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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries:	Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number:	91109
Folder ID Number:	91109-007

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Dimitrov of Bulgaria (5 pp.)	3/3/92	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Israeli Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapiro (3 pp.)	3/10/92	(b)(1)	C
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	3/12/92	(b)(1)	S
04. Memcon	Re: Luncheon with King Hussein [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (7 pp.)	3/12/92	(b)(1)	S
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Khaleda zia of Bangladesh (5 pp.)	3/19/92	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (17 pp.)	3/21/92	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	3/30/92	(b)(1)	C
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (8 pp.)	4/2/92	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (4 pp.)	4/7	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

Pinksheet Number: cap932
OA/ID Number: 91109-007
Date Closed: 1/29/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Violeta Chamorro, President of the Republic of Nicaragua [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	4/9/92	(b)(1)	C
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Calfa of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (2 pp.)	4/10/92	(b)(1)	S
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski of Poland (6 pp.)	4/13/92	(b)(1)	S
13. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation with Yegor Gaydar First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia (5 pp.)	4/28/92	(b)(1)	C
14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Richard von Weizsaecker of Germany [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	4/29	(b)(1)	S
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey (4 pp.)	4/28/92	(b)(1)	C

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MARCH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Miniter Dimitrov of Bulgaria

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Kenneth Hill, Ambassador to Bulgaria
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs, NSC Staff

Philip Dimitrov, Prime Minister
Ognian Pishev, Ambassador to the U.S.
Alex Alexiev, Advisor to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 3, 1992, 4:05 to 4:35 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Tell me how things are going back home. We are pulling for you and admire all you have accomplished. I hope we can find a way of working together. (U)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: First, let me take this opportunity to deliver a letter from President Zhelev who sends his regards. (U)

The President: Let me ask how he is doing. (U)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: He is doing very well. As for how things are going, the democratic process is evolving, we had elections in October and I became Prime Minister of the first democratic government in our country. At the same time we are moving toward economic reform. We have laws in our parliament concerning foreign investment, banking, and privatization. Bulgaria is proud to be a country which has managed to go through this process without violence, even though there were lots of problems inherited from the previous regime, such as bitterness between ethnic groups. Now there is cooperation with the Movement of Rights and Freedom, which represents our Muslim minority, in our parliament. Our people recognize the need for sacrifice. (Ø)

The President: Yes that is a big challenge. I don't want to sound like I'm lecturing, but it seems to us that it is better to move quickly on these reforms. Are you doing that? (Ø)

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Prime Minister Dimitrov: That's precisely what we are trying to do. Bulgaria is a country that very much believes in America. This can be observed, as you may have heard from Vice President Quayle. (Ø)

The President: He told me about his visit. It was thrilling. You were there Jim. (U)

Secretary Baker: I was there in February 1990 just after the revolution. There were 1500 people in the square in front of our hotel chanting "democracy and freedom." (U)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: We highly appreciate your support. Ambassador Hill can vouch for that. (U)

The President: We get good reports from him on the spirit there. Quayle too was very pleased. Someday I would love to go. I have never been although I've been to neighboring countries. (U)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: I understand you're busy this year, otherwise we would insist. (U)

The President: I think I'll win this election; I hope I'm right. Then we'll have time to go back to that part of the world and show our interest. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: We need more overt symbols of support, and this would be one way. (U)

The President: What kind of symbols do you have in mind? Our view is that more private investment is needed and that could be one way of showing support. Has an OPIC delegation visited? (U)

Ambassador Hill: Not yet. I will be talking to OPIC tomorrow. (U)

The President: These delegations really do some good by promoting interest among investors. (U)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: I agree. When I thought of what to emphasize, this was one of the major themes I had in mind. I very much believe in foreign investment and hope to see more from the U.S. I mentioned that we are pursuing a stable process of democratization. Bulgaria, together with the U.S., can be a stabilizing factor in the Balkans. This makes us want to feel even closer to the U.S. The presence of American investment is welcome. (U)

The President: Is the MacDougal project working -- the Bulgarian American Enterprise Fund? (U)

Ambassador Pishev: Yes, it has started well. We will be visiting Chicago for talks with the Fund board. We have also had visits from U.S. companies. There are lots of opportunities now. All the pieces are ready: OPIC coverage, MFN and the bilateral investment treaty. Now we need two or three flagship investments. Therefore we need a political signal. Also, we

need help in the area of defense conversion. The missions that have been sent haven't gone to Bulgaria. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: Let me add our readiness to pass a decision of government on the COCOM issue. (Ø)

The President: This is a time of rapid change on COCOM. Where do we stand with Bulgaria? (Ø)

Ambassador Hill: The Department is in dialogue with the Bulgarian government on the question of export controls. We are pressing ahead, Mr. President. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Do we have a BIT? (U)

Ambassador Hill: It is almost ready to sign. (U)

The President: Can we talk a bit about Macedonia? This is a tough one for us. Our prime interest is in a peaceful evolution. We are getting some criticism at home, especially from the Croatian community, for not recognizing. One reason is that the UN has urged us not to, feeling that U.S. recognition could be a problem. On Macedonia, we try to analyze the Greek situation and not to move too fast. You are so close; what is your feeling? (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: With all respect for our Greek friends we have a different perspective. As for us it was a matter of taking a decision that would express the principle of our approach toward our neighbors. Having stated our support for self determination elsewhere, we had to do so for our immediate neighbors. We have no territorial demands whatsoever, especially concerning Macedonia. Also we felt that recognition of only some republics would put other republics in a vulnerable position. Our aim is stability. (Ø)

The President: Are you optimistic? We are backing the UN, but I must say that I am very worried. We are getting criticized for not recognizing. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: I understand the U.S. position, but recognition might help a peaceful development. (Ø)

The President: Let me understand. Your position is that if we recognize, confrontation will be less likely. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: Yes, especially if there is a general recognition. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The counter-argument that some advance is that if we recognize all four, especially ahead of the EC, the Serb minority in Bosnia might see this as separation from Serbia and could start shooting. On the other hand, you could argue that recognizing Bosnia after its referendum could stabilize the situation. It's not an easy situation. (Ø)

The President: Didn't Croatia almost walk away from the UN process after recognition? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Yes, the EC decision almost backfired. (Ø)

The President: I'm not arguing about this. I just wanted your views. (Ø)

Ambassador Pishev: We also need to pay more attention to regional cooperation. We are ready to help because the viability of all the republics is under question. A regional market will encourage free movement of capital labor and people. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Is it possible that Macedonia will get together with Greece and reach an understanding? (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: We have been expecting this for a long time. (U)

The President: Our time is almost up. Do you have other subjects? (U)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: I have several other points just to mention. The Bulgarian people have a heavy burden because of our debt. We are ready to present proposals and reach an acceptable solution with the banks but we need support from the IMF and World Bank. We hope for better understanding and political support from the U.S. Another problem comes from the connection of the Bulgarian economy with the Soviet economy. Now the collapse of the Soviet market brings disaster to our local producers. We hope to be able to participate in triangular deals. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: We talked about this in the coordinating conference. (Ø)

The President: Perhaps we can follow up. Are people thinking about this? (U)

Secretary Baker: Yes. It is harder for us because of our legislation, but we are pushing the concept. We were delighted to see Bulgaria and the other central and east European countries at the conference. We also discussed this with some Gulf and Asian countries. (Ø)

Prime Minister Dimitrov: We are in a rather hard position because of the collapse of the Soviet market, the inheritance from the previous government, and the consequences of the Gulf crisis. Because of the bad choices before, we find that we have the worst partners. Now we have to change. Finally I would like to mention that we are satisfied at the development of American interest in Bulgaria. There is the possibility of your giving us needed things like training and technical assistance and also bringing Bulgaria closer to American culture. I hope this can be developed directly in the American University in Bulgaria. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: We will be putting another $1 million into the university. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for coming. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Israeli Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapiro (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Mark Levine, Interpreter

Chief Rabbi Avraham Shapiro
Zalman Shoval, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
Rabbi Eytan Eisemann, Director General of Rabbinate
Rabbi Milton Balkany, Dean, Bais Jaakov of Brooklyn
Michael Shilo, Deputy Chief of Mission

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 10, 1992, 11:45 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. EST
The Oval

The President and Rabbi Shapiro met in the Oval Office at 11:45 a.m.

The President: I am very pleased you took the time to drop by. (U)

Rabbi Shapiro: I am pleased to have the honor of meeting with an American President. Today you are carrying the burden of the world on your back. I have come to bless you from the holy land. May you have great success in all you do. I also come to thank the American people for all you have done. In part I want to give my thanks for your help in freeing a great many people from the Soviet Union. We know that your role is great in this matter. Gratitude is a well known Jewish concept. Jewish exile in the Soviet Union was a very difficult one. The Jewish culture was nearly eradicated. Now we are trying to re-create it for the

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Russian immigrants. It is a wonder that after 70 years of exile these people survived with the help of the United States President. As it is said in the Bible, all the Diaspora of Israel will be returned to the land of Israel. I myself am a seventh generation Jerusalemite. My ancestors came from all over the world - one even from America. When they first arrived, there were only 50,000 Jews in the Holy Land. Now there are over 5 million. We've seen how a small, desolate land has become a small developed country. Today it is the center of Jewish cultural life. I'm a Rabbi, not a diplomat. I can only see things in a religious context. The bible is the birth certificate of the Jewish people. We can't exist without it. We must obey its rules. We cannot change them according to convenience. We cannot divide what we want to accept from that which we do not. Inhabiting the land of Israel is one of our commandments. Being in Jerusalem is an integral part of the Jewish faith. A Jew cannot not chose among commandments any more than a mother can chose among her children. One who begins a task must complete it as a gift from God. The President's role in resettling Jews from Ethiopia and the Soviet Union is great. He will be held by God to complete this task. Together we will see the establishment of peace. Peace is also a good deed and also a commandment. We wish you good luck and success and the American people prosperity. We hope for peace between the people of the world. In conclusion, I hope you can help those held hostage. It is a human tragedy only the President can help with. (Ø)

The President: Thank you for your lovely message of peace. Let me see if I can find a proper forum to speak out about those who are held against their will. Even though the American hostages are returned, we remain concerned. I appreciate your comments about Jews returning home from Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. A lot of people worked hard to facilitate this. There is much to be grateful for. Regarding peace, the talks that are going on may be difficult for Israel and the others but they can bear fruit. The very fact that there are talks is good. Are you optimistic? (Ø)

Rabbi Shapiro: Rabbis always have to be optimistic. (U)

The President: I appreciate your message of faith. I truly believe a person cannot be President without having faith and having religious beliefs. They are necessary to lift him up. Every President has found this out. I am sure every Prime Minister in Israel has learned the same thing. (U)

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Rabbi Shapiro: A Chief Rabbi also feels that way. (U)

The President: You'd better. Thank you for coming here. We have great respect for those such as yourself who dedicate their lives to religion. (U)

(Exchange of Gifts)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	3/12/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

Document Partially Declassified
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By 32 (NLGB) on 4/11/11

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-007
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	09-0651-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/17/2010

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Zayd Bin Shaker, Jordanian Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 12, 1992, 11:00 - 11:45 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and King Hassan met in the Oval Office at 11:00 a.m.

President: I'm delighted you are here. We receive you with respect. (U)

King Hussein: Our friendship is solid. We have the same goals and objectives. We know your burden. We know we must come in line with the situation. There are extremists wanting to take advantage of the situation. (Ø)

President: Are you under pressure from your left? (Ø)

King Hussein: Yes. And they are working through Jordan with the occupied territories. Today's issues are not easily solved by a slogan. We do have problems. There are 329,000 returnees. We have to cope with them and that means less help to people in the occupied territories. It has been the worst winter in years, and oil has been expensive. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: His Majesty turned the mood around on the peace process. Is it still positive? (Ø)

King Hussein: Yes. It is the settlement problem which is the big issue. (Ø)

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The President: Do people blame us? (U)

King Hussein: Your position is seen as very resolute. (C)

The President: It is tough here but we are continuing a firm stand. We will not yield. Shamir is caught in an election. I don't know what he'll do. We have our own election process here. I'd be glad to hear how it is viewed. (C)

Can I get the toughest problem out of the way: Saddam Hussein. It gives us problems with Congress and others. We say Saddam Hussein must go. I am getting heat for not taking him out at the time. It was not our objective. But he must comply with the UN resolutions. He is going ahead with his nuclear objectives, building things, etc. We think he is totally impossible. If he goes, I will instantly improve relations to give the new regime a chance. We are concerned about leaky borders. Bob Gates will give you the details. We know it is a problem for you. But Congress, the Saudis, the Egyptians are a problem. King Fahd may not like us having a friendly visit, but we must do it. But the sanctions remain a problem and whatever you can do is in Jordan's interest. You heard the question -- the press wants to raise our differences. (S)

King Hussein: I'd love to talk about it. There is a world-wide organization financed by our mutual friends. (S)

Secretary Baker: You mean it's worse? I thought we had made progress. If not, let us know. (S)

King Hussein: Some of it is private money. (C)

The President: We can try to help some more. (C)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: They interfere in our elections. Support for the fundamentalists hurts us also in Central Asia.

King Hussein: We were taken aback by the invasion of Kuwait. Since the war I have had no contact with him (Saddam). All the Iraqis I see say enough is enough. Iraq has suffered enough. I supported him (Saddam) during the Iran war. It is a choice. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) Iraqis won't turn to the Saudis, but they might to us. I believe that a unified Iraq is in everyone's interest. We have every interest in working together for this. As for sanctions, Saddam has convinced his people that he is not the target, but

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that they are. How about the borders of Iraq? Would we be sowing the seeds of future conflict? (b)(1) (b)(1) (S)

The President: It is a difficult issue. (b)(1) (b)(1) Our reports from Iraq show that Saddam is getting tougher on his people. It is hard to conceive that being conciliatory to him would work. (S)

King Hussein: I'm not suggesting that. The question is how to work to achieve our objectives. (S)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: Without damaging the Iraqi people. (C)

The President: He does that by not selling oil. I don't want to send 500,000 people back in, but he can't get away with this. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have worked with the Saudis and the Congress. The biggest thing you could do to improve the situation would be to say of course you support the UN Resolutions which apply and to permit UN inspectors in Aquba and occasionally to go to the border. This would clear up your position without prejudice to your positions. (S)

King Hussein: I don't have a problem with that. (C)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: His Majesty said it in Iceland. (U)

Secretary Baker: If you would do it publicly it would make a huge difference. (C)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: A public statement would create problems for us but we might be able to do it quietly. (C)

The President: Did you get anything privately from Tariq Aziz that was different from the public? Any comment? We are increasingly worried by Iran. (C)

King Hussein: Saddam has created the impression that if he goes, they all go, and they have no alternative but to support him. We can work together to change this. (S)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: His Majesty spoke three times with high level Iraqis. The half-brother of Tariq Aziz says that if he were in Saddam's shoes he would leave. If the UN plan to

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re-draw the border with Kuwait goes through, the Iraqi people will take that as a national insult and it would be counterproductive. (S)

King Hussein: We need to think out every move, planning the objective and moving to it. The Shiites in the south have no alternative except to look to Iran. (S)

The President: There is no question that Saddam hasn't learned. He is rebuilding and we won't tolerate it. What does Aziz say? (S)

King Hussein: He says he is trying to work out something with the UN which would solve the problem. (b)(1) (b)(1) (S)

The President: (b)(1) It is the one message that we are after. We would be interested in cooperating on it. How about Iran? (S)

King Hussein: They have their own agenda. It's central Asia. Buying arms from the CIS. (b)(1) (b)(1) They have a dream of having a major role in the region. (S)

The President: How about the Saudis? (U)

King Hussein: The same. And the Egyptians talk a better line but nothing happens. The Saudis have the impression we are against them. We have always been supportive of the Saudis. We even sent troops to help them. (C)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: His Majesty tried to contact King Fahd, but he won't respond. He sent a thank you for opening up the border for the 10th anniversary of his rule, for Ramadan. Nothing works. (C)

The President: Maybe the answer is time. Maybe it is a change in Iraq. They like your role in the peace process. (C)

Secretary Baker: Their problem is sanctions and your seeing Aziz on his way to the UN. (C)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: Aziz just dropped by and His Majesty showed him common courtesy. (C)

The President: We'd like to help but it might take time. If we can solve Iraq that will help a lot. (C)

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Prime Minister Bin Shaker: His Majesty explained how we would participate in the peace process. Now we have a terrible economic crisis. Things are dragging on. Israel makes terrible statements on TV. We have the biggest debt and the worst situation in our history. The peace process won't be done soon, so we have to give our people something so we can continue the peace process. We need your help. We know you can't help financially, but you can tell your friends to fill the gap. (C)

Secretary Baker: We got a good IMF program and a Paris club rescheduling. We are working on the World Bank plan for assistance. We will work for Treasury's support here. (C)

King Hussein: We will have elections some time soon. I want to make Jordan a center of excellence. (C)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

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04. Memcon	Re: Luncheon with King Hussein [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (7 pp.)	3/12/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ____ (NLGB) on 4/11/11

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-007
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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	09-0651-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/17/2010

RESTRICTION CODES

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon with King Hussein (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan T. Howe, Deputy Assistant to the for National Security Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning
Ed Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Roger Harrison, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan

King Hussein
Prime Minister Zayd Bin Shaker
Adnan Abu Odeh, Chief of the Royal Court
Prince Talal Ibu Mohamed, Military Aide to His Majesty
Kamal Abu Jabir, Foreign Minister
Basil Jardaneh, Minister of Finance
Hussein Hammami, Jordanian Ambassador

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 12, 1992, 12:00 - 1:05 p.m. EST
The Residence

The President and King Hussein met for lunch at the Residence at 12:00.

