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OA/ID Number: 91109
Folder ID Number: 91109-003

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 9/24/91 - 10/15/91

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia (4 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Amata Kabua of the Marshall Islands and President Bailey Olter of Micronesia (3 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	C
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway (4 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	C
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Carlos Andres Perez, President of the Republic of Venezuela at UNGA, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York (8 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	C
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Ilyas Hrawi of Lebanon (5 pp.)	9/24/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman (6 pp.)	9/25/91	(b)(1)	C
07. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)	9/26/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with the Amir of Kuwait (3 pp.)	10/1/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Jorge Serrano, President of Guatemala (7 pp.)	10/2/91	(b)(1)	C
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany (3 pp.)	10/3/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 9/24/91 - 10/15/91

Pinksheet Number: cap928
OA/ID Number: 91109-003
Date Closed: 1/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, President of Haiti (4 pp.)	10/4/91	(b)(1)	C
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Wong Kan Seng, Foreign Minister of Singapore (5 pp.)	10/4/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA (5 pp.)	10/7/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana of Western Samoa (6 pp.)	10/8/91	(b)(1)	C
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Calderon of the Republic of Costa Rica (7 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	C
16. Memcon	Re: Luncheon with Raphael Angel Calderon, President of Costa Rica (7 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	C
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Franz Vranitzky, Chancellor of Austria (4 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	S
18a. Memcon	Re: One-on-One Meeting with the Amir of Bahrain (3 pp.)	10/15/91	(b)(1)	S
18b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with the Amir of Bahrain (9 pp.)	10/15/91	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Andy Card, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Sichan Siv, Deputy Assistant to the President for Public Liaison
Douglas Paal, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, Notetaker
Intrepreter

Prince Sihanouk
Keo Puthrasmey, Foreign Minister
Mme Khek Sysoda, Chief of Protocol

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 8/21/09

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1991 11:17 a.m. - 11:47 a.m.
USUN New York

The President: Welcome, welcome. (U)

Prince Sihanouk: My most profound respects to you sir. (U)

The President: We will have some press coming in here so let us take our seats. You are doing wonderful work. (U)

Prince Sihanouk: Thanks to U.S. help. We will never forget what you have done for us. (U)

The President: I hope you have not had too tiring a schedule at the UN. Do you want to do this in translation? (U)

Prince Sihanouk: I can speak English. (U)

The President: I want to hear your report. (U)

Prince Sihanouk: Mr. President, we have practically resolved all the problems related to Cambodia. We will sign an agreement. Since we have resolved all the problems related to the draft

framework agreement, according to Mr. Solomon, the U.S. is satisfied with the work of the Supreme National Council (SNC). We had to take into account proposed amendments from Phnom Penh, from Hun Sen. But we found a good compromise solution. Two problems remained but we found a satisfactory solution. With respect to the military, 70 percent will be demobilized, 30 percent will be in uniform without weapons. The weapons will go to a store house permanently under UNTAC. A French proposal solved the military problem. (Ø)

The other problem was the electoral system. We achieved a compromise between the resistance and Phnom Penh. The system will be proportional in each province instead of having a system of nation-wide proportional elections. Hun Sen is satisfied with such a compromise. (Ø)

First, we would like to get for Cambodia a single winner constituency. But that system -- in conformity with the draft of the Permanent Five -- since it is proportional for each province, it is satisfactory. Hun Sen is satisfied. All the problems are solved. When there are questions of the relationship between the SNC and the UNTAC -- The Special Representative of the Secretary General -- in case we cannot achieve a mutual decision, Sihanouk, as Chairman of the SNC, will have the final say. But I wrote two letters to the Secretary General saying that I would not make decisions without consultations with the Secretary General's Special Representative and the SNC. I will give final say to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, since I sincerely do not want to have the final say. I have to save the harmony in the SNC. If I have to take decisions, it hurts one part of the SNC, and that is bad for harmony.
Mr. President, it seems that even Mr. Solomon accepts this arrangement. (Ø)

There were adjustments of the Permanent Five plan. Hun Sen accepted that he would withdraw many of his amendments. Finally, we accepted only a few amendments from Phnom Penh. We resolved many problems. There was a written adjustment of the peace plan. As far as the resistance is concerned, we accepted a draft agreement of the Permanent Five 100 percent. We did not want any amendments to be brought to the Permanent Five draft agreement. But we had to take account of objections of Phnom Penh. So we succeeded by resolving all the differences. We can say that we have a compromise settlement. (Ø)

The President: Congratulations. Your great efforts brought this about. You know we would have great difficulty with the Khmer Rouge. We cannot dictate, obviously, what Cambodia will do. But I would like to hear how you think the elections will come out. (Ø)

Prince Sihanouk: Mr. President, we have four factions: the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen, Son Sann, Funcinpec. Hun Sen controls 80 percent of the national territory. So he has had enough time to strengthen his position vis a vis the people. The resistance, including the Khmer Rouge, controls only 20 percent of the

territory of Cambodia. So, we have not much influence on the people in Hun Sen's zone. We speak in terms of a just and democratic election. They will be organized by UNTAC. The SNC has no authority to oversee or implement the elections. The Khmer Rouge will have no means to influence the election. So, a priori, we will have regular elections. The Khmer Rouge will not have the force to intimidate the population or to influence the population. Hun Sen will have more of a chance to influence the people. Unlike Pol Pot, Hun Sen is somewhat liberal, although very corrupt. In Asia, of course, corruption is normal. (Ø)

The President: Will the 20 percent under the Khmer Rouge be free to support someone else? Is there any chance to vote freely? (Ø)

Prince Sihanouk: The Khmer Rouge are rich. They have much aid and money from China. Now China has ceased giving them money or aid. But the Khmer Rouge controls Pailin. There are gems in the soil. They cooperate with Thai entrepreneurs. There are good trees, and they cooperate with Thai entrepreneurs to export them. So they are rich. They have bulldozers to build roads and reservoirs for the people. They have modified the treaty with the Vietnamese, and the treaty benefits Vietnam. This disturbs the Khmer people. Prince Ranariddh's people tell the people about this. They hope to use the radio. They think they can reach the people in the Phnom Penh zone area. The poor are getting poorer, the rich get richer. The treaty of Hun Sen benefits Vietnam. Look at the many settlers from Vietnam in Cambodia. Phnom Penh says there are 100,000. The resistance says there are 1,000,000. The people think that many of the settlers have taken over the land and the businesses. Your excellency, Mr. President, there are so many Vietnamese advisors in Cambodia. They dominate the Hun Sen regime. The Vietnamese Ambassador to Phnom Penh is like the former French Governor General. Those are the weaknesses of the regime. Prince Ranariddh and Son Sann are able to exploit these weaknesses. So we might have, for the people of Cambodia, a balanced situation concerning the parties. The dominant party will be Hun Sen, but there is a question of an absolute majority. I do not think he will get an absolute majority. Second will be the Khmer Rouge, because they have their zone. But the NCR has their chance. Prince Ranariddh and Son Sann, if they unite, will have a few seats. (Ø)

The President: You know what interests me, in describing the Khmer Rouge, I would think that the young -- farmers around the age of 30 -- will just remember the killing fields. We see the leaders there as so bad, that we cannot have anything to do with them. (Ø)

Prince Sihanouk: Mr. President, the weaknesses of the Khmer Rouge -- the rich families, the merchants and the rich farmers -- the Khmer Rouge wants only the poor, the rich are outside Cambodia. The poor are 80 percent of the population. As for the atrocities, the Khmer Rouge said they were undertaken for the poor. They do everything for the poor. They also have a younger

generation. They cannot know, like young Germans know Auschwitz, German atrocities. We had to see the realities on the ground. I am Khmer. I know the realities of the people. I had to repeat to you, with frankness, those realities. Yesterday, I saw Congressmen Solarz, Atkins, Green. They would not like to see the armies of Hun Sen, Son Sann and Ranariddh cooperate. It is like AIDS, we do not know the source of AIDS, is it the CIA? I prefer not to know. We cannot tell them, please do not make an alliance with Khmer Rouge, please do not associate, then the Khmer Rouge will not get a majority. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Where is Pol Pot? (Ø)

Prince Sihanouk: Mr. Secretary of State, Pol Pot, Mme Ieng Sary refuse to go into exile. Son Sen and Khieu Samphan say nobody will have the power to force them to leave Cambodian soil. In fact, they have left Khmer soil from time to time. They led the war from inside Thailand. They were protected by the Royal Thai Army. The other day I talked to General Suchinda -- who said he met the other day with Pol Pot. He had a good conversation. Pol Pot is in very good health. I said thank you, but I am not interested in the health of Pol Pot. Unless you persuade them to go to China or France you cannot expect them to leave. In our history -- Siam and Annam used the Khmer as proxies to fight. This continues today. The only weapon of the Royal Thai Army to contain Vietnamese influence is Pol Pot. They continue to protect the Khmer Rouge. The key is in Bangkok. (Ø)

The President: Once again, congratulations. I look forward to free, fair elections in Cambodia. You are the key to the reunification of the country. You have never given up. (Ø)

Prince Sihanouk: Thank you. I am inspired by your determination to keep Cambodia peaceful, nonaligned and a reunified state. (Ø)

END OF CONVERSATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Amata Kabua of the Marshall Islands and President Bailey Olter of Micronesia

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Andy Card, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Douglas Paal, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, Notetaker

President Amata Kabua, President of Marshall Islands
Thomas Kijiner, Foreign Minister
Wilfred Kendall, Ambassador to the United States

Bailey Olter, President Federated States of Micronesia
Astrio Takesy, Deputy Secretary of External Affairs
Jesse Marehalav, Ambassador to the United States

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1991 1:36 - 2:14 p.m. EDT
Waldorf Astoria, New York

The President: Well, I just wanted to welcome you all and greet your new arrival to the UN. I also want to hear from you. We are often so engrossed in the Middle East and the Soviet Union, but we do not want to send a signal to the Pacific that we do not care. That is why we had the Pacific Summit. We are working on the environment. I want to hear, what are the priorities out there? (C)

President Kabua: First, Mr. President, I would like to thank you on behalf of myself and my people for all your support. We have a great political achievement in becoming members of the UN. As far as the Marshall Islands is concerned, things are just great with the United States. We want to maintain relations with the U.S. We want to work on our livelihood. May I yield to the Chairman of the Pacific Forum? (C)

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President Olter: Following the line taken by President Kabua, I want to thank you and the State Department. We are very thankful for the efforts of the United States. At the present, the main issue is the improvement of the economy and to do what is important for the development of the Federated States of Micronesia. We want to improve public health. Under the provisions of the FMSC compacts, we are to maintain and live up to the agreement. One area, however, we want to touch base with in your Cabinet is the quota of the tuna catch. Under our statistics ten percent of the consumption should be imported free into the United States. But, it looks like some did not go along with your proclamation. This provision, we feel, is an incentive to attract certain investors in the FSM and RMI. ~~(C)~~

The President: We are reviewing this. I thought it might come up. Dick Solomon briefed me on it. We ought to look at it when we get back. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Solomon: The USTR works up ... (U)

The President: We will look into it. What is it about tuna that they are always making trouble? How about Johnston Island? We made sure that we were doing everything safely. I know there are concerns. I hope that what is happening there will allay those concerns. ~~(C)~~

President Olter: We had a discussion at the Forum. Johnston Island seems to be behind us. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Solomon: At the Forum, it seems that the testing has helped. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am concerned not to be seen as operating the island unsafely. We are not out there because we do not care. When will you be going home? ~~(C)~~

President Kabua: Tomorrow, I will be going to Los Angeles. (U)

The President: I enjoyed our Pacific meeting. I want to do it again some time. I want to demonstrate that we care about South Pacific. I do not know when we will get out there again, but it was great golf. I am taking a long trip in the late fall. I will be in Hawaii for a day, rushing back. ~~(C)~~

President Kabua: I want to say it was a wonderful speech you gave yesterday. (U)

The President: Thank you. The news is all about Iraq. They are still detaining people, right Marlin? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Fitzwater: Yes, they are detaining people. ~~(C)~~

The President: This man just does not seem to get the message. If he gets away once, he wins. He cannot get away with this. It ruins all the capability of the United Nations to solve problems. Well, it was a short visit, but a pleasant one as far as I am concerned. (C)

----------END OF CONVERSATION----------

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Andrew Card, Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Ralph Johnson, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director for International Programs and Public Diplomacy, NSC (Notetaker)

Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister
Per Arne Bjerke, State Secretary
Marten Weiland, Adviser
Kjeld Vibe, Ambassador to the United States
Martin Huslid, Permanent Representative to the United Nations

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1991, 2:00 - 2:30pm EST
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City

The President: Welcome. I am delighted to see you. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: I have read the speech of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It looks very positive. Your statement was excellent. My own view in many ways is along the same lines: a world economy, importance of the Uruguay Round, emphasis on democracy and economic growth. The Soviets need trade; that is the real way for the Soviet Union to be part of the world economy. In Norway, we feel not to take any risk is the greatest risk. You have taken a risk on Gorbachev, deciding to build a new companionship and relationship. I want to support the courage you have shown, and President Reagan too, to push to promote change in democratic ways -- and this is what it has lead to. Without that, we wouldn't have the position developed. So, it is important not to lose the momentum. The US is the leader. ~~(C)~~

The President: You are very generous. We all have lots at stake that the Soviets not decline into economic anarchy. It is an enormous challenge... humanitarian. We will do our part. On economic aid, it is absolutely essential before real substantial progress that they need to work out an agreement. I talked to Foreign Minister Pankin this morning. ~~(C)~~

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I know you are interested in avoiding a nuclear confrontation. It is our view that we can do more now on that. But Soviet missiles still are aimed at us and it is difficult to do as much in aid and financial support. Monolithic communism is history, but there are still arms problems to work out. We got a START agreement but it is almost passe'. There are still things to be done. There are still trouble spots around the world. NATO is important. US military strength is important. Today, we got a call on Zaire. We have got to stay strong. An active NATO is important. We must help the Soviet Union keep on a path. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: We think the Soviets can be helped with technical know how and help in building democracy. We did a forum on energy issues. There is a Soviet buildup in the Kola Peninsula. We are concentrating on the environmental side now. The Soviets are dumping waste there. ~~(C)~~

The President: Are they cooperating? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: They are trying. I signed a document with Gorbachev, and we identified the problem as common interest. With the problem there, we have to deal with Russia. We are planning a Norway-Russia economic commission like we have had with the Soviet Union. ~~(C)~~

The President: Not just the environment? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: Yes, more. The dividing line is the Barents Sea. There is a dispute on the border line in the sea and Continental Shelf. Gorbachev said it is three-fourths solved. We have gradually narrowed to a solution. Now Russia wants to participate before it is finalized. The Russian Republic is coming up as a stronger and stronger force. ~~(C)~~

Short-range Nuclear Forces are still pointed at Norway. It has to do with the flank, and Norway is in a special situation and we would like to have more focus on short-range missiles targeted on Norway. All that has happened in five years benefits Norway, but we do have this special problem. ~~(C)~~

The President: In any talks we have on this down the road we will not neglect Norway's interests. We don't want to make any deals that are detrimental to a friend. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: We get easily forgotten in the NATO context. The focus is on central Europe. We have to keep the US-Norway link. The EC concentrates on the center. Atlantic communications lines are important to us. That is also why we do not want the NATO pillar replaced by the EC. First, we are not EC members. Second, our geographical situation leads to a necessity for NATO. Even if we are members in two years (which could happen), we still want the NATO pillar. ~~(C)~~

The President: A strong NATO is in everyone's interest. We hear talk of other security arrangements, but it is in the interest of Europe and the US for the US to be involved in Europe and to have NATO. The French view may be slightly different. Brent, do you want to add to that? ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: The French have a slightly different view. They are inclined to think we will leave one day. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: We are closer to the German view to not weaken the transatlantic link. Why weaken the NATO alliance too much when it has had such an important impact on Europe and the Soviet Union? The point of the total picture is we did not allow NATO to weaken. In the NATO Summit, we expect a review of military preparations and discussions of whether NATO should be more political or military. France says political, Germany says political, and Norway says political but for different reasons. We think it is political. What we did in 1989 was an important push and background for what then happened with Germany and German unification supported by the Soviet Union. It made it easier to get results. Also, your relationship with Gorbachev was important. ~~(C)~~

The President: There was an internal evolution with Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. It was a trauma when he was held. He is creeping back up now in strength. I credit Yeltsin with great courage, and if he had blinked an eye. . . They are finding that there is room for the center there. Gorbachev once showed a map with blue flags and said the US was encircling the Soviet Union. It was an age-old suspicion. We still have to convince them we are not the enemy. They have a big problem on defense conversion -- same thing in Eastern Europe. All are working together to manage change. Wouldn't it be wonderful to see in ten years totally harmonious republics? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: When I stayed in the US as a child, I wanted to bring a friend home to Norway but her father said no because the neighbor country was the Soviet Union. It stuck with me that Norway was very close to something dangerous. I am worried about the buildup in the Kola Peninsula but I am not afraid of the Soviet Union. ~~(C)~~

The President: I met with Icelandic Prime Minister Oddsson. They have changed their position about naval arms. We have cut the Navy but will keep the Navy as a guarantee. The Philippines doesn't bother us. The facilities are somewhat obsolete and we can still perform our responsibilities. We will keep a relatively strong Navy presence. ~~(C)~~

We were pleased with your cooperation on the Gulf. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Yes, it cost $80 per person in Norway. Do you believe we can succeed on the Uruguay Round? (U)

The President: I am pessimistic. I had a long talk with Kohl. Germany can be a strong influence on France. The major stumbling block is agriculture. I should not have said I am pessimistic too quickly but it is not moving as briskly as we want. Kohl will help -- he is going into an election cycle. We are going into an election cycle too. ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: Chancellor Kohl sounded determined to help. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Brundtland: It is important to continue to try; it is important to move forward, otherwise the world freezes into trading blocs. Norway is ready to do what is necessary. For small countries, we need a conflict mechanism. For US courts to decide on trade conflicts is not appropriate. We have had three issues with the US out of 16. I hope it is coincidence. When your trade people look at cases, it is easier to choose a non-EC country. Salmon is one case. In order to have an international trade system, we must have a trade institution. ~~(C)~~

The President: What are the other two? (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Dumping and a development contract in industry. The second was stupidly handled by Norwegians, naively handled. Salmon is really a strong US and Canadian interest. ~~(C)~~

