

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files

OA/ID Number: 91115
Folder ID Number: 91115-007

Folder Title:
United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to John Weston from Robert Blackwill (1 pp.)	2/4/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Robin Butler from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	2/6/89	(b)(1)	TS
03. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Charles Powell (1 pp.)	3/1/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Letter from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)	3/9/89	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office for Joh Weston from Robert Blackwill (1 pp.)	3/14/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Personal Message from General Brent Scowcroft to Charles Powell (2 pp.)	4/5/89	(b)(1)	S
07. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message from President George Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (1 pp.)	5/4/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Cable	Re: Foreign Ministers of the Nations Represented at the Paris Summit. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap972
OA/ID Number: 91115-007
Date Closed: 2/13/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	5/18/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	5/19/89	(b)(1)	S
11. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Sir Robin Butler from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	5/22/89	(b)(1)	TS
12. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (1 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft for Sir Robin Butler (1 pp.)	6/2/89	(b)(1)	S
14. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message from President George Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	7/1/89	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (3 pp.)	7/6/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
17. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Sir Robin Butler (1 pp.)	7/7/89	(b)(1)	TS
18. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (2 pp.)	8/14/89	(b)(1)	S
19. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (2 pp.)	9/29/89	(b)(1)	S
20. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (3 pp.)	10/4/89	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (1 pp.)	10/11/89	(b)(1)	S
22. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London to Joy Robillard for Prime Minister Thatcher from President Bush (1 pp.)	10/28/89	(b)(1)	S
23. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (1 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	S
24. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Sir Robin Butler from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	TS

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
25. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (1 pp.)	1/1/89	(b)(1)	C
26. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Leonard Appleyard from Robert D. Blackwill (2 pp.)	4/2/89	(b)(1)	S
27. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Upgrade of US/UK Head of State Secure Voice Link (1 pp.)	4/9/90	(b)(1)	S
28. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Sir Robin Butler from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/18/90	(b)(1)	TS
29. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (3 pp.)	4/25/90	(b)(1)	S
30. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (3 pp.)	5/3/90	(b)(1)	C
31. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher [redacted] (1 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1)	TS

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32. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from the President (4 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	S
33. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Leonard Appleyard from Timothy Deal (1 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	S
34. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from the President (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
35. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Thatcher from the President (8 pp.)	6/21/90	(b)(1)	S
36. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from President George Bush (3 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S
37. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from President George Bush (3 pp.)	7/1/90	(b)(1)	S
38. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Sir Charles Powell (4 pp.)	7/14/90	(b)(1)	TS

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
39. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from the President (1 pp.)	7/20/90	(b)(1)	S
40. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from the President (1 pp.)	7/28/90	(b)(1)	S
41. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Diego Garcia (1 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	S
42. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Diego Garcia (1 pp.)	8/11/90	(b)(1)	S
43. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher (2 pp.)	9/5/90	(b)(1)	S
44. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to the Honorable Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	9/22/90	(b)(1)	S
45. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Mr. Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	9/27/90	(b)(1)	S

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46. Cable	From White House to Cabinet Office, Re: Message for Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft [Message from George Bush to Margaret Thatcher, Re: U.N. Resolution on Iraq] [181659Z Oct 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	TS
47. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: to Charles Powell from Robert M. Gates (1 pp.)	11/27/90	(b)(1)	TS
48. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Exchange Between the Prime Minister and the President... (1 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	TS
49. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: CABO Secure Voice Support (1 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	S
50. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister John Major from President George Bush (1 pp.)	12/26/90	(b)(1)	TS
51. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from Robert M. Fates to Sir Robert Butler (1 pp.)	1/5/91	(b)(1)	TS
52. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (2 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	TS
53. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: CABO Secure Voice Support (1 pp.)	1/19/91	(b)(1)	TS

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
54. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: From Brent Scowcroft to Charles Powell (1 pp.)	1/30/91	(b)(1)	S
55. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/3/91	(b)(1)	S
56. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (1 pp.)	2/16/91	(b)(1)	S
57. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Sir Charles Powell from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S
58. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
59. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S
60. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Prime Minister Major from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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SIT: COO WHSR_HOTLINE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 041422Z FEB 89
<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE
<TO> TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON
<TEXT> ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS
RRRR
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO JOHN WESTON FROM
ROBERT BLACKWILL.
BEGIN TEXT:
1. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 2, CONCERNING THE
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY YOU EXPECT ON FEBRUARY 8. WE HAVE REVIEWED
YOUR PROPOSED RESPONSE AND FIND IT SATISFACTORY.
2. WE HAVE ALSO REVIEWED SIR ROBIN BUTLER'S MESSAGES OF JANUARY
10 TO BRENT SCOWCROFT'S PREDECESSOR AND YOUR SUPPLEMENTING
MESSAGE OF LAST WEEK. WE WILL BE RESPONDING TO THOSE MESSAGES
VERY SOON.
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
0008
<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0008 <TOR> 890204100104 MSG000223898464

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0759-MR
JL 1/9/12

(DIST>
SIT: WHSR HOTLINE
(DIST>
SIT: WHSR SPECIAL
(DIST>
SIT: COQ
(PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 062109Z FEB 89

(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR

31 10/3/12

(TEXT>ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

1000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ROBIN BUTLER FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

I HAVE REVIEWED THE MESSAGES YOU SENT MY PREDECESSOR ON JANUARY 10, AS WELL AS THE MESSAGE FROM JOHN WESTON LAST WEEK ON THE SUBJECT OF THE TRADITIONAL EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER CONCERNING THE UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE USE OF UNITED KINGDOM BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE ARE IN BASIC AGREEMENT BOTH ON THE CONTENT OF THE EXCHANGE AND THE SUITABILITY OF ACCOMPLISHING THE EXCHANGE OF SIGNED ORIGINALS DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 17. WE WOULD ALSO AGREE WITH REPLACING THE WORD "POSSIBLE" WITH THE WORD "POSITIVE" IN THE TEXT OF YOUR SECOND PROPOSED REPLY.

I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT ONE PARAGRAPH BE ADDED TO THE NOTE CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS A FINAL PARAGRAPH:

BEGIN TEXT:

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO REAFFIRM THAT THE EXACT CONTENT OF THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM AND THE UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IS RESTRICTED ON A VERY SPECIFIC NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

END TEXT

I TRUST THIS ADDITION, WHICH DOES NOT SUBSTANTIVELY ALTER THE CONTENT OR NATURE OF OUR JOINT UNDERSTANDINGS, IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU DURING YOUR VISIT.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
ERENT SCOWCROFT

ECL: OADR
0014

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0014 <TOR> 890206162715 MSG000224094435

(DIST>
RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 010133Z MAR 89

(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

(TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, TO
CHARLES POWELL, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR CHARLES,

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY VERY WARM, ALBEIT BELATED THANKS
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND TO YOU, FOR YOUR KIND WORDS OF
CONGRATULATIONS UPON MY APPOINTMENT.

THERE ARE A GREAT MANY ISSUES OF CONCERN, BOTH BILATERALLY AND
TO THE ALLIANCE IN GENERAL, THAT WE WILL BE ADDRESSING IN THE
FUTURE AND I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU CLOSELY ON THEM.

AS YOU STATED IN YOUR MESSAGE, THIS CHANNEL HAS SERVED US VERY
WELL IN THE PAST FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
AND THE PRESIDENT. WE INTEND TO RELY ON IT WHENEVER THE
STRICTEST PRIVACY IS NEEDED AND YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT WE
ALSO TREAT SUCH MESSAGES WITH THE UTMOST DISCRETION.

WITH BEST WISHES,

BRENT SCOWCROFT
00013

(SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0013 <TOR> 890228224748 MSG000226018068

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR
J 1/9/12

(DIST>
RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 091553Z MAR 89
(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

(SUBJ>SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

(TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER.

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER. WE BOTH AGREE THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST
MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE LAND-BASED NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN EUROPE.
WE ALSO AGREE THAT, TO PRESERVE THIS DETERRENT, NATO SHOULD MAKE
A FIRM COMMITMENT TO PROCEED WITH OUR AGREED PROGRAM FOR
MODERNIZING OUR SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, INCLUDING REPLACING
THE LANCE MISSILES NOW DEPLOYED ON THE CONTINENT. THIS IS A
PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF MY GOVERNMENT, AS IT IS FOR YOURS.

THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS MUST DECIDE HOW TO EXPRESS THIS COMMITMENT
IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT DOCUMENT TO BE ADOPTED AT THE NATO
SUMMIT IN MAY. BONN'S POSITION IS OBVIOUSLY CRITICAL. I
THEREFORE ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED THE FORTHRIGHT APPROACH YOU
ADOPTED DURING YOUR RECENT TALKS WITH HELMUT IN FRANKFURT. I NOW
WANT TO FOLLOW UP WITH AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO WORK WITH OUR
GERMAN FRIENDS ON POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF A COMMON APPROACH.

SHORTLY AFTER I TOOK OFFICE, HELMUT PROPOSED THAT OFFICIALS FROM
OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS GET TOGETHER TO WORK ON THE SNF QUESTION. I
HAVE AGREED AND HAVE INVITED HIM TO SEND A SMALL TEAM OF SENIOR
OFFICIALS TO WASHINGTON FOR LOW-KEY, DISCREET DISCUSSIONS AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

YOUR LETTER IDENTIFIED SOME OF THE HAZARDS TO BE AVOIDED IN
FASHIONING AN APPROPRIATE AFFIRMATION OF THE COMMITMENT TO
MODERNIZING. I SHARE YOUR CONCERNS. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ON
SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IS AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS NOT YET
COME; NOR IS IT LIKELY TO COME ANYTIME SOON, CERTAINLY NOT BEFORE
WE SEE A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE THREAT WE FACE. IN THE MEANTIME,
THE ALLIANCE'S READINESS TO DO WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO SAFEGUARD
AN EFFECTIVE LAND-BASED NUCLEAR DETERRENT MUST BE CLEAR, WHILE WE
CONTINUE MOVING TOWARD LONGER-RANGE SYSTEMS. YET YOU AND I BOTH
UNDERSTAND HELMUT'S POLITICAL SITUATION. WE WANT TO HELP, NOT
HURT. SO WE WILL BE OPEN TO IDEAS THAT WILL HELP HELMUT REGAIN
THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND LEAD HIS GOVERNMENT TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE COMMITMENT.

WE WILL STAY IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS ISSUE. YOUR VIEWS, AND

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2009-0759-MR
Zr 11/9/12

THOSE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WILL BE SOUGHT AT EVERY STAGE OF THE
PROCESS. YOUR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL. I AM
CONFIDENT THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE THE STEPS THAT ARE
NECESSARY TO REACH OUR COMMON GOAL.

SINCERELY,
SIGNED GEORGE BUSH

ND TEXT.

0058

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0058 <TOR> 890309105634 MSG000226752994

(DIST>
PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
SIT: CO9 HOTLINE_OUT<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> YEXXWHX<DTG> 141700Z MAR 89
ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
TO>TO CABINET OFFICE
TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS ONLY
10000

FOR JOHN WESTON, EYES ONLY, FROM ROBERT BLACKWILL
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF MARCH 13, AND WE AGREE WITH YOUR
SUGGESTED SAFEGUARD. DURING THE FORMAL MEETING IN GENERAL
SCOWCROFT'S OFFICE, HE WILL EXCHANGE WITH SIR ROBIN BUTLER THE
LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THE
ASSOCIATED MEMORANDUM DATED 28 JUNE 1988, REFLECTING THE
UNDERSTANDINGS ON THAT SPECIFIC SUBJECT.

DEPENDING ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE, WE HOPE TO HAVE GENERAL
SCOWCROFT ESCORT ROBIN BUTLER BRIEFLY INTO THE OVAL OFFICE DURING
THE MEETING. IF SO, THE SECOND EXCHANGE COULD TAKE PLACE DURING
THAT VISIT. IF THE PRESIDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE, WE PLAN TO HAVE
GENERAL SCOWCROFT REQUEST A FEW MINUTES PRIVATELY WITH ROBIN
BUTLER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MAIN MEETING, AND THE EXCHANGE
OF THE SECOND SET OF LETTERS ABOUT DIEGO GARCIA WOULD TAKE PLACE
THEN, "UNTER VIER AUGEN," TO BORROW A PHRASE FROM OUR GERMAN
COLLEAGUES.

I CAN ALSO CONFIRM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTERS ARE DATED
MARCH 17.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU DURING THE VISIT, AND HOPE WE WILL
HAVE TIME TO CHAT TOGETHER AFTER THE MEETING IN GENERAL
SCOWCROFT'S OFFICE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

#0001<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 0001<TOR> 890314185643 MSG000227213803

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0759-MR
Zr 1/9/12

(DIST>
RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COO HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXGRI <DTG> 050432Z APR 89

(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR
31 11/9/12

(TEXT>ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA CABO CHANNELS
1990

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, TO CHARLES POWELL, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.
DEAR CHARLES:
BEFORE GORBACHEV ARRIVES IN THE UK. AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE PRIME MINISTER TO KNOW THAT COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT OSCAR ARIAS EXPRESSED STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA IN HIS MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON APRIL 4. PRESIDENT ARIAS PLEDGED TO WORK WITH US IN CLOSELY MONITORING NICARAGUAN PERFORMANCE ON DEMOCRATIZATION. HE ALSO GAVE THE BIPARTISAN ACCORD STRONG PUBLIC BACKING, HERALDING THE "NEW ENVIRONMENT, NEW ATMOSPHERE" IN WASHINGTON. HE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THE PRESS THAT THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ACCORD AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SUMMIT AGREEMENT IN EL SALVADOR AND THAT U.S. HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE RESISTANCE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THAT AGREEMENT. BOTH IN HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, ARIAS REJECTED THE INTERPRETATION THAT THE RESISTANCE SHOULD DEMOBILIZE BY MAY 15, SAYING THAT REINTEGRATION SHOULD GO HAND IN HAND WITH NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIZATION.
PRESIDENT ARIAS WAS BRIEFED ON OUR LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CENTRAL AMERICA, WITH WHICH HE AGREED. WHEN OUR MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV WAS PUBLICIZED LAST WEEK IN SAN JOSE, ARIAS HAD PUBLICLY CALLED FOR AN END OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA AND THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. AS HE HAD EARLIER IN HIS OWN LETTER TO GORBACHEV. FOLLOWING THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING, ARIAS PUBLICLY ECHOED THIS THEME AGAIN. ASKED WHAT MESSAGE HE WOULD SEND TO GORBACHEV, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET LEADER SHOULD BE "CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE WROTE IN HIS BOOK PERESTROIKA. IF HE SUPPORTS SINCERELY THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PLAN, HE HAS TO PERSUADE FIDEL CASTRO NOT TO KEEP ON SUPPORTING THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR."
ON ANOTHER MATTER, THE PRESIDENT WANTED YOU TO STRESS TO GORBACHEV ON HIS BEHALF OUR CONCERN THAT THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHWESTERN AFRICA IS SEVERELY THREATENED BY THE INFILTRATION INTO NAMIBIA OF HEAVILY ARMED SWAPO UNITS. HE HOPES THE PRIME MINISTER CAN IMPRESS UPON GORBACHEV THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE SWAPO THAT ITS ONGOING INFILTRATION, IN CONTRAVENTION OF ITS OWN COMMITMENT TO THE UN TO ABIDE BY THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, MUST STOP IMMEDIATELY. GORBACHEV SHOULD ALSO IMPRESS ON THE CUBANS THE RESPONSIBILITY THEY BEAR FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE AGREEMENTS.
MAY I SIMPLY REITERATE THAT THE PRESIDENT HOPES THE PRIME MINISTER CAN MAKE THESE POINTS IN HER CONVERSATION WITH GORBACHEV.

WARM REGARDS,
BRENT SCOWCROFT

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0001 <TOR> 890406032919 MSG000229145359

DIST>
RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 041700Z MAY 89

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

QQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH,
O PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

EAR MARGARET:

S YOU MARK YOUR TENTH YEAR IN YOUR OFFICE, AND AS I EXPERIENCE
HE FIRST YEAR IN MINE, I AM ESPECIALLY MINDFUL OF YOUR
ONSTANT DEMONSTRATION THAT LEADERSHIP MATTERS, THAT
ETERMINATION MATTERS, THAT CHARACTER MATTERS, MOST OF ALL THAT
REEDOM MATTERS. YOU ARE A DAILY INSPIRATION TO ALL OF US WHO
ARE ABOUT THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND YOU DO A
RETTY GOOD JOB OF GETTING ELECTED TOO. THAT WILL CONTINUE TO
E AN UNBEATABLE COMBINATION, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

OUR ANNIVERSARY WAS ALSO SALUTED ON OUR NATIONWIDE TELEVISION
AST NIGHT, WITH ESPECIALLY GOOD COVERAGE BY NBC.

ONGRATULATIONS.

INCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH
0223

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0223 <TOR> 890504130233 MSG000231598953

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR
Jr 1/9/12

AS A PRELIMINARY CONCEPT, IT WOULD BE HELD BY THE GROUP OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE PARIS SUMMIT.
THE GROUP WOULD COORDINATE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AND HUNGARY
SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THESE RESOURCES ARE SUFFICIENT, TO AVOID
REDUNDANCY AND TO ASSURE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONALITY. THE CONSORTIUM
WOULD OF COURSE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS TO
DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND RECOVERY.

WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS AN AD HOC ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD DERIVE ITS
IMPETUS FROM THE PARIS SUMMIT WITHOUT BEING FORMALLY LINKED TO IT. A
CONNECTION WITH THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MIGHT HELP ALLAY SOVIET
SUSPICIONS THAT THE CONSORTIUM WOULD HAVE A POLITICAL/MILITARY
OBJECTIVE. THE LEADERSHIP WOULD COME FROM THE SEVEN, AND THE SIZE
AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE CONSORTIUM COULD BE REVISED IN A
PRAGMATIC WAY ONCE WE GAINED EXPERIENCE. A SIMILAR CONSORTIUM,
CREATED WITHIN THE OECD, WORKED WELL IN HELPING TURKEY THROUGH SOME
ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE EARLY 1980S. AS IN THAT EXAMPLE,
THE CONSORTIUM WOULD COOPERATE WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE
IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE PARIS CLUB AND WOULD IN NO WAY UNDERCUT
THEM.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CREATION IN PARIS OF SUCH A MECHANISM FOR
ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION WOULD SEND A POWERFUL MESSAGE TO THE
DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND PEOPLES OF POLAND AND HUNGARY THAT THE
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE READY TO WORK WITH THEM AS POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS PROCEED. IT WOULD BE A NEW MEANS OF STRENGTHENING
OUR DIALOGUE WITH THESE COUNTRIES AND OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF
EUROPE. AND, IF HANDLED PROPERLY, IT COULD HAVE POSITIVE
REPERCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCEPT OF A CONSORTIUM, I HAVE DECIDED TO ASK
THE U.S. CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES, IN THE RANGE
OF \$100 MILLION, FOR POLAND AND HUNGARY TO BE USED TO PROMOTE PRIVATE
AND DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BOTH COUNTRIES. THE GRANTS
0126

EM
~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
000

INAL SECTION OF 02
OULD HELP TO ASSIST PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS, PROVIDE NEEDED OUTSIDE
INVESTMENT, STRENGTHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, AND
FOUND NEW TRAINING, MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND OTHER PROJECTS.

PERHAPS THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHER INTERESTED NATIONS MIGHT PROVIDE
DIFFERENT FORMS OF ASSISTANCE SO THAT, TOGETHER, WE MIGHT ATTACK A
WIDE RANGE OF OBJECTIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE NATION MIGHT HELP WORKERS
RETRAIN AND ADJUST TO NEW JOBS; ANOTHER MIGHT FOCUS ON IMPROVING THE
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT (PERHAPS AS PART OF THE BROAD WESTERN
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE I SUGGESTED IN MY SPEECH AT MAINZ AT THE END
OF MAY). HOW BEST TO MAKE OUR RESPECTIVE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
COMPLEMENTARY COULD BE ANOTHER MATTER FOR DISCUSSION IN THE
CONSORTIUM.

IN ADDITION, AS I ANNOUNCED IN APRIL, I SHARE YOUR BELIEF THAT IT IS
TIME TO UNDERTAKE A SUSTAINABLE RESCHEDULING OF POLAND'S DEBTS. OUR
FINANCIAL SPECIALISTS HAVE BEEN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION IN
THE PARIS CLUB. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESCHEDULE POLAND'S DEBT
EXPEDITIOUSLY IN A GENEROUS AND FLEXIBLE MANNER THAT PERMITS POLAND
TO MAKE ITS PAYMENTS AND STILL IMPORT THE ESSENTIALS FOR ECONOMIC
RECOVERY. A FIRST STEP SHOULD BE A RESCHEDULING IN ADVANCE OF AN IMF

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0759-MR
Jr 1/9/12

012017
PORT: GATES COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 180132Z MAY 89

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

0000

YES ONLY

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

PERSONAL FOR CHARLES POWELL

DEAR CHARLES,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CABLE. I BELIEVE YOU MAY HAVE A SLIGHTLY
INACCURATE VIEW OF OUR MINIMAL POSITION ON SNF.

