's children? He had a son and a daughter, I believe. (C)

Ambassador Munteanu: His son was sentenced. His daughter is free; her husband is an assistant professor. Another son, Valentin, is a researcher and still works in that capacity. (C)

The President: That chapter is closed. We wish you great success. (U)

Ambassador Munteanu: I was educated in the U.S. long before, so I see my country from that perspective. The Romanian nation is a Latin nation. Its traditions are with the west; only geographically is it in the east. It had the worst case of Communism. Now we are groping to progress, and we would ask for your understanding. (C)

The President: We want to be understanding, and we know it is not an easy transition. If Romania stays on the path of democracy and market reform and makes progress on this other question of human rights, we will try to be helpful. We want to see you succeed. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Cuban-American Community Leaders

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Armando Perez Roura, Co-owner and General Manager of Radio Mambi
Andres Vargas Gomez, Well-known Writer and Radio Personality in Miami
Armancio Suarez, Co-owner of Radio Mambi
Antonio Maceo, Physician

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DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 6, 1992, 9:45 - 10:00 a.m., DST
Oval Office

Dr. Vargas Gomez: We have to recognize the right of people to fight for the end of the Communist rule. We reject the Kennedy-Kruschchev agreement, we don't think that Castro will go by himself. There is a new firmness in his repressive actions. And we think that the Mexicans and Venezuelans are helping Castro, as are some members of the European Community. We think there is recent evidence of Soviet approval for military help. They said publicly at one point that they would cease but we do not think that is so. We think the only way to get rid of Castro is to develop support from within and the only way to get at him is from other countries. If we wish to succeed against Castro by fighting we are in conflict with U.S. policy. We think that there is a change in Castro's situation and that now is the time for Cuba to be free. (C)

The President: I'm more optimistic about the fall of Castro. I don't think that there is a threat of Russian nuclear involvement, but you follow the situation closer than me. If there is anything that even looks like Russians returning I would be surprised. They say that they would not. (C)

If I have even a hint that they might have kept nuclear weapons there, I would take that very seriously. You think that Mexico and Venezuela and the European Community are shipping to Castro. I have not heard that. Let me look at this thing. I am very respectful of where you are coming from. I think we all want to see the decline and fall of Castro. (C)

We assuming some of the conversation we'll need to check as soon as possible: (1) Whether there is any kind of a missile deal; and (2) whether other countries have supported Castro. I have had assurances that they will be cooperative (other countries). (C)

General Scowcroft: Mexico agreed to suspend subsidies on oil after you talked to them. You stopped the Mexican subsidies. (C)

The President: I am disappointed that you think he is not getting weaker. In Europe there have been great changes. We were pessimistic earlier but great changes took place. (C)

Mr. Vargas Gomez: But he has his horses in place. (C)

The President: I guess it is sort of like Iraq. He feeds the elite and establishes very repressive measures. But there have been more disasters in his economy. I would hope that he would fall from internal pressures without bloodshed. I think you will agree that this is the best manner in which to see him fall. I think that the people of Cuba would respond with aid and economic development assistance from the private community in a greater manner than any other group. (C)

If the Kennedy-Kruschchev accords are not in place, we don't have as much protection from possible Russian nuclear activities in Cuba. (C)

Mr. Suarez: We all agree with your general policy. We have over 250,000 signatures and we could have had more, but we want to say that we are with you. We are big supporters of President Bush. (C)

The President: We don't want to defuse that message. We want to help if there is any way we can. (C)

Mr. Suarez: If anybody makes announcements at this moment, if they could do something that would say we have been more active because of this Cuban movement for exile. They know the Kennedy-Kruschchev agreement does not stop the Cubans from rebelling against Castro but people below that use the agreement to give Castro protection. What about something we can get to take back to Miami? We know what you did with the ships. Maybe you can do it as much with an announcement that will show we are doing more. (C)

The President: I am in favor of anything to tighten the screws on Castro, but I don't want to promise something that I cannot deliver. President reads from section of letter -- I don't know whether this will be helpful. (Copy attached) (C)

Mr. Perez Roura: It's difficult to understand. One finding in 1973 talks about how our obligations will prevent action by any U.S. citizen in other countries. (C)

The President: This rules out other countries. (C)

General Scowcroft: It is not a security guarantee for Cuba. If Venezuelans want to invade, there is no problem with the Kennedy-Kruschchev agreement. (C)

The President: Only the U.S. is constrained by the Kennedy-Kruschchev agreement. (C)

We will express appreciation for this. We want to express appreciation for you and what you have done. We have to stop short of what you want but it may help. (C)

I don't mind discussing this whole problem with my Russian experts. I will talk to the Intelligence people. I don't want to go against the experts, but I don't think he can sustain himself in the face of all the difficulties he is now experiencing. (C)

Mr. Vargas Gomez: Castro is weak but he has a strong security system. (C)

The President: I want to visibly elicit support against Castro. You could say the President supports peace and prosperity in Cuba. You might say that the President is a little more optimistic regarding Castro's downfall.

Mr. Suarez: If we can say that we are in agreement with your psychology. Don't know if you know we have a most powerful radio station. (C)

The President: Do you get a reaction? (C)

Mr. Suarez: Yes. Castro is blanketed with our news. (C)

Mr. Perez Roura: Raul Castro, when we initiated our programs actually issued threats to us in a military ceremony and said publicly that they threaten violence to our lives. (C)

The President: Is TV-Marti doing any good?

Vargas: No, there is nothing in Cuba. TV-Marti is costing gasoline that's all.

Mr. Pryce: (In response to the President's look of query) It's the gasoline that Castro uses to run his jamming generators. (C)

Gomez: That's a lot of gasoline.

The President: Well, that's a lot of money to spend that can't be seen.

Mr. Gomez: I don't mean that it's bad but it is not effective. We want to try to find a way to demonstrate our support for your policy and also encourage our people.

The President: I very much appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and respect all that you are doing. I hope the letter we have given you will be helpful. Before you go I want to give you each a little souvenir.

Attachment
Tab A Letter from President to Messrs Roura & Gomez

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 6, 1992

Dear Mr. Perez Roura and Dr. Vargas Gomez:

I want to thank you for the letter regarding our Cuba policy and to express my admiration for your dedication to the principle of freedom and democracy for Cuba, which is evident in the work you have done on your highly successful petition drive. As I am sure you are aware, Castro's dictatorship is very much on my mind, and I welcome your work calling attention to the "shameful totalitarian tyranny" in Cuba, as your petition so aptly describes the Castro regime.

Let me assure you that my support for the Cuban people suffering Castro's oppression is absolute. Our policy of pressuring Castro on every front is working. His regime is everyday more isolated within the community of nations. Even Castro's former friends in Eastern Europe and Russia condemn his human rights abuses and refuse to continue to prop up his regime with aid. We are working to toughen our economic embargo even more, and we will not have normal relations with Cuba until Castro is gone.

More and more Cubans are standing up to this dictator, and I am convinced that the Cuban people will bring him down and set Cuba free. Let me assure you that there is nothing in the Kennedy-Kruschchev understandings that prevents the oppressed people in Cuba from throwing off their shackles and freely choosing their leadership.

As I recently wrote in the Miami Herald, Castro's days are numbered. My hope is that the process will be peaceful and without bloodshed. I do not condone actions that break U.S. law, but I will do everything I can to support those striving within the law to free Cuba from Castro's illegitimate, desperate grip.

Please pass my appreciation to all those who signed your petition for letting their opposition to Castro be heard.

Sincerely,

Mr. Armando Perez Roura
Dr. Andres Vargas Gomez
223 Shore Drive South
Miami, FL 33133

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (6 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (503)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Roman Popadiuk, Admbassador-Designate to Ukraine
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff
George Sajewych, Interpreter

Leonid Kravchuk, President of Ukraine
Oleh Slepichev, Deputy Prime Minister
Oleksandr Yemelyanov, Economic Advisor, Head of State Duma for Economic Questions
Anatoliy Zlenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasil Tkachuk, Minister of Agriculture
Yuriy Shcherbak, Minister of Environment
Oleksandr Maselskiy, President's Representative for Kharkov Oblast
Boris Sobolev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
Anton Buteyko, President's Adviser for Foreign Affairs
Oleh Bilorus, Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 6, 1992, 12:00 - 12:45pm
Old Family Dining Room

The President: Where were we? Where do you stand on the Crimea? Is that driven by Russia itself? (Ø)

President Kravchuk: The problem with Crimea is artificial. There are 1.6 million Russians; a little more than 600 thousand Ukrainians; and 200 thousand Tartars (a number that is growing). (Ø)

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The opportunities for Russians living in Crimea is greater than for Ukrainians living there. Ukrainians in Crimea have no schools since the Russians don't like special Ukrainian schools. The kindergartens are all Russian. Russians living in Ukraine for several generations do not speak Ukrainian, and don't want to. (C)

Some Russians made official statements at the (Russian) Congress (of People's Deputies) that it was necessary to protect Russian-speaking populations in other states. This simply instigates Russians to act, which is what happened in Crimea. (C)

Russian members of parliament were visiting the area. Rutskoi came to Crimea and made aggressive statements there. The Russian official structure has allocated funds to follow Ukrainian politics in Crimea. (C)

The deputies from the Supreme Soviet of Crimea are mostly from party structures of the former Soviet Union. They were not elected as deputies of the Supreme Soviet. (C)

The President: Are there divisions inside the Russian government? Are some more active in stirring up the Crimea than others. Or is this universal? (C)

President Kravchuk: The majority of the forces speaking for the separation of Crimea from Ukraine are in the conservative factions of the Russian Parliament. (C)

(b)(1)

We see developments moving according to that scenario. Some western countries are included in the scenario. (C)

Dr. Hewett: President Kravchuk, are these papers authored by conservatives, or are they official government documents? (C)

President Kravchuk: These are government papers -- official analysis provided for Parliament. The papers are being used as part of a long-term policy for Russia. (C)

The President: Doesn't Russia face problems of other republics taking steps in Russia? (C)

President Kravchuk: (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

I agree that Russia has internal problems -- problems of dissolution. But they're not dealing with them. Rather they are active in Trans-Dniester and Ukraine. (C)

They have set up a para-military organization -- the Cossacks. They claim the government has nothing to do with it. But those Cossacks were involved in fighting in Dniester. Now they have representatives in Ukraine. (C)

The Russian Government does not even make an effort to stop this activity. (C)

The President: What is their mission? (C)

President Kravchuk: They fought in Dniester. They're soldiers of fortune -- mercenaries. In fact they are not governed by anyone. (C)

Mr. Pavlychko: Mister President, 28 members of parliament of Crimea voted against the declaration of independence, despite the pressure, and terrorism against them. The Steppe areas of Crimea said they do not support the statement. The Crimean Tartars are strongly against the referendum. (C)

The situation is dangerous. There might be a strong conflict in Crimea. (C)

We have some friends in Russia -- Yelena Bonner and Yuri Afanasev, for example -- who speak for true democracy in Russia, and who believe Ukraine should be independent. (C)

There are also people who share their thinking in the Russian Parliament. During voting on Crimea and the 1954 Act, those people spoke out. (C)

Secretary Baker: Will the referendum go forward? What will happen? (C)

President Kravchuk: The decision on the referendum is non-constitutional. The Supreme Soviet of Crimea was not elected. It was appointed by the Parliament of Ukraine for a period of time. Its mandate was to prepare elections. (C)

The deputies did not want elections. They adopted a decision which goes beyond their competence. In fact their decision is a violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is against the constitution. That's why we say that it is not acceptable. They were not elected. (C)

The President: Is the resolution of the fleet tied up in Crimean question? (C)

President Kravchuk: Yes those questions are linked. (C)

(b)(1)

The President: Is some of Russia's game-plan in Crimea related to the Fleet in the Black Sea? (C)

President Kravchuk: [redacted] (b)(1) (C)

The President: Are you talking with Yeltsin regarding the Fleet question? (C)

President Kravchuk: Yeltsin and I issued decrees for the delegations to the negotiations. But the Russian delegation got the instructions that the Black Sea Fleet belongs to Russia, and that Ukraine should get very little. (C)

Russia already has three large fleets: the Baltic, the Northern, and the Pacific Fleets. Nearly 70 percent of all surface ships [in the CIS fleet] were produced in Ukraine. Ukraine owns part of the fleet. (C)

We would like to make the Black Sea a sea of peace, and security. We don't need so many ships; I would like to reduce the number of ships. But Russia and the military are against that. [redacted] (b)(1)

The President: What is the make up of the crews of the Black Sea Fleet? Are the crews primarily Russian and Ukrainian? (C)

President Kravchuk: Mostly Russian and Ukrainian. There are a few others. (C)

You know, Mister President, there are many Russians in prominent positions in Ukraine. My Prime Minister, Fokin, is Russian. Emelianov, my economic advisor, is Russian. One-half of all children in Ukraine studied in Russian schools. That shows Russians are not at a disadvantage in Ukraine. (C)

On a per capita basis, the Russians have more people than Ukrainians in education, more newspapers, more theaters. That's why the Russian population in Ukraine voted for the independence of Ukraine in December. Fifty-four percent of the Russian population in Crimea voted for the independence of Ukraine. I am absolutely positive that there would be no problems if the Russians were not stirring them up. (C)

The President: The reason I asked on the ethnic make-up is that I was wondering if the dispute could step up animosity on the ships themselves? (C)

President Kravchuk: There are different positions. People serving on ships would like to end the speculation. (C)

Secretary Baker: What are the differences, Mister President, between the positions of Russia and Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet? Have you agreed to divide it? Does Russia believe it owns all of it? Or, does Ukraine believe it owns all of it? (C)

President Kravchuk: Ukraine never wanted the entire Black Sea Fleet. Russia has made statements of that sort. There have been, for example, statements by Yeltsin that Russia owns the entire fleet. (C)

Why should Russia have authority over the fleet stationed in Ukraine? We are guided by the agreement signed in Minsk by Yeltsin. It is written there that states which have strategic forces on their soil decide which part should be provided for common defense. That is the wording. (C)

