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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91108
Folder ID Number: 91108-005

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 03/11/91 - 04/24/91

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Michel Rocard, Prime Minister of France (8 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (4 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (6 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Governing Mayor Eberhard Diepgen of Berlin, Germany (3 pp.)	3/19/91	(b)(1)	C
05. Memcon	Re: Expanded Meeting with Lech Walesa, President of Poland (4 pp.)	3/20/91	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Dinner with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti (9 pp.)	3/24/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)	3/28/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Arnold Ruutel, President of Estonia (6 pp.)	3/29/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon	Re: One-on-One Meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (5 pp.)	4/4/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 03/11/91 - 04/24/91

Pinksheet Number: cap924
OA/ID Number: 91108-005
Date Closed: 1/27/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Memcon	Re: Working Lunch with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (6 pp.)	4/4/91	(b)(1)	C
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Santer and EC President Delors (10 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Memcon	Re: Tunisian Ambassador's Credentials Ceremony (2 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	C
13. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg of Germany (3 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	C
14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier (3 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	C
15. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (8 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	C
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Hassan Gouled of the Republic of Djibouti (5 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	C
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Hassan Gouled of the Republic of Djibouti (5 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Michel Rocard, Prime Minister of France (8 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By GBL (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 03/11/91 - 04/24/91

Date Closed:	1/27/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91108-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(305)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Michel Rocard, Prime Minister of France

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Adrian A. Basora, Director for European Economic Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham (Interpreter)

Michel Rocard, Prime Minister
Jacques Andreani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Jean-Maurice Ripert, Diplomatic Counselor
Jacques Mistral, Counselor for Economic Affairs
Christophe Thiery (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 11, 1991, 10:05-11:05 a.m.
The Oval Office

During the photo opportunity, the President made a very positive statement about French-U.S. cooperation in the Gulf War and asked the Prime Minister to convey his appreciation to President Mitterrand. Rocard responded in a very positive vein. The textual comments were recorded by the press office.

The President: Vice President Quayle has filled me in on your discussions regarding the GATT. (U)

(b)(1)

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The President: What was your father doing at the time? (U)

Prime Minister Rocard: He was assigned to naval logistics. (U)

The President: Well, then, maybe you're the man to see Shamir! (S)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

[redacted]

Prime Minister Rocard: She is American, isn't she? (U)

The President: Well, yes... (U)

(b) (1)

[redacted]

Prime Minister Rocard: That is right, King Hussein was not even handed, but what could we have done with 60 percent of his

(b) (1)

The President: Who has said so? (U)

(b) (1)

The President: I missed that. (U)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: He did say it, but his statement was very heavily caveated. (C)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

[redacted]

Were there significant demonstrations in France? (U)

Prime Minister Rocard: There was one but it was very small. The organizers claimed 60 or 70,000 but the Interior Ministry estimated 8,000. (U)

(b) (1)

[redacted]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counsellor, Department of State
David Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs (Notetaker)
Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Joseph Clark, Minister for External Affairs
Others to be Determined

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2000-0429-F
TR 8/21/09

DATE, TIME: March 13, 1991 (7:00p.m.-9:00p.m.)
PLACE: Ottawa, Canada

Prime Minister Mulroney: Mitterrand thinks that the United States and Canada are hostages to the Israeli lobby. He thinks North America cannot have a genuine understanding of the Middle East, that we do not appreciate the nuances as France does. This is all a part of the proprietary French interest that they pretend to have in the Middle East. That said, Mitterrand is a good guy and a loyal friend. (S)

General Scowcroft: Will the French push us to have a conference? Genscher made the point in Washington that it took five years before CSCE was able to have a conference. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Gorbachev said he would like to help the United States achieve peace in the Middle East. What is your assessment of Gorbachev? (S)

The President: I'm being criticized by both the Right and the Left for my support of Gorbachev. The thing about Yeltsin is that his values are good, but I don't know about him. I don't know how Yeltsin would deal with us. In any case, there is a strong chance that if Gorbachev were replaced, it would be by someone from the Right, not by Yeltsin. Even then, I would not expect them to reverse what they have done in Eastern Europe.

But they could be a lot tougher both within the Soviet Union and on arms control. On the Gulf, Gorbachev was not unreasonable. He is our best bet. At the same time, we cannot be against reform within the Soviet Union. The Soviets need to have a place in the sun. It doesn't do us any good to stiff-arm them. That is our approach, but I have to tell you its controversial at home. The Soviet situation is unstable. Gorbachev knows our position on the Baltics. (S)

General Scowcroft: Yeltsin may be a true demagogue. It's very easy to attack the system, which is what he does. Its not clear what he would actually create. Yeltsin does not appear to be a constructive force. We also see that Gorbachev is using Primakov on the Middle East, and that is not necessarily a good sign. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If Gorbachev is thrown out, we could go back to Stalin. Our summit in Paris concerning CSCE seems a long, long time ago. Are we doing enough to help Gorbachev? We have complained enough about the Baltics. When John Major saw Gorbachev, he criticized Canada. So I pose the question, are we really doing enough?

The President: I have to worry about Gorbachev's military, people like Yazov and Akhromeyev. We should stick with Gorbachev, he really wants to have a summit, but he is pulled away on CFE by his military. We are very close on START. He wants a summit. I will say okay, but I could face some grief at home. All I can do right now is to work with him where I can. In the Middle East they do have some legitimate interests and they were helpful in the United Nations during the crisis. They stuck with the coalition. We have to give them some credit. The Baltics are especially difficult in the United States, as I know it is for you because we have to deal with their ethnic supporters. They are not satisfied with our policies. So we're being careful. We haven't open Baltic offices yet like some of the others. (S)

Minister Joseph Clark: I wonder if there is not some way that we can help on the Baltics. I met with the Nordics. They have had a reply from the Soviets on CSCE that is encouraging. I'm a bit worried about the Baltic track we are on. It's driving us to create significant irritation in the relationship. There was a time when we recognized it would take a great deal of time for the Baltics to work things out with the Soviets. Is there no way we can get back to that more patient stance? (S)

The President: If Gorbachev could cut the Baltics loose, he would take off a great deal of the pressure. We should try to convince him that the Baltics are pivotal. Baltic independence is not anathema to him, he says that it is just important that they proceed along a constitutional path, wherever it ends. (S)

General Scowcroft: But he is worried about the precedent of Baltic secession. (S)

The President: If he could get the Baltics solved, he'd get us off his back. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Gorbachev's mind cannot really conceive of a true democratic system or a free enterprise system. Gorbachev asked me how Canada could be so productive with so few people. He just didn't understand. I told him the reason why we were so productive is that the farmers own their own land. When I told him that, he lost interest. He then said something heretical about the possibilities in the Soviet Union, and Raisa pulled him up short, giving him a Marxist-Leninist line. So the intellectual lynch-pin is missing in his mind. He is a Marxist-Leninist who is trying to reform himself. (S)

The President: You are right, he has no concept. (S)

Governor Sununu: The Soviets have no memory. Unlike the East Europeans who were once free within the life-time of many of them, this is not true in the case of the Soviet people. (S)

Minister Joseph Clark: The Soviet people have faith in the "good czar" -- someone who will take care of everything. I guess Yeltsin is the "good czar" these days. But he is ruthless and highly adaptable. (S)

The President: I think our best policy is steady as she goes. (S)

General Scowcroft: The Left and the Right in the United States would want us to give aid directly to the republics. (S)

The President: I guess Yeltsin is not all bad, but we are not sure how to deal with him. If we overplay our relationship with him, we could play into the hands of the worst elements within the Soviet Union. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If you deal with Yeltsin, you will hurt Gorbachev. (S)

Let me tell you about Canadian politics. To the Left Wing in Canada, Canadian independence is measured by being an unreliable ally to the United States. This philosophy of the Left is strong in the universities and the media. When we committed forces to the coalition in the Gulf crisis, we were behind in the polls and our approval rating went way up. So Canadian public opinion has a split personality. The war was okay but there is really no conservative political base left in Canada. (S)

The President: It helped me to understand public opinion when I was told that in 1939/1940 the polls indicated that 90% of the American people were against us getting involved in the War. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I just want to say that if we all live to be a 110 no one will witness a better performance than that of

George Bush during this war. I was at the White House with George Bush and Brent Scowcroft at the beginning, and I was with them at the end. He never flinched. And you handled this with incredible smoothness. I cannot remember a stronger American President. It was an historic performance and I am proud to be here with you. (S)

The President: It was a team effort in the United States and it was a team effort internationally. Canada was steadfast throughout and I thank you.

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Robert Zoellick, Counsellor, Department of State
David Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs (Notetaker)

Francois Mitterrand, President of France
Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Hubert Vedrine, Advisor to the Office of the President
Jacques Lanxade, Chief, Military Cabinet
Pierre Morel, Diplomatic Counsellor

DATE, TIME: March 14, 1991 (2:00p.m. - 3:20p.m.)
PLACE: Martinique

The President: How do you handle Yeltsin or other republic leaders from the Soviet Union when they come to France? (S)

President Mitterrand: I received the Lithuanian but not part of an official visit. That would be a mistake. (S)

The President: I'm getting pressure on our Soviet policy from both the Left and the Right. (S)

President Mitterrand: But Yelstin is not in power and Gorbachev is. Gorbachev should not be compared to Yeltsin, he should be compared to Brezhnev. It is not our responsibility to decide whether Gorbachev should remain in power or not. (S)

The President: I agree. (S)

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President Mitterrand: More broadly, Europe doesn't need 20 more states. I think we should really soft-peddle on the question of internal developments in the Soviet Union. (S)

The President: You are right, we have to wait it out. But Gorbachev must get back on track on CFE. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree that we have to be vigilant. But we cannot force Gorbachev over a cliff. (S)

The President: I hope Gorbachev survives. He's been good to work with so far. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yelstin is an important force. (S)

The President: Congress will invite Yelstin over, and then I will have to see him. I have a Congressional problem. They like to supervise. I would have gone to war with Iraq even without Congress, but I'm glad they came along in the end. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: We believe that there ought to be a United Nations Security Council summit meeting on the Middle East after a reasonable period of time. (S)

The President: (Facetiously) It's fine with me as long as Francois sit next to Castro. He is a real anomaly. He's the last one swimming against the tide. (S)

President Mitterrand: I know him. I met him in 1975. I would have to say that he is not unreasonable. My view is that an Hispanic can't be a Marxist-Leninist. (S)

The President: Perhaps we should talk about the situation in Yugoslavia. (S)

President Mitterrand: The break up of Yugoslavia would create a permanent source of war in Europe. We need larger groupings of states. For all of its problems the Austria-Hungarian empire at least preserved peace in a very unstable part of Europe. (S)

The President: With regard to the Maghreb, you know a lot more about this than we do. Its really your backyard. Is there any way we can be helpful? We respect the Algerian and Moroccan leaders. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: We stay in close touch with all of them except for Tunisia because of their stance on the war, and of course the Libyans. (S)

President Mitterrand: The real problem in the Maghreb is Algeria. Algeria is a big economic failure. They also have serious demographic problems and political problems. It is the largest source of instability in North Africa. But, overall, I

not too worried about relations between North Africa and the West. (S)

The President: Everyone predicted that this would explode during the war, but it was not as bad as we feared. (S)

President Mitterrand: It will eventually get sorted out. But a coup d'etat would be dangerous if fundamentalists came into one of the major countries. Of course, even fundamentalists get old. Qadhafi is a phony fundamentalist. He called me when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. He wanted to commiserate with me about all the mad men in the world (laughter). (S)

The President: Mubarak says that I should be more open minded about Qadhafi. Rocard told me that I was too harsh on the Tunisians also. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree with you on the Tunisians. I'm very harsh on the Tunisians. With patience, the North Africans can solve their economic problems; but we will help. It will be okay in time. (S)

The President: Senegal is hopeful. He is a good friend of yours. (S)

President Mitterrand: He is a good, big friend (laughter). He was courageous during the war. As for Morocco, Hassan is modest in many respects, but he has a traditional, almost medieval, approach to his own rule. (S)

The President: What about the Southern Sahara? (S)

President Mitterrand: It's quiet now, but it is not solved. Morocco is gradually winning the war, and the Algerians can't prevent it. (S)

Tell me about your visit to Canada. (S)

The President: Mulroney is clearly in trouble. He is in a precarious political situation, and he is also very concerned about separatism. In the worst case, we can see a possible breakup into several countries. The war in the Gulf in a way brought Canada together. I was asked at a press conference, and I said we have done very well with a unified Canada. (S)

President Mitterrand: Speaking about Canada helps us understand Gorbachev's problems. (S)

The President: Yes, and the problems of Yugoslavia as well.

Returning to the Middle East, I never thought I would see Sharon as a moderate. (S)

President Mitterrand: It is strange. (S)

The President: May we discuss the weighing subject of European security. I would like to hear your view. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have seen what has been happening. I have seen a demarche from Washington. Your people have posed the problem in the wrong way. Europe is not ready to have a force adequate to provide its own security. This is still in a building process. It is not there, so this is a hypothetical dispute. NATO is the only real force; so in a way this is a debate between something that is real and something that is hypothetical. I fear that you think we want our own defense because we want you out, this is not the case. Any American hostility toward what we are trying to do will be misunderstood. Political unity and a common European security policy are hopes. In the 21st century my wish is that Europe will be able to defend itself but if I have to pay for that hope at the price of a crisis with the United States, the price is too high. Your diplomacy has given the impression that you are fearful of European unity. You are fearful that the United States will be thrown out. This is not true. We have to find a way so that NATO and the embryo of European defense can co-exist. We will naturally chose NATO if we have to. But what will we do twenty years from now? We should hang on to NATO, strengthen it even, but also let the embryo develop. It will be a long and difficult process. John Major is more keen on this than Margaret Thatcher was. (S)

The President: I'm not sure on how far apart we are. We don't want to convey the impression that we are trying to block European integration. We view NATO as the prime security guarantor, but we have no problem with European integration. (S)

President Mitterrand: Your demarche was very somber. Almost depressed. (S)

Robert Zoellick: We've encouraged European integration for 40 years and we understand now that it has moved on to another level. Our key point is that we want to avoid undermining NATO by making it the ultimate decisionmaker on matters that could affect all of us. (S)

President Mitterrand: France has a special policy but it is a part of NATO. Only NATO has real power. We won't replace something real with an idea. When the United States is gone, then it will be important for Europe to defend itself. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Another aspect of European Security is of how to deal with the former Warsaw Pact countries. They want to join NATO. Poland especially wants in. This is a big problem for the Europeans. They also want an "East European Union." They realize that the only firm ground in Europe is the Atlantic Alliance. (S)

The President: Do you have a problem with the NATO liaison offices that we have suggested? Is this a problem for France?

President Mitterrand: No, this is not a problem. Political liaison and consultations are okay, and therefore military liaison is okay too. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: This could present a problem for the Soviets. (S)

President Mitterrand: On the question of European security relations with NATO, my wish is for permanent relations and for ministers and commanders-in-chiefs to talk about these things and avoid suspicions. (S)

The President: Our position is that NATO is to be the vehicle, where policy should get approved. (S)

President Mitterrand: We are agreed on that. (S)

The President: We also had planned to have some NATO/Soviet liaison. This may have been set back. The Soviet military is trying to flex its muscles, and this worries me. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is worrisome.

With regard to NATO, the idea of a bigger political role and a smaller military role is not clear to me. I also have a problem with using NATO for out-of-area. We have to be clear on what NATO's limits are. Ronald Reagan wanted NATO to guarantee Japan (this refers to a discussion of "global security" through the G-7). I pointed out that Japan is not in the Atlantic. But then I said yes we could work through NATO on Kuwait. Its just that it cannot be automatic. I won't go along with the automatic use of NATO out-of-area. (S)

The President: I take it that Kohl has financial problems because of the monumental task of East Germany. This turns out to be a bigger problem than anyone thought. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, it is more difficult than he and the rest of us thought. He called me just this morning. He can't go too fast on East Germany because of the difficulties. There is also the question about where the capital is going to be: Bonn or Berlin. But East Germany is the main problem, and the West German public doesn't want to sacrifice for the benefit of the East Germans. It used to be that all the Germans wanted was unification. Now that they are unified, they don't know what they want to be. There are still some nationalist movements in Germany which make it difficult for the Germans to renounce claims in Poland. (S)

The President: Is Europe experiencing difficulty in achieving monetary union? (S)

President Mitterrand: Not too much. We have another year to go. I take it that you are happy with General Schwarzkopf? ~~(S)~~

The President: Yes, and also I have great admiration for your commander. In fact, our people have enormous respect for your military leaders and for your troops.

