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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Presidential Memcons Files

OA/ID Number: 91107
Folder ID Number: 91107-003

Folder Title:
Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 4/19/89 - 5/31/89

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Berlin Governing Mayor Walter Momper (3 pp.)	4/19/89	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Esquivel of Belize (5 pp.)	4/20/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation: The President and Cape Verdean President Aristides Pereira (2 pp.)	4/21/89	(b)(1)	C
04. Memcon	Re: President's Meeting with Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway (5 pp.)	5/3/89	(b)(1)	S
05. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (5 pp.)	5/4/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (4 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	C
07. Memcon	Re: The President's Meeting with Norwegian King Olav V (1 pp.)	5/8/89	(b)(1)	C
08. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (5 pp.)	5/9/89	(b)(1)	S
09. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (2 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 4/19/89 - 5/31/89

Pinksheet Number: cap912
OA/ID Number: 91107-003
Date Closed: 1/23/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
10. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Sir Dawda Jawara, President of the Gambia (4 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1)	C
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France [FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	5/20/89	(b)(1)	S
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (5 pp.)	5/20/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (2 pp.)	5/20/89	(b)(1)	S
14. Memcon	Re: Meeting with President Vigdis Finnbogadottir of Iceland (2 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	C
15. Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (6 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	C
16. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Defense Minister Rabin of Israel (4 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
17. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (7 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
18. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (2 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
19. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy (4 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S
20. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (2 pp.)	5/27/89	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
21. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium (7 pp.)	5/28/89	(b)(1)	S
22. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO (3 pp.)	5/29/89	(b)(1)	S
23. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
24. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
25. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	C
26. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [redacted] (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S
27. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (4 pp.)	5/31/89	(b)(1)	TS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Berlin Governing Mayor Walter Momper

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
James Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert Blackwill, Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Charles Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Harry Gilmore, U.S. Minister, Berlin

Berlin
Governing Mayor Walter Momper
FRG Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus
Wolf Calebow, Counselor, FRG Embassy

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 19, 1989, 2:00 p.m. - 2:15 p.m.
Oval Office

After opening pleasantries, the President said he was anxious to hear about the situation in Berlin. (U)

Governing Mayor Momper began by inviting the President to Berlin. The government and people of Berlin would like the President to come, he said, to demonstrate America's commitment to Berlin. Even the "alternative" parts of the Senate [referring to the environmentalist "Alternative List" in coalition with Momper's Social Democratic Party (SPD)] would like the President to come. (Ø)

The President thanked Momper very much for his generous invitation. He then inquired whether Momper was pleased so far with the cooperation of the Alternatives. (Ø)

Momper replied in the affirmative. So far they are very reasonable: on the questions of Allied status and a visit of the U.S. President, they have been quite moderate. (Ø)

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The President noted that many of the Greens have been ahead of their time on environmental issues, but their security concerns are radical, and harder to handle in the NATO context. (C)

Momper replied that they are changing. He said that Undersecretary of State Kimmitt emphasized that one of the President's key issues will be the global environment. This will help with the Alternatives. (C)

The President said that his Administration will push on the environment. The U.S. wants to help Brazil, for example, with some sort of environmental set aside. The Administration is going to try to stay out front, to make the environment a real priority. (C)

Secretary Baker noted that the U.S. is adding environmental concerns to its agenda with the Soviet Union. (C)

Turning to Eastern Europe, Mayor Momper said he liked the President's speech in Detroit and the signal that the U.S. supports change in Eastern Europe. Berliners, Momper added, have a special interest in East-West issues and to the improvement of the situation in and around Berlin. The President's speech really encouraged the people and government of Berlin. (C)

The President noted that the U.S. will continue to differentiate between those countries that move toward pluralism, and will have no anti-Soviet cast to its policies. Americans have an affinity and a cultural closeness to Eastern Europe, and do not want to see people crushed under tanks, as in 1956. The President added that the U.S. is limited by budget problems, but it will do everything possible. But perhaps Berlin does not have budget problems. (C)

Mayor Momper replied that his government is trying to cut 8 per cent from the budget, excepting personnel, but it is a real struggle with the Alternatives. Aid from the Federal government in Bonn helps, he said; and in any case Berlin wants to make its contribution and lend its know-how to East-West cooperation. (C)

Secretary Baker asked how Momper sees events in Poland and Hungary affecting the GDR. (C)

Momper observed that the GDR is far behind the times. There is movement, though not yet open, in East German society. There have been some improvements in information policy and a "small perestroika" in economic matters, but even the Soviets are unhappy with the lack of change in the GDR. After Honecker, who is 75, there may be fundamental change. At the moment, however, no one, including Moscow, is really sure how glasnost will affect the German national question in the GDR. (C)

The President said he wondered whether the older leaders in the GDR -- those in their seventies -- would like to return to a unified Germany. (Ø)

Momper replied that this was more true of the younger generation in the GDR. (Ø)

The President then asked how young people in Berlin feel about the Wall. (Ø)

Momper observed that Berliners are accustomed to the Wall. They feel its presence, but young people do not want Berlin's government to tell the GDR to take down the Wall. Rather, Berliners want more open contacts so there will be more sharing of their cultural heritage. They do not like the Wall but have learned to live with it. (Ø)

Before the President concluded the meeting, Secretary Baker observed that this is why Gorbachev's "European house" is such an empty concept. Europeans cannot move from room to room. (Ø)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2901

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Prime Minister Esquivel of Belize

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James Baker, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Designate
Robert Rich, Ambassador to Belize
David Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)

Prime Minister Esquivel
Dean Barrow, Foreign Minister
Edward Laing, Ambassador to the United States
Joy Grant, Counselor of the Embassy of Belize

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 20, 1989, 3:05 p.m. - 3:25 p.m.
Oval Office

The President and the Prime Minister had the following exchange as the first contingent of press (photographers) entered:

The President welcomed Prime Minister Esquivel, saying it was nice to see him. He commented that he had never been to Belize but had heard that it was a beautiful country. He was aware of our cooperation with Belize on fighting narcotics, saying that we have to fight it at both ends, at home and abroad.

The Prime Minister expressed his condolences over the loss of life from the explosion on the battleship Iowa.

The President accepted the condolences, saying it was such a heartbreak for the families involved. The President continued that there has been some question of getting rid of the ships themselves with the argument that they are relics. He disagreed, saying that they have other purposes besides serving as gun platforms. He said it was very thoughtful of the Prime Minister to mention this tragedy.

The President and Prime Minister exchanged the following as the second press group (television reporters) entered:

The Prime Minister asked the President how things were going.

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The President said that he was pleased to see Esquivel and grateful for the visit. (The President then commented that they would chat for a minute or two for the benefit of the cameras.) The President said he was aware of the adverse effect of refugees on Belize and would like to discuss that, and he was always interested in talking about enhanced ways to fight drugs. Those are just two of the subjects on our mind for the meeting, he said.

The Prime Minister said that the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was also on his mind, and he mentioned instability in the border areas of Belize. He welcomed the President's new policy in Central America.

The press then departed, and the President and Prime Minister continued their conversation.

The President said that he had successfully launched his policy towards Central America with the Bipartisan Accord, and that Americans now spoke with one voice on that topic. The Secretary of State had engineered the agreement in an initially hostile political environment. Yet, we got the Congressional leadership here [at the White House] and they became very supportive. There was some dissent, some dissatisfaction and concern, both from liberals and conservatives, but it was accomplished. He thanked the Prime Minister for raising the subject.

The President said that the Central American policy should not be interpreted as lack of interest in democracy. "That underpins the entire idea of Esquipulas." What we want is free and fair--certifiably fair--elections in Nicaragua. We think that is a worthy objective. We will sustain the Contras. Those who want to go back to Nicaragua voluntarily may do so. We urge them to go back and we urge the Sandinistas to live up to their professed goal of democratization.

The Prime Minister characterized the President's plan as the "best hope" for peace. He thought a primary element now was that the Central Americans themselves are taking the lead. This is cause for some optimism. At the same time, he said, we are not that optimistic that everything will happen like it is supposed to happen. But its direction is right, it has a chance to succeed, and we applaud your efforts. The Prime Minister said, "Any support we can give, we will."

The President said that we think along the same lines. Changing the subject, he asked about Belize's border talks with Guatemala, saying in an aside that he did not want to pry into Belize's internal affairs. The President said he did not know if there was a role for the United States in this, but he wanted to ask. "This must bother you a lot," he said.

The Prime Minister answered that he was bothered, but he was encouraged by the attitude of Guatemalan President Cerezo. He had the right attitude. He is sincere. At the same time, Cerezo's hands had been tied by the military and by political history in Guatemala. He is moving forward on one hand with eagerness, but on the other he shows reluctance and is not wanting to upset anyone. The Prime Minister summed up by saying that the atmosphere was positive, but things were moving very slowly.

The President asked if contacts were better under Cerezo.

The Prime Minister said they were better. There are now many informal exchanges. He cited the case of a Guatemalan Minister who attended the Pan American health meeting in Belize, although not as an official visitor to Belize. Belizeans attend conferences and other events in Guatemala.

The President referred to the visit of the Guatemalan Minister, saying it was a Guatemalan call. Belize says, if you want to come, come.

The Prime Minister said there were other relations and exchanges. Overall, things are better. Every now and then there is an unexpected obstacle. Last week something happened that was an example. The Guatemalans had previously concurred with Belize's application for observer status at the OAS. Yet, he said, they opposed us when we did apply.

The President addressed Secretary Baker, asking about points he brought up in an earlier conversation. You mentioned narcotics, the President began to say.

Secretary Baker said narcotics and foreign military sales. Sales were "zeroed out" last year because of Congressional earmarking.

The Prime Minister observed that in the end Belize got $250,000. He said that Belize was fairly dependent on foreign military aid. The Ministry of Defense forces have 700 people. It amounts to a half of a million dollars, which equals six percent of the budget. There is very little left for equipment.

Secretary Baker questioned the figure the Prime Minister had just given.

The Prime Minister corrected himself, saying the amount was $5 million.

Secretary Baker said that would make an $80 million budget.

The Prime Minister said, "Yes, on the current side."

The President questioned how it was managed to fight narcotics traffickers with such a small force.

The Prime Minister said that it was difficult. Marijuana used to be the number one problem, but the government had had great success in controlling marijuana. There was only 350 acres left now. Two Thrush aircraft from the United States Government were very effective for aerial spraying. Marijuana production was now only 10 percent of what it was a couple of years ago. The problem is the unpopulated border areas and trafficking along the borders. There is also the introduction of cocaine from South America; they transship it through Belize, causing serious problems for us.

The President said the Prime Minister's account was interesting. He said that he had been down to Central America when he was Vice President. At the time, people used to say that the demand side was all in the United States. Admittedly, we have a tremendous market, a growing market, he said. The President said it has gone on for some time now, with the involvement of the criminal element, but there is no use giving up. Now, there is no big division on this problem. No longer are foreigners saying that the United States accounts for all the demand, and their countries are suppliers. No one is immune from this. Everyone is saying that now, but he was not trying to say that there were not sizable markets at home.

The President said that we wanted CBI to succeed. There was some feeling out there that we are neglecting CBI, which is not true. He turned to Secretary Baker and asked, "There is a new thrust for that on the Hill, isn't that right?" We had to beat back protectionist sentiment on the Hill. The President said that this subject came up in the election campaign and "I was less protectionist than the fellow I was up against." Protectionism has popular appeal, but we will stand against that.

The Prime Minister said that he would try to reach the American people and inform them of the realities of the situation. He did not believe it was all that threatening, yet he was reading some interesting statistics this morning. Belize sends 22 percent of its exports to the United States and receives 32 percent of its imports from the United States.

Secretary Baker asked if the United States ran a surplus.

The Prime Minister said yes, $34 million.

The President asked what were the main export items.

The Prime Minister replied machinery, petroleum products, some fruit. Sugar is a "dicey one."

The President interjected that it was a tough issue.

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The Prime Minister said he hoped the United States would do whatever it could to assuage his people. He knew that there were many now in the United States who were interested in the Caribbean and willing to act. He cited the Friends of the Caribbean in the Congress. Things are going very well.

Secretary Baker said, you know, Prime Minister, the last administration and this one have tried to get the sugar quotas changed. It is very difficult.

The President said there were powerful lobbies.

Secretary Baker said that we want to help. But it is tough, and even the Friends don't have the votes.

The Prime Minister referred to the bipartisan aspect of the administration's Central American policy and said he sensed an eagerness of the Congress to work with the administration on other issues.

The President said that we will keep going. "I'll have some fights," he said, but they would not be rancorous ones.

The President thanked the Prime Minister and said he was delighted he could come. He had heard wonderful things about Belize. He had heard it was like Texas, and both he and the Secretary were from that area.

The Prime Minister thanked the President and said he was very pleased to come.

As the delegation began to exit, the President took the Prime Minister aside and pointed out where his dog Millie was in the Rose Garden. The President and Prime Minister exchanged good wishes and the party left.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LOG # 2942

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MEMORANDUM ON CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: The President and Cape Verdean President Aristides Pereira

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James. A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant ot the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs-Designate
Robin R. Sanders, NSC staff (notetaker)

DATE, TIME: April 21, 1989, 2:00 - 2:15 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President opened by inquiring about President Pereira's health, and stressing the excellent bilateral relations between Cape Verde and the United States. The President said that he was delighted to have an opportunity to renew his personal relationship with President Pereira, and he fondly remembered their last meeting in Brazil. The President said that the USG was grateful for President Pereira's constructive role which led to the positive outcome of the Angola/Namibia Accords. The President thanked Pereira, on behalf of the American people, for his leadership and foresight. He added that he was personally glad to be able to give President Pereira the proper credit and recognition for his role in bringing about the Angola/Namibia agreement. "You were one of a handful of people that believed early on in our policy and initiatives," the President said, "You believed that something positive could happen, and it did."

President Pereira said that he was delighted to have the opportunity to meet with the President and that it was nice to be able to see him again. He said that his health was improving and he was relieved to know that there was no serious problem with his heart. Pereira added that the treatment he has received at Bethesda Naval Hospital had been superb, and that he has been treated extremely well during his stay in the United States. He thanked the State Department for all of its assistance. "Having my medical treatment in the United States shows how much

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confidence I have in this country and the depth of the friendship I feel for the American people". Pereira inquired about Mrs. Bush's health and hoped that she was feeling better.

The President said that he appreciated the confidence President Pereira had in the United States. The President added that Mrs. Bush was in good health and that he would pass on President Pereira's good wishes. The President asked if President Pereira would be undergoing more medical tests.

President Pereira said he would be undergoing more medical treatment next week, but on an outpatient basis. He said Cape Verde was working hard to improve its ecomony, and inquired if the United States could assist Cape Verde in the area of human resources by granting five scholarships for Cape Verdeans to study in the United States. He also solicited the President's support in the budding relationship between Japan and South Korea. "We have a special relationship with the United States," said Pereira, "and we would be grateful if you could use your good offices with both Japan and South Korea to endorse and encourage them to pursue a relationship with Cape Verde."

The President said that he would be glad to help encourage the relationship between Cape Verde, Japan, and South Korea. He would certainly tell Japan and Korea about Cape Verde's positive role in the Angola/Namibia accords and the excellent bilateral relations that Cape Verde has with the United States. The President said that Greg Petersmeyer could certainly contact several private universitiess in Rhode Island and Massachusetts to see what the possibilities would be for granting several scholarships to Cape Verde. The President said that we would follow up on both issues, and let him know the outcome.
In closing, the President said that he looked forward to visiting Cape Verde again.

President Pereira said that he would welcome another visit to Cape Verde by the President and Mrs. Bush.

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MAY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs
James Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister
Kjeld Vibe, Ambassador
Arne Strand, State Secretary
Morten Wetland, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 3, 1989, 10:00 - 11:00 am EDT
The Oval Office

The President congratulated Prime Minister Brundtland on being honored for her work on the environment. He said he also wanted to mention preparations for the NATO Summit, which should be a demonstration of strength and resilience. The President said he welcomed changes in the Soviet Union and noted what a promising era this is, adding that Secretary Baker would be meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze the following week. The U.S. will be prudent, but there will be no foot-dragging. (Ø)

The President noted that people are looking at the NATO Summit with great interest. While there are differences on short-range-nuclear forces (SNF), the U.S. and Norway share a commitment to extended deterrence, no "third zero," and flexibility on a follow-on to the Lance missile. However, the U.S. believes that early SNF negotiations with Moscow would be a serious mistake that could undermine peace. The West should concentrate instead

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on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks and the need to reduce overwhelming Soviet conventional advantages. The President said he wanted to make clear the U.S. position on this and to ask Norway's support for holding the line against early SNF negotiations. (S)

Prime Minister Brundtland replied that in her press conference yesterday she had said the NATO Summit should seek common ground. This is important at the first summit of an American Administration and especially so on the 40th anniversary of NATO. As to the SNF discussions of last week, Chancellor Kohl used the word "linked" with regard to conventional and SNF negotiations. This view was based on the 1988 NATO summit, which affirmed the need for a mix of conventional and nuclear forces, and to modernize where necessary. This points toward common ground. (S)

Prime Minister Brundtland said the question is how to phrase the Alliance's willingness eventually to negotiate SNF. The Prime Minister agreed a "third zero" would be dangerous, recalling a discussion she had in 1987, after the Reykjavik summit, with Mrs. Thatcher about the dangers of a "third zero" and the problems with INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces]. It is difficult in a European debate to explain why it is dangerous to discuss these matters with the East. The Prime Minister said that it is possible to negotiate with Moscow in this area without going to a "third zero." She disputed the logic that negotiations would lead to a "third zero," saying this view was overly fearful. The question is the phrasing in the Summit communique, which should avoid conflict within the Alliance. It is possible to avoid saying no to negotiations without going into them immediately. (S)

The President replied that a "third zero" is unacceptable. It would leave the U.S. in a position that no President could tolerate. It would also be unacceptable to the American people. (S)

Secretary Baker added that a decision has been taken on a follow-on to the Lance missile that handles the political problem in Bonn. The issue is when to get to negotiations. The U.S. believes it would be difficult for any European government to avoid a "third zero." There is also the situation in the U.S., where there is a continual fight with public opinion and the Congress to maintain hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in Europe. There is some public sentiment to bring them home. We need the follow-on to Lance to protect our troops. The Administration made this clear to Ministers Genscher and Stoltenberg. It is more than an issue of military strategy; domestic political concerns are also at work. (S)

The President said the U.S. has been restrained but that he is getting annoyed by faits accompli and public posturing by others.