Since the Black Sea Fleet is in Ukraine, Ukraine should decide which portion goes to the common defense. Russia says no. We must be independent in deciding which part remains with us. (C)

The President: What flag flies over the fleet? (C)

President Kravchuk: We have ships with no flag. Ships in the Baltic, Northern, and Pacific fleets fly the Russian flags. Russia has said the Black Sea Fleet should also fly the Russian flag. Apparently they haven't finished making those flags. (C)

There are lots of interesting people in Russia. One person from Sevastopol said he was in Rutskoi's office and he noticed that a map on his wall shows Alaska in Russia. (C)

The President: Now you're getting my attention! (C)

President Kravchuk: Understand me. We have no claims against Russia. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

Another dangerous sign. I was with Russians at a conference in Bonn. They didn't want to even hear of an independent Ukraine. (C)

Ukraine will never be on its knees. (C)

Mr. Pavlychko: One basic argument in negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet: Russia says it needs the fleet to counter the U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean. (C)

We are trying to act to avoid confrontation; we have a common interest with the U.S. Russia says so, but uses the fleet to counterbalance the U.S. (C)

President Kravchuk: It is also important that the economy in Russia is in total ruin. They claim to be the second military power in the world! (C)

The President: But you would agree, I hope, that it is very important we stay involved with Russia, trying to work with Russia to be sure that they stay with democratic reform. If we isolate Russia, that would make it even more imperialistic, which would be bad for other countries in the area. (C)

President Kravchuk: Yes, we agree to that. I want to emphasize that you and we should have relations with Russia, but equal relations. Any assistance by the U.S. to Russia should not go to support imperialism. (C)

The President: Mister President, we have the press in two minutes, so we should break. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Rafael Callejas of Honduras (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Cresencio Arcos, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Rafael Callejas, President of Honduras
Gilberto Goldstein, Press Secretary
Ricardo Maduro, President of the Central Bank
Jorge Ramon Hernandez, Honduran Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 6, 1992, 3:00 - 3:25pm, DST
Oval Office

The President: I am delighted that we were able to reduce $434 million of official U.S. debt to Honduras. I wish there were ways that we could do more. We are under tremendous pressure to cut foreign aid. People say when there are cuts that need to be made, that we should not cut domestic programs. They say take it out of foreign assistance. We don't want to do this but there are difficulties. (C)

We hope that the message of our interest in Latin America is being heard. I hope the Enterprise for the Americas is sending the message that we give a damn. This program is very important to us. Jim Baker and Brent and Bernie and all have done a lot for all of Latin America. We are also working in Europe with the new emerging democratic nations of Russia and the others. But that is not meant to be a sign of a lack of interest in Latin America. I wonder if that message is misunderstood, if people don't realize how much we care about Latin America. (C)

President Callejas: We understand. At least as far as Central America is concerned, this is the best situation we have ever been in, regarding our relations with the United States. (C)

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The President: Do you have any advice on Peru? The problem is that what he is doing is popular at the moment. He evidentially has a popularity rating of about 70%. (C)

President Callejas: His popularity is for the time being. I don't see how he can survive without the necessary international financial help he needs from the international institutions and from the United States. I can't see Peru moving ahead under current circumstances. We condemned Fujimori's actions strongly. (C)

The President: What kind of a reaction did you get? Negative? (C)

President Callejas: No. But I wish the reaction against the coup, Fujimori's action, had been stronger. I hope that the OAS reaction will be strong in the Bahamas. Mexico will probably hold back. (C)

The President: What about Haiti? We think that Aristide is a weak reed but we need to help democracy. I'm a little uneasy with a situation where you are supporting a former Communist, Rene Theodore, as part of a solution. I sometimes want to say: "hey, let me explain about this." (C)

President Callejas: This is a matter which should be handled by the Organization of American States. (C)

The President: We are still worried about CAP (Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela). Do we feel better about this? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: A little bit. (U)

President Callejas: Venezuela is one of the oldest democracies. If there is trouble there, it sends a bad signal. The problem is that democratic institutions don't move quickly enough. Venezuela needs to move. If not, then a Fujimori type solution will occur. There are dangerous movements, including leftist groups. (C)

The President: Do you have a left wing problem? (C)

President Callejas: No. We brought them into the system. (C)

The President: What kind of a group were they? Did they have a specific cause? (C)

President Callejas: They had a paternalistic socialist approach like the Soviets. That has changed since the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have economic programs which promise more opportunity. We are looking towards an open economy. (C)

The President: We are on the same side. (C)

President Callejas: We see a need for inflows of $350 million a year. We are looking for help from the economic community, from the world financial institutions and elsewhere. For us, coffee is a real problem. Coffee prices are at a 30-year low. If we get no support on this, we have a real crisis. (C)

Bananas is another problem. Here we find that the European Community violates the GATT, where they ask to have a non-tariff barrier. We hope that you will come out and support us on this. We were willing to have a million tons of bananas come in from the Caribbean separately, but then we would want competition. (C)

The President: Where does the Caribbean come in on this? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: On the other side. (C)

The President: So the Caribbeans are on the other side. (C)

President Callejas: We have made a very open proposal. We believe that five years from now, the Caribbeans would be able to have $350 million. (C)

The President: What would they say? (U)

President Callejas: "No." They say the colonies are supposed to get special treatment. (C)

The President: How about coffee? (U)

Assistant Aronson: The problem is Brazil. (C)

The President: We would like to help. (U)

President Callejas: We have a problem. We have lost $20 million. There is no increase in demand. (C)

Press Secretary Goldstein: There is not an elastic price. There is no response to demand. (C)

Secretary Baker: Let me ask if Honduras would be interested in a multilateral approach to the Haitian problem? Haiti seems to be insoluble under present circumstances. When we first faced the problem, there was a sentiment in the OAS to go in and get rid of it by a multilateral force. Would there be any support if the United States were not involved except for transport? Would the OAS be interested in an action to restore Aristide and call for elections? (C)

President Callejas: We would accompany such action. (C)

Secretary Baker: You would send force? (C)

President Callejas: Yes. I don't know if we could bring it up. (C)

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Secretary Baker: If Venezuela and Jamaica were willing, you would go? (Ø)

President Callejas: I would go along with Venezuela and Jamaica. Not a significant number. A small number. We knew the problem would be back in the OAS. We had a meeting of the Bahamas coming up. We would be willing to act. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: This was a violation. (Ø)

The President: What's the possibility of a new head of Government? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: You couldn't get a consensus. You would get some people to go along. Venezuela. (Ø)

Mr. Pryce: Venezuela wanted to do it, but their legislature would not let them. (Ø)

President Callejas: We have a great respect for you. We hope you will win the election easily. We think so. (Ø)

The President: I think I will, but the political process sometimes gets so ugly. The U.S. economy is beginning to move. There has been all this hopelessness. Most businesses seem to be getting better. Things are moving. (Ø)

President Callejas: We hope that you will have a successful NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). We will have a meeting on trade with El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica and Serrano will also be there. Serrano (President of Guatemala) wants to have good relations with the U.S. and he wants to move forward in Central America. (Ø)

The President: We also want to have good relations. We have had a few problems, but we are making progress. (Ø)

President Callejas: He is trying to do his best, regarding human rights. I think that what you see is that he is making progress. (Ø)

The President: I hope that we will keep making progress. (U)

As the conversation broke up, the President mentioned that he was sorry that he could not be at the 50th anniversary of the El Zamorano agricultural school, but he had a message which he thought his sister was going to read. President Callejas said he very much appreciated that and would look forward to hearing the message. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk (6 pp.)	5/6/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 2/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (505)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1992

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk

PARTICIPANTS: US
The Vice President
Karl Jackson
Jeff McKitrick
Ambassador-designate Roman Popaduik
Nick Burns
Interpreter

Ukraine
President Kravchuk
Foreign Minister Zlenko
Foreign Policy Advisor Melnik
Ambassador-designate Bilorus
Interpreter--Dmtro Markov

PLACE: Blair House

TIME: 2:30-3:00 p.m.

DATE: May 6, 1992

Kravchuk: I was told that President Truman lived here at Blair House for a time. It reminded me that he authored the Marshall Plan.

Vice President: I think I know what is coming next! (Laughter) I am sorry I missed your lunch with the President, but I had to go up to Capitol Hill. Everyone I spoke to up there referred in glowing terms to their meeting with you earlier. The Senators were impressed with the spirit of the Ukrainian-Americans and their response to you. Normally, our Senators are the first to complain, so it must have been a truly special event.

Kravchuk: Of course, it's their job to complain!

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Vice President: Yes. We spent 95 percent of our meeting talking about your event. That's unusual during an election year since we have a lot of "armchair experts" who think they know more than you about everything.

Kravchuk: That's normal. Everyone takes into account only what's in their field of view.

We have a situation in our Parliament where members also chair a collective farm or run a plant. And when a general question is posed that affects all Ukraine, they focus only on the needs of their enterprise.

We have a non-professional Parliament. It is a heritage of the earlier days when a person was elected to Parliament based on the position he held in the party. So the First Secretary was automatically elected to Parliament. The Second Secretary would be automatically elected to a lower level body. We developed terms for those positions that guaranteed an automatic election!

Vice President: I understand you will go with the President to Camp David later. You'll enjoy that very much.

I'm leaving Monday for Japan. I was curious as to Ukraine's relationship with Japan. Are you doing anything interesting with them? Is there anything I should know for my trip?

Kravchuk: Japan has already recognized Ukraine as a sovereign state and we have established diplomatic relations, but we have not exchanged Ambassadors yet. Japanese businessmen have shown an interest in the development of our country. We believe that Japan should be greatly interested in Ukraine. We have a lot of raw materials and we have a geostrategic position in Europe linking Asia and Europe.

Fortunately, there are no bad aspects of Ukrainian-Japanese history that could affect our relations negatively. So, we could establish good relations with Japan. But our abilities today are limited to our immediate neighbors to our north, south, east and west.

Some definite steps with Japan are being taken though. And we would ask you to ask the Japanese to show more interest in Ukraine.

Vice President: Are Japanese businessmen investing in Ukraine? They still have a lot of money, although not as much as before.

Kravchuk: The representatives of Japanese business circles pay attention to what we are doing and watch us closely and attentively. Some joint ventures are already established. Japanese automobiles, televisions, and electronic equipment are already on sale in Ukraine. But their approach is gradual.

Vice President: What about Germany? Do they have a special interest in Ukraine? Are their business people involved? Or are they focused on eastern Germany and domestic issues at home, like the strikes?

Kravchuk: We have a great deal of economic cooperation with Germany. We have some very close contacts with firms producing medical equipment and medicines.

And we have a joint initiative aimed at returning those Ukrainians deported during World War II. Before the war, there were 500,000 people of German origin in Ukraine. Now, it is about 70,000. So Germany is interested in helping to return the people of German origin to original locations.

Vice President: Let me ask you to look into your crystal ball, 10-15 years down the road. Where will Ukraine be? Where will Russia be?

Kravchuk: If Russia does not keep Ukraine from moving forward, Ukraine will turn into a civilized, developed country.

Vice President: What could Russia do to prevent that?

Kravchuk: There are remnants of imperial thinking among Russian leaders. This will probably remain for some time. And they use the Russian-speaking people in Ukraine to inspire separatist tendencies. So national chauvinism in Russia is part of the problem.

Vice President: Does Russia as a whole have tendencies toward imperialism or is it more focused on what goes on within its borders?

Kravchuk: The imperial tendency is strong in Russia. What is important, and sometimes surprising to me, is that communists who are now

prominent people like Sobchak have these tendencies.

There are, for example, regional councils in Russia that simply declare they will take back territory that is part of Ukraine. And they are not delicate about it. They just say they will take it back.

Another example. We have enterprises with close ties to enterprises in Russia. And Russia says that unless we give back the Black Sea Fleet, they will not give our enterprises the parts we need. (b)(1) (b)(1)

Vice President: Is there a real split between Yeltsin and Rutskoy?

Kravchuk: It is difficult to tell. There is an old saying: "One cannot understand Russia with one's mind."

Vice President: So what do you think is happening there?

Kravchuk: Rutskoy has substantial support from the Army. Polls show that a month ago he had support from 15 percent of the Army. Now it is 38 percent. The idea of Russia within the boundaries of Peter's or Catherine's Russia is used to satisfy political ambitions. (b)(1) (b)(1)

Vice President: Are Rutskoy and Yeltsin close?

Kravchuk: No.

Vice President: Does Rutskoy have his own agenda?

Kravchuk: There are deep differences. But they pretend differently in public. Yeltsin has given the agricultural sector to Rutskoy. Imagine an Army General with that duty! I respect Generals, but....

In some respects, Rutskoy is like Nikita Khrushchev. He wants to teach Romanians how to grow maize -- people who have done it for centuries!

Rutskoy is like a sweeper in soccer. He has no assigned duty, but goes where he wants. If a situation is to be aggravated, Rutskoy will be sent.

Vice President: How is Yeltsin? Can you deal with him? Does he keep his promises?

Kravchuk: An agreement can be reached with Yeltsin. But he may change his position and not follow through if the situation changes. Yeltsin measures situations by Russia's values and principles -- that is, (b)(1) (b)(1) For example, the military units that existed in the Soviet Union. Yeltsin made himself commander-in-chief of all these troops, to include those in Ukraine and the Black Sea Fleet.

Vice President: How does Yeltsin view Ukraine?

Kravchuk: As a subordinate of Russia. As part of Russia. A bride that doesn't want to be married, and that he is trying to force her to do so.

Vice President: I guess he'll have to get used to you.

Kravchuk: I hope he has no other choice. I believe he is smart enough to realize that with 55 million people in Ukraine and 165 million in Russia, the two countries cannot oppose each other. It would be a tragedy for each other and for the whole world. I know Rutskoy wouldn't understand, but Yeltsin, Burbullis, and Gaidar should.

Vice President: Rutskoy does not understand?

Kravchuk: (b)(1) (b)(1) Yeltsin knows the burden of responsibility and he should measure the situation.

