

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files

OA/ID Number: 91114
Folder ID Number: 91114-006

Folder Title:
France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	3	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Cable	Re: Message form General Brent Scowcroft to Jacques Attali (1 pp.)	3/1/89	(b)(1)	S
02. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	5/23/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Cable	Re: for President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	6/6/89	(b)(1)	S
04. Cable	Re: Message from President George Bush to President Francois Mitterrand (2 pp.)	6/13/89	(b)(1)	C
05. Cable	Re: Message to Jacques Attali from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	7/1/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (4 pp.)	7/6/89	(b)(1)	S
07. Cable	Re: Message to M. Jacques Attali from General Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	9/12/89	(b)(1)	TS
08. Cable	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President George Bush (2 pp.)	9/19/89	(b)(1)	S
09. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	9/25/89	(b)(1)	S
11. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	10/4/89	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files

Series: Presidential Correspondence Files

Subseries: Head of State Message Files

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Pinksheet Number: cap961

OA/ID Number: 91114-006

Date Closed: 2/10/2009

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	S
14. Cable	Re: Message to Jacques Attali to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/22/89	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Jacques Attali (1 pp.)	1/2/90	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Jacques Attali (1 pp.)	1/2/90	(b)(1)	S
17. Cable	Re: Message to Monsieur Jacques Attali from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	2/15/90	(b)(1)	S
18. Cable	Re: Message to Jacques Attali from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/2/90	(b)(1)	S
19. Cable	Re: Message to Jacques Attali from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/13/90	(b)(1)	T
20. Cable	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President Bush (4 pp.)	4/17/90	(b)(1)	S
21. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (3 pp.)	5/3/90	(b)(1)	S
22. Cable	Re: Message from the President to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)	5/22/90	(b)(1)	S
23. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	5/30/90	(b)(1)	S
24. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (3 pp.)	6/4/90	(b)(1)	S

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25. Cable	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	6/12/90	(b)(1)	S
26. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (8 pp.)	6/21/90	(b)(1)	S
27. Cable	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President George Bush (2 pp.)	6/26/90	(b)(1)	S
28. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	7/1/90	(b)(1)	S
29. Cable	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President George Bush (1 pp.)	7/20/90	(b)(1)	S
30. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	8/04/90	(b)(1)	S
31. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Jacques Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	S
32. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S
33. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	8/18/90	(b)(1)	S
34. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Jacques Lanxade from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	8/23/90	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
35. Cable	Re: Message from the President to President Mitterrand fo France (2 pp.)	9/5/90	(b)(1)	S
36. Cable	Re: Message to Jacques Attali from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	9/7/90	(b)(1)	S
37. Cable	Re: Letter to President Mitterrand from President Bush (3 pp.)	10/5/90	(b)(1)	S
38. Cable	Re: Letter to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	12/1/90	(b)(1)	C
39. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	12/1/90	(b)(1)	C
40. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	12/7/90	(b)(1)	S
41. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	12/8/90	(b)(1)	S
42. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	12/12/90	(b)(1)	S
43. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Jacques Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	C
44. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1)	S
45. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Jacques Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/3/91	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
46. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/21/91	(b)(1)	S
47. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/22/91	(b)(1)	S
48. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (4 pp.)	2/26/91	(b)(1)	S
49. Cable	Re: Message from General Scowcroft to Admiral Lanxade (2 pp.)	3/12/91	(b)(1)	S
50. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	3/22/91	(b)(1)	S
51. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (2 pp.)	3/30/91	(b)(1)	S
52. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/5/91	(b)(1)	S
53. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	TS
54. Cable	Re: Message to Peirre Morel from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S
55. Cable	Re: Message to Peirre Morel from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	5/1/91	(b)(1)	S
56. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	5/3/91	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
57. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	6/1/91	(b)(1)	S
58. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Scowcroft (2 pp.)	6/3/91	(b)(1)	S
59. Cable	Re: Message to General Quesnot from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	6/7/91	(b)(1)	TS
60. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (4 pp.)	7/4/91	(b)(1)	S
61. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (3 pp.)	7/11/91	(b)(1)	S
62. Cable	Re: Message to Peirre Morel from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	7/12/91	(b)(1)	S
63. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	8/28/91	(b)(1)	S
64. Cable	Re: Message to Hubert Vedrine from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	10/4/91	(b)(1)	S
65. Cable	Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Hubert Vedrine (2 pp.)	10/14/91	(b)(1)	S
66. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	11/16/91	(b)(1)	S
67. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (3 pp.)	1/24/92	(b)(1)	S
68. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Francois Mitterrand (3 pp.)	1/29/92	(b)(1)	S
69. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	2/5/92	(b)(1)	S

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
70. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (3 pp.)	2/12/92	(b)(1)	S
71. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	3/16/92	(b)(1)	C
72. Cable	Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Secretary General Hubert Vedrine (2 pp.)	4/2/92	(b)(1)	C
73. Cable	Re: Message to Mr. Hubert Vedrine from Mr. Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/4/92	(b)(1)	C
74. Cable	Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to General Qesnot (1 pp.)	4/17/92	(b)(1)	C
75. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	5/5/92	(b)(1)	C
76. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	5/31/92	(b)(1)	C
77. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)	6/21/92	(b)(1)	C
78. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	6/23/92	(b)(1)	C
79. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	6/26/92	(b)(1)	C
80. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)	7/25/92	(b)(1)	S
81. Cable	Re: Message from Brent Scowcroft to Elysee Secretary General Hubert Vedrine (1 pp.)	8/5/92	(b)(1)	C

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
82. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	8/17/92	(b)(1)	C
83. Cable	Re: Message to Prime Minister Major Be Shared with President Mitterrand (1 pp.)	8/19/92	(b)(1)	C
84. Cable	Re: Message to Hubert Vedrine from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	8/20/92	(b)(1)	TS
85. Cable	Re: Message from President George Bush to President Francois Mitterrand (1 pp.)	9/8/92	(b)(1)	C
86. Cable	Re: Message to Elysee Secretary General Hubert Vedrine from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	9/12/92	(b)(1)	S
87. Cable	Re: Message to President Francois Mitterrand from President George Bush (1 pp.)	9/12/92	(b)(1)	C
88. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	9/21/92	(b)(1)	C
89. Cable	Re: Message to General Quesnot from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	10/5/92	(b)(1)	TS
90. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	10/6/92	(b)(1)	C
91. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)	10/15/92	(b)(1)	C
92. Cable	Re: Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand (2 pp.)	10/15/92	(b)(1)	C

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
93. Cable	Re: Message from President George Bush to President Francois Mitterrand (1 pp.)	11/2/92	(b)(1)	C
94. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	11/5/92	(b)(1)	C
95. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)	11/11/92	(b)(1)	S
96. Cable	Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)	11/28/92	(b)(1)	C
97. Cable	Re: Message from President George Bush to President Francois Mitterrand (1 pp.)	12/14/92	(b)(1)	C
98. Cable	Re: Message from President George Bush to President Francois Mitterrand (1 pp.)	1/1/93	(b)(1)	C
99. Cable	Re: Message to General Brent Scowcroft from General Quesnot (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	C

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

[illegible]

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S	Y	Y	S	T	E	MM
S	Y	Y	S	T	E	M
SSS	Y		SSS	T	EEEE	M
S	Y		S	T	E	M
S	Y		S	T	E	M
SSSS	Y		SSSS	T	EEEE	M

BBB BBBB	LL	UU	UU	EEEE
BBB BBBB	LL	UU	UU	EEEE
BB BB	LL	UU	UU	EE
BB BB	LL	UU	UU	EE
BB BB	LL	UU	UU	EE
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BBBBBBBB	LLLLLLLLLLLL	UUUUUUUUUU	UUUUUUUUUU	EEEE

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	000000	UU	UU	TTTTTTTTTT
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....	00	00	UU	TT
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....	000000	UUUUUUUUUU		TT

Job BLUE (442) queued to 204Z on 8-JAN-1993 11:54 by user SYSTEM, UIC [SYSTEM,MANAG
started on printer WAXC\$LIAO; on 8-JAN-1993 11:54 from queue 204Z.

[illegible]

<DIST>

PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT

SIT: COQ HOTLINE-OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 010134Z MAR 89

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, TO
JACQUES ATTALI, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

-
DEAR JACQUES,

-
I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU MOST SINCERELY FOR YOUR KIND WORDS OF
CONGRATULATIONS UPON MY APPOINTMENT.

-
AS IN THE PAST, WE INTEND TO RELY UPON THIS CHANNEL TO ENSURE
THE UTMOST PRIVACY IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT BUSH
AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. I WILL ALSO USE THE CHANNEL
WHenever I MUST COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU. REST ASSURED
THAT WE HOLD ALL MESSAGES TRANSMITTED OVER THIS CIRCUIT IN
THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.

-
THERE ARE A GREAT MANY ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN THAT WE WILL BE
ADDRESSING IN THE FUTURE, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE
CLOSE COOPERATION THAT HAS TRADITIONALLY EXISTED BETWEEN OUR
TWO OFFICES.

-
WITH BEST WISHES,

-
BRENT SCOWCROFT

#0014

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0014 <TOR> 890228231534 MSG000226019734

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2000 0253 F/2 2009-0727-MR
01 11/23/10 SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>

PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT

SIT: COQ HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 231553Z MAY 89

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE FRANCE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS SENSITIVE EYES - ONLY

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
THEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO PARIS TO BRIEF YOU IN
ADVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE
THEM ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME
EXPLAINING THE PROPOSAL. I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT
HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

#0224

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0224 <TOR> 890523115506 MSG000233236506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR

SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>
PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 062334Z JUN 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

DEAR FRANCOIS,

AS ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS IN FOLLOWING UP ON WHAT WE ACHIEVED TOGETHER AT THE SUMMIT, U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS WILL SHORTLY BE BRIEFING NATO'S HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE (HLTF) ON MY PROPOSAL FOR INCLUSION OF LAND-BASED COMBAT AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND U.S. AND SOVIET MANPOWER IN NATO'S CFE PROPOSAL.

I WRITE TO RAISE WITH YOU A POINT RELATED TO THE AIRCRAFT ISSUE, AND TO LET YOU KNOW THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE JUNE 7 HLTF WILL DISCUSS ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL CEILINGS FOR BOTH AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS. THOSE FIGURES ARE BASED ON NATIONAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE HLTF, INCLUDING THOSE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT. WE HOPE THAT ANALYTICAL EFFORTS BY OUR EXPERTS WILL FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD COMPLETION OF A REVISED NATO PROPOSAL THAT TAKES ACCOUNT OF WHAT WE DECIDED IN BRUSSELS.

MY GOVERNMENT SHARES THE FRENCH VIEW THAT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN AIRCRAFT THAT ARE PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS, AND AIRCRAFT THAT ARE DUAL-CAPABLE OR DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR NUCLEAR MISSIONS. NONETHELESS, THE CFE MANDATE MAKES CLEAR THAT DUAL-CAPABLE SYSTEMS SHOULD NEITHER BE EXCLUDED NOR SINGLED OUT IN THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE, IN PREPARING OUR MILITARY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AIRCRAFT REDUCTIONS, U.S. ANALYSTS HAVE INCLUDED THOSE U.S., FRENCH, U.K., AND OTHER DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT THAT WERE PROVIDED IN THE NATIONAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE DATABASE ON AIRCRAFT.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT AIRCRAFT WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FRANCE'S INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT STRATEGY WOULD BE CUT WHEN CFE REDUCTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED. RATHER, OUR ANALYSIS REACHES AN OPPOSITE CONCLUSION: THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO MAKE ANY CUTS IN THOSE FRENCH AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO MEET THE ALLIANCE'S GOAL OF A 15 PERCENT REDUCTION IN AIRCRAFT. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A CRUCIAL POINT I MADE TO YOU DURING OUR EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE NATO SUMMIT.

I KNOW YOU SHARE MY CONVICTION THAT THE WEST SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO TURN OUR SUMMIT AGREEMENTS INTO PROPOSALS WE CAN USE TO CHALLENGE THE EAST AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN VIENNA. IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT I HAVE URGED MY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS TO PRESS FORWARD IN DEVELOPING A PRACTICAL APPROACH FOR INCORPORATING AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS, AND MANPOWER INTO A REVISED NATO PROPOSAL. I KNOW MY COLLEAGUES LOOK FORWARD TO A FRUITFUL EXCHANGE AT THE HLTF.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR

SCS 9/22/11

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH

#0310

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0310 <TOR> 890606194152 MSG000234474111

<DIST>
PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 130321Z JUN 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH,
TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

LETTER TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DEAR FRANCOIS,

AS YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE SEEN, I ANNOUNCED TODAY THE OUTLINES OF
THE NEW CLEAN AIR LEGISLATION THAT I AM SENDING TO CONGRESS. I
KNOW THAT CLEAN AIR IS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUE IN FRANCE AND
THAT CLIMATE QUESTIONS WILL BE A MAJOR ITEM ON OUR AGENDA FOR THE
PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT. I THEREFORE WANTED TO INFORM YOU
PERSONALLY ABOUT MY DECISION.

THE TARGETS THAT I HAVE CHOSEN WILL CUT SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
IN HALF BY THE YEAR 2000 AND REDUCE NITROGEN OXIDE POLLUTANTS AS
WELL. THIS WILL GREATLY REDUCE ACID RAIN IN BOTH THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA.

THESE REDUCTIONS WILL BE VERY COSTLY FOR SOME OF OUR ELECTRIC
UTILITY COMPANIES WHICH HAVE OLDER COAL-BURNING POWER PLANTS. IN
ORDER TO KEEP THE COSTS FROM ESCALATING UNREASONABLY, I HAVE
INTRODUCED AN ELEMENT OF FLEXIBILITY AND MARKET INCENTIVE. AN
IMPORTANT FEATURE IN MY PLAN WILL ALLOW UTILITIES TO TRADE
REQUIRED REDUCTIONS SO THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE MOST
EFFICIENT, LEAST COSTLY WAY. MY UNDERLYING APPROACH IS TO HARNESS
MARKET FORCES TO ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS.

MY LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS ALSO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF URBAN
SMOG AND THE RELEASE OF TOXIC CHEMICALS INTO THE AIR. WE WILL BE
SEEKING TO HAVE AMERICAN CITIES MEET RIGOROUS STANDARDS FOR
REDUCTIONS OF GROUND-LEVEL OZONE AND CARBON MONOXIDE BY 1995. WE
PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN PART BY PUTTING UP TO A MILLION CLEAN-
FUELED VEHICLES A YEAR ON THE ROAD BY 1997. WE WILL ALSO BE
REQUIRING FACTORIES TO EMPLOY THE BEST TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE TO
ACHIEVE A CUT OF ABOUT 75% IN AIR-BORNE TOXIC POLLUTANTS
SUSPECTED OF CAUSING CANCER.

THESE ARE TOUGH ISSUES POLITICALLY. CONGRESS HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
PASS ANY CLEAN-AIR LEGISLATION FOR THE PAST 12 YEARS. I AM
CONVINCED SUCH LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, AND I INTEND TO
WORK HARD TO GET IT THROUGH CONGRESS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU ON ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES IN THE COMING MONTHS. I KNOW THAT YOU AGREE THAT IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE CONVINCE OUR OWN PUBLICS AND INTERNATIONAL
OPINION THAT A SOUND ENVIRONMENT AND A STRONG ECONOMY NEED NOT BE
AT ODDS.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0727- MR
SCS 9/22/11

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

#0357

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0357 <TOR> 890612232427 MSG000235005867

<DIST>

PRT: COQ COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 010022Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO JACQUES ATTALI
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DEAR JACQUES:

AS YOU WOULD EXPECT, WE ARE PLANNING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
IMPENDING TRIP TO POLAND AND HUNGARY. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE
ISSUE OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN WORLD BANK LOANS AND AN IMF
STAND-BY HAS EMERGED. WE EXPECT TO BE PRESSED BY THE POLES TO
DELINK FROM THE CONCLUSION OF AN IMF STAND-BY THE TWO PROJECT
LOANS (TOTALING \$325 MILLION DOLLARS) FOR POLAND THAT HAVE
BEEN JUDGED BY THE WORLD BANK STAFF TO BE ECONOMICALLY VIABLE.
WHILE WE WOULD BE OPPOSED TO THIS IF CONSIDERING IT STRICTLY ON
ECONOMIC GROUNDS, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND MAY WARRANT
A DIFFERENT VIEW.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THIS ISSUE AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE INTEND TO PUT THE QUESTION TO THE PRESIDENT
EARLY NEXT WEEK.

DECL: OADR

#0083

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0083 <TOR> 890630202733 MSG000236550453

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR

SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>

PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER SIT

SIT: COQ HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 061754Z JUL 89

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> *** INCOMPLETE CABLE ***

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR FRANCOIS,

THE IMPRESSIONS YOU SHARED WITH ME FROM YOUR RECENT TRIP TO POLAND
WERE MOST WELCOME AND TIMELY. YOUR LETTER EVOKED THE VERY
STIMULATING CONVERSATIONS I SO MUCH ENJOYED AT KENNEBUNKPORT.

LOOKING BACK AT SOME OF THE THEMES WE PURSUED AT KENNEBUNKPORT,
AND NOW YOUR COMMENTS ON POLAND, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE WITNESSES TO
ONE OF THOSE RARE PERIODS OF HISTORY THAT MARK THE MOVEMENT FROM ONE
ERA TO ANOTHER, A PERIOD NOT JUST OF TRANSITION BUT OF
TRANSFORMATION. WE DISCUSSED CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT THE CHANGES GOING ON IN EASTERN EUROPE MAY BE THE MOST
PROFOUND AND DURABLE.

POLAND -- AND HUNGARY -- ARE UNDERTAKING BOLD EXPERIMENTS IN
RESTRUCTURING THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. IT IS VITAL THAT
THESE EXPERIMENTS SUCCEED. IF THEY DO, NOT ONLY THE PEOPLES OF
POLAND AND HUNGARY, BUT COUNTLESS OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD WHO ARE
WAITING AND WATCHING WILL CONCLUDE NOT ONLY THAT FREEDOM WORKS BUT
THAT FREEDOM IS ATTAINABLE.

THE FATE OF THESE COUNTRIES, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY, MAY HINGE ON
HOW WE FACE THIS CHALLENGE TOGETHER IN PARIS. IF WE CAN SEIZE THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO HELP MAKE EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE, THAT WOULD TRULY BE A
FITTING COMMEMORATION OF THE BICENTENNIAL OF 1789.

NATURALLY, THE FUTURE OF POLAND AND HUNGARY RESTS PRINCIPALLY WITH
THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS. YET, AS YOU EMPHASIZED IN YOUR LETTER,
THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES HAVE AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN
SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES, SUCH AS SOLIDARITY, THAT HAVE ASKED
PLAINLY AND DIRECTLY FOR HELP. I VERY MUCH AGREE WITH YOUR
CONCLUSION THAT THIS SUPPORT MUST INCLUDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ALONG
WITH A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE WAY THESE ECONOMIES OPERATE.

I WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS OF THE
ECONOMIC SUMMIT GROUP JOIN TOGETHER TO ESTABLISH A WESTERN CONSORTIUM
TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM BASED ON POLITICAL PLURALISM IN POLAND AND
HUNGARY. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE
ASSISTANCE EFFORTS HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECT AND THAT WE SPEAK IN CONCERT

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2009-0727-MR

SCS 9/22/11

SO AS TO EDUCATE AND ENCOURAGE THE LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC REFORMS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS.

AS I ENVISION THE CONSORTIUM, IT WOULD BE HEADED BY THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE PARIS SUMMIT. THE GROUP WOULD COORDINATE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AND HUNGARY SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THESE RESOURCES ARE SUFFICIENT, TO AVOID REDUNDANCY AND TO ASSURE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONALITY. THE CONSORTIUM WOULD OF COURSE WORK CLOSELY WITH THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM AND RECOVERY.

WHAT I HAVE IN MIND IS AN AD HOC ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD DERIVE ITS IMPETUS FROM THE PARIS SUMMIT WITHOUT BEING FORMALLY LINKED TO IT. A CONNECTION WITH THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MIGHT HELP ALLAY SOVIET SUSPICIONS THAT THE CONSORTIUM WOULD HAVE A POLITICAL/ MILITARY OBJECTIVE. THE LEADERSHIP WOULD COME FROM THE SEVEN, AND THE SIZE AND OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE CONSORTIUM COULD BE REVISED IN A PRAGMATIC WAY ONCE WE GAINED EXPERIENCE. A SIMILAR CONSORTIUM, CREATED WITHIN THE OECD, WORKED WELL IN HELPING TURKEY THROUGH SOME ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TIMES IN THE EARLY 1980S. AS IN THAT EXAMPLE, THE CONSORTIUM WOULD COOPERATE WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE PARIS CLUB AND WOULD IN NO WAY UNDERCUT THEM.

I BELIEVE THAT THE CREATION IN PARIS OF SUCH A MECHANISM FOR ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION WOULD SEND A POWERFUL MESSAGE TO THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND PEOPLES OF POLAND AND HUNGARY THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE READY TO WORK WITH THEM AS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS PROCEED. IT WOULD BE A NEW MEANS OF STRENGTHENING OUR DIALOGUE WITH THESE COUNTRIES AND OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE. AND, IF HANDLED PROPERLY, IT COULD HAVE POSITIVE REPERCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCEPT OF A CONSORTIUM, I HAVE DECIDED TO ASK THE US CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES, IN THE RANGE OF \$100 MILLION, FOR POLAND AND HUNGARY TO BE USED TO PROMOTE PRIVATE AND DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BOTH COUNTRIES. THE GRANTS WOULD HELP TO ASSIST PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS, PROVIDE NEEDED OUTSIDE INVESTMENT, STRENGTHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, AND

#0123
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0123 <TOR> 890706135726 MSG000237045446

<DIST>
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SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXWHXX <DTG> 061754Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>*** INCOMPLETE CABLE ***
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

FUND NEW TRAINING, MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND OTHER PROJECTS.

PERHAPS FRANCE AND OTHER INTERESTED NATIONS MIGHT PROVIDE DIFFERENT FORMS OF ASSISTANCE SO THAT, TOGETHER, WE MIGHT ATTACK A WIDE RANGE OF OBJECTIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE NATION MIGHT HELP WORKERS RETRAIN AND ADJUST TO NEW JOBS; ANOTHER MIGHT FOCUS ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT (PERHAPS AS PART OF THE BROAD WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE I SUGGESTED IN MY SPEECH AT MAINZ AT THE END OF MAY). HOW BEST TO MAKE OUR RESPECTIVE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS COMPLEMENTARY COULD BE ANOTHER MATTER FOR DISCUSSION IN THE CONSORTIUM.

IN ADDITION, AS I ANNOUNCED IN APRIL, I SHARE YOUR BELIEF THAT IT IS TIME TO UNDERTAKE A SUSTAINABLE RESCHEDULING OF POLAND'S DEBTS. OUR FINANCIAL SPECIALISTS HAVE BEEN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION IN THE PARIS CLUB. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESCHEDULE POLAND'S DEBT EXPEDITIOUSLY IN A GENEROUS AND FLEXIBLE MANNER THAT PERMITS POLAND TO MAKE ITS PAYMENTS AND STILL IMPORT THE ESSENTIALS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY. A FIRST STEP SHOULD BE RESCHEDULING IN ADVANCE OF AN IMF STAND-BY AGREEMENT.

FINALLY, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INFORM THE WORLD BANK THAT WE SUPPORT BANK APPROVAL OF VIABLE PROJECT LOANS FOR POLAND, AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY REFORMS THERE ARE UNDERWAY. THE BANK STAFF HAS ALREADY PROCESSED TWO LOANS TOTALLING \$325 MILLION, FOR INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING AND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, THAT SEEM WORTHY ON THEIR ECONOMIC MERITS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS CONCERNING THESE INITIATIVES. I WAS ALSO IMPRESSED BY THE INITIATIVES YOU ANNOUNCED DURING YOUR TRIP TO POLAND AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING ABOUT THEM IN MORE DETAIL. ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WHEN WE MEET IN PARIS, I WOULD ALSO WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR WARSAW ON JULY 9. I WILL ALSO BE WRITING TO OUR OTHER SUMMIT SEVEN COLLEAGUES.

RIGHT NOW, AND ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN CHINA, THERE IS NO GLOBAL ISSUE MORE IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING OUR FUTURE THAN THE OUTCOME OF THE CHANGES NOW UNDER WAY IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE IDEAS THAT I HAVE PROPOSED, ALONG WITH YOUR OWN IDEAS AND THOSE OF OUR SUMMIT PARTNERS CAN, I BELIEVE, HELP TO SHAPE A NEW REALITY FOR EUROPE -- AND FOR THE WORLD.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE

END TEXT

#0124

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0124 <TOR> 890706135826 MSG000237045506

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SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 122124Z SEP 89
<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE ATTALI

<TEXT>ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO M. JACQUES ATTALI,
SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE MY SCHEDULE SO AS TO BE IN WASHINGTON
ON SEPTEMBER 27 AFTER ALL, AND I WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO GET
TOGETHER WITH YOU FOR A REVIEW OF THE KEY ISSUES FACING US.

AS OF NOW MID-DAY SEEMS FEASIBLE, SO LET'S PLAN ON LUNCH AT THE
WHITE HOUSE AT 12:30. SHOULD AN EMERGENCY OCCUR AND THROW THIS
PLAN OFF, I WILL OF COURSE BE IN TOUCH TO RESCHEDULE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0690

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0690 <TOR> 890912172548 MSG000242933148

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0727-MK
01 31811

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 192129Z SEP 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WANTED TO FOLLOW UP OUR PHONE CONVERSATION WITH A FEW COMMENTS
ABOUT THE VISIT OF BORIS YELTSIN TO THE U.S. HIS VISIT PRESENTED
US WITH SOMETHING OF A DILEMMA: WE NEEDED TO FIND A WAY TO
RECEIVE YELTSIN TO DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO PLURALISM BUT
WITHOUT GIVING HIM A PLATFORM TO EMBARRASS GORBACHEV.

RATHER THAN RECEIVING YELTSIN MYSELF, I ASKED BRENT SCOWCROFT, MY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, TO MEET WITH HIM AND I "DROPPED BY"
UNANNOUNCED. MY CONVERSATION WITH YELTSIN WAS BRIEF AND I
IMPRESSED UPON HIM MY DESIRE TO SEE PERESTROIKA SUCCEED; MY
POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS; AND THE VALUE I PLACE ON MY RELATIONSHIP WITH
GORBACHEV.

WE ALSO TOOK OTHER STEPS TO DOWNPLAY THE VISIT -- FOR EXAMPLE, WE
AVOIDED GIVING HIM A PLATFORM WITH THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS BY
BRINGING HIM IN A SIDE DOOR. I FRANKLY THINK WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN
YELTSIN MORE PUBLICITY HAD WE NOT INVITED HIM TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

I BELIEVE WE MANAGED THE YELTSIN VISIT WITHOUT DAMAGING THE
RELATIONSHIP WITH GORBACHEV. YELTSIN, HIMSELF, RATHER
PRESUMPTUOUSLY TOLD BRENT THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO EXPLOIT HIS
MEETING WITH ME TO EMBARRASS GORBACHEV. INTERESTINGLY, HE ALSO
PROFFERED THAT "THOUGH HIS OWN POPULARITY WAS RISING WHILE THAT
OF GORBACHEV WAS FALLING," GORBACHEV IS CURRENTLY THE SOVIET
UNION'S LEADER AND HE SUPPORTS HIM.

IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT GORBACHEV UNDERSTOOD THE SPIRIT OF THE
YELTSIN VISIT, I ASKED BRENT TO BRIEF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR OF
THE DISCUSSIONS AND OUR EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE PUBLICITY.

MY PERSONAL VIEW OF YELTSIN IS THAT HE IS SELF-IMPRESSED AND
AMBITIOUS -- A VIEW SHARED BY MANY AMERICANS WHO MET HIM. FOR
INSTANCE, WHEN REMINDED UPON HIS ARRIVAL THAT HIS MEETING WAS
WITH BRENT, HE STOOD FOR SEVERAL MINUTES -- ARMS CROSSED -- IN
THE BASEMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE DEMANDING ASSURANCES THAT HE
WOULD SEE ME. HE RECEIVED NO SUCH ASSURANCES BUT WENT THROUGH
WITH THE APPOINTMENT. IN SUM, BORIS YELTSIN DID NOT MAKE A
PARTICULARLY GOOD OFFICIAL IMPRESSION; THOUGH ON A PERSONAL BASIS
HE WAS GREGARIOUS AND PLEASANT. IT WAS LIKE TALKING TO AN OLD
CITY HALL POLITICIAN IN ILLINOIS. I'M SURE YOU SAW THE BLAST IN

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2009-0727-MR

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

08/ 5/11/05

2005-0818-MR

*PRAYDA ON YELTSIN. THOUGH OVERSTATED, THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF
TRUTH IN THAT ARTICLE.

I ENJOYED OUR CHAT AND HOPE THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT
TO LEBANON WILL RESULT IN PROGRESS BEING MADE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0011

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0011 <TOR> 890919180644 MSG000243540404

<DIST>

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SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 221552Z SEP 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF A LETTER
THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE DELIVERED TO ME YESTERDAY
FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN AWAITING A
RESPONSE TO MY LETTERS TO GORBACHEV ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL,
CFE AND OTHER ISSUES. GORBACHEV'S REPLY SHOWS, IN MY JUDGMENT,
THAT HE WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL.

THE LETTER CONCENTRATES COMPREHENSIVELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON ARMS
CONTROL AND CONTAINS A NUMBER OF INTERESTING SUGGESTIONS,
ALTHOUGH SOME MAY HAVE STRINGS OR CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THEM.
THE MOST FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS ARE IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS
CONTROL: GORBACHEV SAYS HE WILL DISMANTLE THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR;
DROP SOVIET INSISTENCE ON A FIXED PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE ABM TREATY; AND AGREES TO WORK WITH US ON A PACKAGE OF START
VERIFICATION AND STABILITY MEASURES, BUT WITH THE IDEA OF
EXPANDING THOSE DISCUSSIONS TO INCLUDE ALL SYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE
LIMITED IN START.

I AM ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIET DECISION TO DISMANTLE
THE ILLEGAL KRASNOYARSK RADAR -- LONG A VISIBLE SYMBOL OF SOVIET
DISREGARD FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. GORBACHEV ADDS
THAT HE EXPECTS THE U.S. TO RECIPROCATATE BY MEETING SOVIET
CONCERNS REGARDING THE U.S. RADARS IN GREENLAND AND GREAT BRITAIN
-- RADARS THAT WE, OF COURSE, BELIEVE TO BE FULLY WITHIN THE
CONFINES OF THE ABM TREATY. WE CANNOT ALLOW THOSE U.S. RADARS TO
BECOME AN ISSUE AND WE WILL MAKE THAT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS.
STILL, I THINK THAT THE KRASNOYARSK DECISION REPRESENTS A STEP
FORWARD.

ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, GORBACHEV PROPOSES MINISTERIAL
MEETINGS IN VIENNA TO PUSH THE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG AND A CFE
SUMMIT IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1990 TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT. WE WILL
HAVE TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT WHETHER SUCH MINISTERIALS WOULD
SERVE OUR INTERESTS. GORBACHEV ALSO HINTS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT
BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT SUBJECTING MORE OF THEIR AIRCRAFT TO CFE
LIMITATIONS -- SOMETHING THAT WE WILL DEFINITELY WANT TO
FOLLOW-UP. NOT SURPRISINGLY, GORBACHEV REITERATES HIS DESIRE TO
HOLD IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF AND, AS HE MENTIONED IN
STRASBOURG, NOTES THAT HE IS CONSIDERING MAJOR UNILATERAL

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AS AMENDED
5/11/05
2005-0818-MR

REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET SNF.

THE LETTER ALSO REFERS TO THE POSSIBILITY FOR BREAKTHROUGH ON AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. I AGREE WITH GORBACHEV THAT WE ARE CLOSE TO SOLVING THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS OF THE 1974 AND 1976 NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES. WE ALSO HOPE TO MAKE MAJOR PROGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT. I AM WRITING TO YOU SEPARATELY ON THE DETAILS OF OUR CW EFFORT.

I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO LEARN IN THE LETTER OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ATTEND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL. I AM NOW HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY ON PLANNING THE CONFERENCE.

FINALLY, MR. SHEVARDNADZE AND I HAD A VERY PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF THE TIMING OF A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT. I HOPE THAT THIS ISSUE WILL BE RESOLVED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND, IN THAT EVENT, I WILL BE IMMEDIATELY IN TOUCH WITH YOU.

I BELIEVE THAT THE GORBACHEV LETTER IS INDICATIVE OF THE GENERALLY GOOD STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE PROGRESS IS, OF COURSE, BASED ON THE STRENGTH OF OUR ALLIANCE AND, IN THAT REGARD, I WANT YOU TO KNOW AGAIN HOW MUCH I DEPEND ON OUR PERSONAL COLLABORATION.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

P.S. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THERE WILL BE AGREEMENT THAT THE SUMMIT WILL BE HELD BY MID-YEAR 1990.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0047

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0047 <TOR> 890922115553 MSG000243777353

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXGRI <DTG> 250112Z SEP 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH. DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 18 ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. AS I PREPARE MY REMARKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY I WANTED TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON AN ISSUE WE
AGREE IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR COUNTRIES. I SHARE
YOUR VIEW THAT THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS MUST BE
SOLVED QUICKLY. AS I SEE IT, THE PROBLEM IS NOT ONLY THE THREAT
POSED BY SOVIET CAPABILITIES, BUT -- IN SOME WAYS EVEN MORE
DANGEROUS -- BY THE EROSION OF RESTRAINTS IN THE THIRD WORLD ON
THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS, AS WELL AS THEIR CONTINUED
PROLIFERATION.

I HAVE APPRECIATED YOUR PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SEEK PROGRESS
TOWARD A WORLD WIDE BAN ON THESE WEAPONS, AND THE IDEAS IN YOUR
LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 18. I SHARE THIS COMMITMENT. TO THAT END, I
WANT YOU TO KNOW OF THE FOLLOWING COMMITMENTS THAT I AM PREPARED
TO MAKE.

-- DESTRUCTION OF 98 PERCENT OF OUR CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE
WITHIN EIGHT YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION, PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF THE PARTIES.

-- TOTAL ELIMINATION OF OUR STOCKPILE WITHIN TEN YEARS AFTER
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION, PROVIDED ALL CHEMICAL
WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES BECOME PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION BY THE
EIGHTH YEAR, OR TOTAL ELIMINATION WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE TIME
WHEN ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES DO BECOME PARTIES,
WHICHEVER IS LATER.

-- AS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CONTINUE,
REDUCTION OF OUR STOCKPILES TO LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF ITS
CURRENT LEVEL, PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO REDUCE ITS
STOCKPILE TO THE SAME LEVEL UNDER MUTUALLY AGREED TERMS,
INCLUDING SUITABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE INSPECTION OF THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROCESS.

VERIFICATION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IS AND WILL REMAIN
A DAUNTING CHALLENGE, MAKING IT VITAL THAT WE EXPLORE ALL AVENUES
TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITIES. I HAVE DIRECTED MY PEOPLE TO MAKE A
REDOUBLED EFFORT TO TACKLE THE REMAINING VERIFICATION
UNCERTAINTIES. WE RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE HAD WITH SOVIET
PRONOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THEIR EXISTING STOCKPILE LEVELS. I BELIEVE

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THAT THE APPROACH I HAVE SUGGESTED CAN HELP REDUCE THE
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE SIZE OF THESE STOCKS AND BRING ABOUT THE
VERIFIED DESTRUCTION OF A LARGE QUANTITY OF SOVIET CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. MOREOVER, I BELIEVE THE DANGERS CAUSED BY SPIRALING
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE PROCEED
ALONG THE STEPS I HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE.

I RAISED MY CONCERNS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE,
AND ASKED SECRETARY BAKER TO DISCUSS MY APPROACH IN DETAIL WITH
HIM. I INTEND TO ANNOUNCE THESE STEPS IN MY ADDRESS BEFORE THE
UNITED NATIONS.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT THE APPROACH I AM ADVOCATING. I
BELIEVE THAT MY PROPOSALS ACHIEVE THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN
PURSUING AN AGREEMENT AND MAINTAINING THE SECURITY OF OUR FRIENDS
AND ALLIES, ESPECIALLY DURING THE REDUCTIONS PERIOD ASSOCIATED
WITH A BAN.

LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT IN THIS, AS IN ALL OTHER FUNDAMENTAL
ISSUES OF MUTUAL IMPORTANCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, FRANCE'S
VIEWS WILL CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0112

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0112 <TOR> 890924211551 MSG000243983751

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 040542Z OCT 89

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I AM WRITING TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ABOUT THE
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS IN POLAND. THE
FORMATION OF A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT UNDER PRIME MINISTER
MAZOWIECKI, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS DRAMATIC TRANSFORMATION
TOOK PLACE, PUTS POLAND AT THE FOREFRONT OF PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE.

AS WE WERE SAYING ON THE PHONE RECENTLY, THE EVENTS IN POLAND ARE
HISTORIC, WITH THE POTENTIAL TO TRANSFORM AND OVERCOME THE
POST-WAR DIVISION OF EUROPE. PRIME MINISTER MAZOWIECKI AND HIS
GOVERNMENT HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE MEANINGFUL
ECONOMIC REFORM, WHICH WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR A MORE PROSPEROUS
FUTURE. BUT THAT OPPORTUNITY MAY BE SHORT-LIVED, IF THE POLISH
PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT ECONOMIC REFORM SIMPLY MEANS MORE AUSTERITY.

MY ADMINISTRATION HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS LAST WEEK WITH KEY
MINISTERS IN THE NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT AND REVIEWED THE OUTLINES
OF THEIR ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. AS THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED
AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING OF THE GROUP OF 24 IN BRUSSELS, IT IS AN
AMBITIOUS AND BOLD PLAN, CALLING FOR RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORM AND
RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF. AN INTEGRAL PART
OF THE PLAN IS AN URGENT REQUEST FOR WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
IN HELPING TO STABILIZE THE POLISH ECONOMY AS REFORMS ARE
IMPLEMENTED. IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF, THE
POLES SEEK, IN ADDITION TO IMF AND WORLD BANK SUPPORT, \$1 BILLION
IN STABILIZATION FUNDS FROM THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. OUR
OWN CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT THIS FIGURE IS ABOUT RIGHT.

I WANT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO POLAND'S REQUEST AND TO ENCOURAGE THE
WEST'S CONCERTED ACTION TOWARD THAT END. I HAVE DECIDED TO SEEK
FROM CONGRESS A \$200 MILLION GRANT FOR STABILIZATION PURPOSES, AS
THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE \$1 BILLION IN WESTERN ASSISTANCE THE
POLES HAVE REQUESTED. THIS GRANT WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON
CONCLUSION OF AN IMF AGREEMENT, AND UPON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
AN EXPERTS' MISSION THAT I PLAN TO SEND TO POLAND SOON. I
BELIEVE WESTERN ASSISTANCE FOR THIS PURPOSE SHOULD TAKE THE FORM
OF GRANTS RATHER THAN LOANS, WHICH WOULD ONLY ADD TO POLAND'S
ENORMOUS EXTERNAL DEBT.

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2009-0727-MR

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I WILL BE MAKING A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON OCTOBER 4, BECAUSE I CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT TO ACT QUICKLY SO AS TO HELP SOLIDIFY SUPPORT WITHIN POLAND FOR THE NEW REFORM PROGRAM. MY ANNOUNCEMENT WILL ALSO REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO WORKING TOGETHER WITH YOU AND OUR ECONOMIC PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN CONCERTED ACTION IN SUPPORT OF POLAND'S REFORMS.

I HOPE FRANCE WILL MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS \$1 BILLION MULTILATERAL STABILIZATION FUND TO MEET POLAND'S URGENT NEEDS, SINCE THE CONCEPT CAN BE EFFECTIVE ONLY IF IT IS FULLY FUNDED. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP THE POLES SUCCEED WITH A REFORM PLAN THAT HAS IMF APPROVAL. A PROMPT WESTERN COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE THE FULL \$1 BILLION IN GRANTS UPON CONCLUSION OF AN IMF AGREEMENT WOULD BE A STRONG INCENTIVE FOR THE POLES TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THEIR REFORMS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IMF.

I ALSO PLAN TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL PRESIDENTIAL MISSION TO POLAND CONSISTING OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS WHO WOULD DISCUSS AND EVALUATE POLISH NEEDS AND PLANS. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR REPORT, AND AFTER CONSULTATION WITH YOU, WITH THE EC COMMISSION, AND WITH OTHER MAJOR DONORS, I WOULD THEN FORMULATE A MORE DETAILED PLAN FOR HOW BEST TO STRUCTURE LONG TERM U.S. ASSISTANCE TO POLAND. THE PLAN WOULD BE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO STIMULATE POLISH AGRICULTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND HELP TO MAKE POLAND ECONOMICALLY VIABLE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. I WILL ALSO ASK THIS GROUP TO MAKE ITS FINDINGS AVAILABLE TO THE GROUP OF 24.

IN THAT CONTEXT, I AM VERY GRATIFIED BY THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN DEVELOPING CONCERTED WESTERN ACTION, AND BY THE EC "ACTION PLAN" ANNOUNCED IN BRUSSELS SEPTEMBER 26. AS THE GROUP CONTINUES TO DEVELOP A COMMON GENERAL STRATEGY, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S., FRANCE, AND THE OTHER G-7 COUNTRIES TO TAKE AN ACTIVE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN CHARTING ITS AGENDA.

I SHALL BE SHARING SOME OF THESE SAME THOUGHTS WITH OUR OTHER G-7 PARTNERS AND WITH COMMISSION PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS. I WOULD WELCOME HEARING MORE ABOUT YOUR OWN PLANS WITH RESPECT TO POLAND, AS WELL AS YOUR VIEWS ON OUR COORDINATION EFFORTS.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0172

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0172 <TOR> 891004014226 MSG000244777346

<DIST>
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SIT: COQ HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 311252Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA BLUE CHANNELS

GOQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW BEFORE IT IS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I WILL MEET ABOARD U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL
VESSELS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON DECEMBER 2 AND 3 TO REVIEW THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TO DISCUSS U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE WILL BE A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT
IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER OF
NEXT YEAR. THAT IS SOME TIME DISTANT AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND
I HAVE AGREED THAT AN EARLIER INFORMAL MEETING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS
AT THIS TIME OF RAPID AND HISTORIC CHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL.

I DO NOT INTEND A DETAILED NEGOTIATING SESSION DURING THESE
DECEMBER TALKS NOR DO I EXPECT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I
WILL CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING ON ANY
ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANCE. WITH REGARD TO CFE, I WILL NATURALLY
EXPLAIN THE WEST'S CURRENT POSITION AND HEAR OUT ANY NEW IDEAS
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MAY HAVE.

AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT, AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE WRITTEN
TO EACH OTHER OFTEN, I WANT AGAIN TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT
WITH HIM. I HOPE TO GET A BETTER SENSE OF HOW HE VIEWS THE
DEMAND OF PERESTROIKA AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF EAST-WEST AND
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD TO SHARING MY
IMPRESSIONS WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0330

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0330 <TOR> 891031074951 MSG000247132191

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR

SLC 9/22/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 311252Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW BEFORE IT IS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I WILL MEET ABOARD U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL
VESSELS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON DECEMBER 2 AND 3 TO REVIEW THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND TO DISCUSS U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE WILL BE A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT
IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER OF
NEXT YEAR. THAT IS SOME TIME DISTANT AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND
I HAVE AGREED THAT AN EARLIER INFORMAL MEETING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS
AT THIS TIME OF RAPID AND HISTORIC CHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL.

I DO NOT INTEND A DETAILED NEGOTIATING SESSION DURING THESE
DECEMBER TALKS NOR DO I EXPECT THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I
WILL CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING ON ANY
ISSUES OF SIGNIFICANCE. WITH REGARD TO CFE, I WILL NATURALLY
EXPLAIN THE WEST'S CURRENT POSITION AND HEAR OUT ANY NEW IDEAS
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MAY HAVE.

AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT, AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE WRITTEN
TO EACH OTHER OFTEN, I WANT AGAIN TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT
WITH HIM. I HOPE TO GET A BETTER SENSE OF HOW HE VIEWS THE
DEMAND OF PERESTROIKA AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF EAST-WEST AND
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD TO SHARING MY
IMPRESSIONS WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0330

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0330 <TOR> 891031080009 MSG000247132809

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0727-MR
SLC 9/22/11

<DIST>

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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 222213Z DEC 89

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO JACQUES ATTALI, SPECIAL
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT, FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

■
BEGIN TEXT:

■
WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU. I HAVE PENCILED IN LUNCH WITH
YOU ON MY CALENDAR AT NOON ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 5.

■
HAPPY HOLIDAYS. WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

■
END TEXT

■
DECL: OADR

#0674

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0674 <TOR> 891222171710 MSG000251659030

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR

SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>
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SIT: COO HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEKADS <DTG> 021855Z JAN 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELLYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000

-
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

-
TO: MR. JACQUES ATTALI
SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC
ELYSEE PALACE

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR JACQUES:

-
I WILL BE DELIGHTED TO JOIN YOU AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY
FOR OUR LUNCH ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 5 AT NOON. LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOU. HAPPY NEW YEAR.

-
/S/ BRENT

-
END TEXT

-
DECL: OADR
#0027

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0027 <TOR> 900102135903 MSG000252597543

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0727-MR
SCS 9/22/11

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELLYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

-
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

-
TO: MR. JACQUES ATTALI
SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC
ELYSEE PALACE

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR JACQUES:

-
I WILL BE DELIGHTED TO JOIN YOU AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY
FOR OUR LUNCH ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 5 AT NOON. LOOK FORWARD TO
SEEING YOU. HAPPY NEW YEAR.

-
/S/ BRENT

-
END TEXT

-
DECL: OADR
#0027

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0027 <TOR> 900102135903 MSG000252597543

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0727-MR
SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 150227Z FEB 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MONSIEUR JACQUES
ATTALI, SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

I THINK IT WOULD INDEED BE WORTHWHILE FOR YOU TO COME TO
WASHINGTON, BOTH FOR THE REASONS YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR
MESSAGE AND TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE OTHER RAPIDLY EVOLVING
ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST. THE LATE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY
20 WOULD BE MY FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH
YOU. (P)

I UNDERSTAND THAT SINCE YOU SENT YOUR MESSAGE, DAVID MULFORD
TALKED WITH YOU ABOUT A POSSIBLE G-7 DEPUTIES MEETING, MOST
LIKELY IN EUROPE ON FEBRUARY 26, TO NEGOTIATE OUTSTANDING
ISSUES RELATING TO THE EBRD. I LEAVE IT TO YOUR BEST JUDGMENT
THEN WHETHER OUR MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE OR AFTER
FEBRUARY 26. IN ANY EVENT, I LOOK FOWARD TO GETTING TOGETHER
SOON. (P)

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT:

#0026

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0026 <TOR> 900214215630 MSG000256341390

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR

SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 022213Z MAR 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO JACQUES ATTALI,
SPECIAL COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

I WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO SEE YOU ON MARCH 8. I HAD BEEN
DELAYING A RESPONSE BECAUSE I WAS TRYING TO RESCHEDULE A
PREVIOUS COMMITMENT SO THAT WE COULD HAVE LUNCH TOGETHER.
I AM STILL HOPEFUL, BUT WILL NOT HAVE FINAL WORD UNTIL THE
BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. IF LUNCH DOES NOT PROVE POSSIBLE,
WE CAN IN ANY CASE GET TOGETHER FOR A MEETING IN THE
AFTERNOON. I HOPE TO BE IN TOUCH ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY WITH
A DEFINITE PROPOSAL AS TO THE TIME OF OUR MEETING.

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT:

DECLAS: OADR

#0052

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0052 <TOR> 900302171407 MSG000257706847

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR
SCS 9/22/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~TOP SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 130312Z MAR 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~TOP SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO JACQUES ATTALI,
SPECIAL COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

I WANT TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR EARLIER CONVERSATION ABOUT A MEETING
BETWEEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THREE
POSSIBLE DATES. THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST CHOICE WOULD BE APRIL
23RD, WHEN THE PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOST
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IN FLORIDA. ALTERNATIVELY, A MEETING AT
CAMP DAVID ON EITHER APRIL 16TH OR 19TH WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO
THE PRESIDENT.

WE WOULD SUGGEST TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR ALL THREE DATES: A
MID-DAY ARRIVAL FOR LUNCH AND MEETINGS IN THE AFTERNOON, WITH A
RETURN TO PARIS LATER IN THE AFTERNOON; ALTERNATIVELY, AN ARRIVAL
IN MID-AFTERNOON FOR MEETINGS AND SUPER, WITH DEPARTURE THE FIRST
THING THE FOLLOWING MORNING. PLEASE LET ME KNOW YOUR PRESIDENT'S
PREFERENCE AMONG THESE POSSIBILITIES. IF NONE ARE CONVENIENT, WE
WILL SEEK TO IDENTIFY ANOTHER CHOICE.

THE PRESIDENT VERY MUCH LOOKS FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
ANOTHER INFORMAL, IN DEPTH DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR
#0107

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0107 <TOR> 900312221614 MSG000258588974

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-07-27 ME
EU 311411

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 171642Z APR 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 03

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR FRANCOIS,

-
I AM VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR UPCOMING VISIT AND HAVE
BEEN GIVING IT CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT. EACH OF OUR MEETINGS HAS
BEEN HIGHLY STIMULATING AND PRODUCTIVE, AND I WANT OUR TALKS AT
KEY LARGO TO CONTINUE THAT POSITIVE PATTERN.

-
AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF RELATIVELY SMOOTH AND RAPID TRANSITION IN
EUROPE, WE ARE NOW GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF SOME TURBULENCE AND
UNCERTAINTY. IF EVENTS IN LITHUANIA TAKE THE WRONG TURN OR IF
THE SOVIET STANCE ON GERMAN UNIFICATION PROVES INFLEXIBLE, WE
COULD FACE A DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD.

-
AT KEY LARGO, I HOPE TO DISCUSS IN DEPTH WITH YOU THE MAIN
CHALLENGES THAT WE FACE AND HOW WE CAN WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN
MEETING THEM. AS YOU KNOW, I AM DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE U.S.
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ROLE IN MAINTAINING EUROPEAN
STABILITY. AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT IN THE PERIOD AHEAD
A STRONG U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP IS ESSENTIAL TO THAT STABILITY.

-
MY MOST IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO YOU IS THAT I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD AND WILL REMAIN DEEPLY ENGAGED IN EUROPE AND
IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN ITS BROADEST SENSE. IN RECENT
MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN TALK IN THE U.S. CONGRESS -- AND CONCERN
AMONG EUROPEANS -- ABOUT THE EARLY AND COMPLETE DEPARTURE OF
AMERICAN TROOPS. YOU SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED
STATES INTENDS TO KEEP MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN EUROPE,
SO LONG AS THEY ARE WANTED, AND THAT A BIPARTISAN MAJORITY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT OUR CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE ON
THE CONTINENT.

-
MY CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND MY DESIRE TO
MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE COME TOGETHER
ON THE QUESTION OF GERMANY. DURING OUR BERMUDA CONVERSATIONS
LAST WEEK MARGARET THATCHER PRESENTED FIVE POINTS WITH WHICH I
VERY MUCH AGREE: THAT GERMANY SHOULD RETAIN FULL MEMBERSHIP IN
NATO; THAT GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN IN NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY
STRUCTURES; THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY SHOULD APPLY IN FULL
TO GERMANY (INCLUDING ARTICLES 5 & 6); THAT ALLIED FORCES SHOULD
REMAIN IN GERMANY; AND THAT NATO FORCES IN GERMANY SHOULD RETAIN
A SENSIBLE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CEH 511106
2005-0810 MR

MANY OF OUR ALLIES, WHO ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS, ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT DECISIONS MADE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR WHICH COULD AFFECT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT REGULAR NATO CONSULTATIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR AND ABOUT THE SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION ARE APPROPRIATE, TO REASSURE OUR ALLIES AND GUARANTEE THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS. IN THE SAME WAY, EC MEMBERS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO TURN NATO INTO A FORUM THAT IS MEANT TO PROVIDE BINDING GUIDANCE FOR U.S., FRENCH, BRITISH, OR GERMAN POSITIONS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR DISCUSSIONS. INSTEAD, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FOUR WESTERN ALLIES WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR MEETINGS TO MEET PRIVATELY AND DEVELOP COMMON POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES. OVER THE LAST FOUR DECADES, PRESENTATION OF A SOLID FRONT BY THE U.S., FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND THE FRG HAS SUCCEEDED IN PRESERVING OUR VISION OF A UNITED GERMANY COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY AND FIRMLY TIED TO NATO AND THE EC. WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY NOT LIKE THIS DISPLAY OF OUR SOLIDARITY, THE ANSWER TO SOVIET WEAKNESS IS NOT THE DILUTION OF WESTERN STRENGTH.

BOTH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE STRONG WESTERN DIPLOMATIC POSITION AND TO EASE CONCERNS FROM ALLIES WHO ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS, WE SHOULD BE VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR. THIS GROUP IS SPECIALLY CONSTITUTED BECAUSE OF THE POSTWAR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE FOUR VICTORIOUS POWERS ASSUMED FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE AND FOR BERLIN. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS SHOULD BE TO END THIS LEGACY OF WAR AND RESTORE FULL SOVEREIGNTY TO A PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC, AND UNITED GERMAN STATE.

I WAS THEREFORE DELIGHTED THAT THE WESTERN OFFICIALS IN THE ONE PLUS THREE MEETING ON APRIL 10 AGREED THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER GERMANY'S RIGHT TO REMAIN A FULL MEMBER OF NATO; SHOULD NOT DECIDE THE FATE OF ALLIED CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CURRENT FRG; SHOULD NOT AGREE ON THE FUTURE SIZE OF A UNITED GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES; AND SHOULD NOT REPLACE THE OLD FOUR POWER RIGHTS WITH NEW DISCRIMINATORY LIMITS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY -- A PRESCRIPTION FOR FUTURE INSTABILITY.

THE SOVIET UNION MAY WELL WANT THE TWO PLUS FOUR TO DECIDE ALL OF THESE MATTERS, TO USE THE TWO PLUS FOUR FORUM TO UNDERMINE GERMAN SECURITY TIES TO THE WEST AND THE COHERENCE OF NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE. MY OPPOSITION TO THESE POSSIBLE SOVIET AIMS DOES NOT MEAN I AM INSENSITIVE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION OF GERMAN UNITY. THE USSR SHOULD RECEIVE REASONABLE ASSURANCES ABOUT THE MILITARY STATUS OF

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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SECTION 02 OF 03

THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR IN A UNITED GERMAN STATE, INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS WITH GERMANY FOR THE CONTINUED, IF TEMPORARY, PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES. FURTHER, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO OFFER MOSCOW OTHER, LEGITIMATE OPPORTUNITIES TO RAISE ITS SECURITY CONCERNS -- IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND IN THE UPCOMING TALKS ABOUT U.S. AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. BUT IN NO

EVENT SHOULD WE ALLOW MOSCOW TO MANIPULATE THE TWO PLUS FOUR MECHANISM IN WAYS THAT COULD FRACTURE WESTERN DEFENSE AND GERMANY'S IRREPLACEABLE PART IN IT.

I HOPE YOU AGREE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF EUROPE'S FUTURE. I DO NOT FORESEE THAT THE CSCE CAN REPLACE NATO AS THE GUARANTOR OF WESTERN SECURITY AND STABILITY. INDEED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE HOW A EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT INCLUDING EASTERN EUROPE, AND PERHAPS EVEN THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DETER THREATS TO WESTERN EUROPE.

WHILE OUR COUNTRIES HAVE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ABOUT NATO'S POLITICAL MISSION, IT IS CRUCIAL IN MY OPINION FOR THE ALLIANCE TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY A POSITIVE VISION OF WHAT NATO CAN ACCOMPLISH IN THIS TIME OF CHANGE. SUCH A POSITIVE NATO VISION IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT U.S.-FRENCH AGREEMENT CONCERNING HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE. INDEED, I HOPE FRANCE CAN PLAY AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT PART IN A REINVIGORATED NATO IN THIS NEW AREA. LET ME MAKE MY OWN POSITION CLEAR. NATO, CSCE, AND THE EC SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING WHICH STRENGTHENS NATO HARMS THE COMMUNITY; NOR DO I THINK THAT A STRONGER EC IS BAD FOR THE ALLIANCE.

BUT IF NATO IS RELEGATED SOLELY TO A NARROW MILITARY FUNCTION, ITS IMPORTANCE AND SUPPORT AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS IS BOUND TO DIMINISH AS THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT RECEDES. TO RETAIN ITS VITALITY, THE ALLIANCE MUST HAVE A VISIBLE POLITICAL MANDATE, AS A PLACE WHERE SIXTEEN DEMOCRATIC STATES CAN EXPRESS VIEWS ON BOTH POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS OF COMMON INTEREST. MOREOVER, NATO IS THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE JUSTIFICATION IN MY COUNTRY FOR THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. IF NATO IS ALLOWED TO WITHER BECAUSE IT HAS NO MEANINGFUL POLITICAL PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE, THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT CAN DIE WITH IT.

I BELIEVE THAT NATO NEEDS AN ENHANCED POLITICAL ROLE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET THREAT IS DECLINING. IF YOU AGREE, I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS. TWO NATURAL AREAS WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING IN WHICH NATO COULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ARE THROUGH CREATION OF AN ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION STAFF, AND DISCUSSION OF ALLIED GOALS IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE MEANS OF ATTAINING THEM.

NATO SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE THE EXCLUSIVE FORUM FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS ON ANY SUBJECT. THE EC COUNCIL HAS MADE REGULAR ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT THE GOALS ITS MEMBER STATES WILL BRING TO THE PLANNING FOR A CSCE SUMMIT. NATO SHOULD HAVE THE PARALLEL RIGHT TO ARTICULATE THE OBJECTIVES SHARED BY ALL OF ITS MEMBERS, UNDERSTANDING THAT SOME ALLIANCE MEMBERS MAY WISH TO CONSULT ABOUT THEIR VIEWS IN OTHER INSTITUTIONS TOO. THESE ACTIVITIES IN NATO AND THE EC SHOULD MUTUALLY REINFORCE EACH OTHER. NEITHER ORGANIZATION IN MY JUDGMENT SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PRESENT THE OTHER WITH FAITS ACCOMPLIS ON MATTERS WHERE BOTH HAVE A PROPER INTEREST.

YOU KNOW THAT I AM A STRONG SUPPORTER OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. OUR EFFORT TO DEVELOP CLOSER U.S.-EC TIES REFLECTS OUR RESPECT FOR DECISIONS OF THE TWELVE TO HANDLE CERTAIN MATTERS THROUGH

COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS. THE ENHANCED LINKS THAT WE HAVE IN MIND ARE IN NO WAY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE INCREASED EC INTEGRATION WHICH YOU SEEK -- ON THE CONTRARY, THEY SHOULD SERVE TO ENCOURAGE THIS INTEGRATION, AS HAS ALREADY HAPPENED WITH THE G-24 PROCESS. WHAT WE DO HAVE IN MIND ARE MORE EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL TIES AND DIALOGUE WITH THE COMMUNITY'S STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND WITH THE COMMISSION AT A TIME WHEN THE EC IS EVOLVING RAPIDLY.

RAPID EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WILL MAKE CLOSER U.S.-EC TIES EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. AS THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT BECOMES LESS ACUTE, AMERICANS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS PART OF A BROAD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LINKAGE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONTINENT, INCLUDING A CLOSE CONNECTION WITH THE EC. NOTHING WOULD UNDERMINE U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR TROOP DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE MORE THAN FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO COME TO REGARD AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN EUROPE AS MERCENARIES, DIVORCED FROM A LARGER AND INTENSE U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS WESTERN ALLIES. FRANCE'S SUPPORT IN SUSTAINING AND INVIGORATING THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE ACROSS THE BOARD WILL BE CRUCIAL IN THESE CHANGING TIMES.

BEFORE CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU HOW GRATIFYING IT HAS BEEN TO FIND THAT OUR POSITIONS HAVE BEEN SO CLOSE IN CONSIDERING #0028

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 03

THE FUTURE OF LITHUANIA. WE SHARE A SYMPATHY FOR THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE LITHUANIAN PEOPLE, AND NATURALLY OUR COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER RECOGNIZED THE LEGALITY OF LITHUANIA'S FORCED INCORPORATION INTO THE SOVIET UNION. A VIOLENT SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS, OR STRANGULATION OF THE LITHUANIA INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, CANNOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO HOPE FOR CONTINUED SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. SOVIET ACTIONS OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS -- INCLUDING THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS -- HAVE ONLY EXACERBATED THE ALREADY COMPLEX SITUATION. WE MUST URGE THE SOVIET AND LITHUANIAN LEADERS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE, AND HOPE THAT PATIENCE -- AND PERSISTENCE -- WILL PAY OFF.