The President: His Majesty and I go back a long time. I am delighted to have him here. We have a genuine friendship. As I said, I want to look forward. I am glad to see the Prime Minister. Let me begin by asking Secretary Baker to discuss the peace process. (U)

Secretary Baker: You've seen the testimony I've given. Without Jordan there is no peace process. Right now we are still facing the question of venue. We are hoping that the Arab delegations will give us a list of ten sites. Our goal is to move the

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bilaterals closer to the region. Also, I told both the Palestinians and the Syrians at the end of the last round that it would be very counterproductive to place the bilaterals on hold pending the Israeli elections. The Arabs would make themselves responsible for a suspension. I hope the idea has been abandoned. I hope there will be another round of bilaterals in the first half of April. On the multilaterals, Jordan's participation is key. We may be making some progress here with the Syrians. The Palestinians seem to understand they made a mistake by not attending Moscow. The multilaterals can promote progress on the bilaterals. We intend to hold five working groups in early May. The Arabs do not give anything away by participating. Overall, progress is slow but the parties are at least engaging in substance. The Palestinians may have missed an opportunity in the last round by tabling their own plan for statehood and not engaging Israel's proposal. It was even more counterproductive to give their plan to the PLO who made it public at the UN. But overall we are not discouraged. We knew it would be hard. But even Syria and Israel are talking about what UN Resolution 242 means. (S)

President: Does Jordan have views on the process? (U)

King Hussein: As regards venue, we hoped for some progress before it would be changed. It might be easier to have the talks in or near the area however. We will present alternatives if you still feel it would be helpful. We already suggested Iceland for example. (S)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: Do you want negotiations to be outside the United States? (U)

Secretary Baker: We have no strong views. The Syrians think we want to change the venue so the patient would not die in our hospital. (S)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: What people fear is that if the talks are not here in Washington, it will lead to less U.S. involvement. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have said all along that our involvement will not be affected by the venue. We have not weighed in a lot thus far because we want to save our chips for major substantive issues. I told the Syrians that they want the U.S. involved but they are not helping by not giving us a list of alternative venues. (S)

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The President: I don't see why the place makes so much difference. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: It doesn't. (U)

King Hussein: The place shouldn't make a difference. We will give you a list. (Ø)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: It is reassuring to the Jordanian people to have the talks here. The U.S. is in the best position to influence people if they are here. Notice, I am not using the word "pressure". (Ø)

Secretary Baker: It hasn't paid off yet. (U)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: The real question is Israeli motives. They don't accept the need to withdraw from territory. They say the Jordan River is their eastern boundary. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: But the Palestinians say they must have a Palestinian State. My sense is each side is just staking out a maximal position. (Ø)

King Hussein: We predict it will be slow going given the position of the current Israeli government. We see that Labor is prepared to talk to the Palestinians separately. The possibility of a Labor government in Israel has stimulated a dialogue between Jordan and the Palestinians. There is an ongoing dialogue about the objectives. We've come across this before in discussions on UN Resolution 242. We've stated the possibility of minimum order rectification if necessary. You know our position on Jerusalem which the U.S. has not accepted. In our view, the holy places in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth should have a special status. We want to clear up this point. We need to pull together. I'm faced with different Palestinian attitudes on the part of those inside and outside the territories. In 1972, we discussed three options: an independent state, federation with Jordan and confederation. We need to know what the future of Jerusalem and Palestine will be. (Ø)

Regarding the multilaterals, we believe in them. The problems facing the region are not only those created by 1967. There are many claims from before then, from 1948. We need to figure out how to deal with the question of people. We need to deal with refugees as part of the equation. There are more than 300,000 who were essentially expelled from Kuwait. Without peace there is not enough room and not enough resources for all the people

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and their needs. There are many other issues as well. Jerusalem is an area of great confusion. Israel had part of Jerusalem before 1967; the Palestinians are determined to pursue the peace process. We are caught between opposing forces. (S)

Secretary Baker: Jerusalem is obviously the hardest issue. The President spoke of settlements to you during the one-on-one. Regarding the participation of Diaspora Palestinians, I will only say it took us a long time to come up with an approach to this issue. For an interim arrangement, it makes sense for the Palestinians to be from the occupied territories. We see a difference when it comes to final status. At Moscow at the multilaterals, we told the Jordanians we would try to work something out regarding the Diaspora Palestinians and some working groups. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (S)

King Hussein: We went to Moscow as Jordanians and not as a joint delegation. Being with the Palestinians is difficult for us. For example, we were never responsible for Gaza. We are not responsible for the historical disaster of the Palestinians. But I see a positive change. Many of us in Jordan in the past looked to Egypt, Syria or the others. Now the majority of us realize we must rely on ourselves. Historically, Jordan was overruled by other Arabs regarding Palestinian issues. It is quite a lot to ask Jordan to carry the burden of Palestinians. (S)

President: Changing the topic somewhat, is there a clear perception that a Labor government would be easier? Or do you think it would be better with Likud using the "only Nixon could go to China" parallel? (S)

King Hussein: We have no strong feeling, one way or the other. (U)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: There is a general perception that Labor would be better. But Labor was in power in 1967 and it was Labor that started settlements. So there would not be overwhelming enthusiasm if they got back in. (S)

The President: I ask the question precisely because of that history. I understand the Israeli need for security but Palestinians have their rights too. (C)

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King Hussein: We need to get the Israelis out of their fortress mentality. We need to build something positive. It is possible just as it proved to be in Europe. The people in the Middle East yearn for peace and security. (Ø)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: All the people of the area would benefit from peace. (U)

Secretary Baker: I saw an interesting statement out of Israel acknowledging that UN Resolution 242 means territory for peace but saying it was fulfilled when the Sinai was handed back. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: That is the standard Likud position - that territory for peace has been taken care of. It is not the Labor position. (Ø)

King Hussein: The problem though is Gaza and the West Bank. Likud's statements just poison the situation. (Ø)

Mr. Ross: In the last round with Jordan, the Israelis signed up for UN Resolution 242 in all its aspects. But each side is probing and fencing. Once we are out of the Israeli political cycle, we should learn more. People on all sides could be more willing to act if they have a better sense on where we are going. (Ø)

King Hussein: Informal discussions are fine. But we need to know how we will deal with the Palestinian issue. For us, UN Resolution 242's meaning is worked out in the Security Council Resolution; to try to reinterpret it would not be acceptable. We don't want to reopen a debate on what UN Resolution 242 means, but a quiet dialogue, by all means. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Abu Jabir: There may be more room with Labor to talk. But how much, God only knows. Likud is quite adamant. (Ø)

King Hussein: This will be the case prior to the Israeli election. We will have to keep the talks going for the long term. (Ø)

The President: We need to keep people engaged. (U)

Prime Minister Bin Shaker: Is there any chance of progress before the election? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: It will be difficult. But this is not an argument against meeting. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Bin Shaker: The Palestinians may not come, but Jordan would. But I worry about the reaction of our people if there is no progress. (C)

Secretary Baker: One thing that could be achieved if the Palestinians would come is that the two sides could put down in one column where they agree on a self-governing authority. The process has to start somewhere. The Palestinians tabled their plan and that was it and then they gave it to the UN via the PLO. Instead, they could start a real dialogue with the Israelis about the powers under the self-governing authority. (C)

Adnan Abu Odeh: The Palestinians and Jordan are trying to reach a new relationship. This could be important. We need to meet with the Palestinians and try to understand their objections to less than a Palestinian state. (S)

The President: Another subject is Qadhafi. From our perspective, it could come down to confrontation. Has there been any progress? (S)

Secretary Baker: None. (U)

The President: This may cause us problems in the Arab world but the case against the Libyans is rock solid. We need to get the UN resolution implemented. Qadhafi should cut his losses. I've been thinking of this and its impact on public opinion and the fundamentalist problem in the Arab world. (S)

King Hussein: This is a problem. (U)

The President: I am not suggesting you have any influence over Qadhafi, but then who does? We talked to President Mubarak about this. (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

King Hussein: Are there not suggestions that the two people be sent out somewhere? (C)

The President: We will only accept the jurisdiction of the UK or the US. We are not just creating evidence here. To the contrary, it was originally thought the (b)(1) were behind this. (C)

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Mr. Gates: We've had a very thorough investigation by both the CIA and FBI. We have evidence and we have witnesses. (C)

King Hussein: We have no doubts. (U)

Pleasantries exchanged as lunch ended.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Khaleda Begum Zia of Bangladesh

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan T. Howe, Deputy Assistant to the for National Security Affairs
James Covey, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
William B. Milam, U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Mahmud Kibria, Interpreter

Khaleda Begum Zia, Prime Minister
A.S.M. Mostafizur Rahman, Foreign Minister
Barrister Nazmul Huda, Information Minister
Syed Hasan Ahmed, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister
Ambassador Reaz Rahman, Foreign Secretary
Ambassador Abul Ahsan, Bangladesh Ambassador
Begum Selina Rahman, Member of Parliament

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 19, 1992, 3:00 - 3:45 p.m. EST
Oval Office

The President: Welcome. As you pointed out in our meeting, we have not forgotten that Bangladesh contributed to Desert Storm and fought against aggression. You are not a wealthy country. You took an important step and we are grateful. (C)

As for bilateral ties, they are good. We want them to be better. We recognize your financial problems, as well as your commitment to democracy. We should try to find areas to help. (U)

The Prime Minister pointed out to me in our private meeting the textile quota problem and the need to bring more women into the work place. Unfortunately, this is a difficult area for us, but

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we will look at the possibility of a modest quota increase. Our textile industry has a strong lobby and is strong with the Congress. This is a sensitive area but we will try to take a look at it. I have a few other issues we want to raise but I'd rather hear from you. (Ø)

Prime Minister Zia: First of all, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to visit and for this reception. As you know, we are greatly encouraged by the ideals of democracy and of human rights which the US stands for. By doing your part, when we fought for the restoration of democracy, you showed us great support. Through free and fair elections, people have given their mandate to us and we are in office. Now as an accountable government we have started our work. The Parliament is operating and playing its role. Committees are scrutinizing policy. There is press freedom. The Judiciary's independence has been restored. Therefore, we feel that our democracy, if it is to take root, must address economic and social problems. We will need your continued help and support. Our objective is to become self-reliant. To promote economic development in Bangladesh, we announced a new industrial policy with the aim of promoting private investment. We are reducing the public sector. The new industrial policy is liberal, intended to attract foreign investment. We have provided the same terms for private investors as for those from Bangladesh. (Ø)

The President: On investment, it is very important to have a good climate and keep economic reform going. You have worked with the IMF's program; this is vital. This helped us with debt relief which we hope helped. Your reform is courageous and a key to dynamic economic growth. (Ø)

Prime Minister Zia: Thank you for your support for the reforms we've undertaken. We are emphasizing food production to feed our large population. We have privatized distribution of all agriculture imports such as fertilizer. We still have the problem of irrigation during the dry season. My government has started an extensive canal program which will also help us deal with floods. (U)

Two particular projects where we received substantial US support are rural electrification and family planning. Both are very important to us. Rural electrification has done good things for our villages and has helped to develop cottage industry. All of these programs were begun years ago but are coming to an end and we need your support to continue. We hope it will be possible for you to help us. (Ø)

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The President: On family planning, I know it's a difficult problem. Are we making progress? (Ø)

Prime Minister: U.S. assistance has been helpful. Our population growth rate is down from over 3 percent to 2.1 percent over the past eight years. Our performance is much better than either India's or Pakistan's. But for a country of our size, resources and population, this is still not enough and we are committed to further reduction in our population growth rate. Another area which also has a direct relationship with family planning is education. In our society, sons get the preference over daughters. Half the population is female and unless women are fully integrated, we cannot progress. Of course, all the developmental programs will depend on good communications. We have tried to improve the existing infrastructure but with floods and cyclones it has not been easy. We would appreciate your support here too. The environment is also critical for us. Environmental problems can affect us very adversely. A small rise in the sea level is a real danger as one-third of Bangladesh can be submerged. We have followed your announcements on this subject and greatly admired it. We would like to benefit from your technology. (Ø)

The President: We can cooperate fully. Has the Prime Minister seen all the right people here? (U)

Ambassador Ashan: The Prime Minister met with the Director of USAID. (U)

The President: She may want to see the heads of EPA and NASA. We've got good scientists here and they are available to see her or we can send someone out. At the time of the Kuwait oil fires, we sent a team out to help extinguish the fires and help with the environment. On another subject, can I ask you about the refugee situation. I am troubled by this. (Ø)

Prime Minister: I was coming to this problem. At this time we are trying to put things in order. We are stuck with this large number of refugees. There are already 200,000 in Bangladesh now and they are increasing by 5,000 to 10,000 a day. We cannot turn them away but we cannot host them for any length of time. They are coming because of the persecution. Anyone suspected of supporting democracy is being hunted down and forced out. We've asked for help from our friends and the UNHCR. We've received some help but the numbers are increasing beyond our capacity to deal with it. Even worse, the rainy season is coming and will

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bring with it new problems. Unless there is swift progress to get Myanmar to take them back safely, there will be a big tragedy. We've appealed to the Secretary General and UNSC perm members to raise the question as to what can be done if negotiations do not persuade Myanmar to take them back. Time is of the essence. Now we have two divisions of army digging in and incidents are happening inside our territory. (Ø)

The President: We have approved three million dollars. Have you circulated a letter to the Security Council? (Ø)

Ambassador Ahsan: Yes. (U)

The President: We have no influence with Myanmar which I still call Burma. I think the United Nations could help. Getting the Islamic conference would also help. (Ø)

Foreign Minister: One country that could help is China. They have influence stemming from their supply of weapons. (Ø)

The President: I think they may want to help. Have you raised it? (U)

Foreign Minister: Yes. We are ready to sit down with the Myanmar government but they are not. (Ø)

Minister Huda: The U.S. can pressure others to pressure Myanmar. (Ø)

The Prime Minister: That's a good point. Maybe we can do more. (U)

Secretary Baker: We have already talked to the ASEAN countries. (Ø)

The President: Let us try. This is an enormous problem for you. (U)

Minister Huda: The refugees are also hurting our environment. (U)

Foreign Minister: They are denuding our forests. There is nothing we can do. They need fuel. (U)

Secretary Baker: Have you raised this with the Saudis? (U)

Foreign Minister: Yes, and with the OIC and ASEAN. Thailand has some influence with them. (Ø)

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Prime Minister: I've spoken enough now. I would like to express my deep appreciation to you and all you have done on behalf of democracy, peace, stability, progress and cooperation. Your breakthrough in the field of disarmament is dramatic and spectacular. We are a small, poor country. We admire your leadership. We will help you in any modest way we can. (U)

