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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91107
Folder ID Number: 91107-008

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/90 - 4/11/90

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, Ambassador to the United States (6 pp.)	2/22/90	(b)(1)	S
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (4 pp.)	2/23/90	(b)(1)	S
03. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (6 pp.)	2/24/90	(b)(1)	S
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (13 pp.)	2/24/90	(b)(1)	S
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (6 pp.)	2/25/90	(b)(1)	S
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (2 pp.)	3/6/90	(b)(1)	S
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy (5 pp.)	3/6/90	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (5 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1)	C
09. Memcon	Re: Plenary Meeting with President with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (9 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1)	C
10. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (10 pp.)	3/12/90	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence

Subseries: Presidential Memcons

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/90 - 4/11/90

Pinksheet Number: cap917

OA/ID Number: 91107-008

Date Closed: 1/26/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President-elect Rafael Angel Calderon of Costa Rica (5 pp.)	3/20/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (4 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
13. Memcon	Re: Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (3 pp.)	3/21/90	(b)(1)	S
14. Memcon	Re: Follow-up Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (4 pp.)	3/22/90	(b)(1)	S
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	4/4/90	(b)(1)	S
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union (11 pp.)	4/6/90	(b)(1)	S
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (7 pp.)	4/10/90	(b)(1)	S
18. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada (3 pp.)	4/11/90	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By CS (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/26/2009	OA/ID Number:	91107-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(152)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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1492

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMCON

Not H.S.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, Ambassador to the United States

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor
Sandra Charles, NSC Staff, Notetaker

Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi Ambassador

DATE, TIME: The Oval Office
AND PLACE: February 22, 1990; 11:20 - 11:45 a.m. EST

The President and Ambassador Bandar met briefly in the Oval Office at 9:20. (U)

The President: It's good to see you. How is the King? (U)

Prince Bandar: He sends you his best regards and a letter. (U)

The President: Thank you. (b)(1) We are not overly relaxed about the situation there. (S)

Prince Bandar: Nor are we. We support the two-track process. If military pressure is kept up the two track process might produce something. (b)(1)

(b)(1) (S)

The President: (b)(1) And there is the drug problem. (S)

Prince Bandar: We worry about this too. (b)(1) (S)

The President: How? Who supports him? Are we? (U)

Bob Gates: His support has been reduced, but some is still getting through. (b)(1) (S)

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2000-0429-F

The President: The Congress is nervous. When the Soviets went out, we thought the Muj would take over. Our assessment was wrong. I admit we were wrong. (S)

Prince Bandar: We had the same assessment. (U)

The President: (b)(1)
(b)(1) Unless the Soviets agree, it won't happen. They don't want a radical regime on their border. (S)

Prince Bandar: (b)(1) We are in agreement with your plan. (b)(1)
(b)(1) An election process to show... (S)

The President: For a shura? (C)

Prince Bandar: Yes...to show development. Also your continued talks with the Soviets can help. We are puzzled at how much Gorbachev is spending in Afghanistan with their internal problems. (S)

The President: (b)(1)
(b)(1) He told Baker they don't want a radical regime. (S)

Bob Gates: From our talks with the Soviets, it was clear they do not want to lose face. They want us to give them a way out. (S)

Prince Bandar: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (S)

The President: I agree that Gorbachev must save pride and save face. Then I agree with your original point: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (S)

Prince Bandar: It is an unnecessary drain economically. (C)

The President: And now these films are surfacing here. Films of children dying; beautiful children, on both sides. (C)

Prince Bandar: I agree you definitely won't sustain Congressional support for long. This has to be kept in mind. We need to push hard. (b)(1)

(b)(1) (b)(1) (S)

The President: Does anyone really have any influence with him? (U)

Prince Bandar: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (S)

The President: (b)(1)
(b)(1) When is the King coming? (C)

Prince Bandar: I believe we are thinking of blocking a time in late July before your summer holiday. Congress will not be here then. After that he can go for his operation. He will probably go to Hawaii or bring his boat to recuperate on. (C)

(There was a lot of small talk at this point on Aspen and possible recuperation sites for the King.)

Prince Bandar: The King likes the sea. (U)

The President: Then maybe we should meet in Maine. Let's offer that. I use any excuse to go there. (C)

Prince Bandar: On Lebanon... (U)

The President: Is there anything new going on? (b)(1)
(b)(1) (C)

Prince Bandar: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (C)

The President: And now Christians are killing Christians. (U)

Prince Bandar: Yes, this episode of Christians killing Christians is the worse in 15 years. We don't see an end to it. (S)

The President: Is the Foreign Minister still involved? (C)

Prince Bandar: Yes, His Majesty has not given up. (C)

The President: We have great respect for what the Tripartite Group did, rescuing this from failure. As you know, Aoun has quite a following here. (C)

Prince Bandar: But it is interesting that they have been mute recently. It seems they are disappointed with him. (C)

The President: Let us know if you have any thoughts on a role for us. We have limited influence with Syria and Aoun, but there is a strong emotional commitment here to Lebanon. (C)

Prince Bandar: On Syria, Assad has become an interesting case. There appear to be a lot of changes for the better taking place. The changes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union hit him hard, which is not bad. This might be a good time for you to court him. (S)

The President: We have been thinking along the same lines. If there are changes, if doors open and it can be linked to contacts with us, then we would not be opposed if it resulted in progress.

(S)

Bob Gates: Reports show that Assad was hit hard by Ceaucesceau's death and the way it happened. (S)

Prince Bandar: We have been groping for things we might do. (C)

The President: He is a minority in the Ba'ath party, isn't he?
(U)

Governor Sununu: I could see a scenario where we would guarantee contact with him if the outcome was successful. (S)

Prince Bandar: You could work with Assad, through us, to set the stage, to precook something. It would have to be done like that because of your problem with China. If the news were to come out, you would need flexibility. But if it is good news, then it is okay. (S)

The President: It's best to rely on an interlocuter. hile things look brighter, we can't see how to move forward. (S)

Prince Bandar: His Majesty wanted you to know he hopes the peace process will go forward. It is high time. He supports your efforts, and Secretary Baker and Mubarak. I understand Arens will be here in the next few days and maybe there will be some movement. (C)

The President: He's coming tomorrow. I talked with Shamir earlier. I was not encouraged or discouraged. I hoped the Likud party victory would give him more strength, and maybe some hope. We also talked about settlements. I told him our policy had not changed -- settlements are not helpful. (C)

Prince Bandar: We are trying to have more civilized relations with Jewish supporters in Congress and Jewish leaders for two reasons. We hope that will have an impact on your efforts in the peace process. We also agree that we are not opposed to emigration -- anyone who wants to should be allowed to do so -- but settlements we oppose. (C)

The President: There is a separate problem with East Jerusalem. We appear to have a disconnect. Even in the American Jewish community there are differences on this. We need to make it clear we mean all the occupied territories. I've done that. I am glad you are talking with Jewish leaders. There isn't blanket opposition to our position which is good. (C)

Prince Bandar: I have had good results. (U)

Governor Sununu: He has talked with Jack Stein and others. (S)

The President: What we have done is explain to Congress our settlements policy in as direct terms as possible. We also have to make it clear to Israel. I have done that. Still there are some up there who will have differences no matter what we say. (S)

Prince Bandar: We believe your position has lessened the impact of emigration. If I can have a 180 more seconds to mention three more things: first King Hussein's recent visit to the Kingdom. (S)

The President: Was it routine? (U)

Prince Bandar: Basically it was to (b)(1)
(b)(1) -- to tell him we are on board with him, that he is playing a constructive role and we are backing him to the hilt. (b)(1)

(b)(1) We are worried about Jordan so we are helping them. Your giving them moral, military and financial support also is important. (S)

The President: (b)(1) (S)

Prince Bandar: I think his trip helped. We also are working with the GCC to get financial help. With Mubarak, we are doing the same thing trying to reassure him. (S)

The President: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (S)

Prince Bandar: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (S)

The President: (b)(1)
(b)(1) (S)

Prince Bandar: (b)(1)
(b)(1) The last thing is energy. In the future this will be an important area for US-Saudi cooperation. We are working with Secretary Watkins on future cooperation. His Majesty believes it is important to depoliticize oil. We can't afford to have policy affect oil; we cannot play games. (S)

The President: This is in our interests. Your working with Secretary of Energy is the right course. I have full confidence in him. We have been living fat, dumb and happy. The concept of depoliticizing oil is in our national security interests. (S)

Prince Bandar: It is mutual. (U)

The President: I support your talks with Watkins, but not being familiar with the details I can't give them a blanket endorsement. But I agree we've got to get the politics out. This will make for steady, sound relations and no bumps in the road. (S)

One thing, on Yemen -- I believe I sent the King a letter on this -- in our trying to help Yemen, we are not interested in getting into your business. But if we can help there, maybe it will bring more peace to the Horn and that area. I want to assure you that we will always be in touch on this. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~ORIGINAL FILE~~
1735

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Jan P. Syse of Norway (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Loret Ruppe, Ambassador to Norway

Norway
Jan P. Syse, Prime Minister
Kjeld Vibe, Ambassador
Kai Eide, State Secretary, Office of Prime Minister

DATE, TIME February 23, 1990, 10:10 - 10:40 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President and Prime Minister Syse met in the Oval Office at 10:10 a.m. (U)

The President: I am anxious to get your views on the future of Europe. I will tell Helmut Kohl that we must keep in touch with all the NATO Allies. The U.S. recognizes that all the countries of the Alliance have a stake in this process. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: We feel strongly about this. We have no choice about unification. It is more important than ever that we keep the Alliance going and Germany within the Alliance. (Ø)

The President: Is there still a strong feeling in Norway about German unification? On a scale of 1 to 10, where would concern in Norway be? (Ø)

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- 2 -

Prime Minister Syse: It is way down, but still there. So we stress we have to keep them within the Alliance. I read about Tehran in 1943 and the idea of dividing Germany into four parts. Winston Churchill said that would last about 50 years. So I am glad that you are so strong for the Alliance. (Ø)

The President: In Jim Baker's talks with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, he made clear Germany should be in NATO. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: So did Chancellor Kohl when he was there a day or two later. I got the distinct feeling that they haven't excluded Germany's being in NATO, which might be stabilizing. But now domestic politics in the Soviet Union may complicate this. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: Is there a relationship with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe? (Ø)

The President: I can't believe Poland will want Soviet troops to stay in Poland, after what they have been through. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: Poland wants assurances that they will have security guarantees. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Including Poland's current borders. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: We are disturbed about Soviet military capacity on our borders. We won't cut our defenses. (Ø)

The President: We could use more of that thinking here, especially on the Hill. When I am asked who's the enemy, I say apathy, unpredictability, complacency, and innocence. It really helps to have a friend like you making the right arguments on the Hill. I appreciate it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: We are eager to get a reduction of Soviet naval forces. (Ø)

The President: That's a tough one. We are a maritime power with global interests that have nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Jim Baker made that clear to the Soviets. We are in a battle here and will be under increasing pressure to negotiate on navies. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: We understand, but still worry about the Kola naval base. (Ø)

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3

Secretary Baker: If we get into naval arms control, we will weaken the U.S. and the West. (Ø)

The President: How do we get the Soviets to accommodate the Prime Minister? (Ø)

Mr. Eide: START will reduce their naval nuclear presence in the North, but we have a domestic political problem. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: Perhaps "new thinking" will bring a change in the traditional Soviet position. (Ø)

The President: What is your view of how the Baltic situation will resolve itself: total independence? (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: The Soviets want a federated state but in the long run the Baltic States will get their independence. If they lose the Baltic States, we worry that they will build up even more in the Kola Peninsula. We are about to invite the Baltic states to be observers in the Nordic Council. (Ø)

The President: How do the Norwegian people feel about Gorbachev? (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: Good, but we will remain vigilant. We will have a 2.5% increase in our defense budget. I hope our opposition will stand firm on this. (Ø)

The President: Are you and Schluter close on these issues? (U)

Prime Minister Syse: Yes. (U)

The President: Give him my best. Koivisto has been helpful to me as astute observer of the Soviet scene. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: He knows the Soviet Union. (U)

The President: Are there any bilateral problems? (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: I don't think so. Let me say a few words about naval logistic support, which is a domestic political issue. It is important to secure bipartisan support for this. Our Defense Minister will visit in March. This is a very important question, and we are dealing with it in a positive way. (Ø)

Brent Scowcroft: We are committed to the program, as you know. (Ø)

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The President: Good. We will work at the details. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: On the Kola Peninsula, there is one important question -- pollution. I hope you will keep that in mind when discussing environmental questions with the Soviets in the future. (Ø)

The President: We will. We are very interested in this subject. We have tremendous research programs and new legislation here. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: On the Bergen Conference on environment, we would like EPA Administrator Reilly to go. (Ø)

The President: We will let him know you raised the question. I think he is planning to go, but I don't want to commit him here. (Ø)

Prime Minister Syse: We Norwegians are very strong supporters of you and your new Atlanticism. (U)

The President: I appreciate that. (U)

Prime Minister Syse: EFTA and EC are also major domestic issues. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: It would be helpful to us, in your discussions with the French, if you could stress the need to strengthen the political dimensions of NATO. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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MEMCON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1054

Add-on 01

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William Taft IV, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Donald Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Notetaker)

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General
James Cunningham, Private Office of the Secretary General

DATE, TIME February 24, 1990, 1:15 - 3:15pm
AND PLACE: Camp David

The President: I view this as a real opportunity for us to chat. The German question dominates everything and complicates the issue of U.S. force levels, the U.S. role and the U.S. position in Europe. For our part, we are firm in believing that NATO has an ongoing role in protecting the security of Europe. The United States should not dictate to the German people any timeframes for the unification of the German nation. I wanted to ask you how you see NATO developing down the road. (Ø)

Secretary General Woerner: This is a unique opportunity. This is a decisive moment. In weeks or in the next few months, you personally will have to make decisions that can decide the future of Europe. There is only one critical question, since German unification will come, the issue is will Germany be neutral, or will it be a Germany that belongs to NATO? The answer to this question will decide future decades of European history. If we

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go back to a point where Germany is not in the Atlantic Alliance, then the old Pandora's box of competition and rivalry in Europe would be reopened. Nobody will be able to prevent that. A neutral Germany would mean 74 million people with the most powerful economy in Europe -- five to ten years from now all of the united Germany will have the economic sophistication that West Germany has today -- and this country will be a considerable military power. It will not have nuclear weapons for a time, but a neutral Germany may want nuclear weapons. (S)

Trying to create a demilitarized Germany would reproduce the mistake of the Versailles Treaty. I won't accept it. My democracy, the FRG, is as good as anybody's. In this scenario, of a neutral Germany, this German power would not be tied to any safe structure. The most natural reaction then would be for the British and French to try to control the new Germany. The Germans will react, forming their own alliances. We would be repeating the game, with all of its instability, that we witnessed in European politics at the beginning of this century. Potential instability in Eastern Europe will add even more competition and rivalry to the situation. (S)

I am frightened by such a vision. We must avoid the classical German temptation: to float freely and bargain with both East and West. If I have one message, it is that you should not allow that to happen. That is your historic task. The Russians are in a different situation, and we should make clear that we appreciate their concerns. But they are in a weak position. They cannot prevent German unification, if you keep your clear line of supporting the process. I want to protect the Germans from temptation, Europe from instability, and safeguard those elements that have made a new Europe possible. (S)

General Scowcroft: What do you say about the argument that the European Community can play this role of stabilizing Europe? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: The question is: does neutrality allow a security framework within the European Community? The answer is "no". The EC plays an economic role and a mild political role. But it has a small security role. The members of the Community do not want to address defense questions. It will take Europe ten to twenty years to develop real European defense cooperation. The Soviet Union possesses immense power that the EC cannot match. The WEU is pure discussion, no hardware. The CSCE is all talk. Nothing can replace NATO. If NATO goes, Europe will not be able to match Soviet power. If you sacrifice NATO at this moment, you are getting rid of the only stable security structure you have for Europe. If the Soviets correctly perceive their long-term security interests, how can they want German neutrality, given Moscow's own historic memories? But in the short term, the Soviets may push for neutrality. (S)

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Do the Soviets have the means to prevent a united Germany from remaining a member of NATO? Do they really have leverage to prevent this? Can their forces stationed in East Germany provide such leverage? I believe the answer to all of these questions is "no." (S)

An American president who wants a Europe whole and free cannot accept neutralization of a united Germany. Some SPD politicians like neutrality. As German Chancellor, Lafontaine would be attracted by neutrality. You and Germany have to agree now on German unity within NATO and sell this to the Russians. The Russians will have to accept it. The Soviets cannot impose their conditions on you, the United States, when they are so weak. (S)

I think you have to maintain the strong position that Germany must be a member of NATO. There can be no ambiguity. There can be no "association" with NATO. I didn't like that phrase. Just association with NATO will create temptations for Germany to make diplomatic deals with Russia. If Germany is out of the integrated NATO structure, the U.S. will be out of Europe. This would lead to great destabilization in Europe. If you leave now, you will be leaving at the most decisive moment. (S)

The President: How do your other NATO colleagues feel on this? How do they feel about German unification, the issue of troop levels, and other problems? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Mrs. Thatcher doesn't like German unification. The British know they cannot prevent it; they just want to delay it. Everyone agrees that a neutral Germany would be terrible. France wants to dominate Europe, so they don't like German unification. Mitterrand won't prevent binding Germany into the West. Mitterrand wants a united Germany inside the NATO structure. Today, he knows the EC and CSCE cannot replace NATO. But in ten years, he wants a European confederation, free from both the Soviets and the Americans. The Dutch don't like the Germans and they want to keep Germany in NATO. On Italy, Andreotti doesn't like a united Germany, and hopes it will happen inside NATO under the overall control of the Americans. (S)

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: We have no fundamental differences with your perception of this situation. (S)

The President: What would have an adverse effect on NATO and the presence of U.S. troops would be protectionism in the EC. If the EC pulled the rug out from under transatlantic cooperation, especially in agriculture, I could see a snowball effect toward isolationism. Now attitudes about protectionism are associated with Japan. But if the EC introduces that ingredient, we will be in trouble. (S)

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Secretary General Woerner: That is an important point. You should make that clear to members of the EC in all channels. What do you think Gorbachev will accept or not accept on the German issue? (S)

The President: Gorbachev will have to stabilize his internal situation. He will have to accept a unified Germany within NATO. It is sound policy. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: He will have to accept that situation. (S)

The President: We have a selling job to do with Gorbachev. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: Gorbachev has no strong cards. He cannot prevent German unification on Western terms. (S)

The Vice President: What leverage do we have to prevent a neutral Germany? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: You have to maintain a consistent position. You must give a clear message to both the Germans and the Russians. (S)

The President: What about the borders issue between Germany and Poland? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: It is a difficult issue. It is a very delicate problem for Kohl. (S)

The President: Should we speak out more on German unification? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I am grateful that you have made clear that you will not be an obstacle to unification. Opposition to unification could create German nationalism and anti-Atlantic feeling. You have avoided that. You have to give the German people the feeling that the U.S. is with them. You need close consultation with the Germans, and then with the Russians, about the framework and guidelines of German unification. There is no time to lose. (S)

Germany must be completely in NATO. German's participation in NATO's military structures is the key to NATO military integration. We must have German integration in NATO. (S)

To totally demilitarize part of Germany is a silly idea. It was not even done in the case of Austria. One cannot tell the German people that, because they had twelve years of Nazi rule, they are second class citizens forever. The German Territorial Army could be allowed, in a united Germany, in the former territory of the GDR. (S)