Let me know before you go to Iran. We would like to have better relations in Iran, so lets talk. Perhaps you could take a direct message. ~~(S)~~

President Mitterrand: Fine, I will either go in June or in October, I think probably in October. ~~(S)~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Governing Mayor Eberhard Diepgen of Berlin, Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
James F. Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Eberhard Diepgen, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Hildegard Boucsein, State Secretary, Berlin Chancellery
Heinz Fanselau, Berlin Chancellery
Brigitta Richman, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 19, 1991, 1:34 - 1:49 p.m.
The Oval Office

Mayor Diepgen: I want to thank you for all your support. Without the U.S., I would never have had a chance to be Mayor of united Berlin. (U)

The President: That is very kind of you. All these five worked very hard to help bring that about. Let me also thank you for your support on the Gulf. (U)

Mayor Diepgen: It was important. We wanted to be sure you knew we are not just fair weather friends. (U)

The President: Regarding unification, Germany played its hand very skillfully. One reason I regret the difficulties Gorbachev has now is thinking how he permitted and facilitated these changes in Germany. Now one has to wonder whether he can survive. (C)

Mayor Diepgen: I think he will, but I don't know what will happen among the nationalities of the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: How are things at home? I won't get into a capital discussion. (U)

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FR 8/21/09

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Mayor Diepgen: Are you interested? (U)

The President: I am interested, but I know enough not to get into that one. (U)

Mayor Diepgen: Let me say, first, that after all the political changes there has been a reduction of the American presence in Berlin and a reduction of the military presence. The tradition of Berlin and the U.S. necessitates that the American presence not be reduced but become a presence of a new quality in the cultural, scientific, and economic areas. We hope to see U.S. investment in Berlin and the new states and also in central Europe, all of which have the very special problem of moving from centrally planned economies to a new economic system. There are great problems, including high unemployment. But we must succeed. If we don't, it will send a signal to Eastern Europe. We want to see free society in all of Europe. If the "rich Germans" don't succeed, what will happen? So we hope for a new presence of the U.S. (Ø)

The President: I think that in terms of investment and trade, the future is bright. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Mr. Mayor, what is the outlook now for the costs of unification? (Ø)

Mayor Diepgen: We don't know. Even in Berlin, where we have better possibilities, we don't know. Today, the program of the Federal Government is helping the infrastructure -- streets, communications, and so on. Communications is very important. In my office I have two telephones, one for the west and one for the east. These Federal programs will help, but we don't know the costs of, for example, social welfare. And we have to build up a new economy, and new administration. (Ø)

The President: A lot will depend on the world economy. If you do these things in a robust world economy, it will be much easier. (Ø)

Mayor Diepgen: These are problems not only for Germany. The market of the former Comecon is breaking down. This requires a new organization, a new system, and new markets. Berlin can be the headquarters of this work in the new states and central Europe, but for the next few years there will be no productivity and no markets. (Ø)

The President: President Walesa is coming tomorrow. He has real problems, but he has popular support. (Ø)

Mayor Diepgen: I have a special request. With the change of the political situation in Berlin, we need a new international role. Before it was the Four Powers; now we need a new quality for the city. One big chance is the CSCE process. In Paris it was agreed to develop parliamentary cooperation. I want to suggest that this organization be located in Berlin, as a symbol of overcoming the division of Europe. So I ask for your support in

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the next CSCE conference. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: When is the next conference? (Ø)

Ambassador Ruhfus: Foreign ministers meet in June. (Ø)

The President: How long will you be here? (U)

Mayor Diepgen: Two days. It was traditional for new mayors to come to Washington. It is nice to do so under the new circumstances, too. I have a gift for you -- a print of the Brandenburg Gate. When President Reagan came to Berlin, he gave his speech at the Brandenburg Gate and proposed that the Olympic Games be held in Berlin. Now we are running for it in the year 2000 and hope we have a chance. Then we should become the seat of government. (U)

The President: Thank you. I am sorry to be so rushed, but I am off to give a speech. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Meeting with Lech Walesa, President of Poland

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas W. Simons, Ambassador to Poland
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
David Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs (Notetaker)
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Lech Walesa, President of Poland
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Foreign Minister
Janusz Lewandowski, Minister of Privatization
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dariusz Ledworowsi, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
Janusz Ziolkowski, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Slawomir Siwek, Secretary of State
Janusz Sawicki, Deputy Minister of Finance
Michael Rozycki, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: March 20, 1991, 10:40a.m. - 11:30a.m.
PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President: Again, let me welcome you. I want Secretary Baker to know that you and I started to have the discussion of your security situation and requirements during our one on one

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meeting. We can pursue that same topic more, or you can bring up whatever subject you want. (C)

President Walesa: Thank you, Mr. President. We are in a state of embarrassment that we keep begging to the United States. The whole world is asking the United States for something. We want to be more useful to you. We want to provide support to you, to you as the President and to the United States. We want to thank you for your help on debt relief. Frankly, we have serious problems and we don't know what the final solutions will be. We resolutely desire to join Western Europe and the United States in political, economic and military terms. We want to do this prudently, and we don't want to imperil the leading role of the United States. We are prepared to cooperate with you in every respect. We want American business. We want a broad engagement with you in business. We want your businesses to understand that the post-communist societies are educated but also low-paid. We are now at a standstill. Cooperative links of the old system in the East have broken down. Some say we should therefore move very slowly. But we have concluded that the better route is the most extensive possible collaboration and rapid cutover. We want new work and new jobs through openness. Otherwise, these reforms on which we have embarked will have very poor results. These reforms must lead to collaboration as soon as possible, especially in the business area. We have twenty years' worth of work that could be done in housing, for example, but the West views us from afar and is not answering. I came here to the United States because from here, one can hear better. So I want to say, praise to America. I also ask you to stand with our reform. If you don't, there will be huge destabilizing forces not only in Poland but everywhere. If Poland fails, we will see huge migrations from the failings of societies in the East and elsewhere. We must succeed. But there are major difficulties. Perhaps with this debt relief, now the world will be more interested in Poland. We are reforming our system. We are ready to do deals in every area, including the military area. (C)

The President: We understand your sense of urgency. We still feel that the best assistance that we could possibly provide is to encourage our private sector. I explained to you during our one-on-one meeting our approach to the Soviet Union. We support Gorbachev because he has been right before. At the same time we would like to see him free the Baltics. If he takes the right course it will keep the right wing and KGB from exerting itself. Therefore, we must reward whatever he does that is cooperative. I know you are worried about gradualism on the part of the West and its response to Poland's needs, and I know you are also worried about military security. (C)

Secretary Baker: On the security question, your foreign minister and I have talked. The United States has led the way in suggesting changes in security architecture in Europe. We favor an enhanced CSCE, we have advocated NATO liaison with the new democracies, as well as OECD liaison, which has political

importance even though it is an economic institution. We have some small differences about East European arms exports to former Soviet client states. We realize that this is a real problem for you. (C)

On the economic side, as we have discussed, nothing is more important for us than your success. Everyone in the world will look at Poland. We have a tremendous stake in your success. We put you at the top of our priority list and will continue to do so. As the President has said, the real key is internal reform and through internal reform attracting foreign investment. But I have to tell you American businessmen tell us that there is still red tape and bureaucracy, as well as an unclear regulatory system in Poland. Private firms want profit, low risk and fast decisions. It's not clear to them yet that they can get this in Poland. For example, our bilateral investment treaty is still not ratified by Poland. (C)

President Walesa: On the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, we watch what you do very closely. I'm not an expert on the Soviet Union, but it seems to me that your policy is very wise, also very good for us, but we do have a problem. As we leave the communist system, the whole network of ties breaks down. (C)

Poland is fortunate because we have one nation, we have one religion, we have the Pope, we have Solidarity, we have Walesa and we also have ten years of experience in fighting for our freedom, and therefore, Poland has decided to be the leader. But these reforms are dangerous. There is a potential for misguiding the masses. Not everything is perfect. As Poland's President, I can tell you that we are ready for cooperation in every respect, even military. This doesn't mean that we are anti-Soviet or anti-German, but rather that we are pro-peace and security. We don't want Soviet junk like the tanks that we make. But what am I going to do with these lousy tanks? I can't sell them to Iraq because that would undermine your policy. Let's work together to transform what we are doing. You need to understand that there is a real danger, danger of thousands of refugees from Yugoslavia, Albania and other countries. We will fix the law on foreign capital, we will dismantle whatever is not good in our system. We are willing to be the example. We offer Poland as an experiment, as a demonstration. (C)

Secretary Baker: Secretary Brady pushed very hard through the G-7 on debt relief. We see it as critical. Perhaps he would like to comment. (C)

Secretary Brady: It was a long, hard struggle. We pushed others into a position to get a consensus. On top of that, we have offered this environmental fund which we hope will be joined by others in order to go beyond the 50% reduction. We will follow up with the others on this. It's a very exciting project. Also, the Coca Cola and Advanced Computers investments in Poland are important. These are first class American companies and they

should create some follow-on interest and activity. Investment is the way to jump start the private sector of Poland. ~~(C)~~

The President: It would help Secretary Brady and Under Secretary Mulford if you could say something positive while you are here about what they did on debt, so that we can get more for Poland. I say this not for domestic consumption but so that we could use it with others. So praise the Treasury Department while you are here. This will be well received abroad. ~~(C)~~

President Walesa: I am in an embarrassing situation, I was about to thank Secretary Brady before you raised this. I will do it now and I will also do it publicly. You understand what we are up against. You have acted, but other countries are doing much less. We want them to follow your lead on debt. It will help with business. Also, the bilateral treaty ratification has begun. Your concept is to meet us halfway. We like that, and we will praise you. We are like a weight lifter in a deep squat under a heavy weight. Indebtedness is as much a political weight as it is an economic weight. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4230

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting and Dinner with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Peter Secchia, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Sim Smiley, Interpreter

Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Gianni De Michelis, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Bruno Bottai, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Umberto Vattani, Security Advisor to the Prime Minister
Interpreter

DATE, TIME: March 24, 1991, 6:30 - 8:45 p.m.
PLACE: The Residence

The President: I want to take this opportunity to find out your thoughts on two major issues -- where we go in the Middle East and on European security issues. Let me first express our thanks for your cooperation in the run-up to the war and during the war itself. I valued our conversations and learned from them. I appreciated your solidarity with our positions and know that Jim Baker appreciated the conversations with Foreign Minister De Michelis and others. Jim is just back from a trip to the Middle East and the Soviet Union. I will not endeavor to describe a solution to the problem, but overall we see two tracks -- an Arab-Israeli track and an Israeli-Palestinian track. We are not euphorically optimistic, but Jim did get the feeling that there is common ground for a good solution. If the coalition's credibility has been enhanced in the Middle East, we are determined to use our credibility and try hard to solve this problem. We know we have to take positions that won't keep every participant happy. It would be a shame to win the war and gain credibility and then lose the peace for a lack of trying. I can go into greater detail, but I am interested in your observations. (C)

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Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you for your expression of appreciation. For us, solidarity with the United States is a fixed reference point for our policy. What we did was thus natural. It was not easy to convince our people to send ships to the Gulf and to open our ports and airfields to your troops, but I have said that we shall never forget another liberation -- that of Italy from Nazi Germany, when the U.S. provided aid and 44,000 Americans lost their lives. I have stressed that the concept is clear, that the U.S. was not acting for oil, but in the defense of principle. I greatly appreciated your speech on 1 October at the UN. It enhanced the role of the UN, and advanced the idea that after Kuwait was liberated, you would try to solve other problems, such as Palestine and Lebanon. Your concern is right about what to do now that the war is over. First, it is now an acknowledged fact as a result of the war that the Arabs, the West, and Israel cooperated in defense against Iraq. This provides a premise for dialogue. The second fact is that Israel did not act against attacks, and, therefore, gained appreciation and approval from the Arab countries. Perhaps, in my view, the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue will be different. Who will be the interlocutor for the Palestinians? The PLO has been rejected. The situation has led to a stalemate. The PLO is now weakened by its support for Saddam Hussein. I suggest we set aside who represents the Palestinians and address what to do to solve the problem. Give the Palestinians some hope, and then we'll see who represents them. Otherwise, it will be impossible to establish a dialogue. In the past, Shamir has been very negative on this, but today there are some voices in Israel suggesting a readiness to consider this. In certain U.S.-Jewish circles, there is a different stance compared to the past. Today I met with the American Jewish Committee, and I would like for you to have a copy of my speech. Their attitudes seemed quite open. (Ø)

The President: There has been a significant change in the U.S.-Jewish community. They would like to see the Israeli Government come forward and talk peace. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Let me ask you about the invitation by Egypt to convene an international meeting to examine the paths to a peaceful solution. Let me stress that today you have a unique opportunity to help Arabs and Israelis start a dialogue and move towards a solution. My last point: it is important to note that in the Security Council, the five permanent representatives are showing much greater harmony. Working together is key to the outcome. I hope the relationship between the U.S. and the USSR will continue to follow this path of cooperation. I have your letter on CFE and your desire to prevent differences among us over CFE. I am aware of the difficulties facing Gorbachev. We all want to see perestroika continue. (Ø)

The President: Let me make five points and then ask Jim Baker to add detail. First, the U.S. has a unique opportunity, and we plan to go forward. Second, Israel remains very suspicious of the UN. Third, Arafat is personally greatly diminished in the eyes of the Arabs, the Israelis, and the U.S. He went too far over and bet on the wrong horse. Fourth, you make a good point

on the distinction between which Palestinians are willing to move the process forward. Our position on an international conference is that at some point it might make sense. Mitterrand has made a proposal for the heads of governments on the Security Council to meet. I do not think this is a good idea. Fidel Castro has nothing to do with this, but there is no harm in having different ideas. Fifth, I agree the Soviets have a useful role to play, as does King Hussein of Jordan. Although we are upset with him, we do not want to destabilize Jordan by isolating him. Jim? (S)

Secretary Baker: During the trip, I sensed a different attitude on the part of some Arab governments. The Saudis especially are interested in a more active role on behalf of peace rather than remaining in the background and providing financial support as before. I had a unique meeting while in Riyadh -- the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of the eight Arab members of the coalition. This is something they had been reluctant to do in the past. I sensed a new attitude, even in President Assad of Syria, with whom I spent seven and a half hours. He appears to want to turn toward peace and reconciliation. With respect to Israel, I don't want to underestimate what is involved in getting the present Israeli Government to move. But I believe that there, too, in the aftermath of the crisis is a chance for progress that did not exist before. The Israeli Foreign Minister is interested in the peace process, in part for his own personal political interests. Shamir will have continuing pressure from the right not to move forward, but it was Shamir who made the decision not to retaliate against Iraq. He has his own proposal out there from May 1989 that he wants to see move forward. He did agree in the aftermath of the war to focus on new terminologies and explore new possibilities. For instance, for three years in his proposal, he referred to autonomy for the Palestinians. Now autonomy is a dirty word for the Palestinians, and I suggested that he eliminate it from his lexicon and consider the word self-government. The day after I left, Shamir referred to his three-year period as a period of self-government. It's not a giant step, but it suggests a willingness to engage. So, I sense we have an opportunity. Egypt will be cooperative, both with the other Arabs and in their willingness to help find dialogue partners for Israel among the Palestinians. On the other side of the coin, "international conference" are dirty words for the Israelis. There will come a time appropriate for an international conference. The surest way not to make progress is to start with an international conference, which would raise the issue of Palestinian attendance and Yasir Arafat. The two-track approach involves confidence-building measures between states and a dialogue between the Palestinians and the Israelis on the other hand. These merge into one at some point. Last, all agree we cannot impose peace, either the U.S. or the U.S. and the Europeans. We can only hope to act as a catalyst if the parties are willing. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: With respect to your comments on Assad, he is interested in greater tranquility in the area, partly growing out of his Alawite minority. If the majority

should take the upper hand, his situation would be difficult. But he must abide by the Taif Accords and withdraw his troops from Lebanon. Second, on the Israelis, it is important to establish a goal of a solution. I understand that today one cannot speak of a conference, but we must fix the goal. A federation of Jordan and Palestinians as envisioned in 1947 must be revised with borders to satisfy Israel. But it is important to have a goal. The timing of a conference is all procedural; the goal of a solution is necessary, or we will be working in a void as after Camp David. I believe the Israelis fear for their security. They are aware the Arabs have been against their existence. We must overcome this feeling. Perhaps the UN formally could organize contacts between the Israelis and the Saudis or the Israelis and the Syrians so that they could face each other. This speaking would be useful. It is true that Israel has no confidence in the UN. Perhaps, after the outcome of the war they will see it differently, particularly given your firm support. They have a need for common security and they need partners. They cannot do this alone. This is why it is so pressing to convince the Israelis with respect to these massive arrivals of Soviet Jews. This drives the need for space and makes the problem more complex. I cannot understand why they are now leaving the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is the fear of a revival of anti-Semitism. If hundreds of thousands go to Israel, the picture will become even more complicated. (S)