WHAT I TOLD PERCY WAS THAT WE COULD NOT SUSTAIN PERMANENTLY A
POSITION WHICH SAID NO NEGOTIATIONS EVER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

INSTEAD, OUR THOUGHT IS THAT THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS IS AT
PRESENT PREMATURE, AND AS A PRECONDITION EVEN FOR ENTERTAINING
THE IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT ON
QUALITY OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF AND
(PERHAPS) PRIOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET SNF FORCES TO OUR
LEVEL.

WE HAVE NOT REALLY ADVANCED THIS POSITION TO ANYONE, ALTHOUGH IT
IS AT THE HEART OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH GEOFFREY HOWE, AND THIS
PRECISE FORMULATION IS MINE. I FEEL CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT I
AM EXPRESSING THE PRESIDENT'S PROSPECTIVE.

NEVER HAS THE NOTION OF PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS CROSSED OUR MINDS.

HIS MESSAGE, LIKE YOURS, IS A VERY PERSONAL ONE. I WOULD
WELCOME ANY FURTHER COMMENT.

ARM REGARDS,
SCOWCROFT.

ECL: OADR
0183

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0183 <TOR> 890517223854 MSG000232756734

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR

JL 1/9/12

01517
RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COO HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC) IMMEDIATE (CLAS) ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 191142Z MAY 89

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS
0000

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0759-MR
Z 1/9/12

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM BRENT
COWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

PERSONAL FOR CHARLES POWELL

EAR CHARLES,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LATEST MESSAGE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE
CONTINUE TO INSIST ON NO THIRD ZERO AND ON A COMMITMENT TO
EMPLOYMENT OF FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE. WE WILL STAY IN TOUCH.

ARM REGARDS,

RENT

0194

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0194 <TOR> 890519074703 MSG000232876023

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Sir Robin Butler from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	5/22/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 231539Z MAY 89

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
QQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

EGIN TEXT:

EAR MARGARET,

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
ORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
HEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
EPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO LONDON TO BRIEF YOU IN
DVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE
HEM ON WEDNESDAY MORNING TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME EXPLAINING
HE PROPOSAL. I AM SENDING THEM TO LONDON FIRST, AFTER WHICH
HEY WILL GO TO PARIS, ROME, BONN AND BRUSSELS TO SEE SECRETARY
ENERAL WOERNER. I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT HOPE THAT
OU WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
ONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
OUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

ND TEXT
0221

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0221 <TOR> 890523114038 MSG000233235638

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0759-MR
JR 1/9/12

RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT

IT: HOTLINE_OUT

PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 022109Z JUN 89

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

QQQ

FOLLOWING FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON IS
PERSONAL FOR SIR ROBIN BUTLER.

EAR ROBIN:

MANY THANKS FOR A GREAT VISIT AND ALL YOUR HELP.

I APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON MATTERS BEST ADDRESSED
O YOU OR TO CHARLES. VERY HELPFUL BUT, AS YOU ADVISE,
WILL NOT WORRY OVERLY ABOUT IT.

INCERELY,
RENT

ECL: OADR
0298

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0298 <TOR> 890602171638 MSG000234119798

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR

32 1/9/12

RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COQ HOTLINE OUT PRES_MSGS WHSR_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 130338Z JUN 89

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH,
O PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

EAR MARGARET,

AS YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE SEEN, I ANNOUNCED TODAY THE OUTLINES OF
THE NEW CLEAN AIR LEGISLATION THAT I AM SENDING TO CONGRESS. I
NOW THAT CLEAN AIR IS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUE IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THAT CLIMATE QUESTIONS WILL BE A MAJOR ITEM ON OUR
AGENDA FOR THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT. I THEREFORE WANTED TO
INFORM YOU PERSONALLY ABOUT MY DECISION.

THE TARGETS THAT I HAVE CHOSEN WILL CUT SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
IN HALF BY THE YEAR 2000 AND REDUCE NITROGEN OXIDE POLLUTANTS AS
WELL. THIS WILL GREATLY REDUCE ACID RAIN IN BOTH THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA.

THESE REDUCTIONS WILL BE VERY COSTLY FOR SOME OF OUR ELECTRIC
UTILITY COMPANIES WHICH HAVE OLDER COAL-BURNING POWER PLANTS. IN
ORDER TO KEEP THE COSTS FROM ESCALATING UNREASONABLY, I HAVE
INTRODUCED AN ELEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY AND MARKET INCENTIVE. AN
IMPORTANT FEATURE IN MY PLAN WILL ALLOW UTILITIES TO TRADE
REQUIRED REDUCTIONS SO THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE MOST
EFFICIENT, LEAST COSTLY WAY. MY UNDERLYING APPROACH IS TO HARNESS
MARKET FORCES TO ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS.

MY LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ALSO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF URBAN
SMOG AND THE RELEASE OF TOXIC CHEMICALS INTO THE AIR. WE WILL BE
SEEKING TO HAVE AMERICAN CITIES MEET RIGOROUS STANDARDS FOR
REDUCTIONS OF GROUND-LEVEL OZONE AND CARBON MONOXIDE BY 1995. WE
PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN PART BY PUTTING UP TO A MILLION CLEAN-
FUELED VEHICLES A YEAR ON THE ROAD BY 1997. WE WILL ALSO BE
REQUIRING FACTORIES TO EMPLOY THE BEST TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE TO
ACHIEVE A CUT OF ABOUT 75% IN AIR-BORNE TOXIC POLLUTANTS
SUSPECTED OF CAUSING CANCER.

THESE ARE TOUGH ISSUES POLITICALLY. CONGRESS HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
PASS ANY CLEAN-AIR LEGISLATION FOR THE PAST 12 YEARS. I AM
CONVINCED SUCH LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, AND I INTEND TO
WORK HARD TO GET IT THROUGH CONGRESS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU ON ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES IN THE COMING MONTHS. I KNOW THAT YOU AGREE THAT IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE CONVINCE OUR OWN PUBLICS AND INTERNATIONAL
OPINION THAT A SOUND ENVIRONMENT AND A STRONG ECONOMY NEED NOT BE
AT ODDS.

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR

31 1/9/12

HANK YOU FOR YOUR CALL ON SUNDAY. THE REFUGEE REPATRIATION ISSUE
S CLEARLY A DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE
CONSULTING ON HOW BEST TO ADDRESS IT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

0358

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0358 <TOR> 890612234701 MSG000235007221

RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COO HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC) IMMEDIATE (CLAS) ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 010025Z JUL 89

(ORIG) FM WHITE HOUSE

(TO) TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
1999

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR
Z 1/9/12

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

EGIN TEXT:

EAR CHARLES:

AS YOU WOULD EXPECT, WE ARE PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
PENDING TRIP TO POLAND AND HUNGARY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ISSUE
OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN WORLD BANK LOANS AND AN IMF STAND-BY HAS
EMERGED. WE EXPECT TO BE PRESSED BY THE POLES TO DELINK FROM THE
CONCLUSION OF AN IMF STAND-BY THE TWO PROJECT LOANS (TOTALING
325 MILLION DOLLARS) FOR POLAND THAT HAVE BEEN JUDGED BY THE
WORLD BANK STAFF TO BE ECONOMICALLY VIABLE. WHILE WE WOULD BE
OPPOSED TO THIS IF CONSIDERING IT STRICTLY ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS,
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND MAY WARRANT A DIFFERENT VIEW.

WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THIS ISSUE AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE INTEND TO PUT THE QUESTION TO THE PRESIDENT
EARLY NEXT WEEK.

END TEXT

ECL: OADR
0084

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0084 <TOR> 890630205030 MSG000236551830

RT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
IT: COO HOTLINE_OUT PRES_MSGS VAX
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 061814Z JUL 89

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

QQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR

31 1/9/12

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MARGARET,

AS WE PREPARE FOR OUR MEETINGS IN PARIS AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, I
WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON HOW WE MIGHT DEVELOP A
COORDINATED APPROACH TOWARD ASSISTING POLAND AND HUNGARY IN THEIR
EFFORTS TOWARD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. I HAVE
REFLECTED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT, ESPECIALLY YOUR REMARKS
AT THE SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS AND OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION AT THE TIME
OF GENERAL JARUZELSKI'S VISIT TO LONDON. WE BOTH AGREE ON THE NEED
FOR ACTION.

IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE WITNESSES TO ONE OF THOSE RARE PERIODS OF
HISTORY THAT MARK THE MOVEMENT FROM ONE ERA TO ANOTHER, A PERIOD NOT
JUST OF TRANSITION BUT OF TRANSFORMATION. POLAND -- AND HUNGARY --
ARE UNDERTAKING BOLD EXPERIMENTS IN RESTRUCTURING THEIR POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. IT IS VITAL THAT THESE EXPERIMENTS SUCCEED. IF
THEY DO, NOT ONLY THE PEOPLES OF POLAND AND HUNGARY, BUT COUNTLESS
OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD WHO ARE WAITING AND WATCHING WILL CONCLUDE
NOT ONLY THAT FREEDOM WORKS BUT THAT FREEDOM IS ATTAINABLE. THE FATE
OF THESE COUNTRIES, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY, MAY HINGE ON HOW WE
MEET THIS CHALLENGE TOGETHER IN PARIS.

NATURALLY, THE FUTURE OF POLAND AND HUNGARY RESTS PRINCIPALLY WITH
THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS. AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED BEFORE, IT WOULD
ALSO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SIMPLY TO THROW MONEY AT POLAND AND
HUNGARY. NO ONE COUNTRY HAS THE RESOURCES TO ADDRESS THE ENORMITY OF
THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. YET I KNOW YOU AGREE THAT THE WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES HAVE AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN SUPPORT OF
DEMOCRATIC FORCES, SUCH AS SOLIDARITY, THAT HAVE ASKED PLAINLY AND
DIRECTLY FOR OUR HELP. THIS SUPPORT SHOULD INCLUDE ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE ALONG WITH A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE WAY THESE ECONOMIES
OPERATE.

I WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS OF THE
ECONOMIC SUMMIT GROUP JOIN TOGETHER TO ESTABLISH A WESTERN CONSORTIUM
TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM BASED ON POLITICAL PLURALISM IN POLAND AND
HUNGARY. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE
ASSISTANCE EFFORTS HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECT AND THAT WE SPEAK IN CONCERT
AS WE SEEK TO EDUCATE AND ENCOURAGE THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO
UNDERTAKE THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC REFORMS REQUIRED.

AS A PRELIMINARY THE CONSORTIUM, IT WOULD BE HELD BY THE GROUP OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE PARIS SUMMIT.
THE GROUP WOULD COORDINATE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AND HUNGARY
SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THESE RESOURCES ARE SUFFICIENT, TO AVOID
REDUNDANCY AND TO ASSURE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONALITY. THE CONSORTIUM
WOULD OF COURSE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS TO
DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND RECOVERY.

WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS AN AD HOC ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD DERIVE ITS
IMPETUS FROM THE PARIS SUMMIT WITHOUT BEING FORMALLY LINKED TO IT. A
CONNECTION WITH THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MIGHT HELP ALLAY SOVIET
SUSPICIONS THAT THE CONSORTIUM WOULD HAVE A POLITICAL/MILITARY
OBJECTIVE. THE LEADERSHIP WOULD COME FROM THE SEVEN, AND THE SIZE
AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE CONSORTIUM COULD BE REVISED IN A
PRAGMATIC WAY ONCE WE GAINED EXPERIENCE. A SIMILAR CONSORTIUM,
CREATED WITHIN THE OECD, WORKED WELL IN HELPING TURKEY THROUGH SOME
ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE EARLY 1980S. AS IN THAT EXAMPLE,
THE CONSORTIUM WOULD COOPERATE WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE
IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE PARIS CLUB AND WOULD IN NO WAY UNDERCUT
THEM.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CREATION IN PARIS OF SUCH A MECHANISM FOR
ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION WOULD SEND A POWERFUL MESSAGE TO THE
DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND PEOPLES OF POLAND AND HUNGARY THAT THE
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE READY TO WORK WITH THEM AS POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS PROCEED. IT WOULD BE A NEW MEANS OF STRENGTHENING
OUR DIALOGUE WITH THESE COUNTRIES AND OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF
EUROPE. AND, IF HANDLED PROPERLY, IT COULD HAVE POSITIVE
REPERCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCEPT OF A CONSORTIUM, I HAVE DECIDED TO ASK
THE U.S. CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES, IN THE RANGE
OF \$100 MILLION, FOR POLAND AND HUNGARY TO BE USED TO PROMOTE PRIVATE
AND DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BOTH COUNTRIES. THE GRANTS
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FINAL SECTION OF 02

WOULD HELP TO ASSIST PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS, PROVIDE NEEDED OUTSIDE
INVESTMENT, STRENGTHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, AND
FUND NEW TRAINING, MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND OTHER PROJECTS.

PERHAPS THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHER INTERESTED NATIONS MIGHT PROVIDE
DIFFERENT FORMS OF ASSISTANCE SO THAT, TOGETHER, WE MIGHT ATTACK A
WIDE RANGE OF OBJECTIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE NATION MIGHT HELP WORKERS
RETRAIN AND ADJUST TO NEW JOBS; ANOTHER MIGHT FOCUS ON IMPROVING THE
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT (PERHAPS AS PART OF THE BROAD WESTERN
ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE I SUGGESTED IN MY SPEECH AT MAINZ AT THE END
OF MAY). HOW BEST TO MAKE OUR RESPECTIVE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
COMPLEMENTARY COULD BE ANOTHER MATTER FOR DISCUSSION IN THE
CONSORTIUM.

IN ADDITION, AS I ANNOUNCED IN APRIL, I SHARE YOUR BELIEF THAT IT IS
TIME TO UNDERTAKE A SUSTAINABLE RESCHEDULING OF POLAND'S DEBTS. OUR
FINANCIAL SPECIALISTS HAVE BEEN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION IN
THE PARIS CLUB. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESCHEDULE POLAND'S DEBT
EXPEDITIOUSLY IN A GENEROUS AND FLEXIBLE MANNER THAT PERMITS POLAND
TO MAKE ITS PAYMENTS AND STILL IMPORT THE ESSENTIALS FOR ECONOMIC
RECOVERY. A FIRST STEP SHOULD BE A RESCHEDULING IN ADVANCE OF AN IMF

STAND-BY AGREEMENT, A VIEW WHICH I KNOW YOU SHARE.

FINALLY, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INFORM THE WORLD BANK THAT WE SUPPORT BANK APPROVAL OF VIABLE PROJECT LOANS FOR POLAND AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY REFORMS THERE ARE UNDERWAY. THE BANK STAFF HAS ALREADY PROCESSED TWO LOANS TOTALLING \$325 MILLION, FOR INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, THAT SEEM WORTHY ON THEIR ECONOMIC MERITS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING THESE INITIATIVES. I WAS IMPRESSED BY THE INITIATIVES YOU ANNOUNCED DURING JARUZELSKI'S VISIT TO THE UK AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING ABOUT THEM IN MORE DETAIL. ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WHEN WE MEET IN PARIS, I WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR WARSAW ON JULY 9. I WILL ALSO BE WRITING TO OUR OTHER SUMMIT SEVEN COLLEAGUES.

RIGHT NOW, AND ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN CHINA, THERE IS NO GLOBAL ISSUE MORE IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING OUR FUTURE THAN THE OUTCOME OF THE CHANGES NOW UNDER WAY IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE IDEAS THAT I HAVE PROPOSED, ALONG WITH YOUR OWN IDEAS AND THOSE OF OUR SUMMIT PARTNERS CAN, I BELIEVE, HELP TO SHAPE A NEW REALITY FOR EUROPE -- AND FOR THE WORLD.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE

END TEXT

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0126 <TOR> 890706142030 MSG000237046830
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0127 <TOR> 890706142138 MSG000237046898

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Sir Robin Butler (1 pp.)	7/7/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM THE PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

I AM SORRY THAT I DID NOT RESPOND SOONER TO YOUR THOUGHTFUL
MESSAGE ON THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT AS YOU CAN WELL UNDERSTAND MY
ENERGIES HAVE BEEN FOCUSED OF LATE ON THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.
THIS REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST FRUSTRATING PROBLEMS I HAVE EVER
ENCOUNTERED IN THIS OR ANY OTHER JOB. YOU SHOULD KNOW, THOUGH,
THAT OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS A REAL SOURCE OF COMFORT FOR
ME.

LET ME SAY TOO HOW CONSIDERATE IT WAS OF YOU TO PHONE ROBIN
HIGGINS. SHE IS GOING THROUGH WHAT FEW OF US WILL EVER KNOW; I
KNOW THAT YOUR REACHING OUT AND EXPRESSING YOUR AND DENNIS'S
FEELINGS MEANT A GREAT DEAL TO HER. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO LOCATE AND RETURN LT. COL. HIGGINS'
REMAINS TO THE UNITED STATES; ANYTHING YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO TO
HELP BRING THIS ABOUT WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

YOUR LETTER ON THE MIDDLE EAST RAISES A GOOD MANY OF THE CENTRAL
QUESTIONS, AND I SHALL TRY TO DO THEM ALL JUSTICE. I COULD NOT
AGREE MORE ABOUT THE NEED FOR URGENT ACTION. WE ARE PRESSING THE
PALESTINIANS--BOTH THE PLO AND THOSE WHO LIVE IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES--TO SUPPORT THE CONVENING OF A DIALOGUE BASED UPON
THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PLAN. HERE TOO YOUR ASSISTANCE WOULD BE A
GREAT HELP. ONLY ONCE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN CAN WE PUSH THE
PARTIES TO COMPROMISE AND FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR
ELECTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD EVER ACCEPT A
PALESTINIAN DELEGATION THAT INCLUDES NON-RESIDENTS; AS YOU KNOW,
THIS RAISES THE DIFFICULT ISSUE FOR THEM OF AN UNLIMITED RIGHT OF
RETURN THAT IN THEIR EYES WOULD THREATEN TO OVERWHELM THEM. MY
OWN VIEW IS THAT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO GET THIS NEGOTIATION GOING
WITH AS FEW PRECONDITIONS AS POSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE TIME ENOUGH
DOWN THE ROAD TO TACKLE THE TOUGH ISSUES. THAT SAID, IT WOULD BE
ENTIRELY LIGITIMATE FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO RAISE THIS QUESTION.

FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO (DESPITE
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS OF SO DOING) SO LONG AS THE PLO DOES
NOT GO BACK ON ITS COMMITMENTS OF LAST YEAR. THE QUESTION OF A

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05/07/2010 JMM

VISA FOR ARAFAT HAS NOT YET COME UP, BUT I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF IT DID BEFORE LONG. IF AND WHEN IT DOES WE WILL GIVE IT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, REALIZING THAT IT WOULD BE FAR EASIER FOR US TO BE FORTHCOMING IF THERE IS SOMETHING POSITIVE TO POINT TO IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

I CONTINUE TO HARBOR SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE UTILITY OF INVOLVING THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE PROCESS AT THIS POINT, EVEN IF WE ARE JUST TALKING ABOUT THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. THE ISRAELIS ARE SURE TO SEE IT AS AN INHERENTLY UNSYMPATHETIC GROUPING, WHILE THE ARAB SIDE WILL BE PRONE TO SEE THE INTERNATIONAL ANGLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO DEALING DIRECTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. AT SOME POINT WE MAY WANT TO REVISIT THIS QUESTION AS WELL AS THAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, BUT FOR NOW MY INSTINCTS ARE TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE ALREADY SET OUT.

I AM GLAD THAT YOU MENTIONED LEBANON. IT IS PAINFULLY CLEAR THAT DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS OF THE GROUP OF THREE THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE EFFORT HAS COME TO NOUGHT. I AM OPEN TO NEW THINKING, BE IT ALONG THE LINES OF REVIVING THIS EFFORT OR TURNING TO A NEW APPROACH. I CANNOT ACCEPT THE ADVICE OF THOSE WHO SAY TO STAND ASIDE; THERE IS SIMPLY TOO MUCH SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION. THAT SAID, I WILL CONFESS TO BEING WARY OF GETTING TOO INVOLVED WITHOUT STORNG BACKING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE ARABS ALIKE.

LET ME CLOSE BY SAYING A FEW THINGS ABOUT JORDAN. KING FAHD HAS PROVIDED \$200 MILLION TO HELP THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY, AND NOW WE HAVE NEWS THAT THE KUWAITIS AND OTHERS WILL MAKE AVAILABLE SOME ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. WE ARE ALSO PLANNING ON GIVING SOME MODEST AMOUNT OURSELVES. ALL THIS WILL NOT GET HUSSEIN OUT OF THE MOODS, BUT IT WILL HELP A GOOD DEAL. IN A REGION WHERE GOOD NEWS IS RARE, I SUPPOSE WE SHOULD BE THANKFUL.