FRANCOIS, THERE IS NO LEADER IN EUROPE TODAY WHOM I RESPECT MORE. I THEREFORE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR DISCUSSIONS IN FLORIDA WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION AND OPTIMISM.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0029

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<TEXT>ZEM

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

WE HAVE OFTEN DISCUSSED, MOST RECENTLY AT KEY LARGO, THE
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES THAT ARE TRANSFORMING EUROPE. I THINK YOU
WILL AGREE IT HAS BECOME EVEN MORE EVIDENT THAT EUROPE, AND THE
WORLD, IS MOVING BEYOND CONTAINMENT, FROM THE POSTWAR ERA TO A
NEW ERA IN HISTORY.

THESE ARE TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY AND HOPE. THE CURRENT PERIOD IS
STILL ONE OF TRANSITION, AS WE SEE WHAT CHOICES THE PEOPLE OF
EASTERN EUROPE WILL MAKE FOR THEIR FUTURE AND WATCH THE
UNPREDICTABLE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. I BELIEVE IT
WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO SEE WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION
CHOOSSES COERCION OR PEACEFUL DIALOGUE IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS IN
LITHUANIA. YET, IF THE PROMISE OF PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND
CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY REDUCTIONS IS INDEED FULFILLED, THE
MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE -- WHO TOGETHER HAVE DONE
SO MUCH TO USHER IN THIS NEW ERA -- MUST BE READY.

AS WE DISCUSSED IN FLORIDA, NATO WILL REMAIN VITAL TO AMERICA'S
PLACE IN EUROPE. THE EXCEPTIONAL SOLIDARITY THE ALLIANCE HAS
FOSTERED AMONG ITS MEMBERS OVER THE YEARS, AND THE INSTITUTIONS
IT HAS BUILT FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, PROVIDE A PROVEN STRUCTURE
UPON WHICH TO BASE OUR SECURITY, AND FROM WHICH TO PROMOTE A
STABLE AND COOPERATIVE EUROPEAN ORDER. I KNOW WE BOTH AGREE WITH
CHANCELLOR KOHL THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD RETAIN ITS
MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. POLITICALLY, AND MILITARILY, THE ALLIANCE IS
NOW READY TO TAKE ON NEW CHALLENGES, TO BUILD ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS
OF THE PAST FORTY YEARS, TO SUSTAIN THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRATIC
VALUES, AND DEFINE THE OBJECTIVES THAT YOU AND I, AND OUR NATO
COLLEAGUES, WILL WANT TO PURSUE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY
AND BEYOND.

IN ORDER TO SET A NEW WESTERN STRATEGY FOR THESE NEW TIMES, I
INTEND TO SUGGEST, IN A SPEECH ON MAY 4, THAT WE COME TOGETHER
SOON AT A NATO SUMMIT. WITH RESPECT TO THE VENUE AND TIMING OF
THIS SUMMIT MEETING, I WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO EITHER OF THE TWO
PROPOSALS FOR A NATO SUMMIT, IN LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY, WHICH
ARE NOW BEING CONSIDERED AT NATO. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE
ALLIANCE MOVE QUICKLY TO SHOW ITS VITALITY AND DEMONSTRATE ITS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0727-MR
SCS 9/22/11

READINESS TO ADDRESS THE CHANGED POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPE. THIS NATO MEETING DOES NOT NEED TO REACH FINAL DECISIONS ON ALL SUBJECTS; IT COULD INITIATE WORK FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AT ANOTHER NATO SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR, PERHAPS IN CONNECTION WITH A CSCE SUMMIT.

AS WE AGREED AT KEY LARGO, THIS NATO SUMMIT SHOULD LAUNCH A WIDE-RANGING REVIEW OF ALLIANCE POLICY FOR THE TRANSFORMED EUROPE OF THE 1990S. SPECIFICALLY, THERE ARE FOUR KEY ISSUES THE SUMMIT COULD ADDRESS IN ORDER TO PREPARE THE ALLIANCE FOR THE FUTURE.

FIRST, I BELIEVE THAT THE SUMMIT COULD CONSIDER THE FUTURE POLITICAL MISSION OF THE ALLIANCE. WE SHOULD REAFFIRM THE POTENTIAL FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A CRUCIAL PLACE, ALONG WITH THE EC, WHERE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES CAN JOIN IN MANAGING AND STABILIZING THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE.

SECOND, THE ALLIANCE COULD REVIEW ITS NEEDS FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WHILE WE ARE STILL IN A TIME OF TRANSITION, WE CAN BEGIN NOW TO DEVELOP OUR STRATEGY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY, IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EASTERN EUROPE, TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT MILITARY PRESENCE IN A TRANSFORMED EUROPE. I WOULD HOPE THAT, AT THE NATO SUMMIT, WE COULD ALSO SET THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS THAT COULD FOLLOW CLOSELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF A CFE TREATY.

THIRD, AT THE NATO SUMMIT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. AS THE THREAT OF IMMEDIATE AND OVERWHELMING AGGRESSION RECEDES, THE NUCLEAR FORCES NEEDED TO DETER AGGRESSION WILL CHANGE. I BELIEVE WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT, AS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET TANKS AND TROOPS RETURN HOME, THERE IS A REDUCED NEED FOR NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE. THE SUMMIT SHOULD ACCELERATE THE ONGOING WORK WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO DETERMINE THE MINIMUM NUMBER AND TYPES OF WEAPONS THAT WILL BE NEEDED TO DETER WAR CREDIBLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

IN LIGHT OF THESE NEW POLITICAL CONDITIONS, AND PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSPECT FOR FULL SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE BY THE MID-1990S, I HAVE REVIEWED OUR PLAN TO PRODUCE NEWER, MORE MODERN, SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES TO REPLACE THE LANCE SYSTEM WE NOW HAVE IN PLACE IN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK FOR THESE NEW MISSILES, I HAVE DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE PROGRAM. I HAVE ALSO DECIDED TO CANCEL ANY FURTHER MODERNIZATION OF U.S. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS DEPLOYED IN EUROPE.

AS FOR THE U.S. AND SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, WE AGREED LAST MAY TO A NEW SET OF

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

ARMS CONTROL TALKS THAT WOULD REDUCE THESE FORCES. THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT ON THE BROAD OBJECTIVES FOR THESE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION AND START THE PREPARATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FOR THESE TALKS.

-
IN ADDITION, I SUGGEST THAT THE STARTUP OF THESE NEW NEGOTIATIONS BE ADVANCED, SO THAT THESE U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS WOULD BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER A CFE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAS BEEN SIGNED RATHER THAN WAITING UNTIL IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE TREATY IS UNDERWAY.
-

FOURTH, I HOPE THAT WE CAN UTILIZE THE NATO SUMMIT TO ARRIVE AT COMMON ALLIED OBJECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE. AS WE LOOK AHEAD TO A CSCE SUMMIT AT WHICH WE WILL SIGN A CFE TREATY, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER A MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS AGENDA FOR THE CSCE TO GIVE IT -- AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE -- A MORE ACTIVE PART IN SHAPING EUROPE'S FUTURE. SECRETARY BAKER HAS ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO FURTHER ELABORATE OUR VIEWS. THE CSCE CAN OFFER GUIDELINES FOR BUILDING FREE SOCIETIES, AND IT CAN ALSO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN A MORE UNITED EUROPE.
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AT NATO ON MAY 3, SECRETARY BAKER WILL BE PREPARED TO REVIEW THESE IDEAS WITH HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES.
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I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN AT THE NATO SUMMIT.
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SINCERELY,
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GEORGE
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END TEXT
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DECL: OADR
#0133

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AT OPENING OF BUSINESS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

GIVEN YOUR OWN IMPENDING VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, I WANT TO
SHARE PROMPTLY WITH YOU THE RESULTS OF JIM BAKER'S RECENT TALKS
IN MOSCOW. JIM HAD PRODUCTIVE -- THOUGH AT TIMES DIFFICULT --
MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV. THERE IS STILL WORK TO
DO, BUT WE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD A START AGREEMENT. I
AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO NAIL DOWN A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ACCORD AND TO FINISH THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS TO TWO
NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES.

THE ONE MAJOR DISAPPOINTMENT WAS CFE. SHEVARDNADZE AFFIRMED THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S INTEREST IN AN EARLY AGREEMENT AND ASSURED
JIM THAT THE SOVIETS VIEW COMPLETION OF THE TREATY AS A
PREREQUISITE FOR A SUCCESSFUL CSCE SUMMIT. HOWEVER, WHEN JIM
EXPLORED THE NEW IDEAS ABOUT WHICH HE WROTE TO FOREIGN MINISTER
DUMAS, HE WAS UNABLE TO MAKE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST PROGRESS. THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN INCAPABLE OF MOVING FORWARD ON CFE FOR
SOME TIME NOW, AND I WORRY THAT THE PARALYSIS OF CFE IS JUST ONE
SYMPTOM OF GENERAL ANXIETY IN MOSCOW ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION IN
EUROPE. SHEVARDNADZE PROPOSED THAT THE U.S.-SOVIET MANPOWER
LIMITATIONS AGREED UPON AT OTTAWA BE CODIFIED AS A SEPARATE
AGREEMENT, DISTINCT FROM THE CFE TREATY, FOR SIGNATURE DURING
GORBACHEV'S UPCOMING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. JIM SAID NO,
EMPHASIZING THAT FINAL AGREEMENT ON THESE U.S.-SOVIET LIMITS MUST
ACCOMPANY CONCLUSION OF THE CFE TREATY.

ON GERMANY, JIM HEARD FROM BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE A
CONTINUATION OF THE TOUGH LINE SHEVARDNADZE TOOK IN THE TWO PLUS
FOUR MINISTERIAL PLENARY IN BONN EARLIER THIS MONTH. GORBACHEV
FLATLY REJECTED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, SAYING THAT IT WOULD
CONSTITUTE A SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH HE COULD NOT
ALLOW. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY INTEND TO TRY TO USE THE TWO PLUS
FOUR MECHANISM TO PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE UNITED GERMANY. THEY
SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR AGREE UPON LIMITS
ON THE BUNDESWEHR. JIM REFUSED TO GO ALONG, POINTING OUT THAT A
CFE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATION COULD CONSIDER A RANGE OF ISSUES,
INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCES IN A CENTRAL REGION. SUCH LIMITS WERE NOT, HOWEVER, A
MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.

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PER E.O. 13526
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HELMUT KOHL AND I HAD VERY USEFUL CONSULTATIONS ON GERMAN UNIFICATION LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON. WE REAFFIRMED THE WEST'S COMMON GOALS AND APPROACHES, WHICH YOU AND I AGREED TO IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR KEY LARGO MEETING: A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN ITS INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE; TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD NOT DECIDE ISSUES LIKE GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, THE STATUS OF WESTERN STATIONED NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND U.S. MILITARY FORCES SHOULD REMAIN STATIONED IN THE UNITED GERMANY AND ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE. WE ALSO AGREED AND STRESSED PUBLICLY THAT, UPON UNIFICATION, FOUR-POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE ENDED, WITHOUT ANY NEW DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY.

-
I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET ANXIETY ABOUT GERMANY ALSO STEMS FROM THE GENERAL BAD FORTUNE THAT GORBACHEV IS EXPERIENCING AND HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF PERESTROIKA. HE UNDOUBTEDLY SEES GERMANY AS A POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE ISSUE AT HOME.

-
GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON LITHUANIA WAS TOUGH, THOUGH HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE, AND I WAS PLEASED TO SEE THAT HE AGREED TO MEET WITH LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER PRUNSKIENE DURING HER VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE SAID HE HAS LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVER ON LITHUANIA AND MUST INSIST ON A SUSPENSION OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE STEMMING FROM THE INITIATIVE THAT YOU AND HELMUT PUT FORWARD. IN THAT REGARD, YOUR TRIP TO MOSCOW IS VERY TIMELY, AND MAY CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO THE OPENING OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND VILNIUS. I HAVE DONE EVERYTHING THAT I CAN TO KEEP U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ON TRACK, BUT IF THERE IS NOT SOME MOVEMENT ON MOSCOW'S PART BEFORE THE SUMMIT, LITHUANIA WILL CAST A SHADOW OVER MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV.

-
FINALLY, FRANCOIS, I WILL BE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF ANY INSIGHTS OR ADVICE THAT YOU ARE ABLE TO SHARE WITH ME AFTER YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW. AS YOU KNOW, GORBACHEV ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON ON MAY 30.

-
WITH MY VERY WARMEST REGARDS,

-
SINCERELY,

-
GEORGE

-
END TEXT.

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#0329

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR VERY THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE INFORMING ME
OF YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV. IT WILL BE VERY
HELPFUL IN MY PREPARATION FOR HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

I, TOO, AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE LINE THAT GORBACHEV TOOK WITH YOU
ON GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT I WILL WORK
PATIENTLY TO CONVINCE HIM THAT A UNITED GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP
IN NATO, INCLUDING ITS INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURES, WILL BE IN
THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN INTEREST.

AS YOU KNOW, GORBACHEV WILL BE HERE UNTIL SUNDAY, JUNE 3. I WILL
SEND YOU A REPORT OF OUR MEETINGS.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT, AT A NATO MEETING ON MAY 28,
FRANCE JOINED IN SUPPORTING THE CREATION OF A NEW ALLIANCE ARMS
CONTROL VERIFICATION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, WITH A SUPPORTING
STAFF, REPORTING TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND THE NATO
SECRETARY GENERAL. SINCE THIS WAS A MATTER I RAISED WITH YOU
AT KEY LARGO, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW HOW PLEASED I AM THAT THE
ALLIANCE HAS THUS BEEN ABLE TO TAKE A NEW STEP FORWARD TO
COORDINATE COMMON EFFORTS IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA.

I, TOO, REMEMBER OUR MEETINGS AT KEY LARGO WITH PLEASURE AND LOOK
FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN IN JULY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE.

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0366

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0366 <TOR> 900530185237 MSG000265402357

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
C&I 5/11/05
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<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING THE MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WANT TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR THE VERY TIMELY AND INSIGHTFUL LETTER YOU SENT ME AFTER YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW. IT GAVE ME A MORE PRECISE IDEA OF WHAT TO EXPECT FROM HIM, PARTICULARLY THE DEPTH OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT HAVING A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. YOU WERE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO ALLAY HIS CONCERNS REGARDING SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND, PERHAPS ABOVE ALL, HIS FEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT APPEAR TO HAVE ITS VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II, BOUGHT AT SUCH ENORMOUS PRICE, TURNED INTO A DEFEAT.

AS YOU HAVE SEEN FROM THE PRESS COVERAGE, THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SUMMIT WAS VERY POSITIVE. SO WAS THE TENOR OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WERE ANIMATED BUT NOT CONFRONTATIONAL. WE WERE ABLE TO TALK WITH CANDOR AND OPENNESS. THERE WERE NO BREAKTHROUGHS ON THE TOUGHEST ISSUES, BUT I FELT WE MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS TOWARD NARROWING OUR DIFFERENCES.

OUR MOST IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS WERE ABOUT GERMAN UNIFICATION. GORBACHEV BEGAN BY ARGUING THAT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO WOULD ALTER THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. HE PROPOSED THAT GERMANY BELONG TO BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT -- HAVE "TWO ANCHORS," AS HE PUT IT -- AND REFERRED TO A LONG TRANSITION PERIOD, SEEMINGLY UNDER FOUR POWER SUPERVISION, AN IDEA HE CAME BACK TO SEVERAL TIMES.

I MADE THE POINT VERY CLEARLY THAT A UNITED GERMANY IS NO THREAT TO ANYONE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY HAD EARNED ITS PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE AND WOULD HAVE GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I STRESSED THAT I SUPPORTED CHANCELLOR KOHL'S POSITION THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN A FULL MEMBER OF NATO, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION IN ITS INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURES, ADDING THAT A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC GERMANY MUST BE FREE TO CHOOSE ITS ALLIANCE ARRANGEMENTS. GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE COMPLETE AT THE TIME OF UNIFICATION, WITH NO NEW DISCRIMINATORY CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND NO "SINGULARIZATION" OF GERMANY FOR SPECIAL STATUS.

AT ONE POINT, GORBACHEV SEEMED TO AGREE WITH MY POSITION: THAT I SUPPORT GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO BUT OF COURSE THAT IT WAS UP TO GERMANY TO DECIDE. BUT THEN HE RETURNED TO THE IDEA OF A

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TRANSITION PERIOD. AT OUR PRESS CONFERENCE ON SUNDAY, HOWEVER, HE RAISED NO OBJECTION WHEN I SAID THAT WHILE HE AND I DID NOT AGREE THAT THE UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO, "WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE MATTER OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP IS -- IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT -- A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE." INDEED, WE HAD GIVEN MY PRESS STATEMENT, INCLUDING THAT FORMULATION, TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR BESSMERTNYKH THE NIGHT BEFORE, AND HE CAME BACK BEFORE THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO SAY THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NO OBJECTIONS. WE, OF COURSE, WILL HAVE TO SEE WHETHER THIS REFLECTS REAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS STILL FEELING HIS WAY AND THAT HIS POSITION MAY NOT YET BE FIXED. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ARGUING AGAINST A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO, HE SEEMED TO BE CONCERNED AS MUCH WITH NATO ITSELF AS WITH GERMANY'S MEMBERSHIP IN IT. HE WAS LOOKING FOR REASSURANCE THAT NATO WOULD CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE AND EVOLVE TO BECOME A MORE POLITICAL ALLIANCE, AND TRYING TO GET A BETTER SENSE OF WHAT THE SOVIET POSITION IN EUROPE WOULD BE AFTER UNIFICATION.

IN SUM, WE REACHED NO AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, BUT WE DID HAVE A GOOD TALK. WE IN THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO KEEP WORKING -- INDIVIDUALLY, IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR, AND AT THE NATO SUMMIT -- TO PERSUADE MOSCOW THAT A UNITED GERMANY FULLY IN NATO IS NO THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY. IN THAT REGARD, IT WILL BE CRUCIAL AT THE NATO SUMMIT THAT WE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ALLIANCE IS CHANGING AND WILL PLAY A MUCH DIFFERENT ROLE IN EUROPE AFTER GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND AFTER SOVIET TROOPS LEAVE EASTERN EUROPE. I AM PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT THE IDEAS YOU HAVE ON THAT SUBJECT THAT YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR MAY 29 LETTER.

ON ARMS CONTROL, WE MADE GOOD PROGRESS, WHICH HAS THE ADDED VIRTUE OF DEMONSTRATING TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT MILITARY TENSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED. THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT ON CFE WAS IMPORTANT, AFFIRMING OUR AGREEMENT THAT A CFE TREATY IS AN INDISPENSABLE FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COMMITTING US TO INTENSIFY THE PACE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO REACH RAPID AGREEMENT ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS ALSO A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH, AND OUR JOINT STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS SHOULD GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE START NEGOTIATIONS.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV REFERRED TO HIS REYKJAVIK DECISION NOT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE INF TREATY AS A BIG CONCESSION AND NOTED THAT, IN MAKING THIS MOVE, HE HAD THE UNDERSTANDING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO BE INVOLVED WHEN

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

DEEP CUTS WERE MADE IN NUCLEAR FORCES. WE MUST, HE REITERATED, INVOLVE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AFTER THE U.S. AND USSR SIGN THIS START TREATY. I SAID THAT WAS UP TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

ON OTHER SUBJECTS, THERE WERE MANY AGREEMENTS SIGNED, INCLUDING A TRADE AGREEMENT, AND JOINT STATEMENTS ISSUED, SOME OF THEM OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT, PARTICULARLY AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY ON JUNE 1, ALSO TURNED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SUMMIT AWAY FROM THE SERIOUS

DISCUSSIONS WE HAD AT THE BEGINNING TOWARD A MORE UPBEAT TONE, WHICH MAY DO GORBACHEV SOME GOOD BACK HOME.

WE HAD SOME CANDID DISCUSSIONS ABOUT LITHUANIA AND THE OTHER BALTIC STATES, BUT THE SUBJECT DID NOT BECOME A DOMINANT PUBLIC ISSUE. I LAID OUT MY POSITIONS, SO THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS ABOUT HOW IMPORTANT THIS IS TO THE WEST. THERE WAS NO BREAKTHROUGH, BUT I REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT A DIALOGUE WILL GET UNDERWAY SOON BETWEEN MOSCOW AND VILNIUS.

AT CAMP DAVID, WE HAD A THOROUGH REVIEW OF REGIONAL ISSUES BUT WE MADE NO PARTICULAR PROGRESS.

IN A PRIVATE MOMENT AT CAMP DAVID, GORBACHEV ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF MAJOR WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND SAID HE WISHED THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EFFORT. I TOLD HIM THAT I WANTED TO HELP HIM AND HIS REFORMS SUCCEED AND THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS HE FACES, BUT THAT THERE WERE SERIOUS PROBLEMS HERE THAT I WOULD HAVE TO MANAGE. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE U.S. BANKS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE UNTIL AN EFFECTIVE SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM WAS IN PLACE. MAJOR PROGRESS IN RESOLVING THE GERMAN ISSUE WOULD CREATE A CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES THAT WOULD HELP ME BUILD SUPPORT FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. VISIBLE PROGRESS IN LITHUANIA AND A CURTAILMENT OF SOVIET AID TO COUNTRIES LIKE CUBA, VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA WOULD ALSO ANSWER THE ARGUMENT THAT THE U.S. WAS HELPING THE SOVIET UNION WHILE IT WAS AIDING REGIMES THAT UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS AT THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN HOUSTON.

ALL IN ALL, I FOUND GORBACHEV STILL CONFIDENT BUT OBVIOUSLY WEIGHED DOWN WITH ALL HE FACES AT HOME. ON THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL POSITION, HE SEEMS TO BE GROPING HIS WAY THROUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALL THE CHANGES OF THE PAST YEAR. TO HIS CREDIT, HE IS OPEN-MINDED AND PREPARED TO BE REASSURED BY STEPS THE WESTERN ALLIES MIGHT TAKE TO SHOW THAT THE CHANGES CAN BE MANAGED IN WAYS THAT DO NOT THREATEN SOVIET SECURITY. IN THAT REGARD, I BELIEVE THE SUMMIT HELPED GIVE HIM SOME OF THOSE ASSURANCES. OUR AGREEMENT TO HOLD REGULAR SUMMIT MEETINGS WILL ALSO STRENGTHEN THE SENSE OF PREDICTABILITY IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

FRANCOIS, THANK YOU ONCE MORE FOR YOUR VALUABLE PERSPECTIVE AND COUNSEL. I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER EXCHANGES EVEN BEFORE WE MEET IN LONDON, SINCE THERE IS STILL MUCH TO DIGEST FROM OUR RESPECTIVE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, AND MUCH TO BE DONE IN PREPARING FOR A SUCCESSFUL NATO SUMMIT.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

DECLAS OADR:

#0383

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU PROMPTLY MY THOUGHTS ON THE MEETINGS I
HAD ON JUNE 11 WITH PRIME MINISTER DE MAIZIERE.

OUR TALKS WERE VERY FRIENDLY AND OPEN. I FOUND HIM A THOUGHTFUL
MAN -- INEXPERIENCED IN THE AFFAIRS OF STATE, BUT WITH A STRONG
SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY.

I STRESSED THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS SHOULD TERMINATE FOUR
POWER RIGHTS AND THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD ENJOY FULL
SOVEREIGNTY AT THE TIME OF UNIFICATION, WITH NO DISCRIMINATORY
CONSTRAINTS AND NO SINGLING OUT OF GERMANY FOR SPECIAL STATUS.
IN THAT CONTEXT, I TOLD HIM I WAS TROUBLED BY THE DRAFT FINAL
SETTLEMENT THE GDR TABLED AT THE TWO PLUS FOUR POLITICAL
DIRECTORS' MEETING IN BERLIN ON JUNE 9. I SAID THAT IT WAS MY
STRONG VIEW THAT A FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD NOT DETERMINE SUCH
ISSUES AS GERMANY'S ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS OR OTHER MAJOR
SECURITY ISSUES, MANY OF WHICH INVOLVE OTHER STATES, INCLUDING
MEMBERS OF NATO.

HE SAID THAT HE SAW THE SITUATION IN MUCH THE SAME WAY, BUT HE
REFERRED TO THE "BRIDGE FUNCTION" THAT GERMANY SHOULD PLAY TO
HELP REASSURE THE SOVIETS, AS WELL AS POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
HAVING JUST COME FROM THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, HE WAS
VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE CONCERNS OF THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEANS
AND SEEMED TO FEEL A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO WHAT HE CALLED HIS
"BROTHERS AND SISTERS" TO THE EAST. HE ALSO FOCUSED ON WHAT HE
SAW AS GORBACHEV'S NEED TO FIND A WAY TO SHOW HIS MILITARY AND
THE SOVIET PEOPLE THAT HE WAS NOT GIVING AWAY SOVIET RIGHTS IN
GERMANY WITHOUT GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE
WAS REFERRING TO SOVIET CONCERNS OVER TROOP LEVELS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE. HE SAID THAT GORBACHEV WOULD LIKE A "MOVE-FOR-MOVE
DEAL" -- BY WHICH HE APPARENTLY MEANT SOME CONSTRAINTS ON GERMAN
ARMED FORCES IN RETURN FOR GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO -- BUT
DE MAIZIERE SAID HE DID NOT HAVE A MODEL IN MIND. AGAIN, I REMINDED
HIM OF THE DANGER OF SINGULARIZING GERMANY. WHEN I RAISED THE
DANGER OF "PARALLELISM," OF EQUATING U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN
GERMANY, DE MAIZIERE AGREED THAT WAS PRECISELY WHAT GORBACHEV
WANTS TO DO.

DE MAIZIERE WENT ON TO AGREE THAT FOUR POWER RIGHTS SHOULD BE
TERMINATED AT THE TIME OF UNIFICATION, THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR

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SHOULD NOT DECIDE THE MAJOR ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND THAT GERMANY SHOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS OWN ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP, BUT HE NEITHER SUPPORTED NOR REPUDIATED THE UNHELPFUL PAPER THE GDR TABLED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR ON JUNE 9. HE DID, HOWEVER, DISOWN THE IDEA HIS FOREIGN MINISTER PUT FORWARD AT COPENHAGEN FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN "BUFFER ZONE," SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE HABIT OF SUPPORTING PROPOSALS THAT HE FIRST LEARNED ABOUT IN THE PRESS.

HE WAS ALSO VAGUE ON THE MATTER OF GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. HE SPOKE POSITIVELY OF NATO'S ROLE AND DID NOT DISPUTE ME WHEN I STRESSED MY SUPPORT FOR GERMANY'S FULL MEMBERSHIP, BUT HIS OWN PRESENTATION FOCUSED MORE ON TRANSFORMING NATO TO MAKE IT LESS THREATENING AND ON BUILDING UP "NEW STRUCTURES" IN CSCE.

LET ME JUST MENTION TWO OTHER ISSUES. OVER LUNCH, WE DISCUSSED THE POLISH BORDER. HE HAD NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW TO SAY, EXCEPT THAT WHEN THE POLES RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE WESTERN BORDER THEY ARE THINKING ALSO OF THEIR EASTERN BORDER. FINALLY, HE HAD SOME INTERESTING IMPRESSIONS FROM THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HE SAID, ARE DETERMINED TO LEAVE THE PACT, WITH THE HUNGARIANS SAYING THAT THEY WOULD BE OUT BY 1992 AT THE LATEST. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, WAS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT AND CAME ACROSS AS GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC. DE MAIZIERE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT GORBACHEV FACES A FRAGMENTING COMMUNIST PARTY WITH NOTHING TO REPLACE IT AS A STRUCTURE TO INTEGRATE THE USSR.

I HOPE THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE OF SOME USE, FRANCOIS, AND I WOULD OF COURSE WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS YOU HAVE ON THEM. IN PARTICULAR, WE OBVIOUSLY NEED TO CONCENTRATE, TOGETHER WITH THE BRITISH AND THE WEST GERMANS, ON BRINGING DE MAIZIERE AROUND TO OUR VIEW OF HOW BEST TO PROCEED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS.

I ENJOYED OUR TALK ON JUNE 5 AND AGREE WITH YOUR COMMENT ABOUT GORBACHEV'S HOPE OF INFLUENCING THE GERMAN ELECTORATE. OUR FREQUENT CONSULTATION WILL REMAIN VERY IMPORTANT AS GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE TWO PLUS FOUR MOVE TO CONCLUSION.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT.

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0038 <TOR> 900612204356 MSG000266532236

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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SECTION 01 OF 05

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

IN KEEPING WITH OUR DISCUSSIONS AT KEY LARGO AND SUBSEQUENTLY, I
WOULD LIKE TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS WITH YOU ABOUT THE UPCOMING NATO
SUMMIT.

OUR MEETING IN LONDON WILL BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT IN THE
HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE. WE ARE AT A PIVOTAL MOMENT. THE
SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO DECIDE, THIS YEAR, WHETHER TO ACQUIESCE
AMICABLY IN THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AS A FULL MEMBER OF NATO.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, LIKE YOURS, ARE FORMING JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE
RELEVANCE OF THE ALLIANCE TO THE NEW EUROPE THAT IS COMING INTO
BEING. THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERS OF EASTERN EUROPE ARE STILL UNSURE
WHAT TO BELIEVE ABOUT NATO AND ITS PART IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. IN
SUM, THIS NATO SUMMIT IS LIKELY TO FIX THE IMAGE OF WHAT OUR
ALLIANCE STANDS FOR DURING THIS PERIOD OF HISTORIC CHANGE.

I THEREFORE THINK THE SUMMIT DECLARATION SHOULD BE QUITE UNLIKE
ITS PREDECESSORS. IT SHOULD BE SHORT, UNBUREAUCRATIC, AND
WRITTEN TO BE READ BY A BROAD AUDIENCE, INCLUDING PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV. IT SHOULD BE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED AROUND A SERIES OF
IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

I HAVE TRIED TO ASSIMILATE MY OWN THINKING, AND THE RECENT
CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD WITH YOU -- AND WITH HELMUT AND MARGARET
-- INTO THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION I THINK THE SUMMIT SHOULD
PRODUCE. A SUGGESTED DRAFT FOLLOWS AT THE END OF THIS LETTER.
FOR THE TIME BEING I AM ONLY SHARING IT PRIVATELY WITH YOU,
HELMUT, MARGARET, GIULIO ANDREOTTI, AND MANFRED WOERNER.