The U.S. is not going to tolerate this much longer. The President emphasized that the U.S. must state forcefully its position, and that he wanted the Prime Minister to hear this from him. The U.S. wants the Alliance to be strong. The President said he would negotiate with Gorbachev one-on-one and that he knows the man. However, the President said that he wants to do this with NATO together. (S)

Prime Minister Brundtland said that the Alliance must find a common platform. (S)

The President replied that he had tried, but was confronted with a complete reversal and public faits accompli by Bonn. (S)

Prime Minister Brundtland agreed that the situation was unfortunate, but the clock cannot be turned back three weeks. (S)

The President said Allied leaders cannot simply complain about domestic politics and pressures, either. The President said he would go up ten points [in public approval ratings] if he were to announce that he was pulling U.S. troops out of Europe. (S)

Secretary Baker added that Allied leaders cannot play politics with the future of Europe. The U.S. will not. (S)

Prime Minister Brundtland asked about Secretary Cheney's comments on Gorbachev. (S)

The President said he would explain the U.S. position. The U.S. wants to see perestroika succeed. Nobody knows whether Gorbachev will succeed. Secretary Cheney expressed a personal view that he might not. The President said he was not going to make foreign policy based on a presumption that Gorbachev will succeed. The U.S. will have good, sound, and forward-looking proposals for Gorbachev, but the U.S. will not be naive. The President pledged that concerns of the security of the West will remain uppermost in his mind. (S)

Prime Minister Brundtland said that the West needs to test Moscow without taking real risks. (C)

Governor Sununu noted it would be equally self-serving if the U.S. suggested unilateral reductions for short-term reasons. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland countered that in Europe these are long-term trends in favor of negotiations. The U.S. should not misunderstand. (C)

General Scowcroft argued that there is no rationale for negotiating for lower levels of SNF. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland asked how the U.S. answers those who say 50/50 is better than 1400 to 88. (C)

General Scowcroft replied that 88 is much too low given the conventional imbalance. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland agreed that the emphasis must be on conventional forces. (C)

Secretary Baker observed that if SNF negotiations begin, the focus would be shifted away from the conventional negotiations that have just been launched. The approach should be to see results in conventional talks before looking at nuclear systems. The Germans want NATO to study how best to begin SNF negotiations because Gorbachev says the conventional bridge has been crossed. The U.S. does not agree. (C)

The President asked that if Gorbachev is so great, why do the Soviets need such conventional superiority? What does this say about real Soviet intentions? (C)

The President, turning to another subject, said that the U.S. is now speaking with one voice on Central America. It would be useful if Scandinavia would take a hard look at how to bring democracy to Nicaragua. If Scandinavia then concludes that Ortega will bring Swedish-style democracy, fine. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland said that she had talked with Ortega the previous Friday, after a briefing from the American Embassy, and told him that everyone would be studying closely the Nicaraguan election to see if it is fair and follows through on the peace plan. The Prime Minister said she wanted the President to keep the pressure on Ortega, to push Nicaragua to become a democracy. She said she was uncertain whether Ortega has democratic inclinations. (C)

Secretary Baker asked whether the Prime Minister had told Ortega that further economic assistance would be tied to movement toward democracy. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland replied that she had done so. Norway will give 30 million Norwegian Kroner at a pledging conference in Stockholm, but would not offer easy access to Norwegian money in the future. She added that the Soviets like to make the connection between Afghanistan and Central America. Does the U.S. agree? (C)

The President replied that he does not believe in spheres of influence; he believes in democracy. (C)

Prime Minister Brundtland, before the meeting concluded, noted that there had not been much time to discuss the matter, but that there was a need for U.S. leadership concerning the international

environment. The Prime Minister hoped this effort could be advanced at the Economic Summit and at NATO as well. (Ø)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles, U.S. Ambassador to Canada
Rozanne L. Ridgeway, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, Director for European Economic Affairs, NSC

Canada
Prime Minister Mulroney
Joseph Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Stanley Hartt, Chief of Staff
Ambassador Derek Burney
Don Campbell, Associate Deputy Minister for U. S. Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 4, 1989, 11:30 a.m. -12:30 p.m.
Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

The President congratulated Prime Minister Mulroney on his environmental award and said he was coming at a time when there would be a lot of questions on SNF. The change in Kohl's position was not good, and not in keeping with earlier understandings. The President could understand the political pressures on Kohl, but policy could not be changed on that basis. It was essential that the Alliance be seen as demonstrating solidarity, and outrageous that SNF should be made into a U.S. problem. The U.S. too faces public opinion pressures for arms reductions; solidarity is the key word. (S)

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Prime Minister Mulroney said he was glad the President had raised the SNF issue and quoted a line from his own recent speech, to the effect that the solidarity of NATO and U.S. leadership of the Alliance were the cornerstones of Western security. This was most important, and the President's upcoming visit to Brussels was his first as U.S. President. It was necessary to celebrate NATO's success and to project his leadership. The French, Germans, or British could not be the leaders. The fundamentals had to be respected, and so what happened between now and the Summit was essential. Canada had some ideas that might help. While Prime Minister Mulroney understood Kohl's political pressures, he had gone through the same thing in the opinion polls and had fought back. Leadership is often inspired compromise. (S)

The President said he was being criticized for lack of leadership, as a result of the policy reviews his Administration was conducting and because others were going public while the U.S. was trying to discuss the issues quietly in private. This had built up fuel in Congress, and people like Biden, Pell and Nitze were speaking out. President Reagan had taken flack initially for not talking to Gorbachev, and then when he did it was a success. He himself was trying to do things in a thoughtful way, not through the editorial page of the New York Times. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney said that the Alliance had a position. Perhaps Mrs. Thatcher's public embrace of Gorbachev had given Kohl the idea that he too could do business with him. But the assertion by George Bush of complete leadership in Brussels was important. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had started discussions with Kohl on January 24 and had proposed that there be bilateral consultations before the coalition reached its position. But the signals had changed and Kohl had now adopted the SPD or FDP position. As a result, the U.S. cannot seem too anxious to reach a compromise. Any U.S. offer could be picked up, just as the modernization concession was pocketed. (S)

The President said he thought things could be worked out, but it would be necessary to take some heat in the meantime. (S)

Secretary Baker said that anyone wanting to be helpful should first line up the Germans, and only then have the U.S. judge the proposal. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney said the U.S. position was very reasonable. He would try to see what the FRG's bottom line was. He understood the danger that they would pocket any new U.S. offer. (S)

The President said that Kohl had said he wanted to talk early on, but then had kept on postponing discussion. (S)

Secretary Baker said the Germans were playing politics with Western security. There had been many phone calls, many promises made, but then we were presented with a fait accompli. The President could not just accept this and paper it over in the Alliance. (S)

The President said he was being asked why he was pulling back on START and displaying a Cold War mentality. He wasn't, but it was necessary to work patiently. First, Secretary Baker needed to meet with Shevarnadze and then see him a second time. Only then should there be a meeting with Gorbachev. He would not change his views based on New York Times editorials or on Sam Nunn. (S)

Secretary Clark said he understood the problem of German pocketing, but the Summit risked being defined by the SNF disagreements. NATO's success should be its central focus. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney then referred to Canada's Open Skies proposal and asked whether there was any U.S. interest. (S)

The President replied that there was interest and the U.S. was looking at the idea. He asked how it would work in practice. (S)

Secretary Clark said the advantage was that it would be a Western initiative. The information acquired would be information known officially, even though much was already available by satellite. The idea was partly symbolism. Gorbachev knows that President Eisenhower had proposed the idea and could table it himself. (S)

The President said there is an advantage to taking the offensive, and again asked for details as to how the proposal would work. (None were provided.) (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney said that when he had spoken in the Senate earlier in the day and mentioned that Gorbachev was doing innovative things the Senators had applauded. It is frustrating to have to keep fighting a PR battle, but there is a great deal of "high road" that George Bush can pursue, even if it is not exciting. (S)

The President alluded again to the German problem. He would rather be sure than move too fast; this was almost a replay of the early Reagan/Gorbachev years. Recent USIA polling on European opinion was encouraging, once one went beyond the simple "Gorbachev wants peace" type of question. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney said that was why he was upset at the Germans. It was like being blindsided in September in the midst of an election campaign. The Soviet objective was to divide NATO. (S)

The President said he was very pleased by what Prime Minister Mulroney was saying. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney then said that he'd like to raise two specific issues, although the bilateral agenda was a very clean one. The first item was acid rain. He had just met with Senator Mitchell, who thinks there will be progress. However, what would the levels be? (S)

The President replied that the levels hadn't been set yet. They were being discussed in the Domestic Policy Council, but they might not be precisely what Sen. Mitchell might like. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney responded that environment was becoming a prominent foreign policy issue; it was important that the U.S. exercise leadership in this area. Acid rain was important to him from a selfish perspective, but also for the U.S. international leadership role. The U.S. should not niggle about whether the levels (of pollutant reduction) were 10 or 12 million tons. (S)

The President said he had asked his domestic policy people to make proposals for the type of conference where something is actually done. The U.S. can't just go to every conference. He had already shared his views on The Hague. It was important to have sensible proposals which would not bring productive economies to a screeching halt. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney said Canada was having the same problem with international conferences. The U.S. needs to lead a conference and make it the conference. (S)

The President mentioned that even Oscar Arias wanted to have an environmental conference as part of Costa Rica's 100th anniversary. The President was glad Prime Minister Mulroney had raised the issue; we had to do something about the degradation of the environment. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney then turned to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), making a plea that it be given time to work. Canada was not Japan, and it hurt him when he heard rumblings of reprisals before there had been time for full bilateral consultations. He cited the salmon/herring issues as an example. (S)

The President asked Secretary Baker to talk to Carla Hills and Clayton Yeutter about the issue. (S)

Secretary Baker explained that the U.S. had taken Canada to the GATT on the dispute. U.S. fishermen were saying that the new Canadian landing requirements were tantamount to the old constraints on export of unprocessed fish against which the GATT had ruled. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney replied that he understood Carla's problems, but could the President please tell her that Canada was not Japan. (S)

The President alluded to the FSX decision as an example of the climate on Capitol Hill and in U.S. public opinion on trade issues. (S)

Secretary Baker added that the climate extends beyond trade, for example on the SNF issues and pressures to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe. (S)

Prime Minister Mulroney recalled that he had said in February that Gorbachev had us in a political game with public opinion. (S)

The President responded that the Summit should be geared to NATO's success, and to the fact that socialism had failed. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Baker
Chief of Staff, Governor Sununu
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Robert M. Gates
Ambassador Henry Grunwald
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, William Bodde, Jr.
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC

Chancellor Franz Vranitzky
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chancellor, Eva Novotny
Ambassador Friedrich Hoess

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 5, 1989, 9:45 - 10:10 am EST
The Oval Office

The President expressed his gratitude to Austria for its service in hosting international conferences so important to European security, and said he knew that these must be trouble for the host country. (U)

The President noted speculation in Europe about U.S. willingness to engage Gorbachev in the peace process. He assured the Chancellor that the Administration is completing its policy reviews and will approach East-West relations in a sound way and at various levels, with the conviction that the West is on the winning side in terms of political systems and economies. Western Europe is doing well, and Eastern Europe is trying to move toward what has been successful in the West. The President said that while there was no panic to meet with Gorbachev, he would welcome such a meeting. This is a promising time, with new chances to enhance peace and freedom. The President added that he recently looked again at the speech he gave in Vienna several years ago and thought it seemed realistic in light of new signs of progress in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (C)

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Chancellor Vranitzky assured the President that having conference activities in Vienna, and cooperating with politicians from 34 countries, was not a hardship but a vitally important task. Austria is grateful to those nations who chose Vienna as a meeting place for conferences and for international understanding. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky agreed that important changes are taking place in Eastern Europe and noted particularly the removal of the iron curtain between Austria and Hungary. (C)

The President noted the wonderful symbolism and reality of the action, which received wide coverage in the U.S. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky said that Austria is ready to cooperate with all in Eastern Europe who wish to cooperate. Romania is not ready for cooperation, Czechoslovakia is hesitant, and the GDR wants bilateral cooperation but not internal reform. The Chancellor, referring to the important changes in Poland and his earlier discussion with Secretary Baker, said it is important for the West to assist, so as to keep the momentum alive. He noted that with Eastern Europe's weak economic situation, high debts, and lack of convertible currency, cooperation is often a one-sided affair. He expressed concern about increasing social and political tensions, particularly in Yugoslavia, adding that Austria's role as a small country and an outpost of free democracy is to keep a dialogue open. (C)

The President added that the West should show proper support and avoid the dangers that might come from rhetorical overstatement. He agreed with the Chancellor's appraisal of Eastern Europe but thought Czechoslovakia might not be so far behind Poland and Hungary. The President also noted that Yugoslavia's unwieldy system of rotational leadership was not conducive to stability. As to Poland, it would be hard to overstate the emotional connections with the U.S. through Polish-Americans and the Church, yet the U.S. cannot do everything the Polish regime or Solidarity want. The U.S. wants to see progress there continue,

but must pursue a balanced policy. It is a promising time in Eastern Europe, which the Chancellor summed up well. The President said he wished Romania would do more, but failed to see many redeeming features in President Ceausescu. (C)

Secretary Baker asked whether the Chancellor thought any East European country would move toward full currency convertibility. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky replied that none would for the foreseeable future. If any country had a chance, by virtue of the size of

its economy and its natural resources, it would be the USSR itself. Of the smaller countries, Hungary is the most likely candidate, but it also has the highest per capita debt and will have to enter into rescheduling negotiations with the Paris Club. (C)

The Chancellor concluded that Hungary's economic situation does not serve as a basis for convertibility. (C)

The President asked whether Hungarian leaders are blaming the system itself for their economic troubles. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky said they are mainly blaming their predecessors, a process that also involves a difficult public debate over how to deal with the roles of Kadar and Nagy during the 1956 revolution. (C)

The President asked how Kadar's standing has been affected. His reputation has suffered, but he does not seem to have been given the treatment accorded Stalin after his death. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky listed Kadar's merits: he was the first communist leader to establish a certain autonomy and independence, and he was the first to move toward domestic liberalization. He was a reformer long before *perestroika*, but he did not see as his goal the streamlining of the bureaucratic system. Now the situation in Budapest looks good, but conditions 50 kilometers outside the capital are much worse. (C)

The President observed that Kadar had been respected in Hungary but was now on the way down in public perceptions. The view of Kadar in the U.S. was based on his role in 1956, the President said, but his own view was more tolerant, as was that of the Hungarian people. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky alluded to Austrian and Hungarian preparations for a joint World Exposition by 1995, which would be the first ever held by two countries. (C)

The President asked the Chancellor about the Austrian economy. (C)

Chancellor Vranitzky replied that it was doing very well. There is satisfactory growth, low unemployment, a 2% inflation rate, and balanced trade. He noted, however, that Austria was faced with the European Community's plan to create a unified single market by 1992. The Chancellor drew the President's attention to the fact that Austria was preparing to apply for EC membership, saying it was important to mention this to the leader of a country that signed the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. He emphasized that Austria would not change anything written in the

State Treaty nor do anything to dilute Austrian neutrality. What was negotiated in 1955 with the U.S., the U.K., France, and the Soviet Union should not be changed or diminished. The Chancellor said he would be delighted if the American Administration would understand that Austria's neutrality would not be altered by EC membership. Austria had to give thought to the Community, since two thirds of its trade goes into the EC. (Ø)

The President observed that it is not clear what the impact of 1992 will be, but that the U.S. will be appealing for fewer and fewer restrictions. The U.S. has serious problems with the EC's agricultural policy and wants to eliminate as many restrictions as possible. The President said he would take these issues up at the Economic Summit. Freer trade is in everyone's interest. (Ø)

Chancellor Vranitzky said he wanted to insure that those outside the EC do not suffer after internal EC barriers are abolished. Austria does not want to be isolated or excluded and does not want to see new borderlines of discrimination or protectionism. The global economy will not arrive at free trade by the year 2000 through measures that hinder trade. (Ø)