The President: I am concerned about settlements in the West Bank and in the Golan. I am very worried. There might be a real problem with Israel if they continue these policies. The newest argument is that with all the new Soviet immigrants, they must settle their people there. We say that's not acceptable, but they go ahead anyway. I think we have pretty well covered Israel and the Palestinians. We are committed to Taif as the best basis for peace in Lebanon. We hope that our new contacts with Assad will be useful to peace in Lebanon, as well as to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. On security and stability in the Gulf, we have not really discussed that. There are a number of ideas for our participation in the security of the Gulf. We have always had a naval presence, and that will continue. We are talking to the parties about an Arab peacekeeping force with, perhaps, a UN force on the border separating Kuwait and Iraq. I am very eager to get U.S. ground forces out of the area. If not, this will play into the hands of Saddam Hussein, if he is still around. And, of course, we hope he won't be. Some Gulf countries are now willing to consider U.S. and European forces there. We may be able to give assurances through exercises and prepositioning that they will welcome, and we accept. It is hard to address the security of the Gulf until we know what will happen in Iraq. I would be interested in your view. We cannot have normal relations as long as Saddam Hussein is there. What he has done to the environment alone in Kuwait is incomprehensible, not to mention the torture and brutality. He must go before the U.S. can have any normal relationship with Iraq again. What is your view? (S)

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Prime Minister Andreotti: First, we must establish rules for the security of the states of the Gulf. In the first place, this involves imposing a drastic reduction of force of arms in the area, beginning with Iraq. We have to avoid a new arms race there. We have to establish new rules. Second, we must push towards the introduction of democratic rule, representation of the people, and guarantee that power will not be held only by a few. As far as Iraq is concerned, we agree that Saddam Hussein must leave, because he created these tragic conditions including the occupation of Kuwait and the Gulf war -- but also because of the way his mind works. After the Camp David Accords, I went to Baghdad to "sweeten" Saddam Hussein to Camp David. I spoke a long time to him. The basic concept of their thinking is that if you lose territory, you have to rearm and reconquer it. He said to me, since the Yugoslavs took some territory from you, you must be rearming to take it back. When I said we were not, he said he didn't believe me. There is a further aspect. The situation in Iraq is one third Sunni, one million Christians, and the rest Shiites. We must try to find someone able to represent a new leadership there. The ultimate outcome might be an enormous area under the Shias, including both Iran and Iraq. This would be even more complex. A great part of Saddam Hussein's prestige for years was the fear of Khomeini in the rest of the world, and that's why the rest of the world helped him. There was empathy for him. He gained prestige. It is important to make them understand that they must oust Saddam Hussein, but we are not against the presence of the Army in Government. In its present state, the Iranian leadership is much more moderate. Iran has tried to keep a dialogue going. After the hostages are released, I hope you can reopen a dialogue. They have behaved well. (S)

The President: They have behaved well. There are rumors they may release the hostages. Assad is trying to help on the releasing of the hostages, but he does not have as much influence as Iran. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: We should try to assert all efforts on Rafsanjani and Velayati for the conditions for establishing a dialogue with you and to establish a collective security system in the area. De Michelis is going to Teheran next Thursday. He will press this. (S)

The President: He can say that the U.S. would welcome improved relations. We still have some claims problems. Some have been quietly settled, but the main problem is the hostages. Do you know Velayati? (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: When I was Foreign Minister, I worked closely with him. We met many times during the Iran-Iraq war. He is not a fundamentalist. He has a certain degree of authority and prestige that has enabled him to maintain his office while expressing his own views. With Rafsanjani I have had only telephone conversations. (S)

The President: Velayati seems reasonable. Rafsanjani is the same. But he gets pressure from his extreme flanks. Changing

the subject, what are your views on the Soviet Union? Our position is that we wonder if Gorbachev can survive. We will continue to deal with him. Some in the U.S. want us to shift to the Republic leaders and then invite Yeltsin to come (to the U.S.). We will continue to deal with Gorbachev, but we will not approve of the bad things he does, as in Lithuania. My advice to Gorbachev to keep support in the West would be to turn loose the Baltics. If he would do that immediately, he would gain back enormous support in Europe and in the U.S. There is more pressure on the Baltics than on the other republics. I am worried that he is backing away from CFE. It's a matter of the military trying to pull back. Recently, Baker may have made some progress. I hope so. Here, in some quarters, especially the extreme left and right, Yeltsin is a hero. I agree with Ozal, who is convinced he is a demagogue and would become a dictator. If he ever became head of the USSR though, we would deal with him. That's the Bush view. What is the Andreotti view? ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Andreotti: Gorbachev faces two difficulties. First, all who have lost power, the party, and the military do not favor any new approaches. He has had success in having them accept important changes, such as withdrawal from Afghanistan, the unification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In general, his gradual approach is opposed by those who want immediate independence for the republics. Also opposed are those who want to see immediate results of his economic policy and now say he has failed and that the market economy is a bluff because he has not kept his promises. Under his gradual approach, political and economic reforms must go side by side. Only then can the Baltics be freed. Public opinion in Europe and the U.S. is sensitive to Baltic independence, but if it occurs the reaction of the other republics will be serious. Then Gorbachev will not be able to hold the situation under control. The Vatican holds to this view and is not pressing independence. Personally, I do not know Yeltsin, but his way of expressing himself suggests that he is probably demagogic. We want to help the gradual approach of Gorbachev. It is the only path. Second, one difficulty for the military is that it is easier to accept a reduction of missiles than a reduction of conventional arms, which involves the loss of jobs, salary, housing, privileges, and so on. It is a source of fear. The Germans have offered to build housing, but the psychological and human problem is more important than the military problem. The position of Shevardnadze is interesting. He left Rome for a meeting in Moscow with Baker despite the bad weather. I told him the meeting was not more important than a safe trip, but he said that the meeting with Baker was more important. He flew in an Italian aircraft. I don't know the Baker view, but my perception is that Shevardnadze left government because he feared the military could force the Government to use force, which world opinion would not understand and would regard as a reversion to the old times. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker: He still worries about dictatorship -- not by Gorbachev, but by someone coming on the scene after, who would be a dictator. ~~(S)~~

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The President: On Yeltsin, he says the right things, but all the leaders I have talked to have the same conclusion. One, that he's a demagogue and two, that he would be a dictator. But he says the right things about representative government. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Let me touch on NATO. Last year we agreed to debate the future of NATO. The foreign ministers will meet to discuss this. It is important to update the situation, with a strong NATO linked to CSCE and involving cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. Therefore, the concept should be clearly elaborated in the near future, maybe the first half of this year. While on the way to the U.S., I stopped in Paris for dinner with Mitterrand. He said that you had the same discussion in Martinique. (C)

The President: Frankly, there is confusion here. When the EC starts making statements about defense and security policy, some in the U.S. wonder what's going on. We still believe that NATO is the hallmark for security. It is in our interest to have security matters decided by NATO. We've been watching or at least listening with keen interest to some of the comments coming out of Europe. It is very dangerous if the American people get the view that the Europeans feel they can take care of themselves. This will unleash a dynamic that will move toward isolationism in the U.S. There may be pressures we can't control. I don't know where German public opinion will be in five years, but it is important that we rally around NATO as the major security guarantor for everyone. Some may think events will cause us to get out. Discussion and planning for that, or creation of some new EC system, will send exactly the wrong signal to the American people. I had a good discussion with Mitterrand, but he wonders what will be the situation in ten years and talks about the need to make other arrangements. Let me ask Brent Scowcroft for a word or two on the Mitterrand view. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: Mitterrand distinguished between the short term and the long term. In the latter, Europeans need the ability to defend themselves. In the short term, NATO is indispensable. If there is conflict between European measures and NATO, then the latter must prevail. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thanks for clarifying this issue. I participated from the beginning the birth of the Alliance in 1949. At that time members of parliament thought that in the short term we would need such an organization and then we would do for ourselves in the long term, fearing that the U.S. would not be willing to remain in Europe for 40 or 50 years. Experience has proven the importance of our cooperation in the security of the area and to clear the skies over Europe. Without NATO it would have been impossible to see events in Central and Eastern Europe. When we talk of European unity, we can also discuss security but never weaken our commitment to NATO. Left on our own in the security area, there would be a deep rift in Europe because two of the countries are nuclear. We must rely on the Alliance. There is no contradiction between NATO and

European unity. Let me make a further remark. The acceptance of German unification was possible because Germany was placed in the framework of NATO. This is a strong link and unification would have been impossible without it. (C)

Foreign Minister De Michelis: The discussion of European defense grows out of discussion of political and foreign policy issues as we look ahead 30 to 50 years and the possibility of a United States of Europe. There is no contradiction between this and the Alliance, just as there is no contradiction between economic integration with respect to the U.S. This is the only way Europe can unify within the framework of the Alliance. This must be underlined: there is no contradiction. (C)

The President: The key is the integrity of the unified military command. This is fundamental. (C)

Foreign Minister De Michelis: This is quite easy, but it is not easy to explain the contradictions between the Alliance and European political integration. The Alliance is a vital key element of the future European defense system. We are more worried by Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation without the U.S. (S)

Secretary Baker: You are right about Mitterrand's idea of a confederation with Central Europe. We accept the European pillar within the context of the North Atlantic Alliance, as long as it preserves the integrated military command and all debate and decisions on issues concerning transatlantic security take place in NATO. This is sacrosanct. Without those, NATO would be not be the same. (S)

Foreign Minster De Michelis: With respect to the WEU and the UK view, the problem is political, not military. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Let me make a practical remark after the Gulf war. If before the war we were convinced of the need for a U.S. presence, after the effectiveness and efficiency shown by the U.S., we are all the more convinced now. (C)

The President: Maybe I put too much emphasis on what could happen in the U.S. with respect to isolationist and protectionist pressures here. People get the wrong impression here from the debate. They see the debate and conclude that we have done our share, and we should bring our people home. That is not in the Europeans' interest nor is it in the interest of the U.S. You saw what we were up against in the Gulf, and that was a clear cut question of good versus evil. We had to bring the Congress along inch by inch. They kept saying it's no business of ours. I don't want to overstate the point, but I did want to raise it. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: If 40 years ago the U.S. Government had said that for 40 years the U.S. would station 250,000 troops in Europe, it would have been attacked. It would have been

difficult to pass. But it was not just possible, it was essential. Any news on Crotone? (C)

The President: We're grateful for your steadfast support. We are working on the issue in Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I understand. I just remember that you spoke of February for a decision. (U)

The President: We have a problem. We must sell it for the reasons I have described. (C)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Let me conclude with something not part of my political activities, but something that I follow. I am President for the International Center for Cicerone Studies. This year we are having a conference in New York. The issue this year will be one that I think you are interested in -- the influence of Cicero on education in the schools. Three years ago the conference was in Warsaw and the theme was the concept of the State. Jaruzelski was there at the end. Speaking of Cicero, the conference will be on 6 May. I hope you can be present for the Inaugural Session. The President of the Italian Republic will be there. (U)

The President: I have a technical question. Do I have to remember Cicero from school before I go? (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: No. (U)

The President: Thank you for the suggestion. Let me see what is possible. Will there be a lot of different countries? ^U

Prime Minister Andreotti: The best scholars of Latin and Cicero from the whole world. (U)

The President: I appreciate the invitation. Let me get back to you. We want to make sure that the 1992 celebrations are done right. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: We recently reached agreement for the La Scala Company to come here for Columbus Day to the Kennedy Center. (U)

The President: I certainly would attend that. (U)

The President: (On leaving the Yellow Oval Room for dinner:) I am grateful for your government's actions on the process for extraditing Al-Jawary. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ichiro Ozawa, Japan's LDP Secretary General (C)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Peter S. Watson, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker
Frances Seeds, Interpreter

Ichiro Ozawa, LDP Secretary General
Hiroshi Kumagai, Member of Japanese House of Representatives
Ryohei Murata, Ambassador to the U.S.
Koji Tsuruoka, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 28, 1991, 3:30 - 4:05 P.M.
Brent Scowcroft's Office

The President joined the meeting with Secretary General Ozawa at 3:45 P.M. (C)

Mr. Gates: Welcome, it's good to meet you. I understand that you have just arrived in town from Moscow. (U)

Mr. Ozawa: Yes, I have only recently arrived here. (U)

Mr. Gates: I am eager to hear of your time in Moscow. It looks as though you got out of town just in time. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: It is very good to be in Washington. The weather is much warmer here. (U)

Mr. Gates: The weather in Moscow is only warm politically. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: I understand that there has been a demonstration there, is that correct? (U)

Mr. Gates: Yes, a very large one. But little violence to this point, it seems. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: I was able to have two meetings with Mr. Gorbachev when I was there, for a total of about three hours. My themes, of course, were mainly regarding the Northern Territories. Looking at Gorbachev throughout these meetings, it was clear not only from this question, but others as well, that he is in a

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difficult position to make decisive decisions on his own. I also met with the Deputy Party Secretary and the Vice President. They were eager to promote bilateral relations, but I think that they are also in the same shoe as Gorbachev. Gorbachev in his meetings started by saying that it is not correct that Perestroika is in decline and that the conservatives are ascending. He said that there is no such thing as Perestroika backtracking. The Deputy Party Secretary and the Vice President emphasized the same point. They said it so frequently that I took this to mean that indeed Perestroika was in trouble. I discussed this with Secretary Baker this morning. The other topic that Gorbachev raised was Asia-Pacific security. My position was that these issues, and questions of Japanese/USSR relations, can only exist in the framework of the U.S./Japanese alliance. (S)

Mr. Gates: Good. In addition to your response to Gorbachev's points, we appreciate your personal efforts in the Gulf situation and efforts to reduce bilateral problems. (S)

Mr. Ozawa: Well thank you, but I cannot wholeheartedly accept this for all the reasons you know. But I perceive that the Japanese peoples' awareness is rapidly changing. They are more aware of the need to be a true ally of the United States, and become a true member of the international community. In the U.S. I understand that there is some dissatisfaction and frustration in relation to our Gulf participation. Also, in Japan there are anti-U.S. voices. We need to overcome and deal with these developments. (S)

Mr. Gates: I know voices exist in Washington that are critical of Japan. But these do not exist in the senior levels of this government. We are very appreciative of the financial contribution. For us there has never been any doubt that Japan would complete its funding commitment. There are, however, concerns over SII, construction services, semiconductors and agriculture -- especially rice. But this is very much in the spirit of friends as far as the President is concerned. He is looking forward to visiting with Prime Minister Kaifu next week, and any criticism of Japan does not come from this building. (S)

Mr. Ozawa: Thank you for those kind words. As to the trade issues, that is agriculture and other specific issues, these can now be more readily resolved. The Japanese people are now more accepting of a forthcoming Japan which is an ally of the U.S., and a full member of the international community. (S)

[At this point, the President enters General Scowcroft's room]

The President: Hello. It is good to welcome you to the White House. I had heard that we had a distinguished member of the LDP here, and I just wanted to stop by and pay my respects. You have just arrived from Europe, I understand. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: That's right, from Moscow. I am on my way back to Tokyo to be there for elections we are having shortly. (U)

The President: What type of elections are they? (Ø)

Mr. Ozawa: In all cities and prefectures. (U)

The President: What are your prospects like? (Ø)

Mr. Ozawa: Much better than in the last round, where we were in trouble because of the taxation issue. (Ø)

The President: How is the Prime Minister's standing? I understand that it is pretty good. I know that it started low and went up from there. (Ø)

Mr. Ozawa: It is still high. And it should stay there for the time being. (Ø)

The President: I am looking forward to seeing him in California the week after next. From the U.S. standpoint, this will be an important meeting, the timing too. I was talking with the Ambassador [Murata] the other day. As I mentioned to him, I don't like the feel ... the nature of the relationship, in one way. It is so very important that it remain on a strong plane. Don't get me wrong, I have great respect for Prime Minister Kaifu. I might say that we are very grateful for Japanese funding in the Gulf. Japan did what it could do under its constitution. But our economy is slow .. is in a recession, although I hope it comes out of it soon. And when that situation exists, some Americans look for someone to blame. Some of the criticism that comes from that is very unfair in my view. My appeal to Kaifu is that where there are difficulties, let's work them out. When he has problems with what we do, let's get them out on the table. I think that, overall, the relationship is very good. But I am worried about this mood that I am trying to describe. I will do my best as President to keep relations on a strong track. But how do you feel from your side of the Pacific ... I want your frank assessment. (Ø)

