Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries:	Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number:	91107
Folder ID Number:	91107-006

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (6 pp.)	10/3/89	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire (5 pp.)	10/4/89	(b)(1)	C
03. Memcon	Re: Meeting with George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus (5 pp.)	10/4/89	(b)(1)	C
04. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA (5 pp.)	10/5/89	(b)(1)	C
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Francesco Cossiga of Italy (2 pp.)	10/11/89	(b)(1)	C
06. Memcon	Re: Expanded Meeting with President Francesco Cossiga of Italy (4 pp.)	10/11/89	(b)(1)	C
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General (5 pp.)	10/11/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea (9 pp.)	10/17//89	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (6 pp.)	10/19/89	(b)(1)	C
10. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Yevgeniv Primakov, Chairman, Council of the Union USSR Supreme Soviet (4 pp.)	10/26/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Pinksheet Number: cap915
OA/ID Number: 91107-006
Date Closed: 1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Imre Pozsgay, Minister of State Hungary (3 pp.)	11/2/89	(b)(1)	C
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Ratu Mara of Fiji (5 pp.)	11/6/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (4 pp.)	11/8/89	(b)(1)	C
14. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (4 pp.)	11/9/89	(b)(1)	S
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Ben Ali of Tunisia (4 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (2 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	C
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (6 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	C
18. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (3 pp.)	11/21/89	(b)(1)	S
19. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (9 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	S
20. Memcon	Re: Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (8 pp.)	11/26/89	(b)(1)	C
21. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Eddie Fenech-Adami of Malta (3 pp.)	12/1/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Pinksheet Number: cap915
OA/ID Number: 91107-006
Date Closed: 1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
22. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France (10 pp.)	12/16/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Pinksheet Number: cap915
OA/ID Number: 91107-006
Date Closed: 1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of Treasury
Richard L. Thornburgh, Attorney General
Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
William J. Bennett, Director of National Drug Control Policy
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
John Negroponte, Ambassador to Mexico
William T. Pryce, Director for Latin American Affairs, NSC Staff

President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
Fernando Solana, Secretary of Foreign Relations
Gustavo Petricioli, Ambassador to the United States
Pedro Aspe, Secretary of Finance and Public Credit
Jaime Serra, Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development
Patricio Chirinos, Secretary of Urban Development and Ecology
Jose Cordoba, Presidential Chief of Staff
Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, Attorney General

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 3, 1989, 10:45-11:35 a.m. EDT
The Cabinet Room

The President and President Salinas met to discuss U.S.-Mexican relations. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: As we begin, I will repeat what I have already told President Salinas, what a pleasure it is to have all of you here. I had the particular pleasure of meeting informally with President Salinas and his family. We had no agenda, it was informality and friendship. My wife almost killed me when we got back all wet from being out on the golf course. The chemistry was very good -- the score was 4 to 2. What I wanted to do was send a signal that this is a very special relationship and that we have great respect for what you and your Administration have done in such a short time, and I think we have done that. (U)

The President: We will be talking here and tonight there will be the traditional time when President and Mrs. Salinas will be with us privately while the Cabinet ministers have time to finish up any details of talks which have gone on during the day, and there will be opportunity for further talks at the State Department and elsewhere. I don't want you to feel there is not enough time for talks, and we can have more if our delegations feel there is a need. (U)

The President: The press has been yelling at me, "What about a coup, what about a coup?" Knowing of your interest, we will see that you have a full update. We are dealing with a situation where we do not have full information. Whether this happens, the U.S. and the area benefit if the coup is successful. If there is a change, we will have instantly improved relations because our problem is not with the Panama Defense Force; our problem is with Noriega. I learned about this ten minutes before we were to greet you on the White House lawn. We heard rumors yesterday, we don't know where things stand. I welcome you sir, the floor is yours. (C)

President Salinas: Mr. President, I thank you for the great hospitality we have received. Our reception has been very positive. Our relations are particularly important because we are neighbors. We appreciate that your Administration is working so well to be a good neighbor. (U)

President Salinas: Having said that, if you allow me I would like to mention six aspects. I appreciate your speech. I appreciate your sending Secretary Baker and Secretary Brady and your Attorney General, Trade Representative, Commerce Secretary, Environmental Chief and other high-level people to Mexico. They had a very stimulating, positive visit. I would also like to thank them for all the work they did before and after the meeting. (U)

President Salinas: The first subject I would like to mention is trade. We took positive steps to open trade before we got any benefits. Now we are asking for reciprocity. In talks with Carla Hills, we have specific requests. For us, textiles are essential. We hope to arrive at a solution in October or November. (C)

President Salinas: In trade, agricultural goods are very important. When they arrive at the border, there are always one or two officials who say something is wrong. They said, for example, that brooms can't come in because the blind people sell brooms. But only 5 percent of the brooms are made by the blind. The rest are made by large blind broom machines. These are the kinds of problems we need to overcome. There is a new kind of large ventures in textiles. Steel is very important for us. We realize that the U.S. has problems. We need to push for solutions which take into account the needs of both our countries. (C)

The President: Did you go into the coffee situation? (C)

Secretary Baker: You mentioned coffee with Presidents Sarney in New York and Barco here in Washington. (C)

President Salinas: The second item is trade and investment. We are very satisfied with the agreement between Secretaries Serra and Mosbacher. The fact that it covers the kind of trade where we need more investment, and that it contemplates investment in the tourism area is much apreciated. (C)

President Salinas: The third area is finance. I want to thank you for all your help. We hope there is more to come. We want to sign agreements which expressly support the banking system. I will direct Secretary Aspe to return to sign. Something very important on the financial side is that we had a terrible drought. We need to import more agricultural goods, but we need more financing from the C.C.C. We need $2.3 billion. Such financing would be good for farmers in the U.S. (C)

The President: Is Secretary Yeutter following up on this? (C)

Secretary Brady: We have been talking with Mexico on range of financing. As of now, Mexico has $1.25 billion of financing and there is a cap of $5 billion. With such a cap in place, it is difficult to do more. We are financing an extra $200 million. (C)

The President: Excuse me for interrupting, I just want to be sure we follow up on this. (U)

President Salinas: The fourth item relates to the environment. Most of the problems are in Mexico City, the most polluted city in the world. We want to encourage tourism. Children are particularly affected by pollution. We want them to be strong and grow. We have a challenge here. So the agreement we arrived at was very positive. Also the agreement at the border. I had a chance to talk with Senators about this. We are very much interested in a debt for (nature) swap. (C)

President Salinas: The fifth item I would like to mention is drug trafficking. In that aspect, I would mention that we are fighting drugs because they are a threat to our national security. Drug trafficking is a scourge. Drug traffickers carry the most dangerous weapons. We seized 22 tons of cocaine last month which is 120 tons for the street and $130 million. We have jailed many major drug traffickers; we have arrested 8,000, but have jailed 150. Even though these are positive factors, as a global case, we are losing the war. We know that you want to cooperate with us and with other governments. We want to go after consumers, producers, traffickers. We have to take the responsibility to fight traffickers because they are such a danger. We have to hit them where it hurts - in their pocketbooks. When we find poppies being grown we seize their land. We have taken 100,000 acres. We give the land to the small farmers immediately. (ℓ)

President Salinas: There is not much money laundering in Mexico. But we would like to hit them hard. In this field, exchange of information is most important. We will not harbor any Colombian. Any Colombian drug trafficker found will be extradited. I am told that we will not be communicating by leaks, but through telephone. This is a fight for our own safety. If it helps the U.S., okay, but mainly it is for us. (ℓ)

President Salinas: Last - on Panama. We do not defend a person but we defend principle. We will defend the principle of self-determination and respect for the treaties, but Mr. Noriega is a foreign influence to the Latin American community. (ℓ)

The President: Is there any support for him at all? Is he getting some support because he is standing up to us? Is there anybody who thinks he is all right? (ℓ)

President Salinas: He is not liked by the majority of Mexicans. We have criticized him publicly. But if he is thrown out by the U.S., then there will be enormous anti-U.S. feeling in Mexico and Latin America. We don't want to make him a hero when he is a crook. There would be criticism in Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba and Guatemala. (ℓ)

Secretary Baker: May I ask a question? There was a question about the action the G-8 might take against Panama. It would be our hope that Mexico would be agreeable to some action. (ℓ)

The President: What would the action be? (ℓ)

Secretary Baker: There is some debate as to how this would be worded, whether it would be exclusion or expulsion. (ℓ)

President Salinas: We will accept exclusion. (ℓ)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President: I appreciate what you have just said. We have chosen to work by the multilateral route. My duty is to protect the lives of Americans in Panama. I would do what I have to protect these people. Also, we have certain rights. The very exercise of these rights is seen by some as provocative and this is encouraged by Noriega. There is a problem if we don't exercise our rights, then it becomes a matter of convention and we are criticized when we do. We are in a little bit of a dilemma. We will endeavor to conduct ourselves in a way which will not exacerbate the problem. We are sensitive and I am not going to say to hell with multilateralism. I want to do the right thing. (C)

President Salinas: I would say you are the most sensitive President we have had in a very long time. We appreciate your position. We understand your need to protect American citizens. (C)

The President: I don't want to dominate our bilateral talks discussing Panama. I asked Dick Thornburgh about the indictments so he could check them out. These are very solid indictments. Dick has told me these are very solid. This puts me in a dilemma. It is very hard for me to say "drop an indictment" when we have worked so hard to energize our people in the war on drugs. (C)

President Salinas: We don't have any problem with trying to isolate Noriega. We have stated our opinion about him publicly. (C)

Secretary Baker: Any chance you could call back your Ambassador? (C)

President Salinas: We have already done so. (C)

Secretary Baker: I mean get him out all together. (C)

President Salinas: Only if it protects his safety, would we do it. ((C)

The President: Is there anything else you would like to cover? (U)

President Salinas: The responses have been so positive that we have covered the important subjects here or elsewhere. (C)

The President: Let me express my concern on a matter. It disturbs me when I hear there is mistreatment of Mexicans. I want to see that if more needs to be done, we do it. (C)

President Salinas: There are more needs for workers in the U.S. than the supply. That means Mexican workers are needed, so we would like to do it more in a structured way. We would like to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

look for more ordered immigration. Inflation has come down. The U.S. needs more workers. We could arrive at some kind of institutional agreement. (C)

The President: That might be hard. It would put me right up against a brick wall with U.S. labor. (C)

President Salinas: The problem is that U.S. labor does not want an agreement. (C)

The President: You may be right in the long run. We will have more jobs than people. Immigration needs to be in a sensitive mode. (C)

Attorney General Thornburgh: When the Attorney General and I first met, there were allegations of police brutality. We have had them under investigation. When there are civil rights violations, we will not hesitate to prosecute. There are certain points along the border which are volatile and there is a magnified possibility of problems. I believe we have satisfied the Attorney General that we will proceed with actions if there are problems. (C)

The President: Your first comment was on the bilateral meeting. I wonder whether it should be an annual event. To see whether we could do it each year. It was a positive thing. (C)

President Salinas: It was very positive and I agree that we should do it once a year if we meet informally more often, and if there is follow-up between meetings. (C)

The President: Here's the plan. Secretary Baker has to go to get ready to receive you and you will have no chance to freshen up to see him. I guess General Powell is busy -- but we can arrange to brief you about developments during the day. We have very much appreciated this meeting. I will look forward to seeing you tonight. (C)

President Salinas: Thank you very much. Until tonight. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8008

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John N. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Herman C. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
William C. Harrop, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire
David Passage, Director, African Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

President Mobutu Sese Seko
Karl-i-Bond Nguz, Foreign Minister
Liloo Nkema, National Security Advisor
Lalimba wa Katana Mushobekwa, Zairian Ambassador to U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 4, 1989, 10:00 - 10:45 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: Thank you very much for coming down to Washington on such short notice. I know this has been a hectic time for you. I gather that you speak at the UN this afternoon. Will you be returning to Zaire after you deliver your speech? (U)

President Mobutu: Thank you very much for receiving me. Yes, I speak before the General Assembly at 3:15 p.m. and then fly to Boston for a day, departing on Saturday morning. (U)

The President: We need to work with you to achieve national reconciliation in Angola. I have great respect for the role you have played in the difficult and lengthy negotiation which is now getting Cuban troops out of Angola. I don't know all the ins and outs of the difficulties with Savimbi, but I'm absolutely convinced -- for Zaire's standing in the U.S. and in the world -- that we need to get the national reconciliation process back on track. UNITA has many supporters in the United States, and we believe UNITA needs support. With the prospect of success of a 15-year policy ahead of us, we don't want to see it fail now. Can we (the U.S.) play a useful role? Is there anything we can do with the Soviets or UNITA to help make it a success? I'd appreciate your views. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CBI 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

President Mobutu: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words. Let me begin by saying that your description of the problems we have been going through is accurate, but I believe we must rule aside the events of the recent past and deal only with the future. And in those terms, things are looking very good. I know you appreciate that our style of diplomacy is different from yours; we are not so accustomed to dealing in public and with the press as you are. I prefer secrecy to dealing through the pages of the Washington Post. (ℓ)

The President: I couldn't agree more. Sometimes I get so frustrated at trying to keep confidential information confidential! But I think we have a very good record between the two of us; I don't recall any of our conversations ever having gotten out into the papers. (ℓ)

President Mobutu: I agree. We have been able to be very candid and forthright with each other without fear of leakages in the press. (ℓ)

If I may turn to the negotiations themselves. As the result of the Gbadolite meeting, I was designated "mediator" along with seven (7) other chiefs of state. The good news I bring you is that we are ready to work in the wings, without noise, to bring about peace in Angola. Our next (summit) meeting is supposed to take place in Gabon. Since it's up to me to tell them when I have something for them, we will work quietly and off-stage for the time being. (ℓ)

But you should know that since I began working on this, Savimbi has repeatedly insulted me and offended me. In the beginning, I chose not to respond, thinking perhaps he did not realize the pressures on the mediator -- or on any chief of state. I had no problems with Dos Santos, no statements in the press, no negative "media hype," no use of public diplomacy to defeat the purposes of the mediation. I don't believe we should wage a guerrilla war against each other over the air waves. We need to work on the three major elements of the Gbadolite accord -- and preserve the secrecy of our discussions until we have reached agreement. (ℓ)

Dos Santos has asked me for help with one of his internal problems (with his hard-liners), but he stressed the need for secrecy. He has a Central Committee, which watches over him. He asked for help with them. So I have invited members of his Central Committee to visit Zaire, and we agreed to help him by saying how well things were going. (ℓ)

The President: Dos Santos is sending a delegation to visit Zaire? How does this affect UNITA? (ℓ)

President Mobutu: It would be to help Dos Santos with his "hard-liners." (✓)

The President: Sure, I'd think that would be all right as long as it isn't seen as a help to the MPLA. (✓)

President Mobutu: The problem is that Dos Santos has real problems with his "hard-liners." I need to help him create a consensus behind his search for peace with UNITA. The (Angolan) delegation would not be coming for negotiations. It's just to help out Dos Santos. (✓)

The President: Savimbi has a big following here. I have great respect for what he's been able to accomplish against a Soviet-backed government. But I understand your point of view (about him and his attitude) completely. What can we do to be of help? We can tell him not to slander you. We can tell him President Mobutu is a long-standing friend of the U.S., a good friend. That you have been fighting communist regimes all your life. Is he (Savimbi) hung up on the "exile" thing? (✓)

President Mobutu: I think part of his suspicions are the result of the confusion following the Gbadolite summit. The first problem was when some of the presidents at Gbadolite talked about "exile"; the second was when they talked about a "piece of paper" -- a document -- in Harare. I asked Savimbi to send me his foreign minister so we could resolve his doubts and he did, and we agreed to forget the confusion of Harare and go back to the three essential points of Gbadolite. We would do this in secrecy -- Dos Santos, me, and -- with your support -- Savimbi. Once we agree among ourselves, we will announce it to the public. (✓)

The President: Let me raise one very important question: if one side or party in a situation like the Angolan conflict receives supplies from a major power outside the country and the other doesn't, it is very bad; it creates an unbalanced situation. The Soviets are supplying the Angolan Government, but UNITA is currently cut off. I don't want people to begin to think that you -- who have been so constructive and so helpful throughout this long ordeal, have decided to hurt UNITA. What can Savimbi do to satisfy you so you would be willing to make it possible to turn back on the flow of supplies to UNITA? (✓)

President Mobutu: I understand what you're asking. Let me put it this way. I realize it is very difficult for the President of such a great country as the United States to imagine what it must be like to be the President of a small country like Zaire, but let me ask you to try to imagine, for a moment, what it would be

like to be the President of Zaire. You know what my country has done for Savimbi and for UNITA through all these years. You know that my country -- and I personally -- have supported him and helped him, even in a time when your own country, because of the Clark Amendment, could not. And then one day you see in the newspapers that you are being criticised and abused. You see yourself insulted. You ask him to come visit so you can resolve the problem and he refuses to come, saying he is too busy. And then you see that he goes instead to see the President of another country, a president who wasn't even among those at Gbadolite -- which gave Savimbi his first public legitimacy and recognition. (~~C~~)

The President: I can imagine it! No one wants their support and their hard work to be insulted! Would it be helpful -- after all you've done for him -- for us to suggest that he find a way to make up to you? Would it be helpful for us to try to put together a meeting between the two of you? (~~C~~)

It just worries me that we have this imbalance of supplies, with the Soviets actively supporting their side. Dos Santos will obviously be encouraged by this development (cessation of the flow of supplies to UNITA through Zaire). Your own mediation of "national reconciliation" will be much harder to achieve. (~~C~~)

What can I do, as President, with a long-standing friendship and respect for you both? Would a direct talk with you by Savimbi be helpful? You're the one who has done more than anyone else to help him. I just don't want to see the process go backward. I don't want to see you begin to lose support among the American public for your magnificent achievement when UNITA's support dries up because the pipeline has been closed. Should I tell Savimbi to meet with you? Savimbi owes us good will as he owes you good will. (~~C~~)

President Mobutu: I think you've understood me well. I am not interested in the past -- only the future. You can tell your friends that we're willing to forget the past -- but he must now act and behave responsibly. (~~C~~)

The President: (Turning to the other Americans in the room:) This is a rare opportunity -- seldom do we have such a wonderful opportunity to speak candidly and freely among each other with you. Does anyone else have anything to say? (U)

Assistant Secretary Cohen: (To President Mobutu) Mr. President, if I heard you correctly, may we assume, therefore, that everything is back to where it was before (clearly referring to the supply pipeline)? (~~C~~)

President Mobutu: Almost. (U)

The President: I think we're on the same wave-length. I'll be talking to him (Savimbi) myself tomorrow morning, and I'll make sure that he understands very clearly that we want the leadership role to be yours (Mobutu's). You've stood up to leftist regimes. You know a Dos Santos regime, aided from the outside with no moderating aid to Savimbi, would be a danger. But I don't mean to be totally suspicious about Dos Santos -- I realize that the times are changing, and the world is changing. (ℓ)

President Mobutu: If I may, Mr. President, let me take just a moment of the remaining time to raise a different matter with you. In my speech to the United Nations this afternoon, I intend to point out that there are only 10 years left in this century. You know our (Africa's) development problems, our debt problems, and our need for cooperation. I'd like to propose that the world declare the decade from 1990-1999, the year which heralds the end of the 20th century, to be a decade of cooperation for Africa. (ℓ)

Belgium and China have agreed to take all the debt Zaire owes them and convert it into local currency and put it at the service of economic development in Zaire. I'm not talking about forgiving debt, but rather using the debt for economic development purposes. The IMF would monitor the program. It would be a way to increase North-South dialogue and solidarity. (ℓ)

The President: It sounds like a very interesting proposal. We'll be glad to take a look at it. There will be some need for economic reforms -- I know Zaire is one of the countries that has spent a great deal of effort on economic reform. Without economic reforms, some countries might get to the end of the 10 year period with no progress at all. But we'll read it and with keen interest. (ℓ)

Meeting ended with Mrs. Bush coming in to meet President Mobutu. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Vassiliou, President of Cyprus (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Nelson Ledsky, Special Cyprus Coordinator
Barry F. Lowenkron, NSC (notetaker)

President George Vassiliou
George Iacovou, Foreign Minister
Michael Sherifis, Ambassador

DATE, TIME: October 4, 1989, 2:00 - 2:40 pm EDT
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

President Vassiliou: "On behalf of the Cypriot people, I would be grateful if you would accept this piece of pottery. It is very old, dating back to around 600 B.C." (U)

The President: "Thank you. This is a very special gift, and I'll be very careful with it. Why don't we wait until the press has been through before we start?" (U)

(The Press then depart.)