The President: Protection? (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Yes. I hope Kohl is serious in wanting to succeed. ~~(C)~~

The President: You are right about blocs cropping up. We are trying to get free trade agreements with our neighbors, but **not** to interfere with GATT or free trade overall. (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: I agree. Every free trade agreement is a building block to others. (U)

The President: Where are you going from here? (U)

Prime Minister Brundtland: Kentucky to receive an award. I'll be in Washington to see Senators Lugar and Nunn and Congressman Lee Hamilton. (U)

- End of Conversation -

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Carlos Andres Perez, President of the Republic of Venezuela at UNGA, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

Carlos Andres Perez, President of the Republic of Venezuela
Armando Duran, Foreign Minister
Simon Consalvi, Ambassador to the U.S.
Beatrice Rangel, Minister, Secretariat of the Presidency
Sonia Perez, Executive Director for Panama and Venezuela at IADB
Gisela Gomez, Director Minister, Secretariat of the Presidency

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1991, 2:45 - 3:15pm, D.S.T. UNGA, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, New York

The session began with a photo opportunity, during which time the President noted that Saddam Hussein doesn't play by the rules and confirmed that we were consulting with other members of the Security Council on the situation in Iraq, including President Perez. (U)

The following exchange, which is not verbatim, was not picked up by the press transcript. (U)

President Perez: Unfortunately, I think that since the end of the Middle East conflict, all the focus of opposition have been weakened and worry that the UN action against Iraq will be wasted. I think that the position of Secretary Baker in the Peace Talks is exhilarating and outstanding. (U)

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The President: He has certainly been doing an outstanding job. (U)

Press Question: How does the United States intend to revitalize your trade within the Enterprise for the Americas? (U)

The President: First, I thank President Perez for all he has said in a positive way on this subject. I think we should move forward with Mexico and Canada at first. Move forward with this element for the Enterprise for the Americas. As President Perez has said, this will provide a base for further progress. We want to have free trade throughout the hemisphere, so I am very glad that you asked that question. This Treaty is not intended to stop with the countries concerned, but to be the first part of a plan for increased trade throughout the hemisphere. I have great praise and respect for this President who is a great democratic leader. (U)

The above was said publicly to the press, although it doesn't seem to be in the press account of that meeting. (U)

The President began Private Meeting. (U)

The President: What do we have to talk about? (U)

President Perez: First I want to give you greetings from Prime Minister Mulroney. (U)

The President: How is he? He is under great pressure from his Parliament. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: He is doing well. He talked a great deal about you in very positive terms. (U)

The President: He is a great friend and I feel for him because he is having great political difficulties. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: He said, tell George we need to talk about Haiti; that the money it will cost us now is money for peanuts; that we need to move and see if we can deal with the problem early on. We need to start a fund. It's terrible for the country to be in such dire economic straits. ~~(C)~~

The President: I think we believe that he (Aristide) is doing fairly well, is that right Bernie? ~~(C)~~

Assistant Secretary Aronson: We like the government, but there are human rights problems. We have funded a number of programs and are doing a large debt reduction program with Haiti. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: France is not doing all it could. Perhaps we should have a multilateral group. Why not have France, the United States, Venezuela and Canada set up a support group? I will talk to Mitterrand about this. ~~(C)~~

The President: Why don't you talk to him? I called him but didn't discuss this situation. I don't want to commit us too much. (C)

President Perez: I am happy about Suriname. The President is a very good man. The Vice President is a Hindu and he is a strong man as well. We need to get together with the Dutch on this. (C)

Your General in charge of the Southern Command told me how worried he was about Suriname. Now is the time to act. We need to get together with the Netherlands on this. (C)

The President: I hope the military will respect this new government. I hope that Bouterse will play by the new rules. This is important for democracy. (C)

President Perez: This will depend on the support the government gets from us. We would not want him to be a new situation like Noriega and Panama. We need to help. (C)

The President: I think that's right. Brazil also has a role. (C)

President Perez: Yes, Brazil has an interest in this. We also should have a meeting. This is an urgent matter. (C)

The President: What can you tell me about another problem -- the FMLN? (C)

President Perez: Cristiani will stay until tomorrow. Maybe we can get an agreement. Things are going well. I am optimistic. (C)

The President: You have worked like hell on this. You have done a great deal to bring a successful solution about. The Secretary General has been helpful, I understand. Although I also understand that de Soto has not been so good. (C)

President Perez: He has lost the confidence of President Cristiani. Perez de Cuellar is more positive. (C)

The President: I was impressed with his statement yesterday. (C)

President Perez: I think that a draft agreement is about to be reached. (C)

The President: Do you think that the guerilla leaders will agree with it? (C)

President Perez: Yes, they have no choice. They are feeling the pressure of world opinion. I think we are in the homestretch. I think we are finally reaching a solution. (C)

The President: How about Doña Violeta? The Assembly has been giving her a difficult time. There is a separation in the Sandinistas. The Brothers (Ortega) themselves are not together. I was going to ask. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: Yes, there is a separation. They are coming closer and closer -- I was right. ~~(C)~~

The President: How about Cristiani and the military, are they together? ~~(C)~~

President Perez: Yes. (U)

The President: I sent word to Perez. I asked that they look at the problem objectively. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: They are together. We do have to create a system. I'm happy for the help you have given Fujimori and Peru. He is a very serious person. ~~(C)~~

The President: Much has been done, but we need to do more. ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: I talked to Senator Leahy. He said he understood the problem and wanted to help, that he would try to get the money together. ~~(C)~~

The President: Fujimori said that the total of all income from cocaine production from all farmers was $100 million, and if you could get money for all those crops, this would be a good investment. We are spending a half billion dollars on our anti-narcotics program. It's almost a temptation to say okay, we'll buy the crop for $400 million and see if that would work. We had a good visit from the Peruvians. We are impressed that de Soto's brother has a plan and we are going to try to help. The United States has 80% of the demand for cocaine. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: Venezuela had a visit of the Chief of the U.S. Southern Command and he talked about the problems. I think there is a plan of some kind under way. I have open ideas. I think that the five countries of the Andes are all involved and we need to work together to fight the drug problem. At the last meeting of the Andean presidents, we invited you, but then the Middle East situation cropped up. Somehow we should review the invitation. The meeting, of course, would need to be carefully prepared. ~~(C)~~

The President: We are open minded on that. I might get fired if I go to another international meeting. People claim that Bush is interested in international relations and not domestic problems. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: The same is true for me. (U)

The President: They really get after me. They even have a man who comes to meetings with signs, saying Moscow, Middle East,

various places -- that Bush is always travelling, never home. (U)

President Perez: You can think about this for the future; it would be a useful meeting. (U)

The President: Yes, it would be useful, something that would be useful to do. (U)

President Perez: I would like to talk about three issues. We have talked with Carla Hills. Conversations with her are sometimes very direct. ~~(C)~~

The President: We always want to send a bright, charming person. What are your main problems? ~~(C)~~

President Perez: The problem with tuna is nearing a solution. A solution is coming from an International Congress. We share the U.S. position. On the cement problem, the attitude of the United States has been a bit tough. On the ship problem, they have accepted that there is progress but there is a surplus of five percent. We also have mellon problems, in terms of export. The Binational Trade Commission will be meeting soon and I'm hopeful that we can make progress on these items. We also want to make progress on a trade agreement between the United States and Venezuela. We know that the Mexico-Canada Agreement is the first thing, but you are quite well along on this. ~~(C)~~

The President: We are trying to get it done this year -- that is what I am hoping for. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: We are preparing to study the whole economic situation. I don't want to talk particulars now. We would like international financial agreements and a Brady Plan, and we are looking for a trade agreement in Venezuela. There is a big international interest in doing this. ~~(C)~~

We have questions. The Prime Minister of Norway was just talking with you. We are going to have a meeting of all producers and consumer countries. I hope it will go the way the Paris meeting went. Such an undertaking could be positive without interfering with the market mechanism. ~~(C)~~

The President: You know our position, that market forces should set prices. What do you think came out of the Paris meeting? (C)

President Perez: We think it was positive. There was no talk about prices, we talked about how to improve exchanges of information on conditions in petroleum industry. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Duran: We recognized in Paris that markets should be ruled by market forces. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: For certain, we are concerned that nothing has been discussed about the new Secretary General. Perez de Cuellar

has said that he doesn't want to be considered for another term; that is a problem. There are a number of candidates. There is Boutros Ghali of Egypt, and the possibility of a Norwegian. We said that we are waiting to see the whole picture, because the nomination of the Secretary General is very important. The Africans have not agreed, they have six nominees. Boutros Ghali of Egypt is well qualified, but I'm not really sure he is African. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Duran: He is a Christian, married to a Jewish woman. ~~(C)~~

The President: Is he left-handed? If he is left-handed, he may have everything we need. (U)

President Perez: The fact that he is married to a Jewish person, could be helpful. Some people say that there may be a European candidate -- the Norwegian is one person mentioned. ~~(C)~~

The President: Prime Minister Brundtland of Norway just left and we didn't talk about her candidacy. Personally, I like Sadruddin Aga Kahn, but that doesn't have anything to do with our position. The Norwegian also has a lot of good credentials. But we really have no candidate. The French are being very French. Their bottom line is that they want someone who speaks French. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: Boutros Ghali is very good. I have talked with a number of people and he is very qualified. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Duran: The Africans will present five or six candidates so that the Security Council will not support one. They don't want to pose just one because they are afraid the Security Council might reject it. ~~(C)~~

The President: There is also the question of Eastern Europeans. They have never had a Secretary General. There is a Polish person. I understand he is very good, it is still a bit early. We will share with you when we make a decision. I agree that the Secretary General does not want to stay on. We thought perhaps he would, but that evidently is not the case. I am leveling with you when I say we are not focussing on any one candidate. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: I worry about Yugoslavia. This is a real problem. Given the problems there, it could lead to others. As an example of what can happen of fractionalization. If you have a fractional in Yugoslavia, what about the Basques in Spain and other areas? ~~(C)~~

The President: This is a real problem. ~~(C)~~

President Perez: The most harmonious part of the world is Latin America. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, we would certainly like to see democracy come to Cuba. ~~(C)~~

Minister Duran: See, I said he would bring it up, and I was right. (C)

The President: There are now many people who would like to see a change in Cuba. (C)

President Perez: We were talking earlier about your position. (C)

The President: I haven't changed a bit. (C)

President Perez: I think Cuba is becoming irrelevant. I think that there is a problem which will solve itself. I think Castro was waiting for the KGB coup. He postponed his party congress from August to October. I had a very tough talk with him. I told him his time was up, he needed to think of his place in history. When if chaos followed him, violence was very possible and this would give him a very bad place in history. This talk was before the coup. He said that you think that all that could happen, has happened. I said that it's never true that everything has happened. But that there are certain irreversible directions. He didn't answer. (C)

I think he was counting on the KGB. He must have known from the KGB that they were going to make a move against Gorbachev. He said that was the first time. I think he has paranoia. I think that in the October meeting, he will start being open. I don't mean that there will be something drastic, I think there will be now a new consensus. Nothing will happen unless you have hope. We still hope we will be able to advance orderly change. (C)

The President: It can't be a half-way measure, unless you see what has happened in other areas. If change does come from Cuba, then there will be help enough even in Miami to build a whole new economic infrastructure. (C)

President Perez: When Gorbachev started, there was no way to see where he was going, but you were courageous enough to support him, and look where we have come. I said to Castro, a friend of yours, Garcia Markus, your confidant, now says that Cuba is a mess. Ricardo Vegas, who went to Cuba less than two months, he came to Venezuela to say that the Cuban people are fed up. Your economic system is a mess. He says there is no way for it to succeed. (C)

The President: What did Castro say? (C)

President Perez: He replied that we can't waste the revolution. It is not ready to be open, but when openness comes, it will be like Gorbachev. I said that we must give no signal to Castro that he can be helped economically. Because this would make him stay on his present course. We need to see if we can push him a little. Otherwise there will be a blowup. (C)

The President: I think it will happen without any outside help. Change comes from within not without. (C)

Well, unfortunately I have to go. I always look forward to seeing you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Ilyas Hrawi of Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Andy Card, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Kelly, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs
Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon
Douglas Paal, Notetaker
Helal Gamal, Interpreter

President Ilyas Hrawi
Omar Karami, Prime Minister
Fares Bouez, Foreign Minister
Souheil Chammas, Secretary General of Foreign Ministry
Hussein Husseini, Speaker of the Parliament
Khalih Makkawi, Ambassador to the United Nations

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 24, 1991 3:32 to 4:02 EDT
Waldorf Astoria, New York

President Hrawi: Good afternoon, Mr. President. How are you? (U)

The President: I am very well. I do not think we have met before. (U)

President Hrawi: No, it is the first time. (U)

The President: I am pleased to welcome you on your visit here. (U)

President Hrawi: You are the President of the whole world. (U)

The President: All of us feel a great affinity. We all want to see a lasting peace without outside influence. I have been there when Lebanon was at peace. I would like to see it that way again. (U)

President Hrawi: Mr. President, I wish to thank you for your direct interest and for your reference to a visit to my country

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when you were the Vice President. My good friends who were there remember. Thank you for your support for Lebanon. I hope to see you in Lebanon soon, after your reelection. (U)

The President: After we finish this photo op, I am anxious to hear your views. (U)

President Hrawi: Our conversations here are most important. And the most important are here with you, Mr. President. (U)

The President: As you know, we want to support Lebanon. We have made known to Syria privately and publicly, that any bilateral agreements should be according to the Taif Accords. I took that woman's questions, and backed into it. The Arab States clearly have a lot to gain from your reconstruction. We surely will consider your request for funds. I will be glad to mention your request to Japan, for example, to Prime Minister Kaifu. As you know, Congress will require that any aid be bilateral between us. I want to try to help. That is what I am saying. I would also like to say a word on the peace process. We understand your need for assurances. We will try to provide a letter to be helpful before you return to Lebanon. ~~(C)~~

President Hrawi: Mr. President, I have lots of questions to raise with you, only you have preempted my questions by what you have just said. I will be brief. I wish to make reference to Secretary Baker's visits to the region. I know why he cannot travel to Lebanon, and I understand. But I hope he will come soon. May I raise some issues that I raised with the Reagan Administration in 1985? ~~(C)~~

We need training for our officers in the U.S. Certain weapons that we have require training. Certain commercial air activities, certain officers cannot travel to the U.S. I refer now to hostages. Lebanon is not responsible for taking hostages. Nor do we accept or agree to taking hostages. Lebanon is itself a hostage. It is not in our tradition to take them. Recently, the Foreign Minister went to Tehran and raised the question in detail. We hope some solution will be found for them. The President just heard that Jackie Mann was just released today. ~~(C)~~

The President: We have heard the wire reports. It is very good. It is an emotional concern with America for the hostages and for Col. Higgins, an American officer who was killed and whose body has not been returned. Oddly enough, I do not think people blame Lebanon here in this country, but my request to you is to do everything possible to get these people released. You asked about restraints on the airlines and on trade. We will take a look at these in light of the possible changes coming about. ~~(C)~~

I would like to raise South Lebanon. We would like to see contact between you and the surrogates of Israel in South Lebanon. We want Israel and Syria to accept the expansion of Lebanon's legitimate authority. The disarming of Hizbollah would

be a great step in this direction. We have told Israel it would be time to begin the withdrawals after six months of peace. (C)

President Hrawi: As a follow-up to the point you just asked me, Mr. President, I was going to raise Resolution 425 and speak of its contents in some detail. But now you have said what you have said, and there is no need. You understand our position. (C)

There is a need to expand Lebanon's authority. The army has begun to expand south. May I refer, too, to power sharing in Lebanon? Now we have unified the government. We work in unity and harmony together. We, as a government, are unified in our stance and when we put a request for Resolution 425, we make a commitment. We expect that the northern Israeli borders will be kept quiet. We will make efforts to keep our commitments. We make this point to you, Mr. President. (C)

The other resolutions (UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338) are subject to negotiations. They are not directly or immediately our concerns, but, due to the presence of 100,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, we take a serious interest in discussion of these issues. (C)

I wish to thank you for the letter you have referred to on assurances, and we are grateful for that. There is understanding among our friends concerning it, I wish to inform you. I have one wish to express to you, Mr. President. Knowing the time is short, I cannot dwell in depth and at great length (on issues). This expressed wish is for you to assign someone to meet with us, the speaker and others, to pursue with us in depth these issues. (C)

The President: I have great confidence in Secretary Kelly. He works with the White House and Secretary Baker. He has enough expertise to understand the issues, unlike me. (C)

President Hrawi: It is up to you. (U)

The President: We are very interested in that. Let me make one more appeal on behalf of the hostages. I can think of nothing the American people would be more affected by than if you were to effect the release of hostages. In this country, the Lebanese government is not blamed for the hostages. Different groups grabbed these Americans, and Iran gets a lot of the blame. You have said that taking hostages is against your traditions. There is no reason to contradict you. I believe you completely. But, someone out there must know the details, if we are to get them released. (C)

Secretary Baker: I would like to ask, Mr. President, of the likelihood of your ability to disarm Hizbollah. That would assist our efforts to implement 425 and to persuade Israel to withdraw to its territories. (C)

President Hrawi: I cannot easily answer that question now. We have to establish some contact. What may shape action on the

part of the Lebanese government is for the U.S. and Israel to get the release, in the hostage context, of prisoners, including Sheikh Obeid. As a matter of fact, the visit of the Foreign Minister to Iran has two main objectives. One was the hostages, and the other was disarming Hizbollah. That was the purpose, to move events in that direction. ~~(C)~~

The President: May I mention one more point? I do not want to demonstrate that I am only interested in hostages. Americans do not see Sheikh Obeid as related to the hostages. The American people see them as related to the U.S. only. I tell you how the Americans and the American President see it. There is nothing to do with these issues. I think you are right, if Sheikh Obeid and other were released, it might lead to release of the hostages. Innocent Americans had nothing to do with the age-old conflicts. We would like them to be released on their own and not released in a linkage to some other issue. There is no deal or equation about innocent Americans. ~~(C)~~

President Hrawi: Mr. President, I beg you not to misunderstand about Sheikh Obeid. Nothing is tied together. No bargaining. With the release of Sheikh Obeid, the Lebanese government can proceed with disarming the Hizbollah. ~~(C)~~

The President: There is no misunderstanding on that. (U)

President Hrawi: I would like to allow the Speaker of the House to have a few words. (U)

Speaker Husseini: We want you to appreciate that the taking of hostages is an offensive act. Whether they are Americans or not Americans. Likewise, the kidnapping of Sheikh Obeid is offensive to us. But in my view, when President Bush's weight is applied to the Israelis, it helps immensely with the resolution of our problem. Maybe these steps will eventually facilitate the release of the hostages. That is why when we consider when President Bush of the United States, who is such a distinguished President, if he supports a Resolution of No. 425, it will really help with the Hizbollah. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: We cannot tell you that we can be helpful on 425 until you say you can disarm the Hizbollah. That will open up 425, we think. ~~(C)~~

Speaker Husseini: I want to be clear on one specific point. We, as a government, will unite. We have taken the decision. It is clear. We have decided to disarm all factions including Hizbollah. It is a question of time. President Bush has endorsed the Taif Agreement. The Taif Agreement provides precisely that. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am sorry, the time has run out. But it has been a very good meeting. Secretary Kelly will follow-up. Lest we close on the hostages, let me raise one point. I am absolutely convinced, all of us in this room are, that if you could do something to help the hostages, you would do it. I want to say

that if anybody knows or can do anything to help, I hope they will do so. (C)

President Hrawi: Thank you for now.