Mr. Ozawa: Mr. President, thank you very much for the very warm words on the bilateral relationship. Mr. President, if I may I would like to express to you my deepest gratitude for your leadership in the Gulf crisis, and of that of the American people. We are aware that there are various voices of frustration at Japan's reaction, and to our role in the Gulf. As I was saying to Mr. Gates, in Japan the awareness of the Japanese public is rapidly changing, and the Gulf crisis is the turning point in this respect. The awareness on behalf of the Japanese public that they must take on the burdens of being a full ally to the United States, and of full membership of the international community, is growing. Therefore, I believe that this changing mood of the Japanese public, when translated into economic positions in the Uruguay Round, will be positive. (Ø)

The President: This is encouraging. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: Secretary Mosbacher asked me over for lunch today. We discussed the issue of construction services. This is being negotiated between our two delegations in Washington currently. I have no doubt that this issue will be resolved. There are other issues that need to be resolved, and I believe that these too can be resolved in the spirit of improvement in our bilateral relationship. (C)

The President: In some quarters there is an anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. Is there a counterpart anti-U.S. feeling in Japan that you have to contend with as a political leader? (C)

Mr. Ozawa: Yes. Not a majority, but certain segments are trying to arouse wanton anti-U.S. feelings in Japan. These sentiments are only held by a handful of people. But we have to overcome these arguments, and we will be successful. (C)

The President: We have the same problem here, perhaps even worse. However, I pledge to you that we will do our best to counteract these feelings. We do not need any battles over this that we cannot solve. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: Thank you very much. I on my part will spend my political career working on these issues. (C)

The President: The problem will be manageable if we all work on it. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: If I may Mr. President, I would like to report to you on my visit to the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: Please do. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: I met with Gorbachev twice, and we discussed quite a few things. The main issue we discussed was the four islands that have long been the dream of my people. I would like to express to you the principled way that I responded to Gorbachev's expressions -- whether they dealt with the Northern Islands or bilateral issues -- that all these issues can only be addressed consistent with the U.S./Japanese alliance, and nothing outside of this would stand. (S)

The President: Thank you. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: Gorbachev also touched upon security of the Asian region. I responded to him in the same light as I mentioned on the other issues. (S)

The President: Are they going to be flexible on the islands? (C)

Mr. Ozawa: [Makes a long humming sound of uncertainty] [Laughter] I think they are thinking it over. Mr. Gorbachev does not seem to be in a position to make a decision on any issue. (S)

The President: We are having exactly the same problem in the arms control area, on CFE. What happened at the demonstration today? (S)

Mr. Gates: They seemed to have avoided major violence. (U)

The President: What worries me is if they kick out Gorbachev the situation may get even worse -- with the military and the KGB gaining even more power. Of course we will deal with whosoever is President. But some predict that if Yeltsin assumed the Presidency he would also be a dictator. The situation is very unclear, as you probably found. (S)

Mr. Ozawa: I also had a one-hour talk with Popov, the mayor of Moscow. He is convinced that the old party cadre is gaining strength. But these 'old guard' are not equipped to address the many problems the country faces. (S)

The President: It is a major problem. Well, as you know, I have been invited to visit Japan. Barbara and I want to come. That would be good as it would permit me to more closely explain to the Japanese people that we value the relationship. (C)

Mr. Ozawa: Yes, we hope that you and Mrs. Bush indeed come, we are eagerly awaiting your visit. (C)

The President: Thank you. I hope you have a safe trip back home. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Arnold Ruutel, President of Estonia

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Robert Kimmitt, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Edward A. Hewett, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Staff
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Interpreter

Arnold Ruutel, President of Estonia
Lennart Meri, Foreign Minister
Juri Luik, Notetaker
Arvi Jurviste, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: March 29, 1991 (10:40a.m. - 11:25a.m.)
PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Mr. President, we are delighted to have you here. You know our position. We are very concerned about what is happening in the Soviet Union. It is in no one's interest to see a resurgence of KGB or Military control of the country. (S)

You're the expert. I'd like to know your views on this situation. This is my fifth meeting with a Baltic leader. I am proud to have you here. (S)

President Ruutel: First of all, I wish to thank you for finding the time to meet with me. Also, please allow me to use this opportunity to extend greetings to you and to the people of the U.S. for how you've been able to combine a coalition in a victory against aggression in the Middle East. (S)

The President: You wrote me a nice letter on that. Thank you very much. (U)

President Ruutel: It is the human rights aspect of the Gulf War which is most important: you provided a good lesson to those who would use force against a free people. (S)

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Now for some brief information on the situation in the Baltic States. I wish first to thank you for the role you played in January when the Soviets resorted to force in the Baltics. (U)

The President: That offended the American people, and we spoke out against it. I don't know if it did any good. (C)

President Ruutel: We are quite sure it was effective. The Soviet Union was stopped when the international community demanded a dialogue. (S)

Now to the present situation. We are still trying to start negotiations. You may know that yesterday was the first meeting of the Soviet and Estonian negotiating teams. Regrettably nothing substantial came out of it. The Soviet side did not have a mandate to negotiate. (S)

The President: What level are the Soviet members of the negotiating team? (C)

President Ruutel: The Soviet side is headed by a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Foreign Minister Meri: But he was not present at yesterday's meeting. (S)

The President: What are the negotiations about? Do you say, "Let's discuss the mechanics of how we get our independence?" (S)

President Ruutel: Our proposal is that first we need to define our current status. The political situation has changed and in this new situation we would like to define our status. Having done that, we are ready to engage in a constructive, calm dialogue on economic, political and other matters. (C)

It appears, however, that Moscow only wants to talk, without accomplishing anything substantial. It is not clear yet how Moscow will define the Baltic's status. The Moscow delegation appears to be without instructions on how to proceed. (S)

Yesterday the Soviets agreed to a second meeting in mid-April. We hope we can take off there from the negotiations we had last August. (S)

The President: Is it your feeling that the Moscow delegation did not have instructions because Gorbachev is completely absorbed in the battle with Yel'tsin, or that he worries about the military and the KGB? (S)

President Ruutel: I agree that Gorbachev is involved in a struggle with Yel'tsin, the KGB, and the military. (S)

The President: If Yel'tsin were in power, would he grant freedom to the Baltics? (C)

President Ruutel: We have an agreement with Russia, and in that agreement there is a clause supporting full sovereignty for Estonia. When Yel'tsin talked to me, he said that he personally is in favor of freedom for the Baltics, but that it is difficult finding support for that idea. (S)

When I last met with Gorbachev at the end of January, he was almost silent on Baltic independence. And that, despite the fact that I argued with him that after we define our status, we could improve our economy, which would benefit the Soviet Union as a whole, and not only the Baltics. (S)

We truly believe we are in a situation where the Soviet economy is on the decline, and we could improve our economic situation, if only our status was clarified. Of course we assume that one of the requirements for our successful development would be stable relations with the outside world, which would require stability in neighboring countries, including the USSR. (S)

The President: I thought Gorbachev said you could have your independence, but in accord with the secession procedure, which is admittedly very difficult. (S)

President Ruutel: You are quite correct. But these secession procedures were in fact designed to make sure secession is impossible. (S)

The President: I want you to know that I have personally talked to Mikhail Gorbachev more than once about independence for the Baltics. If the Soviets would allow independence, that would help the Soviet Union gain support in the West. (S)

Our whole point is self-determination for the Balts, and especially for the Balts. Georgia, Ukraine -- they are entitled to self-determination, and will have to work that out for themselves. But the Balts are special. We will never recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. (S)

But what will happen in the Soviet Union? None of us can predict what will occur. You are in a position to know. What do you think will happen? Will Gorbachev remain in power? Or will Yel'tsin come to power? Are the Army and the KGB moving society to the right? (S)

Answer only if you are comfortable. It is simply very important to get a feel for how things will work out. (S)

President Ruutel: I am very pleased to respond. Broadly Soviet society breaks down into two camps: liberal and reactionary (the partocracy). In my last meeting with Gorbachev at the end of January he again said that he is on the side of democracy. But whatever he says, he is wavering, and gradually moving towards partocracy. This certainly has contributed to the difference between Gorbachev and Yel'tsin, although there are personal differences here as well. (S)

The President: I think you're right. But will Gorbachev survive? If you had to bet $10, would you bet he'll survive. (C)

President Ruutel: I am convinced that if the international community, with the U.S. at its head, makes clear to the Soviet Union that relations with the West are fully dependent on the commitment to democracy, that will strengthen the democrats and -- if Gorbachev will swing towards them -- then that strengthens his power. In fact you are pursuing this line now, and we are grateful for that. (S)

When I met Gorbachev, I said, "Let the Balkans go; it will boost your authority." Democratic forces in the Soviet Union would support him. (S)

Let the Baltic case be the test case for democracy in the USSR. It is important in responding to the forces of stagnation in the USSR that the rest of the world convey a clear view of their activities. Before coming here we had a meeting with the Council of Baltic States. We agreed on an appeal for an international conference on the Baltic states which could undertake a historical and legal assessment of the Baltic states, as well as a strategic assessment. (President Ruutel hands a copy of the declaration to the President, Tab B). It is important for the international community to publicize the historical aspects of the Baltic situation. (S)

The President: Is the multilateral approach because of frustration over the lack of progress in the bilateral negotiations, or a supplement to those negotiations? (S)

Foreign Minister Meri: Mainly to reinforce, not to replace, the bilateral negotiations. (C)

If I might add -- we believe that time is short. Democratic forces in the Soviet Union feel deceived by Gorbachev. They no longer need Gorbachev. The conservative forces likewise feel they no longer need Gorbachev. (S)

The President: So your $10 says he won't be around long? (C)

Foreign MInister Meri: The time factor is essential. We are in a more dynamic situation than when I last met with you. One way to convince the West to take a more active part is to stress that the military situation in Europe is unclear. Conventional forces are not fully controlled as required. Soviet forces will be deployed through Rostov into the Baltic states. Taht is a major problem not only for us, but for the U.S. (S)

Gorbachev might have a choice, but the only possibility to make him grasp it is clear language: Let the Balts go and there will be rewards. The Baltic States are a test case. If totalitarian forces succeed in crushing legitimate power, that means a new

totalitarianism not only in the Baltic states, but in the entire USSR. (S)

The President: Those are interesting points, and eloquently put. I agree. The U.S. is committed to Baltic independence, and to freedom, democracy, and a market economy in the Soviet Union. (S)

But because of our standing as a superpower, we must conduct ourselves so as not to encourage a totalitarian takeover. I'm listening to your words. But the situation is such that we don't want to inadvertently push the military and the KGB to move against the center. We want independence, democracy, and a free market. We don't want to inadvertently push for a military takeover. (S)

I am not saying Mikhail Gorbachev is the only hope. If another person comes in, we'll deal with him. We just don't want to set back the course. That's why I am asking. (S)

President Ruutel: We fully share your views. We too want stability in the Soviet Union. We need assistance in finding constructive ways to convince the Soviet Union that letting the Balts go will help them domestically. I reiterate once again, I told Gorbachev, "Let us go and it will alleviate the Soviet Union of a big burden, while giving a chance to work to improve our situation." (S)

The President: You are absolutely right. But will the military and the KGB allow it to happen? (S)

President Ruutel: On the military, our proposal recognizes that the Soviets cannot withdraw immediately when we achieve independence. We see a gradual process to remove bases. We believe our proposal is very realistic and constructive. The possible stumbling block is Great Russian chauvinism. (S)

Foreign Minister Meri: During the last three-four months, the press has developed a new image of Gorbachev as a hostage of the KGB and the Army. I believe that is not the case. In fact, the KGB always was in full command of the country, and was the main power behind Gorbachev even under Andropov. (S)

What is possible is a conflict between Gorbachev and his 7000 generals, all of whom want to be marshals. There is still a chance, but this could be Gorbachev's last chance. He sided with the extremists, and is relying on the old party structure. Right now you are at a point where you could give him a push, enabling him to take the right side. (S)

The President: I must take my wife to church, and therefore regret that I must end this interesting meeting. I have enjoyed it. I do have a better understanding now of the situation. The last point was very interesting to me. I hope you are seeing others. (U)

Robert Kimmitt: He met with Secretary Baker yesterday. (U)

The President: OK. I have great respect for you. Your independence is something we want. I made the point to Gorbachev that it would be best for him. It is hard even to give food aid while this situation lingers on. ~~(C)~~

Foreign Minister Meri: I remind you that in 1921 when we fought Russia, we were in a position to give food aid to most of northern Russia. Such are the possibilities of a free country. ~~(C)~~

President Ruutel: I am embarrassed to say that I forgot to begin by thanking you for the medical aid you gave to us earlier this year. (U)

The President: We are glad to help, and want to do more. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: One-on-One Meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Frances Seeds, Interpreter

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
Hisashi Owada, Deputy Foreign Minister
Daisuke Matsunaga, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 4, 1991, 1:50 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. PST
Newport Beach, California

The President: Toshiki, thank you for coming all this way. (U)

PM Kaifu: First, I would like to pay my respects for what you have done in the Persian Gulf, your leadership in restoring peace and my sympathy for those lost. (C)

The President: Thank you for being a strong coalition partner. Despite your constitutional limitations, you were a strong partner, and I tell everyone that. (C)

PM Kaifu: I have been on your side throughout. We are determined to do whatever we can to help restore peace. We did pass tax increase bills and other bills. Japanese public opinion is increasingly favorable on this issue. (C)

The President: I had not realized public opinion was so favorable. I am pleased. Let me mention a couple of issues to get out of the way. You know what they are. Once in a while contentious issues override our basic partnership. I heard one reporter asking will you discuss rice. I know how tough it is for any Japanese Prime Minister. I am in a fight with Congress to get fast track authority. If, after your elections, you could move, it would help enormously getting fast track and insuring success for the Uruguay Round. There are other issues, of course, chief among which the EC and agriculture. (C)

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PM Kaifu: Basically, I think we must make the Uruguay Round a success. We are the world's largest net importer of agricultural goods. We have liberalized citrus and beef. Rice remains. We are determined to resolve the difference each has. You have labor and Europe has variable duties. Each must be solved. You must understand it is terribly difficult to deal with this. Food security is very low in Japan and it is tough.

The President: Is this a rural versus urban issue for you?

PM Kaifu: There are rural-urban differences. But agricultural groups are very strong politically. When we freed beef and citrus, rural Diet members lost their seats and they were very bitter.

The President: I understand, but these are differences that must be overcome. 1.4(d)

[redacted]

PM Kaifu: If I could go back to rice... I urge you to get the fast track done early, so we can move on the Uruguay Round.

The President: We will know on fast track by the end of May.