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The President: What is the constitutional function of the territorial army in the FRG? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: It is no different from the Bundeswehr. It provides support and maintains the military infrastructure. (S)

The President: Gorbachev will want the Four Powers to be involved. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: This would be very dangerous. You will be blamed by the German people if the Four Powers attempt to dictate the fate of Germany. I would prefer that the U.S. agree with Bonn on a common policy, then strike a deal with the Soviets. (S)

You should not accept loose ties between Germany and NATO, or the destruction of military integration, which would mean the end of the U.S. military role in Europe. We should not hold back the only safeguard to European stability, which is NATO and the American military presence. (S)

The President: Is the EC worrying about Eastern Europe? (S)

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: That is a good question. The countries of Eastern Europe are wondering about where they fit in; whether they will be untied either to the rest of Europe or to the West. What will happen? We need to think hard about this. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: You are right. (S)

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: We also need to prevent the U.S. from being closed out of the economic development of Europe in the years ahead. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: France wants to marginalize you politically, but keep you in Europe militarily, in a nuclear role. NATO gives you, the United States, a political role in European affairs. Otherwise, you will be marginalized. Mitterrand and the Quai agree on this. (S)

General Scowcroft: How do we keep NATO from being marginalized? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: You should use NATO in connection with the most important political events. A good example was your coming to NATO right after your meetings with Chairman Gorbachev in Malta. (S)

The President: Could we meet these concerns by having NATO assume a less military role? (S)

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Secretary General Woerner: I think it would help. (S)

General Scowcroft: Gorbachev has objected to our new CFE manpower proposal. He has offered either 195,000 or 225,000 stationed U.S. and Soviets troops in the entire Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone. We believe, however, that we must break the link between U.S. and Soviet troop strength stationed on foreign soil in Europe. Gorbachev is trying to reestablish this linkage. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I agree. I hate this linkage. U.S. troops are in Europe for entirely different political and geographic reasons. (S)

The President: Will the East European countries invite us to stay in Europe as well? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: I believe the Poles will. (S)

-- End of Conversation--

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Security Adviser to the Chancellor
Walter Neuer, Head of Chancellor's Office
Uwe Kaestner, Deputy Security Adviser to the Chancellor for East-West Issues

DATE/TIME February 24, 1990, 2:37 - 4:50pm EST
AND PLACE: Camp David - First Meeting

Chancellor Kohl: I have a couple of items I'd like to discuss with you. First, I want to thank you for inviting me here. Second, I want to thank you for all your signs of friendship since you became President. The letter you wrote to me before I went to Moscow will go down in history as an important document in the history of US-German relations. And we will not forget what Secretary Baker did for me in Moscow, briefing me on his talks with Gorbachev before I saw him. It was decisive. German-American friendship is stronger now than it has ever been in the postwar period. It is vital. This is not just true in a military sense. (S)

If things go well, we will have enormous changes occurring in Europe, even if Gorbachev falls. His successor will have to pursue similar policies. This is an obligatory development in the Soviet Union. I told Gorbachev that you cannot go back to Stalin. There will be no Tiananmen Square in Europe, I told him, not in Dresden, Budapest, or Warsaw. The consequences of such an event would be beyond comprehension. Hitler killed people who listened to radio broadcasts, but now German TV programs can be seen in Kiev. The world has changed beyond recognition, and mass communication has been an important cause of these changes. I told Rakowski, the former Prime Minister of Poland, he and the

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Communists would be finished when the Pope visited his country. These changes are the reality in which we live. The situation of renewal will continue to exist, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, and, a little later, in Bulgaria and Romania. So in Europe there is this new dimension. (S)

In two years we will have the Single EC internal market, and the consequences will be dramatic. There will be an increased demand inside the Community to work for European unity even faster, so that the EC keeps up with the unification of the two German states. I have always pushed for European unity. Now, except for Margaret Thatcher, all the EC leaders agree with me. By the time of the next election for the European Parliament, in 1994, we will have to delegate more authority to European institutions than is now expected. This is because of German unification. People are saying that when Germany is 80 million strong, the Germans must be integrated into Europe. I am happy about this. (S)

These developments will have a major impact on our monetary policy. The United States and the EC, if we are wise, must work closely together. The relationship between the Community and the US is of the greatest importance, and this will be especially true in the 1990s. The EFTA countries, and the states of Eastern Europe will probably become members of the EC during the 1990s. Then there will be movement toward what Francois Mitterrand calls a confederation of Europe. It is a system that will create itself, but it will do so in close cooperation with the United States. (S)

Geographically, we are in the center. We will have 80 million people. Economically, we will be number one. So we do have lots of psychological problems to contend with. There are old fears that derive from history; we must take these fears seriously. We must be forthcoming in our relations with our neighbors. Others must see that Germans are the most European Europeans. Our relations with the French are particularly important. It is important for Paris that they have something we don't have, and that something is nuclear weapons. (S)

US-German relations must remain strong. That will help reduce fears in Europe. We, in Germany, need a good relationship with the US for many reasons. We must get out of an inward-looking spirit, because people fear not our military, but our economic strength. The US is slightly ahead of us in R&D; we are even with Japan. This also creates fears. If I can sum up, the net of US-German relations must be woven as tightly as possible. This includes exchanges in universities, firms, and the German-American youth council. (S)

Now, turning to the subject of German unity, the developments are so dramatic I can hardly believe it. Communism in the German

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Democratic Republic has collapsed like a house of cards. It looked like a giant, but it was hollow. We now are trying to stabilize the situation so one does have time to search for reasoned approaches. My ten-point program of last November has been swept away. (S)

The psychological situation in the GDR was OK until Christmas, but the Modrow government collapsed in January. Let me give you two examples. Thousands of people are running away every day, and Modrow doesn't know how to create confidence. 350,000 people came to the FRG, and 200,000 of them are less than 30 years old. Their numbers included dentists, physicists, engineers, and skilled workers. Between January 1 and today, an entire city's worth of people left the GDR. In seven weeks, the total has been over 100,000. We must find a way to persuade people to stay. Productivity in the East is in sharp decline. Everyone wants to be paid in Deutsche Marks. Shortages are increasing. The corruption trials of the former GDR officials are having disastrous consequences. Of the 15 most important officials in the GDR a year ago, 10 are in prison. That used to be the leadership of the GDR. In the rest of the country, the corruption is just as bad. (S)

Three weeks ago the situation was such that I concluded that we had to do something quite different. We had to change our program. So now we need monetary union. Marty Feldstein says we are crazy. Textbooks don't help; they don't have answers for problems like this. The GDR election will be in three weeks. The new parliament will make decisions fast. They may want us to put money into their state enterprises. We will say no. We are now spending 6 billion DM for health, but that is different from spending money on industrial development. Their telephone system doesn't work; the railroads are a disaster; and the environment is a mess, including two dangerous nuclear reactors -- worse than the design of the one at Chernobyl. The situation is just disastrous. So I must act quickly. I must insist they move to a market economy immediately after the elections. We will have to finance old age pensions and social security for the unemployed. (S)

It all looks pretty devastating. But I believe if the GDR has a market, has decent working conditions, it will be a prosperous area in 3 to 5 years. And the European Community will benefit from this. This will happen because the East Germans are good people; this is the old industrial area of Germany. The GDR will not be a Bantustan. There are about 5,000 enterprises in the FRG that are ready to go into the GDR. This economic angle is the most pressing aspect of my problems. (S)

Secretary Baker: On monetary union, what are your plans? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It must be done fast. All improvement

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presupposes currency conversion. This means we must put the monetary system under the Bundesbank. There are no private banks now in the GDR, but this can be dealt with. This is a real opportunity for the FRG as well. We are getting fat and lazy. Now there is some adventure in our national lives. The prospect of unification is energizing my own party. This weekend, 2,000 CDU members were in the GDR engaging in political activity. In 1948, when I was 18, there was the same kind of fresh mood in the country. Church life in the GDR too is more intense. So there are some good things coming from the GDR. So I hope we can get monetary union completed soon. (S)

In the old days the East German state was divided into Laender. Ulbricht abolished this. That was a major mistake. People there want to bring back the five laender. We want to retain a federal system. The French and the Poles want us to remain this way too. We need to work on two tracks, both of which are equally important: (1) domestic German matters; and (2) dealing with our neighbors. We need to intensify integration in the EC and promote political integration to reduce European fears. (S)

Now, concerning external problems. The border question is not serious. Among friends, I can be honest. In the FRG today 85-90% of the population are in favor of the Oder-Neisse border. The vast majority knows that this will be the border. The man who built Camp David, Mr. Roosevelt, will never be popular in Germany. The Poles were pushed west and the Germans were expelled. This was a reaction to Nazi crimes, but the Germans who were affected were innocent -- this was 12 to 14 million people. One-third of the 1937 Reich was cut off. In 1945, 2 million German civilians were killed fleeing from Eastern Europe. We have to deal with this psychological problem in my country. (S)

The final resolution of the border question, people thought in the 1970s, would come through a peace treaty. I don't want a peace treaty regarding Germany. It would not be a good idea. 110 countries were at war with Germany in May 1945. The issue is to reassure the Poles about the 1,000 kilometer border. They must be assured they are safe. The Four Powers, for instance, must play a crucial role. We will be uniting three parts: the FRG, the GDR, and Berlin. You are involved legally. The Poles should realize that binding decisions must come by a treaty ratified by an all-German parliament in an all-German state. I in the FRG cannot act for a united Germany. But we need to work to meet the expectations of the Poles. The border isn't a problem. Rather, the problem is that the Poles may demand reparations. I would find that unacceptable. We have already paid 150 billion DM to Poland, Israel, and individuals. We won't pay more, fifty years after the war. (S)

Secretary Baker: Does Mazowiecki want reparations? (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: Yes, or at least people around him do. We forgave some loans, but I can't do that every year. This brings me to the Two Plus Four. It will be crucial for us to proceed as follows: The US and Germany will cooperate as closely as possible. We must agree on what we want. Then we will talk with our partners, including the Soviet Union. I am absolutely opposed to expanding the Two Plus Four. Once you open it up, you can't draw the line. (S)

I will say something a little dangerous, which can be difficult to manage. If we coordinate between the US and the FRG, we might have to solve this issue vis a vis Poland, not through participation, but through consultation to relieve the psychological strain. The Poles are unique. They are the only ones who have a border problem. We have to give thought about how to do that. (S)

I know you have many Polish-Americans in your country. I'd like to help Mazowiecki, but Two Plus Five is not doable. We should stick with Two Plus Four, but think about a consultative mechanism for Poland. Gorbachev is not interested in the Oder-Neisse issue; he just doesn't want Poland to open up the issue of its eastern border. There are old Polish cities in the USSR. (S)

Mitterrand said last week, it's a shame these borders exist but, he added, they are realities. This causes me problems at home, but I will have to deal with it. We need to deal with the psychological problems of Poland, and of the Germans too. The SPD will use this issue against me, not out of love for Poland, but out of lack of love for me. In 1950, the GDR recognized the Polish border but explicitly made Poland give up any claim for reparations from Germany. Now the Poles pretend they didn't do that: border no, reparations yes, as seen from Warsaw. My motives are good. We need to find a sensible solution. I hope an all-German parliament will be convened next year, and will settle it. (S)

General Scowcroft: What sort of timeframe do you have in mind for addressing the border issue? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We should finish the Two Plus Four this year, before the CSCE Summit. (S)

Secretary Baker: If the Two Plus Four complete their work, it will come up at the CSCE Summit. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: When the Two Plus Four talks are concluded, the CSCE would bless whatever is concluded. (S)

Secretary Baker: Exactly. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: But we need a psychologically attractive solution for Poland. We have to keep thinking. A way can be found. (S)

Germany doesn't want neutrality in any way. This would be a deadly decision. There is no serious interest in it. A united Germany will be a member of NATO. One needs a precise definition for Germany's NATO membership, however. We will also need a transition period. NATO units, including Bundeswehr forces dedicated to NATO, cannot be stationed on East German soil. (S)

It wouldn't work to have the Soviet group of forces in East Germany remain there indefinitely because it would compromise German sovereignty. And we have to decide what we will do about the East German New People's Army, with its 200,000 soldiers. And if West Germany is a member of NATO, should it be done in the way we are handling France? What about German military integration of the new Germany? Is this a good idea? But we do not want any special status for all of Germany, as occurred after 1918. That is why NATO is so important. (S)

Concerning nuclear cooperation, we must think about what will happen with nuclear artillery, Lance, and the Follow-On-To-Lance (FOTL). What will your Congress say about FOTL? And how will these weapons be seen in Eastern Europe? But we must remain in NATO, and US forces must remain in Europe. (S)

The President: I would like to make a few general comments. (U)

We are going to stay involved in Europe. We have some pressure here to lower the level of US troops and defense spending. We are being asked: who is the enemy? The enemy is unpredictability, apathy, and destabilization. But we will stay in Europe. It will be a tough fight. As for FOTL, FOTL is dead as a doornail. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We will be getting into a nuclear discussion well before 1992. It will be an election issue this year. On the Lance business, I want to avoid the impression that the US caved in to public opinion in Europe. (S)

The President: Congress is very unlikely to fund the FOTL program. (S)

The concept of Germany being in NATO is absolutely crucial. I hate to think of another France in NATO. We need full participation for Germany in NATO. It will be stabilizing for Europe. We will continue to keep US troops in Germany and in Europe despite the pressure. (S)

I'm concerned when I hear the Polish Prime Minister talk about keeping Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. I'm not enthralled when

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I hear Poland might want the Soviets to stay because of the issue of the Polish-German border. I don't like that, and I don't want to accept that. (S)

We want to play a key role with you in all of this. You know and I know your European neighbors are nervous about this. Sometimes I forget to consult. But you and I must take care to consult with our smaller NATO partners. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (S)

The President: Genscher made this statement to the Italians in Ottawa, that: "You're not in the game." This offended Italy, and some of the other guys. I will try to be sensitive to their concerns. Genscher must be sensitive too. I'm not suggesting that you haven't been. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I totally agree. I wasn't in Ottawa, but I had to take some of the consequences of Genscher's act. And I didn't like it. It was totally unnecessary. It's not my style either. There are domestic political reasons for this. Genscher is having trouble with his party. (S)

Everyone is confused but me. I'm doing OK, but the other parties are in disarray, including the FDP. As for the Ottawa matter, I realize, of course, that I have to do a master resuscitation with Andreotti and the others. (S)

I'll do the same thing with Francois Mitterrand at some time. He has been holding firm. Most of the French people are on our side, but the political class is against us. But we have to keep working the problem. Copenhagen, and Norway, are also hard cases. The Netherlands and the UK are also problems. Margaret Thatcher: I can't do anything about her. I can't understand her. The Empire declined fighting Germany -- she thinks the UK paid this enormous price, and here comes Germany again. (S)

The President: We don't look at it that way. We don't fear the ghosts of the past; Margaret does. But you and we must bend over backwards to consult, recognizing our unique role in history. I called Margaret today just to listen to her, which I did for an hour. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: In the FRG there is anger among Germans because we have been reliable partners for over 40 years. Why doesn't that help? Logic doesn't help. (S)

The President: The United States can and will help. When you say Germany will be staying in NATO with full membership, that helps. Margaret told me today that everyone expects German unity (although six months ago she felt differently). But she said everyone is worried about the uncertainties. Germany being fully

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involved in NATO helps. (S)

We don't support the idea of Polish reparations. On the Polish border, it has cycled over here as an issue. I know you have political problems, but the more you can do on this the better it will be. (S)

We feel that US nuclear weapons are an essential part of the US military presence in Germany. If US nuclear forces are withdrawn from Germany, I don't see how we can persuade any other ally on the continent to retain these weapons. Because there is uncertainty, we need a nuclear presence in Germany. Our public sees the nuclear deterrent as the protection for our boys. I worry that if we lose nuclear weapons, domestic support for US troops would erode. (S)

On the Two Plus Four, we don't want the Soviets to use this mechanism as an instrument to force you to create the Germany they might want. I am concerned that the Two Plus Four not get in the way of your dialogue with the GDR on the nature of unification. I worry that too early an engagement in Two Plus Four talks will stimulate the Soviets to interfere. (S)

I told Margaret that the Two Plus Four should focus on giving up Four Power rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole and for Berlin. I would hate to see the Two Plus Four get involved in the issue of Germany's full membership in NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Gorbachev will have his views on NATO. (S)

Secretary Baker: I believe Gorbachev and Shevardnadze believe US forces are a stabilizing presence. The Soviets haven't yet decided on their final position on Germany and NATO. (S)

The President: Full German membership is linked to our ability to sustain US troops in Europe. You must understand that. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I like that very much. I want America in Europe, and not only its military presence. I want to eradicate the concept of a Fortress Europe. Hundreds of steps are required, but we must make Fortress Europe an impossibility. (S)

Secretary Baker: NATO is the raison d'etre for keeping US forces in Europe. If the Soviets want the US in Europe, they have to accept NATO. We couldn't have US forces in Europe on the soil of a non-full member of NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The Soviets are negotiating. But this may end up as a matter of cash. They need money. (S)

The President: On US-Soviet relations, we want to see Gorbachev succeed. We want a successful US-Soviet Summit which will give

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him a boost at home. We want a CFE agreement signed. A CSCE Summit. A START accord this year. (S)

Having said that, the Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany's relationship with NATO. What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn't. We can't let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat. (S)

We have weird thinking in our Congress today, ideas like this peace dividend. We can't do that in these uncertain times. We can't let the Polish Prime Minister dictate how many Soviets stay. We have to stay together and work things out. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The Soviets could stay in Germany for a limited time if that could be a solution, if the time is limited. But it must not be for an extended period. (S)

The President: Just so we don't say: All the Soviets must leave, so all the US troops must leave Germany too. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: No. As I said, there is a difference between being 6000 kilometers away and being 600 kilometers away. It is a ten-to-one difference. You must stay even if the Soviets leave Germany. (S)

The President: On a CSCE Summit, I have agreed to participate in a CSCE Summit this year, if we can complete a CFE treaty that can be signed at the meeting. The Summit should review how we are doing in the three CSCE baskets. I hope that the Summit will endorse new CSCE guidelines for the conduct of free elections, to help us protect the emergence of real democracy in Eastern Europe. (S)

While this CSCE Summit may acknowledge, in some way, the activities of the Two Plus Four, we do not want the CSCE Summit to be centered on Germany, or to be a meeting which tries to undermine Germany's full membership in NATO. (S)

Finally, we need to try to strengthen the CSCE process. But I'm sure you agree with me that the CSCE cannot replace NATO as the core of the West's deterrent strategy in Europe and as the fundamental justification for U.S. troops in Europe. If that happens, we will have a real problem. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I don't want the CSCE Summit to be a forum for discussion of the German problem. But Gorbachev needs a CSCE Summit. And you will make lots of progress in arms control at a US-Soviet Summit. You can work on progress in the three baskets. (S)

Secretary Baker: What else should we discuss? How about

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procedural next steps on the Two Plus Four process? (S)

The President: And domestic politics in Germany. We support you because of your principles, and because we have a big stake in this. We feel comfortable with you at the wheel. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We will stick to two tracks: a domestic German track and an international track. It is important that you continue US-Soviet disarmament, so that no one can say the German issue is slowing progress in arms control. I will push EC integration with all my weight. There will be a special EC Summit on the last Saturday in April. We need as many consultations as possible. We need to talk frankly with the Soviets. It would be good for the US to talk to the Soviets outside of the Two Plus Four about German membership in NATO. That way the Soviets will understand that there is total US-FRG agreement without any games. The Soviets may be more willing to tell you their real price tag for their agreement. (S)