END OF CONVERSATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert S. Strauss, Ambassador to the USSR Ed A. Hewett, Senior Director for Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker) Lawrence Napper, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State George Sajewych, Interpreter Leonid M. Kravchuk, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Zlenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Pavlychko, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Aleksandr Melnyk, Personal Advisor to the Chairman Oleh Semenets, Interpreter
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	September 25, 1991, 1:35 - 2:15pm Cabinet Room

The President: Welcome. First I want to thank you for your hospitality in Kiev. It was an unforgettable event, a visit at a very interesting time. History has gotten even more interesting since I left. (U)

I want to hear from you what your priorities are. Our Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert Strauss, is here. He is interested in Ukraine. [President also introduces the other U.S. participants]. (U)

I am delighted to have you here. Please go ahead and start. (U)

President Kravchuk: I would first like to extend my gratitude for the possibility to continue the conversation we began on

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August 1 in Kiev. Mr. President, you said that was an interesting visit. Kievites still remember my meeting with the President of the United States. (U)

There have been big changes since then. Ukraine has declared its independence. It has begun to directly construct its own independent structures: an independent legislature; legislation aimed at economic reconstruction and democracy. We will have a referendum and a presidential election in December. I am confident that the referendum will confirm Parliament's declaration of our independence. (U)

We must change all aspects of our economic and political life. This is no time for modest changes. We will change dramatically. ~~(C)~~

I realize we face a complex situation. The Soviet Union is virtually disintegrating. There is no national government. There is no Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. I cannot tell you when it will be set up. It depends on the republics. This is an extraordinary historical period in which we have a state without a government. ~~(C)~~

We control the situation in the Ukraine. Stability in the Ukraine is higher now than before the coup. There is less confrontation now. We have a common aim. We face concrete tasks. ~~(C)~~

We have started forming a new constitution, which envisages democratic changes in the system of power. The new constitution will be centered on human rights, and the rights of national minorities. ~~(C)~~

Ukraine should directly participate in international relations with other countries, and should have direct relations with other countries. ~~(C)~~

On nuclear weapons, Ukraine wants to be a non-nuclear state, and is ready to participate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will participate in the reduction of nuclear weapons. For now, nuclear weapons should be controlled by one center. We are against transferring nuclear weapons from one republic to another. We want to join in the START treaty. We favor eliminating these weapons throughout the world. ~~(C)~~

We have severe economic problems. Production is falling; we are in a recession. Over the last 1/2 year, production has fallen ten percent. Privatization, and the move to a free market, is not going well. We favor drastic change. We have introduced legislation giving equal treatment to all forms of property, and creating conditions favoring a market economy: a law on economic independence of the Ukraine, a law on external economic activity, and an investment protection law. ~~(C)~~

We will create the most favorable conditions for investment in the Ukraine. We will forgive taxes on funds that are reinvested. We are moving to create our own currency, our own tax system, and our own national bank (which already has correspondent relations with other banks). ~~(C)~~

We want direct, diplomatic, relations with the U.S. We request the U.S. to establish such relations. The U.S. should initiate programs for the Ukraine favoring investment and promoting bilateral economic relations. Our priorities are in defense conversion (we have 30% of the defense potential of the Soviet Union), processing of agricultural products, and communications. We ask that you give credits directly to Ukraine, not through the center. Credits to the center give us nothing. ~~(C)~~

We would like to open a Ukrainian trade mission here in the U.S. We would also like to have MFN treatment for the Ukraine. ~~(C)~~

Up until December 1 we would like to have a plenipotentiary representative here for contacts with the U.S. After December 1, we will ask for recognition. ~~(C)~~

For now, we ask you to support democracy in the Ukraine and the aspirations for a new economic system. Ukraine has a favorable geopolitical position in Europe. We have good possibilities to use credits from abroad. The legislation we are now developing will help. ~~(C)~~

On the Union and its future. The Union cannot exist in any serious form. There is a struggle for power there, and we cannot be part of a union in which there are some members more powerful than others. It is better for you to have direct ties with the republics. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you for your presentation. Clearly the U.S. will be on the side of democracy and reform of the economic system. I know Secretary Brady has explained that we want to help with food and humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. We want to see an equitable distribution of our assistance, so that the assistance does not go to just one area. ~~(C)~~

We need to know the results of your elections before you decide on independence. There is also the question of the relations you work out with the center. We think that some form of economic union is better, but one in which you enjoy your sovereign rights. ~~(C)~~

American investors want a clear view of how this will all work. They want to know that a deal is firm, and that no other entity will have a claim. I am sure Secretary Brady discussed this with you. This must be sorted out. ~~(C)~~

The Ukraine has a special standing in the minds of the American people. There are lots of Ukrainians here. They want what you want. But this must be determined by the people. ~~(C)~~

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Businessmen must know what the rules are. You must work out an arrangement with the center, as I know you are. (C)

We are giving urgent attention to assistance. We would like to know -- not necessarily right now -- what you need. (C)

It is not the role of the U.S. to determine the final shape of the union. You must determine that. We must deal with the center on some matters, but not to the exclusion of the republics. (C)

Ambassador Strauss' responsibility will include the consulate in the Ukraine. This is a delicate situation we must walk through. (C)

I was pleased at your comments on nuclear weapons. We would like your support in concluding START and CFE. I hope you will work with the center on the conclusion of these treaties to see that they are ratified and implemented. This fits in with your idea of a nuclear-free Ukraine, unthreatened by nuclear weapons from anyone. The whole change in the Ukraine promises great changes in nuclear weapons. To the degree you influence those responsible for ratification, please help. (C)

Let me reiterate that our policy is on two complementary tracks. We will work closely with Silaev and the Interrepublican Economic Committee on assistance to republics. We must make sure that assistance is distributed equitably. (C)

It is crucial that this group [The IEC] come up with a market reform plan, working with the IMF and the World Bank. They should appoint one person as a contact with the republics. (C)

The U.S. must look to union-wide assistance. You work out the details. We will be dealing with the republics. (C)

I talked to Boris Yel'tsin today. He talks three times a day with Gorbachev by phone. (C)

The second point is that we want to work with Ukraine in other ways. The paper your Prime Minister gave me in Ukraine addresses this. We will work to increase trade, introduce a Peace Corp, and other measures. We will include Ukraine in technical assistance, food distribution, for example. (C)

We are running short on time. But did you have any final questions? (U)

President Kravchuk: I will not respond to all you said, but just focus on one thing: food assistance. (U)

The Ukraine does not need food assistance. We may be interested in buying fodder from the U.S. We have a difficult situation. The Soviet Union has received food assistance, but the Ukraine has not. Now we must pay these debts. While the Soviet Union was getting assistance, we were sending 60,000 tons of meat and

milk to the Soviet Union. Maybe Silaev can get assistance from abroad, but we must pay. Our request is that you give us credits. We'll buy technology. We'll invite businessmen to invest in Ukraine. We'll work. (C)

The Soviet Union's debt to the world is $70 billion. We'll pay our share. But in the future we cannot accept more central debt. We want technology. We want to work in a market economy. The Silaev Committee has no power. Six years of effort, and nothing to show for it. (C)

Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenstan, are each different republics, with their own specific features. We can only trade with them at a just price. Before we had to send them products at low prices. (C)

As for technical assistance, we have our priorities. We are thankful to you for including us in these programs. We must stop the drop in production. We must use our great potential. We need a push to market. (C)

We have proclaimed our independence. Now people expect economic support. That's our great problem. (C)

The President: Do you see that there must be an economic union with a center or not? We think that is a necessary step to encourage investment. (C)

President Kravchuk: I would be glad to have that if the center could do something. But the center is incapable of doing anything. We're losing time. The Soviet Union is a huge country. It is impossible to pursue economic reform at a rapid pace in the entire country. (C)

We would like these credits and assistance to go to the Ukraine. There should be coordination with other republics on the basis of treaties we've signed. (C)

In the Soviet Union we cannot find new technology. The reason Russia cannot sell us all the oil and timber we need is because their technology is outmoded, and their production therefore low. (C)

We must find some other way. Those in euphoria today are unrealistic about our situation. (U)

The President: This gives us a better understanding of the situation. Are you going to be here longer before going to New York? (U)

President Kravchuk: We will stay here today and tomorrow, then go to Chicago, Boston, then New York at the United Nations General Assembly. (U)

The President: This has been very interesting, and I wish I had more time. Would it be possible for you to come back later and meet with Nick Brady, Ed Hewett, and others? (U)

President Kravchuk: We would be glad to. (U)

The President: OK. Ed [Hewett], can you set something up? (U)

Dr. Hewett: Yes sir. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Plenary Meeting with King Hassan III of Morocco ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Frederick Vreeland, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Michael Ussery, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asia
Edmund Hull, Director for Near East and South Asia Affairs (Notetaker)
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

King Hassan II
Abdellattif Filali, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ahmed Osman, President of the National Assembly
Ahmed Reda Guedira, Counselor to His Majesty the King
Mohammed Berrada, Minister of Finance
Hassan Abouyoub, Minister for Foreign Trade
Mohammed Belkhayat, Moroccan Ambassador to the United State

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 26, 1991; 11:40 - 12:30 a.m. EST
The Cabinet Room

After the arrival ceremony, the President and King Hassan, joined by General Scowcroft, Ambassador Belkhayat, and Interpreter Alec Toumayan, met for 40 minutes in the Oval Office before joining the two delegations for the Plenary Meeting in the Cabinet Room. (U)

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The President: I want to welcome His Majesty and his distinguished colleagues and apologize for the delay in joining you. I had many questions to ask His Majesty, and we also renewed a longstanding friendship. This all took some time. We covered many subjects, but now I would like to turn the floor over to you to hear your views. If there are any questions, we have people here to answer. We will also want to respond and comment. (U)

King Hassan: First let me tell you how happy I am to be here today. It is deeply moving to see an old friend who is always faithful to that friendship. Because of your personal leadership, we see an American policy in the international area predicated more and more on respect for international legality. Sometimes there may be wide gaps between that objective and its realization, but it is most important that the intention be clearly expressed. ~~(C)~~

In Morocco, which is located on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, we have observed with great interest the problems of the socialist bloc. This camp has been active in Africa of which we are a part. Our region has suffered from the "pollution" of the Cold War. We thank God that the Western Mediterranean has been less polluted in this sense than has the Eastern Mediterranean which suffers directly from the Arab-Israeli dispute. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and other Arab countries are directly involved; we are removed. ~~(C)~~

Looking north from our perspective across the Bosphorus, we clearly perceived Soviet naval power -- both above and below water. In this regard, there is now a major change for which we thank God. Now the situation is quieter. ~~(C)~~

In another sense, these changes in Europe have placed Morocco and other Mediterranean countries in a precarious economic situation. We now find the EEC more inclined toward Eastern Europe and less attentive toward our needs. They planned for a common market of 300 million and instead have a market of 700 million. We are concerned with being "shut out" of everything. Yet, I doubt whether the Eastern Europeans will succeed. "Rich" is not in their vocabulary. They are not used to enterprise. The Maghreb countries have an opportunity -- not as recipients of aid, but initially as partners and ultimately as associates. ~~(C)~~

South of the Sahara, the situation is not good. The failure of socialism in Eastern Europe and its return to market principles bodes ill for African states which have followed socialist ideals. Two countries are key: Zaire -- here we can say this country is a little tired and sick -- and Sudan -- a country which is even sicker. They share a short, common border, and they are in the heart of the African continent. A line of destabilization runs through them, right up the Red Sea and into the Middle East. Egypt borders Sudan. Saudi Arabia is but 30 miles away. ~~(C)~~

Elsewhere in Africa, the picture is mixed. Thank God there is reconciliation in Angola, but meanwhile Zaire falls into disorder. The French and Belgians have personal accounts to settle with Zaire. This is not so for U.S. and Morocco which has twice deployed its forces there. Regardless of Mobuto's mistakes, we should support actions which are not too radical, not too blunt. ~~(C)~~

In Africa then, there are two countries which remain stable and moderate: South Africa at the southern tip and Morocco at the northern tip. We recognized change in South Africa, and I received De Klerk as a chief of state to encourage this change. We have given the South Africans rights to land and overfly their aircraft. In the coming month, we will establish diplomatic relations. ~~(C)~~

Although the USSR is no longer a menace, we must take care because there are tens of thousands of Marxist/Leninists remaining throughout the world. They are "nostalgics" ready to aid any extremist faction -- racial or religious. We must be vigilant. Previously, we knew from where the threat came -- the KGB or Stassi. Now we do not know. There is no discipline now, but disarray caused by these Marxist/Leninist nostalgics. Therefore, we should not be euphoric, but rather vigilant. The world today falls into two camps -- those who say "In God we trust" and those who say "In gold we trust." The latter is dangerous. ~~(S)~~

It is a historic moment -- a critical period for the Middle East. Not since 1956 when President Eisenhower and that iron man John Foster Dulles stood up to Britain, France and Israel over Suez, has there been a stand taken like the one today under your leadership. We know your position is based on principle -- there is no double standard. But, as I have said before, I do not think Shamir will make peace. He will arrange for himself to be overthrown before he will sign an agreement. He and his associates were the pioneers. The next generation will have to be the peacemakers. This at least is my psychological analysis for what it is worth. ~~(S)~~

We must ask both the Arabs and the Israelis to look at the long term. They cannot "improvise" their existence in the region. The Arab countries must grasp the opportunity. The world is living in a period of legality; UN prestige is at an all time high. For our part, Morocco and the Maghreb have not refused to participate as observers of a Middle East peace plan. Allow me to clarify our view. The problem is that the countries directly concerned -- Egypt and Syria -- object to the presence of observers. Mubarak told me this as did Assad's vice president. Jordan, on the other hand, is for observers, and the Palestinians too may favor observers because they are disinterested parties.

But, the Palestinian position is not united. A Palestinian National Council in underway to confirm or replace their leadership. Let me say that the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) countries are ready to participate if the concerned parties accept that participation. U.S. diplomacy can play a role in this regard. We cannot say we will come now because they may say we do not need you. At the Rabat summit last week, the AMU countries agreed that we would participate as observers if all concerned parties agreed. Only Libya reserved its position, but in private. They promised not to make an uproar. As I told you, I am mandated to meet with the Syrians, Egyptians and Jordanians in New York next week to consult further, and I will keep you informed of their responses. ~~(S)~~

On bilateral issues, we can congratulate ourselves on the state of our relations. During the Cold War, we signed agreements on staging and other issues. Since the end of the Cold War, we see no lack of U.S. interest in these issues. Internally, we have taken measures to encourage investment. We hope this administration can encourage Americans to come to Morocco. Mr. President, I know you are a busy man with other meetings. I will stop here. These are my views. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you, Your Majesty. I know Larry Eagleburger does not want his lunch to burn so I will not speak long. I do want my colleagues to know that we also covered Iraq in our private meeting, and we see eye-to-eye on the need for Iraq to respect UNSC resolutions. On Israel, I might just say that I am not as pessimistic as you about Shamir. In any case, we must press forward. There are big problems with Israel, Syria and the PLO, but this is the last, best change for peace. I appreciate your clarification about participation as an observer. Larry, we need to inform Jim Baker and get back to those concerned. ~~(S)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I spoke with Secretary Baker last night (after my meeting with the King.) ~~(S)~~

The President: In Israel, we find the people are much more supportive of the peace process than is the government. A large percentage are willing to accept our approach -- land for peace -- as I noted in my arrival statement. Shamir could be like Nixon going to China. It could be harder for a moderate to take the steps which need to be taken. In any case, we will work in an equitable fashion on this very difficult issue. I hope to hear from you after your talks in New York. Perhaps a letter. ~~(S)~~

We also discussed the Sahara in the Oval Office. I appreciate your views. There will be time in the one-on-one meeting we have upstairs prior to dinner to discuss other issues. Let me say I agree with you on South Africa, and we are lifting some of our

sanctions. And, I agree that we must not let our guard down vis-a-vis communism. We are concerned, for example, with communist presence in the ANC and that organization's support for radical causes. I am delighted to hear of your treatment of De Klerk. ~~(S)~~

Now it is time to let you get to your lunch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Amir of Kuwait (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of States, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC

The Amir of Kuwait
Sheikh Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, Ambassador to the United States
Mohammad Sulaiman Sayed Ali, Senior Advisor
AbdulRahman Salem Al-Ateeqi, Senior Advisor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 1, 1991, 11:15-11:30 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and the Amir of Kuwait met in the Oval Office at 11:15 a.m. (U)

President: I want to apologize at the outset as I will have to leave to give a speech to American school children. If there are any specific issues we don't have time to cover, I suggest that you and the Secretary of State continue to discuss them. (U)

Amir of Kuwait: We understand about your scheduling problems. ~~(C)~~

President: I am glad to see that you are making real progress. We follow what is going on carefully. (U)

Amir of Kuwait: Following the destruction of our country, we have taken many measures and are on the right path. ~~(C)~~

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President: If we can just contain your neighbor we will be better off. We have not let up one bit in our determination to see him fulfill the letter and spirit of every UN resolution. The man is crazy in my view. I don't know what you think. Is there any opposition group inside that could move him out? (S)