I HAVE REFLECTED ON THE SUGGESTION SOME HAVE MADE THAT THE NATO
SUMMIT SHOULD ENDORSE A JOINT NATO-WARSAW PACT DECLARATION. I
CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THIS CONCEPT COULD SEEM ATTRACTIVE. HOWEVER,
I HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT IT. I AM RELUCTANT TO SEE US
CREATE THE PERCEPTION THAT THE TWO ALLIANCES ARE EQUIVALENT --
AND DOOMED TO SHARE THE SAME EVENTUAL FATE. I AM ALSO
PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN
TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A JOINT DOCUMENT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY
TRUE IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT SUCH A JOINT
DECLARATION ESTABLISH A FULL-BODIED PAN-EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE
SECURITY SYSTEM, ABROGATING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY, AND BASED ON A NUMBER OF LONG-STANDING SOVIET PRINCIPLES

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FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY THAT WE (AND I KNOW YOU TOO) CONSIDER UNACCEPTABLE.

INSTEAD I SUGGEST THAT WE MAKE A PLAIN STATEMENT OF OUR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND INVITE A RECIPROCAL DECLARATION FROM THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT. OUR DRAFT TEXT INCLUDES SUGGESTED LANGUAGE TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. TO FURTHER DRAMATIZE OUR NEW PERSPECTIVE, I HAVE SUGGESTED THE ALLIANCE INVITE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV TO ADDRESS THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

A STEP WITH EVEN MORE LASTING SIGNIFICANCE WOULD BE FOR NATO TO ASK THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES TO OPEN LIAISON MISSIONS AT NATO, WITH AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED TO THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS NOT AN OFFER OF MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. IT IS AN EFFORT TO CREATE NEW LINKAGES WITH THE INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES BILATERALLY WITH NATO, RATHER THAN THROUGH FORMAL TIES BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES.

I BELIEVE THAT IF WE EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN A UNITED GERMANY WE SHOULD DO SO ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A BROADER FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, ENCOMPASSING ALL OF EUROPE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, OUR DRAFT NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION DESCRIBES AMBITIOUS LONG-TERM SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR FOLLOW-ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN THE 1990S, INCLUDING "FURTHER FAR-REACHING REDUCTIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES." IT SEEMS TO ME IMPORTANT THAT WE HOLD OUT THE PROMISE FOR OUR PUBLICS THAT THE PROCESS OF REDUCING CONVENTIONAL FORCES WILL CONTINUE AND THAT OUR GOALS WILL BE AMBITIOUS, INCLUDING WITH REGARD TO SOVIET FORCES IN THE HOMELAND. WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT THE FORCES WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE -- AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SOVIETS HAVE -- AT THE END OF THIS CENTURY AND DESIGN AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH THAT PROMOTES THOSE OBJECTIVES.

IN OFFERING GUIDELINES FOR NATO'S REVIEW OF ITS CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PLANS, WE HAVE TRIED TO INDICATE THAT WE CAN MOVE AWAY FROM 'FORWARD DEFENSE' AS CURRENTLY CONCEIVED. THE DRAFT TEXT DOES POINT OUT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEND "ALL THE TERRITORY OF ALL OF OUR MEMBERS," A REFERENCE TO NATO'S AGREEMENT, AT TURNBERRY, THAT ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WILL COVER ALL THE TERRITORY OF A UNITED GERMANY. BUT WE DO HAVE TO GIVE DIRECTION TO NATO AUTHORITIES ON HOW WE SHOULD CHANGE THE WAY WE PLAN OUR DEFENSES.

AS YOU KNOW, I AM SENSITIVE TO FRANCE'S SPECIAL ROLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND YET I ALSO HOPE THAT FRANCE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THIS REVIEW OF ALLIANCE MILITARY STRATEGY. PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION IS DRAFTED SO THAT FRANCE CAN TAKE PART IN THIS REVIEW IN WHATEVER MANNER YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE. I AM PLEASED

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SECTION 02 OF 05

THAT ADMIRAL LANXADE WILL BE HERE NEXT WEEK, AT SUCH AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT FOR DISCUSSION OF SUCH ISSUES.

ONE CHANGE I HAVE SUGGESTED FOR NATO'S DEFENSES, AS YOU WILL SEE, IS TO PLACE MUCH MORE EMPHASIS ON MULTINATIONAL CORPS. THIS IDEA IS DIRECTED PRINCIPALLY AT THOSE UNITS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE ALLIANCE'S INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND, BUT IT IS FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ENCOMPASS OTHER POSSIBILITIES. MY SUGGESTION IS THAT THE NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS BE LED IN PEACETIME BY CORPS COMMANDERS DESIGNATED BY NATO, REPORTING TO SACEUR. THESE STEPS WOULD EXEMPLIFY THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF OUR DEFENSES AS NOTHING ELSE CAN, AND CREATE A NEW FOUNDATION FOR THE CONTINUED STABILIZING PRESENCE OF NATO STATIONED FORCES -- INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL U.S. FORCES -- IN A UNITED GERMANY.

ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT DETAIL OUR GOALS FOR FUTURE SNF ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MY GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIETS. THIS WILL HELP PUT OFF A DOMESTIC DEBATE IN GERMANY ABOUT TASM UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, I DO THINK WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE OUR WILLINGNESS TO REMOVE U.S. NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS FROM EUROPE AS SOVIET STATIONED FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE. THE PROPOSED DECLARATION IS DRAFTED IN A WAY THAT GIVES US THE LATITUDE TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO RELATE THIS INITIATIVE TO OUR OTHER SNF ARMS CONTROL GOALS.

NATO NUCLEAR STRATEGY, WHICH HAS HAD TO RELY ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EARLY IN A CONFLICT TO DEFEAT SUDDEN AND OVERWHELMING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, IS ALSO BECOMING OUT OF DATE. THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE NEEDS TO BE REVISED. I HAVE SUGGESTED A NEW FORMULATION, IN PARAGRAPH 16, TO SIGNAL A CHANGE, CAREFULLY CONDITIONED ON THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET STATIONED FORCES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE AGREEMENT. WE MUST NOT SUCCUMB TO PRESSURES TO ADOPT A POSTURE OF NO FIRST USE THAT WOULD MAKE EUROPE SAFE FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR. I KNOW YOU AGREE THAT WE MUST IN FACT RETAIN A GOOD DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING HOW NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED. YET WE MUST SHOW THAT OUR STRATEGY -- IN THIS NEW EUROPE -- WILL EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCES AS WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT.

IN OUTLINING A POSSIBLE ALLIANCE VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE OUR DRAFT DESCRIBES GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS TO GIVE LIFE TO THOSE PRINCIPLES. THE LIST OF NEW INSTITUTIONS I HAVE SUGGESTED IS EXTENSIVE BUT BALANCED, WITH ENHANCED POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS BACKED BY A SMALL SECRETARIAT, AN ELECTIONS COMMISSION TO COORDINATE THE MONITORING OF FREE ELECTIONS, AND A CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT. THERE IS ALSO A PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION, THAT OVER TIME CAN BROADEN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE CSCE. I THINK WE SHOULD TRY, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, TO PLACE THESE NEW CSCE INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW DEMOCRATIC STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE TO REINFORCE THESE NATIONS' SENSE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF THE NEW EUROPE.

RATHER THAN CREATE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CSCE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, I HAVE SUGGESTED ONE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER THAT WOULD HAVE CLEARLY DELINEATED RESPONSIBILITIES IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, FROM DATA EXCHANGES TO POSSIBLE DISPUTE CONCILIATION MECHANISMS THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS NEXT YEAR IN VALLETTA. OUR SUPPORT FOR THIS CENTER WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AN IMPORTANT SOVIET PROPOSAL BUT DO SO BY EMPHASIZING THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF CONFLICT RATHER THAN PAN-

EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT, NARROWLY FOCUSED ON GERMANY.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THESE IDEAS, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN LONDON.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT SUMMIT DECLARATION

LONDON DECLARATION
ON A
TRANSFORMED NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

ISSUED BY THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING
IN THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN LONDON,
JULY 5-6, 1990

1. THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS BEEN THE MOST SUCCESSFUL DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE IN HISTORY. NOW, EUROPE HAS ENTERED A NEW, MORE PROMISING ERA. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IS LIBERATING ITSELF. THE SOVIET UNION HAS EMBARKED ON THE LONG JOURNEY TOWARD A FREE SOCIETY. THE WALLS THAT ONCE CONFINED PEOPLE AND IDEAS ARE COLLAPSING. EUROPEANS ARE DETERMINING THEIR OWN DESTINY. THEY ARE CHOOSING FREEDOM. THEY ARE CHOOSING ECONOMIC LIBERTY. THEY ARE CHOOSING PEACE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THIS ALLIANCE MUST AND WILL ADAPT.

2. AS OUR ALLIANCE ENTERS ITS FIFTH DECADE AND LOOKS AHEAD TO A NEW CENTURY, IT MUST CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE. NO ONE CAN BE CERTAIN OF THE FUTURE. WE NEED TO KEEP STANDING TOGETHER, TO EXTEND THE LONG PEACE WE HAVE ENJOYED THESE PAST FOUR DECADES. YET OUR ALLIANCE MUST BE EVEN MORE AN AGENT OF CHANGE. IT CAN HELP BUILD THE STRUCTURES OF A MORE UNITED

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CONTINENT, SUPPORTING SECURITY AND STABILITY WITH THE STRENGTH OF OUR SHARED FAITH IN DEMOCRACY, THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT, IN THE NEW EUROPE, THE SECURITY OF EVERY STATE IS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE SECURITY OF ITS NEIGHBORS. NATO MUST BECOME AN INSTITUTION WHERE EUROPEANS, CANADIANS, AND AMERICANS WORK TOGETHER NOT ONLY FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, BUT TO BUILD NEW PARTNERSHIPS WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY MUST REACH OUT TO THE NATIONS OF THE EAST, WHO CONFRONTED US AS ADVERSARIES IN THE COLD WAR, AND EXTEND THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP.

4. WE WILL REMAIN A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEND ALL THE TERRITORY OF ALL OF OUR MEMBERS. WE HAVE NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AND WE COMMIT OURSELVES IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES TO THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. WE WILL NEVER IN ANY CASE BE THE FIRST TO USE FORCE. TODAY, WE CALL UPON

THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT TO MAKE A SIMILAR SOLEMN COMMITMENT TO NON-AGGRESSION.

5. IN THAT SPIRIT, AND TO REFLECT THE CHANGING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE, WE TODAY INVITE THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, TO COME TO BRUSSELS AND ADDRESS THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. WE TODAY ALSO INVITE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, AND ROMANIA TO COME TO NATO, NOT JUST TO VISIT, BUT TO STAY. WE PROPOSE THAT THE USSR, AND THESE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, OPEN PERMANENT LIAISON MISSIONS WITH AMBASSADORS HERE AT NATO. ALTHOUGH THESE NATIONS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF OUR ALLIANCE, THIS STEP WILL BRING THEM CLOSER TO OUR THINKING AND DELIBERATIONS IN THIS HISTORIC PERIOD OF CHANGE SO THAT THEIR DIPLOMATS -- AND GENERALS -- CAN BE SURE THAT THEIR VOICES ARE HEARD.

6. OUR ALLIANCE SHOULD DO ITS SHARE TO OVERCOME THE LEGACY OF DECADES OF SUSPICION. TO FOLLOW ON THE GENEROUS SOVIET INVITATION TO NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER TO VISIT MOSCOW AND MEET WITH SOVIET LEADERS, WE SUGGEST THAT NATO'S SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR EUROPE, GENERAL JOHN GALVIN, ALSO GO TO MOSCOW, AND EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS, TO DISCUSS OUR ALLIANCE'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE.

7. MILITARY LEADERS FROM THROUGHOUT EUROPE GATHERED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN VIENNA TO TALK ABOUT THEIR FORCES AND DOCTRINE. NATO OFFERS TO HOST ANOTHER SUCH MEETING THIS AUTUMN, TO PROMOTE COMMON UNDERSTANDING. WE WILL EXPAND AND INTENSIFY MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS ACROSS EUROPE, ALONGSIDE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ON PROBLEMS LIKE THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESOURCES TO CIVILIAN USE. IN THESE WAYS, WE INTEND TO ESTABLISH AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT QUALITY OF OPENNESS IN EUROPE, WHICH IS ALSO WHY WE WANT TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON OPEN SKIES.

8. THE SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN CONVENTIONAL AND U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE DEMONSTRATES THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL COMPACT THAT BINDS NORTH AMERICA'S FATE TO EUROPE'S DEMOCRACIES. BUT, AS EUROPE CHANGES, WE MUST PROFOUNDLY ALTER THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT DEFENSE.

9. TO REDUCE OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, SOUND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE ESSENTIAL. THAT IS WHY WE PUT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON COMPLETING THIS YEAR THE FIRST TREATY TO REDUCE AND LIMIT CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE). THESE TALKS SHOULD REMAIN IN CONTINUOUS SESSION UNTIL THE WORK IS DONE. YET WE HOPE TO GO FURTHER. USING THE MANDATE ALREADY IN PLACE FOR CFE, NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS CAN BEGIN WITH THE SAME MEMBERSHIP, ONCE A CFE TREATY IS SIGNED.

10. WE WILL SEEK THROUGH NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 1990S FURTHER FAR-REACHING REDUCTIONS OF THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, SO AS TO PREVENT ANY NATION FROM MAINTAINING DISPROPORTIONATE MILITARY POWER ON THE CONTINENT. WE WILL MAKE PROVISIONS AS NEEDED FOR DIFFERENT REGIONS TO REDRESS DISPARITIES AND TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE'S SECURITY IS HARMED AT ANY STAGE. THIS IS AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA, BUT IT MATCHES OUR GOAL: ENDURING PEACE IN EUROPE.

11. AS SOVIET TROOPS LEAVE EASTERN EUROPE AND A TREATY

LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IS IMPLEMENTED, THE ALLIANCE'S FORCE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY WILL CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- THE ALLIANCE WILL FIELD SMALLER AND RESTRUCTURED ACTIVE FORCES. THESE FORCES WILL BE HIGHLY MOBILE AND VERSATILE, ENHANCING THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE MOBILE FORCE AND THE NATO COMPOSITE FORCE, SO THAT ALLIED LEADERS WILL HAVE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING HOW TO RESPOND TO A CRISIS.
- THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL CORPS SECTORS IN NATO WILL BE REPLACED. NATO WILL RELY INCREASINGLY ON MULTINATIONAL CORPS MADE UP OF NATIONAL UNITS.
- TO REINFORCE OUR COMMITMENT TO A MULTINATIONAL, COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO OUR COMMON DEFENSE, FORCES WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THESE MULTINATIONAL CORPS IN PEACETIME. THESE MULTINATIONAL CORPS WILL BE LED BY CORPS COMMANDERS

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DESIGNATED BY NATO WHO WILL REPORT, THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE (SACEUR) WHO IN TURN ANSWERS TO ALLIED POLITICAL LEADERS.

- NATO WILL SCALE BACK THE READINESS OF ITS ACTIVE UNITS, REDUCING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND THE NUMBER OF EXERCISES.
- THE ALLIANCE WILL RELY MORE HEAVILY ON THE ABILITY TO RECREATE LARGER FORCES IF AND WHEN THEY MIGHT BE NEEDED.

12. OUR ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO TRANSFORM THE SIZE AND MISSION OF ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES. TO KEEP THE PEACE, THE ALLIANCE MUST MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BASED IN EUROPE, AND KEPT UP TO DATE. BUT, AS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE, NATO HAS ALWAYS STRESSED THAT NONE OF ITS WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE AND THAT WE SEEK THE LOWEST AND MOST STABLE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES NEEDED TO SECURE THE PREVENTION OF WAR. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHANGES IN EUROPE, AND THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER CHANGES, NOW ALLOW US TO GO FURTHER.

13. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONS IN EUROPE, THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ROLE FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE. WE HAVE DECIDED SPECIFICALLY THAT, ONCE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, THE ALLIANCE POSITION WILL BE TO ELIMINATE ALL ITS NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS FROM EUROPE BY THE TIME ALL SOVIET STATIONED FORCES IN EUROPE HAVE RETURNED HOME.

14. NEW NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ON THE REDUCTION OF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER A CFE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

15. WE WILL DEVELOP AN ARMS CONTROL FRAMEWORK FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR FAR FEWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE DIMINISHED NEED FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE.

16. FINALLY, WITH THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET STATIONED FORCES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CFE AGREEMENT, THE ALLIANCE CAN REDUCE ITS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WILL ENABLE US, IN THE TRANSFORMED EUROPE, TO ADOPT A NEW NATO STRATEGY MAKING ITS NUCLEAR FORCES TRULY WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT.

17. IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE REVISED PLANS FOR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL, AND WITH THE ADVICE OF NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND ALL INTERESTED MEMBER STATES, NATO SHOULD PREPARE A NEW ALLIED MILITARY STRATEGY MOVING AWAY FROM 'FORWARD DEFENSE' TOWARDS A REDUCED FORWARD PRESENCE AND MODIFYING 'FLEXIBLE RESPONSE' TO REFLECT A REDUCED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THAT CONNECTION THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ELABORATE NEW FORCE PLANS CONSISTENT WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN EUROPE. NATO'S HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE SHOULD FORMULATE A DETAILED POSITION FOR THE FOLLOW-ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS. NATO SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR ALLIED CONSULTATION ON THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. ALL THESE NATO BODIES, WORKING IN COORDINATION WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SHOULD REPORT THEIR CONCLUSIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN 1991 TO ANOTHER MEETING OF NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

18. OF COURSE, OUR ALLIANCE IS NOT ALONE IN HELPING TO SHAPE THE EUROPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS A VITAL PART. THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) SHOULD BECOME MORE PROMINENT IN EUROPE'S FUTURE, BRINGING TOGETHER THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA.

19. WE SUPPORT A CSCE SUMMIT LATER THIS YEAR IN PARIS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE SIGNATURE OF A CFE AGREEMENT AND WOULD SET NEW STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, AND PRESERVATION, OF FREE SOCIETIES. IT SHOULD ENDORSE:

- CSCE PRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS;
- CSCE COMMITMENTS TO RESPECT AND UPHOLD THE RULE OF LAW; AND
- CSCE GUIDELINES FOR ENHANCING ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BASED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE AND COMPETITIVE MARKET ECONOMIES

20. WE FURTHER PROPOSE THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT IN PARIS DECIDE HOW THE CSCE, AS AN INSTITUTION, CAN PROVIDE A FORUM FOR WIDER POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN A MORE UNITED EUROPE. WE RECOMMEND THAT CSCE GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH:

- A PROGRAM FOR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AMONG MEMBER GOVERNMENTS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AT LEAST ONCE EACH YEAR, WITH OTHER PERIODIC MEETINGS OF OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR AND FOLLOW UP ON THESE CONSULTATIONS;
- A SCHEDULE OF CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCES ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS TO ASSESS PROGRESS TOWARD A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE;
- A SMALL CSCE SECRETARIAT, PERHAPS IN PRAGUE, TO COORDINATE THESE MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES;
- A CSCE ELECTIONS COMMISSION, PERHAPS IN BUDAPEST, TO COORDINATE MONITORING OF FREE ELECTIONS;

-- A CSCE CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT, PERHAPS IN
WARSAW OR BERLIN, AS A FORUM FOR EXCHANGES OF MILITARY
INFORMATION, DISCUSSION OF UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND
THE CONCILIATION OF DISPUTES INVOLVING CSCE MEMBER STATES;

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FINAL SECTION OF 05

AND

-- A CSCE PARLIAMENTARY BODY, THE ASSEMBLY OF EUROPE, TO BE
BASED ON THE EXISTING PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, IN STRASBOURG, AND INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL
CSCE MEMBER STATES.

21. THIS ALLIANCE HAS DONE MUCH TO BRING ABOUT THE NEW
EUROPE. A UNITED GERMAN NATION WITH FULL MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WILL
BE AT THE HEART OF A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE.

22. TODAY, OUR ALLIANCE BEGINS ITS TRANSFORMATION. WORKING
WITH ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, WE ARE DETERMINED TO CREATE
ENDURING PEACE ON THIS CONTINENT.

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0151

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<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH.

DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS THE DATE OF OUR MEETING IN HOUSTON APPROACHES, I HAVE BEEN REVIEWING THE AGENDA AND SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION.

TWO OF THESE ISSUES -- TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT -- NOT ONLY CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR AGENDA, BUT ALSO CARRY WITH THEM THE POSSIBILITY OF BECOMING SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE. IT IS BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIAL OF THESE ISSUES TO BECOME POINTS OF CONFRONTATION THAT I DECIDED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO WRITE YOU A PERSONAL NOTE IN THE HOPE, NOT ONLY TO AVOID SERIOUS DISCORD, BUT TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS ON BOTH SUBJECTS.

AN OPEN WORLD TRADING SYSTEM IS VITAL TO ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. WE HAVE BENEFITED ENORMOUSLY FROM SUCCESSIVE ROUNDS OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THAT OPENED OUR MARKETS AND ENRICHED OUR CHOICE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.

FIRST, WE MUST TACKLE OUR DIFFERENCES HEAD-ON AND PROVIDE THE POLITICAL DIRECTION NEEDED TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE URUGUAY ROUND IN DECEMBER. THIS WILL REQUIRE, ABOVE ALL, AGREEMENT ON RULES GOVERNING TRADE IN AGRICULTURE. REFORM OF THOSE RULES IS LONG OVERDUE. PRESENT POLICIES ARE COSTLY, CREATE UNNECESSARY TRADE CONFLICTS, AND HURT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. FURTHER, WE WILL NOT GAIN THE ADHERENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO RULES GOVERNING SERVICES, INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNLESS WE PROVIDE THEM WITH GREATER EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES, ESPECIALLY FOR THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. THOSE OF US AROUND THE TABLE IN HOUSTON HOLD THE KEY TO AGRICULTURAL REFORM AND, THEREFORE, TO THE ROUND ITSELF. AGRICULTURAL REFORM REQUIRES THAT WE EACH MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS, INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN EXPORT SUBSIDIES, IMPORT BARRIERS AND INTERNAL SUPPORTS. WE MUST MAKE THEM IN A WAY THAT PROVIDES FOR AN ACCEPTABLE TRANSITION TO LESS COSTLY AND LESS DISRUPTIVE PRICES. FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON AGRICULTURE IN HOUSTON IN A WAY THAT PROVIDES A PATH TO SUCCESS IN THE URUGUAY ROUND WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO AN OPEN WORLD TRADING SYSTEM. I BELIEVE WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO BREAK THE LOGJAM ON THIS PROBLEM.

ON THE SECOND DIFFICULT ISSUE, THE ENVIRONMENT, OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND OF WAYS TO PREVENT ITS DEGRADATION IS ADVANCING RAPIDLY, EVEN THOUGH MUCH UNCERTAINTY REMAINS. I WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED BY THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AT THE ARCH SUMMIT. I KNOW THAT

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YOU HAVE BEEN ACTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES DURING THE PAST YEAR. WE, TOO, HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MUCH IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS YEAR ALONE, THE UNITED STATES IS INVESTING APPROXIMATELY ONE BILLION DOLLARS TO GATHER DATA, MONITOR THE CRITICAL PARAMETERS, AND DEVELOP CREDIBLE ANALYTIC MODELS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION.

WE LEADERS OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES HAVE AN OBLIGATION NOT ONLY TO ACT TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT, BUT ALSO TO DO SO RESPONSIBLY AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BEST SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND BALANCING ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS. OUR DISCUSSION AT HOUSTON WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON OUR RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES. MY HOPE IS THAT WE CAN BUILD ON OUR DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. MY PERSONAL VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD AGREE ON COMPLETING THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE BY 1992, BUT DEFER ANY DECISION ON POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON PROTOCOLS. LET ME REITERATE MY OFFER TO PROVIDE THE VENUE FOR THE FIRST NEGOTIATING SESSION ON THE CONVENTION.

I KNOW THAT SOME WOULD PREFER A MORE AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVE CONCERNING CO2 REDUCTION. HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC BASIS FOR US TO MAKE A COMMON COMMITMENT ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD SEEM TO MAKE MORE SENSE TO TREAT SOURCES AND SINKS OF ALL GREENHOUSE GASES COMPREHENSIVELY, SO AS TO ALLOW EACH COUNTRY TO PURSUE A FLEXIBLE AND EFFICIENT STRATEGY FOR MAKING ANY REDUCTIONS THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. IN MY VIEW, THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL PROVIDES A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A COOPERATIVE EFFORT THAT, BASED ON SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS, BALANCES ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH OBJECTIVES.

AS I MENTIONED IN MY MESSAGE REPORTING ON MY MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE SOVIET UNION'S REQUEST FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE AT HOUSTON. I WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON THIS SUBJECT.

FRANCOIS, THE PRIVACY OF OUR MEETINGS IN HOUSTON WILL PROVIDE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR CANDID DISCUSSION OF THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. I BELIEVE A PRINCIPAL VIRTUE OF THESE SUMMITS IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO ADDRESS TOUGH BUT IMPORTANT ISSUES AND, THROUGH LIVELY DEBATE, ACHIEVE BREAKTHROUGHS THAT ALLOW OUR GOVERNMENTS TO MOVE FORWARD. THIS IS THE BIG CHALLENGE BEFORE US NOW.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN HOUSTON.

WARM REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH

DECL: OADR
#0196

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

YOUR LETTER WAS VERY GRATIFYING. I AM REASSURED TO KNOW YOU SHARE
MY SENSE THAT THIS NATO SUMMIT MUST BE A TURNING POINT IN ADAPTING
OUR ALLIANCE TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN EUROPE. WE CAN WORK ON
SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS TO THE DECLARATION WHEN WE GET TO LONDON.

AS WE THINK ABOUT THE DECLARATION I WANT TO ASSURE YOU, AS THE
SUMMIT APPROACHES, THAT NOTHING IN OUR DRAFT TEXT IS MEANT EITHER TO
CHALLENGE FRANCE'S TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE ALLIANCE OR
REDUCE FRANCE'S FLEXIBILITY AS IT CONSIDERS ITS FUTURE DEFENSE
ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE. I WILL STRESS THIS POINT IN MY PRESENTATION
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

MY MAIN WORRY IS THAT IF WE DO NOT MAKE BOLD MOVES AT THE LONDON
SUMMIT TO ENHANCE AND TRANSFORM NATO'S POLITICAL POSITION, WE WILL
FAIL TO MEET THE PUBLIC TEST WE BOTH AGREE THE DECLARATION MUST
PASS. WE MUST NOT END UP REPLACING SOLID SUBSTANCE WITH FAMILIAR
NATO RHETORIC.

IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING RECENTLY IN BERLIN, SHEVARDNADZE TOLD JIM
BAKER NO LESS THAN FOUR TIMES HOW IMPORTANT THE NATO SUMMIT WOULD BE
IN SHAPING SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE VITAL QUESTIONS THAT MOSCOW MUST
ANSWER DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. I AM ALSO AWARE THAT HELMUT KOHL
WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON JULY 15-16. HE SHOULD HAVE WITH HIM A CLEAR
ALLIANCE POSITION ON JUST HOW WE WILL (AND WILL NOT) ADAPT TO THE
NEW REALITIES IN EUROPE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU ONCE AGAIN, MY OLD FRIEND, IN LONDON
AND THEN IN TEXAS. YOU WILL ENJOY HOUSTON!

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0292 <TOR> 900701132645 MSG000268147605

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
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2005-0818-MR

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS HOST OF OUR RECENT MEETINGS IN HOUSTON, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR
YOUR MANY CONTRIBUTIONS TO WHAT I BELIEVE WAS AN EXTREMELY
PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT. WE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN A NUMBER OF
AREAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO EACH ONE OF US, AND TO THE WORLD AS A
WHOLE.

OUR DISCUSSION ON PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S REQUEST FOR WESTERN
ASSISTANCE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. AS AGREED IN HOUSTON, I HAVE
SENT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV A LETTER COMMUNICATING OUR DECISIONS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT MICHEL CAMDESSUS HAS ALREADY CONVENED A MEETING
WITH BARBER CONABLE, JACQUES ATTALI AND JEAN-CLAUDE PAYE TO DISCUSS
THE STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY WITH WHICH THEIR INSTITUTIONS HAVE
BEEN CHARGED. THE HOUSTON COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES THEM WITH CLEAR TERMS
OF REFERENCE: A DETAILED STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS REFORM, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CRITERIA
UNDER WHICH WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COULD EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT
THESE REFORMS.

IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE IMF AND THE
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER AS THE
STUDY PROGRESSES. MICHEL CAMDESSUS HAS ASSURED US THAT THE PROJECT
WILL MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY, AND THAT WE WILL RECEIVE THIS
REPORT BY DECEMBER.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION WITH YOU ON THIS AND
OTHER MATTERS.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT.

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0010 <TOR> 900720130905 MSG000269788145

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2009-0731-MR
SCS 5/16/11

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
30. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	8/04/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed: 2/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
31. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Jacques Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	8/8/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed: 2/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
32. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	8/7/90	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed:	2/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<CSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 181814Z AUG 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

Q999

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE FROM
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THE IRAQ-KUWAIT SITUATION DEVELOPS. ALTHOUGH THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE SOME DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH AMONG ALLIES, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TRY TO KEEP ANY PUBLIC DISCREPANCIES TO A MINIMUM IN VIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STRATEGY OF DIVIDING HIS ADVERSARIES.

THE PROMPT FRENCH DECISION TO SEND NAVAL FORCES TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAS VERY MUCH WELCOMED HERE, AS HAS BEEN FRANCE'S LEADERSHIP IN ACTIVATING THE WEU TO ENSURE A FULLER EUROPEAN ROLE IN PROTECTING OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA. WE WERE PLEASED TO SEE THAT THE INITIAL OVERSIGHT OF NOT INVITING THE TURKS TO NEXT WEEK'S WEU MINISTERIAL WAS QUICKLY CORRECTED, IN VIEW OF THE INVITATION TO OTHER OBSERVERS LESS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE CRISIS.

I AM AWARE THAT FRANCE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE EXPLICIT UN AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY INTERDICTION. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT THE EXISTING UNSC RESOLUTIONS ALREADY PROVIDE THE NECESSARY JURIDICIAL BASIS, AND THAT THERE IS THUS NO NEED TO GO BACK TO THE UN. AT PRESENT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE URGENT TASK AT HAND IS TO MAXIMIZE THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON IRAQ AS QUICKLY AND AS SURELY AS POSSIBLE.