There has been a rise of conservative political forces in Russia. Look at the Congress of People's Deputies and what they did.

Vice President: Well, enjoy yourself at Camp David. This is a good visit and you are warmly received. I, the President, and all Ukrainian-Americans are rooting for you.

Kravchuk: Thank you. And I would like to invite you to visit Ukraine and see it with your own eyes.

I know in America and in other countries there is not an appropriate view of Ukraine. Often it is viewed through the eyeglasses of Russia.

Last year when I met the Vice Prime Minister of another country and told him that I was President of Ukraine, he asked "What's that? Part of Russia? Do you have figures like Pushkin?" I said we were a separate country and, yes, we had figures like Pushkin. He asked if they were still alive!

So I invite you to see Ukraine with your own eyes.

Vice President: Thank you. I would love to visit some day. You're right that it helps to see a country first hand and get a feel for a people in their homeland. I don't want to rely on Roman Popaduik to tell me what's going on! (Laughter) He's a good man.

We wish you the best.

Kravchuk: Thank you. We want to be your friend. No double standards in our relations. Frank and sincere relations. We will pursue such policies.

Vice President: That would be a sign of genuine friendship.

End of conversation.

DRAFTED BY:

Jeff McKitrick

APPROVED BY:

Karl Jackson

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas of France (3 pp.)	5/11/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (506)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. P. Curley, U.S. Ambassador to France
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European & Canadian Affairs
Tony Wayne, Director, Western European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister
Jacques Andreani, French Ambassador to U.S.
Alain Dejammet, MFA Political Director
Philippe Delmas, Advisor on U.S. Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 11, 1992 2:45 pm
Oval Office

Minister Dumas: President Mitterrand sends his best wishes. (U)

The President: I wrote him a note because I appreciated his recent remarks on my handling of the situation in Los Angeles. (U)

Minister Dumas: The President very much wishes that you could stop in France soon. Perhaps you could stop in Paris on your way to Munich? (U)

The President: I'd like to do that, but it is not clear that it will be possible given my schedule. Is Francois going to Rio? We are deciding whether to go. It looks like we will, but we're in the process of deciding. It is hard for me to get the time. How long will Francois be there? (C)

Minister Dumas: Three days I believe. (C)

The President: Well, as I say, we're trying to decide whether and when to go, though it looks like I will be there. When was the last time I was in France? Rambouillet, that was it. We gave that decoration to your General. (C)

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Minister Dumas: Yes. (U)

The President: I assume you had good discussions with Jim this morning. I haven't gotten a full read-out yet. I trust you discussed that sensitive but important problem of GATT. We need a solution. (C)

Secretary Baker: Yes, we touched on that, and we discussed NATO, the EC and other issues. (C)

Minister Dumas: Yes, we had a good discussion. We talked about European security questions and the effects of the Maastricht Treaty. I explained to Jim that we want to create a new Europe and to make European unity a reality, but at the same time we need to retain and reinforce ties to the United States. (C)

The President: Yes, that is very important. Did Jim brief you on the Kravchuk visit and related developments? (C)

Secretary Baker: No, we didn't get into visits. (U)

Minister Dumas: We did try to work out our differences on the European nuclear powers meeting together. (C)

The President: I thought we had agreed to that. Didn't we agree that it would be at the Under Secretary level? (C)

Secretary Baker: Yes, and we are still willing to do it. (C)

The President: But it is a bad time now (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

Secretary Baker: Yes, that is right. (C)

Minister Dumas: Yes, Jim explained all of your concerns about the Ukraine, Russia and others. (C)

The President: In fact, I just a minute ago got off the phone with Prime Minister Demirel. He was back from Kazakhstan and (b)(1) I'm sure Nazarbayev is a nice guy, but we just can't do that, as I am sure you agree Roland. The costs would be way too high. (C)

Minister Dumas: Nazarbayev will be coming to Paris next week and will see Mitterrand. Perhaps, he is stopping on the way to Washington. (C)

The President: Well, he's a good man. (b)(1) (b)(1) Did you and Jim talk about the Bosnia situation? (C)

Secretary Baker: Yes, a bit. The Russians are still blocking action on suspending the Serbs in CSCE and the EC just voted to withdraw Ambassadors from Belgrade. (C)

Minister Dumas: Only for consultations. (C)

The President: Is that enough pressure to stop the fighting, Roland? (C)

Minister Dumas: No, it's not enough. They seem determined to fight some more. (C)

The President: It's funny, fighting seems to be breaking out all over. It just underlines that we need to stay close together in these times. (C)

Secretary Baker: One thing worth exploring if Nazarbayev is stopping in Paris is his request for security guarantees. He wants guarantees (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1). We have made clear to him, and to the Ukraine, that we cannot provide such guarantees. (b)(1) [redacted] Nazarbayev committed to sign on to the NPT, and we have now offered him a role in ratifying the START treaty along with the Ukraine and Belarus, as he wanted. (b)(1) [redacted] We just cannot see nuclear proliferation be the result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: Yes, I made this same point to Demirel on the phone. (C)

Secretary Baker: We must remember that only in December Nazarbayev told us that he would sign the NPT as a non-nuclear state if we supported Kazakhstan's entry into the CSCE and the world community. We have done all he asked. (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

Minister Dumas: What about Kravchuk? Did he say all of the nuclear weapons were out? (C)

The President: Yes, the tactical weapons. (C)

Minister Dumas: And does your intelligence confirm that? (C)

Secretary Baker: Yes, we believe that the tactical weapons have been removed from all republics except Russia. (C)

The President: Well, its good to see you. I'm off now for Philadelphia. Say Hello to Francois. (C)

Minister Dumas: Do not forget that we would like you to visit, perhaps on the way to Munich. (C)

The President: Well, I don't know if I can. If it is possible, I would like to. Good bye my friend. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Lunch with Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations
Edward J. Perkins, US Ambassador to the United Nations
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director for International Programs and Public Diplomacy (notetaker)

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General
Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations
James Jonah, Under Secretary General for Political Affairs
Joseph Verner Reed, Special Representative for Public Affairs
Maurice F. Strong, Secretary General of UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
Dick Thornburgh, Under Secretary General for Administration and Management
Alvaro de Soto, Senior Political Adviser

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 12, 1992, 12:00 - 1:00pm EST
Old Family Dining Room

The President and UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali met for thirty minutes in the Oval Office and proceeded to the Old Family Dining Room. (U)

The President: It is a pleasure to welcome all of you. As I said in the Oval Office, Boutros is off to a really good start. We want to play a constructive part. I am going to Rio (for the UN Conference on Environment and Development), and I was glad to announce that. I think it is important. We will do all we can to make a positive contribution. We are respectful about what peacekeepers do. We talked in the Oval Office about Libya and Iraq. Our view remains that Iraq is not willing to comply with pertinent resolutions and that Saddam is trying to circumvent UN actions. Ekeus is doing a good job with the UN Special Commission regarding weapons of mass destruction, and that sends a strong signal around the world. We did not talk about

peacekeeping generally or the Middle East in the Oval Office meeting, but we certainly can talk about it here. (U)

The Secretary General raised the complaints of some elements in the Moslem world about lack of UN attention. (C)

Secretary Baker: We talked about the Middle East peace process at breakfast and can certainly continue here. (U)

The President: We are sending you our best people. We had a very good ambassador up there in Tom Pickering. Now with Ambassador Perkins you are getting a really seasoned person too. And you have stolen Thornburgh and Reed. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: The main question in Yugoslavia is trying to decide what the next step should be. I am worried that the political isolation of Serbia will simply exacerbate Serbian nationalism. The Serbs feel isolated and wrongly accused. They do deserve 70% of the blame. The Europeans have pushed hard for the UN to be active in Bosnia-Hercegovina. We will present our report to the UN Security Council tomorrow. There is no possibility to do anything in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In fact, we are having problems with UNPROFOR's mission in Croatia. (C)

The President: Do you feel there is something the U.S. could be doing? We held back recognition to help the UN and I got pounded by the ethnic groups. I think we were right. In any of these disputes, is there something you could suggest we could do to facilitate? (C)

Mr. Goulding: You kept influence for a long time in Belgrade by not recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Then you recognized them about the time the Bosnia-Hercegovina problem began. The Serbs feel they are criticized by all the major powers. It is having an effect on the current UN operation. The Serbs are acting like spoiled children in saying that they would withdraw the federal army from Bosnia-Hercegovina, but would leave Bosnian Serbs in a Bosnian-Hercegovinian army. As a practical matter, this would leave some 80% of the JNA behind in Bosnia-Hercegovina. I told them to not do it until the EC fixes an agreement. This is an example of how criticism of them causes them to not behave. They deserve most of the blame but not all. (C)

The President: Do the Serbs feel totally ganged up on? (C)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali and Mr. Goulding: Yes. (U)

The President: Is anyone in the republics still communist? (C)

Mr. Goulding: All of the leaders say communism gone, but they all have communist backgrounds. (C)

The President: Are there Serbian communists in Belgrade? (C)

Mr. Goulding: No, Milosevic now thinks he invented the free market. (C)

Secretary Baker: For months, we tried to not recognize Slovenia and Croatia and work with Yugoslavia. The Serbs did not do well with this. They took our support and turned around and began killing people in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The President did what is right on this and it is still costing him. We had to let the Serbs know that we were angry. So, now both the Croats and Serbs are mad at us, all from just doing the right thing. (C)

Mr. Goulding: We are still stuck dealing with the dissolution of Yugoslavia so that the crisis does not spread beyond Yugoslavia to the other Balkan countries. (C)

General Scowcroft: We are facing a difficult issue. The EC is recognizing Bosnia-Hercegovina yet it is now being divided up. How should we deal with that? (C)

Mr. Goulding: There are two possible ways of responding. First would be a huge military force to impose change. This would not work. Second is the political diplomatic route. There is still a mechanism, the Conference on Yugoslavia chaired by Lord Carrington. It has met spasmodically and has a style of giving speeches. Maybe it could be made more continuous, keeping technical experts there all the time to try to find a solution, while the plenipotentiaries come periodically. Too much criticism may not produce a solution. (C)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: A more active role by the EC in diplomacy is needed but has not been done as of yet. (C)

Mr. Goulding: EC monitors are being withdrawn, and I would hardly recommend inserting UN monitors in their place. (C)

The President: Are you involved in Macedonia? (C)

Secretary Baker: That one is quiet. (C)

The President: We have been in touch with the Greek government. We joined others in saying this needs time. There is no easy answer. (C)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: They could change their name. (C)

The President: That will solve it. (U)

Mr. Goulding: Macedonia has been a separate republic only since World War II, isn't that right, General Scowcroft. (U)

General Scowcroft: Yes. (U)

Mr. Thornburgh: What is the climate on the Hill re UN funding? (U)

The President: It is better in that they think the UN is doing a good job, but not so good on getting them to appropriate funds, but we will keep trying. (U)

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Mr. Thornburgh: Can we expect anything before November? (U)

Secretary Baker: There is no vehicle. We were fortunate to get the additional $270 million for peacekeeping - that was the only new money approved for FY 1992. (U)

Mr. Bolton: We recently paid just under $200 million for peacekeeping bills on May 1. (U)

The President: The problems in Los Angeles have not helped. I heard again today about Americans turning inward. (U)

On Cyprus, is there any reason to be upbeat? (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: There have been new developments in the last two weeks. I believe that Denktash and Vassiliou could meet in New York within the next two weeks. (C)

The President: Our role is we support what the UN Secretary General does. There is no easy answer. (U)

General Scowcroft: We were fairly optimistic last fall because Ozal was behind it and put pressure on Denktash. But, Demirel is more cautious. The heart of it is the Turkish political situation. (C)

The President: Demirel is looking East. I spoke to him the other day, largely about President Nazarbayev. And, also he is concerned about Azerbaijan. We will keep pushing however we can. (C)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: I am afraid we will become involved in Nagorno-Karabakh. (C)

The President: What are they asking you to do? (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: Send peacekeepers like Yugoslavia. Their Permanent Representative is asking, saying "we are a full-fledged UN member now, so why not appoint a special representative? Why not send a fact-finding mission?" (C)

Another problem is we are overloaded. Even sending 200 observers costs. During the last six months, Rwanda and Uganda have asked for my help but I cannot intervene now. (C)

Secretary Baker: All of this is the result of the breakdown of the East-West confrontation. You made the good point that it is extraordinarily important to protect credibility of the UN. Long-time peacekeeping missions like Cyprus affect credibility. (C)

Mr. Goulding: There are very few conflicts ready for the UN. This fact has been obscured. (U)

Mr. Jonah: I am concerned about the perception that southern problems do not matter. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: I agree. (U)

Mr. Bolton: The UN did Namibia. (C)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: That was three years ago. (U)

Mr. Bolton: I can also point to Angola, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Somalia.

