

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91107
Folder ID Number: 91107-010

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/17/90 - 6/26/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (8 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	5/17/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Acting President Arpad Goncz of Hungary (4 pp.)	5/18/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Ertha Trouillot of Haiti (5 pp.)	5/24/90	(b)(1)	Ø
05. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (6 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation with President Virgilio Barco of Columbia (4 pp.)	6/5/90	(b)(1)	Ø
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Roh Tae Woo, President of the Republic of Korea (6 pp.)	6/6/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting and Lunch with Prime Minister Mitsotakis (10 pp.)	6/6/90	(b)(1)	S
09a. Memcon	Re: Meeting with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (4 pp.)	6/6/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence

Subseries: Presidential Memcons

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/17/90 - 6/26/90

Pinksheet Number: cap919

OA/ID Number: 91107-010

Date Closed: 1/26/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09b. Talking Points Re: During the recent summit... (1 pp.)		n.d.	(b)(1)	
09c. Talking Points Re: Talking Points (1 pp.)		n.d.	(b)(1)	
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (5 pp.)	6/8/90	(b)(1)	S
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (4 pp.)	6/11/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (5 pp.)	6/11/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (4 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	C
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Sam Nujoma of Namibia (9 pp.)	6/19/90	(b)(1)	C
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (4 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/17/90 - 6/26/90

Pinksheet Number: cap919
OA/ID Number: 91107-010
Date Closed: 1/26/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG
Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Gerhard Stoltenberg, Defense Minister
Hans Klein, Spokesman of the Federal Government
Horst Teltschik, Security Advisor to the Chancellor
Dieter Kastrup, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Klaus Naumann, Major General, Ministry of Defense
Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's Office
Uwe Kaestner, Director for East-West Relations, Federal Chancellery
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME: May 17, 1990, 11:40 - 12:55 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2005
2000-0429-F

The President: Mr. Chancellor, welcome. I am delighted to see this high-level German team back. I had a little chat with the Chancellor -- mostly serious, but there was some reminiscing. I told the Chancellor that on the Gorbachev meeting it is important to get your views and for me to share ours with you. It is not an easy time with Soviet Union. I have great respect for German

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

efforts to be a catalyst in solving the Lithuanian problem. The letter was a great help. I hope this will help get that matter in better shape than is it now. It does cloud our relationship. My view is that the Lithuanians themselves have not been as flexible as they should have been. Gorbachev is under pressure. We've had pressure, too -- not unmanageable, but some pressure -- to cancel the summit or impose sanctions. We have tried to handle this carefully, because it affects not just us but also Germany and the rest of Europe. After all, we managed arms control negotiations at a time when things were much more difficult. But I want to say that it is not easy. My position is not as flexible as it might be. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Mr. President, dear George, first let me thank you for your warm welcome. I would like to repeat in this larger meeting -- and I will say it again in my press briefing (A problem with the President's earphone leads to jokes about its having been made in Japan rather than Germany.) So let me say, without meaning to embarrass you, that for us Germans and Europeans, President George Bush is a lucky thing indeed. I say this not just because I am a guest. But in the Oval Office in the past there were some who have knew considerably less about Germany. (S)

In this dramatic period of transition, we have an interest in pursuing this path in very close cooperation with the U.S. In two weeks' time, I will be meeting with a group of U.S. Senators and Congressmen. The next day, I will meet U.S. intellectuals in the field of literature. And, later, Feldstein will point out that my economic ideas are half-baked Communism. All these are connected with our working together. I am also preparing to set up a German-American Academy. All this will have an effect. For European development, think ahead to the year 2000. It is essential that Americans remain in Europe. Some on the Hill don't grasp the important of this for the U.S., too. I think the military dimension will lose in importance. It will remain, but we need to develop our relations in all fields. I am firmly convinced that NATO is indispensable. Therefore it is essential that a united Germany remain in NATO. We couldn't maintain NATO otherwise, given all the domestic effects in the U.S. Who would send American troops under those circumstances? And what about the Norwegians and the Benelux without the security guarantee of NATO? (S)

As to our relationship, I'm very grateful that we personally have established such close ties, and that our colleagues, Jim Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Stoltenberg and Cheney, also cooperate in an excellent way. I met a very excellent member of the Department of Justice and asked him facts about organized crime for the EC Summit. As to present realities and your preparations for Gorbachev, rest assured that we gave great sympathy for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Before the war, we had lots of contacts with the former states. But they can't live on sympathy alone. I met Prunskiene and had a very frank talk. I told her she cannot expect support from us unless she enters

into a dialogue. She cannot expect that I would find it wise if Lithuania prejudiced all other issues. It was a good discussion. (S)

The President: May I interrupt to ask a question? We were impressed with her. I wonder if she's not more flexible than Landsbergis. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I said why don't you leave that gentleman at home and you travel around the world. I told her frankly: put your decisions in the freezer for now. Say you want a dialogue, not conditioned on the boycott. But tell the world that you can't talk with the boycott in effect. The world will understand. I need not go into details, but we would like to use our contacts with Moscow in such a way as to convince Gorbachev that if he wants the Summit to succeed he must improve the climate, so that there will be no demonstrations. This is also the opinion of Mrs. Thatcher. Normally she is tough, but on Lithuania she is restrained because she sees the importance of the matter. (S)

Second, in Germany things are more dramatic than we expected. Tomorrow we will have a treaty between the two German states that I would not have hoped for even four weeks ago. We will introduce the D-Mark into the GDR on July 1. I have no doubt that in four years it will be a thriving economy. There are many problems. There are far too many in the GDR administration. Yesterday we achieved a financial miracle, which you will understand as a federal state: we concluded a treaty with our federal states on financing these acts without raising taxes. (S)

It is important for us, it is our wish and plea, that your raise with Gorbachev those issues that hinder Two Plus Four -- so that he will see that the U.S. has an essential interest in not prolonging that process, that you have an interest in seeing these issues settled. The mood in the GDR and the FRG is that people do not want unification prolonged; they want all-German elections. (S)

The real problem of the GDR is not economic, but the wounds to the soul. The GDR has 17 million people, and 105,000 were members of the State Security. To understand this reign of terror, compare it to the Third Reich, which had 80 million people and 50,000 Gestapo. You see how the GDR population was terrorized. We have to find out where these people stashed their money. Information is available that money was used by the GDR Security and Romanian Security for drug trafficking. Now, with an opening border, there is an enormous opportunity for this to expand. That is just one reason that compels me to take quick action. I can't give you a date; but I can't delay beyond January, and it would not be good to have elections then and to elect again in six months on an all-German basis. (S)

If the Two Plus Four works out, it will settle satisfactorily the German issue. But look at the overall situation -- in Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the USSR. We're in the position of a farmer cutting hay. He asks in the evening, should I bring it in? If it looks cloudy, he brings it in just in case. We should be the farmer that brings in the hay on time. (S)

The President: I think on these matters we're pretty much on the same wavelength. The American people basically support a continuing U.S. troop presence, though we have trouble knowing how long this will last. One thing is certain: it is essential that we have this common view of NATO. The Soviets should not be allowed to expand the Two Plus Four to solve their security problems. We favor an expanded CSCE, as an umbrella under which all participants can be sheltered, but we are convinced that an expanded role for NATO is essential. We want to stay in Europe, but this is only possible if we have an institution that provides a proper forum for us. We have thought hard about this and believe an expanded role for NATO is the only way to accommodate this requirement. I'm convinced that we can convince Gorbachev that U.S. troops do not threaten the USSR. It will take time. We do have all those missiles pointed at each other, after all. But we can convince him that U.S. troops are a stabilizing force. The Chancellor put it very well, when he referred to the distance for the Soviets and the distance for the U.S. We will do our best to convince him that an expanded NATO is not detrimental to his interests. I will tell him that I talked to you, Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Woerner. I don't think we have any differences on this. I hope we agree on the essentials of Two Plus Four. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We do. There are no problems. The talks between Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jim Baker are on an excellent track. Regarding Gorbachev's visit with you, it will gain even more importance because of the events ahead of us in the next two weeks. What he will announce in the Supreme Soviet regarding economic reforms will have an enormous effect. It comes two to three years too late, but if we consider them reasonable steps we should make favorable comments. He faces real public opinion, so he has an interest in the U.S. response. The Soviet Union has enormous problems in the eyes of the world and his own people, so he has to avoid looking like a smaller partner with the U.S. They have had a loss of prestige. For a Soviet Foreign Minister it is a new situation: when he gets together with the Warsaw Pact countries, he has to face the man from Prague, the man from Warsaw, and the man from Budapest, and they say Germany has to stay in NATO. Shevardnadze has talked about that publicly. They call him a weakling in the Soviet parliament. (S)

The President: They're learning fast. They had one big demonstration criticizing Gorbachev and then passed a law saying people can't criticize the President. We want the same thing here. More seriously, you have given good advice, which I accept 100 percent. I want to say in front of your colleagues that everyone has a level of pride. Gorbachev has done amazing things. In terms of Gorbachev's standing, I am sensitive to what you have said. I will do my best not to treat them as a nation in decline or undermine his standing. I understand exactly what you are saying. We have problems, which we will discuss, but we

know how much this relationship means -- even for big, powerful countries like the FRG. We will discuss the concerns we have but will treat him with the respect he deserves. It is in our interest that he should succeed. The press says I am a Gorbachev lover. That may be true. I have met the other kind. You've met Yazov. If you sent to central casting for the stereotype of a Soviet general, they would send you Yazov. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, I should perhaps come back to one thing we discussed before. Last year we prepared with great success the NATO Summit. I looked at how you had to deal with a lady. In the end we achieved our result. She also said she achieved her result, and I have nothing against that. Now, looking back, what was important then is secondary now. In negotiations with our foreign ministers and defense ministers, it is important that we achieve close coordination. Three dates are important in this context: the Gorbachev meeting, the NATO Summit, and the Economic Summit. Don't underestimate the last. These three will determine who is the leader of the West -- the President of the United States of America. In this transitional period, we have to set the right direction. (S)

We feel this in Germany. A large number want unity but also fear it. People in the GDR know they are bankrupt. They need changes, but they fear changes. It is all the more important in such a situation that you give a sense of leadership. That is why I think these three dates are so important. You can count on us. We are campaigners, and of course we have another date that is important to us. Eagleburger doesn't have enough work. Perhaps a few days before he can come over. (C)

The President: You talked about a lady. When Larry goes to see her, he usually goes with Gates. She refers to them as Tweedledee and Tweedledum. It is important that each of these consultations go forward. Let me say one word on the Soviet economy. It is absolutely essential that there be fundamental reform. Greenspan was there. So was Thornburgh. He said the legal thinking was like the dark ages. In visit after visit by business people, I hear the same thing. Their major mission is trying to facilitate economic reform. It is in our interest, too. We'll consult and try to be forthcoming. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps Hans-Dietrich Genscher could make a few remarks about the Two Plus Four. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher: I think the beginning in Bonn was encouraging, particularly with fixing the agenda so we could delineate the desired subjects. There is no reference to a Peace Treaty, nor to any subject that we think should be dealt with in arms control negotiations. We want to avoid the singularization of united Germany. Also, we have achieved a good speed: in June we will meet in Berlin; in July, we will be in Paris, with the Poles participating. This is good because the Bundestag and the Volkskammer will pass the resolutions defining the border, saying united Germany has to affirm the existing frontier. This will be signed and ratified afterwards by an all-German government and

parliament. The Poles are uneasy about our sincerity. Mazowiecki is responsible, but he is under Communist pressure. Also, Walesa has his own ambitions, creating a kind of tripolar situation. To create this security we will have these two declarations, which will then be accepted by the two Governments, who will formally notify the Polish Government to show that we must enter into binding obligations. We will be grateful if the U.S. could support this approach. Also, the Polish Prime Minister has the idea of initialing a treaty now and have it signed at the time of unification. We think nothing could be more binding than a resolution by the two parliaments and governments. (S)

We also talked about a fourth venue, in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze was actually ready to do this. He didn't want it in July, because of the Party Congress, so the meeting in the Soviet Union will be in early September. This also has the advantage that already by then talks will have begun toward the CSCE Summit. (S)

So we are off to a good start. It is interesting that Shevardnadze said that high-level official meetings between Ministerials should move very fast. I think that shows the Soviets recognize they cannot be the country that is odd man out, the one that delays. After all, the Soviet Union depends on there being no anti-Soviet feeling in Germany. We have to push unification -- bring in the harvest. This will also have an impact on Two Plus Four. The Soviets want their own interests settled. If we leave ourselves a lot of time in unification, it also means that external issues may be delayed. This is not good for us, and not good for the Soviet Union. Therefore, in your talks with the Soviets, we would appreciate your showing your interest in having Two Plus Four concluded by the CSCE Summit. Jim Baker is presently in Moscow. It would be helpful if you said it, too. It is important for the next meeting that we adhere strictly to the agenda. A final point: the settlement under international law should terminate the rights of the Four Powers. We will start with that, so it is clear we want to establish at the same time the sovereignty of a united Germany. (S)

Regarding the NATO Summit, the Soviets have mounted a campaign to remove the demonic image of NATO. The Shevardnadze visit to NATO was an example. All this is to show the Soviet people that NATO is not such a bad thing. Concerning Germany in NATO, we refer to the Helsinki reference to the rights of countries to join or leave alliances. When we wrote that in, we had other things in mind. We were focusing on the second point, with the idea of East Europeans leaving the Warsaw Pact. Actually, we are concerned with the first point, the right to remain in an alliance. (S)

One single problem where we have to pay attention is the temporary presence of Soviet forces in the current GDR. Mistakes are being made about this in public. We can accept this temporary presence, but the dates must be fixed. We cannot

accept a parallel with U.S. forces in the FRG. They can't be compared. That is why it is so important to stress the role of the U.S. and the Western alliance for stability. One consequence of European unity is that Western Europe is a strong stabilizing factor. But I have to say in Eastern Europe there are still a lot of national difficulties. It reminds us of 1913. Therefore NATO, besides its military purpose, has an enormous political purpose. That is why we hope during the Gorbachev visit you will underscore the importance of concluding Two Plus Four before the CSCE Summit in the autumn. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: George, don't be worried about those in the FRG who make parallels between U.S. forces in the FRG and Soviet forces in the GDR. We will push this through. We'll put our political existence at stake for NATO and the political commitment of the U.S. in Europe. I hope you see that within a unified Germany for a period of, say, three years, we can accept Soviet troops in GDR territory. Don't worry. There is no parallel. We will need a new treaty. But I don't believe Gorbachev has an interest in having soldiers in Leipzig. In twelve months, if the shops are full, it will present a completely different security problem for him. Demoralization will set in. (S)

Second, again, I would welcome it if you could very clearly get out the American position during your meeting. Finally, on Poland, we did all we could to find a reasonable solution. Let me say frankly that this has an enormous psychological effect in our country. It is not the same as with Havel, who addressed those expelled and said Germans also suffered, along with Czechs. So far there has been nothing along those lines from the Poles. A statement like that would be very helpful. Jaruzelski has not been very helpful in the last few weeks. Frankly, I don't think he wants to help. But we need peace between Poles and Germans. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Mr. President, it would be helpful for us if the U.S. could tell the Polish Government that this resolution of the two parliaments is a good solution. (S)

The President: Let me comment. We all but did this when Mazowiecki was here. We discussed it. Since then the situation has improved. I am concerned with what you said about Jaruzelski. We might have some influence, because we have tried not to knock him publicly. I get the feeling they are more willing to accept your solution, but we can try. (S)

On the meeting with Gorbachev, we will press for the timetable you set. We are on the same wavelength. I worry that the Soviets may try to keep Two Plus Four alive after unity. On the disposition of forces, I have been hard over. The longer Soviet forces remain, the greater the danger of de facto parallelism. I worry that the world would be presented with parallelism. My view is the sooner they are out, the better. If we're successful in persuading them that the U.S. and NATO are stabilizing forces, perhaps that will help. I think we are thinking the same way,

but I worry about this three-year period. On Jaruzelski, we can take care of that. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: I explained our position to him. He didn't approve, but he didn't reject, either. (S)

The President: The only other point: Walesa looks like he is on the sidelines. We think Mazowiecki a reasonable man. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I had talks yesterday on the party level. We have a completely new situation in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, though I am skeptical about Romania. On the elections in Czechoslovakia, there are new groups with new names, but they represent the old traditions. In Hungary, Antall is one example of that. Antall is not being given justice in the U.S. press; he is not being treated in a fair way. He is a reasonable man, attached to Western values. In Czechoslovakia, there will be a very clear picture after the elections, with Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats. Poland is another matter entirely, more difficult. It is always difficult with the Polish public. What will Walesa do? Mazowiecki? The race is not over yet regarding the parties. I agree with you that Mazowiecki is a clever man. Minister Stoltenberg would like to make a few remarks. (S)

Defense Minister Stoltenberg: The main focus of the talks with Gorbachev will be on arms control. In Vienna, too, after a very good start, again we have delays. We had already anticipated the success of the Vienna talks. The Soviets now say that because of political changes in the GDR, there is a new situation. Therefore to correct that your Administration's approach is important on the difficult issue of ceilings for aircraft. It is very important that the Soviet President see that he must bring the Vienna talks back on track so they can conclude on time. Your Administration has said that CFE must be signed for there to be a CSCE Summit, but a CSCE Summit is also important for other reasons. You have said that the NATO Summit should undertake a political, not only a military, strategy review. Next week, my colleague Secretary Cheney and others will present a few ideas. Vienna is important not just for Germany but for the whole Alliance. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Let me add one more sentence. I said in our private meeting we are very grateful for your proposals in arms control. (S)

The President: Thank you. Dick? (U)

Secretary Cheney: Having just come from Alberta, we go next week to Brussels. My feeling is that the initiatives on SNF and FOTL are very appropriate concerning the planning meeting. Perhaps we can come to an agreement. (S)

The President: Thank you. Shall we go to lunch? (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4000

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary
of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Gerhard Stoltenberg, Defense Minister
Hans Klein, Spokesman of the Federal
Government
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Horst Teltschik, Security Advisor to the
Chancellor
Dieter Kastrup, Political Director, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Walter Neuer, Director of the Chancellor's
Office
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 17, 1990, 1:00 - 2:00 p.m.
AND PLACE Old Family Dining Room