ANOTHER MATTER OF UTMOST CONCERN IS IRAQ'S ILLEGAL DETENTION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN BOTH BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING APPROPRIATE UNSC ACTION TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM. YOUR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT FOR THIS INITIATIVE WILL BE DEEPLY WELCOME.

AS ALWAYS, THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO MAINTAIN THE FULLEST COMMUNICATION WITH KEY ALLIES, AND HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMES AND RESPECTS THE VIEWS OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU ON SEPTEMBER 5, WHEN WE WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES AS WELL AS THE QUESTIONS OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY THAT AROSE AT THE LONDON SUMMIT. SHOULD YOU, OR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HIMSELF, HAVE FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE IRAQ/KUWAIT CRISIS THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SHARE IN THE INTERIM THEY WOULD BE MOST WELCOME INDEED.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

■
END TEXT

■
DECL: OADR
#0113

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0113 <TOR> 900818141716 MSG000272297836

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<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 232127Z AUG 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL JACQUES LANXADE
FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

AUGUST 23, 1990

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT HELPFUL MESSAGE. WE SHARE MUCH OF YOUR
ASSESSMENT. OUR CURRENT THINKING IS THAT SADDAM WILL MOST LIKELY
CUT OFF ALL SERVICES (WATER, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONE, ETC) TO ANY
EMBASSY IN KUWAIT THAT IGNORES HIS ORDER TO CLOSE DOWN. WE ALSO
EXPECT HE MAY BLOCKADE EMBASSIES TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE AND
NOTHING CAN EITHER ENTER OR LEAVE. WE THINK IT LESS LIKELY THAT
HE WILL ORDER HIS TROOPS TO USE PHYSICAL FORCE TO EJECT FOREIGN
DIPLOMATS, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT RULE THIS OUT AS A POSSIBILITY. IF
THIS HAPPENS, THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE
UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT WE ARE PREPARING A NUMBER OF RECIPROCAL
MEASURES THAT WE WOULD TAKE HERE AGAINST IRAQI DIPLOMATS SHOULD
IRAQ FOLLOW THROUGH ON ITS THREAT TO CLOSE ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS
IN KUWAIT ON AUGUST 24. OUR STATE DEPARTMENT AND OUR EMBASSY IN
PARIS WILL BE COORDINATING WITH THE QUAI AND YOUR EMBASSY HERE.

ON A SEPARATE MATTER, I HAVE LEARNED FROM OUR MILITARY THAT YOUR
COMMANDER IN THE REGION DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE RECEIVED
INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS THAT WOULD PERMIT FRENCH NAVAL UNITS TO
PARTICIPATE IN JOINT ACTIONS WITH US AND THE BRITISH TO USE FORCE
TO DISABLE IRAQI AND OTHER VESSELS VIOLATING UN SANCTIONS
WHenever WE BEGIN THE USE OF FORCE FOR ENFORCEMENT. I WOULD
BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LOOK INTO THIS IN LIGHT OF THE
CONVERSATION BETWEEN OUR RESPECTIVE PRESIDENTS EARLIER THIS
WEEK.

BEST REGARDS,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0019

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0019 <TOR> 900823172813 MSG000272741293

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2006-12-07 MR
11/13/10

<DIST>

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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT SUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 050337Z SEP 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND OF FRANCE
VIA WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY CHANNELS

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS YOU KNOW, I WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN HELSINKI
FOR A FULL DAY OF DISCUSSIONS ON SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 9.

ONE OF MY MAIN OBJECTIVES WILL BE TO SECURE CONTINUING SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN. SOVIET
POLICY TO DATE HAS BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY HELPFUL, AND THROUGH THESE
CONSULTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS I HOPE TO REINFORCE THE POSITIONS
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAS ALREADY TAKEN IN THE GULF.

AS WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF THE FIRST POST-COLD WAR CRISIS, IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY
AND BE SEEN TO BE DOING SO. THIS IS CRUCIAL NOT ONLY IN MEETING THE
CURRENT CHALLENGE, BUT IN SETTING A TONE AND PATTERN FOR A NEW KIND
OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN ALLIES.

BUT THE MEETING WILL NOT BE ONLY ABOUT THE GULF. WHEN HE WAS IN
WASHINGTON IN EARLY JUNE, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I AGREED TO MEET
REGULARLY, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ITEMS SPRINGING FROM THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT THAT NEED DISCUSSION.

I PLAN TO USE THIS MEETING TO GIVE ANOTHER PUSH TO OUR ARMS CONTROL
AGENDA -- ESPECIALLY IN CFE -- SO THAT WE CAN MOVE FORWARD TO A CSCE
SUMMIT IN PARIS IN NOVEMBER. I ALSO INTEND TO DISCUSS OTHER BROAD
QUESTIONS OF SECURITY, BUT WITHOUT GETTING INTO DETAILS ON REGIONAL
ISSUES OTHER THAN CAMBODIA.

THIS MEETING WILL ALSO GIVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV'S VIEWS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, PARTICULARLY
IN LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FEDERAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS AND THE UNION AND THE CONTINUING
ECONOMIC REFORM DEBATE.

CONSULTATIONS SUCH AS THIS ONE, AND YOUR OWN PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH
GORBACHEV, ARE IMPORTANT IN KEEPING OUR LINES OPEN TO MOSCOW AND
BUILDING ON THE GREATLY IMPROVED EAST-WEST CLIMATE OF THE PAST YEAR.
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AMONG OURSELVES, AND I
WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR THOUGHTS OR ADVICE.

SHOULD YOU WISH TO SPEAK BY PHONE THIS WEEK BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR
HELSINKI, I WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU. JIM BAKER WILL

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

DO A BRIEFING AT NATO ON SEPTEMBER 10, AND I WILL ALSO SHARE MY
IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEETING WITH YOU AFTER MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END OF TEXT.

#0070

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0070 <TOR> 900905001349 MSG000273802429

<DIST>

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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXGRI <DTG> 071355Z SEP 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. JACQUES ATTALI
FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

I WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE YOU AS MY GUEST FOR LUNCH AT THE WHITE
HOUSE ON SEPTEMBER 21. LET'S AIM FOR 12:30, SUBJECT TO
RECONFIRMATION THAT MORNING.

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0101

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0101 <TOR> 900907095932 MSG000274010372

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 051540Z OCT 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER, WHICH ARRIVED AT THE
WHITE HOUSE MONDAY EVENING. I HAD READ YOUR UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY SPEECH WITH GREAT INTEREST, AND THE POINTS STRESSED
IN YOUR LETTER PROVIDED VERY USEFUL CLARIFICATION. THERE ARE,
HOWEVER, SOME POINTS THAT I FEEL MERIT FURTHER DISCUSSION AND
COMMENT.

SOME CONFUSION WAS INITIALLY CREATED BY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY YOUR SPEECH AS A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM
PREVIOUS POLICY, AND IT WAS MAGNIFIED BY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF
FACILE PRESS INTERPRETATIONS. STRONG SOLIDARITY BETWEEN
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, AND WITH THE OTHER NATIONS THAT
HAVE TAKEN A FIRM STAND IN THE GULF, IS ESSENTIAL TO
CONVINCING SADDAM THAT HE MUST ADHERE TO THE WILL OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

IT THUS FOLLOWS THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE THE APPEARANCE OF
DISTANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY WITH
REGARD TO THE NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI
WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 660. WE HAVE TRIED TO ENSURE THIS THROUGH OUR OWN
EXPLANATIONS TO THE PRESS, AND I KNOW THAT THE ELYSEE AND
FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS HAVE DONE EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS AS WELL.
I KNOW YOU WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERScore THE UNITY OF OUR
PURPOSE AND OUR POSITION ON THIS MOST FUNDAMENTAL MATTER.

YOUR LETTER EMPHASIZES YOUR SUPPORT FOR ALL OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS PASSED SINCE AUGUST 6 AND THAT THESE
CONSTITUTE NON-NEGOTIABLE PRECONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. I
AGREE COMPLETELY, AND I FULLY CONCUR IN YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE
RELEASE OF ALL HOSTAGES AND ON UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL
FROM KUWAIT.

AS JIM BAKER HAS MENTIONED TO ROLAND DUMAS, HOWEVER, WE ARE
WORRIED ABOUT ANY APPERARANCE OF DIVERGENCE BY FRANCE FROM THE
ELEMENTS OF THESE RESOLUTIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE POINT THAT
KUWAIT'S LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT MUST BE RESTORED. AS YOU KNOW,
SEVERAL UN RESOLUTIONS ARE CLEAR IN EXPRESSING THE COUNCIL'S
"DETERMINATION TO RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT" AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661

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PER E.O. 13526
2005-1149-MR
12/11/10

SPECIFICALLY DECIDED ON SANCTIONS AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. THERE IS RISK THAT ESPOUSAL OF ANY OTHER POSITION IN ADVANCE OF IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WOULD PLAY INTO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S STRATEGY AND WOULD CONTRAVENE THE POSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE UNCONDITIONAL.

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU ALSO STRESS YOUR CONCERN THAT THERE BE A DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME IN KUWAIT. THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS OF THE WEST MUST OF COURSE STAND UNEQUIVOCALLY FOR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CAN ONLY TAKE ROOT IF GROUNDED FIRMLY IN THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF A COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE. DEMOCRACY CANNOT BE IMPOSED, BUT RATHER NURTURED FROM WITHIN.

I BELIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO BRING ABOUT DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN KUWAIT -- WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, WAS ONE OF THE MORE OPEN COUNTRIES IN THE REGION -- IS FIRST TO RESTORE THE FORMER REGIME, WHICH CAN AND IN MY VIEW SHOULD ADDRESS THE DEMOCRATIC DESIRES OF THE KUWAITI PEOPLE. I BELIEVE WE CAN BEST ENCOURAGE SUCH PROGRESS BY WORKING WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT.

THE ISSUE OBVIOUSLY MERITS FURTHER PRIVATE DISCUSSION, AND I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW THIS CONCEPT MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT SADDAM NOT BE ALLOWED TO CREATE, MUCH LESS BENEFIT FROM, THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON THIS POINT. TO THE DEGREE HE THINKS HE CAN DIVIDE US, HE WILL BE THAT MUCH MORE INTRANSIGENT.

SADDAM HUSSEIN APPEARS TOTALLY UNWILLING TO COMPLY WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF SECURITY COUNCIL AND ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS, NAMELY THAT IRAQ WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM KUWAIT. IF YOU HAVE SEEN ANY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, OR IF YOU SHOULD RECEIVE ANYTHING SUGGESTING A GENUINE MOVE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN, I WOULD OF COURSE BE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING ABOUT IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SADDAM'S PROGRESSIVE PILLAGING AND OBLITERATION OF KUWAIT RAISES ANOTHER CONCERN. WE MAY WANT TO CONSIDER A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THIS BEHAVIOR, AT THE SAME TIME PUTTING IRAQ ON NOTICE THAT IT WILL BE LIABLE FOR REPARATIONS. IN ADDITION, THERE MAY BE LIMITS AS TO HOW LONG WE CAN REASONABLY WAIT FOR THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO TO HAVE AN EFFECT. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES AS WELL.

I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH DURING THE COMING WEEKS.

WITH MY WARMEST REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0058

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0058 <TOR> 901005114650 MSG000276436010

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SIT: NSFEG HOTLINE_OUT ZELIKOW
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 010335Z DEC 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

RECALLING OUR DISCUSSION IN PARIS, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I
RAISED THE SUBJECT OF LEBANON WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN GENEVA. (I
DID SO IN OUR ONE-ON-ONE, SO AS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO ACT
IF HE SO CHOSE.) I TOLD ASSAD WE THOUGHT AOUN SHOULD BE ALLOWED
TO LEAVE SO THAT THIS CHAPTER OF LEBANON'S HISTORY COULD BE
CLOSED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE RELEASE OF AOUN WOULD DO A
LOT FOR SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

ASSAD SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT HE WOULD TRY. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO REINFORCE YOUR EFFORTS TO GAIN A SATISFACTORY
SETTLEMENT OF THIS PROBLEM.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0114

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0114 <TOR> 901130224613 MSG000281313973

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0731-MR
SLC 5/16/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 011721Z DEC 90

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

RECALLING OUR DISCUSSION IN PARIS, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I
RAISED THE SUBJECT OF LEBANON WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN GENEVA.
(I DID SO IN OUR ONE-ON-ONE, SO AS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO
ACT IF HE SO CHOSE.) I TOLD ASSAD WE THOUGHT AOUN SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO LEAVE SO THAT THIS CHAPTER OF LEBANON'S HISTORY COULD
BE CLOSED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE RELEASE OF AOUN WOULD DO
A LOT FOR SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

ASSAD SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT HE WOULD TRY. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO REINFORCE YOUR EFFORTS TO GAIN A SATISFACTORY
SETTLEMENT OF THIS PROBLEM.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0116

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0116 <TOR> 901201122245 MSG000281362965

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 072055Z DEC 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

DECEMBER 7, 1990

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

WITH THE PASSAGE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 678, WE HAVE ENTERED A
CRITICAL PHASE IN OUR DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY EFFORT TO PERSUADE
SADDAM HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW FROM KUWAIT. FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES ARE THE LEADING PARTNERS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COALITION TO FREE KUWAIT AND PROTECT SAUDI ARABIA.
I AM THEREFORE WRITING PRIVATELY TO YOU ON TWO QUESTIONS WE WILL
NEED TO CONFRONT TOGETHER IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

FIRST, WE NEED TO STEP UP REINFORCEMENT OF THE COALITION OF
MILITARY POWER IN THE REGION TO BACK UP RESOLUTION 678. OUR
MAXIMUM MILITARY READINESS IS AN ARGUMENT SADDAM SHOULD
UNDERSTAND AND MAY BE THE ONLY ONE THAT CAN ULTIMATELY PERSUADE
HIM TO RESOLVE THIS CRISIS PEACEFULLY. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY
MADE THE ESSENTIAL DECISIONS TO REINFORCE OUR FORCES IN THE GULF.

FEW COUNTRIES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO PROJECT AND SUPPORT
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CAPABILITIES RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY.
FRANCE IS ONE OF THEM. YOU HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED THE
EQUIVALENT OF NEARLY A DIVISION IN FORCES. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO
CONSIDER A SIGNIFICANT AND RAPID EXPANSION OF YOUR GROUND COMBAT
PRESENCE. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT IN A TRULY SERIOUS CRISIS
FRANCE WOULD BE READY TO ASSUME A LEADING ROLE. WITH THE PASSAGE
OF RESOLUTION 678, SUCH A TIME IS UPON US. SUCH A DECISION BY
FRANCE WOULD BE A STRONG MESSAGE TO SADDAM AND FURTHER ERASE HIS
DOUBTS ABOUT OUR STRENGTH, OUR RESOLVE, AND OUR COHESION.

OUR POLITICAL UNITY AND CLARITY IS ALSO CRUCIAL. I HAVE ALREADY
COMMUNICATED WITH YOU ABOUT OUR OFFER TO SEND JIM BAKER TO
BAGHDAD AND HAVE TARIQ AZIZ COME HERE. WE WILL, OF COURSE, BE IN
TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THESE TALKS.

WE FEEL THAT PARALLEL OFFICIAL TALKS BETWEEN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
COALITION AND IRAQ WOULD BE MOST ILL-ADVISED AND THAT CREATING
PARALLEL CHANNELS COULD SIMPLY PRESENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WITH
OPPORTUNITIES TO TRY TO WEAKEN THE COALITION. MOREOVER, THE
SPECTACLE OF NUMEROUS FOREIGN MINISTERS VISITING BAGHDAD COULD BE
INTERPRETED AS A LACK OF COHESION AND RESOLVE. AGAIN, IN VIEW OF
YOUR LEADERSHIP ROLE, I WOULD HOPE YOU COULD DISCOURAGE SUCH
INITIATIVES. IF YOU FEEL IT IS NECESSARY FOR EUROPE TO REINFORCE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

CSH 511105
2005-0818-MR

THE FIRM MESSAGE WE WILL BE GIVING THE IRAQIS, I WOULD HOPE THAT THE MEETING IN ROME BETWEEN TARIQ AZIZ AND GIANNI DE MICHELIS WOULD SUFFICE.

FINALLY, I TRUST YOU WILL AGREE THAT SADDAM'S TACTIC OF TRYING TO WEAKEN OUR DETERMINATION AND DIVIDE US BY RELEASING THE HOSTAGES MUST BE DEFEATED. HE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WE WILL ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL UN RESOLUTIONS.

I WELCOME YOUR ADVICE ON THESE IDEAS, AND ANY OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR GULF STRATEGY, THROUGH THIS CHANNEL.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR
#0148

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0148 <TOR> 901207160319 MSG000281894599

<DIST>

PRT: GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE HOTLINE OUT

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE
FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES:

ADMIRAL DUR HAS INFORMED ME OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S DECISION
TO REINFORCE FRENCH GROUND FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA BY FOUR COMBAT
REGIMENTS, THUS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASING THEIR MILITARY
CAPABILITIES. HE HAS ALSO TOLD ME OF YOUR PRESIDENT'S DECISION
THAT FRENCH FORCES WOULD BE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL
OF USCINCENT IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT.

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S DECISION IS MOST TIMELY AND WILL BE VERY
MUCH WELCOMED HERE. IT SHOULD ALSO HAVE A SALUTORY IMPACT ON
SADDAM HUSSEIN. I MUST ALSO NOTE, MY FRIEND, THAT IT
CORRESPONDS VERY PRECISELY WITH THE CONVERSATION YOU AND I HAD
IN PARIS A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO.

WE WILL OF COURSE AWAIT YOUR OWN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
DECISION BEFORE MAKING ANY PUBLIC COMMENT IN WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

#0156

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0156 <TOR> 901208160429 MSG000281981069

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 120318Z DEC 90

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I AM WRITING YOU IN THIS CHANNEL TO RAISE MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL'S CURRENT DEBATE ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
ISSUE. TO BE FRANK, I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT FRANCE ABSTAINED,
ALONG WITH CHINA, ON TWO RECENT PROCEDURAL MOTIONS TO DEFER A VOTE
ON A MISCHIEVOUS PLO-INSPIRED TEXT CONTAINING LANGUAGE ON AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IN MY VIEW, FURTHER DEBATE ON THE PLO-
PAGE 02 RHEHAAA0042 ~~SECRET~~
SPONSORED TEXT CAN ONLY DAMAGE THE UNITY OF OUR COALITION AND THE
INTEGRITY OF ITS AIMS.

IF THE TEXT IS PASSED, IRAQ WILL CLAIM INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF
A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE GULF AND ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICTS. IF IT IS
VETOED, IRAQ WILL SEEK TO USE THE VETO TO INFLAME ARAB OPINION
AGAINST THE U.S. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE PREFER TO SEE
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE POSTPONED.

IF WE CANNOT POSTPONE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, THE ALTERNATIVE
OPTION MY REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION
IN NEW YORK IS AS FAR AS WE CAN STRETCH TO BRIDGE THIS GAP. I
BELIEVE THE U.S. TEXT CAN GET US AWAY FROM UNPALATABLE CHOICES,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT THE
RIGHT TIME. AS YOU KNOW, I AM OPEN TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
HOWEVER, I DO NOT WANT TO DISCREDIT A POTENTIALLY CONSTRUCTIVE
APPROACH BY INAPPROPRIATE HANDLING, AND I CANNOT AGREE AT THIS TIME
TO A RESOLUTION THAT CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION OF LINKAGE.

FRANCOIS, I REALIZE THAT THE FRENCH AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PAGE 03 RHEHAAA0042 ~~SECRET~~
PALESTINIAN ISSUE ARE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. NEVERTHELESS, WE NEED TO
COOPERATE ON THIS MATTER TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A BREACH IN OUR
COMMON FRONT. WE SHOULD DENY SADDAM HUSSEIN ANY COMFORT OR SUCCOR
AS WE WORK TO GET HIM OUT OF KUWAIT. MANY THANKS FOR GIVING THIS
YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

END OF TEXT.
DECLAS: OADR

BT

#0042

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0042 <TOR> 901211223933 MSG000282263973

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL JACQUES LANXADE
FROM GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE WITH RESPECT TO TIMING OF A
SCENARIO. I ASSUME THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY TO ADVANCE YOUR
SCHEDULE BY ONE DAY. YOU SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE IDEAS I
PRESENTED TO YOU ON THE 9TH ARE FAIRLY DEFINITIVE. I PRESUME
THAT DOES NOT CREATE A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR YOU WITH RESPECT TO
YOUR OWN TIMING.

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0010

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0010 <TOR> 910112182142 MSG000285013302

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2009-0731-MR

SCS 5/16/11

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
44. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	1/25/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed:	2/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
45. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Jacques Lanxade from General Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	2/3/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed: 2/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 212105Z FEB 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LAXADE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

.

WE ARE PROVIDING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT STATEMENT OF PROPOSED COALITION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AN IRAQI WITHDRAWAL SHOULD THE IRAQIS COME FORWARD WITH AN INITIATIVE REQUIRING A COALITION RESPONSE. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU.

BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL OFFER

THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY FROM KUWAIT IS LONG OVERDUE. IF THAT DECISION IS REAL, WE WELCOME IT. WE AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS, SO LONG AS IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL TWELVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

THE WORLD HAS GOOD REASON TO TREAT IRAQI COMMITMENTS WITH SKEPTICISM. THE COALITION HAS HEARD SUCH PLEDGES FROM THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT BEFORE. IN THE FIRST WEEK AFTER ITS INVASION, IRAQ PROMISED TO WITHDRAW AND INSTEAD REINFORCED ITS MILITARY FORCES IN KUWAIT. IRAQ ALSO PLEDGED IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO AUGUST 2 NOT TO INVADE KUWAIT. THE WORLD IS NOW LIVING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THOSE BROKEN PROMISES.

STRICT, PROMPT, AND UNCONDITIONAL IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 660 AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT UNSC RESOLUTIONS REMAINS THE ONLY PATH TO PEACE. THAT MEANS IRAQ MUST IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO WITHDRAW ALL OF ITS FORCES FROM ALL OF KUWAIT, SO THAT KUWAIT'S SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN BE RESTORED. AND IT MEANS IRAQ CAN ATTACH NO CONDITIONS TO ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT. FINALLY, UNTIL IRAQ FULLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIES, RESOLUTION 678'S AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE REMAINS IN EFFECT.

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION MUST SEE IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS REQUIRE IRAQ TO BEGIN TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS WITHIN 12 HOURS:

-- BEGIN A MASSIVE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT TO BE COMPLETED IN 96 HOURS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADED AND OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN 96 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET

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2009-0731-MR
SCS 4/4/11

RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.

-- TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE COMPLETE, IRAQ MUST, WITHIN THE FIRST 48 HOURS, REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY, FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT BORDER, FROM BUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS, AND FROM KUWAIT'S RUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD;

-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660, ALL IRAQI FORCES MUST, WITHIN THE 96 HOURS SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1. THOSE FORCES THAT WERE DEPLOYED WELL NORTH OF THE IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER ON AUGUST 1, THEREFORE, MUST NOT ONLY LEAVE KUWAIT, BUT RESUME THEIR AUGUST 1 POSITIONS.

-- ARRANGE WITH THE ICRC THE RELEASE OF ALL COALITION PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED COALITION SERVICEMEN, WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL;

-- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES OR BOOBY-TRAPS ON KUWAITI OIL INSTALLATIONS;

-- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT;

-- HALT ALL CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES IN KUWAIT;

-- ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE;

-- CEASE ALL FURTHER ATTACKS, INCLUDING USE OF SCUD MISSILES AND TERRORISM BY IRAQ OR ITS SURROGATES AGAINST ANY COUNTRY, INCLUDING ISRAEL;

-- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES; AND

-- DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS WISH TO REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES. ANY BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BRING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0092

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0092 <TOR> 910221161848 MSG000288461928

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

FEBRUARY 22, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT ON IRAQI WITHDRAWAL

THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY REPRESENTS A SERIOUS AND USEFUL
EFFORT WHICH IS APPRECIATED. BUT MAJOR OBSTACLES REMAIN. THE
COALITION FOR MANY MONTHS HAS SOUGHT A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THIS
CRISIS IN KEEPING WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS.

AS PRESIDENT BUSH POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV, THE STEPS THE
IRAQIS ARE CONSIDERING WOULD CONSTITUTE A CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL
AND WOULD ALSO PREVENT THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RELEVANT UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. ALSO, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT
IRAQ IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY.

FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS HAS BEEN A
CONSISTENT AND NECESSARY DEMAND OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
THE WORLD MUST MAKE SURE THAT IRAQ HAS, IN FACT, RENOUNCED ITS
CLAIM TO KUWAIT AND ACCEPTED ALL RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS. INDEED, ONLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN AGREE TO LIFT
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, AND THE WORLD NEEDS TO BE ASSURED IN
CONCRETE TERMS OF IRAQ'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS BEFORE SUCH AN ACTION
CAN BE TAKEN. IN A SITUATION WHERE SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN LIFTED,
SADDAM HUSSEIN COULD SIMPLY REVERT TO USING HIS OIL RESOURCES ONCE
AGAIN, NOT TO PROVIDE FOR THE WELL-BEING OF HIS PEOPLE, BUT INSTEAD
TO REARM.

SO IN A FINAL EFFORT TO OBTAIN IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH THE WILL OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE UNITED STATES, AFTER CONSULTING
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHER COALITION PARTNERS,
DECLARES THAT A GROUND CAMPAIGN WILL NOT BE INITIATED AGAINST IRAQI
FORCES IF PRIOR TO NOON, NEW YORK (UN) TIME SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23,
IRAQ PUBLICLY ACCEPTS THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND AUTHORITATIVELY
COMMUNICATES THAT ACCEPTANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS. THE TERMS ARE
AS FOLLOWS:

-- BEGIN LARGE-SCALE WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT BY NOON, NEW YORK (UN)
TIME, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23;

-- COMPLETE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM KUWAIT IN ONE WEEK. (GIVEN

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2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

THE FACT THAT IRAQ INVADED AND OCCUPIED KUWAIT IN A MATTER OF HOURS, ANYTHING LONGER THAN THIS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT MEET RESOLUTION 660'S REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIACY.);

-- WITHIN THE FIRST 48 HOURS, REMOVE ALL ITS FORCES FROM KUWAIT CITY (TO ALLOW FOR THE PROMPT RETURN OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT), FROM ALL PREPARED DEFENSES ALONG THE SAUDI-KUWAIT AND SAUDI-IRAQ BORDERS, FROM RUBIYAN AND WARBAH ISLANDS, AND FROM KUWAIT'S RUMAYLLAH OIL FIELD;

-- WITHIN THE ONE WEEK SPECIFIED ABOVE, RETURN ALL ITS FORCES TO THEIR POSITIONS OF AUGUST 1, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 660;

-- IN COOPERATION WITH THE ICRC, RELEASE ALL PRISONERS OF WAR AND THIRD-COUNTRY CIVILIANS BEING HELD AGAINST THEIR WILL, AND RETURN THE REMAINS OF KILLED AND DECEASED SERVICEMEN, THIS ACTION TO COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY WITH THE INITIATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL AND TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 48 HOURS;

-- REMOVE ALL EXPLOSIVES AND BOOBY-TRAPS INCLUDING THOSE ON KUWAITI OIL INSTALLATIONS AND DESIGNATE IRAQI MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER(S) TO WORK WITH KUWAITI AND OTHER COALITION FORCES ON THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS RELATED TO IRAQ'S WITHDRAWAL, TO INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF ALL DATA ON THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ANY LAND OR SEA MINES;

-- CEASE COMBAT AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OVER IRAQ AND KUWAIT EXCEPT FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CARRYING TROOPS OUT OF KUWAIT AND ALLOW COALITION AIRCRAFT EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER AND USE OF ALL KUWAITI AIRSPACE; AND

-- CEASE ALL DESTRUCTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST KUWAITI CITIZENS AND PROPERTY AND RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COALITION PARTNERS REITERATE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK RETREATING IRAQI FORCES AND, FURTHER, WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT SO LONG AS WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE GUIDELINES AND THERE ARE NO ATTACKS BY IRAQ ON OTHER COUNTRIES. ANY BREACH OF THESE TERMS WILL BRING AN INSTANT AND SHARP RESPONSE FROM COALITION FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 678.

END OF TEXT:

#0098

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0098 <TOR> 910222131920 MSG000288537560

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<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 260421Z FEB 91

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADM LANXADZ FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

FEBRUARY 25, 1991

WE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE THIS EVENING AT 10:30 P.M., WASHINGTON TIME. WE WILL OBVIOUSLY NEED TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AT THE UN OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

BEGIN TEXT:

WE CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. WE HAVE HEARD NO REASON TO CHANGE THAT. AND BECAUSE THERE IS A WAR ON, OUR FIRST CONCERN MUST BE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. AND COALITION TROOPS.

WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THIS MOST RECENT CLAIM ABOUT IRAQI WITHDRAWAL IS GENUINE. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THE IRAQI ARMY IS WITHDRAWING. IN FACT, IRAQI UNITS ARE CONTINUING TO FIGHT. MOREOVER, WE REMEMBER WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TANKS PRETENDED TO SURRENDER AT KHAJJI, ONLY TO TURN AND FIRE. WE REMEMBER THE SCUD ATTACKS TODAY AND SADDAM'S MANY BROKEN PROMISES OF THE PAST. THERE ARE AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL 22 DEAD AMERICANS TONIGHT WHO OFFER SILENT TESTIMONY TO THE INTENTIONS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.

THE STATEMENT OUT OF BAGHDAD TODAY SAYS THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FORCES WILL FIGHT THEIR WAY OUT WHILE RETREATING. WE WILL NOT ATTACK UNARMED SOLDIERS IN RETREAT. BUT WE WILL CONSIDER RETREATING COMBAT UNITS AS A MOVEMENT OF WAR.

THE ONLY WAY SADDAM HUSSEIN CAN PERSUADE THE COALITION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF HIS INTENTIONS WOULD BE FOR HIM PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY TO AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THE PROPOSAL WE ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 22 AND (BECAUSE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM BAGHDAD REFERRED TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE) PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY TO ACCEPT EXPLICITLY ALL RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY UNSC RESOLUTION 662 (IRAQI REJECTION OF ITS PURPORTED ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT) AND UNSC RESOLUTION 674 (IRAQI COMPENSATION TO KUWAIT AND OTHERS).