The President: "I want you to know that I'm impressed with your dedication and sincerity in trying to reach a settlement on Cyprus. But, I want to hear your views on where the Cyprus negotiations are going." (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "I must tell you that the talks are not going well. Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash had rejected the UN Secretary General's ideas for a settlement. I believe that Denktash wants to sabotage the talks because he is not interested in a solution. As for Turkey, it has not made up its mind on whether it wants a solution. Given the present political situation in Turkey, the Turkish government will follow

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/12/2009
2000-0429-F

Denktash's lead and therefore reinforce the stalemate in the talks. Nelson Ledsky {Special Cyprus Coordinator} is trying to get the talks restarted, but constructive conditions are needed. As long as Denktash and Turkey believe that the status quo can be perpetuated, the negotiations will fail. It is important to get Turkey to realize that the status quo is not a solution. Cyprus is a small fish that cannot pressure Turkey, but the U.S. can. The next step is to have meaningful negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. The Secretary General had set the parameters for the talks, and Denktash, seeing that progress was possible, would no longer play by the Secretary General's guidelines. Denktash's actions are similar to that of a football player who, rather than continuing to play, picks up the ball and walks off the field." (Ø)

The President: "What is the current position of the UN Secretary General?" (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "The UN Secretary General wants a solution, but is opposed to having talks simply for the sake of talks, which is Denktash's strategy. Mr. Ledsky wants to get the talks started, and then apply pressure from behind the scenes. However, without the UN Secretary General's framework, the talks will not succeed. I need US support to pressure Turkey into accepting meaningful negotiations." (Ø)

The President: "As I understand Nelson's {Ledsky} position, one has to learn to crawl before one can walk, therefore it's important to get the talks going again. I support this. I believe we share the same objective, a peaceful solution. It's important, however, to get re-engaged. Nelson, would you like to add anything?" (Ø)

Mr. Ledsky: "What you've said Mr. President is correct. Allow me if you will to review briefly where we've been with the UN Secretary General's efforts. The Secretary General sent a letter to Turkey in June asking the Turkish government to support his efforts. However, Denktash disrupted the talks in July. The Turks have told Denktash to negotiate and to conform to the rules as laid down by the Secretary General. Next Tuesday the Secretary General will be meeting with Denktash to see if the negotiations can resume. We should await the outcome of that meeting and take stock on where to go from there. I'm not absolutely confident that Denktash will agree to resume the talks. But, the Turks know that the talks are vital. Therefore, I'm more optimistic than President Vassiliou. I think it important to see what emerges from next Tuesday's meeting between the UN Secretary General and Denktash." (Ø)

Secretary Baker: "I think it's important for us to bear in mind that the President has spoken to both Prime Minister Ozal and President Evren on the Cyprus issue." (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "I'm grateful to hear that." (U)

The President: "There's nothing to be grateful for since we've not yet seen any success. However, both of us are not that far apart." (C)

President Vassiliou: "After the UN Secretary General tabled his paper, Denktash created a crisis, insisting that he would not continue the negotiations until the paper were withdrawn. I have accepted the paper, Denktash has rejected it. If the UN Secretary General were to accede to Denktash's wishes and withdraw his paper, he would be accepting an ultimatum from Denktash. In that case I would be discredited. If Denktash backs down, then he would lose face. I cannot negotiate if the UN Secretary General were to withdraw his paper. The negotiations should take place in private and on the basis of the UN Secretary General's ideas. There are three important disagreements that required resolution: re-establishing a unified State as opposed to a permanent partition of the island; a security guarantee for the Turkish Cypriots, and, resolution of the refugee problem by the re-adjustment of territory, with the option presented to those Greek Cypriots who fled the north to return." (C)

Mr. Ledsky: "President Vassiliou's statement is a fair assessment of where things stand. I hope that the UN Secretary General will succeed with Denktash. In my opinion, the Turkish Cypriots will counter the UN Secretary General's paper with ideas of their own. I see three areas as well that have to be addressed in the negotiations: the status of refugees, security guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots without preconditions, and the nature of the central government for Cyprus. I think the negotiations will be resumed but that they will not be quick or easy." (C)

The President: "Are there any communications between the members of both communities?" (C)

President Vassiliou: "There had been some contacts but no movement, although members of both communities have been able to live side by side in London for years." (C)

Mr. Ledsky: "There is more contact among the people of Berlin than among the citizens on Cyprus." (C)

Governor Sununu: "Are there any Greek Cypriots who support Denktash or any Turkish Cypriots who support Vassiliou?" (C)

President Vassiliou: "Yes." (U)

Governor Sununu: "What about the possibility of holding a referendum on the island to resolve the dispute?" (C)

President Vassiliou: "An agreement is needed first before a referendum can be held." (Ø)

Foreign Minister Iacovou: "In the context of a referendum, 65,000 Turkish settlers who have moved onto the island after the Turkish invasion should be barred from voting. Denktash draws his strength from these settlers." (Ø)

The President: "What is the Turkish troop level on the island?" (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "There are 35,000 Turkish troops and 400 tanks on Cyprus, as opposed to 10-11,000 Greek Cypriot troops. I hope to build up the Cypriot forces in order to reduce the ratio of Turkish Troops to Cypriot troops from 4 to 1 to 3 to 1." (Ø)

The President: "Are you concerned about your personal security?" (Ø)
President Vassiliou: "The day I reach a solution is the day that my enemies will shoot at me." (Ø)

The President: "Are you perceived as a hostile figure?" (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "No." (U)

The President: "What's the status of your relations with the Soviet Union?" (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "Our relations are friendly, but not special. Both sides have modest trade on a barter system. Moreover, Cyprus, as a member of the non-aligned movement, supports the rapprochement between the US and the Soviet Union." (Ø)

The President: "Secretary Baker had good meetings in Wyoming with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze." (Ø)

The President: "I want to take constructive steps to help the negotiations. I've spoken to President Evren and Prime Minister Ozal. The United States is not in the position to snap its fingers and make Turkey do what you want. But, we have an excellent relationship with both leaders and we'll continue to raise the Cyprus issue with them." (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "I understand Turkey's historical importance to the US as an ally against the Soviet Union." (Ø)

The President: "US-Turkish relations also grew stronger in response to the strains we've experienced with Greece." (Ø)

President Vassiliou: "East-West relations are changing. The US can manage its relations with the Soviet Union without the help of Turkey. Now is the time to press the Turks. If Turkey could

be made to realize that the US does not accept the status quo on Cyprus, then Turkey would move to support a solution." (C)

The President: "We'll continue to support the UN Secretary General's efforts. We have a very able Ambassador to the UN, Tom Pickering, who has the confidence of Secretary Baker and Perez de Cuellar." (C)

Secretary Baker: "In my view, Ozal is making a serious effort to get Denktash to re-engage. I do not think we're being naive in trusting Ozal. When I saw you last in Paris, you told me that President Evren might be the key player in Turkey on Cyprus. Based on that, the President talked to Evren and again to Ozal. If there is anything else the US can do, we will do it." (C)

President Vassiliou: "This is the first time an American Administration is doing something, and I am grateful. But, I need to show concrete progress. Maybe a goodwill gesture on the part of Turkey can help. I remember when I saw you last year Mr. President when you were Vice President. I raised the idea at that time of Turkey allowing the re-opening of the city of Famagusta under UN auspices. It's currently a ghost city." (C)

Mr. Ledsky: "That's an idea that was first raised by the US, Britain and Canada in the Ford Administration." (C)

President Vassiliou: "This gesture would lead to the rebuilding of the city and create momentum in the talks." (C)

The President: "I'll do all I can to help the negotiating process along. I think we should wait and see what happens next week when the UN Secretary General meets with Mr. Denktash. (C)

The meeting adjourned at 2:40 p.m. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8022

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
William C. Harrop, U.S. Ambassador to Zaire
David Passage, Director, African Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President
Jeremias Chitunda, Vice President
General Antonio da Costa Fernandes, Foreign Secretary
Dr. Jorge Valentim, Chief Negotiator for UNITA

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 5, 1989, 10:30 - 11:15 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office

The President: First, let me welcome you. I know you've been seeing a lot of people in Washington and that you have a very hectic schedule. I thought I might begin by giving you a bit of a fill-in on my meeting yesterday with President Mobutu of Zaire. I hope there is no question in anyone's mind about our enormous respect for what you've been able to accomplish for peace and for a free and democratic Angola. (U)

Dr. Savimbi: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your warm words of welcome and for your expressions of support. Let me say that the problems everyone has been discussing about the situation in Angola stem from the three key elements of the meeting at Gbadolite (agreement on a ceasefire, face-to-face negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA, and the commission to monitor and resolve problems associated with the cease-fire). The summit meeting at Harare came up with a document I was asked to sign which had not been seen by me. I said I could not respond to it because I had not seen it, and I did not agree with the idea that I should sign it. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
GEL 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

This was an MPLA maneuver, which President Mobutu joined in. Mobutu had always been our friend, and he has always been their friend, but things have changed; he is not mediating impartially now. The MPLA's goal is to cut off all outside support to UNITA. When we asked Mobutu's help to prepare for Harare, he said we should not worry. But when we saw the document we were presented in Harare, there was no mention of the Gbadolite accords. We were simply told to "sign here, and here, and here." (℄)

Mr. President, there are two key points I would like to make. First, we believe the only way to restore balance to the process is for the United States to become more involved in the mediation effort, to help keep President Mobutu neutral. Of the seven presidents in the working group, six -- Zambia, Zimbabwe, the MPLA, Bongo (Gabon), Sassou (Congo) and Zaire -- include not a single friend of UNITA and, in fact, include our enemy (the MPLA). If there were eight (with the U.S.), it would be more fair. (℄)

Assistant Secretary Cohen: The seven shouldn't "mediate;" there should only be one mediator. (℄)

Dr. Savimbi: (Resuming) The second (key point) is that our logistical situation is not good. We are all right for the moment, but looking toward six months from now, we need to get supplies in, and Mobutu -- as you no doubt know -- has refused to permit supplies to come to us through Zaire. (℄)

The President: I understand. Let me make a few points in response. First, I'm not sure I agree about the U.S. role. It seems to me that the more support you get from other African leaders, the better. This is a process which started with the hard work of Chet Crocker, followed by Mr. Cohen. You may not have many friends among (the seven co-mediators) but we do, and maybe we can influence them in positive ways. President Kaunda has been a friend over the years and even Mugabe has too -- although we have had our differences with Zimbabwe. But it seems to me that the more African involvement you have, the better for you -- and for us. (U)

Second, we continue to support UNITA. We won't allow anyone to dictate to you or to harm your core interests. That includes exile, or integration, or other things that are key to you. If you want "free and fair elections," we want free and fair elections. (U)

But third, we don't see any feasible alternative to working through Zaire, and through Mobutu. Secretary Baker here can take a look at some alternatives, but I don't believe there are any. The range is just too great. (U)

Yesterday (with President Mobutu), I tried to help smooth over some of your differences with President Mobutu. But I think you've got to figure out a way how to work with him. If he makes unacceptable suggestions, simply don't accept them. (✓)

I guess the bottom line is that we support the peace process; we support the need for a cease-fire. (U)

Secretary Baker: Let me say, Mr. President (addressing Savimbi), that this morning, President Mobutu had a conversation with Hank Cohen and he agreed to re-open the supply pipeline. He made it clear that he was responding to the request the President put to him yesterday afternoon. But he wants to meet with you and said he would be glad to do so in Nice on October 14th. Hank Cohen can join you. (✓)

The President: Yesterday, President Mobutu told me he would put past events behind him and move toward the future. He proposed that you and the MPLA meet with him in Kinshasa on October 25th, alone (i.e. without the other 6 African presidents), and sign a cease-fire -- after you've met him in Nice, and after he's re-opened the supply pipeline. The agreement would be based on the three principles from Gbadolite. (✓)

Secretary Baker: As the President mentioned, we want as much additional support from the other Africans as possible. But you need to keep President Mobutu on board as the mediator. We think this is an offer in good faith, and hope you'll pick it up. (✓)

The President: Perhaps someone can type this out (the points from President Mobutu's conversation that morning with Assistant Secretary Cohen) and get it to Dr. Savimbi. (Cohen undertook to do so.) (✓)

Secretary Baker: President Mobutu may not have come here with this agreement in mind, but after the President leaned on him pretty hard yesterday afternoon, this is what he agreed to do. (✓)

The President: I don't want to prejudice your thinking. I know you need time to think about it and study it. But if you have a reaction to it, it would be helpful to us to have. (✓)

Dr. Savimbi: I have to make clear to you my concern that with President Mobutu as both the mediator and having a role in the supply of logistics to UNITA; it puts us in a very difficult position. He is in the position of a mediator who puts his views on the table, but is in a position to cut off supplies to one side if it doesn't agree with him. (✓)

The President: You mustn't overestimate our leverage with him. Still, we may be able to help out here a bit. (C)

Dr. Savimbi: We have studied possible alternatives (to supply through Zaire); although we're OK for now, we hope you'll take a look at them. (C)

Secretary Baker: We'll be glad to take a look at them. (C)

The President: (To Savimbi) You're meeting with Secretary Baker tomorrow? (C)

Secretary Baker: (To Savimbi) Give me your thoughts when you see me tomorrow. (C)

The President: Let me give you a thought -- and this has a bit to do with "pride." We all know President Mobutu is a proud man. But he has a right to be proud. He's the leader of a mighty nation. He has withstood the challenges of communism for more than 20 years. He feels a bit wounded by some of the attacks he has seen on him in the press. I think there's a bit of a need to salve some wounds right now. You (Savimbi) didn't like going to Gbadolite and sticking out your hand toward Dos Santos and not having a photographer there to record it. I think maybe the argument has become a bit too personal. I've dealt with President Mobutu over a period of many years -- a long time. I think there's a need to make some amends. (C)

Dr. Savimbi: Allow me two points, Mr. President. First, it is very important that there be a steady and firm position from Washington. After the Gbadolite summit, we (UNITA's senior leadership) travelled to five different African countries to ask for their understanding and help: in each one, they asked "what do the Americans think?" (C)

The second is the importance to us of elections: we would like your support on our call for elections. (U)

The President: Well, we can certainly help in that respect. And I hope that all these pictures (taken between the President and the UNITA leadership) will help. (U)

Secretary Baker: We're passing the word to everyone we talk to, all around Africa and elsewhere, that we support you. (U)

Dr. Savimbi: Finally, Mr. President, let me ask your views on what I should be saying to the press -- who will probably be waiting for me just outside the door. (C)

The President: You should feel free to say anything you want to say. You can certainly say that we support you completely. I think probably the only area you might want to be a bit careful is about representing what President Mobutu and I talked about, and what President Mobutu said he would do. (C)

Secretary Baker: You should say you have our unswerving support. (C)

The meeting ended at 11:15 a.m. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:	Meeting with President Francesco Cossiga of Italy (U)
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Notetaker) Francesco Cossiga, President Sergio Berlinguer, Secretary General of the Presidency
DATE, TIME AND PLACE:	October 11, 1989, 10:45 - 11:05 a.m. EDT The Oval Office

Following the arrival ceremony for President Cossiga's State Visit, the President and President Cossiga proceeded to the Oval Office for a one-on-one meeting. (U)

The President: Let me welcome you once again to the White House. I am pleased to say that our relationship is excellent, with no nagging special problems. (U)

President Cossiga: I am especially pleased to be here. There is a particular reason for my pleasure. Nine years ago, after we decided to deploy cruise missiles, I came here as Prime Minister. It was a very troubled time, and it was important to send the Soviets a signal that they could not divide us. We made the cruise missile decision with the peace of mind that it was the right thing to do. We wanted the Soviet Union to understand what was really happening -- that they could not divide us and should negotiate. Brezhnev's reaction was strong, and Schmidt and I paid a political price for it, but you will forgive me for being proud of our decision. (U)

The President: You should be proud. The danger now is there are many who see no reason for defense. We cannot go too far now and base Alliance policy on our hopes. (U)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
06-0577-MR
5/13/09 KO

President Cossiga: The action of Congress on the 401st -- despite the fact that it was an Alliance decision -- is puzzling. I do not know why the Congress is objecting. One Congresswoman in particular is likening this to the construction of the cruise missile bases. Supposedly useless expenditures can prove very valuable. If CFE makes it unnecessary to transfer the 401st, that event would be great, but it would be better to have negotiated a balance of forces that includes a transfer of the 401st. ~~(C)~~

The President: You should tell this to the Congress. ~~(C)~~

President Cossiga: I am not known as a warmonger. (C)

The President: Those who said cruise missile deployment was a provocation were wrong. They should admit it. (U)

President Cossiga: An Italian correspondent of a Warsaw Pact country interviewed me for an hour and a half. I told him that prudence and courage were the right approach to take with the Soviet Union. The fact that we remain united on arms control is useful to demonstrate that the old way of overpowering and dividing us is wrong and will not work. (U)

The President: Prudence is sometimes taken as timidity, as in the reaction to our policy in Panama. (U)

President Cossiga: Even a proper action is perceived as proper only if it succeeds. The Panamanian affair is not viewed as negatively in Europe as it seems to be here. (U)

The President: We are taking flack now, but I am confident that our actions are correct and will eventually be vindicated. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Expanded Meeting with President Francesco Cossiga of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Peter F. Secchia, Ambassador to Italy
Robert L. Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Francesco Cossiga, President
Gianni De Michelis, Foreign Minister
Sergio Berlinguer, Secretary General of the Presidency
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Bruno Bottai, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Giovanni Domenido, Diplomatic Advisor to the President
Ludovico Ortona, Director, Press and Information Office
Alessandro Grafini, Deputy Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 11, 1989, 11:10 - 11:35 a.m. EDT
The Cabinet Room

Following their meeting in the Oval Office, the President escorted President Cossiga to the Cabinet Room for an expanded meeting. (U)

The President: Mr. President, I apologize for taking so much time in our private meeting. Let me welcome you all to the White House. This will be a short meeting, but we can follow up this evening. First, let me reiterate some of what I said before. This is a visit between two countries that have never been closer

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
06-0577-MR
5/13/09 KO

than they are today. I had an opportunity to tell President Cossiga how much we value the Italian decision on INF, which helped move East-West relations forward. I would like to hear your views, especially on Eastern Europe, where change is coming fast. (U)

President Cossiga: Let me reiterate my thanks, and those of our foreign minister, for your invitation. Our meeting is a reaffirmation of the very special relationship between Italy and the United States, which is valuable in its own right and which also has practical results within the Atlantic Alliance. There are a multitude of reasons: ethnic and cultural, as well as our shared values. We do not forget your young people who came to our shores to die for freedom. (C)

The most important issues we have to discuss concern East-West relations. We have passed from a period of confrontation to one of detente, characterized by nonbelligerence and a search for less conflictual relations. We were faced with a united bloc under the supremacy of the Soviet Union, but thanks to our determination this situation no longer holds. There is great movement in the eastern part of Europe. Analysts ask about Gorbachev's chances of success, but it is a mistake to link these changes to Gorbachev himself. Gorbachev is a product of deeper changes, though of course he has had the prudence and wisdom to act. The problem in the east is more profound: it is a crisis of ideology, a crisis of the model of government, and a crisis of reconciling the political system with civic life. The Soviet Union cannot manage its economic system without deep and far-reaching reforms. Therefore we are witnessing a crisis of the Soviet model and of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist system. The passage will be a slow process, whose first effects are in economic and nationalities problems. There will be ups and downs, but our conviction is that the Soviet Union cannot return to the old situation. Perhaps if Gorbachev fails the Soviet Union will try to turn back -- but with very high costs, including for us. Therefore we must support the reform ideas of Mr. Gorbachev, giving to him our prudent confidence. I stress the word prudent, because Gorbachev also needs to show there is no other alternative to his approach. (C)

As the President said in Poland, we do not want to suggest that we are trying to gain political and strategic advantage. This would only play into the hands of the hard-liners. Poland and Hungary, each of which has very particular difficulties, are running great dangers. In Poland, economic problems could threaten the political evolution; and the economic effects of faster reform in Hungary could jeopardize political change there as well. Beside our political strategy, we must also proceed on conventional, nuclear and chemical disarmament. Your meetings with Shevardnadze showed Soviet willingness and need to negotiate. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