THANK YOU AGAIN FOR WRITING. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WOULD NOT

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

HESITATE TO COMMUNICATE IF YOU HAVE ADDITIONAL IDEAS ABOUT ANY OF THESE SUBJECTS. YOUR COUNSEL IS ALWAYS GREATLY VALUED HERE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
GEORGE

ND TEXT

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SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0397 <TOR> 890814200237 MSG000240436957

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0759-MR
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

I AM WRITING TO YOU ON A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S.
AND TO OUR FILM AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY. I REFER, OF COURSE, TO
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S PROPOSED BROADCASTING DIRECTIVE. THIS
ISSUE WILL COME BEFORE THE EC'S COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AT ITS
MEETING ON OCTOBER 2 AND 3. AS YOU KNOW, THE DIRECTIVE WOULD
REQUIRE 50 PERCENT OF TELEVISION PROGRAMMING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY
BE OF EUROPEAN CONTENT "WHEREVER PRATICABLE."

YOUR VOTE ON THIS DIRECTIVE WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE OUTCOME.
I MUST CONFESS I AM PUZZLED BY BRITAIN'S SUPPORT OF THE
COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL. IT SEEMS TO ME CLEARLY TO RUN COUNTER
TO THE FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES WHICH I KNOW YOU SO STRONGLY
SPOUSE. SUCH A QUOTA SCHEME WOULD ALSO IMPEDE THE FREE FLOW
OF INFORMATION. FURTHER, IT EXPANDS EC REGULATIONS INTO THE
REALM OF CULTURE, WHICH WOULD ALSO SEEM IN CONFLICT WITH YOUR
THOUGHTFUL SPEECH AT BRUGES ABOUT CREEPING EC JURISDICTION INTO
AREAS HITHERTO RESERVED TO MEMBER-STATES.

I MUST TELL YOU THAT APPROVAL OF THIS DIRECTIVE WILL ALMOST
CERTAINLY HAVE A MAJOR ADVERSE EFFECT ON HOW OUR CONGRESS VIEWS
THE EC 1992 SINGLE-MARKET PROGRAM. OUR ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IS
ONE OF OUR MAJOR EXPORTERS, AND IT HAS VERY STRONG SUPPORT WITHIN
THE U.S. CONGRESS. I VERY MUCH FEAR THIS DIRECTIVE WILL RAISE
ONCE AGAIN THE CONCERNS ABOUT "FORTRESS EUROPE" AFTER 1992 --
CONCERNS WE HAVE WORKED SO HARD AND SUCCESSFULLY TO KEEP IN
CHECK.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE "WHEREVER
PRATICABLE" PHRASE SHOULD OFFER THE U.S. SOME DEGREE OF
PROTECTION FROM A LOSS OF EXPORT SALES. HOWEVER, THAT SEEMS A
WEAK DEFENSE FOR A BLATANT AND DISCRIMINATORY QUOTA SYSTEM.

YOUR VOTE TRULY MATTERS. I UNDERSTAND THAT 23 VOTES ARE
NECESSARY IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO STOP PASSAGE OF THIS
DIRECTIVE. I BELIEVE THAT GERMANY AND DENMARK, WHICH TOGETHER
ACCOUNT FOR 13 VOTES, ARE ALREADY OPPOSED. YOUR 10 VOTES COULD
PROVE DECISIVE. THE NETHERLANDS WITH 5 VOTES MAY ALSO OPPOSE
THE DIRECTIVE.

I DO HOPE THAT YOU WILL RECONSIDER YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THIS QUOTA. WE BOTH AGREE THAT QUOTAS ARE THE WORST FORM OF TRADE BARRIERS. AS "THE ECONOMIST" SUGGESTED RECENTLY, IT MAKES MORE SENSE FROM A MARKET STANDPOINT TO USE SUBSIDIES TO PROTECT FAVORED INDUSTRIES -- NOT PROTECT THEM THROUGH TRADE BARRIERS, AND ESPECIALLY NOT QUOTAS.

YOU WOULD DO ME A GREAT FAVOR BY TAKING A HARD LOOK AT THIS ISSUE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

P.S. THANKS FOR THE FASCINATING MESSAGES OF YOUR TALKS IN MOSCOW. I'M GLAD YOU HAD SUCH A SOLID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH GORBACHEV. I WILL BE WRITING TO YOU SOON ON THE SUBJECT OF POLAND.

END TEXT

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SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0153 <TOR> 890928235250 MSG000244338770

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET,

I AM GLAD YOU HAD SUCH A GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH GORBACHEV,
AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HELP IN CONVEYING MY MESSAGES TO HIM.

LET ME TURN NOW TO POLAND. YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 4, AND OUR
RECENT TALK OVER THE TELEPHONE, DEMONSTRATES THAT WE ARE THINKING
VERY MUCH ALIKE ON HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THE HISTORIC
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THE FORMATION OF A
SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER MAZOWIECKI, AND
THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS DRAMATIC TRANSFORMATION TOOK PLACE, IS A
MOVING DEMONSTRATION OF POLAND'S PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

YOU HAVE CORRECTLY POSED THE CHALLENGE. PRIME MINISTER
MAZOWIECKI AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE A CHANCE OF ACQUIRING THE
PUBLIC TRUST THAT IS NEEDED TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR THE DIFFICULT
ECONOMIC STEPS AHEAD. BUT THE OPPORTUNITY MAY BE SHORT-LIVED, AS
POLES GROW IMPATIENT WITH WHAT INEVITABLY WILL BE A DIFFICULT,
UNEVEN PATH TOWARD ECONOMIC REFORM. THE DANGER IS THAT PUBLIC
IMPATIENCE AND A RESUMPTION OF SPIRALLING WAGE DEMANDS COULD
THREATEN THE PROGRESS MADE TOWARD DEMOCRACY, WITH CONSEQUENCES,
AS YOU POINT OUT, THAT GO FAR BEYOND POLAND ITSELF.

WITHOUT FUELING A SENSE OF URGENCY OR CRISIS, WE NEED TO
DEMONSTRATE OUR SUPPORT AS THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO
TACKLE ITS ENORMOUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES. AS JOHN
MAJOR POINTED OUT IN HIS RECENT MEETING WITH ME, IT WILL BE
IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE SPOTLIGHT ON THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL
ECONOMIC REFORM AND REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF, WHICH ALONG
WITH WORLD BANK LOANS AND A GENEROUS RESCHEDULING OF THE POLISH
DEBT WILL GET POLAND ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY. THE SUPPORT WE
OFFER -- FOOD AID, EQUITY INVESTMENT, TECHNICAL AND OTHER
ASSISTANCE -- SHOULD BE AIMED AT FACILITATING THE POLISH
GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PRESS AHEAD WITH ECONOMIC REFORMS. WE
MUST DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE POLES TO BELIEVE THAT
THE WEST CAN RELIEVE THEM OF THE NEED FOR DEEP AND PAINFUL
ECONOMIC MEASURES.

I SHARE THE BASIC THRUST OF YOUR COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR AN
EXACTING BUT NOT UNBEARABLE IMF PROGRAM, FOR A FAR-REACHING PARIS
CLUB RESCHEDULING WITH COMMENSURATE ACTION BY THE COMMERCIAL

BANKS, AND FOR SUBSTANTIAL IBRD LENDING IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREED MACROECONOMIC PROGRAM. I ALSO SHARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR TRAINING, INSTITUTION-BUILDING, AND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT. AS YOU MENTIONED, THE POLISH-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND IS DESIGNED LARGELY TO HELP CATALYZE PRIVATE INVESTMENT, BOTH WITHIN POLAND AND FROM OUTSIDE. WE ALSO PLAN SOME ASSISTANCE IN TRAINING AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING, BUT MANY OF THE DETAILS REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT.

I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WHILE HELPING BUILD POLAND'S ECONOMIC FUTURE, THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES MUST ADDRESS ITS IMMEDIATE NEEDS IN THE PERIOD OF INITIAL ECONOMIC REFORM. MY ADMINISTRATION HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS LAST WEEK WITH KEY MINISTERS IN THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT AND REVIEWED THE OUTLINES OF THEIR ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. AS THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING OF THE CONCERTED ACTION GROUP IN BRUSSELS, IT IS AN AMBITIOUS AND BOLD PLAN, CALLING FOR RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORM AND RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF. AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PLAN IS AN URGENT REQUEST FOR WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN HELPING TO STABILIZE THE POLISH ECONOMY AS REFORMS ARE IMPLEMENTED. IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF, THE POLES SEEK, IN ADDITION TO IMF AND WORLD BANK SUPPORT, \$1 BILLION IN STABILIZATION FUNDS FROM THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. OUR OWN CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT THIS FIGURE IS ABOUT RIGHT.

I WANT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO POLAND'S REQUEST AND TO ENCOURAGE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S CONCERTED ACTION TOWARD THAT END. I HAVE DECIDED TO SEEK FROM CONGRESS A \$200 MILLION GRANT FOR STABILIZATION PURPOSES, AS THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE \$1 BILLION IN WESTERN ASSISTANCE THE POLES HAVE REQUESTED, AND WHICH WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON CONCLUSION OF AN IMF AGREEMENT, AND UPON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN EXPERTS' MISSION THAT I PLAN TO SEND TO POLAND SOON. I BELIEVE WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR THIS PURPOSE SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GRANTS RATHER THAN LOANS, WHICH WOULD ONLY ADD TO POLAND'S ENORMOUS EXTERNAL DEBT.

I WILL BE MAKING A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON OCTOBER 4, BECAUSE I CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT TO ACT QUICKLY SO AS TO HELP SOLIDIFY SUPPORT WITHIN POLAND AROUND THE NEW REFORM PROGRAM. MY ANNOUNCEMENT WILL ALSO REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO WORKING TOGETHER WITH YOU AND OUR ECONOMIC PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN CONCERTED ACTION IN SUPPORT OF POLAND'S REFORMS.

I HOPE THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS \$1 BILLION MULTILATERAL STABILIZATION FUND TO MEET POLAND'S URGENT NEEDS. THE MAZOWIECKI GOVERNMENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT HAS BUT A BRIEF PERIOD IN WHICH TO ACT, AND IT HAS PUT FORWARD A BOLD AND COURAGEOUS REFORM PLAN. I CONSIDER IT VITALLY IMPORTANT

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THAT WE DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP THE POLES SUCCEED WITH A REFORM PLAN THAT HAS IMF APPROVAL. A PROMPT WESTERN COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE \$1 BILLION IN GRANTS UPON CONCLUSION OF AN IMF AGREEMENT WOULD BE A STRONG INCENTIVE FOR THE POLES TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THEIR REFORMS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF.

WE ALSO PLAN TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL PRESIDENTIAL MISSION TO POLAND

CONSISTING OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS WHO WOULD DISCUSS
AND EVALUATE POLISH NEEDS AND PLANS. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR
REPORT, AND AFTER CONSULTATION WITH YOU, WITH THE EC COMMISSION,
AND WITH OTHER MAJOR DONORS, I WOULD THEN FORMULATE A MORE
DETAILED PLAN FOR HOW BEST TO STRUCTURE LONG TERM U.S. ASSISTANCE
TO POLAND. THE PLAN WOULD BE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO STIMULATE
POLISH AGRICULTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND HELP TO
MAKE POLAND ECONOMICALLY VIABLE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I WILL
ALSO ASK THIS GROUP TO MAKE ITS FINDINGS AVAILABLE TO YOU AND TO
THE GROUP OF 24.

IN THAT CONTEXT, I AM VERY GRATIFIED BY THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE
THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN DEVELOPING CONCERTED WESTERN ACTION,
AND BY THE "ACTION PLAN" PRESENTED BY THE EC. AS THE GROUP
CONTINUES TO DEVELOP A COMMON GENERAL STRATEGY, IT WILL BE
IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S., GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE OTHER G-7
COUNTRIES TO TAKE AN ACTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN CHARTING ITS
AGENDA.

I SHALL BE SHARING SOME OF THESE SAME THOUGHTS WITH OUR OTHER G-7
PARTNERS AND WITH COMMISSION PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS. I WOULD
WELCOME HEARING MORE ABOUT YOUR OWN PLANS WITH RESPECT TO POLAND,
AS WELL AS YOUR VIEWS ON OUR COORDINATION EFFORTS.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0170 <TOR> 891004004201 MSG000244773721

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MARGARET:

- I JUST WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I RECENTLY MET WITH
PRESIDENT MENEM AND CAME AWAY VERY IMPRESSED. MENEM IS
TAKING ON A VERY AMBITIOUS AGENDA WITH VIGOR AND AN EVIDENT
DESIRE TO ACT RESPONSIBLY ON BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL FRONT. I HOPE WE CAN HELP HIM IN WHAT HE IS
TRYING TO DO.
- MENEM IS MAKING THE RIGHT MOVES IN TRYING TO LEAD ARGENTINA
TO A MORE OPEN, MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY, AND TO OVERCOME THE
DIVISIONS OF THE PAST. I UNDERSTAND THERE ARE TALKS COMING
UP ON THE FALKLANDS AND I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT MENEM
STRUCK ME AS HAVING A GENUINE DESIRE TO REDUCE TENSIONS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

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PLEASE DELIVER TO JOY ROBILLARD FOR PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

I AM DELIGHTED TO EXTEND MY HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS AND
WARM WISHES TO YOU ON THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF YOUR ELECTION
TO PARLIAMENT.

I'M SURE THAT ON THIS OCCASION YOUR THOUGHTS RETURN TO WHAT
IS ONE OF A POLITICAL LEADER'S FONDEST MEMORIES -- THAT FIRST
VICTORIOUS ELECTION EVE FILLED WITH BOUNDLESS EXHILARATION AND
PROMISE. FEW LEADERS IN HISTORY HAVE FULLFILLED THE PROMISE
AND POTENTIAL OF SERVICE TO THEIR COUNTRY MORE THAN YOU.
OVER THE LAST THREE DECADES IN PARLIAMENT, AND ESPECIALLY
THE LAST 10 YEARS AS PRIME MINISTER, YOU HAVE SERVED AS A
SHINING EXAMPLE OF HOW ONE PERSON OF PRINCIPLE CAN TAKE THE
INITIATIVE AND MAKE A DIFFERENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE VERY CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS IN THE YEARS TO COME.
TOGETHER, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE
HELPED TO ADVANCE THE CAUSES OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND FREE-
DOM. I AM CONFIDENT THAT, AS WE CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER,
WE WILL MAKE FURTHER STRIDES IN PURSUIT OF THESE GOALS.

BARBARA JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR WARM BEST WISHES FOR A
MEMORABLE CELEBRATION AND FOR EVERY FUTURE HAPPINESS AND
SUCCESS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

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SECTION>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0305 <TOR> 891028100612 MSG000246881172

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PER E.O. 13526

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TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

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QQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MARGARET,

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW BEFORE IT IS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I WILL MEET ABOARD U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL
VESSELS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON DECEMBER 2 AND 3 TO REVIEW THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TO DISCUSS U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE WILL BE A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT
IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER OF
NEXT YEAR. THAT IS SOME TIME DISTANT AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND
I HAVE AGREED THAT AN EARLIER INFORMAL MEETING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS
AT THIS TIME OF RAPID AND HISTORIC CHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL.

I DO NOT INTEND A DETAILED NEGOTIATING SESSION DURING THESE
DECEMBER TALKS NOR DO I EXPECT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I
WILL CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING ON ANY
ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANCE. WITH REGARD TO CFE, I WILL NATURALLY
EXPLAIN THE WEST'S CURRENT POSITION AND HEAR OUT ANY NEW IDEAS
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MAY HAVE.

AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT, AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE WRITTEN
TO EACH OTHER OFTEN, I WANT AGAIN TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT
WITH HIM. I HOPE TO GET A BETTER SENSE OF HOW HE VIEWS THE
DEMAND OF PERESTROIKA AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF EAST-WEST AND
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD TO SHARING MY
IMPRESSIONS WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

ECL: OADR
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2009-0760-MR
Jc 11/26/12

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR ROBIN BUTLER
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE
PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR ROBIN:

I HAVE HAD A REPORT OF THE DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK BETWEEN LEN
APPLEYARD OF YOUR STAFF AND JOHN GORDON OF THE NSC STAFF ON OUR
PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION WITH FRANCE. IT IS MY SENSE THAT THESE
WERE USEFUL DISCUSSIONS AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE INVITATION AND
THE ARRANGEMENTS YOU MADE.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE TREAT THIS PROGRAM WITH CONSIDERABLE
SENSITIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ARE PLEASED TO LEARN THAT
YOU DO AS WELL. ACCORDINGLY, THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO
KEEP ANY FOLLOW-UP COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PRIVACY CHANNEL. DURING
THE MEETING, LEN APPLEYARD SUGGESTED THAT WE CONTINUE SUCH
EXCHANGES ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. WHILE I WOULD LIKE TO DEFER ON THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER WE NEED THESE MEETINGS EVERY YEAR, WE WOULD
BE PLEASED TO HOST YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON FOR ANOTHER
SUCH EXCHANGE LATE NEXT YEAR. WE CAN AGREE ON THE SPECIFIC DATES
NEXT FALL AS WE SEE EVENTS UNFOLD.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

AS WE FLY BACK TO WASHINGTON FROM TEXAS, BARBARA AND I WANT
TO WISH YOU AND DENNIS A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR.

I LOOK FORWARD TO FREQUENT PERSONAL CONTACTS AS WE COPE
CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES OF THE WHOLE
NEW DECADE.

FAMILY LOVE TO YOU BOTH,

GEORGE AND BARBARA

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR
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(SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0025 <TOR> 900101102347 MSG000252498227

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
26. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message to Leonard Appleyard from Robert D. Blackwill (2 pp.)	4/2/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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(TO>TO THE CABINET OFFICE LONDON

(SUBJ>SUBJ: UPGRADE OF US/UK HEAD OF STATE SECURE VOICE LINK

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. CHARLES POWELL, NO.
10 DOWNING FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJ: UPGRADE OF US/UK HEAD OF STATE SECURE VOICE LINK

1. IN REFERENCE TO MR. KEN DAVIES' CABO MESSAGE OF MARCH 9,
1990, THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (WHCA) HAS BEEN
INSTRUCTED TO UPGRADE THE EXISTING US/UK HEAD OF STATE LINK WITH
THE NEW WHCA WIDEBAND SECURE VOICE EQUIPMENT AS DEMONSTRATED ON
MARCH 2, 1990 AT OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON. THE INSTALLATION OF THE
NEW SECURE VOICE EQUIPMENT WILL ELIMINATE THE CAPABILITY FOR
LATERAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER EUROPEAN HEADS OF STATE AS
NOTED IN MR. DAVIES' MARCH 9 MESSAGE.

2. A REPRESENTATIVE OF WHCA WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH MR. DAVIES'
OFFICE IN THE NEAR FUTURE REGARDING THE INSTALLATION SCHEDULE AND
THE TECHNICAL PARAMETERS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS TAIL SEGMENTS IN
LONDON WHICH ARE BEING PROVIDED BY THE CABINET OFFICE.

3. IN REGARDS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF USING SECURE FACSIMILE AND
DATA ON THIS LINK, WHCA HAS BEEN ASKED TO REVIEW WITH THE CABINET
OFFICE THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT LINKS NOW IN
OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE AND
OPTIMUM UTILIZATION OF THESE CAPABILITIES. THIS CAN BE DISCUSSED
FURTHER DURING MR. DAVIES' VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JULY.

4. WARM REGARDS, BRENT SCOWCROFT.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
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(SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0009 <TOR> 900409151927 MSG000260983167

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
28. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message to Sir Robin Butler from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/18/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

APRIL 25, 1990

DEAR MARGARET,

I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU PROMPTLY, AND OF COURSE IN THE STRICTEST
CONFIDENCE, THE RESULTS OF MY POSITIVE DISCUSSIONS AT KEY LARGO
WITH FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM OUR RESPECTIVE STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS
AT KEY LARGO, FRANCOIS AND I AGREED IN GENERAL ON THE NEED TO
KEEP NATO STRONG, ON THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR U.S. FORCES
IN EUROPE, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A TRANSATLANTIC
DIALOGUE ON ALL OF THE SECURITY ISSUES FACING EUROPE, AND ON THE
DESIRABILITY OF CLOSER TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE EC.

FRANCOIS SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE RISK OF WAR HAS DECREASED AND
THE EASTERN EUROPEANS ARE NO LONGER ENEMIES, THE SOVIET UNION
POSES A POTENTIAL THREAT AND WE MUST RETAIN OUR CURRENT NATO
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE BELIEVES THAT U.S. TROOPS SHOULD REMAIN
IN EUROPE AND AGREES WITH YOUR POSITION THAT GERMANY
SHOULD REMAIN FULLY IN NATO.

FRANCOIS ALSO STATED THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER THE WHOLE RANGE OF
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS THAT AFFECT THE POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
OF EUROPE. HE RECOMMENDED A NATO SUMMIT TO DISCUSS NATO'S
EVOLVING ROLE AND THE ISSUES OF EUROPEAN EQUILIBRIUM ALTHOUGH
UNLIKE YOURSELF HE DID NOT SUGGEST A SPECIFIC TIME OR PLACE FOR
SUCH A MEETING. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT NATO SHOULD DISCUSS THE
CSCE AND THAT, IF THERE IS TO BE A CSCE SUMMIT, THE NATO SUMMIT
SHOULD DISCUSS IT BEFOREHAND. FRANCOIS STATED THAT, UNLIKE SOME
OF HIS PREDECESSORS, HE DID NOT WISH TO SHUT HIMSELF OFF FROM
NATO.