PM Kaifu: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

[redacted]

The President: That probably is the best way, to discuss and work it out. I am prepared to leave it that way. But we need a press answer. How about this: The U.S. is grateful for the financial support Japan has given. As for those differences you have mentioned, our staffs will work together to resolve them. Is there a problem in that? (C)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: I understand. You and Brent work out what we should say to the press. On to other subjects... (C)

PM Kaifu: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: I appreciate your coming over to meet me and I really want to go to Japan. I am committed, but my problem is one of time. I am just not sure I can do it before the summit.. I will come, but I can't promise it will be before London. I can't hold out too much hope for that. I also have been held up on my going to Moscow. That is delayed by CFE and START, but I want to do that, too. I am worried by events in the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's survival and viability. I say this to you only to point up my problems of timing. I will try. It is very important that I come, and I will. It is only a question of time. (C)

PM Kaifu: I hope you can work out your schedule to visit at the earliest possible time. To show the U.S. presence is very important to the Asian scene. (C)

The President: Can I ask a broad question? I heard what you said earlier about public opinion toward the Middle East. As Prime Minister and my friend, do you sense a growing anti-U.S. feeling in Japan, or is it about the same? I worry about anti-Japanese feeling in the Congress and if you worry about the same thing. (C)

PM Kaifu: The biggest opposition party, the Socialists, oppose the Security treaty. At the people level, I appeal that under the Security Treaty, Japan has grown prosperous and gradually the Japanese people recognize the role of the American people. The figures are now growing after having been flat for some time, especially since the Gulf crisis began. (C)

The President: That is good. (C)

PM Kaifu: For the past six months, the Japanese people have been asking what they can do with the U.S. They are aware of anti-Japanese feelings and wonder what can be done with the U.S. to change this. (C)

The President: I don't want you to think the relationship is in bad shape. I will point out in my statement how much Japan buys from the U.S. The Vice President told me you expressed interest in helping the Kurdish refugees. (C)

PM Kaifu: The trade balance between us is moving positively and we have worked hard on it. We have moved on public works, the anti-monopoly law and distribution to deal with SII issues. (C)

The President: I appreciate that. I wanted to raise that issue as well. (C)

PM Kaifu: Just before I left, I received Secretary Mosbacher and business executives. I said we must work together to move the trade imbalances further toward each other. (C)

The President: I appreciate your receiving them. These are important businessmen. (C)

PM Kaifu: Over five years, the imports from the U.S. increased by $20 billion. Last year they were $48 billion, I think. In addition, we are thinking how we can improve our communications with each other. (C)

The President: What is your view of the Kurdish issue? We don't plan to use force, but we are very concerned. (C)


PM Kaifu: It is wrong for Saddam Hussein to repress by brute force. We want Iraq to be a peace-loving country again. The Kurd issue has twists and turns in history, but I am against force and coercion. (C)

The President then reviewed briefly the state of discussion in the U.N. (C)

PM Kaifu: What do you think about post-crisis arrangements and Saddam Hussein surviving? (C)

The President: We can't have normal relations with Saddam Hussein in power. I still hope the army or some within the government will put Saddam Hussein out, one way or another, opening the way for the Kurds and the South and for better relations with the outside world. We are twenty minutes behind for lunch. (C)

PM Kaifu: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)



The President: That's fine. We would not take exception to that. (C)

PM Kaifu: On the 25th of April, the Crown Prince will go to Texas and I wish you could receive him. (C)

The President: I do not know if I will be there, but we will make sure he is properly received. Maybe my son can take him to a ball game. (C)

PM Kaifu: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)



(C)

---------- End of One-on-One Conversation ----------

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 03/11/91 - 04/24/91

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Lunch with Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Michael Armacost, U.S. Ambassador to Japan
Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Douglas Paal, Special Assistant to the President, Notetaker
Frances Seeds, Interpreter

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu
Tadamori Oshima, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Ryohei Murata, Ambassador of Japan to the U.S.
Hisashi Owada, Deputy Foreign Minister
Taizo Watanabe, Press Spokesman
Koichiro Matsuura, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Masaki Orita, Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister
Nobuaki Tanaka, Director, North American Affairs Bureau, Notetaker
Daisuke Matsunaga, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 4, 1991, 3:00 - 3:53 p.m. PST
Newport Beach, California

The President: To continue on Turkey, I might just tell you Ozal's thinking. I talked to him just a couple of days ago. He told me there might be 600,000 Kurds coming toward Turkey. He told me he might have to send a very strong signal to Iraq to keep their forces away from the border. I am not sure what he meant by that. But I told him we are all interested in helping with the refugee problem. John Major will talk to him today, urging that he open the border. Ozal will be worried about that, because an enormous flood will hit him. Right now, we are at a very delicate point. Just to finish that point, we

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are very pleased the U.N. passed a strong (cease-fire) resolution yesterday. My intention is to get our forces home. Some will stay for a while, but we want to get them off Iraq's soil. (C)

The U.N. force, the blue helmets, will come in along the Iraqi border. But we might reserve the right to overfly until all the resolution's provisions are resolved. Just one more point, General Scowcroft informed me, there are reports of almost one million Kurds along the border with Iran. So, this is just a rundown. I will be glad to respond to any additional you would raise. (C)

PM Kaifu: George, you mentioned you wanted your troops home as soon as possible. How long will that take, so long as the Iraqi internal situation is so turbulent? How long before you get back your men and weapons? (C)

The President: When the blue helmets take position on the border, our troops will be out of there, all of them. I do not have an estimate when all will be home, but soon, very soon. It is a major logistical move, as you know. We will keep a substantial naval presence. We have been talking to the GCC countries about their own security arrangements. They know we do not want to keep any ground forces there. Oddly enough, they would like some to remain until they have their own security forces. Now, Brent, is there anything to add on the timetable? (C)

Gen. Scowcroft: No, sir. The UN forces should be in by the end of the week. The UN Secretary General has three days to consult, and our understanding is that some of the countries contributing troops already have forces moving there. (C)

The President: Our military, Toshiki, is convinced that damage to Iraq and its forces is such that Iraq no longer can project a threat to any neighbor. They can use forces as they are now to fight against an internal uprising. Their efficiency, power has been reduced, so they are no longer a threat. (C)

PM Kaifu: Then, if I may ask one more question. Eight countries, the GCC plus Egypt and Syria, are supposed to play a central role to restore and maintain peace in the Gulf. What kind of role is it desirable for Iran to play? (C)


The President: Obviously, we would like to see Iran no longer a threat to any GCC countries. Saudi Arabia is reaching out to improve relations with Iran. We think, we would welcome the views of your experts. We think Iran is moving away from the excesses of fundamentalism. In terms of US-Iran relations, we would like to see improved relations. I guess, to sum up, there is still a wariness in the Gulf states about Iran. There is much more hope now that the countries can live harmoniously with them.

But what is the Japanese view on Iran, now? You have good judgment. (C)

PM Kaifu: We cannot underestimate Iran when we think of Gulf security. We watch with interest when we see Saudi Arabia seeking to normalize relations with Iran. We are aware there are still pending issues between the U.S. and Iran. We want to appeal to Iran to take steady steps to improve relations. (C)

The President: On that point, they say we must first settle outstanding claims and assets. Our point is that it is very hard for us to do so, so long as Iran is involved in holding hostages. But I am a little bit optimistic now. May I change the subject and go back to North Korea? A major worry, and I think you have that as well, is that they will in some way build a nuclear weapon. So, I hope we all can stay together in insisting they comply with IAEA safeguards. Are you optimistic about vastly improved relations with them. (C)

PM Kaifu: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)



We are going to host a conference on disarmament and arms control in May. The Director of ACDA, Mr. Lehman, will attend. We will discuss the transparency of transfers of weapons. Do you have something to raise? (C)

The President: Not on the conference, but going back, one of our objectives is keeping the Middle East from being rearmed, not just with weapons of mass destruction, but conventional weapons as well. In that connection, North Korea is shipping SCUD missiles to the region. So I have no comment on your conference, but hope you will address that question. (C)

PM Kaifu: 1.4(b); 1.4(d)



Koreans. With respect to the conference, Mr. Lehman will attend and address the opening. (C)

The President: Good, he is our top man. Toshiki, let me raise a matter another hemisphere away. (U)

PM Kaifu: Please. (U)

The President: Next week, Mrs. Chamorro will be in Washington. She is embarked on an ambitious stabilization plan. We are planning to help her in this regard. We are talking about $50 million. It would be good if Japan could help. Once again, it would put Japan on the side of democracy and reform. She is a good woman. She has got very difficult problems. (C)

PM Kaifu: I met Mrs. Chamorro in Japan. We had a good discussion. I am aware of the situation she is in. In this connection, an investment fund will be set up under the IDB, and through this fund we are ready to help. In close connection with the IDB, the PDD initiative will be launched. Because it is such an important initiative, it will be launched in Costa Rica. We are thinking of hosting a ministerial in Japan together with the US to help out the Central American states. We will work closely with the US (C)

The President: What is the time frame? (U)

PM Kaifu: The dates are yet to be worked out. At the meeting in Costa Rica, April 9-10, we would like to announce the dates. (C)

The President: We will speak to our people. Anything to help out the situation we would welcome. (C)

May I say a word on the overall Middle East process? We will try very hard to be a catalyst for peace between the Middle East and the Palestinians and Israel. There is plenty of room for input by many countries on this difficult question, of course. Secretary Baker was in Israel recently. He was somewhat hopeful they might be more forthcoming. We are pleased that Israel, in the Gulf war, stayed out of the fighting despite the SCUDs fired at them. We are hopeful some of the Arab countries might be more forthcoming than they have been. As you know, they have not even recognized Israel's right to exist so long as a state of war existed. But we are going to try. We are not opposed to an international conference. But more important than the symbolism of an international conference is what will work. (C)

We are not advanced enough in our thinking to have one plan. But along the line we will be encouraging the Arab countries to end the boycott and eventually end hostilities, the state of war with Israel. Of course, along with that, Israel has to make some accommodation to the Palestinians. It will not be easy. But there are reasons, with our participation with the troops in the

Gulf and our historical relations with Israel, to push now as we have not before. And there might be an opportunity in here for Japan to have close relations with Israel. We would welcome your thoughts on this subject. I really think we have a chance now. (C)

PM Kaifu: We have a high regard for Israel's self-restraint despite the SCUD attacks. We have it in our minds to improve our relations with Israel. I recently sent Deputy Foreign Minister Owada there, and we are considering our policy. Over the past five years, there has been a remarkable increase in trade. It is up 3.6 times compared with five years ago. Japan ranks second to the US in Israeli exports. It would be helpful and important for Israel to be more flexible. (C)

The President: I must confess concern with respect to their settlements policy. They continue to do this. It is totally counterproductive. We all must continue to tell Israel that that makes lasting peace more difficult. (C)

PM Kaifu: We also think Israel must become more flexible on that point. We will use the forum of political dialogue to try to persuade Israel to be more flexible. As to the Arab boycott, we do think it is undesirable for the free flow of goods and trade. (C)

The President: Maybe it will do something to shut that guy up outside the hotel. He was shouting something about Israel. During the Gulf war, somebody decided to beat drums. It has nothing to do with war. All it did was make Brent Scowcroft irritable, and Barbara, her office is also on that side of the White House.. and the hotel, the Hay-Adams... the hotel tried and the Secret Service tried to get them to stop. (C)

PM Kaifu: Ambassador Armacost had drums, too. (C)

Ambassador Armacost: Mainichi. (U)

PM Kaifu: (In English) Every day. (U)

Ambassador Armacost: Outside my office. (U)

The President: Drums...? (U)

Ambassador Armacost: Yes, Buddhist drums. Soft. (U)

The President: I am glad you talked in there on SII. It is very important to us and on the Japanese side. But I would also like to raise another subject that also starts with an "S." I come from Texas. The superconducting supercollider is in Texas. If you have any scientists who want to get into a project, that is a fine one. I don't know how my radio works, but the scientists

tell me the SSC is a fine one. If there is someone looking for a scientific investment, this is a fine one. (C)

PM Kaifu: With respect to SII, we have submitted five bills to fulfill our commitment to the report. As to the SSC, we know scientists are interested in the project. I know each agency is looking into the project. (C)

The President: We are running late. We both need private time for the press questions. I don't want to cut this off, but maybe we should adjourn at this time. I think we are on the same wavelength on the contentious issues. Have we got a joint wording? (C)

General Scowcroft: It needs some work. (U)

The President: I would like to make a final comment, in view of the presence of a member of the Diet. This relationship is fundamentally in good shape and we view it as a very important relationship. I hope I don't have to say that. I will do my level best to explain to the American people the respect I have for this relationship and also for this fine Prime Minister here. Thanks for coming all this way. (C)

----------End of Conversation----------

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Santer and EC President Delors

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert Kimmitt, Acting Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick, Counsellor, Department of State
Edward Rowell, Ambassador to the EC
David C. Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs, (Notetaker)

EC

Jacques Santer, Prime Minister
Jacques Delors, President
Andre Philippe, Ambassador to the U.S.
Jean-Jacques Kasel, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Albert Hansen, Counsellor to Prime Minister
Pascal Lamy, Special Assistant to the President
Guenter Burghardt, Political Director, EC Commission
Andreas van Agt, Head Permanent Delegation of the EC Commission

DATE, TIME: April 11, 1991 (11:00 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.)
PLACE: Cabinet Room and Old Family Dinning Room

The President: Welcome. The floor is yours. I suggest we make it a workmanlike discussion. We will be happy to hear from you on the first item. (U)

Prime Minister Santer: We're happy for this opportunity. It's the first U.S.-EC summit since the declaration that we signed

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last year. Since then, the world has shifted more. There are many issues, and our time is short. (S)

The first item on our agenda is Europe after the Paris CSCE summit. In our view, a number of basic changes have taken place in Europe climaxed by the Paris Charter. The European Community is now at a stage where our founding fathers' expectations will at last be fulfilled. We will be not only an economic community but are now about to add a political dimension as well. This commitment to political union has immediate consequences. For one thing, we now understand better that defense and security are not synonymous. The Atlantic Alliance must review its own doctrine; 11 of the 16 NATO members will have a common foreign and security policy in the European political union. This could have an immediate impact on the relations between the EC and the United States. This gives the U.S. and Europe three avenues for transatlantic relations. The U.S.-EC dialogue, NATO, and CSCE. We can use all of these avenues. (S)

We have concluded that with political union, we will need to adapt existing structures but not break them. We don't want to break America's sponsorship in Europe. The changes that we are making should be in solidarity with the United States. We want to preserve NATO and by that I mean alliance assets, alliance consultations, the integrated command structure and the U.S. force presence. All of these must remain. But we have new developments. There will be multinational forces in Europe, some including the U.S. and some that are purely European. We have to decide on the future of the WEU. It is our view that there should be an organic link between the WEU and the 12. We have not made any final decisions on this matter among the 12; it is not easy. (S)

We also have to reach some understandings about the relationship of the WEU to NATO. Let me offer some general observations. First, there can be no European political union without a common foreign policy and a common security policy and eventually a common defense policy. Second, there can be no European political union without NATO. Third, the relations among European political union, WEU and NATO need to be worked out. That is the essence of the debate. This debate over the European political union overlaps with our own debate about the European monetary union. (S)

As political union is achieved, Europe will at last be in a position to fulfill its logical responsibilities in solidarity with the United States and within NATO. Today we are in a position to give Europe a new path toward the political dimension that has been lacking. (S)

The President: Let me respond. With the events of 1989, we in the West had a sense of euphoria that peace and security had at last come to Europe. But with recent events, we're still concerned about developments in the Soviet Union. These

instabilities reinforce the need to keep our guard up and to have an affective defense. We understand what you are trying to achieve with political union, and we support the trend. But as Europe moves toward a common security policy we need to preserve and if possible strengthen our alliance by tying European security into the alliance rather than making it an independent identity. It seems to us that this is in everyone's interest. The Alliance should be the principal venue for consultations and the forum for agreement on all policies that bear on the Alliance responsibilities of NATO members. (~~S~~)

General Scowcroft: In the security field, the United States should continue be an integral part of Europe. And American and European security should be indivisible. This is a matter of historic consequence. Western Europe's unification does not obviate need for U.S. engagement in Europe's security. (~~S~~)

Robert Zoellick: The decisions on European political and monetary union are yours to take. But we are very interested in these decisions and we welcome your offer for contacts to learn about your thinking. In the security realm, our view is that transatlantic security is indivisible, and we need to work toward unintended consequences, of your decisions on European political union such as steps that could weaken the command structure of NATO. (~~S~~)

We also believe that CSCE is at an important institutional juncture. It has an important role, especially in East European security and as the conscious of the Continent. Therefore, we look for real results. (~~S~~)

President Delors: Dear President, even if there are some differences at times we are all in fundamental agreement. We Europeans need to be careful that we don't create problems here in the United States concerning NATO and your position in Europe. The Alliance is the first venue. But we think the European pillar will help the United States because it will mean a stronger European commitment to the defense to the alliance. (~~S~~)

The President: That is helpful to know. (U)

Jean-Jacques Kasel: Next week, General Galvin is coming to Luxembourg to discuss these matters. (~~S~~)

The President: We need to do more of this kind of consultation. Now on Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, we think it is essential to consolidate the gains of the last two years, despite the enormous problems that these countries have. While this is a matter for you to decide, we think support for Eastern Europe should be a matter of extraordinary high priority for the European Community. We will of course do what we can to help and you can let us know where you think our help would be most effective. We have increased our assistance by 50% and we will urge other countries to increase their by some considerable measure as well. (~~S~~)

The reforms in Eastern Europe are at the point now where investment is essential. It would be a tragedy if these economies collapsed and these democracies failed. We will do what we can, but Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia need more access to markets, consistent with the GATT. We urge you to give them as much market access as possible, as we will do. Otherwise there will not be any investment and they will remain depressed and dependent -- which is not in your interest or ours. ~~(S)~~

We will renew this as a top American priority and we hope you will do likewise. ~~(S)~~

On Yugoslavia I understand that there is close cooperation between the United States and the EC. But we remain very troubled about this country. We have a common interest in seeing Yugoslavia held together without violence and with reform. I hope that by working together we can have an impact. We want to continue to cooperate. What are your views? ~~(S)~~

President Delors: Leaving aside the problems of the integration of Eastern Germany into Germany the other new democracies are undertaking a very difficult task. They have two sources of help. Help from the West bilaterally and through the G-24 which is having some good results for Poland and Hungary. In the aggregate, we have provided $8 billion in aid to Poland from the EC and $6 billion to Hungary. There are enormous needs for training and technical assistance which we are trying to address. We also rallied around the IMF and the World Bank. They have to be the prime promoter for the problem of financing of these countries. $15 billion has been offered of which the EC has contributed $3.7 billion and as you know we have also cancelled significant debt for Poland. We are now working on trade and agreement cooperations with these countries. They have suffered a serious breakdown of trade with the Soviet Union. Its dropped by 50%. The Commission is pressing its members very hard on opening up markets. Our aim is a free trade area for these countries. We also try to strengthen their confidence by maximizing high level political dialogue. Thirdly, we try to strengthen cultural links. This is important because it helps protect against any sharp changes in the political situation in Eastern Europe. ~~(S)~~

We have a double message (1) To the population of these countries work hard but know that you can count on us. We need to be sure that they understand that we will help so that they can bear the sacrifices to transform their societies. (2) Appeal to foreign investors, including Japan, to take an interest in these countries. ~~(S)~~

We are seriously concerned that we could have a social revolt in Poland over the reforms. We could have civil war in Czechoslovakia. We in the EC are willing to grant asymmetrical agreements. The Commission will not hesitate to tell the 12 members how important this is. We are absolutely right, Mr.