We should also add Yugoslavia to our discussion. The true independence of Yugoslavia is of the utmost importance for the Western world. As an example, I invited the Italian military to estimate how much we have saved in defense spending by not having to counter a Yugoslav threat. Yugoslavia is also an important factor in the transformation of Eastern Europe. You know that Italy has shown through deeds its adherence to the Atlantic Alliance, but we are a curious state in some respects. The Secretary General of our Communist Party has declared his support for NATO membership. Italy, in agreement with our Allies, has an important role to play in Eastern Europe. In Hungary we have a traditional role. Our relations with Yugoslavia cover a very broad range of economic, political, and military cooperation. Therefore we believe we can cooperate in a specific manner, also with Austria and Hungary. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take pride in a meeting of these four countries. Our approach is not based on fantasy nor independent of the overall policy of the West, but as part of our common strategy. ~~(C)~~

To sum up, I believe I have explained our thinking. A Washington Post correspondent in Europe said I was supporting your policy of prudence. This is true, but I also support the policies of a President who had the courage to go to Poland and Hungary. I hope you will also go to the Soviet Union, not because you need it but because Gorbachev needs it. Prudence side by side with courage: your policy is both courageous and prudent. I apologize for having spoken like a professor. (C)

The President: Your remarks were exactly what I hoped for. We have no concerns at all regarding your initiative with Yugoslavia. I do understand that the Polish prime minister is going to Italy soon. It is important that we do all we can to help. We asked our Congress to approve a $200 million grant, which would be our contribution to the $1 billion stabilization fund the Polish Government has requested. At the G-7 Summit, we agreed to work together to support Poland and Hungary. We agree on the need for fundamental reform, but Poland needs an early manifestation of our support. We want to work together with Italy and others to ensure that Poland gets that support. (C)

I should also mention that as relations improve with the Soviet Union, it becomes more difficult to get funding for defense. We must keep our guard up. In that context, I appreciate your help with the transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. ~~(C)~~

The one contentious issue I should mention concerns the Olivetti case and the transfer of sensitive technology. I hope we can resolve our differences, because we are very concerned about transferring technology that has an impact on our security. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: We have discussed the issue and will follow up at lunch. (U)

The President: You will also want to discuss Libya. I do not believe that we have wide differences, but because of your geographic location there may be some differences of approach. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE 9134

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
William H. Taft, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Raymond G. H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Philip D. Zelikow, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General
W. Robert Pearson, Deputy Assistant Secretary General
James Cunningham, Private Office Director

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 11, 1989, 2:00 - 2:30 pm
Oval Office

The President: I want to get your views on the changes going on. I worry that on our side we will get hit on the defense budget more than we should, due to this sense of euphoria. I don't think this will strain our commitment to NATO, but I hope it will not have too strong an effect on our allies in Europe. (∅)

Secretary General Woerner: I just spoke on this matter in Rome. I am concerned about structural disarmament. We need to make a stronger case that good defenses are required because of this period of change, the potential for instability in a period of transition. Intentions today are clear, but what about tomorrow? (∅)

I wanted to tell you two things. First, the only safe basis for managing the Western approach in this time of change is through NATO. Second, we need to identify NATO more as a political alliance dealing with political change. Your leadership during the Summit galvanized the Alliance. We still live on that. We

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

should follow up on the Summit Declaration to link NATO with positive values like peace, change, and greater freedom. (✓)

Although this is not for the public, the EC role in Poland is good, but now there is a pattern of leaving things to Europe. It is in the interest of the U.S. to use NATO as a political platform to coordinate policy, not just on defense, but as an instrument for your leadership and influence, even if the level of your forces goes down. Many groups are now involved with Eastern Europe -- the EC, the OECD, the World Bank, etc. NATO should not take their place in implementing policy, but we need one place for coordination of a common approach. The role of NATO here is equivalent to visible American leadership. (✓)

The President: Are there weak sisters causing more unravelling within the Alliance that need more bilateral efforts from us? (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: No, the need for NATO is not in question, though we have more defense problems with some than with others. I will discuss this with Secretary Cheney. (✓)

Governor Sununu: Does it seem that those countries which are weaker on defense want more political leverage? (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: No. (✓)

General Scowcroft: I do not think so. (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: I am also concerned about my own country. (✓)

The President: The elections next year? (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: No, the whole situation. There is no settled solution. (✓)

The President: How do you answer questions about German reunification, both as Secretary General and as a citizen of the FRG? (✓)

Secretary General Woerner: I make two points. First, it is clear that the current situation is untenable. We have a clear Alliance vision for overcoming the division of Europe. Self-determination is the key. We want self-determination for all, including East Germans. The Allies are committed to German unity through self-determination. Second, this is not a policy problem for tomorrow. The main thing is to continue encouraging change in Eastern Europe and the GDR, and press the Soviet leaders to allow it. (✓)

The GDR leadership understands what many people do not see, that if you take away the Communist Party there is no reason for the East German State to exist. The GDR's chief idealogue published an article two months ago saying just this. Gorbachev will not

allow the GDR to leave the Warsaw Pact. If it leaves, that is the end. He needs the GDR in order to keep the others in. (S)

The President: Why is that so bad for Gorbachev? It's a new day -- perhaps he will decide the Warsaw Pact is not essential, that he does not need to rely on military might. Suppose he made a dramatic move. That may seem naive, but who predicted the changes we are seeing today? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: You could try to convince him that it is better just to have friendly neighbors. But that is not realistic. The Russians see the Warsaw Pact as the great achievement of the war. Their dominance contributes to a feeling of security. They consider the Warsaw Pact a condition of their world power position. They are entirely occupied with the idea of their equality with the United States. (S)

The President: No, I probably won't convince him. I was just thinking. How are we doing with Greece now? (S)

Secretary General Woerner: It will depend on the election. There might be better relations if the conservatives win. (S)

Ambassador Taft: We need a strong government there. They now can't give an inch to the Turks. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: The Turks are more generous on Alliance matters. (S)

The President: The Turks want to get into the EC. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: What is your feeling about progress in arms control? (U)

The President: We are going forward with CFE. We see no impediment there right now. Everyone is together now and Shevardnadze said they want to work this out expeditiously. Brent or Bob could go into the technical details more, but we think this is worth pushing. On CW, we have made a proposal but recognize some difficult verification problems. We now have a little high ground, but I am not optimistic about results because of the verification problems. On START, Brent would you comment? (S)

General Scowcroft: Akhromeyev was astonishingly frank in talking about various formulas and tradeoffs, more than in Wyoming. Wyoming indicated more flexibility on their side. It is too early to say, however, if they want real movement. (S)

The President: I think they want a START agreement badly. (S)

General Scowcroft: I don't know yet. They want a CFE treaty. We'll see more by the Summit next year. (S)

Mr. Gates: Shevardnadze is preoccupied with internal problems. He talked all about it on the plane to Wyoming. They need CFE

and START, but they haven't figured out how to get from here to there in a way that will satisfy their government. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: We need to maintain pressure and keep the initiative. Your CW proposal was good. NATO is dominating the agenda. (C)

General Scowcroft: In CFE we have as many problems within the Alliance as we do with the East. (S)

Secretary General Woerner: What do you think about the future of Eastern Europe? (U)

The President: There will be more dynamic change unless it gets to a point where the Soviets cannot accept it. There may be a line out there, or it may result in Gorbachev's departure. We were speculating about this a month ago. If the hard-liners take over, all bets are off. There could possibly be an iron fist. If we leave that contingency out, I can't say how far things could go. (S)

So we should just not be imprudent, not push the Soviets beyond that hidden line. I want to be sure I understand the nationalities and other problems in the Soviet Union so we do not inadvertently alarm them. You don't handle this with a new initiative every day or call the shots on how fast change will come to all these governments. We should stay on the high ground. This calls for a certain delicacy, and when I see Gorbachev we will talk about it, not to draw lines, but to get a feel for his views. Bob Gates is a Soviet expert. (S)

Mr. Gates: Once constraints are lifted, it is hard to put things back in the box. They will want East European states to remain in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, and avoid anti-Soviet actions. Beyond that it is unclear what Moscow will allow. Can they accept such change for East Germany? I agree with Secretary General Woerner. (S)

The President: There could be different possibilities for Czechoslovakia. Let me give you an example of how we conduct ourselves. Yeltsin came here -- he is quite a character. We didn't want to stick a finger in Gorbachev's eye, but we're not unafraid either. If they see Ted Kennedy why can't I see Yeltsin? They understood it. Brent worked out a good formula. That's an example of the need for understanding. At the same time, we can't just worry about Gorbachev being mad. (C)

[Secretary Baker and Assistant Secretary Seitz joined the meeting.]

Secretary Baker: I bring greetings from President Cossiga. (U)

The President: We've just had a good talk. You should feel the door is open here anytime. We're most respectful of what you're doing and can talk with no holds barred. (C)

Secretary General Woerner: You should maintain your strong leadership during this time of uncertainty. (Ø)

The President: If you see a vacuum being created, or anything we can do bilaterally or by speaking out, let me hear about that. (Ø)

Secretary General Woerner: I won't hesitate. There are some other matters I wish to take up with Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft. You should use the Alliance for managing East-West relations. Don't let the Europeans go their own way. Use it. (Ø)

The President: Cossiga told me a Summit would be important for Gorbachev. (Ø)

Secretary General Woerner: More important than for you, I agree with Cossiga. There are many reasons. He has internal problems and needs to be seen as your equal, deciding the fate of the world together with the American President. This is his backup. With problems everywhere, he can be seen as the one who achieves things with the great superpower. (Ø)

Confirmed Mtg w/
Markovic of Yugoslavia
on Oct 13th
No Memcon

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON 8480

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Donald P. Gregg, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Douglas H. Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Chang-ho Lie, Interpreter

Roh Tae Woo, President
Choi Ho Joong, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lee Sang Hoon, Minister of Defense
Han Seung Joo, Minister of Trade and Industry
Park Tong Jin, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea
Hong Sung Chul, Secretary General to the President
Lee Hyun Woo, Director General, Presidential Security Service
Kim Chong Whi, Presidential Adviser for National Security and Foreign Affairs
Roe Chang Hee, Senior Protocol Secretary to the President, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 17, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 1:13 p.m. EDT
Oval Office/Cabinet Room/Old Family Dining Room

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
OSD 8/12/2009
2000-0429-F

The President and President Roh met for forty minutes in the Oval Office, accompanied by their national security advisers and interpreters. (U)

The President: Welcome to the White House. (U)

President Roh: I appreciate your invitation. I know how busy you are. I would like to raise several issues. You have mentioned a new breeze of peace in your inaugural address. This change in the eastern world comes from our pressure forcing them to change, not from their own willingness. Your leadership and that of President Reagan has made this happen. With U.S. support, Korea has developed economically and socially. We are proud of our progress in democratization. On the security relationship, first, we are reassured by your firm commitment to the defense of Korea. Polls show that 95 percent of the Korean people wish continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea. I think the American people support it as well. (S)

The President: Yes, that commitment is strongly supported. (S)

President Roh: U.S. forces play a critical role. They are a deterrent to North Korea and a major element in the overall balance of power in Asia. If the Asian-Pacific countries are growing rapidly -- and they are as a result of U.S. help -- they will be able to pay a little of this debt to the U.S. We have these security discussions. We will endeavor in them to increase our share of the defense burden. We are concerned with the presence of U.S. soldiers in the center of Seoul. We are discussing all relevant issues in a cooperative way to move them to the south. (S)

The President: I hope our people are being cooperative and that the talks are moving forward. (S)

President Roh: As a small example, the golf course is right in the city center. We have started a new course outside Seoul. It will be ready in about one year. One other thing, our concern about North Korean nuclear activity -- I hope North Korea will soon agree to safeguards and the U.S. will press to have North Korea open to inspections. (S)

The President: We have little influence with North Korea, but if there is something we can do, we are ready. We are suspicious of that facility and certainly are ready to help in any way. (S)

President Roh: May I turn to the Korean domestic situation? I apologize for the trashing of the Ambassador's house in Seoul. (S)

The President: We understand. You cannot control every crazy bastard and neither can we. Put it out of your mind. We appreciate your thoughts, but do not worry. (S)

President Roh: Thank you very much. As you know, on June 29, 1987, I promised to pursue the course of democracy. We have now exterminated the last traces of authoritarianism. I have found that democratization is easier said than done. All the pent-up demands are bursting out, which makes it difficult to concentrate on all the big issues. But I am determined to continue. The biggest current problem is radical leftist groups which are prepared to use violence. Some are influenced by North Korea. They endanger law and order, throwing molotov cocktails, etc. We have joined with the opposition for new regulations on the possession of firearms, etc. (S)

The President: There is a lot of support in the U.S. for you in the troubles you are having. We see the provocative behavior of the radicals, and public opinion is supportive of what you are trying to do. (S)

President Roh: Thank you for your understanding. I was called the "water president" -- the water against fire president. Can I say more? (S)

The President: We should go next door, but there is still time. And then we go over to lunch. (U)

President Roh: I would like to refer to trade issues until we join the others. I would like to discuss our nordpolitik. Our policy, following the Olympics, has been successful. Our object is to cultivate relations with the socialist bloc to blunt any activities by North Korea. We have established relations with Hungary and hope to do so with Poland and Yugoslavia. We are having contacts with the Soviets. But much Soviet talk has not been accompanied by action. They have taken away old weapons, but replaced them with new, and are providing support for North Korea. In China, the opening to the outside world has been set back. Even in Japan, the weakening of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) is of concern. So the role of the U.S. in Korean security is of the utmost importance to us. (S)

The President: I agree with your assessment. We are trying to maneuver to get Chinese relations back on track. We watch your relations with North Korea with favor and support. We have no objections to improving your relations with the socialist bloc. I assure you, we will never surprise you with North Korea. (S)

President Roh: I served for a long time as president of the Olympic Coordinating Committee, and in that capacity I traveled around the world. We have relations with Iran which might be helpful. We want to help in any way we can. (S)

The President: Thank you. Our relations with Iran are moving only slowly. The hostages are very important to us. We concern ourselves about every single life, but we are not discouraged about making some headway with Iran. Now we better join the others before we both get fired. (S)

The two presidents then joined the rest of the party in the Cabinet Room, 11:40 a.m. - 12:20 p.m. EDT. (U)

The President: Welcome everyone. President Roh and I covered about every subject in our meeting except the commercial aspects. At the outset, I want to say welcome. We have looked forward to this visit. It is an opportunity to make clear on this side of the table how this relationship is, and it is in very good shape. I told the President that we view the security aspect as very important. The U.S. is never going to surprise your country. We have not changed our view on the threat to your country. Time is short. The floor is yours, and we can continue at lunch. (S)

President Roh: In order to save time, I would like to repeat what the President said, and I would like to double it. As the President mentioned, we had occasion to discuss the very important security relationship between our two countries. I would like to raise something about trade. First, I would like to express satisfaction that we have resolved some issues between us. I express appreciation for Secretary Mosbacher and Ambassador Hills, who visited us recently. I am particularly satisfied with our results precluding Super 301 sanctions and our recent conclusion of talks on driftnet fishing. We will, of course, continue to liberalize and open our markets more widely in the future, so that by the middle of the next decade we will reach the level in market opening of the OECD countries. Those who have visited Korea recently will fully understand. We are fully engaged in adjusting the economic structure. In a short span of time, we have made some efforts which Japan took the past three decades to accomplish. On the average, the other industrial sectors are going on smoothly and acceptably, with the exception of agriculture. Twenty percent of our people are engaged in agriculture. We have been engaged in industry in our country for not very long. Before departing Seoul, I was briefed by the Minister of Industry and Trade, and I was happy to hear from him. As of the end of August this year, the trade deficit with the U.S. diminished by 33 percent, since the same time last year. I mention this not to be complacent. We will continue on

this road. If there are any questions on this issue, I will ask the Cabinet members to speak. (S)

The President: You have been most hospitable to Secretary Mosbacher, Ambassador Hills and Vice President Quayle. Their talks gave me great encouragement. Agriculture is difficult for you, but please understand, it is difficult for us. I mean we have got to press on this worldwide. That, telecommunications, intellectual property rights -- you might think that these items would be of less importance to us, but they tie into our overall relationship. They are in the trade area, but spill over into the security area, given the mood in our Congress. Inasmuch as the President offered graciously to respond to questions, has anyone got any questions? (S)

Secretary Mosbacher: The President and his ministers were most kind and gracious to me, and I thank you. I appreciate the progress you have made to date. Aside from the intellectual property rights area, when we -- Minister Han and I -- have talked about continuing progress, we have been very hopeful. We will see some movement in telecommunications, where to date we have not seen opportunities for our companies that we believe we should have seen by now. Whether fiber optics, etc. -- depending on prices -- we hope our companies will have opportunities. (C)

Minister Han: I think we have been rather successful to solve problems through mutual dialogue and consultations. The Super 301 settlement set a very good precedent, not just for us, but for other countries as well. In view of the market opening in Korea, I hope the U.S. will view Korea in the longer term and broader perspective. Korea has done more than other countries at a similar stage of development. In viewing the trade problems of specific countries, we have to look at the general trend. We are working for free trade, even though problems come up from time to time. Some of the specific areas mentioned by Secretary Mosbacher -- IPR, telecommunications, and agriculture -- can be solved satisfactorily based on mutual confidence and taking due considerations of the specific difficulties in each country. (C)

The President: Mr. President, shall we walk to lunch in the White House? (U)

President Roh: Yes, Mr. President, we can go to lunch. Before we do, just one word; I told the same story to Ambassador Hills when she visited. Everything has its own time. If an apple is not ripe enough, it will not taste sweet. We want to enjoy it when it is ripe. (U)

The President: We don't want to be so old that we won't be able to taste it. (laughter) In private, the President said he was concerned about the attack on Ambassador Gregg's residence. Not to worry. Don Gregg is expendable. (laughter) On the North Korean nuclear program, we see eye-to-eye. As for the Koreans' interest in the communist countries, we certainly understand that. We are keeping our eyes open on changes in the Soviet Union. But we are being realistic, and we will watch for changes that may affect your area. One last point, particularly for the benefit of our guests from Korea, the President expressed his commitment to democracy. There is concern for demonstrators. I see that these demonstrators do not generate sympathy in this country. Those pictures do not undermine our relations in my view. (S)

The party then proceeded to lunch, 12:20 p.m. - 1:13 p.m. EDT. (U)

The President: Have you had any recent contacts with China? Any feelings about what is happening in China? (S)

President Roh: You know better than I. We have limited contacts with China. In the Chinese cultural tradition, abrupt change will not be welcomed by the Chinese people. I see no basic change. Of course, the ruling circles have difficulty ruling the country with tight control. Our businessmen visit China. We held an ethnic Korean sports festival. Chinese Koreans who came shared the same feelings, that it is a temporary setback. My personal advice is for the U.S. to have some tolerance. Treat them in a generous manner. Give them some time. Let them learn from their mistakes. (S)

The President: We are trying to preserve overall relations -- not set them back any further. I tried not to take steps that would hurt the Chinese people, such as economic measures. We stayed away from that. The right time is important in getting back on track. The human rights violations were so pronounced and visible, that I could not act as if everything was okay. (S)

President Roh: Yes, you are very much right. We have to tackle this patiently. You know the Chinese people well, you were there, so you deal with patience. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Foreign Minister and I remarked that we have met four times in eight months. We have covered in some detail most of the issues between us. I must mention that we will continue to make clear our commitment to the security of Korea. At the same time, we are facing budget pressures, which the Secretary of Defense is subjected to. We need to spend some

time strategizing how to maintain the strength of the relationship. I should also say that in meetings with the Soviet Foreign Minister in Wyoming, I specifically raised the issue of North Korean nuclear proliferation. I told him how negatively we would react, what the problem is in our eyes, and the problem for South Korea. They profess to be equally concerned, and said they would raise it with North Korea as they had before. I have no reason to doubt that they will raise it nor to believe that it will stop North Korea. The Soviets, of course, answered with questions about nuclear weapons in South Korea. I said this issue was entirely different. It has to do with deterrence against the substantial imbalance that exists. (S)

President Roh: Yes, that is a completely different matter. We have neither confirmed nor denied the existence of nuclear weapons. (S)

Secretary Baker: I did not confirm that either. (S)

President Roh: I am happy you had successful meetings with the Foreign Minister. I hope you will have some influence on North Korea, although I am doubtful. During the Olympics, we asked you to help with North Korea. There was not much effect, by this I mean the terrorists' destruction of KAL 858. (S)

The President: Are any leaders in North Korea reasonable? (C)

President Roh: There may be some, but in practical terms it is almost impossible. Kil Il-sung enjoys god-like status, similar to Mao Zedong. After him, there is some chance for a more reasonable leader. We have some people, for instance, former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of DPRK forces in the Korean War and former Ambassador to Moscow, who was a political exile in Moscow for a long time, who have come to Seoul and told insider stories. Overall, we cannot be optimistic. But there is some possibility after Kim. (S)