The President: I talked to Ronald Reagan yesterday, because Gorbachev is stopping in California. He had invited him to Los Angeles, but Gorbachev is going to San Francisco rather than Los Angeles. It is all quite confusing, but Reagan may have coffee with Gorbachev in San Francisco. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: How can he spend so much time abroad when he has so many problems at home? (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The President: Perhaps it gives him standing at home. But I hope he doesn't encounter folks shaking their fists at him because of Lithuania. Emotions are quite high. Helmut, do you or Hans-Dietrich know Ryzhkov or Yakovlev? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: We have met them. (U)

The President: They have just changed ambassadors here. Dubinin did a good job. Then just before the Summit they changed to Bessmertnykh. I wonder what's going on. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They are trying to develop a new cadre of ambassadors, supportive of Gorbachev. (S)

Acting Secretary Eagleburger: And Vorontsov is coming to the UN. (C)

The President: Mrs. Gorbachev will travel with Barbara to Wellesley to give a speech. She was such a good Marxist then, but I think she has shifted gears. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: In the SPD, 40 percent of the posts have to be held by women. It's a quota. We have rejected that, but it continually comes up. (C)

The President: I can understand the aspirations of professional women, but that is another matter from denigrating the role of courtesy. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Mrs. Thatcher feels strongly about this issue. (C)

The President: She has tough political problems because of the poll tax. She isn't always easy to deal with, but I am happy she is there now -- and not Kinnock, although he seems to have calmed down his left wing. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Kinnock has come a long way. He is now quite reasonable regarding NATO. It is much different than before. This is an important reason why Labor is doing better now. (S)

The Vice President: He told me unilateralism was dead in his party. He also talked about a nuclear deterrent, although he used the words "for the time being." (S)

The President: Do you have any thoughts on China? Have you had any high-level contacts? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: It would be wrong to isolate China diplomatically. (C)

The President: We agree, but it's tough here at home. They react to pressures differently than others. They are the Middle Kingdom; we are the barbarians. We need to keep some contact. Has Mandela visited? (C)

SECRET

Chancellor Kohl: A bit later -- next week. (Ø)

The President: Is anyone asking who should come first? (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: It is not a problem. (U)

The President: I would appreciate a short cable after your meeting with him. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher: I met with both at Windhoek. Each said the other was a serious person trying to make things better. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: I will call you next week to give you my impressions. Mandela is a human giant. After all the years in prison, he is not embittered. Amazing. But the Boers are very difficult people. (Ø)

The President: I agree with what de Klerk is trying to do, including deflecting pressures from his right. Some hotheads here want Mandela to come first, but I can't withdraw my invitation to de Klerk. I think things will work out, though. Is there anything else we should discuss? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: Perhaps I should say a few words about the EC. At the end of June we will be in Dublin for the EC Summit. The Irish are doing very well in the EC presidency. It is not an easy job. We will be discussing Lithuania. And drugs. We need something like an FBI within the EC to deal with drugs and crime, especially after the borders come down in 1992. We will also talk about the IGC on economic and political union that Francois Mitterrand and I are pushing. It will be an interesting debate. We are now in an interesting and much more important phase. (Discussion of budget summit exercise.) (C)

Chancellor Kohl: What are your economic prospects? (Ø)

The President: Most experts think we have passed the low point and that the economy will keep growing, perhaps at about 2 percent of GNP. But many still worry about a recession. Unemployment is about 5.2 percent. But even though things are going reasonably well, we want to work urgently on the deficit problem to forestall a recession. How is your economy? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl: It is doing well. There is 4 percent real growth and the highest employment rate ever. I am very optimistic, including on the eventual economic prospects for the GDR. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Acting President Arpad Goncz of Hungary (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
James F. Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff
Bulcsu Veress, Interpreter

Arpad Goncz, Acting President
Gabor Horvath, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME May 18, 1990, 10:05 - 10:40 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office (U)

The President: You come at a fascinating time of change since my visit. There were dramatic changes then, and there have been even more dramatic ones since. (U)

President Goncz: I remain confident that we have already crossed the border to a new Hungary, with multiparty democracy. If I may assure you, my message is that the new Republic of Hungary, the new democratic Hungary, will be a reliable and calculable partner. (U)

The President: Let me assure you that we want to work with you on the economic front in every way we can. We have a good team, including former Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead as Chairman of the Enterprise Fund Board. We want to see more private investment and better trade relations. In addition to our governmental activities, we want to see as many leaders as possible from the American private sector to be involved. (U)

I would love to have you tell me how you, as a free thinker, see Soviet-U.S. relations. What should we consider as we deal at a difficult time with Gorbachev? I would like your advice. Let me put my cards on the table: I have great respect for Gorbachev, but Lithuania presents problems for me domestically. I have some concerns about the Soviet economy, but I want to move ahead on arms control. I want Gorbachev to succeed. (L)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

President Gencz: I believe, drawing from the experience of the historical process in my country, that the most important point is that half-reform is no reform. It simply goes like water down the drain. I fully understand and appreciate the position of the U.S. -- that you attach significance to preserving stability. But my opinion is that final stability will come only with the completion of the reforms in the Soviet Union. Therefore, slowing down the reform will not bring the final result we want, but rather the reverse. I personally attach great significance to Gorbachev's statesmanship as well as his intention to keep the Soviet Union together, but the tendencies are incalculable. (Ø)

Therefore, if I may, Mr. President, suggest that in your foreign policy you look ahead two or three steps and not always search for stability in the present realities. Mr. Gorbachev could be promoted and reforms facilitated by a search for solutions which also mean the promotion of the Soviet reform process. I share your opinion regarding Lithuania. It is very difficult to identify a solution, because the domestic stability of the Soviet Union is far more important. But, Mr. President, you should be aware that if the U.S. won't side with the independence of Lithuania, then in the "intermediate regions" in Europe there will be greater suspicions concerning your intentions. There are three factors: the internal stability of the Soviet Union; the military might of the Soviet Union, whose strength is doubtful; and the economic situation, which demands aid and assistance. On the other hand, I feel the U.S. is pursuing the high ground position at the negotiating table. If you are interested, I could share with you my views on the impact of instability in the Soviet Union on East Central Europe. (Ø)

The President: I am very interested. I would like to hear them. (U)

President Gencz: From such a resulting instability, there would follow economic and political instability in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, because of our dependency on Soviet energy. The oil taps would stop. That is why we try to defend against this possibility by diversifying our international economic relations. However, changes are already irreversible in Hungary. It is crucially important that Soviet troops be withdrawn according to the agreed timetable, because those that left under the new international realities could not come back again. (Ø)

The President: Are you worried that the Lithuanian situation could have an adverse effect on Hungary? (Ø)

President Gencz: It is not the Lithuanian situation itself, but rather the emotional issue of Lithuania playing the role of a time bomb for the republics of the Soviet Union prior to the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Or, if there were a Soviet military takeover, the consequences would be incalculable. We have to take into account two factors. First, we shall need to elaborate and work out a Ukrainian policy. The U.S. will need to think about that, too. Second, if Moldavia

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

joined Romania, that would add a huge Ukrainian minority to the 2.5 million Hungarians already living in Romania. If Romania's campaign of homogenization continues, then we Hungarians shall have to fear an almost totally unbearable hotbed on our border to the east. (Ø)

The President: I think it important that we are all positioned in favor of the self-determination and independence of the Baltic States. However, we are trying to conduct ourselves in such a way that we do not inadvertently exacerbate a situation for Gorbachev that also has an impact on others. It is a difficult situation. (Ø)

President Goncz: I fully share your opinions, Mr. President. May I add that the U.S. probably will have to make a very clear statement that the Baltic States deserve the right of independence and that the Soviet Union should accept this in principle. In order to achieve their goals, the Baltic States could be encouraged to accept a transitional period that would last a couple of years. Of course, I am not impartial. If the loosening and disintegration of the Soviet Union is postponed, it will give us time to stabilize and consolidate our own position in Hungary. But the risk also has to be taken into account that trying to curtail a natural process of disintegration may also bring an explosion. (Ø)

The President: I don't think we can get into that. We do not have much leverage. (Ø)

President Goncz: Maybe, Mr. President, if the U.S. would take part in providing manifold assistance to Gorbachev in easing his consumption and supply problems, that probably will give him time to solve the problem of Lithuania. So my counsel is economic assistance, along with a strong American position on behalf of the independence of Lithuania and the other Baltic countries. (Ø)

The President: Herein lies the dilemma. It is a chicken and egg problem. To help the Soviet economy, two things must happen: first, demonstrable economic reform, and, second, a visible solution to the Lithuanian question. Because if the Lithuanian conflict is still at a boil, our Congress will be unwilling to take steps to help the Soviet economy. I want to see a solution. This means that negotiations between President Landsbergis and Gorbachev must go forward toward freedom, but in which minority rights are observed. I was encouraged yesterday by the meeting between Prime Minister Prunskiene and Gorbachev. Baker is seeing Gorbachev today and will stress that there must be a defusing of the Baltic problem for there to be U.S. enthusiasm to help. Then there have to be steps toward reform; otherwise, U.S. help will go down the drain. Hungary is way ahead in this regard. You understand how markets work, but they are back in the dark ages. (Ø)

President Goncz: I am very much afraid that all the money given to the Soviet Union is, in an economic sense, money down the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

drain. But I am not sure that is true in a political sense. I am not sure it is a waste if we can gain from it. With this argument you cannot convince Congress, however. I would like to add that the process will also involve risk. (S)

The President: Risk in what way? (S)

President Goncz: Risk should be taken for future objectives, rather than to preserve the status quo. It is probably very important to ask who is the next man in the Soviet Union to carry the process forward, and also which countries on the periphery. (S)

The President: I just want to be sure that the next man wants to go forward, not backward. The process in the Soviet Union has a certain dynamic, but in the short term there could be a backlash -- in Lithuania, as there was in Budapest. We are running out of time, but I want to make one point on troops. I want to see all troops out of everywhere they are not wanted as soon as possible. All Soviet troops should go out of Hungary as soon as possible. Havel -- your friend and my new friend -- made the point that the Soviet Union has problems housing these troops, and I understand that. I think that post-unification Europe is best served by the U.S. remaining involved -- with troops. But if they are not wanted, they would come home. They'd be out. What worries me is that the longer the Soviet Union stays, the more they will say, "Okay, we'll go out if you go out." Free countries have to help us avoid that linkage. I will do my best to convince Gorbachev that U.S. troops in Europe are not a threat to Soviet security but rather a guarantee of stability; but if we link U.S. troops that are wanted with Soviet troops that are not wanted, it will be a dangerous situation. (S)

President Goncz: We are in full agreement, Mr. President. Taking account that Hungary and Czechoslovakia have timetables for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, one of my aims is to request your assistance in urging Mr. Gorbachev to keep these deadlines. But I agree they cannot be linked to U.S. troops. (S)

The President: I will do that. I will take your advice. I wish we had four hours to talk. I enjoyed your visit and have great respect for you and your country. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Ertha Trouillot of
~~Jamaica~~ (U) *Haiti*

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs
Alvin P. Adams, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
William T. Pryce, Senior Director for Latin
American Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)
Carol Wolter, Interpreter

Ertha Trouillot, President
Kesler Clermont, Foreign Minister
Raymond Joseph, Counselor to the President

DATE, TIME May 24, 1990, 10:05 - 10:35 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President and President Trouillot met in the Oval Office.
(U)

The President: You come here with good reports about all you are doing to bring about elections and the performance of your government in the face of many difficulties which face it. We don't want to minimize the dimensions of the challenge you face. From the heart we want to try to be as helpful as we can to your government. Obviously, human rights are important. Free elections are important. Obviously you are committed. We welcome your invitation to technical assistance and observers for your elections. Bernie, have you had a chance to talk about the \$2.3 million aid package for elections? (Ø)

Mr. Aronson: Yes, we have talked about it. (U)

The President: I would only encourage the earliest possible date for elections. I think I saw a UN report that suggested that a September date was possible. Obviously that is a question for you to decide. The security situation is vital; it became the problem in the 1987 elections. Whatever you can do to create a positive security situation will be good -- I think that we have

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
G1 8/21/09
2000-0429-F

a million in non-lethal military assistance. We hope that is to your satisfaction. You don't need a lecture. The more you do, the better we are able to help. What I want to do is hear from you. We care and have been able to help in food aid and other areas. But I want to hear from you. (Ø)

President Trouillot: In a few seconds you have captured the situation very well. The situation in Haiti is complicated. We have chosen not to postpone honest elections. We have encountered security problems. There were problems when I accepted the Presidency, but the Army and the civilian population have helped us and we have made progress. But to reach a state where the army is well developed to do its job, there are needs. The army has expressed certain requirements especially regarding logistics and communications. I think that the army would be more effective in the elections if it had proper equipment. We also believe the Army should include certain agents which would be trained and guided for service during the elections. They would not be a separate force. (Ø)

The President: What kind of agents are you thinking about? (Ø)

President Trouillot: These are people recruited from the population, directed by the army. They would be volunteers. (Ø)

The President: What would their purpose be? To calm down the situation? (Ø)

President Trouillot: They would be only for elections, to try to calm down the situation. The people need confidence. It would be helpful to have assistance in their training. (Ø)

The President: This is a difficult question and I don't want to embarrass you, you may not want to respond. Do you think the military will give you total loyal support or do you worry about it? (Ø)

President Trouillot: I don't have great concern because I have real confidence in the army. I think that it has shown its cooperation. (Ø)

The President: Good. That's important. (U)

President Trouillot: I think that this is very important to me. When I went to the army headquarters they said they would support me. But they said they needed equipment. (Ø)

The President: Do you appoint the Commander in Chief of the Army under your system? (Ø)

President Trouillot: Yes. The President can appoint the Commander, sometimes with recommendations. The President is also the Commander in Chief. (Ø)

The President: What other subjects would you like to discuss?
(U)

President Trouillot: We have established or are establishing a system for elections. We have established an electoral council to carry out this process. This is entirely independent. We hope that elections will be in September. Their work is done and there will be an electoral law in about five days to two weeks. A week after that a calendar will be promulgated and a date will be set for elections. (Ø)

The President: Have the French and the Canadians been able to help you? (Ø)

President Trouillot: Friendly countries such as France and Canada have shown cooperation. They have offered food and logistical support. They have also sent people to help the people who will be "peace agents". We would like to be able to have your help in this. (Ø)

Mr. Aronson: There is \$3 million for election assistance in the Panama/Nicaragua Aid Bill. (Ø)

The President: Can some of that be used to train peace officers?
(Ø)

Mr. Aronson: I think it could. (Ø)

President Trouillot: We have other very urgent needs. In order to create the situation for elections we need to be able to give material aid to the people. We need to carry out certain minor projects of public works. The government has to take measures to try to find work for the people. Even if the U.S. gives assistance to help the election, we will need to find employment for the people to occupy them. This is a principal worry. I don't know if the U.S. Government could help us. This is important because the people need to have confidence. (Ø)

The President: Bernie, what would you say about that? (Ø)

Mr. Aronson: There will be \$10 million in Development Assistance in the Supplemental Assistance Bill which we hope to use for job creation. (Ø)

The President: That's why I asked about French and Canadian assistance. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Our assistance package overall is about \$35 million. One half is PL-480 but there are other elements. What about the private voluntary organizations? (Ø)

Mr. Aronson: There is about \$40 million in all. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: So, overall, there is about \$76 million. (Ø)

Mr. Aronson: I think that one area where the UN and OAS can help is in a large observer delegation. In Nicaragua, this gave confidence to the voters. A large presence in Haiti would be helpful. (Ø)

The President: We certainly would do this if this is acceptable. (Ø)

President Trouillot: I don't know if this is the time to mention it, but our government is a short term government with a mission to have elections. So what we need is immediate or emergency assistance for our people now. This needs to be in time for the elections. (Ø)

The President: How do you see the elections shaping up? Do you see a lot of candidates. (Ø)

President Trouillot: After the electoral law is promulgated, we will invite all candidates to present themselves. They will be the ones who run according to the electoral law. (Ø)

The President: Are these national and local elections? (Ø)

President Trouillot: I can't fully answer your question. This comes under the electoral council which is an independent body. We want to have the elections as soon as possible. If the government is to organize elections, it could do so for presidential and legislative elections, and let it be left up to the new government to organize the municipal elections. There is a UN report which says that all elections could take place at the same time within four or five months. But in the Haitian context, I think it is better to have the presidential and legislative elections first. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Is the date firmly set for September? (Ø)

President Trouillot: It is not set yet. That is up to the electoral council. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: But September is the target? (Ø)

President Trouillot: Yes, but we need to encourage the council. (Ø)

The President: The sooner that a date is set, the better. (Ø)

President Trouillot: I agree. (U)

The President: How long will you be here? (U)

President Trouillot: Three days. I will go on Saturday. (U)

The President: Are you going to Capitol Hill? (Ø)

Foreign Minister Clermont: This was done this morning. (Ø)

President Trouillot: We talked with key Congressmen, but I will not speak to the Congress as a whole. (Ø)

The President: It is a good thing that there is great support for you in the Congress. This is not always the case for people who visit this office. (Ø)

Have you warned the President what kind of questions she will get from the press outside? I think they will be good questions. (Ø)

President Trouillot: In any case, we want to encourage transparency (openness) and sincerity on all issues, so our answers will be the same. (Ø)

The President: I think I need to study under you for a while. We wish you well. I hope we will meet again. We want you to let us know if we can help further as you move toward elections. We have, regrettably, certain limits on what we can do, but this is important. We have a stake -- because our aspiration is for every country to have a maximum of freedom which comes from democracy which comes from free elections. We want you to succeed. We know that sometimes the U.S. gives the impression of being overpowering. We don't want to do that. We want to give you support.

President Trouillot: I think that this is a time for elections. Today, more than ever the support of the U.S. is important. Our relations are very good, and I value your advice. I want to say that your Ambassador is very active and gives us every support. (Ø)

The President: How are you received? (Ø)

Ambassador Adams: Very well. I went to a small town in the interior recently and was received very well. I got great applause when I spoke about elections. It took six hours to get back. One reason the people want elections is so that there will be changes, including better roads. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Clermont: Ambassador Adams is representing U.S. interests very well. (Ø)

Charge Roy Joseph: I want to say one thing. Ambassador Adams is well received not only in Haiti, but also by the Haitians in the United States, in New York and Washington. They get word of his speeches and appreciate them.