Amir of Kuwait : There are lots of opposition groups but they do not have a strong presence on the inside. (C)

President: I just want to say that I am pleased you are here and I would like to hear any points you might want to raise. (U)

Amir of Kuwait: I'd like to thank you Mr. President for this opportunity to meet. I know your schedule is tight. But there is one issue I would like to raise. It is regarding your forces in Kuwait, currently due to stay until the end of the year. Would it be possible to keep them there through February so that we can settle our border issue? My second point regards the agreement we have recently signed. I am expressing the view of more than ninety percent of the Kuwaiti people who support this agreement. We very much hope that during the implementation of this agreement our relations will continue to be strong and firm. (S)

President: I fully support this too. I am pleased that we were able to work this out a few weeks ago. How are you doing in your talks with Egypt on a residual security presence? (C)

Amir of Kuwait: I visited Egypt and Syria before coming here. They are both ready to send any amount of troops at my request. When I go back to Kuwait we will be able to work this out. (S)

President: Good. As for your request about our forces, I will talk to the Defense Department and get you a prompt answer. I don't want to leave you in the lurch. (S)

Amir of Kuwait: Once again Mr. President, I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to invite you to visit Kuwait. (U)

President: I'd love to. But you've got to get these guys here to say yes. In the meantime, let me thank you for your thoughtful present. (U)

I know you are distressed over the criticism of the internal situation in your country. We would simply encourage as much forward motion as possible. I am delighted to see you but I feel

bad over the time constraint. We have to go outside now for our joint appearance. Afterwards, there will be time for you to talk with the Secretary if you have any problems. We do not. ~~(C)~~

Amir of Kuwait: From my point of view there are no other problems. (U)

President: How is the situation coming with the fires? Is it true that they will all be out by the end of the year? (U)

Amir of Kuwait: The situation is much better. We hope so. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jorge Serrano, President of Guatemala (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Thomas F. Stroock, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American Affairs, National Security Council (Notetaker)
Barbara Phillips, Interpreter

Jorge Serrano, President of Guatemala
Roger Haroldo Rodas, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Juan Jose Caso, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States
Bernardo Neumann, Presidential Advisor and Economic Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 2, 1991, 9:40 - 10:25 a.m., D.S.T.
Oval Office

The President: First, I want to deliver a letter for your wife from mine. It is a delight to see you here. Before anything else, I want to inquire about your family. I understand that you have stopped in Houston and that your mother has been in the hospital there. How are things going? (U)

President Serrano: Oh, I wasn't expecting that. Thank you very much for inquiring. My mother had a problem in Guatemala and we sent her to Houston. The problem was in her back but it was caused by a thyroid condition. We decided to send her to the States and my sisters all came up also. It turns out that one of my sisters also has a thyroid problem. (C)

The President: That's the same problem I had -- a thyroid problem. Now I feel perfectly fine. How is your mother? (U)

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President Serrano: I talked with her this morning and she is great. (U)

The President: I thought that I would open up with a couple of points, and then we would like to have you bring up anything you would like to speak about. The important thing is that we would like to hear everything you may have on your mind. (U)

First, we were very pleased with your action in recognizing Belize. Every time I have been to Guatemala, and when the Vice President was there we always heard about this difficult problem and that it was difficult to solve. We want to congratulate you on the courageous stand that you took. ~~(C)~~

On economic agreements, I know that we have talked about the measures that you are taking to improve Guatemala's economy. And that you have talked with the Banks. We are not in a very good position to talk about growth since our own growth is not nearly what I would like it to be. We admire what you are doing. I hope that things are going the way you want them to. I know that energy is a real problem for you. ~~(C)~~

There are so many good things in our relationship. The only contentious problem we face is human rights. I would urge a solution to the Devine matter. Anything which can be done would be a help in enabling us to cooperate more fully with Guatemala. I don't want to be a preacher, but it is a very important matter to us. We worry about the rising level of violence. I know that you are new and not responsible for many problems and I felt that I owed you a frank discussion because this holds up what we want to do. ~~(C)~~

There is no similarity but we have had tremendous problems involving the human rights situation in El Salvador. I felt I owed it to you to mention the problem. I didn't want not to mention it and then have it continue as a serious problem. ~~(C)~~

On narcotics, we think the demand is down now. We wanted you to know that we realize that the narcotics problem is a two-way street and we will continue to work on the demand side as we cooperate with you on the supply side. ~~(C)~~

You mentioned the military. This is tied to other questions. ~~(C)~~

These are the points I wanted to mention to you. For the most part things are going pretty darn well. What I wanted to mention most is how pleased we are that you are here. We want you to feel at home, and there are so many positive things in our relationship. I would be interested in hearing from you anything you would like to say and knowing how you view our relationship. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: Thank you. I bring greetings from the people of Guatemala and from my government. It has been great to be in New York and Washington. One thing because it has been difficult

(for people here) to understand how we are handling our situation. Guatemala has been under fire for 40 years. I am 46 and there has not been a single year of my life where there has not been violence. I have been in exile, and have suffered the problems of violence, personally. I have now been elected President and this is ending. To make a comparison between Guatemala and the United States, you must go back to the Civil War where your whole nation was torn by violence. And extraordinary measures and actions were taken under great stress. We are in the middle of a war. We are making our best effort to respect human rights, which has been difficult, and we have used restraint. ~~(C)~~

Guatemala has been the country which has received the least help in the hemisphere. Also, we have the least debt. But we have paid our debt and our principal. Guatemalans are proud to be independent, but we need more help from the world, especially the United States. I received a government with 60% inflation. We have broken inflation. We now have only 4.5% inflation. ~~(C)~~

The President: Do people appreciate this? (U)

President Serrano: Yes, people appreciate it. We are collecting more taxes and we are putting on an extra tax to help in education. We are making big strides in health care. I visited a hospital with a thousand beds recently, and gave them a check. And in the process, the director of the hospital told me they had not received money for maintenance of the building in 30 years. They have never received any money for maintenance. ~~(C)~~

The President: Very impressive. (U)

President Serrano: When I came to the government, there were no reserves. We now have $400 million in reserves. More than any other Central American country. This gives confidence to our investors and supports the return of capital. We are very happy with our economic accomplishments. I talked with businesses. We have enough serious people to invest but the question is can we have security in the United States market. They worry about the North American Free Trade Agreement. ~~(C)~~

The President: Are they worried about their markets? We think along opposite lines. We think the North American Free Trade Agreement will open up the hemisphere and provide better markets for everybody. Maybe we need to do a better job of letting this be known. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: We do worry about the markets. We are much more interested in trade rather than aid. Aid is a one-time thing, trade goes on forever. If we could have a statement that the North American Free Trade Agreement will not restrict trade with other countries. ~~(C)~~

The President: We'll do our best to get that out. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: On the Devine case? ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, let us ... (U)

President Serrano: (Interrupts) We have in jail six persons. We are not going to cover (up) anybody. On the case of Mr. Devine, I saw (thought) that it would be the case for discussion. But, you are the first to mention it. Well, I was with a Congressman who had to look at his notes to get the name. I had a meeting with the human rights people and told them to come to us with the facts. We have been thorough. One army commander, Hugo Contreras is in jail. Four members of the army are in jail. ~~(C)~~

The President: Does anybody want to speak a little more about this? (U)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: The problem is that the government has released several officers who are involved in the crime. It looks like a whitewash. There was a Captain and two Colonels -- Hugo Contreras and Colonels Portillo and Alpires. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Neumann: I was told about the problem by Ambassador Stroock and Assistant Secretary Aronson. I believe he hoped he could talk to the Attorney General. There is a legal system which can cause difficulties. The Defense attorneys want to get them out. But they can't do it. We are determined that they can't get away with anything. They were freed, but now there is an appeal. ~~(C)~~

The President: Are they let out? ~~(C)~~

Assistant Secretary Aronson: The Minister of Defense absolved the Colonels. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: The Minister of Defense can't do that. Colonel Portillo is under missions of the court. They can present proofs in their defense. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: Mr. President, if I could interject. Mr. President, the purpose in mentioning this situation is to avoid problems so that we can do more. We have been down this road before. We know where it leads. We have been fighting the battle of El Salvador for years. The purpose is to nip it in the bud. Maybe the thing to do is to dig up more facts. ~~(C)~~

The President: If the facts are different than we perceived, we must work together to make sure that Congress understands them. We have fought this battle over the years, and there is a serious problem with the Congress. Some in Congress are demagogues. Some are out to accommodate forces in the left. Some are serious people with problems. We had a hell of a time with the pro-Sandinistas in Congress. We want you to know you can be sure that we will try to get the facts. We know that there is something there and it needs to be dealt with. We need to get something done because we want to cooperate as much as possible. That means the facts need to be that there is a fair trial. It would be great if it comes out this way. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: As we put problems to bed in one place, we have problems in another. People who raised cane about what happened in Nicaragua, when that problem was solved, moved to El Salvador. We knew that with the Nicaraguan solution, the impetus would shift to El Salvador. We knew it would happen and we don't want to let that happen in Guatemala. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: We'll be fruitful. Our impression is that you are stuck on the Devine case. I am not covering (up). We can give you a real description, but we have other cases where we are working in the same way. We have seven cases of officers in jail. We have done a lot of things. We have changed the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I am willing to do it again. I have to say in all frankness, that we think that you are overemphasizing the Devine case. Nobody in our human rights discussions, mentioned Devine. Only one Congressman mentioned Devine and he needed notes to know the name. ~~(C)~~

The President: Don't interpret the need to look for a name by a Congressman, as a lack of interest. If we don't get the facts, it will snowball. I guarantee you that you are fighting a trend like Secretary Baker said. We can't get anything done without the Congress. I know he mentions it as a friend, as do I. If I let you think that there isn't a problem because I did not mention it, I would not be being your friend. I promise you that the people who worried about El Salvador operation, will also focus on Guatemala. I don't want you to feel that because only one Congressman mentioned the problem, it is not a serious problem. I want to help, but there are serious problems. If the people who supported the Sandinistas are saying that the Colonels are released and they are not, then we need to make this known. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: If the court says they are scheduled to be released, that is not my government. There is a clear difference between the government and the courts. I want to respect the judicial difference. We are doing our part in the Congress. We are lobbying and people understand. ~~(C)~~

And they are doing a good job. The fact is that we have found no problems in the Congress because of Devine. The Army, I am ensuring, is helping in two ways. As I said to President Reagan at a meeting when you were there, we are fighting a war for you and against you. We have been fighting for forty years. We want to get relief. We are trying to control drugs. They, the drug barons, are moving to Guatemala. The Cartel people have 20 times our budget. We have an issue of Devine and we are handling it, but we have other problems and we are trying to help solve them. We are becoming a big drug target. ~~(C)~~

As I said on the telephone, my party is a conservative party. We are on the same approach. We sometimes think we are treated unfairly. We want to know what we can do to improve relations. You can be sure we will do whatever is necessary to better relations, but I know that if we resolve the Devine case, it will help. We need to build a better relationship. ~~(C)~~

The President: This has been very helpful. Take a look at what happened in El Salvador. You can't be linked to them. Your case is an internal matter of Guatemala. Congress sees this as their bailiwick. El Salvador had a decision in court. One guy convicted, others let off. The left said: "what a mockery, this is a whitewash." I understand your need to have separation of powers. That there is a perception problem. I don't know what would happen if there is bad perception. ~~(C)~~

If there is a false perception, and we have been unfair, we want to correct it. We want you to succeed. I want to convince you that we want you to succeed. I want to work with you together. Nevertheless, we do have a problem. ~~(C)~~

Speaking of problems, we do have a real problem in Haiti. The last thing we want to do is to send U.S. troops, but there is a very serious situation there. ~~(C)~~

The value of this conversation is that I can know from you that you don't think we appreciate the steps you have taken. I don't want you to think that there is a conspiracy not to support you. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: Take the case of eleven people who got murdered. I put them in jail, even without the proper evidence. People worried about this and I said tell the objectors to call me. I will testify myself. This is the first time this has ever been done. What we need is support. ~~(C)~~

The President: We want to support you. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: We have had enough criticism. What we need is support; we need a hand. We want to build a society. We want to build along a conservative ideology that is improving. I don't know if I am transmitting the proper message. ~~(C)~~

The President: I got the message. (U)

President Serrano: I'm not asking for more military aid. What we are looking for is respect, dignity. ~~(C)~~

The President: I guarantee that this is not even a question. You have our greatest respect. I hope you don't think we are looking from a negative point of view. You have convinced me of the many positive things you are doing. The economic measures, your elections, growth democracy. But on human rights, I am trying to point out to you the facts of life. It is a tough way to build a consensus in the Congress -- it is tough. The way to build a consensus in the Congress is to be sure that your process is open and free, and then the U.S. people will understand. I really mean that. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: We can't turn over military aid if we wanted to without Congressional support. Let me go back to a previous experience. President Duarte and President Cristiani have done a

great job in explaining the situations in their country. I wonder if you will be helping your cause on the Hill. I wonder if you will be meeting with various Congressmen. Do you have a series of meetings? ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: Yes, we have had a meeting with Congressmen, and I am inviting Congressional staff tomorrow for breakfast. ~~(C)~~

The President: Brilliant idea. If you follow up on the questions of people, it will have a very positive effect. ~~(C)~~

Assistant Secretary Aronson: One point. Part of the problem we face is that your predecessor came up here with promises, and he didn't fulfill them. That creates a bad atmosphere. We understand you have changed things, and we have fought hard for aid to Guatemala. We have fought with Congress. We said that you had a strong commitment to human rights and we did all we could to defend aid to Guatemala. We don't want to leave the impression that we do not understand all you have done. ~~(C)~~

The President: We know you have advanced the cause of democracy. Speaking of elections, I hear the helicopter coming to pick me up. I have to go to Pittsburgh, Kentucky and Tennessee. We do want to be helpful and we hope you think we have been helpful. I think your meeting with Congressional staffers is brilliant. Sometimes they are the tail wagging the dog. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: You will see a change in the Congress with my explanation. You should see a card of Bob White. It says "you did a great job, I will try to help." You know who Bob White is? (C)

The President: Yes, I certainly do. You want to keep that card and be sure that he helps as he said he would. ~~(C)~~

President Serrano: On the case of drugs, we are fighting a war. We don't know what will happen. We are fighting on the U.S. side. Our army will succeed. We are committed to do battle with human rights. You have been very good in explaining what you have done on human rights. ~~(C)~~

The conversation closed with the President expressing again his appreciation for President Serrano's visit and his appreciation for all he has done and his hope that Serrano understood that we were mentioning the human rights problems as friends; we want to resolve a common problem.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David C. Gompert, Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs (Notetaker)
Ralph Johnson, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Frank Elbe, Director of the Foreign Minister's Office
Perry Notbohm, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 3, 1991, 4:00 - 4:30 pm
Oval Office/Roosevelt Room

The President: How is everything going, Hans-Dietrich? (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher: In the end, I am confident we will be able to achieve European Economic and Monetary Union and also European Political Union. ~~(S)~~

The President: I wanted to mention one thing that is a very high priority for me. I am very worried about the Uruguay Round. Can you give it a push, Hans-Dietrich? Is there anything that the United States should be doing on our side that we are not doing? We have to get progress in the GATT negotiations or else we are going to end up with trade blocks and trade barriers. I know this is bad for the United States, and I assume you think it's bad for Germany as well. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: Yes, Mr. President, I agree. This is crucial. We will do what we can. We will use all of our influence. I know that you understand that it is not up to us; it is a matter for the 12. But it is not even easy for us. ~~(S)~~

The President: It's not easy for anybody; it won't be any easier for us than it is for you. But the lesser developed countries are counting on a GATT agreement. We have to keep after the

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French. I realize that Mitterrand has problems with his farmers. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: We all have farmers. (U)

The President: Tell me about it. I've heard however that we are slightly more optimistic. Is this true Brent? (S)

General Scowcroft: Well, we heard the Chancellor indicate his strong commitment, and we've also heard that Mr. Dunkel is going to advance a proposal for compromise. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: On this day of celebration of German reunification, I want to express our deep gratitude, Mr. President, for everything that the United States has done for Germany over the many years and also what you did during our 2+4 negotiations. Your stance will never be forgotten. I left Eastern Germany in 1952. I have with me people from my hometown of Halle. We are all grateful. (S)

The President: You have been very generous in your remarks about America's role and about what this Administration has done. We are very pleased to have helped. I have been touched by what you have said. (S)

What is your latest thinking on the Soviet Union? (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Gorbachev and Yeltsin agree that they must try to keep a majority of the Republics together. But, I am afraid that their agreement might not go much beyond that. Yeltsin believes that the Union should be just a kind of coordination mechanism. My own view is that the Union ought to provide a common foreign, defense, and economic policy. But, I have my doubts as to whether or not the Republics will agree to this. (S)

One thing we can do in the face of all of this difficulty is to give the Soviets some kind of a framework for continuing to participate in Europe and also to prevent the Balkanization of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. We should emphasize the role of CFE in this regard. For the Central and East Europeans, the EC can do a lot. Germany is advocating a much more forthcoming stance on the part of the EC. We recommend full associate membership and then full membership, but we have to convince our partners. (S)

We are facing the third historic challenge since the end of the second World War. The first was after Europe was destroyed, the United States made the decision to stay in Europe through the Marshall Plan. This was a most decisive moment. Second, when the Soviets pursued relentlessly the arms race and tried to split the U.S. from Western Europe with missiles aimed at Western Europe but not at the United States, we stuck together and went forward with the double-track decision. This was the second decisive moment. Third, we now have to decide how to help

Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We cannot let them fail. ~~(S)~~

The President: We are reasonably pleased with the initial Soviet response on our arms control initiatives. You could help by urging them to meet our challenge. We continue to watch for the possibilities of the Yeltsin/Gorbachev rivalry. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: Your nuclear initiatives are historic. You have provided a basis for new peace order in Europe based on cooperative security. Yeltsin is in favor of eliminating these weapons. He and others are very concerned about proliferation and with good reason. Thank God there are no nuclear weapons in Yugoslavia or you could imagine what an acute situation we would have there. ~~(S)~~

The President: We are worried about Yugoslavia. Scowcroft and Eagleburger are suppose to be our two leading experts in the United States Government, and they don't know what to do. ~~(S)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Scowcroft thinks we ought to bring back Tito.