HE PRESSED ME FOR SPECIFIC IDEAS CONCERNING HOW NATO'S POLITICAL
ROLE MIGHT BE ENHANCED. IN RESPONSE, I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD
ALREADY PROPOSED A NATO ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION STAFF, HANDLING
OF CSCE ISSUES IN NATO, AND ENHANCED ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS ON
PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS -- ALL OF WHICH FRANCE HAD OPPOSED.
FRANCOIS THANKED ME FOR BEING SO SPECIFIC AND SEEMED RESPONSIVE
BUT HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY AGREE TO ANY OF THESE THREE U.S.
INITIATIVES. WE WILL NOW PRESS OUR CASE WITHIN NATO ON THESE
MATTERS AND GO BACK TO THE ELYSEE PROMPTLY IF THERE IS A

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CONTINUING PROBLEM.

I SENT A LETTER TO FRANCOIS JUST BEFORE WE MET IN WHICH I MENTIONED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR DISCUSSIONS ON GERMANY. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FOUR WESTERN ALLIES WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR MEETINGS TO MEET PRIVATELY AND DEVELOP COMMON POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES. I INDICATED, AS YOU AND I HAVE AGREED, THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER GERMANY'S RIGHT TO REMAIN A FULL MEMBER OF NATO; SHOULD NOT DECIDE THE FATE OF ALLIED CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CURRENT GDR; AND SHOULD NOT AGREE ON THE FUTURE SIZE OF A UNITED GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES.

I EMPHASIZED TO FRANCOIS THAT, AS THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT BECOMES LESS ACUTE, AMERICANS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS PART OF A BROAD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINKAGE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONTINENT. I SAID THAT NOTHING WOULD UNDERMINE U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE MORE THAN FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO COME TO REGARD AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN EUROPE AS MERCENARIES, DIVORCED FROM A LARGER AND INTENSE U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS WESTERN ALLIES. AT KEY LARGO, FRANCOIS APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS POINT, AND HE SPOKE REPEATEDLY OF KEEPING THE U.S. ACTIVELY INVOLVED WITH EUROPE.

REGARDING U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE EC, FRANCOIS TOOK A POSITIVE APPROACH TOWARD THE IDEA OF AN EXPANDED DIALOGUE. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EC WAS WEAK, AND HE BELIEVED THAT U.S.-EC POLITICAL DIALOGUE SHOULD ALSO BE STRENGTHENED. HE ENDORSED THE IDEA OF PERIODIC U.S. MEETINGS WITH EC FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND HE SPOKE OF INSTITUTIONALIZING U.S.-EC LINKS, SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING THE IDEA OF A PERMANENT CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S.-EC TREATY AS EUROPEAN UNITY PROGRESSES.

IN SPEAKING OF U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS FRANCOIS STRESSED THAT WE WERE CLOSE ALLIES AND THAT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT DIVIDES US. INTERESTINGLY, HE ALSO UNDERLINED THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WAS A FRAMEWORK FOR THIS CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED LITHUANIA AND THE SERIOUS DILEMMA THAT WE FACE IN VIEW OF OUR DESIRE TO SEE GORBACHEV CONTINUE IN POWER AND ARRANGE ON WITH HIS REFORMS, AND OUR CONFLICTING NEED TO SIGNAL THAT SOVIET USE OF FORCE OR OF EXCESSIVE ECONOMIC PRESSURE CANNOT BE CONDONED.

IN SUM, I FOUND MY DISCUSSIONS WITH FRANCOIS QUITE ENCOURAGING. I AM ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL TO YOU, MARGARET, FOR YOUR EFFORTS IN RECENT WEEKS TO HELP BRING THE FRENCH AROUND ON THE VITAL ISSUE OF NATO'S FUTURE. WE WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW THINGS WORK OUT IN PRACTICE, BUT I HOPE FRANCOIS' UNIFORMLY POSITIVE COMMENTS IN KEY 0076

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FINAL SECTION OF 02
ARGO WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF FRENCH POLICY ON THESE ISSUES IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

WE HAVE OFTEN DISCUSSED, MOST RECENTLY IN BERMUDA, THE
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES THAT ARE TRANSFORMING EUROPE. I THINK YOU
WILL AGREE IT HAS BECOME EVEN MORE EVIDENT THAT EUROPE, AND THE
WORLD, IS MOVING BEYOND CONTAINMENT, FROM THE POSTWAR ERA TO A
NEW ERA IN HISTORY.

THESE ARE TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY AND HOPE. THE CURRENT PERIOD IS
STILL ONE OF TRANSITION, AS WE SEE WHAT CHOICES THE PEOPLE OF
EASTERN EUROPE WILL MAKE FOR THEIR FUTURE AND WATCH THE
UNPREDICTABLE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. I BELIEVE IT
WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO SEE WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION
CHOOSSES COERCION OR PEACEFUL DIALOGUE IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS IN
LITHUANIA. YET, IF THE PROMISE OF PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND
CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY REDUCTIONS IS INDEED FULFILLED, THE
MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE -- WHO TOGETHER HAVE DONE
SO MUCH TO USHER IN THIS NEW ERA -- MUST BE READY.

AS WE DISCUSSED IN APRIL, NATO WILL REMAIN VITAL TO AMERICA'S
PLACE IN EUROPE. AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT SO CLEARLY, THE
EXCEPTIONAL SOLIDARITY THE ALLIANCE HAS FOSTERED AMONG ITS
MEMBERS OVER THE YEARS, AND THE INSTITUTIONS IT HAS BUILT FOR
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, PROVIDE A PROVEN STRUCTURE UPON WHICH TO BASE
OUR SECURITY, AND FROM WHICH TO PROMOTE A STABLE AND COOPERATIVE
EUROPEAN ORDER. I KNOW WE BOTH AGREE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT A
UNITED GERMANY SHOULD RETAIN ITS MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.
POLITICALLY, AND MILITARILY, THE ALLIANCE IS NOW READY TO TAKE ON
NEW CHALLENGES, TO BUILD ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST FORTY
YEARS, TO SUSTAIN THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES, AND DEFINE
THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU AND I, AND OUR NATO COLLEAGUES, WILL WANT
TO PURSUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY AND BEYOND.

IN ORDER TO SET A NEW WESTERN STRATEGY FOR THESE NEW TIMES, I
INTEND TO SUGGEST, IN A SPEECH ON MAY 4, THAT WE COME TOGETHER
SOON AT A NATO SUMMIT. WITH RESPECT TO THE VENUE AND TIMING OF
THIS SUMMIT, I WOULD BE AGREEABLE EITHER TO YOUR PROPOSAL OR THAT
OF BRIAN MULRONEY FOR A MEETING IN LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY.

AT THIS NATO SUMMIT WE SHOULD, IN MY VIEW, LAUNCH A WIDE-RANGING

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SCS 8/15/13

REVIEW OF ALLIANCE POLICY FOR THE TRANSFORMED EUROPE OF THE 1990S. SPECIFICALLY, THERE ARE FOUR KEY ISSUES THE SUMMIT COULD ADDRESS IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE ALLIANCE FOR THE FUTURE.

FIRST, I BELIEVE THAT THE SUMMIT COULD CONSIDER THE FUTURE POLITICAL MISSION OF THE ALLIANCE. WE SHOULD REAFFIRM THE POTENTIAL FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A CRUCIAL PLACE, ALONG WITH THE EC, WHERE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES CAN JOIN IN MANAGING AND STABILIZING THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE.

SECOND, THE ALLIANCE COULD REVIEW ITS NEEDS FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WHILE WE ARE STILL IN A TIME OF TRANSITION, WE CAN BEGIN NOW TO DEVELOP OUR STRATEGY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY, IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE, TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT MILITARY PRESENCE IN A TRANSFORMED EUROPE. I WOULD HOPE THAT, AT THE NATO SUMMIT, WE COULD ALSO SET THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD FOLLOW CLOSELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF A CFE TREATY.

THIRD, AT THE NATO SUMMIT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. AS THE THREAT OF IMMEDIATE AND OVERWHELMING AGGRESSION RECEDES, THE NUCLEAR FORCES NEEDED TO DETER AGGRESSION WILL CHANGE. I BELIEVE WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT, AS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET TANKS AND TROOPS RETURN HOME, THERE IS A REDUCED NEED FOR NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE. THE SUMMIT SHOULD ACCELERATE THE ONGOING WORK WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO DETERMINE THE MINIMUM NUMBER AND TYPES OF WEAPONS THAT WILL BE NEEDED TO DETER WAR CREDIBLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

IN LIGHT OF THESE NEW POLITICAL CONDITIONS, AND PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSPECT FOR FULL SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE BY THE MID-1990S, I HAVE -- AS WE DISCUSSED IN BERMUDA -- REVIEWED OUR PLAN TO PRODUCE NEWER, MORE MODERN, SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES TO REPLACE THE LANCE SYSTEM WE NOW HAVE IN PLACE IN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK FOR THESE NEW MISSILES, I HAVE DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE PROGRAM. I HAVE ALSO DECIDED TO CANCEL ANY FURTHER MODERNIZATION OF U.S. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE.

AS FOR THE U.S. AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, WE AGREED LAST MAY TO A NEW SET OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS THAT WOULD REDUCE THESE FORCES. THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT ON THE BROAD OBJECTIVES FOR THESE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION AND START THE PREPARATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR THESE TALKS.

IN ADDITION, I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP ON THE NOTION WE DISCUSSED

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FINAL SECTION OF 02
LAST MONTH AND SUGGEST THAT THE STARTUP OF THESE NEW NEGOTIATIONS BE ADVANCED, SO THAT THESE U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS WOULD BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER A CFE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAS BEEN SIGNED RATHER THAN WAITING UNTIL IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE TREATY IS UNDERWAY. I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS MOVE WILL STRENGTHEN THE

POSITION OF OUR FRIENDS IN GERMANY AND IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR
KEEPING, AND MODERNIZING, NECESSARY U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN
EUROPE, AND IN THE FRG.

FOURTH, I HOPE THAT WE CAN UTILIZE THE NATO SUMMIT TO ARRIVE AT
COMMON ALLIED OBJECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE. AS WE LOOK
AHEAD TO A CSCE SUMMIT AT WHICH WE WILL SIGN A CFE TREATY, THE
ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER A MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS AGENDA FOR THE
CSCE TO GIVE IT -- AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE -- A MORE
ACTIVE PART IN SHAPING EUROPE'S FUTURE. SECRETARY BAKER HAS
ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO FURTHER ELABORATE OUR
VIEWS, WHICH ARE SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS TO THOSE YOU SUGGESTED
IN YOUR KONIGSWINTER ADDRESS. THE CSCE CAN OFFER GUIDELINES FOR
BUILDING FREE SOCIETIES, AND IT CAN ALSO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR
POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN A MORE UNITED EUROPE.

AT NATO ON MAY 3, SECRETARY BAKER WILL BE PREPARED TO REVIEW
THESE IDEAS WITH HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN AT THE NATO SUMMIT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0134 <TOR> 900502233804 MSG000263000284
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0135 <TOR> 900502233847 MSG000263000327

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
31. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Message from the President to Prime Minister Thatcher [redacted] (1 pp.)	6/1/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

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Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2009-0760-MR (530)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	2/19/2013

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
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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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**DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET**
SCS 2/19/13

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER.

EAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE PROPOSED FIBER OPTICS
SYSTEM FOR THE USSR. I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN OF YOUR WILLINGNESS
TO DENY THE EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION FOR THE BRITISH CONSORTIUM
PROVIDED THAT WE TAKE SIMILAR ACTION ON THE APPLICATION BY THE
AMERICAN-LED CONSORTIUM. I AM PREPARED TO PROCEED AS YOU
HAVE SUGGESTED.

I UNDERSTAND THAT OUR STAFFS HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT AND HAVE
PROPOSED THAT WE BOTH INFORM THE COMPANIES OF THE DECISION TO
DENY THE LICENSES ON TUESDAY, JUNE 5. IN KEEPING WITH U.S. LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS, SECRETARY MOSBACHER OR HIS DESIGNEE IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL NOTIFY THE U.S. COMPANY ON THAT DATE.
WE PLAN NO PRESS STATEMENT, BUT EXPECT THAT THE DECISION MAY
BECOME PUBLIC SHORTLY THEREAFTER GIVEN INTENSE INDUSTRY AND
CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE PROJECT. WE WILL HAVE A PRESS FACT
SHEET READY IN THAT EVENT.

I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO PREVENT OTHER COUNTRIES
FROM TAKING OVER THE PROJECT. I AM, THEREFORE, WRITING
ALSO TO HELMUT KOHL, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, AND TOSHIKI KAIFU,
INFORMING THEM OF THE DECISION AND ASKING THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO
JOIN OURS IN DECLINING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROJECT FOR THE
USSR. AS APPROPRIATE, WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH OTHER DIPLOMATIC
EFFORTS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE COCOM.

(b)(1)

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN JULY.

ARM REGARDS.

INCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

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PER E.O. 13526**

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET
THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

FURTHER TO OUR SUNDAY PHONE CONVERSATION, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU A
PROMPT REVIEW OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV. AS YOU PREPARE FOR
YOUR OWN MEETING WITH HIM, I HOPE YOU WILL FIND THIS DETAILED
INFORMATION TO BE OF SOME USE IN CRAFTING YOUR OWN APPROACH FOR
HANDLING THE KEY ISSUES.

AS YOU HAVE SEEN FROM THE PRESS COVERAGE, THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE
SUMMIT WAS VERY POSITIVE. SO WAS THE TENOR OF OUR DISCUSSIONS,
WHICH WERE ANIMATED BUT NOT CONFRONTATIONAL. WE WERE ABLE TO TALK
WITH CANDOR AND OPENNESS. THERE WERE NO BREAKTHROUGHS ON THE
TOUGHEST ISSUES, BUT I FELT WE MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS TOWARD
NARROWING OUR DIFFERENCES.

OUR MOST IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS WERE ABOUT GERMAN UNIFICATION.
GORBACHEV BEGAN BY ARGUING THAT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO WOULD ALTER
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. HE PROPOSED THAT GERMANY BELONG TO BOTH NATO
AND THE WARSAW PACT -- HAVE "TWO ANCHORS," AS HE PUT IT -- AND
REFERRED TO A LONG TRANSITION PERIOD, SEEMINGLY UNDER FOUR POWER
SUPERVISION, AN IDEA HE CAME BACK TO SEVERAL TIMES.

I MADE THE POINT VERY CLEARLY THAT A UNITED GERMANY IS NO THREAT TO
ANYONE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY HAD
EARNED ITS PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE AND WOULD HAVE GOOD AND
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I STRESSED THAT I
SUPPORTED CHANCELLOR KOHL'S POSITION THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD
REMAIN A FULL MEMBER OF NATO, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN ITS
INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURES, ADDING THAT A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC
GERMANY MUST BE FREE TO CHOOSE ITS ALLIANCE ARRANGEMENTS. GERMAN
SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE COMPLETE AT THE TIME OF UNIFICATION, WITH NO NEW
DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND NO
"SINGULARIZATION" OF GERMANY FOR SPECIAL STATUS.

AT ONE POINT, GORBACHEV SEEMED TO AGREE WITH MY POSITION: THAT I
SUPPORT GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO BUT OF COURSE THAT IT WAS
UP TO GERMANY TO DECIDE. BUT THEN HE RETURNED TO THE IDEA OF A
TRANSITION PERIOD. AT OUR PRESS CONFERENCE ON SUNDAY, HOWEVER, HE
RAISED NO OBJECTION WHEN I SAID THAT WHILE HE AND I DID NOT AGREE
THAT THE UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO, "WE ARE IN
FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE MATTER OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP IS -- IN

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ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT -- A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE." INDEED, WE HAD GIVEN MY PRESS STATEMENT, INCLUDING THAT FORMULATION, TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR BESSMERTNYKH THE NIGHT BEFORE, AND HE CAME BACK BEFORE THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO SAY THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NO OBJECTIONS. WE, OF COURSE, WILL HAVE TO SEE WHETHER THIS REFLECTS REAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS STILL FEELING HIS WAY AND THAT HIS POSITION MAY NOT YET BE FIXED. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ARGUING AGAINST A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO, HE SEEMED TO BE CONCERNED AS MUCH WITH NATO ITSELF AS WITH GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN IT. HE WAS LOOKING FOR REASSURANCE THAT NATO WOULD CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE AND EVOLVE TO BECOME A MORE POLITICAL ALLIANCE, AND TRYING TO GET A BETTER SENSE OF WHAT THE SOVIET POSITION IN EUROPE WOULD BE AFTER UNIFICATION.

IN SUM, WE REACHED NO AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, BUT WE DID HAVE A GOOD TALK. WE IN THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO KEEP WORKING -- INDIVIDUALLY, IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR, AND AT THE NATO SUMMIT -- TO PERSUADE MOSCOW THAT A UNITED GERMANY FULLY IN NATO IS NO THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY. IN THAT REGARD, IT WILL BE CRUCIAL AT THE NATO SUMMIT THAT WE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ALLIANCE IS CHANGING AND WILL PLAY A MUCH DIFFERENT ROLE IN EUROPE AFTER GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND AFTER SOVIET TROOPS LEAVE EASTERN EUROPE.

ON ARMS CONTROL, WE MADE GOOD PROGRESS, WHICH HAS THE ADDED VIRTUE OF DEMONSTRATING TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT MILITARY TENSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED. THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT ON CFE WAS IMPORTANT, AFFIRMING OUR AGREEMENT THAT A CFE TREATY IS AN INDISPENSABLE FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COMMITTING US TO INTENSIFY THE PACE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO REACH RAPID AGREEMENT ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS ALSO A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH, AND OUR JOINT STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS SHOULD GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE START NEGOTIATIONS.

ON START, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS STRESSED THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE ISSUE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION. KNOWING THE IMPORTANCE WE BOTH ATTACH TO THIS MATTER, I WOULD LIKE TO REPORT TO YOU ON THIS DISCUSSION IN SOME DETAIL. GORBACHEV SAID HE WAS CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT, JUST WHEN HE THOUGHT U.S.-UK COOPERATION WAS CONFINED TO TRIDENT II, HE HAS NOW BECOME MINDFUL OF WHAT HE INCORRECTLY ASSERTED WAS A CHANGE IN THE U.S. POSITION. HE REFERRED TO HIS REYKJAVIK DECISION NOT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE INF TREATY AS A BIG CONCESSION AND NOTED THAT, IN MAKING THIS MOVE, HE HAD THE UNDERSTANDING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

WHEN DEEP CUTS WERE MADE IN NUCLEAR FORCES. HE SAID YOU BELIEVED THAT, AS SOON AS THE U.S. AND USSR AGREE TO FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS, THE BRITISH SHOULD GET INVOLVED IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

GORBACHEV CHARACTERIZED OUR POSITION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AS ALLOWING AN UNLIMITED NATO BUILDUP IN NUCLEAR FORCES. THIS, HE SAID, WAS ILLOGICAL. U.S.-UK COOPERATION COULD ONLY BE ALLOWED FOR TRIDENT II, AND THIS QUESTION REQUIRED A SERIOUS ARGUMENT, NOT JUST PASSIONATE APPEALS. WE MUST, HE REITERATED, INVOLVE THE BRITISH AND

FRENCH IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AFTER THE U.S. AND USSR SIGN THIS START TREATY.

YOU WILL WANT, IN MOSCOW, TO MAKE CLEAR TO GORBACHEV THAT NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE UNITED KINGDOM POSES NO THREAT TO SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERESTS, AND IS AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THE CLOSE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

ON OTHER SUBJECTS, THERE WERE MANY AGREEMENTS SIGNED, INCLUDING A TRADE AGREEMENT, AND JOINT STATEMENTS ISSUED, SOME OF THEM OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT, PARTICULARLY AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY ON JUNE 1, ALSO TURNED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SUMMIT AWAY FROM THE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WE HAD AT THE BEGINNING TOWARD A MORE UPBEAT TONE, WHICH MAY DO GORBACHEV SOME GOOD BACK HOME.

WE HAD SOME CANDID DISCUSSIONS ABOUT LITHUANIA AND THE OTHER BALTIC STATES, BUT THE SUBJECT DID NOT BECOME A DOMINANT PUBLIC ISSUE. I LAID OUT MY POSITIONS, SO THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS ABOUT HOW IMPORTANT THIS IS TO THE WEST. THERE WAS NO BREAKTHROUGH, BUT I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT A DIALOGUE WILL GET UNDERWAY SOON BETWEEN MOSCOW AND VILNIUS.

AT CAMP DAVID, WE HAD A THOROUGH REVIEW OF REGIONAL ISSUES BUT WE MADE NO PARTICULAR PROGRESS.