Secretary Baker: It is important that we send strong public signals about continued full German membership in NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Of course. We are in complete agreement. There will be concerns for the Soviets if Germany remains in NATO, for their security. And they will want to get something in return. (S)

The President: You've got deep pockets. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Now, as to the Two Plus Four, we have to work very closely together. After the elections, we will keep you informed about developments with the two Germanys. The Soviets will be likely to influence the new GDR government. We must coordinate every step, along with the UK and France. (S)

On domestic developments, the mood of people in the FRG is in favor of unification, but they are afraid of the sacrifices required. These won't be major sacrifices in a historical sense, but people are worrying. We now pay 22 billion DM to subsidize Berlin, and 30 billion DM in tax privileges for Berlin per year. These costs will disappear. If I add up the balance sheet after 10 years, then we will be making money. (S)

Now, on the political situation in the GDR. Someone who lives in Leipzig has to be 79 years old to have participated in free elections before. They would have been 21 years old in November 1932. That says all there is to say. In East Berlin, 32,000 people are employed in State Security. This has left an impact, has shaped the people. There is no middle class. There are no wealthy people. The social structure is warped. It will take some time. It is a peasant and worker state. All of a sudden a market economy will be introduced. (S)

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The first election won't be typical. It will take two or three elections before things take on a clearer shape. I want this March 18 election, then local elections in May, then the Land elections in the GDR, then a federal election in December, and then -- next year -- all-German elections. We had the same situation in 1946-49. If I can win this year in the FRG election, I can win next year in the all-German election. This will give me time. If I postpone elections, I would no longer be in charge. (S)

The GDR's new government will have to make many unpleasant decisions, about inefficient industries, the consequences of introducing supply and demand, and on the environment. They will have to make these decisions. They will have to begin being real politicians. (S)

Secretary Baker: There would be all-German elections in 1991. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: If I have any influence... (S)

Secretary Baker: What if the laender try to join the FRG under Article 23? Will that force you to move the elections up? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: No. I want a graduated strategy from successful monetary union, to the federal elections in December 1990, to all-German elections in 1991. I want to involve GDR politicians in the future of a united Germany. (S)

The SPD in the GDR is the strongest party. It is a region where that party has had long-time historical strength. This will stir up some emotion. Then, there are the so-called conservative parties -- the former Liberals, the former Christian Democrats. People remember that they cooperated with the SED. After the first elections, time will be needed. Only two people are important in the GDR elections. Willy Brandt, who is 75 years old, and myself. I'll have six campaign appearances in the GDR. Hundreds of thousands of young people come to my rallies. But, whatever happens in the election, the new GDR government will have to face its responsibilities. We will need time before all-German elections. (S)

The President: What do your political opponents in the FRG say about your handling of German unification. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: They criticize me for not putting enough money into the GDR. I'll do that after March 18. People will stay home only when they have cold cash in their hand. It's the same problem Gorbachev has. (S)

The President: Do you think your German domestic political

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opponents will try to oppose full German membership in NATO, and US troops in Germany? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: As far as NATO is concerned, everyone is in favor of full membership. Some in the SPD discuss German membership in NATO along French lines. I don't think it will be a big issue. On US troops, there may be more varied opinions. Worse still, in the next two months, FOTL and nuclear artillery will be coming up in all the parties. The debate will intensify. The ranges of these missiles makes these systems politically untenable. There must be a decision made by the US, and not made under pressure. The Soviets would have to remove theirs too -- that would be the US proposal. (S)

Secretary Baker: We hope we will have a CFE agreement in June or September. (S)

The President: What would you like us to do on FOTL? What would help you most? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: For the US President, it is essential that he not give up under external pressure. The question is, of course, to try to involve the Soviets. (S)

General Scowcroft: FOTL funding will be gone by May. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The initiative should be yours, not with Congress. Couldn't one raise this with the Soviets? (S)

Secretary Baker: Maybe we could lump no modernization of Lance in with our position going into the SNF negotiations. (S)

General Scowcroft: The Soviet systems are, by and large, already modernized. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: There will be a debate in your Congress on this starting in four to six weeks, which will instantly give us a debate in Germany. (S)

The President: We want a position that will help you, and not undermine the Alliance. The authority of the President is also important here. (S)

General Scowcroft: There are two ways we can do it: (1) we can fight to keep the money in; or (2) we can let you announce the cancellation for your political benefit. (S)

Secretary Baker: Last year's debate in the Alliance was about SNF negotiations. If we could fold FOTL into SNF negotiations, that might help with the Congress. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Nuclear artillery is also a part of the SNF

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issue. We must keep that in mind. (S)

Secretary Baker: Maybe we can begin SNF negotiations this year, folding in FOTL. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: My problem is with your debate in Congress. (S)

Secretary Baker: There could be an announcement in the next 30 days that we will not fund FOTL in FY 91, as we wait to see what will happen in the SNF negotiations. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: It would be good to make a decision soon. But if you said to Congress that you might ask for a modernized Lance next year if SNF negotiations fail, that would be worse for me than the present situation. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher talks to me in a way I wouldn't accept from anyone else. She is isolating herself from her own countrymen. I once told her that I was post-Churchill, but she was pre-Churchill. (S)

Secretary Baker: I would like to make a comment on the Polish borders. The Two Plus Four will mostly be a mechanism for consultations. It can't decide issues of fundamental importance to other countries without their presence. It can't be another Yalta. At the press conference, why can't you say that the Two Plus Four is a discussion mechanism, so Poland is not a member, but they would have to be involved with any issue that fundamentally affected them. The Two Plus Four is primarily a consultations and discussion mechanism. Many issues are only for the Germans to decide. (S)

On the military status of the GDR, full membership in NATO involves others but is up to a sovereign German government to decide. Since the discussions affect others, those other countries would be at the table when their issues are being discussed. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: On another subject, I want someone to push US-German youth exchanges. They need a little more pep. (S)

- End of First Full Meeting -

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(Notetaker)

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Security Adviser to the
Chancellor
Walter Neuer, Head of Chancellor's Office
Uwe Kaestner, Deputy Security Adviser to the
Chancellor for East-West Issues

DATE/TIME February 25, 1990, 9:22 - 10:30am EST
AND PLACE: Camp David - Second Meeting

Chancellor Kohl: We need to discuss the procedures of the Two Plus Four. (S)

The President: Margaret talked on the phone of getting started with official-level meetings. (S)

Secretary Baker: The statement in Ottawa made it clear that there will be no Two Plus Four ministerial meeting before March 18. But official-level contacts would begin shortly. Nobody defined what "shortly" means. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: A question is what will be the outcome of the Two Plus Four talks? What are our goals? We have agreed with the GDR to meet with them on March 7, to develop an agenda. There will be no other meetings until after the election. We cannot negotiate with the Modrow government. It has no status. (S)

Secretary Baker: One of the things we are running into is nervousness among our Allies about consultations. We were thinking, subject to your views, about having a One Plus Three discussion (the FRG, US, UK, and France) at the political directors' level, looking toward a political directors meeting at Two Plus Four. That would help dampen British and French

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anxieties as well as those of other NATO allies, especially if we let NATO know about these discussions. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That procedure is satisfactory, but what would take place on March 1? Is that a One Plus Three meeting or the Two Plus Four? (S)

Secretary Baker: We are not married to any particular date. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We should start with One Plus Three, then move to Two Plus Four. (S)

The President: Let's make damn sure we don't leave our Allies out as if we are carving up Europe. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: We need to exactly meet that point. There could be a One Plus Three meeting soon at the official level (including all Allies, France and the United Kingdom). Then we could have a Two Plus Four meeting after March 18. (S)

Secretary Baker: We need real consultation with the Permreps in NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: My idea, that I have discussed with Manfred Woerner, is that, when I'm in Brussels in two weeks, I'll go see Woerner for an hour. I would ask Woerner to call a meeting of the Permreps and I would meet with them. All this would take place before March 18. Psychologically speaking, this would be unusual, but it would be helpful in these circumstances. (S)

The President: Excellent. (S)

Secretary Baker: Good. (S)

General Scowcroft: Great. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Then we are agreed. (S)

Secretary Baker: There is one other thing we need to think through. We will have to deal with the USSR. If you do the One Plus Three without a subsequent Two Plus Four, you may lose the chance to get Soviet acquiescence in a united Germany becoming a full member of NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The One Plus Three must know what they want. They must establish a joint position. Then we would go to the Two Plus Four. (S)

Secretary Baker: We should do that very quickly. (S)

The President: We need to be low-key about our activities at One Plus Three. We don't want to give the Soviets the impression

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that they are being dealt out. (S)

Secretary Baker: The One Plus Three officials would meet on about March 1. Then the two Germanies would meet on March 7. Then the Two Plus Four would meet before March 18? Is that right? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: To be sure, let me say it. The One Plus Three can meet around March 1. At the end of that meeting we all must have identical goals. Then we in the FRG meet with the GDR on March 7. After that the Two Plus Four could meet, after the March 18 elections. (S)

Secretary Baker: I don't see how we can have a meeting on March 1 of the One Plus Three, then the Two Plus Four would meet only after March 18. I think the Soviets would have a problem. The British and French wouldn't like that either. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: After March 18, positions in the GDR will change. But, if you take that into account, then it is OK to have the Two Plus Four meet before March 18. (S)

The President: The Chancellor's visit to NATO will help. The One Plus Three looks like a deal in a smoke-filled room. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I will be going to NATO on March 8. (S)

Secretary Baker: Any One Plus Three discussion should be the night before the Two Plus Four. They should be almost simultaneous. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That is not a problem with me. But the present GDR government will be a spokesman for the Soviets before March 18. What do the British and French want regarding our membership in NATO? (S)

Secretary Baker: They want full German membership in NATO. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I would think so. That's why I hesitate about having East German representatives at the table before March 18. That makes everything more difficult. I don't think this was discussed at Ottawa. The Foreign Ministry of the GDR is Communist from top to bottom. Why involve them before March 18? If the Two Plus Four takes place before March 18 then you will have the USSR, and the GDR, there as Soviet spokesmen. Why should we want that? (S)

General Scowcroft: That's a very good point. (S)

Secretary Baker: It is a good point. We don't feel strongly about it, but the British and French do. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Then shouldn't we simply talk with the British and the French? (S)

The President: Helmut has made an excellent point. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: For the next few weeks, we need to conduct discreet consultations, so we don't offend people. We need full US-German agreement, then a clear position at One Plus Three. Then we can look toward the Two Plus Four, agreeing on how we will handle the Two Plus Four. You will have to deal bilaterally with the Soviets on this. (S)

The President: What do you see on the timing of when people will say Germany is unified? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: I cannot give a precise prognosis. Developments are too dramatic. But here's how I see it today. (S)

First, there will be the elections on March 18. Then the GDR will be forming a government. Then there will be the May local elections. Then they will reestablish the old laender (which I support, but it will take time). That will take us to the end of the year. (S)

Parallel to that process we will deal with monetary union, which will require a great deal of work. Then we will address ownership of property and land reform. All of this will take lots of time. I don't want a hectic pace, partly because of the fears of others. So German unity might be next year. Some in the EC believe there will be unity only after 1992. That is silly. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher hit me in the press again today, saying there will need to be a delay, because people in the GDR will have to learn how to vote. She is in a bad humor because the polls are bad for her. But we need to bring her in. (S)

The President: Yes, and she worries about the pace. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: But George, it won't be in my hands. We could have a mass exodus after March 18. I won't be able to control it. (S)

Secretary Baker: What are your views on a Ministerial meeting of the Two Plus Four? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: If the Two Plus Four talks at the official level go well, I would do the Two Plus Four Ministerial discussions soon too. When is your Summit with Gorbachev? (S)

Secretary Baker: The last two weeks of June. (S)

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Chancellor Kohl: If you had made headway by June, then the Two Plus Four Ministers could meet, perhaps in May. (S)

Secretary Baker: What about a Two Plus Four Ministerial shortly after the Two Plus Four official talks? (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That would depend on what happens in the Two Plus Four official discussions. I don't want to put myself under time pressure. That is only useful to the Soviets. We want no time pressure. The Two Plus Four will have to finish its work by November, for a CSCE Summit, or else the CSCE will take over the Two Plus Four's work. (S)

Let's assume the Soviets want to fix their bottom line on Germany during the US-Soviet Summit, rather than before. I have a feeling that will be Gorbachev's approach. With that background, Two Plus Four Ministerial would then be OK before your Summit, but Gorbachev will wish to take a real decision with the President, in the context of major agreements and progress on arms control with the Americans. That would not be the Two Plus Four, just Gorbachev and the President. (S)

The President: Gorbachev has to be provided with face, with standing. That's a key point. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: That supports my thesis. He wants to make a deal with the other superpower. (S)

Secretary Baker: We need to be getting the Two Plus Four process concluded by the time of the US-Soviet Summit. That means we need to get going soon. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: The central question is the membership of Germany in NATO. In the end, Gorbachev will make that concession to the President. (S)

The President: What will he need to make that deal? (S)

Secretary Baker: He will need two things: First, Gorbachev needs to know Germany will remain steadfast behind full NATO membership. Second, he will want to see that legitimate Soviet security interests are being taken into account. (S)

The President: Yes, and that's why we must have the closest possible consultation between us. We are going to win the game, but we must be clever while we are doing it. (S)

Mr. Teltschik: We should not use the word "jurisdiction" when referring to NATO and former GDR territory. Rather we should use the word "forces." There is a critical difference. (S)

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Secretary Baker: Right. I agree completely. I used the term "jurisdiction" before I realized that it would impact on Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (S)

Chancellor Kohl: Good. It would be good if that is said publicly. (S)

Secretary Baker: Absolutely. (S)

- End of Second and Final Meeting -

(The two leaders and their colleagues then prepared between 1030 and 1050 for the joint press conference. A transcript is attached.)

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Confirmed Pres Mtg
w/ Haughey of
Ireland on Feb 27th

NO MEMCON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti
of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Sim Smiley, Interpreter

Italy
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Advisor to the
Prime Minister (notetaker)
Carla Lonigro, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 6, 1990, 10:30 a.m. - 10:48 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Following the arrival ceremony and photo opportunity in the Oval Office, the President and Prime Minister Andreotti began their one-on-one meeting at 10:30 a.m. (U)

The President: The press asked you a question on Two Plus Four. We are sensitive to it. Your answer was good. There will be no condoning of the exclusion of any ally on German unification. I tried to impress on Kohl our views on this. There was an unfortunate comment at Ottawa. I will insist on full consultation within the Alliance. It is not the role of the US to sit around and divide up the world. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you. The Alliance needs to be more united, even more than in the past. The problem of Germany, of course, concerns the two Germanies, but also NATO and the CSCE process. If we fall into the temptation of dealing with problems bilaterally -- including Germany -- it will be disastrous. We told Kohl he shouldn't start talking about a monetary union without talking to us, because that affects all of us. He said there had been no time. If this happened in the military sector, it would be a disaster. It's not a matter of prestige to say that Two Plus Four is not a device to deal with overall problems, except maybe in Berlin. The three-circle approach is right: EC-NATO-CSCE. (S)

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The President: No solution should come about without full agreement. I worry about the border issue, but there have been encouraging words from the two parties in Germany on that issue. Soviet troops remaining in Poland are part of this. If Kohl would consult with all the rest of us as well, we could deal with these concerns. (S)

The press asks me who is the enemy. I say it is instability and unpredictability. Events have moved in the right direction, but will that continue? I wanted you to know my feelings, because you are such a good and close friend. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: We cannot thoroughly discuss the Alliance, because the enemy has changed. Everything must be done gradually. In the early stage there may be troops on the other side, but this must be transitory. In the meantime, we cannot build the new Alliance and Helsinki model. These two must be a strong basis for US in Europe. Should several "Euro-theories" get stronger, we would have a real crisis. We have two nuclear powers, and the rest are not. We could absorb this within NATO; but without it, all will want nuclear weapons or a European nuclear deterrent. This would be a step back. (Ø)

The President: If this became seen here as a predominant view, the US would come home and be isolationist. I will fight for defense and the Alliance, but if this happened, it would overwhelm all other views. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: It would create a crisis within the Alliance. We must move fast to upgrade the philosophy of NATO. (Ø)

The President: I agree. We had good talks with Woerner, and we should consult closely. This is our unifying force. I was pleased when Kohl came out strongly in favor of a continuing strong NATO. (Ø)

Prime Minister Andreotti: This, along with CSCE, doesn't create problems for Gorbachev. (S)

The President: In his heart, I think Gorbachev accepts this idea, though maybe his generals do not. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: A strong, unified Germany inside Europe without the US would be a danger. Mrs. Thatcher is very strong on this point, and she is right. You called me about troop reductions. It is not the number that matters, but the US commitment to remain in Europe. (S)

The President: Of course, but there are pressures in Congress -- right and left -- to bring our troops home and deliver a "peace dividend," putting money into Chicago, etc. But this is not the world role the US should play. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Giulio
Andreotti of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the
Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the
President and Deputy for National
Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant
to the President for European and
Soviet Affairs (notetaker)
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Canadian
Affairs
Peter F. Secchia, Ambassador to Italy
Sim Smiley, Interpreter

Italy
Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister
Gianni De Michelis, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the
U.S.
Bruno Bottai, Secretary General,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Umberto Vattani, Diplomatic Advisor to
the Prime Minister (notetaker)
Paolo Janni, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Italian Embassy
Ricardo Sessa, Head of Secretariat,
Office of the Prime Minister
Pio Mastrobuoni, Head of the Press
Office, Office of the Prime Minister
Carla Lonigro, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 6, 1990, 10:50 - 11:53 am
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

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Following their Oval Office meeting, the President and Prime Minister Andreotti met for an expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room at 10:50 a.m. (U)

The President: I am pleased to have you here. This is a very important time, especially given all the developments in Europe. All of us recognize the importance of full consultation with our Allies and friends. We see eye-to-eye on the importance of NATO. We are delighted you are here. (U)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Thank you for your welcome. This visit occurs at a particularly important time in history. These several decades prove that we in the West have been managing things well, including in NATO and in the US-European partnership. Since 1975, the Helsinki formula acknowledges by all of Europe that the US and Canada are part of Europe. What is now occurring is that Eastern Europe is establishing democratic regimes, each according to its own identity. Some have pre-Communist models, but not the Soviet Union. Within this framework, the problem of German reunification must be placed. Until recently, to speak of reunification of two German states would have been dangerous, and would have produced strong and destabilizing reactions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Moreover, there was concern that a whole set of boundaries which emerged after World War II might be questioned. It is indispensable that NATO become stronger and that CSCE and the EC become stronger. We must assure that concerns for seeing a Germany that might change its policy or question its borders must be absolutely removed by a stronger, more relevant NATO. We need a broader political-military framework for the Alliance. This acquires a great urgency. It is necessary for NATO to always be kept informed about your talks with the Soviet Union, as you have done. You discussed matters with the Soviets, but only after discussions with the Allies. Although specific Four Power tasks and the two Germanies cannot be left out, the goal must always be assessed within a broader framework. NATO has faced in the past diverse conditions; we face them now. We have succeeded in the past; we must succeed now. And NATO must be the priority forum, since the world has not become a sort of Eden. There could be turmoil in the Balkans, or Arab fundamentalists could mount terrorism. There must be ever closer contact between the US and Europe. (S)