Before concluding the meeting, the President asked how Swiss views compared to Austria's. The Chancellor replied that Switzerland's domestic situation, particularly its reliance on referenda, made it very difficult to join the international community. (Ø)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Norwegian King Olav V

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
The President
Governor Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Marlin Fitzwater
Adrian A. Basora (NSC)
M. James Wilkinson, State Department

Norway
King Olav V
Ambassador Kjeld Vibe
Jan Braathen, Aide-de-Camp to the King

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 8, 1989, 10:30-10:40 a.m.
Oval Office

The President welcomed the King and referred to the recent visit of the Norwegian Prime Minister and her initiatives on the environment. The US would be making its own proposals and he hoped they would be well received in Europe. On SNF, the US was working with its Allies and did not want a divided summit, but policy would not be driven by a changing mood in Germany. (Ø)

The President asked about Albert's wife and other mutual acquaintances, and King Olav responded briefly about their state of health. (U)

The President then spoke about his designee for Ambassador to Oslo, Loret Ruppe, praising her political abilities and the international experience she gained as Director of the Peace Corps. (U)

King Olav referred nostalgically to his family's five years in the US during WW II, and there was a brief discussion of whether some of the young people in Germany have forgotten. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Governor John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek
Henry Wijnaendts, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Richard Fein

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 9, 1989, 10:00 - 10:15 am and 5:00 - 5:45 pm EST
The Oval Office and The President's Living Quarters

Prime Minister Lubbers began by saying preparations for the NATO Summit were the most important items and proposed that they be the subject of the afternoon discussion. (Ø)

The President asked Prime Minister Lubbers for his latest thinking on the environment. (Ø)

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that the U.S. environmental proposals were very much like those of his government. The Dutch want to strengthen existing organizations under the framework of the U.N. His government also wants an environmental convention and in the coming months will have to achieve practical steps toward that end, including in the U.N. General Assembly. (Ø)

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The President emphasized his personal commitment to sponsoring an environmental conference. The U.S. Administration is working to define its objectives, to fulfill this commitment to the American people. The President said he would be prepared to discuss this in July and to explain how best to use U.S. expertise, but he rejected Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland's suggestion that 1% of GDP be put in an international fund. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers noted that his government also had doubts about the financial aspects of the Brundtland idea. It is important not to overexcite the expectations of developing countries. (C)

The President observed that the U.N. General Assembly gets very emotional and said he would not look for help in that forum at this time. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers conveyed greetings from Queen Beatrix before the morning meeting concluded. (U)

The President expressed his thanks and conveyed his respects. He then invited Prime Minister Lubbers to come to the residence at the end of the day to discuss SNF. (C)

The President began the late afternoon session by saying the U.S. wants the NATO Summit to be a success. The Administration is not dragging its feet with the Soviet Union. The U.S. wants to have good relations, wants perestroika and glasnost to succeed, and wants to go forward on a wide array of issues. On Central America, the President expressed the hope that Europe will speak out on the outrage in Panama and noted that U.S.-Soviet relations will be tempered by Soviet behavior in Central America. The President added that the U.S. welcomes change in the Soviet Union and is willing to sell grain to the Soviets. This, he said, brings the discussion to the topic at hand. (C)

The President said that it is essential that the NATO meeting be successful. He expressed concern about the Germans, noting that Chancellor Kohl cannot be allowed to drive NATO, but said the U.S. Administration would be talking with them further. The President said he had to be concerned about domestic support for U.S. troops in Europe. He has a responsibility to guarantee the safety of U.S. forces, and that entails continuing nuclear deterrence. The answer to the SNF problem lies in the success of conventional force reductions, which must be our priority. If Gorbachev is serious about reducing forces, he can take unilateral steps, given his superiority in conventional forces and SNF. SNF negotiations, however, would lead to a third zero, which would undermine U.S. capacity to keep troops in Europe. This is an absolutely critical issue which goes to the heart of nuclear deterrence. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers noted that Foreign Minister van den Broek has been active on the SNF issue. Lubbers agreed with what the President said. The formal German position is risky and would endanger the NATO Summit. The first thing is to agree on what the Alliance has said in the past, and Lubbers said he thought Chancellor Kohl would take such a position. As to the follow-on to the Lance (FOTL) missile, the Prime Minister argued that if a decision on deployment is postponed until 1992, it would be unwise to make research and development only a U.S. decision. It would be better to have it a NATO decision. (S)

The President agreed absolutely. The U.S. cannot be seen pushing such a decision on Europe. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers suggested a formulation providing for a decision on FOTL in 1991 or 1992, with research and development proceeding in the meantime. In the Comprehensive Concept, NATO should say that the Alliance will restructure and challenge the Warsaw Pact to reduce to NATO levels. Then, in a further phase, the Alliance would anticipate future SNF negotiations toward equal ceilings at lower levels above zero. This would also be considered in the context of the conventional balance in Europe. In sum, the Prime Minister proposed two preconditions: unilateral SNF reductions to our levels and progress in conventional talks. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers said his government had put this position to Chancellor Kohl in a paper delivered the preceding Wednesday. The Chancellor did not give a direct reply but said he would study the proposal. Prime Minister Lubbers said he promised to be back in touch with Chancellor Kohl after speaking with the President. Prime Minister Lubbers added that Chancellor Kohl, whose call for SNF negotiations is very important for him domestically, said he wants an agreement before the NATO Summit. As to nuclear artillery, Prime Minister Lubbers said there was something strange going on. A year ago, many Europeans thought of phasing out nuclear artillery and updating Lance. The Dutch thought the key to the problem was this shift from shorter to longer ranges. Prime Minister Lubbers felt the European populations would have accepted this, but then the idea got around that it would be dangerous to phase out nuclear artillery completely. Now the Alliance needs a "perspective" on modernization and a "perspective" on negotiations -- a very delicate formula that mentions negotiations but postpones them. (S)

Foreign Minister van den Broek argued that the Alliance cannot phase out artillery until there is a firm FOTL decision. Europeans know that the U.S. fears that SNF negotiations would lead to a third zero. However, expectations of such negotiations were prompted by the 1987 Reykjavik communique, and the Germans use that language forcefully. Now the Alliance is saying that SNF negotiations do not make sense, that the Soviet side should

reduce to our levels. The Foreign Minister said that his government does not feel it is dangerous to give an SNF negotiating perspective so long as there are preconditions, though they will be hard for the Germans to accept. (S)

General Scowcroft asked about the timing of phasing out of nuclear artillery. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that the Alliance would reduce unilaterally the U.S. stockpile and challenge the Soviets to come down to our levels. Then the Alliance would say a phasing out of nuclear artillery could occur, if FOTL and tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASM) were modernized. Prime Minister Lubbers added that the U.S. is quite right to worry about a third zero, but the Alliance does not need nuclear artillery. (S)

General Scowcroft said it would be important, then, to have modernized SNF before eliminating nuclear artillery. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers agreed, adding that it would be better to phase out artillery unilaterally, rather than through negotiations. This would be a good NATO initiative. (S)

The President asked for Dutch views of required NATO troop levels, including U.S. (C)

Director-General Wijnaendts supported the current NATO proposal. (C)

Foreign Minister van den Broek added that the focus should be on tanks and artillery rather than troop reductions. (C)

The President asked what Mrs. Thatcher had said (during the April 29 visit of Prime Minister Lubbers and Foreign Minister van den Broek to London). (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that Mrs. Thatcher knows the Dutch paper and does not like it. She favors telling Chancellor Kohl he is totally wrong and that there will be no negotiations. At the same time, she did find some elements of the paper useful. Mrs. Thatcher agrees on the need to find a formula other than negotiations, favoring equal ceilings at lower levels but omitting any reference to negotiations. (C)

The President summarized the Dutch view: that this language is acceptable to the Dutch, but would not accommodate Chancellor Kohl. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers confirmed that summary. The language is "one bridge too far" for Chancellor Kohl. (S)

The President, concluding the meeting, asked how much of Chancellor Kohl's problem would be helped if there were forward

movement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Would movement on START or CW help? (S)

Foreign Minister van den Broek replied that there is no linkage. Such moves would not help Chancellor Kohl. Foreign Minister Genscher wants SNF negotiations because he deeply feels a special German obligation to bring peace to Europe. Nothing else will satisfy him. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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5301

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Jonathan Moore, US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs
Richard Shubert, President of the American Red Cross
Nancy Bearg Dyke, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

President Cornelio Sommaruga
Andre Pasquier, ICRC/Geneva, Director of International Operations
Fred Isler, ICRC/New York, Acting Chief Delegate

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 15, 1989, 2:05 - 2:15 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President welcomed President Sommaruga and told him of his great respect for the ICRC. (U)

President Sommaruga said ICRC views the President as a real Red Cross supporter, and he noted his appreciation for US support. (U)

The President asked how the work of the ICRC is going around the world. (U)

President Sommaruga said that regional conflict solutions have given the ICRC more to do. In Afghanistan, ICRC representatives have been visiting prisoners of war held by the government, but the Mujaheddin has not let ICRC visit Soviet POWs in their hands. (C)

The President expressed an interest in helping and said he and General Scowcroft would talk about it. (C)

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President Sommaruga brought up the subject of southern Sudan and noted that the situation is improving. There is a truce and humanitarian assistance is better and more possible now. ICRC is working with the United Nations. Fifteen planes are working there now. (U)

President Sommaruga continued by observing that ICRC is still present in the Philippines, at the Cambodia/Thai border, in Namibia, and in Mozambique. Also, ICRC is in El Salvador and Nicaragua. He noted that there are many needs in Central America. (U)

President Sommaruga said that the support of the USG is good but it could be more, and he hoped that despite budget difficulties, the President could ensure that the percentage for ICRC is in keeping with the US size and status. (U)

President Sommaruga turned to the subject of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention. He hoped that the US can ratify it. (U)

The President said he would have to check where the issue of Protocol I stands. (U)

President Sommaruga invited the President to visit the ICRC in Geneva, if he is in Geneva. (U)

The President said he would like to do that. (U)

The President and President Sommaruga shook hands and the meeting ended. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3714

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Sir Dawda Jawara, President of The Gambia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Herbert E. Horowitz, U.S. Ambassador to The Gambia
David C. Miller, Jr., NSC (notetaker)

President Sir Dawda Jawara
Ousman A. Sallah, Gambian Ambassador to the United States
Omar Sey, Minister of External Affairs
Abdou Janha, Secretary General of the President's Office

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: May 15, 1989, 10:00 - 10:10 am
Oval Office

The President welcomed President Jawara to the Oval Office. While the press corps was in attendance, the President kept the conversation on the weather and asked President Jawara about his talk on agricultural affairs at Cornell. President Jawara indicated that he spoke for about 50 minutes not only on issues of veterinary medicine but on broader issues affecting Africa. President Jawara pointed out to the President that The Gambia has a center for agricultural and veterinarian research.

After the departure of the press, the President took the opportunity to welcome President Jawara to the White House and indicated his great personal support for the President's leadership of The Gambia. The President indicated he was particularly proud of President Jawara's principled stands on many issues, in particular human rights, which had made a profound effect on us. The President indicated that due to his own background and travels he had a sympathetic feeling for Africa.

The President then asked President Jawara how The Gambia was handling the refugee overflow from the current Senegal/Mauritania disturbances. President Jawara indicated that the situation was

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stabilizing. It had however created a real problem with the massive issues of repatriation. The President wondered if the countries were recalling their citizens or whether they were fleeing. President Jawara indicated that they were fleeing due to acts of violence committed by both sides.

President Jawara indicated that it was truly a tragic situation. President Jawara pointed out that the two countries really have citizens of mixed ethnic background with ethnic Senegalese holding Mauritanian passports and vice versa. The President then asked if indeed people were not being uprooted from their homes and family ties and neighbors. President Jawara indicated that was the case. The President then inquired as to whether The Gambia's role as a haven for these refugees was producing any strain in The Gambia's bilateral relations with either country. President Jawara indicated that: no, The Gambia was viewed as an honest broker and was working well with both sides. President Jawara pointed out that the Chairman of ECOWAS had become involved and that indeed the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS was currently touring the States to see if there was not some way to resolve the situation.

The President inquired as to how the situation began. Assistant Secretary Cohen replied that it was a situation of long historical animosity. President Jawara indicated that the real problem is an ill-defined border. The Mauritanian/Senegalese border is defined by a river and there is some confusion as to who has what grazing rights where. The murder of two Senegalese herdsmen was the incident that kicked off the current round of violence. Assistant Secretary Cohen pointed out that individuals of Senegalese background has been consistently discriminated against in Mauritania. President Jawara indicated that Mauritanians are black like Gambians while Senegalese are not and President Jawara pointed out that the Senegalese are of a different ethnic group.

President Jawara then began his talking points to the President. He expressed his appreciation to the President for the invitation to the White House indicating that it was a great honor. He congratulated the President on his election

President Jawara then indicated that he had one or two points he would like to make to the President. (U)

First, he wished to express his appreciation for the help he received from the U.S. on The Gambia's economic recovery program, specifically the 1985 IMF/World Bank program. The Gambia had taken the necessary economic steps to comply with the program and the upshot was that The Gambia's economy has really turned

around. President Jawara stated that in the most recent negotiations with the IMF and the Bank, that The Gambia has been singled out as a "star performer." President Jawara indicated that The Gambia is convinced that it is on the right course but indicated that the American balance-of-payments support had been a critical component of its recovery. He pointed out in particular that the grant it had received from the African Economic Policy Reform Program ($6 million per annum for 3 years) and the PL 480 commodities shipment had been vitally important. As PL 480 is now in the process of being phased out, he would like to request an increase in the funding from the AEPRP increasing from $6 to $15 million per annum over the next three years. This is very important so that The Gambia could do its structural adjustment program.

President Jawara indicated that his second point related to the support that The Gambia had received from the U.S. on defense and security matters. He pointed out that the international military education program had provided a very valuable opportunity for The Gambia's officers to receive training in the States. He also indicated that the African coastal defense program had been very helpful not only to protect The Gambia's fishing rights but for the defense of its territory. This program also allowed The Gambia to fulfill its territorial obligations with Senegal to protect their joint maritime rights.

President Jawara then requested that we consider non-lethal military assistance, specifically clothing and equipment that might be excess in our inventory but would be very helpful to The Gambia.

President Jawara went on to point out that it was important for The Gambia to maintain its defense preparedness. He referred to the 1981 attempted coup financed by the Libyans with the attendant loss of life. President Jawara reported that the Libyans had not given up and that indeed only last year The Gambia apprehended 15 young people who were to be taken to Libya for training with the objective of infiltrating them back into The Gambia.

The President asked why there was a problem with regard to continuing PL 480. Ambassador Horowitz said that PL 480 was approaching the end of a program and that the Embassy and the State Department were simply exploring other opportunities that might be more appropriate than PL 480.

The President responded that we would try to work something out and respond to President Jawara's request. On the military side, the President indicated that we should take a look at surplus equipment to see if something might be done.

With regard to economic support, the President indicated that it was wonderful to have somebody visit the Oval Office who was an example of a successful IMF/World Bank program. The President made it clear that we should work out some way to provide the increased economic support so that The Gambia would continue to be a showcase for economic reform.

The President then went on to discuss Libya and its leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi. The President reported that while some newspapers indicate that Qadhafi wants better relations "this is highly unlikely if not impossible" as things stand now. The President indicated that we "will not surprise our friends" by changing positions and "there is no possibility of improved relations with this man."

The President then went out of his way to thank President Jawara for taking the time out of his schedule to come lecture to college students in the U.S. He was sure that this would have big impact on the students who hard the speed. The President then indicated that he did not want to be a President who was accused of ignoring Africa.

President Jawara closed by inviting the President or members of his family or the Vice President to come to The Gambia for a visit. The President responded that President Jawara should be careful about such an invitation because had so many children who enjoyed travelling and who had been doing a good job of representing the U.S. (The general tenor of the remarks indicated that the President might seriously consider having a family member visit The Gambia.)

The meeting then broke up with President Jawara and the President walking to the globe in the office behind the President's desk for a few minutes of informal conversation before the party left the Oval Office.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France [FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	5/20/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 4/19/89 - 5/31/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By SS on 4/7/23

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(54)	**MR Case #:**	2012-1590-MR(511)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	9/27/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. P. Curley, Ambassador

Francois Mitterrand, President
Roland Dumas, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Jacques Attali, Special Counselor to the President
Jean Musitelli, Foreign Policy Adviser to the President
Hubert Vedrine, Press Spokesman

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 20, 1989, 12:35 - 2:00 pm EDT
Kennebunkport, Maine

President Mitterrand opened with the statement that the Syrians wish to run Lebanon; it was as simple as that. He had met several years back in his home with Jumblatt's father, then leader of the Druze. Jumblatt's father had shown him a map and with a pencil pointed out how Christians and Moslems had fought and had partitioned Lebanon in the 12th Century. Jumblatt said those who were fighting now were fighting in the same way. A few months later he was assassinated. His son does not wish to suffer the same fate, and therefore does not wish to offend the Syrians.