The President: We, of course, have full confidence in our Ambassador. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4544

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with United Nations
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organizations
Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director, International
Programs and Public Diplomacy, NSC
(Notetaker)

Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General
Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary General for
Political and General Assembly Affairs and
Secretariat Services
Virendra Dayal, Chef de Cabinet, Office of
the Secretary General
Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary General,
Office for Special Political Affairs
Alvaro de Soto, Executive Assistant to the
Secretary General
John L. Washburn, Director in the Executive
Office of the Secretary General (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME June 4, 1990, 12:20-1:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room

The President: Glad you could come today. This is a working lunch and we want you to feel free to raise any issues you like. I want the advisers here to know that I raised UN financing in the Oval Office meeting with some embarrassment, after our previous criticism of the Soviets for not paying their dues. I believe great nations should keep their word, and as a great nation, we should keep our word. Secretary Baker told you that we have some new funding coming. I want your associates to know

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
01 812112009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

how strongly I feel. I'm delighted you are talking to Congress. I want to know how you come out on your talks and we will try to follow up. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Thank you. I would like to know your views re Afghanistan. (U)

The President: Gorbachev is as frustrated as we are. The tribal leaders are engaged in narcotics. The refugee problem is enormous - I know you have tried to help. Najibullah is hanging in. I thought he would be out sooner after the Soviet troops left. (S)

Secretary Baker: We find ourselves closer and closer together with the Soviets on this. The only thing that stands between us is whether Najibullah agrees to step down during the time of the Afghan-style election. Our view has always been that we can't be against his running. We clearly need a transitional authority. The Soviets cannot agree to our and we cannot agree to theirs. The main difference is what happens to Najibullah during the transition. We must be able, we think, to point to some change in his status. (S)

The President: They want the Nicaraguan model. They point to Ortega staying in power. We say that's because Chamorro and all agreed. The Mujahadin will not agree. They are not willing to do it. (S)

The President: What is your suggestion? (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: The Resistance is the problem. They are not used to our elections. (S)

Secretary Baker: We said "Afghan-style" elections. (S)

The President: Gorbachev knows we are not playing games and we are not trying to set up a hostile power on his border to be detrimental to Soviet interests. He knows about the attitude of the mujahadin elders. We had a reasonable discussion with him. (S)

The President: What about Hekmatyar? Do you see him as a bad guy? We see difficulty there, and he is not acceptable to Gorbachev. Also we have concluded that the chieftains are involved in the drug trade. This undermines confidence in the leaders. (S)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: That is a source of money for them. It is the same for the Syrian soldiers in Lebanon. (S)

The President: Do we have specific information on that? (S)

Mr. Gates: We can take a look at it. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

Mr. Goulding: Our information is anecdotal, but we are told that it is across the board. The Syrian soldiers in Lebanon are selling hashish. (Ø)

Mr. Pickering: Poppies in the Bekaa Valley. (U)

The President: What is your general view on Lebanon? We have been able to do no more than give verbal support to efforts to bring a resolution to the problems. It just keeps churning away. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I wish them well. I feel sorry for the Lebanese people, who are suffering. We have to do something. I may appoint a special representative. (Ø)

The President: Do you know Aoun? (U)

Mr. Goulding: I've met him on several occasions. He has a strong sense of mission. He vowed to get the Syrians out of Lebanon or die trying. He resists advice. (Ø)

The President: How is he dealing with the elected government of Lebanon -- any moderation? (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: He shoots his guns -- no. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Jaja was willing to recognize the government but Aoun was the holdout. (Ø)

The President: Can the Catholic church, the Pope, do more? (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: The Foreign Minister of Iraq is Chaldean Catholic. His intention is to embarrass the Lebanese government. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The Iraqis are still sending equipment to Aoun. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Isn't the level falling off somewhat? (Ø)

General Scowcroft: Syrian levels are falling too. (Ø)

Mr. Goulding: Because Jaja is doing too well. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: The dialogue in El Salvador is moving well. (President) Cristiani is helping us very much. More pressure is needed on the army in order to gain more flexibility. (Ø)

Mr. de Soto: We hope to have a cease-fire by mid September and elections by March 1991. There is agreement by all. We need to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

4

be sure there is a sufficient political opening for the FMLM to feel part of it. The cease-fire in September will be the first stage. The price is high for the FMLN. Agreeing to a cease-fire by the FMLN makes them have to come out of the cities and into enclaves in rural areas. The UN can verify, but it is a high price for the FMLN. We need to stress respect for human rights and reform of the judiciary. The most difficult is getting the army to follow human rights. The need is to reduce the armed forces and put them under civilian control and assure that the police forces are separated and turned into civilians. This is a separate process. We are urging the FMLN on this. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: As with Nicaragua, we are trying to formulate a bipartisan approach to this. The chances are excellent if we can move to end the war this year. We are very grateful to you. The FMLN for the first time is engaged and serious. The big question is whether to slash aid up front or condition it on such actions as punishment of those who murdered the Jesuits. Some Congressmen want to immediately slash our aid by 50%. This would drive the army out of the process. (Ø)

Mr. de Soto: Everyone is counting on US leverage on the armed forces. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: But, we can't do it in a way that removes leverage on the FMLN. Balance is the challenge. (Ø)

The President: We like Cristiani. He conducted a fair election. I need to know what we're talking about before we go to another election. It worries me for the left to take the murders and let them undermine a fledgling democracy. (Ø)

Mr. de Soto: Everyone is in favor of election reform. (Ø)

The President: I do not want to send a signal that we are willing to undermine a fairly-elected President. I want to be sure we are on the same wavelength. (Ø)

Mr. de Soto: What I am talking about could strengthen Salvadoran democracy. Many more people will be able to vote. (Ø)

Mr. Pickering: Yes, there are pressures for more registration. (Ø)

The President: We should be supportive of that but when I saw Duarte the second to last time when he was dying of cancer in February, he confided in me, "I'm afraid I am going to be killed and I ask safe haven for my family. The new leaders will kill my family." He felt very strongly. That was before the election. This insidious reprisal has not taken place. We cannot undermine now a free process. (Ø)

Mr. de Soto: First, we need the cease-fire. (Ø)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

5

Secretary Baker: What is the FMLN insisting on about solutions on the Jesuit murders? (C)

Mr. de Soto: Exemplary punishment on that and other murders. (C)

Secretary Baker: Those are the kind of things that it is difficult for Cristiani to deliver. He doesn't have the political strength to deliver. (C)

The President: Do you think he is trying? (C)

Mr. de Soto: He has severe limitations. the Army is separate. (C)

The President: We believe in the army being controlled by the person elected by the people. (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: It's not an easy one. I would like to discuss Nicaragua. (C)

Mr. Goulding: There is a new agreement. There will be a better demobilization rate now. There are about 10,000 to go. By 10 June, nearly half of the core group will have been demobilized. If we can improve the rate, more than half will be demobilized by Sunday (June 10, the deadline). (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I have to report to the UN Security Council today and by the 10th. (C)

Mr. Goulding: By Friday, we will know the rates. I have a confession. There was a glitch. ONUCA did not go as quickly as it should have in May on sorting out violations. The problem has been put right. Most complaints have been resolved. The ones that remain are about a difference of opinion on boundary, etc. (C)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Cyprus. (U)

The President: This will be a timely discussion. The Greek leader (Prime Minister Mitsotakis) will be here this week. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: He is a reasonable man. I hope you will encourage him to move. (C)

The President: We will. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Partition is unacceptable to me. Equality and liberty are a good recipe. Any piece of advice you can give them will be helpful. (C)

The President: I will do it. Secretary Baker has already told him about our interest in a strong UNSYG role. I'll do it when I see him Wednesday. (C)

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

6

The President: What about Vassiliou (President of Cyprus). (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: He is a realistic man. He is extremely thankful to you. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: I wish we could snap our fingers and have a good solution. The President has personally weighed in with Ozal (President of Turkey) and with Prime Minister Thatcher too. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: The Foreign Minister is a reasonable man. (Ø)

The President: We went through a difficult time when Congress wanted a resolution on the Armenians. We think we are past it now; we are talking to them again. It was a very divisive issue. If that comes up again, we will duck down for a while. We are talking to the Greeks too. If you see something we can do, please let us know. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Mrs. Thatcher helps me enormously. (U)

The President: Is there any change in Cuba or in Castro? (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I just sent Mr. de Soto to Cuba. (U)

Mr. de Soto: The Cubans are not urging the FMLN on positions. I went to Cuba and saw one of the leaders (not Castro, he was out of town) watching CNN about the US/USSR Summit! They are making contingency plans in case they are sold down the river. They actually don't have lots of business deals with Eastern European nations. They do rely heavily on the Soviets. (Ø)

The President: Castro is showing no flexibility, but some day it is inevitable that it is going to happen. Castro must realize that he is out of step. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I've recently visited Albania. They want to join CSCE. They took a decision to create an attorney general post. There were six refugees in the Italian embassy; they were allowed to leave for Rome. The leader said, "I want to move ahead at a reasonable pace, not like Gorbachev." It was a reasonable discussion. He listened to my points. They are not pro-religion, as the religious groups did not help in the independence fights. It is not like Poland where the church helped. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with President Virgilio Barco of Colombia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Robert Kimmitt, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Michael Kozak, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Thomas E. McNamara, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
Donald C. Johnson, Acting Senior Director for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Virgilio Barco, President
Victor Mosquera, Colombian Ambassador the United States
Maria Mercedes Cuellar de Martinez, Minister of Development
Luis Fernando Alarcon, Minister of Finance

DATE, TIME June 5, 1990, 2:00 - 2:40 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I appreciate your coming by for this informal visit. I'm delighted to see you. (U)

Please assure your elected successor that we want to work with him. It looks like he'll be following your courageous approach. I hope it works out that way. (U)

I understand you're close to him. I know he has some reservations on what we can do on the demand side of narcotics. We are trying very hard to reduce demand. Have you talked to Bill Bennett? (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
81 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

President Barco: Yes. (U)

The President: So you've gone over things already. (U)

President Barco: That's right. (U)

The President: Any subjects on your mind? Again congratulations on your party's win. The Barco team is prevailing. Also, congratulations on your MIT commencement speech. It is a high honor and well deserved. (Ø)

We have just finished the meeting with Gorbachev. But in my view that went pretty well. We made headway on a number of different fronts. We agreed on chemical weapons, a trade agreement, and we reached a grain agreement, for example. The man is quite different from any of his predecessors. We're quite pleased with the changes that he has brought about. We want to make progress, or to say it another way, not to act in ways that set things back. (Ø)

We've got some critics, particularly over issues like Lithuania. But we have a broad agenda, which includes Lithuania and many others. We are for self-determination, and trying to get things to move forward. (Ø)

I felt quite comfortable with Gorbachev. Embattled as he is at home, he showed confidence and courage that's exemplary. (Ø)

President Barco: That is very important. I have some points that I want to inform you about. The policy of opposition to drug trafficking shows that it is the right one. President-elect Gaviria has been very strong in his statements. The response to fighting drug trafficking has been very positive. Pablo Escobar is on the run. (Ø)

The President: Is he still in Colombia? You don't you have any way of knowing that, do you? (Ø)

President Barco: He is still in Colombia. He has many small houses in the country-side. Every night he goes to 3 houses. I hope that he'll be captured before August 7 when I leave office. In addition, many murderers and assassins have been captured. (Ø)

The President: Are they in prison? (Ø)

President Barco: Yes. There has also been a deterioration in coca leaf prices. The effect of Colombian policies has opened a window of opportunity for coca substitution programs. We need to move fast to take advantage of this opportunity. The biggest problem is narco-terrorism. We'll continue the struggle. Despite the campaign of violence the people will sustain the will to go forward with this policy. (Ø)

Mrs. Cuellar de Martinez, the Minister of Development, has been working with her counterparts on trade measures that will enhance trade relations. We understand that a package of measures on trade is advancing from the technical level on the U.S. side. (C)

Colombia recently signed the GATT Subsidies Code. We expect U.S. authorities will not object to Colombia's accession, because this will create a conflict with Colombia. We are also interested in the sugar quota, and some changes here. (C)

The President: I'm not up-to-date on all this. Brent, what about sugar? (C)

General Scowcroft: It looks very difficult. (C)

The President: We ran into a stone wall. The problem is a political lobby that's tougher than nails. (C)

Coffee-- is that still hung up? Oh, I want to comment on GATT. I think we've been having differences on this. Bob, how does this look. (C)

Mr. Kimmitt: I understand you've been having discussions with USTR on this. I'm told that this involves Article 19.9 of the GATT. Our position is that we'll have to reserve on Colombian accession if we can't reach agreement. I'm not sure whether in your discussions you've advanced. If we can reach agreement, we could accept Colombian accession, But we have so far not been able to. (C)

Minister Martinez: Yesterday I spoke with Mr. Katz. We have differences. We ask the U.S. to be flexible. The points are very important. We can't put down commitments (being sought by U.S.) on paper. (C)

Governor Sununu: We have to have some uniformity in the way we treat these questions. We could not make an exception for Colombia. It can't be done. We asked them to raise this issue when you talked. (C)

The President: Are we asking them to change certain practices? (C)

Mr. Kimmitt: As John said, the concern of USTR was creating a special exception for Colombia that would be inconsistent with what we do for others. (C)

Minister Martinez: You have signed these with others, including Pakistan. (C)

The President: It seems to me like you need to keep talking about this. If there room to work this out, we'll try to. Ambassador? (Ø)

Ambassador McNamara: We need to find some language that will allow a phase-out of subsidies. We always have such a time frame, or else we don't accept the injury test. We are down to one or two phrases or sentences. (Ø)

The President: Why don't we agree we'll keep working on this? (Ø)

Minister Martinez: Tomorrow is the last day. (Ø)

Ambassador McNamara: The U.S. is obligated to make its objection within 30 days of Colombia's signing of the Subsidies Code. The USTR is planning tomorrow to make this objection. Colombia will not obtain the terms of the GATT Subsidies Code insofar as trade with the U.S. is concerned. But as soon as we do, the terms will be applied. We're reaching a critical point tomorrow, but it is not one that can't be revoked if we reach agreement on an exchange of letters. (Ø)

The President: Are we asking things which you think are unreasonable? We're trying to be consistent. (Ø)

Minister Martinez: We need to reach compromise on dates. (Ø)

The President: Dates... (U)

Minister Martinez: For Colombia this is very difficult. For policy and everything else. (Ø)

The President: I gather we can't solve it right here. (U)

Ambassador McNamara: We'll keep working on it. (U)

The President: That's the important thing. What's your next agenda item? (U)

President Barco: The cost and difficulty of the drug fight prompted the U.S. to offer its support. While the U.S. has proved responsive, no complete proposal has been put forward on the economic side. I have a few points I would like to give you. (Ø)

The President: Will you leave that with me? (U)

President Barco: Yes. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

President Barco: The other point is our relations with the World Bank. We've had great difficulty in last fiscal year. The

country has been able to deal with these problems from the bank due to the backlog of other financing. This cannot be sustained in the medium term. If Colombia is going to maintain its good status on payment of debt, we need help. Continued backtracking has consumed valuable time and threatened economic development. The problem has been recorded in a memo that has been given to Barber Conable of the World Bank. I'm going to give it to you, too. (C)

The U.S. could help on several points. The U.S. could help bring to success a program of \$500 million dollars. Expeditious action is necessary so that the coming government can take over smooth management of existing debt. Colombia has maintained stable policies and has been able to overcome many difficulties. (C)

The President: What you're asking is that we talk to the bank? (C)

President Barco: Yes. (U)

Mr. Kimmitt: We can do that. (U)

The President: We can help. (U)

President Barco: The bank position has been completely unjust and without reason. Colombia has been a borrower that has fulfilled its obligations. We feel discriminated against. (C)

The President: Why don't we ask-- Bob, you and Bob Gates take a look at this. (U)

Mr. Kimmitt: Through Treasury and our Executive Director on the World Bank. (C)

The President: We'll do that. (U)

President Barco: The same way that we have been able to deal with this. Our situation on debt is impeccable. (C)

The President: Sometimes we defer. In this case we ought to weigh in. (C)

President Barco: It is not the head of the bank. It is somebody in the bureaucracy. (C)

The President: We'll try to help. (U)

President Barco: (hands President the paper) (U)

The President: (To Kimmitt) Make sure it gets over to Brady and get someone to weigh in. Who will that be-- Mulford? (C)

Mr. Kimmitt: Mulford's operation at Treasury, yes. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

President Barco: Here is another memo on trade issues. (C)

The President: I'll read this. (U)

President Barco: Since Cartagena, we've been working on bilateral agreements. We are almost ready to sign an agreement on asset sharing and money laundering. Others we are working on, such as precursor chemicals, and the media outreach. (C)

The President: Okay. On another subject, on shipboarding. Hope the new procedures are working to your satisfaction. We have asked for a prompt yes or no. We would like to speed this up. How is it working from your side? If we can get faster response; yes, Ambassador? (C)

Ambassador McNamara: The one area we see is that it takes so many hours to get approval that ships sometimes go into other ports. (C)

President Barco: We think we are can do this. (U)

The President: Your request is most understandable. Glad that we could respond. We don't want to come in with an arrogant attitude and try to bully somebody. (C)

President Barco: The rules and processes should be carried out as fast as possible. (C)

I want to say one more thing, Mr. President. Gaviria is brave, very well prepared, and has good moral convictions. He was my minister of police for three years. I believe that U.S.-Colombian relations will be in good hands. (C)

The President: His platform was well received here. He has big shoes to fill. He needs to know that we'll try to help. We want to follow up and help him face what he will be facing to develop his policies. (C)

President Barco: He will need your support. The forces that oppose the policy are getting stronger. (C)

The President: Not because they're in favor of drug trafficking, though? (C)

President Barco: We need to receive some voices saying that he will be backed. (C)

The President: Tell him from this country we'll try to help. We recognize the sensitivities involved. We don't want to over-embrace him. When is the inauguration? (C)

President Barco: August 7. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: What do you plan to do after that? Rest a while?
(C)

President Barco: I don't know yet. (U)

The President: You have my friendship and command my respect. I wish you the very best. When are you headed back down to Colombia? (C)

President Barco: This afternoon. (U)

The President: Didn't you bring a copy of your commencement speech? I heard it was well received. (U)

President Barco: Yes. I have a copy for you. (U)

The President: Thank God it's in English. Well, all the very best to you. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confirmed Pres mtg w/
Roh Tae Woo of Korea
on June 20
NO MEMCON

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5686

August 9, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

FROM:

DOUGLAS PAAL *DP*

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation for Meeting with Korean
President Roh Tae Woo, June 6, 1990

The President met with President Roh Tae Woo in the Oval Office on June 6, 1990. Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation for that meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I MEMCON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Cox NARA, Date 1/27/90

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Roh Tae Woo, President of the
Republic of Korea (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Donald P. Gregg, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Douglas H. Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC,
Notetaker
Chang Lee, Interpreter

Roh Tae Woo, President
Choi Ho Joong, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Park Tong Jin, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea
Ro Jae Bong, Secretary General to the President
Kim Chong Hwi, Assistant to the President for
Foreign and National Security Affairs
Roe Chang Hee, Senior Protocol Secretary,
Interpreter and Notetaker

DATE, TIME June 6, 1990, 10:00 - 11:00
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President welcomed President Roh to the White House and the Oval Office.