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: The contrast between rushing 14,000 troops to Croatia and hesitating over a very few to Somalia is part of the basis of the perception. (C)

The President: What are you concerned about besides Somalia? The Secretary General mentioned in our earlier meeting concerns about the south and emphasis on East-West. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: The perception is there that the UN is acting in Yugoslavia/Europe at the expense of the south. There are reports and complaints that we are not doing enough. (C)

Secretary Baker: We are paying. (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: It can be fixed with political attention and public relations. We are doing our best to counter the perception. We are sending missions. (C)

The President: Can we look to Rio and say what will happen? Will it be highly contentious with many groups raising loud voices? (U)

Mr. Strong: Fears have been exaggerated. The NGOs (non-governmental organizations) will be there by the thousand and they will make noise. But they will be located far from the conference itself. Your decision was not easy but I thank you. The voices of the south will be happier than now expected with your message and the G-77 are going to be reasonably cooperative. I expect positive results from the official conference. There is substantial agreement on what is being put in the documents. On the declaration, there is a strong move to open it up. It is not good to do that, though some of your people may want to do so. The G-77 do not want to reopen it. As to the rest of the agenda, there is a majority on virtually all the big issues. There are many square brackets still but they do not involve major sticking point. I believe the financial issue is the big one. (U)

The fact that you are willing to go along with the GEF is good. The G-77 see it as not the only source of funds. They see other channels that can be used for money too, such as IDA. But, it is not a pledging conference. What the developing countries expect is a decent start. (U)

I believe your business community has not recognized the opportunities for them. You might want to form a task force to assess the opportunities for US business. There is a significant

array of opportunities that Japan will run away with if the U.S. does not try. If your advisors take a look, you will see formidable opportunities. (U)

The President: I am looking forward to the conference. How do the NGOs participate? (U)

UNSYG Boutros-Ghali: There is a meeting outside of the formal conference. (U)

Mr. Strong: A few will speak formally at the conference. (U)

The President: The timing of the conference is not good for us, but we will try to be constructive. What is the role of Olivia Newton John? She sent me a tape urging that I go to Rio. In the tape, she said she is a UN ambassador. (U)

Mr. Strong: She is a goodwill ambassador for UNEP (United Nations Environment Program). I am committed to making sure this decision to attend is a good one for you. We want it to be a positive investment for you. (U)

Ambassador Reed: How many heads of state are coming? (U)

Mr. Strong: There are 120 now but more will come since the President has announced his decision. (U)

The President: Maybe we can ask about timing to come? (U)

Mr. Strong: Whenever you decide to come, we will make sure you have what you need. (U)

The President: Is it better earlier or later? I cannot stay long. Would it be more helpful at the beginning or the end? (U)

Mr. Strong: The latter part is best from the point of view of maximum extent of your own influence and feedback here in the U.S., though I should not assume to comment on your domestic considerations. Friday and Saturday the 12th and 13th are the last working days and the 14th is a symbolic day. We are encouraging heads to come the last three days. Whenever you choose to come is fine. (U)

Many businessmen will be there. I am glad you met with the US Business Council. Japan uses half the level of energy as the U.S. to produce a unit. Japan believes a new generation of technology will be environmentally driven. You can turn your decision into something positive for business. (U)

The President: Mike Deland has such a council as you mentioned. (U)

Thank you all so much for coming. (U)

End of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Patrick Manning, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Sally Cowal, U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Patrick Manning, Prime Minister
Ralph Maraj, Minister of External Affairs
Wendell Mottley, Minister of Finance
Shastri Ali, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Trinidad and Tobago

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 12, 1992, 5:00 - 5:25pm DST
Oval Office

The President: How are you? It's been a long time since I've been to Trinidad and Tobago, but I remember the country very fondly. I did some drilling for an oil company in the mid-60s with Zapata Petroleum. We did some exploration drilling and then we drilled for a Venezuelan consortium. (¢)

I hope you feel relations are good between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago. We feel that way. I want to know if there are any problems. Anything you think that we should discuss, I would be very glad to do so. (¢)

Prime Minister Manning: Trinidad and Tobago is the jewel of the Caribbean. Economically it has done very well. The real problem is that of social and economic adjustment. This can come through a number of things. Our party was in opposition for five years. We had time to think, and we have come up with policies while we were in opposition, which we are now trying to implement. When we take over with our new economic policies, we are in harmony with that of the International Banks. We want to liberalize our economy and we want to encourage privatization. (¢)

The President: Did you take your case to the people? (¢)

Prime Minister Manning: Yes. But we were not as explicit as we needed to be. (C)

The President: Are both parties in the same area, economically? (C)

Prime Minister Manning: Yes. You have two references. One problem is the need for stability. We are looking for a partner. I wanted to ask you about a partner. (C)

The President: I'm not really an expert. You don't have enough production to utilize refineries to the full, and you want to bring in production. I don't know enough about it, but we should be able to find someone who would know. Is there a lot of oil available? Is production declining? (C)

Prime Minister Manning: Yes. AMOCO is drilling a well which will go down about 25,000 feet. The AMOCO production is all exported. (C)

Secretary Baker: What kind of an arrangement does the government have? (U)

Prime Minister Manning: It's a tax regime. (C)

The President: What sort of a percentage do you get? Do you get sort of a share? (C)

Prime Minister Manning: Well, it's like a tax. It sort of works out to 12 and 1/2 percent royalty. (C)

The President: How are other things going? You mentioned the World Bank. (U)

Prime Minister Manning: Well, we can always do better. We are going to have to liberalize our foreign exchange regime by the end of June. To do that, we have learned from other countries, not excluding Jamaica. We need a cushion. In larger terms, we need to manage the money we get from the Inter-American Development Bank, not because of impositions but we want to manage our change. They told us to talk with the International Monetary Fund. We hope to see flexibility there. We have managed the economy so that we don't need a standby. (C)

The President: I have a personal question. Are you an economist? You certainly sound as though you have a complete mastery of the financial situation. It sounds like you have a solid economic background, that is so important. We hear about the need for solid economic programs from the international financial institutions. We normally back their efforts. (C)

Prime Minister Manning: In a small country like Trinidad and Tobago, there are special problems. (C)

The President: How are you doing in the neighborhood? I understand you are taking over the Presidency of CARICOM. (C)

Prime Minister Manning: In July, we assume the Chairmanship. (U)

The President: Who is it now? (U)

Ambassador Cowal: Saint Kitts. It's interesting because the Commission will submit a report which will have revealing implications for CARICOM. (C)

The President: How many countries are in CARICOM? (U)

Ambassador Cowal: Thirteen. (U)

The President: How is Manley's successor doing in Jamaica? We had a very nice supper with him just before he left office, but I haven't seen much of what is going on in Jamaica since then. (C)

Prime Minister Manning: I haven't been too much involved in that. Their economic situation is a little different. I did live there for three years. (C)

Secretary Baker: What will happen with the Jamaat al Muslimeen? (C)

Prime Minister Manning: It looks as though they will be set free. (C)

The President: What would be the consequences of that? (C)

Prime Minister Manning: It would seem a little surprising. (C)

Secretary Baker: There was an amnesty granted. The question is whether to honor it? (C)

Foreign Minister Maraj: The question will go the Privy Council. We will have a judgment in the middle of the month. (C)

The President: How many people are in jail? (C)

Secretary Baker: One hundred fourteen. How much proof do you have of Libyan involvement? (C)

Prime Minister Manning: We aren't sure. We don't have facts on financial involvement. There has been training by the Libyans and there was talk of financing. (C)

One other subject I wanted to mention is drugs. I'm sure you are aware that our interdiction efforts have been successful. We are funding a program jointly. (C)

The President: Do you have a user problem, or is it just one of transport? We are still trying hard to improve our situation to reduce demand. We know that many people say that we are the problem, but we are trying very hard. We have good news to talk about on the young people, but bad news on the older people who

are addicted. There is great difficulty there in the addicted people from 30-35 years old. We just got a report saying that we are going the wrong way. (Ø)

Prime Minister Manning: We are proceeding on criminal investigations of this whole problem. We have a problem of the management in the security forces. We are seeking to remove all of the top management. They are not all at fault but we don't know who are and who aren't. (Ø)

The President: Well, if they are involved. (U)

Prime Minister Manning: Well, we don't know, but management is involved so we have to move. (Ø)

The President: That is tough, but positive action helps with Congressional support. I want you to know that we want to assist you in this situation. (Ø)

The conversation broke up at this point with an exchange of amenities. The President and the Finance Minister, who is a former olympic champion exchanged pleasantries about the track coach at Yale. The conversation ended on a very positive note.

-- End of Conversation --

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Patricio Aylwin Azocar, President of the Republic of Chile (6 pp.)	5/13/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (509)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Patricio Aylwin Azocar, President of the Republic of Chile (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

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The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor
Curtis Kamman, U.S. Ambassador to Chile
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American Affairs (Notetaker)
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

Patricio Aylwin Azocar, President of the Republic of Chile
Enrique Silva Cimma, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Patricio Silva, Ambassador to the United States
Carlos Ominami, Minister of Economy
Alejandro Foxley, Minister of Finance
Edgardo Boeninger, Minister and Secretary General of the Presidency
Carlos Portales, Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Carlos Bascunan, Chief of Staff to the President
Marcelo Trivelli, Advisor to the President
Estela Lorca, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 13, 1992, 10:35 - 11:30am DST
The Oval Office

The President: I was pleased to say publicly what I feel about President Aylwin and what a wonderful job he is doing. I was only half kidding when I told the Finance Minster that perhaps we could take some lessons on how to achieve a 6% growth rate. (C)

The American economy is beginning to get better. We haven't reached the level of consumer confidence we would like to see but there are indicators that we are turning the corner. We think the U.S. economy is recovering. The economic indicators suggest that things are moving in the right direction. (U)

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President Aylwin made his strong feelings on a free trade agreement known in the Oval Office. We want to work out language to say that this will take place. We need to say that we need to get the Mexican Agreement finished as well as work out language that will be satisfactory to the Chileans. We need to work this out. We remain committed to free trade and we are having a hell of a time with the GATT. I salute Carla Hills. She has worked so hard on this problem. They are reluctant to do what they must do (the Europeans and Japanese). But Carla Hills will be working on this and we are not yet there but we will keep working. I think that Carla is one of the most over-worked people in the Government. (Ø)

We had a discussion and I want to try to be helpful to the Chilean side. But I don't want to spook a skittish Congress. We can't get on to Chile until we finish with Mexico. But I think we can do it. I wish it were not an election year. But I'm not going to stop because of politics. If we can get agreement with Mexico, we will push it tomorrow. Some members of Congress don't feel that way. Some groups have come out with protectionism. We have stood up to them. But we won't get it through if we don't get the votes. Let's try to treat that by a statement, letting your people know that we want to go forward. (Ø)

But what I really wanted to do was to let you speak and tell us anything you would like to tell us. (U)

President Aylwin: Thank you Mr. President for giving us the ability to speak out frankly. You have done so much to foster good relations with Latin America. The Enterprise for the Americas is great. I would express appreciation for it, not just for Chile but for all of Latin America. It is a new opportunity. It's not the case of the old uncle giving out help to the nephew. It's more a case of a big brother in partnership with the younger brother. But two years have passed and still there is no fruit. Mexico will be the first, Chile comes second. It isn't that Chile isn't coming, but people will say that there is no response to Chileans' effort. Nothing gets done without overcoming obstacles. Washington and Jefferson wouldn't have made the progress they did if they hadn't overcome obstacles. I'm optimistic. We have talked with some Congressmen and we are ready to take on the challenge of your Congress. With frankness I would press the point again. I don't know if you would object to hearing from our Finance Minister on this? (Ø)

The President: No, I would be happy to hear. I like the fact that our conversations are very frank. (U)

Finance Minister Foxley: As you know, we have worked very closely for two years. We have cooperated in the Uruguay Round in GATT. We have found common ground regarding access to markets. We have taken positions very close to yours in the GATT. Mrs. Hills knows that for some time we have supported the Enterprise for the Americas at the very first. We were the first to support it. I was here. This is the first time when we have

an equal partnership and we feel an equal partnership for free trade. Free trade is the engine for growth. Half of our growth is related to trade. Trade is the key issue in Latin America and certainly the key issue in Chile. What we must do is reconcile traditional problems here with the perception in Latin America in time to act to support democracy. (b)(1) (b)(1) Everyone knows that we are waiting for a free trade agreement. Senator Bentsen said, regarding this very issue, things that were encouraging. He said he had no objection with fast track for Chile. If we could get the announcement under fast track then we would keep quiet until after the elections and then would go forward. What do you think of that? We think we could get bipartisan support in Congress. We have good relations with the AFL/CIO. (b)(1) (b)(1)

Chile and the United States have two complimentary economies. This will be the first free trade agreement under the Enterprise for the Americas. The NAFTA was before the Enterprise. In summary, we think that we can get support in Congress and the opposition would not say so publicly. This would have an economic effect throughout Latin America. (C)

The President: What about a statement? After Mexico comes Chile. A public statement. I could say that after NAFTA we would do Chile. I could commit the Administration to doing an agreement. We are for this. We see it as a plan we want to implement. But we don't want Congress to say "You are opening the flood gates" on GATT and on Mexico. They might say this. Let's see if we can make a statement. I say that we move forward with Chile after Mexico. (C)

Minister of Finance Foxley: Bentsen said he could say he would support notification within fast track. He thinks this would raise serious problems in Congress. A statement by you would be helpful but we don't think that is enough. We think that what is necessary is notification. That is what is needed to assure that agreement will be reached. If not, we have to start all over again. It is like saying we will think about it later. (C)

The President: You have seen what's happened in the last year. It has been tough to get a NAFTA. It has been difficult, very difficult for the U.S. to get a GATT Agreement. If you think we aren't trying, that is not a correct impression. Carla Hills is perhaps the most over-worked person in the Cabinet. The Cairns Group has been helpful and that is where we need to work even harder. We don't want too many balls in the air at the same time. I don't want to sound defensive, but I don't want to think that nothing has happened in two years. A lot of effort has taken place. Well, let's think about it. (C)

President Aylwin: I understand your viewpoint. We don't want to have conflicting approaches. I ask you to please look at the situation and only repeating what was said in the past is not substantial progress. Some formula which says within fast track but after Mexico. We are not saying to start. But we need to

get something on the fast track. If we can find a formulation of this kind we would be grateful. (¢)

The President: We will try to find a formulation and talk about it. But I have to see that something that you want doesn't derail what Chile wants. But we will try to work out something. We will see if we can find a formula to work out what Mr. Foxley explained. Perhaps we can try to work it out at lunch -- Secretary Baker and Carla could work it out. (¢)

As we try to work something out for Russia and Eastern Europe, I hope you don't think that there is a lack of interest in Latin America. Sometimes I worry that there is that perception. We think that successful support for Russia is good for the whole world. We are working hard with all emerging states. We want to be sure that there is not a return to the problems of nuclear war and other problems which we had before. But that doesn't mean that we aren't very interested in Latin America, because we are. I touched on your interest in Haiti, Peru and Venezuela. (¢)