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Syria's occupation of Lebanon and Israel's invasions have reawakened these passions of the past, and the factions in Lebanon fight but cannot decide their future. France would like to help the Christians but they tend to fight among themselves and take extremist positions, which any community does under threat. Meanwhile, the institutions of Lebanon are being destroyed, and the factions are not likely to ever settle the Lebanon problem themselves. (S)

The President inquired whether President Mitterrand had met General Aoun. (S)

President Mitterrand replied he had not, but Aoun was a patriot and he was right to try to expel the Syrians. However, his actions had produced the constant bombardment of the Christian community. The Russians do not hold sway over Assad; still, they are the only external support of Assad. The Arabs -- Mubarak, Iraq, Hussein -- detest Assad, so Syria is isolated. Syria should consider itself as a keeper of internal peace in Lebanon, and help end the bombardment. The continuous open sore in Lebanon should not continue. There had been progress in Afghanistan and in Africa; the armed conflict in Lebanon should be ended; the U.S., the Soviet Union, France and the UK should - say enough is enough. All should bring economic pressure to bear on Syria to make them more responsible and get them to withdraw, but this would also require Israeli withdrawal or else Syria would have a perfect excuse to stay in Lebanon. Unless this happens, the prospect is for the obliteration of Christian forces in Lebanon. This is a terrible responsibility for all. (S)

The President agreed, but said the U.S. had little leverage with the Syrians. However, he would be willing to try to see if the U.S. could influence them. He was interested that President Mitterrand believed the Soviets might be willing to push Assad toward moderation. He added that Aoun seems to be a firebrand and asked if he wasn't stirring up Christian criticism of the United States. (S)

President Mitterrand said that France and the U.S. could influence Aoun. He asked whether out of this meeting the U.S. and France could call on him to do something. (S)

The President replied that this would have to be a discreet approach. (S)

Minister Dumas said that he had urged Aoun to accept the Arab League approach. Aoun can be reached, but he will fight if he thinks Christian interests are being sold out. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had issued a joint statement with the USSR the previous week calling for a cease-fire and backing the Arab League initiative. He thought the Soviets would like to use their influence on Syria to accomplish a cease-fire. This

recent exchange of action had been triggered by Aoun's closing of Moslem ports. It was necessary to get both Aoun and the Syrians to agree to the Arab League cease-fire proposal. (S)

President Mitterrand said that when he had called Gorbachev he had agreed that the independence of Lebanon must be preserved and said that he had made a demarche too. President Mitterrand asked rhetorically whether Gorbachev was saying this just to be nice. He opined that Gorbachev was better disposed on this issue than he had thought. He added that, recently, 2000 fanatics had arrived in the Bekaa Valley to penetrate into the Christian redoubt; this would not simply be a bombardment, but an invasion. If this were to happen, there would be a massacre. This Iranian intervention was a very worrying development; this bloody conflict had to be stopped. (S)

The President replied that it was hard to know if the Iranians openly did this. It was not clear what action should be taken. (S)

President Mitterrand said that if the Christian minority were massacred, it would be a catastrophic moral situation for the West. We were on the eve of some kind of genocide. (S)

Minister Dumas asked whether there shouldn't be consultations to plan for Christian evacuation. (S)

The President responded that it was necessary to stay in close touch. Perhaps there could be more high level contact with Syria and with Aoun. (S)

Secretary Baker added that we could also call on Iraq to slow down weapons deliveries to Aoun. He must be able to defend himself, but those latest Iraqi shipments had precipitated the latest flare-up. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that Aoun had to protect himself. (S)

Secretary Baker agreed, but said that before there could be any hope of succeeding with Syria, one had to make sure that General Aoun was willing to abide by a cease-fire. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that the French would sound out Aoun; he owed France something. But he is a Christian hero who may think he can be President of Lebanon. (S)

Secretary Baker said he thought that was exactly what Aoun was trying to do by eliminating all his opposition. (S)

President Mitterrand responded that Aoun could stand up against the Syrians. Perhaps it was easiest for France to approach Aoun and the U.S. to approach the Syrians. (S)

The President suggested that both might appeal to both. (S)

President Mitterrand agreed and said this should be done, energetically, in concert with the Soviet Union. (S)

The President suggested that the U.S. might be able to step up its interaction with the Soviets on this matter. Now might be a good time to do this. (S)

Governor Sununu commented that it was interesting that President Mitterrand thought the U.S. had more influence over Assad than did France. (S)

President Mitterrand confirmed that this was his view. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. did not have good relations with Syria. (S)

President Mitterrand stated that Assad had a big problem with his economic situation. If he believed the U.S., U.S.S.R., France and the United Kingdom would tighten the economic screws, he might see the light. (S)

Secretary Baker said he was not sure what move the U.S. could make economically. The U.S. had classified Syria as a terrorist state. He was not sure what else could be done. (S)

The President commented that people who have dealt with Assad believe he is very smart. (S)

President Mitterrand then turned to Cambodia, saying that the Khmer Rouge had military might, but Sihanouk had political force. We must try to work with the latter. (S)

Minister Dumas asserted that the Chinese held the key because they are helping both Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. They would like both in a coalition. The rapproachement between Hun Sen and Sihanouk was because both fear the Khmer Rouge. Relative to Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge is stronger: 45,000 men under arms supplied by the Chinese. It may be necessary to leave the Khmer Rouge out of the first roundtable. It is close to decision-making time on how to organize the process, which should include the four parties, plus the five members of the U.N. Security Council, plus ASEAN, Japan and Vietnam in an international conference. Sihanouk and Hun Sen will be in France in July. (S)

The President said he realized Sihanouk was the best hope, but he was not very optimistic about his stability. He remembered him in Beijing in 1975: he would scream; he was not a stable man. Nevertheless, he is the best hope. (S)

President Mitterrand said there was no other possibility except to support Sihanouk. One should not forget that his family was massacred by the Khmer Rouge and thus he would not come to terms with them. (S)

The President confirmed one could not come to terms with the Khmer Rouge. (S)

President Mitterrand commented that they were really horrible types. (S)

The President said that Sihanouk's son had visited the other day; he was attractive. He wanted more military support. (S)

President Mitterrand said that this problem could not be solved on the battlefield. (S)

Secretary Baker said it was interesting that the Sino-Soviet summit did not produce progress in Cambodia. (S)

The President commented that today's China was embarrassed by the Khmer Rouge. (S)

President Mitterrand said that the Chinese were never in a hurry. (S)

Minister Dumas said that, concerning the elections, there were two schools of thought regarding international control. Cambodia doesn't want the UN; neither does Vietnam. Hun Sen prefers something like Geneva in 1954, with neutral observers such as the Swedes and the Pakistanis. There are no major divergences and there is a will to move towards a solution. One hopes that the four factions will resolve this and call for an international conference. Hun Sen no longer challenges Sihanouk as head of state; Sihanouk no longer insists on a Republic. The gap is narrowing. Both sides have agreed to international control of the elections. One hopes Sihanouk will be elected unopposed. He would be the head of state, not the head of government. (S)

The President said that the relationship between the head of state and the head of government would be tricky to arrange. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that this could perhaps be defined at the international conference. Sihanouk wants to come back to power under one form or other. Hun Sen is a young man and would like to succeed Sihanouk. (S)

The President asked how President Mitterrand felt about assistance to the non-Communist resistance. (S)

President Mitterrand said France had provided some but could not do much. (S).

Minister Dumas added that this kind of operation must be run
1.4(b); 1.4(d); 3.3(b)(6)
(S)

The President asked whether U.S. assistance of this sort was productive to the peace process. (S)

Minister Dumas responded that it was difficult to answer. Diplomacy, not weapons should resolve this situation. (S)

The President then turned toward the Middle East and suggested they get that subject out of the way before dinner.

President Mitterrand said that the Lebanese had to stop killing each other. With respect to Israel he was only the witness of the wedding of Mr. Shamir, just holding the wedding candle. (S)

The President commented that Shamir was a bit more flexible than he had expected. He had wanted the visit to go well and gave lip service to elections on the West Bank. The President had made it clear that a sham election would be unacceptable to the world and that continued new settlements were unacceptable. But he was not optimistic about progress. He had told Shamir he was not happy about the state of violence on the West Bank. Because of the changed views in the U.S. Jewish community, Shamir was somewhat more flexible than he otherwise might have been. Meanwhile, Hussein was more upbeat than in some time. The U.S. had discussed an international conference with the Israelis and they were worried about Soviet influence in the Middle East. (S)

Secretary Baker added that elections must not be an end in themselves; they must lead to a final settlement. He understood this, but Shamir was moving out well ahead of some of his party on the modalities of elections. He thought there was something there to work with. It would be helpful if European countries made clear to the PLO that this is worth the effort and that they should allow PLO sympathsizers in the occupied territories to participate. Israel needs the fiction that it is not dealing with the PLO. (S)

President Mitterrand said that, between friends, he did not believe in elections. But, when he had spoken to Arafat, he had urged him to go ahead with elections if the army was in its barracks and there was international supervision from Arab countries. However, personally he believed elections would lead nowhere. (S)

The President asked why President Mitterrand was against the concept of elections. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that France had experimented with this in Algeria for several years; it was a dismal failure as

long as France had tried to avoid final status issues. Elections in revolutionary circumstances won't work. As to the President's comment that Shamir was moving, Shamir reminded one of a man paralyzed for three months who moves one toe and we say it's a miracle. (S)

Secretary Baker commented that the man's resuscitation had to begin with the movement of one toe. (S)

President Mitterrand replied that Shamir only wanted to move one toe, and only one toe, and never any more than one toe. (S)

The President said the U.S. was not naive about this, but he could not think of any other way to proceed. (S)

President Mitterrand wished the U.S. good luck with the elections, but personally he was skeptical. (S)

The President concluded that a phony election with no international supervision would be worse than nothing at all, and he was worried about that. But fair elections could move things forward. (S)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (5 pp.)	5/20/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 4/29/89 - 5/31/89

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(55)	**MR Case #:**	
AR Disposition:	Denied in Full	**MR Disposition:**	
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 20, 1989
Boston, Massachusetts

Prime Minister Mahathir: The Prime Minister raised the Cambodia issue and opined that the Khmer Rouge, left alone, could win out. (S)

The President: The President asked what might happen in China. (S)

Prime Minister Mahathir: The Prime Minister indicated that events might turn out like Burma if the authorities bring in troops from outside. However, they must worry about Hong Kong, Taiwan, etc. The students are trying to force the pace and this is not wise. The students should move more gradually and restrain themselves. China is not ready yet for elections. (S)

The President: The President characterized U.S.-Malaysian relations as being OK. Although it sometimes seems that they are swallowed up by the Cambodian problem and attention to ASEAN, the President declared that he did not want to neglect our bilateral relationship. The President raised the Uruguay Round indicating that it was the best way to work out trade problems. (S)

Prime Minister Mahathir: The Prime Minister indicated Malaysian support for the Uruguay Round. Our bilateral relationship is satisfactory but we have palm oil problems. There is a vicious anti-palm oil campaign (shows poster). (S)

The President: The President stated that we must honor labeling procedures but that labeling should be factual. (S)

Prime Minister Mahathir: The Prime Minister responded that Malaysia has tried to put out the facts, but the Federal Trade Commission has intervened to prevent the pro-palm oil message from being distributed. The scientific facts are difficult to

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sort out but the Food and Drug Administration said that the contents of "The Facts about Palm Oil" were accurate. (S)

The President: The President said that the Food and Drug Administration's position should prevail and agreed to look into the matter. (S)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Vigdis Finnbogadottir of Iceland

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, M. James Wilkinson
U.S. Ambassador to Iceland, Nicholas Ruwe
Notetaker: Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs, NSC

President Vigdis Finnbogadottir
Chief of Staff to the President, Kornelius Sigmundsson
Ambassador Ingvi Ingvarsson

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 23, 1989, 11:05 - 11:20 am, EST
The Oval Office

President Finnbogadottir thanked the President for taking time to meet with her and expressed her satisfaction that Ambassador Ruwe could also be present. She expressed her gratitude for all the Ambassador had done to represent the U.S. so effectively in Iceland. (U)

The President said he was delighted to have the meeting, not only for personal reasons but also to strengthen ties between the two countries. The President then turned to preparations for the NATO Summit, noting that the U.S. and West German governments were working out their differences. He said that the U.S. does not want to be grudging in its relations with Moscow but does not want to engage in a public relations war, either. With the world moving toward democracy, free markets, and peace, the President said, there is no need for panic. Chairman Gorbachev knows from

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the President and from Secretary Baker that the U.S. wants him to succeed. The President also assured President Finnbogadottir that the U.S. would do its part to advance peace, perhaps through significant reductions, but would not move hastily for the sake of public relations. (C)

President Finnbogadottir said she appreciated the President's comments, adding that her country approaches world problems from a different angle. Iceland is deeply involved in environmental issues. Before going to Luther College to receive an honorary degree, President Finnbogadottir had been at the University of Bologna, where she met scientists from around the world working on a new, interdisciplinary concept of "cognitive mapping." She said that Iceland wanted to do its share and invited this group to come to her country. (C)

The President replied that EPA Administrator Reilly had just returned from Europe, where he had explored various environmental proposals. The President reaffirmed his commitment to the environment and mentioned recent conferences held in Kenya and The Hague, adding that he hoped there could be more gatherings at the experts' level to harness global efforts. The President said he was thinking of having a conference at that level, though he was not quite ready to announce it formally. (C)

President Finnbogadottir affirmed the desirability of cooperation between a small country like Iceland and a giant one like the U.S. She specifically suggested a gathering in Iceland for an event called "Mission Year 2000," adding that the image of the U.S. she had gleaned from her recent visits to Iowa and Pennsylvania was not that usually seen in Europe. She further suggested that the U.S. cooperate in a project on "Tourism: A Vital Source for Peace." (C)

The President asked President Finnebogadottir to convey further details on the projects to Ambassador Ruwe. The President concluded by noting that he had recently gone to North Dakota to join in that state's efforts to plant 100 million trees, as part of its efforts to address problems affecting the international environment. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Member of the Politburo, People's Republic of China (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State-Designate
Douglas Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC staff and Notetaker
Vivian Chang, Interpreter

Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People's Congress (NPC) and member of Politburo
Cao Zhi, Deputy to the National People's Congress, Deputy Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the NPC
Zhu Qizhen, Vice Foreign Minister
Gu Ming, Member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Vice Chairman of the Law Committee of the NPC
Han Xu, PRC Ambassador to the United States
Shi Guobao, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Standing Committee of the NPC
Zhang Yijin, Director of the Department of American and Oceanic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yang Jiechi, Counselor of the Translation and Interpretation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 23, 1989, 2:30 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.
Oval Office, Cabinet Room, and Residence

The President greeted Wan Li in the Oval Office at 2:30 - 2:40 p.m. and they then went into the Cabinet Room for the plenary session for about 30 minutes and then the President invited Wan Li and Vice Foreign Minister Zhu to the Residence for tea with Mrs. Bush. They remained there for about 30 minutes. (U)

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After an exchange of pleasantries during a photo opportunity in the Oval Office, the President invited Chairman Wan to join him for a short meeting in the Cabinet Room and then to proceed to the Residence. (U)

Chairman Wan agreed to the President's proposal and said that he wanted to finish all the topics that they have to cover during those discussions. He said he would also very much like to meet with Mrs. Bush. (U)

Upon arrival in the Cabinet Room, the President extended an official welcome to Chairman Wan. He said he was delighted that the Chairman could be in Washington. He referred to the Chairman as an old personal friend. The President said he considered the visit to be very constructive -- and friendly -- for the bilateral relationship between the United States and the PRC, one that is so very important. He then offered to turn the agenda over to Chairman Wan. (U)

Chairman Wan said that it is a great pleasure and a heartwarming occasion to meet his old friend the President in Washington. He extended greetings from the Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Li Xiannian. He said they all extended cordial and friendly greetings from the party and government leaders. He then handed a letter to President Bush sent by President Yang Shangkun. He noted that this letter had been written before the President's letter recently sent to Chairman Deng Xiaoping. Chairman Wan explained that he had been traveling in the time since the letter had been written. (U)

Chairman Wan said that the United States President's visit to China was a complete success. Although it was brief, it played an important role in enhancing Sino-U.S. friendship. China always attached importance to Sino-U.S. relations. It viewed the relations from the long term perspective, in light of the global situation. Under the present international situation, these relations are of vital importance whether in terms of the two countries or in terms of promotion of a relaxation of international tension. Deng Xiaoping said China-U.S. relations should progress in a new pattern. The two countries should trust each other and work to minimize their troubles. (U)

Chairman Wan said to the President that he would basically like to discuss two major events in China -- first, the unrest among the students and second, the Sino-Soviet summit meeting. Chairman Wan said that Deng Xiaoping and the Communist Party of China and the government of the People's Republic of China have two considerations in mind in their strategy to modernize China. First, China wants a peaceful international environment. In recent years there has been a tendency to relaxation of tensions, due to the joint efforts of China, the United States, the USSR, and the peoples of the world. The second, unity and stability have been demonstrated within China. Chairman Wan said to the

President that he is an old friend of China, and knows a lot about China. The reasons for the current unrest are, first, problems in economic reforms. After a decade of reform, there have been great successes, doubling growth. In recent years, that growth has reached double digit, but it has become overheated. There is too much currency in the system and prices are rising. At present, China is in a transitional period from a product economy to a commodity economy. China follows a two-tier price system, with two kinds of markets. This has caused confusion in the economic order. This gives ground to embezzlement, graft, corruption, and official racketeering. That is why democracy is not given full play in the National People's Congress and other institutions and units. Channels of communication within China are not all smooth, one cannot always communicate to higher ups. Political reform has not kept pace with economic reform. The legal system lags behind. China is going from being a secluded to an open society. That is why there are so many rumors on the grapevine. There are rumors about foreign bank accounts, including those of Deng Xiaoping's children. (C)