IN A PRIVATE MOMENT AT CAMP DAVID, GORBACHEV ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF MAJOR WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND SAID HE WISHED THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EFFORT. I TOLD HIM THAT I WANTED TO HELP HIM AND HIS REFORMS SUCCEED AND THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS HE FACES, BUT THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS PROBLEMS HERE THAT I WOULD HAVE TO MANAGE. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE U.S. BANKS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE UNTIL AN EFFECTIVE SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM WAS IN PLACE. MAJOR PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE GERMAN ISSUE WOULD CREATE A CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES THAT WOULD HELP ME BUILD SUPPORT FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. VISIBLE PROGRESS IN LITHUANIA AND A CURTAILMENT OF SOVIET AID TO COUNTRIES LIKE CUBA, VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA WOULD ALSO ANSWER THE ARGUMENT THAT THE U.S. WAS HELPING THE SOVIET UNION WHILE IT WAS AIDING REGIMES THAT UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN HOUSTON.

FINALLY, I RAISED THE BW ISSUE. HE SAID THIS WAS NONSENSE BUT THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT.

ALL IN ALL, I FOUND GORBACHEV STILL CONFIDENT BUT OBVIOUSLY WEIGHED DOWN WITH ALL HE FACES AT HOME. ON THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL POSITION, HE SEEMS TO BE GROPING HIS WAY THROUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALL THE CHANGES OF THE PAST YEAR. TO HIS CREDIT, HE IS OPEN-MINDED AND PREPARED TO BE REASSURED BY STEPS THE WESTERN ALLIES MIGHT TAKE TO SHOW THAT THE CHANGES CAN BE MANAGED IN WAYS THAT DO NOT THREATEN SOVIET SECURITY. IN THAT REGARD, I BELIEVE THE SUMMIT HELPED GIVE HIM SOME OF THOSE ASSURANCES. OUR AGREEMENT TO HOLD REGULAR SUMMIT MEETINGS WILL ALSO STRENGTHEN THE SENSE OF PREDICTABILITY IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

I HOPE, MARGARET, THAT THIS HAS BEEN OF SOME HELP AS YOU PREPARE FOR YOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV. I AM GLAD TO KNOW HE WILL BE HEARING FROM YOU SO SOON AFTER HIS TALKS WITH ME IN WASHINGTON.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO LEONARD APPEYARD,
CABINET OFFICE, FROM TIMOTHY DEAL, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STAFF.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. AS DISCUSSED AND AT YOUR REQUEST, BELOW IS THE TEXT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE CONCERNING FIBER OPTICS TO PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND, CHANCELLOR KOHL, AND PRIME MINISTER KAIFU. WE INTEND
TO DISPATCH THESE MESSAGES VIA NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ON
JUNE 5.

2. DEAR -----: I AM WRITING TO INFORM YOU OF MY DECISION TO
DENY AN EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM
TO INSTALL A TRANSCONTINENTAL FIBER OPTICS SYSTEM IN THE SOVIET
UNION. AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THIS APPLICATION, WE CONCLUDED
THAT ALLOWING THE EXPORT OF THIS TECHNOLOGY WOULD CAUSE EXTENSIVE
DAMAGE TO OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY AT A TIME OF GREAT UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF SOVIET POLICY. ACCESS TO SUCH TECHNOLOGY
AND EQUIPMENT WOULD ENHANCE SOVIET MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL
CAPABILITY AND ALSO SEVERELY HAMPER ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION.
THEREFORE, I REQUEST YOUR SUPPORT IN DENYING THE TRANSFER OF
COCOM-EMBARGOED FIBER OPTICS TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET
UNION. I AM SENDING SIMILAR MESSAGES TO MARGARET THATCHER, (AS
APPROPRIATE: FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, HELMUT KOHL, AND TOSHIKI KAIFU)
SINCE FIRMS IN OUR COUNTRIES ARE, FOR THE PRESENT AT LEAST, THE ONLY
ONES CAPABLE OF PULLING TOGETHER A CONSORTIUM FOR A PROJECT OF THIS
NATURE AND MAGNITUDE.

WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT:

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(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET
THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET,

I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE MESSAGE YOU SENT ON YOUR TALKS WITH
GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW. YOUR ASSESSMENT TRACKS CLOSELY WITH MINE ON
GORBACHEV'S THINKING ABOUT GERMANY, AND I AM SURE YOUR TALKS WERE
HELPFUL IN MOVING HIM TOWARD ACCEPTING GERMANY'S REMAINING FULLY
IN NATO.

IN THAT SAME VEIN, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU PROMPTLY MY THOUGHTS
ON THE MEETINGS I HAD ON JUNE 11 WITH PRIME MINISTER DE MAIZIERE.
OUR TALKS WERE VERY FRIENDLY AND OPEN. I FOUND HIM A THOUGHTFUL
MAN -- INEXPERIENCED IN THE AFFAIRS OF STATE, BUT WITH A STRONG
SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

I STRESSED THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS SHOULD TERMINATE FOUR
POWER RIGHTS AND THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD ENJOY FULL
SOVEREIGNTY AT THE TIME OF UNIFICATION, WITH NO DISCRIMINATORY
CONSTRAINTS AND NO SINGLING OUT OF GERMANY FOR SPECIAL STATUS.
IN THAT CONTEXT, I TOLD HIM I WAS TROUBLED BY THE DRAFT FINAL
SETTLEMENT THE GDR TABLED AT THE TWO PLUS FOUR POLITICAL
DIRECTORS' MEETING IN BERLIN ON JUNE 9. I SAID THAT IT WAS MY
STRONG VIEW THAT A FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD NOT DETERMINE SUCH
ISSUES AS GERMANY'S ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS OR OTHER MAJOR
SECURITY ISSUES, MANY OF WHICH INVOLVE OTHER STATES, INCLUDING
MEMBERS OF NATO.

HE SAID THAT HE SAW THE SITUATION IN MUCH THE SAME WAY, BUT HE
REFERRED TO THE "BRIDGE FUNCTION" THAT GERMANY SHOULD PLAY TO
HELP REASSURE THE SOVIETS, AS WELL AS POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
HAVING JUST COME FROM THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, HE WAS
VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE CONCERNS OF THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEANS
AND SEEMED TO FEEL A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO WHAT HE CALLED HIS
'BROTHERS AND SISTERS' TO THE EAST. HE ALSO FOCUSED ON WHAT HE
SAW AS GORBACHEV'S NEED TO FIND A WAY TO SHOW HIS MILITARY AND
THE SOVIET PEOPLE THAT HE WAS NOT GIVING AWAY SOVIET RIGHTS IN
GERMANY WITHOUT GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE
WAS REFERRING TO SOVIET CONCERNS OVER TROOP LEVELS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE. HE SAID THAT GORBACHEV WOULD LIKE A "MOVE-FOR-MOVE DEAL"
-- BY WHICH HE APPARENTLY MEANT SOME CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN ARMED
FORCES IN RETURN FOR GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO -- BUT DE
MAIZIERE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE A MODEL IN MIND. AGAIN, I REMINDED
HIM OF THE DANGER OF SINGULARIZING GERMANY. WHEN I RAISED THE

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DANGER OF "PARALLELISM," OF EQUATING U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY, DE MAIZIERE AGREED THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT GORBACHEV WANTS TO DO.

DE MAIZIERE WENT ON TO AGREE THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS SHOULD BE TERMINATED AT THE TIME OF UNIFICATION, THAT TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD NOT DECIDE THE MAJOR ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND THAT GERMANY SHOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS OWN ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP, BUT HE NEITHER SUPPORTED NOR REPUDIATED THE UNHELPFUL PAPER THE GDR TABLED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR ON JUNE 9. HE DID, HOWEVER, DISOWN THE IDEA HIS FOREIGN MINISTER PUT FORWARD AT COPENHAGEN FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN "BUFFER ZONE," SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE HABIT OF SUPPORTING PROPOSALS THAT HE FIRST LEARNED ABOUT IN THE PRESS.

HE WAS ALSO VAGUE ON THE MATTER OF GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HE SPOKE POSITIVELY OF NATO'S ROLE AND DID NOT DISPUTE ME WHEN I STRESSED MY SUPPORT FOR GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP, BUT HIS OWN PRESENTATION FOCUSED MORE ON TRANSFORMING NATO TO MAKE IT LESS THREATENING AND ON BUILDING UP "NEW STRUCTURES" IN CSCE.

LET ME JUST MENTION TWO OTHER ISSUES. OVER LUNCH, WE DISCUSSED THE POLISH BORDER. HE HAD NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW TO SAY, EXCEPT THAT WHEN THE POLES RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE WESTERN BORDER THEY ARE THINKING ALSO OF THEIR EASTERN BORDER. FINALLY, HE HAD SOME INTERESTING IMPRESSIONS FROM THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HE SAID, ARE DETERMINED TO LEAVE THE PACT, WITH THE HUNGARIANS SAYING THAT THEY WOULD BE OUT BY 1992 AT THE LATEST. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, WAS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND CAME ACROSS AS GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC. DE MAIZIERE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT GORBACHEV FACES A FRAGMENTING COMMUNIST PARTY WITH NOTHING TO REPLACE IT AS A STRUCTURE TO INTEGRATE THE USSR.

I HOPE THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE OF SOME USE, MARGARET, AND I WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS YOU HAVE ON THEM. IN PARTICULAR, WE OBVIOUSLY NEED TO CONCENTRATE, TOGETHER WITH FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, ON BRINGING DE MAIZIERE AROUND TO OUR VIEW OF HOW BEST TO PROCEED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS.

THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR RECENT MESSAGE. OUR FREQUENT CONSULTATION WILL BE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT AS GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE TWO PLUS FOUR MOVE TO CONCLUSION. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LONDON.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

INCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT.

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SECTION>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0037 <TOP> 900612200639 MSG000266529999

DISPATCH
FROM: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT KANTER SDO ZELIKOW
TO: HOTLINE OUT BLACKWILL ZELIKOW
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ COSRI YEXXWHX DTG 211427Z JUN 90

ORIGIN: FM WHITE HOUSE

TO: TO CABINET OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0760-MK
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SECTION 01 OF 05

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 17, AND YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT THE
CONTENTS OF A NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE
NEED A SHORT DECLARATION THAT EVIDENCES OUR SERIOUSNESS
ABOUT ADAPTING NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS.

THIS MEETING IN LONDON WILL BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT IN THE
HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE. WE ARE AT A PIVOTAL MOMENT. THE
SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO DECIDE, THIS YEAR, WHETHER TO ACQUIESCE
AMICABLY IN THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AS A FULL MEMBER OF NATO.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, LIKE YOURS, ARE FORMING JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE
RELEVANCE OF THE ALLIANCE TO THE NEW EUROPE THAT IS COMING INTO
BEING. THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERS OF EASTERN EUROPE ARE STILL UNSURE
WHAT TO BELIEVE ABOUT NATO AND ITS PART IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. IN
SUM, THIS NATO SUMMIT IS LIKELY TO FIX THE IMAGE OF WHAT OUR
ALLIANCE STANDS FOR DURING THIS PERIOD OF HISTORIC CHANGE.

I THEREFORE THINK THE SUMMIT DECLARATION SHOULD BE QUITE UNLIKE
ITS PREDECESSORS. IT SHOULD BE SHORT, UNBUREAUCRATIC, AND
WRITTEN TO BE READ BY A BROAD AUDIENCE, INCLUDING PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED AROUND A SERIES OF
IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

I HAVE TRIED TO ASSIMILATE OUR THINKING, AND THE RECENT
CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD WITH YOU -- AND WITH HELMUT AND
FRANCOIS -- INTO THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION I THINK THE SUMMIT
SHOULD PRODUCE. A SUGGESTED DRAFT FOLLOWS AT THE END OF THIS
LETTER. FOR THE TIME BEING I AM ONLY SHARING IT PRIVATELY WITH
YOU, HELMUT, FRANCOIS, GIULIO ANDREOTTI, AND MANFRED WOERNER.

I HAVE REFLECTED ON YOUR SUGGESTION THAT THE NATO SUMMIT ENDORSE
A JOINT NATO-WARSAW PACT DECLARATION. I CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THIS
CONCEPT COULD SEEM ATTRACTIVE. HOWEVER, I HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS
ABOUT IT. I AM RELUCTANT TO SEE US CREATE THE PERCEPTION THAT
THE TWO ALLIANCES ARE EQUIVALENT -- AND DOOMED TO SHARE THE SAME
EVENTUAL FATE. I AM ALSO PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A JOINT
DOCUMENT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT SOVIET
PROPOSAL THAT SUCH A JOINT DECLARATION ESTABLISH A FULL-BODIED
PAN-EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM, ABROGATING OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, AND BASED ON A NUMBER OF LONG-

STANDING SOVIET PRINCIPLES FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT WE (AND I
(NOW YOU TOO) CONSIDER UNACCEPTABLE.

INSTEAD I SUGGEST THAT WE MAKE A PLAIN STATEMENT OF OUR PEACEFUL
INTENTIONS AND INVITE A RECIPROCAL DECLARATION FROM THE
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT. OUR DRAFT TEXT
INCLUDES SUGGESTED LANGUAGE TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. TO
FURTHER DRAMATIZE OUR NEW PERSPECTIVE, I HAVE SUGGESTED THE
ALLIANCE INVITE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO ADDRESS THE NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL.

A STEP WITH EVEN MORE LASTING SIGNIFICANCE WOULD BE FOR NATO TO
ASK THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES TO OPEN
LIAISON MISSIONS AT NATO, WITH AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED TO THE
ALLIANCE. THIS IS NOT AN OFFER OF MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. IT IS AN
EFFORT TO CREATE NEW LINKAGES WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES BILATERALLY WITH NATO, RATHER THAN THROUGH FORMAL TIES
BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES.

I BELIEVE THAT IF WE EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERNS
ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN A UNITED GERMANY (AND I AGREE
WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH YOUR VIEWS ON THE TACTICS AND TIMING OF THIS)
WE SHOULD DO SO ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A BROADER FRAMEWORK FOR
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, ENCOMPASSING ALL OF EUROPE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, OUR DRAFT NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION DESCRIBES
AMBITIOUS LONG-TERM SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR FOLLOW-ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN THE 1990S, INCLUDING "FURTHER
FAR-REACHING REDUCTIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES." IT SEEMS TO ME IMPORTANT THAT WE
HOLD OUT THE PROMISE FOR OUR PUBLICS THAT THE PROCESS OF REDUCING
CONVENTIONAL FORCES WILL CONTINUE AND THAT OUR GOALS WILL BE
AMBITIOUS, INCLUDING WITH REGARD TO SOVIET FORCES IN THE
HOMELAND. WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT THE FORCES WE WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE -- AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SOVIETS HAVE -- AT THE END OF
THIS CENTURY AND DESIGN AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH THAT PROMOTES
THOSE OBJECTIVES.

IN OFFERING GUIDELINES FOR NATO'S REVIEW OF ITS CONVENTIONAL
DEFENSE PLANS, WE HAVE TRIED TO INDICATE THAT WE CAN MOVE AWAY
FROM "FORWARD DEFENSE," AS CURRENTLY CONCEIVED. THE DRAFT TEXT
DOES POINT OUT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEND "ALL THE TERRITORY
OF ALL OF OUR MEMBERS," A REFERENCE TO NATO'S AGREEMENT, AT
TURNBERRY, THAT ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
WILL COVER ALL THE TERRITORY OF A UNITED GERMANY. BUT WE DO HAVE
TO GIVE DIRECTION TO NATO AUTHORITIES ON HOW WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
WAY WE PLAN OUR DEFENSES, AND I HAVE USED LANGUAGE DRAWN IN PART
FROM YOUR ADDRESS TO THE NAC AT TURNBERRY.

ONE OF THOSE CHANGES, AS YOU WILL SEE, IS TO PLACE MUCH MORE

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EMPHASIS ON MULTINATIONAL CORPS. WE ARE PREPARED TO SEE THE
CORPS COMMANDERS DESIGNATED BY NATO LEAD THESE CORPS IN
PEACETIME, REPORTING TO SACEUR. THESE STEPS WOULD EXEMPLIFY THE
COLLECTIVE NATURE OF OUR DEFENSES AS NOTHING ELSE CAN, AND CREATE
A NEW FOUNDATION FOR THE CONTINUED STABILIZING PRESENCE OF

WESTERN STATIONED FORCES -- INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL U.S. FORCES --
IN A UNITED GERMANY.

ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, I AGREE WITH YOU -- AND OTHER ALLIES -- THAT
WE SHOULD NOT DETAIL OUR GOALS FOR FUTURE SNF ARMS CONTROL
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MY GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIETS. AS YOU
SUGGESTED, WE THINK THIS WILL HELP PUT OFF A DOMESTIC DEBATE IN
GERMANY ABOUT TASM UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, I
DO THINK WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE OUR WILLINGNESS TO
REMOVE U.S. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS FROM EUROPE AS SOVIET
STATIONED FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE. YOU WILL NOTICE THAT
MY SUGGESTED DRAFT LEAVES US THE LATITUDE TO DECIDE THE BEST
CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH TO MAKE THESE WITHDRAWALS, AS WELL AS HOW TO
FRAME OUR SNF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS TO BEST PROTECT AIR-
DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING TASM.

OUR NUCLEAR STRATEGY, WHICH HAS HAD TO RELY ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS EARLY IN A CONFLICT TO DEFEAT SUDDEN AND OVERWHELMING
SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, IS ALSO BECOMING OUT OF DATE. THE
CURRENT STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE NEEDS TO BE REVISED. I
HAVE SUGGESTED A NEW FORMULATION, IN PARAGRAPH 16, TO SIGNAL A
CHANGE, CAREFULLY CONDITIONED ON THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET
STATIONED FORCES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE AGREEMENT. WE
MUST NOT SUCCUMB TO PRESSURES TO ADOPT A POSTURE OF NO FIRST USE
THAT WOULD MAKE EUROPE SAFE FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR. WE MUST IN-
STEAD RETAIN A GOOD DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING HOW NUCLEAR
WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED. YET WE MUST SHOW THAT OUR STRATEGY -- IN
THIS NEW EUROPE -- WILL EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCES
AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT.

IN OUTLINING A POSSIBLE ALLIANCE VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
CSCE, OUR DRAFT DESCRIBES GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS
TO GIVE LIFE TO THOSE PRINCIPLES. THE LIST OF NEW INSTITUTIONS I
HAVE SUGGESTED DRAWS ON THE PROPOSALS YOU FIRST MADE IN THE
KONIGSWINTER SPEECH. THE LIST IS EXTENSIVE BUT BALANCED, WITH
ENHANCED POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS BACKED BY A SMALL SECRETARIAT,
AN ELECTIONS COMMISSION TO COORDINATE THE MONITORING OF FREE
ELECTIONS, AND A CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT. THERE IS
ALSO A PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION, THAT OVER TIME CAN BROADEN PUBLIC
SUPPORT FOR THE CSCE. I THINK WE SHOULD TRY, AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE, TO PLACE THESE NEW CSCE INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW
DEMOCRATIC STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE TO REINFORCE THESE NATIONS'
SENSE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF THE NEW
EUROPE.

RATHER THAN CREATE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CSCE SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS, I HAVE SUGGESTED ONE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER
THAT WOULD HAVE CLEARLY DELINEATED RESPONSIBILITIES IN A NUMBER
OF AREAS, FROM DATA EXCHANGES TO POSSIBLE DISPUTE CONCILIATION
MECHANISMS THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS NEXT YEAR
IN VALLETTA. OUR SUPPORT FOR THIS CENTER WOULD RESPOND
POSITIVELY TO AN IMPORTANT SOVIET PROPOSAL, BUT DO SO BY
EMPHASIZING THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF CONFLICT RATHER THAN PAN-
EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT, NARROWLY FOCUSED ON GERMANY.

WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THESE IDEAS, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOU IN LONDON.

SINCERELY,

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT SUMMIT DECLARATION

LONDON DECLARATION
ON A
TRANSFORMED NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

ISSUED BY THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING
IN THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN LONDON,
JULY 5-6, 1990

1. THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS BEEN THE MOST SUCCESSFUL DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE IN HISTORY. NOW, EUROPE HAS ENTERED A NEW, MORE PROMISING ERA. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IS LIBERATING ITSELF. THE SOVIET UNION HAS EMBARKED ON THE LONG JOURNEY TOWARD A FREE SOCIETY. THE WALLS THAT ONCE CONFINED PEOPLE AND IDEAS ARE COLLAPSING. EUROPEANS ARE DETERMINING THEIR OWN DESTINY. THEY ARE CHOOSING FREEDOM. THEY ARE CHOOSING ECONOMIC LIBERTY. THEY ARE CHOOSING PEACE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THIS ALLIANCE MUST AND WILL ADAPT.