The President: It doesn't look like a ceasefire will hold. We want to be supportive of you. We aren't doing much ourselves. What else can be done? ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: Lord Carrington will try again for ceasefire and for new political negotiations. We need to offer negotiations looking toward independence for these republics in order to give them the possibility of leaving, we ought to offer them the right to leave but only if they accept the responsibility to protect minority rights. I have encouraged them in this direction. With such a possibility open to them they might hold off on unilateral action to achieve their independence. We have to be given hope of reaching independence through negotiations. There is a strong public opinion in favor of slipping in Croatia and Germany. You have many Croats and Serbs living in Germany. ~~(S)~~

The President: Do they live peacefully? (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Yes, they do. Which goes to show that the real problem in Yugoslavia is not between Serbs and Croats but between their leaders who are causing all of these historic hatreds to resurface. ~~(S)~~

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, President of Haiti (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Eliza Burham, Interpreter

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, President of Haiti
Jean Casimir, Ambassador to the United States
Fritz Longchamps, Ambassador to the United Nations
Raymond Valcin, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Haiti

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 4, 1991, 9:40 - 10:10 a.m., D.S.T.
Oval Office

The President: Welcome. They were asking questions on what the American people are interested about (use of force to restore the government of Haiti) and I gave the answer. We want to see democracy restored. I am anxious to see what you think about the situation. Is there something additional that we should do? Please let me know what you think. I would like to have you speak completely freely. ~~(C)~~

President Aristide: I am convinced that people want to live in democracy and that they will die for democracy. That is why we are happy with what you have said and done. We are alive with you in your hope for democracy. ~~(C)~~

On behalf of the Haitian people I want to thank you and all that the democracies are doing to resolve the process in Haiti. I talked to a journalist in Haiti about an hour ago and he said there were about 500 casualties. ~~(C)~~

The President: Dead? (U)

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President Aristide: The Washington Post says there are about 300 dead. This is the doing of one General with the help of the army. (C)

The President: What General? Cedras? (C)

President Aristide: We, the people of Haiti, want to thank you and the people of the United States for their help in restoring democracy to Haiti. We think that the OAS delegation, which is going to Haiti, will be positive. It leads us to believe that they can convince the small group that they cannot prevail. (C)

The President: What do you think about the use of force? (C)

President Aristide: If we can have the express will of the United States to demonstrate the determination of the U.S. Government not to tolerate the destruction of democracy, this will be helpful. Of course, the presence of U.S. Navy in the area is an expression of determination and reflects U.S. objectives. For the moment, the OAS mission is the best way to solve the problem. (C)

The President: I agree. (U)

President Aristide: If we can solve the first phase of the problem, then we should take that for a guarantee for democracy down the road. (C)

The President: I don't understand. (U)

President Aristide: There are three points for the protection of democracy. First, no democracy will exist without justice so there must be punishment for crimes. Two, the Haitian armed forces have been institutionally used to protect dictatorships. With your help we should be able to support the police who will help the people. Third point, and this is delicate. As you know, the government of Haiti have always looted, pillaged and killed. It's also unfortunate when we see people in the government get aid and it goes to the pockets of a small group of people. So when I took over on February 7th, we had a change. Your Ambassador Adams can corroborate this. I think emergency economic assistance is needed to train judges for justice. And secondly for the training of police; this would also provide jobs and allow people the possibility of working in peace. I am convinced that this way we can have non-violence. I am convinced that it is most necessary that we have non-violence in arriving at democracy. I will continue in that struggle. Struggle to assure a non-violent approach. I will continue so that with your help and with that of other countries we can build democracy. (C)

The President: Let me respond. We take this matter very seriously, because this is a very significant event. We don't want to see democracy set back. There is also the problem of protection of American lives. I view this as a prime responsibility of the Presidency. I take your point. We will do

what we have to protect Americans. I am concerned about the use of U.S. force to bring about domestic tranquility in the hemisphere. When in history we have used force, even though we used it to protect democracy, it was often not perceived that way in the hemisphere. It has almost always given us a black eye. I am not speaking of Haiti, but rather of other countries. I strongly support your hope that the OAS can do the job of providing domestic tranquility. Human rights has got to be the hallmark of all this. The more you can identify with human rights, the stronger you will be. And even the rights of people who made this unconstitutional change, if you can protect their rights too, all of this will be of benefit to democracy. I would encourage you to speak out on human rights and when you get back, which I hope you do, to take that very much into account. People will say that you condone violence. The more you can do to support human rights, the better it will be. ~~(C)~~

If force has to be used, the OAS should organize, so people can't say it was the U.S. trying to impose this or that government. I don't want to be under a false claim. I am reluctant to put U.S. force into Haiti. I think a better way to do it is through the OAS. I think we have a chance to make an historic change. You have been set back -- all the hemisphere has been set back -- and we want to see a restoration of your government. I will try to make that point in a press conference I am giving later. ~~(C)~~

President Aristide: I am very happy with what you have said. I want to share one more thought. You see Haiti is a country of great poverty. One of the reasons that you have had such poverty is that the armed forces refuses to support democracy. When I was arrested and taken to their headquarters in the presence of General Cedras, there was a major criminal there who was famous for killing people. This person was released; it was in my presence and he will be in a senior position of the government. ~~(C)~~

The President: As I get it, they took the bad guys and are giving them their release. I can understand your worry. ~~(C)~~

President Aristide: He will be the new chief (of police). Several of the narcotics prisoners are free. ~~(C)~~

The President: What does Cedras have to say about this? ~~(C)~~

President Aristide: He wants that. ~~(C)~~

The President: Who came to pick you up? ~~(C)~~

President Aristide: I was in my house, and shots were fired. The U.S. and French Ambassador came to get me, and then when I arrived at the Palace, and I tried to get Cedras to talk to the smaller group of soldiers to help, he did not. He gave an order to the soldiers in the Palace not to shoot (his own guard), then went out. They shot at me, I then was helped down on the ground. One of my soldiers next to me had a leg broken by a bullet. They tied my hands with my necktie and took me to General Cedras, who

said that he was President now. They released during the day, all the drug dealers and criminals. The question I raise is, if I go back to Haiti for democracy, what can I do about the drug people who are free? (C)

The President: The OAS Mission must be fully informed of this. As a first step the Mission must know. Bernie is going on the Mission, isn't he? And I want you to know that he has great respect, not only in the State Department, but here in the White House. We will have to be sure he understands what you have said. (C)

What do you think about the attitude of the majority of the armed forces? (C)

President Aristide: It is only a small group in the army who are involved. But structurally, the army has always been involved in drugs. (C)

The President: You will see that there are people out in the Rose Garden who are not as important as this meeting, but it is something that has been arranged and I will have to go. How long will you be here? (C)

Ambassador Casimir: We will go back to the hotel and will be meeting with the Haitian community; we will be here until tomorrow. (C)

The President: If we have any new developments, we will certainly keep you informed. May I make a gratuitous suggestion. In the interviews with The Washington Post and The New York Times, and other establishment press, it would be useful to emphasize your commitment to human rights. The media are offended by what happened to you and democracy but they are also committed to strong internal programs of human rights, so as much as you can link your return to human rights, the more support you will get. The other thing they will be interested in is in freeing of the drug people. This I think would also be very interesting. (C)

The President then began closing the meeting with a strong reaffirmation of support for President Aristide and he took him over to the window to explain a little bit about how, as he put it, a President earns his pay, "in working with domestic groups --this one on education." (C)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Wong Kan Seng, Foreign Minister of Singapore (5 pp.)	10/4/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By [illegible] (NLGB) on 10/7/10

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 9/24/91 - 10/15/91

Date Closed:	1/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(392)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Wong Kan Seng, Foreign Minister of Singapore (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Timothy Carney, Director of Asian Affairs, Notetaker

Wong Kan Seng, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ong Keng Yong, Charge d'Affaires
Selvadas Govindasamy, First Secretary

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 4, 1991, 5:05 - 5:35pm EST
General Scowcroft's Office

After introductions and a brief exchange of courtesies, General Scowcroft began the meeting.

General Scowcroft: You have been to the UN? (U)

Foreign Minister Wong: I spent four days there for my speech at the UN General Assembly and then for the ASEAN Foreign Minister's meeting, the second of the two held every year. (U)

Our part of the world is alright except for your problem with the bases in the Philippines. How do you see that? (C)

General Scowcroft: Unless something happens, and that looks doubtful, we will go ahead and get out. (C)

We have been looking at alternative ideas for some time. (S)

We are grateful for your support which predates the current issues. It has been very helpful to us. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: Are you looking for access in other ASEAN states? (S)

General Scowcroft: We have no specific focus on that, not wanting any leaks while the negotiations with the Philippines are on. We will be looking very seriously. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: Until a new President and new Senate take office in the Philippines, it would be better not to move forces out of Subic Bay. The new players might bring new

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thinking and maybe there would be an opportunity for retention of the bases. (S)

General Scowcroft: Our sense is that the bases are popular with the Philippine people and, if a referendum were held, retention would win quite handily. It would be a disaster if the bases close down. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: For us, too. (S)

General Scowcroft: I have talked to some Senators. The issue is solely psychological: they will not feel really independent until they tell us to go home. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: It is so few, just 12 (who voted against the Treaty). There is no sense in their being able to do that. (C)

President Aquino has talked to our Ambassador about the possibility of a three-year withdrawal. (S)

General Scowcroft: We will do nothing hasty. It is important, and we want to retain a presence and will be doing something to effect that. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: With matters as they are in the Soviet Union, your move out of the Philippines would leave a vacuum. Who knows what regional powers would enter into contention. This would be destabilizing. (S)

General Scowcroft: We consider ourselves a Pacific country. Looking to the future, Japan and China are important elements. We will keep some kind of balance in the region. (S)

What about your domestic developments? (C)

Foreign Minister Wong: In our elections the 31st of August, we lost four seats. (U)

General Scowcroft: That is an earthquake! (U)

Foreign Minister Wong: Indeed, it was very dramatic. There was a two point fall in the vote for the People's Action Party as well, down to 61%. (C)

When the Prime Minister called the election it was to get support for new policies and his new style. The issue was himself and he was disappointed at the two point drop in voter support. (C)

General Scowcroft: In the context of a transition from the towering figure that (former Prime Minister) Lee was, you should be gratified at the encouraging result. (C)

Foreign Minister Wong: The next election will be crucial. In 1996, a new Prime Minister will be in it in his own name. We will see. Now, there is a feeling among people that a few oppositionists should be in Parliament. While the PAP is in power to deliver the goods, a few in opposition can be there to criticize. (C)

Foreign Minister Wong: Tremendous thing are going on in the USSR. How do you see the next three years? (U)

General Scowcroft: What happened with the failure of the coup was that the conservatives, who had tried to slow things down, to stop the evolution which Gorbachev had put in motion, not only did not succeed, but caused much more rapid movement. Bad elements have been eliminated for some time, but more chaos exists now than if matters had moved more gradually. (C)

Gorbachev's own real power is significantly diminished. Our sense now is that centrifugal forces are stronger than centripetal forces. It is quite possible that on December 1 the Ukraine will vote to leave the union. (S)

The economic situation is dreadful. the old system has been dismantled. No new system is in place and no one knows what to do. A member of the New Economic Commission was in this morning. He said, regarding their Defense Industry, that when the USSR worried about an attack from Europe, they built plants in Siberia, attaching special cities to each plant. If a plant goes out of business, the problem is how to reconnect the plant to some other industry. They are located in an uneconomic part of the country and workers' wages are extra high for them to settle in such desolate places. (C)

The likelihood is for a fairly complete breakdown of the country into its republics, at least for a time. They might eventually come back together again. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: What about nuclear weapons? (U)

General Scowcroft: This problem is one of the reasons behind the recent U.S. proposal. Now, while the situation is stable, we might control and eliminate the weapons more rapidly. (S)

It is not entirely clear. The other Republics are fearful and jealous of Yeltsin. Kazakhstan and the Ukraine have commented that they are not willing to let the weapons go into Russian control. (C)

Tactical weapons are no problem, but for SS-18s in silos, they cannot move. It is a dilemma for them and worrisome for us. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: What will Kazakhstan do if the Ukraine leaves the USSR? (U)

General Scowcroft: It is likely that Kazakhstan would go independent as well. They would not want to be alone with Russia if the Ukraine goes. If all stay in the union, there would be a counterweight to the size of Russia. (C)

All of this makes the economic situation more difficult. Different regions have different economic independence: the Ukraine exports food and imports oil; Kazakhstan exports oil and minerals. A break-up would make things even more complicated. (C)

Foreign Minister Wong: That is why the Europeans are not proposing to put in much money. (C)

General Scowcroft: Emergency assistance during the coming winter would be OK. But, they can absorb the entire world supply of excess capital to no effect at this point. There must be an economic plan. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: Will this have an impact on China? (U)

General Scowcroft: Good question. The Chinese were upset when the coup failed. They are very worried. They are worried that they are the last remaining significant communist country and what that will mean. They worry over the example to the Chinese people. If the USSR breaks up, there will be independent countries on China's southwest border which will be an attraction to the non-Han people of China. (C)

We would like to open a dialogue with China. We are in a difficult position. Congress makes it difficult to do anything. (S)

Foreign Minister Wong: If the Soviet breakup affects China and if China goes the same way it will be much worse. (C)

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In our quiet way we talked to them about Hong Kong and the need for agreement with the British government. We said Hong Kong is their link to the rest of the world for both capital and technology. They made an agreement on the airport. So long as China does not export arms to others, we do not have to bother. Of course we must deal with human rights. (S)

General Scowcroft: Any developments there? (U)

Foreign Minister Wong: Deng put reform-minded people in key positions. The longer they are there, the track of reform is easier. When Deng and Yang Shangkun pass, it will work. But, if there is a sudden passing, then struggle will result. Younger province leaders have traveled and know what will be good for their country. (S)

General Scowcroft: It is frozen now. (C)

Foreign Minister Wong: A period of waiting, waiting. If there are enough of those people, they can take China through the transition. Otherwise there will be ten million refugees and problems throughout Southeast Asia where ethnic Chinese minorities exist. (S)

General Scowcroft: A Cambodia settlement? (U)

Foreign Minister Wong: We hope to sign in Paris on 23 October and begin a new phase. Whether it will be implemented as envisaged is another matter. But, with a strong UN presence and strong Special Representative of the Secretary General it will work. It will take about 18 months from signature to elections. (C)

General Scowcroft: Hopefully it will get there. (U)

Foreign Minister Wang: If Cambodia is removed, then Southeast Asia will be stable and it is up to governments to pursue regional problems. In ASEAN, the problem is with the Philippines: national disaster; coup. This may improve with a new administration. Unemployment is destabilizing. (S)

General Scowcroft: We plan to stay and contribute to stability. (C)

The Foreign Minister concluded by giving General Scowcroft a pictorial book on Singapore.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA (5 pp.)	10/7/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By [redacted] (NLGB) on 10/7/10

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 9/24/91 - 10/15/91

Date Closed:	1/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(393)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant Secretary to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Hank Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Ted McNamara, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs
Walter Kansteiner, NSC Director for African Affairs

Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA
Jeremias Chitunda, Vice President of UNITA
Tony Da Costa Fernandes, Foreign Minister
Jardo Muekalia, U. S. Representative of UNITA

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 7, 1991, 10:20 - 11:00 a.m.
The Oval Office

President Bush: I am delighted to see you Dr. Savimbi and also very pleased by the reports at the reception which you received on your return for the first time in many years to Luanda at the end of the fighting. The reports of the crowd size and the enthusiasm of the reception were very encouraging. Is this true? (U)

Dr. Savimbi: Yes, and I am also very pleased at the very consistent and supportive role that the U.S. has played. The U.S. assistance with the Soviet Union was particularly helpful. I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for helping out during the visit here to Washington of President dos Santos by pressing him to proceed with the Peace Accords implementation and to move toward elections in September 1992. Since the meeting in Washington there has been more talk about September and less talk of holding the elections later or delaying them. (C)

President Bush: Would September be the best time? (U)

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Dr. Savimbi: Yes, September would be the best time. (U)

President Bush: Is the Angolan government committed to the peace process? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: Yes, no one really wants to return to armed conflict which we have had for so many years and which has so hurt the country. (C)

To achieve the objective what we need from the U.S. is continuing pressure, because Angola is still a one party state. The MPLA uses their administration to pressure various organizations and people throughout Angolan society. The U.S. needs to continue to pressure the government, to commit itself to a democratic process. Only in this way would the government respond and abide the accords fully. (S)

The problem of getting troops to assembly points seems to be solved at this point. The biggest problem of the moment is the need to transform the UNITA into a political movement. It needs offices; it needs vehicles; it needs the structure of a political party. Yet this is very difficult to accomplish because much has been confiscated for example, the houses and other buildings that it had in Luanda before the civil war have been confiscated and thus far it has not been able to get this property back. (S)

I think that if this difficulty of reorganizing and getting UNITA under way as a political movement is solved then the problem of food would also be easily solved. With respect to this effort to form itself into a political party, I know that the U.S. is committed to this and is trying to help. I understand some of the restraints about aid, but we need assistance for the people. We need resources which includes even basic things such as water and electricity. (C)

President Bush: Where will you be spending most of your time and will you be located in Luanda or in villages out in the interior? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: Our main office will be in Luanda. (U)

President Bush: What about dos Santos, how is he doing? (U)

Dr. Savimbi: President dos Santos is trying to organize himself and his party in the South, but at present he is also remaining in Luanda. (C)

President Bush: This is an exciting time for Angola, a very difficult time. Is there a peaceful solution in progress and to what extent might there be leftwing resistance to any movement towards a peaceful solution? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: We originally thought the majority of the MPLA wanted a peaceful solution. But we now discover that probably the majority of the MPLA does not want it. As an example, when dos Santos came back to Luanda with the accord signed, he went to

the same square where I had such a huge welcome and drew a crowd which was only half the size of mine. (C)

President Bush: When you were in Luanda were the supporters in the square people from Luanda? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: Yes, from Luanda. (U)

The President: Are there any Cubans left? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: There are only a few left. I estimate about five to seven thousand specialists still in Angola. This is of some concern to us because all of these personnel have military backgrounds. (C)

President Bush: Do the soldiers truly not want to return to Cuba? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: They are staying because they are afraid to return thinking about what might happen in Cuba, and what their future might be there. (C)