The President: I am delighted you are here. (U)

President Roh: Thank you. (U)

The President: Your meeting with Gorbachev was a very important meeting -- I want to discuss the details in private. (U)

President Roh: I met Gorbachev yesterday; it was a hectic day, but he seemed quite happy. It seems your visit was quite successful. I was happy to see that. (U)

The President: Hi, Don (Gregg). (U)

Mr. Gates: This is something that the Koreans did on their own with Gorbachev. There is reason to be very proud. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
GFI 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

President Roh: Well Mr. President, I was not so sure the meeting would come up. In the initial stages Don Gregg was so assured. I want to take this opportunity to approve his help and encouragement. (C)

President Bush: Long after the date for your meeting was set, I talked with Gorbachev at Camp David. He said Kim Il Sung will not be too understanding. (S)

President Roh: About that, I also could feel his concern over the reaction of Kim.

The meeting of one hour was very warm and cordial. As far as Kim is concerned, he seemed quite aware. At the end of the meeting, he wanted no TV pictures, only some stills. That much concerned him. I had to convince him we had to have pictures. People throughout the world would be expecting the meeting -- he agreed to pictures. (S)

The President: Any more progress with Soviets -- I was impressed with your Japanese trip. Gorbachev seems more open than before. Gorbachev urged us to do more with Kim. I told him we have big problem with IAEA. If he wants more with us, he needs to get into compliance. (C)

President Roh: Thank you for raising that question -- President Gorbachev mentioned on behalf of Kim -- not his own feeling -- but Kim is always worried about the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea. I answered that I cannot confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons. I noted progress in his negotiations with U.S. -- and hoped there will be further progress. My position is to hope to do away with nuclear weapons. I mentioned IAEA, and he seemed to share the same views. (S)

In addition, I mentioned North Korea maintained a very definitely superior military force over us. There is no need to take up this issue. (S)

The President: Do you see anything we should be doing with the Kim regime. Your having met with Gorbachev in no way implies that at this point I'll sit down with Kim. I have no idea what such a step might be, but is there anything I can do to help you? (S)

President Roh: Yes, first on the North-South question, Gorbachev asked if he could pass any message to Kim. I mentioned three points -- (1) engage Kim in summit with myself. Kim up to now has refused to negotiate government-to-government, instead negotiating with dissidents that come to North Korea. (2) We need to press Kim to change basic attitudes toward world affairs

and domestic politics. Up to now, refusing to accept worldwide winds of opening and reform. (3) Militarily, I stressed we will never seek superiority. He should tell Kim of our determination. Having spent so much, North Korea can now direct resources to its people. (S)

I hope you will stress these points in your contacts with North Korea. We had no detailed discussions with the Soviets. (S)

I stressed we could provide some assistance -- consumer goods, some technology to our mutual benefit. We agreed governmental officials will discuss this. On this point, I recommend your cooperation, e.g. in joint ventures of U.S.-South Korea firms developing relations with the Soviet Union. I make a request; I know the U.S. has a sense of the resources in the Soviet Far East. I ask that you share info with us. (S)

The President: On the business side, joint ventures would be a plus, we have no hang-ups at all. We also have business problems of our own with the Soviets. No problems with more contacts and free enterprise, open markets. The more the better to keep the whole process of perestroika moving forward. (U)

Joint ventures should be done with private enterprise, Gorbachev is enthusiastic about a consortium headed by Chevron. (S)

If we can go back to Kim Il Sung for one minute, as you know we are not enthusiastic about a group approach to North Korea. The six nation concept has some difficulties, I'm not sure what would come out of it. You mention "your" contacts with North Korea. Would it be helpful for us to have high-level contacts or anything of that nature? (S)

President Roh: Mr. President, I favor America having contacts with North Korea. There are one or two conditions I'd like to stress. As already agreed, the U.S. has to stress IAEA safeguards. Another thing is to force them to abandon their scheme for Communist unification and urge them to engage in constructive dialogue with us. Another point is the U.S. should stress they should prevent any terrorist activities. In these, I am sure you will always continue to have very close consultations. We know best how to deal with them. (S)

The President: Have you encountered any new acts, like tunnels or boats coming in? (U)

President Roh: Take a few examples: A few months ago, we discovered an additional tunnel -- very worrisome. Experts say it is very difficult to detect -- perhaps there may be a dozen more. (S)

The President: They guess there will be a dozen more? (U)

President Roh: Recently hydrofoils were sent to the North. There are new MIG-29s and SAM-5s in forward positions. (Ø)

The President: Have you had preliminary talks to discuss the tunnels? What do they say, for heaven's sakes? (U)

President Roh: On our side a U.S. officer presides, whenever it's raised, North Korea claims nothing to do with it, and says you must have dug the tunnels. (Ø)

The President: Total denial. (U)

President Roh: I would like to say a few words on my visit to Japan. (U)

The President: Please, we view that as extremely important. (U)

President Roh: The basic problem between the U.S. and Japan is trade -- we have similar problems. Additionally, we have historical problems, due to Japan's wrongdoing of the past -- not just Korea, but Northeast Asia has these problems. Without clearing this emotional thing, even if Japan gives economic help, we do not really appreciate it. The primary purpose of my visit to Japan was to get rid of this problem between our two countries. Without that, we cannot hope to build better relations in the future. (Ø)

On this point, I had frank and sincere talks with Kaifu and the Emperor. I was glad that in general, Japanese share the same view as we, and through solutions or agreement on this basic problem, we were able to resolve basic problems concerning the legal status of Korean residents of Japan. Also we reached agreement on reducing the trade imbalance and the need for transfer of Japanese technology. On the whole it was very successful and helpful to improved relations between us. (Ø)

The President: Did you get a sense Japan was eager to improve relations with the Soviet Union? I talked with Gorbachev on the Northern Territories. Did you talk with him about it? (Ø)

President Roh: I had a slight talk with Gorbachev about Japan. But what I felt in Japan was -- put simply -- Japan was rather hesitant on relations with North Korea. The news of my meeting with Gorbachev gave some shock to Japanese, and it might cause them to look again at the problem. Gorbachev asked the identical question of me. (Ø)

President Bush: He's interested. Reaching out all over. I didn't feel he had a sensible solution to the Northern Islands problem. Maybe he has. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

President Roh: What Gorbachev said to me was "let's see" about it. (U)

The President: Same to us.

Mr. Gates: Yes, sir. (U)

The President: There was no reason to give that away to us. (U)

President Roh: Summing up results of my visit to Japan, I expect relations with Japan will improve quite a lot. This will affect permanently Japan's relations with other Northeast Asia states. I hope it will build trilateral U.S.-Korea-Japan relations. (U)

The President: Let's stay in touch on it. (U)

President Roh: Mr. President, there is not much time left, and already I have had three meetings in one year with you. May we briefly mention bilateral issues? (U)

The President: Please. (U)

President Roh: About trade, through mutual efforts and consultations, I am happy to say there are not any big problems now. There's a big purchasing mission now that will buy an estimated \$4 billion, including some aircraft. As Mr. President is aware, the Korean economy grew rapidly last decade. In the last few years, we've had many difficulties. I am glad the U.S. understood our problems also. (U)

We are now restructuring. I fear we will have some net deficit in our trade around the world. We are ready to discuss support for USFK. The level of readjustment will require close consultations. I will stress that in future we will take more and more of leading role in our defense. (U)

To conclude, Mr. President, I hope the Korean economy will recover in the next year or so, so we can continue to play a more positive role in our bilateral relationship -- not only in military but in economic relations.

Because of the time limit, I regret we cannot enjoy tennis today, I hope to do so in the future. (U)

The President: We will eventually have a tennis date. The Greek Prime Minister is due. Time is tight. I need to talk with the experts for a few minutes. The Vice President told me of his breakfast with you. Senator Lugar talked on the state of play in the U.S. Congress on defense issues, among others. You should leave here knowing the North Korean threat is well understood. Our strategic alliance is as strong as ever. You raised very

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
6

generously the idea of Korea playing more of a leading role. Very helpful. We, too, are in trade and budget deficit time. The more Korea can do, the more we can remain in Korea. I understand from Ambassador Gregg and others, that the security relationship is going well. (U)

One last comment, although it was a long sacrifice on your part to come all the way here, it was a very good thing to do. It sends a strong symbol around the world, that after the Gorbachev visit our alliance remains paramount. One never should neglect friends. Thank you for coming so far. (Ø)

President Roh: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

4619

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting and Lunch with Prime Minister Mitsotakis

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Michael G. Sotirhos, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
Robert Kimmitt, Acting Secretary of State
James Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Nicholas Burns, Director for Soviet and European
Multilateral Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis
Andonis Samaras, Foreign Minister
Stavros Dimas, Minister of Industry, Energy and
Technology
Christos Zacharakis, Ambassador of Greece to the
U.S.
Mrs. Dora Bakoyiannis, Member of Parliament
Viron Polyadoras, Press Spokesman for the Prime
Minister
Dimitrios Argyriadis, Director of the Prime
Minister's Diplomatic Office (Notetaker)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CFL 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Date, Time June 6, 1990, 11:30-1:00 p.m.
and Place Cabinet Room and Old Family Dining Room

The President: Welcome. There has been great interest in this visit in both of our countries, and I have looked forward to it. This is my first chance to see you after your victory and to congratulate you for it. I know this is also a special week for your family. I only wish your son were here so that I could congratulate him for his graduation from Harvard. I would like to welcome, as well, your daughter, to this meeting. (S)

I think it is important for the U.S. to have a good, strong relationship with Greece. And so I think it would be a good idea for you to come back sometime in the future on an official visit. Our people will stay in touch to work out the details. I understand from my staff that you are the first Greek Prime Minister in twenty-six years to visit the White House. That is hard to believe, and is not good enough. We'll do better. I

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

hope this meeting starts a new pattern of closer relations between us. So, I would like to say welcome again, and will turn the floor over to you. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: If you don't mind, I will speak in Greek since my English is a little rusty. First, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to visit during the first months of my term. It is a great pleasure and an honor. (S)

I also thank you for the opportunity to return in the future on an official visit. I accept your invitation. All of us here today are representing the Greek President, Mr. Karamanlis, who sends you his best regards. He and I would like to invite you to visit Greece. The Greek people would be delighted by such a visit. (S)

I would like to talk about the situation in Greece. As you know, there has been a great political change after eight years of Papandreou. During the last year, we had three elections, and two of them were fruitless due to the new electoral law imposed by Papandreou to make attaining a majority difficult. While we have a small majority in Parliament, we have a big one with the people. I won 47 % of the vote in the April election--the largest percentage of any governing party in Europe. We feel strong, and will do what is right. (S)

During the campaign, we told the truth to the people on both foreign and domestic policy. We are now set to tackle these important problems. We worry about our economy which poses a difficult situation. We have a big public sector deficit, amounting to 22% of GNP. There is heavy borrowing, dangerous inflation and stagnation--there is no development in the economy. We have taken reform measures--privatization, restriction of expenditures, new taxes and an increase in public utility charges. Our effort will require time. (S)

In foreign policy we have made major changes within our first fifty days in office. First, we initialled the bases agreement with you. Second, we established full, diplomatic relations with Israel. Third, we have made it clear that Greece will accept all of its obligations as a member of NATO. And, I should remind you that it was the New Democracy party under the leadership of Constantine Karamanlis which obtained EC membership for Greece. We intend to follow a policy of promoting European unity. (S)

I can tell you with great satisfaction that the Greek people support our new policies. They know we are determined to restore the credibility of our country abroad. (S)

We are also determined to normalize our relations with your country. We share the same ideals and a history of friendship. I can tell you that our people feel friendship and love for the American people. Papandreou's policies only diminished that friendship superficially. (S)

Relations with Turkey, of course, will be a difficult issue to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

handle. My policy will be one of dialogue and friendship. I've always had this view which led Papandreou to accuse me of treason for having advocated dialogue with the Turks. I am ready to take the necessary steps and I've told the Turks we'll pursue a dialogue, and that I will go to Ankara, if necessary, as long as the trip is well prepared to insure its success. We know Turkey is a valuable ally of yours and we don't want to cause problems between the two of you. And we are not asking you to intervene between us. But it would be helpful if you could give advice to both of us. We don't want to create an Ankara-Athens-Washington triangle in which you are the intermediary. We believe our problems should be resolved directly. (S)

Cyprus is an important issue for us. I am an old-timer, having been a member of Parliament since 1946 and having lived with the problem during all those years. I believe an opportunity exists for a solution. Vassiliou is a good man and a valuable ally with a positive approach. But we have to find a way to break the circle, and accomplish something. I have launched an idea to reduce the number of occupation forces which would be a symbolic step. But I don't insist on this idea. It might be better for Turkey to return Famagusta, as they were ready to do so before. (S)

Turkey has many problems. As its neighbor, we don't want Turkey to fall under the dominance of Moslem extremism. We would rather see Turkey's European orientation strengthened. We think the U.S. can play an important role in this regard. (S)

I've spoken to many European leaders about Cyprus and have been assured it will be on the EC summit agenda later this month. I also think the U.S. will play a major role in the world, and that you are stronger than ever. The Cyprus problem requires American help to be resolved. I also believe that, with your help and engagement, the Greek-Turkish dialogue on other problems will be enhanced. This will help Greece, NATO, and the U.S., but mainly Turkey. So, my approach on Cyprus is not antagonistic. I want to convince Turkey to settle the problem. But we are running out of time after sixteen years of occupation. There is now a new generation of Cypriots who have not lived in a united Cyprus. (S)

Vassiliou is already being criticized for producing no results. He has only two years left. My own government also needs a success. We hope to do well, but it will be a tough road. This is why, Mr. President, I wanted to put the Cyprus question before you today, in order to ask for your support. (S)

The President: Thanks very much for your remarks. You have covered several subjects, and I will try to respond. (S)

First, on your economic situation, welcome to the United States. We are fighting many of the same problems, and I agree that many of them are tough ones. I also agree that your private sector reforms are the answer. We start from the same common ground. (S)

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Second, we view our overall relations as important and feel comfortable with your policy changes since taking office. We have a strong and fascinating Greek community in the U.S. who approve of the improvement in relations and who have great hope for our success. (S)

Third, on Cyprus, I am flattered that you think we can play an important role. I know that we have not been as effective in the past as we might have been. But we have been engaged in the problem. We have a good man, Nelson Ledsky, who is in the region now. I am amenable to your suggestions. I also have great respect for Vassiliou. He is a good man, and I understand why he is frustrated. (S)

I think the Turkish President is more reasonable than some of the others. We have some differences with the Turks, but we are also friends. We want to solve the Cyprus problem and are impressed with the importance of the need for action. Famagusta could be a confidence-building measure if the Turks think they can do it. But they might want something in return. We are intrigued by it. (S)

As for our overall policy, we support the UN Secretary General in his mandate. We have spoken to him about this recently and think this is the best way to go forward. We do care about Cyprus. We would be interested in having our Foreign Ministers explore what we could do. Our Ambassadors could also be helpful in working out some ideas. If our Foreign Ministers could come up with something, we could consider it. We want to see you and Vassiliou succeed and resolve this problem. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I have some comments to make on what you have said. I accept that Ozal is a reasonable man. We have met several times. But he is weak today. I am opening a path to dialogue and also want contacts with Demirel and Inonu, the leaders of the two other parties. I am old acquaintances with them. There is no doubt about the importance of the UN role, but Perez de Cuellar is desperate. He doesn't know what to do, and we must help him. I spoke with Ledsky about these matters. (S)

I believe that Famagusta could act as a catalyst and that we should try to influence the Turks in this direction. I believe our Foreign Ministers should maintain contact with each other. Our Ambassadors are also helpful. We are very happy with Ambassador Sotirhos. All Greeks like him. We must find a way--one step forward. We would like the press release describing this meeting to give impetus to the Cyprus problem and underline our commitment to finding a solution. (S)

The President: Before we go to lunch, I want to tell Dora (Mrs. Bakoyiannis) in front of everyone here that our hearts go out to you. We think you are courageous and we know you are motivated by this tragedy to reduce the terrible scourge of terrorism. We just feel terribly for you. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In that regard, I want you to know we will combat terrorism. Our position is firm on the Rashid case (end of conversation in Cabinet Room). (S)

(Conversation resumed in the Old Family Dining Room over lunch).