President, to raise the question of markets. We will urge our governments to open markets. (S)

With regards to Yugoslavia, we will make a further approach from the highest level of the EC to both Federal and Republic authorities in Yugoslavia urging them to reform but also to maintain unity if they want to participate in Europe. Prime Minister Santer and I will give this message to Markovic and the others. (S)

The President: We are together on Yugoslavia. (S)

President Delors: I believe we should turn to the topic of the Soviet Union where the EC is suppose to offer the first comment. We all know about their economic difficulties, production is down, shortages are up. Our staffs in the Soviet Union say that people lived better under Brezhnev. There is no foreign exchange. The one encouraging sign is that the microeconomic level where there is an impetus towards markets. But basically we are sitting on a volcano. The referendum proved nothing. They have to reform their institutions, work out their institutional arrangements; otherwise they cannot reform their economy. Without new arrangements among its institutions, this country is like a puppet with its strings cut. I would like to see an agreement to implement the union treaty between the Union and the Republics. Also speaking personally I think the Baltics must be more realistic about prospects of immediate independence. I'm not sure that they realize that by their actions they could cause widespread upheaval throughout the Soviet Union. (S)

Lets hope that Gorbachev will broaden the political base of his government by bringing in some people who have a commitment to change. Gorbachev is the one, maybe the only one on whom we can count. I hope he will reach some kind of agreement with Yeltsin. (S)

As far as EC assistance is concerned, we will not give any now. But we know by June that there could be a very serious problem and an appeal from Gorbachev to provide food aid. Right now we are focusing large scale resources on technical assistance, carefully targeted. We deal with the Center not with the Republics. Doing so would make Gorbachev weaker. (S)

The President: The Soviet Union presents a mixed picture. Gorbachev was very cooperative during the Gulf crisis. He permitted the United Nations to be effective, not only in sanctions but in the use of force. We worked closely with him. Despite some talk you might have heard, we were not upset by his last-minute initiative. We understood and are sensitive to his domestic problems, and it did not get in our way. Gorbachev stayed with us. We need to deal with who's in power. That said, we worry about his shift to the right, such as CFE Treaty. I should mention to you that we think that the CFE treaty might work out, but we can't be sure. (S)

Like you we are concerned about serious instability. We will continue to engage Moscow and push for domestic reform; but we won't push too hard or it will hurt Gorbachev and strengthen the military. (S)

With regards to the Baltics, I tend to agree with you, they should not overdo it. Of course we meet with them, I think we have met with them all. The Estonians seem much more reasonable than the Lithuanians. The principle we stand for is that they should be independent, but they need to move cautiously. We need to be cautious. We do not want to facilitate a right wing takeover in the Soviet Union because then we would lose everything that Gorbachev has offered. So we should join together in keep up pressure on the Baltics. I believe that Gorbachev did not order force in the Baltics. He said he didn't and I have to believe him. I wish he could just start moving in the right direction. (S)

The Soviet obviously have abandoned radical reform. Our policy will be to encourage resumption of the reform process but not to become embroiled. Dealing with Yelstin is a dilemma because he represents the values that we support but at the same time for all we know he might be a totalitarian. After all, he has asked for unusual powers. (S)

All in all, I think that the U.S. and EC are not far apart. (S)

President Delors: Much of the Soviet agricultural production never gets to the shops. They will have to prove to us that they have actual requirements -- and also prove that any food that we provide will actual get to the people. Then and only then will be provide food aid. (S)

The President: Do you think Gorbachev will be there in a year? I don't know the answer myself. He has horrendous problems. Every morning when he wakes up he finds that some other republic has declared independence. What worries me is what will happen if he leaves. The takeover could be from the right. His successor could be Yaneyev supported by the military and KGB. Then everything would be different for us. (S)

Prime Minister Santer: We share your views Mr. President. There is no easy answer to your question. It's a most difficult situation. We have to support Gorbachev's efforts, and we have to support Gorbachev himself. At the same time, he is a prisoner of the conservatives. We also have a public opinion problem in the West, explaining why we are working with him even though he has abandoned the reforms that were so helpful. In particular, why do we support Gorbachev inspite of the fact that he will not permit the Baltics to go free. This is a real dilemma. The Soviets really need to understand that they need a new type of union. (S)

Robert Zoellick: I hope you will bear in mind that as you help the Soviets that you could take away East European markets in the Soviet Union, such as with agriculture or pharmaceutical products. Also with regard to your concept how Europeans Soviet energy cooperation, we are concerned about being excluded. (S)

President Delors: For the time being the East Europeans have no basis for complaining about any assistance that we have provided to the Soviet Union because it has simply not displaced their exports to the Soviet Union. (C)

The President: With regard to Iraq, we did the right thing in liberating Kuwait. And now we will bring our troops home. But we are very concerned about the refugees. We are very pleased with our cooperation with Europe, not only in a crisis but now with regards to the refugees. We will do our part, but we must not become involved in the civil war. I'm being criticized for not using force -- for example, not shooting down helicopters. This criticism will not force me to commit American forces. We will do all in our power to help on the "enclaves." We should talk about this differently. The Secretary General is rightly worried about what will happen if we had an enclaves resolution. The Soviets and the Chinese would not go along. We need to regain the moral high ground on this issue. We are making it clear that we will use force if Saddam Hussein interferes with the humanitarian effort above the 36th parallel. In such a situation we would of course talk to you; but we won't let him shoot at our relief effort. That said we won't get involved in an age-old civil war. In the south the neutral zone and the UN presence of course will make things easier. (S)

There will be no normal relations with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein is there. Saddam Hussein is sanctioned forever. We still hope that some military or perhaps party element will take matters into their own hands. (S)

Prime Minister Santer: The European Council met on this matter. We have already committed to $200 million to supplement the aid to refugees that we had already undertaken. John Majors proposed enclaves. But it's clear that we cannot have a legal enclave. Its got to be a humanitarian sector. Our aim is to get the refugees back to their homes, therefore, we need some kind of safety zones within Iraq. Public opinion will not understand why Saddam Hussein is permitted to do this. If he has been defeated why is it that we let him get away with this. (S)

Our hope is that there will be a continuous U.N. presence to prevent Saddam Hussein from committing genocide against the Kurds. We need to give the Kurds a feeling that they can stay in Iraq safely. The 12 want to protect the refugees in Iraq for humanitarian purposes. The international community has achieved real credibility during the war, but now it must restore that credibility. (S)

The President: Would Europe support the use force to punish Saddam Hussein if he interfered with the relief effort? (S)

Prime Minister Santer: Our reading of the UN Charter indicates that in Chapter 7 would permit military intervention in that case. I think that the EC would support it if the Security Council said okay. (S)

The President: Yes, but the Soviets and Chinese might not support it. (S)

General Scowcroft: When we talk to the press, they might try to accentuate the differences between the United States and Europe. (S)

The President: The press says that the United States has been more callous than Europe. The fact is that John Major and I agree. We are not going to carve out a part of Iraq. And the Turks will not keep the Kurds. (S)

President Delors: The UN man who has been sent there is good. We know him, he is a Belgian. I understand he has a long term mission. (S)

Prime Minister Santer: The EC agrees that there could be no normalization of relations with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. (S)

The President: Let me tell you about Jim Baker's work in the Middle East. We are looking for any formula that will work. We and others may have to forget past positions in order to find a successful formula. I want to assure you that we are not trying to exclude anybody, that is not our purpose. Let's find out what will work and then decide how to proceed. We will bring Israel along. Perhaps Europe can help to deliver the Arabs. In failing to embrace the idea of a CSCM, we don't mean to exclude Europe. All we care about is what will work. (S)

Prime Minister Santer: We welcome your speech on the Middle East to Congress and also Jim Baker's mission. These are positive initiatives. But we have discussed this matter in the EC, and I want you to understand that we are ready to take our responsibility. We have links in the Middle East as well as interests to provide $7 billion of aid, and we do have influence. Frankly, our member countries would not understand why the Soviet Union participates but the EC does not. And we are convinced that we could be helpful. (S)

The President: I want something that will work. We have new circumstances. The Arabs now have a different view. We have a new opportunity. Our policy will be predicated on what works; I'm trying not to exclude people because that would make us appear to be more in the lead. This is not our purpose. We must all set aside such matters of pride. The situation is unaccept-

able. It is crazy to have these settlements continuing and to have an Arab boycott still in place in 1991. We should recognize that this situation makes no sense. We will consult with you; we will definitely not leave you in the dark. We are trying to use new found credibility that the United States has. We are not trying to gain prestige. If you could deliver the peace for us on the side lines that would be fine with me. (S)

President Delors: If Israel is willing to enter into the peace process, the EC is ready to offer Israel markets and also help by bringing our influence to bear with the Arabs. (S)

The President: The Israelis are very difficult, as you know. Dealing with this government in particular is difficult. But even Shamir seems to be willing to talk. (S)

President Delors: If we are involved, we will also take responsibility in the Maghreb. (S)

The President: It is important for you in any case to take the lead in Maghreb. You tell us what we can do to help. I discussed this with Mitterrand. We talked about Tunisia and Algeria. He advised me on where our policies might not be as advanced as your own. This is an area where you can lead. (S)

Robert Kimmitt: I might add Mr. President that perhaps it's possible for the EC to be more helpful with Israel. I think this is one of our considerations. (S)

President Delors: Yes, I understand. Israel is worried about their position after a settlement. But the EC is prepared to offer new cooperation and new markets to Israel. (S)

The President: One thing you could do would be to use some influence in Ethiopia to get the Falatian Jews free to go to Israel. (S)

President Delors: On the Uruguay Round, the mood is better. We are grateful for your effort in seeking an extension in the fast-track authority. We agree that the Uruguay Round is important but we have to make progress in many sectors not, only agricultural but services and intellectual property. We are ready for discreet U.S.-EC discussions on all issues. We have a new paper on the table on reform of our common agricultural policy. It will take months to convince the 12 members on CAP reform. As you know, it is a very complicated matter. But we hope to achieve something by the end of the year. What we will achieve will involve less subsidies for exports but more subsidies for rural development.

Prime Minister Santer: I was to emphasize Mr. President that there are many other areas besides agriculture to be discussed in the GATT.

President Delors: On our new CAP reform, 9 of the 12 are okay. One is hesitant, and 2 are against. The three that have a problem are the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands. This is because it will involve reduced subsidies to the larger farms. (S)

The President: You can be helpful on our fast-track vote. We will fight for it but there is a way you can help -- if you could overcome this problem of oilseeds, which is a GATT dispute, which could be a problem for our fast-track vote. (S)

President Delors: This is a problem. On CAP reform in general, it is important that we do this for our own reasons. It will not help if it appears that we are transforming the common agricultural policy because of the GATT negotiations or because of the U.S. pressure. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Tunisian Ambassador's Credentials Ceremony (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Ambassador Ismail Khelil Brent Scowcroft DAS Vreeland, State Sandra Charles, NSC
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	April 11, 1991; 3:30-3:45 p.m.; The Gold Room

The President: We have lots of work to do. And I know from your background and your experience that you are just the man to do it. I recognize there was some stress between us during the war, but it was not bilateral in that sense. The President veered toward the opposition toward those who were our opponents. We weren't particularly happy about that. But we have had a longstanding relationship and you are the guy to build on it here. Please tell your President that that's what we want to do. I know from where he is he must be wondering if the United States is upset. Well, we do wish he had done thing differently, but I don't think he attacked us personally. I understand it. We have a base to build on here. (C)

The Ambassador: We have had a special relationship over the years. For 35 years there has been cooperation between us. The President is eager to maintain with you and your country the best relations. (C)

The President: Let me ask you is there a lot of pressure on the government from the fundamentalists for change? (C)

The Ambassador: Yes, and they took advantage of the situation and used the situation. But we managed the crisis. On the substance we always condemned the invasion of Kuwait and told the Iraqis. We emphasized that we wanted them to withdraw. The President has been tough with Iraq. On this objective we have been in full agreement. At the August 3 Arab League meeting I was there and helped draft the resolution condemning the invasion, and said that we needed to recognize all the consequences of it. Tunisia was one of the countries that spoke out strongly. Our Embassy in Kuwait was among the last to withdraw. Iraq was not happy with how long we kept our Ambassador there. (C)

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The President: I have a question: when some of the people who opposed us in favor of Saddam, some who were to the left of the President, when they see these refugees now, what are these critics of ours saying now that he is killing his own people? Do they see it as an internal matter? That goes for Jordan too. I'd like to know what Jordan has said. (C)

The Ambassador: These people realized that he shouldn't have stayed in Kuwait to his last man. He had many chances to withdraw. Now this situation is seen as a sad situation. We are sympathetic with what you are doing. You don't want to interfere in Iraqi's internal affairs, and on the other hand, you can't watch it continue. We are filled with admiration for what you are doing. It is the best thing. (C)

The President: What would help is for the people running Iraq to get him out. We have said we can't have normal relations with him. I know Mitterrand, who I spoke to about an hour ago, feels that way. And John Major, and the EC Prime Minister De Lors and Santer. We don't want to hurt the Iraqi people; we want to save the Kurds and the people in the south. But there can't be relations with us with him especially with what he is doing to the Kurds. I'm being criticized on the right and the left about not shooting down the helicopters. We are trying to stay within the UN mandate. It would be wonderful if the Baathis, and the military would say it was time to get him out and reconcile with the south. (C)

The Ambassador: I hope there will be a solution in the Middle East as well. (C)

The President: We are following up on that now. (U)

The Ambassador: There is an opportunity it seems to find a resolution. (C)

The President: We are working hard for it. The odd thing is that there seems to be a chance now with Israel and the Arab states. We want to follow through on it. We will be working it hard. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to Germany
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff

Gerhard Stoltenberg, Minister of Defense
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Manfred Eisele, Major General, Ministry of Defense
Peter Wichert, Head of Planning Staff, Ministry of Defense

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DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 12, 1991, 3:15 - 3:30 p.m.
General Scowcroft's Office

The President dropped by during General Scowcroft's meeting with Minister Stoltenberg. (U)

The President: Did you have good talks with Cheney? (U)

Minister Stoltenberg: Yes. Mr. President, the Federal Chancellor asked me to extend his greetings. (U)

The President: How is that skinny man? He told me he was losing weight. (U)

Minister Stoltenberg: He has great energy. We have difficulties: the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the former GDR. We are making strong efforts to raise funds for investment there. (U)

The President: I had a long talk with Havel today. He has real concerns about the problems of shutting down his defense plants, especially in Slovakia. Walesa raised the same issue -- that they are turning out tanks that no one wants. (C)

Minister Stoltenberg: Czechoslovak Defense Minister Dobrovsky mentioned the same problem, so we should discuss this within the EC and the G-7 and give them our support. (C)

The President: We talked yesterday with Santer and Delors. A lot of our discussion was focused on Eastern Europe. They said they will do more. (C)

Minister Stoltenberg: They ought to have open markets, and the EC should do more in that regard. (C)

The President: We are trying to do more, too. (U)

Minister Stoltenberg: Mr. President, we have great admiration for your leadership in the Gulf war, and hope you also succeed in the very difficult task of assuring stability. (C)

The President: We don't want the status quo ante. Baker is over there, probing for agreement. We are not too discouraged; in some areas there are signs of flux. I told Delors and Santer that with this Baker trip we are not trying to close others out. There is plenty of room in this briar patch. We have probably a little more leverage in some questions. But I agree that it is very important to find some answers, not just to the Palestinian Question but also Lebanon, the Arab-Israel question (which is of course bound up with the Palestinian issue), and the Gulf itself. I don't seek how we can deal with Saddam Hussein still in power. He will never be able to develop normal relations with the U.S. and others. But we won't get sucked into a Vietnam-like quagmire. (C)

Minister Stoltenberg: Is there a chance for the British proposal to create safety zones? (C)