The President: One thing I would ask is that we stay together with regard to Saddam Hussein. We want him to comply with the UN resolutions. Thank you for your kind words. Incidently, I had a long talk with Boris Yeltsin. We all have a stake in their success. He is determined to stick with reforms despite the difficulties. (C)

Mrs. Bush is here and would like to pay her respects. (U)

Prime Minister: We like to put on the record our full support for your record in the Middle East. What you have done with the peace conference is a great accomplishment. We will continue to support you on the peace process as well as with the UN resolutions on Iraq. (C)

The President: Thank you. (U)

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
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AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	09-0651-MR(505)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for the National Security Affairs
David Gompert, Senior Director, NSC Staff Notetaker

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Peter Hartmann, Security Advisor to the Chancellor
Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's Office

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 21, 1992, 11:50am - 4:00pm
Camp David

The President: Helmut, it is a pleasure to have you here. We could start with our bilateral relationship if you like, or we could talk about G-7 issues. Of course we have to get to the GATT. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you for this hospitality, George. We appreciate this quiet talk in these turbulent times. My fingers are crossed for you. (U)

The President: I think things will be alright. The big problem is the slow economy. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We have the same phenomenon in Europe. Let's be frank. Let me describe the situation in Europe for you politically. Within three weeks there are important elections in the UK, France and Italy. I think that John Major will get a majority. (U)

The President: I hope you are right. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Your concerns about the other man are justified. But the voters will prefer Major. The Tory party is not so popular. The question is whether personalities will emerge as more important than party politics in the final weeks. On the basis of personality, John Major is certainly more

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The President: (b)(1) (b)(1) (S)

Chancellor Kohl: (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) I will help John Major if I can. (C)

The Italian elections are on April 5. They are even more difficult to predict. The reason is that there is a general grass-roots movement against the parties. Cossiga has started this himself from the presidency. I think the federalist element within Italy is going to be strengthened. I welcome this for Europe. It's what we have in Germany, of course, and I think things will be moving in the same direction in other countries. (C)

Jacques Delors told me that France also has to move toward federalism. He said that to me in Paris, of all places. The new generation won't accept one-person rule. Life is more complex, too complex for one person to command everything. So highly centralized government is going to become more difficult. Take Italy, where northern and southern Italy are so vastly different. So there will be pressures to try to put things more on a local basis. (S)

The President: What is the view now in Europe about the Alliance and the EC? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I am coming to that. The Italians pin their hopes on the regions of the EC getting more rights for their region. This won't change the foundation of Italian politics, but it will lead to changes within Italy. (C)

Now, as far as the French elections tomorrow are concerned, these are only regional elections but the implications are significant. Because of their proportionate representation, the French elections give an accurate view of the various segments. So it is going to be very interesting. (C)

The President: I understand that Le Pen on one extreme and the Greens on the other are going to become stronger. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: The most significant result will be the heavy losses experienced by the Socialists. These are just my predictions. I think the Socialists will be down to 20%. Chirac and Giscard together will be around 32-35%. Communists 8-10%. The Greens 12-14%. Incidentally, Mitterrand never believed me when I told him to keep his eyes on the Greens. So now we have two Green parties in France. They are a bit at odds with each other. (b)(1) (b)(1) Then there is Le Pen. It is

hard to predict, but my guess is that he will get between 12 and 15%. Its all too easy to say that they are neo-Nazis. They are really populists. They complain about taxes; they complain about Algerians, they complain about anything else that people are upset about. They even complained about the new hunting rights. Le Pen protested a new law affecting the hunters. They appeal to this kind of thing, now he has all of the hunters on his side. Matters like the future of NATO are absolutely irrelevant to people like this. Le Pen is simply a crucible for discontent.

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If the election turns out as I suspect, there is going to be a big hangover on Monday morning. There will be a second round in another eight days, but it won't change the outcome. This will bring down the current government. Then who comes in? Delors is a possibility.

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So things are shaping up in France as Chirac vs. Delors. (S)

I think it will be hard for Mitterrand to stay in power for the next 2 years.

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(S)

Now in Germany, on April 5 we have Laender elections. In Schleswig-Holstein and in Baden-Wuertemmberg. These elections won't be too easy, but not too difficult either. I'm really looking ahead to 1994. We are seeing incredible changes taking place in Germany. We've already privatized 3,000 of 6,000 of the East German state firms from the communist system. This has been an enormous undertaking. (S)

From 1949, when we launched the Marshall Plan, to 1953 before we landed on our feet, it took a good four years. Then, the only support we got was the money from you. So in a way, the East Germans have it easier. We are giving enormous support. Psychologically, however, it's different. After the war, all of us Germans were in a bad situation. Today, we have a sharp contrast between wealth on one side of the street and poverty on the other. Let me tell you an anecdote. I was in a village in the East recently. They used to have one telephone for every 200 flats. Now, the Deutsche Bundespost has installed as many telephones in the former GDR in one year as they had installed in all prior years. But now those without phones are much more resentful than they use to be. That is the paradox. (S)

I think that in another 3 to 4 years everything will be okay. Our economy is difficult now, but we are still growing at 2%. The growth of the new Laender is at 10%. Inflation will soon be brought down under 4%. A big problem is unemployment in the new Laender. But the greatest danger of all that I face is the fight that I have with the trade unions -- both public and private sector unions. This is the toughest battle in 10 years. Right now I am having the most difficulty with the public sector. They want a 9% wage increase and I am offering 3.5% which is roughly the inflation rate. So we may have big strikes in store for us. But I won't retreat. (S)

The President: Is the SPD against you on this? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Well they say yes and no. But they will certainly blame me if there are strikes. The situation is somewhat like what we had before the Pershing missile deployment. With people out in the streets, the question is who is in charge? Will it be the will of the streets that prevails, or is it the government? There is a principle involved. (S)

The President: Tell me about the changing perceptions in Germany about U.S. troops and NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Actually the latest opinion polls look better than 1990. We now have a clear majority in favor of maintaining a U.S. presence. When the question is asked who is the most important guarantor of German security, 58% said the U.S., 18% said France, 8% said Britain. The question is then asked should the Americans stay? The clear majority says yes. Of course, there will always be local complaints; but now even at the local level there is more interest in maintaining the presence. Foreign troops in Germany have been declining so fast that it has had a local economic impact. If you can believe it, the mayors come and tell me that they want compensation for this. (C)

But George, I think it would be foolish for you to leave. I think it would not be in your interest. To be frank, I can understand you want to reduce but it would be a mistake for American interest to withdraw completely. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) Europe is becoming more important for Americans, not less. (S)

Now let's turn to the GATT. We have some notes and some ideas we developed on the airplane that I would like to share with you (paper attached). The first point I would make is that we can't negotiate here. The second point is that we in Europe all want an agreement. As you will see from our paper, there are three problems, export subsidies, cereal substitutes -- which just cannot be unlimited -- and income supports. We have to come to some form of agreement. I have been preaching this message to Mitterrand lately. This paper reflects where we are in Europe. I think it reflects the view of people like John Major. Apart from the official talks, our people need to get to work on this. Feiter is up on all of this, in fact, he is now in Washington

talking to one of your people. Let's face it, we can forget about the developing countries if we cannot get a GATT agreement. (S)

The President: We want to get a deal done. It is in everybody's interest. But I have political problems here too. Let me show you the charts I have that illustrate the problem. What we have to do is figure out how to bring this to a conclusion. We have proposed a "safe box," so that you could new introduce the new payments. We have been very forthcoming on this. It's a major American concession. (S)

But we have trouble on corn glutens, on rebalancing. The fact is that it is the only thing that sustains our exports. So this will be very tough for me politically. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We are not asking for cuts. You have a problem with our wheat exports. But we have a problem with these cereal substitutes. We are only asking for a freeze at the current level. (S)

Secretary Baker: Let me summarize our problem. We are trying to find a way to bridge the differences. But different EC members seem to have different interests. (S)

The Dunkel paper is public. Even that was barely acceptable to us. It has formed a base line. It is hard for us to walk away from that now that we have been forthcoming on the "safe box," which we understand is good for Germany. The EC would avoid any cuts on internal supports altogether for two years. We have also offered just to put off internal supports. This is a one-sided agreement. If we do that, we have no flexibility on export subsidies. Your paper doesn't even address what we have done. We made a significant proposal which we understood to be important to many members. We have also suggested that we defer any action on internal supports for two years, as long as we agree to negotiate the reductions by the end of two years. We can't move away from the Dunkel text on the level of subsidized exports. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I want to make clear that there is a single European position -- not just on GATT but on other matters. What I don't understand on the second point is that we are not asking for reductions but for a freeze. For us the problem is that we are going to be reducing our export subsidies and getting nothing in return. (S)

Secretary Baker: David, would you like to explain the problem. (U)

David Gompert: Mr. Chancellor, the negotiators of the EC Commission have made it clear to us consistently that the EC's highest priority is internal supports. We have therefore, as the President and the Secretary have explained, worked vigorously and have made significant concessions to address what we have understood to be the highest priority. As a consequence, we have laid out a plan that would permit the EC to implement its new

program of income supports under a GATT agreement. But having made these moves in response to the EC's stated priorities, we are in no position now to offer further concessions. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me think out loud. What if we were to find a system whereby we tied a certain level of wheat exports to your level of exports to the EC of cereal substitutes. If we were to have deeper cuts in wheat exports, this would affect the level of cereal substitutes. This would be a flexible formula, providing a linkage between the two. The nightmare is that we would reach an agreement on a reduction in exports only to find ourselves faced with a flood of noncereal imports. (S)

The President: Perhaps we should leave things at this. I have to be guided by my experts. I am not really ready to talk about this kind of detail. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand that completely. I just wanted to offer some specific ideas to make it clear that I am personally committed. I could leave Feiter in Washington or I could send him back. (S)

Secretary Baker: I would just like to make clear that even if the President were to determine that we could look at linkage of the sort that you suggest, it would have to be based on an export subsidy level close to the Dunkel paper. We cannot give up on all three of these issues. We can be thinking about all of this. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, we will have to examine where we go in the next 3 or 4 weeks. We need to try to reach agreement by the end of April apart from the official talks. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) The experts have their own vested interests. You and I are not experts. We have to make the decisions. Perhaps the most intelligent course would be to have Feiter come back to Washington. We will get in touch with Brent about this. (S)

The next issue we need to talk about and need to cooperate on closely is the environment. This is a big political issue in all of our countries. I don't want us to meet in Munich with a detrimental effect from this issue. We have to cooperate closely. I have another paper I just want to leave with you (attached). (S)

The President: Our experts are talking on this and they should continue talking. I believe that there are some areas in which the U.S. and Germany are moving together, such as forests. Now, I have to say that we have a major problem with this Rio Conference. Given my schedule and the campaign I can't commit at this time and I certainly I am not going to commit to things that will halt our economy. Maybe our experts can resolve these problems. But we don't want a big bill at the end of the day.

We will continue to work in the run-up at this UN meeting. The U.S. and Germany should work very closely together on this. This conference is at a bad time for me politically. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: As a friend, George, my advice is that if we prepare for the Conference carefully, we can get a partial victory; then you should definitely go. This environmental subject has real appeal. With regard to the management and preservation of forests, I think we will be in agreement. There may be a problem over finances especially from the Third World countries. But the question is whether there can be compromises in certain areas. If we don't go, we will definitely be attacked. We should have something to show up for. (S)

The President: How long will it last? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Three days, but actually I think I will be able get it done in two days. (U)

The President: Well, we are talking about it. I've told Collor that I may have problems with the timing. I agree that it is a good political subject. But I can't go to Rio and get myself embarrassed because we can't satisfy the demands of the LDCs and the environmentalist advocates. We have a particular problem with global warming commitments. All things being equal, I would like to go, but I need to see more results from the working group first. If I am not there, you can always blame things on me! (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Well, you know that we can play different roles. In fact, I think we could play the ball for you from Europe. I'd do that for you if you would like. Politically, I think those who want to save what God has given us will do well. (C)

The President: Maybe so, but not if I am criticized by accepting far-out proposals. I also think that it is important that the World Bank has control over the cost. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I think it will be about $3 billion but the timeframe for this $3 billion is not clear. I definitely want to avoid having the U.S. and Europe on two different sides. (C)

The President: I want to avoid the same thing. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Now with respect to the G-7 summit itself, I think the Sherpas are doing okay. We can always talk if there is a problem. (C)

The President: Yeltsin ask me to discuss this with you. Can we do something like we did with Gorbachev? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I will be open with you about this. I will tell them that I will decide in a few weeks. I won't decide now. I have a concern about the CIS. The Kiev conference looks like it was a failure. What do we do in May if there is no CIS? (S)

The President: Well, I think in that case we have to deal with Russia. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but what about Kravchuk? (S)

The President: That's true. And Nazarbayev? (S)

Yeltsin is very sensitive to comparisons to Gorbachev. I'm not arguing this one way or another. We may want to have him come afterwards as Gorbachev did. He may want to be there for the whole time. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But George, he is going to ask you for money. (S)

The President: He already has. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But at Munich his request will be much more dramatic. (S)

The President: I'm not sure what we will do if he comes with a huge demand. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: And the problem for me is what will I do about Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania. I say let's decide this in late April or early May. (S)

Secretary Baker: The longer you wait before deciding this, the better. But it is important to begin to develop criteria as a host between Russia and everyone else. Maybe you could say that as Russia joins the IMF, the size of its economy is the basis for their inclusion. This might have some potential. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't think so, not at the rate their economy is going. We don't even know what's left of their economy. (S)

(Conversation resumed over lunch, participants were the same.)

Secretary Baker: Let me ask about the four-power proposal the French have made. We have resisted because of you and also because of the Italians, who have been vehement. The President told Mitterrand that it would be okay for us to proceed. But then we proposed that this be done at the Under Secretary level and only once. Now the French are still pushing for ministerial level. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me give you a frank answer, Jim. Do whatever you want. (U)

The President: I tried to help the man by giving him something on this. I made him an offer. We offered to compromise, and now I am told that he is upset with our offer. (C)

With regard to the CIS, I spoke with Ter-Petrosian on Nagorno-Karabakh this morning. They want a three-way group: Armenia,

Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. We will be supportive at the CSCE meeting. Ter-Petrosian says Turkey is not being fair. We think the Turks are in fact being fair. The Armenian and Turkish Foreign Minister, Cetin, have had good talks. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I view CIS developments skeptically. There is a danger of these republics drifting apart. This will have big effects in the economic and security fields. Their economy can't work. For 70 years, there was a centralized economy which devised a division of labor among the old republics. One republic provided coal, another one provided wheat, another one provided tanks. I don't know how they will manage if they split up. Another big problem is that their nuclear power plants are in terrible condition. Even within the republics, you've got these tendencies for splitting up, such as Crimea and Tartarstan. We have to try to help them. We have to give them advice and new structures. It is very much in our interest to do so. I understand that there are 20 reactors that are worse than Chernobyl. (S)

The President: There is not enough money in the world to take on that problem. I am told that the technology is so bad that many of these reactors are not worth fixing. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I told Gorbachev not to speculate about things getting worse and he has been pretty good about it. We do hope for the success of Yeltsin. (S)

Secretary Baker: I spoke with Shevardnadze recently. He is going back to Georgia as the new leader and he would like to set up diplomatic relations with us. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: On the Middle East I have to say that you risked a lot last year and now it is very important that we don't see you lose the peace. (C)

The President: Let me discuss Iraq and then the Arab-Israeli problem. On Iraq they continue to cheat but now they are moving in the right direction again. There is still good support based on international insistence that they comply with the resolutions. So we have to keep the sanctions in place, and we have to keep the pressure on. When King Hussein was here, he said he was supporting the sanctions and the embargo, but they have a very leaky border. We will have to make Saddam Hussein comply. We could use force if need be but we certainly hope we don't have to. On the Arab-Israel front we are still talking. The Israeli hardline positions on settlements are counterproductive. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: (b)(1) (b)(1) (S)

The President: Listen, I take great pride in the level of Jewish immigration to Israel. The American people support us on the

housing loans by a factor of 80-20%. How are your relations in general with Israel? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Quite good. I have helped to get a lot of them out of the USSR, and I helped them on other issues. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Secretary Baker: I am not sure that is right. I've heard that the newest immigrants from the former USSR are backing Labor because they believe that the policies that Likud has pursued are making it more difficult to bring more Soviet immigrants. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I hope you are right. (U)