The President: It doesn't surprise me, but it pleases me that we are on the same wavelength. We know your concerns about Germany and the Two Plus Four. Together, we now support German unification because things have changed so much. We want NATO to continue with an expanded role. We want Germany to remain a full member of NATO, and Kohl was direct and supported this. We feel the US military should remain in Europe and in Germany. I think

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Gorbachev himself does not see a continued US presence as threatening. If there are such worries, we will try to allay any fears in the USSR. We need to establish a special military status for East Germany. Kohl made clear that all the Allies should be in the unification process. That's our position. All of us want to go the extra mile on consultations. The more that you can say about a united Germany in NATO and the US military in Europe, the better. That will help Kohl, those in Germany who support the US, and Italy. We support the inviolability of the Polish border. Developments in the FRG are encouraging. We are sensitive to Polish concerns. I don't want to be involved in German domestic questions. The Polish Question can best be allayed through strong assertions in Germany about not changing borders. We believe the two German states should take the lead in German unity. (S)

The Two Plus Four talks, as we see them, should focus on the devolution of Four Power rights and responsibilities to a unified Germany. They will not decide the future of NATO or of European security. The Two Plus Four should have no voice on the issue of Germany's full membership in NATO. As Jim Baker stressed in his letter to Foreign Minister De Michelis, we want the broader security implications of German unification to be fully discussed within the Alliance. And, as I said, Helmut fully agrees with this. That is one reason he will be briefing NATO representatives in Brussels later this week. This is a good idea. I would welcome your views on how best to structure these consultations at NATO. Let me repeat: your involvement is essential. We feel that way not only because Italy has a right to be involved, but because Italy and the rest of the Alliance can contribute to a stable outcome in this delicate process. (S)

I mentioned to the Prime Minister the odd US views on defense. NATO's involvement at these crucial times should be the beginning of a new era for the Alliance. I know that you agree that we must maintain NATO's defenses despite public pressures here and in Europe for a "peace dividend." They would have us cut the hell out of our overseas forces and spend money on social programs. The more you can say about the US role in Europe, the importance of stability, and the dangers of instability, the better. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: Concerning the position of a united Germany, it would be good to envisage a preliminary stage (no one knows how long it will last) during which some Soviet troops remain in the former GDR. It is better to say this than to suggest that a united Germany in NATO will have Soviet troops for an extended period, lest it lead to denuclearized and demilitarized areas in Europe. That would be very dangerous. All military problems must be discussed within NATO. Otherwise, NATO would be weakened. Concerning Four Plus Two, if it is a conclusion of the Berlin mechanism, there are no problems. But if there is an idea to stabilize this group as dominant, this

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would be negative and dangerous. We have to prepare Helsinki II carefully. It can make a contribution, especially concerning ethnic minorities. We have a strong German minority in an Italian province. We have Italians in Yugoslavia. Regarding what you said about the US Congress, it is true about us in Europe, too. Our people want a peace dividend, too. We must all work together to provide public opinion with greater education on the need for a strong defense in these uncertain times. We must all pull together to meet this problem. We in government have that responsibility. (S)

The President: We need to broaden the political component of NATO. We attach special importance -- as you do -- to the CSCE process in this period of change in Europe. We want to continue strengthening the process at the upcoming Bonn and Copenhagen conferences. We can agree in principle to a CSCE Summit this year, if the signing of a CFE agreement will be part of any such meeting. We think that's a good incentive to finish CFE. A summit should review substantive progress in each of the three CSCE baskets, including, we hope, a commitment to the principle of free elections. While this summit may acknowledge, in some way, the activities of the Two Plus Four, we do not want the CSCE Summit to be centered on Germany, or to be a meeting which tries to undermine Germany's full membership in NATO. (S)

I might say on Soviet relations, Kohl drove home that our arms control agreements with the Soviets are all important to the Chancellor. We are moving forward on the Malta agenda. The Baker meeting went well in Moscow. One thing we can do to help Gorbachev -- and help Europe and the Alliance -- is to continue working to support stable democratic change in Eastern Europe. Things are going well in Poland and Hungary, but both countries will face severe economic problems for a long time to come. Western help must be sustained and coordinated. President Havel's visit here left us encouraged about the prospects for success in Czechoslovakia. But there are major problems there, too, both economic and political. In Bulgaria and Romania -- and Yugoslavia, too -- the outlook is less clear. We need to ensure that Western aid is tied to genuine economic and political reform, including the holding of free and fair elections. So we are optimistic about changes in Eastern Europe, but we must stay together as Allies. And that's why I like an expanded role of NATO in this time of unpredictability. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: As far as chemical weapons are concerned, we haven't quite finished the work. But it remains an important goal. (S)

The President: We made good progress with the Soviets on chemical weapons. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Soviets agreed in Moscow on a joint statement that embraced the President's UNGA initiative, to reduce, on both sides, chemical weapons to a small residual amount. (S)

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Prime Minister Andreotti: In addition to the bilateral US-Soviet dimension, don't forget the Geneva negotiations. That's important, too, including verification. That will help us control Libya. We can finish this in a few months. (S)

The President: Rabta is now producing chemical weapons, Gadhafi having lied to his friends. We are absolutely sure of this. I'd like Jim Baker to talk with you about Rabta at lunch. I see your point, but we certainly want to safeguard against further nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: I agree we need to stop Libya. But we also want a comprehensive ban. One word on the Middle East: we in Europe have tried to convince the Palestinians to accept Israel's right to exist within secure borders, to respect 242 and 338, and to reject violence. In the PLO Council in Algiers 15 months ago, the PLO accepted these. And the US now has a dialogue with the PLO. Shamir tells me he doesn't trust Arafat. Europeans are convinced that by excluding formally the PLO from negotiations, we are working on sand. Therefore, I would like to stress that we now risk losing the PLO again to violence, to the possibility of negotiations with Israel as Arafat loses his authority over the PLO. Leaders of the more enlightened Arab states agree with this. We are well aware of Shamir's difficulties, but he cannot remain so inflexible. I must pursue a dialogue with the Palestinians. Concerning Soviet Jews, the Reagan Administration has helped the Soviet Jews to leave the USSR, mostly to come to Canada and the US. Now conditions should be created to persuade Jews to stay in the Soviet Union and help build that country, not least because Soviet Jews complicate the PLO's problems. (S)

The President: We agree Arafat made important changes. We have not ruled out Israel's talking to the PLO. It is up to Israel, and Shamir has set preconditions. We support the exodus of Soviet Jews. At same time, we have told Gorbachev that he should make changes to persuade Jews to stay. We now have a flap with Israel regarding settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. This is not a change in policy. (S)

Secretary Baker: The issue is not whether Israel talks to the PLO but, rather, whether we can get Israel to talk to the Palestinians. If we insist that Israel talk to the PLO, there will be no dialogue. So we are trying to get Israel to talk to Palestinians, without raising the symbolism of the PLO. The Egyptians have been helpful. If Israel can show the slightest flexibility, we may get talks started. (S)

Prime Minister Andreotti: If Israel insists that no PLO be involved, Shamir is only pretending a dialogue. Rabin agreed with me that only the PLO could stop the Intifada and that I would not talk to the PLO. Israel gives the appearance of

wanting dialogue but doesn't really want such talks, partly because of domestic politics. We must persuade the Israelis. If we do not, Islamic fundamentalists will gain strength as we saw in the Jordanian elections. Please, Mr. President, do your utmost to persuade Shamir. (S)

The President: We think it is important that Israel take that first step. We are close to that now. It has been extraordinarily difficult, but we will persevere, including with Israel. They have to keep up the dialogue. The more you speak out, the better it is for Americans to hear how our closest friends feel about this. The proof of the pudding will be if we can get these talks going. But the US cannot insist that Shamir negotiate with the PLO. It doesn't work that way. (S)

I would like Jim Baker to discuss Nicaragua at lunch. Thank you for your letter on Nicaragua. I appreciated your government's decision not to consider new assistance until after the election. Now that Mrs. Chamorro has won and there finally will be a democratic government, I hope your government will be able to help. I hope Italy will also join in calling on the Sandinistas to leave power peaceably, including handing over control of the Army and security services. Our appeal is please help now as Mrs. Chamorro tries to restructure her country. (S)

---End of Conversation---

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (5 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/90 - 4/11/90

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By CSA (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/26/2009	OA/ID Number:	91107-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(159)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/31/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMCON

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1965



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of
Mozambique (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
John Ordway, Director for Africa, NSC Staff
(notetaker)

President Chissano
Francisco Madeira, Presidential Advisor
(notetaker)

DATE, TIME March 13, 1990, 11:10 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: With your permission, I thought we could chat here for a few minutes. We have our top players who are interested in what our views are next door. First, however, I want to say how happy I am to see you here. (U)

President Chissano: I am very happy to have come. It was a very timely invitation. (U)

The President: Is there anything you want to raise here? I know our experts are waiting, but if there is anything you would like to discuss more privately, just go ahead. (U)

President Chissano: No. (U)

The President: I do want to talk about the negotiating process. And there is another thing, although I realize this is an internal affair. I know you are proud of what you have been doing with political reform, but I wanted to tell you that going toward a multiple party system would get a lot of support here in the U.S., and in other countries as well. (U)

[REDACTED] (b)(1)
These are the subjects I wanted to talk about here. (U)

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The President: That would be good. Speaking about that area, I am very encouraged about the two Yemens getting together. (C)

President Chissano: I would like to offer you this, Mr. President. [Hands over a copy of the draft constitution.] (C)

The President: It's brand new? January 1990. What support are you getting from the people? Good? (C)

President Chissano: Very good. And this invitation from you to visit Washington is also very good support. (U)

The President: Really? It's a good signal? (U)

President Chissano: If it is seen that you are supporting this, that is very important. (U)

The President: We want to say whatever is helpful. We have respect for what you are doing, and know it is difficult. You have regional problems, RENAMO, poverty. But I have the greatest respect for the direction in which you are moving. I hope this visit symbolized that. (C)

President Chissano: Your invitation came just when we were deciding to move to direct talks. (C)

The President: What do they want, RENAMO? (C)

President Chissano: We are trying to find out. They say they want talks without preconditions. We prepared some principles, but these were not preconditions. But we never did find out what they wanted, other than to move us out of power. (C)

Now they are saying, come, let us discuss. They want me to say that they are a political party. But to do that, we would have to change the constitution. We are prepared to do that, but they must participate in the discussion about the constitution, and argue their case. We have made changes in the constitution, but we have not yet decided on the party system. This must be discussed on its own. After discussion, we will include the result into the constitution. (C)

Whatever the conclusion on parties, we have seen to it that there will always be the possibility of independent candidates, even if we maintain for some time the one-party system. If there is consensus on a multi-party system, we have nothing against that. We have even put together three or four advantages of a multi-party system, and then what the specific problems are in Mozambique. More than 70 percent illiteracy. Many different ethnic groups, languages and religions. And, it's a question of

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tradition. There is no habit of this in Mozambique. FRELIMO has been the only political vehicle. We are the party, the army, the state, everything. Now, we have to put things in their appropriate places. But we have to prepared the people's minds for that. We have to understand how a multi-party system fits. If it doesn't fit now, then perhaps in five years. (C)

The President: The more you can demonstrate openness in your political system, the better it is. You need what works, though. (C)

President Chissano: For us it is an open question. We will produce an electoral law supposing that a multi-party system will be adopted. Another electoral law supposing that it is not adopted. Once we see the trend, we will bring them out. But we don't want to prejudge the results. If the people accept it because the President says so, it does not mean that they will adapt to it. (C)

[Provides copy of pamphlet by Oscar Monteiro on democracy, explaining that he found it to be very interesting.] (U)

Meeting adjourns to Cabinet Room. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1986

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Plenary Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
Melissa Wells, U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique
John M. Ordway, Director, African Affairs, NSC
Staff (notetaker)

President Joaquim Chissano
Pascoal Mocumbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jacinto Veloso, Minister of Cooperation
Abdul Osman, Minister of Finance
Francisco Madeira, Presidential Advisor
Florencio Infante, Presidential Advisor
Felisberto Lukanga, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Valeriano Ferrao, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME March 13, 1990, 11:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President: Let me give you an official welcome, Mr. President. We had a very pleasant talk in the Oval Office. Photographs were taken. Then, we talked about some subjects. We talked about north Africa, and our views on Libya. The President gave me a copy of the new constitution, and another article by a man whose opinion he values. We talked about his aspirations under the new constitution. We talked about our views on a multi-party system. He said this was an open issue. We talked about direct discussions with RENAMO -- we began this but didn't define any deals. (Ø)

I am really very pleased that you are here. We have great respect for your approach to your wonderful country. (U)

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The floor is yours. I guess I can thank you for bringing this weather from Mozambique. (U)

President Chissano: I have congratulated your protocol man on this. He said it was your responsibility. [Laughter] (U)

This invitation of yours was very timely. It came when we were taking very important decisions, which have to be supported by people like you and countries like yours. The main decision is how to bring an end to the war. We decided that now we should do everything to get seated with RENAMO directly and talk about peace. We had some difficulties in the past in getting them to accept principles. But the U.S. contribution was very important. When your seven points were presented, it said "U.S. Position." This led RENAMO to accept six of the seven points. Now, RENAMO is accepting part of that remaining point. I brought a letter they sent, and with your permission will read part. (Ø)

"We would like also to reaffirm that we are ready to enter into direct and meaningful negotiations for peace and national development for the people of Mozambique. It is for this reason that RENAMO is willing to negotiate directly with the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique. It is not our opinion to reject to negotiate for peace with the leaders of the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique." (Ø)

The President: Could you repeat that last portion, please? (U)

President Chissano: [re-reads last sentence of quotation] (U)

This is a new statement by RENAMO. It shows they are meeting part of point six. There is this, and the discussions going on about the revision of the constitution, together with discussion of what system to follow on the question of parties -- a one or a multiple-party system. This opens the way to go and sit down with RENAMO and talk. During the talks maybe we can get them to accept these principles they either don't understand or fear. We decided not to waste any more time, although we continue to insist that they address these principles, especially the peaceful and democratic process of change. We will not ask them to stop fighting before talks, but that will be an immediate aim. The talks will be about guarantees for their participation in political life. The form of that participation will be decided after the debate is over, and we will invite them to participate in that debate. We will be able to discuss how to end the war, how to achieve a ceasefire and how to guarantee it. (Ø)

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We don't want a temporary ceasefire, but the end of the war. We will discuss about their resettlement in society, and what guarantees there will be. They may require some other countries to guarantee this, but they don't need that. We have received thousands of them under the amnesty program, which was necessary to prepare the minds of our people for them. The workers are asking how can they accept and work with these killers? We have a lot of work to do. When the war is over, let us not have any rancor. (Ø)

There will be some things we can't discuss with them. One is changes in the constitution, which must be discussed by everybody, not just my group, or RENAMO's group. All should participate. (Ø)

Multiple parties or one party must be discussed by everybody. The electoral law can be discussed only on the basis of the constitution, and on the outcome of the discussions on the constitution. We may, however, discuss the electoral law with them when the time comes. Also, the qualifications to establish a political party. Algeria has done some things which could help avoid divisions, and overcome backwardness and tribal divisions, language and religious differences. This is the main problem. There are 20 parties in Algiers now. I don't know how many there might be in Mozambique. Mr. President, all freedoms have limits, or they can turn into anarchy. We have to look at what can be a party in Mozambique's situation. (Ø)

Then there are trade unions. We did not have them in the colonial days. Now we have them. The right of strike is in the draft constitution. There are now no laws to regulate strikes. (Ø)

Mr. President, all these questions are not just for discussion with RENAMO. There is the law on land tenure. These are laws which will have to take into account the constitution, which must first be adopted. (Ø)

I would ask you, Mr. President, to maintain your position, which has been very helpful. We don't ask you to support a party called FRELIMO, but what is valid for a truly democratic system. We want true democracy, where people participate in making decisions on their own governance, to use your word. (Ø)

We are moving ahead with dialogue, peace and constitutional changes for an improved, democratic life in our country. (Ø)

My second point is to thank you for the help we have been receiving, for the emergency aid we are receiving. We are getting \$65,000,000 from you this year for the population in

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need. You have also started giving a substantial amount for development. We regard this as a starting point, channeled to the private sector. We hope you will be more flexible in the future, since we need to rebuild the economy. You are providing good help for the private sector -- \$14,000,000. Combined with regional assistance, this is up to \$61,000,000. We thank you, and ask you to continue and to expand to new directions. (C)

For example, encourage the U.S. private sector to invest in Mozambique. To go from just aid to cooperation. We welcome cooperation in the economy, and want to see it in the cultural field also -- art, theatre, cinema and sports. We think this is very important. (C)

I should draw your attention to the fact that while we are moving toward peace, the problems in the first phase will be more complicated. The refugees will return. The RENAMO people will need jobs, land, clothing and food. Our emergency relief situation will be complicated in the first phase. We cannot avoid it, since we cannot continue the war. (C)

The President: The refugees are under RENAMO control, or outside the country, or both? (C)

President Chissano: Both. One million are in neighboring countries. They are not in RENAMO control. We are coordinating with the UN to feed and take care of them. In Mozambique, we have 1.6 million displaced persons, removed from their areas of origin. We also have some 3 million people who live in their places of origin, but are deprived of their belongings due to attacks or environmental problems. All of them are supported by external aid. A few are in pockets under the influence of RENAMO, which I don't think are the majority, but there are a good number of people in these areas. (C)

Due to the war, there has been lots of destruction. Schools, hospitals, bridges, factories, firms. All will need to be reconstructed. I joked with some representatives of some U.S. foundations in Maputo. I said you will help me, but I also said I would ask the President of the U.S. to draw up a Bush Plan. [laughter] Marshall is gone, so what we need now is a Bush Plan. (C)

Mr. President, I know the U.S. can't help us alone. We need to mobilize the world. The U.S. can help, but that is not enough. (C)

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Mr. President, I have some figure here which I would like to read to you. (U)

3,000 schools have been destroyed. (U)

900 health centers. (U)

36 boarding schools. (U)

44 farms and factories, including two big sugar factories, and ten tea factories. (U)

1000 shops. (Although they are "against communism," they have destroyed private property.) (Ø)

The President: All destroyed by war? (U)

President Chissano: The war consists of destruction. Bridges, power poles, power lines. We have power lines from Cabora Bassa in the central west to South Africa, and a line from South Africa to Maputo. These are two main targets. (Ø)

All this amounts to \$15 billion worth of losses. We are losing through the decline of exports and imports to South Africa, since the railroads are targets. Two railroads are paralyzed completely. (Ø)

My worry is that we will come to terms with RENAMO, but will they be able to stop the ravages? They have become accustomed to war and looting. We will have to continue to make efforts to defend the people, and use escort convoys for goods. You may want to think about this, and convince Congress to let you give us some help. (Ø)

The President: There are some legislative restrictions. These differences can be overcome if these negotiations happen. It is not a question of the Administration being less appreciative. We are. We have some Congressional problems. At some point, maybe we can make some progress. It will need progress on the negotiating front, though. (Ø)

President Chissano: We are trying to put the emphasis on civilian protection. For instance, the maize you are giving us won't get through without protection. (Ø)

The President: The problems you outline are tragic. I can understand (U)

President Chissano: If you allow me, perhaps I could make some specific requests. (Ø)

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We spoke about the democratic process. We have organized a discussion in our country, but it needs money. We would like to get some support to organize the discussion of the constitution, and to organize elections. To pay for the expenses of the electoral commission. (Ø)

Second, the process of peace, as we discuss with RENAMO, involved lots of travel, and a lot of expenses. If we finish quickly, it won't be too expensive. We asked Mugabe to fix a date for a meeting with RENAMO, after March 23 and Namibian independence. First, we want to try and talk in Malawi, privately and quietly. This is because the Kenyans have some very complicated behavior. We want to try some things of our own. We may involve them later. But we don't understand some of their behavior. The letter I read was kept from Mugabe for one month. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Who had it? (Ø)

President Chissano: President Moi. (Ø)

Ambassador Wells: The second letter? (Ø)

President Chissano: The first letter. It was handed to Mugabe, but later an official from Kenya promised to go to meet with Mugabe and with me. He still hasn't turned up. Then, they say that Mozambique is delaying the talks. (Ø)

We would also like to ask your help for construction of some housing for university students. This is important since we have to hand back to the church institutions which were taken unlawfully from them. They have to be returned, but we can't do it without creating new problems, since students are now occupying the former seminaries. In the countryside, teachers are occupying priests' residences. The church used to be responsible for education, and we needed someplace to house teachers when we took it over. But it was wrong to take them, and we want to correct this, but we have to build housing for the teachers. We need housing for our students. There is only one university in Mozambique, in Maputo. Students come from far away, sometimes thousands of kilometers, and they need places to live. (Ø)

We would also like training for our cadres in the U.S., particularly in health, agriculture and management. (Ø)

The President: Graduate students? (Ø)

President Chissano: Yes. Undergraduates, too. But I was talking about graduates and post-graduates. (Ø)

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The President: You said health, agriculture and management? (U)

President Chissano: These are main areas. Another area is military training. (Ø)

The President: Do our requirements prevent officer training? (Ø)

Ambassador Cohen: Yes, it is against the law. (Ø)

The President: It is very much in our interest to see that this is changed. We do find this military training program beneficial, and for you as well. The underpinning of the training would be military, of course. But your officers would get a taste of how our country works, a taste of democracy. (Ø)

Ambassador Cohen: This prohibition dates from the days when Mozambique was considered to be Marxist. (Ø)

President Chissano: Regional (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Excuse me. If I could just clarify exactly what you were asking for. You mentioned housing, technical training, military assistance, and there was one other thing. (Ø)

The President: Organizing elections and the costs of the constitution, and travel to discuss the peace process. To pay for experts. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: Are you interested in financial or technical help for the constitutional process? (Ø)

President Chissano: Financial. We have had some contacts in the U.S. already on the technical side. (Ø)

On regional issues, we appreciate U.S. help on Namibian independence, and the changes in South Africa. We hope this can be continued, since we are very interested in peace and democracy in South Africa. We have been trying to help all these processes. During the discussions with the Angolans and the Cubans, we tried to help.