President Bush: They may be right. (U)

Dr. Savimbi: They have jobs. They are not engaged in combat. They are not in uniform and a substantial number of them are in Cabinda. (U)

President Bush: How are things in Cabinda? How is the oil exploration going? (U)

Minister Da Costa Fernandes: The exploration is going along rather well. The French are engaged in research and exploration. They have discovered new fields. They hope to reach 500,000 barrels a day in Angola. This represents about $750 million a year for the government. (C)

President Bush: This is a substantial amount of money which could go for a number of programs. Hank what is our situation? (C)

Assistant Secretary Cohen: We had a request for $28 million in money to support implementation of the Peace Accords, and we expect Congress will give us most of it. Then it would be a termination point so that none of the aid would be given after the election campaign itself begins, therefore the cutoff would be July, 1992. (S)

President Bush: We better get that aid in there before the elections. Think the elections will be fair? (S)

Dr. Savimbi: In this respect the role of the U.S. and others who would be international monitors in the elections would be very important. After 16 years of warfare against UNITA the government is certainly not going to put down power and allow it

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to be at the disposal of UNITA or others. The MPLA will stall and cheat. (S)

President Bush: In what manner would the elections be conducted? Parliamentary style elections or constituencies? Will you go head-to-head with dos Santos? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: First there would be presidential elections followed by elections for National Assembly. (U)

President Bush: Do you think you can whip dos Santos? (C)

Dr. Savimbi: I believe we can. (U)

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Dr. Savimbi: The people would never support him; they would wish to defeat those who had brought Cubans into Angola. The people want to reward those that fought the Cubans. (C)

President Bush: It seems like a long time from now until September 1992 when the elections come along. (U)

Dr. Savimbi: It takes a long time to register people and to organize such an election. (U)

President Bush: This is true even here in the United States where our political structures are much firmer. I think the idea of a free and fair election is good news and progress. You have been struggling all these years. I am sure the reception you got in Luanda must have been very uplifting. (U)

Dr. Savimbi: Yes, it was good reception. It exceeded our expectations. I was pleased. (U)

President Bush: How did you get the word out about coming back to Luanda? Was it by radio or by some other means? (U)

Dr. Savimbi: Yes, radio. You know the U.S. provided us with that radio; it has a powerful reach. (C)

President Bush: What about the rest of your trip? (U)

Dr. Savimbi: I will be meeting with businessmen, the Secretary General in New York, and then I am going on to Houston. (U)

President Bush: I am going to Houston once I'm finished here in Washington. That is where I am going to retire. (U)

Dr. Savimbi: I wish you good luck in the coming elections. I am sure it is going to be a success; you are a shoe-in. (C)

President Bush: I'm not so sure. These things can change very fast in this country. Congratulations, Dr. Savimbi, for your support for the progress in Angola and good luck in the future and in the elections. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana of Western Samoa (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Arnold L. Kanter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
John Becker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Acting
Timothy M. Carney, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Tofilau Eti Alesana, Prime Minister of Western Samoa
Tuaopepe F. Wendt, Ambassador of Western Samoa
Mose Pouvi Sua, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Terry Toomata, First Secretary of Embassy

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 8, 1991 1:45 - 2:15 pm
Oval Office

The President met with the Prime Minister in the Oval Office. Photographers and a writing pool entered as the President and the Prime Minister were seated.

The President: When did you arrive? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: Last evening at about six. (U)

The President: Did you stop on the way? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: In Los Angeles. (U)

Question from the Press: ...credit crunch. It had no specifics in it. (U)

The President: The reference is to steps in terms of regulations. We are trying to do everything the Administration can to get the economy going better. (U)

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The Press Departed.

The President: Regarding the question of Johnston Island: I want to be sure Johnston Island is going to the satisfaction of the countries concerned? I have been told that the first phase was safely done. Hopefully that will calm down the concerns so eloquently expressed when we met in Honolulu last year. What are your views? ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: The question was again raised, touched on at the last (South Pacific) Forum meeting in Pohnpei. There were no more harsh views about the non-acceptableness of the destruction of weapons there. But, we were concerned that after the destruction of weapons, the U.S. should look into closing and not continuing with destruction of that kind of weapon there. ~~(C)~~

In general it is not an issue that countries of the South Pacific are so concerned about as before. ~~(C)~~

The President: I am hoping that the first safe shipment and dismantling would allay the concerns which I clearly felt. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: First of all, I offer my thanks, sincerely and very profoundly, for the opportunity afforded me to pay this courtesy call at the White House. It has been a long-standing desire, as leader of my country, that I have a visit to the White House. Today is the culminating point. It is an honor for myself, and country to visit, meet, greet you in the White House. ~~(C)~~

Everything back home is working out. The results of the last election, the first one under a system of universal suffrage, were according to my expectations and those of the country. In the future I will guide myself to the totality of universal suffrage for Western Samoa. ~~(C)~~

I did not visit with a large amount of subjects to trouble you with, but there are issues of extraordinary importance. I would like to raise some issues. I would like to thank the U.S. for trying to settle what took place in the Gulf War and Middle East. Western Samoa supported, stood behind you in every way required as is known to you. By the same token, what the U.S. had in mind, sending troops to the Middle East is a sign to us, a burden of the world, that what happened in the Gulf could happen in the South Pacific. The reason is because I feel that if we don't seriously work together, the economic system in the region is something that has to be nursed properly in accordance with the need. What people fervently require for the future is security of political aspirations. Most parts of the world are not settling as they should be. The main root of most of the world's problems is economic instability. ~~(C)~~

Western Samoa worries that, with the emerging of newly independent nations in Asia (sic), formerly communist states, there will be much effect on the policy of the U.S. Government. One demonstrated fact is that with the involvement of the U.S. in peacekeeping of the world, economics, military and other spheres, the world will remain stable. The U.S. will assist in keeping of the peace and harmony in the world. A world remaining at peace is what we dream of. ~~(C)~~

With other leaders of the South Pacific in the South Pacific Forum, particularly Australia and New Zealand, I discussed this. Our main goal is economic security. I believe this worthwhile for you to take up again with other South Pacific leaders. ~~(C)~~

The economic question you raised in the Hawaii meeting is still something we are looking at. Maybe it would answer what I have just voiced. ~~(C)~~

I believe you are fully aware of the fact that the world, and particularly the free world, looks to the U.S. to keep peace and harmony. ~~(C)~~

Regarding issues strictly related to Western Samoa: upgrading your Embassy in Apia which since 1988 still has a Charge d'Affaires. The involvement of the U.S. with the issues I just posed would be greatly enhanced if an Ambassador was designated to head your Embassy in Western Samoa. ~~(C)~~

I would like to reiterate my question of the availability of scholarships in U.S. university institutions. The reason is a decent one: mainly on the fact that who knows in the future about the selection of leaders. Education overseas may involve some education in the USA. I am always regarded as pro-U.S. ~~(C)~~

The President: We here, too, are very happy at that. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: My elementary education was in American Samoa and I was the first grantee of a U.S. foreign leadership grant in 1962. The time spent here was worthwhile. U.S. escorts took me around the U.S. and to Puerto Rico to observe politics and how the government of the USA runs. That is why I request some form of scholarship assistance for Western Samoa. The request does not reflect on the Peace Corps Volunteers in Western Samoa. ~~(C)~~

The President: That is different... ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: Yes, it is different. The other issue is the question of...no, that is about all. (U)

The President: On the Embassy: the problem is not of wanting to do it as it is a problem of Congressional views. Of equal importance is just plain budget on which we are fighting constantly. Isn't that right, Arnie? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Kanter: Yes, Mr. President. (U)

The President: If I see an opening .... You are simply caught up in one of our problems here. The budget agreement last fall is very constraining. It caps every account. If you add spending, you must take from another account. It sounds like an excuse, but that is just the way it is. It is not a putting down of your country. If there is a change, maybe we can accommodate that. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: The information from your Embassy and visiting envoy is plentiful. Still I feel the impact of a full-fledged Ambassador would be good. ~~(C)~~

The President: Does our Ambassador get there from Wellington? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: Yes, she was there with Neil Smith. I think it was last month. (U)

The President: My sister was there in 1989. I am not saying she was an Ambassador. I will not even say it can never happen, but I can't say yes at the moment, but given my personal interest... ~~(C)~~

Are there specifics on scholarships? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: Just in general. Your Ambassador has been informed. I have put it in a letter for you. (U)

The President: Are you going to the UN? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: I will address the UN on Thursday. (U)

After crossing the Atlantic to London, I will go to Wales for the football test match of Western Samoa against Australia. (U)

The President: Size matters. Do you have some big guys? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: We could be No. 1 if they put me into it. (U)

The President: We have our own peculiar brand. TV will show people slamming into people. ~~(C)~~

You mentioned Desert Storm. We are very grateful for your solidarity on that. I feel good about the UN Resolution to end

the aggression, but compliance with the rest of the UN Resolutions is a problem. He (Saddam Hussein) backed down from defying the UN and is permitting inspections. There is some evidence he is still hiding information. ~~(C)~~

The UN has definite conclusions on whether he is continuing after the war the ambitious program of before the war to seek weapons. The jury is out on whether he will succeed or not. We are determined, and will keep on driving to get what he's hiding. I say we, but it is mainly being done by the UN. I hope you will tell the UN Secretary General about your support for fulfilling the UN Resolutions. ~~(C)~~

Regarding the Pacific, what we are doing with the Soviet Union is in the big picture. We hope for peace in the Pacific. The nuclear arms proposals will have some effect. If none are on ships, 'tho your country has accepted (the earlier U.S. policy). We appreciate you receiving our ship visits. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: The announcement of a decrease in ICBMs was well received by the world. (U)

The President: Then President Gorbachev on Sunday responded well. ~~(C)~~

In the USSR they have such big problems. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Tofilau: I am given to understand that you might go to the South Pacific, to Australia. (U)

The President: I am not sure that we have locked the dates in. (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: Please stop in Western Samoa. (U)

The President: Have you ever seen the size of my squad? (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: We had a Shultz visit. (U)

The President: It is four to ten times that size. Thank you for the invitation. I do want to participate in another Pacific Forum (sic), but next year is an election year. They tell me I travel too much. I learn a lot from that. It was a good discussion, a good climate. (U)

Prime Minister Tofilau: The motivation for it was good, it was very informative. (U)

The President: I came back here to explain to the bureaucracy that if the ocean level rises, some islands will be under water. ~~(C)~~

The President and Prime Minister moved to examine the carved wooden bowl which the Prime Minister gave the President

Prime Minister Tofilau: "Talofa" means hello. The bowl is for a ceremony in which kava is drunk as a prayer before a meeting. (U)

The President: It is very handsome and will have a special place. Every President has a library and I will put it there when I get one. Before then, Barbara might put it where we live here.

The Prime Minister expressed thanks and he and his party departed.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Calderon of the Republic of Costa Rica (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John Robson, Acting Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Luis Guinot, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Rafael Angel Calderon, President of the Republic of Costa Rica
Arnoldo Lopez, Second Vice President
Bernd Niehaus, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thelmo Vargas, Minister of Finance
Roberto Rojas, Minister of Trade
Gonzalo Facio, Ambassador to the United States
Rodolfo Jimenez, Advisor to the President
Ricardo Adolfo Jimenez, Advisor to the President

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1991, 11:25am - 12:15pm DST
Cabinet Room

The President: Well, I think we can get started. I really want to do a very warm welcome back to the White House. We know that we are welcoming a good friend, both personally and from a country point of view. We start from a good base. The people of the United States and Costa Rica share common values. Part of my problem is that when I went down to that inauguration and went into the stadium, and was welcomed by all those people cheering and waving American flags, I was tremendously impressed at the warm feeling of Costa Rica for the United States. It is indelibly written and all of us here feel the same way, but it is a very personal feeling with me. But, listen, this leads me to let you know that we want to be part of the answer, not part of the problems. We have touched the surface of economic problems,

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I know what you have done, of the difficult economic decisions you have taken. When you do that, it's not popular at home. Nobody likes to do that. I congratulate you on the difficult decisions you have taken and on the decisions which may lie ahead. We are in no position to lecture your country or any country on the economy, we are down and have been dragging a few other countries down a little bit, but we are confident that we are out of the recession now and, realistically, things are getting better. The economy is better, but I still worry about it. We are pushing ahead. As our economy recovers, you will see more investment abroad including, especially, investment in the democracies. ~~(C)~~

I noted your support for the Enterprise for the Americas and I know that we have talked to Ambassador Guinot regarding the steps which need to be taken for PL-480 assistance and all that will be needed for our support. ~~(C)~~

We don't want the Enterprise for the Americas to be a slogan. We want it to be a reality. We are now negotiating a free trade agreement with Mexico, and we want to move on and have free trade agreements with others. I know there is interest in this. ~~(C)~~

Here's the drill. We continue our conversation, stay here until about 12:15 p.m., then we'll go over to the White House for lunch. But it will be a working luncheon where we can continue to talk. I would like to hear from any Ministers about anything they would like to say. It will not be a formal luncheon. We will be prepared to talk about any questions. Well, welcome back and the floor is yours. ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: Thank you for your warm welcome, and to let you know the great affection that the people of Costa Rica have for the people of the United States of America. There is great affection for President Bush in Costa Rica. As a matter of fact, I think there were more Bush-Quayle stickers in Costa Rica -- you would have won by an even wider margin in Costa Rica than you did here. I wanted to come here to thank all of you for the policies we have benefitted from -- from both you and the international organizations. The Enterprise for the Americas cannot be one more slogan. As I said in Houston, history is to be discussed in two stages, before and after the Enterprise for the Americas. We see that countries want to go forward if they have the ability, they don't want to just ask for money. We need to grow and develop. This is what the Enterprise for the Americas offers. Our commitment is to do the things that are necessary to qualify for the Enterprise for the Americas. We hope to follow Mexico on a free trade agreement. The Caribbean Basin Initiative was a very good program, but it's not the same as a free trade agreement, it's not as secure. Businessmen are not as secure because they know that you have a Treaty obligation to fulfill under a free trade agreement. We expect to begin talks with USTR and to set a date to work toward negotiations. We know that you are interested in intellectual property agreements. We are ready to negotiate one, as of now. On other issues, it would be difficult to have a free trade agreement with the whole region

all at once, because all countries are not the same and are not in the same stage of readiness. There are some who want to go ahead rapidly, like us. Others, it will take longer. We would hope that the Mexican-Canadian-U.S. Trade Agreement would be open, so that other countries could simply be added to it. This would be simpler for you, and simpler for us. We hope to be the first ones to join the agreement after Mexico. We want to go first because we are the purest democracy. You understand the problems involved in approving the agreement, because you have problems with Congress also, and you have to take Congress into account. In the dealings there have to be certain compromises. That is why we haven't made more progress already in qualifying for the Enterprise for the Americas. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: Regarding the free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico, some supporters of the Treaty who have expressed worry about extending the Agreement beyond just the North American Free Trade Agreement partners now negotiating, because of the difficulty in getting such an agreement through Congress. We will have a difficult time with the North American Free Trade Agreement by itself. We would like to engage with you on discussions and, at the proper time, it would be okay to move forward, but we need to be careful. I should mention, that we consider the North American Free Trade Agreement will be a liberalizing factor not only for the countries involved, but for the rest of the hemisphere also. We need to explain this better to you and to others. We recognize your desire to negotiate an agreement. We see significant difficulties in free trade, but we do want to move forward, and we need to contemplate the possibly of allowing other countries to accede to the agreement but, it is complicated. So we need to see how we can engage with you and with others on this subject. ~~(C)~~

The President: The goal is a free trade area in the entire hemisphere. (U)

President Calderon: That is the objective. We need to see how we can move forward. You are the greatest democracy in America and we know of the difficulties that a democracy has in dealing with Congress and the public. ~~(C)~~

We are prepared to reduce tariffs by half in 1992. We have already made a proposal to the Central American governments which covers all tariffs with a small exception involving where the reductions would be 20% for six products by 1993. This is a small exception. We are moving steadily to greater liberalization. There are difficulties in doing this, and we need to make adjustments, there are constant pressures. To give you one example: since prices on some commodities are set by the government, it is difficult to increase them. In our government of one year and four months, we have seen rice go up 70%, milk 46%, water 206%, gas 75%, electrical energy 42%. None of this is politically easy. We are going to raise electricity cost prices again, but this costs us politically. We have not ranked people directly. ~~(C)~~

The President: John, (Robson) do you want to add anything on this? (U)

Acting Secretary Robson: The Enterprise for the Americas was, in a way, designed with Costa Rica in mind. Things have gone a great way down the road. The biggest thing has been making the investment reforms which have been required and getting agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank. We will be calling about future measures. It will be important what the Inter-American Development Bank will want, in order to implement the investment loan. ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: We can fulfill all the Inter-American Development Bank requirements except the nationalization of the banks. We didn't nationalize the banks, the opposition did. The biggest thing the opposition did was to nationalize the banks and abolish the army. It would be very difficult to be able to change either of those. I don't know what would be similar with the democrats here, but it's like a fundamental tenant of party policy and very difficult to change. It would be as though someone were to tell me that we have to change the social security system which our party, under my Father, established. So you need to understand how difficult that is, how impossible this change would be. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: I understand about the difficulties this would cause. In the question of trade liberalization, I would think that step could be taken more easily if it is taken as part of a free trade agreement. ~~(C)~~

The question is, that they are placing additional requirements on us. I was talking about trade restriction liberalizations and how it would relate to a free trade agreement. (C)

President Calderon: I understand that clearly. What Acting Secretary Robson was saying is the requirement which was placed on us by the Inter-American Development Bank. ~~(C)~~

The President: I understand. (U)

Secretary Baker: I understand. (U)

Minister of Trade Rojas: We have been discussing a bilateral investment treaty. Something we can talk about later. (U)

President Calderon: Perhaps this afternoon we can set a date to meet to give the whole thing a big step forward. (U)

Regarding our difficult political situation. We are going to have a big effort to get the inflation rate down. We have a 38-40% rate. We can solve this with the help of Treasury. We need Treasury to face the Central Bank dollar denominated bonds, besides the local economy. We don't want the U.S. Government to buy them. I am sending our Minister of Treasury to Taiwan to talk to Mr. Lee, to see if we can get them to buy the bonds. If Japan and China could buy 60,000,000 dollars of Costa Rican

government bonds, then we don't have to put pressure on our Treasury. Our request is to ask the United States to push Japan and China to buy bonds. ~~(C)~~