The President: Is Kim Chung-il's succession guaranteed? (C)

President Roh: For practical purposes, the son is the number 2 for substantive affairs. Ninety percent of the power over domestic affairs is in his hands. He will succeed, but it is a question of how long he will survive. There are about 300,000 exiled Koreans in the Soviet Union who can be counted as against him. For China, there are two million, of whom 85 percent side with the South against the North. (C)

Ambassador Gregg: Arbatov's man, who was visiting Seoul, called and visited me. He had seen Pyongyang's Youth Festival on

television. It reminded the Soviets of life under Stalin. He said that his hope is that as U.S.-USSR relations improve, they will provide a role model for North-South relations. (Ø)

The President: The President and I, while in the Oval Office, discussed military relations. Perhaps Secretary Cheney would like to say something. (Ø)

Secretary Cheney: Mr. President, one of the items I will discuss today with Minister Lee is the Korean Fighter Program. Secretary Mosbacher raised this during his visit to Korea. This is an important program, in the security interest of the U.S. and Korea. I might mention we were successful this year in defeating Congressional proposals requiring reductions in Korea. I am fairly confident that the final legislation will require me at least to study this issue. There is no intention to weaken our commitment by anyone in the U.S., but there will be continued debate over how we position our forces and what levels are involved. (Ø)

President Roh: Yes, Mr. Secretary. I hope you have a good conversation with Minister Lee. I would stress one point -- our very unique situation. You liberated us, saved us from destruction, supported us all this time. As a boy in a student's uniform, I joined the army when my country was invaded, and I served in Vietnam. We have shared ideals, including liberty. I am willing to continue in that spirit with the U.S. We miss the Vice President here today, but when he was in South Korea, he reaffirmed your government's firm commitment to our defense. We had very good discussions. I want to talk about his experience in going to the front lines. He insisted on going to the dangerous spots against the advice of his staff. Ambassador Gregg was with him. He had his way and visited your forces on the very front line. The soldiers were encouraged; he set a very good example. (Ø)

Ambassador Gregg: It was a very good experience. It got my tenure as Ambassador jump-started. We went to the National Assembly, as I did in 1982 with you. The four party leaders all said the same things about democracy and security. (Ø)

President Roh: Democratization is very praiseworthy. Some politicians get out of touch sometimes. (Ø)

Ambassador Hills: I am struck at how defense relations are interrelated with success in economic and trade talks. As I mentioned when I was there, Korea built a tremendous wave of appreciation for the way it handled Super 301. I hope what was gained in May will not be lost in the autumn. I hope for

progress on intellectual property rights, telecommunications and agriculture as a symbol of goodwill and cooperation. We need to maintain that spirit to accomplish all that we accomplish together. (Ø)

President Roh: Mrs. Hills, thank you. I would like to turn to Pacific Basin cooperation. I hope the Foreign Ministers will discuss this. As you know, the Asian-Pacific region is more and more important. Twenty percent of the world's GNP is in the region; forty percent of world trade is Pacific trade. There will be more in the coming decade. During Australian Prime Minister Hawke's visit to Seoul, we discussed this and I said we have to include Canada and the U.S. Now in November there will be a ministerial meeting in Australia. I hope the U.S. will continue to lead the way in Pacific Cooperation. (Ø)

The President: We will lead. More and more Americans recognize that the Pacific rim is important in its economic and political relationships. We are willing to go the extra mile. (Ø)

President Roh: Especially during the Seoul Olympics, that vitality was shown. That vitality is now dampened by some domestic problems. The people of the Asian-Pacific region showed vibrancy. This strengthened my impression of the prospects of the Asian-Pacific region. (Ø)

The meeting ended with a brief exchange between the Presidents on the Olympic Games and on Korea's pleasure at having Ambassador Gregg serve there. (Ø)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (6 pp.)	10/19/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By GH (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(121)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8443

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
508
2000-0429-F
#121

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Joseph Zappala, U.S. Ambassador to Spain
Adrian Basora, Director for European Economic Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Foreign Minister
Carlos Solchaga, Finance Minister
Rosa Conde, Minister/Government Spokesperson
Julian Santamaria, Spanish Ambassador to U.S.
Fernando Gomez Aviles-Casco, Secretary General of Commerce
Eudaldo Mirapeix, Foreign Ministry Director General for North America
Juan Antonio Yanez, International Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 19, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President: First, I want to wish you a very warm welcome to Washington. We have a wide range of issues to discuss. Let me suggest that you lead off with the issues that are on your mind. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: There have been very positive changes in our bilateral relations. These have to do in part with Spain's own internal political and economic evolution as well as Spain's attempt to define its international role and move away from its previous isolationism. We are ratifying our membership in the WEU; we are fully involved in the construction of the European community, and we are participants in the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
8/21/09
2000-0429-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

nonproliferation treaty. Our policies are becoming more defined, more open to the rest of the world. Spain is becoming firmly identified as a European, Western nation. (Ø)

As to relations with the United States, we are looking for points of expanded cooperation. There had been difficulties in recent years, but now these have been overcome. We need to define Spain's relationship with the U.S. within the new East-West context. We Western Europeans are focusing very heavily, sometimes obsessively, on the changes in Eastern Europe. At times we worry about them. The speed of change is almost dizzying. In Poland, there is no alternative to the present government because it represents the alternative. The alternative is already in power and we cannot let it fail. (Ø)

In Hungary, it is remarkable that the country has even changed its name as part of the reform process. In Poland, remarkably, the Secretary General of the Communist Party told the King that the page in Poland had been definitively turned on the Communist experience.
(Ø)

In this period of change and stability, it would be frivolous to say that NATO is no longer needed. The Federal German Republic represents a special challenge that we must deal with carefully.
(Ø)

With regard to bilateral relations, we would like to build up our exchanges based on agreements in the cultural and scientific fields, as well as in areas such as taxation, which can help to encourage investment in both directions. It is a sign of the times that, over the past year, Spanish investment in the U.S. actually exceeded U.S. investment in Spain -- although I am sure this trend will not continue. (Ø)

The President: As I assess our bilateral relations, I see them as very sound. The very fact that you are here in the midst of an election campaign says something about the relationship. I agree with you regarding the dynamics of change in Eastern Europe. We support that change, and Secretary Brady is working hard to help put together financing to assist in the economic reforms there. (Ø)

When I was in Poland last July, it was remarkable to see General Jaruzelski and Solidarity leaders all in the same room for lunch at our Ambassador's residence. Even though Jaruzelski had jailed these same leaders only a few years earlier, they were joking together. We have a great affection for Poland here in the U.S.; in fact, it is said that there are more Poles, or Polish-Americans, in Chicago than in Warsaw. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Regarding NATO, Secretary General Woerner visited Washington recently and suggested that NATO play a larger role regarding the changes in Eastern Europe. I am not sure exactly what he had in mind. I would be interested in hearing your views. (C)

Secretary Baker: The Prime Minister and I had an interesting talk last night about the Soviet Union. Regarding NATO, it will definitely have a continuing role, not a diminished role, certainly not in the near term. We will need NATO to help us manage the changes in Eastern Europe. We will need it to help us deal with the consequences of the demise of Communism, even if there is less of a military challenge facing the alliance. Woerner's idea is that NATO can help to formulate the Western response, thus building up the political aspects of the NATO mandate. (C)

The Vice President: Based on my travels to Latin America, I am very impressed by Prime Minister Gonzalez' standing with Latin American leaders. With his prestige, he can help solve the problems that we face in Nicaragua and Panama. (C)

Secretary Brady: Spain has been very helpful in implementing the new debt strategy. We very much appreciate Spain's role. There are two ways of looking at the debt problem: one approach takes account of the problems of our own banking system; the other looks at the debt problems of the countries themselves. On the latter score, I am frequently asked if Spain will provide new money to help alleviate the problem. (C)

I would also like to mention our goal of assuring full financing of the $1 billion structural adjustment fund to support economic reform in Poland. The U.S. has offered to put up $200 million. We need to find the other $800 million, and I hope that Spain will contribute. (C)

The President: I had a group of bankers over the White House for drinks recently and I am now very sympathetic to Nick Brady's problem in getting the bankers to put up new money. I had thought that bringing them to the White House would help soften them up, but then I overhead them talking among themselves off in a corner. They were complaining about the difficult sacrifices we were asking them to make. (C)

I am very impressed with Mexican President Salinas, both with the debt restructuring agreement he has signed on to, and with the steps he has taken since then to implement this agreement. (C)

Secretary Cheney: I had the honor to host a visit from Defense Minister Serra just recently. We had excellent discussions, which made it clear that our relationship has progressed beyond

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the base negotiations to a stage of normal relations within the alliance. We talked about setting up a bilateral consultative group involving our two ministries of defense, which is something I would like to do. I very much agree that NATO's role will be important in providing continuity and stability in Europe over the coming years. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Turning back to Eastern Europe, I think it is important to be aware of the limits and difficulties of the reform process in both the political and economic spheres. When our bankers say they don't want to invest in Poland, it is because Poland does not yet have its new economic system in place. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev does not know how to set up a market-based pricing system. Eastern Europe needs time to make the necessary adjustments -- and yet once the windows are open, one can no longer control the speed at which the winds of freedom blow in. (C)

On the Soviet Union, it is not ethnic problems but rather the explosion of nationalisms that represents the gravest danger, for example, in the Baltic republics. This represents one of the limits of perestroika. One of the very important questions we must face is whether the West is prepared to accept this limit. In my view, we cannot attempt to break up the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev needs to have the military blocs continue in existence. Rationality and tranquility is needed on both sides. (C)

Regarding Latin America, it is important not to focus solely on Central America, which we tend to do too much. The problems of democracy throughout the region are important and countries such as Argentina and Chile have more magnitude and impact than those in Central America. In Nicaragua, I think we are seeing an opportunity for democracy to be won irreversibly. I see this as the outcome, whoever wins the elections, as long as they are clean. I say this despite the suspicions that one may have about the Sandinistas. I share these suspicions, in that the Sandinistas do not have a democratic vocation, but I feel that they believe that they cannot avoid democratic elections. The opposition can win in February, or it can win four years later. The important thing is that the electoral process be a clean one. (C)

On Panama, I have some ideas that we might want to discuss, but not a plan. Perhaps we could talk about this tonight. (C)

Finance Minister Solchaga: On the debt issues, Spanish policy has been very positive and we have pushed for a common EC position. We are concerned about the difficulty of finding new funds. It is important to take a variety of approaches to restructuring. We believe that in view of the international debt situation, the U.S. should agree to the proposed quota increase for the IMF. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Foreign Minister Ordonez: In El Salvador, we are trying to provide strong support to President Cristiani. As to the U.S.-Spanish bilateral relationship, we now have a new framework. The new juridical framework should be implemented, for example, the new cultural agreement. I hope we can move quickly to have a new science and technology agreement by overcoming the problems posed in the light of the U.S. Omnibus Trade Act. Fin Min SOlchaga tells me that with regard to the proposed tax treaty, we can finish off our negotiations within five days. On defense industrial cooperation, we would like to see a memorandum of understanding between the Defense department and our defense ministry which would provide for a better trade balance and defense products. On the commercial side, we hope for increased exchanges. The Spanish bid for the Boston-New York train is an example of such a project on which we would appreciate your help. We should also be able to reach nuclear agreements based on the fact that Spain has signed the MPF treaty. And, of course, our Expo '92 in Seville will be a major event in which we look forward to U.S. participation. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: We have asked democratic political parties in Europe to support Mrs. Chamorro in her campaign in Nicaragua. This is permitted by Nicaraguan law. We would like to ask that you consider having Spain doing something in this regard. Also, in view of Spain's prestige in the region it would be very valuable to have Spanish observers in the Nicaraguan elections in addition to the EC observers already planned. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

We, too, want to guarantee that this will be a clean election and Spain is already present in Nicaragua towards this end. (Ø)

The President: Turning back to NATO, we want to push forward on the CFE negotiations. We think your concerns have been met on the paramilitary issue. I have been pleased with the Soviet reaction so far and expect that they will not engage in foot dragging. But it is important that we not have a fractured NATO position. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I agree with you although perhaps the time frame you have set for the CFE negotiations is too short. Although we should try to meet the schedule, there are some real technical problems that need to be sorted out carefully. I agree that alliance cohesion is important. If we can get the Soviets to cut their military spending by as much as 3 or 4 percentage points of GNP, this would be of more assistance to the economy that all of the aid that the NATO allies and Japan could possibly provide. (Ø)

The President: We don't want the goal of completing the CFE negotiations promptly to slip if it can be avoided, so we should try to meet the goal. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzales: I agree with you completely. I will certainly not say anything in public implying that we should prolong the negotiations. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: NATO has now gained the initiative in these negotiations and we should be sure to keep it. (Ø)

Secretary Cheney: I should mention the visit of Soviet Defense Minister Yazov which was an historic first. Our discussions were very interesting indeed. He talked about restructuring in every area except the strategic rocket forces. I asked him a direct question on this, but Yazov ducked it. He is clearly having a difficult time with the transition which is being required of the Soviet military. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The Soviets need to get arms control agreements. (Ø)

On the Middle East, despite the great difficulties, we need to get a dialogue started. The role of the U.S. is critical. I noticed that Secretary Baker was very skeptical yesterday, but even if the situation is difficult we should use whatever opportunities exist. (Ø)

The President: If Secretary Baker was "grumpy" yesterday, it was because Prime Minister Shamir had put the wrong spin on what Secretary Baker was trying to do. First Shamir made a public statement misrepresenting the U.S. position, and then he called me one half hour later to talk about it. What we need to do is to get Shamir to implement his own plan. Instead, he is accusing us of pushing for a "Palestinian state," which is false. I agree that we should continue our engagement as long as there is still some chance. The fact that both the Government of Israel and the PLO are critical of the plan may mean that it is a good plan. (Ø)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It may be that Shamir feels that he needs to say no to his own plan for domestic political reasons, but that at the same time he wants to be pushed to move ahead on the project so that he can say that he had no choice. (Ø)

Secretary Baker: The PLO is also very negative. (Ø)

The President: Let's go out now and make our statements to the press. We'll have more time to talk this evening. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMCON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0371

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Yevgeniy Primakov, Chairman, Council of the Union USSR Supreme Soviet (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)
Interpreter

Yevgeniy Primakov, Chairman, Council of the Union, U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Anatoli A. Sobchak, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, Member of Supreme Soviet Committee on Legality and Law and Order, Head of Law Faculty of Leningrad State University
Ilmar O. Bisher, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, Department Chairman, Council of Nationalities
Oleg A. Krokhalev (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 26, 1989, 3:50 - 4:30 pm
The Oval Office

The President: Welcome. (U)

Chairman Primakov: My colleagues and I are grateful for your receiving us, especially since you are so busy. (U)

The President: Your visit is an important sign of the importance and improving nature of our relationship. (U)

Chairman Primakov: After his visit here, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reported in detail to the Politburo; his talks here caused great interest in the Politburo. President Gorbachev is of the opinion that new possibilities have opened up in our bilateral relationship as is indicated in the letter. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
06-0577-m2
5/13/09 kO

The President: I look forward to reading it. (S)

Chairman Primakov: There was some tension while we waited for your review of our relationship but now we are optimistic. We appreciate your proposals on conventional weapons, Open Skies, and CW. They create the possibility of advancement. (S)

The President: What area do you think is the most important for progress in our relationship: CFE, CW, START, economic relations? What are the priorities? (S)

Chairman Primakov: They all are of high priority. We are witnessing a clearing up of START obstacles. We are impressed with your CFE timetable of an agreement in six months to a year. Our position has become much closer regarding CW. A considerable inpulse to our relationship would occur if by the time of the 1990 Summit, a nuclear testing Treaty could be concluded. Speaking about economic matters, I am aware of some in the U.S. who believe something should be done regarding the Jackson-Vanik amendment. We highly appreciate your position on perestroika and its significance for our country and for the system of international relations. Indeed, within the context of perestroika we face considerable difficulty, both economic and nationality questions. I want you to know that we will go forward and overcome those difficulties. There is no question of this. It is our fate. We are doing everything we can to remove those difficulties by political means, including in the Caucasus. The situation remains difficult. The Armenian republic is blockaded there. We faced a dilemma: to use force or peaceful means. We chose the second road, although some pushed for the first road. In the economic area there are difficulties of an objective nature. We are laying groundwork for measures that would produce results in three years, while people want results of perestroika today. That produces problems. Nevertheless, we will succeed. There is no other possibility. A political struggle that is quite serious is underway. (S)

The President: We are impressed with how you have handled rapid change both inside and outside your country. Sometimes events snowball. But recent comments Foreign Minister Shevardnadze made were interesting and in accordance with what we would like to see. We are committed to democracy and a market-based economic system. But we are trying to conduct our Administration with a certain rhetorical restraint. We recognize some of the changes you are undertaking are difficult. We do not want to appear to exacerbate your problems. So we want to handle our relationship properly. We want to see perestroika succeed and will keep reiterating that. We listen to debate in your bodies and we applaud that. Debates are getting great credit for Soviet Union. That is building up enormous goodwill for Soviet Union and helping us move forward to improve our bilateral relationship. (S)

Chairman Primakov: Proceeding from our experience, don't

televise all sittings of your Congress. (S)

The President: Our country has a way of coming together. I know you will be talking with Senators Dole and Mitchell about these matters. In our system there is built in conflict, especially when the party that controls the White House does not control Congress. But somehow the system works. I'll get some of what I want; they will get some of what they want. I will run U.S. foreign policy because that is what the Constitution says; and they will try to micromanage it. But there is good conversation going on behind the scene with both the House and the Senate. I was in the House for four years myself. We do have fundamental respect for Congress. We will work out these important problems. As you work out your new system, I want you to understand the frustrations a President feels. You can be sure that if we sign a treaty, we will do our homework from this office to be sure it can be ratified. You will not be frustrated as you have been in the past. (S)

Chairman Primakov: We have set a precedent in our Parliament. Speaking of foreign policy, we don't have pluralism. We are all united in the Parliament on foreign policy issues. The only Minister who was confirmed by 100 percent of votes was Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. But we have a vast range of opinions on tactics of solving internal issues. But consensus is gradually working out. Our Parliament used to be a preprogrammed voting machine. Now all is changed. But I take it you wouldn't mind if your party controlled Congress. (S)

The President: I have a son who is 36 who has never been alive when Republicans controlled the House. The system rewards incumbency. But in this situation compromise is crucial. My Chief of Staff, John Sununu, visits regularly with the Speaker of the House. (S)

Chairman Primakov: Our arrival here marks an important stage in our relations, since Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985. We do expect much from the Summit meeting that is forthcoming. You are known in the Soviet Union as one of the most informed, professional Presidents. (S)

The President: Too cautious? (S)

Chairman Primakov: A month ago yes, not now. You are now both cautious and dynamic. (S)

The President: But you can be sure that if we reach a deal, I will be able to bring Congress and the country along because I have taken time and been cautious. I don't want to miss a big opportunity, but I want to build on a firm foundation. I hope you will convey this to Mr. Gorbachev for whom I have great respect and good personal feeling. (S)

Chairman Primakov: With pleasure, I will convey your words to him. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Imre Pozsgay, Minister of State Of Hungary (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
The Vice President
Lawrence Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
James Dobbins, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Laszlo Szimonisz, Interpreter

Hungary
Imre Pozsgay, Minister of State
Laszlo Kovacs, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Peter Varkonyi, Ambassador
Judit Abri, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 2, 1989, 1:30 - 2:05 p.m.
The Oval Office

The discussion began after a brief photo opportunity. (U)

The President: Let me welcome you. We are very pleased that you are here, and want to thank you and your countrymen for your country's hospitality during my visit. We said we would take steps and we have. We have no interest in interfering in your internal affairs. Members of some Hungarian opposition groups are coming here soon. We are very interested in your elections. How can we help? (U)

Mr. Pozsgay: Thank you. We appreciate the discussions we had with you in Hungary. Your visit made a big impression on us as we move toward freedom in Hungary. This is taking place under stable circumstances and represents a real transition. We appreciate that the U.S. looks on us as a sovereign state. We greatly appreciate the U.S. initiatives. There is a favorable echo from the permanent MFN. (U)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
08-0611-MR
12/15/08 HO