I myself have been in touch with P.W. Botha, when he was President of South Africa, and with F. W. de Klerk. We are very interested. South Africa without apartheid will be very important for development in our region, although we will still have to reduce our dependence. We want interdependence, but South Africa will be important for development in the area. We will work for good neighborliness with South Africa, and maintain contact with de Klerk. I have sent Minister Veloso there, beginning at the time of the discussion of the Nkomati agreement.

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We have also tried to convince the South African military side. They have been most stubborn. Now, however, we see some movement. Military assistance to RENAMO is very decreased, and we have no proof that it is continuing. But there are forces inside South Africa -- maybe the White Wolves, forces who are against de Klerk -- that are trying to help RENAMO.

The President: This is a good point for a break. I think that chef will be very angry with us if we don't show up. You and I, Mr. President, can go back into the Oval Office to wash up, while the rest go along to the White House. I'd like to continue this discussion over lunch, and talk about Angola and South Africa.
(U)

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Nov Dec 1984-85
V.P. Speech Miami FC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memcon	Re: Luncheon Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (10 pp.)	3/12/90	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 2/22/90 - 4/11/90

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By CD (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/26/2009	OA/ID Number:	91107-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(161)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	8/31/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1987



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with President Joaquim Chissano
of Mozambique

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and
Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Robson, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
Melissa Wells, U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique
John M. Ordway, Director, African Affairs, NSC
Staff (notetaker)

President Joaquim Chissano
Pascoal Mocumbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jacinto Veloso, Minister of Cooperation
Adbul Osman, Minister of Finance
Francisco Madeira, Presidential Advisor
Florencio Infante, Presidential Advisor
Felisberto Lukanga, Assistant Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Valeriano Ferrao, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME March 13, 1990, 12:30 p.m. - 1:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Old Family Dining Room

The President: Tell me about de Klerk. I know you have met him. Our impression is that he is very different. I have invited him here, and Mr. Mandela as well. I would be interested in your view. (C)

President Chissano: I met him even before he became State President, as leader of the National Party. I reported on my meeting to my colleagues in the Front Line States. I said he was a man who knows how to listen, and with whom we can discuss. (C)

The President: When was that? (C)

President Chissano: Before he became President. It was September 1989. [COMMENT: Chissano's first meeting with de Klerk, before his election, was in July 1989. He had a second

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meeting in Maputo with the new State President, in December 1989. END COMMENT] De Klerk told me about his program. I said I trusted him. He was so frank and open. He listened to my suggestions. And on his second visit, we had a very private lunch, just myself and two others. We spoke freely. He told me he would release Nelson Mandela, and end the State of Emergency. He hinted he would unban the parties that had been banned. And he did it. (C)

As Nelson Mandela said in Lusaka, he has the same views. They trust him. But he has to move. (C)

The President: Can he deliver? There are problems on the political right in South Africa. Is he strong enough to do the things necessary to end apartheid? (C)

President Chissano: I think so. There is a lot of fear among the whites, especially the Afrikaners. There is a fear of being the minority. But I think they can come to a solution. I recently read a book by South African whites, linked to the Government, who say guarantees, freedoms and rights should be extended to all, not just a group. They should not apply just exclusively to a minority. (C)

Secretary Baker: When do you think negotiations, beyond talks about talks, between the black majority and the government might start? (C)

President Chissano: The ANC needs some time, not long, to organize themselves. Their leaders have just been released from jail. Mandela was a member of the National Executive Committee, without a title, when he was arrested. (C)

The President: So long ago. (U)

President Chissano: Now, he has been elected Vice President [COMMENT: Deputy President], and can act with some power. He had not even met with the ANC President, only now in Sweden. (C)

Secretary Baker: Is his health -- Tambo's -- such that he will not come back? (C)

President Chissano: Not soon. (C)

The President: Before Mandela went into prison, was Tambo a leader over Mandela? (C)

President Chissano: Yes. (C)

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The President: Mandela, as a result of his many years in prison, has a standing in the outside world that Tambo does not have. (C)

President Chissano: They were friends, two lawyers who opened up the same office. They were very close friends. Tambo built up Mandela after he went into prison. He would have proposed Mandela as president, but Mandela would not have accepted. (C)

The President: I am very hopeful both will come. We don't have a date for Mandela. But I believe that de Klerk has accepted? (C)

Ambassador Cohen: We don't have a date for him yet. (C)

The President: I hope we can help. We don't have a colonial background, so perhaps we could help where others couldn't. (C)

We are operating under sanctions. I'd like to ask your opinion, although maybe we will disagree, here. I have never been very impressed with sanctions, although we do enforce them. What is your impression? Should we keep them on? (C)

President Chissano: Now, sanctions may be playing a positive role supporting de Klerk. He can say to his right wing, we have to change. If we don't change, sanctions will prevail. We will have to keep sanctions for some time. (C)

After talks with him, you could move to relieve some sanctions, but coordinate this with the anti-apartheid forces. In terms of the UN, I would wait until July, when the Secretary-General will give his report on the implementation of the resolution on South Africa. We in Mozambique will have to be in touch with de Klerk to see what we can do. We don't apply sanctions. We can't. (C)

We and Angola are talking to them to prepare for the future. We are trying to bring in our other colleagues in the region, but it is difficult. We, South Africa and Angola will start talks in Cape Verde. But we won't do anything spectacular that would harm the process. (C)

The President: There's a delicate balance. (C)

President Chissano: A question of timing. Also, the pressure is not against de Klerk and Pik Botha. The pressure is against other forces. (C)

The President: This is what worries me. De Klerk is different. And if he is freeing Nelson Mandela and taking other steps which show he is doing different things, how do we give him help with his right wing, so he can show progress? How to combine this

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with keeping up the pressure. We want to give something that can help. (C)

President Chissano: I am not sure that things will work that way. We may get the reverse. They may say, the U.S. is satisfied, we don't have to do any more. I was to visit South Africa, but I am now taking my time. I talked to the anti-apartheid movement, and to the FLS, about my invitation to visit South Africa. I found out this would not be welcomed. And when it comes to a visit, they say no, it will relax pressure. Wait until July. It is possible that something could happen in the meantime but otherwise we will wait until July. (C)

The President: Jim, do you or Hank want to comment? (C)

Secretary Baker: For us, sanctions is a legal issue. There are certain conditions written into the law that have to be satisfied first. (C)

If I could get back to the peace process. Did you say that talks will start in Malawi shortly after Namibian independence? (C)

President Chissano: Any time after that. It will depend on RENAMO. (C)

Ambassador Cohen: Are there any preconditions? (C)

President Chissano: They didn't spell any out, but up to now they have asked that we recognize them as a party. We could not start by accepting them as a party. (C)

Secretary Baker: Regarding investment, there should be great potential for investment in Mozambique, once people know the war is ended. We will have to have that also before we can get Congressional action on military assistance. It would not carry the day unless discussions were going on with some prospect of success. (C)

I know Hank Cohen will meet with you later today, and he will discuss the specifics of what you asked for in the Cabinet Room. Incidentally, I wanted you to know that the \$100 million in assistance we are providing this year is the largest assistance budget in sub-Saharan Africa. (C)

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Ambassador Cohen: May I raise a new issue? (C)

The President: Please, go right ahead. (C)

Ambassador Cohen: We have just learned this morning that South Africa will sign the NPT. And, they want you to sign, also. (C)

President Chissano: I know. They want to condition their signature. You know, the decision to adhere was taken three years ago, when I was foreign minister. But then there were procedural problems, and it got all stuck up. But it will be ratified by the government, even before we go back. I have

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instructed the permanent commission to adopt it. Yesterday, the Council of Ministers was supposed to act, but their agenda was too full to do so. (C)

Ambassador Cohen: South Africa will be the first nuclear capable country to sign. (C)

The President: Why is that so important? (C)

Ambassador Cohen: Because they accept safeguards. It's like Pakistan and Israel. (C)

The President: I had an interesting discussion in the Oval Office with the President on multiple parties, on how the constitution was being drawn up, figuring out the best way to proceed. I was wondering how you plan to proceed. (C)

President Chissano: We are putting this in a separate track. This is being discussed as a special point. We see some advantages to a multi-party system. But also some inconveniences related to the specific situation of Mozambique. So we are taking into consideration both. We want the people to understand and accept and work within it. There are some dangers: many different languages and ethnic groups, poverty. (C)

You in America can talk about democracy and rights. The Brazilian Ambassador in Maputo was astonished after visiting Zambezi Province recently. He said that in Brazil, the people say "we want rights." But you, as President of Mozambique, have to tell people in the village, that they have rights. (C)

We have to educate our people on democratic rights. I am afraid that some may abuse this opening against the interests of the people themselves. And the people might not participate if they don't understand it. Today they are accustomed to obeying the traditional chief. They are used to saying, FRELIMO must decide. These are some considerations we have to take into account. (C)

Secretary Baker: The U.S. has a multi-party democracy. But we have only two parties. Some say that is our strength, since there can be no coalitions. In Romania, where I was recently, they are encouraging multiple parties to the point that three people and a mimeograph machine results in a new party. They have 40 parties. They will coalesce, and the number will be reduced. (C)

Maybe I shouldn't ask, and you don't have to answer, but if you were negotiating with RENAMO, and they said they were prepared to have a ceasefire, but wanted to organize as a party and compete, what would you say? (C)

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President Chissano: We will accept it if the national consultation accepts that the country is ready for a multi-party system. (C)

Secretary Baker: Consultation? (C)

The President: He explained that the decision can't be taken just by FRELIMO. It must be the people. (C)

President Chissano: Everybody is expressing themselves in favor or against this. The process will end up in the National Assembly, and the decision taken. Then, the prerequisites for a group to claim to be a party will be established in law. Only then can we say that RENAMO is a party. (C)

Secretary Baker: Maybe it will be like here, where anybody can form a party, but to get on the ballot you need evidence of support. Will FRELIMO take the position that you want a multi-party system? (C)

President Chissano: We may not have support for this in FRELIMO. So we won't have party discipline on this issue. Members must take individual positions. For example, a group of lawyers will meet soon, with foreign visitors present, to discuss freely their position. We don't want to influence their views, since we did this in the past and it was wrong. (C)

Ambassador Cohen: The Nigerians have done some useful work here. For example, they require that a party have a minimum level of support in each district. (C)

President Chissano: In the constitution, it will have to say that each candidate will have to have 200 signatures in each province, and 5,000 total. (C)

The President: That is most understandable. But you still don't have what is required for a party. (C)

President Chissano: It depends on what the people want. Even if we don't adopt a multi-party system now, it could happen within five years. (This is because the constitution cannot be changed for at least five years.) The discussion will continue, and a decision can be taken when the people are ready. (C)

The President: Faster is better in terms of the way the people of the world look on it. The trend is that way in the Soviet Union, in Central America. The trend is toward participation, multi-party structures, and the more you can do, the better. (C)

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President Chissano: There are those in our leadership who can argue that very well. (C)

The President: Who is the head of RENAMO, and does he have power, or is it diffused? (C)

President Chissano: Dhlakama (C)

The President: Does he impose himself? (C)

President Chissano: Many are participating out of fear. I had information that some of them wanted to quit, thought that our principles were sound, and were tired of war. But they did not dare tell him that, since he can kill them. (C)

The President: Who is perfect among us. Take Nicaragua. If you had said two months ago, George, Nicaragua will have an election, and Ortega will lose and accept defeat gracefully and turn over power to the opposition. If you had said that two months ago Jim, I would have said you needed psychiatric help. (C)

The jury is still out, but he's behaving extraordinarily well. He went over the night of the election and, in the democratic tradition, congratulated the winner. There have been some flurries, but for the most part, including his conversation with the Vice President yesterday, he has done the right thing. This is a good lesson. Maybe the parallel in Mozambique is that it is not just the extreme in control, and the spirit of democracy can prevail. (C)

Nicaragua is very interesting to us. It looks like he will participate in the minority, respecting the people's right to change. It has been a good lesson for me, sitting up here to the north. (C)

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The President: That is very interesting about South Africa. We know you stuck your neck out, when you reached your agreement with South Africa. We know you found violations of the deal. But I am glad you are now encouraged by developments in South Africa. (C)

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President Chissano: In Nicaragua, Ortega and the Sandanistas had some power -- at least 41 percent. They could retain 41 percent. This might happen with FRELIMO. Other people could say, "we will give you food" and get elected. People are hungry and struggling. (C)

The President: I would not worry about going head to head with RENAMO. You have a record, you have improved the situation, the reputation and standing of the country. If someone says you screwed up, you can stand on your record. (C)

President Chissano: The problem with FRELIMO is that we did not fight for power, and don't fight for power. If I want to replace someone, they say, "let's negotiate." We all want to retire [indicating some of his colleagues.] (C)

The President: I was very glad you came the 19-1/2 hours to get here. The press is waiting downstairs for us to make our statements. But I want to let you know how much I appreciate your coming here, and to let you know that there are channels to communicate, if you have to. (C)

President Chissano: You have a trusted man in Maputo. (U)
[laughter]

The President: One of our best men. [laughter, as Ambassador Wells waves her hand.] (U)

We want to keep good, two-way lines of communication. We have great respect for you. When I heard your story about the destruction of schools and infrastructure I hope we can respond. (C)

I always feel funny telling others that we have problems. But we do. I don't ask for anything but understanding that what we want to do is circumscribed by our enormous deficit, and Congressional restraints. But sometimes we need positive results to get Congress to change. I am sorry to say that, but we want to support what you are doing. Stay in touch with the Ambassador, who reports to the Secretary. We want to stay in touch, especially given the situation in South Africa. (C)

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The President: I don't know him, don't recognize the name. I know many businessmen, who were involved in going into China while I was there, when things were just starting up. But he is

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10

not a personal friend. If he represented himself as a close personal friend, he's not. But I will check it out. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**MEMCON**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President-elect Rafael Angel Calderon of Costa Rica (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
David C. Mulford, Under Secretary of Treasury
William T. Pryce, NSC Senior Director for Latin America
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter
Rafael Angel Calderon, President-Elect

DATE, TIME March 20, 1990, 2:00 - 2:25 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: It's a pleasure to see you here in the White House. I'm proud to congratulate you on your election. We want to work with you and with some of your neighbors to bring peace, democracy, and development to the region. Violeta was here a while ago. Her economy is a real basket case. I wonder what your opinion of her situation is. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Her election was a real surprise. Your son Jeb and I were together that evening and we were...[The President interjected] (Ø)

The President: Jeb did pick the winner in talking to his father. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: It was a great surprise especially that the Sandinistas accepted the victory. We need to coordinate our actions so that we can help Violeta and Endara. You can count on me to cooperate in a coordinating effort. The same goes for President Callejas (President of Honduras). We are close friends. I sponsored him for membership into the International Democratic Union in 1987. (Ø)

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The President: I was unaware of the linkage. (U)

President-elect Calderon: I was in Dallas in '84 and in New Orleans in '88. (U)

The President: What are Callejas's main problems. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Economic, the same as our own. (Ø)

The President: I want to hear about your problems. The Vice President has told me of your talk this morning. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: After a period of economic statism and state ownership in the '70s and in the '80s, the country had to make a great effort to reduce the size of state ownership and the size of government. We needed a lot of help in this. The Social Democrats were doing it only out of necessity. The U.S. played a big role. You gave enormous help. But it is all on the verge of collapse because we now have a deficit of 6% of GDP. All of the indicators led everyone to believe that the deficit would be only 1%. But the drop in coffee prices caused a deficit of 1%. The Government's refusal to raise tariffs and taxes for water, electricity etc. caused another 2% deficit. And then the Government's excessive fiscal expenditures caused another 3% deficit. So we are at critical juncture. We are prepared to take the very stringent measures necessary. I will ask the people to make sacrifices. I will raise taxes and reduce expenditures. But this whole series of measures will not be enough if we don't get some help from outside. Curiously, this is when assistance is needed most. During Monge's years, the U.S. gave an average of \$200 million a year. During Arias's time it averaged \$130 million. I will start with only \$60 million. This is a problem. I want to do things right, and we want to reach agreement with the IMF. We need two years of special help. We need \$90 million extra in '90 and '91. After two years we will be on our own. (Ø)

The President: Will you be able to privatize? (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: We have already done so to a large degree. There are four or five more industries. We want to apply the principal to internal debt. We think that if we could get assistance from the U.S., if the U.S. could provide private investment, this would be very helpful. And if you could talk to the Minister of Economy of Japan. They have so much money that they don't know what to do with it. (Ø)

The President: Interestingly enough, I recently brought up the need to do more in Latin America in my talks with the Japanese. (Ø)

Who can address this problem? We want to help, but we have big problems. I hate to plead poor-boy in front of friends. Let us

talk about this. I hadn't realized that the problem was quite as serious. (Ø)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: One thing which will help somewhat will be our refugee program. This will put some money into the country indirectly.