The President said that he had seen that story. (U)

Chairman Wan continued that all kinds of rumors and doggerel about the leadership are circulating. This combination of reasons led to the gigantic student movement for democracy and to oppose embezzlement, graft, and official racketeering. Chairman Wan said that the situation with respect to democracy in China was very different from the days when the President was posted at the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. The Chinese Government has exercised restraint with respect to the students. That is why there have been no incidents of violence, he continued. The government dialogue with the students will continue. This will be carried out under stable social conditions. The problems troubling the students already were raised by deputies to the National People's Congress at its second session. In fact, the student movement occurred after the government had accepted the views of the deputies to the National People's Congress. These problems will be solved after the situation calms down. Chairman Wan said that China cannot accomplish anything without stability and unity. He said that the President and the Americans and the Chinese and foreign investors all do not want to see more turmoil in China. Investors from Japan, Thailand, and Hong Kong are hesitant. The Hong Kong Hang Seng Index plummeted after the student demonstrations. This shows the negative effect. Chairman Wan said he hopes that the unrest will be settled. Unity and stability will advance both economic and political reform. China will adhere to a policy of reform and opening to the outside. China will never turn back. (C)

Chairman Wan then said there is a second topic to cover, and that is the Sino-Soviet summit meeting. He said that when the President was in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping covered in great detail and in depth Sino-Soviet relations. After Gorbachev's visit, a

joint communique was issued. In effect, relations were normalized between the two countries and the two parties. The Chinese side emphasized that China and the Soviet Union should establish a new kind of state relationship based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The relations between China and the Soviet Union will not be as they were in the 1950s. The Chinese side reiterates that after the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, China will pursue an independent foreign policy of peace. Party relations will be confined to exchanges of work experience. There will be no activity which has an overtone of bloc politics. During the meeting with Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping reviewed the history of relations between China and czarist Russia. The President is familiar with this, so the Chairman did not dwell on it. On the question of Cambodia, no agreement has been reached. The Chinese side reiterated its principled stand. From China's perspective, the Cambodian problem may be settled, but only on the basis of serving the interests of all parties and not hurting any one party. The Soviet side does not agree to this. The Soviets do not approve of establishing a four-part coalition government. The two sides have agreed to reduce their respective forces on the Sino-Soviet border to a minimum. But China says to the Soviets that it has already had reduced its forces by 1 million men and insists that new reductions not be asymmetrical. China insists that the Soviets remove all remaining forces in Mongolia. The two sides agreed to establish a military-political experts group to study deployments along the border. There will be no other kind of military exchange. At present, China does not have any plan to conduct such exchanges. On the question of the boundary, no agreement was reached. The two sides agreed to continue negotiations. When necessary, the two Foreign Ministers will discuss this specific topic. The two sides also had exchanges of views on cooperation in economic, scientific and technological, and cultural affairs. The two sides also exchanged views on the question of reform. China and the Soviet Union will continue to exchange visits between the leaders of those two countries. However, it takes time to settle differences and it is difficult to solve them. Chairman Wan then said that this was the briefing he wished to give the President. (C)

The President thanked his good friend for that briefing. He said that he wanted to respond briefly and then go to the Residence for tea. On the Soviet-Chinese summit meeting, the President said he appreciated the explanation. The more there is a reduction of Sino-Soviet tensions, the better. The United States will follow this with great interest. The President said that he hoped that they will result in less tension and more progress. Turning to the question of events in China today, the President said he had four points to make. First, the United States respects the sovereignty of China, of course. The United States will live by the United Nations principle of nonintervention in the affairs of another country. Second, the United States is strongly committed to democracy everywhere. It is the underpinning of the very being of the United States as a nation.

In a statement several days before, the President said he cautioned everyone and urged nonviolence and restraint. The President said he noticed what the Chairman had said about reforms taking place already in the National People's Congress. As a friend, the President said, the more reforms and the more dialogue, the more China will find acceptance around the world and in the United States. The President saluted the fact that so great a demonstration had been handled with no violence or bloodshed. He said there may have been one or two incidents, but the perception is that there was no violence or bloodshed. He said that credit goes everywhere for that. Third, the United States does not make decisions or judgments based on rumors. The President said that he knew that some people are spreading rumors, some were coming out of China, but the United States is not persuaded by rumors. Fourth, with respect to the statements attributed to the Chairman in Canada, the President said they were very sound and constructive. For that, the President said, Chairman Wan has his added respect. (C)

The President then made a last plea, for more access for United States reporters. He said the more access they are given and the more VOA is able to transmit, to that degree it would be very good for relations with the United States. He noted that jamming of VOA goes on. The President said reporters can be a pain, as they are sometimes here. But in the long run, to the degree they are given access, it will work to strengthen relations between the United States and China. Finally, the President said that he knew how difficult it was for all the people in the Chairman's party to be half way round the world during these events, to love their country, and therefore he would not expect them to have answers to every question. Those who are traveling must wonder what the real facts are. This is a human observation. The President said that he hopes that the situation will turn out for the glory of China. A more democratic China will have to continue new reforms. The President said that in America everyone feels this way. (C)

Chairman Wan said it is precisely because of these questions that, when he was in Canada, members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress urged him to return as soon as possible. However, to enhance the mutual understanding between the leaders of the United States and China, the Central Committee and the State Council held the view that the Chairman should come to the United States to brief their old friend President Bush. In the last days, the Chairman was accorded a warm reception by the American government and various quarters. There has been a good exchange. Chairman Wan said his visit, however, cannot proceed. He will be returning directly to China. He apologized that he could not attend the dinners and functions arranged for him. He was also sorry he could not play tennis with the President and there would be no opportunity to shake hands in friendship on the tennis court. (C)

The President and Chairman Wan, together with General Scowcroft and Vice Foreign Minister Zhu, then walked to the Residence. At the Residence, the President asked how the Chairman sees the present situation playing itself out. (U)

Chairman Wan said that before his departure from China the leaders had discussions. Chairman Wan said that under no circumstances should there be bloodshed. He noted that bloodshed has not happened. The latest news is that the demonstrators are dispersing. This depends on rational attitudes. The soldiers have given their word that they would not be the first to use force. They have said that they believe there is an extreme minority seeking to stir up people against Deng Xiaoping and force Li Peng to step down. (C)

The President asked if this was just a handful of all those demonstrators. (U)

Chairman Wan replied that, yes, there are people instigating turmoil. Then there are also Taiwan agents stirring up turmoil and hoping for bloodshed. Chairman Wan said that he is far away and deeply worried. In a big country like the PRC the Chinese cannot accomplish anything without stability and unity, the Chinese cannot build up their country. To have turmoil is not in the United States' interests or that or other friendly countries. (C)

The President said that it is hard for the United States to judge. The United States would not comment on internal matters but the impression in the United States is that the students are more anti-Li Peng than with Li Peng. (C)

Chairman Wan said that rumors are flying about and he did not have accurate word. He said he favored the safeguards taken by the government. The government is showing great restraint and no bloodshed has resulted. It was Deng Xiaoping who first instigated the talk of democracy. But in recent years, the Chinese have slowed the pace of democracy. The National People's Congress plans to strengthen the democratic and legal systems. Chairman Wan said that he plans to oversee the development of democracy and free expression by the people. Chairman Wan concluded that he would step up reforms in this respect. (C)

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ADD ON 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Defense Minister Rabin of Israel (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

United States
The President
James A. Baker, III, The Secretary of State
Richard B. Cheney, The Secretary of Defense
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William Brown, US Ambassador to Israel
Dennis Ross, Director, Policy Planning Staff, The Department of State
Richard N. Haass Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC Staff, (notetaker)

Israel
Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador Moshe Arad
David Ivry, Secretary General, Ministry of Defense
Amos Yaron, Defense Attache

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 24, 1989, 4:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.
Oval Office

The President began the meeting by expressing his delight at meeting with Rabin. He noted U.S. respect for Rabin's leadership and for what he had done to further the possibility of elections in the occupied territories. We were interested in his sense of where things stood. We also wanted to be helpful and act as a catalyst. Despite the successful visits of Mubarak, Shamir and Hussein, the U.S. was not prepared at this juncture to support a major policy thrust beyond elections and direct talks. (S)

Defense Minister Rabin, thanking the President for this opportunity, stated that Israeli policy moved along two parallel lines. The first involved maintaining military strength -- the best assurance Israel had against large scale hostilities. In this context, he expressed the hope that the U.S. would maintain

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aid levels in FY91. The second policy direction was to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, something wanted by the people of Israel. Although the Cabinet approved a four-point initiative, the Defense Minister said he would focus on the fourth point, in that elections were the key to movement on the others. The challenge was how to get the Palestinians in the territories involved. It had been Israel's preference for Egypt or Jordan to take the lead, but for different reasons each had decided not to. A peace process required a partner, and Israel saw the Palestinians in the occupied territories as this partner. (S)

Defense Minister Rabin explained that the intifada had given the Palestinians in the territories self-respect and a stake in finding a political solution. Many of them saw the elections proposal as providing a unique opportunity, especially if additional details were added. The challenge was how to create conditions in which Palestinians would feel free of fear from the Arab world and the PLO that prevented them from taking advantage of this opportunity. The key issue was how to get Palestinians and Israelis together, something made more difficult by the certainty that Palestinian extremists would oppose such a dialogue. He had already started to talk on a political level with Palestinians, making clear that this was a unique opportunity and that a resort to violence on their part would not get them anything better. The question was to what extent Israel, the U.S. and the Europeans, working with Arab governments, could deliver the message to Palestinians to engage. No commitment regarding final status was being asked for. What had to be made clear that was this was the track that Israel intended to move on. It would take much courage on both sides to overcome the animosity of the past. This was a conflict between two national entities, not within the same nation. He believed it was possible for Israel and the U.S. to work together to create conditions so that this approach would succeed. (S)

The President asked whether an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue would be more likely to occur if it were made clear that the elections would be open and broad in terms of participation? (S)

Defense Minister Rabin explained that he had recently held discussions with prominent Palestinians with pro-PLO sympathies. What was clear was that without a green light from Tunis, it would be difficult for them to participate. He did not believe that Egypt would press the PLO to approve elections. He told the Palestinians that history showed that when they were given a choice between all or nothing they sought all and ended up with nothing. By contrast, the Jewish community always took something. It took 40 years for the Palestinians to accept UNSCR 181 and the concept of partition. Once again, they were faced with a fair proposal. They would not be wise to debate its details at the outset; instead, Israel wanted the Palestinians to

first accept elections in principle, after which details could be discussed. Israel had shown in 1976 that it could conduct free and democratic elections, something even Bethlehem Mayor Freij acknowledged. (Ø)

The President asked whether Israel could publicly provide details of its plan so that world opinion would swing to its side? (Ø)

Defense Minister Rabin said that such details were secondary. The key was the ability of Palestinians to enter a dialogue with Israel given the attitudes of Arab governments and the PLO. Palestinian leaders in the territories already enjoy freedom of speech on Israeli television, while Israel's own communist party favored a two-state solution and negotiations with the PLO. The problem was not with details but rather how to overcome the fear of Palestinians to go it alone. (Ø)

The President said that modalities were a significant part of the problem. As Egyptian President Mubarak had made clear, the Arabs would be suspicious of elections unless they had assurances on final status and other details. (Ø)

Secretary Baker stated that assurances on permanent status, participation, and guarantees that Israel would deal with those elected were key. We know that Israel would conduct open and fair elections. The Minister was right to say that the key next step was how to get a yellow if not green light from Tunis. But getting this signal might require Israel to fill in some details. (Ø)

Defense Minister Rabin said that Israel first required Palestinian acceptance of elections in principle. After this, Israel would be prepared to discuss details. Israel believed it was poor bargaining practice to play all its cards now. (Ø)

The President stated that this was a fair point. (Ø)

Secretary Baker said that the PLO might view accepting elections as playing their key card and as a result would be inclined to hold off. (Ø)

The President introduced the subject of Lebanon, stating his personal concern and that of Christian church organizations here with the mounting violence. He stated our policy was not to get out front but rather to call for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. (Ø)

Defense Minister Rabin said the Syrians had suffered a series of setbacks in Lebanon and had been unable to elect a president or unite either the Parliament or the Army. Israel had recently met with Walid Jumblatt in Europe, advocating that Christians and Druze work together. The problem was that the Druze feared Syrian reactions. In Rabin's view, General Aoun had gone too far in confronting the Syrians. Israel did not want to see Syria provoked into introducing more force. The key question was what would happen after the Arab League Summit. Iraq had provided the

Christians with weapons and might be interested in inflaming the situation. Israel was advising caution on all parties. He did not know what were Syria's intentions, but it was noteworthy that Syria had recently increased its reconnaissance activity over Lebanon. As a result, Israel had signaled Syria in a manner designed to make Damascus question the extent of its freedom to act in Lebanon. He suggested the U.S. needed to talk to Kuwait's foreign minister about next steps. For its part, Israel wanted to keep a low profile and was happy to see Syria sink more deeply into Lebanon's morass. (S)

The President asked whether Rabin believed that Iran had recently increased its force levels in Lebanon? (C)

Defense Minister Rabin said that to the contrary, the number of revolutionary guards had declined to under 1,000. It appeared that although some new troops had been rotated in, more had left. In addition, Hizbollah had lowered its profile in Lebanon. (S)

The President, returning to the situation in the occupied territories, expressed his concern and that of the American people over the violence there. We were aware that it takes two to tango but all the same the images of violence had shaken the American people. (C)

Defense Minister Rabin said that he was aware of the implications of the television pictures and also wanted the violence to stop. Israel reacted to the violence but did not provoke it. He added that he took the President's point seriously. (C)

The President closed the meeting by expressing his great confidence in the leadership abilities of the Defense Minister and by stating his commitment to a close relationship with Israel. (C)

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Interpreter

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1989, 10:10 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.
Villa Madama, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita renewed his welcome and said he was sure Rome would get the President off to a good start for his European visit. Italy and the U.S., he said, now face an exceptional international situation. Today, we are building on peace and no one is prepared for that. We must be ready for the future. Therefore, the Atlantic Community, which has been the equilibrium for keeping the peace, should be the center of future efforts to build peace. Solidarity within the Alliance should grow, should take advantage of this new era. In previous decades, there were arguments about whether the Alliance was the correct choice for civilization. But now the Western Alliance has won, because its military position of strength deterred the Soviet Union. Now that the Alliance was winning, it would be a shame if it was troubled by self-doubt. (Ø)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his welcome. He said it was no accident that Italy was chosen as the first stop

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on his trip. This decision signaled the importance of this bilateral visit and the closeness of the U.S.-Italian relationship. Americans felt very special about Italy in their hearts, and the President wanted all Italians to understand that. There were few bilateral problems, so it was possible to concentrate on broader questions. (U)

The President agreed that the Alliance was winning -- Western values, and the resulting peace and economic prosperity were capturing public attention. As a result of this success, there were pressures on the Alliance. So the President felt the Allies must have a united and successful Summit in Brussels. NATO would be judged on whether it could settle one contentious issue: SNF (short-range nuclear forces). (~~C~~)

The President believed the Germans, torn asunder by their domestic politics, had been reluctant to move toward the kind of compromise that the President thought must come out of the Summit. Recognizing that the conventional force imbalance was a major problem, and recognizing that Soviet forces were the biggest threat, the U.S. had come up with a conventional arms control proposal on which the Prime Minister had been briefed. That proposal should be an enormous help with the German problem. The President had made an appeal to Helmut Kohl to compromise, to accept a text which would be sustainable politically because of this U.S. conventional arms control initiative. The President felt Chancellor Kohl should accept the U.S. compromise text on the SNF issue. If the Prime Minister agreed with that assessment, the President would love to have the Prime Minister's support in Brussels if the matter was not resolved before the Summit. (~~C~~)

Prime Minister De Mita said he had talked about the SNF issue with the German Chancellor. He thought he understood the German position. There was, the Prime Minister thought, no real objective conflict in views. The Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl had discussed the unacceptability of a "third zero" and an eventual negotiation on SNF missiles after a significant agreement reducing conventional weapons. The problem was in the timing of the relationship between SNF negotiations and a conventional forces agreement. (~~C~~)

Prime Minister De Mita then turned to the general problem of Germany, which was not always discussed between the U.S. and Italy. The problem stemmed from the fact that East-West relations were no longer characterized by conflict. In the

"space" that was opening up, many things can happen. So the U.S. and Italy should endeavor to be sure that the elements that fill up this new space should not be a source of conflict in Europe. Washington and Rome must help those conservative Germans, including Chancellor Kohl, who want to remain within "Europe," within the Alliance. Others in Germany have different ideas. (S)

The President asked if the Prime Minister was concerned about reunification and a neutral Germany. (S)