The President: We are also worried about Algeria and the Maghreb. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. Everything is moving in the world. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

The President: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) (S)

Chancellor Kohl: What about Iran? (S)

Secretary Baker: We got a message recently that they wanted to have a discussion of economic relations on the side. Our response is that we are prepared to discuss everything on a formal basis, but we will not have a discussion of economic issues unless we talk about political issues, too, especially the question of state-sponsored terrorism. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm told that there is a concern here about Germany's policy on terrorism. I want to tell you that there is absolutely no intention to change our position on the Hammadi brothers. I want to be clear. I will not be blackmailed. (S)

The President: That's good. That will be well received here. (S)

The President: What is your view on Yugoslavia? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we are getting close now but the name Macedonia is still a problem. (C)

The President: Mitsotakis called. (b)(1) (b)(1) I said that we cannot give that much time. So the idea is that in early April we will go forward with Slovenia and Croatia and we should both recognize Bosnia. Then we should ask the Greeks to work out the problem with Macedonia. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I want to help Mitsotakis with the name. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Portuguese are trying to broker a deal. They are making a very good effort. They are exploring the question of the name. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to help him but I cannot postpone this for six months. That said, it is important that we stabilize Mitsotakis' government. (S)

The President: I agree. Mitsotakis is very important. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: On South Africa, we have to find a way to help de Klerk. (S)

The President: I agree. I think we have only one sanction left which is legislative. Otherwise we will want to lift all sanctions. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Is the question of your troop presence a divisive political issue here? (S)

The President: No, not too divisive. The Democrats want to cut the defense more than we do, and they will propose substantially fewer American troops in Europe. But I don't think that the American people will take this view. We have proposed forces on the order of 150,000. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It's our feeling that it would be foolish if the Americans left. We don't need to get into the figures here, but a symbolic presence would make no sense. You need to have a militarily significant capability. I am convinced there will be more dramatic change in Europe. Within another nine or ten months, we will have a single market. It will have an enormous effect: 380 million people in one market. In 1995, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and probably Norway will enter. I believe by the end of the century Switzerland will, too. Then there may be a break before Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia come in. Not this decade. In this situation it is important to have an American physical presence in Germany and in Europe, but the rest of our relations should also be enlarged. This is why I am proposing a German-American Academy of Sciences. I think this German connection, George, could actually help you with the election. You can use it to show that the United States benefits from your foreign policies. I am convinced that within European integration, the French will gradually change their position in

NATO. You can feel that with Mitterrand. The Franco-German corps is moving in that direction. If Chirac or Delors becomes the next president we may have new opportunities. I am prepared to let the optics go in one direction as long as the real developments go in the other direction. But this is no reason to diminish the U.S. presence. We should have more links like cultural links. We should recognize each other's diplomas, for example. (S)

The President: With regard to the troops, I will make a strong case. It would be helpful if you say while you are here that it is important to have this presence. (C)

Secretary Baker: From our perspective, the French attitude toward NATO is not helpful. Bear in mind that the political debate in the United States could turn toward bringing the boys home. If it appears that elements in Europe don't want or don't count on our presence it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whenever we advance ideas about NATO, France is always negative. Maybe this is just left over from the past, but it makes things very difficult. We have to renew NATO because without NATO there will be no U.S. presence. Yet we always get French resistance. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: This is true, and its clear to all of us. (U)

The President: How will this French-German corps work? Will it be NATO-assigned? And what about the Hades missile? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The German part of the corps that has been NATO-assigned will remain NATO-assigned. We think we know what is going to happen over time. This will work out. (S)

The President: Will tactical nuclear weapons be assigned also? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Hades is a big issue. In my own party, there was a big flurry about it. But I don't want to raise this issue. [redacted] (b)(1) It is of great cost and no value. It can only hit Germany and Poland. (S)

The President: But if people here see developments outside of NATO, they'll say we're not needed. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: The world has changed. Not long ago, FOTL was the issue. Thatcher attacked me for weakness. Now the first issue of the NATO summit was food aid to the CIS. From Lance to food aid to Russia. Jews were not getting the food. A German general solved this. (S)

Secretary Baker: In CSCE, we are stressing all three baskets and don't want to lose flexibility. We are face to face with the French proposal for a European security treaty. We don't support it; it would be counter-productive with NATO. It also implies security guarantees all the way to the Chinese border. We think

the U.S. and German views are same. It is directly related to U.S. presence. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Europe shouldn't underestimate American strength. Germans will be the last to do so. We underestimated you twice in this century and won't make that mistake again. (C)

The President: There will be no turning inward. We'll stand up for our presence there. (C)

(Following lunch and the departure of the Vice President, Secretary Baker and David Gompert, discussions resumed.)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Kohl
Peter Hartmann
Brent Scowcroft

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 22, 1992, 3:00 - 4:00 pm
Camp David

The President: We have not talked much about what to do for the CIS and how to do it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We must maintain differentiation between two things: what they need to do, and what we need to do. They have to help themselves. They must adopt their own political course without coming under our tutelage. The Baltics are now independent. But they belong together. It would be a tragedy if they set up separate systems for currency, customs etc. Here is an easy but typical example. The Scandinavians set aside $100M for the Baltics. We will also help, but the Nordic states are in the best position to help without arousing fears of domination. It appears that things are going badly between Russia and the Ukraine, and also with the Central Asia Republics. (S)

The President: They all call me trying to establish separate status with us. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, but they have no idea how to build separate economies. The international financial institutions should be the basic means for helping them, because Germany is at the ceiling of our bilateral aid. (S)

The President: We are nearly at the same point. I wanted to talk to you about the GAB. Nick Brady says that it is set up for just this sort of thing. What more reform do they need to do before we offer a stabilization fund? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They have to know what they want. Yeltsin wants to move fast. Kravchuk is moving more slowly. We can be of most help in providing technical know-how. But there are many advisors there now and there is no coordination. We should improve this. This is very important. We also should improve

our coordination within the international financial institutions. Maybe we should use the Sherpas for this. (S)

The President: We agree with you. Russia needs to move on privatization in sectors such as energy. They just don't seem to move. There is almost instant hard currency to be made there. We agree on the international financial institutions, and we will try to get IMF replenishment through Congress. This is a bad year for it, but I sense that there is a better mood on the necessity to help CIS. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I recognize your problems here. But can't you just point out that this is a repetition of 1945? We must also agree what points to make with the press and what remarks you think useful for me to make here. (S)

The President: Clearly, we should say that more reform is needed. You could say that the U.S. is determined to do its part. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: No, I just want to help and I am thinking out loud. I wonder if I should say today is like 1945, when Germany was in terrible shape. We received your aid and became a flourishing democracy. Its an easy point for me to make. (S)

The President: I think we should make clear that we are supporting Yeltsin. That Hoagland piece was very damaging. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, even Gorbachev says so. On aid, I think our Sherpas can go over the ground-work. Koehler is my man on this. (C)

The President: Zoellick is mine, and we have great confidence in him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps the two can get together. (U)

The President: The press will yell about Yeltsin coming to Munich. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is not a problem. The question is not just Yeltsin, but G-7 coordination with the Commonwealth. (S)

The President: Yeltsin will expect something. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yeltsin will participate one way or another. (S)

The President: The more forthcoming the better, but not in every meeting. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I will call him on Monday. (U)

The President: That is all you need to say to the press. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: We could also say that we will be discussing this with all the others. (S)

The President: Good. They are all competing with each other in CIS, especially Kravchuk. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Kravchuk will immediately say how about me and so will the East Europeans. (S)

The President: Maybe we can find some rationale having to do with the eight largest economies. (S)

General Scowcroft: That might include the Chinese. (S)

The President: Maybe we could point to the eight largest democratic states. Otherwise we will dilute the G-7. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The summits have become distorted. We discuss every topic supposedly and spend most of our time on a communique we haven't even read. (S)

The President: What can we do about it? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I plan to send a letter to the G-7 along these lines. Let's get a list of issues so we can really discuss them, and not just read the old and new testament to the press. (S)

The President: Yes, the press looks for a discussion. Who is up and who is down. Maybe we should not even have a communique. It's too bureaucratic. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Mitterrand thinks the same way. I think Major and Mulroney also. (S)

The President: I think the Japanese might have a different view. This is the only forum for them. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I like the Japanese Prime Minister but that should not affect this. (S)

The President: Why don't you send your letter to the rest of us? What will you do about expanding the EC? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: There will be a natural limit in 1995. We will have Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway. (S)

The President: What about Turkey? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Apart from Great Britain, the most natural partner for the U.S. is Germany. We are very close together, our ideas about the

economy, religion and so on. Having the U.S. as a close partner will reduce fears of Germany in Europe. Close U.S.-German relations will not arouse fear from the smaller countries of the EC. So after the elections, we should talk we could do on a long-term basis. Many Americans are already thinking along these lines. They also observe how our new Laender are being transformed. Our cooperation should go beyond the military. We could also help you with Japan. Now about Kinnoch, it wouldn't change much in the EC. It's mostly talk. (S)

The President: Isn't Labor more inclined toward integration with the EC? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Not really. Thatcher gave that impression. The British problem is like ours and France's. We have put an engine on a track. Then we include countries who try to change track, but the train goes right on. At the practical level the changes are already taking place. In industry we already have European entities. Nestle and Agnelli are fighting for Perrier. All the companies, including American companies, are already integrating. This is the reality of what is happening. There is no way to retreat from Maastricht. If I were American, I would put all my eggs in this basket. (S)

Perhaps Feiter can come to Washington again on the 30th. I am convinced that we could find a solution. The biggest problem is rebalancing. We can't leave this to experts. We can let them do what they can. I am not negotiating, but we should conclude this by the end of April. Therefore we must compromise. I will discuss this with my colleagues. (S)

The President: Should we say that our experts will meet? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: No. I don't want to relieve the Commission from its responsibilities. We need a GATT agreement in order to boost the world economy, and this is better than aid for the Third World. Let's call each other whenever it may be necessary. (S)

The President: Rebalancing is a big problem for us. It is a big step back from free trade. We gave on the "safe box." We will try but it will be very tough. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand. Let's continue to talk. Is there anything I can say to be helpful to you? (S)

The President: Well, no one is really focused now. Perhaps around the time of the summit. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: What are the themes that the Democrats are using? (C)

The President: They say it is a time for change, and they also say they can fix the economy. The only chance for the Democrats is if the economy turns down again. The Democrats will say they can cure and turn around the economy. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Are you saying that foreign policy will play no role? (C)

The President: It will in the Fall. And our role in the global economy will be important. Also people are now asking, without the Soviet Union, why do we have NATO? And why do we need military strength? But this will change in the fall. I feel confident. But it is an ugly period. But the economy will improve and dilute the Democrats' arguments. Foreign policy will assume its rightful importance. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Who will his vice presidential nominee be? (C)

The President: I don't know. Not a Southerner. He needs California. Maybe Cuomo, even Tsongas? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Would Cuomo accept the Vice Presidency? (C)

The President: Maybe not. But he is the governor of a big Northeast state, and that would be good for them. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: There is one more important point I want to make. I will be coming to make a speech in New York in May at the American Newspaper Publishers' Association. Who should I talk to discreetly? Obviously, I will discuss unification and all the Presidents who have helped Germany from Truman to Bush. Then I can really set out what you did for us. (S)

The President: That would be very helpful. I would say, talk to Sulzberger. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I would like to talk quietly to someone on your staff and coordinate ideas. (C)

The President: Talk to Brent. (U)

General Scowcroft: I can work with Peter on this. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: What should we say to the press? (C)

The President: Do I have a statement? (C)

General Scowcroft: Yes, you have an outline of what was discussed. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

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Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS:



The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Lamb, Ambassador to Cyprus
Nelson Ledsky, Special Cyprus Coordinator
Jane E. Holl, Director European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus
George Iaccovou, Foreign Minister
Michael Sherifis, Ambassador to the United States
Akis Fantis, Government Spokesman

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 30, 1992, 4:00 p.m.
Oval Office

The President: Welcome. I'm very glad to see you, sir. Can we talk about Macedonia first? What is your view? I've been talking with my good friend Constantine Mitsotakis, he asked us for some time to work out the problem they are having with Macedonia and we went along, but what is your view about what we should be doing? How do you see it being resolved? (C)

President Vassiliou: I went to Greece to help Mitsotakis solve this problem. Sometimes it is good for someone from the outside to come in and offer help. I wanted to help Mitsotakis address the issue. All of the political parties see this as an issue that needs to be solved. First, I would say that it is vitally important to make sure that there are no claims on the territory of Greece, and second that the propaganda about minorities must cease. The entity that would be established should be guaranteed because if Skopje collapses that would be worse. It is better to have a small but neutral state that you can help develop and grow. (C)

That is the substance. As far as the psychological aspects go, the name has too many connotations -- some compromise must be worked out. Therefore an independent republic should be set up and helped to develop and not be threatened with being taken over. It cannot be developed as a source of tension in the region, but as a means of stability. (C)

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The President: So the real problem is with the name. (C)

President Vassiliou: Yes. Either it should be changed completely, or if that is not possible then to find some kind of compromise. (C)

The President: I know that Mitsotakis made it clear that a name change was important. But do you think a compromise is possible? (C)

President Vassiliou: If enough persuasion is brought to bear, they will compromise. (C)

The President: We do want to help but I don't know what leverage or influence we can have. We've been under a lot of pressure from ethnic Americans here -- Croatian Americans -- all kinds really that say that these people want their independence, and you're not moving forward U.S. -- when is the U.S. going to recognize their independence. I know it's not easy, but it's not easy for us either. Tell that to Mitsotakis. He's a good man. (C)

President Vassiliou: I can tell you that he appreciates greatly that you have given him some time. It is vital to make sure that the independence of Skopje/Macedonia is secure and guaranteed by everybody. There can be no irredentist efforts. (C)

The President: How about Cyprus? Where do we go from here? (U)

President Vassiliou: First, let me say how grateful I am for all you have done. And I am grateful for you seeing me today. (U)

The President: Let me just say that we have great respect for you as a person and your background -- what you have been through -- and for what you have done while you are in office. Second, I would like to say that on our trip, when we sat with the Turks and with the Greeks, I thought we'd really have something. Then the Turkish political situation got us all caught up. I think events have been not as we would have liked. I had thought we would have had a settlement by now. (C)

President Vassiliou: (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) They want to turn this into a bicommunal discussion. The UNSYG wants to break the deadlock -- the Turks cannot wash their hands of Cyprus -- but the UN Security Council and the SYG want to see real progress made. They are not prepared to always accept this one step forward and then another back. (b)(1) (b)(1)

The Permanent Five met with me and they will see Mr. Denktash today. If they could set up a committee -- to be visibly supportive of the SYG -- then we will have a cause to make progress. The U.S. should be behind this and I ask for your

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personal support as well. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) The issues must be negotiated. All of the chances for a solution are there -- they should be persuaded to negotiate. I will dedicate all of my efforts in the next months. The international climate is such that it needs a settlement. (C)

The President: I think it would be better without a lot of public pressure and posturing on Turkey. When Demirel was here we had a good discussion. He's willing to give it a shot. But I don't know him very well. What is your impression of him? Have you met him? (C)

President Vassiliou: Yes, only once at Davos. My impression is that Demirel is a shrewd politician. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) But if you continue to come at him, he will make up his mind. (C)

The President: He indicated to me that he wanted to stay involved. We can remind him again after this visit. Didn't Demirel talk to Mitsotakis at Davos? (C)

President Vassiliou: Yes, but nothing substantive. You know it is an illusion that Turkey could improve its relations with Greece without solving the Cyprus problem. But if there were a solution to Cyprus, all differences between Greece and Turkey would be solved. I would work for it. (b)(1) (b)(1)

The President: You support the UNSYG efforts, do you want another resolution or just that the Security Council support the SYG more? (C)

President Vassiliou: I think it is very important that we have a new resolution. (C)

The President: But we can't just beat up on Turkey -- that would force Demirel to back off. I think it would be counter-productive. (C)

President Vassiliou: If you say nothing and not let it be known who is responsible for the current lack of progress -- we must say that we are disappointed with the lack of progress and that this problem has to be addressed. (C)