2. AS OUR ALLIANCE ENTERS ITS FIFTH DECADE AND LOOKS AHEAD TO A NEW CENTURY, IT MUST CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE. NO ONE CAN BE CERTAIN OF THE FUTURE. WE NEED TO KEEP STANDING TOGETHER, TO EXTEND THE LONG PEACE WE HAVE ENJOYED THESE PAST FOUR DECADES. YET OUR ALLIANCE MUST BE EVEN MORE AN AGENT OF CHANGE. IT CAN HELP BUILD THE STRUCTURES OF A MORE UNITED CONTINENT, SUPPORTING SECURITY AND STABILITY WITH THE STRENGTH OF OUR SHARED FAITH IN DEMOCRACY, THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES.

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3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT, IN THE NEW EUROPE, THE SECURITY OF EVERY STATE IS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE SECURITY OF ITS NEIGHBORS. NATO MUST BECOME AN INSTITUTION WHERE EUROPEANS, CANADIANS, AND AMERICANS WORK TOGETHER NOT ONLY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, BUT TO BUILD NEW PARTNERSHIPS WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY MUST REACH OUT TO THE NATIONS OF THE EAST, WHO CONFRONTED US AS ADVERSARIES IN THE COLD WAR, AND EXTEND THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP.

4. WE WILL REMAIN A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEND ALL THE TERRITORY OF ALL OF OUR MEMBERS. WE HAVE NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AND WE COMMIT OURSELVES IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. WE WILL NEVER IN ANY CASE BE THE FIRST TO USE FORCE. TODAY, WE CALL UPON THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT TO MAKE A SIMILAR SOLEMN COMMITMENT TO NON-AGGRESSION.

5. IN THAT SPIRIT, AND TO REFLECT THE CHANGING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE, WE TODAY INVITE THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, TO COME TO BRUSSELS AND ADDRESS THE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. WE TODAY ALSO INVITE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, AND ROMANIA TO COME TO NATO, NOT JUST TO VISIT, BUT TO STAY. WE PROPOSE THAT THE USSR, AND THESE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, OPEN PERMANENT LIAISON MISSIONS WITH AMBASSADORS HERE AT NATO. ALTHOUGH THESE NATIONS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF OUR ALLIANCE, THIS STEP WILL BRING THEM CLOSER TO OUR THINKING AND DELIBERATIONS IN THIS HISTORIC PERIOD OF CHANGE SO THAT THEIR DIPLOMATS -- AND GENERALS -- CAN BE SURE THAT THEIR VOICES ARE HEARD.

6. OUR ALLIANCE SHOULD DO ITS SHARE TO OVERCOME THE LEGACY OF DECADES OF SUSPICION. TO FOLLOW ON THE GENEROUS SOVIET INVITATION TO NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER TO VISIT MOSCOW AND MEET WITH SOVIET LEADERS, WE SUGGEST THAT NATO'S SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR EUROPE, GENERAL JOHN GALVIN, ALSO GO TO MOSCOW, AND EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS, TO DISCUSS OUR ALLIANCE'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE.

7. MILITARY LEADERS FROM THROUGHOUT EUROPE GATHERED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN VIENNA TO TALK ABOUT THEIR FORCES AND DOCTRINE. NATO OFFERS TO HOST ANOTHER SUCH MEETING THIS AUTUMN, TO PROMOTE COMMON UNDERSTANDING. WE WILL EXPAND AND INTENSIFY MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS ACROSS EUROPE, ALONGSIDE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON PROBLEMS LIKE THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESOURCES TO CIVILIAN USE. IN THESE WAYS, WE INTEND TO ESTABLISH AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT QUALITY OF OPENNESS IN EUROPE, WHICH IS ALSO WHY WE WANT TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON OPEN SKIES.

8. THE SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL AND U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE DEMONSTRATES THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL COMPACT THAT BINDS NORTH AMERICA'S FATE TO EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES. BUT, AS EUROPE CHANGES, WE MUST PROFOUNDLY ALTER THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT DEFENSE.

9. TO REDUCE OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, SOUND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL. THAT IS WHY WE PUT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON COMPLETING THIS YEAR THE FIRST TREATY TO REDUCE AND LIMIT CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE). THESE TALKS SHOULD REMAIN IN CONTINUOUS SESSION UNTIL THE WORK IS DONE. YET WE HOPE TO GO FURTHER. USING THE MANDATE ALREADY IN PLACE FOR CFE, NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS CAN BEGIN WITH THE SAME MEMBERSHIP, ONCE A CFE TREATY IS SIGNED.

10. WE WILL SEEK THROUGH NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 1990S FURTHER FAR-REACHING REDUCTIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, SO AS TO PREVENT ANY NATION FROM MAINTAINING DISPROPORTIONATE MILITARY POWER ON THE CONTINENT. WE WILL MAKE PROVISIONS AS NEEDED FOR DIFFERENT REGIONS TO REDRESS DISPARITIES AND TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE'S SECURITY IS HARMED AT ANY STAGE. THIS IS AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA, BUT IT MATCHES OUR GOAL: ENDURING PEACE IN EUROPE.

11. AS SOVIET TROOPS LEAVE EASTERN EUROPE AND A TREATY LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IS IMPLEMENTED, THE ALLIANCE'S FORCE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY WILL CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

-- THE ALLIANCE WILL FIELD SMALLER AND RESTRUCTURED ACTIVE FORCES. THESE FORCES WILL BE HIGHLY MOBILE AND VERSATILE,

ENHANCING THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE AND THE NATO COMPOSITE FORCE, SO THAT ALLIED LEADERS WILL HAVE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING HOW TO RESPOND TO A CRISIS.

-- THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL CORPS SECTORS IN NATO WILL BE REPLACED. NATO WILL RELY INCREASINGLY ON MULTINATIONAL CORPS MADE UP OF NATIONAL UNITS.

-- TO REINFORCE OUR COMMITMENT TO A MULTINATIONAL, COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO OUR COMMON DEFENSE, FORCES WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THESE MULTINATIONAL CORPS IN PEACETIME. THESE MULTINATIONAL CORPS WILL BE LED BY CORPS COMMANDERS DESIGNATED BY NATO WHO WILL REPORT, THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE (SACEUR) WHO IN TURN ANSWERS TO ALLIED POLITICAL LEADERS.

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-- NATO WILL SCALE BACK THE READINESS OF ITS ACTIVE UNITS, REDUCING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND THE NUMBER OF EXERCISES.

-- THE ALLIANCE WILL RELY MORE HEAVILY ON THE ABILITY TO RECREATE LARGER FORCES IF AND WHEN THEY MIGHT BE NEEDED.

12. OUR ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO TRANSFORM THE SIZE AND MISSION OF ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES. TO KEEP THE PEACE, THE ALLIANCE MUST MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BASED IN EUROPE, AND KEPT UP TO DATE. BUT, AS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE, NATO HAS ALWAYS STRESSED THAT NONE OF ITS WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE AND THAT WE SEEK THE LOWEST AND MOST STABLE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES NEEDED TO SECURE THE PREVENTION OF WAR. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHANGES IN EUROPE, AND THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER CHANGES, NOW ALLOW US TO GO FURTHER.

13. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONS IN EUROPE, THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ROLE FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE. WE HAVE DECIDED SPECIFICALLY THAT, ONCE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, THE ALLIANCE POSITION WILL BE TO ELIMINATE ALL ITS NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS FROM EUROPE BY THE TIME ALL SOVIET STATIONED FORCES IN EUROPE HAVE RETURNED HOME.

14. NEW NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE REDUCTION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER A CFE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

15. WE WILL DEVELOP AN ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR FAR FEWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE DIMINISHED NEED FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE.

16. FINALLY, WITH THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET STATIONED FORCES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE AGREEMENT, THE ALLIANCE CAN REDUCE ITS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WILL ENABLE US, IN THE TRANSFORMED EUROPE, TO ADOPT A NEW NATO STRATEGY MAKING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT.

17. IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE REVISED PLANS FOR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL, AND WITH THE ADVICE OF NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND ALL INTERESTED MEMBER STATES, NATO SHOULD PREPARE A NEW ALLIED MILITARY STRATEGY MOVING AWAY FROM 'FORWARD DEFENSE' TOWARDS A REDUCED FORWARD PRESENCE AND MODIFYING 'FLEXIBLE RESPONSE' TO REFLECT A REDUCED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THAT CONNECTION THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ELABORATE NEW FORCE PLANS CONSISTENT WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN EUROPE. NATO'S HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE SHOULD FORMULATE A DETAILED POSITION FOR THE FOLLOW-ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS. NATO SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR ALLIED CONSULTATION ON THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. ALL THESE NATO BODIES, WORKING IN COORDINATION WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SHOULD REPORT THEIR CONCLUSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN 1991 TO ANOTHER MEETING OF NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

18. OF COURSE, OUR ALLIANCE IS NOT ALONE IN HELPING TO SHAPE THE EUROPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS A VITAL PART. THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) SHOULD BECOME MORE PROMINENT IN EUROPE'S FUTURE, BRINGING TOGETHER THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA.

19. WE SUPPORT A CSCE SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR IN PARIS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE SIGNATURE OF A CFE AGREEMENT AND WOULD SET NEW STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, AND PRESERVATION, OF FREE SOCIETIES. IT SHOULD ENDORSE:

- CSCE PRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS;
- CSCE COMMITMENTS TO RESPECT AND UPHOLD THE RULE OF LAW; AND
- CSCE GUIDELINES FOR ENHANCING ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BASED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE AND COMPETITIVE MARKET ECONOMIES.

20. WE FURTHER PROPOSE THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT IN PARIS DECIDE HOW THE CSCE, AS AN INSTITUTION, CAN PROVIDE A FORUM FOR WIDER POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN A MORE UNITED EUROPE. WE RECOMMEND THAT CSCE GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH:

- A PROGRAM FOR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AMONG MEMBER GOVERNMENTS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AT LEAST ONCE EACH YEAR, WITH OTHER PERIODIC MEETINGS OF OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR AND FOLLOW UP ON THESE CONSULTATIONS;
- A SCHEDULE OF CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCES ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS TO ASSESS PROGRESS TOWARD A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE;
- A SMALL CSCE SECRETARIAT, PERHAPS IN PRAGUE, TO COORDINATE THESE MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES;
- A CSCE ELECTIONS COMMISSION, PERHAPS IN BUDAPEST, TO COORDINATE MONITORING OF FREE ELECTIONS;
- A CSCE CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT, PERHAPS IN WARSAW OR BERLIN, AS A FORUM FOR EXCHANGES OF MILITARY INFORMATION, DISCUSSION OF UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND THE CONCILIATION OF DISPUTES INVOLVING CSCE MEMBER STATES; AND

- A CSCE PARLIAMENTARY BODY, THE ASSEMBLY OF EUROPE, TO BE
BASED ON THE EXISTING PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, IN STRASBOURG, AND INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL

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CSCE MEMBER STATES.

21. THIS ALLIANCE HAS DONE MUCH TO BRING ABOUT THE NEW
EUROPE. A UNITED GERMAN NATION WITH FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WILL
BE AT THE HEART OF A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE.

22. TODAY, OUR ALLIANCE BEGINS ITS TRANSFORMATION. WORKING
WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, WE ARE DETERMINED TO CREATE
ENDURING PEACE ON THIS CONTINENT.

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

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SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 05 <SSN> 0142 <TOR> 900621103145 MSG000267273105
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SECTION 01 OF 02
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET
THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH.

DEAR MARGARET:

AS THE DATE OF OUR MEETING IN HOUSTON APPROACHES, I HAVE
BEEN REVIEWING THE AGENDA AND SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES FOR
DISCUSSION.

TWO OF THESE ISSUES -- TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT -- NOT ONLY
CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR AGENDA, BUT ALSO CARRY WITH
THEM THE POSSIBILITY OF BECOMING SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE. IT IS
BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL OF THESE ISSUES TO BECOME POINTS OF
CONFRONTATION THAT I DECIDED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WRITE
YOU A PERSONAL NOTE IN THE HOPE, NOT ONLY TO AVOID SERIOUS DISCORD,
BUT TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS ON BOTH SUBJECTS.

AN OPEN WORLD TRADING SYSTEM IS VITAL TO ECONOMIC
PROSPERITY. WE HAVE BENEFITED ENORMOUSLY FROM SUCCESSIVE ROUNDS OF
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THAT OPENED OUR MARKETS AND ENRICHED OUR
CHOICE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.

FIRST, WE MUST TACKLE OUR DIFFERENCES HEAD-ON AND PROVIDE
THE POLITICAL DIRECTION NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
TO THE URUGUAY ROUND IN DECEMBER. THIS WILL REQUIRE, ABOVE ALL,
AGREEMENT ON RULES GOVERNING TRADE IN AGRICULTURE. REFORM OF THOSE
RULES IS LONG OVERDUE. PRESENT POLICIES ARE COSTLY, CREATE
UNNECESSARY TRADE CONFLICTS, AND HURT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

FURTHER, WE WILL NOT GAIN THE ADHERENCE OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES TO RULES GOVERNING SERVICES, INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY UNLESS WE PROVIDE THEM WITH GREATER EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES,
ESPECIALLY FOR THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. THOSE OF US AROUND THE
TABLE IN HOUSTON HOLD THE KEY TO AGRICULTURAL REFORM AND,
THEREFORE, TO THE ROUND ITSELF. AGRICULTURAL REFORM REQUIRES
THAT WE EACH MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT
PROGRAMS, INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN EXPORT SUBSIDIES,
IMPORT BARRIERS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS. WE MUST MAKE THEM IN A
WAY THAT PROVIDES FOR AN ACCEPTABLE TRANSITION TO LESS COSTLY AND
LESS DISRUPTIVE PRICES. FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON AGRICULTURE
IN HOUSTON IN A WAY THAT PROVIDES A PATH TO SUCCESS IN THE
URUGUAY ROUND WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO AN OPEN WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM. I BELIEVE WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO BREAK THE LOGJAM ON
THIS PROBLEM.

ON THE SECOND DIFFICULT ISSUE, THE ENVIRONMENT, OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF OUR IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND OF WAYS TO

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2010-0217-MK
09/17/2010 JMW

PREVENT ITS DEGRADATION IS ADVANCING RAPIDLY, EVEN THOUGH MUCH UNCERTAINTY REMAINS. I WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AT THE ARCH SUMMIT. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ACTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES DURING THE PAST YEAR. WE, TOO, HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS YEAR ALONE, THE UNITED STATES IS INVESTING APPROXIMATELY ONE BILLION DOLLARS TO GATHER DATA, MONITOR THE CRITICAL PARAMETERS, AND DEVELOP CREDIBLE ANALYTIC MODELS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION.

WE LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES HAVE AN OBLIGATION NOT ONLY TO ACT TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT, BUT ALSO TO DO SO RESPONSIBLY AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BEST SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND BALANCING ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS. OUR DISCUSSION AT HOUSTON WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON OUR RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES. MY HOPE IS THAT WE CAN BUILD ON OUR DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. MY PERSONAL VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD AGREE ON COMPLETING THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE BY 1992, BUT DEFER ANY DECISION ON POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON PROTOCOLS. LET ME REITERATE MY OFFER TO PROVIDE THE VENUE FOR THE FIRST NEGOTIATING SESSION ON THE CONVENTION.

I KNOW THAT SOME WOULD PREFER A MORE AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVE CONCERNING CO2 REDUCTION. HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC BASIS FOR US TO MAKE A COMMON COMMITMENT ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD SEEM TO MAKE MORE SENSE TO TREAT SOURCES AND SINKS OF ALL GREENHOUSE GASES COMPREHENSIVELY, SO AS TO ALLOW EACH COUNTRY TO PURSUE A FLEXIBLE AND EFFICIENT STRATEGY FOR MAKING ANY REDUCTIONS THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. IN MY VIEW, THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL PROVIDES A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A COOPERATIVE EFFORT THAT, BASED ON SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS, BALANCES ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH OBJECTIVES. I APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER ON THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL AND BELIEVE WE ARE PURSUING COMMON OBJECTIVES. I LOOK FORWARD TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT THIS WEEK'S MEETING IN LONDON.

AS I MENTIONED IN MY MESSAGE REPORTING ON MY MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE SOVIET UNION'S REQUEST FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE AT HOUSTON. I WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON THIS SUBJECT.

MARGARET, THE PRIVACY OF OUR MEETINGS IN HOUSTON WILL PROVIDE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR CANDID DISCUSSION OF THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. I BELIEVE A PRINCIPAL VIRTUE OF THESE SUMMITS IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO ADDRESS TOUGH BUT IMPORTANT ISSUES AND, THROUGH LIVELY DEBATE, ACHIEVE BREAKTHROUGHS THAT ALLOW OUR GOVERNMENTS TO MOVE FORWARD. THIS IS THE BIG CHALLENGE

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FINAL SECTION OF 02
BEFORE US NOW.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN HOUSTON.

WARM REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH

DECL: OADR
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:SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0192 <TOR> 900626122117 MSG000267711677
:SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0193 <TOR> 900626122307 MSG000267711787

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<TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR JUNE 25 REPLY TO MY PROPOSALS FOR THE NATO
SUMMIT. I WAS GLAD THAT YOU EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
SUMMIT FOR NATO AND FOR OUR FUTURE, AND THE NEED FOR A STRIKING
DECLARATION TO EMERGE FROM IT. THAT IS WHY I WISH TO RESPOND
DIRECTLY, BEFORE THE SUMMIT BEGINS, TO THE SEVERAL CONCERNS YOU
RAISED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

ON THE ISSUE OF NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE AND THE OVERALL TONE OF THE
DECLARATION, WE BOTH THINK NATO MUST STAY IN GOOD HEALTH AND PROSPER
IN THE NEW EUROPE. BUT TO GAIN PUBLIC BACKING FOR THIS, I BELIEVE
WE MUST SHOW THAT NATO WILL HAVE A NEW DIMENSION OF COOPERATION WITH
THE NEW DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. I AM
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS NOT FEEL THEY ARE
DOOMED TO ASSOCIATION ONLY WITH THE DYING WARSAW PACT. YOU SAW WHAT
ANTALL SAID IN BUDAPEST, THAT THE PACT COULD NOT BE MODERNIZED OR
DEMOCRATIZED.

THE LIAISON MISSIONS IDEA GIVES THE EAST EUROPEANS A LINK TO NATO,
BUT KEEPS THEM ENOUGH AT ARM'S LENGTH TO AVOID ALARMING THE SOVIETS
-- WHO OF COURSE MUST BE INVITED TOO. IT EXPANDS NATO'S POLITICAL
MISSION AND STATURE AS WELL, IN A HIGHLY VISIBLE WAY. GORBACHEV
HAS EVEN PUBLICLY SUGGESTED SOVIET MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. THAT IS OUT
OF THE QUESTION, BUT THE LIAISON MISSIONS IDEA COULD HELP HIM WORK
TO PUSH ASIDE THE IMAGE OF NATO AS AN ENEMY THAT IS SO DEEPLY
INGRAINED IN THE MIND OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC.

ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, I WANT TO ADDRESS YOUR RESERVATION
ABOUT PROMISING "FAR-REACHING REDUCTIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY
OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES." OUR LANGUAGE LEAVES US CONSIDERABLE
ROOM FOR MANEUVER ON THE ACTUAL MEANS FOR ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS. YOU
WILL ALSO HAVE NOTICED MY USE OF THE PHRASE "IN THE 1990S," GIVING
US THE REST OF THE DECADE TO CONTEMPLATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS
GOAL. I CERTAINLY HAVE NO WISH TO THREATEN BRITAIN'S CONTRIBUTION
TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OR FULFILLMENT OF OUT-OF-AREA SECURITY
OBLIGATIONS. BUT WE MUST KEEP AN EYE ON THE SOVIETS, WHO WILL STILL
BE ABLE TO FIELD -- AFTER CFE I -- AN ARMY WHICH DWARFS THAT OF ANY
OTHER COUNTRY ON THE CONTINENT. FURTHER, MANY OF OUR ALLIES INTEND
TO TAKE DEEP CUTS IN THEIR TROOP STRENGTH OVER THE NEXT DECADE. WE
SHOULD PROMISE AT THE NATO SUMMIT TO HANDLE THESE ADJUSTMENTS IN A

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2006-0576-MR
02/02/2010 MM

STABILIZING WAY, AND WITH A GOAL THAT LETS OUR PUBLICS KNOW THAT MEANINGFUL CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL WILL CONTINUE. IT IS NOT ENOUGH (AND AS YOU POINTED OUT EARLIER, THE WRONG TIME) TO DESCRIBE THE FUTURE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL BY FOCUSING ON MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE CENTRAL REGION.

I ALSO AGREE WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL IN DEALING WITH CHANGES IN NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY. BUT I WORRY THAT IF WE SAY NOTHING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND OUR STRATEGY FOR DETERRENCE AT THIS SUMMIT, WE WILL JUST ALLOW THE ADVOCATES OF NO FIRST USE AND DEPENDENT NUCLEARIZATION TO SET THE TERMS FOR THE DEBATE, INCLUDING IN GERMANY.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE HAD TO RELY ON THE EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A CONFLICT OUT OF NECESSITY, IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. THE SOVIET UNION CAN NO LONGER RELY MILITARILY ON ITS PRINCIPAL EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES. AFTER SOVIET TROOPS HAVE RETURNED TO THE HOMELAND AND CFE IS IMPLEMENTED, THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WILL BE TRANSFORMED.