The President: There was a good impact here after the nice ceremony. There was no criticism from the right. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Pozsgay: That is good news that you, too, have your hardliners. It is important that there be a consensus. There is an important situation in Hungary now. During your visit, we were not sure this would take place. A Parliament appointed by a dictatorial system has approved our transition to democracy. The U.S. keeps contact with all the political forces within our country. We feel there are no powers forming in Hungary that could reverse this course. On January 7, we will have presidential elections in Hungary. Within 90 days after that, we will have legislative elections. ~~(C)~~

The President: When do Presidential candidates have to declare? (U)

Mr. Pozsgay: Within two weeks of the announcement of the Presidential election. I will be the nominee of the Socialist Party. It will be the first democratic election since 1947. Legislative elections will probably be held in April on a multiparty basis. Also it is symbolic that the Hungarian Republic was created on the anniversary of 1956 Hungarian insurrection. (U)

The President: May I say a word about Gorbachev. I noticed that you thanked us for acknowledging your sovereignty. Everybody respects your sovereignty and your fierce loyalty to your country and freedom. There is no dispute here. We are realistic and know that your lives in Hungary are impacted by how well the U.S. and the Soviet Union get along. When I was in Hungary, we talked about this and we talked to our Summit 7 allies. My advisors and I agreed that Gorbachev and I should get together rather early. I contacted him and indicated interest in a type of meeting I had formerly ruled out: informal and without an agenda, in advance of a formal summit which will address arms control. We want to be sure we understand the situation within the Soviet Union and that Gorbachev is sensitive to my problems. We do not intend to join to influence others; we would not do that. But we do think this meeting can have a favorable general impact on the international situation. We want you to know the genesis of it. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Pozsgay: It is quite a complicated but important issue. We appreciate that this meeting has different goals than a full scale meeting would have. It is important that you have initiated this meeting. Most people wouldn't suspect the intent to establish spheres of influence. But this meeting involves the security of all people in Central Europe. Gorbachev has an incredibly difficult situation at home in the short term. He must overcome these short term problems in order to avoid the serious ramifications of a failure on his part. But he has struggled through contradictions for four years. He has problems with consumer goods, transportation, and a military that needs to be controlled, and brought to a manageable size. ~~(C)~~

The President: This sounds like a sensible analysis. A reporter asked Shevardnadze yesterday if the U.S. would bail the USSR out of its economic difficulty. With great pride, he rejected that notion. I admired that and thought that it was well put. And besides, we do not have a blank checkbook ourselves. A lot of good can come out of this meeting. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Pozsgay: I consider your word as a guarantee that no agreement will emerge from the Summit, and that there will be no compromise on our interests. We want to go on our way and I hope you can convince Gorbachev of that. We can then begin to resolve our economic problems. We shouldn't complain too much about our economic problems because it has brought economic reform. Your initiatives and those of your allies are important in this effort to reform our economy. ~~(C)~~

The President: OPIC takes on an important dimension. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Pozsgay: Regarding OPIC, we do not expect answers right now, but we are quite concerned about COCOM. We know that there have been abuses in the past but we want to change that. ~~(C)~~

The President: Computer technology? ~~(C)~~

Mr. Pozsgay: Yes. (U)

The President: We will talk about it here. We want to be flexible but we do have national security requirements. We will keep this under review. ~~(C)~~

--End of Conversation--

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Ratu Mara of Fiji (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President and National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Desaix Anderson, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Peter Watson, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Ratu Mara, Prime Minister
Abdul Yusuf, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Fiji

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 6, 1989, 11:00 - 11:25am EST
The Oval Office

The President: Welcome. It's wonderful to see you again. It takes me back to when we opened the Embassy here. I was pleased to see you then. That event was important to the relationship. (S)

The President: We have no formal agenda this morning. We heard you were going to be back in town, and just wanted to take this opportunity to renew a wonderful relationship between friends. I would like to leave it open to you to tell me how things stand. We are grateful for the positive approach you take to the U.S., and your concept of expanding relations with us, which is an example to other countries in the region. Although events in Eastern Europe seem to take our time these days, I want you to know that we are not losing any interest in your region or pulling back from our participation in it in the long term. Some may feel that the developments we have made with the Soviets relieve tensions in the Pacific, and therefore believe that we do not need to keep a strong presence in the region. We disagree. It is important to work with you to maintain regional security. (S)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CEI 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Prime Minister Mara: We appreciate our relationship over the years with the U.S., starting in the early days when U.S. forces assisted in the region during World War II. And we've had no reason to doubt that relationship with the U.S. since. We see the U.S. as a friend and a protector. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: A problem could have arisen when New Zealand broke away from its strategic relationships. They probably expected other regional countries to do the same. They thought that because we play a role in the area, that we would follow suit. But we did not do so, and they have not been supportive of us until recently. We have received interest expressed from Russia to establish an embassy in Fiji, as well as other overtures from them. And we have resisted all of these. The Soviets have, however, made a foothold in PNG. Actually, I am a long-time friend of the former Prime Minister of PNG, Michael Somare, the current Foreign Minister. And I can't understand why he is supporting these initiatives, and that he has encouraged the Soviets since he was Prime Minister. Unfortunately, I haven't had the opportunity of discussing this matter with him. (Ø)

The President: What's your view on why he and the PNG Government are doing this? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: It's very complicated, frankly. But I believe it's largely a reaction to Australian dominance, and a desire to express their international independence. There is also the question of Libyan influence in PNG, Vanuatu and New Caledonia. Many nationals from those countries are graduates from our own university in Fiji. They pick up propaganda from disgruntled lecturers who were on the loose, and gained a foothold at our university. These people are lecturing with leftish viewpoints, and are anti-establishment. Therefore we "grew a crop of politicians on the left such as Barak Sope." Sope was Foreign Minister of Vanuatu. He has developed connections with Libya, and has helped them gain an influence in the region. (Ø)

The President: It's fascinating what influence one person can have. I am actually surprised that Libya is accepted down there, as they are largely discredited around the world. But I suppose that with money they are able to promote themselves. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: This has been particularly true in New Caledonia, where Libya has provided arms and training to Kanak extremists. (Ø)

The President: I wonder what Qadhafi really seeks to achieve by supporting these groups, but when he has to reach halfway around the world? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: It's amazing, but some people in Vanuatu and New Caledonia continue to turn to him to provide training, weapons, etc. (C)

The President: That is also true for the Philippines, and other countries. (C)

The President: On New Zealand, do you have any advice for me on that situation? We had great person-to-person relations with New Zealand, and then came a breach. Since then, the exchanges have grown more shrill than I like, or feel comfortable with. It's helpful that Lange is out as he personalized the situation so much. What's your thinking on this? Will time heal this problem? (S)

Prime Minister Mara: The climate with New Zealand seems to be changing. The Foreign Minister, Russell Marshall, portrays a less strident attitude with us, and seems to be coming around. The first signal of his new attitude came from his response to lobbying efforts for a statement against Fiji, at the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, in Kuala Lumpur. He and Palmer resisted this lobbying, and stated that any action against Fiji must be taken in conformity with the views of the neighboring island countries. They stated that, unless you get the approval of all of the islands, no action against Fiji is going to fly. This is the first time that the New Zealand Government has enunciated this internationally. This is a difference from Lange. (S)

Prime Minister Mara: If this is an indication of their overall thinking, this might be helpful to the U.S. A number of countries in the region -- Tonga, Fiji, and Western Samoa -- are friends of the U.S., and their collective views can be influential. (S)

Prime Minister Mara: (Addressing the President): Do you think that in the near future the U.S. will change its attitude toward New Zealand? (S)

The President: I don't want to miss an opportunity with them. But, as the world takes a look at the rapid changes arising in the Soviet Union, there is a danger that people in the region will feel that the U.S. does not need a naval presence, that warships are not necessary, and that soldiers are not necessary. There is this lulling effect that takes place around the world when these rapid changed with the Soviets are taking place. However, there will be no slashing of our defense budget. The situation is not all roses. (S)

Prime Minister Mara: It is significant that after a long debate, New Zealand recently approved the purchase of two warships. (C)

The President: What type of vessels were they? Small vessels, or frigates? (S)

Prime Minister Mara: Two frigates. (Ø)

The President: That seems to be a realistic view by them. We are having Cabinet meetings in Australia presently, and are having good talks with the Australians about New Zealand. We wish to take a realistic view and work together to improve the situation. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: I do not expect that the Labor Government will, however, be changing their position before the next election -- but they possibly might try to do so if they win. (Ø)

The President: When is the next election? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: In the last quarter of next year. (Ø)

The President: What other countries are attracted to the "Soviet's siren song," i.e., suggestions of bases and fleet facilities, etc.? (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: Kiribati entered into a fishing agreement with them, as did Vanuatu. Both of these countries are influenced by Sope who, unfortunately, is very persuasive, and may well be the next Prime Minister of Vanuatu. He has a long and deep resentment of the French and British political condominium that ruled Vanuatu at one time. He has a deep need to show independence. (Ø)

The President: Maybe we should work with them to demonstrate we are not hostile, or have any interest of subjugation. (Ø)

The President: (Addressing Desaix Anderson) We are not doing very much over there presently, are we (referring to Vanuatu)? (Ø)

Mr. Anderson: We have some fishing interests out there, I recall. (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: The real issues in the region currently are driftnetting and French atomic testing. Of these issues, driftnetting is really more serious, because France offered facilities to test the effects of atomic blasts, but this offer was not taken up. However, anti-testing protests continue. In this respect, our relations have been strained with some island countries because we allow nuclear vessels to come to Fiji. (Ø)

The President: Did you speak to the UN during this visit? (U)

Prime Minister Mara: No. Not this time. (U)

The President: Whatever happened to Samesa Sikivou (former permanent representative for Fiji to the UN)? Are you on the same side these days? (Laughter) (Ø)

Prime Minister Mara: (Smiling) Yes he is a good friend, and I will say "hello" for you. (C)

The President: I have a great deal of respect for the man. And his daughter, Vasiti, I think, and Dorothy were good friends. (C)

Prime Minister Mara: Sikivou is now a journalist, and keeps up with current events. He has learned a lot, and has taught me a lot. (C)

The President: As you know, I have sent Evelyn Teegen to Fiji as our Ambassador. She is a close friend, and is very serious about Fiji. She studied very hard, and I am advised by some senators that she did very well during her confirmation hearings, answering her questions in detail. (C)

The President: The message I want to convey is about our strong friendship and with this our understanding of your concerns. (C)

Prime Minister Mara: (Nodding assent) (C)

All Participants: {A personal conversation ensued at this point concerning golf.} (U)

The President: We so appreciate your taking the time to come and visit. You're a friend, my door is always open to you and to Fiji. (C)

Prime Minister Mara: Thank you very much. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Nicaraguan Presidential Candidate Violeta Chamorro (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
William T. Pryce, Director, Latin American Affairs, NSC Staff
Joseph Sullivan, Director, Office of Central American Affairs, DOS
John P. Leonard, Charge d'Affaires, American Embassy, Nicaragua
Stephanie Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

Nicaraguan Presidential Candidate Violeta Chamorro
Antonio Lacayo, UNO Campaign Manager
Ernesto Palacios, UNO Washington Representative

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 8, 1989, 3:00-3:30 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President and Nicaraguan Presidential Candidate Violeta Chamorro met in the Oval Office to discuss her electoral campaign. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: This visit to you is to thank you for your solidarity and concern for our country. I am sure that on February 25 Nicaragua will be a republic, as my husband used to say, because I will win the elections. The Nicaraguans want change. They are tired, not of the Boy Scouts, but of the boys. From February 25 on I shall be asking for your help and assistance in the reconstruction of Nicaragua. I shall be leaving for Europe to visit friends in the democracies and tell them about our situation in Nicaragua. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CEI 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: I hope that you are seeing Socialist leaders in Europe. They should be supportive. Some have not been. In talking to them, I have noticed some changes. Many European socialists are strongly supportive of democracy, but have supported Ortega in the past. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: I will be seeing Felipe Gonzalez and Italian Socialist leader Craxi, as well as Margaret Thatcher. (Ø)

The President: I also recommend that you see German SPD leader Vogel. Who else are you seeing? (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: Felipe Gonzalez and Mitterand. (Ø)

The President: They should be most sympathetic. Are you seeing British Labor leader Kinnock and German SPD leader Vogel and Italian leaders Craxi and Andreotti? (Ø)

Mr. Lacayo: Despite the short time, we are seeing all of those. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: We will be dropping our grain of sand everywhere. (Ø)

The President: The Scandinavians are nice people, but have been coopted by Ortega, although this is lessening. (Ø)

With respect to Ortega's disgraceful conduct in San Jose, I hope my comments in San Jose were not offensive to anyone but Ortega. I used the expression "little man," not with respect to his physical stature, but to his small-mindedness in raising his points in a celebration of democracy. My comments on his uniform were also not meant in disrespect of the military. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: Don't worry. We enjoyed it. (Ø)

The President: I was troubled that he disrupted the summit. I didn't want him invited, but Oscar Arias, with his Nobel Prize, wanted to invite him based on the fact that he had held elections. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: Don't worry. The next day, Ortega jumped on a plane and raced home. (Ø)

The President: The fact that he did what he did makes what you are doing clearer. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: He was very upset with the support we got from the other Presidents. (Ø)

The President: Did you talk with him? Is he friendly? (C)

Mrs. Chamorro: I did not speak to him in San Jose. In Caracas, we spoke and he proposed that I return to Nicaragua in his plane. I said no, that I have had better propositions. I could not let the world think I would accept an offer like that. (C)

The President: I would like to ask you a question. We obviously want you to win, but we don't want to smother you with a U.S. embrace. We want to give you whatever support you think would help. I don't know whether it would help for us to visit or not. We could have government or sports figures visit, but this could be used against you. (C)

Mrs. Chamorro: Whatever comes from you or the U.S. is positive. (C)

Governor Sununu: Printed material is often useful in campaigns. (C)

Mr. Lacayo: In a recent poll of 1,300 respondents, 56 percent supported U.S. assistance to the opposition and 28 percent opposed. The latter were the solid Sandinista supporters. Ortega should not be allowed to escape from the election process. The purpose of the trip to the U.S., Europe, with the Congress, and when we return, with Gorbachev, is to prevent Ortega from moving away from the election process. We need to press so that he cannot escape. We hope that you will coordinate this policy with Congressional and European leaders and ask for help with Gorbachev. (C)

President Bush: We will do that. Is it better to have someone from the U.S. in the campaign or not? Someone with a following in entertainment or in sports who would be respected could come or perhaps it would be better to have no one. (C)

Mr. Lacayo: We decided that we could not compete with them in singers, given the resources they have. We decided not to have outside campaigners. But, the more American visitors observing, the better. (C)

Governor Sununu: Who is appearing for Ortega? (C)

Mr. Lacayo: Young singers from Puerto Rico and Mexico. (C)

The President: If it is useful, we could help. Get us the names. Perhaps, Jose Canseco. I took Nolan Ryan and Gary Carter with me to the Honduran presidential inauguration and they were a great attraction in their baseball uniforms. You let us know. Also, with respect to entertainers, think about it and let me know. (C)

Mrs. Chamorro: All your ideas are wonderful. (Ø)

The President: I am inclined to send my son, who speaks Spanish and is very interested and supportive of you, but maybe that is too much. (Ø)

Governor Sununu: How much time do you get on television? (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: About one hour a month. (Ø)

Mr. Lacayo: Independent pollsters are very important. The Sandinistas say that polls published in "La Prensa" to date are UNO pollsters. (Ø)

The President: Do you have confidence in the Costa Rican pollsters? (Ø)

Mr. Lacayo: Yes, but independent pollsters would also be very important. (Ø)

Governor Sununu: A poll should be taken every two weeks. How much does it cost? (Ø)

Mr. Lacayo: Twelve thousand dollars with a sample of 1,300 people. (Ø)

Mr. Gates: In the Philippine election, we supported a steady string of polls, polls every three weeks and they helped create the perception that if Marcos won, this would be fraudulent. (Ø)

Mr. Lacayo: Twelve percent of the citizens, the exiles, can't vote. (Ø)

Governor Sununu: If it is not too difficult it would be a good thing to ask someone to count the number of votes you would have, even though the votes don't count. (Ø)

The President: Sounds like you have a cold. If you need doctors, we have them here at the White House. Take care of yourself. (Ø)

Mrs. Chamorro: I will be all right. (Ø)

The President: It will be good if you talk to the press and answer two or three questions when you leave. (Ø)

(Mrs. Bush came in to greet Mrs. Chamorro at the end of the meeting.)

-- End of Meeting --

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON 9520

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Republic of the Philippines (~~S~~)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to the Philippines
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker

Corazon C. Aquino, President
Raul Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Emmanuel Pelaez, Ambassaor to the United States
Vicente R. Jayme, Secretary of Finance
Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., Secretary of Trade and Industry
Heherson Alvarez, Chairman, Senate Committee on Agrarian Reform
Margarito Teves, Chairman, House Committee on Economic Affairs
Adolfo S. Azcuna, Press Secretary, Notetaker

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 9, 1989, 11:10 a.m.
Cabinet Room

The President and President Aquino met in a one-on-one meeting at 10:30 and moved to the Cabinet Room for the Plenary Session at 11:10.

The President opened the Plenary Session by welcoming the Philippine delegation. "We have just discussed the broad parameters of the U.S.-Philippine relationship. I described the extra-ordinarily tough time we are having with the U.S. Congress. From our standpoint, I hear from my old friend Nick Platt that our relationship is good. There are some problems regarding the

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
GL 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

~~SECRET~~

bases, but we agreed to conduct the talks in a dignified manner. We cannot afford to have the relationship shaped by extreme rhetoric on both sides." (S)

President Aquino said that she "appreciated the leadership of the United States on the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI). To sustain economic growth, market access and debt relief are necessary. We request that the textile quota be increased to $1.5 billion over and above the present level. We are trying to use employment generated by textile production to reduce the attractiveness of the insurgency. We hope the same kind of generous treatment can be given the Philippines as is being given to Bangladesh and China. The Philippines would like to see more products included under the 1990 GSP as well as an increase in procurement by U.S. forces." (C)

The President asked what kind of goods Mrs. Aquino had in mind. (U)

Joe Concepcion mentioned food stuffs as an example. (U)

President Aquino asked the U.S. to grant a sugar quota of 200,000 metric tons per year for the Philippines. "We would also like to see more U.S. investments in the Philippines and would appreciate help in drumming up more American investments. The top three countries for new investments are Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, but we would like to see more American investment. The debt burden of the Philippines remains heavy; interest payments consume 40 percent of our budget. We would like to reiterate our appreciation of the Brady plan. However, the debt buy back of $1.4 billion requires a payment of $650 million by January 3, 1990. New World Bank, IMF, and Japanese resources are critical. It would be very helpful if the U.S. Government would consider condonation of the outstanding debt due on U.S. Eximbank, foreign military sales, and P.L. 480 amounting to $1.3 billion. Full condonation is particularly desirable for FMS. We are also interested in H.R. 2545 recognizing Philippine Commonwealth Army Veterans. The environment is a major thrust of my Administration. We would appreciate U.S. support on the National Forestation Program, the National Biodiversity Conservation Program, and the Rivers Revival Program. We are thinking of holding a conference for Pacific Rim countries on global environmental problems in early 1991." (S)

The President asked whether President Aquino's environmental experts would be meeting with their equivalent U.S. officials. He thanked President Aquino for her presentation and asked Secretary Baker for his views. (C)

Secretary Baker began by saying, "we will discuss all of the matters you have raised in greater detail. However, the President has already taken note of what the conference committee is doing with regard to ESF/MAP funding. We have not met the $200 million we sought for MAI, but under the present budget constraints we have done relatively well. We will need to make it up over the next four years and the overall commitment continues to be $1 billion. This is a matter of great importance. We will continue to try to restore funding shortfalls." (S)

"On trade matters, someone from your delegation should meet with USTR. Textiles are always a serious problem in the United States. Your quota has recently been increased. You should discuss this with USTR. Our sugar program globally is a disaster and it needs a complete revision. Perhaps, in the course of the review a larger quota can be found for the Philippines, for instance, by redistributing Panama's quota. On investment, I have just returned from the APEC meeting in Canberra. Your representative there was very supportive. We were able to conclude a joint statement on the need for such a new, Pacific-wide organization. Singapore will host the second meeting. Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore were very supportive. We talked about the importance of increased investments. Investments will gravitate to growing economies, but only if the investment climate is appropriate. Foreign and domestic investments take place naturally if investors feel comfortable about the overall climate, which includes many things such as protection for intellectual property rights." (S)

Secretary Manglapus intervened regarding the subject of U.S. procurement of Philippine goods. "The U.S. agreed during the MBA review to push for a waiver of the Berry Amendment. The Senate has passed it but the House has not. On debt reduction, we look forward to rapid disbursement of ESF funds. Treasury has said yes but the Department of State has not decided yet." (S)