Ambassador Ledsky: When I saw Prime Minister Demirel two weeks ago, he renewed his commitment to you. I don't think there is any question that he wants a settlement. But he is concerned. He says he cannot be seen to be pressured or seen to be pressuring Mr. Denktash. I share President Vassiliou's view that the SYG should be active and that the Security Council support his position to get more progress. (C)

President Vassiliou: If the UN thought that Turkey should be left out of the process -- (b)(1) there is no hope of a Cyprus solution. (C)

The President: I can be in touch with Demirel -- write to him and say that I assured President Vassiliou of your commitment to me and of your willingness and commitment, and that we think progress can still be made. What do you think? (C)

General Scowcroft: We can certainly do that. (U)

President Vassiliou: They have to be kept on the line -- the only way to be really kept moving -- if they don't cooperate, the whole world will know it. (C)

The President: What is President Ozal's role? Can he be helpful here? Because I have a very good relationship with him. (C)

President Vassiliou: Yes. He has some role because the opposition is in favor of a solution. But he does not have executive powers. And Demirel doesn't like him. (C)

The President: I like both of them. I wasn't sure, is Ozal totally out of this question? He's coming here in a few weeks. (C)

President Vassiliou: He's totally out of any question because he doesn't have executive powers. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) The only time there was progress was after your visit. Then they cooperated. But shortly after that they changed. (C)

The President: Well, we will follow-up with Demirel. I don't think he'll try to wiggle out. But I don't know about his foreign office. Do we have good contacts there? (C)

Ambassador Ledsky: The Foreign Minister is good, and their number two is very good. He's a friend. (C)

General Scowcroft: I think a letter from you Mr. President will help. (C)

The President: We'll get that out right away. (C)

President Vassiliou: One more thing, Mr. President. You know our region of the world is not the most stable. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

The President: Well we appreciate it. It's a very generous gesture. I just hope we don't have to take you up on it. (C)

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President Vassiliou: Well you do not need to make any decisions now, (b)(1) (b)(1) (U)

The President: Thank you very much. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Felipe Gonzalez of Spain

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for the National Security Affairs
David Gompert, Senior Director, European and Eurasian Affairs, Notetaker
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs
Joseph Zappala, Ambassador to Spain
Patricia Arizu, Interpreter

Felipe Gonzalez, President
Francisco Ordonez, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jaime de Ojeda, Ambassador of Spain in Washington
Miguel Gil, Under Secretary, Minister of the Spokesperson
Jose Pons, Director, International Affairs Department, PM's Office
Rafael Spotorno, Chief of Staff of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jorge Fuentes, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Spain in Washington
Divine McLaughlin, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 2, 1992, 11:00am - 1:30pm
Oval Office

The President: Welcome. Please give my respects to His Majesty. We still haven't forgotten his help and yours at the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference and also I have not forgotten your personal courtesies. I still remember that wonderful dinner we had, just the four of us, Gorbachev, the King, you and I. We had a chance to let our hair down. It was kind of a "Last Supper" for Gorbachev, though we did not realize it at the time.

Well, my friend, the floor is yours. (U)

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President Gonzalez: Thank you, Mr. President. Your efforts over four years have put our bilateral relations where they have never been before. Your vision on international problems has brought more harmony between our two countries than ever. This was most evident during the Gulf War. In Rome at the NATO summit, I was surprised to see that our views were so close with regards to Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, I think American views and Spanish views on that subject are closer than those between Spain and its neighbors. (U)

We are following your political campaign with great interest. It would be a great concern if any thesis were to succeed resulting in diminished U.S. engagement in the world. Thank you for your efforts to improve our relations. I hope we will continue. This is absolutely essential, and I extend to you warm greetings from His Majesty. You are especially welcome in Spain during this 500th Anniversary year. (U)

The President: I wish I could come. I am involved in this crazy election year. I try to be flexible where my calendar is concerned. You are right U.S.-Spanish bilateral relations are in great shape. (U)

It might be useful to start with the Middle East. There have been some troubling signs. We have some real difficulties with Israel right now -- not so much with the Israel but with Israeli government. Our relationship with Israeli government is strained by my unwillingness to provide loan guarantees for their settlements for Soviet Jews. In the New York primary going on right now, my opponents are staking out opposing positions. But I will not change my position. Jim Baker and I take a lot of heat, but we are convinced that if we acquiescence in the settlement policy of the Israeli government it would be a bad signal to those who came to Madrid to talk about peace. The present government is very difficult to deal with, but at least Jim has kept people talking. I would like him to fill you in what is going on. (C)

Secretary Baker: As you know, the last session of bilaterals saw the parties actually begin to focus on substance. This was just the beginning of a substantive dialogue. They didn't really get anywhere, but no one has left the table. Despite the conflict in Lebanon, despite the Israeli military action, today we are announcing that the parties will all be here in Washington on the 27th of April. Finally, the Arabs have given us 10 different locations for bilaterals to continue. I regard both of these developments as positive. We have no agreement yet on where the next bilaterals will take place. The Fifth Round will be here in Washington on 27th of April. The sixth round then is to take place before the 23th of June. But it is doubtful if anything will happen. The Arabs in fact do not want to have that round then because they know that the Israeli election will make progress impossible. (S)

Multilateral negotiations are scheduled for May. This includes the working groups on arms control, on water and environment, and

on economic development. All these working groups will be meeting in May. Syria will not attend the bilateral meetings, and it is not yet clear who the Palestinian representative will be at the multilaterals. We believe that a representative from the European Community should be at the multilaterals. Israel has not yet agreed with some of these particulars . Also, they have not yet agreed to including the EC in the arms control and regional security working group, which I know is of interest to you. (S)

President Gonzalez: We share your position completely. The two most important developments for us right now are peace in the Middle East and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. These are the highest priorities for Europe. Both are very complicated. I want you to know that you can always use Madrid if it will help the cause for peace. I am aware that the process will be slow and unspectacular. Israeli President Herzog was in Madrid this past week to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. We had a reconciliation. He warned me frankly that there is a danger coming for the United States and that is Israeli hyper-nationalism. But if the settlements continue I see no way to achieve a territorial settlement. (S)

The President: We've been concerned that some members of the Israeli government are being critical of us. Do you believe that they will try to attack us during the Israeli election? (S)

President Gonzalez: What I know is that Herzog wants to reduce tension. I believe that there is a chemical incompatibility between Shamir and Bush. In the election, the present Israeli government might try to provoke a nationalistic reaction to help them. But this must be offset in Israel by the realization that U.S.-Israeli relations are absolutely critical for Israel. But they are hyper-sensitive right now in Israel. We are willing to lend a hand in the Middle East. Peace is an overriding consideration. We are worried about fundamentalism. Therefore, we believe that a Middle East peace would help more than anything else. (S)

The President: Could you give me your views about Venezuela? Whenever I go to South America, I can see a strong respect there for Spain. You have a unique position there. Carlos Andres Perez has prided himself as being one of the hemisphere's leading democrats. And we respect him. He has been constructive. Even though we sometimes differ, he is very straight with me. While we were worrying about Haiti, CAP's own problems began. My concern is that if this outspoken advocate of democracy in this hemisphere is overthrown, it would be a horrible signal and a horrible thing in its own right. (S)

President Gonzalez: The democratic development in South America is one of the most positive developments of our times. The spreading of democracy and the overcoming of wrong-headed nationalist economic policies has worked. Too much of the GNP had been in the public sector. But in Venezuela, now only 3% of the

GNP is in the budget. Venezuela has gone too far in the opposition direction. The direction itself is correct. Venezuela has been growing at 8% a year, but requirements for a balanced budget prevent social policies. So its a paradox. There are no overall Macro-economic problems. But there are serious social problems, and there is no tool to respond to them. With just 3% of the GNP in revenue, and with the public enterprises producing no profit, there is nothing to work with. Argentina is also suffering from having no tax policies. (S)

This is what caused the coup attempt in Venezuela. I tried to tell CAP of the risk. The military movement can spread to Bolivia. Even Argentina can have political uprisings. There is a tense situation in Argentina; not the military but a political uprising. It has the backing of some military elements. But in Venezuela more than any country, democracy has had symbolic value for decades. (S)

The President: Why is there trouble in Argentina? I've been complacent about Menem. I think he is on the right track. (S)

President Gonzalez: Yes, that is right. Again, it is a paradox. Venezuela was on the right track too. Growth does not prevent a social explosion. It takes time for the benefits of growth to be distributed. So while they have had success, people are hungry. (S)

The Argentine people won't tolerate this. The majority of the people aren't benefitting from the growth in the economy. The Argentine government hasn't treated the last group of coup plotters effectively. There is no control of the old military. Indeed, there is a danger that Argentina might go back to its nationalistic roots. There is a link between social discontent and nationalism, as we have seen before. But this is a political operation going on in Argentina. Not a military coup like Venezuela. (S)

The U.S. is in a good position to talk to the military of these countries and tell them that they will be rejected if they pursue such blind adventures. (S)

There are still some problems in Central America. There is some progress with the police in Nicaragua. I know the Nicaraguan government well: they need to make an agreement with the Sandinistas. The pact with the Sandinistas cannot be broken. So we have to moderate the Sandinistas and also make the military and the police more professional. They have to be reformed since they cannot be rejected. If we have a breakup in Nicaragua between government and the Sandinistas, the effects in El Salvador would be very negative. Within the Sandinistas, there is a split between the reformers and those who reject cooperation. (S)

The President: Are the Ortega brothers divided with, one being in government and then the other not. Are they split, as you indicate? (S)

President Gonzalez: I don't think there are real differences between the Oretga brothers. Umberto is more competent. He wants to play institutionally. Daniel has it tougher. His task is to bring all the Sandinistas together. So he is schizophrenic. He has to walk a tight-rope. (S)

Secretary Baker: I have a high regard for Lacavo. He seems to have political ability. Your estimate of his strategy of cooperation is right. He is pragmatic. Our real worry is that the government will walk away from its base. We have offered to help in two ways. First, with the creation of an independent police force. And second, a reduction of the size of the army. They need retirement benefits. But U.S. law does not permit us to help to provide help in this respect. Can you do so? (S)

Anything we can do to encourage them toward an independent, non-Sandinista police force would be helpful. But we can't continue to provide substantial resources. Congress will cut off these resources unless there is movement to take the police out of hands of the Sandinistas. (S)

President Gonzalez: The plan for reforming the police is not bad. If it works and they divide the police into corps, the influence of Sandinistas will decline. We could complement this. Actually, perhaps we could use our funds to help reduce the size of the army. We are concentrating our reforming the police. Chamorro tells me that she is unsure of Umberto; she says she'll change him, but when? (S)

Secretary Baker: The Sandinistas' past errors are being revealed. So I think Umberto will leave. We are somewhat optimistic on El Salvador, Though, of course it could change. (S)

President Gonzalez: I am positive about El Salvador too. We have 120 military officers in El Salvador and we have 138 police officers. We have 1/3 of the UN force there. The most delicate issue is control of the police. (S)

The President: When Duarte was here before he died at Walter Reed he asked me to protect his family and bring them to the U.S. He knew he was dying. How could he have thought the worst of Christiani? We think Christiani has a real commitment to democracy. (S)

President Gonzalez: Duarte thought that D'Ambisson would be the boss, not Christiani. In fact, Christiani would be just a figure head. (S)

The President: We are still committed to the return of Aristide in Haiti because he was democratically elected. But he is a weak reed. The flow or refugees is down, and the returnees have not been mistreated. (S)

President Gonzalez: I don't understand how they could name Theodor Prime Minister. Anything is possible in Haiti. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have supported all the OAS initiatives, not just because it is the OAS but because it seems the best approach to pursue. But now it appears that we are back at the drawing boards. (S)

The President: Tell us what you did recently against the terrorists. (S)

President Gonzalez: We have just conducted an important operation against the ETA and arrested all the leaders. We got good cooperation from France. This will give us a margin of comfort for the 1992 games. Still this is a tough struggle. (S)

The President: Where does Spain stand on Yugoslavia? (S)

President Gonzalez: What happened in Yugoslavia was disgraceful. This conflict could start again. The Greeks need help. Maybe we can think of a new name for Macedonia. When you were in Paris, we had 34 countries signing the charter in Paris. Now we have 50 or more in just 1-1/2 years. This is ridiculous. Where would the end come? I think that Russia will want to expand but will also fragment. In Western Europe, we see a movement toward union and an attraction toward Western Europe from Eastern Europe. And yet in the East, we see s splintering movement. (S)

Secretary Baker: There is trend toward devolution in Western Europe too, even though integration is occurring. (S)

President Gonzalez: There is always a danger of disintegration In Spain we call it the cry of Cartagena. Mr. President, I received your letter about the new assistance aid package to the former Soviet Union. I very much agree with this, but I think we must be very clear about the conditions. We are worried above all about nuclear weapons. The Ukrainians will not give up these weapons. This should be our first condition. The second condition should be the institutionalization of democratic government. (S)

The President: I agree we ought to use our leverage on the nuclear weapons question. Ukraine wants guarantees that the weapons will be destroyed under international supervision. This seems reasonable. But yes, we should use our leverage. We should insist because we have such leverage. (S)

President Gonzalez: Kazakhstan will not be easy either. (S)

I'm afraid that we won't make progress at the CSCE meeting in Helsinki. This proliferation of European institutions is causing political tension among countries. We need to conduct some kind of a study with these various institutions: NATO, CSCE, WEU and EPU. We are getting very confused. NATO is the best guarantee, so I would begin there. Then ask the question, what does CSCE do? What sense would it make to give CSCE military roles -- since we already have NATO. We have to think this through. (S)

The President: Let me explain my concern. There has been a proliferation of ideas on the question of military forces in Europe. This causes us problems at home. If the Franco-German force or the CSCE take on the role the U.S. is playing, we can't keep our presence in Europe. We are in a funny climate here at home, and if it looks like Europeans are providing some alternatives to what we have provided it won't work. Kohl says the German people want us, but I am worried about what happens when the last Russian soldier leaves. Our worry is even more fundamental. Conflicting signals from Europe will hinder the ability of a U.S. President to keep our forces in Europe. So I caution my friends. I think this would be a big mistake myself. Who is going to protect Europe -- Byelarus? (S)

President Gonzalez: We are speaking clearly and frankly, so I will as well. Your starting point about the Franco-German corps is wrong, Mr. President. This brigade is not a sign of distrust of the U.S., but an attempt to overcome distrust between France and Germany, though this point cannot be said publicly. We support the Franco-German corps, and we might even participate in it as long as it won't be antagonistic to the Atlantic link. France is always raising jealous problems. But I don't know one single leader in France who would want the United States out. I am worried that we could lose our Atlantic link. (S)

These European movements shouldn't be seen as anti-American. You are needed more than ever because of the instability in Central and Eastern Europe. People have trouble saying we are dependent on you, but yet they admire you. The key question is how to reconcile NATO with EPU. The EC is the most stable element in Europe. EC is a brake against nationalism, including German nationalism. We all have different concerns, but I'm more worried about Morocco than Helmut Kohl is. I am very worried about Maghreb. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have a schizophrenic situation. When we say that there should be a substantial role for WEU as a complement to NATO, we mean it. But the French make proposals at every turn that would diminish NATO to the point that the U.S. presence cannot be sustained. For example, their proposal to make CSCE a new security treaty organization would be seen here as making NATO superfluous. We agree on the need to rationalize the various institutions, but the French are making harmful proposals. (S)

President Gonzalez: Your perception is right. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) I propose we avoid all these unilateral theories. We need a group of trusted people to look at NATO, CSCE and WEU and come up with some solutions. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) There is a very serious risk. CSCE helped end the Cold War. But the Charter of Paris didn't deal with the new situation we are facing. So very quietly we should get a group together; one French, one German, one Spaniard, one American, and so on. (S)

The President: Before we end, let me raise the Uruguay Round. I think that it is essential that you and I and others remain personally involved. We don't much like the Dunkel draft ourselves, but we can live with it. Now the EC needs to help this process by getting on board. This would be the best thing in the world for the LDCs. It is absolutely essential. (S)