IF I AM ASKED IN LONDON AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER OUR SUMMIT WHETHER NATO WILL ADAPT ITS NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO THESE CHANGES, I COULD SAY WE ARE STUDYING IT. BUT THEN WE HAVE FAILED TO OFFER LEADERSHIP. IF I SAY FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WOULD CONTINUE, UNAFFECTED BY THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, THEN IT WILL BE MUCH HARDER TO MAINTAIN A CONSENSUS BEHIND NATO'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT. AND IF I SAY NATO'S STRATEGY WILL BE DIFFERENT, DON'T WE HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING TO DEFINE THIS NEW DIRECTION?

THE PHRASE "LAST RESORT" LEAVES A LOT OF ROOM FOR SPECIFIC ELABORATION OF A NEW FORCE POSTURE AND EMPLOYMENT GUIDELINES. IT OF COURSE PROTECTS FIRST USE. BUT THIS TERM ALSO SIGNALS A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS, MOVING AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS SOON AFTER A CONFLICT HAS BEGUN -- A MOVE ALREADY BLESSED BY OUR DEFENSE MINISTERS AT THEIR MAY MEETING IN CANADA.

IN GENERAL I WORRY THAT, IF WE DO NOT MAKE BOLD MOVES AT THE LONDON SUMMIT TO ENHANCE NATO'S POLITICAL POSITION, WE WILL FAIL TO MEET THE PUBLIC TEST WE BOTH AGREE THE DECLARATION MUST PASS. WE MUST NOT END UP REPLACING SOLID SUBSTANCE WITH FAMILIAR NATO RHETORIC.

IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING IN BERLIN, SHEVARDNADZE TOLD JIM BAKER NO LESS THAN FOUR TIMES HOW IMPORTANT THE NATO SUMMIT WOULD BE IN SHAPING SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE VITAL QUESTIONS THAT MOSCOW MUST ANSWER DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. I AM ALSO AWARE THAT HELMUT KOHL WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON JULY 15-16. HE SHOULD TAKE WITH HIM A CLEAR ALLIANCE POSITION ON JUST HOW WE WILL (AND WILL NOT) ADAPT TO THE

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

NEW REALITIES IN EUROPE.

WE WILL BE ABLE TO WORK ON THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENT IN LONDON. I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN A FEW DAYS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0291 <TOR> 900701132710 MSG000268147629

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
38. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Sir Charles Powell (4 pp.)	7/14/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0760-MR
31 11/28/11

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
MARGARET THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

20 JULY 1990

DEAR MARGARET:

AS HOST OF OUR RECENT MEETINGS IN HOUSTON, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR
YOUR MANY CONTRIBUTIONS TO WHAT I BELIEVE WAS AN EXTREMELY
PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT. WE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN A NUMBER OF
AREAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO EACH ONE OF US, AND TO THE WORLD AS A
WHOLE.

OUR DISCUSSION ON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S REQUEST FOR WESTERN
ASSISTANCE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. AS AGREED IN HOUSTON, I HAVE
SENT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV A LETTER COMMUNICATING OUR DECISIONS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT MICHEL CAMDESSUS HAS ALREADY CONVENED A MEETING
WITH BARBER CONABLE, JACQUES ATTALI AND JEAN-CLAUDE PAYE TO DISCUSS
THE STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY WITH WHICH THEIR INSTITUTIONS HAVE
BEEN CHARGED. THE HOUSTON COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES THEM WITH CLEAR TERMS
OF REFERENCE: A DETAILED STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS REFORM, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CRITERIA
UNDER WHICH WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COULD EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT
THESE REFORMS.

IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE IMF AND THE
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER AS THE
STUDY PROGRESSES. MICHEL CAMDESSUS HAS ASSURED US THAT THE PROJECT
WILL MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY, AND THAT WE WILL RECEIVE THIS
REPORT BY DECEMBER.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION WITH YOU ON THIS AND
OTHER MATTERS.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT.

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31 11/28/11

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MARGARET
THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JULY 25 OUTLINING YOUR PLAN FOR
ESTABLISHING A SUSTAINABLE BASIS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM IN THE 1990S. WE ALL FACE VERY DIFFICULT DILEMMAS IN
DECIDING HOW TO ALLOCATE OUR DEFENSE RESOURCES TO ADJUST TO THE
NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE ASSOCIATED WITH SOVIET TROOP
WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE
ACCORD.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS REFLECT INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
THAT DEPEND UPON CONTINUED POSITIVE CHANGES IN EUROPE, BOTH IN
CFE AND IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS. I AGREE ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF INSURING THAT NATIONAL DECISIONS ARE ULTIMATELY COORDINATED IN
A WAY THAT WILL FACILITATE THE WORK OF OUR DEFENSE PLANNERS AT
NATO.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES WITH
YOU IN ASPEN.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END OF TEXT.

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(SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0021 <TOR> 900727221220 MSG000270425539

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
41. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: Diego Garcia (1 pp.)	8/9/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

BEGIN TEXT:

EAR MARGARET:

AS YOU LEARNED FROM GOVERNOR SUNUNU, I WILL BE MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN HELSINKI FOR A FULL DAY OF DISCUSSIONS ON
UNDAY, SEPTEMBER 9.

ONE OF MY MAIN OBJECTIVES WILL BE TO SECURE CONTINUING SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. SOVIET
POLICY TO DATE HAS BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY HELPFUL, AND
THROUGH THESE CONSULTATION AND DISCUSSIONS I HOPE TO REINFORCE THE
POSITIONS PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS ALREADY TAKEN IN THE GULF.

AS WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF THE FIRST POST-COLD WAR CRISIS, IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE AND THE SOVIET UNION COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY AND BE
ABLE TO BE DOING SO. THIS IS CRUCIAL NOT ONLY IN MEETING THE
CURRENT CHALLENGE, BUT IN SETTING A TONE AND PATTERN FOR A NEW KIND
OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN ALLIES.

BUT THE MEETING WILL NOT BE ONLY ABOUT THE GULF. WHEN HE WAS IN
WASHINGTON IN EARLY JUNE, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I AGREED TO MEET
REGULARLY, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ITEMS SPRINGING FROM THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT THAT NEED DISCUSSION.

I PLAN TO USE THIS MEETING TO GIVE ANOTHER PUSH TO OUR ARMS CONTROL
AGENDA -- ESPECIALLY IN CFE -- SO THAT WE CAN MOVE FORWARD TO A CSCE
SUMMIT IN PARIS IN NOVEMBER. I ALSO INTEND TO DISCUSS OTHER BROAD
QUESTIONS INVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY, BUT WITHOUT GETTING INTO
DETAILS ON REGIONAL ISSUES OTHER THAN CAMBODIA.

THIS MEETING WILL GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV'S VIEWS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, PARTICULARLY
IN LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FEDERAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THE UNION AND THE CONTINUING
ECONOMIC REFORM DEBATE.

CONSULTATIONS SUCH AS THIS ONE, AND YOUR OWN PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH
GORBACHEV, ARE IMPORTANT IN KEEPING OUR LINES OPEN TO MOSCOW AND
BUILDING ON THE GREATLY IMPROVED EAST-WEST CLIMATE OF THE PAST YEAR.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AMONG OURSELVES, AND I
WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR THOUGHTS OR ADVICE.

SHOULD YOU WISH TO SPEAK BY PHONE THIS WEEK BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR

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2609-0753-MR

31 8/6/12

HELSINKI, I WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU. JIM BAKER WILL
DO A BRIEFING AT NATO ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND I WILL ALSO SHARE MY
IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEETING WITH YOU AFTER MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END OF TEXT.

#0069

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0069 <TOR> 900904233736 MSG000273800255

DIST>
RT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
IT: NSFEG HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220029Z SEP 90
ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
1000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE HONORABLE MARGARET
THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER. FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

HOW VERY THOUGHTFUL OF YOU TO FIND TIME IN YOUR INCREDIBLY
BUSY LIFE TO CONCERN YOURSELF WITH MY PERSONAL PROBLEMS. YOUR
MESSAGE AFFECTED ME DEEPLY. THANK YOU.

ARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT:
10020

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0020 <TOR> 900921203454 MSG000275258094

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 7/7/2010

EDIST>
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IT: HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 271446Z SEP 90

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. CHARLES POWELL
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CHARLES,

THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION OF A RESTRICTED SESSION
PRECEDING AN EXPANDED MEETING IS PERFECTLY AGREEABLE TO THE
PRESIDENT. WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN NEW YORK.

SINCERELY,

BRENT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
0034

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0034 <TOR> 900927104907 MSG000275741347

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0753-MK
JL 6/6/12

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
46. Cable	From White House to Cabinet Office, Re: Message for Charles Powell from Brent Scowcroft [Message from George Bush to Margaret Thatcher, Re: U.N. Resolution on Iraq] [181659Z Oct 90] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	10/18/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/11/2022

Date Closed: 2/13/2009	OA/ID Number: 91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0753-MR(545)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/14/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<DIST>
>RT: COMM 1.4(c) SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <OSRI> 1.4(c) <DTG> 181659Z OCT 90
<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO CABINET OFFICE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
10000

EYES ONLY FOR CHARLES POWELL FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT
PLEASE PASS ONLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE. IT WAS EXTREMELY
THOUGHT-PROVOKING AND USEFUL. I WANTED TO RESPOND AND GIVE YOU SOME
SENSE OF MY OWN THINKING BEFORE WE SPOKE ON THE SECURE LINE.

I AGREE WITH YOUR SENSE THAT THE KEY CALCULATION IS WHETHER WE HAVE
THE LUXURY OF WAITING FOR SANCTIONS TO WORK. FRANKLY, I AM FAR FROM
SANGUINE THAT TIME WORKS IN OUR FAVOR. I AM WORRIED IN PARTICULAR
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM TO AFFECT THE
COHESION OF OUR SIDE. I AM TRYING TO GET SHAMIR TO SHOW SOME
FLEXIBILITY VIS-A-VIS THE UN MISSION, BUT YOU KNOW HOW DIFFICULT HE
CAN BE.

I AM COMFORTABLE WITH THE DIRECTION WE ARE NOW TAKING IN THE UN. A
RESOLUTION ON COMPENSATION FOR WHAT IRAQ IS DOING AND ON THE RIGHT
TO REPROVISION NATIONALS (OR EXTRACT THEM IF NEED BE) MAKES SENSE.
I BELIEVE JIM BAKER WROTE DOUGLAS HURD ABOUT THIS TODAY. I REFUSE
TO SEE OUR EMBASSY SHUT AND AMERICANS, DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS, SIMPLY
PLACED AT THE MERCY OF SADDAM. BUT WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS
MIGHT PROVIDE A FLASHPOINT IF IRAQ RESISTS.

I CAN ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR APPREHENSION ABOUT RETURNING TO THE
SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE. THIS
SAID, I THINK YOU MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING THE ADVANTAGES OF HAVING
SUCH A RESOLUTION AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF GOING TO WAR
WITHOUT ONE. BUT REST ASSURED THAT I WOULD ONLY GO BACK TO THE UN
IF CONSULTATIONS REVEALED WE COULD GET WHAT WE WANTED QUICKLY AND
WITHOUT UNACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINTS.

IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE GIVING SOME THOUGHT HERE TO THE IDEA OF
HAVING SUCH A RESOLUTION ALSO CALL FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE
HIS GOOD OFFICES TO SOLVE THE CRISIS CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 660
AND ITS SUCCESSORS. HE WOULD BE GIVEN SAY 30 OR 45 DAYS TO GET IRAQ
OUT; IF NOT, STATES WOULD HAVE A GREEN LIGHT TO USE FORCE. I SEE
TWO ADVANTAGES IN THIS APPROACH: DIPLOMACY IS ONLY LIKELY TO WORK
IF SADDAM SEES WE ARE SERIOUS, BUT IF SADDAM IS NOT COMPLETELY OUT
AND WE MUST FIGHT, I WANT TO TAKE AWAY FROM PEOPLE THE ARGUMENT THAT
WE DID NOT GIVE DIPLOMACY A CHANCE.

YOU ALSO RAISE THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHAT WE DO IF WE SUCCEED
AND SADDAM WITHDRAWS. CLEARLY, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT CONTAINING

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET


bach 6/12/14

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR

MM 4/14/2015

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IRAQ. WE DON'T YET HAVE A DETAILED PLAN, BUT AT A MINIMUM THIS
WOULD REQUIRE CONTINUED SANCTIONS, PEACEKEEPING FORCES,
REPOSITIONING, GUARANTEES, IMPROVING SAUDI AND GCC MILITARY
CAPABILITIES, AND SOME FORM OF POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE FOREIGN
PRESENCE. THIS IS SOMETHING OUR POL-MIL EXPERTS COULD USEFULLY
DISCUSS.

IF WE DO GO TO WAR, AND I THINK THE TIME-FRAME YOU SUGGEST
(MID-NOVEMBER THROUGH MID-FEBRUARY) IS REALISTIC, WE WOULD
OBVIOUSLY WANT TO MINIMIZE CASUALTIES ON OUR SIDE. I WANT TO SPEAK
AGAIN WITH COLIN POWELL AND DICK CHENEY ABOUT PHASING, BUT IN
ADDITION TO THE QUESTION YOU RAISE ABOUT THE WISDOM OF A PAUSE,
THERE IS ALSO THE RELATED QUESTION OF HOW LONG WE CAN AND SHOULD
EXTEND PHASE 3. I SHOULD PERHAPS MENTION A FEW OF MY OTHER CONCERNS
HERE. I AM A BIT DISMAYED AT THE SLOW PACE OF ARAB FORCES ARRIVING
ON THE SCENE. THEN THERE IS THE PROBLEM OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
ARRANGEMENTS. LAST, THERE ARE ALL THE QUESTIONS OF WHAT WE SHOULD
AND COULD DO IF IRAQ WERE TO ATTACK JORDAN OR ISRAEL.

1.4(c)



LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING WITH YOU SHORTLY. BEST REGARDS.

GEORGE

END TEXT.

ECL: OADR
0023

SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0023 <TOR> 901018130044 MSG000277563644

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DIST>
RT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
IT: HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 270134Z NOV 90

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQ

THIS TRANSMISSION IS CLASSIFIED TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF
PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
IS UNCLASSIFIED.

TO: CHARLES POWELL
ASSISTANT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

FROM: ROBERT M. GATES
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CHARLES:

I KNOW BRENT HAS SENT YOU A MESSAGE BUT I JUST WANT TO LET
YOU KNOW PERSONALLY HOW TERRIBLY SADDENED I AM BY THE TURN OF
EVENTS IN LONDON. I AM PERHAPS THE ONLY SENIOR OFFICIAL WHO HAS
BEEN IN OUR GOVERNMENT CONTINUOUSLY (AT CIA AND THE NSC) DURING
THE ENTIRE TIME MRS. THATCHER HAS BEEN PRIME MINISTER. I CANNOT
TELL YOU WHAT A GREAT INSPIRATION AND EXAMPLE SHE HAS BEEN. FROM
PREPARING AND READING CABINET LINE MESSAGES WHEN I WORKED HERE
FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI TO MY MORE RECENT CALLS ON HER WITH LARRY
EAGLEBURGER, I HAVE ALWAYS MARVELED AT HER COURAGE,
STEADFASTNESS AND PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE. WHAT A
REMARKABLE AND TRUE ALLY. WE ALL WISH HER WELL. HER ADMIRERS
ARE LEGION AND HER PLACE IN HISTORY IS SECURE. AND WORKING WITH
YOU HAS BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY PLEASURE AND PRIVILEGE.

WARM REGARDS AND VERY BEST WISHES,

BOB GATES

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0095

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0095 <TOR> 901126203158 MSG000280960318

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0753-MR
JL 6/6/12

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RT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
IT: HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 181634Z DEC 90
(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

**DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET**
bah 6/12/14

(SUBJ> EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT
IN SPECIAL UNDERSTANDINGS

(TEXT>ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

1000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ROBIN BUTLER FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT
IN SPECIAL UNDERSTANDINGS

- 1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 12 DECEMBER.
- 2. I AGREE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR AN EXCHANGE ON SPECIAL UNDERSTANDINGS.
- 3. THE TEXTS WHICH YOU HAVE SUGGESTED ARE FINE, AS IS AN ORAL EXCHANGE ON THE MILDENHALL UNDERSTANDING.
- 4. AS YOU SUGGEST, AND AS WAS DONE LAST YEAR, WE WILL PREPARE TWO ORIGINALS OF EACH OF THE TWO LETTERS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE, AND YOU WILL DO LIKEWISE.
- 5. THE LETTERS SHOULD BE DATED TWENTY-ONE DECEMBER.
- 6. I ASSUME THAT IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LETTERS WILL ALREADY HAVE BEEN SIGNED BY THE TWO LEADERS. WE SUGGEST THAT THE TWO LEADERS ACKNOWLEDGE DURING PRIVATE TIME THAT THE LETTERS ARE BEING EXCHANGED BETWEEN YOU AND ME. THEY COULD ALSO REFER TO THE MILDENHALL UNDERSTANDING AT THAT TIME.
- 7. THESE UNDERSTANDINGS ARE, OF COURSE, NOT ONLY HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. REAFFIRMING THEM IS BOTH AN IMPORTANT PRACTICE AND A STATEMENT OF THE CONTINUATION OF A UNIQUELY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP.
- 8. WE LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

BEST REGARDS,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2009-0753-MA
6/12/2014 MM

END TEXT

ECL: OADR

0046

(SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0046 <TOR> 901218114208 MSG000282829328

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
49. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office London Re: CABO Secure Voice Support (1 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>
PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT
SIT: FILE HOTLINE OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 262140Z DEC 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
0000

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0753-MK
31 6/6/12

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER JOHN
MAJOR FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DECEMBER 26, 1990

DEAR JOHN,

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE. BARBARA AND I
GREATLY APPRECIATED YOUR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE SUCH A LONG TRIP AT
SO BUSY A TIME. WE PARTICULARLY ENJOYED BEING ABLE TO INVITE YOU
AND NORMA TO CAMP DAVID WHERE THE ATMOSPHERE IS SO CONDUCTIVE TO
AN INFORMAL BUT INTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. OUR DISCUSSIONS
WERE ABSOLUTELY INVALUABLE TO ME, ESPECIALLY SO AS TOGETHER WE
HEAD INTO THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE CRITICAL DAYS AHEAD.

I HAD A GOOD DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 24 WITH SECRETARY CHENEY
AND GENERAL POWELL, FOLLOWING THEIR RETURN FROM THE GULF.
DESPITE SOME OF THE CONFUSING PRESS STORIES YOU MAY HAVE SEEN
PURPORTING TO DESCRIBE WHAT THEY TOLD ME, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT
NOTHING IN THEIR REPORT INVALIDATED THE DISCUSSIONS YOU AND I
HAD. INDEED, THEY REAFFIRMED FOR ME THE STRATEGY OUTLINES WE
AGREED UPON AND WE WILL BE PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS WE DISCUSSED.

AS WE GO FORWARD IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, IT WILL BE
ESSENTIAL THAT WE STAY IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH. I HOPE THAT 1991
WILL BE A WONDERFUL YEAR BOTH FOR THE MAJORS AND FOR US-BRITISH
UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

00070

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0070 <TOR> 901226164307 MSG000283538587

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RT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT UHL
IT: HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 050056Z JAN 91
ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE
TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT>ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
QQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ROBERT M. GATES,
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, THE WHITE HOUSE, TO SIR
ROBERT BUTLER, CABINET OFFICE LONDON AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR ROBIN,

LEN APPELYARD WOULD BE WELCOME ON MONDAY, AND I WOULD BE HAPPY
TO MEET WITH HIM. PLEASE HAVE HIM CALL MY OFFICE AT (202) 456-
1257 ON MONDAY MORNING TO CONFIRM THE ARRANGEMENTS, BUT PERHAPS
WE CAN PLAN TENTATIVELY ON 1:30 P.M. SECRETARY BAKER WILL BE
RAISING ELEMENTS OF THE SUBJECT OF OUR CONVERSATION WITH DOUGLAS
MURD, BUT I AM HAPPY TO SIT DOWN WITH LEN.

HAPPY NEW YEAR TO YOU AND CHARLES.

WARM REGARDS

BOB.

END TEXT:

0097

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0097 <TOR> 910104200112 MSG000284328072

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0753-MR
3/10/2014 MM

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(IT: HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 090051Z JAN 91

(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

(TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
10000

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0753-MK
JL 6/6/12

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE U.N. DEADLINE FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN
TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM KUWAIT. AS PART OF OUR BROADER ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL STRATEGY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE IN PLACE
ADEQUATE MEASURES TO DEAL WITH ANY POSSIBLE INTERRUPTION IN OIL
SUPPLIES.

IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A STRONG
REACTION IN OIL MARKETS, REINFORCED BY THE PROBABILITY OF
TEMPORARY LOSS OF SOME OIL FROM THE GULF. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS
BETTER TO BE VISIBLY PREPARED NOW THAN TO BE FORCED TO REACT
LATER.