The President: De facto we have them already. The problem at the UN is that China might veto any new resolution, but we are told that the last resolution -- 688 -- gives us the authority to take care of people in Iraq. We've told Saddam Hussein that there can be no military action north of the 36th parallel. Since we made that clear, he has taken no action, though there is some just below the 36th parallel. He's stupid, but he would be really stupid if he attacked those convoys. I don't expect him to do that. (C)

Brent Scowcroft: He has been very cautious -- very, very cautious. (U)

Minister Stoltenberg: We are concerned about the violation of the arms control treaty by the Soviet Union. I read with interest your proposal to Gorbachev. (C)

The President: I think he is trying, though he has certain constraints. But Brent is the expert on this. (C)

Brent Scowcroft: One problem is that the military says the treaty went too far -- not just to equal percentages but to equal levels. This was reinforced by the performance of their equipment in the Gulf. But Gorbachev was reassuring to the President. I'm a bit more optimistic now. (C)

The President: One problem is whether Gorbachev will be around. I worry about his survival. It seems unlikely that they could ever set the clock back to the cold Stalin days, but we are very sensitive not to push the military too far. (C)

Minister Stoltenberg: May I raise one other issue, Mr. President? We believe it very important to continue the work on the future policy of NATO. You are involved in the political strategy, and we defense ministers are working on the military strategy. I hope by the end of May we can decide at least on an interim report, because if we postpone this our national plans will go in different directions. We need guidelines at a time when all of us face changes in manpower and planning. I hope that in the next six weeks we will agree on a coherent concept. (C)

The President: It is very important. (U)

Minister Stoltenberg: It is in our European interest to keep substantial U.S. forces. (U)

The President: Is that view universally held among the people of Germany? (U)

Minister Stoltenberg: It is by the great majority, aside from some in the political opposition or on the extremes, left and right. It is interesting that in regions where troops are stationed, the mood is completely changing. In Rheinland Pfalz, the people say that the Americans must stay. I told them that two years ago they were saying very different things -- about low level flying and so forth. The mood has really changed. (U)

Ambassador Walters: When the President was there, the Minister-President gave me a letter noting all the problems. Now he says for God's sake don't leave before the elections. (C)

Minister Stoltenberg: It is curious, but the basic mood has changed. We all know there will be fewer troops, but the great majority want them to stay in substantial numbers. (U)

The President: You mentioned the U.S. role in the Gulf, and I thank you for that. I also want to thank you for Germany's role. I know the constraints you have, but I also know you did all you could. Germany took some shots here, but I am proud to say the Germany carried a great deal of the burden. Most of the comment has been about financial support, but we are also grateful for the tremendous logistical support. So there are no problems at all, only pride that we were together and gratitude for what you did. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier of Czechoslovakia (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs

Jiri Dienstbier, Foreign Minister
Rita Klimova, Ambassador to the U.S.
Dana Hunatova, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Michael Cermak, Advisor to the Foreign Minister
Ladislav Mravec, Deputy Chief of Mission, Czechoslovak Embassy
Vladimir Galuska, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 16, 1991, 2:15 - 2:30 p.m.
General Scowcroft's Office

The President dropped by during General Scowcroft's meeting with Foreign Minister Dienstbier. (U)

The President: Your President explained Slovak problems with high unemployment resulting from military plants closing down. (C)

Minister Dienstbier: We need help. If we survive the next two to three years, we will be fine. But we need very concrete help with specific problems -- markets for our agriculture and textiles, defense conversion, and the ability to sell our sport and hunting rifles. Progress in these areas would give our people hope. (C)

The President: I spoke about this in my speech on Saturday. Congress wants to help, and it will be easier for Czechoslovakia than for China. But I don't want to be too hopeful. We have a real problem with textiles in our Congress. (C)

Minister Dienstbier: We also would like to be involved in the reconstruction of Kuwait. (C)

The President: Your President mentioned that. What do you have in mind? (U)

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Ambassador Klimova: We could repair the water towers, which our country built, and also their pipelines and high tension power lines. (C)

The President: The reconstruction is going slower than we thought it would. (C)

Brent Scowcroft: It is getting a little better, but there is a lot of criticism for the government for being inept. (C)

Minister Dienstbier: In the short run, we need help in opening markets in the U.S. and Kuwait. I told Secretary Baker that Syria owes us $1 billion. He said he would talk to Assad. (C)

Ambassador Klimova: We also have $800 million in Iraq. (C)

The President: Don't hold your breath with this guy. That is why I have been so hectic. We want to get the refugees back into Iraq and give them security support. I just talked to the Secretary General about a major initiative. We have put in a tremendous amount so far. (C)

Minister Dienstbier: We also sent help, in cooperation with you. The problem is how to get it into the region. Maybe it could be done through Iran. (C)

The President: Germany is helping. I talked to Kohl about his efforts in Iran. We have problems with the Iranians, as you know. (C)

Minister Dienstbier: We went there a couple of months ago and talked with Rafsanjani and Velayati. (C)

The President: Do they want better relations with you? (C)

Minister Dienstbier: Yes. They are still very anti-American, but not so direct as before. They blame Saddam Hussein for American participation in the Gulf. (C)

The President: They were a problem during the war. They seemed almost to be for Saddam Hussein. (C)

Minister Dienstbier: They told me America wanted to get to the Gulf and that they will never learn. (C)

The President: The main thing is that we want to support Czechoslovakia in any way we can. How is President Havel's health? (U)

Minister Dienstbier: He had influenza, but it was nothing serious. We are preparing to negotiate about coming to the U.S. in September or October. (C)

Brent Scowcroft: We will work it out. (U)

Minister Dienstbier: We are preparing a common declaration, which we would like to issue during his visit. ~~(C)~~

The President: Are you going elsewhere -- to New York? (U)

Minister Dienstbier: Tomorrow I will go to New York and then back to Prague. I was there Thursday. Saturday I went to Kissinger's house in Connecticut, and on Sunday to Yale. I also went to the Senate and House. (U)

The President: Did you mention your trade problems? Some of our best friends in the Congress are the most protectionist. ~~(C)~~

Minister Dienstbier: They seemed to be supportive. If we survive the next year, we will be all right. But we are now preparing three constitutions. (U)

The President: I have to go and take a call from President Ozal. Please give my best to your President. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with President Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Robert Kimmitt, Acting Secretary of State
John E. Robson, Acting Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs
Harry W. Shlaudeman, U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter (Cabinet Room)
Barbara Phillips, Interpreter (Oval Office)

Violeta Chamorro, President
Enrique Dreyfus, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Antonio Lacayo, Minister of the Presidency
Silvio De Franco, Minister of Economics and Development
Erwin Kruger, Minister of Foreign Cooperation
Alvin Guthrie, Governor, Autonomous Region of the Atlantic Coast
Ernesto Palazio, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States
Jose Adan Guerra, Vice Minister of the Presidency
Idette Swetye, Interpreter

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DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 17, 1991, 10:50 - 11:35 a.m.
Cabinet Room

The President: May I simply say welcome. We are so glad to have President Violeta Chamorro back, both in a professional sense and as a friend. We have great respect for President Chamorro and all she has done for Nicaragua and all she is trying to do. On a more personal side, we greatly appreciate her warm relationship

with my son Jeb and Columba our daughter-in-law, who will be here for dinner tonight and are looking forward to seeing her. I want to assure her that we greatly admire the progress she has made towards reconciliation and her efforts for economic recovery. And so *Señora Presidente, bienvenida*! That is all I know in Spanish, but it comes from the heart. I suggest that you bring up any subjects that you would like to discuss. And after that I will respond; and if it gets more technical, I will turn to my Ambassador in whom I have great confidence. ~~(C)~~

President Chamorro: The first thing that I want to say, and I will say it in English, "thank you, my dear president, George Bush." [Turns to Spanish] I am very pleased to see around the table a number of old friends, led by the President and the Vice President. As a woman I have felt that being here is like being in the family. I must say that I feel as if I am at home. Also as a woman, I want to say how much I appreciate the beautiful gift. I will of course, reciprocate. ~~(C)~~

The area which concerns me, concerns all of us, is that after having completing a year in office, the most important thing was to end the dissention and violence. We have passed through the revolution and the conflict, and now are rebuilding. We have given the ex-combatants land. We have given them help, but we have to help the remainder. I do not want to leave anyone without help. I want to help everyone. ~~(C)~~

Talking about the army. We have cut it back about 60%. A year ago there were about 86,000 -- now there are about 28,000 and these people are not out in the street -- we have helped them. The 5,000 officers have been given the ability to return to civilian positions in society. We gave them a job or money to help get resettled. We have also buried weapons to put an end to war. We have collected a quantity of arms and weapons. You have to remember that after years of dictatorships, weapons are a problem throughout my country. My concern is to put an end to weapons. To do this, we have to buy them back. We have to pay $25-50 depending on the size of the weapon. This is what I want to say, that I want to continue to reduce the number of weapons. We need help in buying the weapons back. ~~(C)~~

I have passed a law in the Legislative Assembly, a law that prohibits the selling of arms. This is designed principally for arms going to El Salvador, but it also applies to anyone. I want to get rid of all arms. I want to buy them back. Those who sold the arms to El Salvador are now in jail. ~~(C)~~

For the economic part, there is so much to say, we are a developing country. We are passing laws to privatize banking, to stimulate private investment, eliminate state monopolies -- we are making great progress. In two months or very soon, there will be a privatization law in place. I want to restore the economy quickly. I am very ambitious. I want people to have a better life. I want to have a free economy. That is why I am in favor or a Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Mexico. ~~(C)~~

Having said that, I also want human rights -- and I want to work towards complete peace throughout the area. We have five democracies throughout central America and we talk frequently on any topic. I had talked with President Cristiani and he said that there were certain subversives in Nicaragua. Then I talked with ONUCA about this, but they didn't find anyone. I don't want to see any more weapons in Nicaragua. I am an enemy of these things. (C)

Perhaps some day we can sign a trade agreement with you and Mexico, but that is up to you. (C)

Also, and this is most difficult to bring up, I have to pay back arrears to the Inter-American Development and the World Bank and I need to have additional help from you. I need $75 million. (C)

Foreign Minister Dreyfus: You have already offered $50 million and we ask that you, because you are the strongest nation in the world and you exercise leadership, that you add $25 million for a total of $75 million. Then..... (C)

President Chamorro: I have talked with Germany and Korea and with Taiwan. I am sending my son to Taiwan -- he presented his credentials yesterday. Any help you can give will be greatly appreciated. (C)

When I left Nicaragua, I sent to the Assembly, a bill to abolish the international court claim. I want to solve this case. As a woman I submitted to the Assembly a pardon to those who killed my husband. They vetoed my law, but my conscience is clear. (C)

I will keep my doors open. Twenty-five million will be very important. (C)

We want to help with Panama. We want to help President Endara. There is a meeting of Ministers of Agriculture in Panama and they asked the Presidents to come, and I will go. Central American presidents will be there and they will be pressed to try to find solutions to all problems. (C)

I am sorry to ask you for these things, but you asked me to be frank. (C)

The President: I will respond. It is always difficult to talk about money. I think we can be helpful to that request, but I do not want to get ahead of my staff. Bernie, what do you think about this? (C)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: Clearing the arrears is most important. We are fully committed to getting this done. If we need to have additional money to succeed, we will do so. There are several ways to do this. (C)

The President: Before I comment further, I want to check with Treasury. (C)

Under Secretary Robson: We did have a very positive meeting with Mrs. Chamorro and her advisors. She said that to clear their arrears with the international financial institutions was most important -- that they need to mend their relationship. We agree fully and we said that we would do all we could to help correct the arrears problem. (C)

Foreign Minister Dreyfus: There is a political condition to clearing up the arrearage. The success of democracy will depend on this process. If stability is important to the region -- then it is important to give Mrs. Chamorro what she needs. She is making a special effort to clearing the arrears which will make possible continued cash flow. Also, if the Nicaraguan approach succeeds, this will help in El Salvador. We can point to the success in Nicaragua as giving an example for peace process in other countries. In this connection, the legalization of elections with OAS participation which took place in Nicaragua is a very important example for democracy throughout the hemisphere, and must meet with ultimate success. (C)

The President: We will get this done one way or the other. Whether with AID or with Treasury, working together. (C)

President Chamorro: Permit me one minute. We have a very productive land, but without the economic assistance, we will not be able to have success. There is another little thing, I will finish my term in five years and we need to have success before my term has ended. My term will end the same time as yours. (C)

The President: Let me comment. You referred to the Hague and your case against the United States in the international court and your desire to rectify it. That is very important to us. I appreciate that you are trying to improve the climate for us to be able help you, but it is important to get a solution to this case. It is difficult to convince Congressmen to be forthcoming when people are suing us. I hope your law will be accepted. I know that sometimes when Administrations submit proposals they are dealt with in the Congress differently than we would like, but we will see if we can get this done in a proper way. And if there is a way we can help, let us know. (C)

President Chamorro: Our members of the Assembly need to have a sweetening from time to time. I will give each one a sweet so that they will be in a mood to pass the law. (C)

The President: A couple of points. I noticed, and the Vice President mentioned to me, that you very generously endorsed the Enterprise for the Americas (EAI) and the US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement in your talk to the Congress. We are going to fight very hard for both. The first step is fast track. If we can get this fast track and go forward with the Enterprise, not just words, but a real program, this will be greatly helpful for Latin America. (C)

People look at us as a great, powerful country. We just sent a half million people to the Persian Gulf. People say, what the hell, this is the United states and it can do anything it needs to do. I want to assure you that as we fulfill our solemn obligations to them in the Middle East and in Europe, we will not lose interest in our own neighbors; and one way that we are expressing our interest, is to move forward on the Enterprise for the Americas. (C)

On Panama, you said that you were going there. This is good. We worry about the situation there. We do not want to intervene in any way. As they get the stamp of respectability -- that will help solve their problems, and I am very glad to hear that you will be going there. (C)

You mentioned Japan. I asked Prime Minister Kaifu, God knows how long he will be there -- he is a good man, but he has terrible internal problems -- I have asked him to contribute as much as possible to Nicaragua. You can say in meeting other Ministers that the President of the United States has mentioned our interest to Prime Minister Kaifu. I don't know how much help that will be. We don't have relations with Taiwan, but perhaps your son can do more there than we can, but are we trying? (C)

Under Secretary Kimmitt: We have talked with the Taiwanese office here in Washington to ask them to help. (C)

The President: We have talked to Germany. We want to have their help. Germany has many obligations. Havel has asked them for help and they have shown a special problem with Eastern Germany and they have to help there. They have constraints, but we think they will help and we have urged them to do so. The structural reforms that you mentioned have our full support. A lot of the new democracies are finding problems in making the economic changes to help their people. I have seen sometimes that people are reluctant to see reductions in government entities. I know that your predecessors have a great reluctance to reducing unnecessary personnel. We want to help however we can. When I was talking with Lech Walesa of Poland, he said, I have a factory which builds tanks and you have beaten up on the tanks, so how can I sell them? He said that his country was still producing the tanks but there was, of course no market. He was having difficultly in shifting the priorities to other production. President Havel had a similar problem in Czechoslovakia. There is a large arms factory in Slovakia which was selling all over the world. They put a stop to selling arms, but now that have a factory with 100,00 people who are not working, and they are having difficultly in finding new ways to put those people to work. (C)

On polls, as you know I don't live by polls, but I have noted that the Nicaraguan people support you in carrying out your reform. I think it is a real tribute to you that they continue to support your reforms. Is my understanding correct that your approval rate was about 77%? (C)

Foreign Minister Dreyfus: Yes. (U)

President Chamorro: I want to say a little bit more. I have a great deal of travel to do. I am going to the Soviet Union to call on my friend Gorbachev. I will say to him, "What do I do with your tanks?" If he wants them back, he can figure out a way to take them back. I would be happy. Times are changing. There is a democratic move everywhere. Two years ago, when the Berlin wall came down, I said if this can happen there, why can't we change for democracy everywhere, especially in Nicaragua. I would like to help the Soviets, they are our friends now. I want to tell them about the democratic family. (C)

The President: I don't want to get off the subject, but in World War II when I first got into the Navy, Hirohito was depicted as the symbol of all evil. He was the bad guy. He was the same to us as Hitler. As we got over World War II, Hirohito went to see McArthur. Many Japanese were surprised and we were surprised that he would do that, but he went. People came to take another look at Hirohito. Later Barbara and I met him, and when you see him, here was this little, peaceful person going around with a butterfly net. There are changes in the world and sometimes yesterday's enemy is not the same today. We do not know how things will develop in the Soviet Union. Yeltzin is a new factor. We want to help the growth of democracy. But if we don't handle the situation properly, the military may come back. (C)