The President: What do you think of Yeltsin? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I am impressed by him. I hear many negative comments about him, but I do not share all of them. (S)

The President: Our impression, in brief, is not particularly favorable. He came to the White House and refused to see General Scowcroft without bringing four people along. It colored the visit. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: My wife told me he reminded her of Papandreou. But I think he will play an important role. (S)

What are your impressions of Germany? (S)

The President: We favor a unified Germany in NATO. We may have made progress in convincing Gorbachev that this would be less of a threat than singularizing Germany. Gorbachev should be more worried about a Germany isolated after fifty years of division. This is our view. Germany, of course, is cooperating with the Soviets on the economic side. We understand why the USSR would be suspicious after having lost twenty seven million people in the Second World War. But I wonder how long Germany must do penance before it is accepted as a democratic country. What is your view? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I agree with everything you have said. I am a good friend of Kohl and will see him at Harvard. I believe he will win the elections of a unified Germany. We too have suffered at German hands. I, for example, was sentenced to death twice by the Germans. But the Greek people support unification. (S)

The President: Are all Greek parties united on this? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: All the parties agree that Germany should be united. But the issue of Germany in NATO has not been widely discussed. I think the opposition will disagree with us on that. (S)

The President: We need to convince them that NATO won't necessarily be the same organization. Article 2 provides language on the purpose of NATO that conveys a broader, more political role. We will have to figure out how to cast the new NATO, while keeping Dick Cheney's forces there. We believe U.S. forces are a stabilizing presence in Europe. Our troops must be wanted, however, or they will come home. We need European support in order to maintain support at home. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I believe the Soviets agree with what

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
6

you have said. We have seen an important change in the psychology of the East European countries. Our opposition, and the Greek communists, who are still Stalinists, are lagging behind these changes. We have good relations with the Balkan countries and I was recently impressed during a visit to Eastern Europe. (S)

The President: How do the East Europeans in general view a U.S. presence in Europe? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: The prestige of the U.S. in Eastern Europe is enormous--probably greater in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. I think their decision to turn toward democracy is final. They also want free markets but are a little confused about how to manage the transition. Each of the countries, of course, is different. Bulgaria will have free elections. We are helping the opposition parties, and there will be some balance after the elections. In Romania, the President's victory was large, but the elections were unfair. (S)

The President: Do you know Iliescu? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: No, I do not. But I have good relations with the Bulgarians. Bulgaria is stable and will help us in the Balkans. (S)

The President: If you were asked at a press conference in Greece about the Baltics, what would you say? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I would say that Greece never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR. I would say Lithuania could become independent but that reality must also be respected. Gorbachev is doing the maximum now. I have a feeling that Gorbachev is doing his best, and that we must all help him. If Gorbachev falls, and we inherit Yeltsin, it will be an adventure. (S)

The President: Do the East Europeans want Gorbachev to succeed? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Yes, they all do but they are worried about his internal problems. The Yugoslavs also find themselves in a difficult spot. The revival of nationalism in the region has hurt Yugoslavia and makes it difficult to maintain its unity. We are being careful not to excite the Macedonian minority. (S)

I also think there could be developments in Albania. (S)

The President: Perez de Cuellar said the same thing. (S)

Foreign Minister Samaras: There are 400,000 Albanians of Greek origin. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Albania has a terrible regime, with a very poor human rights record. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The President: How do you account for the changes inside Albania? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: There has been an internal reaction inside against the regime which is now shaky. (S)

The President: I hope they shake Castro too, although even Cuba is not as bad a place as Albania. (S)

Foreign Minister Samaras: There is not one functioning church in Albania. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We want to work closely with you on terrorism and narcotics. This is of great interest to us. (S)

The President: Both are vitally important to us. What is your thinking on this complicated Rashid case? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We must make a decision by September. It is out of the question to release him. Either we will extradite him to the U.S. or try him in Greece. Personally, I would like to hand him over to you because his trial will be an adventure. But I must consider the political situation in Greece. I will give you a clear answer soon. (S)

The President: I wasn't pressing today for a clear answer, and will await your response. The raid on the Israeli coast undermines the Palestinian cause and plays into Shamir's hands. It gets Shamir off the hook. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Shamir's policy is too extreme. (S)

The President: That's right. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have resumed full diplomatic relations with Israel which we think will make us more effective in the Middle East. But Israel must learn to coexist with the Arabs for its long-term survival. (S)

The President: It is a very difficult and unpromising situation. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It would be easier for the Israelis if they changed their electoral law. (S)

The President: They need to do something--the situation is frozen. What type of electoral laws were changed in Greece by Papandreou? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Its simple. I need 50 % to win which is not possible in our system without coalition partners. Felipe Gonzalez has the same percentage as me. (S)

The President: What did Ronald Reagan receive in the 1980 election? John Anderson's candidacy reduced his winning percentage. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Secretary Cheney: I think President Reagan received barely 50% of the vote. Lincoln never achieved a majority. (S)

The President: So don't let your opposition cite the U.S. as an example--we've had Presidents with less than 50% of the vote. (S)

I don't want to probe into your internal affairs, but, having said that, whatever happened to the first Mrs. Papandreou? (S)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: She lives in Athens, and is planning to remarry--an American, actually. (S)

The President: Is she still less than infatuated with the U.S.? (S)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: Well, she is marrying an American. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I would like to raise one last issue and ask Mr. Samaras to present it to you. (S)

Foreign Minister Samaras: In the CFE talks, we have problems in the negotiations of the areas of application. The Turks want the port of Mersin, from which they invaded Cyprus, to be militarized. We want Mersin to be demilitarized. Mr. Bartholomew and our Ambassador have been discussing the issue and we would appreciate your weighing in with Bartholomew and others that we need to find a solution to this problem. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: This is a very important issue for us. (S)

The President: I'm afraid I am not aware of the details of this issue. Brent, can you discuss it? (S)

General Scowcroft: No sir, I cannot discuss it either. (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Our position is that Mersin should be excluded. We can discuss it with you, but we cannot change our basic decision. (S)

The President: We disagree with the Greek position? (S)

Mr. Kimmitt: Yes sir. (S)

The President: Why are the Turks insisting on it? (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: As a provocation. (S)

The President: We'll take a look at it. But we do want CFE to be concluded without many delays. Jim Baker called me last night to say we may have more options with the Soviets. They have accepted the premise of some of our ideas, and we find this encouraging. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: It is a very important issue. Please try to do something. (S)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: This is an important issue for the Greek public. People know about this. It is politically important. (S)

Foreign Minister Samaras: This is a huge problem for us. The area of exclusion is three times the size of Greece, and all of Greece will be demilitarized. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: I am establishing a special task force on terrorism to see what we can do. We hope to achieve results from this change in emphasis. There was no certainty before that the government wanted to combat terrorism. Now we've changed that. We would like closer cooperation with you. (S)

The President: I am delighted to hear that. We're ready to assist you. We are working on new technologies for airport security. There are no perfect defenses and it is very expensive. Sharing intelligence information will also be important. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We need technical assistance in counter-terrorism. (S)

The President: We have just finished the Pan Am 103 investigation on the plane that went down over Scotland. Is that report available, Brent? (S)

General Scowcroft: Yes it is sir. (S)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: Is there a way to detect plastic explosives? (S)

General Scowcroft: Not well enough. (S)

The President: We are trying to develop technology to detect plastics. (S)

General Scowcroft: The problem is that to detect plastic, you generally need to have an amount of plastic larger than what is used in most bombs. (S)

Mr. Dobbins: The detection devices are also very large and expensive. (S)

The President: Cooperation will be important. (S)

Foreign Minister Samaras: November 17 is a terrible organization. They have killed both Greeks and Americans, including Richard Welch in 1975. (S)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: They kill people without security, it is easy for them. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: The Germans also lost Herrhausen. (S)

Mrs. Bakoyiannis: And he had security. In Greece, they attack defenseless people. (S)

The President: Do you know who they are? (S)

Foreign Minister Samaras: No. And we don't even want to venture a guess in public. (S)

The President: This is a cowardly and shadowy business. There seems to be a better chance for improved relations with Iran with the release of the two hostages. They now want me to do more. But we have four other hostages still there. What do they want me to do? I am not ungrateful, but I don't want to rush out to congratulate them when they are still holding other Americans. (S)

Ambassador Argyriadis: I was in Iran recently. I think Rafsanjani has to improve Iran's foreign relations. But there is a strong internal reaction and he also has to survive. The hardliners are strong and are doing everything possible to keep the two great Satans, the U.S. and the USSR, out of Iran. So, I have a feeling Rafsanjani will try to become the single, strong leader. (S)

The President: People say Velayati is reasonable. (S)

Ambassador Argyriadis: Yes, but he doesn't have much power, especially compared to the Interior Minister. The hopes are on Rafsanjani. There is also a hardening of the situation of women. The pretext is the Imam's line. They really want to keep people at a distance from their increasing economic problems. (S)

The President: I have enjoyed this. I think we have covered most of the ground. And congratulations to the Prime Minister on his 37th wedding anniversary. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: We have covered all issues of interest. We are entering a new era in our relations. I want you to know that we'll continue to follow this course. (S)

The President: We will also follow through on our part. (S)

Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Don't forget Mersin. It may blow up on us. (S)

The President: You have made that clear. (S)

- End of Conversation -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4585

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with United Nations Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
John Wolf, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organizations
Nancy Bearg Dyke, Director, International
Programs and Public Diplomacy, NSC
(Notetaker)

Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN Secretary General
Ronald I. Spiers, Under Secretary General for
Political and General Assembly Affairs and
Secretariat Services
Alvaro de Soto, Executive Assistant to the
Secretary General
John L. Washburn, Director in the Executive
Office of the Secretary General (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME June 6, 1990, 3:30 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Willard Hotel

Exchange of greetings. (U)

General Scowcroft: How were your Hill meetings in general? (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Useful with good questions,
though two were cancelled. I hope to see Dole and Mitchell
tonight. (U)

General Scowcroft: I am sure the Senators and Congressmen are
responsive but in their priorities, it is easily deferred (the
arrears). (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: I gave Cambodia as an
example of an expected dire need for reserve funding. (U)

General Scowcroft: We are planning on the UN in several
instances. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes, we could have the
Western Sahara, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador all at the
same time as new requirements. And we do not have a single penny
of reserve. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CJ 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

2

General Scowcroft: Maybe, if it is of direct interest to the US, we can go up to the Hill for a supplemental. I would be delighted if you can get to that point. It would mean success. The President is determined to pay the arrearages but I don't know when it will happen. (U)

Mr. Spiers: Sarbanes says the President should say it on the Hill. (U)

General Scowcroft: Okay. Is there any subject you wish to raise? (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Afghanistan. Is the status of Najibullah the only remaining problem between you and the Soviets? (S)

General Scowcroft: It is the main one. (U)

Discussion followed about options for Najibullah and the possibility of a shura or a role for the king. (S)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Many mujahadin are against the king. How to set up a situation which the leaders will accept is a big problem. (S)

General Scowcroft: The Pakistanis are giving most of their aid to Hekmatyar, but we do not like him. Masoud is the closest to a national leader we think we should support. We are definitely not at a solution yet. (S)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Cambodia. The news from Tokyo (meeting of Cambodian groups) is bad because Pol Pot is not a part of the agreement. I cannot provide security if all do not agree. (S)

Mr. Spiers: On the Zionism is Racism resolution, how much of a head of steam is built up here? Moynihan wants to repeal it. (S)

General Scowcroft: The Israelis raise it every time as an objection to the UN. The President mentioned it to Gorbachev. (S)

Secretary General de Cuellar: It is necessary to not try too early to repeal it and be defeated. It is actually dead but the Israelis have kept it alive. I will be the first to vote for a resolution against it but we must be careful that the resolution will not lose. (S)

Mr. de Soto: It is linked to other issues too. If we raise it, the Arabs will say the Israelis demonstrate what is in the resolution in the Occupied Territories. (S)

General Scowcroft: If it can be done quietly, it is better than with much fanfare. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

Mrs. Dyke: The Israelis do not want us to go forward if we might lose, as even an improved margin will reconfirm the resolution. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: It can be a mistake to revive this. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: That is my view too. It is an irritant but not worth spending any time on. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Havel raised it. I explained as I have to you. Eastern Europe is changing -- establishing relations with Israel. As I told Vice President Quayle, I am willing to help but there is no tradition of directly repealing a UNGA resolution. (Ø)

Mr. de Soto: It is better to rephrase, reinterpret. (Ø)

Mr. Spiers: Our concern was that you would start down a path and get backlash from the Congress against the UN. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: No, there is no sign of that. It would be foolish to pursue it unless we knew we had the votes to do it quietly. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: I hope you know we support your sending Goulding to Israel. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: They do not want Goulding, though he is an impeccable man. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: We would work hard to get an emissary accepted by Israel. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes, I want to send a man. It will be a humanitarian mission. In 10 days, I could send a mission quietly, but two weeks ago in Geneva, the Israelis told me Goulding is unacceptable. Aimé is my man on the Middle East. (Ø)

Mr. Wolf: There is some pressure to go to the UNGA. (Ø)

Mr. Spiers: Yes, the Arabs are thinking about asking for a UNGA session 18 June. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Maybe, I can advance my announcement. They respect Aimé. (Ø)

Mr. Spiers: After President Bush mentioned Goulding in his press conference, Terzi called to complain. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: If the Israelis give me the green light, everyone will agree. I need the green light. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

General Scowcroft: We are prepared to help. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: Rafsanjani. I understand he made some comments today at a press conference. (U)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Yes, he is asking me to go to Tehran. Tomorrow I will see the Ambassador of Iraq. If the trip works out, it can be important. I will keep you informed. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Middle East. My great frustration is that we are not moving. If you accepted, the UN Security Council could begin quietly discussing it. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: We are reaching a moment of truth on our own peace process. If Shamir is not prepared to go forward in about two weeks, we will look for something else. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: What are the chances for Shamir? (Ø)

General Scowcroft: The experts think yes. The question deep down is if Shamir wants election reform. A coalition government is in both their interests. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: Shamir is courageous. (Ø)

General Scowcroft: But he seems to feel any alternative is worse than where he is now. (Ø)

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar: You work on Israel quietly and give me the green light. You can tell Israel that Perez de Cuellar met with Netanyahu(?) and it is no problem to give a visa to Mr. Blanchard accompanied by Mr. Aimé to the area, for me as UNSYG. (Ø)

After the formal meeting, John Wolf gave the UN Secretary General the attached non-paper on Ethiopia and mentioned its main points. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

Attachment

Tab A Non-paper/Talking Points on Ethiopia

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- o During the recent summit, the U.S. and USSR noted the following:
 - that the Ethiopian Government has agreed to open Massawa to food shipments;
 - that the Ethiopian Government has agreed to accept a UN observer in the Carter peace talks;
 - U.S./Soviet agreement on a joint U.S./Soviet airlift of relief supplies to Asmara;
 - U.S./Soviet support for an international conference on the Horn of Africa.
- o We have called in the EPLF to get their re-affirmation of willingness to participate in a UN effort to move food through Massawa.
- o Embassy Addis will be working with their Soviet counterparts to plan the Asmara airlift.
- o The EPLF has told us it remains willing to engage in the Carter peace talks with a UN role. We have briefed Carter on developments; he is ready to resume his efforts quickly.
- o The SYG told HFAC he has designated Charles Lamuniere as his point man on Massawa.
- o The SYG also told HFAC he has informed Carter he will accept Ethiopia's invitation to send an observer to the Carter peace talks.

Talking Points

- Political developments now permit us to move vigorously towards opening Massawa to relief shipments.
- The donor community is looking to the UN for effective coordination and leadership in these efforts.
- We would suggest an immediate effort to draw up a plan for the receipt and distribution of food, and obtain Ethiopian and Eritrean agreement to the plan.
- The plan should provide for the cessation of military activity in and around Massawa and the establishment of corridors for the safe, unhindered movement of relief into Asmara and the rest of Eritrea.
- We appreciate your designation of Charles Lamuniere as your action officer on Massawa. It may be desirable to designate an experienced UN agency as well to help formulate the plan, elicit agreement to it, and oversee its implementation. Your direct participation may become necessary if political problems arise in obtaining agreement.
- You can count on political support from the USG and the rest of the donor community in working with the parties in conflict.
- The plan will have to spell out what (if any) representatives from the relief organizations maintained by the Eritreans and the government will be invited to observe or assist UN operations in Massawa. A limited presence by their NGO's may prove politically desirable.
- The plan should also address how the grain offloaded at Massawa will be allocated between government-controlled areas and rebel areas.
- We have more suggestions of a technical nature which we will pass on to Lamuniere.
- Your acceptance of Ethiopia's invitation of a UN observer in the Carter peace talks opens the way for early resumption of these talks. Mr. Carter has been following developments closely, and is anxious to resume the talks.
- An international conference on peace in the Horn of Africa would complement, not supplant, President Carter's efforts. We would welcome your ideas on the nature of such a conference and its timing.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#8375

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the
Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
(Small Meeting) James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Peter Hartmann, Deputy National Security
Adviser
Dorothea Kaltenbach, Interpreter

PARTICIPANTS: The President
(Dinner) The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Peter Hartmann, Deputy National Security
Adviser
Dorothea Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME June 8, 1990, 7:00 - 9:15 pm
AND PLACE: Oval Office/Old Family Dining Room

Chancellor Kohl: There are two things related to NATO that I wanted to raise. Germany going out of NATO would mean forty years have been wasted. NATO would collapse and the US would withdraw from Europe. Gorbachev knows this, but we have to find a way to help him without giving anything up. (S)

Second, NATO must send a clear message to Gorbachev that we are ready to adapt. It is strange. East Germany is chairman of the Warsaw Pact meetings right now. (S)

The President: And Hungary wants to get out of the Warsaw Pact. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I think our closest people should get together and put together a message for Gorbachev which conveys this

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

01 01/21/09
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

willingness to change. We don't want it to leak out. The Alliances could, perhaps, conclude a non-aggression pact. I just want to float the idea. (S)

The President: What it might do, though, is to cement the Warsaw Pact together. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: You could take them one by one. But we must keep this in a very close group. I could send Teltschik over if this is required. Your Summit came across very well. Brent told me that the human Gorbachev was very good as well. (S)

Second, I would think that -- not in the Two Plus Four forum -- we could agree to limits on the Bundeswehr. The big problem is the New People's Army in the GDR. They are 180,000 strong, including professionals and an officer corps drilled in the ideology. We can't use them. Only about twenty percent can be used. (S)

The Soviets will ask how many troops the future Germany will have. There are 450,000 in the Bundeswehr now, and 180,000 in the New People's Army. Maybe we should prepare now a certain figure for Germany. When unification concludes, it must be a sovereign Germany. I can accept Soviet troops in East Germany for three years, so long as it is based on a treaty between two sovereign states. Over the next few weeks -- before the NATO Summit -- we should arrive at a figure for the Bundeswehr. (S)

The President: How should we do this? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We could send one or two people over to talk. There is something irrational about the Soviets that we have to consider. It is their psyche -- but Germany has invaded the Soviet Union twice. (S)

The President: I told the Soviets that Germany is reformed. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They don't say Napoleon is French, but a European. But a German is a German. They did have over 20 million killed. They will be tough on this point. (S)

The third point. I expect a letter from Gorbachev on economic issues. They have two ideas -- one of which they raised with you. (S)

The President: He raised it only in passing, at the end of a meeting. He said he needed aid and hoped we could be a part of it. Nothing more specific. (S)

((Secretary Baker joined the meeting.))