No, replied Prime Minister De Mita. The problem of reunification was not immediate; if it was immediate, the U.S. and Italy would not be able to handle it. But the problem does exist in the long run. Italy was worried about those forces in Germany who would like the FRG to be equidistant between the USSR and the West. Next year in Germany there would be difficult elections. The Prime Minister put the problem in this way: Do we wish to help the Kohl Government or will we remain indifferent to the outcome of the next German election? If the Allies keep Kohl's situation in mind, and their strategic objectives in mind, a compromise could be found. But the result must not be a mess. If the Prime Minister understood the U.S. position correctly, the U.S. did not exclude SNF negotiations, if the CFE negotiation "makes good progress." This is a reasonable position. So the SNF negotiations could begin when there was a good result in the CFE talks. Prime Minister De Mita knew it was difficult to define when a good outcome has been achieved. But the U.S. and Italy had to be mindful of the timing of the West German elections. When Prime Minister De Mita spoke to Chancellor Kohl, Kohl said that he was not for the "third zero." (S)

Secretary Baker asked if the Germans were willing to say explicitly that a third zero has been excluded. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that, in his press conference a month ago, Chancellor Kohl had said it must be clear that we Germans do not want a denuclearized Europe, a zero option. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti observed that the Allies had always been able to find agreements. Germany has always done its duty, while some countries, like Holland, seem to be more clever and did not accept INF missiles when Italy and the Germans did. In addition to the concerns described by the Prime Minister, Germany was also dealing with the 50th anniversary of Germany's invasion of Poland. So this psychological element must be taken into

account when thinking of German and East European reaction to the whole SNF issue. (Ø)

Continuing, Foreign Minister Andreotti said that too much emphasis was being given to the SNF problem. President Reagan's nuclear-free world was a wonderful vision and Reagan's idea was that such a vision should be implemented step by step. The question was to explain how the West intended to get to a nuclear-free world and how conventional arms negotiations would push the world closer to this noble goal. Foreign Minister Andreotti thought inclusion of aircraft in the West's CFE approach was a good idea. Too much emphasis should not be given to SNF missiles because the Alliance might lose prospects for a successful NATO Summit. (Ø)

The President said the world press was focused on the SNF issue, so it would be difficult to push it off to another meeting. The Alliance must find a compromise solution on SNF at the Summit. The President thought it could be done. Otherwise, the Summit would be overridden, soured by that one contentious issue. (Ø)

Prime Minister De Mita understood that, because SNF had been discussed so intensively, the Allies could not pretend at the NATO Summit that the problem did not exist. Yet he agreed with Minister Andreotti that, in celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance, the Allies should stress NATO's political accomplishments. It would be a mistake not to emphasize the triumphs of Western values throughout the world. The Allies should stress the strong justifications for the Alliance's continued existence. At the same time, NATO should describe how it wished to proceed in the future, to stay together, and avoid concentrating on one divisive item. The Eastern Bloc was changing strategy and causing problems. NATO's challenge was to assess East-West relations. This was the real subject for discussion in Brussels, rather than this or that specific problem. (Ø)

Prime Minister De Mita added that the Alliance also needed to talk about disarmament. Prime Minister De Mita knew President Bush was about to put forward a conventional arms control proposal in Brussels. Prime Minister De Mita thought President Bush had to stress the importance and the meaning of this proposal. The Alliance would be looking at the future by trying to bring about a conventional military equilibrium at the lowest possible level. Within the context of the U.S. proposal, the

Allies could say that, if "concrete results" were reached in CFE, there could also be an eventual SNF negotiation. This vaguer formula would get past the SNF problem at the NATO Summit and avoid a serious problem with the German friends. Thinking aloud, Prime Minister De Mita suggested that the Alliance could say SNF negotiations would begin when the CFE talks reached a "positive result." "For a given time," the Alliance would say it could not do without nuclear weapons, and thus could not denuclearize Europe. On SNF modernization, the Allies could say that if short-range nuclear forces are kept in Europe ("if in the SNF negotiation, we keep something...") then those forces would be modernized if necessary. (ℓ)

The President asked Secretary Baker to review the three central points for the U.S. on SNF. But, first, he wanted to reply to what Prime Minister De Mita and Foreign Minister Andreotti had said. The Summit's emphasis must be on the future of NATO. The Alliance should address the tremendous changes in the USSR, in Eastern Europe, and around the world. This was a time of great optimism, of bringing the Soviet Union into the community of nations. The West's success was so great, and the future was so exciting, that the President did not want the SNF issue to destroy the climate of celebration. (ℓ)

Secretary Baker commented that, because the President wanted to stress larger issues at the Summit and because the U.S. recognized the problems of its German friends, Washington had been trying to work out the SNF problem with Bonn for several months. The President had taken three actions that were very forthcoming: first, indicating a willingness to delay production of a follow-on system to the Lance missile until the end of 1991 or early '92; second, embracing the principle of SNF negotiations dependent upon "tangible implementation" of a CFE agreement; and third, deciding to propose, at the NATO Summit, speeding up the CFE negotiations through a major new NATO conventional arms control initiative. All this would, it was hoped, meet Chancellor Kohl's problems in Bonn. Secretary Baker also noted that the U.S. was anxious that the text of the President's arms control initiative not become public until the President presented it at the Summit in Brussels. (ℓ)

Secretary Baker added that with these three actions, there remained two important principles that mattered to the U.S. and to other members of NATO: first, explicit rejection of a third zero and, second, an understanding that any agreement on SNF forces cannot be implemented before there is full implementation

of a CFE agreement that would redress the significant imbalance of conventional forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Secretary Baker believed this last point was acceptable to the Federal Republic. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti asked why, if the Alliance spoke of reducing nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, it was necessary to say that the West needed nuclear weapons for all time. This changed the policy of the Reagan Administration, which wished to get rid of all nuclear weapons, and it gave the other side a propaganda advantage. Foreign Minister Andreotti recalled that NATO had a difficult moment in the 1960s when it moved from massive retaliation to flexible response; the Foreign Minister was Defense Minister at the time. The Alliance found a good strong formula that took into account the psychological situation in Bonn. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had taken into account changing circumstances in Germany and the psychological factors there. That was why Washington had substantially changed its position on modernization and agreed to the principle of SNF negotiations in certain circumstances. The U.S. was not suggesting that the provision ruling out a third zero say that there can never be a third zero. That was not the U.S. formulation. But the U.S. was suggesting that the text be silent on the duration of the period when there would be no third zero. This approach should therefore, in the U.S. view, be acceptable. The SNF negotiation should seek lower and equal levels, but not go to zero. The German language saying that under the present circumstances there should not be a third zero created major problems because the present circumstances end tomorrow. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti said the Alliance should not express a view one way or the other. (S)

Secretary Baker recalled that General Scowcroft had made a good point that, in the 1960s, it took five years to develop Alliance consensus on the flexible response doctrine and the Allies did not have five years to solve the SNF problem. (S)

The President asked if West German Foreign Minister Genscher could accept Foreign Minister Andreotti's formulation. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti said it was important not expressly to rule out the zero option, since Genscher could not accept that. (S)

Secretary Baker said there should be some statement in the text of NATO's Comprehensive Concept document that an SNF negotiation would not produce a zero outcome for SNF missiles. (Ø)

Prime Minister De Mita said that lower and equal levels did not mean zero. (Ø)

Secretary Baker answered that it could mean just that. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Andreotti asked why the Allies should today exclude the possibility that, in thirty years, there would be no SNF missiles. (Ø)

Secretary Baker replied that the U.S. was not saying that forever and always there would be no zero. But, in connection with an SNF negotiation, the Alliance must say it was not going for zero now. The text of the U.S. language did not say NATO needed SNF missiles forever. But it must say that the Allies were not aiming for the third zero in this SNF negotiation. There were strong views in the United States, including in the Congress, that America needed those SNF weapons to help defend the 324,000 U.S. troops in Europe. The Alliance was faced not only with substantial Warsaw Pact conventional advantages, but also with a tremendous Warsaw Pact SNF advantage. Public opinion in U.S. and some other Allied countries would not support any position that does not make clear that the Alliance was not intending to go to zero. (Ø)

Prime Minister De Mita said that the SNF problem had to be solved without making a statement of principle, without saying yes to the zero option or no to the zero option. This was not only a German problem; it was a problem for other members of the Alliance. If this problem was not solved, there will be problems with other countries. Mrs. Thatcher was inflexible on everything, pretty close to a Cold War approach. At the same time, she has the closest sentimental attachment to Gorbachev. (Ø)

The President said the U.S. was working with the Germans, getting close to a common position. The U.S. now understand Italy's views better. A discussion of SNF could go on all day. (Ø)

Prime Minister De Mita, concluding, said that the Allies needed to work the SNF problem out. (Ø)

Confirmed Mtg. w/

Pope John Paul II of Vatican on

May 27th

No MEMCON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
William Reilly, Administrator of the EPA
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Interpreter

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Luigi Cavalchini, Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff
Andrea Manzella, Secretary General of Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Umberto Vattani, Prime Minister's Office
General Franco Angioni, Prime Minister's Office
Ugo de Mohr, NATO Adviser
Mr. Perlot, Foreign Ministry Director General
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1989, 11:48 a.m. - 12:02 p.m.
Villa Madama, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita opened the expanded discussion by asking the President for his views on the evolution of East-West relations.
(7)

The President said he saw tremendous change in Eastern Europe, with Poland and Hungary obviously in the forefront. The President recounted his offer of assistance in Poland's economic recovery, provided the Poles could persist in making needed

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economic reforms. His overall goal was not to stir up trouble but to make it clear that, as the East moved toward greater freedom and human rights, the U.S. would respond. (C)

The President continued, saying that his policy would not involve a "post-Yalta" arrangement, sitting with the Soviets to divide up spheres of influence. The goal was differentiation based on movement toward democracy and economic liberty. While this called for a certain amount of delicacy, to avoid seeming to exhort people to the barricades as occurred with Hungary in 1956, Western values had intrinsic appeal. The U.S. would reach out, selectively, in every way it could. Actions would not be so "flamboyant" that the Soviets would feel the need to take action to reverse movement toward freedom. The next few years would be exciting. Eastern Europe would be a high priority for the Administration. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita asked for an overall assessment of East-West relations. (C)

The President said they were pretty good. Despite what some had said, the President wanted Gorbachev to succeed and had told him so personally in New York. Caution was still needed, since foreign policies could not be based on one individual. However, the U.S. wanted good relations with the Soviet Union and was conducting its policies so that the Soviets knew that. A summit meeting with Gorbachev was still up in the air. The President's proposals would show he was prepared to be forthcoming, but the President was not interested in a public relations or charm school battle with Gorbachev. The U.S. had asked for help on arms sales to Central America and there had been frank discussions on this issue. The Soviets had shown interest in changing their policies. Angola was one example. There were possibilities for a more constructive Soviet role in restraining their Middle Eastern clients. So the President thought the Soviets might be able to be more helpful on Central America as well. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Interpreter

Francesco Cossiga, President
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sergio Berlinguer, Secretary General of Quirinale Palace
Giovanni Dominedo, President's Diplomatic Adviser
Ludovico Ortona, President's Spokesman
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1989, 12:32 p.m. - 1:09 p.m.
Quirinale Palace, Rome

President Cossiga welcomed the President on behalf of his government and people. He was touched that the President chose to begin his first visit to Europe as President in Rome. He praised, as well, the exemplary performance of Ambassador Rabb. (U)

The President thanked President Cossiga and joined in his praise for Ambassador Rabb. He said the choice of Rome as the first stop on his trip was no accident. Relations between America and Italy had never been better. In his briefings for this trip, the President had noticed that hardly any issues seemed to divide the two countries, an indicator of the excellent state of the relationship. (C)

The President asked if, incidentally, President Cossiga could fit an official visit to the United States into his schedule during

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the fall, perhaps in October. Such a visit could keep attention focused on the fine relationship between the United States and Italy. (C)

President Cossiga expressed his gratitude for the invitation and said he would certainly come. The Foreign Ministry and the State Department would agree on the date and work out the details. (C)

The President noted that many Americans were already preparing for the 500th Anniversary celebration of Columbus' voyage of 1492. There was great interest in this celebration in the United States as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean. (U)

The President, continuing, said he had already discussed the NATO Summit with Prime Minister De Mita and Foreign Minister Andreotti and there was no need to review the subject again. The President did, however, want President Cossiga to hear directly that he, the President, welcomed the changes in the Soviet Union. The policy reviews, which were proper and prudent for a new Administration, were mostly finalized. The United States was prepared to move forward in a realistic way with Moscow. (C)

The President did think a word of caution was still in order. A foreign policy must be based on reality, not on the charisma of a new leader. As Commander-in-Chief, the President felt a profound responsibility for the lives of soldiers and sailors, so when he put forward arms control proposals he wanted to be sure that they would enhance peace and not threaten it. The President observed that the Alliance was on the winning side and its values were prevailing. There was less of a threat to peace. There was, therefore, no reason not to move prudently. Those were the views the President would take to the NATO Summit. (S)

The President added that euphoria about Gorbachev caused some people to feel there were no problems anymore. The President was sorry to say that there were still problems. Yet, as the President had himself told Gorbachev, no one in America wanted perestroika to fail. Secretary Baker had met Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Soviets knew that the US supported reform in the Soviet Union. The US and Italy were entering an exciting new era. (C)

The President thanked the Government of Italy for its helpful decisions on Alliance issues, such as the transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Italy had shown real leadership. The President could still remember how Italy's war against domestic terrorism and the freeing of Colonel Dozier had shown strength and earned the respect of all Americans. (C)

President Cossiga thanked the President for his comments. He understood why the President had carefully examined his policies

before taking action. President Cossiga believed that, in ordinary life, prudence and care are major virtues. (C)

President Cossiga remarked that the NATO Summit would be an important celebration of the Alliance's great success. The Allies had demonstrated that, without firmness, there might not be any glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union today. There were certainly important changes occurring in the USSR. It was too early to foresee the outcome. (C)

President Cossiga recalled that he had recently travelled with Foreign Minister Andreotti to Poland. They were able to meet freely with people from the whole range of political and social life. At an Italian Embassy reception, which Jaruzelski attended, were guests who, during the period of Stalinization, had been sentenced to death. This symbolized the important changes now underway. Poland needed Western support. (C)

The President asked President Cossiga for his opinion of General Jaruzelski. The President commented that, when he had met the General, Jaruzelski had made an unexpectedly favorable impression. (C)

President Cossiga replied that, during his recent visit to Poland, he spoke to General Jaruzelski for hours. President Cossiga believed that General Jaruzelski had qualities that were not immediately apparent. He also thought General Jaruzelski was determined to pursue a new course and that, without General Jaruzelski, Poland could not have proceeded as far as it had. President Cossiga thought that General Jaruzelski was responsible for getting the Communist Party to sit at the Roundtable with Solidarity and accept the outcome of the negotiations. General Jaruzelski, President Cossiga thought, was a man who had suffered for measures he had had to implement in the past. History would be more generous to the General than recent critics. It was very likely that General Jaruzelski's role had prevented a repetition of Soviet intervention as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. President Cossiga thought the winds of freedom were blowing in Poland. The just-passed laws on religious freedom were of great importance. The officials of the Church in Poland had also displayed great insight and prudence. President Cossiga left Poland convinced that, if economic and political reforms did not progress, all the recent achievements would be jeopardized. (C)

The President said he had talked with General Jaruzelski long before the Roundtable negotiations and had urged him to be more forthcoming with labor. General Jaruzelski had cited some extreme demands from the union leaders, such as a call for five years paid maternity leave. The answer was obvious: the President advised General Jaruzelski to recognize free unions and then negotiate with them, but the President had not realized that labor was making such tough demands. (C)

President Cossiga said that it was difficult to predict how the Opposition would ultimately express its views. Solidarity was just the peak of the iceberg. Yet Poland could not turn back now. (S)

Secretary Baker asked if Poland would be in a political position to sustain the economic changes that must be adopted in order to move forward. In the 1970's, credit had been made available and that did not work. The US could not repeat that example unless Poland made the free market reforms needed for real growth. (S)

President Cossiga said he was convinced that the political leadership and the new Opposition could support the needed changes that would allow them to receive aid from the West. Poland was no longer asking for more money. They were asking for Western businesses to invest in Poland and teach the Poles how a market economy works. (S)

Secretary Baker asked how companies would be assured of being able to keep their profits. (S)

President Cossiga responded that laws were the guarantee. Still, the opportunities for investment were not there yet, though Fiat chairman Agnelli's interest in Poland was a promising sign. (S)

The President said he was looking forward to his visit to Poland. (U)

President Cossiga said the Poles were looking forward to the President's visit as well. He said his Polish police escorts had all still been wearing the tie pins received during the President's trip to Poland as Vice President. It was a small point, but a revealing one. (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 27, 1989, 5:20 - 5:25pm
Villa Taverna, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita told the President that, as a citizen of the free world, he was very happy with the President's conventional arms control initiative. It would have a great effect on the world and in Europe. (S)

The President said that the spirit this morning had been very good. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita turning to the SNF issue, noted the tension between Great Britain and Germany. He hoped that Prime Minister Thatcher could eventually agree to the "communique." (S)

The President observed that there were still difficulties on the issue of a "third zero." President Mitterrand had been very diplomatic and generous. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that, when he had heard the President's proposals, he thought they would help with Germany. The German situation was very difficult. There had been many criticisms of Germany in recent weeks. Chancellor Kohl was in a difficult situation. It was impossible to say exactly why this was so, because the German economy was so strong. Perhaps it was a product of the emotions of the German people, "searching," as they had so many times before. (S)