On Haiti, speaking frankly, we are not admirers of Aristide on a personal basis. Our interest is to work with the OAS and get him back, as he represents the institution of democracy. I'm a little bothered that we are supporting a coalition with a former Communist. Are you of the same frame of mind? We are having trouble with the economic flow of refugees. We have all kinds of people wanting to go to the United States. The maximum reserve we have (in Guantanamo) is 12,000 people. Our main interest is in the restoration of democracy. (¢)

On Peru, he came up here and there was reference to the problems that he had. But our problem, created by his action is democracy. I told him that. He said that they want to have democracy but they have big problems in terrorism and the economy. He said that "I'm for democracy but I need to do something," and that 70% of the people support him. We have a dilemma. We want him to succeed in fighting terrorism and in developing the economy but if we sit back and do nothing now, this sends a very bad signal. And Venezuela with CAP is getting pressure from the military and this worries us. We are still worried about a possible coup in Venezuela. A lot of the problem is economic but we must support democracy, that is our view. What is yours? There is so much positive in the hemisphere in Argentina and Brazil and other areas. But we don't want to suggest in any way that we don't support democracy. (¢)

President Aylwin: We share the same concerns. In the OAS meeting at Santiago, we passed a resolution in defense of democracy. Haiti put it to the test. The measures so far have not worked as well as we hoped. (¢)

(b)(1)


(b)(1)



Secretary Baker: We have suspended aid but not all on narcotics aid. (C)


Foreign Minister Silva: (b)(1)

(b)(1)



The President: (b)(1)

(b)(1)



Are you going to the Rio Summit? (U)

President Aylwin: Yes. (U)

The President: How long will you be staying? (C)

President Aylwin: I don't know about the dates but I'll be there for several days and for the signing of the Protocol. (C)

The President: I don't know about the signing of the Protocol. I think that we are planning to be there about the same amount of time. (U)

Secretary Baker: My lunch is tomorrow and Carla has been invited. (U)

President Aylwin: We are having lunch in the Senate. (U)

Secretary Baker: Let me see if we can make a proposal. When we dealt with the Canadian Free Trade Agreement, one of the first, I was then in Secretary Brady's job. We went ahead with notification and we almost lost it right there. The Senate Committee voted 10/10 and almost turned it down. Our real concern is the House of Representatives. If we can, we want to negotiate a free trade agreement as soon as we complete the NAFTA and will notify the Congress at that time. As soon as NAFTA is over we would notify. (Ø)

Minister of Finance Foxley: We need all we can get. We may get an exemption on Chile. Or they say approve the trade bill and they will take away authority for Chile. (Ø)

The President: Where is Rostenkowski? (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: Real set against it. (Ø)

President Aylwin: We have a breakfast with him tomorrow. If there is no fast track authority we will have no agreement. (Ø)

The President: Let's see if we can't work something out. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Esko Aho of Finland

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mary Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
John Kelly, Ambassador to Finland
Jane E. Holl, Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff

Esko Aho, Prime Minister of Finland
Martti Ahtisaari, State Secretary
Jukka Valtasaari, Ambassador to the United States
Seppo Harkonen, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 13, 1992, 1:30 - 1:50pm
The Oval Office

The President: Well, how are things? (U)

Prime Minister Aho: Rather good. Much better than last year. Last year was really a bad situation. We only had 6% growth. It was terrible. The main reason was Russia. In 1990 our exports were 13% to the former Soviet Union. Last year, they were only 4% of our total exports. Now the situation is better -- twenty-two percent higher than the year before. A little bit better, but still a very difficult problem. (C)

The President: Our growth has been minuscule. The only thing that saved us was our exports. But our growth was terrible. That's what has caused the bad mood in this country. But we think it is turning around. (C)

Prime Minister Aho: The United States is very important for Finland. You are fourth in exports for us. As you know, we made a decision to buy your aircraft. It was a big decision for us. (C)

The President: Yes, we are pleased about that. Tell me, are you still worried about the refugee flow from the former Soviet Union? (C)

Prime Minister Aho: Well I did visit only a month ago a border station. They're not worried about refugees now. The border controls from the Russian side are working well. The situation is not now difficult. But if Russia fails in its reforms, we are facing a dangerous situation. We are also concerned about the safety of their nuclear power plants, especially the ones in St. Petersburg. It is very close to Finland. (C)

Secretary Baker: We'll be talking more about that problem in Lisbon. We're developing a program and others have programs. It takes a huge amount of money to fix those power plants up. (C)

The President: Did one of the republics just announce they were closing one of their plants and keeping it closed? (C)

General Scowcroft: Yes. Ukraine. They're closing the one at Chernobyl permanently. (C)

Prime Minister Aho: But they cannot live without nuclear power. We in Finland have invested a lot of our time and resources in power production. We have a great deal of investments in energy conservation. The western countries have to give assistance. We hope to gain international assistance for our programs. (C)

Secretary Baker: Will you be discussing this in Lisbon? (U)

Prime Minister Aho: Yes. Let me invite Mr. Ahtisaari to elaborate. (U)

Mr. Ahtisaari: We will definitely be speaking about energy saving enterprises and nuclear safety. We want to work with the Russians in all of these areas. (C)

Secretary Baker: Will you be teaching the Soviets? (C)

Mr. Ahtisaari: Yes and concentrating on improving the energy efficiency of their power production. (C)

Prime Minister Aho: We have budgeted for such a program. (C)

Secretary Baker: It will take big bucks to replace those plants. (C)

The President: How much? $20 billion? (C)

Secretary Baker: More like $5 billion. (C)

Prime Minister Aho: That's why it is important to get energy conservation programs underway. (C)

The President: We're working to get through Congress our end of the $24 billion program for Russia. We hope it will benefit Finland because if that economy gets moving, you will benefit because of the export relationship. We hear a lot from the Baltics and Ukraine and the others who say tell us not to forget

about them. I think we have a big stake in seeing this succeed. All free countries have a stake in seeing this through. What is your view? (Ø)

Prime Minister Aho: It's difficult to forecast. Last winter went better than expected. There was better than expected food production. (Ø)

The President: Yes, their food production was OK. But distribution was a problem. Storage was a problem too. They claim to be continuing to improve, however. (Ø)

Prime Minister Aho: But they still have a division of labor problem. They're dependent on the military for production and to bring in the harvests. There is a problem with the food supply. We've given assistance to St. Petersburg. How do you see the G7 Conference? (Ø)

The President: Well the one thing we'd like to see resolved is the GATT round so it doesn't end up taking all of our time there. Yeltsin will probably be there, like Gorbachev was last time. Other states want to be represented. We told Kravchuk that the reason Ukraine was not there is because we have a program with Russia that we want to talk about. The environmental conference will have already taken place, so we won't have too many of those issues to discuss. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: There will be discussions with respect to the former Soviet Union and economic aspects of the G7. Germany will be more concerned with inflation. But I'd like to flag one issue about Helsinki. We're hearing suggestions from the Baltics that they will block CSCE consensus if they don't get cooperation on getting the Russian troops out of their states. This issue is not really for CSCE -- it's not the way CSCE has functioned in the past. I think we need to find a way to work together particularly since the Baltics have not been as forthcoming with respect to CSCE principles. This is not an issue we want to come up in Helsinki. (Ø)

Prime Minister Aho: We are also worried about this issue. They have threatened not to sign the agreement. (Ø)

The President: All three? (Ø)

Prime Minister Aho: Yes. Your contacts with them are very important. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: But we believe that the Scandinavian contacts are very influential with them. We should work together on this. (Ø)

The President: Let me restate what we said earlier in our conversation that we are very pleased with your purchase of the American fighter. I'm confident you will find it measures up to your expectations. (Ø)

Prime Minister Aho: The technical qualifications are very high and the economic aspects together were the basis on which we made our decision. But I hope we can have a subsequent agreement. It is tough for our government now to go through with this investment. (C)

The President: We should work through this issue. Unfortunately I must get to Baltimore for a healthcare issue. Thank you for coming, I'm sorry our chat was so brief. I really did enjoy my last visit to Helsinki. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

May 26, 1992

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The Vice President
Karl Jackson
Robert Pines, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs
Jim Carman

Canada

Prime Minister Mulroney
Paul Heinbecker, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (foreign and defense policy)
Derek Burney, Canadian Ambassador to the U.S.
Don Campbell, Deputy Minister of International Trade

PLACE: Capitol Hill Ceremonial Office

TIME: 3:00 - 3:30 p.m.

DATE: May 21, 1992

Prime Minister: I understand you had a good trip to Japan. The last trip by President Bush did not go so well -- it seemed some of the people along with him had a different agenda.

Vice President: Yes, I think we had a good trip. However, Foreign Minister Watanabe didn't like businessmen going to the White House to complain. They are very sensitive about people trying to intimidate them. After the President became ill, there was a 12 hour news void and Iacocca et al stepped up to fill the void -- 90 percent of what they said

was positive, but the press focused on the small amount that was unfavorable.

On my recent trip Japan did commit to provide $400 million to Eastern and Central Europe. This is significant since they have no cultural or historical link to the region.

There will be no supplemental budget until this fall, so the trade deficit will go up -- leading to more negatives on Japan.

Prime Minister: We're losing market share in Japan. They're turning inward -- Germany is too, and the U.S. and Canada are suffering.

Turning to the regulatory environment, I see you're tightening up -- will any of this impact on arrangements Canada has with the U.S.?

Vice President: It shouldn't. It should make enforcement less burdensome. This is really a bureaucratic battle and should have no effect on you at all.

Prime Minister: What about your space station plans?

Vice President: The success of the Endeavor mission should be a big shot in the arm. Europe, Japan, and the U.S. are all committed to it, but it is a bit of a political issue; there is so much potential for other applications -- particularly in medicine.

There needs to be more to the space program than astronauts and shuttles. Sometimes, there is a need for unmanned vehicles. We have a great new Administrator who understands all this.

Prime Minister: You were just out in Los Angeles -- how bad is it?

Vice President: There are many social overtones from all of the minority communities (Blacks, Latinos, and Asians), but the biggest problem is the absence of males which contributes to a

breakdown in family values. These men assume no responsibility.

The gang business is out of control. Many of these people have no suitable male role model and look to the gangs as a source of family and stability. Many of the people who are trying to do good things in the community must also go to the gangs for assistance and support. Central to the whole issue is the breakdown of the family. Women in this situation have a better chance to make it.

Prime Minister: Is this a localized problem or is this prevalent in other big U.S. cities?

Vice President: It's endemic in big cities across the U.S., and it's because of the absence of males and an incoherent family unit. The growing Black middle class has a responsibility to become more involved and provide role models. I've met with many successful Black middle class. Their view is that it's not their problem -- they made it. They must become more involved.

Prepared By: James A. Carman

Approved By: Karl D. Jackson

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2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Mark Parris, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem
Zalman Shoval, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.

The President and Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek met in the Oval Office at 2:10 p.m. May 27

Pleasantries were exchanged.

Mayor Kollek: I didn't want to start out with gruesome things but the fact is there have been several deaths a month on average in Jerusalem over the last few years. Still it is an open city. Secular and religious Jews live side by side as do Arabs and Israelis. There is freedom of the press, assembly and worship. Several Cardinals who were recently here agreed that churches now operate more freely than at any time in history. We just opened a new library on the Arab side. The one thing I want to say, though, is that you do us an injustice when you mention the number of Jews settling in the Occupied Territories and include Jerusalem. I know we have our disagreements over the Occupied Territories but the fact is that while we enlarged Jerusalem, we did not take territory from Jordan. (ℓ)

I am here trying to attract investment. My own theory is that people should live among themselves. I don't believe in mixing the secular and the orthodox, different Christians, or having Israelis living in Moslem areas. I know I am swimming against the stream, but this is my view. (ℓ)

The President: We are not trying to highlight the question of Jerusalem. (ℓ)

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Ambassador Shoval: The problem the Mayor referred to was from a report sent by the State Department to the Congress (the Obey Subcommittee) which placed Jerusalem under the Occupied Territories. (U)

Mayor Kollek: My own personal view is that any policy by Israel that keeps 1.7 million Arabs under our rule is more dangerous for us than any border. (C)

President Bush: I know we have a big difference on loan guarantees but there is no point in highlighting it. We are not trying to exacerbate the situation by highlighting Jerusalem. We can look into the report you mentioned. Our own view is that we feel Jews have the right to live there. After the election we will try again on loan guarantees with whoever wins, but we are not trying to stir things up. I will say this, and I am not blowing smoke, your fairness has given you an ability to do things that others don't have. I saw it for myself when I was there. Your standing smooths pressures that cross political and religious lines. But again, I want to emphasize there is no policy here to stir things up in any way. (C)

Mayor Kollek: I have no sense that you are trying to do so. You may have inadvertently done so with your report. (U)

Richard Haass: The problem with the report from the Mayor's perspective is it grouped Jerusalem under the heading of Occupied Territories and did not treat it separately. (U)

Mayor Kollek: What would help is if you would find an occasion to praise the quality of life in Jerusalem. (U)

Richard Haass: We will find one where we can say something positive about reconciliation. (U)

The President: I agree. We should not let loan guarantees spill over and affect other issues -- especially, as I think we have a good record over all on things that matter to Israel. (U)

Mayor Kollek: I agree and have said so publicly that you have done tremendous things for us. (U)

Ambassador Shoval: The problem is that good news is no news. (U)

Mayor Kollek: I know that loan guarantees are a cause celebre. But the fact is that the last Jews are now leaving Ethiopia. I know what you did with the Russian Jews and the Zionism resolution. I am a man of Jerusalem so I come here today to plead Jerusalem's case. I will send you clippings of what I have said. (U)

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The President: We will be sensitive and careful not to exacerbate problems while you are masterfully handling a complicated situation. (C)

Mayor Kollek: If ever you come to visit you will see real progress. (U)

The President: How's the economy? (U)

Mayor Kollek: Not bad. Jerusalem is one place where real estate values are not declining. We are busy trying to absorb all the immigrants. Some Americans and Europeans are building second homes there and I am trying to attract industry. (U)

The President: Good luck. Thank you for your visit. I wish you well in your quest for investment. I will take to heart your gently made critique. Also, I'd like to see a copy of your citation from Yale. (U)

Mayor Kollek: I promise to send a copy of it and the clippings to you through our Ambassador. (U)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Telecon	Re: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (3 pp.)	5/28/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (513)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telecon with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Interpreter: No
Notetaker: Anthony Wayne, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 28, 1992, 7:58-8:11 a.m.
Camp David

The President: Ruud, how are you? (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Fine and you, George? (U)

The President: I am calling on the situation in Sarajevo. As you know we haven't been out front on this, but now we are very concerned. It sounds like the same is true for the EC from reading my morning papers on your meeting. I talked to Yeltsin and Major briefly yesterday. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, we discussed this yesterday. People here are much more motivated than a few months ago. The most important change is that France finally came to the conclusion that it cannot go on like this, despite France's historic ties to Sarajevo. Germany has always been willing to be active but faces the constitutional limits. Italy has made a very strong appeal to the European Council to be more active. John Major was the most hesitant. I think they, a bit like the U.S., consider it a problem of the continent. We came to the common position that we should organize our humanitarian aid and that we want the Security Council of the UN to do the most to give the possibility of action. Of course, this would be working with the U.S. I think Jim Baker's statement before the (EC) Council met made clear that the U.S. would not stand by. Then as you have heard, Mitterrand went to Bosnia. This was motivated by pressures from his population. He could no longer be seen as not doing anything. (S)

The President: We think we have got to act now. We have the feeling that we should take this into the UN and get a resolution that authorizes the use of all necessary means and of course tying this only to the humanitarian assistance situation.