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Chancellor Kohl: (The Chancellor repeated his introduction of the economic issue for Secretary Baker.) They have the expectation that we will help -- 20-25 billion. He used this figure with Teltschik. It would be to buy goods for consumption. (S)

But the second economic idea is for June, and the FRG only. It would be a loan of five billion DM to extend their credit line. Guaranteed. They said we could expect something in return. (S)

The President: I told him that the reality was that we would have big problems: Cuba, Lithuania. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We're talking about two different things -- one now and one in the autumn. (S)

I think Gorbachev is seeking a way to settle the NATO issue. If Germany is not in NATO, the US will leave and Great Britain and France will have a nuclear entente. Then the small powers will be left alone. Then parallel to NATO is the question of the EC. If we change the security situation now, it would have a catastrophic effect on the EC. There would be two nuclear powers, a neutral Germany, and the small powers with nowhere to go. Then begins a debate in Germany: Why don't we have nuclear weapons? (S)

Gorbachev must understand this is non-negotiable, but we must try hard to make it easy. (S)

So there are three points. They will ask: How many troops will there be in the FRG? We won't allow this to be discussed in the Two Plus Four. I want to settle it now -- on the NATO level and not in the Two Plus Four. We have a big problem on the hard part, the New People's Army. It is a Party army, with many professionals. I would like us to agree on troop levels before we go into the NATO Summit. (S)

We also have to give a message to NATO, and the President of the United States must be a leader. What kind of proposals can we make? The Warsaw Pact has agreed to do some stocktaking and see how things progress. I was just thinking that De Maiziere was the chairman of that meeting. One idea I'm floating around was a non-aggression pact. (S)

Secretary Baker: We discussed this at Turnberry. It is dangerous to give the Warsaw Pact legitimacy, but we could do it for individual states. Some allies are too hard over on the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The ball now is Germany in NATO, and some continued existence of the Warsaw Pact might be conducive to that. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There is a psychological point. The Soviet Union doesn't want to look like losers. Shevardnadze told me we would hear specifics on this point. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We must send a signal to the Soviet Union on this point at the NATO Summit. (S)

- End of Small Meeting -

Dinner began at 7:30pm

The President: I am worried. How many Soviet troops would be in Germany, and for how long? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It's feasible that they would stay for a short time, if we conclude a SOFA treaty. Then they couldn't claim the parallel issue. (S)

The President: How about German public opinion on this? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: One can't win support in Germany for the idea of Germany not in NATO. Only the Greens have opted out. Once we have all-German elections, I don't foresee problems. Germans in the GDR want the Soviets out. (S)

The President: But will the troops leave? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We could agree to two or three years. (S)

The President: How valid is the argument they make, that they can't bring their troops out because they have no housing. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: This is no argument to leave troops there. (S)

The President: Gorbachev didn't say he wanted the U.S. out of Germany. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: All countries want the U.S. in Germany as part of NATO, and they want Germany in NATO. That, for the Europeans, puts two roofs over Germany. (S)

I am frequently asked about the timetable (for unification? for elections?). I have only limited influence on the timetable. (S)

The President: Has Poland been pacified with the way things are going? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: A decision is needed in about two weeks in the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GDR and the FRG, to give a solemn declaration that, as their first act, the two Germanies will guarantee the border. (S)

The President: Will Walesa come in? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't think so. (S)

The President: I was impressed with Mazowiecki. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. But it would be a mistake for him to become President. That would shunt him aside. Poland is falling behind in economic progress. Czechoslovakia is doing better. (S)

Secretary Baker: We agreed on SNF to kick the can down the road by studying the appropriate mix. Push it until after your elections. We should avoid taking up TASM. (S)

The President: When are the elections? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They have to come between the last Sunday in November and the middle of January. My tactical approach is to keep it vague for now. (S)

Secretary Baker: Shevardnadze just told me the transition period didn't have to go past unification, provided the issue of troop levels was solved. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I think we should stabilize Gorbachev. Yeltsin is not a substitute. He is appealing to Slavophile feeling. (S)

The President: The question is, how does Gorbachev fit into Europe in a way which saves face. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It's too bad there is a limitation on the press that is arriving with De Maiziere. You should let more of them in. (S)

The President: We'll take care of that. Any other advice for my meeting with him? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: (Described De Maiziere's family history)

The President: What was his instrument? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: The cello. He has no one he can rely on. (S)

The dinner ended at 9:15pm

~~SECRET~~

Confirmed Pres mtg
w/ Salinas of Mexico
on Jun 10th
NO MEMCON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4697

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de
Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard C. Barkley, Ambassador to the GDR
James Dobbins, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European
Political Affairs, NSC Staff
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Lothar de Maiziere, Prime Minister
Sylvia Schultz, Head of the Office of
the Prime Minister
Fritz Holzwarth, Political Counselor to
the Prime Minister
Thilo Steinbach, Director for Foreign
Policy, Office of the Prime Minister
Matthias Gehler, Government Spokesman
Norbert Reemer, Minister Counselor of the
Embassy of the GDR to the U.S.
Joachim Keitz, Interpreter

DATE, TIME June 11, 1990, 11:36 a.m. - 12:08 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room (U)

The President: Let me welcome you all to the White House. The Prime Minister was just saying that this meeting is an historic first. We feel the same way, and we couldn't be more pleased that you are here. Our plan is to meet here until noon and then have an informal luncheon. I want to say how much I respect the historic role you have played, Mr. Prime Minister, and how much I appreciate the close cooperation you have developed with the Federal Chancellor. I would also add that is important that you and I work together to achieve the goal of German unity in peace and freedom. (U)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CBI 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Mr. President, it is a great privilege to be here in the White House, where so many European personages in history have come. It is a great day for us. If we think back one year, no one would have dreamt of any of this. Only Herr Reemer has been here before. The rest of us are all newcomers, but we have been given a clearcut and unambiguous mission by our people -- as you said, German unification in peace and German unification in a unifying Europe. Those of us who have lived in Communism for 40 years should also take our brothers and sisters into the new Europe. This is particularly essential to achieving our goal. (U)

Let me express my profound gratitude to you for your letter, which I received one day after your meetings, briefing me on your meetings with President Gorbachev. It was very useful to me for our meetings in Moscow of the members of the Warsaw Pact. I am ready to brief you, if that would be useful. We made it crystal clear in Moscow that all six wanted change -- not revitalization of the military aspects but a strengthening of the political dimension. Developments in the Warsaw Pact could take us in the direction that the Pact won't survive very long. The Hungarian and Czechoslovak representatives especially said that following a transitional period, they don't want this alliance. Afterwards, it will be necessary to establish new structures, because singularization and marginalization of individual countries would make them become more attached once again to this "flagship," so to say. Therefore it is important for Western Europe to open to Eastern Europe at all levels -- economically, through the EC, and also building common security structures. All participants in the Moscow summit favored the CSCE process -- not in a way that CSCE should replace efforts at European unification made so far, but as a kind of umbrella. All made it clear that socialism as it has existed has failed and is now on the road to complete downfall. It has failed economically and as a method of administration, and its values have proved not bearable. This means defeat: all of see that very clearly. But there is a danger of portraying this as a defeat for the other side. (S)

The President: That's a good point. (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: 40 years of socialism has also changed the people. Defeat means a certain loss in life for many people. We need to recover our own souls and let them catch up. I believe the subtle and cautious policies pursued by the U.S. and especially by you, Mr. President, clearly led toward a new partnership. (S)

The President: Let me make a few comments on what you have said. We made very clear to President Gorbachev that singularization, singling out for special status, of a united Germany would be very bad. I believe he understands -- maybe you have insights into this -- that a united Germany has earned its place and that we shouldn't write the past into the present. I told Gorbachev that we were sensitive to their concerns but that a united Germany is no threat to them and that a united Germany in NATO would be stabilizing. He agrees, by the way, that the U.S. role

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

in Europe is stabilizing. So we don't want singularization. Second, we agree that new structures should be developed. We believe that NATO with a broader role would strengthen security and also help in other ways. I told President Mitterrand, for example, that it had a role to play in verification and stabilization measures. I don't know if Gorbachev agreed, but he sat where you are sitting, and I told him that a united Germany should be in NATO but that Germany should decide. I thought he agreed, but then he said a few words to his foreign minister and pulled back. We see utility for CSCE. It is unwieldy, but it provides a home for a lot of countries, including the U.S. (S)

Let me refer to one thing you said. I agree we shouldn't talk of winners and losers. Everyone has a level of pride; this applies to Gorbachev and the Soviet people. I tried to convince them of the reality that a united Germany in NATO would not be a threat to their security, that we could go forward from there. A lot of what he wants is economic. But we've got to keep working to convince him. (S)

I made a point to him that NATO is a defensive organization which has wide public support. I mentioned new challenges that it should take on. We will have a NATO Summit in early July, and we will be talking about steps to transform the Alliance. We have talked about a new political role and a changed threat. Out of that we want to develop a common position on CSCE. As we do, we hope it will be of some comfort to the other side, so they will not be suspicious of our intentions. I mentioned we believe the CSCE has a role to play in helping the countries of central and eastern Europe build free societies and giving the Soviets and the East Europeans a role in the new Europe. (S)

Let me, with your permission, mention the Two Plus Four process. We don't believe it should have a broader role, or try to solve everything connected with the "German Question." These are just some observations. I am fascinated with the meetings you had in Moscow, and I understand your point that we should not talk about victory and defeat, especially with a Soviet Union that is trying to reform. We will conduct ourselves accordingly. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Let me briefly comment. In the plenary at the Warsaw Pact Summit, Gorbachev said his assumption was that stability in Europe could come only with a U.S. presence. But he also said the stability and the balance of forces had to be defined, and that stability and balance were not only a matter of counting missiles. In addition to our public and plenary meetings, I had a private talk with Gorbachev. I felt he still assumes that the Soviet nationalities and peoples will have trouble accepting full German membership in NATO unless certain elements are added. For example, he has talked about a treaty for the continuing presence of Soviet troops in the GDR. (S)

Secretary Baker: Did he have in mind a treaty between the two pacts or between Germany and the Soviet Union? (S)

SECRET

Prime Minister de Maiziere: He appeared to prefer a treaty between the two pacts, but his suggestions were a bit vague. But if a solution were hammered out, I would propose a treaty, because the unification of Germany should be accompanied by the end of allied rights. We should have a new legal basis, rather than one as a result of the Second World War. So this would strengthen our position and help the Soviet Union retain its position as a big power, a great power. He said he would leave it to German imagination to work out. (S)

The President: Let me return to this to be sure I understand. I understand there was a GDR paper. Our view is that the Two Plus Four should terminate these Four Power rights. The Two Plus Four ought not to decide alliances or other security relations, which have a bearing on other states, including the NATO allies. A settlement shouldn't address these issues, because of the danger of singularization. I don't know whether you agree. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I consider the situation in a very similar way as you, Mr. President, but I can see a problem. If German unification is of importance to other countries, we should be able to play a certain bridge function. NATO has a kind of enemy stereotype, not only for politicians but also for publics. A change in NATO, as you said in your nine-point proposal, which we read with the greatest interest.... If NATO remained as it is now but changed its name, that would not be a serious proposal. Anxiety has been signalled to us by the Poles, Czechs, etc. So a gesture should be made by NATO to address those deeply rooted fears and anxieties. I also feel, like you, that Two Plus Four should result in the abrogation of Four Power rights and that alliance relations should be decided by European states on the basis of sovereignty. That is not the view of President Gorbachev. He would like a move-for-move deal. I don't have a model in my mind. (S)

The President: I believe we can allay some Soviet fears by stressing Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the political side. The idea of a name change is not ridiculous at all. We had a discussion about that just recently. I believe we can do our best to reassure the Soviet Union and others in the Warsaw Pact to show that we are not a great threat, no threat at all, to democratic Poland, Hungary, and so on. (S)

Secretary Baker: I want to ask what Gorbachev meant by "move-for-move." Was he referring to levels of forces in central Europe or something more? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: He was talking about troop strength, but first of all, he is looking for a recipe to bring a message to his own people and his own military. If he abandons rights, he would like to assure them he is getting something in return as regards the Soviet place in Europe. For all the Soviet Union's economic problems, economic assistance alone will not be sufficient to pacify his population. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4697

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere of the German Democratic Republic (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard C. Barkley, Ambassador to the GDR
James Dobbins, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC Staff
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

Lothar de Maiziere, Prime Minister
Sylvia Schultz, Head of the Office of the Prime Minister
Fritz Holzwarth, Political Counselor to the Prime Minister
Thilo Steinbach, Director for Foreign Policy, Office of the Prime Minister
Matthias Gehler, Government Spokesman
Norbert Reemer, Minister Counselor of the Embassy of the GDR to the U.S.
Joachim Keitz, Interpreter

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

DATE, TIME June 11, 1990, 12:20 - 1:03 p.m.
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room (U)

The President: Did you give a speech in New York or were you just there on a visit? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I was visiting. I have an appointment with the UN Secretary General tomorrow. (U)

The President: He is a good man. We like him. (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Tonight I will give a lecture at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
2

The President: You mentioned your meeting in Moscow with other leaders of Eastern Europe. There are differences, though. Hungary seems to want to move away sooner. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Our joint declaration was the lowest common denominator. Hungary would like to quit the Warsaw Pact very soon. The same goes for Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria is different; it has a number of motivations. The Poles think of German unification in terms of their own security. (Ø)

The President: Are they still worried? I thought they understood that a unified would recognize the border. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I don't think policy-makers are so concerned, but they have to take into consideration the general public. It is a question of the best approach. The Poles favor a bilateral treaty, which would be initialed now and signed later. (Ø)

The President: Are you comfortable with your formulation on that point -- that the two German parliaments and Governments issue a declaration now, and then sign a treaty later? (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I cannot see the unambiguous pluses or minuses of either procedure. The outcome will be identical. The difference is related to the mass media. I would like an approach that could eliminate differences. (Ø)

The President: I thought the Poles had been reassured. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: They still would like to move faster than the Chancellor would. There are issues besides the border issue. There is also Article 116. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: This is a decisive problem. The Poles have a right to secure borders, but they do not have the right to determine the Constitution of a united Germany. There is Article 116, which says that those who were at one time German citizens have the right to claim German citizenship. The Poles fear that Germans living there have not only a claim to citizenship but also to certain territory. Something can be done, because Article 23 of the Federal Constitution, covering this possibility, will be deleted after unification. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The Poles have the additional concern that they fear all those eligible will claim German citizenship because of the better pension benefits. (Ø)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I feel they are also not secure about their eastern border. When they talk about western border, they mean all borders. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Mr. President, the next meeting of the Two Plus Four will be in Berlin. Then we will meet in Paris in July, and the Poles will attend. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The President: May I make a comment on "parallelism"? We think it would be bad, when discussing troop limits, to draw a parallel between U.S. troops and Soviet troops. If ours are not wanted, they will be out. The difference is that theirs are not wanted. We have to make sure this issue doesn't come up of equating our troops with theirs. It worries me that Gorbachev, not wanting to be seen in defeat, might call for equal cuts in U.S. and Soviet forces. If you believe stability is best kept by U.S. troops remaining, I hope you can help. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Gorbachev made us understand that he continues to base his calculations on some form of parallelism. He agrees that U.S. troops are important for the security of Europe as a whole, but he says why shouldn't it be the same way for Soviet troops! (S)

The President: The answer is that they're not wanted, but we must be careful telling him that. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: The Soviet troop presence is highly differentiated. In Hungary they are a result of Stalinism, but in the GDR it is on the basis of World War II. Gorbachev stressed this. He also mentioned tremendous unemployment in the USSR. They are having problems with troops withdrawn from Afghanistan, and on top of this they face withdrawals from the GDR. (S)

Secretary Baker: Mr. President, may I pick up on what you said in the Cabinet Room concerning Two Plus Four? We think it very important as a matter of German sovereignty to refer political-military issues to the proper fora. For example, force levels in central Europe should be referred to Vienna. A security role for CSCE should be referred to the CSCE process. When we come to Berlin in a week and a half, I hope we can convince your Government to get unification done and then get to these other issues in the appropriate fora. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: There is no need to convince me! (S)

Secretary Baker: We are working on your foreign minister through you. (S)

The President: I'll work on mine if you'll work on yours. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: At the Moscow talks, the main reason given for maintaining the political structure of the Warsaw Pact was that it has a mandate at Vienna as negotiator. For example, should the Hungarians leave the Pact, who would be their negotiator? In future negotiations, CSCE should be added. A Warsaw Pact committee was appointed to revise the treaty. The word revise is very important: it includes everything from the continuing existence of the Pact to the possibility of leaving. Hungary made it clear that it should take effect by January 1991 and that by 1992 at the latest, Hungary would no longer be a member. We raised the question of what the new structure should

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

be later. Warsaw Pact members should be integrated into an all-European solution. (S)

Secretary Baker: Mr. Prime Minister, are you supportive of the suggestion your foreign minister made in Copenhagen that a special zone should be created in central Europe? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I never support plans or programs of which I am informed through the press. (S)

The President: Another question: how did you find Gorbachev? Was he confident? After his very successful visit, he went back to face problems like Yeltsin's comments. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I had the impression that he viewed the Summit as very successful. He said it marked the transition from confrontation to partnership. In this context, he gave us a quite optimistic view, but that doesn't change his domestic problems. Hundreds of thousands are leaving the Party, which is fragmenting into particular groups. The Party Congress in early July will be very important, because there is no integrative structure in the Soviet Union except the Party. There is no Church, as in Poland. The Soviet Union has no experience with multiparty democracy. He fears this might collapse. And there is also the economy. (S)

The President: Have you met Yeltsin? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: No. I have the impression he is pursuing a Greater Russian line. (S)

The President: It will be interesting to see how he handles the federation meeting. On Lithuania, Gorbachev talked about the right to secede but also about his obligation to uphold the Constitution. (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: It will be important to create a new kind of liberal federation, because too early a dispersal would add to his difficulties. There are the exaggerated centralistic structures of the past that pose a problem. A balancing of interests is essential. (S)

Secretary Baker: Can you share with us your timetable for unification and all-German elections? (S)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: We must reach an agreement with our coalition partners. After the Economic and Monetary Union takes effect, we will discuss it. The Social Democratic Party is thinking of a longer period. A two thirds majority in parliament is required, because this means changing the Constitution. However, we feel the timing should not be determined by wishes but by objective criteria. There will be an additional, complicated discussion on the State Treaty about the conditions under which the various States of the GDR can accede through Article 23. We also need good results of the Two Plus Four. An early announcement of a deadline might bring pressure to bear on