President Gonzalez: My impression is that the problem of how to handle exports subsidies is not very important for Spain. We would be happy with CAP reform because the CAP does not benefit us. We have only one problem, and it's an acute problem which is bananas from the Canary Islands. But we must do what we must. The EC needs time to reform its CAP, and maybe we can't do this by the 15th of April, or even by next April 15. So perhaps if we have found a way to reach more limited agreement and postpone some of these tougher issues. CAP reform would make it easier to have a comprehensive solution in due time. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

APRIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Francesco Cossiga of Italy (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs
Peter Secchia, Ambassador to Italy
Tony Wayne, Director for Western Europe Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Interpreter

Francesco Cossiga, President
Sergio Berlinguer, Secretary General to the President of the Republic
Bruno Bottai, Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Boris Biancheri, Ambassador of Italy in Washington
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 7 4:00 p.m.
Oval Office

President Cossiga: I'm delighted to see you and in such splendid form. Of course, you know I see you almost daily on CNN. (U)

The President: Let me comment on that. You know about 70% of the media coverage we've been getting in recent months has been negative. But I think that is changing. A lot of the criticism relates to the economy and to the fact that five democrats and one right wing republican have been knocking my head off daily. (Ø)

President Cossiga: I think they are scared of you. (Ø)

The President: Maybe, but it's changing. The economy is showing signs of life, and as it improves so does the mood of the American people. There was a new rating issued the other day on the confidence of the American public which showed a marked improvement. (Ø)

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President Cossiga: You have many people in Europe who would vote for you. Maybe it would be best for your right wing candidate in the U.S. not to know the answer of the Italians who were asked who they would vote for. The Italian Left said they would vote for you. I will also tell you about a former Communist philosopher. He said that it's possible that if he lived in America that he would be a democrat but since he is a European he prefers voting for Bush as you provide for greater security in European affairs. (S)

The President: I hope you are saying that our administration wants to stay involved, in trade in NATO. We will stay involved, and we will not be pulled into protectionism. What do you make of the Italian election results? (S)

President Cossiga: Well, they have created a complex situation. But it is far less dramatic than it could appear. I largely foresaw the results. The changes come from the major shifts in Europe with the end of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation. As you know, we have the second largest communist party in Europe, the third largest in the world and the largest in the free world. Now this point of reference has disappeared. Therefore we are seeing a sort of thawing in political society. So what were the dominant parties in the old order, the Christian Democrats and the PDS (Democratic Party of the Left) are the ones who suffered the biggest losses in this weekend's vote. (S)

The President: But what is happening to the former communist party and to the lady who was the speaker of parliament? (S)

President Cossiga: The Italian communist party was the first communist party to evolve. It accepted NATO, and it fought with us against terrorism. The great majority of the communist party members were not marxist-leninists. It was a populist party by enlarge. I did what I could so that when the communist system collapsed the Italian communist party would evolve along social democratic lines. However, the present leadership of the communist party is not up to the task. I use a biblical reference to explain this. The communist people had to be led out of Egypt to the promised land through the Red Sea and the desert. But they've gotten bogged down somewhere between the Sea and the desert. As for your question about the former communist speaker of parliament, she wasn't re-elected. (S)

The President: Was this because of the party split? (S)

President Cossiga: Not only that but also because of some stands which she had taken. (S)

The President: How long will it be before the new government is established? (S)

President Cossiga: There is no statutory deadline. I am determined to start consultations immediately. There are two reasons for this. First, the country needs a government to deal with the economy and public finances, for meeting our European

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deadlines, and for facing our responsibilities in the Yugoslav region and the Mediterranean region. Second, on July 3 my successor will be elected and matters will be far more complicated if we haven't come up with formula for the government by then. You know the presidency will be more important. (Ø)

During my tenure I shifted some of the powers to the presidency. This was needed to balance the political situation. Now the fragmentation of political parties calls for a more powerful president. (Ø)

But I want to assure you that this will have no influence on Italy's foreign policy. For example, the most successful party in gaining votes in this election is the Lombardy league. It will support the traditional line of Italian foreign policy. (Ø)

I want you to know that just yesterday I gave our consent for a combined U.S.-Italian exercise against terrorism in the Mediterranean area and to asking NATO confidentially about the possibility of redeploying patriot missiles in southern Italy to deal with possible crisis in the Mediterranean related to Libya. Since the government is in crisis, they asked for my consent which I have given. Also I want you to know that relations between our two countries won't be effected by internal Italian matters. The men who may become prime minister or president are well known. (Ø)

The President: Well, whoever wins here, U.S.-Italian relations will remain strong. The only troubling point is that the democrats may want to do less in NATO. I don't want to prejudice you against them. But I'm just not sure because they want such cuts in defense spending. This is the only area where the election might effect the status quo. The democrats are proposing such substantial defense cuts that the only way they could carry them out would be precipitous cuts in troop levels, which I don't think is wise. (Ø)

President Cossiga: Yes, reductions beyond certain levels would have serious political connotations, especially for the Mediterranean region. We have already seen an example with the Congressionally-imposed cuts regarding the Crotone base. I am fully aware of the new efforts to deploy the 401st to other Italian bases. In my opinion U.S. forces within NATO in the Mediterranean, which is becoming the most sensitive area, are still very necessary. (Ø)

The President: I think it would be okay. We certainly haven't changed our view of the importance of staying involved. By the way, I wonder if you are looking forward to leaving the presidency? (Ø)

President Cossiga: The next two and half to three months will be very tough. But they are lightened by the fact that whatever happens on midnight July 3 I leave. I'm already creating some new jobs for myself. Tomorrow, we sign an agreement at Columbia University establishing a chair in Italian law. (Ø)

The President: They will be very lucky to have you in that chair. (U)

President Cossiga: I am very lucky, my daughter and son-in-law used to live in New York City. Now they are in London, but I had a house which I had originally financed for them. I also have a son in France who is an aeronautic engineer, and I financed a home for him there. So, with my wife, I can become an itinerant visitor. (U)

The President: And perhaps an itinerant grandfather? (U)

President Cossiga: No, not yet. But you know, I did ask Ambassador Secchia to get me invited to the Houston convention. (C)

The President: He can arrange that. It's a deal. (C)

President Cossiga: Well, I have no answer yet. (U)

The President: He is such an operator. I'm sure he can even make you a delegate. (C)

President Cossiga: You know I can't become a count or a lord like Margaret Thatcher, but I will be a Senator for life. (C)

The President: That's very good. It was very good to see you again. (C)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Violeta Chamorro, President of the Republic of Nicaragua [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	4/9/92	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ____ (NLGB) on 4/11/12

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

Date Closed:	1/29/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	09-0651-MR(509)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	12/17/2010

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Violeta Chamorro, President of the Republic of Nicaragua (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin America and Caribbean Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

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PER E.O. 13526
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JR 12/17/10

Violeta Chamorro, President of the Republic of Nicaragua
Ernesto Palazio, Ambassador to the United States
Jose Adan Guerra, Vice Minister of the Presidency
Cristiana Chamorro, President's Daughter, Chairman of the Board of La Prensa, and wife of the Minister of the Presidency, Antonio Lacayo

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 9, 1992, 3:05 - 3:50pm DST
The Oval Office

There was an initial exchange of amenities before the press. And then the President commented on the Noriega conviction. This conversation begins after the press left.

President Chamorro: How did things go at the meeting you just had? (U)

The President: Oh, the one where I just held you up in traffic. If I had known you were near, we could have asked you to come down with us. I think it went well. The idea is to get public opinion to support aid for Russia. Much of it will go through the international financial institutions. There was a very lively question and answer period. (C)

General Scowcroft: They are the group that Mrs. Chamorro will be speaking to tomorrow. (U)

The President: They will be very polite to you. (U)

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President Chamorro: I'm scared of the press. I don't like to speak before them. (Ø)

The President: It is a frustrating year with politics everywhere in the air. Everyone wants to find bad news. But the good news is that the economy is beginning to turn around. That will help us and help other countries. It will get confidence up. When the economic matters begin to turn around, you get a better overall atmosphere. (Ø)

How are things at home for you? How are things going? (U)

President Chamorro: Thank you so very much for receiving me and thanks to all your colleagues here present who have helped so much. We could not have done what we have done without their help. (U)

I went out to Kansas yesterday and spoke to the school. I brought back a gift -- a scholarship. (Ø)

The President: How will you decide who gets it? (U)

President Chamorro: We will have a contest around the country to see who is the best. (U)

The President: Did you speak in Spanish? (U)

President Chamorro: Yes, with a translation. (U)

It is wonderful to be with you. (U)

(Coffee and tea are served)

I won't have any, we need to watch our figures. (U)

The President: Actually, that's skim "leche" (U)

President Chamorro: I will be going to the hospital tomorrow to see my grandson. (U)

The President: Is that the boy who was in Texas? (U)

President Chamorro: Yes, he has Philadelcorrison Leukemia. It's not very common and they couldn't treat it down in Texas. They recommended three places for him to have a bone transplant and one of them is here. (U)

The President: How is the boy? Is he scared? (U)

Mrs. Chamorro: He has done very well. At one point, he got dizzy and felt weak and said, "help me, help me, I'm afraid." But when he got over being dizzy and he was healthy again, he said "forget what I said, it wasn't important." (U)

President Chamorro: On holy week, I will spend time there. If you are a mother and a grandmother, you are the mother of all. (U)

From the very first, way in the past, people said my family was split -- it was not so. But now, more than ever, we are together. We have enormous forgiveness and a desire to get along together. Regarding Nicaragua's problems, I thought to say to you, don't leave me. By all means, don't leave me, I need all the help I can get. We have drug plans and we have two oceans and we have to have ways of dealing with this problem. (C)

The President: Are we working on drugs, Bernie? (C)

Mr. Aronson: Yes, yes we are. (U)

The President: How will the conviction of Noriega be received in Latin America? (C)

President Chamorro: I don't think there will be reaction of any kind, because the drug problem is a criminal problem. (C)

The President: I hope there will not be a reaction at home. And that when there is a reaction, it will be positive. (C)

Mr. Aronson: Mr. President, Panama has done very, very well. It has had a 9.8 percent growth rate and if employment has gone down 20 percent, they are doing wonderfully, and then this person asks that kind of a question. (C)

The President: We need to get that word out. We'll need to talk to Judy (Deputy Press Secretary) on that. (C)

Well, I see we're okay on drugs. How about your economy? (U)

President Chamorro: We are progressing faster than any one of you ever thought. My economic team was just up here. I thought people were going to fall in love with them and bring them all here. People were so impressed with them. I think that what has been done in connection with privatization has been good -- and this has been a terrible headache. This is an incredible job. Like I said to Secretary Baker when he visited, it is very difficult to have to untie this knot. So little by little we are untangling this problem. I need to do it so that what happens to me is not what happened in Haiti and in Peru. (C)

The President: Speaking of your second biggest admirer, Carlos Andres Perez, he can hardly talk. He has laryngitis. We agreed that the OAS should send a group down there to try to work the problem. I said that we needed to get everyone together. He said that there would be a meeting of the Rio group. I said "that's good, but we don't want it to replace the OAS." He started off by saying that things are good in Venezuela. I don't know whether things are really good or if that is wishful thinking. (C)

President Chamorro: I don't know whether he (Fujimori) did this with the advice of the group or what. When I visited France, where I saw Mitterrand, I said that you are a politician and not me -- I am a humble housewife. Aristide went too far, too fast. People criticize me because I have gone gradually with reconciliation and forgiveness. I have talked with many people who have come back. Many people in the resistance are working, many people in the Sandinistas are working. (C)

We are changing the Cabinet when it is time to do so. I change members when it is time to do so in the democratic process. (C)

I say that people have confidence in the transition. Those people put me there. I don't know if we can succeed, but the people put me there. I need help. The help I need is not for my sake, but for the people. (C)

I talked with AID about a $30 million program for schools. What I am saying is that you should not abandon me. I know that the budget must go through Congress but let me tell you that you will finish your term when I finish mine. (C)

The President: And when is that? (U)

President Chamorro: You will finish in four years and nine months and that is when I will finish. (U)

The President: I was checking my figures a little while ago. I think we are furnishing about $200 million. How are we doing, are we doing what we said we would? (C)

Mr. Pryce: Yes, we are. (U)

Mr. Aronson: Yes, we are working with the Nicaraguans very satisfactorily. (U)

The President: How about the Ortega brothers? (C)

President Chamorro: I want you to know that Roberto Ortega decorated one of your people. (C)

The President: Oh? (U)

President Chamorro: Yes, and he also stopped in the U.S. and said ... (C)

The President: Did he talk with us? (C)

President Chamorro: I want to explain how we have been working. Private business invites investors to talk. We get a number of people. Some from the Sandinistas, some from the government, one of UNO investors -- a number of people are invited. We say that he is not a Sandinista. He said I'm going to the U.S. with you. What happened to Daniel before when he went with his new Vice President wouldn't happen here. He was going to come but he had to go somewhere else, so we asked the Sandinistas who they would

send and they decided to send Daniel. He was all dressed up. He didn't wear his red bandanna. I wore a red dress, but he didn't wear his red bandanna. He gave good support to the government. I think that he did not want to come off badly. (C)

The President: Did he talk with us? (C)

Mr. Aronson: No, he didn't ask to see us. (C)

Secretary Baker: We talked with him in Mexico. (C)

Ambassador Palazio: Mainly about Cuba. (C)

The President: I wonder how you were with Daniel, because he said some tough stuff in other places, but that's your stuff -- that's up to you to decide -- (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

President Chamorro: New people just dissolve CL -- I'm not just defending him. (C)

The President: (b)(1) (b)(1) (C)

What about the Contras? (U)

Foreign Minister Leal: There is a group covering problems. A larger group of reContras who have handed over their arms and we have collected them and helped them resettle. We gave them land for their arms. There is a small group in the region of the north where the government is trying to get together with them, but at this point they don't represent any real danger. (C)

The President: Any questions? Are things going fairly well, Bernie? (U)

Mr. Aronson: Yes. (U)

President Chamorro: What happens is that it is in Nicaragua that there are too many weapons from all over. Weapons from the Soviet Union, from the United States, from everywhere. I and Antonio (Lacayo, Minister of the Presidency) talked and we decided that we have to buy off these weapons. They are Russian weapons, American weapons. We have been taking weapons apart and burying them because we can't even make souvenirs of them. But I no longer have money to buy them. People are seeking them. (C)

The President: Who buys them? Arms dealers? (C)

President Chamorro: The government, but the problem is that there is not enough money. They need to be taken out. I'm sure that with the allotment of funds, with just 5 million we can get all the weapons. (C)

Secretary Baker: We can help in demining. (C)

President Chamorro: We have discussed this. You were going to send a team down to help us on this. (C)

Secretary Baker: We are working on this. (U)

President Chamorro: Don't get scared. (U)

The President: We have a couple of one-legged people with experience in this and we can send them down. (C)

The conversation broke up with a renewed exchange of amenities at this point. The President introduced Mrs. Bush who invited President Chamorro to visit Camp David with her grandson. President Chamorro declined but mentioned that it might be possible to do so some time in the future. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Calfa of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff
Zdenek Sadlon, Interpreter

Marian Calfa, Prime Minister
Rita Klimova, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 10, 1992, 2:10 - 2:30 p.m.
Oval Office

(The first part of the meeting was devoted to intelligence matters.) (S)

The President: I hope things are going well with the rest of your visit. (U)

Prime Minister Calfa: Yes, Mr. President. I was in Philadelphia yesterday and gave a lecture at the university, which went well. Then I met with businessmen and gave a talk about the difficult path to democracy. It was well received. This morning I went to the Congress and State Department. Tomorrow I will meet the Czech ethnic community in Texas. (U)

The President: Dallas? Houston? (U)

Prime Minister Calfa: It is between Dallas and Austin. I will have a meeting with the Mayor of Dallas and then go to the University of Texas. I never mentioned anywhere any of this, so, please, when we speak to the press we should be general. (C)

The President: We will say we exchanged greetings, had a general discussion, and talked about things in Czechoslovakia. (C)

(The conversation returned to intelligence issues.) (S)

Prime Minister Calfa: I appreciate your receiving me. (U)

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The President: I am glad to see you. I hate to rush off, but the press corps is waiting. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2869

SIGNED

April 15, 1992

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLH

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's Meeting with Prime Minister Olszewski of Poland, April 13, 1992.