SINCE 1974 WE HAVE WORKED HARD TOGETHER IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY AGENCY (IEA) TO ENSURE OUR ENERGY SECURITY. A DECISION BY
THE IEA BEFORE JANUARY 15 TO TAKE COORDINATED ACTION IN THE EVENT
OF HOSTILITIES WOULD REASSURE MARKETS AS WELL AS SEND A CLEAR
SIGNAL TO SADDAM HUSSEIN. IT WOULD ALSO LESSEN ECONOMIC DAMAGE
TO US, THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GENERALLY.

THEREFORE, I HAVE ASKED MY OFFICIALS TO WORK WITH THEIR
COLLEAGUES IN OTHER IEA COUNTRIES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A PROGRAM
OF COORDINATED ACTION. SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD CALL ON IEA MEMBERS
TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF OIL TO MARKETS. FOR OUR PART,
THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO 1.5 MILLION
BARRELS A DAY OF OIL FOR ONE MONTH FROM THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM
RESERVE, IF IT PROVED NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THESE EMERGENCY
MEASURES.

I HAVE WRITTEN HELMUT KOHL AND TOSHIKI KAIFU REQUESTING THAT
GERMANY AND JAPAN, AS HOLDERS OF SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC STOCKS,
COMMIT TO MAKING AVAILABLE A PROPORTIONATE AMOUNT OF THIS OIL TO
ENSURE COORDINATED ACTION. OTHER IEA COUNTRIES MUST TAKE
COMPLEMENTARY ACTION.

THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE IEA GOVERNING BOARD,
CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN ENSURING COORDINATED ACTION BY THE IEA.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL IEA COUNTRIES MAKE A COMMENSURATE
CONTRIBUTION, IN PARTICULAR HOLDERS OF STRATEGIC STOCKS. I URGE
YOU TO DIRECT YOUR OFFICIALS TO JOIN US IN RAPIDLY IDENTIFYING A

CONSENSUS AMONG KEY IEA COUNTRIES AND REACHING FORMAL AGREEMENT.
PERHAPS YOU COULD PERSONALLY URGE HELMUT KOHL TO TAKE THIS
DECISION.

THE MAJOR OIL PRODUCERS RESPONDED QUICKLY TO OUR REQUESTS
FOR ADDITIONAL OIL PRODUCTION AFTER AUGUST 2. IN THE EVENT OF
HOSTILITIES, THEY HAVE STRESSED THE NEED FOR QUICK ACTION BY THE
IEA COUNTRIES TO HELP CALM THE MARKET.

I SHARE THESE CONCERNS AND TRUST YOU DO TOO. COORDINATED
ACTION TO COUNTER A POTENTIAL SUPPLY DISRUPTION WILL COMPLEMENT
OUR MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ENSURE FULL IRAQI
COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR
0113

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0113 <TOR> 910108200104 MSG000284673664

DIST>
RT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
IT: HOTLINE_OUT
PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 191954Z JAN 91

ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

SUBJ> CABO SECURE VOICE SUPPORT

TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AT START OF BUSINESS
MONDAY MORNING

TO KEN DAVIES, CABINET OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECRETARIAT
FROM NEIL O'LEARY, DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: CABO SECURE VOICE SUPPORT

1. WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY INFORMS ME THAT YOU HAVE
APPROVED THE WHITE HOUSE TEAM'S INSTALLATION OF CABO SECURE VOICE
PHONE AT RAF ALCONBURY BEGINNING TUESDAY, 22 JANUARY 1991. ONE
OF MY STAFF, DENNIS CHENEY, WILL BE ACCOMPANYING THE WHCA TEAM.
I WOULD APPRECIATE IF YOU, OR ONE OF YOUR STAFF, COULD BRIEF HIM
ON THE OPERATIONS (LOCATIONS/PROCEDURES) AT YOUR END AND ANY
POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS YOU ENVISION THAT COULD IMPROVE SERVICE
BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT.

2. WE ARE HAVING A PROBLEM SUPPORTING AN ADDITIONAL SECURE VOICE
LINK BETWEEN GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND SIR ROBIN BUTLER DUE IN GREAT
PART TO THE COMMUNICATIONS DEMAND CREATED BY DESERT STORM
OPERATIONS. I HAVE INFORMED GENERAL SCOWCROFT OF THIS AND HE
UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEM. I JUST DO NOT SEE ANY WAY THAT WE WILL
BE ABLE TO PROVIDE DIRECT CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN THE GENERAL AND
SIR ROBIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRESUME A SHARED PHONE LINE
BETWEEN CHARLES POWELL AND SIR ROBIN IS STILL A TECHNICAL OPTION.

3. DESPITE HOLIDAY, I WILL BE IN MONDAY MORNING. PLEASE CALL IF
I CAN BE OF ANY HELP.

REGARDS.

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR
0039

SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0039 <TOR> 910119150346 MSG000285606225

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2009-0753-MR
JL 6/6/12

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
54. Cable	White House to Cabinet Office Re: From Brent Scowcroft to Charles Powell (1 pp.)	1/30/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: United Kingdom (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993 [1]

Date Closed:	2/13/2009	OA/ID Number:	91115-007
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

(DIST>
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IT: HOTLINE_OUT
(PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 031654Z FEB 91

(ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

(TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

(TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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2009-0753-MR

8 6/6/12

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

DEAR CHARLES:

AS WE GO THROUGH THE THIRD WEEK OF WAR, I THOUGHT I MIGHT STEP BACK
AND OFFER YOU A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE GULF. I WOULD
WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS. WE ARE THINKING ABOUT PUTTING TOGETHER A
MILITARY BRIEFING TEAM THAT MIGHT COME BY LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE
AND SHARE AN EVEN MORE DETAILED PICTURE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER,
SUPPLEMENTING THE INFORMATION WE ARE ALREADY SHARING DAY BY DAY.

THE MILITARY PICTURE IS QUITE PROMISING. THE FIRST PHASE OF OUR AIR
CAMPAIGN IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE AND AIR
DEFENSE SYSTEM IS NOW POWERLESS TO INTERFERE WITH OUR OPERATIONS.
WE BELIEVE THE FLIGHT OF SOME OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO IRAN IS SYMPTOMATIC
OF A DESPERATE JUDGMENT THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE EVEN
A CHANCE OF PRESERVING SOME OF THEIR BETTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE FUTURE.
WE HAVE NOTED THE ASSURANCES FROM TEHRAN ABOUT THESE AIRCRAFT.
WE DOUBT THEY WILL BE REEMPLOYED IN THE WAR AGAINST US. WE HAVE
SEEN NO SIGNS OF PREPARATION FOR SUCH USE AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO PREPARE AND MAINTAIN THE AIRCRAFT FOR SUCH OPERATIONS WHILE THEY
REMAIN IN IRAN. THE IRANIANS WILL DISPOSE OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH IRAN'S INTERESTS. IF THEY ARE USED AGAINST US,
WE WILL BE READY TO DEAL WITH THAT.

OTHER OBJECTIVES IN THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN INCLUDED
THE DISRUPTION OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CAPABILITY AND DEGRADATION OF ITS NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
SYSTEM. THOSE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. WHERE PARTICULAR
FACILITIES SUFFERED ONLY PARTIAL DAMAGE, WE ARE NOW FOLLOWING UP TO
FINISH THE JOB. NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL, ALONG WITH COMMAND
AND CONTROL IN KUWAIT, CONTINUES TO BE HIT (19 OF 20 NATIONAL COMMAND
FACILITIES HAVE BEEN ATTACKED) AND CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

IRAQ RETAINS SUBSTANTIAL STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH SOME,
SUCH AS MUSTARD GAS, MAY POSE A THREAT FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THE
NERVE AGENTS WILL DETERIORATE IN WEEKS AND BAGHDAD WILL HAVE
DIFFICULTY PRODUCING MORE OR FILLING THEM INTO MUNITIONS. IRAQ'S
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, AND PETROCHEMICAL
PLANTS HAVE ALL SUFFERED SEVERE DAMAGE AS WELL.

WE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: THE ISOLATION
AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQ'S FORCES IN KUWAIT. I SHOULD NOTE HERE THAT,
ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THE SCUD THREAT (PERHAPS
50-200 SORTIES A DAY), THIS EFFORT HAS ALREADY PAID OFF IN REDUCED

NUMBERS OF MISSILE ATTACKS AND IS NOT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE DISRUPTED IRAQ'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY ITS FORCES IN KUWAIT AND THAT THE BOMBING IS TAKING AN INCREASING TOLL ON THE FORCES THEMSELVES. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT OVER 75% OF THE IRAQI NAVY HAS BEEN SUNK OR DISABLED, AND SURVIVING CRAFT ARE INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR OWN SURVIVAL. AS YOU KNOW, YOUR FORCES HAVE MADE AN ESPECIALLY LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO THIS NAVAL EFFORT.

RECENT IRAQI OFFENSIVE PROBES INTO SAUDI ARABIA, ALONG WITH ATTEMPTS TO REPOSITION THEIR FORCES -- POSSIBLY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION -- HAVE OFFERED NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR AIRPOWER. WE BELIEVE OUR STRIKES MAY ALREADY HAVE BROKEN UP AT LEAST ONE ATTACK BY III CORPS AND HAVE CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO IRAQI UNITS. THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS ARE BEING HIT DAY AND NIGHT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SADNESS HERE ABOUT ANY LOSS OF OUR SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN, IRAQ'S APPARENT EFFORT TO EMBROIL US IN COSTLY GROUND BATTLES IS PROVING COSTLY ONLY FOR BAGHDAD. THERE ARE SIGNS OF MORALE PROBLEMS IN THE IRAQI UNITS -- ONE INFANTRY DIVISION IS REPORTING THAT THOUSANDS OF ITS TROOPS HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE RANKS.

WE CERTAINLY DO NOT FEEL COMPLACENT. THERE MAY WELL BE ADDITIONAL MISSILE ATTACKS OR OFFENSIVE SALLIES. THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IS QUITE HIGH, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET IT. THE AIR CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. WE WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO LAUNCHING ANY GROUND CAMPAIGN BEFORE WE ARE READY, OR BEFORE SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS. RECENT AIR ATTACKS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IRAQ'S ABILITY TO LAUNCH ATTACKS THAT WOULD REQUIRE A SUBSTANTIAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE BY THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES.

POLITICALLY THE COALITION REMAINS SOLID. OUR POSITION ON WHAT SADDAM MUST DO TO END THE WAR IS UNCHANGED. ALTHOUGH WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON THE RANGE OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN WAR TERMINATION AND POSTWAR ARRANGEMENTS, AND WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS IN GREATER DETAIL WITH YOU SOON, THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT QUICK CONVENING OF A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS YOU MIGHT GUESS, WE THINK SUCH PLANS ARE PREMATURE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING AGAIN WITH YOU SOON.

SINCERELY,
BRENT SCOWCROFT

BT

#0129

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0129 <TOR> 910203115827 MSG000286891107

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<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 160223Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

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PER E.O. 13526
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<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

FEBRUARY 15, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN:

I TOTALLY AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW, IN YOUR JANUARY 31 MESSAGE,
THAT BRITIAN IS ALSO ENTITLED TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
TO SUPPORT YOUR SPLENDID MILITARY EFFORT IN THE GULF. I AM
GLAD TO HEAR THAT YOU HAVE SOME SUCCESS WITH GERMANY AND THE
ARAB STATES.

WE WILL ENDORSE YOUR EFFORTS TO RECEIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND
THE SUMS ALREADY COMMITTED TO US. YOUR EIGHT PERCENT TARGET IS A
GOOD ONE, PROVIDED THE DONORS DO NOT REDUCE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE
U.S. BY THAT AMOUNT. WE WOULD WELCOME COORDINATION OF OUR
BIDS FOR FINANCIAL HELP. I UNDERSTAND THAT JIM BAKER HAS ALREADY
BEEN TALKING TO DOUGLAS HURD ABOUT HOW TO FRAME THE DISCUSSION
WITH JAPAN.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU SEE PARTICULAR OPPORTUNITIES WHERE
WE NEED TO HELP, OR CHARLES CAN CONTACT BRENT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0054

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0054 <TOR> 910215225047 MSG000287967047

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IT: HOTLINE_OUT

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ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

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~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SIR CHARLES POWELL, FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1991

CHARLES --

HERE IS THE TEXT OF A GENERAL LETTER TO THE COALITION PARTNERS
WHICH WE DISCUSSED A FEW MINUTES AGO.

BRENT

BEGIN ATTACHMENT:

DEAR

I WANTED TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS
AND MORE GENERALLY ON WHERE WE STAND. I FIRST HEARD FROM PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV YESTERDAY, FEBRUARY 18, ON THE VISIT OF IRAQI FOREIGN
MINISTER AZIZ TO MOSCOW. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WROTE ME THAT HE HAD
PROPOSED TO THE IRAQIS A PLAN IN WHICH IRAQ WOULD ANNOUNCE THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT BY A DATE CERTAIN, TO BE
FOLLOWED BY A TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND, THE NEXT DAY, BY THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS THEMSELVES. IRAQ WOULD RECEIVE A
GUARANTEE THAT ITS TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED AND
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV ALSO DEPICTED A LARGE ROLE FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,
BOTH DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND, IN A MANNER THAT
RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF LINKAGE.

I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S LETTER,"
EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE THAT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BE
UNCONDITIONAL AND IMMEDIATE AS CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 660. I
NOTED MY CONCERN OVER THE UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF THE IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTING THAT IRAQ SHOULD BE PERMITTED NO MORE THAN
26 HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS TASK. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY
FOR IRAQ TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS
AND EXCHANGE ALL POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS HELD
AGAINST THEIR WILL. LAST, I UNDERLINED THAT WE COULD NOT BE DRAWN
INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL.

I HAVE SINCE SENT A SECOND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, ONE THAT
REFLECTED ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HIS LETTER BY ME AND MY MOST
SENIOR ADVISORS. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE THEMES OF MY
EARLIER COMMUNICATION, I IMPRESSED UPON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT
THERE COULD BE NO CEASE-FIRE BEFORE A MASSIVE WITHDRAWAL FROM
KUWAIT WAS UNDERWAY AND NO CESSATION OF THE OVERALL STATE OF

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HOSTILITIES UNTIL THAT WITHDRAWAL WERE COMPLETED. ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD RISK THE LIVES OF COALITION FORCES. I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES; AT THE SAME TIME, ANY IRAQI BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS WOULD BRING INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE. THE EXCHANGE OF POWS AND OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 24 HOURS. FINALLY, THE IRAQIS HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT ANY USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON THEIR PART WOULD TRIGGER NOT ONLY A MASSIVE COALITION MILITARY RESPONSE BUT WOULD AFFECT THE COALITION'S TREATMENT OF IRAQ IN THE WAR'S AFTERMATH.

IN SHORT, AND AS I SAID PUBLICLY, THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS DOES NOT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS; THAT SAID, WE ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON DIPLOMACY. THE IRAQIS KNOW AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WHAT THEY MUST DO. IN THE MEANTIME, WE ARE CONTINUING WITH OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREPARATIONS. I WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS; AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD HOPE YOU WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME ABOUT ANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED HERE.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

SECRET

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0072 <TOR> 910219143046 MSG000288282646

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ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

TO>TO CABINET OFFICE

TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS
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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0753-MR

8 6/6/12

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
ERENT SCOWCROFT.

WE ARE PROVIDING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT STATEMENT
OF PROPOSED COALITION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AN IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL SHOULD THE IRAQIS' COME FORWARD WITH AN
INITIATIVE REQUIRING A COALITION RESPONSE. IT TAKES INTO
ACCOUNT SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU.

BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OFFER

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL WITHDRAW
IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT IS LONG OVERDUE.
IF THAT DECISION IS REAL, WE WELCOME IT. WE AND OUR COALITION
PARTNERS HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, SO LONG AS IT IS FULLY
CONSISTENT WITH ALL TWELVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

THE WORLD HAS GOOD REASON TO TREAT IRAQI COMMITMENTS WITH
SKEPTICISM. THE COALITION HAS HEARD SUCH PLEDGES FROM THE IRAQI
GOVERNMENT BEFORE. IN THE FIRST WEEK AFTER ITS INVASION, IRAQ
PROMISED TO WITHDRAW AND INSTEAD REINFORCED ITS MILITARY FORCES IN
KUWAIT. IRAQ ALSO PLEDGED IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 NOT
TO INVADE KUWAIT. THE WORLD IS NOW LIVING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THOSE BROKEN PROMISES.

STRICT, PROMPT, AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC
RESOLUTION 660 AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS REMAINS THE
ONLY PATH TO PEACE. THAT MEANS IRAQ MUST IMMEDIATELY BEGIN
TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM ALL OF KUWAIT, SO THAT
KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN BE RESTORED.
AND IT MEANS IRAQ CAN ATTACH NO CONDITIONS TO ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM
KUWAIT. FINALLY, UNTIL IRAQ FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIES,
RESOLUTION 678'S AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE REMAINS IN
EFFECT.

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION MUST SEE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE
EVIDENCE OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE AND OUR
COALITION PARTNERS REQUIRE IRAQ TO BEGIN TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING
STEPS WITHIN 12 HOURS:

-- BEGIN A MASSIVE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT TO BE
COMPLETED IN 96 HOURS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADED AND
OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN 96
HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET

RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.

- TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE COMPLETE, IRAQ MUST, WITHIN THE FIRST 48 HOURS, REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY, FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER, FROM BUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS, AND FROM KUWAIT'S MUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD;
- IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660, ALL IRAQI FORCES MUST, WITHIN THE 96 HOURS SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1. THOSE FORCES THAT WERE DEPLOYED WELL NORTH OF THE IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER ON AUGUST 1, THEREFORE, MUST NOT ONLY LEAVE KUWAIT, BUT RESUME THEIR AUGUST 1 POSITIONS.
- ARRANGE WITH THE ICRC THE RELEASE OF ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED COALITION SERVICEMEN, WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;
- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES OR BOOBY-TRAPS ON KUWAITI OIL INSTALLATIONS;
- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT OR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT;
- HALT ALL CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN KUWAIT;
- ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE;
- CEASE ALL FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING USE OF SCUD MISSILES AND TERRORISM BY IRAQ OR ITS SURROGATES AGAINST ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING ISRAEL;
- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES; AND
- DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS WISH TO REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES. ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BRING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

END TEXT:

ECL: OADR

0091

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0091 <TOR> 910221161913 MSG000288461953

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<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHARLES POWELL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

FEBRUARY 25, 1991

WE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE
THIS EVENING AT 10:30 P.M., WASHINGTON TIME. WE WILL OBVIOUSLY
NEED TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AT THE UN OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

BEGIN TEXT:

WE CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. WE HAVE HEARD NO REASON TO
CHANGE THAT. AND BECAUSE THERE IS A WAR ON, OUR FIRST CONCERN
MUST BE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. AND COALITION TROOPS.

WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THIS MOST RECENT CLAIM ABOUT IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL IS GENUINE. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THE IRAQI
ARMY IS WITHDRAWING. IN FACT, IRAQI UNITS ARE CONTINUING TO
FIGHT. MOREOVER, WE REMEMBER WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TANKS
PRETENDED TO SURRENDER AT KHAJJI, ONLY TO TURN AND FIRE. WE
REMEMBER THE SCUD ATTACKS TODAY AND SADDAM'S MANY BROKEN PROMISES
OF THE PAST. THERE ARE AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL 22 DEAD AMERICANS
TONIGHT WHO OFFER SILENT TESTIMONY TO THE INTENTIONS OF SADDAM
HUSSEIN.

THE STATEMENT OUT OF BAGHDAD TODAY SAYS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
FORCES WILL FIGHT THEIR WAY OUT WHILE RETREATING. WE WILL NOT
ATTACK UNARMED SOLDIERS IN RETREAT. BUT WE WILL CONSIDER
RETREATING COMBAT UNITS AS A MOVEMENT OF WAR.

THE ONLY WAY SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN PERSUADE THE COALITION OF THE
SERIOUSNESS OF HIS INTENTIONS WOULD BE FOR HIM PERSONALLY AND
PUBLICLY TO AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL WE ISSUED ON
FEBRUARY 22 AND (BECAUSE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM BAGHDAD REFERRED
TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE) PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY TO ACCEPT
EXPLICITLY ALL RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,
INCLUDING ESPECIALLY UNSC RESOLUTION 662 (IRAQI RECISION OF ITS
PURPORTED ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT) AND UNSC RESOLUTION 674 (IRAQI
COMPENSATION TO KUWAIT AND OTHERS).

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0129 <TOR> 910225235245 MSG000288834765

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DISPATCH
FROM: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
TO: HOTLINE_OUT PRES_MSGS
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE <CLASS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220735Z MAR 91

ORIGIN: FM WHITE HOUSE

TO: TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TEXT: ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

12 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JOHN,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
OFFER WAS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS
TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN
IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO
COMPULSIVE THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO
NEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS
TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE
WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS,
AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD
FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT
AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND
IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE
RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO
EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO
WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING
PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS,
ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE
REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH
THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2004-1953-MR
01/17/2008 MM

THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

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