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~5~~

the negotiations when pressure is not the best means. (S)

Secretary Baker: Is there a possibility of all-German elections before 1 February? (C)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I wouldn't rule it out. (U)

The President: Are the people enthusiastic? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: There are differences. Some want it tomorrow, others would prefer more time. After the past six months, we no longer dare to indulge in prognostication. (U)

The President: Do you have other meetings this afternoon with our officials? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: We will meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as with trade and industry leaders. I will also give a talk at Georgetown tonight and will visit the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. (C)

Secretary Baker: Are you suffering from jet lag? (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: I was warned beforehand, but I didn't feel anything. (U)

The President: May I suggest that we have our coffee in the other room and have eight minutes of music to relax, because we have a distinguished musician in our midst. (U)

Prime Minister de Maiziere: Thank you very much. This is really a treat. Last night I met Mr. Perlman. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

Confirmed Pres Mtg w/
Kabua of Marshall
Islands on
June 12th

NO MEMICON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4500
Add-On

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chatichai Chunnhawan of Thailand (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs (Notetaker)

Chatichai Chunnhawan, Prime Minister
Sathianthai Surakait, International Law Advisor to
the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME June 14, 1990, 11:00 - 12:00pm, One-on-One Meeting
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President welcomed the Prime Minister and held a brief meeting in the Oval Office. (U)

The President: Welcome, Prime Minister Chatichai. We view this as an important visit and are very pleased to have this distinguished visit from the Prime Minister of Thailand. I thought we would spend a minute in here before we move into the Cabinet Room. Afterwards we will go to White House for a working lunch. I am very pleased you are here. (U)

On Cambodia, we have worked closely to achieve our immediate strategic objective, the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. But we continue to worry about a longer term threat of Vietnamese domination and, therefore, a comprehensive political settlement is necessary. We want to see Cambodia as an independent buffer. In the U.S. there is great dread of the Khmer Rouge. Just for working with ASEAN, I am being accused of favoring the Khmer Rouge. (Ø)

We welcome your own commitment to a comprehensive political settlement. We welcome what Thailand has done to keep the process going forward. However, we believe it is very important to maintain links between short-term proposals and progress toward an overall political solution. Unless there is a comprehensive political settlement, steps, such as a ceasefire, will not bring lasting peace to Cambodia. Vietnam and Hun Sen must show some flexibility to get to the comprehensive settlement we all want. (Ø)

We remain concerned about Rabta and the chemical plant. The fact that Thai's have been involved has caused heartburn. If you need anymore information on Thai involvement, we will provide help. Qadhafi has lied about this chemical weapons facility. We do not want to be at cross purposes with Thailand about this. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
Ø 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

We have strongly suggested to the PRC that they halt weapons to Khmer Rouge. At the last Perm Five meeting we brought this up with China. I want to know how you feel about all of this, especially the question of how weapons reach the Khmer Rouge. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Thank you for your time. The last time I planned to come I had to postpone the visit because we had a typhoon in Thailand. I have a few things to raise with you. In April I met with Prime Minister Kaifu. He is a big change for Japan. (S)

The President: I like the man. He is a different, more modern Japanese political leader. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: When I spoke with Prime Minister Kaifu I said that now that peace is coming to Cambodia, Japan should participate in the peace process. If you do not, you will be blamed. He agreed. I suggested that he host the Hun Sen-Sihanouk meeting and an agreement was achieved. This is a good sign; Japan is talking about something other than just trade. (S)

With regard to the Tokyo agreement, it is a good thing that the Khmer Rouge did not sign. Sihanouk represents all three factions. If the PRC stops supplying the KR, the war will end. We would like the U.S. to ask the Chinese to halt arms shipments to the Khmer Rouge. (S)

The President: We are in a tough position. If we extend MFN to China, and all we get is blame. The New York Times is slugging us on this issue. China should give us a break; Fang should be released. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We cannot allow the China-gate to be closed. It took 20 years to open it. (S)

The President: The politicians do not have your long-range view. Regarding China and the KR, I don't think we have as much leverage with China now, but I like your suggestion and we will talk to them about it. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We have learned that the amount of narcotics being produced is increasing. Burmese producers are now producing ten times more than in the past, mostly in Shan states. We are going to put more pressure on the Thai-Burma border. (S)

The President: The more that you can crack down and close the border--and crack down on corruption, the better. We have the same problem here. We are trying to cut down on the demand here and are trying to do better on interdiction and corruption. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

Are young Thai's using narcotics? Is this becoming a problem?
(Ø)

Mr. Surakait: Not many. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We are strengthening our anti-narcotics capabilities, but we need assistance, such as helicopters. (Ø)

The President: Let's review this with our top staff people. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: You gave us a group of helicopters 18 years ago but they are now worn out. (Ø)

On Burma, we should have close contact with Burmese military forces; I have many close friends there. I worked to repatriate the Kuo Min Tang from Burma. We need to sandwich Khum Sa between the Burmese army and the Thai. (Ø)

The President: Does the political change bode well for Thai-Burma cooperation. Will it be possible to coordinate more closely with the new group, or not? (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Only some of them. We need to talk to Burmese forces. (Ø)

The President: We want to give you maximum cooperation in the area of narcotics. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The demand must come down. (Ø)

The President: There has been some decline in cocaine use. I feel the same way that you do; the demand must come down. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: When we caught people before they might have 1-2 kilos, but not 100-200 kilos like now. (Ø)

The President: You can tell your associates, we are making a serious effort to control demand in the United States. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We have strengthened the narcotics unit and we passed a new bill on assets seizure. (Ø)

Mr. Surakait: Mr. President, these are copies of the draft bill. This bill has passed the first reading in parliament. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: You should not move your bases from the Philippines. (Ø)

The President: We do not have a limitless pocketbook. When we see anti-Americanism and killings -- combined with this Foreign Minister who blasts my country all the time. I have instructed my staff to look for other locations. If it becomes clear that

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

we are not wanted, we will go elsewhere. If the government engages in anti-bases rhetoric, we will leave. We have a good tough negotiator. This is not so much a matter of dollars but of the attitude of the government, which is not strong. (S)

However, regardless of what happens in the Philippine negotiations, we are not going to leave Asia. I know some of our friends are concerned that we may neglect Asia. We won't. We have strong security and financial interests. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: In 1992 we will host the APEC meeting. This is very important. This is our way to prevent the Japanese from dominating the area completely. (S)

The President: We will stay involved in Asia. We do not want Japan alone to dominate. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: On Libya, do not forget we are Buddhists. The Moslems do not let us know what is going on. They have not informed us. (S)

The President: If you want more information on Rabta, I will personally get it to you. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I hear you will be decommissioning many units in Europe. (S)

The President: We have a proposal for CFE. We do not know yet exactly how it will turn out. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We would like to buy tanks and APCs. (S)

The President: You should get to Secretary Cheney on this. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4500
Add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chatichai Chunhawan of Thailand (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative
William J. Bennett, Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Daniel O'Donohue, Ambassador to Thailand
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State,
East Asia & Pacific Affairs
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Chatichai Chunhawan, Prime Minister
Sitthi Sawetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Subin Pinkhayon, Minister of Commerce
Prachuap Chaiyasan, Minister of Science,
Technology, and Energy
Korn Thappharangsi, Minister Attached to the
Office of the Prime Minister
Phatchara Isarasena, Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Commerce
Witthaya Wetchachiwa, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sathianthai Surakiat, International Law Advisor
(Notetaker)
Kasem S. Kasemsi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Interpreter to Prime Minister
Chatichai)

DATE, TIME June 14, 1990, 11:35 - 12:00pm, Expanded Meeting
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President moved the meeting from the Oval Office to the
Cabinet Room. (U)

The President: We are very pleased you are here. As every
President since Dwight Eisenhower has done, I want to reaffirm
strong American commitment to Thailand under the Manila Pact. We
must maintain this commitment even in a time of diminished world
threat. We start as friends and our relationship is expanding
and evolving. This creates some problems which we can discuss
here or at lunch. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
01 012112009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

In our earlier discussion of the narcotics problem, Prime Minister Chatichai made a good statement, "Do something about the demand for narcotics." We are waging an all out fight on the demand side and are making some progress. The Prime Minister has asked for our cooperation and we will try to help. (S)

I want to keep this meeting as informal as possible. Others should join the discussion. (U)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Mr. President, it is a great pleasure and honor to have this meeting. I hope this visit will mark a new era of relations between our two countries, a new economic relationship based on common interests such as joint ventures in ASEAN and in Indochina in the future. (S)

Living in the transnational era in diplomatic affairs, Southeast Asia benefits from positive trends. Looking forward to the post-Cambodia era, we look forward to economic competition replacing the battlefield in Southeast Asia. We want to work with you on refugees and displaced persons, narcotics, and the environment. We appreciate the technical advice and assistance supplied in the past. We are willing to negotiate in good faith to solve the trade problems. (S)

Prime Minister Chatichai next introduced his delegation and called upon Foreign Minister Sitthi Savetsila. (U)

Foreign Minister Sitthi: Mr. President, we know your security assistance has been diminishing but believe your interests in supporting Thailand remain the same. You are a real good friend. (S)

The President: We will continue to be good friends. (U)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Do you want more on the Vietnamese boat people? (S)

The President: Let me begin by saying we appreciate what Thailand has done by providing first asylum to 300,000 displaced Khmer. We are concerned that ASEAN might condition its provision of first asylum on our acceptance of force repatriation. (S)

We will continue to oppose involuntary repatriation but will continue to work with you and take as many refugees as possible. We continue to believe that voluntary repatriation will work. We ask for patience and that you not take actions that will remove the focus from Vietnam, the real cause of the refugee problem. (S)

Foreign Minister Sitthi: We will maintain the first asylum principle and provide humane assistance as long as we can. On the boat people -- Australian and others are increasingly concerned. In only four months there have been 4,000 boat people -- nearly equal to all of last year. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3

There is the problem of the screened-out and the screened-in. Regarding the screened-out, we are asking for involuntary repatriation, beginning July 1. We need your sympathy. If the screened-out remain in Thailand, this will be something for us to deal with in the future. (Ø)

Perhaps a holding center should be set up elsewhere for the screened-out. (Ø)

The President: I am trying to be understanding. I don't want to get cross-wise. You should talk in more detail with Secretary Baker. We want to try to be part of the answer here. Good talks today might help. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I want to talk about narcotics. The Royal Thai Government has undertaken enforcement measures as mentioned in the aide memoir in Tokyo. Minister Korn is empowered to take action in my name on all narcotics matters. (S)

Minister Korn: I had a good productive meeting with Secretary Bennett this morning. Looking at the problem from this part of the world, we wish that policy toward Burma could be changed. You need a friend to work with inside Burma. (S)

The President: As a result of the recent elections, will there be more of an opportunity to find such friends? (S)

The bills being drawn up on the Hill against Rangoon will be counterproductive. We need Burmese groups on our side to control production of the Hill tribes within Burma. (S)

Secretary Baker: The election just held on May 27th could change the dynamics on the Hill but it won't happen unless there is a peaceful transition to civilian government and things are done to relieve the concerns voiced in the Monihan amendment. (Ø)

Secretary Bennett: This is similar to the Andean problem. We need friends in Rangoon. Minister Korn is concerned with the Monihan/Solarz view that there be no contact with Burma. (S)

Minister Korn: For the first time in ten years the Royal Thai Government has appointed someone to be in charge of the narcotics program. Perhaps Secretary Bennett and I can go to work on these problems. (S)

The President: As usual, we have 535 would-be Secretaries of State on the Hill trying to run foreign policy. We must avoid becoming handcuffed by our own good intentions. (S)

Minister Korn: Last week we passed a narcotics bill unanimously. This does not happen often in the Thai Parliament. (Ø)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

The President: We view your designation, like Bill Bennett's, as something that puts the focus on the narcotics problem. Perhaps Secretary Bennett can give us one or two minutes on the drug program in the United States. (Ø)

Secretary Bennett: There are two major things. People are changing their minds. The American people have seen what drugs can do and don't like it. Drug use is down in the U.S. education and prevention programs have begun to have a positive impact. (Ø)

The demand side is starting to turn around very directly. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The demand side is very important. (Ø)

Secretary Bennett: It is down by about 35% in the U.S. (Ø)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I want to expand on the idea of our bilateral economic relationship. We believe there is a necessity for a general framework for economic matters. The first step might be to establish a consultative mechanism at the ministerial level to help with potential economic problems. The oriental approach features conflict avoidance and this will help our bilateral economic relationship. (Ø)

The President: We know of your interest. If it is agreeable to you, we are prepared to establish the Joint U.S.-Thai Committee under the Secretary of Commerce. We can announce it today, including commerce, trade, and investment. (Ø)

Minister Subin: We have met this morning. We hope to solve problems in the future before they arise, so that we do not need to deal with USTR. I asked if we could combine USTR and Commerce on the bilateral committee. (Ø)

The President: How did she respond? (Ø)

Minister Subin: She didn't. (Ø)

The President: Representatives from both departments must be present. This is legally required. If set up appropriately, there will not be mindless interagency conflict. (Ø)

Minister Subin: We think on both sides there should be two agencies. (Ø)

Minister Korn: If concerns are raised from Commerce or USTR, these could be resolved in the consultative committee. (Ø)

Concerning American investment in Thailand, in the past ten years U.S. investment has become number two. You have come back to that part of the world and this is encouraging to see American

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

companies participating such as Bell and Caltex. The Guardian Glass case will be solved within 24 hours. We will meet with the President of Guardian and will tonight bring about a solution. (S)

The President: If this can be done, this will remove a cloud over U.S. investment in the area. (S)

Minister Korn: This cloud will be removed. (S)

The President invited the meeting participants to lunch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (5 pp.)	6/14/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/17/90 - 6/26/90

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By CA (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/26/2009	OA/ID Number:	91107-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(203)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.


Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



4500
Add-On

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chatichai Chunhawan of Thailand
(C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State

Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Daniel O'Donohue, Ambassador to Thailand
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs, NSC staff (Notetaker)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

8/12/2009
2000-0429-F

Chatichai Chunhawan, Prime Minister
Sitthi Sawetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Bin Pinkhayan, Minister of Commerce
Prachuap Chaiyasan, Minister of Science,
Technology, and Energy
Kon Thappharangsi, Minister Attached to the
Office of the Prime Minister
Phatchara Isarasena, Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Commerce
Witthaya Wetchachiwa, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sathianthai Surakait, International Law Advisor
to the Prime Minister
Sunthon Grates (Admiral), Deputy Supreme
Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces

DATE, TIME June 14, 1990, 12:15 - 1:15pm, Luncheon Meeting
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room

The President: We had just started talking about trade matters. The protection of intellectual property rights is a tough issue, but it is very important that it be done and the problem solved. You mentioned the 1992 APEC meeting. We will be in Singapore for the APEC meeting after the Post Ministerial meeting of ASEAN. Perhaps Thailand could host the 1992 meeting. (C)

In ASEAN is there a belief that we are not devoting enough attention to Asia. We have talked about the Philippines. If the Philippine Foreign Minister continues to go after us and to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2

create anti-American rhetoric, this will make it difficult for us. We want to stay in the Philippines. I have told our chief negotiator we will not leave the Pacific, even if we leave the Philippines. I am annoyed with the posturing of the Foreign Minister although I am sympathetic with problems of Mrs. Aquino. We will remain in Asia. Do you pick up the idea that the U.S. might lose interest in the Pacific because of Eastern Europe? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We worry that Western Europe will lose interest, leaving us to be dominated by the Japanese. Thailand has close cooperation with ASEAN. The Philippines is in bad shape. (c)

The President: Will Mrs. Aquino survive? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: You should help the Philippines. I believe that the Muslims will try to take advantage. We will give full support to Mrs. Aquino. Whether or not she will survive is the \$32 question. (c)

Secretary Baker: We went out last year, at a time of budget constraint, but we obtained \$160 million from Congress for the Multilateral Assistance Initiative. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The last time I was there, at the Manila Hotel, in 3 hours only one container vessel moved. (c)

The President: We are trying very hard. We would like to keep the bases. They are marvelous installations. We will try to support democratic aspirations. But we will not be held up on the bases. If it does not work out, we will leave the Philippines but we will find a way to remain very active in the area. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The South China Sea is very important to us. If you leave the Philippines, this would be very bad for us. (c)

Secretary Baker: We are hearing more debate and criticism of our Cambodia policy that we pursue with ASEAN. It centers on the Khmer Rouge element, in spite of our opposition to the Khmer Rouge. This is becoming more and more of a political issue. We hope you will reconsider the degree of your support and contact with Khmer Rouge. (c)

The President: We are being attacked for being soft on Khmer Rouge -- when, in fact, we are not. If you could discuss this with Secretary Baker it would be helpful. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: [REDACTED] (b)(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

The President: As I mentioned in our chat, there is a need to cut off supplies from the PRC to the Khmer Rouge. (c)

Foreign Minister Sitthi: We need to talk to the PRC. (c)

The President: I wish we had a little more credibility with China but they blame us for Tienanmen Square. I want to preserve that relationship. I want to keep commercial ties to support economic reform in China which will lead to more openness. But I would mislead you if I told you we had great influence. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I think you are absolutely correct about China. It took twenty years to open the relationship. (c)

I returned to China after Tiananmen and learned that they had no riot control training course. They had neither tear gas nor gas masks. They need training, rubber bullets, etc. (c)

There has been a meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China with Vietnam. The official has left to return to Beijing now. Now it is difficult to talk to the Chinese leaders. There is no real center of power; that is the difference between Mao, Chou, and Deng and these leaders now. (c)

The President: The Prime Minister commented on Kaifu being a good man. We hope he will stay on. Is there still a fear of the Japanese in Thailand? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We are lucky. If Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have become dominant. I worry about Japan now. That's why I have asked for increased U.S. trade and investment. (c)

The President: U.S. trade and investment is up now? (c)

Minister Korn: We consult with the American Chamber of Commerce all the time. We hope you will consider the American presence in Thailand when formulating your policies. (c)

Minister Subin: Because the rate of interest, with the exception of Japan, is declining, we are concerned. (c)

The President: We should talk frankly while you are here. One problem is IPR. I will tell you one that worries me, textiles. (c)

We are under great pressure and it is important that you level with us. With elections in the Fall we will face more and more protectionist pressure. The less the protectionists can point to, the better. We need to be frank with one another. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We are going to build a land bridge across Isthmus to link the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. This