Secretary Cheney stated that it would be helpful "if you mentioned this matter on the House side. This is a difficult political problem. A word or two with Speaker Foley would be helpful." (S)

A further discussion ensued of the Philippine need for front loading of the IMF program because otherwise the $1.3 billion debt buy back would fall short on January 3, 1990. (S)

President Aquino expressed its hope that the U.S. Government would support the attempt to come up with the necessary $650 million to implement the Brady plan. "We wish to show that there are benefits to countries that are responsible in honoring their debts. This raises questions among the people about why we must spend so much on debt reduction." (S)

Congressman Teves spoke about the investment climate. "Both the Philippine Senate and House as well as the Ministry of Trade and Industry are reviewing investment laws in consultation with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. On a quarterly basis we discuss these matters, along with issues such as IPR, to provide a clear signal to investors and to make us competitive with Thailand and other countries." (S)

Vice President Quayle said that he appreciated the hospitality he had received during his visit t the Philippines. He felt the relationship between our two countries was "very solid." On investment he suggested that the focus should be on the broad concept of stability. Economic and other types of stability continue to be interrelated. (S)

Secretary Brady commented that the debt reduction scheme currently underway was very promising. "There are problems to be ironed out at the IMF but the Philippine transaction might well close before any of the other debt reduction plans." (S)

The President described the enormous debt burden in South America and the broad feeling that the Brady plan offers hope. However, it all depends on the private banks. "We can encourage the private banks to cooperate but we cannot dictate to them. In any case, we remain committed." (S)

President Aquino said, "I believe the Secretary found our package acceptable because it stresses the voluntary aspects." (S)

The President closed the meeting by saying that Mrs. Bush would love to have tea if President Aquino could find time in her schedule. (U)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Ben Ali of Tunisia (4 pp.)	11/14/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By CSA (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(127)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9273

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
514
2000-0429-F
#127

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Ben Ali of Tunisia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA)
Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia
C. David Welch, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC, Notetaker
Shuckran Kamal, Interpreter

President Ben Ali
Abdelhamid Escheikh, Foreign Minister
Moncer Rouissi, Minister of Social Affairs
Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisian Ambassador to the U.S.
Oussama Romdhani, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 14, 1989, 11:05 - 11:37 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: I'm very glad that you are able to visit here for this brief amount of time, before we offer you more extended hospitality next year. (U)

President Ben Ali: I am very happy to be here. It is an honor for me and for the people of Tunisia. Mr. President, you know Tunisia as it was before the changes of November 7, 1987. Without going into the details, you know the situation, as it was with the leadership of President Bourguiba, because you were there for visits. There was a constitutional change, confirmed by the people in elections on April 2, 1989. The former President is fine and he is being taken care of. ~~(C)~~

The President: How is his health? I know he is old and his faculties have slipped somewhat, but has he slipped further? (U)

President Ben Ali: He is an old man -- over 90 years old. He has no physical ailments, he just suffers from old age. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: Well, let me just say that the way that you handled the transition earned great respect. We know that Bourguiba was the patriarch and was close to his people. The way you have handled this has been just great. (C)

President Ben Ali: The United States and Tunisia have been friends for a long time. The friendship was good before the changes of November 1987, before our constitutional reforms, before we restored human rights and democracy, and before we undertook economic reforms. After all of these changes, we are now better friends. (C)

The President: If you don't mind, I thought I would quickly make a couple of points that are on my mind. First, our close military cooperation is a good thing. We appreciate it. Second, we hope to offer you a more generous welcome here for a State Visit on May 15 (1990), if that is agreeable to you. Third, I realize that your economic and political reforms are not easy decisions. Because of the drought that has affected Tunisia, we are ready to provide $11.9 million in feed grain, which we hope will be helpful. (C)

The President: My fourth point relates to one of your neighbors. I don't want to seem inflexible, but I just do not trust him (Libyan President Qadhafi). Your response to Qadhafi is your own business, say for instance in the Maghreb Union. You also have economic connections. Our good friend President Mubarak has waxed eloquently on the potential for changing Qadhafi, but I told him to watch his wallet -- that's an American expression meaning be careful. Qadhafi is still involved in terror and radicalism. You will handle him as you will, and I know you have experience; my word is only one of caution. (C)

The President: Last, the PLO. We appreciate your hosting of the U.S.-PLO dialogue. We believe it can be a moderating influence. Jim Baker is killing himself trying to put together a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians to get things moving forward. We want the PLO to OK this even if the original formula does not satisfy them in all ways. (C)

President Ben Ali: Allow me to start with bilateral matters, then address the other questions. Bilateral relations are excellent. We appreciate all your assistance in the past. With regard to military cooperation, we hope it continues and improves. We hope for defensive weapons, deterrent weapons that we have asked for, especially Stingers. Second, there is a deficit in feed grains for the next ten years because of the drought of the last two years. Third, there is democracy. There can be no democracy without government, and no government without democracy. That is why we are proceeding with economic reforms. We want to encourage U.S. investment in Tunisia, with new loans to open our economy. We still hold to the same principles and values; so, stability in Tunisia should encourage investors. The

final point is debt. Our debt burden is very heavy, especially to the United States. The debts are largely because of Qadhafi and the military expenditures we had to undertake to defend ourselves. This affects economic development. If there is not the possibility of deferring or forgiving debts, then perhaps doing so in return for defending the environment might be possible. ~~(C)~~

Ambassador Hamzaoui: Forgive me, but what is meant here is a debt swap for environmental projects. ~~(C)~~

The President: What we call environmental set-asides... ~~(C)~~

President Ben Ali: Regarding Qadhafi, he has caused problems for us. He has an unusual personality. We had to arm ourselves after the 1980 incident. Qadhafi has a capability and resources, and he has access to terrorists. We have had to take precautions. We are a peaceful tourist country, no threat to anyone. Our position is that we don't believe Qadhafi will ever change. ~~(C)~~

The President: You're right. Everyone seems to go through thinking that he can be moved to change. About the Stinger missiles -- I know we have a commitment to sell you Stinger missiles. As we have said, as soon as the environment is right in Congress, we will begin consultations for moving ahead with that commitment. But what I need to know from you before we proceed is whether you think that the threat is still there. Once I know from you what you want to do, then we could begin consultations with an intent to proceed to the sale, but I will need to reserve the final decision on timing in consultation with you, after our informal soundings with Congress. I just wanted to tell you that there may be more controversy here than we want -- your wonderful country could well get injected into that controversy. This is not a reason not to go forward, we stand by our word -- but just to let you know. We reserve the right to decide the timing. I just don't want Tunisia thrust into a political controversy in Congress. We need a "yes" from you to proceed, then we will start consultations and we will consult with you each step of the way. I know our friends in the Arab world say that it isn't right that these things should be so controversial -- and I won't argue that. Your "peaceful tourist country" could be dragged into a political controversy. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker: The mood in Congress is to severely restrict if not eliminate Stingers to countries in the region. There has been a vigorous debate over the buy-back of Stingers provided to one country in the region. I know that Undersecretary Bartholomew and Assistant Secretary Armitage have talked to you about the timing of any consultations and notification of Congress, pending resolution of this other debate. We know we have a commitment. We just do not think that the timing is good and we hate to see a friend like Tunisia involved in what will be a very nasty debate. ~~(C)~~

The President: We don't need an answer on this now. You consult with your advisers and let us know. Congress is concerned about the proliferation of Stingers. (C)

President Ben Ali: To conclude about Qadhafi, I have received a message from him to relay to you -- which I am now doing without anything on my part -- with his wishes for a normal relationship with the United States. (C)

The President: You believe that? I can see you aren't sure. Well, I think there are some signs of moderation, but there are other signs that he is still encouraging international terror. I know this from the best intelligence there is. He continues to do things. I admit that our friend President Mubarak is rather convincing about Qadhafi's turn to being more moderate, but he simply continues to do certain things. There must be demonstrable evidence that he has ceased to export terror and to harbor terrorists. (C)

President Ben Ali: [redacted] We are trying to coexist and at the same time be cautious. (C) (b)(1)

The President: Let me inject a word of support for the Taif process and the new President of Lebanon. You have my respect for what you have done for Lebanon and we would welcome any support you can give President Moawad. We want to return Lebanon to the safe oasis it used to be. (C)

President Ben Ali: We supported the Taif process. Aoun is now isolated. We support Moawad and I sent him congratulations. I thank you very much for your hospitality -- I know you are very busy. I would be happy to return for a visit in May. Perhaps you can visit Tunisia at the time of your trip to Malta. (C)

The President: Well, that's very kind of you to ask. I think we'll be heading back this way after Malta, but one day I would love to return to Tunisia. If it would not be any imposition or any problem -- believe me, I don't want to raise a difficulty -- I would appreciate it if you could pay my respects to Bourguiba. He may remember me. (C)

The meeting concluded at 11:37 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Richard Haass (Notetaker)

Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister
Yosi Ben Aharon, Advisor to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 15, 1989, 1:20 p.m. - 1:30 p.m., Oval Office

Prime Minister Shamir: Mr. President, it is very important to clarify misunderstandings if indeed there are any. I am aware that there has been some misunderstanding regarding settlements. I would like to explain. When the current coalition government was formed, all parties to it agreed to establish eight settlements. We respect this agreement, and have implemented it without celebration or much noise. What I want to explain is that we are committed to establishing these eight settlements in this first year of the coalition government. Now, some ten months into this year, we have established the first five. In these five, there is a total of 43 huts. As you can see, this is hardly a great matter. We are doing what we need to do without making any special effort. We have received no complaints from the Arab side. It is not an important matter. Nor is it an obstacle to the peace process we are trying to advance. (ℓ)

The President: You and I had a frank discussion alone on this. I tried to be clear that U.S. policy is to discourage settlements. This is not new with this Administration. Settlements are unacceptable to us. We are aware of your position and the difference between us. What I want to do is get out on the table the strains in our relationship. This is a relationship that is important to us because of our own interests. But this new settlement that you have announced puts me in a difficult and embarrassed position. I owe you my frankness here. I know the Secretary of State raised this too. What I don't understand is why just before coming here you would confront me with this embarrassment. (ℓ)

Prime Minister Shamir: This is the third of eight settlements decided upon some six months ago. What was decided now by the government was to change the location. There is no new settlement. (ℓ)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
OA1 8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

The President: But why does it have to happen now? This all puts me in an embarrassing position with the press and the American people. I can't say to them that we in any way acquiesce. I cite this as an example of what bothers us about our relationship. I want us to be able to speak frankly so that the relationship may improve. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: You can tell your people that this settlement is only one of eight and that it is nothing new other than a changed location. (Ø)

The President: I take your point, but the world will see it as your staking a flag, creating a fait accompli. It leaves a bad impression. I am glad you raised the subject though. It has exacerbated the difficulties that face us both. (Ø)

Prime Minister Shamir: We have a difference in our view as regards the fate of the territories. We don't want to make difficulties for you, however. We are convinced that we can work together in the peace process and reach a permanent solution. This is feasible and possible if for now we put aside what is our desired bottom line. (Ø)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
John Kelly, Assistant Secretary, Near East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William Brown, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Richard N. Haass, NSC (Notetaker)

Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister
Eli Rubenstein, Secretary to the Israeli Cabinet
Moshe Arad, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
Oded Eran, Deputy Chief of Mission
Yosi Ben Aharon, Advisor to the Prime Minister
BG Azriel, Military Adviser to PM Shamir

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 15, 1989, 1:30 p.m. - 2:20 p.m., Cabinet Room

The President: Welcome to the White House. The Prime Minister and I had a chance to go over a matter where we disagree. I am talking about settlements. He explained his point of view; I explained mine. I will simply repeat that the recent announcement by the Government of Israel (despite what the Prime Minister told me) causes me problems and puts me in an embarrassing position personally. There is no point in fencing around when we do disagree as we do here. If it is acceptable to you, what I would like to do is explain frankly to you where I see tensions and differences between us, and then invite you to do the same. (S)

As President, I see a strong relationship with Israel as good for the United States. It is my job to ask what is in the national interest of the United States. A strong relationship with Israel is in our interest. We all agree, as I know you do. We start

DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
CDI 8/21/09
2000-0429-F

from a common base, but the relationship has gotten off the track. I would like to do something not normally done at diplomatic meetings such as this. We are not at some crossroads, but I do want you to hear my personal assessment of where things stand. I want this visit to be characterized as a success. I hope that what I have to say will be taken as intended. A strong relationship is in the interests of both countries. (✓)

Prime Minister Shamir: I fully accept the principle that relations must be strong and friendly. This is in the interests of both countries. We are a loyal ally of the United States who will stand with you in good times and bad times. This doesn't mean that we don't have differences from time to time. But despite these differences, we will try to keep and develop this relationship. As for settlements, this is an important matter for Israel. It is a subject where there are differences. It is tied to the ultimate or permanent solution of the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors. But we believe that despite any differences we can and must work together on the peace process. One day, we will reach a permanent solution. We are therefore interested in working together to implement the peace initiative we are supporting. Settlements are only a detail. If we are right that the territory belongs to us, there will be Israeli centers of population. If the Arabs are right, settlements won't change the political or legal situation. The difference between us is not one created by the Bush Administration. We need though to minimize it and not allow it to become an obstacle to the overall relationship. (✓)

The President: I just want to make our position clear. I was embarrassed by the timing of your announcement. If any settlements are used for Soviet Jews, it will put us in an extremely difficult position and limit sharply our ability to facilitate their resettlement. We are trying to help promote your elections plan with others, but they see settlements as a de facto situation on the ground that makes it harder for them to work with us to facilitate a peace process. I have not changed my views on this. What we have is a direct confrontation of views on something we both feel strongly about. I want to put this front and center. Your policy on settlements is causing us problems. I will make this clear when I respond to press questions on this. As for the peace process, we are together in this Administration. There are no divisions. Our goal is to try to move the Israeli plan forward. No one will try an end run regarding the PLO or the agenda or conditions. Secretary Baker was very open on this. I know there is tension, but it is important for our relationship that we get all this on the table. (✓)

Secretary Baker: We spent most of two hours on the peace process. We understand where one another stands. (U)

Prime Minister Shamir: We discussed the philosophy of our activity as well as the details. There are no essential differences between us. You and we are awaiting the Egyptian

response to advance the discussion and pave the way for the first meeting between Israel and a Palestinian group to discuss the modalities of elections. This is a necessary first step but one that is very important. After this there will be additional obstacles. It will require that we work hard as we go to interim arrangements and permanent solution. I am grateful to the President and the Secretary of State for giving so much of their time and energy to accomplish this. I know you have other issues to worry about, many of which are for you more important. But for us peace in the Middle East is first on our agenda. (✓)

The President: Thank you. Let me list three or four things that have diminished support for Israel in this country, especially among young people. I do so in the spirit of frankness. (✓)

I understand that you have the feeling that we are attuned more to Labor. This is not so. We had a closeness to Labor when it was in charge as regards such issues as settlements and an international conference. But that doesn't mean that we are interested in dealing with Labor and not you. I want to clear the air here. I have heard this from respected Jewish-Americans, but it is not true. It is possible that on some issues that our position is closer to Labor's, but we are in no way trying to get involved much less interfere in your politics. I have enough trouble here at home without trying to get involved in your business. (✓)

Let me turn to something I am seeing in American public opinion. What I am saying is subjective, although there may be polls to support it. The automatic or reflexive sympathy for Israeli is diminishing here. Whatever the reason, the use of force and violence associated with the intifada -- the detentions, home demolitions, school closings -- (and despite the need to keep order) are having an impact. Again, reflexive support for Israeli here is diminishing. (✓)

South Africa is another matter. We have an arms length relationship with South Africa and will continue to until they get rid of apartheid. What you are doing tends to undermine the blanket support you once enjoyed here. I hope there will be visible manifestations of a change in your policy here. (✓)

Another issue that caused us problems was Sheikh Obeid. We were blindsided. Some Americans said that Israel knew Higgins was dead but didn't tell us. And if you didn't know, they are wondering why you did what you did. I cannot contain my emotions on this. I am trying to sort out our problems, and this is still one. These are the main issues I wanted to raise. On the peace process, we have known differences, and it is up to Jim Baker and Foreign Minister Arens to try. If Israel is perceived as unwilling to go forward on its own plan it will undermine the relationship. If there are just tactical differences, it need not undermine the relationship. What would undermine our ties would be if Israel is seen as stepping away from its own plan because of internal forces. Here though we seem to be moving in

the right direction. The basic question though is how to we build back an automatic approval for Israel that is being eroded. I invite you to be equally frank. (✓)

Prime Minister Shamir: I thank you Mr. President for your frankness. It can help strengthen the friendly relationship that we have had and still do. No one in Israel doubts our close tie with the United states. I will try to answer the questions you have raised. (✓)

As for charges that the U.S. Government prefers Labor, I know no one in Likud who claims this. I never dreamt of it. It is nonsense. The only differences with us involve the terms for a permanent solution. (✓)

Regarding the intifada, it is a painful problem that we have to deal with. We have to defend our civilians and soldiers while sparing human life and not causing too much suffering and loss of life. The Israeli army has precise orders not to shoot except in emergencies. But a soldier knows how to use arms, not refrain from doing so. We try to protect human lives, including Arab lives. But it is reality that Palestinian Arabs are being killed by other Palestinian Arabs who are terrorists. We know that those who view the violence on television are not pleased. It is a tragedy. An aim of our peace initiative is to put an end to these confrontations. We are doing our utmost to reduce the use of force, but sometimes we must use violence to fight violence. You know the Defense Minister. He is someone who tries to be strong and just at the same time. (✓)

As for South Africa, you know we strongly oppose apartheid. We have some links, mainly because of the large Jewish community there. Since 1987 we have decided to reduce our ties. We have done so, except for those contracts in force. We decided to implement them but not make new ones. This cooperation will come to an end in a few years and the problem will disappear. (✓)

Regarding Sheikh Obeid, one feature of living in the Middle East is that one must deal with terrorists and violence. In this case it was our thought that by taking this man of violence we would gain the release of kidnapped people, Israelis and non-Israelis alike. Unfortunately, so far this has not happened. As for Colonel Higgins, our assessment was that he was not alive when we acted. This issue falls in the realm of defense. It is part of Israel's security problem on its borders, particularly our northern one. In Lebanon, Israel has no territorial ambitions. We want a free and independent Lebanon. We will be happy when Israel can withdraw its few hundred soldiers. I don't know if our presence there helps the new President, but we hope our presence comes to an end. (✓)

As for the peace process, we have explained to you that we are fully committed to our peace initiative. We will do everything possible to make this a reality. We are grateful to the United States for its efforts to facilitate the implementation of our

initiative. We are willing and happy to work with you, but it is normal that there will be various points of view and positions. But in principle we are working along the same lines. We know how to work together. We agree with the philosophy as articulated by the Secretary of State. We cannot foresee any difficulty. (C)

Secretary Baker: What I said was that we need to move without putting forward a bottom line, something that would prove to be a "deal-breaker" at this point. (C)

Prime Minister Shamir: As for the future of our relationship, I would like to compliment you on the victory of the free world. In Eastern Europe there is a huge victory for the free world. This would not have happened without U.S. strength. (U)

The President: It could come to be that these changes will make it possible for you to establish new relationships. (C)

Prime Minister Shamir: We already have normal relations with Hungary, and soon should have with Poland. Other possibilities are the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. What has happened is a great victory without bloodshed. (C)

The President: We will try at Malta to facilitate change. I am glad that we have had this talk. I wanted to clear the air. I don't like tensions. I am relieved to hear you do not think we are playing "footsie" with Labor. There is the perception here that you are having great problems with those who are less forthcoming vis-a-vis the peace process in your own party. We want to move the peace process forward, but we do not want to dictate. We want to help. Forward motion on this would be the best way to eliminate difficulties in our own relationship. It would improve the public perception of Israel in the United States. We can't change this perception, but we can help the peace process which in turn will ease the intifada. Time should help take care of tensions relating to Obeid. South Africa we've discussed. Our objective is to move the peace process forward. If it can be seen that Prime Minister Shamir wants to advance the peace process, this will reduce tensions in the bilateral relationship. (C)

Eli Rubenstein: What has been lacking in this exchange is any mention of the real affinity that Israelis feel for the United States. If there is a crisis, Israel will be the one friend of the United States in the Middle East. There is no anti-Americanism in Israel. To the contrary: Likud and Labor compete as to who likes America more. (C)

The President: I agree with what you say. (U)