Attached is the memcon covering the meeting between the President and Prime Minister Olszewski.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the memo at Tab I for State forwarding the memcon to State.

That the memcon at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve VGH Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memo to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By Cap NARA, Date 01/29/09

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Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Jan Olszewski of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Thomas Simons, Ambassador to Poland
Robert Hutchings, Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, Notetaker
Val Chlebowski, Interpreter

Jan Olszewski, Prime Minister
Zdzislaw Najder, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister
Wojciech Wlodarczyk, Chief of the Prime Minister's Office
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Ambassador to the U.S.
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 13, 1992 4:05 - 4:45 pm
Oval Office

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0651-MR
JR 12/17/10

The President: Welcome to Washington. I would like to hear from you about how things stand from your point of view. Fundamentally I think our relations are in good shape. I would like to think we can be helpful to you in insuring democracy's success in Poland. (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: I am very, very grateful for the opportunity to have direct interaction with you. First let me express my gratitude for all you have done yourself, along with the U.S. government and the American people, for the cause of our reform and for maintaining faith in the Polish nation. Now, to carry out our very difficult reforms I think it is clear that we have the support of the world's biggest superpower. We all remember all the things America has done for us; to enumerate would take too much time in our short meeting. So let me say that you have the thanks and gratitude of the Polish nation. (U)

The President: Thank you for your very kind words. Our relations with Poland have a special meaning for us, and a lot of Polish American citizens have a vital interest in your success.

We want to see reform succeed and feel that working with IMF is very important. As I just mentioned to our press, we want to help Russia, but not at the expense of Poland. What you say touched me in my heart, and I know it's right. (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Mr. President, as I expressed to the Secretary of State, what you have done is of great material significance but has also had an enormous moral impact. We understand that our success above all depends on us -- our determination and our consistency. It is our responsibility and our task. I can assure you that no matter what difficulties we face we will very firmly move to build a democratic system in Poland and a free market economy. This is not only the position of my government; it is the will of the entire nation. Our long years of struggle against Communism is a guarantee that our reforms ultimately will succeed. We want to pursue a way that is not only the most effective but also one in which political democracy and market reform work together. Our democratic framework will enhance the free market and vice versa. We therefore reject any departure from democracy. Should any doubts arise, I assure you they are groundless. Above all, Poles are attached to democracy and civic freedom. Our experience over the last half century guarantees that no other way would ever succeed. My government is the first freely elected government in post-war Poland, and we will continue to abide by this principle. It is also our desire to pursue economic reform in close coordination with the IMF. This is absolutely essential to us. It is reflected in our social policies and also in our draft budget which has won the preliminary approval of the IMF. We will continue to work to restore our agreement with the IMF and also hope for the help of the U.S. Government. (Ø)

The President: Obviously, that is the path we would like to see. One thing we hope is that the very fact of this visit will be a psychological symbol of our support. I have a question. Are there elements in Poland who would like to go back, not necessarily to Communism but to an authoritarian economic system? Do some want to return to a state-run economy? (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Following the Communist system, it is not only the economy that we must deal with but also the people who worked to make that system. Their interests have been hurt, and they retain influence. In the last election, their representatives won a significant number of seats. Therefore we may expect aspirations to bring back the old system, but that group alone cannot succeed. It would need outside support. They used to rely on Soviet support, but now that is gone. There is only one scenario concerning the process of change in Poland that might give them a chance: that would be a situation of massive unemployment and social upheaval. The experience of the 1930's shows that this may form a base of support to all sorts of extremist forces. Now we don't see such a threat. Again, this is an area where we hope for assistance from the international financial institutions. (Ø)

I would like to take the opportunity to refer back to an issue in your letter of congratulations to me. You mentioned the need to start negotiations with the London Club. That is also our intent. After an IMF agreement, we intend to resume discussions and hope for U.S. support. (Ø)

The President: I am glad to hear that. May I raise another question with you? It relates to private investment. John Whitehead, an outstanding businessman who was also the number two man at the State Department, is widely respected and known to me personally. He has agreed to lead a team of businessmen to Poland. We want to give American investment a shot in the arm and give people who have been looking at opportunities in Poland more encouragement. So my first point is that we want to give Whitehead our political support. Second, I want to mention what seems to be a sticking point in our relations. There is a feeling that some of our exports are being discriminated against in Poland. This makes it hard for us to tell our business people that they should be more involved. We shouldn't have our business people thinking that they are disadvantaged. In other words, encouraging U.S. investment is a two-way street. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The EC Association Agreement provides for tariff reductions for some EC products. This disadvantages us because the tariffs remain on U.S. products. (Ø)

Ambassador Simons: The answer is the Uruguay Round and Polish accession to GATT. (Ø)

The President: We still think that private investment in Poland is a big answer to your problems. I hope Whitehead can spur investment and get things moving. (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Mr. President, rest assured that Mr. Whitehead's mission will be welcomed with great joy. Regarding investment, some is underway and quite successfully, but the scale is too modest. We will work on our side, since we know foreign businessmen encounter difficulties that are remnants of the Communist system. We cannot change things overnight but we will work to resolve these problems. I will appoint a special plenipotentiary, who will be my personal representative. (Ø)

The President: This is the "ombudsman" concept. That is a good step. (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: I will tell you frankly that one of the successes of my government is that we were able to conclude an agreement with GM, after long negotiations to no effect. We would like this to be a symbol. (Ø)

The President: May I raise something that may be sensitive? Did anything ever come of negotiations between that American woman and the shipyard? (Ø)

Ambassador Simons: It never worked out. The expectations may have been too high on both sides, but it's over now. (Ø)

The President: How is President Walesa? (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: It is my pleasant duty to convey his best greetings. He asked my to give you his personal greetings. (U)

The President: I would like to extend the same to him. By the way, what has happened to General Jaruzelski? I know his background, but on a personal level, during my visit as Vice President, he was very kind to me. I wondered what has become of him. Is he in private life? (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: He now has the possibility to give lectures at one of our academies. He also does research as a full time job, and he has an appropriate status related to the fact that he exercised the office of the President and made a personal contribution. (Ø)

Mr. Najder: He has just published his memoirs. (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: The Poles are not vengeful, even though martial law did not leave good memories. Jaruzelski played a role which facilitated, at lower cost, our democratic development. (Ø)

The President: I am glad to hear there is a healing process. He had a difficult role in some ways. In other countries such as East Germany and Romania, the fate of former leaders was not so good. (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: The Poles are mild natured -- but not too mild. (U)

The President: Are you getting on all right with Germany? (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Our current relations are a strong psychological success, considering the enormous burden of the past. I lived through World War II in Warsaw. Traces of those times have left no major impact on our relations. The sensitive issue of the German minority is being handled in such a way to be an example for all of Central Europe. We hope the same standards will be applied to Polish minorities in the ex-Soviet Union. Things are not so good everywhere, for example Lithuania. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Are there still problems? (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Unfortunately, yes. (U)

The President: Do you have a lot of refugees from the former Soviet Union? (Ø)

Prime Minister Olszewski: There are a lot who do street business. (Ø)

The President: Were you in Warsaw when the Germans came in? (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Yes, I was ten at the time. (U)

The President: Do you remember it clearly? (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Very clearly. In a child's memory some things stay strongly etched. My generation continues to live with those memories. This is another reason for the importance of our current relations with Germany. (U)

The President: I am delighted to have seen you and wish you well. I appreciate the suggestion for me to visit Poland. (S)

Prime Minister Olszewski: You would be very welcome even for a short time. (S)

The President: I was asking my secretary whether you had been apprised of a possible scenario. I cannot spend a long time in Europe because of our domestic situation, and I will need to be at the G-7 and CSCE summits. One thing that has an emotional appeal is the return of Paderewski's remains. I have a question, If I could spend only a few hours in Poland, would such a short visit be insulting or, in the spirit we would like, would it be seen as paying respects to this distinguished statesman? (S)

Prime Minister Olszewski: We would be happy to receive you for as long as possible but would welcome even a brief stop. (S)

The President: I would not want to insult the Polish people, but if my visit would be understood as a gesture of support and respect.....(S)

Prime Minister Olszewski: All Polish people know the vast responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the U.S. President. We would be happy even for a short visit. (S)

The President: Let us try. I would like to do it. (U)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Mr. President, with your permission, I was encouraged by the Secretary of State to raise one issue of importance to us and where U.S. assistance might help. Iraq has $500 million in debts to Poland which were frozen after the war. They could be repaid through oil deliveries. This would not add to Iraqi assets and would bring major relief to us. The UN sanctions committee might perhaps grant an exemption from the embargo if the U.S. would not object. There have been exceptions for others; perhaps this could be done in our case. (S)

The President: Let us talk about it. If it doesn't enrich Iraq perhaps it would be possible. Why would Iraq do that now? (S)

Prime Minister Olszewski: Just to begin clearing its outstanding obligations. (S)

The President: Let us talk about it. Clearly, we want to help Poland, and, clearly, we do not want to help Iraq. Has there been a precedent? (S)

Secretary Baker: Jordan, Mr. President. The Jordanians get all their oil from Iraq. This exemption was purely oil for debt. (S)

The President: I am glad you raised this. We will see what can be done. I wish Iraq would get rid of this man and get back to the family of nations. (S)

Prime Minister Olszewski: I think, Mr. President, we might work out a formula that involves only debt repayment. (S)

The President: Have they said they would be willing? (S)

Prime Minister Olszewski: We have not yet negotiated with them, but we have indications that it might be possible, because our interests and assets in Iraq are considerable. (S)

The President: The reason I ask is that Iraq has not even been willing to sell oil to bring in medicine for its own people. (S)

Secretary Baker: They are sending oil to Jordan in return for debt, but they are not willing to do so for humanitarian reasons. (S)

The President: Thank you again for your visit, and good luck to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Yegor Gaydar
First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert S. Strauss, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Yegor Gaydar, First Deputy Prime Minister
Vladimir P. Lukin, Ambassador of Russia to the U.S.
Pyotr Aven, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
Andrei I. Kolosovskiy, Deputy Chief of the Russian Mission
Konstantin Kagalovskiy, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Government on Interaction with International Financial Organizations

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 28, 1992, 2:36 - 2:55pm
Oval Office

The President: What do I need to know? We keep up through the Ambassador (Strauss), and other ways. (U)

I hope this package (FREEDOM Support Act) goes through. I don't think there are a lot of obstacles. We'll keep pushing for it here. (Ø)

How do you feel about your reforms? (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: We lost about one and one-half months with the political situation before and during the Congress. But that was probably inevitable. The political situation is now better. Public support is galvanized. (Ø)

The President: Is that right? (U)

Mr. Gaydar: Yes. The polls are strong. Support is growing. (Ø)

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BR 12/17/10

The President: At the beginning we weren't sure how it would all work out. It was a contentious beginning. Then you turned the tide. (Ø)

Ambassador Lukin: I told Yeltsin that the Congress was going well because it was turned from harmful to useless. (Ø)

The President: Yes, it came along to a good outcome. (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: Yes, it was a good ending. It became quite clear that the conservatives had no program, and no ideas. So when they had to take a position -- either strongly oppose Yeltsin or support him -- they thought it better to support him. (Ø)

Amb. Strauss: Mr. President, this was a Congress whose members were elected in March 1990. (Ø)

The President: Were there lots of military in there? (Ø)

Ambassador Lukin: Shaposhnikov called on the military to withdraw. (Ø)

The President: Did they? (Ø)

Ambassador Lukin: No. (Ø)

The President: Are they primarily high-ranking? (Ø)

Ambassador Lukin: Yes. (U)

The President: What is the situation with the coup-plotters. Is their case still being investigated? When will it go on trial? (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: It is a slow process. Our laws almost excessively protect civil liberties when they are fully used. For example it can take a year for the defendants to study the case, yet the case can't go to the judge until they've studied it. It probably won't go to the judge until next July. (Ø)

The President: Our system is the same. It can take years to bring someone to trial. (Ø)

How is Yeltsin's health? How has all this affected him? (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: He feels well -- plays tennis. Now he is on a new political trip to the north. (Ø)

The Congress improved his position with the population. There is a joke now that if the Congress had lasted many more days, a Yeltsin personality cult would have started. (Ø)

The President: We want his visit here to be a big success, and we want it to be seen as a success around the world. (Ø)

I know there is a little concern about Gorbachev's visit. Yeltsin is the head of government, and will be treated accordingly. Gorbachev will be treated with respect. There is a parallel to how we deal with Mrs. Thatcher and John Major. I am determined to work closely with Major. I stayed with him. But I had a quiet meeting with Mrs. Thatcher. (Ø)

We will treat both with respect, but not equally. Yeltsin is the man. We will give him full honors. I wanted to get this out there. I know there is some sensitivity on this. We can handle it. (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: Thank you. I will explain the situation, and the position to the President. (Ø)

Ambassador Strauss: Mr. President, a new poll a few days showed that after a five- to ten-fold increase in prices people support the reform program of Yeltsin (designed by Gaydar) by 70 percent. Try to get those ratings here. (Ø)

The President: 70 percent! (U)

Ambassador Strauss: 70 percent. (U)

The President: How is the supply situation now? (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: Much better. It was terrible in December. People had to wait two to three hours for a bottle of milk. Now it is better, although far from perfect. (Ø)

By Soviet standards it is quite good for foodstuffs. For durables, it is improving, although not as rapidly. (Ø)

There is no hunger in the country. (Ø)

The President: Good. We were concerned by the possibility of a severe winter. (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: We have been happy with the weather. One of the crucial factors was grain imports. Here, thanks to your support, the situation was quite good. (Ø)

The President: How about distribution. Is food getting into the town from the countryside. Is there progress there? (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: We're trying. The price liberalization created new possibilities. We're trying to privatize retail trade, but cannot do it in a few months. (Ø)

The President: What about the privatization of the agricultural economy. Are you moving there? (Ø)

Mr. Gaydar: We're moving. Over the last four months 90,000 private farms have been created. State farms are behaving differently now that they have to worry about customers. (Ø)

There will be no miracles in the countryside, as there were in China. All of the socially active and most talented people tended to leave the countryside for the city. (C)

The President: Right. (U)

Mr. Gaydar: I hope now in the industrial crisis that a wave of immigration will move from the cities to the countryside. (C)

The President: Another question. Ed Hewett is just back from Ukraine. Is Yeltsin spending a lot of time on relations with the states of the former Soviet Union? I'm particularly interested in Ukraine. There are a lot of Ukrainian-Americans. We must handle them properly, with great respect. There is the nuclear question. (C)

The last time I talked to Kravchuk, before Ed went, Kravchuk was optimistic for a speedy resolution in Ukraine's relationship with Russia. Is he right, or will it take a long time? (C)

Mr. Gaydar: It will take a long time. The President spends a lot of time on republic problems. In some areas there is rapid progress -- in relations with Byelorus and Kazakhstan, for example. (C)

There are problems with Ukraine. Of course we are not afraid of a Yugoslav-type case in Russian-Ukrainian relations. We'll need time to find new ways to establish close relations. (C)

There is a very serious problem in Ukraine itself, for example in the tensions between West Ukraine and Kiev. There are also problems with Russian-language Ukraine. The economic situation is uneasy, and worse than ours. They're not moving fast enough on reforms. I hope they will speed up their reform program. (C)

Ambassador Lukin: It is interesting. Sometimes people overestimate the nationality problem in Russia, and underestimate it in Ukraine. Russia is 83 percent Russian; Ukraine is 73 percent Ukrainian. (C)

The President: 73 percent. Who are the rest? (C)

Ambassador Lukin: Mostly Russian. (C)

Mr. Gaydar: Mostly in Crimea. (C)

The President: If we can help, we'd like to. Of course, this is better left to the countries involved. (C)

Ambassador Lukin: It will be hard to do anything with Crimea. On May 5 the Crimean Supreme Soviet will meet to consider whether or not to have a referendum. They will almost certainly decide in favor of referendum on whether to be independent or stay in Ukraine. It would be best to put this aside, but it looks like a referendum will take place in August. (C)

The President: How will the ballot read? Is the choice to be independent, stay in Ukraine, or go to Russia? (Ø)

Ambassador Lukin: There is no Russia option. Either stay in Ukraine or join the Commonwealth as an independent state. (Ø)