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0007

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0007 <TOR> 910225033204 MSG0000288833523

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 280224Z FEB 91

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<SUBJ> DRAFT OF STATEMENT FOR FEBRUARY 27, 1991

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL JACQUES LANXADE
FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

SUBJECT: DRAFT OF STATEMENT FOR FEBRUARY 27, 1991

FOLLOWING IS BEING TRANSMITTED INFORMALLY TO YOU FOR YOUR
INFORMATION:

BEGIN TEXT:

OVAL OFFICE ADDRESS
FEBRUARY 27, 1991

KUWAIT IS LIBERATED. IRAQ'S ARMY IS DEFEATED.
OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE MET. KUWAIT IS ONCE MORE
IN THE HANDS OF KUWAITIS, IN CONTROL OF THEIR OWN
DESTINY. WE SHARE IN THEIR JOY, A JOY TEMPERED ONLY BY
OUR COMPASSION FOR THEIR ORDEAL.

TONIGHT, THE KUWAITI FLAG ONCE AGAIN FLIES ABOVE
THE CAPITAL OF A FREE AND SOVEREIGN NATION. AND THE
AMERICAN FLAG FLIES ABOVE OUR EMBASSY.

SEVEN MONTHS AGO, AMERICA AND THE WORLD DREW A LINE
IN THE SAND. WE DECLARED THAT THE AGGRESSION AGAINST
KUWAIT WOULD NOT STAND. AND TONIGHT, AMERICA AND THE
WORLD HAVE KEPT THEIR WORD.

THIS IS NOT A TIME OF EUPHORIA, CERTAINLY NOT A
TIME TO GLOAT. BUT IT IS A TIME OF PRIDE -- PRIDE IN
OUR TROOPS, PRIDE IN THE FRIENDS WHO STOOD WITH US IN
THE CRISIS, PRIDE IN OUR NATION AND THE PEOPLE WHOSE
STRENGTH AND RESOLVE MADE VICTORY QUICK, DECISIVE AND
JUST. AND SOON WE WILL OPEN WIDE OUR ARMS TO WELCOME
BACK HOME TO AMERICA OUR MAGNIFICENT FIGHTING FORCES.

NO ONE COUNTRY CAN CLAIM THIS VICTORY AS ITS OWN.
IT WAS NOT ONLY A VICTORY FOR KUWAIT, BUT A VICTORY FOR
ALL THE COALITION PARTNERS. THIS IS A VICTORY FOR THE
UNITED NATIONS, FOR ALL MANKIND... FOR THE RULE OF
LAW, AND FOR WHAT IS RIGHT.

AFTER CONSULTING WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY,
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL
POWELL, AND OUR COALITION PARTNERS ... AT MIDNIGHT

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2009-0730-MR
SS 4/4/11

TONIGHT, EXACTLY 100 HOURS SINCE GROUND OPERATIONS COMMENCED, SIX WEEKS SINCE THE START OF OPERATION DESERT STORM, ALL U.S. AND COALITION FORCES WILL SUSPEND OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS.

IT IS UP TO IRAQ WHETHER THIS SUSPENSION ON THE PART OF THE COALITION BECOMES A PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE. COALITION POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS FOR A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

IRAQ MUST RELEASE IMMEDIATELY ALL COALITION PRISONERS-OF-WAR, THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS, AND THE REMAINS OF ALL WHO HAVE FALLEN. IRAQ MUST RELEASE ALL KUWAITI DETAINEES. IRAQ ALSO MUST INFORM KUWAITI AUTHORITIES OF THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF ALL LAND AND SEA MINES. IRAQ MUST COMPLY FULLY WITH ALL RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS INCLUDES A RESCINDING OF IRAQ'S AUGUST DECISION TO ANNEX KUWAIT, AND ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF IRAQ'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS, DAMAGE AND INJURY ITS AGGRESSION HAS CAUSED.

THE COALITION CALLS UPON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO DESIGNATE MILITARY COMMANDERS TO MEET WITHIN 48 HOURS WITH THEIR COALITION COUNTERPARTS AT A PLACE IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS TO BE SPECIFIED, TO ARRANGE FOR MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. IRAQ SHOULD DESIGNATE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES TO MEET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER AND COALITION COUNTERPARTS TO DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. FURTHER, I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY BAKER TO REQUEST THAT THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MEET TO FORMULATE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS WAR TO BE ENDED.

THE SUSPENSION OF OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS IS CONTINGENT UPON IRAQ'S FIRING UPON ANY COALITION FORCES AND NOT LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY. IF IRAQ VIOLATES THESE TERMS, COALITION FORCES WILL BE FREE TO RESUME MILITARY OPERATIONS.

AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY I HAVE SAID TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ THAT OUR QUARREL WAS NOT WITH THEM BUT INSTEAD WITH THEIR LEADERSHIP AND ABOVE ALL WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. THIS REMAINS THE CASE. YOU, THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ ARE NOT OUR ENEMY. WE DO NOT SEEK YOUR DESTRUCTION. WE HAVE TREATED YOUR P.O.W.'S WITH KINDNESS. COALITION FORCES FOUGHT THIS WAR ONLY AS A LAST RESORT, AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN IRAQ IS LEAD BY PEOPLE PREPARED TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS.

WE MUST NOW BEGIN TO LOOK BEYOND VICTORY IN WAR. WE MUST MEET THE CHALLENGE OF SECURING THE PEACE; IN THE FUTURE, AS BEFORE, WE WILL CONSULT WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS.

WE HAVE ALREADY DONE A GOOD DEAL OF THINKING AND PLANNING FOR THE POST-WAR PERIOD, AND SECRETARY BAKER HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CONSULT WITH OUR COALITION PARTNERS ON THE REGION'S CHALLENGES. THERE CAN BE AND

WILL BE NO SOLELY AMERICAN ANSWER TO ALL THESE CHALLENGES. BUT WE CAN ASSIST AND SUPPORT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AND BE A CATALYST FOR PEACE. IN THIS SPIRIT, SECRETARY BAKER WILL GO TO THE REGION NEXT WEEK TO BEGIN A NEW ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS.

THIS WAR IS NOW BEHIND US; AHEAD OF US IN THE DIFFICULT TASK OF SECURING A POTENTIALLY HISTORIC PEACE. TONIGHT, THOUGH, LET US BE PROUD OF WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED. LET US GIVE THANKS TO THOSE WHO RISKED THEIR LIVES; LET US NEVER FORGET THOSE WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES. MAY GOD BLESS OUR VALIANT MILITARY FORCES AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND LET US ALL REMEMBER THEM IN OUR

#0137

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

PRAYERS. GOOD NIGHT, AND MAY GOD BLESS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0138

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0137 <TOR> 910227213121 MSG000288999081

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0138 <TOR> 910227213017 MSG000288999017

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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 121330Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT
TO ADMIRAL LAMYADE FOR HIS EYES ONLY.

11 MARCH 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF MARCH 8. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS BUT A
PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE IMPORTANT MATTERS YOU RAISED; WE SHOULD
PLAN ON GIVING THEM FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN MARTINIQUE.

IPAC IS MAKING SOME PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 686; THAT SAID, WE WOULD WANT TO SEE MORE DONE
OR AT LEAST AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE BEFORE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
AGREE TO A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE. IT IS OUR TENTATIVE THINKING THAT
THE TIME WOULD BE RIGHT TO MOVE TO CONSIDER SUCH A CEASE-FIRE
RESOLUTION SOME TIME THE WEEK OF MARCH 18, THAT IS, AFTER JIM BAKER
IS BACK HERE AND HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE RESULTS OF
HIS TRIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT, AN IMPORTANT
ELEMENT OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ARAB COALITION PARTNERS AND
KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA IN PARTICULAR ADDRESSES JUST THIS ISSUE.

AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF POST-WAR SECURITY, IT IS OUR TENTATIVE
THINKING THAT THE BULK OF THE POST-WAR SECURITY BURDEN OUGHT TO BE
BORNE BY THE LOCAL STATES ALONG THE LINES OF THE DECLARATION ISSUED
IN DAMASCUS ON MARCH 6 BY THE GCC, EGYPT AND SYRIA. THAT SAID, WE
DO SEE A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR A UNSC FORCE, PROBABLY MORE
FOR MONITORING AND OBSERVING THE CEASE-FIRE LINE THAN ANYTHING
ELSE. THE IDEA THAT WESTERN FORCES MIGHT PROVIDE SECURITY DURING A
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS IN EFFECT WHAT IS HAPPENING; WE SHOULD,
HOWEVER, DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF U.S. AND FRENCH TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND
HOW BEST TO COORDINATE. IT IS OUR WISH AS WELL TO REMOVE OUR
GROUND FORCES AND MAKE THE TRANSITION FROM WARTIME TO POST-WAR
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AS QUICKLY AS CAN BE ARRANGED.

I HOPE THE ABOVE GIVES YOU A BETTER SENSE OF OUR CURRENT THINKING.
MUCH REMAINS IN FLUX, AND THE UPCOMING MEETINGS COULD NOT HAVE COME
AT A BETTER TIME. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

SINCERELY,

BRENT

END OF TEXT.

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2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

#0135

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0185 <TOR> 910312083312 MSG000290075592

<DIST>

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 220740Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

22 MARCH, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

WHILE IN MOSCOW ON MARCH 14-16, SECRETARY BAKER RECEIVED A
NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THEY ARGUE SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESOLVE THE IMPASSE OVER THEIR FAILURE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT
THE CFE TREATY. HE IS COMMUNICATING THE DETAILS TO YOUR
FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ALLIED COUNTERPARTS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO
REVISE ITS CFE OBLIGATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO BE
REDUCED, AND THE WAY IT IS TO BE REDUCED. WHILE WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SEIZED WITH THIS ISSUE AND
SEEM EAGER TO SEE IT RESOLVED, THEIR OFFER IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SAME BASIC REASON THAT THEIR INITIAL
STANCE IS UNACCEPTABLE: OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO IN GOOD
FAITH MUST BE HONORED AND CANNOT BE REOPENED WHENEVER A
PARTY CHOOSES.

ALL OF US MADE COMPROMISES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS
TREATY AND ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO SIGN
IT. STILL, ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISH TO
COMPEL THE OTHER 21 SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY TO
RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS AFTER THE FACT. IF WE ACCEPT THIS
TACTIC, WE WILL DO MORE THAN UNDERMINE THE CFE TREATY. WE
WILL ENDANGER THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
ACROSS THE BOARD BY WEAKENING THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS,
AND UNDERMINING THE EXPECTATION THAT BARGAINING IN GOOD
FAITH WILL LEAD TO A DEFINITE, BINDING CONCLUSION.

I HAVE ALREADY OUTLINED MY CONCERNS ON THIS SUBJECT TO
PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE CFE TREATY IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT
AND WE MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AND
IMPLEMENTED. WE SEEK A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, WITH DUE
RESPECT FOR THE DIGNITY OF ALL INVOLVED. WE ARE READY TO
EXPLORE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, SO LONG AS THEY PRESERVE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM PREPARED TO
WORK FOR A SOLUTION THAT COMPLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING
PRINCIPLES: FIRST, TOTAL SOVIET HOLDINGS OF TANKS,
ARTILLERY, AND ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES IN THE CFE ZONE
(REGARDLESS OF THE BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICE TO WHICH
THEY MAY BE ASSIGNED) CANNOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SPECIFIED IN

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
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2000-1389-F

THE TREATY. SECOND, ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT IN EXCESS OF THESE LIMITS WILL HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED USING AGREED PROCEDURES. THIRD, THE SOLUTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER TERMS OF THE CFE TREATY (INCLUDING LIMITS ON EQUIPMENT HELD IN ACTIVE UNITS AND CEILINGS ON EQUIPMENT IN SPECIFIED ZONES) SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO RENEGOTIATE ITS TERMS. I INTEND TO CONVEY THIS POSITION TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH IN YOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH HIM.

ALLIED SOLIDARITY HAS HELPED PRODUCE SOME MOVEMENT FROM MOSCOW. TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ANY REASON TO THINK WE CAN BE DIVIDED OR WEAKENED ON THIS MATTER WOULD SET BACK THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. TOGETHER WE CAN CONTINUE TO SHOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR FIRM RESOLVE TO STAND BY THE AGREEMENT WE SIGNED IN PARIS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE RUSH

#0020

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0020 <TOR> 910322024130 MSG000290918490

<DIST>

PPT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 302207Z MAR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES:

I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE REQUESTING A WHITE HOUSE PERSPECTIVE ON
THE WALESA VISIT.

I BELIEVE THE VISIT WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL, BOTH IN REASSURING
WALESA OF CONTINUING STRONG WESTERN SUPPORT AND IN REINFORCING
HIS COMMITMENT TO THE DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
WHICH POLAND IS ENGAGED.

ON DEBT RELIEF, WE PRESENTED WALESA WITH THE 50 PERCENT-PLUS
PARIS CLUB REDUCTION PACKAGE THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED WITH THE
STRONG COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF YOUR FINANCE MINISTRY. WE HAD
MADE IT CLEAR IN ADVANCE TO WALESA AND HIS ADVISORS THAT, EVEN
THOUGH THEIR OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN AN 80 PERCENT REDUCTION, THIS
PARIS CLUB PACKAGE WAS IN FACT A VERY GENEROUS ONE AND IT WAS
ESSENTIAL THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TAKE A THOROUGHLY POSITIVE
VIEW OF IT. AS YOU KNOW, THE PARIS CLUB AGREEMENT CALLS FOR
CREDITORS TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS BEYOND THE MINIMUM 50
PERCENT AGREED TO BY ALL, AND THE U.S. WILL IN FACT REDUCE
POLAND'S DEBT BURDEN BY 70 PERCENT. TEN PERCENT OF THIS WILL BE
USED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO CREATE, WITH LOCAL CURRENCY, AN
ENVIRONMENTAL FUND. WE WOULD HOPE THAT OTHER CREDITORS MIGHT BE
INTERESTED IN A SIMILAR ADDITIONAL REDUCTION, WITH POSSIBLE
PARTICIPATION IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL FUND.

WALESA SEEMED MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE SPECIAL EFFORTS BEING MADE
BY POLAND'S CREDITORS, AND HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE
OF KEEPING TO THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM RECENTLY
NEGOTIATED WITH THE IMF. HE ALSO INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO
ACCELERATE PRIVATIZATION AND OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS NEEDED TO
CREATE AN EFFECTIVE MARKET ECONOMY, AN ATTITUDE WHICH WE VERY
MUCH ENCOURAGED.

WALESA DID NOT MAKE ANY NEW REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND
INSTEAD REPEATEDLY STRESSED COOPERATION RATHER THAN JUST AID. HE
DID, HOWEVER, RAISE THE DILEMMA OF THE POLISH ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY,
AND SPECIFICALLY OF THE TANK EXPORTS WHICH WE HAVE OPPOSED. OUR
DISCUSSIONS OF WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO CONVERT THESE INDUSTRIES WAS
LEFT INCONCLUSIVE.

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THE TWO PRESIDENTS ALSO SIGNED A JOINT DECLARATION, WHICH WILL BE SENT TO YOU SEPARATELY. THE POLES HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED A MUCH LENGTHIER DOCUMENT CONTAINING CLEARLY IMPLIED SECURITY GUARANTEES. HOWEVER, WHEN WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER LANGUAGE OF THAT KIND, WALESA'S REPRESENTATIVES QUICKLY ACQUIESCED IN THE MUCH MORE GENERAL STATEMENT THAT WE PROPOSED.

-
DURING HIS SEVEN-DAY VISIT TO THE U.S., WALESA MET WITH TOP BUSINESS LEADERS IN NEW YORK, CHICAGO AND WASHINGTON, IN EACH CASE MAKING A STRONG PLEA FOR INCREASED PRIVATE INVESTMENT. OUR BUSINESSMEN AND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS STRESSED, IN THEIR TURN, THE LARGE NUMBER OF LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES AND RIGIDITIES THAT MUST STILL BE REMOVED BEFORE POLAND CAN BECOME A TRULY ATTRACTIVE PLACE TO INVEST. THESE COMMENTS SEEMED TO HAVE AN IMPACT, AND WE PLAN TO FOLLOW THEM UP IN OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH WALESA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

-
DURING THE VISIT, WE ALSO AGREED TO SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO POLAND TO EXPLORE PRAGMATICALLY HOW THAT COUNTRY'S EXPORTS MIGHT BE INCREASED THROUGH THE REMOVAL OF BARRIERS BOTH WITHIN POLAND AND IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN MARKETS.

-
WALESA SEEMS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO JOINING THE WEST AS FAST AS POSSIBLE, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY. HE CLEARLY FEELS A NEED FOR CLOSER TIES TO, AND SUPPORT FROM, THE WEST. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO QUITE AWARE OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES.

-
I HOPE THAT THESE COMMENTS WILL BE OF USE TO YOU. SHOULD YOU WISH MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE ECONOMIC OR OTHER ASPECTS OF THE VISIT, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO HAVE YOUR DEPUTY CONTACT ADRIAN BASORA.

-
I HOPE THAT THE WALESA VISIT TO PARIS WILL PROVE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL, AND I WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN YOUR ASSESSMENT.

-
SINCERELY,

-
BRENT SCOWCROFT

-
END TEXT

-
DECL: OADR
#0068

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0068 <TOR> 910330171145 MSG000291661905

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 050425Z APR 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
9999

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE
FROM GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

MY WARMEST PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF
OF STAFF. WELL DESERVED, AND A VERY FINE AUGURY FOR CONTINUATION
OF THE EXCELLENT BILATERAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST YEAR BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HOPE TO VISIT WASHINGTON RELATIVELY SOON,
AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND CONTINUING OUR DISCUSSIONS.

IN THE MEANTIME, MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS I KNOW WILL
BE YOURS IN YOUR NEW POST.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0078

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0078 <TOR> 910404232848 MSG000292116527

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2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
53. Cable	Re: Message to Admiral Lanxade from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed: 2/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>

PRT: GANTT GATES COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE HOTLINE OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 241748Z APR 91

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PIERRE MOREL FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

PIERRE:

FOLLOWING UP ON OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS, I AM SENDING TALKING POINTS WE PLAN TO PROVIDE TOM PICKERING, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE FOR USE THIS AFTERNOON OR THIS EVENING WITH THE IRAQI UN PERMREP. I BELIEVE OUR POTENTIAL FOR REALIZING THE AIM OF GETTING THE IRAQI SECURITY PERSONNEL OUT OF ZAKHU QUICKLY AND WITHOUT BLOODSHED WOULD BE ENHANCED APPRECIABLY BY OUR MAKING A JOINT APPROACH TO THE IRAQIS. (I AM SUGGESTING THE SAME TO STEPHEN WALL.) I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GETTING BACK TO ME AS SOON AS YOU CAN WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT BEFORE ANY OF US INSTRUCT OUR PEOPLE IN NEW YORK.

MANY THANKS. BRENT

END TEXT

BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

- U.S. AND OTHER POWERS ARE CONDUCTING A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

- THE CAMP CONSTRUCTION IN THE ZAKHU AREA IS PROGRESSING.

- INITIAL OPERATIONS TO CONSTRUCT THE HUMANITARIAN CAMP HAVE BROUGHT OUR FORCES INTO CLOSE CONTACT.

- HOWEVER, NO UNTOWARD INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ZAKHU AREA. WE NOTE FURTHER THAT IRAQI FORCES ARE GETTING REPOSITIONED TO PRECLUDE AN UNINTENDED INCIDENT.

- AT THE SAME TIME, A LARGE NUMBER OF IRAQI SECURITY PERSONNEL HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED IN ZAKHU.

- THE NET EFFECT HAS BEEN TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF DISCOMFORT, UNEASINESS AND INTIMIDATION IN THE LOCAL POPULATION WHICH HAS DETERRED THE KURDS FROM LEAVING THE HILLS, FRUSTRATING OUR HUMANITARIAN GOALS.

- WE HAVE BOTH AGREED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO CREATE CONDITIONS

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THAT WILL ALLOW THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TURNOVER OF THESE HUMANITARIAN CAMPS TO APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODIES.

- MOREOVER, JUST AS IT HAS PROVEN SENSIBLE TO CREATE A BUFFER BETWEEN FORCES CONDUCTING HUMANITARIAN WORK AND YOUR FORCES IN THE AREA, SO ALSO MUST WE INSIST THAT THE RECENTLY INTRODUCED IRAQI SECURITY PERSONNEL BE WITHDRAWN FROM ZAKHU AND ITS ENVIRONS.

- THIS WITHDRAWAL NEEDS TO BE UNDERTAKEN PROMPTLY (NLT 260300Z APR 91) AND COMPLETED NLT 270300Z APR 91 SO THAT WE MAY PROCEED WITH REFUGEE RELOCATION AND RELIEF OF SUFFERING.

- IN THE MEANTIME, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE U.S. AND THE OTHER POWERS PROVIDING FORCES TO CONDUCT THIS HUMANITARIAN MISSION WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE OF ORDER IN THE AREA OF ZAKHU SECURITY ZONE.

- AS WE EXPAND THIS SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN SUCH A WAY TO ENABLE US TO ACCOMPLISH OUR HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVE, WE WILL ADVISE ALL IRAQI MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL THAT THEY WILL BE DENIED ENTRY INTO THE NEW SECURITY AREA WITHOUT PROPER COORDINATION WITH THE MCC. THIS NEW SECURITY AREA IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN AN AREA 30 KM AROUND (REPEAT AROUND) ZAKHU, AS MANDATED BY LTG SHALIKASHVILI 19 APRIL.

- WE EXPECT THIS PROCESS TO BE COMPLETED BY 270300Z APR 91.

- WE URGE PROMPT RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST. WE NEED TO CONDUCT THIS HUMANITARIAN EFFORT QUICKLY IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES AND RETURN THE AREA TO NORMALCY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

- SHOULD WE ENCOUNTER IRAQI MILITARY OR SECURITY PERSONNEL AFTER 270300Z APR 91 INSIDE THE SECURITY AREA DEMARCATED BY OUR HUMANITARIAN FORCES, WE WILL DISARM AND TAKE THEM INTO CUSTODY AND NOTIFY YOUR LIAISON OFFICER.

- IF AN IRAQI SHOULD EXHIBIT HOSTILE INTENT AGAINST FORCES OR INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT, WE WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO CONTROL THE SITUATION.

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0146

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0146 <TOR> 910424135526 MSG000293810126

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 012346Z MAY 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PIERRE MOPEL FROM
BRENT SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

PIERRE:

THE PRESIDENT IS VERY PLEASED WITH THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION
THAT NOW EXISTS BETWEEN THE US AND FRENCH FORCES IN OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT. THE SITUATION IN ZAKHU HAS BEEN STABILIZED AND
THE REFUGEES ARE NOW BEGINNING TO RETURN IN CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS.
OUR COMMANDER ON THE SCENE BELIEVES THAT IT IS TIME TO BEGIN
SLOWLY EXTENDING OUR EFFORTS UP THE VALLEY TO THE EAST TOWARD
AL AMADYAH, AND IN DUE COURSE BEYOND AL AMADYAH TO THE TOWN OF
SURI, TWENTY KILOMETERS FURTHER EAST. HE PROPOSES USING
COALITION FORCES TO PROVIDE THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THESE TWO
AREAS TO ALLOW REFUGEES TO FLOW BACK INTO THE VALLEY AND HOME TO
THEIR ORIGINAL VILLAGES.

THE PLAN HAS BEEN BRIEFED TO YOUR COMMANDER IN THE FIELD AND
I KNOW THAT ADMIRAL LANXADE HAS DISCUSSED IT WITH GENERAL POWELL.
THIS PLAN HAS OUR SUPPORT HERE AND WE HOPE YOU CONCUR IT IS THE
RIGHT COURSE TO PURSUE.

MANY THANKS. BRENT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0009

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0009 <TOP> 910501195611 MSG000294436571

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

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<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 032338Z MAY 91

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

MAY 03, 1991.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

AS YOU KNOW, JIM BAKER AND ALEKSANDR BESSMERTNYKH JUST MET IN THE
USSR. I THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO SHAPE WITH YOU OUR
MOST CURRENT ASSESSMENT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF YOUR UPCOMING
VISIT TO MOSCOW.

SO FAR, MOST OF THE SOVIET UNION'S "NEW THINKING" IN FOREIGN POLICY
HAS SURVIVED THE TWISTS AND TURNS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. DESPITE
THE CLEAR TURN TO THE RIGHT LAST FALL, MOSCOW COOPERATED WITH US UP
TO AND THROUGH THE WAR AND IS NOW WORKING CONSTRUCTIVELY TO TRY TO
BUILD A LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION.

ON THE BALTICS, GORBACHEV IS STILL LARGELY PURSUING A PATH OF
NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN REPRESSION, ALTHOUGH SOVIET SECURITY FORCES
HAVE AT TIMES GONE PAST THE EDGE. THE SOVIETS ALSO CONTINUE THEIR
PULL-OUT IN EASTERN EUROPE. FARTHER AFIELD, THE RECENT NEGOTIATING
PROGRESS IN EL SALVADOR MIGHT WELL NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE HAD THERE
BEEN A SOVIET REVERSION TO PREVIOUS POLICY. SIMILARLY, WE ARE VERY
PLEASED THUS FAR WITH BOTH THE SUPPORT THE SOVIETS ARE GIVING OUR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND THE SYMPATHY THEY ARE DEMONSTRATING TOWARD
WHAT WE ARE DOING IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

DOMESTICALLY, GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL POSITION REMAINS PRECARIOUS
DESPITE HIS RECENT AGREEMENT WITH THE NINE REPUBLIC LEADERS, WHICH
SEEMS TO BE AN "UP" IN HIS FAMILIAR PATTERN OF UPS AND DOWNS.
ECONOMICALLY, I AM QUITE PESSIMISTIC. GORBACHEV'S RECENT PACKAGE
OF REFORMS IS UNLIKELY TO ARREST THE SOVIET UNION'S STEADY DECLINE,
AND THE COUNTRY'S EXTERNAL PAYMENTS POSITION HAS GONE FROM BAD TO
WORSE.

THERE IS ONE SPECIFIC POINT ON OUR FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA WITH
MOSCOW THAT DOES CONCERN ME, HOWEVER. I KNOW YOU AGREE THAT THE
SOVIETS MUST BE BROUGHT INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CFE TREATY AS SIGNED. THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSAL I
RECENTLY MADE TO GORBACHEV AND ON WHICH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE
BEEN BRIEFED.

I HAVE PROPOSED TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV A PRACTICAL SOLUTION WHEREBY
THE SOVIETS WOULD ENSURE THAT THE AMOUNT OF THEIR EQUIPMENT IN
EUROPE, WHETHER ASSIGNED TO NAVAL INFANTRY, COASTAL DEFENSE OR ANY

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OTHER BRANCH OF THE MILITARY SERVICES, WOULD NOT EXCEED THE LIMITS SET OUT IN THE TREATY. THE PROPOSAL ALSO ASKS GORBACHEV TO CONFIRM THAT THE EXCESS EQUIPMENT WOULD BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED, AND THAT HE RECONFIRM PREVIOUS SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF THE EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN EAST OF THE URALS WILL BE DESTROYED OR CONVERTED. AT THE SAME TIME, IT AVOIDS DIRECTLY CONFRONTING THE UNJUSTIFIABLE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE III OR REQUIRING GORBACHEV TO ACKNOWLEDGE EXPLICITLY A REVERSAL OF THE SOVIET POSITION. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A DISAPPOINTING ORAL REPLY FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH TO JIM BAKER. THE RESPONSE WAS NOT SPECIFIC, BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT EQUIPMENT HELD BY NAVAL INFANTRY IS CLEARLY COVERED BY CFE LIMITS.

IT MIGHT WELL SWAY GORBACHEV IF YOU WERE TO TELL HIM YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS PROPOSAL HAS GONE AS FAR AS IS LEGALLY AND POLITICALLY POSSIBLE. WE HAVE TRIED TO ACCOMMODATE HIS NEEDS WHILE BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION INTO PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS. YOU MIGHT WISH TO POINT OUT THAT CONTINUING SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO HONOR A TREATY THEY HAVE ALREADY SIGNED COULD END UP DOING SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO MOSCOW'S IMAGE AND TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

I ALSO WANT TO GIVE YOU A SENSE OF WHERE THINGS STAND ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. JIM BAKER HAS MET THE SORT OF RESISTANCE TO THE NOTION OF A PEACE CONFERENCE ONE WOULD EXPECT, ESPECIALLY FROM SYRIA AND ISRAEL. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE NARROWING THE GAP ON CONFERENCE STRUCTURE AND ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. HERE IT INCREASINGLY LOOKS AS THOUGH JORDAN MUST PLAY A KEY ROLE. WE SHALL PERSEVERE, AND JIM MAY HEAD BACK TO THE AREA SOON. I THINK WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE POINT FOR CLOSURE; EITHER WE WILL CONVENE A CONFERENCE (WITH THE EC THERE), OR WE MUST TRY ANOTHER APPROACH. WHAT I WILL NOT ACCEPT IS FOR THE PROCESS TO BE DELAYED BY THE INTRANSIGENCE OF ONE OR MORE OF THE PARTIES.

I WISH YOU A VERY SUCCESSFUL TRIP, AND I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR ASSESSMENT AND YOUR VIEWS AFTER YOUR RETURN.

WITH MY WARMEST REGARDS,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.
DFCL: CADR
#0016

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<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 012142Z JUN 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZFM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

-

-

BEGIN TEXT:

-

DEAR FRANCOIS:

-

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF MAY 30 AND, AGAIN, FOR AGREEING TO
HOST THE FIRST MEETING OF SUPPLIERS UNDER THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS
CONTROL INITIATIVE.

-

I LOOK FORWARD TO STUDYING YOUR ARMS CONTROL PLAN, AND I VERY MUCH
AGREE THAT WE AND OUR SENIOR ADVISORS WILL NEED TO WORK CLOSELY IN
THE WEEKS AHEAD TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS.

-

YOUR PLAN INCLUDES ONE STATEMENT THAT MERITS SPECIAL COMMENT: YOUR
DECISION THAT FRANCE WILL SIGN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THIS
IS TRULY A HISTORIC DECISION, WELL TIMED TO GIVE MOMENTUM TO OUR
COLLECTIVE NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE.

-

FRANCOIS, BY TAKING THIS COURAGEOUS DECISION YOU HAVE GREATLY
ADVANCED THE CAUSE GLOBAL PEACE. I APPLAUD THIS GREAT ACT TO
STATESMANSHIP.

-

SINCERELY,

-

GEORGE BUSH

-

-

END OF TEXT.