Deputy Secretary Eagleburger: Zeder [Chairman of OPIC] should be able to do something on the private side. Zeder is a miracle worker. Why don't I talk to him. (Ø)

Under Secretary Mulford: One thing we can do. The banks which produced the largest debt reduction of the Brady plan, 60%, are important. The deal is not closed. There is a danger that the fruits will not be brought to ground if you don't complete the deal with the IMF. That deal is at risk. We can: 1) work with fund on behalf of Costa Rica, and 2) stay in touch with the Banks which may be wavering. If there is a new IMF deal we could provide a short term bridge loan which could save the benefit of the deal. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: I would be prepared to talk to the banks. Things are moving so fast. They are seeing the forthcoming attitude we are taking. I think that we can keep the banks together which would represent a resource flow. But to get agreement with the Fund we must make a difficult 4% adjustment. We can do something on our own, but economic assistance is necessary because we need to reduce 4% in a year, but we only come into office in May, thus the administrative measures will only be in effect for seven months. And legislative efforts will take even longer. The whole effort the U.S. has made to support democracy in Costa Rica could be lost if we don't get the additional assistance we need. (Ø)

The President: We'll certainly talk about it here. You make a very good case. (U)

Assistant Secretary Aronson: We can see what can be done about cash flows. (Ø)

Mr. Pryce: We asked the Congress for \$90 million for Costa Rica this year and got cut to \$57 million. (Ø)

The President: We are hurt by earmarking. We will try to do what we can. (U)

President-elect Calderon: Arias said that inflation is only 10% but this was artificial. He is not willing to take any drastic measures. It doesn't bother me to take tough measures. They want me to come to you for technical assistance to see how you get an 80% approval rating. (Ø)

The President: I don't believe in those polls. Ortega did, but probably doesn't now. Arias said that you won well. What was your percentage? (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Fifty two -- and we won in all states. Now we must show the world that the country which has 100 years of democracy can succeed. Now that the military budget in the U.S. will be cut, this is the time perhaps to use the proceeds. (Ø)

The President: It will be cut, but we need to be careful. I had a discussion with the Leadership on this subject yesterday. We need to be sure that we don't cut muscle. Let us discuss this among our top people to see what we can do to help. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Our people will make great sacrifices. (Ø)

The President: What would you do with the money? (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Deficit reduction. (U)

Under Secretary Mulford: One source of money -- we used part of -- in the package of \$40 million. Perhaps they (the Banks?) can do more. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: If you ask. (U)

Under Secretary Mulford: We can try. They are not very malleable. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: I will go to Japan this year. (U)

The President: Perhaps they can help. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: At the end of one of your phone calls when you have finished discussing matters of great importance, you could mention us. (Ø)

The President: In my recent meeting with the Japanese I did mention aid to Latin American countries, but I was not country specific. I see no reason why we could not be country specific. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: With you as President we hope for great things. The funny thing is that Arias got three times what I get. (Ø)

The President: We will work on it. (U)

President-elect Calderon: People in Costa Rica love the United States. As I told you in the Breakfast for Chamorro (in Costa Rica in October of '89). The Bush/Quayle ticket is even more

popular in Costa Rica then in the U.S. When you went to the inauguration you got a bigger ovation than President Arias. (Ø)

The President: I was surprised at the reception. I was so proud at the manifestation of support for the United States. Let us see what we can do. (Ø)

Barbara was pleased that you whispered to Jeb that you would be pleased if she went to your inauguration. (Ø)

Sending Jebbie isn't because he needs to look after his mother to be sure she doesn't get into trouble. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Your reception in Costa Rica was wonderful, but wait until you see the reception Barbara gets!

One thing more: fishing. (U)

The President: Now you're talking! (U)

President-elect Calderon: We have the best fishing in the world. We really want you to come. You will be President for six years and I will be for four. We don't need to set a date. (U)

The President: I have a fishing partner in Florida, George H. who has been fishing in Costa Rica and who has told me how good it is. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Please come any time you can -- I hope in the next four years -- so I can welcome you as President. (U)

The President: I would like to do that, do you know Armando Cardenas, a Cuban who is a partner of Jeb's? (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: I know John S. My wife, Gloria, was born in Mexico. Jeb wants to be Guanajuato when he has his 40th. (Ø)

The President: This has been a very useful visit. We will certainly see what we can do to help. I look forward to maintaining a close relationship with you. I wish you all the best. (Ø)

President-elect Calderon: Thank you very much. I am sorry that you can not come to my inauguration, but very pleased that Barbara and Jeb will be there. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime
Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 21, 1990, 10:30 - 11:20 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Following the arrival ceremony, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki began their one-on-one meeting at 10:30 a.m. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: There is one problem I have not been able to clear up. (U)

The President: What? (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Smoking. (U)

The President: (Describes Mrs. Bush.) First, let me welcome you. After our meeting and the expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room, I will be introducing you to the U.S. members of the Polish-American Enterprise Board and then we will sign the U.S.-Polish Business and Economic Agreement. If you have any private subject, this is a good time to discuss it. Then we can join our colleagues. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I want to thank you for an open, warm, friendly welcome. I value it. I believe there has been an enormous acceleration of history in Europe. Its speed is surprising us all. (U)

The President: Absolutely. No one here has predicted the pace. We thought Poland would be first, but no one predicted the pace of change. (U)

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Prime Minister Mazowiecki: My first topic is German unification. Reconciliation with Germany is an historic task for us. We must take it on because soon we will be neighbors of such a Germany. We must be forward-looking, not concentrate on our traumas. We also must reconcile with the Russians. I must convince them that a non-Communist government could still be a friendly government with normal relations. So we have two reconciliations. (Ø)

But concerning the border: thank you for your statement with Kohl and for including us in the Two Plus Four talks. The Polish people are paranoid about agreements being made over their heads. (Ø)

The President: There is similar thinking in this country on Yalta. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: It is crucial to us to insure that our western territories are not just a gift from Stalin -- that they are guaranteed by all the powers, not just in a unilateral act by one. That is why we want to be in the meeting and want a recognition of that border by treaty. We welcome progress in that direction, but declarations are just declarations, and we need a treaty. We need a treaty worked out prior to unification and signed afterwards. Why before? Because after, we fear a sense of strength of a new Germany. I believe Kohl sincerely, but I worry about subsequent statements. (Ø)

The President: We may have a slight difference -- not on substance, but about Kohl. I am convinced he is not stalling because he thinks a unified Germany would be less willing to cooperate. He is not trying to find a way out of adequate guarantees. He has big political problems, though less severe after the GDR elections. That is why he is dragging his feet. He has taken steps: the Bundestag resolution renouncing territorial claims "now and in the future" and calling for a treaty. (Ø)

I see your concerns. Confidentially, what if I could get Kohl to agree with you on a text of a treaty now? Don't answer now, and please keep it confidential. If that would help move the process, I would try it. I don't think I am naive about Kohl. I am convinced he has no secret agenda. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Basically, I am convinced it is not a game, but I worry about excessive references to his right wing. I, too, have a right wing. I cannot accept all his arguments about not doing what is necessary. (Ø)

The President: But he has moved. (Ø)

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Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yes. (U)

The President: Do the GDR elections make Kohl's problem easier or harder? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: They should make it easier. It was a big victory, but I would fear that a big victory would make unification by Article 23 more likely. We all should insure that a unified Germany should not have that in its Constitution. (Ø)

The President: Doesn't that have to come from a unified Germany? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yes. Going back to your words, my first reaction is positive, but I must study the idea. But I think a treaty should be initialed before unification. Why not? (Ø)

The President: Because neither is a legal entity. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: But they could initial it. (Ø)

The President: Kohl has proposed that the two German parliaments pass common resolutions and that an all-German Government conclude a treaty with Poland. Your idea is to write and initial the treaty before unification and sign afterwards. But think about my proposal. Be assured we are playing no games. We are solid on things. You know of our good relations with Germany and Kohl. We trust Kohl, but I realize you can't make policy on individuals. But we have no reason to be suspicious. Kohl is sensitive about having to do continued penance for Nazi sins. But I also recognize Polish concerns about the past and sympathize with their emotions. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Regarding unification itself, we do not share the view that Germany should be neutral. We believe Germany should be incorporated into a European framework. (Ø)

The President: We think Germany should stay in NATO. I have a selling job with Gorbachev -- I like him -- to convince him to have Germany in an expanded role for NATO. We don't want to withdraw from Europe and come home. We see the U.S. playing a positive role. We see the U.S. as a stabilizer. If we aren't wanted in Europe, I will have our troops out the next day. But I think that is not the wise way to proceed. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We don't believe in a neutral Germany. But we have to do something in a way that Gorbachev can survive. I feel a NATO solution is not acceptable to Gorbachev.

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I may be wrong. Maybe forces of both could remain in Germany.
(Ø)

The President: You may be right about that. I can't see with great clarity future events in the Soviet Union. We see irreversibility in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but not in the Soviet Union. While there is a mood for pulling back, we should take advantage of it. It might not always be so. I want him to accept the idea there need not be a parity of forces. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: 195,000? (Ø)

The President: For now, but I don't think we should reduce equally, because we think we are a stabilizing force. But if Europeans don't think so, we will be out of there. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I understand. (U)

The President: We mustn't impose on our colleagues in the other room. We can talk again this evening briefly, and perhaps we could have another private meeting tomorrow. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I would like to continue. We have much to discuss. (Gives plaque to the President.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
John R. Davis, Jr., Ambassador to Poland
Victor Litwinski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Marek Dabrowski, Secretary of State
Jan Majewski, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dariusz Ledworowski, Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
Margorzata Niezabitowska, Under Secretary of State and Government Press Spokeswoman
Waldemar Kuczynski, Under Secretary of State, Cabinet Office
Jan Kinast, Ambassador to the U.S.
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 21, 1990, 11:22 - 11:35 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room

Following their Oval Office meeting, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki began their expanded meeting at 11:22 a.m.
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The President: May I say an official welcome. We have had a long, good discussion, including on the border. We will continue tomorrow. Here, I would like to ask the Prime Minister if there is anything he particularly wishes to say before we move on. Welcome to Washington. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you for the invitation, which is of great importance to us. I am happy we can continue our conversation tomorrow. (U)

The President: We could discuss economic issues if you wish. We have Secretary Brady and Larry Eagleburger here. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Concerning the economy, you know how hard a program we have taken. It is linked to our political reform. There is a junction between democracy and a free market economy. These must be taken together. Thank you for all you and your Congress have done to help us. We are not requesting more. We hope what has so far been arranged could be quickly implemented. We hope the Polish-U.S. Enterprise Fund can be quickly implemented and then spread efficiently over the years. (Ø)

The second question is difficult, but we must raise it. We need help on our indebtedness, which is a noose around our economic neck. We need to find a way out. We hope we can get reduced interest rates on our debts, as well as some degree of forgiveness. In the 1950s, this was done for Germany as part of the London Treaty. We know that this can't be fixed during this visit. But we want to begin the intellectual process today to relieve this debt in the Paris Club. (Ø)

The President: Secretary Brady and I have discussed how we can help reduce commercial bank debt. We believe the Brady Plan is applicable to Poland because of the steps you have taken, including a solid IMF program. We are prepared to approach others to pursue the application of the Brady Plan for Poland. We now have good common ground to work together on your debt. We hope you can discuss this later with Secretary Brady. Larry Eagleburger can discuss export controls with you. We are working with our COCOM partners to reduce controls and be more flexible vis-a-vis Poland. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I also touched on the question of the Enterprise Fund. It is important for us if it could be spread over time, with front-loading in the early years. That would give a big boost to the private sector in Poland. (Ø)

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Secretary Brady: There will be \$60 million in 1990, which is how Congress appropriated it. If the \$60 million in 1990 is used up, we could go back to Congress for more. But there are only seven months left in 1990. (Ø)

The President: We are running out of time, but I wanted to tell you we are delighted to accept this request for a Polish consulate on the West Coast. On diplomatic travel restrictions, we will lift those; that matter is also totally resolved. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We are delighted. We will lift restrictions on our end. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Follow-up Meeting with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Christopher Perzanowski, Interpreter

Poland
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister
Ryszard Wojtkowski, Director of the Prime
Minister's Office
Krzysztof Litwinski, Interpreter

DATE, TIME March 22, 1990, 10:00 - 10:30 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

As agreed in their March 21 Oval Office meeting, the President and Prime Minister Mazowiecki held a follow-up meeting, which began at 10:00 a.m. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you for a magnificent evening.
(U)

The President: I worried that it was late for you. But I liked the spirit of the dinner. It was palpable. You stayed awake during the piano recital. That was heroic. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I love Gershwin and Chopin. I thought during the recital that we politicians do many things, but Chopin goes on. (U)

The President: What would you like to finish up on -- overall security arrangements, the border? How do you see longer term security arrangements, following a settlement [of the issue of German unification]. (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Yesterday we discussed a Council for European Cooperation -- an expanded CSCE. History moves so fast that some institution like this is needed. We should not leave Helsinki II without something like this, providing collective

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security in Europe for the longer term. To us an essential point is as follows: we are between a unifying Germany and a Soviet Union having a variety of unpredictable processes. I want to ensure that U.S. policy envisages a strong Poland -- not on a German or a Soviet scale, but as a big, stable factor between Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland could serve as a basic factor for a new democratic order in Europe. With American support, this role could grow. (C)

The President: I could say something to the press about this, I would be delighted to say Poland has this useful and unique role. (C)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I would really appreciate that. (C)

The President: I want to assure you that I will handle the Soviets in a way which doesn't complicate life for Poland. I want to reduce tensions and solve problems with the Soviet Union, not create problems which would add to German tensions and thus affect Poland. I think Gorbachev realizes this as well. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: Thank you. We want to get both those relationships free of associations with the past. I want to get Soviet forces out of Poland. With a reduction to 195,000, I would hope to have them out. (S)

The President: We aren't saying everyone must leave now. I just want to delink after the 195. We are there to stabilize. But I can't go out and say we think Soviet troops should stay. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: No, of course not. (U)

The President: U.S. forces wouldn't remain to threaten anyone. (C)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: We have made clear that we plan to talk about it with Gorbachev. We just don't want to be ostentatious about it. (S)

The President: (Side conversation about broccoli.) (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: The press tries to get differences between us on the German issue. I told them the differences were minimal. We will continue to press for a treaty before unification, because we fear afterwards it would slow down. We would like your support with Kohl. I think his worries are excessive. (C)

The President: If he would agree, that would be final. But I am not sure we are in total agreement. If there is content to a

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treaty, isn't that better than two treaties by states which won't exist? You have pulled Kohl a long way. I just can't go out and put public pressure on him. I trust Kohl. A contented unified Germany -- frankly, under Kohl -- is easier to deal with on a number of issues. I will tell Kohl your position. I am just not as concerned on this point as you. I think resolutions followed by an early treaty -- which we would press for -- would be okay. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I understand. But this concern is across Europe, not just with us. (S)

The President: Yes, I know -- especially in France, though Mitterrand is very close to Kohl. I know your concerns are broadly shared. A philosophical question: how long does Germany have to do penance? (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: It is not a question of penance. It is a credibility that Germany has changed. I told Kohl: don't let yourself be overtaken by the SPD. It sounds different to Poles when you say, "I can speak for the FRG and will support that in a unified Germany" than if he says "I speak for the FRG and what comes after has to be decided then." (S)

The President: But you got him off that. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: But it came hard. (S)

The President: I think Kohl is for real. (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: West Germany has undergone a deep democratization process. East Germany has not. It moved from one totalitarian system directly to another. What kind of influence will they exert? (S)

The President: Do you worry more about East Germany or the Republikaner? (S)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I don't think there is a current threat. It is leaving something that in the future could be returned to -- that is our fear. (S)

The President: One short point: on Two Plus Four, we have a narrow view of it as dealing with Four Power legal and other responsibilities, not with Europe as a whole. We don't see it as an exclusionary body with a broad mandate. The Soviets were anxious to get it going, but Britain and France like it also. (S)

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What is the rest of your schedule? (Discussion of remainder of visit.) (U)

Prime Minister Mazowiecki: I thank you for a very warm and magnificent reception. (U)

The President: We have only respect and friendship for you and your people. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

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PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
Harry Obst, Interpreter

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Dieter Kastrup, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Frank Elbe, Chief of the Foreign Minister's Staff
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Perry Notbohm, Interpreter

DATE, TIME April 4, 1990, 10:10 - 10:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Cabinet Room

Following a photo opportunity in the Oval Office, the President and Foreign Minister Genscher began their meeting in the Cabinet Room at 10:10. (U)

The President: Welcome. I want to congratulate you on how Germany has handled its end of things. (U)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Thank you for receiving me at this crucial time. Greetings from the Chancellor. And thank you for your help in solving the problems with German unification. (U)

In the DDR, the election produced a majority for those supporting unification and a market economy, like ourselves. There are still great complications: the creation of an economic, monetary

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and social union, where we will have to overcome decades of mistakes by the DDR Communists. The new Government there is very weak. The Federal Government is preparing a draft treaty to present to the DDR Government on steps toward legal unification. Then there will be political discussions. We have made a mistake on our side concerning the rate of D-Mark exchange. But we are on the right track. But this is all part of the internal aspects of unification. (Z)

In addition, there are the external aspects. The next Two Plus Four official level talks will be after the formation of a DDR Government. Then at the end of April there will be the first Two Plus Four Ministerial. We want to reach agreement with the Four Powers before a CSCE Summit in November. We want to present to the 35 the results of the Two Plus Four talks. This CSCE Summit was proposed by the Soviets before German unification became urgent. If we cannot reach a Two Plus Four agreement, we would have to wait for the next CSCE Summit in 1992. This would produce great instability in the DDR, whose citizens would panic. We don't want a special CSCE Summit in 1991 which would have the character of a German peace conference. When I met Shevardnadze in Windhoek, he raised the idea of a Peace Treaty. I asked if he wanted Sam Nujoma to attend such a peace conference. This cannot happen. (Z)

The membership of a united Germany in NATO is an essential of the Western position. I think the Russians are more and more accepting this. But how will they react to our position? What if they say, yes, but....? Soviet soldiers on the territory of the DDR: we can accept that, but not linked to U.S. troops in the FRG. Second, what will be the size of the Bundeswehr and Allied stationed troops? We cannot accept that this will be discussed in Two Plus Four. This would put Germany in a special, isolated position. But when the Russians raise this, we think the West should answer that this will be discussed in CFE. This emphasis on a CFE II won't meet all Soviet concerns. Third, therefore, the CSCE Summit is of great importance to the Soviets, which will give impulse to changes in Europe. They want a substitute for an eroding Warsaw Pact. They need an institutional framework for change, and maybe we do, too. This could mean, first, regular foreign ministers' meetings; second, a CSCE crisis center; third, an environmental protection agency; fourth, institutions to protect human rights, like the Council of Europe's Court of Human Rights; fifth, mechanisms to secure the rights of minorities; and sixth, adding the right of free elections to the Final Act principles and a monitoring body. (Z)

Finally, the EC is on the way to political union. We are improving the institutions of the European Community. This will give the EC a new identity. This is the right time to give the relationship between the EC and the U.S. a push. We need a U.S.-EC declaration which would express our common goals, convictions, and responsibilities. I discussed this with the EC foreign

ministers and there was no substantial disagreement. This would be alongside our close relationship in NATO. We need to produce dynamic West-West cooperation in this time of change. (S)