Well, back to arms transfers. I don't want to be contentious, but we are skeptical that the arms transfers to El Salvador are being done by rogue elements of the Nicaraguan military. Anyway, the army should go all out to stop shipments. I know that you have taken steps. You need to keep the pressure on. What would be helpful is if Soviet supplied spare parts for military items could be conditioned on a complete stopping of shipments to the FMLN. It would also be helpful if we could get the serial numbers from the weapons in the Nicaraguan inventory. I know that this may be difficult, but this would help us trace shipments. (C)

Foreign Minister Dreyfus: I think that we have shown that we are working effectively for the cause of peace in the area. Within the OAS, we have embarked our program of de-militarization and civilianization. We are thinking of a small fund with help from the United States, Spain and France to try to buy up arms. The OAS has a group in the area; we hope that perhaps they could stay six more months. We have collected abut 45 thousand rifles, but there are about 150 thousand more out there. Another thing, at the OAS, Nicaragua has deposited a full, complete inventory of its military assets as a result of agreements made. We need a security network that would cover all of Central America. Costa Rica and Nicaragua have given inventories of their military assets. Honduras will do it on its own soon. Guatemala and El Salvador want to wait. El Salvador doesn't want to reduce until there is an end to the guerilla threat. Mrs. Chamorro has been

pushing for the reduction of military expenditures in all of Latin America. (C)

On arms traffic, we think we can improve on performance here. We need US help. The head of ONUCA has a mandate which ends on the 6th of May. We need to renew the mandate, but it needs to be strengthened. All they do now is ask to see if the Contras comply. If I were a guerilla, and knew that ONUCA had no power to investigate, then I would not worry about my activities. ONUCA needs to have the ability to investigate. It needs to be strengthened. There is a General in charge from Canada. In addition, we would like to ask Perez de Cuellar to become more interested. We need to ask him to extend the mandate for six months and ask for a stricter mandate. (C)

On human rights, the situation with Enrique Bermudez is very sad. Mrs. Chamorro has named a special investigative, independent committee which includes a former commander of the Resistance, a representative of Cardinal Obando y Abravo, and other distinguished citizens. Before we came here, last week I delivered a request to the American Embassy asking for technical assistance from the United States. (C)

Under Secretary Kimmitt: The FBI says that it is prepared to lend technical assistance as requested. (C)

President Chamorro: I would like to ask again about the arrears program because we have been asking people to reaffirm commitments to clearing arrears. There is going to be a consultative group in May, and we need to go to it with a firm commitment. We need to be able to present the Nicaraguan people with something concrete. (C)

Under Secretary Robson: In all of our conversations we have recognized that there is a short time span, that we need to do it sooner that later. We are going to break our necks to see that the debt arrearage clearance is successful. (C)

President Chamorro: I know something else I would like to discuss also. I want to assure you that all young people are looking to the future and they are in my heart. I want to help all people and I will do all I can to bring about peace. I have encouraged by the fact that people are going to work for peace in El Salvador, and I am going to help. If I have a done a job in El Salvador, I will be happy. I am not a politician, you are. But often women can do things to smooth the way for the common good of mankind. I want to make a toast, "the Nicaraguan people love the United States." (C)

Oh, it looks like Mr. Guthrie would like to say something about the Atlantic. (C)

Mr. Guthrie: I want to say first that we very much appreciate the aid program that we have on the Atlantic coast. It will be helping from 5 to 7 thousand people. I also want to say that I am worried about the situation there because I am the Governor

and I am the Congressman and I am a Union man. I am worried because we have 670 miles of coast on the Atlantic side, and we are near Colombia, and we have problems with trafficking. I want to be helpful, and I think it would be helpful to us if we could get a used Coast Guard vessel. (C)

I want to tell a little story about what a teacher told me. There were two girls in a classroom who, when a piece of chalk broke and fell on the floor, begin sniffing the chalk powder. When he teacher asked why they were doing that, they replied that it was because their father did it. This is a sad commentary about the prevalence of cocaine in the area and we need to do everything we can to fight this problem. (C)

The President: We need to talk to Governor Martinez about this. We will see what we can do to help. (C)

Here is the plan. We will meet upstairs before the dinner. If there are any subjects that you would like to raise again, or if there are other things to talk about as a result of your other meetings, we will can discuss them and if need be, we can get a few people aside to discuss them. I think it will be a good dinner tonight. I'm told we will see Silvester Stallone. I look forward to seeing you. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Hassan Gouled of the Republic of Djibouti

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert Barrett, IV, U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti
Irvin Hicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Robert C. Frasure, Director for African Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham, Interpreter
Carol Wolter, Interpreter

Hassan Gouled Aptidon, President of Djibouti
Moumin Bahdon Farah, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ismail Omar Guelleh, Chef de Cabinet
Moussa Bouraleh, Minister of Finance
Mohamed Moussa Chehem, Minister of Agriculture
Roble Olhaye, Djibouti Ambassador to the U.S.
General Ali Mehidal Waiss, Chief of Staff
Gawad Farah, Head, Bilateral Relations, MFA

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 24, 1991, 11:15 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. EST
Cabinet Room

The President: May I say how much I have been looking forward to this visit? In our smaller session, I expressed to the President how much we appreciated Djibouti's support in the UN action in the Gulf. (U)

We didn't approach this war lightly. We didn't want to put our people in combat. We did a disproportionate share in the war. (U)

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I know that Djibouti's decision to take part was not easy. You had good relations with Iraq. But the bottom line which we appreciate is that you did the right thing. (C)

President Gouled raised Djibouti's financial needs with me. There are dire, he said. I didn't tell him about our problems. I didn't want to see him cry. Secretary Eagleburger will describe our efforts to help. (C)

We talked about Somalia some. (U)

You are among friends here, sir. (U)

President Gouled: Mr. President. It is good to be your guest here. I will be frank. I will speak from the heart. You earlier referred to the difficult events in the Gulf. We could not abide injustice. (C)

On the Middle East, there are two facets; the need for a lasting peace and the Palestinian problem is unresolved. A durable peace is needed between Iraq and Kuwait. We think everyone wants justice. (C)

On the Horn, in Ethiopia and Somalia we have two neighbors. Djibouti has been neutral and both have interfered with us. Both claim our territory. But we have maintained our integrity and dignity. We must struggle for peace in the region. Ethiopia and Somalia have people coming into Djibouti. During their wars, there have been repercussions which have added to our existing problems. (C)

We have a young population in Djibouti. They get heated up. There are no jobs. But stability is difficult to attain. (C)

Our most fervent hope is support for peace. (U)

People buy and sell arms like tomatoes in our country. (U)

The President: Who has these weapons? Are there armed groups. (C)

President Gouled: Ethiopian and Somali soldiers sell their weapons. They are just lying about. (C)

In 1977 we told them to lay down their weapons if they come into Djibouti. But there are weapons all over the place, AK-47s everywhere. (C)

We need dialogue to achieve peace. We value stability. We want dialogue. (C)

Do you have any specific questions? (U)

The President: I do have questions. We are very interested in Ethiopia. We would love to hear your views. (C)

Will Mengistu remain in office? Will he be weakened? We don't have very good relations with Ethiopia. (C)

President Gouled: We believe a good neighborliness. (U)

We recognize that the situation in Ethiopia is very serious. We must have a round table format. (C)

As far as Somalia is concerned, there is no President. No one. No one leads the country. No one is consulted by the other factions. We are not condoning any of them. (C)

It comes as a shock to us, this region. The Horn of Africa is sick. We are becoming sick as a result. (C)

The President: What about your relations with Yemen. We started to improve our relations. Salih was here. We liked him. But he bet on the wrong horse. It finished last. Yet the country is doing interesting things now. But we cannot embrace him now. Our allies think he did a deal with Saddam for Saudi oil. (C)

Yemen is close to you. They have resources. We have kept our private investments there. But he went too far with Iraq to protect his own interests. (C)

President Gouled: Djibouti once averted a war between the two Yemens. Unity was achieved. There is a good relationship. We can say what we think. (C)

They didn't want to endorse the Arab League resolution. But we didn't cut off ties. Yemen cannot be left to its own devices. Future solutions must be brought to bear. Saudi Arabia has a role to play. (C)

The President: That is helpful. We have strained relations with Jordan and Yemen. (C)

Jordan is important on the Palestinian question. King Hussein went further out than he had to do. He bet on the wrong horse too. We will work our way back on this one. (C)

It is an important relationship because of their key role in the Palestinian situation. (C)

Concerning Saddam, let me put some cards on the table. Because of his brutality to the Kuwaiti people, his rape of the environment which was ugly and mean, because of his brutality with the Kurds, there will never be any reconciliation with Saddam Hussein. We will never have normal relations with Saddam. I think the British, the French and the Saudis agree. ~~(C)~~

We have good relations with a lot of countries whom we used to be cross wise with. But not with Saddam Hussein, so long as I am in this job. ~~(C)~~

But I have no animosity to the people of Iraq. The tears run down my face when I see the pictures of the children in Baghdad. We have a problem with one man. And that position won't change. ~~(C)~~

But we will keep on helping refugees. (U)

You know him. I don't. How will he react to pressure? He thought he would prevail. He thought he would have standoff in the desert. ~~(C)~~

We want peace. We want your insights. (U)

President Gouled: I know Saddam. To trust him is another thing. I cannot give my friendship to Saddam. ~~(C)~~

When the Cairo resolution was adopted, the Iraqis criticized us. ~~(C)~~

In terms of humanitarian needs, we support what is being done, as we do in Djibouti on this issue. ~~(C)~~

On the future of Iraq, we must let the dust settle to see if there is a viable solution. ~~(C)~~

The priorities for us are Yemen and the Horn. If there are troops in Yemen, they are on our doorstep. ~~(C)~~

I have met Saddam several times but I cannot advise you. I cannot tell you what goes on inside him ~~(C)~~

The President: Do Saddam's neighbors think he will remain or will he go? ~~(C)~~

President Gouled: It is a complicated question. In Washington technology can tell you whether a woman is going to have a boy or a girl. (U)

Will he remain in power in Iraq? Djibouti does not have a vote on that issue. (C)

The President: I asked because I had General Schwarzkopf here yesterday, and he said most of the leaders in the region felt he wouldn't last. It makes a difference. (C)

I like the mystery of not knowing whether it will be a girl or a boy. But I don't like the mystery of not knowing whether Saddam will remain in power. (C)

President Gouled: The sum total of all of the factors is that not all believe he should exit. But his harm must be countered, such as what he did to the Kurds. But we haven't hit on a solution in the Arab league. (C)

Some people don't tell the truth at Arab League meetings. They kiss each other but they don't tell the truth. (C)

The President: Schwarzkopf said people in Basra are scared to death that Saddam will send in his tough guys to kill them. The Kurds are afraid of his goon squads, these police. There is terror up there. We feel a responsibility. It was never our intention to go in to get Saddam Hussein. (C)

World opinion sees this fear. Some are urging us to do more. I want to stop the death of babies. Saddam is making it difficult. (C)

We are helping the refugees. But it requires enormous amounts of money. We will do what is both human and right. That is the need. (U)

We are not talking about instant democracy in Baghdad, but an end to the suffering. (U)

Shall we go over to lunch now? (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with President Hassan Gouled of the Republic of Djibouti

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert Barrett, IV, U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti
Irvin Hicks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Robert C. Frasure, Director for African Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Eliza Burnham, Interpreter
Carol Wolter, Interpreter

Hassan Gouled Aptidon, President of Djibouti
Moumin Bahdon Farah, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ismail Omar Guelleh, Chef de Cabinet
Moussa Bouraleh, Minister of Finance
Mohamed Moussa Chehem, Minister of Agriculture
Roble Olhaye, Djibouti Ambassador to the U.S.
General Ali Mehidal Waiss, Chief of Staff
Gawad Farah, Head, Bilateral Relations, MFA

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 24, 1991, 12:05 - 1:15 p.m. EST
Old Family Dining Room

The President: Tell us about your economic problems. You said there is high unemployment? (U)

President Gouled: We are suffering from the repercussions of war. There are refugees. We cannot send them back. (U)

The President: What are the numbers? (U)

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President Gouled: About a fourth of our population. (U)

The President: Do they work in Djibouti? (U)

President Gouled: Some do. But we have no natural boundaries. There are family ties especially with the Somalis. Some work in the capital. But housing is scarce. There is a lot of fallout from the war. (U)

In particular there are economic projects in our country which were curtailed because of lack of money from the Gulf, from Kuwait. We need to take up these projects again. (C)

We also need emergency assistance. (C)

The President: Is the UN helping? UNHCR? (U)

President Gouled: We have two types of refugees. For the Ethiopians, yes, the UN is helping. We signed a resettlement agreement in which 30,000 went home. About 1500 refused. (C)

But UN refugee resolutions are based on non-African conditions. The Somalis are not officially refugees. We are waiting for the situation to stabilize. The UN buys food and we distribute it. But Somalis cannot be distinguished from Djiboutians. It is the same language. They meld in easily. In the case of the Somalis, there are family ties. (C)

Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: Have you approached the Saudis or others on these projects? For assistance? (C)

President Gouled: No. Everyone is moaning and groaning. I don't think they will do it until President Bush asks them to do it. I have no other way to answer your questions. (C)

General Scowcroft: On Ethiopia, do you see any way the conflict can be resolved and their territorial integrity maintained? (C)

President Gouled: I feel more comfortable talking about Somalia. We need a roundtable for Ethiopia. There must be a dialogue. (C)

The President: Is the next Arab League meeting in Cairo? (U)

President Gouled: Yes. (U)

The President: Is the agenda set? (U)

President Gouled: All outstanding issues since the invasion of Kuwait. There is a need to restore the ties among Arab states. (C)

Assistant to the President Gates: You said Africa is sick. What is the problem? Economics? (U)

President Gouled: Economics, politics, social problems. All of it. (U)

Assistant to the President Gates: What is the role of tribalism now? (C)

President Gouled: Not so much. It is rather the lack of resources, a lack of dialogue. (C)

We need to lay down our weapons. We need the support of friendly countries. (C)

Minister Farah: Population growth outweighs production. Everywhere it is over 3%. (U)

There is a gap between development and growth. Aside from climate problems, there is also poor management. (U)

Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: How do you see the PLO? Have they been permanently damaged by their position on the Gulf War? (C)

President Gouled: We lose our appetite if we keep talking about the war! (U)

Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: I have already finished eating. (U)

President Gouled: The Palestinian problem remains. It is intractable. Perhaps Arafat miscalculated. But the Palestinian people must be factored in. There is the problem of the substance of how to do that. (C)

General Scowcroft: Do you think Iraq will continue to divide the Arab League? Will there be a resolution on the Palestinian issue? (C)

Minister Farah: It's a very serious question, Iraq is not n a position to divide the Arab world. It's in the interest of the Iraqis to get in line.

General Scowcroft: Easier said than done. (U)

Minister Farah: We need a lasting peace. We must find a solution to the Palestinian problem. (C)

Assistant to the President Gates: Have you had much contact with Qadhafi? (C)

President Gouled: Who is asking? (U)

I know him. He favors unity from the Horn to the Mediterranean. (C)

The President: With him in charge? (U)

President Gouled: Impossible. (U)

We told him we were willing to unite with our neighbors. But the Red Sea is a problem. Could he build a bridge for us? He said he would do it! (U)

The President: Mubarak says his contacts with Oadhafi make him believe he has moderated. (C)

President Gouled: I wouldn't trust him. (U)

The President: I agree. (U)

General Scowcroft: Can the Arab League help you with your economic problems? (C)

Minister Farah: The Arab league has no special funds. It must be done bilaterally. It is a grave problem with unemployment. (C)

General Scowcroft: They have provided special subsidies in the past, I recall. (U)

Minister Farah: I will be frank. We have a $225 million shortfall. We have gotten $40 million from the Arabs. (C)

Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger: I want to talk about the projects which were stopped. What can we do to get them restarted? (C)

President Gouled: We want the projects to put people to work, not just assistance. (C)

Minister Farah: We will give you more details. The $225 million figure includes the projects. (C)

Assistant to the President Gates: What are your views on developments in Iran? Do you have a dialogue with them? ~~(C)~~

President Gouled: No. But we have not turned them down. I may be going there. ~~(C)~~

Minister Farah: We would like to be on the list of countries that get developmental assistance from the U.S. ~~(C)~~

The President: On Iran, our problem is still the hostages. But we are sending relief to the Kurds in Iran. ~~(C)~~

The pace of improving relations is up to Iran. But they have problems with their radicals. ~~(C)~~

But, if you go there, tell them President Bush wants better relations. There is no secret about that.

-- End of Conversation --