DECLAS: OADR

#0131

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0131 <TOR> 910601174506 MSG000297107106

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<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 032227Z JUN 91

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<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ADMIRAL LANXADE FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

JUNE 3, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JACQUES,

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN FROM DICK CHENEY'S REPORTS OF HIS TALKS IN
PARIS THAT YOUR VIEWS ON NATO'S ROLES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY REMAIN
CONSISTENT WITH OURS. HOWEVER, I AM CONCERNED THAT WE HAVE BECOME
HUNG UP IN THE COMMUNIQUE-DRAFTING PROCESS AT NATO ON A NUMBER OF
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE TWO ISSUES THAT CONCERN US MOST ARE THE
VERY TWO WE RAISED AT MARTINIQUE: THE PRINCIPLE THAT NATO NEEDS TO
DECIDE POLICIES THAT BEAR ON ITS MEMBERS' SECURITY AND DEFENSE
COMMITMENTS UNDER THE TREATY, AND THE IDEA THAT NATO SHOULD PURSUE
FURTHER LIAISON CONTACTS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

I UNDERSTAND THERE IS RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF FRENCH
REPRESENTATIVES AT NATO TO INCLUDING THESE POINTS IN THE NAC
COMMUNIQUE, DESPITE OUR POSITIVE EXCHANGE ON THEM AT MARTINIQUE.
THE FIRST ISSUE IS OF COURSE OUR BASIC POINT OF REFERENCE FOR
CONSIDERATION OF A EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY. AS YOU CAN
UNDERSTAND, BECAUSE THIS PRINCIPLE IS SO FUNDAMENTAL, THE INABILITY
OF OUR ALLIES TO SIGN ON TO IT AT THIS POINT WOULD PORTEND SERIOUS
DISAGREEMENT OVER THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMON EUROPEAN POLICIES TO
THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS WHY PRESIDENT BUSH RAISED IT AT MARTINIQUE
WHEN HE ASSURED PRESIDENT MITTERAND THAT WE SUPPORT EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION.

AS TO NATO'S LIAISON ACTIVITIES, WE THINK IT IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT
THAT BOTH THE EAST EUROPEANS AND THE SOVIETS SEE CONCRETE EVIDENCE
THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PURSUE NEW AVENUES OF DIALOGUE, INCLUDING
(BUT NOT ONLY) THROUGH NATO. IF THE EAST EUROPEANS DO NOT PERCEIVE
US AS WILLING TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION, THEIR SENSE OF INSECURITY
WILL GROW AND LEAD TO RENEWED PRESSURES FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND
SECURITY COMMITMENTS. AS FOR THE SOVIETS, THIS IS A CRUCIAL TIME
TO SHOW THAT WE ARE EXTENDING A HAND TO THEM AS WELL, AS I KNOW YOU
WOULD AGREE.

FOR THESE REASONS, I AM PERPLEXED TO LEARN THAT THE FRENCH
DELEGATION AT EVERE IS INSISTING THAT THE NAC COMMUNIQUE CONTAIN
ONLY A VAGUE, GENERAL STATEMENT ON LIAISON, AND THAT IT NOT ENDORSE
ANY SPECIFIC INITIATIVES TO DEVELOP THE PROGRAM. THE LIAISON
PROGRAM IS A KEY ELEMENT OF NATO'S EFFORT TO ADAPT ITSELF TO
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. IT COMPLEMENTS THE WORK DONE IN OTHER FORA
TO BROADEN OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS. AND

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IT RESPONDS TO EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS.

I HOPE WE CAN MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER ON BOTH OF THESE ISSUES AND HAVE A SUCCESSFUL NATO MINISTERIAL. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT FRANCE AND THE U.S. BE SEEN AS COOPERATING TO ADAPT THE ALLIANCE TO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR VIEWS, AND I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO GET TOGETHER ON JUNE 18 NOW THAT JUNE 17 WILL NOT WORK IN VIEW OF MY ABSENCE FROM WASHINGTON THAT DAY WITH THE PRESIDENT.

BRENT

END TEXT:

DECL: OADR
#0134

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0134 <TOR> 910603183045 MSG000297282645

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
59. Cable	Re: Message to General Quesnot from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	6/7/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed:	2/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

JULY 3, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN LONDON, I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I OUTLINED MY THINKING ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES, THE PROBLEMS, AND A POSSIBLY USEFUL WAY TO PROCEED BEFORE WE MEET IN RAMBOUILLET. I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS WITH ME. I AM SENDING SIMILAR LETTERS TO OUR G-7 COLLEAGUES. TO THE EXTENT WE CAN UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S VIEWS AND COORDINATE OUR APPROACHES BEFOREHAND, WE INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PRODUCTIVE MEETING.

I KNOW YOU AND I SHARE THE GOAL OF SUPPORTING PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND THE CAUSE OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION. OUR MEETINGS IN LONDON PROVIDE US WITH A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SUPPORT AND ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE USSR.

CLEARLY THIS IS A CRITICAL MOMENT IN SOVIET HISTORY, AND IN THE WEST'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TOOK OVER A TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM IN A HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST. IN A MERE SIX YEARS HE HAS TRANSFORMED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST AND BROKEN OPEN THE TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM. BY THEMSELVES, THESE ARE EXTRAORDINARY, INDEED REVOLUTIONARY, ACHIEVEMENTS. BUT HIS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS HIS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAVE FALLEN FAR SHORT OF WHAT IS NEEDED, THE RESULT BEING AN INCREASINGLY ALARMING ECONOMIC CRISIS.

NOW PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MAY BE READY TO CONTEMPLATE THE RADICAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO ADDRESS HIS PROBLEMS, AND HE IS COMING TO LONDON TO LAY OUT HIS APPROACH. IF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IS IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO CREDIBLE ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS, AND CAN SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT THEM, WE SHOULD HELP HIM IN WAYS THAT MAKE SENSE. I AM NOT THINKING HERE OF ANYTHING AS UNREALISTIC AS THE "GRAND BARGAIN" SOME TALK OF, NOR DO I BELIEVE WE SHOULD USE OUR TIME IN LONDON TO TRY TO ORGANIZE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE USSR. RATHER, OUR FOCUS SHOULD BE ON ESTABLISHING A PROCESS THAT WILL SUPPORT SOVIET EFFORTS TO HELP THEMSELVES OUT OF THE ECONOMIC MORASS THEY ARE NOW IN.

IN OUR APPROACH TO THE REFORM PROCESS, I PROPOSE WE BE GUIDED BY TWO PRINCIPLES:

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- COMMITMENT TO MARKETS. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MUST DEMONSTRATE AN UNMISTAKABLE POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO MARKET REFORMS AND BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THEM. OTHERWISE THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN OR SHOULD DO TO HELP, AND WE SHOULD HONESTLY TELL HIM THAT. WHATEVER ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM IS IMPLEMENTED, THE ROAD TO ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT IN THE USSR WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT. BUT WE DO MIKHAIL GORBACHEV NO FAVORS BY BEING "UNDERSTANDING" ABOUT UNWORKABLE ECONOMIC PROGRAMS THAT PROLONG THE CRISIS.

- SOVIET SELF-HELP. RIGHT NOW OUR PRIORITY, AND GORBACHEV'S, SHOULD BE TO MOBILIZE SOVIET RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE MOVE TO A MARKET-BASED ECONOMY. THE SOVIET UNION IS A WEALTHY COUNTRY IN TERMS OF RESOURCES AND SKILLED PEOPLE. IT IS THOSE RESOURCES, AND SOVIET POLITICAL WILL, THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FATE OF REFORM. THE WEST CAN HELP, PARTICULARLY BY PROVIDING EXPERTISE, BILATERALLY AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. HOWEVER THE DECISIVE FACTOR WILL NOT BE OUR HELP, BUT WHAT HELMUT KOHL SO APTLY CALLS SOVIET "SELF-HELP."

- IF WE DETERMINE IN LONDON THAT GORBACHEV HAS FINALLY AND IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED TO MARKETS, THEN WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH HIM BY ESTABLISHING A SUPPORTIVE PROCESS. I BELIEVE THAT A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE "SPECIAL ASSOCIATE" STATUS IN THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK. THAT WILL GIVE SOVIET POLICY MAKERS ACCESS TO THE HIGHLY RESPECTED FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC EXPERTISE OF THESE INSTITUTIONS WHICH THEY COULD USE IN DRAWING UP A DETAILED, OPERATIONAL, PROGRAM FOR MOVING TO A MARKET ECONOMY. IN ADDITION, A PROGRAM DEVISED WITH EXTENSIVE AND ONGOING IMF AND WORLD BANK ADVICE, AS WELL AS THAT OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, WOULD PROVIDE CONFIDENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE USSR HAS EMBARKED ON THE PATH OF SERIOUS MARKET REFORM.

- WHILE THE EXPERTISE OF THE FUND AND THE BANK WILL BE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS ENTERPRISE, IT ALSO IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SUMMIT LEADERS RETAIN A CLOSE AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE EFFORT. IT OBVIOUSLY HAS IMPORTANT POLITICAL DIMENSIONS, AND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WILL BE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE TO THEM.

- IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN DRAWING UP AN INTERNATIONALLY CREDIBLE REFORM PROGRAM, WE SHOULD ALSO PURSUE INITIATIVES WHICH WILL MAKE THE ROAD TO A MARKET-BASED ECONOMY EASIER AND QUICKER THAN IT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL THAT CAN BE DONE TO SUPPORT REFORMS WITHOUT COMMITTING TO FINANCIAL AID. JIM BAKER HAS ALREADY OUTLINED SOME OF THE KEY COMPONENTS OF OUR APPROACH IN HIS RECENT BERLIN SPEECH. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD PROPOSE TO:

- WORK WITH THE SOVIETS TO PRIVATIZE THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, WHICH WILL HAVE OBVIOUS PAYOFFS FOR THE POPULATION AT

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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FINAL SECTION OF 02

LARGE. ASSISTANCE IN THIS AREA COULD GIVE PRESIDENT GORBACHEV SOME OF THE QUICK RESULTS HE NEEDS TO SUSTAIN SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM PROCESS.

- CONFER WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS ON DEVISING STRATEGIES TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT IN SOVIET ENERGY DEVELOPMENT. PROGRESS IN THIS SECTOR COULD HELP THE SOVIETS EARN HARD CURRENCY, WHILE ALSO DEVELOPING PROPERTY AND CONTRACT RIGHTS, AND CREATING A PRACTICAL PAYOFF FOR CENTER-REPUBLICAN COOPERATION.

- BEGIN AN EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE SOVIETS IN RESTRUCTURING, CONSOLIDATING, AND CONVERTING THEIR DEFENSE PLANTS TO CIVILIAN USES, SOMETHING CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST AS WELL AS THEIRS.

ASIDE FROM THIS FOCUS ON KEY SECTORS, WE CAN OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT THE CREATION OF MARKETS. IN THESE EFFORTS WE WILL BE COOPERATING WITH SOVIET GOVERNMENTS AT ALL LEVELS -- CENTRAL, REPUBLICAN, LOCAL -- AND WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. WE CAN ALSO TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE TRADE RELATIONS.

THIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV COULD PROVE AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE USSR INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND MOST DIFFICULT, TASK WILL BE TO CONVINCE GORBACHEV OF OUR GENUINE SUPPORT FOR WHAT HE IS DOING, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING QUITE FRANK WITH HIM TO THE POINT OF TELLING HIM WHAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO HEAR.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV MUST UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH WE ALL OPERATE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STILL DEVOTES AT LEAST ONE-FIFTH, AND PROBABLY MORE, OF ITS GNP TO DEFENSE; OFFERS FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO REGIMES SUCH AS THAT IN CUBA AND AFGHANISTAN; REFUSES TO EXTEND "NEW THINKING" TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION; AND ALLOWS TENSIONS TO CONTINUE IN THE BALTICS. AS LONG AS THESE POLICIES CONTINUE, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S REFORMS WILL BE CRIPPLED, AS WILL HIS EFFORTS TO GARNER SUPPORT FROM ALL OF US.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MAY RAISE THE ISSUE OF DEBT RESTRUCTURING IN LONDON. I FEAR THAT IT WOULD SERVE NEITHER HIS NOR OUR INTERESTS. RESCHEDULING WOULD GREATLY LIMIT THE SOVIET UNION'S FUTURE ACCESS TO EXTERNAL CREDIT. MOREOVER, I WORRY THAT A FORMAL RESCHEDULING WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE IN THE USSR WHO OPPOSE REFORM, AND WHO WILL ARGUE THAT GORBACHEV HAS BANKRUPTED THE COUNTRY.

IF GORBACHEV IS COMMITTED TO REFORM, IF HE HAS A CONSENSUS IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THAT POINT, AND IF THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THROUGH, WE SHOULD RESPOND ACCORDINGLY, TAKING THINGS ONE STEP AT A TIME. WE SHOULD NOT ACT IN HASTE, NOR SHOULD WE BE PRESSURED INTO THROWING MONEY AT A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF SOME ARTIFICIAL SENSE OF URGENCY. AT THIS POINT WE CAN OFFER STRONG SUPPORT WITHOUT LARGE-SCALE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BY FOCUSING ON A PROCESS THAT WILL HELP THE SOVIETS BRING THEIR OWN CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES TO BEAR IN SOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS.

WE MUST ALSO NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE URGENT NEED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE EMERGING EAST EUROPEAN MARKET DEMOCRACIES. EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES HAVE ALREADY MADE THAT CHOICE, AND THEY ARE STRUGGLING NOW UNDER A TREMENDOUS BURDEN AS THEIR EXPORT MARKETS COLLAPSE. WE MUST DO OUR UTMOST TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY AND THE TRANSITION TO MARKETS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY I AM SO STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE PROPOSAL TO LIFT THE EBRD CAP ON LENDING TO THE USSR, FOR TO DO THAT COULD TAKE MONEY OUT OF THE POCKETS OF EAST EUROPEANS, WHICH MAKES NO SENSE AT THE MOMENT. I HAVE A NUMBER OF IDEAS ON HOW WE CAN ENSURE THAT WE STRENGTHEN OUR SUPPORT FOR THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN

EUROPE, AND I WILL BE SENDING A SEPARATE LETTER ON THAT IN A FEW DAYS.

I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR OWN THINKING ON THESE ISSUES AND LOOK FORWARD TO EXPLORING THEM FURTHER WITH YOU.

FRANCOIS, I AM DELIGHTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND TIME TO MEET AND TALK IN RAMBOUILLET BEFORE WE TRAVEL TO LONDON. WE HAVE MUCH TO TALK ABOUT, AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO A PRODUCTIVE MEETING. IN THE MEANTIME I WILL ALSO BE COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY WITH GORBACHEV SO THAT HE IS AWARE OF MY THINKING ON HOW WE CAN SUPPORT MARKET AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN HIS COUNTRY.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
PARIS

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0019

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0018 <TOR> 910703203008 MSG000299881808

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0019 <TOR> 910703203016 MSG000299881816

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<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

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SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

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BEGIN TEXT:

.
DEAR FRANCOIS,

.
LAST WEEK I SHARED WITH YOU SOME OF MY THINKING ABOUT HOW WE CAN
SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF SOVIET REFORM. IN THIS LETTER I WOULD LIKE
TO RAISE ANOTHER URGENT PRIORITY FOR ALL OF US: SUPPORT FOR THE NEW
DEMOCRACIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. I BELIEVE WE ALL AGREE
THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE IF, IN TRYING TO SUPPORT SOVIET
REFORM, WE DIVERTED ATTENTION AND RESOURCES FROM THE COUNTRIES OF
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WHICH HAVE ALREADY EMBARKED ON COURAGEOUS
REFORM PROGRAMS. THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE CRITICAL FOR THESE NEW
DEMOCRACIES, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE EXPRESS AT LONDON OUR
CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THEIR SUCCESS.

.
AS THESE COUNTRIES CONTINUE THEIR TRANSITIONS, WESTERN SUPPORT WILL
NEED TO FOCUS MORE ON A STRATEGY OF EXPANDED TRADE AND INVESTMENT.
THROUGH OUR ONGOING SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, WE ARE HELPING THESE COUNTRIES ACQUIRE THE
TOOLS NEEDED TO COMPETE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. WHAT THEY NEED NOW IS
THE OPPORTUNITY. THEIR SUCCESS ULTIMATELY WILL DEPEND ON GREATLY
INCREASED TRADE AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THIS REQUIRES BETTER ACCESS
TO OUR MARKETS, SO THAT THESE COUNTRIES CAN INCREASE THEIR EXPORT
EARNINGS IN THE NEAR TERM AND ATTRACT THE INVESTMENT THEY WILL NEED
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THESE WERE THE PRIORITIES
CONVEYED TO VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE IN HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE REGION
AND ECHOED IN THE LETTER WE RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT HAVEL, PRESIDENT
WALESZA, AND PRIME MINISTER ANTALL.

.
I WILL SOON BE ANNOUNCING A PACKAGE OF CONCRETE MEASURES TO OPEN THE
U.S. MARKET MORE WIDELY TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN GOODS,
INCLUDING IN POLITICALLY DIFFICULT AREAS LIKE TEXTILES, STEEL, AND
AGRICULTURE. AS PART OF MY TRADE ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE, I
DISPATCHED A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO THE REGION IN MAY TO IDENTIFY
OBSTACLES TO THE REGION'S EXPORT EXPANSION AND TO RECOMMEND
SOLUTIONS. I HAVE ACCEPTED ALL THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS, AND IN SOME
CASES HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR TRADE NEGOTIATORS TO GO BEYOND THEM.
ADDITIONALLY, WE WILL INITIATE A NEW SPECIAL REVIEW UNDER THE U.S.
DUTY-FREE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE
REGION'S ACCESS THROUGH THE GSP PROGRAM.

.
I HOPE ALL THE G-7 COUNTRIES WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES TO OPENING THEIR
MARKETS AS WIDE AS POSSIBLE TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE EC

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MARKET IS OF COURSE CRITICAL, AND I WOULD URGE THE COMMUNITY, IN THE "ASSOCIATION" AGREEMENTS WITH POLAND, HUNGARY, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY EXPANDING QUOTAS ON CENTRAL EUROPEAN TEXTILE AND AGRICULTURAL SHIPMENTS. AT LONDON, I SUGGEST THAT WE INCLUDE IN OUR DECLARATION A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE IMPROVED MARKET ACCESS, INCLUDING IN AREAS LIKE TEXTILES AND AGRICULTURE, WHERE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CAN BE COMPETITIVE RIGHT AWAY. THESE EFFORTS, WHICH I HOPE WE CAN AGREE TO UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATELY, SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY AGREEMENT ON A SUBSTANTIAL, MARKET-OPENING URUGUAY ROUND PACKAGE. WE MIGHT ALSO AGREE TO WORK WITH THESE COUNTRIES TO HELP THEM EXPAND THEIR TRADE WITH THE WEST, BY OFFERING NEW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN SUCH AREAS AS MARKETING, DISTRIBUTION, AND SALES.

FOR OUR PART, WE WILL BE INCREASINGLY TARGETING U.S. GRANT ASSISTANCE TOWARD HELPING THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES ENHANCE TRADE, ATTRACT INVESTMENT, AND DEVELOP THEIR PRIVATE SECTORS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WILL LAY GREATER STRESS ON OUR ENTERPRISE FUNDS, WHICH WE HAVE FOUND EFFECTIVE IN DELIVERING INVESTMENT CAPITAL PROMPTLY AND WHERE IT IS NEEDED MOST. AT THE SAME TIME, OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WHERE IT IS NEEDED AND, AS REFORM ADVANCES IN BULGARIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES, WILL PROVIDE BROAD-BASED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT WE ARE DOING ALREADY WITH POLAND, HUNGARY, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THERE IS ANOTHER AREA, AFFECTING ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, THAT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DISCUSS IN LONDON: THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET MARKET FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PRODUCTS. LET ME SUGGEST THREE SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE MIGHT CONSIDER. FIRST, WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT OUR AGRICULTURAL EXPORT SUBSIDIES DO NOT DISPLACE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER MARKETS. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, THE U.S. WILL HOLD PERIODIC REVIEWS WITH THESE COUNTRIES OF THEIR EXPORT PATTERNS INTO SUBSIDIZED MARKETS, AND WE WILL SEEK IMPORTER ASSURANCES THAT U.S. EXPORTS WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRADE. I WOULD ENCOURAGE YOU TO IMPLEMENT SIMILAR STEPS. SECOND, WE SHOULD URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO REMOVE ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES PROHIBITING SOVIET ENTERPRISES FROM ENGAGING IN BARTER TRADE. TO AVOID SIMPLY PERPETUATING AN INEFFICIENT REGIONAL TRADING PATTERN, WE SHOULD ALSO OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET-BASED TRADE

#0055

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~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

RELATIONS IN THE REGION. THIRD, I PROPOSE THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS EXPLORE WAYS TO HELP THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CREATE EXPORT AND INVESTMENT PROMOTION PROGRAMS, INCLUDING EXPORT FINANCE PROGRAMS WHICH MEET OECD GUIDELINES, SO THAT THEY CAN HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF COMPETING IN THE SOVIET AND OTHER MARKETS.

TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE NEW EFFORTS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE REAFFIRMATION OF THE COMMITMENT THE G-7 FIRST MADE AT THE SUMMIT OF THE ARCH TWO YEARS AGO. I SUGGEST THAT WE ASK JOHN MAJOR, AS OUR HOST, TO WRITE A LETTER ON BEHALF OF THE SEVEN TO PRESIDENTS HAVEL AND WALESIA AND PRIME MINISTER ANTALL, CONVEYING OUR STRONG SUPPORT AND DETAILING STEPS WE HAVE AGREED TO TAKE. WE MIGHT INDIVIDUALLY COMMUNICATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT MESSAGE TO OTHER EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS, PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT ZHELEV.

•
I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH YOU IN RAMBOUILLET
AND TO HEARING YOUR IDEAS ON HOW WE CAN STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR
EUROPE'S NEW DEMOCRACIES.
•

•
END TEXT:
•

•
WITH BEST REGARDS,
•

•
SINCERELY,
•

•
GEORGE RUSH

#0056

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0055 <TOR> 910711175427 MSG000300563667

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0056 <TOR> 910711175446 MSG000300563686

<DIST>

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE WAYNE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLASS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSPI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 120025Z JUL 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PIERRE MOREL FROM
GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

JULY 11, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

WE HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE VALUE OF INITIATING HIGH-LEVEL,
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND A
EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO CLARIFY OUR
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, IDENTIFY AREAS OF COMMONALITY, AND BUILD
ON THE GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS.

PRESIDENT BUSH MAY SUGGEST SUCH CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WHEN THEY MEET AT RAMBOUILLET. THE PURPOSE
WOULD BE TO INSURE THAT THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR TALKS IS
MAINTAINED.

BECAUSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR PRESIDENTS, WE WOULD
ASSUME THAT THE ELYSEE AND THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD LEAD ANY SUCH
CONSULTATIONS, THOUGH WE SHOULD INCLUDE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF
OUR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES AS WELL AS OUR JOINT MILITARY
STAFFS.

WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND A TEAM TO PARIS FOR A FIRST ROUND OF
TALKS, IDEALLY SOON AFTER THE RAMBOUILLET MEETING. WE COULD HOST
A SECOND ROUND OF TALKS IN WASHINGTON. IF THE PRESIDENTS AGREE
ON THIS IDEA, I WOULD PROBABLY DIRECT THIS PROCESS ON OUR END AND
PARTICIPATE IN THE WASHINGTON PORTION OF THE TALKS. I LOOK
FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS AND TO SEEING YOU JULY 14.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0067

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0067 <TOR> 910711202811 MSG000300572890

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<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 281704Z AUG 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QOQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

AUGUST 28, 1991

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

DURING THE PAST YEAR, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN LEADERS
HAVE RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE
AMERICAS INITIATIVE. A MAJOR GOAL OF THE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN TO
ENABLE COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE REGION TO COMPETE MORE
EFFECTIVELY FOR INVESTMENT FROM BOTH HOME AND ABROAD.

AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE INVESTMENT COMPONENT OF THE
INITIATIVE, THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED THE MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT FUND, TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAVE EACH
INDICATED THEIR INTENT TO PROVIDE \$100 MILLION PER YEAR OVER
THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

THE FUND WOULD SUPPORT LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN
COUNTRIES IN REFORMING THEIR INVESTMENT REGIMES. THIS SUPPORT
WOULD OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, HELP TO
DEVELOP THE SKILLS OF THE WORK FORCE, AND IMPROVE ACCESS TO
CAPITAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS ENTREPRENEURS. I AM CONVINCED THAT
SUCH ASSISTANCE, PROVIDED IN A TIMELY AND RESPONSIVE MANNER, IS
ESSENTIAL DURING THE INTENSIVE REFORM PERIOD AHEAD.

I KNOW YOU ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH OUR OBJECTIVES. THE
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND OFFERS EACH OF US AN HISTORIC
OPPORTUNITY TO ASSIST THE REGION, HELPING THOSE COUNTRIES
PARTICIPATE MORE FULLY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE.

I VERY MUCH HOPE I CAN COUNT ON YOU TO COMMIT RESOURCES TO
THE FUND SO THAT IT MAY BEGIN OPERATIONS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0063

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0063 <TOR> 910328143025 MSG000304698624

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2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 041217Z OCT 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO HUBERT VEDRINE
FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HUBERT,

GIVEN THE DEPTH AND SPEED OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO RENEW OUR SUGGESTION THAT WE HOLD SENIOR-LEVEL BILATERAL TALKS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. OUR THOUGHT IS THAT THE TALKS COULD INCLUDE: 1) PREPARATIONS FOR THE ROME SUMMIT; 2) DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD INCLUDING THE SOVIET REACTION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S NUCLEAR PROPOSAL AND RELATED ISSUES; AND 3) THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO A EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY. WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME YOUR THINKING ON THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA. THE PURPOSE OF THE TALKS WOULD BE TO CLARIFY OUR DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, IDENTIFY AREAS OF COMMONALITY, AND BUILD ON THE GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO PRESIDENTS.

WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEND A DELEGATION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE (GOMPERT), STATE (NILES), AND DOD (HADLEY AND A SENIOR JCS STAFF OFFICER). WE WOULD ASSUME THAT THE ELYSEE WOULD TAKE THE LEAD ON YOUR SIDE WITH SIMILAR INTER-MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION.

GIVEN THE APPROACH OF THE NATO SUMMIT, I THINK WE SHOULD HOLD SUCH TALKS SOON. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEND THE TEAM TO PARIS, AND WE SUGGEST OCTOBER 10. WE ARE PLANNING TO HAVE SIMILAR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND THE GERMANS.

I HOPE THIS WILL BE CONVENIENT. BUT WE ARE OF COURSE WILLING TO FIND ANOTHER DATE, IF YOU PREFER. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE. YOU CAN COMMUNICATE WITH ME OR DAVID GOMPERT ON THIS MATTER.

TO BE SURE THERE IS NO CONFUSION, THESE CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE TOTALLY SEPARATE FROM OUR OTHER PRIVATE CONTACT.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0056

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0056 <TOR> 911004082100 MSG000307873260

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0730-MR
SCS 4/4/11

<DIST>

PRT: GANTT GOMPERT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<CSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 141827Z OCT 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS EYES ONLY

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BPENT SCOWCROFT TO HUBERT VEDRINE.

.
BEGIN TEXT:

.
DEAR HUBERT:

.
I WANTED TO GIVE YOU AN EARLY REACTION TO YOUR PROPOSAL ON A EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY, KNOWING THAT THE SUBJECT IS UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION IN EUROPE. WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A MORE CONSIDERED AND SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE IN A FEW DAYS.

.
AS I SAID WHEN YOU WERE HERE, WE SUPPORT WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO DO, WE ARE GRATEFUL THAT YOU ARE SEEKING OUR INPUT, AND WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT YOU ARE WORKING TO ENSURE THAT PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN UNION DOES NOT COME AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR ATLANTIC BONDS. THE KEY, AS WE DISCUSSED WHEN YOU WERE HERE, IS TO BE CLEAR THAT EUROPEAN COMMON DEFENSE WILL REST WITHIN THE WEU, WHICH IN TURN WILL BE A PART OF BOTH THE UNION AND THE ALLIANCE. THIS FORMULA WILL AVOID THE PERCEPTION THAT OUR ALLIES ARE PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE WITHOUT US AND SEPARATE FROM NATO. BY UTILIZING THE WEU, ALL OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE IN BOTH NATO AND THE EC, AND BY BUILDING BALANCED AND STRONG TIES TO BOTH, THE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF THE UNION WILL ALSO BE SQUARELY IN THE ALLIANCE AS WELL.

.
WITHIN THIS BROAD UNDERSTANDING, OUR MAIN INTERESTS WILL BE TO AVOID A REDUNDANT MILITARY STRUCTURE, TO ENSURE THAT A EUROPEAN CAUCUS WOULD NOT IMPEDE NATO DECISION-MAKING, TO BALANCE THE WEU'S TREATMENT OF NON-EC MEMBERS OF NATO AND NON-NATO MEMBERS OF THE EC, AND TO LINK WEU AND NATO PLANNING STRUCTURES. AS I TOLD YOU, USING NATO PERMREPS ALSO AS WEU PERMREPS IN BRUSSELS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

.
WE WILL GET BACK TO YOU SHORTLY WITH OUR FURTHER THINKING ON THESE AND ANY OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE. I MIGHT POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE HEARD SOME STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF EUROPE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WEU WILL BE CLOSER TO THE EC THAN TO NATO, OR PART OF THE EC BUT NOT NATO. NEEDLESS TO SAY, SUCH STATEMENTS ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO FIND THE RIGHT SOLUTION. BUT AGAIN, BASED ON OUR DISCUSSION, THE SPIRIT AND AIM OF YOUR EFFORT IS CLEAR AND REASSURING, AND WE WILL CONSIDER FURTHER YOUR PROPOSAL IN THAT LIGHT.

.
FINALLY, I AM SURE YOU APPRECIATE THAT WE CONSIDER THE NATURE OF WEU-EC TIES A MATTER FOR OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO DECIDE. OUR CONCERN IS FOR OUR ATLANTIC COMMON DEFENSE AND THE QUALITY OF WEU-NATO TIES. IT WILL BE UP TO YOU TO SATISFY OTHER ALLIES THAT

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THE WEU-EC RELATIONSHIP YOU PROPOSE WILL NOT RISK DIVERGENCE WITH
NATO, EVEN IN THE LONG TERM.

AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR EFFORTS. I AM SENDING A SIMILAR LETTER
TO PETER HARTMANN.