The President: You will be negotiating on this? (U)

President Calderon: Yes, we are not looking for soft terms. We are thinking of a commercial rate for three or four years, so that the structural reforms will have time to work. ~~(C)~~

Minister of Finance Vargas: International debt is a tremendous onus. We need help to rake the political pressures which we feel so that we can go public to the private sector. ~~(C)~~

The President: What is the cut? (U)

Minister of Finance Vargas: We are cutting ten percent, in some cases 5%. The government employs one person in ten. Another step we are taking is in privatization. Twenty-five percent of our budget is for interest. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: That's less than our percentage. (U)

Minister of Finance Vargas: We have been improvising for investment. We have worked hard for reform, but we need two years where we don't have to push the local economy more. ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: The feeling I have is that we must get help so that we can move forward. We have taken very difficult reforms. This is the first government to undertake this. This is the first government to attack special interests. For example, there are people who have retired on $4,000 a month pension. I'm afraid that if we don't have help we will have difficulty in getting reforms, like changing this, through the Congress. So I am asking help from China and Japan. ~~(C)~~

The President: Have you approached them? (U)

President Calderon: Mr. Vargas is going to Taiwan and he hopes to talk with their Vice Minister. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: Then, you need this to strengthen your balance of payment financing? ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: On balance of payments, we are okay. Now we have three months reserve. ~~(C)~~

The President: Is this in addition to World Bank loans? ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: These are very simple things. I did my address [in Houston] in English. It is not for decision now. The decision needs to be made and be taken in a couple of years. ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: One other thing I wanted to mention although it's way ahead of time. We would like our Foreign Minister to be the next Secretary General of the OAS. There are many who feel that it is time that Central America should be entitled to have a representative as a Secretary General of the OAS. For Mr. Niehaus has the support of all the Central Americans, and of the Dominican Republic and of Belize. He has also received a favorable response from the Rio group. We hope for the support of the United States at the proper time. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, I don't want -- our position is not to take a position to early -- we don't want to put the Secretary General in a lame duck position by supporting somebody else. How long does the Secretary General have to go? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Pryce: Over two years. (U)

The President: We consider that Mr. Niehaus would be a good candidate, let's leave it there for the time being. ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: Thanks. On the question of drug trafficking -- we would like to be the first line of defense. We have a very strong program and we hope this will be of help to the United States. We understand that the United States has agreed to give assistance both in training and equipment to strengthen our programs. What we need is equipment. Frequently after you have used equipment for two and one-half years or so, you dispose of it. We could find great use for some of this equipment. We will make a request through normal channels to see what can be done. We, of course, are also concerned about drugs. I think it is important that the Costa Rican people know that we are trying very hard to reduce demand and are having considerable success. We have a big education program and the demand is going down. I got the feeling at Cartenaga that other countries were not clear about our commitment to reduce demand. I think it is important that people know that we are fighting on the supply side of the problem. For the first time, we have encouraging statistics. We will keep on that fight. We recognize that the supply side of the equation is important, so people won't say that if you reduce demand there would be no problem. I'm convinced that we can win this battle. Governor Martinez and others are working very hard on this. I am glad we are working together in training and we will see what we can do to comply with your request. This exchange is important if we want to work with you and to recognize that we are part of the problem. ~~(C)~~

President Calderon: I will talk with Governor Martinez and suggest that he talk with our Interior Minister. (U)

Secretary Baker: We might be able to do something to our Bureau of Narcotics. ~~(C)~~

The Vice President: We will also be talking on specific requests. We will hope to get a PL-480 loan in 1992 and we hope that the level will be at the same level that it was this year. We hope there will not be a lowering. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, we don't have a specific answer on that. Now I think it's about time to move to the other side. We'll continue our discussion at lunch. I think we can talk about Haiti and any other subjects you would like to talk about. President Calderon and I will go back here for a few minutes and we'll see you over at the lunch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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16. Memcon	Re: Luncheon with Raphael Angel Calderon, President of Costa Rica (7 pp.)	10/10/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 9/24/91 - 10/15/91

Date Closed:	1/28/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91109-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(396)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Raphael Angel Calderon, President of Costa Rica

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Luis Guinot, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
William T. Pryce, Senior Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Rafael Angel Calderon, President
Arnoldo Lopez, Second Vice President
Bern Niehaus, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thelmo Vargas, Minister of Finance
Roberto Rojas, Minister of Trade
Gonzalo Facio, Ambassador to the United States
Rodolfo Jimenez, Advisor to the President
Armando Gonzalez Fonseca, Advisor to the President

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1991, 12:25 - 1:15 pm, D.S.T.
Old Family Dining Room

The President: On Haiti, we have been worried of sending U.S. forces. The last few days things have become more complicated. There is no question that Aristide is the democratic elected leader, but there is opposition and there are charges against him. We just don't know what will happen. Assistant Secretary Aronson and of course the secretary of State have followed the situation more closely. We don't know what you think about the situation. Carlos Andres Perez was certainly very highly charged up at the beginning, but I think perhaps he has pulled back little bit. (Ø)

President Calderon: I share your view. We hear of abuses and of human rights violations, ******* by President Aristide. But there are ways to insure that if he goes back, the problems will not be repeated. We think it is very important for the whole

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western hemisphere that we do something to ensure the continuance of Democracy. This is the first time almost all of the hemisphere is democratic. I don't know if he --- or --- you might be able to do something. We are obliged to give a lesson to the countries of the hemisphere that democracy will be supported. We all prefer that the measures should be peaceful--santions, blockades, and others, but, if we think we'll work with peaceful means, I think that a multilateral force could go in to Haiti, but with the full backing of the Organization of American States. (C)

The President: Yes, we would want to have the full OAS backing, but the trouble is, they work by consensus don't they? (C)

President Calderon: No. It only requires a two-thirds ****** (C)

The President: Maybe Secretary Baker or Bernie Aronson would want to say something. (C)

Secretary Baker: Bernie has been following this twenty four hours a day. It's probably better to have him speak. (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: Foreign Minister Niehaus and I went down to Haiti. We found that with the elite: the army, the parliament, and Aristide, we could probably come to a solution, but that the enlisted men would not agree. (C)

The President: Were they part of a movement lead by Cedras? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: No. I did not get the feeling that was the case. If we put our sanctions and they work this would be a victory for the OAS. But, the other possibly is, it could lead to violence or chaos. (C)

The President: Is there a leader of the enlisted personnel? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: There is a Major who seems to have some status. But, I would say that no one is really in charge. (C)

The President: The precedent, which is set by the Organization of American States is very important. (C)

Foreign Minister Niehaus: I think that what the President said is true. It provides a precedent for what might happen with other countries. It is very important that we demonstrate that democracy has support, if not, what is happening in Haiti could happen in Guatemala, El Salvador, or Peru. This is proof that the OAS can function well. I don't see an easy solution. There is of course, the problem of human rights. (C)

The President: Yes. He is now staying in Venezuela. What is the next step? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: The sanctions will take effect. The hope that the next step would be that the new government comes back to say we are now here to negotiate, and then maybe, we could achieve our purpose. But, it might also be, that the sanctions ***** and the country becomes beset by anarchy. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: That is the greater risk. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: The sanctions don't really hurt the army. (Ø)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: We must accept that arms cut off could hurt them, but they may get arms from the Dominican Republic. Mr. President, I've never seen the OAS working together better than it has in this situation. I don't know if the Foreign Minister agrees. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Neihaus: Yes. (Ø)

The President: Is anything going on in the United Nations? (Ø)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: Aristide wanted the U.N. to deal with the problem, but India and others on the Security Council didn't want the Security Council to deal with a situation, which they consider to be an internal matter. I think the General Assembly will take action in the next day or so. (Ø)

President Calderon: I think it is important for you and all friends of democracy to coordinate closely. And we are prepared to cooperate. We are all moved by the same principle. (Ø)

The President: I certainly hope it comes out all right. (Ø)

Perhaps Secretary Baker would like to talk little about the Middle East. This will be his final trip. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The fourth final trip. In Moscow, the Soviets suggested that we would have a meeting in November. October 20 is the drop date in order to make proper preparations. This is a difficult situation. You probably need to say at some point, okay, here is what we will be able to arrange. Here is the letter of assurance. Will you come or not. (Ø)

As the President has said, we have a new baseline. Something which has never happened before. I don't know how the Palestinian delegation will be constituted. I hope we will be meeting with the Palestinians today, and that they will go to Aman afterwards. If we had been able to get the Palestinians issue behind us, it would have been better. The trouble is that everybody is looking at the T.V. stations and trying to satisfy their political needs. You have people on one side moving into houses, and then you have a trumped letter from the other side. Once we are able to arrange a talk, hopefully, we could move forward to a really lasting settlement. (Ø)

President Calderon: I think you have been absolutely great. The world has a sense of new tranquility with the end of the cold war. If you will be able to solve the Middle East crisis, then we will have the greatest period of tranquility in history. This would be the best thing you could leave to your grandchildren, to all our grandchildren. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: We will certainly do all we can. We'll see in the after mass of Central American developments, we are near the end of most regional problems. We have seen solutions in Nicaragua, in Afghanistan, and ******* in Cambodia. The Middle East problem is the toughest of all, and of course, we have the new problems, like Yugoslavia and Haiti. (Ø)

President Calderon: All this relates to our own sense of tranquility. Do you think President Gorbachev has been able to consolidate his position? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: He and Yeltsin are working together. Yeltsin is determined to sign a Union treaty. We think this is important. We need to have some authority to deal with the number one problem. We need to have some authority to deal with the nuclear problem. For example, the Ukrainians are saying that Ukraine is now independent and therefore the nuclear weapons that we have are ours. This argues for some center, some power to bring security to the nuclear problem. President Gorbachev has agreed to talk about how to settle the nuclear problem in the Ukraine. They want to do something, but that present situation is too dispersed and uncertain. We think it important to have a center with some authority. Yeltsin says, he agrees. Even though, some of the people around him may not. I've talked with both and each says that he's working closely with the other, but things need to be worked out. What will the center look like and how will it relate to the Republics? We have sent several delegations to the Soviet Union dealing with food and health. There is no agreement as to the problem. But, all agree that the distribution system is bad. There is a need to figure out to get from point A to Point B. We might see something less than perfect. We may get a strong center force. Not quite the Communist Party from before, but it could be bad. It will take time to sort out. Gorbachev has come back. He was weakened by his dialogue with Yeltsin where he was humiliated. But Yeltsin then seemed to say, hey, we really do need each other. But, the issue of the relations of the Republics to the center is used differently by different factions. We have the possibility of problems like in Yugoslavia. The Ukraine is acting very independent. And some Russian parts of the Ukraine are saying that they want independence, or a relationship with the Russian Republic. You could have a return to totalitarianism because of the desire for order. (Ø)

The President: The Baltic countries are crying for help. They are finding that going it alone as independents is tough. they had steel production, and now there is a question of where is the market for the steel. And they received energy from the other Republics, and it is a question where they will get it. (Ø)

President Calderon: It is the most serious problem--the independent actions of the Ukraine. (Ø)

The President: Brent, what do you think about that? (Ø)

General Scowcroft: The Ukraine is the biggest problem of an independent force, and there have been discussions where the Russian Republics would declare themselves (in charge of nuclear weapons?) Both of them should try to gather in their nuclear _____ and to get a mechanism for exercising control. The problem of breaking up nuclear forces within the Soviet Union. You could have internal proliferation. (Ø)

President Calderon: The big problem is will you have nuclear forces in various areas. (Ø)

The President: No. The weapons can be independently used. We don't know if they need to be connected with the central command. We do not think that strategic missiles could be launched, but, there may be a problem with tactical weapons. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: The weapons all have safety ******* to prevent firing, but this could be overcome with the application of local scientists. Another problem -- you could have Soviet scientist who are unemployed, who would put themselves up for sale to people like Khadafi and Hussein. There are all kinds of potential problems. (Ø)

The President: We are moving in the right direction, but problems remain. The good news is that they are being very responsive to our thoughts about reducing nuclear armaments. (Ø)

Minister of Finance Vargas: How do you look at new movement in Sweden? (Ø)

Foreign Minister Niehaus: ******** I would say a few words about the PDD. The EC has made a positive contribution. We think that contributions from other countries could play a big part in the development of the PDD. (Ø)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: The first meeting, which was held in Costa Rica, with Costa Rica hosting it, was a big success. The European community and Japanese contributed very helpfully to the meeting by their participation. They have begun to work together. (Ø)

The President: Could you give us your views on Cuba? (Ø)

President Calderon: I'm a natural optimist. I believe that's why I've run three times for President until I finally won. We think that democracies have turned the corner in the hemisphere. Actually, democracy has become an epidemic. It is spreading everywhere, even in the Soviet Union. There is no reason not to have change in cuba. I have never dealt with Fidel before. We have had very little relationship with Cuba. I did see him in Guadalajara. I found him to be worn out, exhausted, and isolated

- the only dictator in a group of democracies. I believe that he is in the eclipse. I believe that he has passed the summit of his days. (Ø)

The President: Did he look old? (Ø)

President Calderon: Yes. What you heard about his vitality I didn't see. I did see that he was willing to discuss any views. I would think that we will until '93 when he will be gone. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: How will that happen? (Ø)

The President: It's hard to tell if he would step aside peacefully. I found it interesting that a foreign-policy-area conference-poll, and I think this was a poll of some 30,000 people, said in large part that they thought we should be willing to dialogue with Cuba even though he doesn't make any moves. It surprised me that the group would want to work with Castro. We wont do it, of course, but I was surprised that they would suggest this. (Ø)

President Calderon: It is interesting that a large part of the world has come to the western hemisphere's point of view. We were tough on the Sandinista Guerrilla's in Costa Rica. ****** because they **** a need for escalation. The firmness of Congress has undermined the Guerrillas. I think that it would be a big mistake to negotiate with Castro. He will have to be thrown out. It will happen. (Ø)

The President: I understand that he still has a very effective security apparatus with representatives of the apparatus on every block. It could be difficult to get rid of him. (Ø)

Baker may have something I didn't get.

The President: One thing, I think their are a lot of people in South Florida who would be willing to help with advise and investment if there were a new government in Cuba. People would want to help. (Ø)

(b) (1)

How are we doing on timing with the press. We don't like to get them irritated by keeping them waiting too long. Remember the telephone works so give me a call anytime you feel the need. We want to stay in touch. I want to tell you again, I admire your courage and seeing your economic reforms made, and I hope you

will keep on. I have great respect for what you are doing. Let's keep in contract. (Ø)

-- End of conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Franz Vranitzky, Chancellor of Austria

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National security Affairs
Roy Huffington, Ambassador to Austria
Ralph Johnson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Tony Wayne, Director for Western European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Franz Vranitzky, Chancellor
Thomas Klestil, Deputy Foreign Minister
Friedrich Hoess, Ambassador to the U.S.
Ewa Novotny, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chancellor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 10, 1991, 3:00 - 3:30 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: I'm anxious to get your views on Europe and especially the situation in Yugoslavia. This is a difficult situation, and we need to exercise restraint. The quest for independence is commendable and we must respect those desires, but we have tried to resist premature recognition. I'd like to get your views. ~~(S)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: First, on behalf of my government and the people of Austria, I want to say how pleased we are with what you said the other day on nuclear matters. On Yugoslavia, we've arrived at a situation where the central government no longer controls the army. We're now in our third or fourth cease-fire and none of them have held. So this is the situation where all of the international efforts so far have been unsuccessful. We can't, however, stop these international efforts. We must continue. We've been discussing with our EC friends further measures, financial and economic. What we are talking about are possible sanctions and an embargo. Senior officials were meeting today to put together a list of possible steps. I know that an embargo won't stop the fighting right away, but it will increase the pressure. And then we still have the vital question of whom we are dealing with in Yugoslavia. There is no central government, and authority is now widely dispersed. We have said that we are prepared to recognize Slovenia and Croatia if others

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join us. But so far there is no sign that others are willing. I have been in regular contact with the Germans and others on this question. In sum, I do not see a quick and smooth solution to this problem. ~~(S)~~

The President: We think that premature recognition could leave us in a very difficult situation. We could have an entity without any way of protecting itself. We could also find a Serbian rump state that would create problems for years to come. We don't want to turn our back on the people, but neither do we want to move to a situation which would just generate further instability. ~~(S)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: Yes, we have also heard reports that premature recognition could lead the Serbs to undertake even more attacks. ~~(S)~~

The President: Yes. I am reminded of the precedent in Hungary where they thought in 1956 that the West would come to their rescue, but nobody did. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: I also think that we could be leaving ourselves open to future problems if we do not respect the CSCE principles in this case. There could be a number of situations where accords signed by central governments are repudiated and disregarded by regional authorities. This could be a problem elsewhere in Yugoslavia, in Macedonia for example, and it could be a serious problem in the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker: Yes. That is exactly the heart of the problem. We can expect to be faced with this type of situation in a number of areas around the world. If we allow change of borders by force or unilateral actions, it could cost us all in the long run. ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes. We are worried about the Soviet Union. The Ukraine, for example. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: Yes. What would we do if the Ukraine unilaterally declared its independence. Would we recognize it? Now, of course, it is a different thing if Moscow were to approve and this move were done through negotiations. ~~(S)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: Yes. I agree fully. I was in Moscow recently and met with Gorbachev. I also traveled to Kazakhstan and met with Nazarbayev. Yeltsin was not there, however. He was recovering from his heart attack. But Gorbachev, Nazarbayev and the others said they were agreed to form the nucleus of a union and that they hoped the others would follow. If the other republics chose not to, they said they still felt strong enough to survive. ~~(S)~~

The President: Was Gorbachev optimistic on the signing of the union treaty? ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: No. He said they needed to have a union treaty. (C)

The President: I don't think I'm talking out of school here, but Yeltsin said that he would sign the treaty. However, there are a number of others in Russia who don't like it. I think the jury is still out on whether or not this treaty will be signed. (S)

Chancellor Vranitzky: I have another issue that I'd like to raise with you, Mr. President. You know there is a debate going on in Europe about whether this problem or that problem should be solved by the Europeans or by the Americans or if we want America to work with us. This applies to Yugoslavia and to other problems. I hope that this will not be seen as a choice between the U.S. or Europe, but that the result will be the U.S. and Europe working together to find solutions. (C)