Concerning the German Question, your meeting with Gorbachev will be crucial. They have not yet made up their mind. (S)

The President: Jim has told me how helpful you have been on the EC. As I listen to you, we are very close on the major issues. We must stay close before the Gorbachev meeting. We have an opportunity at the Gorbachev meeting to get agreement on Germany. What has been your public position on Lithuania? (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: Like yours. The EC's is, too. Lithuania happened 6 to 12 months too early for Gorbachev. He needs CSCE to help to show there is a new framework in Europe to ease his dilemmas in Lithuania. Maybe there will eventually be a Soviet confederation. There must be a stable framework. (S)

The President: Yes. We have been responsible. We have fire-eaters. Senator D'Amato wants to go tell Gorbachev off. That's easy to say. But I am gratified we are on the same wavelength. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: At the same time, the economic situation in the USSR is getting worse. I saw Robert Maxwell yesterday, who had spent two hours with Gorbachev on Monday. Gorbachev is extraordinarily preoccupied with economic problems. They know what they want but have no economic strategy. I wonder if we -- you -- can give them the right advice to run a market economy. (S)

The President: I totally agree with your assessment. But as long as Lithuania is flapping, it's hard to move ahead. (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: We and the DDR Government are going to give assurance that the DDR-Polish Treaty of 1970 and the Warsaw Treaty [between the FRG and Poland] will be final. (S)

The President: I hope you can work this out along the lines Helmut explained to me on the phone. This needs further discussion. (S)

Secretary Baker: I told Hans-Dietrich that we would stick with the German Government. (S)

The President: I was frank with the Polish Prime Minister on this issue. I told him we are on Germany's side. I hope the Poles can be persuaded to see the light. (S)

Secretary Baker: On the question of CSCE, I expressed our concern to Foreign Minister Genscher about an enhancement of the security side that would undermine NATO. (S)

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The President: Thanks again for coming. It was a pleasure to see you. We want to stay together. I will be having important meetings with Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand.
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-- End of Conversation --

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President
and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
Raymond Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Condoleezza Rice, Director for Soviet and
East European Affairs NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Demetri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign
Minister

Viktor P. Karpov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergey F. Akhromeyev, People's Deputy,
Supreme Soviet

Aleksey A. Obukhov, Department Head, MFA
Teymuraz G. Stepanov, Aide to Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze

Sergey P. Tarasenko, Head, Evaluation and
Planning Administration, MFA

Georgiy F. Mamedov, Deputy Head, USA and
Canada Administration, MFA (Notetaker)

Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

DATE, TIME April 6, 1990, 10:00 - 11:40 am EST
AND PLACE: Cabinet Room

The President: Let me say, welcome. You come at a complicated and interesting time. Jim has filled me in and I would like you to pay my personal respects to President Gorbachev. Please say anything that is on your mind. Our relationship is absolutely vital and I want it to be better. You know that the Baltics have caused a complication in our relationship. It is necessary to overcome that and I look forward to the Summit with President Gorbachev which I hope will be a productive meeting. (Ø)

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Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you for your hospitality and attention. May I express my genuine satisfaction about the talks and negotiations while I have been here. I share your view that we are in a complicated time of dynamic events in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. I met with the Secretary of State in Africa and there we both felt the atmosphere of change. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are great powers and have a special responsibility to our people and those of the world. We are guided by a very large responsibility. I want to convey from President Gorbachev and from the entire Soviet Union regards. Mrs. Gorbachev also asked that I pass her regards to Mrs. Bush. She wanted you to know that she values their relationship as well and hopes that it evolves over time. (Ø)

The relationship between Secretary Baker and I has become one in which we have the ability to discuss international problems in an open, candid, frank and realistic way. I want to give you the original of the letter from Gorbachev. You have a copy. I will not recount its contents. There are ideas there about the problems and issues that Gorbachev thinks are important. (Ø)

I thought that I should raise a few points. I brought a small piece of paper with general comments about U.S.-Soviet relations and their development. You have participated for a long time in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and you probably remember what the dialogue was like when it began in 1985. I remember it as one of mutual complaints and recriminations. I remember sharp exchanges on humanitarian affairs, sharp recriminations about regional behavior, mutual feelings of animosity. The exchanges were quite emotional. A lot has changed. The process of getting to this point was difficult and painful. You were a participant in establishing the new relationship. Now looking at the agenda we have an extremely broad range of questions on which we engage: arms control and disarmament, humanitarian issues, regional issues, transnational affairs. Only the UN is a forum that encompasses as broad a range of issues as the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. The Summit agenda is very important. I think that it is becoming a norm that we discuss things openly and I think it is important that we have now a date for the Summit. Setting the date itself gives us a very important mark toward which to move. It will become like Malta pushing progress forward. (Ø)

Concerning the goals of U.S.-Soviet relations, let me say that Gorbachev speaks of a possibly unique evolution of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Talks that I have had here confirm this possibility. I know you are following our exchanges. We have been working well, have built a good relationship between ourselves. It is possible now to have constructive negotiations. Personal relations between us allow us to discuss even the toughest problems openly, allowing us to be totally candid and then to implement. After Malta, much has changed. (Ø)

There are improvements and movement forward in the arms control talks despite the fact that we have very many important differences still. On the ABM Treaty on space we made good movement in Wyoming, on ALCM and SLCM we had good movement, no

difficult questions remained. We have made progress on mobile ICBMs, telemetry encryption and non-deployed missiles. We have made good progress in the conventional arms talks. Despite skepticism, I believe that we have good prospects for the completion of those talks before the end of the year. Then nothing will stand in the way of the meeting of the 35. (Ø)

We have made substantial progress on chemical weapons. I want to emphasize the importance of your proposals as discussed with me by the Secretary of State. Your readiness to stop at some point the production of chemical weapons will be an important step forward for us. We will be examining your proposals over the next few days and will reply soon. Despite problems in strategic arms, chances are still good to initial a treaty in June. Our intention to prepare and adopt a declaration of intent on future arms control despite certain differences is useful. There is mutual understanding that strategic arms control should be an ongoing and continuing process. I think that the content of a statement should be obvious assuming we can find a way to agree. (Ø)

On the protocol of nuclear testing, I have always said that the nuclear testing protocols are very important to us. Nuclear testing causes significant domestic problems for us. There are protests against nuclear testing. You have in the past had public protests too and the problem may become difficult for you in the future so we should move forward on nuclear testing. If we are able to prepare agreement on conventional arms we believe the practical preparations should begin for a Summit of the 35 and then after the Summit a CFE treaty could be signed. Subsequent phases could be identified for further conventional arms talks. We should identify a program for the future. (Ø)

I will not speak in detail about the unification of Germany. At the next CSCE Summit, we will have to prepare and design some fundamental European security structures, some guarantee of security against a background of development not only in Germany but development in Eastern Europe. It used to be that any Soviet proposal immediately brought a negative response from the United States. We did the same thing. It is now happening that we are jointly proposing resolutions in the UN and other countries are voting for our proposals. This is a change. (Ø)

Let me speak to Open Skies - the negotiations are not proceeding rapidly but toward the middle of the year I believe that we will be able to sign an Open Skies treaty. You do not mind that I am listing these elements? (Ø)

The President: No, this is useful. When you finish I will be able to comment. (U)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Then briefly, I am speaking of positive things but this does not mean we don't have problems between us. Many things have changed in our approach to transnational problems. It has become a part of the agenda because of the initiative of the Secretary of State to deal with these transnational problems. We have good experiences in

discussing and finding ways to resolve them - to take into account our interest with those of other states. Yesterday, we began to list the agreements on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on environmental protection, on counter-terrorism, some had proposed a Soviet-American environmental association. We have identified trends in the peaceful exploration of space, of safeguarding the ecological system. Both sides are interested in protecting the environment. I have said that we are ready to participate at a high level in the White House Conference that you will have on the environment. It will be an important part of your dialogue with Gorbachev to talk about these trans-national issues. For instance, in Africa, there is a threat of famine. We can still, I believe, adopt radical measures to stop the destruction of the land. But that can take 8-900 billion dollars over the next ten years. Developed countries will have to contribute to this process. (Ø)

Now, what is lacking in our dialogue? We are not yet able to engage on economic problems. World economic problems are of a global nature. These deserve attention. One figure is illustrative. Overall the debt in the world is 1.3 trillion dollars. We must look for ways to resolve this. In the bilateral area - I remember your remarks at Malta - that the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship makes it possible to have economic relations. On the trade treaty we have made a good beginning. It will be of limited value. But I hope it can be concluded although there are still some problems. We are also working on a bilateral investment treaty and cultural centers are being prepared. (Ø)

Some ask about a Soviet-American University that would not cost too much but would be a good step forward and we have agreement on expanding student exchanges. The cooperation and dialogue between our military officials is very good. I remember that I invited Weinberger when he was Secretary of Defense. The Soviet Minister of Defense wanted to visit the United States but those visits did not take place at that time. Now we have a good ongoing process and relations in that area of new quality with a new degree of trust. It is still important that we work to continue to reject certain stereotypes that are a legacy of the past. The discussion of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development seems to be in that category. We hear that you do not want the Soviet Union to be able to get loans. This should be a thing of the past, we are not looking for your help. We are only looking to be treated as partners. The sooner we abandon stereotypes the better for all of us. (Ø)

On regional conflicts, I am under the impression, after my trip to Africa, that where third world countries used to be suspicious of Soviet-American cooperation they now think that it is useful. I have seen that prejudice about this is disappearing. There is more trust. They are encouraging us to act more actively on our agenda. The President of Angola said this to me and reported in detail on his visit here. While the problem of apartheid is one of the most difficult, conditions are good I think for dismantling apartheid. This is of great importance and we should try to facilitate the solution of the problem. (Ø)

We also discussed Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Middle East. We have worked well together. There is good understanding concerning these conflicts. In Central America I can only say that we accept the results of the free elections there. (Ø)

May I say a word about the problem of stability. This is not only an issue of nuclear arms though it is an important element of that problem. Gorbachev mentions in his letter that at this stage we need to think about a qualitatively different phase in arms control. He speaks of balanced measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. There is need for continuous dialogue on strategic stability. This is a matter of tremendous importance. The idea of stability between countries who confront each other is one thing but there is stability between countries that don't consider themselves enemies. At Malta we said that the United States and the Soviet Union had achieved a new closeness. Gorbachev said that we are ready not to regard the United States as our enemy. That is a phrase that is not empty or wishful thinking. It is a promise to implement this idea practically. It will be complicated and contradictory but we need to pursue this as our goal. On strategic stability, I must emphasize that the ABM Treaty is considered by us to be the basis of strategic stability. (Ø)

I know you are following perestroika, our internal development, and we are aware of your remarks. I want you to know that we appreciate your support of our process. There are many contradictions, we face many serious problems. Recently, I was asked would you do things differently if you could begin again. I said we would have to start in the same way. There is no other way to develop our society, to develop our country. Social and economic problems are always difficult. Nevertheless, our per capita consumption, our standard of living, are high by most standards of the world. We do not have a crisis. We need, maybe three years to implement fundamental laws. We believe our economy will be healthier using the positive experience of other countries - capitalist experience, socialist experience, and the experience of the world-wide scientific-technical revolution in which, quite frankly, we lag behind. (Ø)

We are a multi-ethnic country. America is too. The problem is our state structure has a fundamental principle that is different than yours. We are a Union of fifteen sovereign states. This is stated in our Constitution. When we began democratizing -- when we recognized the need for pluralism -- it was a very difficult step for us because pluralism was not warmly greeted. (Ø)

The problems of inter-ethnic relations are more dramatic. In the Trans-Caucuses we have even had clashes and bloodshed. In Central Asia, in the Baltic republics, we have problems. The legal process has been lagging behind our political process. In the Constitution of 1977, which all republics adopted by referendum, there is the right of the republics to secede. But a mechanism was not established. No one asked what the conditions were, the circumstances under which this could happen. That was lacking. The laws that we adopted were unfortunately adopted

after Lithuania took its steps. I know that this is being discussed here. I said at the airport that that is OK. We understand that it is an issue of debate in the United States and everyone can voice his opinion. I have said and I wish to reiterate that our main weapon is dialogue. With any state that is true but particularly with our own people. Perestroika and democracy, the right to self-determination, these are all a part of our program. Dialogue must be open, candid and frank with our people and with our leadership. The course of developments is difficult to predict. Different ethnic groups there [in Lithuania] - not everyone supports the Supreme Soviets ideas about secession and relations among the republics. We must make sure that there are no inter-ethnic clashes. In Lithuania, for instance, there are 350,000 Russians, 300,000 Poles, 100,000 Byelorussians; these are important numbers. There are also big factories that belong to the central government. We have concluded that it is necessary to have Presidential authority in the Soviet Union to deal with some of these problems. In establishing that authority, we did it only to protect democracy. Gorbachev wanted me to tell you that he will adhere to the principles that he has stated. (S)

The President: I would like to reply. This is what I was hoping you would do - explain your positions. I will not go into arms control. You and Secretary Baker will discuss that. I hate to start on a less positive note - but the feeling of our side is that we have moved back from positions that we thought we had agreed. I know you want progress - I do too. If we can stay with the progress we have made in the past and then move ahead I think we will get an agreement. I want an agreement. More talk is necessary but you should know that our people feel that there has been some pulling back on your side. (S)

Let us see if we cannot get back on track. You ended your remarks on the Baltic states, laying out your constitutional issues, I need to make a few remarks: 1) We do not want to complicate, for the Soviet leadership, problems that you view as internal problems. Gorbachev knows that I am not using excessively hot rhetoric. As a matter of fact, I am under fire here for not using hot rhetoric. Not having recognized, however, the incorporation of Lithuania, we are in a position where we must support self-determination, and recognize their stated desire for independence, and democracy. We must hold to this position. (S)

Churchill said, "Jaw, jaw, jaw; not war, war, war." What he meant was, engage in dialogue. I know you have reservations about the word "negotiation," we aren't using that word. But let me say I think we are responsible for the restrained response of the Europeans. There must be a solution for this problem because that can keep our relationship on track. We are caught up in fifty years of history. We are respectful of your views and of your problems. But there must be dialogue and discussion. I don't know if I have the right to be optimistic or pessimistic. But today I have heard that some discussions have begun and that is good. (S)

I agree with what you say about the relationship. There is less suspicion though it is not completely removed. You cannot say that it has been removed on your side and I cannot say that it has been removed on my side. I hope the people will understand that we support perestroika and also Gorbachev's handling of these difficult situations. We have seen you help bring about a peaceful evolution in Eastern Europe and there are, we understand, ethnic problems of the union in the Soviet Union. We are sympathetic, strongly sympathetic, to the Lithuanians and their desire for self-determination. I hope you will go forward into discussions with them. We don't have a desire to interfere in your affairs, but the force or perceived crushing of Lithuania would be a problem. I know people think I hide behind the Congress and some Congress people, including Bob Dole, have told me they have had good conversations with you. When Primakov was here, he asked about the system and I said it was a difficult one. He thought I was some sort of heretic. But it is a good system. We want to move forward with you in arms control and on the economy. The Congress has a lot to say about that and as I said we all feel very strongly about the Lithuanian people and their rights. Gorbachev has said certain principles underlie perestroika. Given that and given our own principles, if the aspirations of the Lithuanian people were suppressed I, too, would feel strongly about it. I want you to communicate the strength of my feelings to Gorbachev. (S)

Let me return for a moment and say that we must recapture any lost momentum, set the stage for closing out any issues at the final Ministerial. We have an ambitious timetable. We will bring as much to closure as possible. We have a lot of work to do. There needs to be a lot of effort at the expert level. We've been able to sustain considerable progress during this turbulent period. I don't want to lose that progress. I will instruct our negotiators to go back and redouble their efforts. I hope you will do the same. On CFE, let me say, that I cannot imagine serious preparations for CSCE unless we have a CFE Treaty. I am confident that we will. I appreciate what you said about my proposal on chemical weapons. Let me say that I am troubled by the lack of progress on the original initiative on Open Skies. Your government will have to accept a really open regime, not just token flights, not just in good weather, not just in daylight. All must be open if we are going to have an effective regime. I told our military and intelligence services that they were going to have to accept this kind of openness. Not everybody liked it. This sends an important signal as to what kind of relationship we are building. It is more than symbolism, but it is also an important symbol and it will benefit our overall relationship. On human rights, let me say that I am pleased with the number of emigrants. We've made dramatic progress and this helps our overall relationship. (S)

This is far more than symbolism, it is the emotional issue. I am working toward a waiver of Jackson-Vanik and we are making progress on a trade agreement. I hope your emigration law will have been passed so we can move forward on Most Favored Nations status. Let me communicate to you my personal interest in direct flight for Jewish emigrants to Israel. Please reconsider your

position on this. Finally, let me say that the tolerance of ethnic and religious differences are not automatic fruits of democracy. It is necessary to work at it. On Germany, let me just say that we are interested to see that the Soviet Union and the West European countries have some similar concerns. I have talked with Chancellor Kohl and even though unification is coming fast, it is proceeding in an orderly fashion. The Two Plus Four will be a useful way to dissolve the Four-Power rights and responsibilities but we should not put new constraints on a sovereign German state. Germany has been a good democratic ally. (S)

You know that we, the Germans, and the West European countries agree that the unified Germany should remain a full member of NATO, including its integrated military structures. Even some of the East European leaders are coming to that conclusion as a major element of stability in Europe. NATO is also the anchor for American military forces in Europe and thus our commitment there. You and President Gorbachev have said that you want the United States to remain in Europe. The United States will keep a significant military presence in Europe as long as our allies want us to. You should understand that a strong NATO is the best way to ensure our presence. (S)

We are working with you and the other European countries to strengthen the CSCE. CSCE will be an important pillar in the new Europe but we should not try to make it do more than it can. Those of us who remember when Europe was not at peace do not want to return to notions of collective security that almost inevitably fail. (S)

I understand you might be skeptical. I am often reminded of the enormous loss of life in World War II in the Soviet Union. Marshall Akhromeyev has told me about the 20 million people that you lost and I am not unsympathetic but I would urge that we stay in close touch. The U.S. willingness to stay in Europe is a stabilizing force. I want to convince Gorbachev of that. That it is in our interest and in the interest of a Europe whole and free and the common European home as you call it. It's not all that popular a position here at home. No President would want to stay in Europe if no one wants us to stay. There are pressures in the United States for us to go home, but they are containable pressures. I believe that stability is enhanced by a U.S. presence. You know our position on NATO. We feel strongly and we must convince you that a Germany in NATO is no threat to the Soviet Union. People ask me who is the enemy? I say unpredictability. An expanded NATO mission does not mean a threat to Soviet interests. NATO will take into consideration the new conditions. (S)

On regional issues I agree that we have entered into a new phase. In Nicaragua we believe that the dialogue contributed to the change there. We still have reservations about Castro. And in the days of perestroika, he is a tremendous holdout. He is the old guard. We look forward to a peaceful resolution of Afghanistan. Let me say again, that we are not interested in seeing a radical regime that would exacerbate or threaten Soviet

interests. It is not in the U.S. interest or in global interest to have that happen on your border. There is no thinking that there should be an alignment of our interests against yours. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: We agreed we have discussed Afghanistan for fifteen months and that we find ourselves closer to a positive approach now. (Ø)