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John Major is very hesitant and worried about a situation like Dien Bien Phu. We would be willing to do all possible on the air side -- airlift support, open the airport and if needed provide air cover. I wanted to get a sense of how forward-leaning you are. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Very much. Mitterrand did not want to get involved precisely because of the Dien Bien Phu example, but he was under a lot of pressure from his people. He'd received thousands of letters and felt he had to act. Major was hesitant, but with a lot of pressure from Italy and Germany and from us -- you know we're usually aligned with Britain -- so Major moved a little. All of this was influenced a little by a report from Lord Carrington. He concluded that it was impossible to come to any serious result with Milosevich. This had an impact with the U.K. The problem now is to do this the right way. (S)

The President: The next step is to go to the U.N. I am reluctant to put U.S. troops in. I don't think the parties want us to do so. But we have an enormous ability to support in the air transport area and to provide air cover, if needed. We also have a carrier tank force in the Mediterranean. But the first step is to act in the U.N., and I think Boutros Ghali is taking the same line on this. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Plus, George, this can have a good effect by showing the U.S. and Europe acting together. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) It will be good to have the U.S. defending the same idea as Europe, and maybe we can involve NATO in some way. (S)

The President: Yes, Jim Baker was thinking of perhaps coming to Europe. I do not know if it will happen for this, but perhaps for a GATT Ministerial. We'd like to try to do something on GATT before Munich. If he does, maybe he can meet on this, too. Are there any changes on GATT? (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: Yes, Major and Kohl were active on this in Lisbon. Things changed a little for the good. Delors is taking a more positive attitude with the British and Germans, and the situation with the French is a bit more relaxed now that Maastricht is through parliament and their farmers are a bit quieter. Delors is still hesitating. (b)(1) (b)(1) But Jim Baker, who seems to be taking the lead now, is so close that it is not impossible to find agreement. So we should take advantage of the opportunity of Jim being in Europe. Maybe if an agreement was reached and the conclusion reported to governments, people wouldn't say "no". But Delors is still hesitant. (S)

The President: You have been wonderful and I know people think we have been tough. But we want an agreement. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers: The problem has been on both sides. I'd say the chances of agreement are still less than 50 percent, something like 40 percent. But with luck and courage, it could happen, especially if we can get people (the Commission) to act with the authority they already have and then report back. (Ø)

The President: Many Thanks. (U)

Prime Minister Lubbers: All best wishes. (U)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Shin Kanemaru, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (3 pp.)	5/26/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (514)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WASHINGTON

May 26, 1992

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Shin Kanemaru, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The Vice President
Karl Jackson
Dana Marshall

Japan
Shin Kanemaru, Vice President, LDP of Japan
Ichiro Ozawa, Former Secretary General, LDP
Bunmei Ibuki, Deputy Secretary General, LDP
Takakazu Kuriyama, Ambassador of Japan to the U.S.
Nobuo Matsunaga, Former Ambassador to the U.S. and Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yutaka Kawashima, Deputy Director General, Bureau of North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hiroshi Suzuki, Interpreter

PLACE: Vice President's OEOB Office

TIME: 8:00 - 8:40am

DATE: June 5, 1992

VP: I understand you had a very good visit with the President, much longer than expected. This again shows the depth of our mutual friendship and respect.

K: I was touched by the heartwarming hospitality offered to me by the President. I take it as hospitality to the whole Japanese nation. Thank you for taking part in the 20th anniversary commemoration of the reversion of Okinawa.

It is interesting to compare this with the situation in the Northern Territories. In Okinawa, the U.S. lost lives, some 20,000 in occupying Okinawa, yet it was kind enough to return Okinawa. This drives home the friendship and love of the United States for Japan. For this, all of Japan is appreciative.

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There is a wide gap between this and the attitudes of the former Soviet Union.

VP: I recently briefed Yeltsin's chief of staff on my Tokyo trip. I mentioned the Northern Territories and compared it to Okinawa. They are aware of my trip, and the comparison.

K: I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to you and the President for sparing the time to meet with me. You must be very busy on the campaign. Most sincere good wishes for a victory.

VP: We all felt this [the VP's May trip to Tokyo] was a good trip. Most of the publicity was in the area of partnership and working together; commemorating the return of Okinawa, the Manufacturing Technology Initiative, cooperation in East Europe.

We did not publicly get into trade issues, but discussed them quietly. This is why we felt this was a good trip.

K: I agree with you.

Regarding my trip, I came here with my most solid conviction that U.S.-Japan relations are extremely important. Japan can't be what it is without the U.S. - but this does not hold vice-versa.

Japan's path to prosperity could not have happened without the U.S., without your material help and support for our self-defense, (b)(1) Japan would like to continue this relationship.

So I had talks with the President and you, hoping to reaffirm U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Now I can go back and say I did so.

VP: Good, that is very important.

I would like to make several points, first on the supplemental budget and the trade deficit. I would very much like the trade deficit not to be a factor in the election. But if it goes way up, our opponents will make it an issue.

It is important to conclude the GATT. There is some perception in Europe that we don't want it before the election, but that is not correct.

The third issue is on the inter-operability of our security forces, including the AWACS.

And, fourth, I hope we can get the details of the U.S.-Japanese cooperative program for Eastern and Central Europe settled before the Miyazawa visit.

K: On the first point, regarding the supplemental budget and Japan's economy, I understand that you raised this issue with the Prime Minister and the MITI Minister.

Today, Japan's economy is on a declining path; the role of politics is to bring that path to normal. We have increased public works and investment. We have done everything we can do.

It is necessary to have a supplemental budget, which will happen after the election of the House of Councillors. The Prime Minister shares this view with me. We are trying to expand domestic demand to help the U.S. recovery.

Regarding GATT and the Uruguay Round, this subject is much discussed in Japan. The President was very interested in it. It is natural that from the perspective of free trade, the Uruguay Round is very important.

All countries have particular problems with this; for Japan, it is rice.

When I met the President, he indicated his interest in this area to me. I'd like to make the utmost effort to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution. I would like to help solve the Uruguay Round before the President's election.

Regarding the third and fourth points: I was once Director General of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and I know well the importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and how it has contributed to Japan's prosperity today.

In terms of developing equipment or procuring equipment from the U.S., it is necessary to keep the idea of inter-operability in mind.

Regarding the AWACS, I understand that there are ongoing discussions with relevant agencies. I hope that these discussions will move smoothly.

Regarding Eastern Europe, there is some hope now. The President said, regarding Russia, that he doesn't want to throw money out the window but wants to use money in the best way. But if Russia goes back to the status quo ante, this would put a burden on Japan. Japan must shoulder an appropriate share of assistance.

And, to end, I would like to reiterate the first and foremost objective of my trip - my conviction that the solid foundation of U.S.-Japan relations - the security treaty - provides for Japan's prosperity and for mutual assistance.

I wanted to reaffirm that the two countries can cooperate, based on this solid foundation.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Brundtland of Norway (5 pp.)	6/7/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 2/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (515)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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4400

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Brundtland of Norway (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Arnold Kanter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mary Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs, NSC Staff

Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister
Kjeld Vibe, Ambassador
Svein Roald Hansen, State Secretary
Morten Wetland, Director General

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0650-MR
SCS 3/1/11

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 7, 1992, 10:46 - 11:21 am
The Oval Office

(Continuing discussion begun during press availability about the Rio conference)

Prime Minister Brundtland: It is a big event and is off to a good start. The UN Secretary General gave a good statement. I had a nice talk with him. (U)

The President: A bilat ? (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: It turned out to be. (U)

The President: I wondered how the schedule works down there. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: I went over the main issues in my remarks. What we feel is there is a combination of responsibilities to explain how we got where we are. There are non-sustainable patterns of consumption which we have to change, partly by technology. That's why we are changing our approach to nonrenewable resources. I know you are not happy about the CO2 tax, but I think a working taxation system could be made responsible. It could be used to discourage the wasteful use of resources. (Ø)

The President: We've got a different system. Our states primarily depend on taxing hydrocarbons, such as gas, to meet their budgets. The Federal government also taxes. I am very sensitive to the shortage of funds our states have and therefore

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very reluctant to add to the hydrocarbon tax. We think alternative sources are a better answer. We think technology is a better answer. Of course I am burdened with an economy in difficult shape. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: I see that. That's why I'm discussing that on a long-term basis. After the election year here, and when your economy is doing better, then we can consider a taxation system to provide economic incentives and disincentives. (C)

The President: I can't argue your fundamental point. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: This is the kind of thing we are doing in Norway. We have a $20 per barrel tax on fuel oil. (C)

The President: $20 per barrel? A barrel of Texas crude sells for $18 to $20. So you are doubling it? (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: This is for domestic use; it is a consumption tax. It is also an incentive for Norwegians to buy smaller cars. (U)

The President: How do they feel about nuclear power? (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: We have electricity based on water power, so we don't don't need nuclear. With the infrastructure required, it would not be a good idea for such a small country. But everyone uses fossil fuels, and we have to realize consumption and production patterns must change. With research we can change to alternative sources. (C)

The President: We are putting a fair amount into battery technology. I was driving around in an electric car the other day; this has enormous promise. We are also working on ethanol and methanol and also natural gas, of which we have an enormous amount. A lot of environmentalists say wind power has a lot of possibilities, but solar seems to have better potential. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Economies can grow in an environmentally responsible way. Japan and Germany, for example, have become more efficient, and their economies are growing. The other issue I raised in my opening statement was financing. The developing world is combining its resources, but additional financing has to come from the OECD states. The initiative by former Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita is a good one. In the meeting he referred to a target of .7 of GDP to be met in the 1990's. This would be needed to have Agenda 21 implemented and provide basic sanitation, health and sustainable development. The bill would not be enormous in the long term. Norway is at 1.1 today. The OECD average is .34. To go from .34 up to .7 in the 1990's is achievable. We should try in 1993 to reach a level of $10 billion to try to implement Agenda 21. (C)

The President: How did you handle GEF? (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Norway's position is to build on that. We need a forum for those in the Convention to have a say in how the money is used. I think it is workable. We can find a compromise. I also addressed the population question. We are burdening the carrying capacity of the globe. (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

The President: Let me tell you something you don't know. We are spending more on family planning than ever before. I don't like the UN approach, (b)(1) (b)(1) but for international family planning our administration is spending more on AID than ever before. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: I think, Mr. President, it is possible to improve the text of conference without coming close to what you are talking about. The fight against poverty is also part of the issue. (C)

The President: When I was at the UN I argued the same thing. The developing countries, said don't tell us about family planning. Their view was, more population means more production. They think we're trying to assign them to a lower level of growth. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Attitudes are changing. (U)

The President: Let me raise another subject. We normally don't spy on Prime Ministers from friendly countries, but we made an exception in your case. We had a spy -- the wife of one of our colleagues -- in the audience when you spoke at Harvard. She said you were very well received. (C)


Prime Minister Brundtland: I spoke about the challenge to democracy of technological changes and how we need to widen and deepen our democratic strength, including across borders. The reference in the Gettysburg address to accountability presupposes that leaders are in control of events. But leaders are not in control anymore because the world is too interdependent. We are at the crossroads of democratic accountability. Therefore we need an improved, gradual global governmental element so we can tell people what we have done with other countries. You have spoken about a new world order. I said we need collective engagement to mobilize the forces of democracy. I also took up the question of population growth and women. In developing countries, women are patronized. They are not given access to family planning services. (C)

The President: Your speech got a positive response in the New York press. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: I am glad. It is the kind of speech one thinks over for years. (U)

The President: We have been following the Danish referendum. What do you think about it? (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: (b)(1) (b)(1)



The President: Will they have another referendum? (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Some politicians think so, but they will be careful. (U)

The President: Did the vote break down by parties? (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Not really. The extreme left and extreme right make trouble, but the conservative and labor parties are behind unification. As you saw in the UK, Mrs. Thatcher represents the extreme opposition to Major on the right of his party. This makes it difficult for center, but it is good that there is bipartisan support. (C)

The President: I have to break off soon to meet the Russian Ambassador to talk about the Yeltsin visit. It is a complex question -- how to help him move toward democracy and market reform. The IMF is pushing him harder. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: One should probably listen to the person who has to actually make the decisions. (C)

The President: But how far to push? If they don't go far enough, the $24 billion disappears. We want to help, but it is not an easy sell for the American people. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Senator Mitchell says that 80-90% of his constituents are opposed. (C)