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The President asked the Prime Minister whether Gorbachev had awakened Germany's aspirations for unity. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita thought that Gorbachev had done this, but what was most important was for Germany to have a chance to express itself. The Germans did not feel that they were treated like the French or the British, despite their great strength. (C)

The President asked whether the June elections for the European Parliament were likely to have an impact. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita thought they would, especially in Germany. He noted that detente and East-West relations were a major problem. (C)

The President said that, in his Boston University speech, he had reiterated his intention to remain fully involved with Europe, not to turn isolationist. He wanted the Prime Minister to know how he felt on this subject. Most Americans, though not all, felt the same way. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita said that there was a consensus in Europe that the speech was very important. (C)

Continuing, Prime Minister De Mita said it was difficult to know how to proceed with Eastern Europe on economic matters. Some wanted to go too far too quickly. The U.S. and Italy should cooperate closely on such issues. (C)

The President said he would like to help Poland and Hungary bilaterally, but there must be economic reform or the U.S. would just be wasting money. (C)

Prime Minister De Mita agreed. The East Europeans had told him that they welcomed Western economic help but did not want Western advice. (C)

The President returned to the idea of a united Germany and said he would like to say the Germans should do what they wish, but he must be responsible. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said one could think about the problem on two levels. On the level of ordinary people, a desire for reunification was strong. At the political level, the entities wanted to remain distinct. (C)

The President referred to the unrest in China and said he had been very circumspect recently about the student riots there. It was tough to know what line to take. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maynard Glitman, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Spokesman
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, Director for European Security Affairs, NSC

Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Leo Tindemans, Foreign Minister
Guy Coeme, Defense Minister
Frans Roelants, Foreign Ministry Secretary General
Alexis Reyn, Chef de Cabinet
Jan Grauls, Diplomatic Adviser, Prime Minister's Office
Philippe Nieuwenhuys, Adviser to the Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 28, 1989, 6:45 - 7:32pm
Chateau Stuyvenberg, Brussels

Prime Minister Martens welcomed the President and commented that this was a difficult time for the Belgian government because of the SNF issue. The Prime Minister hoped for a solution at the Summit. (ℓ)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his hospitality and noted that bilateral relations were very strong. He admired the Prime Minister's economic success in lowering the government deficit without serious inflation or major tax increases. The U.S. was also trying to get its fiscal house in order. The President thought tax increases would slow economic growth and cause a net loss in revenue. He was working with Congress. (ℓ)

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The President said he was not pessimistic about NATO or East-West relations. His policies were realistic. Their development had taken some time, and criticism for this had been expected. The President said it should be clearly understood that his Administration wanted Gorbachev and perestroika to succeed. The West had won the battle of ideologies and the Communist model was dead. Western values were prevailing. The Allies should try to capitalize on that success and reduce arms, but not be naive or base their foreign policies on one person. (C)

Turning to security issues, the President said the differing viewpoints on SNF were well understood. The President said he planned to make an important conventional arms control proposal, challenging the Soviets to reduce to equal levels of manpower stationed on foreign territory in Europe. The world would see the fairness in having the two largest powers deploy the same number of soldiers in Europe. This dramatic arms control proposal should strengthen Kohl in fighting his political battles. Yet, whatever the outcome of the SNF issue, it should not be allowed to affect the basic principles underpinning NATO strategy. (C)

The President was optimistic about the opportunities for change. The Soviets were moving toward the West on arms control, and Western values. The U.S. was prepared to help with the Soviet economy but would do so with eyes wide open. All these developments were good for the security of Europe. (C)

Prime Minister Martens commented that he and Foreign Minister Tindemans had recently been in Poland. It had been interesting to hear the Polish government talk of its willingness to accept an opposition role. The Prime Minister thought the key was in Polish statements that they wanted a free market economic system. South Korea had been cited as an example. The same trend was seen in African countries, such as Dakar, which the Prime Minister had just visited. Although it was dangerous when so much depended on one person, the real reason for change in the East was economic. (C)

The President urged the Prime Minister not to underestimate the unquenchable thirst for freedom. In Chile, for example, a totally repressive regime allowed a free market economy to operate. However, the Chilean people still agitated for political change. Once Gorbachev had unleashed perestroika and glasnost, he could not put the genie back in the bottle. Ortega, in Nicaragua, now announced he was a socialist in the "Swedish model." If true, this would be a conversion without precedent since Christ had walked the earth. Ortega was being convinced by the failure of his economy and the increasing trend toward democracy among his neighbors. These were exciting times. The Allies just needed to be prudent in proposing and making significant reductions in armed forces. (C)

The President appreciated that the Prime Minister took a tough decision in accepting deployment of INF missiles and got "bloodied" for it. This showed courage, and firmness. No one would ever convince the President that these deployment decisions did not compel the Soviets to be forthcoming at the negotiating table. Changes were encouraging, but the Alliance should not disperse out of euphoria. (C)

Prime Minister Martens asked for an elaboration of the President's conventional arms control proposal. (C)

The President asked Secretary Baker or General Scowcroft to provide one. (U)

Secretary Baker said the proposal would pick up on Warsaw Pact acceptance of Western figures for tanks and armored troop carriers, with reduced equipment to be destroyed. It would urge agreement on reducing land-based combat aircraft and helicopters on each side to a level fifteen percent below the current NATO total. These Alliance-to-Alliance ideas would be complemented by a U.S.-Soviet manpower ceiling of 275,000 for troops stationed in Europe. The U.S. would cut 20% of its combat manpower, with withdrawn forces to be demobilized and deactivated. The U.S. would cut about 30,000 troops (29,200 being 20% of the combat manpower), and the Soviets would have to cut 325,000. (C)

The President added that the Soviets could decide where they wanted to take their troop cuts, but the U.S. cuts would be in combat forces. (C)

Secretary Baker said that, in the U.S. view, these moves should allow the timetable for an agreement to be accelerated to six months to a year. This timetable would be important in resolving the SNF issue. On that point the U.S. felt that negotiations, though accepted in principle, should await the beginning of implementation of a CFE agreement. This should take about a year. In any case, however, the U.S. was reluctant to proceed with SNF negotiations until a CFE agreement had been concluded and its implementation had begun. (C)

Secretary Baker asked that information about the President's CFE proposal not be made public in advance of the Summit meeting. (C)

Returning to SNF, Secretary Baker said the President had recognized the FRG's particular problems and the significance of the changes in the East. The U.S. had been forthcoming, beginning with the Secretary's meetings with NATO leaders in February. The U.S. had delayed decisions on production and deployment of a modernized system until late 1991 or 1992 and had agreed in principle to SNF negotiations, all to accommodate the concerns of the Federal Republic. These moves should now be considered along with the President's conventional arms control

proposal. It would be good to have an agreement on SNF and not dampen the Summit by kicking the problem over to a later date. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Tindemans said that, of course, the President's proposal was extremely interesting. It would be the event of the Summit meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Martens, after cautioning that he was negotiating on the SNF issue on the basis of a political agreement within his government, asked the President for a commitment to early SNF negotiations, running parallel to the CFE talks. However, he said his priority was the conventional talks and that he was against the "zero option." Forces should be updated where necessary, without any production or deployment decision before 1991 or 1992. NATO did not need to decide on development. The President's conventional arms control proposal had overcome some of the problem, reducing the issue to one of immediate negotiations versus a link to an accelerated CFE timetable. (Ø)

The President hoped his conventional arms control proposal would take precedence over SNF negotiations. His fast track approach should change political calculations. (Ø)

Secretary Baker emphasized the accelerated timetable for implementation of CFE reductions as well, with 1992 or 1993 as the target date. He hoped this would give the Belgian government latitude as an alternative to parallel SNF talks. (Ø)

Prime Minister Martens asked if he had correctly understood that an agreement would be sought in six months to one year. (Ø)

Secretary Baker said that was what the U.S. thought was reasonable, in light of the convergence in the positions of the two sides. (Ø)

Defense Minister Coeme thought the linkage between the outcome of the Vienna CFE talks and the beginning of SNF negotiations was potentially dangerous. (Ø)

The President said he would prefer no linkage, just a concentration on the conventional forces. The conventional force imbalance was destabilizing and should be addressed. This may be tough for those who, like some elements in the FRG, put SNF reductions over everything else, but the accelerated timetable could accomplish what everyone wants -- conventional reductions and SNF negotiations. (Ø)

Secretary Baker said the conventional imbalance was a primary requirement for the SNF deterrent. It was therefore prudent to link the two problems. This would also give the East an incentive to move more quickly toward a CFE accord. (Ø)

The President said this was true despite the Eastern advantage in SNF. He asked Ambassador Glitman to elaborate on the disparities. (C)

Ambassador Glitman noted that, according to our count, the disparity was 14 to 1 and was 11 to 1 according to Eastern figures. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said these disparities were a justification for SNF negotiations designed to correct the imbalance. (C)

Secretary Baker replied that the Western SNF forces were counterforce weapons designed against Eastern conventional forces. He asked if General Scowcroft agreed. (S)

General Scowcroft said the principal function was to counter the conventional imbalance. (S)

The President said the short-range nuclear forces were there to deter attack. He said the Allied views were different from those of the Soviet Union on this point but he agreed that linkage to the CFE outcome might help speed an agreement on conventional force reductions. (S)

Secretary Baker said that the President understood political problems in Europe, but the President had political problems too. One was the military's very strong belief that ground-based nuclear missiles were needed to defend the 325,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe. The Secretary understood the appeal of a third zero. That was why a conventional agreement was needed before embarking on that slippery slope. (C)

The President said he hoped not to refer to U.S. politics at the NATO meeting. There were some in America who did not support the commitment to NATO, but the President would not rely on this argument. However, when it came to protection of "our kids," the President had to listen to his military commanders. In his role as Commander-in-Chief the President felt SNF was vital as long as there was a massive conventional imbalance. (C)

Prime Minister Martens wondered whether this argument against early SNf negotiations would still be valid if it was clearly accepted that a third zero outcome was ruled out by the Alliance. (C)

The President said the argument would be less valid, but valid. The levels of SNF were affected by the conventional imbalance. He looked forward to a lively discussion of this subject at the Summit. He hoped a solution to the problem could be negotiated with the Germans. (C)

Prime Minister Martens said his government had reviewed the positions of many countries, including the Germans. His government would propose some ideas. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Tindemans thought that, rather than each government putting forward a position, it would be better to have experts draft a document and then have a political discussion of it. (Ø)

Prime Minister Martens said this practice worked well in the EC, with the EC Commission proposing papers to the Council of Ministers. (Ø)

The President promised to consider the procedural question. He asked the Prime Minister for all possible consideration of what he, the President, had suggested during the meeting. (Ø)

Prime Minister Martens referred to an earlier discussion on Zaire during the drive from the airport. (U)

The President asked the Prime Minister when he would decide upon a course of action. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said he would inform the government the next morning (May 29). If the government accepted the results from Dakar then King Hassan would mediate and the Moroccans would organize a meeting to confirm the conclusions. He thanked the President for his help and noted that (President) Mobutu (of Zaire) had said the Belgians were clumsy and the Americans have lost their sangfroid. (Ø)

The President commented that Mobutu was a flamboyant person who was useful in some ways. He had some human rights problems. Perhaps the Belgian government had sobered him down. (Ø)

Prime Minister Martens said Belgium had an enormous effort in Zaire, five billion francs worth. (Ø)

Secretary Baker asked if this was commercial debt. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said it was a 25 year debt rescheduled with a grace delay of 14 years, but intervention was needed for payment of interest charges. (Ø)

The President said the problems were with the system and the need for reform. Without reform, money was being poured down a rathole. (Ø)

Prime Minister Martens said Mobutu had accepted adjustment from the IMF. (Ø)

General Scowcroft said the question was whether he would perform or not. (S)

The President asked about (Senegalese President) Diouf. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said Diouf was a good man, having difficulty with reintegrating 90,000 citizens from Mauritania but maintaining a political system with opposition parties. He was a serious man at the Francophone summits. (S)

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on May 29th

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Alton Keel, Permanent U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
Robert Zoellick, State Department Counselor
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General
Marcello Guidi, Deputy Secretary General
James Cunningham, Director of the Secretary General's Private Office

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 29, 1989, 9:00 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.
NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President said that the SNF issue was still unresolved. He asked the Secretary General, as the host for the Summit meetings, for his advice. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said that one clear priority was to keep the Summit from being dominated by the missile issue, although the press would focus on it. He wished to avoid spending the morning discussing SNF instead of the main purpose of the Summit, which was to look forward to the great opportunities lying ahead. The Allies should create a group chaired by Deputy Secretary General Guidi to see if there was anything that could be done. (S)

The President thought this was a good idea. (S)

Secretary General Woerner asked for the President's support. (S)

The President asked how much time the prepared interventions should take. (U)

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Secretary General Woerner expected they would average about ten minutes each for the sixteen heads of state and government. (U)

General Scowcroft commented that the President's intervention was slightly longer than ten minutes. (U)

Secretary General Woerner asked that the intervention not last more than twelve minutes. (S)

The President said he wished to be forward looking and mention his decision on COCOM no exceptions policy and Jackson-Vanik, but he did not wish to take advantage. He recalled sitting through speeches at the United Nations. (S)

Secretary Baker observed that those in the room would be interested in the President's major conventional arms control proposal. (S)

The President said the U.S. would not move any further on SNF. It would be unwise, he said, to be driven by the lowest common denominator. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said he did not wish to contradict the President. (S)

Secretary Baker said he had detected a little more flexibility on when the SNF negotiations might commence and the conditions thereto, but none on the question of the third zero. The UK, French, and Dutch may support the U.S., so Genscher might worry that he will be isolated. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said he was more pessimistic. The Alliance needed to emphasize its political objectives. (S)

The President said his CFE proposal alters the previous Western approach to the talks in an unprecedented way. The West would be moving forward in CFE. This would bring SNF negotiations closer. Things were different now and, naturally, time would be needed to study the situation. The President hoped Genscher would take this suggestion. (S)

Secretary General Woerner advised the President not to set a new deadline for arriving at a decision on SNF. This would put all the public expectations and pressure on the Alliance. German domestic pressure would continue. Those who blocked agreement should not be allowed to claim victory on the issue of SNF negotiations with only "details" to be worked out. Genscher was popular because he said the weapons are no good and negotiations will solve everything. The Allies needed to explain to its publics the rationale for nuclear weapons. (S)

Continuing, Secretary General Woerner urged the President to point out that the U.S. had come a long way to gain an agreement. People asked why SNF would be needed if there was conventional stability. This view was dangerous because, even if there was a conventional balance, SNF weapons would still be necessary. This point was not easy to explain. The Secretary General also remarked that the President had given a good speech on Eastern Europe; he should repeat that message. (S)

Governor Sununu asked whether there was any Allied support for the Secretary General's language on the SNF issue. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said this text could be a basis for compromise except for Genscher. Genscher might accept tying SNF negotiations to a CFE agreement. But Genscher could not accept exclusion of the possibility of a third zero. There had been bitter arguments between Genscher and Kohl which threatened the coalition. Kohl could accept the Secretary General's formulation but Genscher could not. (S)

Secretary Baker said the Alliance could not let itself be driven by a representative of five percent of the German electorate. It was clear from the (Quad) breakfast that no compromise was possible on the issue of the third zero. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister
Karolos Papoulias, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 30, 1989, 11:10 - 11:19am
NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President said he just wished to say hello. He knew the Prime Minister was preparing for elections. (U)

Prime Minister Papandreou said he was pleased to meet the President. He met with Secretary Baker for constructive discussions in Athens in February. He congratulated the President for his conventional arms control initiative. The Summit was a real triumph, with "no asterisks." The Prime Minister said he had not expected it. (Ø)

On the question of U.S. bases, Prime Minister Papandreou said the U.S. and Greece were having very professional meetings. The process was being interrupted until after the elections. The next Greek government would resolve the issues. There were difficulties, but Prime Minister Papandreou thought they could be overcome. One such difficulty was the amount of time needed to absorb the costs of new developments. (Ø)

Prime Minister Papandreou said he sought to strengthen the relationship between Greece and the U.S. These relations were far better today than eight years ago, when Cyprus played such a negative role in public opinion. (Turkish Prime Minister) Ozal was close and friendly with the Prime Minister, but the Prime

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8/21/2009
2000-0429-F

Minister felt Ozal had not put enough pressure on Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Prime Minister Papandreou had said so to Ozal but Ozal did not reply. Greece and the U.S. needed to work hard on the Cyprus issue. Perhaps not today or tomorrow, but some day the problem there could explode. The UN Secretary General was working on the problem too, but the Turkish side had not been willing to give an inch, even though Greek Cypriots have agreed to bizonality and political equality. Both of these were big concessions. (S)

The President said he had been impressed by Cypriot Prime Minister Vassiliou. The President knew Prime Minister Vassiliou was trying for a fresh approach, but the parties involved had never been able to develop a compromise acceptable to all. At some point, the U.S. might be in a position to be helpful. (S)

The President said he would like to see the problem solved. (S)