The President: I was pleased when Secretary Baker conveyed your thinking on the Summit. Everyone wondered if moving this up a few days meant that there was some dire emergency. They asked if we had Lithuania in mind. I said that when things were more complicated there was even more reason to have discussions. It was more important. We are in total accord that an early Summit is a good idea. We have shortened the fuse and we will have to work hard but I am very happy about the arrangement. Let me now, if I may, invite you in to receive a personal letter. I hope that the Summit comes through with flying colors. Let me just say just one more word. I am not regarding the Soviet Union as a foe. We have our differences. We have come a long way in five years. I do worry about instability. Stability is something that we are for. Whatever we do in Europe we will keep stability in mind. Let me say too that I am hopeful that in the Middle East we will be able to move forward. The days of trying to exclude the Soviet Union from this process are over. We urge you to use your influence there as much as possible - to participate in whatever talks happen. On the economic side, the problems do require attention. We want discussion on how we can facilitate what you're trying to do in your economic reform. There I would point to something like the Greenspan visit. So, let me summarize - my own assessment of where we are. (Ø)

This is a vitally important relationship. (Ø)

Problems are now arising because of Lithuania - that makes our relationship more difficult than three months ago. (Ø)

We are determined not to contribute to the difficulties that you face at home. (Ø)

I don't however want to convey a relaxed feeling. We feel strongly about the Lithuanians' rights. (Ø)

I am determined to move forward in arms control. (Ø)

I want to contribute to stability and to the creation of a Europe, whole and free or, as you call it, a common European home. A idea that is very close to our own. (Ø)

I want you to convey my warm best wishes to Mr. Gorbachev. I want to tell him that I won't tell him my problems if he doesn't tell me his. There are enough for both of us to go around. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Thank you for your remarks regarding your own goals. I won't comment in detail on them but let me say a few things. (Ø)

There is little time until the Summit to achieve practical results. We attach great importance to Secretary Baker's visit to the Soviet Union in mid-May - May 16. We do believe that those ministerial talks must review what has happened and push it very far forward. (Ø)

You spoke extensively about Lithuania as did the Secretary of State. Our qualitatively new relationship enables us to speak candidly and to discuss our internal domestic problems. When reporters asked I said that we could have said this is just our domestic situation but that would have been a formalistic answer. We understand that this is an issue in the United States. I have noted that you said this is a domestic matter of the Soviet Union. (Ø)

You have said that the Soviet Union has backtracked on the main agreement which was the ALCM counting rule. We did accept the U.S. counting rule which was not easy to accept. On some questions, however, you disregarded certain agreements that we had made. You, yourself, are a diplomat. You know that both sides have to adjust. We thought that the question of the international verification on ships and submarines was the principal that we agreed to in the December 1987 joint statement which was signed by top leaders and we thought we had an agreement to on-site inspection. The U.S. has retreated on that; but we are not saying that in an accusatory fashion. Maybe there was special considerations that had to be taken into account. We are not saying it in an accusatory way but we were concerned about this change in the U.S. position. (Ø)

In principle, we favor mutual concessions without that there will not be any agreement. There will be no serious way to get the work done. I wanted to make sure that you heard this because I have had to complain to my very good friend, Jim Baker, on this matter. It is important that we have dialogue. Gorbachev raised it at Malta. You said you needed to think about it. But the dialogue on naval arms control has got to begin someday. Let me thank you for your attention and express my confidence that we will be able to move toward a very good summit when Gorbachev comes here. (Ø)

The President: Let me just say again that I hope you can accept my chemical weapons proposal. There is widespread support for it world-wide. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Mr. President, I have said that your proposal on chemical weapons and promise to stop production was a major step forward. The two percent continues to worry us. We don't understand it to a substantial degree. The reaction of all participants of the Geneva group would be that we should agree to a complete destruction. We are at a stage where we can find common ground however and we will study it. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: I heard you say that there was an acknowledgement of Lithuania as an internal Soviet issue. What the President said was that it is your position that this is a domestic issue. (Ø)

The President: We have never recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. You must understand. (C)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: I have not come here to ask for anything on this. We have our laws, our rules. It is our state. We have our constitution. We will act within them without violence because it is against our principles to use violence. The U.S. position is up to you and to the American leadership. We are grateful for your restraint and for your support but your position is up to you. (C)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for European and Soviet Affairs
Edward Ney, Ambassador to Canada

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for External
Affairs
Paul Tellier, Secretary to the Cabinet
Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff, Prime
Minister's Office
Derek Burney, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME: April 10, 1990, 4:11 - 5:05pm EST
AND PLACE: Toronto, Canada

Following their private discussions, the President and Prime Minister Mulroney had an expanded meeting at the Toronto Sky Dome, followed by a working dinner and attendance at the ballgame. (U)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Well George, I enjoyed signing that Mexico trade agreement! (Laughter) Welcome all of you to Canada. The President and I have had a nice chat. We value your presence very much. I appreciate this opportunity to speak before what we hope will be a NATO Summit and before the Houston Summit. On the subject of European architecture, we do not like structures that do not include the U.S. and North America. We would be grateful for an opportunity to discuss that architecture as well as the possibility of a NATO Summit and prospects for the Houston Summit. Not all leaders in Europe want to include North America in the new European architecture. (S)

The President: It is hard to say what issues will dominate the Houston Summit until we see how Lithuania will turn out. It has the potential to foul our relationship with the Soviet Union. That will be the effect in the United States. Our short-run goal is to convince the Soviets to stick with their expressed desire to seek a peaceful resolution. We have already tried to talk with the Lithuanians, although we did not have much influence.

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We are now getting criticism that we are not tough enough on the Soviets. I am worried that Gorbachev is under increasing pressure from the Soviet military. We saw that during the Shevardnadze/Baker ministerial. Gorbachev is on the horns of an historic dilemma. He says that he has a constitutional process to deal with the problem, but the world wants to help poor little Lithuania. However, he sees the possibility of an unraveling of the Soviet Union. This cloud will hang over the preparations for our Summit. We have emotional ethnic communities in the U.S. who lobby on Lithuania. (S)

On the Summit, I would like to talk about the U.S. and Canadian role in Europe. We need you, even if there is pressure here to the contrary, perhaps worse than we feel. But in the U.S. too, there is talk of a peace dividend. I, and Jim Baker, have tried to convince the Soviets that the U.S. military presence in Europe is a stabilizing factor, but they are concerned, as Thatcher and Mitterrand are concerned, about the future of Germany. We made some progress with Havel who came around a bit on the value of NATO when he visited Washington. We are trying to finish CFE, and I don't believe that Soviet troops should stay anywhere in Eastern Europe. Margaret (Thatcher) has a somewhat different view, namely, that the Soviets should stay in Poland until the border issue is settled. I told Mazowiecki that the Soviets should leave. We want to move START and CFE down the road by the time of the Summit. Regarding the Summit date, we did not move it because of Lithuania; rather it was arranged because of Gorbachev's schedule. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Regarding activities abroad which make a politician unpopular, nothing, but nothing, would make me more unpopular. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Soviets showed a night and day difference when they were in Washington as compared to the Moscow ministerial. They were defensive and under pressure by their military regarding arms control. They walked back from some of the Moscow agreements concerning Cruise Missiles. Shevardnadze and Gorbachev are being criticized at home for losing Eastern Europe and Germany, and they are now facing the possible breakup of the Soviet Union. In addition, there is continued ethnic strife; there were 200,000 demonstrators in Georgia last night. The Soviets also have a basket-case economy. Regarding German unification, they were defensive about having a unified Germany in NATO. Moscow didn't want Germany out there roaming around. In Washington, they said that nothing could be done regarding Germany without their agreement. (S)

Regarding Lithuania, we made it clear that we could not sustain progress in U.S.-Soviet relations if they continued to crack down on Lithuania, even without tanks. We said that our pain threshold was lower regarding Lithuanian than Azerbaijan. I am pessimistic about Lithuania unless the Lithuanians suspend their declaration of independence. (S)

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The President: If they said they would accept a referendum under the Soviet constitution, perhaps this would solve the problem. (S)

Secretary Baker: However, this is an onerous process, with five years of waiting, the requirement for a two-thirds approval by the legislature and the possibility of a second referendum if 10 percent of the population calls for it. (S)

The President: It's a real dilemma. We have discussed arms control during much less encouraging times in U.S.-Soviet relations, but the U.S. is caught in a dilemma on this because of our general commitment to self-determination and freedom. That would prevent us from moving forward briskly on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. It worries me enormously. (S)

Regarding the Two Plus Four, it should not be used as a mechanism for solving a lot of European security problems. Rather, it should focus on Four Power rights: on devolving to the Germans the rights of the four occupying powers. (S)

As to an expanded role for NATO, I know you agree it is desirable. However, there is a brewing problem with the French. We do not want to turn over European security to an amorphous CSCE process. (S)

On Polish borders, we think that Kohl has come a long way. The difficulty is the degree of suspicion regarding the Germans, and Helmut Kohl is getting sensitive as to how long the Germans must pay penance. We must come out of that Summit discussing all of these issues. I think that the U.S. and Canada are close on these matters. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I get the impression that Helmut was a fullback for the Chicago Bears. (S)

The President: Yes, "The Refrigerator." (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The Germans spooked the hell out of people. Genscher arrived in Ottawa with the most cavalier attitude: "the big boys will settle this." Jesus Christ, with all those Canadian boys buried in Europe. If you (the Two Plus Four) don't touch base with NATO, Helmut Kohl will be in trouble.

Mitterrand has said since July that the nationalities issue would be the downfall of Gorbachev. It seems to me to be happening. Is the U.S.-Soviet Summit going to take place? (S)

The President: Yes, it will take place barring really bad developments in Lithuania. We can talk even with mounting tension. I would be reluctant to cancel. The whole world would suffer: Afghanistan, Angolan, and a host of regional issues. Economic relations would also be set back. Some actions would cause us to postpone the Summit, and we have told the Soviets this. It could be put off because of developments in the Soviet Union. Then we would have to figure out how to get things back

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on track afterwards. However, we cannot overlook the extensive use of force. But a cancellation of the U.S.-Soviet Summit would make the Houston Summit more urgent -- a real wake-up call for the West. (S)

Secretary Baker: Our negative reactions would be in the area of trade rather than in arms control. But a cancellation of the Summit might make it harder to conclude an arms control agreement. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What bothers you about NATO's situation? (S)

The President: I don't see any common approach emerging toward European security in the context of a post-unification Germany. The French have a special approach. I worry about how everyone is looking at Germany's security arrangements. I don't see how that will work out. Regarding an expanded role for NATO, we have a hell of a selling job to do with the Europeans --especially the French, but also the Eastern Europeans. However, I think we can do it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: On the trade side, you have been bloody tough with the Japanese. Regarding U.S.-EC relations, how is that going? (S)

Secretary Baker: So far, what we have only gotten agreement to is additional formal contacts. More meetings with me, with the President, and with the EC Commission. That's it so far. (S)

The President: I feel a little bit uneasy about the emerging EC. I am not sure that we will not see EC protectionism toward North America. They always want to talk about agriculture at some other time. We are kidding ourselves if we don't think that's a problem. (S)

Secretary Baker: I agree that the EC would stick it to us, if they got a chance. However, the closer we are to them, the more we can influence them. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Jim is right. We have major fishing problems with the EC. We don't know what door to knock on. We go from Margaret, to Helmut, to Francois, and to the EC Commission, and we get nothing. (S)

Secretary Clark: Jim is correct, but only because we press so hard. (S)

Secretary Baker: On the EBRD, they cut their own deal without us. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Do you see any value in the idea of an EFTA type of agreement between North America and the EC? (S)

Secretary Baker: I think so. (U)

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The President: I don't mean to say that it would necessarily turn out to be the worst case, but I am worried. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: If you are thinking of another NATO Summit at any early moment, I hope it will be in North America, indeed in Halifax. I am delighted that the G-7 Summit is in Houston. We can get frozen out by Europe in the next few years. I am delighted at how you got the Japanese to move, even though you had to be brutal. I am afraid this is coming with the Europeans. (S)

The President: Yes, but I am not sure that the American people think that we made progress; things were getting ugly with Japan. We had a good team effort. (S)

Governor Sununu: We got all our agencies on a single track. There was no weak underbelly in the Administration, as has been the case in the past. We had a united block of solid granite. (S)

Secretary Baker: It was really difficult. As I said in our Cabinet meeting yesterday, never in nine years have I seen such solidarity within the U.S. Government.

Prime Minister Mulroney: I told my colleagues that I was astonished. In all my G-7 Summits, everybody said that Japan's blood would be on the floor, but it never happened. I am astonished at how well you did. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Soviets do not see German unification going as fast as we think it will. Now they want to slow it down, delaying it through the Two Plus Four mechanism. (S)

Secretary Clark: Where are France and the U.K.? (S)

The President: They want an expanded agenda for the Two Plus Four. (S)

Secretary Baker: Down deep, they don't want German unification, but I don't know if they want to slow it down through the Two Plus Four. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I want to tell you about my visit to Mexico. President Salinas is a going concern. He sees all these changes culminating in a larger FTA between Mexico and the U.S. Then, at some later time, he would see a larger continental agreement. Brazil is also intrigued about the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and about U.S.-Canada-Mexico discussions. They think that 140 million Brazilians would be a great add-on. Salinas knows who's cutting the mustard and who is not. (S)

The President: Did he mention a three-way street? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: No, but he said that the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement is marvelous. Latin leaders think that it

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is tremendous, and he wants to do a deal. I said I had a barrel of political problems with FTA and that he would have to face the same thing. But I told him that it was a good deal in the long run, especially for job creation. He likes this, and the political impact and drama -- but I told him it was lucky that he only has one term as President. When he comes up to see you during the first week in June, he wants to make a deal. He understands the domestic problems that an FTA would cause him, but he is hot to trot. He sees a U.S.-Mexican FTA as a great advantage. (S)

The President: We are high on this fellow. We have problems with his Foreign Minister, but that is always the case. Salinas is a whole new breed. He was hurt by a TV program saying that the Mexicans were not cooperating. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: He told me about that. (S)

The President: We have convinced him that we want to move ahead. He took on some water as a result of the FTA leak that came from the Mexican side. (S)

Regarding the environment, John Sununu deserves great credit for moving our legislation forward. What should we say at the press conference about an acid rain treaty? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I would like to be able to say that we could enter into discussions this summer regarding an accord. (S)

Governor Sununu: This would not be a problem, but please don't create a deadline just in case we get a bad bill and have to veto it. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The idea of a U.S.-Canada-Mexico Heads of Government meeting on the environment came up with Salinas. Perhaps it could be in 1991. He said that if Brian Mulroney and George Bush go, then he too will go to such a summit. (S)

The President: Why only on the environment? You and I must show we are not neglecting this hemisphere. In principle, we are for a meeting, but we are not sure it should be issue-specific. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Can I leave it with you? (S)

The President: Should I raise it in June? In principle, we are enthusiastic. We need to show the hemisphere that we are concerned. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We joined the OAS not because of its effectiveness, but rather to show Canadian commitment to the hemisphere. We supported you in Panama, but we both need to be involved in the hemisphere in a more noble way, if I can put it that way. (S)

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Secretary Baker: It would be hard to have such a meeting without discussing narcotics. It would cause a hue and cry. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: George Shultz would be in ecstasy, if it could be held at Stanford. (S)

During the dinner discussion which followed the press conference, there was discussion of the fact that the MPLA had agreed to direct talks with UNITA, although not to a ceasefire. There was also further mention of how much was at stake in Lithuania and why the President was so worried about it. Also discussed was ex-President Nixon's new book and the way Mr. Nixon describes the infirmity of Brezhnev.

-- End of Conversation --

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting With Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff

DATE, TIME April 11, 1990
AND PLACE: Sky Dome, Toronto, Canada

The meeting opened with a brief discussion of Prime Minister Mulroney's problems surrounding the Meech Lake Accord. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The Soviets might compare Lithuania and Quebec. (C)

The President: They also have mentioned our Civil War. If the press tries to divide us after this meeting, it will probably be on the environment. I will say that we are in the midst of a basic revision of the Clean Air Act and until we know what our law is, we can't negotiate. (C)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will say that it took you to get things moving on environment in the U.S. However, I would like to get confirmed that there will be discussions going soon. So that when you have a law, we could be nearer to having something to sign. On CNN here, there was discussion that nothing would come of this meeting because no one cares about Canadian views. If you could say you just didn't come up here for a Canadian ball game, that would help. (C)

I have an idea for your meeting with Mitterrand. I just came back from the Caribbean. Per capita income down there is pretty good. This is true everywhere except Haiti which has just gone to hell. Here's where the three of us could do something together. If we could guarantee free elections and get things off the ground there, Cuba would be completely isolated. I haven't talked to Mitterrand about it, but we could do it for peanuts. (C)

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The President: This would be good politics for us. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I want to get you together with Mitterrand. (S)

The President: We need it. I am worried about France. It's either Mitterrand himself or the Foreign Ministry, I don't know which. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: [REDACTED] They are just different. That is why Haiti might give him a chance to cooperate with us close to home. Kohl goes off the reservation when Mitterrand's nose is out of joint. (S) (b)(1)

The President: Kohl is a little hurt on this. He says "how long must we do penance." France is worried about Germany, as is Maggie Thatcher. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Their EC friendship is coming untucked. The EC wasn't envisioned with a united Germany in mind. Kohl did an end-run with his speed on unification. I think the G-7 Houston Summit will see the most changed Europe ever. (S)

The President: People ask me who is the enemy. Could it be instability, unpredictability? (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I'll be unfashionable and say it is still the Soviet Union. I'm less and less confident that Gorbachev will stay in control of things. (S)

The President: We got a glimpse of this at the Ministerial with Shevardnadze. The military was throwing its weight around. With the present regime, there cannot be a real reversal, but if they got thrown out, then things could change. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Last summer, I remember Mitterrand saying the enemy in the Soviet Union was the nationalities problem. Eventually, Gorbachev will have to use massive force to put them down, and then he will lose his moral authority at home and in the West. (S)

The President: Lithuania is a delicate problem for us. In the Soviet Union, however, the Supreme Soviet voted about 1300 to 90 against them. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Your approach is just right. (S)

The President: It is going fairly well, but as with China, people say I don't give a damn about human rights. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: The big game hunter should not be diverted by rabbit tracks, but what could you do about Lithuania? (S)

The President: The critics say we should impose sanctions. I don't think it will work. (S)

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Prime Minister Mulroney: I misread Li Peng, but you have to hang in there. (S)

The President: We are coming to a crunch on MFN. They (the Chinese) have to give, if we are to go forward on MFN. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: What do they want you to do? (U)

The President: He who ties the knot... There are some signs of movement, but scanty. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: Is there any value in Canada calling in the Chinese and telling them the U.S. has run out of strength?

(S)

The President: That would be great. With your closeness to me and to the Peoples Republic of China, it might be very useful.

(S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I will call the Chinese Ambassador in for breakfast. It will not be attributable to you. (S)

The President: They could break out Feng for example. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: We will take him, if they do. The American people need some dramatic gesture like that. (S)

The President: You're right. Feng might not be enough, but along with amnesty, that might do it. The hard-liners are scared. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: One other thing: Shevardnadze asked me if I know Castro. I said no, but obviously he was probing to see if I would get a message to Castro to lighten up. (S)

The President: There are no indications at all that we see in that direction. Our Catholics say there is some easing in the Church, but we think he is clamping down. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney: I just thought it was fascinating that Shevardnadze raised the subject with me. (S)

At this point, the one-on-one conversation ended and the larger group discussion began.

-- End of Conversation --

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