The President: Yes. We want to be involved. Now in the case of Yugoslavia, I think it is good that the EC is taking the lead in trying to sort things out. But on the bigger picture, yes, we want to be involved. We want to be involved on the security front and the economic front. Certainly there are some isolationist pressures in the United States, but I think they are manageable. Those of us in the government are certainly not in the mode of pulling back. The only thing that could turn around public opinion in the United States would be if the people in France or Germany became hostile to a continued U.S. presence. Certainly, we are reducing our defense expenditures, but that does not mean that we will neglect security problems. (S)

Chancellor Vranitzky: You know that we have applied to join the EC. We now wish to do that as soon as possible, and we will be trying to speed up the negotiations. Right now, the EC tells us that those negotiations can only begin in 1993. We will be urging them to move that date up, and I think it will be of value to them to have us join given our geographic location. (C)

The President: Is there any domestic opposition to joining? (U)

Chancellor Vranitzky: There are opposition voices, especially from the Freedom Party. But we will get a majority in the referendum which will be required to approve membership. If we don't get it in the first referendum, we will get it in the second. (C)

The President: I was wondering, since it seems a very logical step for Austria to join. Of course, your economy is doing well, I believe. What is the growth rate? (U)

Chancellor Vranitzky: The economy grew at 4.3% last year. (U)

The President: I wish I could say the same thing about the U.S. economy. But you know the forecasts are looking good, and these aren't just government forecasts. I think we are out of the recession, but, of course, it would be difficult for some people in Detroit to believe that if you told them right now. There are

still weak spots, and we have some big economic problems. But I think it is coming along. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: When I visited Houston yesterday, I met with many American businessmen so we did discuss the economy. We also discussed the fact that Vienna is becoming a meeting place for U.S. and European businesses. ~~(C)~~

Ambassador Huffington: Yes. I think there are some very promising developments. I have been encouraging Houston businessmen to consider all the facilities available in Vienna. (U)

Chancellor Vranitzky: I have one other issue to raise with you. As you know, Vienna is one of the three sites which hosts the United Nations. At the request of the United Nations, we will be expanding these sites and the current facilities. I would like you to consider giving your support for us in two areas. First, we would like any future headquarters established under the chemical weapons treaty to be located in Vienna. And, second, we would like support for expanding the IAEA. ~~(C)~~

The President: I better get some advice on this. But in principle we have certainly always supported Vienna as one of the three sites for UN offices. What are the specifics here? ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Vranitzky: Specifically, we believe that any new office related to the control of chemical weapons should be based in Vienna. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: Yes, certainly, we are moving toward completion of the treaty, and we will have to look for a site. ~~(C)~~

The President: Well, I do want to say that we certainly don't believe that the United Nations should be spread out too far. That is just too expensive and inefficient. I also think that the IAEA is doing a very good job today with Iraq. But I also want to note that, as a general principle, I think we need to keep the UN bureaucracy in line. In general, I think what you are asking is compatible with our thinking, but I want to be sure that we haven't promised someone else the site for the chemical weapons office. ~~(C)~~

Deputy Foreign Minister Klestil: The idea is that since the role of the new chemical weapons office would be similar to that of the IAEA, it would make sense to have them based near each other. ~~(C)~~

(closing pleasantries)

-- End of Conversation --

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18a. Memcon	Re: One-on-One Meeting with the Amir of Bahrain (3 pp.)	10/15/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: One-on-One meeting with the Amir of Bahrain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Amir of Bahrain
Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa
Minister of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 15, 1991, 10:35-10:50 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and the Amir of Bahrain met in the Oval Office at 10:45 a.m. (U)

President: I don't have anything specific. I want your advice regarding the area. (U)

The Amir: There are some things not settled. Everyone is grateful to you. But there are problems--like between us and Qatar. (Ø)

President: I'm not familiar with the details. (U)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: We have a border dispute. I don't want it to get like that between Iraq and Kuwait. We agreed to submit it to the International Court of Justice after the Saudis finished their mediation, but Qatar caused an incident, not even waiting for the Saudis to finish. We should solve it peacefully, not escalate it. Keep it friendly. (Ø)

President: Don't you have friendly relations? (U)

The Amir: Except on this. (Ø)

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President: How long has this dispute been going on? (C)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: Since the 1940's, but we have a police station and policemen there. We just want it solved peacefully. (C)

President: We certainly can support a peaceful solution. We will find a way to speak out on it. Do you have a garrison there? (C)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: Yes. It is twenty percent of our territory. (C)

President: We are committed to peaceful resolutions. Are they threatening force? (C)

The Amir: Yes. They attacked one of our shoals. In 1986 they took several prisoners who were eventually released. (C)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: We felt we couldn't come here without raising it. (C)

President: I understand. Should we raise it with the Saudis? (C)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: That would be helpful. (C)

President: How do we get Saddam Hussein out? Can we? (S)

The Amir: He has a very strong army. (C)

President: But do they support him? (C)

The Amir: Yes. He says he can survive sanctions for ten to twenty years. He brings in groups to adulate him. (C)

President: We would work with any successor group. We will not let up on sanctions. We still have some forces there who are prepared to enforce sanctions. (S)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: We need to keep the pressure on. (C)

President: Are you under pressure on this in the region? (C)

The Amir: No, not at all. (U)

President: How about Iran? (U)

The Amir: (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1) (Ø)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: They are weaker than before. Their revolution finished them. (Ø)

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Amir of Bahrain (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Donald J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Charles Hostler, U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain
Richard Haass, Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC

The Amir of Bahrain
Sheikh Al-Khalifa bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tariq AbdulRahman Almoayyed, Minister of Information
Habib Ahmed Kassim, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture
Yousif Rahma Al-Dosari, Head of the Amiri Court
Mr. Mohamed Yousuf Jalal
Mr. Mubarak Jassim Kanoo
Ghazi Mohamed Algosaibi, Ambassador of the State of Bahrain
Mr. Nabil Ibrahim Qamber, Chief of Protocol

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 15, 1991, 10:53-11:55 a.m. EST
Cabinet Room

The President and the Amir of Bahrain met in the Cabinet Room at 10:53 a.m. (U)

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President: Your Highness, with your permission I will make a few remarks, then please comment. I'd like to have my top aides comment as well. (U)

I said it on the lawn at the arrival ceremony, I was pleased to be there with you. It sent a good signal abroad and here. Bahrain is a small country, but it has always had our respect. You remained true to principle despite Saddam's threats. We are impressed with your leadership and friendship. The assistance you have given to the UN Special Commission is one more example of your help. It is another signal of your willingness to work for peace. We believe the Special Commission is needed more than ever given Saddam's attempts to evade Security Council resolutions, especially those dealing with weapons of mass destruction. The information we have adds up to a serious indictment. We are determined to keep the pressure on Iraq, to bring full compliance. There will be no normal relations with Iraq with that man in office. ~~(S)~~

We touched a little on Iraq and Iran in the Oval Office. Regarding Iran, we each have claims against the other, including Airbus and the hostages. Our experts believe Iran faces tough economic problems. I would be interested in your views. We are inclined to see Rafsanjani and Velayati in more reasonable molds, but the radicals are still there. We would like better relations but we don't think they have given up on terrorism. They are threatening to use terrorism to disrupt the peace conference. I'd encourage your weighing in with them on this. I'll stop there although I will ask Acting Secretary Eagleburger and Deputy Secretary Atwood to discuss these issues. ~~(S)~~

The Amir: Mr. President, I'd like to thank you for your invitation and reception. I am glad to have this opportunity to talk. As you know, our relationship was the first in the area. It is now fifty years old, a model for others. We believe your historic decision to liberate Kuwait has contributed to regional peace. But I hope this meeting looks forward to the future. We should work out a strategic arrangement for the region, to avoid the use of force, to keep peace and stability. Defense arrangements are needed to meet our requirements. Our Defense Minister was here last week and had a useful meeting with Secretary Cheney. I hope you will encourage what they discussed about meeting Bahrain's equipment needs. Defense cooperation is very important and needs to be continued. Economic Cooperation is also important and we need to look to improve it. ~~(C)~~

Concerning Iran, cooperation should be based on respect and non-interference in internal affairs. We are being very careful. ~~(C)~~

President: Do you feel threatened by Iran now? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: No. They are not a direct threat but we watch them carefully. ~~(C)~~

President: Do they try to infiltrate radicals? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: Not any more. We wish for peace between Moslems and Non-Moslems. We wish Baker all the best. As regards defense arrangements, we have been participating in one for forty years. What is needed is to improve what has been. Mr. Clark will be coming here by the end of this month. I hope Mr. Atwood will look carefully at this. ~~(C)~~

President: We have a keen interest in the security of Bahrain. I hope everything can be accommodated. ~~(C)~~

Deputy Secretary Atwood: We will be meeting later. We are tremendously pleased with the relationship over the years, especially during Desert Storm. Your hospitality was extraordinary. We had as many as 17,000 people in Bahrain. We are close to an agreement on prepositioning. Everything I can see is positive. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: We need to thank you for your help. It is nice to have trouble sometimes so you can see who your friends are. (U)

President: How do you see things in Kuwait? We had a good visit here. We want to see stability there. They are doing well putting out the fires. Is there stability there? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: They need to do more for their internal security, but they can talk about it themselves. ~~(C)~~

President: I don't want to place you in an awkward position, but we are a little concerned. They are doing a little bit on a democratic approach. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: The question is how the political situation in Kuwait develops and whether the government opens up a bit to other groups. This is a concern of ours. ~~(C)~~

President: Our relations are good, but we are encouraging them to move forward and heal wounds. It is important that they work on internal peace. Rest assured they we will not undermine the Amir of Kuwait in any way. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: They are trying hard but moving slowly, but it is not for us to say. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I'd be interested in your sense of how things are developing in Iraq. Is Saddam's support weakening? This is terribly important to us. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: We are very much concerned with Iraq. Iraq still has an army. The Iraqi people are suffering. So long as this regime exists, there can be no progress. Is he weaker? Sure, but he can survive. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: But doesn't all this create problems for him? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: We are trying. It is important that his isolation does not end. ~~(S)~~

President: Is Jordan holding the line? We see truck traffic between Jordan and Iraq. I know King Hussein is in a difficult position. But I worry whether Jordan is a weak link in the chain. ~~(S)~~

The Amir: I believe Jordan was a weak link. Now they are changing their position, but we are still not happy. During the crisis they were Saddam's window to the world, but we hope now they are changing. ~~(C)~~

Minister Al-Shirawi: Iraq can always find enough food. Saddam can continue with his three or four divisions and his 1500 tanks, so long as they have the will to shoot. The privileged are getting food. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: No one in Iraq can say what he thinks. ~~(C)~~

President: We hear propaganda claiming that we are trying to starve them; then we see information that they are getting food. We don't want the people to starve. But this man Saddam is so brutal, he might start to starve his people. ~~(C)~~

Minister Al-Shirawi: The sewer system has collapsed and there is lots of disease. (U)

President: What should we do? (U)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: The choice is his, not ours. We must keep sanctions on him. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: But surely you know we agree. (U)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: We are dealing with an unacceptable regime. ~~(C)~~

Brent Scowcroft: But how do the Iraqi people ever get to choose? ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: We have seen in many countries when the army gets frustrated and moves. Sanctions are the key. The Iraqi people will have to choose. ~~(C)~~

Deputy Secretary Atwood: Is Saddam doing much to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, or is he just rebuilding his military? ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: He is focusing on rebuilding his army. He will not devote resources to rebuilding the infrastructure. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: But how can he spend money on his military as he can't import anything? ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: He is using resources to buy loyalty. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Every day, UN inspectors are finding things and destroying them. Doesn't this show his military that this is a losing process for them? This must be a blow to his pride. Doesn't this weaken him? ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: I'm sure the Iraqi people feel humiliated. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Plus it's reducing his military. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: We never thought he would last a week after the war but he is still there. ~~(C)~~

Minister Al-Shirawi: He's now claiming to have won the war. ~~(C)~~

President: We saw him saying something to that effect. Is Yemen still close to Iraq? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: Yes. (U)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Why is Yemen so close? (U)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: Like Jordan, Yemen felt that if Saddam wins, they would benefit. They were wrong. Even if he wins, they will get nothing. It is just Arab politics. As His Highness said, crisis shows you who your friends are. ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: At least Jordan's behavior is understandable, but with Yemen there is no visible reason why they would continue a pro-Iraq line. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: They have become close over the past few years. ~~(C)~~

President: Do you think Salih figured Saddam would win and take over Saudi Arabia? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: Of course, Salih was persuaded by Saddam. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: What was key was your firm stand. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: And there will be no change. (U)

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: We agree. Our cooperation on the Special Commission flows from this. ~~(C)~~

President: How about Iran? Is it trying to make up with Iraq or to weaken sanctions? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: No, I do not think relations between them will improve. There is still great mistrust after their war. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Gates: We hear reports of coup plotting in the army versus Saddam and then generals being shot. Have you heard this? ~~(S)~~

The Amir: Yes, we hear such things. Many people we know have disappeared. ~~(C)~~

President: We have not discussed one issue, which is the Soviet "card". We don't see them coming back to threaten our interest in the Middle-East. We are not sure how things will work out between the republics and Gorbachev. ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: Right now there are three revolutions going on in the Soviet Union: a political revolution over what kind of post-Communist government; an economic revolution over the degree of decentralization; and a national revolution over whether the Soviet empire will continue or break up. All three are going on at once. Chaos is the result. The third revolution is probably key right now. It appears centrifugal forces are strong and the republics are gaining at the expense of the center. It looks like the Ukraine will leave despite the recent economic accord. One additional complicating factor is the mistrust of other republics toward Russia. There is a question of whether Russia will try to keep the union intact. ~~(C)~~

While they are helping on the peace process in most cases they are not focusing on foreign policy. It could take them years to sort themselves out. On the military side, the President made dramatic proposals on nuclear arms. They have responded well. The failed coup did a lot to weaken conservatives in the military. The republics may prove reluctant to turn over their weapons to the center out of fear Russia will end up with them. All in all, it is a very difficult situation. ~~(S)~~

The Amir: I share your analysis of the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union. We hope the Soviet Union will come out in a way that will allow it to cooperate with the world. We think Gorbachev is a good man and hope you will help him. ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: Unless they put together an economic reform package, no amount of help will matter. We are trying to encourage them to adopt a serious economic framework. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: The third revolution, the nationalist one, affects the other two. It tends to weaken the political and economic reform efforts. (C)

President: What do you think the Soviets are doing with Iraq? Do we have evidence about this? ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: During the buildup to the war, there were signs the Soviets still had a stake in Iraq. They were reluctant to overthrow Saddam Hussein. They had a close military relationship. We don't see much evidence of a role now, especially with Primakov out of the Foreign Ministry. ~~(S)~~

Deputy Secretary Atwood: As long as the Soviets spend 25 percent of their wealth on the military, they will have trouble. We are trying to encourage conversion, but we are hindered by the confusion over who controls what. ~~(C)~~

Minister Al-Shirawi: One new development is Iran's ties with the Muslim Republics. This raises the question of Iran's future--whether it will be with the Gulf or the Muslims of Central Asia. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: There was always a concern in Moscow that these peoples would look south and not north. ~~(C)~~

Minister Al-Shirawi: In Muslim history, what are now Iraq and Iran were once southern ports for these areas. ~~(C)~~

President: Does this worry you? (U)

Minister Al-Shirawi: Not necessarily. (U)

The Amir: We hope there can be a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. ~~(C)~~

President: We are grateful to those countries willing to come forward. We know it is not easy. We have taken on some issues here to facilitate the peace process--for example on Israel and its desire for loan guarantees. We know settlements are a difficult question for the region. We had a contentious argument here. We feared Congress would act. We took a strong stand. This sent a strong signal of our fairness, that we want to facilitate the process. This was not well received in Israel. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Secretary Baker is focusing on the Palestinian representation issue. There have been real problems, but I think he has agreement for them to come to a peace conference as part of a joint delegation. It looks like this may be resolved. The second tough question is whether those on the far right of the Shamir government will try to torpedo the conference. My own view is that the Israeli government will not want to be seen as preventing a peace conference. I think the President and the Secretary have brought this closer than ever before. Getting everyone to sit down together will be a major step forward. ~~(C)~~

The Amir: I hope so. I look forward to there being a face to face meeting. ~~(C)~~

President: How do you see your friend Arafat? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: He is not my friend any more. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: He has given up on getting a place of his own. His actions at the time of the Gulf war hurt him badly. Like Yemen and Jordan, he guessed wrong. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Al-Khalifa: Arafat is weakened, but there is more to this than personalities. We should move ahead and try to break the deadlock. There are extremist on both sides. This is a golden opportunity for moderates. This is also a golden opportunity for Palestinians and Israelis. Security cannot come from arms and fences alone. ~~(C)~~

President: I had an opportunity to tell His Highness that we would be glad to speak out on the need for a peaceful resolution on the Hawar Island dispute. We are concerned and would like to be helpful. ~~(C)~~

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Will speaking publicly on this help? ~~(C)~~

The Amir: Any way you like, public or private. The key is the message of U.S. support for good neighbor relations. We must try to keep the focus on the bigger threat. ~~(C)~~

President: We can do that. (U)

Minister Kassim: We are one of the few countries with a trade deficit with the U.S. It is large by our standards. A large percentage of our imports come from the U.S. Another issue is U.S. investment in Bahrain. There was little new investment in the 1980's. We'd like to see this change, both in Bahrain and in the region. There are large opportunities in high technology and financial services. Bahrain is in a good position to play a role given its openness. ~~(C)~~

General Scowcroft: Bahrain is famous for being a banking center for the region. Have the two wars upset traditional patterns? ~~(C)~~

Minister Kassim: Yes. Many international companies saw Bahrain as being in a war theater. (U)

Ambassador Hostler: Bahrain suffered badly from the outflow of dollars. It is important to note that Bahrain has the least oil of any GCC country. (U)

Minister Kassim: Non-oil investment stopped in the 1980's. We suffered as a result. Job creation is a real problem. We also have a balance of payment problem. You could help us by investing. (U)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: We'd like to start talking about such ideas focusing on non-oil investment. We are prepared to encourage American investment in Bahrain. OPIC can help. But there are other mechanisms as well. ~~(C)~~

President: Why don't we stop here and continue over lunch. (U)