The President: Yes. We are resisting but it is not easy. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: You have to; world leadership has to be focused from Washington. (U)

General Scowcroft: Your speaking out on this is very important. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan (3 pp.)	6/9/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SCS (NLGB) on 7/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (516)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

RESTRICTION CODES

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft
Douglas Paal, Notetaker

Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Foreign Minister
Kenzo Oshima, Minister of Political Affairs
Kenji Shinoda, First Secretary for Political Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 9, 1992, 4:46 - 5:10pm EDT
Brent Scowcroft's Office

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: I will be brief. I have a new request for your government on Japanese - U.S. relations. First, however, I would like to make two points. Mr. Kanemaru and Mr. Ozawa returned to Japan in a very happy mood from their visit to Washington. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: I am very pleased that worked out well. (U)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: The Prime Minister also was very pleased at the President's reception for Mr. Kanemaru. (U)

General Scowcroft: Thank you. The President was very happy to receive them. (U)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: The Prime Minister is coming at the end of the month. The agenda is now being discussed between the Japanese Embassy and the State Department. The Prime Minister wishes among other things to have a one hour tete-a-tete, with a very limited group present. Although we are proposing this agenda for you separately, I estimate that the Prime Minister wishes to discuss [redacted] (b)(1) and issues related to it as well as the Asian Pacific region and Japan's role in the region. We expect some economic problems might be raised by the U.S. side. They would not be specific trade issues but matters of general economic policy. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: That's reasonable. (U)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees it, the main objectives of the visit will be to reconfirm the Global Partnership and adjust our policies in advance of the G-7 Summit. (Ø)

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2009-0650-MR
BK 3/1/11

General Scowcroft: Exactly. (U)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: Today I have met with Robert Zoellick, Arnie Kanter, and Dennis Ross, all this afternoon. I made to them a particular proposal, so I won't go into details with you. (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

General Scowcroft: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) (C)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

General Scowcroft: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

General Scowcroft: One thing that we see is that Yeltsin is becoming worried about his opposition. We are seeing this in the backing away from the economic reforms, in the backing away from arms control measures. It sounds like this is part of the same thing. (C)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

General Scowcroft: The President will do that. Yeltsin is presently quite desperate for investment. The President can point out this barrier to Japanese investment. This is a way for Yeltsin to show progress. The argument is powerful. The President will make these points when Yeltsin visits next. (C)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)

General Scowcroft: He is not at all happy with the aid so far. He is not happy with the $24 billion package, because he says he has not seen any of it. He doesn't understand how the IMF works. Some educating needs to be done. We'll have this opportunity and a chance at the end of the Economic Summit. (C)

Deputy Foreign Minister Saito: I should have said at the beginning that the next few months are critical. The Foreign Minister will go to Moscow again and Yeltsin will come to Japan and there is a possibility that the Prime Minister will go to Moscow, then Yeltsin will come to Japan in July next year. We will also host the coordinating conference on the CIS and then we will host the Economic Summit. (C)

General Scowcroft: The President and he will have a good chance to talk. (C)

----- End of Conversation -----

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18. Talking Points	Re: Points to be made to the Russian side (4 pp.)	6/9/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Donated Historical Materials
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed: 1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:** 91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**
Re-review Case #:	**Appeal Disposition:**
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	**Disposition Date:**
AR Case #:	**MR Case #:**
AR Disposition:	**MR Disposition:**
AR Disposition Date:	**MR Disposition Date:**

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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I. Yalta Agreement, signed at Yalta Conference, 11 February 1945

The leaders of the three Great Powers--the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain--have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

3. The Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

II. Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia, signed at Shimoda, 26 January 1855

Article 2

The border between Japan and Russia shall run henceforth between Etorofu Island and Urup Island. Etorofu Island belongs entirely to Japan, and Urup Island as well as the other Kurile Islands situated in the north of the said island belong to Russia. As for Karafuto (Sakhalin) Island, it remainds, as in the past, undivided between Japan and Russia.

III. Treaty of exchange for Karafuto (Sakhalin) Island for the group of the Kurile Islands, signed at St. Petersburg, 25 April 1875

Article 1

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, for himself and his heirs, concedes to His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russia the part of the territory of Karafuto (Sakhalin) Islands, which he possesses at present, with all the rights of sovereignty arising from the possession, so that henceforth the said Karafuto (Sakhalin) Island entirely and integrally shall belong to the Emperor of Russia and that the border between the Empires of Russia and Japan in the region shall run through La Perouse channel.

Article 2

In exchange of the transfer to Russia of the rights to Karafuto (Sakhalin) Island, set forth in the Article 1, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russia, for himself and

his heirs, concedes to His Majesty of Japan the group of islands called the Kuriles, which he possesses at present, with all the rights of sovereignty arising from the possession, so that henceforth the said group of the Kuriles shall belong to the Emperor of Japan. This group is composed of the 18 islands named below: (1) Shumushu, (2) Alaid, (3)Paramushir, (4) Makanrushi, (5) Onekotan, (6) Harimukotan, (7) Ekarma, (8) Shiashkotan, (9) Mushir, (10) Raykoke, (11) Matua, (12) Rasshua, (13) the islands of Sredneva and Ushishir, (14) Ketoy, (15) Shimshir, (16) Broton, (17) the islets of Tcherpoi and Brat Tcherpoieff, and (18) Urup, so that the border between the Empires of Russia and Japan in the region shall run through the channel which is situated between the Cape Lopatka of Kamchatka Peninsula and Shumushu Island.

IV. Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia, signed at Portsmouth 5 September

Article 9

The Imperial Government of Russia concede to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and in full sovereignty the southern part of Sakhalin Island and all the adjacent islands, as well as all the public facilities and proprieties which are situated there. The 50th parallel of the northern latitude is adopted as the limit of the conceded territory. The accurate borderline of the territory shall be determined in accordance with the disposition in the Additional Article II annexed to this Treaty.

Japan and Russia agreed mutually not to construct in their respective territories on Sakhalin Island and adjacent islands neither fortifications nor military facilities. Similarly they agree not to take any military measures which could hinder the free navigation in La Perouse Strait and Tartar Strait.

V. Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951

Article 2

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Guillermo Endara, President of Panama [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (7 pp.)	6/11/92	(b)(1), (b)(6)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By Scs (NLGB) on 7/20/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92 - 6/17/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2009-0650-MR (518)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	3/1/2011

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Guillermo Endara, President of Panama (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Samuel Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Deane Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to Panama
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Guillermo Endara, President of Panama
Boyd Guillermo Ford, Second Vice President of Panama
Julio Linares, Foreign Minister
Jaime Boyd, Ambassador to the United States
Gilberto Guardia, Administrator, Panama Canal Commission
Menalco Solis, Executive Secretary, National Defense Council
Joaquin Franco, Presidential Advisor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 11, 1992, 11:45am - 12:20pm
Presidential Palace, Panama

President Endara: We want to welcome you very warmly. And we want to thank you for all the help you have given us. We needed it. And we have used it well, I think. We want to thank you for your help in developing our democracy. The democratic experience is working well -- too well! We have a major goal in our government -- it is to have a good transition between today and the year 2000. We want to be sure that the transition will be smooth. We have had a lot of help and we don't want to ask for more aid from you but rather from the international financial institutions. (C)

The President: All I want to say to start is that I very much appreciate the warm welcome that you gave us. For me it is a very moving experience. I was very pleased to see people all along the way who seemed very positive about our visit and showed friendship for the U.S. I salute you. (C)

If you could give me your formula for achieving a 9.3 growth rate, I would be very pleased. (Laughter) But seriously, we are

plugging along and I think our economy is picking up. But you certainly have an outstanding growth rate. (C)

What I will say in the Plaza today is that we will fully comply with the terms of the treaty. I think that an American President should say that. The main thing is to thank you. How are our plans for departure going? (C)

President Endara: We are very worried about the situation in Europe, where bananas are being discussed and there is a problem of discrimination. We are worried about the attitude of some of the Europeans. There is a GATT meeting on June 19. (C)

The President: I certainly understand what you have said. I had a meeting with Caribbean leaders. We urged that they seek to solve their problems through tariffication. We are on your side, the side of free trade, because if there is a quota for bananas, then there will be a quota for rice, and a quota for a great many items, and the GATT Agreement would be in jeopardy. We have told the European heads about our opinion. We discussed this in our meeting with John Major. The European Community knows our position. I told the President of Honduras this and want to tell your people the same thing. We must find a way to help these small Caribbean economies, and not have their markets diminished, but it should be through tariffication and consistent with GATT. (C)

President Endara: I would like to have Vice President Ford to talk about aid. (C)

Vice President Ford: Thank you very much. We have said for over a year that what we are trying to do is to rejuvenate democracy. It is not easy. Regaining democracy, it is difficult and so is keeping it and ensuring it, and we appreciate the help you have given us. We don't want to go to the United States to ask for more aid, but we think that the international financial institutions should be able to come to more speedy solutions and have easier terms. They are not reaching us fast enough. We have paid a billion in back payments but we need to get more money dispersed. We need to get the message to the IFI's that they need to find out how to get funds dispersed quicker. (C)

The President: Are they asking you to do more? (C)

Vice President Ford: We have done the things that they ask. The problem is that it takes the IFI's too long to get things going. They have been good and we have to comply with privatization. The message should be to help all of Latin America. (C)

The President: That's a good message. Maybe we can help with some of the IFI's. (C)

President Endara: Regarding the reversion of territories. We have a law which says we must have a master plan. We think we can have this plan in ten months. We are very anxious to get to work on this. (C)

The President: Are you happy with the way we are working with you on the Canal? (Ø)

President Endara: We are very happy. We have been very gratified. You have given us a lot of help from everyone, especially General Joulwan. (Ø)

The President: We want to help, to continue working with you. There should be good economic opportunity coming from the steps you have taken. We salute you. (Ø)

President Endara: We understand that there is need for us to comply with conditions for aid programs. (Ø)

The President: How are you moving with the Congress on privatization? (Ø)

President Endara: The law is there. We expect to get it passed before the end of the month. We have been moving on privatization and have had some good experiences, but we need to do more. (Ø)

The President: It has worked in other countries. It has been very successful for Mexico and Argentina. (Ø)

What are your main problems? Is it unemployment? (Ø)

President Endara: Yes, it is high. The progress of 9.3% growth is very good and we have a tentative figure of 11% for the first quarter. (Ø)

The President: Doesn't that promote growth in employment? (Ø)

President Endara: Not enough yet. I have been meeting with business groups -- they have been treated well. We have a man who lost a lot of money, in Operation Just Cause, so they weren't happy. (Ø)

The President: In our country, although the economy is improving, employment is slower to improve. It is a major challenge for me. We are trying to get our Congress to stimulate investment and growth. We are having an experience not totally different from your problems. (Ø)

I am a little more optimistic than many. I talked with Alan Greenspan yesterday. He is more optimistic than most. I hope he is right. He thinks there will be brisk movement in the second quarter. There is a problem with perceptions of our people. They have lost some confidence. So we are linked with you all. (Ø)

How is the fight against narco-traffickers going? Are we helping? (Ø)

President Endara: Oh yes. It is a big fight, we are making progress. We have a lot still to do. We need to keep our

banking system clean. We think we can. We need more effort on that. (C)

The President: Money laundering? (C)

President Endara: Yes. We still have a lot to do. We need more effective efforts. (C)

The President: I want you to know we are proud of what you are doing. We know we provide a key market for drugs in the U.S. I want to assure you that we are doing all we can, not only on interdiction and education, but also on reducing demand. I always tell our friends to the south that we know we are producing the demand, that we are part of the problem. We are very sensitive to this and want to reduce it and we are working hard on it. (C)

The trouble is when we are successful in interdiction they look for other routes and find other ways to operate. We are cooperating with you. How do you see the problem? Do you have a problem of use with your kids? I would like you to know that we want to help. (C)

President Endara: We are starting to have a problem. (C)

The President: Cocaine? (C)

President Endara: Yes, and some heroin. I've been following it closely. We are waiting for the ratification of the MLAT. We are working with other countries also. We have similar agreements with other countries, such as Colombia and England. (C)

The President: We hope that the Senate will ratify the MLAT soon, this summer. (C)

Vice President Ford: We hope the Senate does not come up with unhelpful amendments, like the DeConcini Amendment. (C)

We are committed to fighting this problem. I was shocked to see that we have a great increase in cash flow, an increase in the money supply. We don't know why -- and I don't like the trend. We have to watch this, to investigate it thoroughly. There is a large flow of money in the free zone; 25% of the free zone business is in cash. We don't like this, don't like the trend. (C)

The President: The narco-traffickers could be using this. First we want MLAT, which will demonstrate our cooperation. (C)

How do you think President Gaviria in Colombia is doing? Is he having trouble with the Cartels? There are stories that the Medellin jailings are not very effective. (C)

President Endara: No, he is doing good. He is going in the right direction. Noriega was working with them (narco-

traffickers) and we had a dictatorship of arms and narcotics. (C)

The President: We have great respect for Gaviria and what he is trying to do. But we have heard that he put narco-traffickers in jail, but that they operate from jail. Gaviria says this is not happening. I was wondering if you are seeing the effect of his efforts. (C)

Executive Secretary Solis: I think other people are taking over from the people in jail. We have evidence that the narcotics business in Colombia is very much alive. (C)

The President: He probably knows that. I think Gaviria is a dedicated man, but it's just very hard. We are running into situations like in Los Angeles, where people are shocked to learn that the gangs are involved. We see that gangs like the Crypts and the Bloods are into narcotics. We are mounting an offensive against the gangs but it is difficult. We have made pretty good progress in reducing demand among teenagers, but not so much progress concerning addicts. (C)

Vice President Ford: We see the corruption. The situation was worsening in our schools. Now we are making some progress. (C)

The President: Let me ask about Noriega. Do most people here think he got a fair trial? (C)

President Endara and Others: Yes! Most people who followed the trial recognized that he got a very good defense. Of course, the dignity battalions are still in his favor. (C)