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

would save four days for big ships, two weeks for fishing boats. We would like to invite American business people. There will be a port at each end as well as a railway, road and a pipeline. Because you control pollution, we want to do the refining in Thailand for export to the West Coast? (c)

In the field of telecommunication, we need three million lines. I have close contacts with AT&T, Triton Oil (a subsidiary of Seagram), Cal Tex, and Texas Pacific. (c)

Ambassador O'Donohue: Unical offshore gas provides 25% of Thailand's energy needs. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: We need the Seventh Fleet because, although it is called the Gulf of Thailand, there are many owners, e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. (c)

The President: Do you see a big change in Vietnam? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: There are big changes but they will take time. (c)

Secretary Baker: Who has more influence on Hun Sen, the Vietnamese or the Soviets? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Hun Sen is young and easy to talk to. Khieu Samphan is very difficult; he just smiles. (c)

The President: Who can influence Hun Sen? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The Minister of Defense is a Thai and speaks Thai. Sihanouk is one of the few kings in the world; this is a sad story - Franz Joseph and Sihanouk. I knew Sihanouk when he fled from the French. (c)

The President: Sihanouk is a very nervous little man but he still has a respectful following inside the country. (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Sihanouk should be a King with a four party coalition government, but Monique said no and Sihanouk must be the President. Why not use the Thai constitution? (c)

General Scowcroft: What will the result be in Cambodia? (c)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I agree with the comprehensive solution but we must start with a step-by-step process. Cambodia has not had an election for 30 years. We need an International control mechanism to determine the situation. We need a cease-fire, elections, and then a coalition government under Sihanouk but we should establish a cease fire first. I did this in 1954 with General Donovan in Burma. (c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5

General Scowcroft: But what about the Khmer Rouge? (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: The Khmer Rouge will agree to a ceasefire but they only listen to China. (C)

Secretary Baker: What needs to be done to get Vietnam to exercise its influence on the PRK? One way is to offer them normalization if they use their influence in advance. We need to do some thinking about how they might do something in advance to exercise their influence affirmatively. (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Hun Sen is amenable to persuasion. If we could get the Chinese to eliminate the Khmer Rouge threat, then Hun Sen would fall into place. (C)

Secretary Baker: But, if we could go to China and offer to have Hun Sen step down before an election, wouldn't this be better? (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: I do not recognize Hun Sen. (C)

Secretary Baker: The French say we should support economic reconstruction in Vietnam, but the one card we have is the economic one for convincing the Vietnamese. (C)

Prime Minister Chatichai: Perhaps Japan can influence both China and Vietnam. The only people who can talk to the PRC are the Japanese. Only Japan will be able to stand up to the PRC over Hong Kong. (C)

The President: The problem is that the Japanese are much less interested in human rights than we are. They are more interested in markets. (C)

Ambassador Vittiya: That is what the Chinese and the Vietnamese really want. (C)

The President: Maybe you have a good point about working with Kaifu. We can talk to him prior to the Houston Summit. The President thanked the Thai Prime Minister for coming and concluded the meeting. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confirmed Pres Mtg w/
Rodriguez of Paraguay
on June 15th

NO MEMCON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5120

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Sam Nujoma of Namibia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
and National Security Advisor
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy National Security Advisor
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Roger A. McGuire, Charge, American Embassy
Windhoek
John M. Ordway NSC Staff (notetaker)

President Sam Nujoma
Theo-Ben Gurirab, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME June 19, 1990, 2:40 p.m. - 3:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: I would like to welcome you to the White House, and to the United States. (U)

President Nujoma: I would like first of all, Mr. President, to thank you for the support your country provided during our struggle for independence. (U)

The President: We have a very keen respect for the way you have taken hold and run things in your country. It was not an easy thing, coming back into the country, and running during the elections. (U)

Secretary Baker came back from Namibia very impressed, and has told me of his experience, and the courtesy which he received there. (U)

You were very generous in your opening comments. I meant what I said that we take your government very seriously. Also, we are proud that some American citizens were very helpful in your struggle. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
ON 8/21/2009
2000-0129-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

I know you are concerned about aid levels. We have a level of \$10,000,000. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: That's up from \$500,000 when I went out to Windhoek. (Ø)

The President: We wish it were more. We are trying to restructure our entire aid situation. We have enormous fiscal problems here in the United States. In fact, that is one of the reasons I am late -- and I apologize for that -- we were meeting on the budget. (Ø)

We want to support you. We want to stimulate the private sector, which we find to be the most effective method. (Ø)

But mostly I want to hear from you, about the dramatic elections which is resulting in a free and open society in Namibia. (U)

President Nujoma: Let me thank the United States on behalf of the Republic of Namibia, for being a member of the Contact Group which initiated UN Security Council Resolution 435, and which helped implement that resolution which resulted in independence for Namibia. Without American efforts, South Africa might remain in Namibia to date. (Ø)

We are trying to establish a democratic society, with freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and liberty for all Namibian citizens. We have adopted a policy of national reconciliation and unity, in order to reconstruct our economy. We have inherited a difficult situation from the South African colonial administration. This involved a deficit of about 500,000,000 rand, and they left debts behind of 700,000,000 rand, and the poverty that exists among the majority of the population of the country, from the apartheid policies. We have to overcome the legacy of the South African colonial administration in our country. This is why we have adopted a policy of national reconciliation. And, we have invited whites to stay in the country. (Ø)

The President: What has been the response to this? (U)

President Nujoma: Pretty good. Even those who sold their property and were ready to leave at independence, are now buying new properties. There is not going to be wholesale nationalization. If Parliament decided to take over some enterprises for national reasons, the owners will be fully compensated. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3

By maintaining the huge number of civil servants, we have to pay a substantial wage bill, but we feel we have to pay this price for national reconciliation and unity. We also have to bring in the African majority which was kept out by the South African apartheid policies. We want to appeal to the United States Government to make more financial assistance available to us to maintain democracy in Namibia. We hope that we will give a good example to our neighbors in South Africa. (Ø)

The President: I wanted to ask you about South Africa. Are you encouraged with Nelson Mandela out, and some discussions beginning? (Ø)

President Nujoma: Discussion has started, and we would encourage that, since there needs to be a peaceful solution. Taking into account our situation in Namibia, we had a long struggle with the loss of lives. If South Africa had been agreeable to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 435 earlier, there could have been no destruction and loss of life. (Ø)

We invited de Klerk to participate in the independence celebrations, along with Nelson Mandela. I told de Klerk that if you think you want to use our territory for negotiations, you are welcome. We maintain contact. We urge you to encourage negotiations. (Ø)

The President: We will try, since that is the only reasonable answer. (U)

President Nujoma: We are taking over a country devastated by war. Over the years, the South African Government followed a policy of racial discrimination, excluding the African population from decision making. The poverty among the African majority, 90% of the population, is very visible. We are preparing to embark on a program of crash development -- water supply, education, health and better accommodations for the people. We have a budgetary deficit, and would be most grateful if the United States Government could help us out with these projects. Otherwise, we would be faced with the difficult situation of maintaining democracy as a young country. (Ø)

The President: The debt is owed to South Africa, is that right? (Ø)

President Nujoma: Yes, to South Africa. (Ø)

The President: Are other countries involved? (Ø)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

Mr. Cohen: The money was borrowed from South African banks, and is guaranteed by the South African Government, which expects Namibia to repay the loans. (Ø)

The President: Jim, would you care to comment? (U)

Secretary Baker: When we went to Windhoek for the independence celebrations, we had only \$500,000 in aid available, since that is all we could find. I said then that we would try to do better. We now have \$10,000,000 and we are looking at the possibility of continuing for another year. We will be seeking that level in our forthcoming budget discussions. (Ø)

The Government of Namibia is taking appropriate steps to maintain a viable private economic sector. The Government is signing an OPIC agreement after three days of discussion. We believe that foreign direct investment creates jobs and technology. (Ø)

The President: Have we moved forward on Peace Corps? (U)

Mr. McGuire: The cabinet has agreed to the Peace Corps agreement, and we expect to sign it shortly. By the end of August, there will be about 30 Peace Corps volunteers who will be coming from Botswana. They will be teachers, who can hit the ground running. As you know, Mr. President, since you have been there, Botswana is very similar to Namibia. (U)

Secretary Baker: Roger, perhaps you could provide a word about the situation regarding assurances of property ownership. (Ø)

Mr. McGuire: President Nujoma and other leaders have spoken out on the fact that there will be a mixed economy, with private property respected. Namibia has been independent for three months, but they have done a good job on public statements, and with legislation. We are very encouraged that they are doing the rights things in the right sequence. People that are interested in commercial opportunities will find Namibia a good partner. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: There is great mineral potential, and we are not seeing the brain drain and white flight, due to the assurances that President Nujoma has given. (Ø)

The President: Can the UN donors conference in New York be helpful? (U)

President Nujoma: Yes. We are very impressed by U.S. economic development, and are emphasizing the private sector. This will help us, help our people take the initiative in economic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5

development, perhaps through joint ventures. Since our people do not have money to invest, joint ventures can help. (Ø)

Mr. Gurirab: We are also planning a private sector conference in November in Namibia. We hope that private sector representatives will come from abroad, and discuss the opportunities for investment and trade that exist. (Ø)

The President: How is the situation in Angola? Is there a danger for you of getting drawn into that conflict? Are passions running high in Namibia on this? (Ø)

President Nujoma: There has been an influx of people from Angola in the last two months, because of the fighting on the border. We all hope that negotiations will continue so that this conflict can come to an end. (Ø)

The President: That is what is needed. (U)

Secretary Baker: They can take a lesson from you. You were helped by free elections. (Ø)

President Namibia: I know that the Government of the People's Republic of Angola wants to negotiate sincerely. (Ø)

The President: Are they fearful that UNITA will win? (Ø)

Secretary Baker: They have not yet agreed to free elections. (Ø)

President Nujoma: We want to encourage them to negotiate. Mr. President, you and your government could encourage these peaceful efforts with UNITA and Savimbi, to agree to a negotiated settlement, since we all want to see the bloodshed end. (Ø)

The President: We have talked to him about reconciliation. He has said the proper things. We have been very pleased with the Cuban troop withdrawal agreement, and I agree that the answer is reconciliation and dialogue. Nothing can be decided by killing people on either side. I would welcome any suggestions on how we can be helpful. (Ø)

Hank, what is the latest on the negotiations? (Ø)

Mr. Cohen: They had a good round in Portugal. They are coming closer to free elections, and Savimbi is recognizing dos Santos. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: They are getting closer. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Mr. McGuire: On another angle, there is the issue of coastal security. If it is agreeable to you, President Nujoma, we could send a survey team out to Namibia in the next three weeks. (Ø)

The President: Is that part of IMET? (U)

Mr. McGuire: No. The African Coastal Security program helps protect fisheries. (U)

The President: Are poachers overfishing your waters? (U)

Mr. Cohen: Even those who have licenses are overfishing. (U)

Mr. McGuire: The Spanish are the worst. (Ø)

The President: Do they come right up to the coastline? (Ø)

President Nujoma: We have an act in Parliament to extend out to the 100 mile limit, but to enforce this is a big question. (Ø)

The President: That is always a big question, but you have every right to protect your fisheries. I hope that this team can proceed and help out the situation. (U)

Mr. Gurirab: Fishing is our second industry after mining. (U)

The President: Protecting it will undoubtedly help sustain lots of lives, along with the economic benefits. (U)

I hope you have a good visit, Mr. President. We have great respect for what you have done. You have made a lot of friends. Lots of people were asking how you would behave in the big house. We are very pleased with what you have done. We want to help. I am very glad that you have agreed to OPIC, and hope that the Peace Corps works out. We look forward to having your military people come here to the United States under IMET, if that fits in with your plans. (Ø)

We want to try hard to work with you, and facilitate further change in the region, which will make your international relations easier. For example, we see a possible role for ourselves with South Africa if Mandela and de Klerk think it useful. We don't have a colonial history, and have a slate clean of colonialism. We might find a way to help. If we can be helpful in Angola, pushing toward reconciliation, we will do that as well. (Ø)

President Nujoma: We are determined to go ahead with our system. We are learning from your great country, and other countries. We want you to get more interested in South Africa. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

7

The President: We will encourage de Klerk. I worry about his right wing. I think de Klerk has shown lots of courage, and we want to be helpful, with Buthelezi, Mandela and others. We don't want to act like we can solve this problem, though. We are half way around the world. But it is a big domestic political issue here. (Ø)

Speaking of Nelson Mandela, I am concerned about some of the things he is doing -- meeting with the Puerto Rican people who shot up our Congress. He comes here with a good reputation, and then talks to these people, who have no following, and who shot up our Congress. It is stupid for the organization to put Mr. Mandela into that position. (Ø)

I am sure that his trip will go well, and I will extend to him every courtesy due to him. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Some people want to use Mandela for their own purposes. (Ø)

Mr. Gurirab: That's right. (U)

President Nujoma: I would like to extend to you, Mr. President, an invitation to visit our country. (U)

[The conversation concluded with an exchange among the President, Secretary Baker, and President Nujoma on the possibilities of fishing in Namibia.] (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (4 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 5/17/90 - 6/26/90

Document Partially Declassified

(Copy of Document Follows)

By ES On 5/09/22

Date Closed:	1/26/2009	OA/ID Number:	91107-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(205)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	3/20/2015	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5086 ADD-ON 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs (Notetaker)

Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Minister of Foreign Affairs
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.
Osama el-Baz, Special Advisor to President Mubarak
Ahmed Abul Ghait, Aide to Foreign Minister Meguid

DATE, TIME June 26, 1990, 10:07 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Minister Meguid: We consider the peace process to be essential for the area. We will use the next few weeks to see what can be done. (U)

The President: How much trouble do you think we are in as a result of our decision to suspend the U.S.-PLO dialogue? I know it sent bad signals to our moderates friends in the area. What has been the reaction and what should we do? (C)

Minister Meguid: The reaction was one of regret. We believe dialogue between the United States and the PLO is essential. We are aware of the mistake behind the terrorist attack. But the problem with the decision was that it penalized the moderates in the PLO. Our goal now is to resume the dialogue. The PLO deserves credit for its November 1988 decision to recognize Israel's right to exist and UN (SCR) 242. (C)

The President: They also agreed to renounce terrorism. (U)

Minister Meguid: Yes. I was involved in the process leading to their decision. The PLO had rejected UN 242 for 21 years. UN

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0873-MR
EJ 3/2015

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

242 is essential for the peace process. By accepting it, they paved the way for the dialogue, which was a real breakthrough. Suspending it was regrettable even though you have a point. (C)

The President: What can the PLO council do to reiterate their disapproval of terrorism? We made clear our decision was only a suspension. Can the PLO Executive Committee say he did the wrong thing and put him on probation? (C)

Minister Meguid: They are investigating. We are urging Arafat to discipline Abu Abbas and oust him. (C)

The President: That would be acceptable to us, right? (U)

Secretary Baker: Those are the conditions we have announced publicly. But there are other indications of terror, involving Force 17. What needs to be done publicly is just what we've said. But privately, we also need to end the toleration of Force 17's activities. (S)

Minister Meguid: I agree with Secretary Baker. We will discuss this at length this afternoon. (U)

The President: Does Arafat express any regret for what has taken place? (U)

Minister Meguid: Yes. But Arafat has does not have full control. There is a long history of trouble created by Abu Abbas. (C)

The President: If Arafat and the Executive Council kick him out, are you worried over the reaction of the extremists? (C)

Mr. el Baz: Legally speaking, Arafat cannot act without the PNC. The PNC is not meeting until October. We in Egypt are looking for how to fill this gap. We are speaking with the PLO. Arafat is now back in Tunis to consider what to do, away from Iraqi pressure. (C)

The President: We're trying to keep things on track with Iraq, something that is tough given Saddam. (C)

Minister Meguid: It takes patience. (U)

The President: It's not easy given his long gun that stretches out from here to the Washington Monument. Admittedly, some of what he has said he'd do was in response to Israel, but it sounds bad. On another subject, I spoke to King Hussein. He is worried. What should we be doing? (C)

Minister Meguid: He needs public and private assurances. (U)

Mr. el-Baz: Especially public assurances that you are committed to Jordan's integrity. (U)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The President: Do you see him being pressured by radicals? (U)

Minister Meguid: Yes -- Islamic groups. (U)

The President: What is the worst case scenario? (U)

Mr. el-Baz: That the King will be toppled by the Israelis who think Jordan is a Palestinian state. Hussein believes that the U.S. would not come to his aid. (S)

Dennis Ross: It goes back to 1970, when some Israelis like Sharon said that Israeli should not have helped Hussein. (S)

Minister Meguid: The more assurance you give him the better. (U)

The President: Let's think how we can do this. Do his fears apply to Israeli armed forces? (S)

Secretary Baker: He worries that Israel might encourage forces inimical to him. (S)

The President: I'm glad we have had this talk. (U)

Secretary Baker: Was there a suggestion at the Baghdad Summit that Hussein might step down in favor of the Saudis? (S)

Minister Meguid: It was a rumor that was denied. (S)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

The President: Let's consider what we can do to help him. (S)

Minister Meguid: I'd like to raise a second point, on economics. We just had a mission from the IMF. We will go into the details with Jim Baker. The situation is very serious. We are facing heavy installments in the next three months. About \$500 million is due. We don't have the money. We need a Brooke waiver and FMS debt relief. We also want a new IMF agreement and rescheduling. We are taking steps toward economic reform, including price increases. Our hope is that the G7 when it meets in Houston will consider how to assist us. Our position is comparable to Poland's. I hope you'll look into it Mr. President. (U)

The President: Are you seeing the Treasury people? (U)

Secretary Baker: We're working with Treasury on an approach to the IMF. (U)

The President: We want to help. To be candid, though, the whole aid program is under review since so much of it goes to a handful of countries, including Egypt. But this does show that Egypt has strong support in the Congress. We'll talk about this. (U)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

Minister Meguid: We were very pleased by the AID Director's visit. Some flexibility on aid will help us. (U)

The President: I'm glad you came. Please give my respects to your President. Maybe we can do something with the PLO dialogue. (U)

Minister Meguid: You can count on us. (U)

The President: What did you make of Sharon's statement? (U)

Minister Meguid: Not much Mr. President. (U)

Mr. el-Baz: We should take him up on it and move things further. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~