Secretary Baker: You are correct. There exists a gut feeling here of support for and concern for Israel. But what the President is saying is that we risk losing the battle for public opinion. For example, just the fact that we now have to respond

to questions about whether we are pressing you on human rights reflects a change in the atmosphere. (C)

The President: To end on a positive note, I believe that if we can move forward on the peace process it will help with the public view of Israel and the overall relationship. I am glad we could have this frank talk. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
Vernon Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the FRG
Gisela Marcuse, Interpreter

FRG
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Dieter Kastrup, Ministerial Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Josef Holik, Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador
Dorothee Kaltenbach, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 21, 1989, 10:10 - 10:45 a.m. EST
Oval Office

The President opened the meeting at 10:10 a.m. in the Oval Office. (U)

The President: I am interested in your reactions on SNF. I was worried about the story in this morning's paper. It caused me heartburn. The Alliance needs to stay together. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: We have an agreement to defer the issue until 1992. ~~(C)~~

The President: At Malta, there will be no surprises to our Allies. There will be full consultation. My meeting with Gorbachev is very timely. We need to discuss the changes taking

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
07-0051-MR
11/29/07 KD

place. We have been criticized here for not jumping on top of the Wall and cheering, but things are moving in freedom's way. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher: One should never change a winning team. We should never change the winning concept agreed to at NATO in May. We are confident you will handle your meeting with Gorbachev well. We want better relations between the superpowers, because that will increase the freedom of maneuver in Europe. Germany's fate is embedded in this. There will be no isolated or singular German policy toward the East. We will stay firmly in the West. We want to keep the EC integration process going. The Strasbourg summit will be important in this respect. It will encourage reform in Eastern Europe. (C)

The USSR is part of Europe, so we cannot guarantee stability without the participation of the United States. We need to improve the political character and the arms control character of the Alliance and focus more on the arms control process. The more arms control in Europe, the less likely Soviet military, or even political, intervention in Eastern Europe. Second, the philosophy of the Russians has changed. They are less based on the military and the police. Instead, they have concluded that stability will only last if it is based on the consent of the publics in Eastern Europe, as long as these countries stay in the Warsaw Pact. The West needs to stress that we want these reforms to succeed, that we will not take any advantage of the problems or crises they will surely face in Moscow. Your meeting with Gorbachev will be helpful in this regard. (C)

The President: Gorbachev is concerned about German reunification. Is there a likelihood that the rapidity of change that has come to Eastern Europe will result in an instant demand in Germany for reunification? We know in the long run this is for the German people to decide, based on self-determination. But will reunification move faster than any of us think? (S)

Foreign Minister Genscher: No one can foresee. In the GDR, at the top of the agenda is freedom, democracy, and free elections. Last night, 200,000 in Leipzig shouted "one nation" again and again. So things are changing. When the GDR establishes a democracy, the better for the whole of Europe. It cannot be a concern for others to see Germans in freedom. This is a great advantage in Europe. Events in the GDR are not isolated events; they are embedded in a European framework. It is important for all to know that we will stick to our obligations in NATO and the EC. We do not want a special course for Germany, but we do not want self-determination everywhere except in Germany. That would not be acceptable. Whatever is done in Germany must be done in the context of the European Community. But all of this must be done in a way that does not alarm the Soviet Union. That is why we must stick to our current borders. That is a condition of the building of a stable structure in Europe, a structure first mentioned in 1967 in the Harmel report. We in the West have had the vision, not the Soviets. We need to repeat this to public opinion. (S)

The President: I hope you will share your views with us concerning Malta. It is not an arms control meeting. If Gorbachev tries to make it an arms control meeting, I will say we have our allies and we will make no unilateral deals. He might propose the total withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet troops from Europe. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: I do not think he will play the German card. He is very much satisfied with a U.S. presence on German soil. ~~(S)~~

The President: We want to know what you think. I want to understand what Gorbachev thinks are his limits now. I want to know what he means regarding German reunification. Until he changes Soviet policy in our hemisphere, we will not move completely on the economic side. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Genscher: German reunification is discussed more outside Germany than inside Germany. Germans are now concentrating on free elections in the GDR. ~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
19. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (9 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ___ (NLGB) on 1/24/11

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2007-0051-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	5/13/2009

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
dupe of #500 from 2007-0051-MR/1999-0841-F

10493

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Amb Henry Catto, US Amb to Great Britain

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Charles Powell,
Amb Antony Acland, Great Britain

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 24, 1989, 10:00 am - 2:30 pm EST
Camp David

The President and Prime Minister Thatcher met at Camp David.

The President: My meeting with Gorbachev has no agenda. People warn me he always has surprises. I'm not worried because I think he wants the meeting to be a success. Our summit next year will deal with the knotty problems of arms control.

I would love to turn the floor over to you. It is building to be quite a meeting. It was my idea -- in Paris after Poland and Hungary. They wanted me to meet with Gorbachev. We tried several different schemes to get it up.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
2007-0051-MR
5/13/09

(b) (1)



(b) (1)

The President: What borders?

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: I raised the nationality question because we always asked what happens if Gorbachev has to crack down and asks us to show forbearance.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: Leave out East Germany. What if East European countries want to leave Warsaw Pact. NATO must stay.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)



The President: Can't give it to Soviet Union. Shevardnadze said we don't want aid. They may raise IFI participation. Things are going badly for him. But the elite around this country says do something.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: Story about Walesa and buying Polish farms. It is so naive. I am going to have to be frank with Gorbachev on economics. They don't understand incentives, access to materials, etc., for leasing, for example.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)



The President: About what we did in Tiananmen Square.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: I can't just stay quiet.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: Leslie Stahl asked you "What about reunification." What do you say?

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: Good. How about Kohl? Are there differences?

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: Let me ask about EC. If you were me, would you worry?

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: Are you catching hell at home --- by Labour.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: Maybe I should start speaking out more.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) [redacted] (b) (1)

The President: Let me tick off some issues. China -- appalled as we are about Tiananmen Square, we don't want to break relationships or turn China back or inward. We want to find ways to move forward. (b) (1) [redacted] (b) (1)

The President: I only raise it because I don't want Gorbachev to think because we are estranged from China that we don't have big stake in China. (b) (1) [redacted] (b) (1)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) [redacted] (b) (1)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) [redacted] (b) (1)

The President: On another regional subject -- Nicaraguan elections. (b) (1) (b) (1) Ortega. Then I will go on to Cuba.

He is likely to want to trade for Afghanistan. On afghanistan, we generally thought Najibullah would collapse when Soviets left. Can't trade, but I would like to find a formula, unless we would drop Najibullah.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: Gorbachev may want to trade Nicaragua for Afghanistan and we won't do that. We are sending signals to Iran (little ones) but so far no response.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: (b) (1) (b) (1)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1) (b) (1)

The President: I was very impressed with Menem. He is about as reasonable as you're likely to get.

(LUNCH)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: We have enormous budget problems (described Cheney's approach to deaing with the budget). I am upset it has

all been made public 10 days before Malta. If we must take hits, I want to get something for it.

(INSERT EAGLEBURGER NOTES HERE)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: Extraordinarily difficult problem. (b) (1)

(b) (1)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: It is not the same.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: India-Pakistan.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

The President: Will Bhutto make it.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: She is definitely a stabilizing factor, (b) (1)

(b) (1)

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: How about the Japanese.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: New Zealand and Australia.

PM Thatcher: (b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President: Cristiani is a good man. But there is an emotional wing in this country which is violent on the issue.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20. Memcon	Re: Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (8 pp.)	11/26/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 10/3/89 - 12/16/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By CDL (NLGB) on 10/6/10

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	1999-0273-F(116)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	11/29/2007	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BUSH PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
519
dup of 1999-0273-F
#116

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Dinner with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mrs. Bush
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Ney, U.S. Ambassador to Canada

Canada
Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister
Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister
Derek Burney, Ambassador

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 29, 1989, 6:00 - 9:00PM
The Residence

Prime Minister Mulroney said that he had spent five hours with Gorbachev, 10-12 hours with Reykjavik and about the same with Shevardnadze. Mulroney said that Gorbachev was approaching Malta expecting no miracles and having no grand design or tricks up his sleeve. He understands why the President has been quite conservative in his approach and his need to devise his own policies after being Vice President for eight years. Gorbachev regards this as quite legitimate inasmuch as the President will be there for eight years and that it was important for him to take time to get it right. At a private lunch, Mrs. Gorbachev said she looked forward to a close and friendly relationship with

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED
CBI 11129107
1999-0273-F

Barbara Bush. Gorbachev mentioned that he had invited Ronald Reagan to visit the Soviet Union in the spring and made a number of affectionate comments toward Reagan.

When asked about Soviet consumer goods and problems, Mulroney said that staff and media accompanying him had found nothing in the stores. Foreign Minister Clark said he had asked one Soviet whether things were better now under Gorbachev and the response had been "politically, yes, but there is no meat in the stores and nothing even in the windows." Mulroney said there are not even any fur hats in Leningrad. There are no carpets in carpet stores and no shoes. Even Gorbachev said that times were tough and that pressures were building.

Mulroney asked Gorbachev, "What is going to happen to you? Who doesn't agree with you?" Gorbachev responded that he would be around but, "what are we going to do about them." Mulroney said it is clear Gorbachev is not losing any sleep, that he is in control. He is casual, unconcerned. His enemies seem to be institutional -- the party, the economy, the nationalities and so on. At one point, Gorbachev said "Maybe President Bush can give you help with regard to Quebec," a clear reference in Mulroney's mind to inviting the US Congress to butt out of Soviet nationalities issues. He said that the new legislative session in December would take steps to institutionalize religious freedom and private property.

Gorbachev said everything must be done within the federation. Mulroney said that the Prime Minister of Sweden had asked Gorbachev if he would allow neutrality for Poland and Hungary and there withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Mulroney said it was clearly "not on." Gorbachev has said there should be no changes in the alliances and that any change in the alliances would be seriously destabilizing.

Mulroney said Gorbachev was quite forthcoming in the discussion of political liberalization. And that Gorbachev found this "terrific, just fine." Mulroney continued that what was absent from Gorbachev was the idea that pluralism should be extended to the Soviet Union. There is no suggestion in his remarks of political parties, although everywhere else he supports pluralism. He said that the problems of the Soviet Union are such that only one party with him in command can see the USSR through this period. When asked where he would be in five years, Gorbachev responded "I'll be here." At this point, Mrs. Gorbachev said that her mother often talks to his mother and that his mother had said, "If the Soviet people are so stupid that they cannot appreciate what my son is doing, then the hell with them." Mulroney read this anecdote as evidence of growing disenchantment.

Mulroney then described his discussions with Ivashko, the new party head of the Ukraine. Ivashko mentioned that there are 52 million people in the Ukraine, 18 million people in the Soviet Communist Party and 3.4 million Party members in the Ukraine. Ivashko said all of them supported him and Gorbachev. He continued that one had to understand that Gorbachev started high in popularity, and slumped because he couldn't meet expectations. There are no consumer goods. But now Gorbachev is coming up again, primarily for international reasons. Nonetheless, Gorbachev faces trouble in the shortages.

Mulroney asked Ivashko what Gorbachev is expecting from George Bush. Ivashko responded, no aid. He was not further specific. Mulroney then noted that Gorbachev had indicated that Bush was very conservative. Mulroney responded that Gorbachev had to understand that the Republican Party had several wings and that a successful politician cannot fly on one wing. Gorbachev responded that he understood. Mulroney told Gorbachev that Bush was very moderate (in which context Gorbachev denigrated Kohl). Mulroney noted that people in congress were given to strident speeches. Gorbachev responded, "Yeah, Mitchell!" Mulroney continued that Gorbachev was casual, well informed, relaxed and had a good sense of humor.

With respect to the Germans, Gorbachev is concerned that they are trying to do endruns. Gorbachev said that the American Ambassador in Bonn is acting like a German Gauleiter. He said the sense of Gorbachev's views was that the Germans could forget about reunification. According to Clark, Shevardnadze spoke of anxiety in Western Europe about reunification, adding that "all of us in the war are against revanchism and neo-Nazis. Mulroney noted the strength of the Russians' hatred for the Germans.

Mulroney told Gorbachev that to understand Kohl he had to understand that Kohl was appealing to the electorate. Gorbachev said he understood that, if that's all it is. But there would be no reunification. Clark indicated that of all the problems, only this one was worrying them. Gorbachev indicated, "People have died eating unripened fruit" -- a clear suggestion that any kind of reunification was premature. Gorbachev indicated that there might be reunification but, in effect, "not in my lifetime." If the Germans want progress towards this, they shouldn't put it on the table. It should not be brought forward prematurely.

With respect to the Balts, Clark mentioned the large Baltic population in Canada and the consequences of a crackdown, that is, a strong reaction. Shevardnadze said there is no crackdown planned by the Foreign Ministry or by the Army or by anybody else.

Mulroney then offered several anecdotal observations from his dinner with Ryzhkov on November 21st:

-- He underscored he was completely against German reunification.

-- He said that "aid to Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam was substantial and must be allowed to rundown."

-- Aid to Eastern Europe is insubstantial. In fact, the Soviet Union owes a number of these countries. Only Poland owes the USSR -- about one billion dollars.

-- Mulroney mentioned there would be no reform of agriculture without farmers owning their property.

-- Ryzhkov said that the Canadians should take a section of land in the USSR and run the agriculture there as a pilot project -- wheat, beef, pork and so on.

-- Swedish Prime Minister said that the Soviet bottom line was neutrality for Poland and Hungary. But Ryzhkov said there would be no border changes allowed because they would perturb developments in Eastern Europe.

-- Mulroney pointed out to Ryzhkov the 175 year peace in the US. The US has no imperialist interests and is inclined toward peace unless betrayed or attacked. With George Bush, the Soviets will always know where they stand and that, unless you provoke him, he will stand with peace. Shevardnadze asked Mulroney to comment on his own instinct that James Baker was a man of his word. Mulroney responded, "you can put it in the bank," noting that Baker had put aside a week to complete the Free Trade Agreement because he had recognized its importance and given his word to make it happen. Shevardnadze was impressed.

According to Mulroney, Ryzhkov was deferred to by all when Gorbachev was absent. He found him thoughtful, reasonable and the least ideological of all.

Ryzhkov noted that on 1 January 1988 there was large scale implementation of the concept of a market economy. Still the Soviet Union was not ready to do this. He said Gorbachev had inherited an archaic system and wanted to move toward a new one. He said the problems of society could be solved only with new approaches. However, at no point did he acknowledge that the whole Soviet system is wrong.

Gorbachev indicated to Mulroney that he wanted to trust in George Bush and establish trust at Malta. Gorbachev said any period of change will bring difficulties and instability. Some will seek to profit and that would be a dangerous mistake. The former mistake in Eastern Europe was to insist on a single model. Each country must decide what's best for it. Eastern Europe will be allowed to follow reform at its own pace. With respect to Germany, we should let history determine the issue. "People have been poisoned by eating unripened fruit." This road must be traveled without skipping steps.

According to Gorbachev, under new thinking, confrontation is on the way out and there must be focus on common interest. We need mutual trust, a long period of trust. Moreover, it is not only the East that needs new thinking.

With respect to international economic cooperation, according to Gorbachev, the USSR needs to open up its economy and bring it into line with the world economy. Decisions about the future of the USSR though will be made in Moscow alone. We will not have grants or handouts.

According to Gorbachev, perestroika represents a fundamental change in the mentality of dependence on the state. The revolution embarked upon, is above all, a revolution of the mind. We need new people. You can't make them in the classroom.

According to Gorbachev, the world debates how long he has. What is important is that the country will not go back. Gorbachev has done his part but intends to go on. He will put in place new property relations -- public, cooperative and private, as well as credit, banking and so on. We need to limit the power of the monopolies.

Gorbachev said, with respect to the nationalities, that if we destroy what we have it will be a disaster for the smaller peoples such as the Baltic peoples. He continued that there is no reasonable alternative to perestroika, although there are differences on tactics.

Gorbachev admitted that when he announced his decisions originally he had thought things would happen. In the domestic economy, the situation is very different. People see shortages and bare shelves.

Under these circumstances the West should act prudently. Kohl sometimes is not prudent enough. It is dangerous to appeal for the votes of revanchists. He understood that Bush and Baker had had a difficult process in adjusting their thinking. The West should be less arrogant; act less like they have a hotline

to God or as if they have God by the beard. The West has to change, too. In essence, according to Mulroney, Gorbachev is saying, "you must help me without looking like you're helping me."

Mulroney then related several observations from the lunch that he and his wife had with Gorbachev and Raisa:

-- Gorbachev's ambitions for Malta are to get to know and understand George Bush, to convey his objectives and his rationales.

-- He expects no miracles or solutions in Malta.

-- It is entirely normal for George Bush to have taken time to come up with his own policies.

-- He was very warm toward Ronald Reagan.

-- With respect to Mrs. Bush going to Malta, Raisa acknowledged having received the letter from Mrs. Bush and said that she looked forward to working with her in a friendly fashion.

-- The Gorbachev's seem to have a friendly, affectionate relationship.

-- Gorbachev said he never thought he'd end up running the shop; that he had first written down his reform ideas when he was first transferred to Moscow.

-- He said that when he became General Secretary he had called for the memo he had sent in on reform years earlier.

-- Gorbachev said that George Bush seemed quite conservative in his view of the world.

-- Gorbachev gave tempered, quiet responses. Raisa indicated that he would serve two full terms.

Mulroney then noted a number of observations from his meetings with Ivashko in the Ukraine:

-- Gorbachev is completely supported by the Central Committee in his policies and personally.

-- Unrealized expectations led to a decline in Gorbachev's popularity which for a time unsettled him.

-- Gorbachev will be absolutely in command for five years. On a scale of 1 to 10 his political strength is over 9.

-- Gorbachev does not have an identifiable enemy as to cause him trouble.

-- (b)(1) [redacted]

-- Gorbachev needs a durable peace so that he can concentrate on the economy.

Ivashko made no attempt to hide problems. He indicated the system had failed. They want to be like us, but not have it lorded over them.

Mulroney said to the President, "If you take care, yet lend a hand, you and Gorbachev will walk together into the history books."

In response to a question about how the US could lend a hand, Mulroney responded:

-- Help the Soviets integrate their economy into the West. For example, see the USSR have observer status at GATT and perhaps integrate them into the IMF. Perhaps each year the chairman of the industrial nations summit could meet with Gorbachev afterward. He noted the importance of the symbolism of a meeting on economic matters.

-- It is time for an initiative on ground forces. We must acknowledge that they will not be around in these numbers in five years in NATO. We should not have unilateral reductions but we should take a chance for peace.

Mulroney said he discerned historic opportunities at Malta.

The President responded that he intended to lean forward. Our purpose for the meeting is exactly as Gorbachev outlined. He intends to be as informal as possible. He does not intend to put him down and intends to avoid a "we won, you lost" approach. He intends to give Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt. On arms control, the President indicated he is prepared for a broad discussion and wants Gorbachev to sense flexibility. He wants to offer the hope that the status quo will change. He would like to accelerate START, CFE and CW. On Central America the President indicated he would be tough, particularly with respect to Castro and Ortega. He will lean forward and make sure Gorbachev understands that we will not conduct ourselves in ways to make life difficult for him.

Clark turned to Central America saying that Shevardnadze had indicated with regard to Nicaragua and Cuba that the USSR has an

obligation to supply Cuba because it is under blockade. However, if the US and Cuba were to come to terms, the Soviets could back off. The President responded that Gorbachev is going to hear plenty about this. What good does it do him? "I have no impression that he wants to be in any of these countries."

Mulroney told the story to Ryzhkov that the Canadian manager of McDonald's in Moscow advertised for applicants for jobs. He said 19,000 people applied for 500 jobs, so many that the postmaster asked them to stop advertising. With these economic problems Mulroney asked, why should they put so much money into that dopey little island? He said Ryzhkov seemed to have a sense of embarrassment about it and a real sense of financial drain. He said, "Aid to Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam is substantial and must be allowed to run down." Clark added that their whole preoccupation is with domestic matters. He thinks they have a sense of obligation to Nicaragua and Cuba.

Mulroney then made a number of suggestions of economic measures the US could take to help the Soviets.

-- Repeal Jackson/Vanik.

-- Join GATT and OECD with observer status.

-- Include the Soviet Union in IMF and World Bank economic reviews.

-- Support the idea of having the Chairman of the Economic Summit later meet with Gorbachev.

-- Support an East European Development Bank.

-- Reduce COCOM restrictions.

-- Reduce troops in the near future.