The President: Well, we wish you well. I know you've talked to others, but I wanted to say hello. (Ø)

Please give my warm regards to President Yeltsin. (U)

Mr. Gaydar: Thank you, Mr. President. I want to express my strongest gratitude to you for your assistance. (Ø)

The President: Keep pushing. We'll work to get what we want out of Congress. And we'll push the ifi's to come through, along with the G-7. We're on your side. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Richard von Weizsaecker of Germany [FOIA EXEMPTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	4/29	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 3/3/92 - 4/28/92

Document Partially Declassified
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By JR (NLGB) on 4/11/11

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Richard von Weizsaecker of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan Howe, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Kimmitt, Ambassador to Germany
David C. Gompert, Senior Director, European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director, European Affairs, NSC Staff

Richard von Weizsaecker, President
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Andreas Meyer-Landrut, Chief of Staff of the President's Office
Dieter Kastrup, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Frank Elbe, Chief of the Planning Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Thomas Matussek, Chief of the Foreign Minister's Personal Office
Hasso Buchrucker, Office of the President

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2008-0705-MR
BR 6/16/10

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 29, 10:58-11:40 am
Cabinet Room

The President: Let's see: your schedule has you here until 11:30, then to the State Department for your luncheon. This evening at the State dinner we will have some private time for further discussions. Let me say to all of you how very pleased we are about this visit. The weather is perfect, and the enormous turnout is a manifestation of the friendship that I tried to touch on in my remarks. So welcome to all of you. (U)

Before turning to you, Mr. President, let me say a few words about the domestic situation here. Don't believe everything you may see on CNN, we are not about to turn isolationist. At the time of New Hampshire there was a lot of criticism of foreign trade and investment and even some foreign-bashing. In the

democratic party there has been a little of that and my right wing opponent has perfected it, but there is no substance to it. No serious person as president would try to pull the U.S. into isolation, to pull back from Europe or from supporting the new democracies in Eastern Europe and the CIS. If there is any fear about this in Germany, it is not true. Ross Perot has the idea to have Germany pay $50 billion for our forces. Maybe I'll take that up with Chancellor Kohl (laughter). I hope we will talk about Europe and the U.S. presence. (S)

If it is not inappropriate, let me say to Hans-Dietrich that we will miss you, you have been superb to work with and we have had wonderful cooperation during these historic times. I mean that from my heart and will say so tonight. (U)

I have some other points but I would rather hear your views. Let me reiterate what I said to the press a few minutes ago: our relations are good and strong and very important to us. (U)

President von Weizsaecker: Thank you very much for your very warm words. It is a great honor for me. I have been in the U.S. many times but never in this solemn way and also never with such a feeling that our relations really are good. (U)

I have to apologize because someone included in my program a visit to CNN (laughter). (S)

The President: That's a good thing to do but don't make the same mistake Saddam Hussein made. He listened to CNN and heard that no one supported our efforts in the Gulf. CNN made him miscalculate; I'm absolutely convinced of that. First, he didn't think we would go in and second, he thought that even if we did, it would be a Vietnam-like standoff. (S)

President von Weizsaecker: My position is a little easier than Saddam Hussein's. (S)

The President: I was hoping to clarify that (laughter). (U)

President von Weizsaecker: We are satisfied that the economic development in the U.S. is going up, not only because of its influence on the campaign but also the importance of the economic situation in the U.S. For us, relatively speaking, we are more interested in trade than you, but the size and strength of the American market is of vital importance to the rest of the world leading with us. (S)

I think our relations are very good and sound because we do not have to bring one another to do something he doesn't want to do on his own. Our interests really coincide. A U.S. pullout of Europe is not even a question in Europe. There is a question of whether it will be 150,000 or less, but the more important question is what are those forces for? It is not just to protect us but it is very important that there be one global, integrated nuclear security system, which can only be under U.S. leadership. I think most Americans will understand, especially after the Gulf

War, how important the European factor is. It is not a matter of our begging you to stay; it is in U.S. interest to stay. (Ø)

Second, the exemplary cooperation between Secretary Baker and Herr Genscher shows that it is our common task to move from the Cold War to a "democratic peace". Except for Cuba and Haiti, there has been an enormous change in the Americas. In Africa it is more difficult, but the message African leaders bring to us is that they want to try to approach democracy and human rights. After the Cold War we have that great chance of expanding democracy east of Germany and all the way to Vladivostok. We have to try to include this whole region in the world economic system -- especially the G-7 and the international financial institutions -- and in the world order. We started this in a multilateral way in Helsinki with Basket Three which was addressed to the people rather than the governments. To develop that further into a world order sphere is from the German point view among our most important tasks. What the two foreign ministers have done together with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and also the CSCE is extremely important. (Ø)

Let me make two more remarks which will be very familiar to you. We have a great problem with unification. No Germany would be a reliable partner if it failed to succeed in this, so our unification is also in the interest of the world. Second, at the end of the last century our nation was in the middle of the continent, which gave us options (east and west) that led to so much tragedy. Then with the division of Germany the option in the east was no longer open. Now that we are unified some think that option is being revitalized and that Germany will again go it alone. This we don't want, neither the people, who know that we are a western country, nor the responsible political leaders. That is why we wanted from the beginning to combine German unification with European union, this was the idea of Kohl and Mitterrand. You should not worry about European union, it is the guarantee of the place of Germany as an integrated Western nation. There is no other option. While I join you, Mr. President, in regretting that Minister Genscher is leaving, I am sure there will be no change in our foreign policy. (Ø)

The President: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me make a couple of points. We have been wondering among ourselves: what would it take in Europe for opinion here to change about the U.S. role? One thing would be voices rising to say "America out". We are reassured about that both in Germany and elsewhere. But I must be honest, we worry that as France pushes for other security arrangements where they will have a larger role, that will undermine the confidence of the American people. We will do our best to persevere, but sometimes we wonder whether they might go too far and inadvertently undermine the U.S. presence. I believe from my talks with Francois, and think the same is true of Jim Baker and Roland Dumas, that they really want us to stay. But still they present ideas like the four-power talks that present problems. If it goes too far, if people here are made to believe that NATO is just one more defense organization or its mission is murky, it could swing public opinion and our Congress. I would

welcome your comments -- without getting into France-bashing, because we have good relations. (S)

President von Weizsaecker: Let me say first that German-French friendship was and remains a vital interest for us in Europe. As it was for Jean Monnet, it is still true that the French and Germans are the main movers in the direction of European union. There are problems that come up from time to time. It is true that France and Britain have, under your leadership, won two world wars, but they also lost those wars. (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) The arrangements made by Herr Genscher and Chancellor Kohl are certainly not meant to encourage the French in this thinking but rather to bring them back. (S)

A second issue concerns national identity and ratification of the Maastricht agreement. We find in France an unlikely coalition of Communists, Gaullists and supporters of Le Pen who say the agreement must be rejected. They say benefits will all go to the Germans, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) I still think the French will ratify Maastricht. Mitterrand has committed himself in a very personal way to it. French cooperation in the field of security will move rather slowly but it won't prevent us from doing the necessary. (S)

The President: Jim, what did I leave out? (U)

Secretary Baker: Nothing, Mr. President. Let me just elaborate on a couple of points. Many of us on both sides of the table are familiar with what happens at every NATO meeting. Our efforts, U.S.-German along with others, are aimed at strengthening the alliance and emphasizing its political nature as we did at London, but at every stage we have a battle. The French don't want us to leave, but they believe we will leave. Therefore they are preparing for a new arrangement. We worry that will become a self-fulfilling prophecy if every time we try to strengthen NATO, which is our ticket to Europe, they obstruct. One example is the Franco-German corps. We have talked about this, but now we understand that Germany's first commitment will be to the corps and only second to NATO. We worry about that. CSCE is a wonderful organization, but it is not a security organization. It has the flexibility of three Baskets, but the French propose that we turn it into a security alliance by way of a full fledged treaty. That's what worries us. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Jim, you should go back to the years after the Second World War. You decided to stay, unlike your decision after the First World War. At first your engagement was based on the East-West conflict. Now some here and in Europe may

give thought to new considerations. So from the beginning we had the idea of giving your presence a new justification. Therefore I am so glad that we could agree on the NACC, which shows a follow-up to the old confrontation of blocs and gives a new, and maybe more important, role to NATO to bring in the states of the former Warsaw Pact. (S)

Never before has the U.S. been more interested in CSCE than under this Administration. It is a great institution for change in Europe, and it is now very important that you are involved. The Transatlantic Declaration, which we issued parallel to the Paris Charter, we understood as a basis for a connection between the U.S. and Europe that was not only defined by East-West conflict. (S)

France is very much occupied by the Yalta system. They gained a strong position, especially with regard to Germany: nuclear power, not integrated into NATO, and having a seat on the Security Council. Some in France are concerned that the U.S. will leave; therefore, they want structures to constrain Germany. We can meet their concerns, but not at the price of relations with the U.S. I just met with Roland Dumas and Skubiszewski. We had a discussion of the security treaty idea and agreed that at a later stage we could consider if a security treaty could be useful. Dumas has backed off. He understood that this is not the time to create a new problem for your presence. (S)

Secretary Baker: But they have opposed every initiative we have taken, many of them jointly with you, to revitalize NATO. The NACC for example: the French vetoed every meaningful element of our work plan. Why do they object? (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: We have to proceed step by step. It takes time. (U)

The President: Is there anything coming out of the political process in France that would cause them to look differently at NATO? (S)

Minister Genscher: No. (U)

President von Weizsaecker: The French won't spoil our plans. France remains difficult but lovable. They have given up on convincing us of their positions. Sometimes they say, "we French are monogamists, you Germans bigamists." They always worry that we have another wife. (S)

The President: This would be a good time to break off so that we do not delay your luncheon. Thank you very much. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Turgut Ozal of Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Samuel K. Skinner, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director, European and Eurasian Affairs, NSC Staff

Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey
Nuzhet Kandemir, Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 28, 1992, 3:00pm
Oval Office

The President (in the presence of the press): It is a pleasure to have President Ozal here. We have good relations with the government of Turkey and we have good relations as well with President Ozal. He and I have been together through some very interesting times and of course some tough times during the Gulf conflict (press departs). (U)

I miss our daily phone calls Turgut. I hope our personal relationship has benefitted U.S.-Turkish relations. I think it has. We are off to a good start with the new Turkish government. Most importantly, your health? I wish you well. (U)

President Ozal: And I wish you well, Mr. President, in the election. I know you will win. I've told the American people with whom I talk that the whole world depends upon your election because you are the leader of the world. (U)

The President: This is terrible election year here. Our economy is very sluggish though it is getting better. But I appreciate what you say. (U)

President Ozal: Don't forget you were 20 points behind Dukakis this time four years ago. (U)

The President: I do want to emphasize that we have good relations with Demirel's government. (U)

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President Ozal: The main topic on my agenda is Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is a very big problem. We have a large number of Bosnians in Turkey, since half of Yugoslavia was once part of the Ottoman empire. The other half was part of the Austrie-Hungarian empire, which is why the Germans recognized only that half. Milosevic is very tough and he is a serious communist. If he is pushed, however, the Bosnia-Hercegovina situation will be corrected. If not, the problem will continue and spread to Kosovo. (~~C~~)

Secretary Baker: And Macedonia too? (U)

President Ozal: Yes. (U)

The President: Will the Macedonians satisfy the Greeks on the name change? (~~C~~)

President Ozal: I don't think so. Why are the Greeks insisting on this? Macedonia is a small republic that cannot possibly threaten them. (~~C~~)

Secretary Baker: We condemned Serbia because of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and we got CSCE to issue a warning to Belgrade. It looks like it may be pulling back, but it is uncertain still. The best leverage we have on the Serbs is to deny them the international legitimacy that they want. This might make a difference. (~~C~~)

President Ozal: The aim of Milosevic is to get part of Bosnia-Hercegovina and maybe part of Macedonia as well for his new Yugoslav state. Izetbegovic is a good man and so is Gligorov. (~~C~~)

Secretary Baker: Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia went about this whole matter the right way. They didn't take unilateral action unlike Croatia and Slovenia. The EC recognized those who were the most irresponsible. (~~C~~)

President Ozal: You have to keep pushing Serbia. (~~C~~)

Secretary Baker: We will to the extent we can. We don't think that peacekeeping in Bosnia-Hercegovina is in cards. (~~C~~)

President Ozal: What about the UN? (U)

The President: If you are talking about Vance, yes, we do support that effort. This whole matter is very troubling. (~~C~~)

President Ozal: The example being set in Bosnia-Hercegovina is very dangerous. We could see similar problems arise in the former Soviet Union. If Serbia gets something as a result of its aggression, Russia could see that.

Now on Nagrono-Karabakh, I have an idea. Nagorno-Karabakh is 80% Armenian and 20% Azeri. They could swap territory, with Nagorno-Karabakh going to Armenia and Azerbaijan getting the piece of

Armenia that separates the two parts of Azerbaijan. Stalin created the borders down here. He divided Azerbaijan to give it to the Armenians to buy them off. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: What would happen to the Armenians in the southern part that you would give to Azerbaijan? (Ø)

President Ozal: All together, not more than 50,000 people would have to be moved. Otherwise this war will continue forever. Turkey has good relations with Armenia, and Armenia needs good relations with Turkey. There is another reason to do this. The Central Asian republics need a connection to Europe. The new Russians want to be like the Tzarist Russians. They want all roads to go to Moscow. Under the communists, everything produced was then processed in Russia. There is still a desire to pull these states back toward Russia. These states could be threatened by Russia. I hope you don't put all your eggs in the Russian basket. All the pipelines go to Russia or through Russia. Even now Turkmenistan gas all goes to Russia. So they are looking for alternative routes such as Tehran and Turkey. With my plan, there could be a connection through Azerbaijan to Turkey and on to Europe. These states need lines of communications to Europe that don't go through Russia. The other route would be through Afghanistan to Pakistan and the Indian Ocean. It is important to make these states independent from Russia by infrastructural development. We have started a telecommunications project, offering them connections that are better than the Russian connections. After that will be television. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: We are already doing the same thing. All of the states but Tajikistan want this. Do you think that the Tajiks are vulnerable to the Iranians? (Ø)

President Ozal: No, I don't. I think that the Tajiks will be okay because they are Sunnis. But Azerbaijan is key. They need a corridor, and Azerbaijan could provide it. This would also benefit Armenia. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Would the Azeris be interested? Let us know. We might be willing to follow up. We would have to check into the demographics. (Ø)

The President: What is your latest thinking on Saddam Hussein. I know you have a problem with the Kurds. But what about Saddam himself? (Ø)

President Ozal: Saddam Hussein has to the eliminated otherwise Iraq will be divided into three parts. He is still very dangerous. The Saudis and Kuwaitis are still afraid of him. In Baghdad, you are known as the big devil and I am known as the little devil. (Ø)

The President: We are still somewhat worried about Jordan. The King had a good visit here, but the border is still porous. What have you heard about increased dissatisfication in Iraq? (Ø)

President Ozal: We have heard some of this too. But Saddam Hussein is merciless. He cares only about himself. He would have run away if you had extended the war by one day. If you had come within 50 kilometers of Baghdad, he would have fled. He thinks only about himself. (C)

Secretary Baker: It's a good thing we did not give him a deal he could have accepted. He was too dug in. (C)

President Ozal: He thought you would not attack. (C)

The President: And he thought that if we did attack, we couldn't handle the casualties. (C)

What are your views on Cyprus? (C)

President Ozal: The Greek Cypriot Council did not accept the conditions of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless, I believe the federal state will be established. We have to be very careful about mixing Greek and Turkish people. There should be a moratorium on migration. Also, the presidency of the federation ought to be rotated; otherwise one side will have the upper hand. (C)

Secretary Baker: We hope you will extend Provide Comfort. (C)

President Ozal: The ANAP had taken the decision away from Parliament. Now this government has given the authority to extend Provide Comfort back to Parliament. Nevertheless, I think there is a high probability it will pass. I am not saying that the ANAP will help, because I can't get involved in parliamentary matters. But I am sure the Prime Minister wants it to continue. It is important to get this passed before the 6th or 7th of June, after which there may be some changes in parliament. So be sure you request it before that. (C)