Prime Minister Papandreou concluded the meeting by promising to be in touch with Secretary Baker. (U)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
24. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 4/19/89 - 5/31/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 3/24/2023

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(66)	**MR Case #:**	2012-1596-MR(513.02)
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	**MR Disposition Date:**	2/2/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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MM 2/2/2016

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2009-0630-MR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 30, 1989, 11:20 a.m. - 11:27 a.m.
NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President thanked Prime Minister Gonzalez for his help on Panama. He wondered if the Prime Minister had any ideas about how best to resolve the issue. The President was afraid that the OAS was backing off a bit. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that pressure from Latin American countries on Noriega was growing. He was not sure when this pressure would get stronger. (S)

The President said the pressure must stay on. He recalled that he had raised the question of the Panamanian Defense Forces with Prime Minister Gonzalez. The President thought that Noriega had been lying to the PDF, telling them that they would be persona non grata if Noriega left. That was not true. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said it is quite obvious that the PDF realizes that it has a continuing role in Panama. Spain had passed that message along. Noriega had tried to involve the PDF in his problems, but Noriega may be a prisoner of the National Strategic Council. (S)

The President said he had been reading about that. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez commented that Noriega had created and corrupted this body. Now that he wants to get out, this body is

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resisting because they worry about what will happen to them. Perhaps the leadership will come to understand they can play a role without Noriega. (S)

The President said the U.S. had sent word to key figures in the PDF that the U.S. had no problem with them, only with Noriega. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez did not want to be optimistic, but he thought there would be results with Noriega. (S)

Governor Sununu asked if Spain had special contacts with the PDF. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said the Spanish ambassador had normal contacts 3.3(b)(1) (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez, turning to the Summit, remarked that the atmosphere of the Alliance was superb, the cohesion impressive. (U)

The President said one could feel the cohesion in the air. (U)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
Alfred Kingon, U.S. Ambassador to the European Community
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission
Frans Andriessen, Vice President
Sir Roy Denman, Head of Delegation
David Williamson, Secretary General
Pascal Lamy, Chef de Cabinet
Johannes Wijnmaalen, Chef de Cabinet for the Vice President
Horst Krenzler, Director General
Claus Ehlermann, Spokesman
Gianluigi Giola, Deputy Director

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 30, 1989, 1:55 p.m. - 2:20 p.m.
European Commission Headquarters, Berlaymont

President Delors said he was pleased with the results of the just-concluded NATO Summit and asked the President for his assessment. (U)

The President said he was very pleased with the outcome of the Summit. The Alliance had shown itself at its best. The German question related to short-range nuclear forces (SNF) had dominated early discussions, and Secretary Baker had taken a strong leadership role in finding a solution. The resolution of the SNF issue and the new proposal for reducing conventional

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2000-0429-F

forces were historic accomplishments. The conventional arms control proposal had won broad acceptance within the Alliance. U.S. generals had also certified that the proposal was militarily sound. The first tentative Soviet reaction was fairly good and upbeat. The U.S. would push forward now, challenging the Alliance to move faster. Although there was skepticism in the press and among some military people on "our side," things could be changed if the Alliance could keep the momentum going. All the Allies had agreed that the Summit was a success. (ℓ)

President Delors then asked Secretary Baker for his comments. (U)

Secretary Baker said the Summit meeting had resulted in a double victory for the Alliance. There had been questions, before the Summit, about Allied unity. The Alliance was now very unified, with broad and deep acceptance of the President's conventional arms control initiative and gratitude for it, welcoming leadership by the new American President. The SNF issue had been resolved in a way that adapted to changing circumstances in Europe, while putting priority on solving asymmetries in the balance of conventional forces. The Comprehensive Concept document provides for no reduction of SNF forces to zero. Although it did not say so in those words, due to certain sensitivities, this message was quite clear in the document. (Dutch Foreign Minister) Van den Broek had done a good job in chairing the final Foreign Ministers' meeting. (ℓ)

President Delors asked Secretary Mosbacher to comment on his meetings in Brussels. (U)

Secretary Mosbacher said his meetings had gone well. Progress had been made in several areas. With respect to financial institutions, the issue of national treatment was on the way to a good settlement. Standards would be more transparent and open. The Secretary knew the EC would be discussing these questions further. (ℓ)

Vice President Andriessen said the most important result was an improvement in public perception. The goals and objectives of the U.S. and the EC were better known. The creation of economic opportunities in a more integrated European market would be beneficial for other operators. The EC wanted an open market. The Vice President was determined to let the single European market function in a multilateral world trading framework and shared the position of the United States in this respect. He looked forward to intensifying contacts between the U.S. and the Community. (ℓ)

The President commented that his Boston speech had spoken of a united Europe and of shared values, such as a commitment to democracy, human rights, and free markets. He had made clear

that integration of Europe meant a stronger Alliance and more prosperous trading partners. (U)

Continuing, the President said he hoped to continue the political dialogue between the U.S. and the EC. In addition, he noted the recent meetings at the EC of U.S. Trade Representative Hills and Senator Roth and observed that a good exchange of views was going on. The President hoped that a single market would result in a more open, vigorous Europe. There had been lingering doubts about this prospect in the U.S., but there was more understanding now. The big thing was how the single market would be implemented, the details. The most important of these details, the President said, would be in agriculture. The success of the Uruguay round follow-on would be critical. (C)

Overall, the President concluded, problems might come up but the EC should know the U.S. was encouraged by and supportive of what the EC was trying to do. There had been problems in the past, but the Administration was not in a "posture of doubt;" it wanted more interaction with the EC. (U)

President Delors replied that only a stronger EC could strengthen the multilateral trading system. That was why integration was so important. (U)

The President then asked President Delors whether the arrangements were set for his visit to the United States. (C)

President Delors said he hoped they were. (C)

The President asked President Delors when he would be coming. (C)

President Delors said the U.S. had to decide this. (C)

The President, after briefly conferring with Ambassador Kingon, said he understood that the matter now rested with President Delors. (C)

President Delors said there were details to be worked out. (C)

The President then said that, in any case, President Delors was welcome to come to the United States. He urged President Delors to firm up the arrangements and said he did want to meet with him in Washington. (C)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
26. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [redacted] (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence
Subseries: Presidential Memcons
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Presidential Meetings - Memorandum of Conversations 4/19/89 - 5/31/89

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By ES On 5/9/22

Date Closed:	1/23/2009	**OA/ID Number:**	91107-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	**Appeal Case #:**	
Re-review Case #:		**Appeal Disposition:**	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		**Disposition Date:**	
AR Case #:		**MR Case #:**	2011-0862-MR (508)
AR Disposition:		**MR Disposition:**	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		**MR Disposition Date:**	8/17/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Hans Klein, Minister for Economic Cooperation
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on Security Policy
Dieter Kastrup, Foreign Ministry Political Director
Walter Neuer, Head of Chancellor's Private Office
Uwe Kastner, Chancellery Director for USA and Europe

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 30, 1989, 5:30 p.m. - 6:20 p.m.
Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl said the day was a good one for the FRG after the joint labors of Brussels. The Summit outcome was a cornerstone in the U.S.-German relationship. As the Federal Republic celebrated its 40th anniversary, it was clear that the FRG's success would be inconceivable without the United States. Beyond the material help in the Marshall Plan, America's spiritual help was immeasurable. Without going into the details of the Summit, the Chancellor wanted the President to be sure that Germans understood that there could be no secure future for the FRG without NATO and without German friendship with the United States. (℄)

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Chancellor Kohl wanted to raise U.S.-German relations and his hopes for improved cooperation in exchanging young people between the two countries. He also hoped the U.S. and Germany could tap the resource of the millions of Americans who had served as soldiers in the FRG. (U)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted to discuss burdensharing. Nine hundred thousand soldiers moved about in a small country, as wide as the length of Long Island. Chancellor Kohl and the President also needed to discuss low-level flights. In the months ahead, Chancellor Kohl hoped for an intensified discussion of burdensharing and, with a view to U.S. domestic politics, it might be good to come to reasonable agreements on this issue. (C)

Chancellor Kohl, referring to an earlier discussion of the EC, said that, without any overestimation, the FRG was the real engine of the EC. The Federal Republic paid in the most money and drew the most benefits. In 1989, 55% of the FRG's exports would go to the EC. In heading to 1992, Bonn's policy was to avoid a 'fortress Europe' at all costs, and the FRG was not alone. There would not be a U.S.-EC trade war. An agreement was needed on goods and services. In 1948, West Germany had opted for a free market. From this lesson, it was clear that the FRG would never revert to protectionism. These were the points the Chancellor Kohl wanted to make. Later, perhaps the Chancellor and the President could talk about the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Hungary. (C)

The President said he was pleased with the Brussels result. Reaction at home had been positive. With regard to NATO, the President would be misleading the Chancellor if he did not say that some in the U.S. wanted someone else to take on the NATO burden. But a majority of Americans, as the President made clear in Brussels, realized how important the U.S. relationship to NATO really was. This Summit meeting would help. (C)

The President was thinking about how to push forward now quickly after the euphoria in Brussels. The HLTF needs to have the new proposal ready by September 7; then the Allies must move CFE forward. This would be an interesting test for Gorbachev. The President's general feeling was that Gorbachev would find positive elements in the NATO initiative, partly because of the cost of conventional forces to the Soviet economy. So the President was somewhat hopeful, and determined to try to make the CFE process work. (S)

The President felt that German-American relations probably had never been better. There was a feeling of goodwill toward Germany in the U.S. There would be differences, but the relationship would endure and only get better and better. (John) McCloy's funeral was a symbol of this. As for exchanges, the U.S. and the FRG should intensify efforts to exchange more young

people, see what could be done about that. There would be budgetary constraints because of the U.S. budget deficit, but the U.S. would work on the problem. On burdensharing, exercises were needed to maintain readiness, but the U.S. and the FRG needed to explain their purpose better. On trade, both the U.S. and Europe needed to keep markets open, especially on agriculture, where all were guilty. The President hoped to talk about this issue at the Economic Summit. The U.S. would work with the EC as best it could. Consultation had gotten much better and the U.S. never wanted to "blindside" the FRG. There would be no surprises. Consultation was crucial. (C)

Foreign Minister Genscher said that, on the subject of the European Community, he had followed the President's Boston speech with great attention. There was a great opportunity on both sides of the Atlantic because of 1992. The EC had a 340 million person market. The President saw in Brussels yesterday how members of the EC could talk -- and some men and women fight, especially as the night gets longer. In ten to fifteen years, there would be three major economic areas: Japan, the EC, and the U.S. and Canada. The Foreign Minister was not afraid of Japan. He had told Nakasone that, as MacArthur said, we in Europe shall return. On terrorism and drugs, the U.S. and the FRG must work even more closely together. (S)

The President asked about the UK role in the EC. What were Prime Minister Thatcher's concerns? Were they manageable? How would the EC accommodate neutrals like Austria or Switzerland? (C)

Chancellor Kohl said he held Prime Minister Thatcher in very high esteem. He had known her for 18 years. He respected her very much. She is intelligent [1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)] For a long time, the English Channel was a border for the UK. Half the population of the UK has never crossed the Channel. That would change over time, but now the British were behind the views of the rest of Europe. [1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)] [1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)] Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand were very close, as were their countries. When Chancellor Kohl was younger, France was Germany's sworn enemy. That had changed. [1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)] (S)

Chancellor Kohl said that as time passed European national "competencies" would gradually shift to the EC. This was inevitable. Norway would vote for membership in the EC in three or four years. Sweden and Finland would also have to be accommodated. Chancellor Kohl wished the Germans would have pursued the thoughtful economic policies of Finland for the last forty years; Chancellor Kohl had great admiration for the Finns. As for Switzerland, Chancellor Kohl was not sure the Swiss would agree to join the EC. As for Austria, it had applied for membership but it was unclear what would happen when EC defense cooperation intensified, if there were neutrals within the EC. (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on Security Policy
Interpreter

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CSI 11/29/07

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 31, 1989, 9:10 a.m. - 10:05 a.m.
Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl opened with a discussion of exchange programs. He emphasized the value of student exchanges and mentioned possibilities for a congressional exchange program, starting with the leadership in the U.S. Senate. They could spend four or five days in the FRG, including meetings with military units so they can see how a conscript army works. It would be good for the Senators to meet with these young people. A similar program could be followed for the U.S. House of Representatives during a second phase. Also, the Soviets were mounting a massive offensive in this area, with more and more visitors all the time. (S)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted the President to understand that, for him, there were two pillars in his foreign policy: the EC and NATO. (S)

The President suggested that the Chancellor not forget the importance of state officials as well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said that Mr. Weidenfeld would do more about this problem, and suggested that General Scowcroft could talk to him. The Chancellor also wanted to establish a scholarship for ten American students. Could the Chancellor and the President be joint patrons? (S)

The President said he would like that very much if there was no Congressional prohibition. (S)

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SCS 4/11/13

Chancellor Kohl admitted that it sounded crazy but said the U.S. and the FRG must get back to the year 1910. That was when the largest exchanges were taking place. The Chancellor joked that he was a nut on this issue. (C)

The President said he did not worry about American young people going to Moscow if they had something to compare it with. (C)

Chancellor Kohl noted he had spoken to (Egyptian) President Mubarak about this. Mubarak had studied in Moscow and told the Chancellor not to worry. (C)

The President commented that Mubarak was a good man. (C)

Chancellor Kohl said he wished that (Israeli Prime Minister) Shamir would reach out more. He should know that any other leader in Egypt would be worse for him to deal with. (S)

The President said he was under pressure from the American Jewish community but would persist in his approach. The U.S. had a problem on the settlements issue and the President would do something publicly about it. (S)

The President said he was especially disturbed about the problems in Lebanon. It was hard to know what to do. The President would not send the Marines back in, but he was frustrated. He loved the Lebanese people. The crisis in Lebanon was a pressing concern in the U.S., especially in the Catholic community. The President had discussed Lebanon with the Holy Father. (S)

Chancellor Kohl said that, if he could be of help, the President should let him know. This was a critical area -- one where Christians, Jews, and Moslems come together. (C)

Chancellor Kohl then asked the President for his views on the situation in Japan, noting his regret about Nakasone's problems. (C)

The President said it was a tough period for Japan. The U.S. knew that Uno, and Takeshita, were good men. The President said he had reluctantly taken a 301 decision. There is an anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and the President was worried about it. The U.S. needed a close relationship with Japan and the Japanese were buying U.S. bonds. The President described the FSX problem. There was an ugly undercurrent in U.S.-Japanese relations and it worried the President. (C)

Chancellor Kohl said he had encountered the same situation three or four years earlier. When the Chancellor came into office there was a depressing attitude toward Japan all over Europe. The Chancellor was in Japan and the Japanese said the Germans had lost out, could not keep up. The Chancellor promised the Germans

would be back later. The Japanese told the Chancellor last year that he was right; the Germans were back. Now, for example, BMW sells motorcycles in Japan. The U.S. and Germans could do it. The Japanese did not have more brain cells than the Americans or Germans did. Nor did the Chancellor think the Japanese could continue as they had in the past. The Chancellor said the Japanese will have a cultural crisis, and recounted a story about Japanese children identifying their home as being their kindergarten school. The absence of any home life was the reverse of the traditional Japanese lifestyle. The Japanese had gone from one extreme to the other. They were not better people; they were just organized better, and work harder. The SPD now had a program for a 30-hour work week. In 1988 the Germans were investing more in research and development and were up to the per capita level of investment of the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. and the FRG should do more joint research and development. The Chancellor wanted thousands of ties between the U.S. and Germany in every conceivable field. (S)

Chancellor Kohl cited another problem. The Germans had an inferiority complex. By the year 2000 there would be three main economic areas -- Japan, the U.S. and Canada, and Western Europe. Within this room, the Chancellor said he felt the FRG should stay within the second rank, not stick its neck out. That was why the Germans pushed France out in front. That was the problem with Prime Minister Thatcher. She got irritated with the FRG even though the Chancellor spoke last at the EC meetings. The Chancellor did not want to push her into a corner, but wanted to bring her in. That was also why he wanted to bring the U.S. in. ~~(TS)~~

The President said he wanted to be sure the U.S. did not appear to have exclusive friends in Europe. That was why he had taken Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. The U.S. would have problems with Mitterrand, but these were also because the French felt there was a U.S.-Great Britain special relationship. That was also a problem with Germany. ~~(TS)~~

Chancellor Kohl characterized France as a capricious lady that can always be wooed. The only Cardinal in France does not receive his hat from the Pope, but from the head of state -- ever since Louis XIV. One must accept these French idiosyncrasies and deal with them. (S)

The President said all countries had their special concerns. The U.S. would cater to them, but not grovel. (S)

Chancellor Kohl said it was fantastic that the President took Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. With President Reagan, the relationship just did not work. The President had dealt with him exactly right. Mitterrand used to say he did not take instructions from U.S. Presidents. He could not talk with

President Reagan. He talked with the President and he loved it. The Chancellor urged the President to please continue this approach with Mitterrand. There was no jealousy on the part of the Chancellor. (~~TS~~)

The President recounted a story about former Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl asked the President when he would be going to Poland. (U)

The President said it would be just before the Economic Summit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said the U.S. and the FRG should help Jaruzelski. The Poles were a bit too arrogant, but it was important to help them. (Ø)

The President said he would like to consult with the Chancellor about this subject before his trip. (Ø)