The US should untether the Europeans even while providing strategic leadership. Overall, Mulroney said his impression of Gorbachev's attitudes toward the President were that "he is there for the long haul and you're in place for the long haul."

{This memorandum was prepared by Robert Gates.}

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMCON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Eddie Fenech-Adami of Malta (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
Sally Novetzke, Ambassador to Malta

Malta
Eddie Fenech-Adami, Prime Minister
Evarist Saliba, Advisor to the Prime Minister
Richard Cachia-Caruana, Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister
Arthur Pace, Director, Department of Information
John Camilleri, Personal Secretary to Prime Minister
Salv Stellini, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 1, 1989, 10:40 - 11:10
Auberge de Castille, Malta

Following the arrival ceremony, the President proceeded to the Prime Minister's office for their meeting. (U)

Prime Minister Fenech-Adami: I am delighted you chose Malta for your meeting with Chairman Gorbachev. History is changing. We are embarking on a new era, and Malta is proud to be part of it. We remember that Roosevelt and Churchill met on a warship here before they went to Yalta. We are proud of our history and think we can contribute to the international relationship. Sometime we come up with good ideas. We are very active in environmental issues. Now we are preparing for more cooperation on global climate change. We have no ulterior motives. (U)

The President: Sometimes a smaller country can effectively take the lead. On the environment, we will be talking to Gorbachev about that. We will take the lead next year. The United States is blessed with scientific talent, and we will host a conference on this next year. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
OSI 5/13/09
1999-0273-F

It is great to be here. The meeting was our idea, indeed my idea. You extended such hospitality to my brother, who was impressed by your hospitality, the historic setting, and your own personal kindness to him. Leading up to this significant meeting, the reaction has been very positive. We have no desire for a public relations victory or defeat. This is too important for that. His economy is in a shambles. He needs help. His is a sovereign nation with great pride. We will treat him in that way. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech-Adami: All this is extremely helpful. Our bilateral relations are good, even excellent. We want to undo the situation we inherited: a state controlled economy, with democracy in danger. We have made great progress. We have turned the country around. In parliament, we have a one seat majority. In the next election we will do much better. We are hoping to join the European Community, and next year we will make a formal application. The political dimension is the most important, to take Malta into Europe. I do not expect quick results from the EC, but we must press ahead urgently. We would welcome your support for our interest in the EC. (C)

I am after something that gives a signal of U.S.-Maltese relations. Regarding surveillance, we need patrol boats. We appreciate your help on training and through the Peace Corps. (C)

The President: Where does the ship stand? (C)

Ambassador Blackwill: We have identified one but want to be sure it suits Malta's purposes. (C)

The President: I want to be helpful. (U)

Prime Minister Fenech-Adami: We have something more to thank you for. (U)

Secretary Baker: What about an aircraft? (C)

Ambassador Blackwill: We are still looking. (C)

The President: We hope to make progress with Gorbachev. (U)

Prime Minister Fenech-Adami: These are exciting times, but one must be cautious. (C)

The President: Yes, I agree completely. It is a time for prudence. If he proposes pulling his fleet out of the Mediterranean in return for our doing the same, that is not going to happen. He can forget that one. But we can move forward with things that really do affect our budgets -- these standing armies. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech-Adami: Back to Malta, our economy is growing. We are pushing hard. (U)

General Scowcroft: (Returning to the meeting with news from the Philippines) President Aquino feels the tide has turned, that things are looking up. We continue to provide air cover, but we may be able to conclude that. (C)

Prime Minister Fenech-Adami: Thank you again for your visit. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0214

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Brent
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Notetaker)

Francois Mitterrand, President of France
Roland Dumas, Prime Minister of France
Hubert Vedrine, Elysee Press Spokesman
Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Elysee Military Advisor

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 16, 1989, 1:30 - 3:00 pm
St. Martin

The President: We need to move forward on CFE. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, and we still have a problem with aircraft. The Soviets want to exclude air defense aircraft. (S)

The President: We have to move the process and get it done. It's very important. (S)

President Mitterrand: I don't see too many obstacles. It was a mistake to generalize the definition of aircraft. What we need on aircraft we should exclude from regular forces. We must sacrifice one category to save another. (S)

The President: Given the changes in Eastern Europe, we have a real problem in the US with defense spending. (S)

President Mitterrand: In France, we do not see things clearly enough to reduce defense spending. Things could change internally in the USSR. (S)

The President: That's the way I look at it too, but there is a crazy mood in the US. Some people say we should cut $50 to 100 billion dollars in defense and give out a peace dividend in our social programs. There are almost euphoric expectations in the U.S. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
OSD 8/21/09
2000-0429-F

President Mitterrand: During a TV program a few days ago, I said that the time had not yet arrived to cut defense spending. However, this is not a refusal to consider doing so in the future, because we are spending too much. (S)

The President: MacNamara said that we could cut the defense budget in half. (S)

Secretary Baker: Yesterday, the Soviets announced an 8 percent cut in defense spending and said that all foreign based troops would be home by the year 2000. (S)

The President: That will put great pressure on us to cut back our forces. (S)

President Mitterrand: Shall we talk more about CFE now? We must get this thing moving. We had a problem with the Greeks and the Turks and we solved that one. This is a good lesson regarding the Turkish application to join the EC. If we solve the aircraft problem, we should be able to sign an agreement in the second half of 1990. (S)

Secretary Baker: This will take continued high level direction. (S)

Brent Scowcroft: Yes, or our respective bureaucracies will bog down. (S)

The President: What about wrapping up a CW treaty next year? (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: We are somewhat optimistic, but the U.S. delegation in Geneva has the key. You made good proposals at Malta and I think the Soviets will accept. We got that impression in Kiev. I think they are interested in this one. Two treaties in one year would be a good signal. (S)

The President: I think they are interested across the board if we can find the right formulation. That will help more than anything. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have no objection to a CSCE summit. One will have to decide what is said. We will have to be prepared. It will not cost us anything, and it will boost Gorbachev at home. (S)

The President: We have been somewhat reserved about this. It did not come up with Gorbachev. We need to discuss what might come out of it. (S)

President Mitterrand: What does he expect of this? Gorbachev feels they need this to make the Summit solemn, to make it obvious he is a part of the international community. He needs it given his problems. (S)

The President: In Malta, he thought we had proposed a

Helsinki II rather than a CFE Summit. (S)

President Mitterrand: He needs results on arms control. We are in a good position to get concessions from him. (S)

The President: Tell us about the Eastern Europe Development Bank. We are interested, but how do you see it? Would the USSR be a sponsor or a recipient? If the latter, won't that break the bank? (S)

President Mitterrand: This morning in Paris, I signed a letter to you. On the basis of an EC decision, I would like a meeting on January 15 of all countries that will take part in the European Development Bank. There is no time to lose. The situation in the USSR is desperate. We need to help. I wrote to the other eleven EC members, to you and to the Japanese, Swiss, Austrian, Canadian, and Australian Prime Ministers. I also wrote to Gorbachev, and said this invitation is open to all who wish to give capital; they can be on the board of directors. We don't want it to be an EC bank. Recipient countries should also be involved at the decision making level. Hence, the participation of USSR. Each country will appoint representatives: bankers, Treasury Secretaries. These people will not make mistakes, or take financial risks. But this Bank is very important to the Eastern European countries. Gorbachev told me in Paris that he is very much interested; he is keen on this idea. Everything will depend on the quality and level of people we appoint. We can't throw money out of the window. (S)

The President: Exactly. (S)

Secretary Baker: Will there be a private sector component to this bank? (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Exactly; that's the point. (S)

President Mitterrand: The Strasbourg Declaration says we want them to move to a market economy. This bank should be open to both public and private funds. (S)

Secretary Baker: The President has proposed an Enterprise Fund to help develop the Polish and Hungarian private sectors. (S)

President Mitterrand: This will be a bank run by professionals. Bankers in France are not tenderhearted towards Frenchmen, and I doubt that they will be tenderhearted towards Moscow. You have bankers who are evangelists. Look at their loans to Mexico. (S)

The President: And look at Argentina also. (S)

Secretary Baker: Should the Soviets join the World Bank? (S)

President Mitterrand: They want to. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Soviets are not yet ready to come up with funding, but they want to join the International Financial Institutions. (S)

President Mitterrand: In itself, this is a good thing, although they must meet conditions. We mustn't isolate them. (S)

The President: This is good. It helps them understand the market. (S)

Secretary Baker: The Ryzhkov plan moves them in the wrong direction. This reveals their political vulnerability. (S)

President Mitterrand: As long as we maintain control, we will be fine. In the EDB, they will have a share commensurate with their contribution. It will be very small. The IMF and World Bank are strong. Why should they fear the Soviets, especially when dealing with a country that needs everything. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: IMF is certainly independent ready. (S)

President Mitterrand: On Lebanon, as soon as Muawad was elected, we recognized him. Then he was killed. I wrote General Aoun telling him I recognized the legitimacy of the Muawad government. I told him that this was in the interest of Lebanese Christians. I think the Syrians killed Muawad, although I have no proof. After Harawi was elected, we acted in the same fashion. We don't send arms to General Aoun. It is difficult for us to do much more as I said on French TV. The only legitimate government is this government. I have stopped all arms shipments to General Aoun. He is hesitant. He has picked up stature in the last few days thanks to Iraq and Israel. They have given him oxygen. I was right to tell the Syrians they would not accept bombing of Beirut. We said the same thing. I told Harawi that France would not understand an attack on East Beirut Christians through the Syrian Army. How does Harawi want to use force? His legitimacy would be questioned if he did. The Arabs are saying to us that General Aoun is in a state of rebellion, and we are helping Aoun. If we let him go on, he will win the day. Aoun should feel isolated without external support. Our advice to Israel should be to remove Aoun's external support. He must understand that Lebanon cannot be partitioned. He does not have the support of France. This is the first time in history that this is so. If the U.S. could act as we are to appease passions, we perhaps can avoid additional civil war. (S)

The President: As you know, we have no contact or standing with General Aoun. I had not heard of Israeli support. Aoun ought to be offered refuge somewhere so that he can get out. (S)

President Mitterrand: I have offered him asylum. This remains absolutely secret, but I have given Aoun all assurances as to the safety of his family. (S)

The President: I had not heard about the allegation that Israel was providing support for General Aoun. I assume you mean diplomatic support, not military. (S)

President Mitterrand: Assad doesn't want a victorious army which can be dangerous to politicians when the army comes home. It is

a tragedy for General Aoun that he does not have French government support. (S)

Secretary Baker: Would you have a problem with a statement that he should step down? (S)

The President: I have said on French TV that France does not recognize Aoun, and that we want the Taif agreements to succeed. But, we don't want to encourage the Syrians either and it is a Lebanese internal matter in any case. I am sad about this. (S)

General Scowcroft: We are more worried about Syria than you are. We feel that they are about to attack, only held back by a promise that Aoun will leave. (S)

The President: Aoun can beat the Syrians in the short term, for several weeks. The Syrians do not have a good army. (S)

The President: Many Lebanese Americans are sympathetic to General Aoun. It amazes me that they still are sympathetic. They see him as a strong Christian champion. (S)

President Mitterrand: We have the same problem. The only difference is they have friends in Parliament. (S)

The President: Are they of Lebanese heritage? (S)

President Mitterrand: Not especially, they are just Catholics. (S)

President Mitterrand: Today, the Pope is very silent on the subject. (S)

Secretary Baker: Very. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: If we push in the right direction, Aoun is more likely to step down. If he thinks he has outside support, such as Iraqi and Israeli backing, he will hang on. (S)

The President: Let us check the Israel connection. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Israel provided support for the Maronites for a long time. (S)

The President: The Secretary is working hard to move the peace process forward. (S)

President Mitterrand: We can reiterate the points of law: recognition of the government by you and by all of us. This is significant because France is considered the protector of the Christians. To add to this that Aoun should go would be counterproductive, too aggressive. We can express the hope that everyone will draw the consequences. (S)

The President: The Tripartite group did well. It looked like they were down and out, but they arose from the dead. (S)

President Mitterrand: The Pope refused to meet the delegation. The Pope doesn't want to accelerate the process. (S)

The President: I thought the Pope had encouraged Muawad and Aoun to cooperate with the Tripartite group. (S)

President Mitterrand: What does Secretary Baker have in mind regarding your NAC proposals? (S)

Secretary Baker: We need to adapt our institutions for a new era. NATO/EC/CSCE need to be reviewed at a time when we are reducing the US presence in Europe. We want the EC to serve as an anchor for Germany. We should institutionalize some of what we now do informally. How to enhance cooperation? We have no blueprint in mind. We could talk about trade agreements, but not necessarily. The essential point is that when the US military presence is reduced, we should enhance our trans-Atlantic political ties. (S)

President Mitterrand: What does this mean in concrete terms? (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: I said to Jim Baker this morning that Europe does not speak with one voice. He said, "does that mean you have twelve positions?" We can't create artificially one EC voice. Europe needs to shape itself. We are driven to move forward because of the German issue. Our approach should be practical, not theoretical. We don't know how Eastern Europe will turn out. Regarding U.S. reductions in Europe, the Soviets say they will withdraw from Europe by the year 2000. But Gorbachev says he wants the U.S. to remain in Europe. (S)

President Mitterrand: How do you interpret the idea of having all Soviet troops out of Europe by the year 2000? (S)

The President: I can't figure it out. He must be addressing himself to internal problems. (S)

President Mitterrand: This may be linked to Jim Baker's speech. (S)

Secretary Baker: I sent it to Shevardnadze. (S)

Secretary Baker: Czechoslovakia says that it wants Soviet forces out. Then will come Hungary and Poland, and then the GDR. They will have to leave anyway, so why not propose it. (S)

President Mitterrand: We are open as to the form the Alliance will take, but we must be practical. (S)

Secretary Baker: In my speech I suggested a NATO verification unit. This will be more and more a part of NATO's business. Regarding political consultations, we could talk about regional issues within NATO. This would not be to take NATO action, but to talk over the issues. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Regarding NATO verification, our military believes it is the responsibility of each state. We are not against coordination and there could be an exchange of information. But to have NATO take over the responsibility entirely would seem inappropriate. (S)

Secretary Baker: As the military component of NATO diminishes, as it will, NATO needs an increased political role, but verification would remain a national responsibility. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: As for regional discussions, we talk bilaterally. Why do it in NATO? (S)

Secretary Baker: We would like to enhance NATO consultations in addition to bilateral contacts. (S)

President Mitterrand: It is a question of common sense. France is a loyal member of NATO. It is not in the integrated command, but we have good talks between our military and the NATO command. Each time the US has needed something, we were forthcoming. We have received assistance from the U.S. of all kinds, We have no complaints. France and the UK are the most reliable U.S. allies. National responsibility is fine, but I'm very open to this kind of thing especially since we are moving toward the time when there will not be an enemy to the East. But we must be careful and not put the cart before the horse. Things can change in the USSR and bring about a military reversal. However, if by the year 2000 we don't have a strategic enemy, .. I accept the framework but will reserve on the contents. (S)

Secretary Baker: We favor continued EC integration. It's not for us to say how or even whether to deepen the EC. We have discussed this issue. The key is a strengthened EC. (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes, we talked about that. Your last point is very right. I agree that it is important to understand the German urge to reunify, but this must be accomplished through a proper transfer. We can't ignore the others who will resist this: the Poles, the Soviets, the Czechs, the Belgians, the Danes, the Italians. And there are others. France is showing the most understanding for the Germans right now. As I said to Kohl, German reunification must not go forward any faster than the EC. Otherwise, the whole thing will end up in the ditch. (S)

The President: Regarding China, it will be a long time before we achieve normalized US-China relations. But I thought the time had come to have contact with them. We have difficult problems with China on trade, human rights, and their man in the U.S. Embassy. I asked Brent Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger to go there. They were well received, but it caused a firestorm in some quarters in the U.S. We are trying to move the human rights agenda forward not backward. I hope China will take certain positive actions as a result of this trip. We don't know that they will, but it is my gut instinct that they will. We have taken a gamble. Privately, we have heard from the U.S. Ambassador that things are moving. They will not sell missiles

to the Middle East, and they have permitted The Voice of America correspondent to come in, although they do continue their jamming. We are also having discussions regarding Fulbright scholars. In taking this first step, I have taken some heat, but we want to move them forward on the rights of dissidents. Time will tell. I hope that I am right. (S)

General Scowcroft: There is an internal struggle going on in China. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: How is Deng Xiaoping? (S)

President Mitterrand: Has the situation stabilized? (S)

General Scowcroft: No, Deng Xiaoping still has control when he wants it. He is trying to transfer power to Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the Party. (S)

The President: Li Peng is tough and has something of an anti-US streak, but even he seemed a little more positive. Du Shi Meng was pleased that Scowcroft was meeting with Jiang Zemin. (S)

President Mitterrand: These eighty-year-olds give us some hope. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Did anything come up on Cambodia? (S)

General Scowcroft: We didn't discuss it. (S)

Secretary Baker: China has said no to the idea of a UN-supervised process. (S)

President Mitterrand: Hun Sen is the strong point of his government. Paradoxically, we didn't choose him but he is governing well. He is benefiting from fears of the return of the Khmer Rouge. For us, the Khmer Rouge are a nightmare. They would kill the negotiation. Hun Sen really needs to be taken into account by us. Sihanouk has lost lots of authority. He hopes to regain it in the field via the Khmer Rouge. (S)

Secretary Baker: There can be no settlement that does not involve the Khmer Rouge and China. That is an absolute fact of life. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: If you have China then you have the Khmer Rouge. China is pulling the strings. Without China, Hun Sen will be the strongest. The Khmer Rouge depends entirely on China. (S)

Secretary Baker: Without China, the Khmer Rouge would indeed be weak. (S)

General Scowcroft: But China won't cut its links to the Khmer Rouge; that is their influence in the game. (S)

Secretary Baker: We have differences as to the role of the Vietnamese. We believe they influence Hun Sen. The West has

leverage over Viet Nam through their aid requirements. You give because you seek leverage. We hold back because we seek leverage. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: So there is no difference! (S)

General Scowcroft: It's only a question of tactics. (Laughter) (S)

The President: Turning to Hong Kong, that is a very difficult repatriation problem. (S)

President Mitterrand: For us, it is ethically an almost unbearable situation. (S)

The President: Regarding Central America, Oscar Arias asked that I ask Gorbachev to persuade Castro to stop exporting revolution. We didn't get much progress, but our views are more clearly understood. (S)

President Mitterrand: On the question of what we tell the press on the German issue, developments in Germany must be linked to developments in NATO and the EC. We should show understanding over what the Germans wish. There is not much we can do because we are not going to go to war against Germany. It could cause a diplomatic crisis if it goes too fast. It would have the wrong effect and would complicate East-West relations at a time when the West is winning hands down. (S)

Secretary Baker: With regard to the Strasbourg communique and the NATO Ministerial, we are all together. (S)

President Mitterrand: I agree fully with President Bush. We are prepared to manage the contradictions in the situation. A speedy move towards reunification cannot be stopped by force, and perhaps not by diplomacy. At the same time, it could disrupt the European equilibrium based on existing treaties and frontiers. What you have said, I feel. I did not care for General Walters giving a date for reunification. (S)

The President: What he said about a five year time frame is not the official U.S. position. (S)

President Mitterrand: But he said it in Germany and the Germans heard it. I am not saying anything about the man, but I do not think it is wise to mention a date. We don't need to encourage more speed. (S)

The President: General Walters is no longer saying it. (S)

President Mitterrand: We must move on arms control, on EC integration, on European monetary union, and on US-EC cooperation all at the same time in order to create a new Europe. Otherwise, we will be back in 1913 and we could lose everything. We are friends of Germany. They can't take our advice amiss. (S)

The President: Kohl understands this but he is playing political cards. (S)

President Mitterrand: He has turned down the rhetoric, but he has his election problems. I was mentioning earlier that we must respect the Helsinki agreements. When Germany says no to the elimination of border controls with France because of the East Germany issue, that upsets me. Holland and Belgium refused outright; we were more diplomatic. But Germany caused the problem. Four days ago, Kohl called me and raised no objection. When our representatives met and had East Germany foisted on us, we were shocked. (S)

Secretary Baker: Regarding my trip to the GDR, the opposition said that Modrow represented our only hope of getting to the May 6 elections. He is the last symbol of legitimacy in the GDR. We fear anarchy if Modrow falls. (S)

President Mitterrand: I am going there on Wednesday on a State visit. Honneker had invited me. (S)

Secretary Baker: Kohl will have the opportunity to make the same point. (S)

Foreign Minister Dumas: Do you think he will? (S)

Brent Scowcroft: No. (S)