The President: Are they still active? (C)

Executive Secretary Solis: Our FBI is watching them. We have some suspicions that they are still active. (C)

Vice President Ford: We think that the guy who was after me (during the demonstration in 1989) may be the one who was involved in killing the Americans. We want to get him. (C)

The President: What did he (Noriega) do for them? The dignity battalions. (C)

President Endara: He paid them big money and he let criminal activity go unpunished and criminals go free. (C)

The President: I didn't know ... (C)

Vice President Ford: His sentencing will be on July 10, which is a black day, black Friday. A day of our fight. It will be a celebration that day [redacted] (b)(1) (C)

The President: Does he have family here? (C)

President Endara: No, he doesn't have family in Panama now. His wife was caught shoplifting in the U.S. His other "wife" is in Panama. Did you see him on CNN? (C)

The President: I think he dropped her from the scene. (C)

President Endara: He already had a new mistress. (C)

Vice President Ford: (b) (6) (b) (6)

The President: You have done well with your police institution. (C)

President Endara: Yes. We have created a real organization. We have turned a military organization into a police force. We are not 100%, but we have gone a long way. Progress is slow. We are retraining people, and we have to teach them that they should not act like they were acting before. (C)

The President: Are they the same people who were in the police before, retraining? (C)

President Endara: Some, not all. ICITAP has done a good job of training many. (C)

Executive Secretary Solis: We have about a thousand people who have been trained by ICITAP in a new institution -- about 10% of the force and about 90% of the force has been retrained. (C)

The President: Who do they report to? (C)

President Endara: To the Minister of Government and Justice. I am the Chief of Police. (C)

The President: Is that separate from the Army? (C)

President Endara: No, we have no army. (C)

The President: What do you do about the Navy and the Coast Guard? (C)

President Endara: We have a small Navy and we are looking to you for help. (C)

Chief of Staff Skinner: Under our system, the Coast Guard reports to the Department of Transportation. We have had several boats, maybe we could work something out. (C)

The President: I remember a ceremony at the Coast Guard Academy where the Panamanian participant could not have his national anthem played because we thought it would be bad because of Noriega. I always felt sorry about that young man. I always wanted to do something. We still can. (C)

Mr. Pryce: I think you did send him a letter. (U)

Mr. Franco: I want to make a point. I am a member of a Canal advisory group and wanted to say that we expect to get a law which will help us in the transition. We will go to a new Canal Commission. All regulations will be ready in six weeks. We are working on a commission, then there is another commission. (Ø)

President Endara: Maybe you would like a report from the Canal Administrator? (Ø)

The President: Yes. (U)

Canal Administrator Guardia: I feel we are doing very well. We are looking at an aging Canal but a modern one. We have a 15-year modernization program which means we are looking beyond the day when we will take over the Canal. So the day of transition will just be another day. The Canal is modern even though it is old. The traffic has been fairly flat, although there is an increase in tonnage. The mix of the ships is changing. We are getting a larger number of "Panamax" ships, which are the biggest which will go through the Canal. We projected 2% a year growth. We have approved a resolution by the Board to cooperate in every way with Panama regarding the transition. We have been involved in a lot of briefings with various sectors in Panama, telling them what the Canal is about. And we have been working faithfully for a positive changeover. Now we are operating under the law 9670 and a whole body of U.S. legislation. We have to look to Panama on key issues to keep the Canal functioning and we need proper legislation in Panama to assume control of the process. At some point we may want your help to advise us on this. But things are going well. (Ø)

The President: That's progress. Thank you very much for that very succinct report. (Ø)

Vice President Ford: I want to make a final statement. We are very bullish about Panama. We're committed to democracy. There are problems, but the problems are not as big as they were. We will not miss this opportunity. And Deane Hinton, your Ambassador, is wonderful. And AID is cooperating with us to a great degree. (Ø)

President Endara: Yes, we very much appreciate all that you are doing with us. (Ø)

The President: I want you to know once again that I salute you for what you have been doing and for what you are doing. You are getting democracy going again; and we want to help.

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Expanded Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on Military and Security Issues

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert S. Strauss, Ambassador to the Russian Federation
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for International Security
Dennis Ross, Director for Policy Planning, Department of State
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff
John Gordon, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, NSC Staff
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Dmitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Boris Yeltsin, President
Yevgeniy Gaydar, First Deputy Prime Minister
Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Pavel Grachev, Minister of Defense
Vladimir Lukin, Ambassador of Russia to the U.S.
Viktor Ilyushin, First Assistant to the President
Yuri Petrov, Chief of the Presidential Administration
Yuriy Skokov, Secretary, Security Council
Dimitriy Ryurikov, Assistant to the President
Yuliy Vorontsov, Adviser to the President
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vyacheslav Kostikov, Press Secretary

Georgiy Berdennikov, Deputy of Foreign Affairs
Nikolai Spassky, Notetaker
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 16, 1992, 2:30 - 4:10pm
Cabinet Room

The President: Mr. President, this is our first expanded meeting with our top teams. I want to begin by saluting you and your Administration. We are extraordinarily grateful for your visit and the positive steps that we just announced on arms. I am also grateful for the positive information on American POWs. This is a two-way street. If we can help with your Afghanistan prisoners of war, we will do so. We do not have much influence there, but we understand it is a major concern of yours and we will do as much as we can. I salute what you are doing at home. This is a meeting on security concerns -- but we have already taken care of the most important issues. I would invite you to take the floor. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Mr. President. Together, you and I have just announced decisions of historic and unparalleled importance. We had the political will to close on these agreements, in contrast to the old dogmas, and we agreed with each other calmly and serenely. The ceilings -- 3,000 to 3,500 -- are low but realistic. We need to think now of the manner by which we can put them into practice. (S)

I would request that you consider allocating some funds to us for targeted investments to assist in nuclear disarmament, including at Arzamas 16, Chelyabinsk 70 and Sverdlovsk 45. These are the three major plants for nuclear missile production. I believe we must assure that strategic missiles are dismantled only by experts. This will also increase job opportunities there. (S)

We employ roughly 40,000-50,000 men at each. I have visited them all. Together, we will use the $400 million to build storage facilities at the three and to store dismantled uranium and plutonium. We will have to think together to produce a common technology to recycle uranium and plutonium as fuel for power plants. Our scientists have done some work on this and we have design facilities. We have agreed with Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan that destruction will start first in their countries during stage I. Stage II destruction will be mainly in Russia. (S)

I may say to your Congress that -- and Grachev can affirm this -- to demonstrate our political bona fides, we have begun to dismantle our SS-18 heavy missiles and to remove them from alert status. On our heavy bombers, 100 of them will be converted to conventional purposes. We will exchange letters of guarantee on this -- this is a pledge from me to you. (S)

~~SECRET~~

We have agreed that the SS-24s and Peacekeepers will retain their old platforms, even if there is downloading -- it would be too expensive otherwise. Baker and Kozyrev will exchange letters on that. (S)

The great progress we made is no surprise to our delegation. We had worked on this confidentially back home -- the range of 3,000-3,500 in the second stage with each country free to choose its level. I want us to discard the notion that great powers must have nuclear weapons -- because greatness depends on culture, on wealth, living standards. This is how we will compete in the future and the basis upon which we can assist each other. (S)

We will also sign an agreement on a global shield to protect against some other countries. We will not fight each other. But there may be other crises, like the Gulf crisis, and we must have a way to safeguard against them. (S)

The President: If there are no other questions, I would like to move down the agenda. I feel that we are close to a Chemical Weapons Convention and I want to bring it to a close this summer. We are ready to do so. At Camp David, we talked about a new security relationship. We should establish more vigorous and regular consultations. I like the concept of our top defense people getting together. We have asked Dennis Ross to chair a group for this purpose. I think military exchanges are a good idea. I am all for that, and it can help to avoid misunderstandings. (S)

Secretary Cheney: Mr. Grachev and I will meet tomorrow to discuss an expansion of our military contacts. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, in this context, let me add: we have a strong Navy in Russia. At the end of World War Two, the Germans sank chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea. These containers are now rusting and, in a matter of years, there could be a catastrophe and a big impact on our civilization. If the our two navies could work out a joint project to destroy those chemical agents, this would be an important achievement. (S)

The President: I may have misspoke on the Chemical Weapons convention. You said this morning that it would be ready by fall. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, by fall. To be candid, this is a purely financial issue, not political. I don't need much money to destroy the biological weapons, but I do need money for chemical weapons destruction. It is just a question of time. We tried to build plants to destroy chemical weapons in several cities, but people objected. They didn't want them there. I wanted to build in three places and failed. But we will sign the agreement. (S)

~~SECRET~~

The President: We know exactly what you are talking about. We had a similar problem on Johnston Island. We should cooperate on these technical problems. (S)

With your permission, let's touch on Space. We will sign an agreement tomorrow. We will support your bid to launch one of the Inmarsat satellites -- this is an exception to our policy. Before additional launches, we will need agreement on international launch guidelines -- this is a highly sensitive question. (S)

NASA is studying the Soyuz emergency recovery vehicle. This is a potentially very rich area for work. I know of your interest in space. Our Vice President is Chairman of our National Space Council and will discuss this with you tomorrow. (S)

President Yeltsin: I will be at the Air and Space Museum today. (U)

The Vice President: As the President indicated, the Space agreement is a major step forward. On Inmarsat, I would like to emphasize how sensitive this is. We are ready to set a date for a Russian Cosmonaut to ride on the Space Shuttle -- in November 1993 and this will hopefully include a spacewalk. This will help us here at home to prove the relevance of space. I hope we can agree on a schedule for our Astronauts to travel on Mir in 1993, especially for life sciences data. We want to work in space as partners. Finally, we want a docking rendez-vous between the Shuttle and Mir in 1994 -- that will really demonstrate our partnership and our interest in Space. I want to congratulate both of you on this agreement. This is new -- it won't replace the arms deals -- but it is new and speaks to the next frontier. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Mr. Vice President, thank you and I appreciate your views. I think you omitted one point -- a joint mission to Mars. (S)

The Vice President: We have no problem in trying to get to Mars -- 50 years after the Moon landing is our aim. That could be 2019. (S)

The President: Are you suggesting more consultations on a long-range program to Mars? (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I think the draft agreement should include some provision about our joint preparation for Mars. We should not compete to get there first. We should cooperate. We don't care about competition. We should do it together and add a clause to the Space agreement to that effect. You have unique experience, and we do too. (S)

The President: I don't know who is taking the lead on this. (S)

The Vice President: I haven't seen the final language. In our agreement, we wanted to discuss specific programs. On Mars, we face spending cuts and there are some political and technical problems in getting too specific. But we are moving forward together. But we are not ready to get too specific on Mars yet. (S)

President Yeltsin: Still, Mr. Vice President, I thought we could agree on a flexible formulation, subject to funding. We could say that we intend to make a joint effort on Mars. We should express our willingness to do this. Let's join together. (S)

The President: Let's get some language on this such as "explore ways to work together on Mars." (S)

On the proliferation of weapons, we share a goal on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have a new Moscow Center on Science and Technology. We should continue to stem proliferation in other areas -- Korea, the Middle East. We need your leadership. I would be interested in working on all that. We have some problems with China on that. I would urge you to join a consensus -- it may be difficult -- on the supply of nuclear reactors to Iran. (S)

Secretary Baker: We ought to clear up our old agenda. We should aim for the ratification of CFE at Helsinki, and we want to push Byelarus on this. The ratification of the START treaty is still important as a basis for additional reductions. We will be working on this next week. Also, we need to find ways to get Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Byelarus to accede to the NPT. We need to be careful how to handle this. We should brief them on our new agreement. And START should enter into force before they sign the NPT. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. I would simply say on START ratification that our Parliamentary commission is working on it. I agreed with Khasbulatov that Parliament will work until July 5-10 to assure ratification before their recess. There will be a 40-50 day break on the recess. We have a treaty with Kazakhstan on security. We have agreed they will sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. On June 23, I will see Kravchuk and will insist on the reaffirmation of the commitment on the NPT. (S)

The President: Dick? (U)

Secretary Cheney: Mr. President, we will discuss many of these issues with Minister Grachev. On military to military ties, we will arrange for young Russians to attend our military schools. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. On nuclear testing, I understand that we have less common ground here. We should bridge the gap. Our scientists want to assure reliability but I still signed a one-year moratorium, as did France. Could we at least start a

negotiating process to agree on a limited number of tests per year? Let our negotiators work out a limit. This is an important environmental issue. We have closed Semipalatinsk. But there is still a public outcry on the one still open. I would appreciate your cooperation so that we can talk. (S)

The President: There is a lot of sentiment for changing policy on nuclear testing. But safety and reliability concerns me -- maybe, Dick, you can start to discuss this. We are convinced that we must do some testing. We should talk. But I do not want to mislead you -- our experts are convinced that we need to test. I do want to get on the same wavelength with you and your experts. Dick, share what you can so that President Yeltsin knows about our concerns. (S)

Secretary Cheney: It is safer to test than not to test. We are convinced that it is unsafe to have a stockpile of weapons whose reliability we are unsure of. (S)

President Yeltsin: This is a pity because I also talked to my scientists. They say that two or three tests per year are enough. So I beg to differ, Mr. President, on minimizing environmental damage. I went to the Altai region. In 1949, our tests at Semipalatinsk contaminated 1.5 million people through the tests and the winds. Children were crippled. It was a terrible loss. It happened at Novzenum, not far from Moscow -- people live there. My Minister of Defense tells me that out of every thirty people, only one can be drafted since their health is no good. Let our scientists talk to establish a minimum ceiling. (S)

The President: We will talk. You are right. Let's get our people together to share information. We have not had the type of experience you have had. (S)

Secretary Baker: We haven't had more than 5-6 tests in the last year. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know that. Let's start with a scientific seminar. Let them do a workshop with our Foreign Service and military officers. (S)

The President: This all makes sense. Let's do it. But let's hear from Cheney why testing makes sense. We had a meeting on this recently. Let's talk about scientific exchanges. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

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