BEST REGARDS,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0084

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0084 <TOR> 911014150005 MSG000308761205

<DIST>
PRT: MERCHANT
<DIST>
PRT: SIT
<DIST>
PRT: BEERS GANTT GOMPERT HILL MCNAMARA SITTMANN
SIT: FILE
<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SCOWCROFT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 161537Z NOV 91

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO SEE YOUR COMMENTS IN BONN REGARDING LIBYAN
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103 AND UTA FLIGHT
772. I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SUGGEST THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION AND
COOPERATION ON NEXT STEPS. I FULLY AGREE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE MADE NO RUSH TO JUDGEMENT OR ACTION HERE.
DESPITE INITIAL INDICATIONS SUGGESTING THAT SYRIA, IRAN AND THE
PFLP-GC CARRIED OUT THE ACT, WE WERE LED CONCLUSIVELY BY THE
EVIDENCE TO LIBYAN RESPONSIBILITY. NOR DO WE THINK THIS WAS A
RENEGADE OPERATION. AL MAGRAHI, ONE OF THOSE INDICTED, IS JUST TOO
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH TOP LIBYAN OFFICIALS AND IS TOO SENIOR IN
LIBYA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO HAVE BEEN OPERATING WITHOUT THE
KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS.

WE WANT TO BRING THE TWO INDIVIDUALS INDICTED TO TRIAL IN THE US OR
THE UK. AND WE ARE FULLY COOPERATING WITH YOUR JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
ON UTA 772. BUT MUCH MORE IS AT STAKE -- HOW TO DEAL WITH THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT. FRANCE HAS WORKED CLOSELY
WITH US, THE BRITISH AND OTHERS TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND TO RAISE THE
COST FOR GROUPS AND STATES WHICH RESORT TO IT. IF WE WERE TO LET
SUCH EGREGIOUS ACTS OF TERRORISM AS THE BOMBING OF PAN AM 103 OR UTA
772 GO UNPUNISHED, IT WOULD SET BACK THE PROGRESS BOTH OF US HAVE
MADE AGAINST TERRORISM AND INCREASE THE THREATS TO OUR CITIZENS.

I PLACE PARTICULAR VALUE ON YOUR IDEAS AND COOPERATION ON THESE
MATTERS. WE ARE CONSIDERING FOUR BASIC DEMANDS WITH REGARD TO PAN
AM 103: 1) THAT LIBYA SURRENDER THE TWO ACCUSED FOR TRIAL AND
ACCEPT COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF ITS OFFICIALS; 2)
THAT IT DISCLOSE ALL IT KNOWS OF THIS CRIME, INCLUDING THE NAMES OF
ALL THOSE RESPONSIBLE AND FULL ACCESS TO WITNESSES, DOCUMENTS, AND
OTHER MATERIAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE REMAINING TIMERS; 3) THAT IT
PAY COMPENSATION; AND 4) THAT IT PROVIDE CONCRETE INFORMATION ABOUT
ITS LINKS TO TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION AND

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SLC 5/16/11

THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY, AND THAT IT EXPEL THE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND CEASE TO TRAIN, FINANCE, AND ARM SUCH GROUPS.

I AM DISCUSSING THESE WITH JOHN MAJOR, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO CONSIDER WHETHER FRANCE WOULD ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THESE DEMANDS AND POSSIBLY EXPAND THEM TO INCLUDE UTA 772. WHILE I AM HAVING DOUBTS ABOUT LIBYA'S WILLINGNESS TO MEET SUCH DEMANDS, I THINK THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WOULD BE GREATER IF THEY WERE PUT TO TRIPOLI JOINTLY BY THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE.

IF LIBYA WERE TO REFUSE THESE DEMANDS, I THINK WE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER FIRM SANCTIONS, SUCH AS CESSATION OF CIVIL AIR SERVICE, AN OIL EMBARGO AND OTHERS. I THINK THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACT DECISIVELY TO DEAL WITH THE MURDERS OF THE 440 INNOCENT PEOPLE WHO WERE ON THE PAN AM AND UTA FLIGHTS. OUR JOINT EXPERIENCE WITH IRAQ WILL BE USEFUL HERE. GIVEN FRANCE'S SPECIAL INTEREST IN NORTH AFRICA, I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW WE CAN CONVINCE THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES AND EGYPT TO JOIN US IN OUR EFFORTS.

I HAVE MADE NO FINAL DECISIONS ON NEXT STEPS, AND I VERY MUCH WANT TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS. FRANCE IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION, GIVEN THE DOWNING OF UTA 772. I ALSO RECALL HOW MUCH FRANCE SUFFERED SEVERAL YEARS AGO FROM INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM IN PARIS. THESE ACTS HAVE NO PLACE IN THE WORLD TO WHICH YOU AND I ARE COMMITTED.

AS WE STOOD SHOULDER TO SHOULDER AGAINST AGGRESSION IN KUWAIT, I AM LOOKING FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN GETTING LIBYA TO GIVE UP THOSE RESPONSIBLE AND TO ABANDON TERRORISM. I HOPE OUR DEMANDS AND, IF NEEDED, SANCTIONS, WILL SUFFICE. BUT IF THEY DO NOT SUCCEED, WE MAY BE FORCED TO CONSIDER OTHER MEANS WHICH I WOULD WISH TO AVOID.

I WOULD LIKE TO SEND A TEAM ON NOVEMBER 19 OR 20 TO CONSULT FURTHER ABOUT NEXT STEPS. DEPENDING ON YOUR PREFERENCES, I THINK IT COULD BE VERY USEFUL TO INVITE THE BRITISH TO PARTICIPATE.

AS IN THE GULF, WE NEED YOUR SUPPORT AND LEADERSHIP. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOON. IF YOU WANT TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES FURTHER, I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO TALK WITH YOU. OTHERWISE, OUR PEOPLE CAN FIRM UP THE CONSULTATIONS MONDAY BY PHONE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT:

#0087

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0087 <TOR> 911116103903 MSG000311596743

<DIST>
SIT: JOHNSONE

<DIST>

PRT: HOWE SCOWCROFT

SIT: FILE SIT

<DIST>

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 240532Z JAN 92

<ORIG> FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO> TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT> ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

WE HAVE WITNESSED THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICAL FORCES WHICH ARE BOTH DEMOCRATIC
AND EAGER TO SEE THEIR NATIONS BECOME RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF
OUR COMMUNITY. WHILE INSTABILITY PERSISTS AND NEW PERILS
COULD ARISE, THE COLLAPSE OF THE MENACING SOVIET EMPIRE IS
COMPLETE. THIS GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY, AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY, TO TAKE FURTHER SWEEPING ACTIONS TO RID THE
WORLD OF THE HEAVY AND DANGEROUS BURDEN OF THE COLD WAR'S
NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.

I AM THEREFORE PLANNING TO ANNOUNCE SHORTLY MEASURES TO
TRANSFORM THE CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
ARSENAL, TO REDUCE ITS SIZE SHARPLY, AND TO CALL UPON OUR
FORMER ADVERSARIES IN THE EAST TO TAKE COMPARABLE STEPS.
THESE DECISIONS WILL SEND ANOTHER STRONG SIGNAL TO THE
PEOPLES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION THAT WE MEAN THEM NO HARM
AND THAT WE WELCOME THEM AS FRIENDS NOW THAT THEIR LEADERS
HAVE CHOSEN A RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. BY SHOWING
THAT THE U.S. IS DRAMATICALLY REDUCING ITS OWN ARSENAL AND
CURTAILING MODERNIZATION EFFORTS, I HOPE ALSO TO IMPROVE THE
CLIMATE FOR OUR COLLECTIVE STRATEGY TO CURB THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I INTEND TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS:

- THE B-2 BOMBER PROGRAM WILL BE TERMINATED. WE WILL
BUILD ONLY THE TWENTY AIRCRAFT FOR WHICH PROCUREMENT
HAS ALREADY BEGUN.
- PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SMALL ICBM WILL BE
CANCELLED.
- PRODUCTION OF THE W-38 WARHEAD FOR OUR SUBMARINE-BASED
DETERRENT WILL CEASE, THUS LIMITING DEPLOYMENT TO A
SMALL FRACTION OF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN.

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SCS 7/19/13

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-- PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SPARE PEACEKEEPER MISSILES
WILL BE TERMINATED.

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-- PRODUCTION OF THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE WILL BE
TERMINATED, LIMITING THE PROGRAM TO A NUMBER WELL UNDER
THE ORIGINAL PLAN.

.
I AM CALLING ON BORIS YELTSIN AND OTHER CIS LEADERS TO
CURTAIL MODERNIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS. BUT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE THE STEPS I HAVE
INDICATED ABOVE REGARDLESS OF ANY RECIPROCAL STEPS BY RUSSIA
AND THE OTHER CIS STATES.

.
I AM ALSO EAGER TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GO WELL BEYOND
START IN ELIMINATING THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOST
DESTABILIZING WEAPONS. I AM THEREFORE OFFERING TO PRESIDENT
YELTSIN AND OTHER KEY CIS LEADERS TO ELIMINATE U.S. MIRVED
ICBMS AND TO REDUCE BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD THE NUMBER OF
WARHEADS ON U.S. SUBMARINES IF THEY AGREE TO ELIMINATE THEIR
MIRVED ICBMS. I WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER A NUMBER
OF OUR STRATEGIC BOMBERS TO A PRIMARILY CONVENTIONAL ROLE.
THIS PROPOSAL, IF ACCEPTED, WOULD RESULT IN THE ELIMINATION
OF THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WHILE ALSO
BRINGING AGGREGATE WARHEAD NUMBERS FAR BELOW THE CEILINGS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE START TREATY. WE WOULD EACH BE LEFT
WITH SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER, LESS THREATENING, AND MORE
SURVIVABLE DETERRENT FORCES.

.
I AM SENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT WHILE THESE MEASURES AND
PROPOSALS WILL BE WELL-RECEIVED AROUND THE WORLD THEY MAY
ALSO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR NUCLEAR FORCES. IN THAT WE
ARE NOT PROPOSING A NEW ROUND OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS OR
STRATEGIC WEAPONS, PRESSURES ON YOU TO JOIN IN SHOULD BE
MANAGEABLE. MOREOVER, WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO POINT OUT THAT
THE U.S. AND THE CIS WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ARSENALS
SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN THAT WHICH YOU HAVE OR ENVISAGE.
WE WILL CONTINUE TO SAY THAT WE SUPPORT BRITISH AND FRENCH
POLICIES TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE, MODERN DETERRENT FORCES, AND
WE WILL SAY NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT WE THINK YOUR FORCES OR
PLANS SHOULD BE REDUCED.

.
NEEDLESS TO SAY, I AM TAKING THESE STEPS BECAUSE I BELIEVE
THEY ARE BOTH JUSTIFIED BY AND WILL CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO
THE IMPROVEMENT IN GLOBAL SECURITY. THE SECURITY OF THE
ALLIANCE AND OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE CAN BENEFIT GREATLY FROM
THE NEW SITUATION WE ARE CREATING.

.
EVEN WITH REDUCED LEVELS AND CURTAILED MODERNIZATION
PROGRAMS, THE UNITED STATES WILL RETAIN MORE THAN AMPLE
CAPABILITIES TO CONTINUE TO EXTEND CREDIBLE DETERRENCE TO
ITS NATO ALLIES. THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC COMMITMENT WILL BE
AS STRONG AS EVER.

.
I DO NOT KNOW WHAT RESPONSE WE WILL GET FROM BORIS YELTSIN
AND THE OTHERS. BUT I AM HOPEFUL. I WOULD LIKE TO KEEP
THIS ENTIRE MATTER CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL MY STATE-OF-THE-UNION
SPEECH ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, AND I ASK YOU TO SHARE THE
INFORMATION WITH NO ONE. ONCE I MAKE THESE PLANS AND
PROPOSALS PUBLIC IN THAT ADDRESS, I WOULD WARMLY WELCOME

YOUR SUPPORT, AS WELL AS YOUR OWN EFFORTS PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY TO URGE PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO RECIPROCATE. YOUR INFLUENCE WITH HIM COULD BE MOST HELPFUL.

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT I HAVE OUTLINED HERE, PLEASE COMMUNICATE WITH ME DIRECTLY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

#0154

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0154 <TOR> 920124004817 MSG000317522897

<DIST>

PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 290210Z JAN 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

.
BEGIN TEXT:

.
DEAR FRANCOIS:

.
I WANT TO KEEP YOU ABREAST OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE
STRATEGIC ARMS INITIATIVE WHICH I DESCRIBED TO YOU IN MY
RECENT LETTER AND WHICH I ANNOUNCED IN MY STATE OF THE UNION
ADDRESS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS SENT ME A RESPONSE IN WHICH
HE HAS SPECIFIED THE FOLLOWING UNILATERAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
THAT RUSSIA WILL TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THOSE ON WHICH I HAVE
DECIDED:

.
-- PRODUCTION OF THE BEAR AND BLACKJACK HEAVY BOMBERS
WILL BE TERMINATED.

.
-- PRODUCTION OF LONG-RANGE ALCMS OF EXISTING TYPES WILL
BE TERMINATED.

.
-- PRODUCTION OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR SLCMS OF EXISTING
TYPES WILL BE TERMINATED, AND NEW TYPES OF SUCH
MISSILES WILL NOT BE DEVELOPED.

.
-- EXERCISES INVOLVING MORE THAN 30 HEAVY BOMBERS WILL NO
LONGER BE CONDUCTED.

.
-- THE NUMBER OF SSBNs DEPLOYED AT SEA WILL BE HALVED AND
THEN REDUCED FURTHER.

.
-- PRODUCTION OF GROUND-LAUNCHED TACTICAL MISSILE NUCLEAR
WARHEADS, NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHELLS AND NUCLEAR MINES
WILL BE HALTED. AS ALREADY PROMISED, THESE WEAPONS
WILL BE ELIMINATED.

.
-- THE ELIMINATION OF ONE-THIRD OF SEA-LAUNCHED TACTICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ONE-HALF OF AIR-DEFENSE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IS PROCEEDING.

.
-- AIR-LAUNCHED TACTICAL NUCLEAR MUNITIONS SHALL BE
REDUCED BY ONE-HALF.

.
YELTSIN ALSO HAS PLEDGED THAT, WITHIN A THREE-YEAR PERIOD,
RUSSIA WILL TAKE OFF COMBAT ALERT THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS SCHEDULED FOR ELIMINATION UNDER THE START
TREATY. HE PROPOSES THAT THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0728-MR

SCS 7/19/13

REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE TRAINED ON AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN TARGETS.

IN ADDITION TO THESE STEPS, YELTSIN IS PROPOSING THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA ELIMINATE NOT JUST LAND-BASED MIRVED ICBMS BUT ALL MIRVED SEA-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES AS WELL. HE SUGGESTS NOT DEPLOYING SSBN'S TO SEA. HE ALSO PROPOSES ULTIMATE STRATEGIC FORCES OF 2000-2500 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE URGES THAT CHINA, THE UK AND FRANCE JOIN THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROCESS, CLAIMING THAT U.S. AND RUSSIAN EFFORTS WOULD BE INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE WITHOUT LIMITING THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THESE THREE COUNTRIES. HE MAKES CLEAR HIS BELIEF THAT THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BUILD THEIR FORCES UNCONSTRAINED BY ARMS CONTROL, A SITUATION WHICH COULD, IN HIS WORDS, "DESTABILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION EVEN AS EARLY AS IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS."

YELTSIN'S RESPONSE HAS MANY POSITIVE FEATURES, BUT COULD CAUSE US PROBLEMS IN SOME AREAS. WE WILL BE STUDYING ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HIS RESPONSE CAREFULLY. FOR THE PRESENT LET ME COMMENT ON TWO SPECIFIC IDEAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: ELIMINATING MIRVED SLRMS AND INCLUDING THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

THE FOCUS OF MY INITIATIVE OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1991, WAS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE MOST DESTABILIZING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS -- MIRVED ICBMS. IN RESPONSE TO THE ISSUE OF EQUITY IN REDUCTIONS, MY CURRENT INITIATIVE INCLUDES STEPS TO REDUCE FURTHER OUR SEA-BASED FORCE. I CANCELLED PRODUCTION OF THE HIGH-YIELD ACCURATE W-88 WARHEAD AND OFFERED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF U.S. SLBM WARHEADS BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD IF RUSSIA AGREES TO ELIMINATION OF MIRVED ICBMS ON BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE VASTLY IMPROVED CLIMATE AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES, A HALLMARK OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE WILL CONTINUE TO REST ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, WHICH MUST REMAIN CREDIBLE, SECURE AND STABLE. U.S. MIRVED SLBMS MEET THOSE CRITERIA, AND WE CANNOT AGREE TO ELIMINATE THEM, NOR CAN WE AGREE TO CONFINE THEM TO PORT.

MY SECOND CONCERN HAS TO DO WITH INCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THE DEACTIVATION AND DESTRUCTION OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE NUMBERS NOW ENVISIONED WILL TAKE MANY YEARS TO ACHIEVE. MOREOVER, I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR DRASTICALLY REDUCING THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SLOWED IN ANY WAY BY INTRODUCING THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

I DO NOT KNOW WHEN PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL BE ANNOUNCING HIS INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH I IMAGINE IT WILL BE SOON. I WILL BE IN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU ON HOW WE GO ABOUT IMPLEMENTING THESE INITIATIVES AS WELL AS FRAMING NEXT STEPS.

I WANT TO REITERATE THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE ANY STEPS THAT WILL CHALLENGE YOUR LONG-STANDING POLICY ON YOUR STRATEGIC FORCES. WE INTEND TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IN RESPONSE TO ANY PUBLIC INQUIRIES ABOUT INCLUSION OF YOUR SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS:

•
"THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE MAINTENANCE OF
EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES BY ITS ALLIES FRANCE
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. THESE FORCES HAVE CONTRIBUTED
TO STABILITY FOR DECADES. WHILE ANY QUESTION REGARDING
THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITS ON THESE FORCES IS FOR OUR
TWO ALLIES TO ADDRESS, FOR ITS PART THE UNITED STATES

#0021

ZFM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

FINAL SECTION OF 02

DOES NOT BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO INVOLVE THIRD
PARTIES IN ORDER TO PROCEED WITH THE FURTHER REDUCTIONS
UNDER DISCUSSION AS A RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LATEST
INITIATIVE."

•
THE CONCERNS I RAISED NOTWITHSTANDING, WE ARE ON A THRESHOLD
OF MAKING DRAMATIC PROGRESS IN REDUCING AND TRANSFORMING OUR
NUCLEAR ARSENALS TO LEVELS THAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ENVISIONED. MINDFUL OF SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS,
WE INTEND TO SEIZE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE THE NEW ERA
OF RELATIONS THAT HAS DAWNED.

•
SINCERELY,

•
GEORGE BUSH

•
END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0022

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0021 <TOR> 920128220050 MSG000317944850

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0022 <TOR> 920128220349 MSG000317945329

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SIT: GOMPERT HOTLINE_OUT FILE WAYNE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 050108Z FEB 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I WAS HAPPY TO SEE YOU IN NEW YORK. I THINK WE HAD A GOOD
DISCUSSION ON SOME OF THE ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA, BUT OUR TIME WAS, OF
COURSE, ALL TOO SHORT. I WANT TO SHARE SOME IMPRESSIONS OF MY CAMP
DAVID MEETING WITH BORIS YELTSIN. I KNOW THAT YOU WILL BE
RECEIVING HIM WEDNESDAY.

THIS WAS MY THIRD MEETING WITH YELTSIN SINCE JUNE. HE WAS IN GOOD
HEALTH AND SPIRITS. HE WAS ALSO QUITE IMPRESSIVE. HE SPOKE
CLEARLY AND INTELLIGENTLY ON A RANGE OF COMPLEX ISSUES WITHOUT
NOTES OR REFERENCE TO HIS ADVISORS. A CENTRAL THEME THROUGHOUT
YELTSIN'S PRESENTATION WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA WERE
NO LONGER ADVERSARIES AND INDEED SHOULD NOW BE PARTNERS. HE MADE
THIS POINT EMPHATICALLY, EVEN INSISTING THAT WE MAKE IT CLEAR IN
OUR JOINT STATEMENT.

YELTSIN DESCRIBED THE BASIS FOR HIS ECONOMIC REFORM EFFORTS AND THE
CRITICAL CHALLENGE OF SHEPHERDING RUSSIA THROUGH THE WINTER, BUT HE
DID NOT DWELL ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. HIS FINANCE MINISTER GAYDAR, MET
SEPARATELY WITH TREASURY SECRETARY BRADY TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF
THEIR ECONOMIC PLANS. MY PEOPLE FOUND GAYDAR TO BE SERIOUS AND ON
TOP OF THE REFORM EFFORT. WHILE GAYDAR DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY
OF A WESTERN-FINANCED STABILIZATION FUND, HE DID NOT PRESS IT. OUR
SIDE CAME AWAY FROM THE MEETING WITH A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF
RUSSIA'S REFORM PROGRAM. WE ALSO ADVISED GAYDAR TO WORK VERY
CLOSELY WITH THE IMF IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

THERE WAS ONE RELATED ISSUE WHICH YELTSIN DID RAISE THAT MAY ALSO
COME UP WITH YOU. HE SAID RUSSIA IS SHORT ABOUT 25 MILLION METRIC
TONS OF FOOD AND WONDERED IF RUSSIA COULD NOT RECEIVE MORE ASSISTANCE
FROM WHAT HE SAID WAS 20 MILLION METRIC TONS IN EC FOOD SURPLUS
STOCKS.

YELTSIN SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME WITH ME ON MILITARY AND NUCLEAR
ISSUES. HE PROPOSED A RANGE OF JOINT PROJECTS IN SUCH AREAS AS THE
STORAGE OF URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROJECTS TO
ALLEVIATE THE DANGER OF A BRAIN DRAIN OF RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS, THE
DISABLING AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SPACE RESEARCH AND
THE CREATION OF A GLOBAL DEFENSE SYSTEM COMPATIBLE BUT NOT
IDENTICAL TO SDI. WE LISTENED CAREFULLY TO THESE PROPOSALS AND

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2009-0728-MR

SCS 5/16/11

SAID WE WOULD PROVIDE CONSIDERED RESPONSES DURING SECRETARY BAKER'S TRIP TO RUSSIA NEXT WEEK.

GIVEN YOUR PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL, I WANT TO NOTE THAT YELTSIN WAS PARTICULARLY REASSURING IN DESCRIBING THE AGREED SYSTEM FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND DISMANTLING OF THOSE WEAPONS FROM THE THREE OTHER FORMER REPUBLICS WHICH HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YELTSIN WAS ALSO QUITE ADAMANT THAT HE WOULD WORK HARD TO ASSURE THAT THOSE THREE REPUBLICS ALL SIGN ON TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS NON-NUCLEAR STATES. HE SAID HE EXPECTED KAZAKHSTAN TO AGREE TO THIS BY THE FEBRUARY 14 MEETING OF CIS LEADERS IN MINSK. YELTSIN ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT DESPITE CURRENT PROBLEMS, HE WOULD NOT ALLOW SERIOUS CONFLICTS TO DEVELOP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA. HE SAID RUSSIA WOULD BE FLEXIBLE AND HAD NO IMPERIAL DESIGNS.

WE ALSO REVIEWED IN GENERAL OUR RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR INITIATIVES. WE AGREED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS ON THEM DURING JIM BAKER'S UPCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW.

I HOPE YOU WILL FIND THIS BRIEF OVERVIEW USEFUL IN PREPARATION FOR YOUR MEETINGS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT:

#0052

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0052 <TOR> 920205031407 MSG000318568447

<DIST>

PPT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT

SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 120241Z FEB 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

SECTION 01 OF 02

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

.
BEGIN TEXT:

.
DEAR FRANCOIS:

.
I AM WRITING TO YOU ON A MATTER OF GREAT POTENTIAL VALUE FOR
THE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS, OUR ALLIANCE, AND EVEN THE
WORLD. I AM ALSO SENDING SIMILAR LETTERS TO OTHER KEY
ALLIES. AS A RESULT OF THE FRESH THINKING OF THE NEW
RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP, WE MAY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN
CREATING A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. SUCH A REGIME
WOULD ENABLE US TO DEFEND AGAINST A RANGE OF NEW BALLISTIC
MISSILE THREATS WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF LONG
STANDING DETERRENT FORCES. ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF THIS
COOPERATIVE EFFORT COULD BE THE ALLIANCE, WITH ITS PROVEN
PRINCIPLE OF INDIVISIBLE SECURITY AND SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF
STRATEGIC COOPERATION. OUR PRINCIPAL PARTNER COULD BE
RUSSIA ITSELF, THANKS TO THE OPENING PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS
NOW OFFERED.

.
AS WE REPORTED TO YOU LAST WEEK, AT CAMP DAVID, PRESIDENT
YELTSIN INDICATED CLEAR INTEREST IN A COOPERATIVE APPROACH
TO GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE. JIM BAKER IS ON HIS WAY BACK TO
RUSSIA AND OTHER NEW INDEPENDENT STATES TO PURSUE OUR COMMON
AGENDA, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, AND OUR READINESS TO BRING
THESE SOCIETIES INTO OUR COMMUNITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES.
IN MOSCOW, JIM WILL ALSO EXPLORE THE IDEA THAT WAS RAISED AT
CAMP DAVID AND IF POSSIBLE SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH.

.
AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS HAVE BRIEFED THEIR ALLIED
COUNTERPARTS OVER THE PAST YEAR ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR WHAT
WE CALL GPALS (GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES).
NOW I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO YOU PERSONALLY WHY I BELIEVE THIS
IS SUCH AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY.

.
THE GOAL OF EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC
MISSILE ATTACKS HAS BECOME BOTH MORE COMPELLING AND MORE
FEASIBLE. DESPITE OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO IMPEDE
PROLIFERATION, WE ARE EXPERIENCING A STEADY SPREAD OF THE
TECHNOLOGY OF BOTH BALLISTIC MISSILES AND DEVICES OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND TERROR. THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE OF THIS
PERIL IS IRAQ -- BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE GULF WAR.

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PER E.O. 13526

2000-0233-F/3

SCS 3/14/11

BUT THE NUMBER OF CASES WHERE DANGEROUS REGIMES MIGHT COME TO POSSESS DANGEROUS WEAPONS IS GROWING. WE CANNOT LEAVE OUR SOCIETIES EXPOSED TO THREATS WE CANNOT BE SURE OF DETERRING.

AT THE SAME TIME, TWO DEVELOPMENTS HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO CREATE THE MEANS OF PROTECTION, AND TO DO SO ON A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL BASIS. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE TECHNOLOGIES NEEDED FOR DEFENSE AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE STRIKES. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO DEPLOY LIMITED DEFENSES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. NOW, PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAS BROUGHT A NEW RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE: A CONCERN, LIKE OURS, ABOUT THE DANGERS CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION, COMBINED WITH A READINESS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT IN COOPERATION WITH US.

THE IDEA WE NOW WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPLORE WITH OUR ALLIES, WITH RUSSIA, AND POSSIBLY WITH OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONS, IS A STAGED APPROACH TO A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIME, IN WHICH A SHARED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WOULD BE CREATED, THE POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGIES AMONG PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD BE PURSUED, AND THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD DEVELOP A CONCEPT FOR A GLOBAL BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING AND PROTECTION REGIME. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO DISCUSS HOW, AND THROUGH WHAT FORMS OF COOPERATION, AMERICAN EARLY WARNING AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OUR ALLIES.

LET ME REITERATE TO YOU THAT WE WILL TAKE NO ACTION WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF YOUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCE.

ALL OF THIS IS STILL EXPLORATORY, THOUGH THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAN FIRST STEPS IS VERY REAL, THANKS TO THE NEW POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE WE SEE ALLIED COOPERATION AS A KEY ELEMENT, AND BECAUSE OUR SECURITY TRULY IS AS INDIVISIBLE TODAY AS IT HAS BEEN FOR OVER FORTY YEARS, WE WANT TO PROCEED ON THIS PATH TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIANCE PARTNERS. WE WILL THEREFORE, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT JIM LEARNS AND CAN ACCOMPLISH IN MOSCOW REGARDING THIS CONCEPT. I SUGGEST WE AND OTHER ALLIES BEGIN SYSTEMATICALLY TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES, THE IMPLICATIONS, AND I HOPE A COMMON PLAN. WITH RUSSIA AS A PARTNER IN THIS ENDEAVOR, WE CAN EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AMONG A WIDER COMMUNITY OF TRUSTED FRIENDS.

I THINK THIS IDEA HOLDS GREAT PROMISE. WE WILL NEED TO WORK TOGETHER AT EVERY POINT. I HAVE ASKED JIM BAKER AND DICK CHENEY TO DEVELOP AND OFFER TO THEIR ALLIED COUNTERPARTS A PLAN FOR EARLY CONSULTATION AND LONG-TERM COOPERATION. LET ME ASK YOU IN RETURN TO ENCOURAGE YOUR MINISTERS AND STAFFS TO BEGIN TO EMBARK WITH US ON THE CONSIDERATION OF WHAT COULD PROVE TO BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DIVIDENDS OF THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUCCESS.

WE ARE PLANNING EARLY CONSULTATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE,
#0087
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

FINAL SECTION OF 02

BEGINNING WITH THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 18. I WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME YOUR
PERSONAL THOUGHTS AND QUESTIONS AT ANY TIME.

▪
SINCERELY,

▪
GEORGE BUSH

▪
END TEXT

#0088

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 0087 <TOR> 920211214950 MSG000319153790
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 0088 <TOR> 920211220352 MSG000319154632

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE SUM SUM2
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 161507Z MAR 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

AS WE MOVE INTO A CRUCIAL PHASE OF OUR JOINT EFFORT TO PASS
A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE PAN AM AND UTA
BOMBINGS, I WANTED TO ENSURE THAT WE COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY ON THIS
VITAL MATTER. THE ABILITY OF FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM TO MAINTAIN UNITY OF PURPOSE HAS BEEN, WE ALL
RECOGNIZE, CENTRAL TO OUR SUCCESS TO DATE AND REMAINS ESSENTIAL
TO ACHIEVING OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES.

LIBYA HAS MADE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO SPLIT FRANCE FROM THE U.S. AND
THE UK, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR STEADFASTNESS IN INSISTING ON FULL
LIBYAN COMPLIANCE WHICH HAS BLUNTED QADHAFI'S MANEUVERS. LIBYA,
HOWEVER, WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ESCAPE THE COSTS OF ITS SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM BY DELAYING TACTICS AND OTHER MANEUVERING, SUCH AS
SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

WHILE I KNOW IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO WIN UNANIMOUS SUPPORT
FOR A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IMPOSING SANCTIONS, THE
INITIAL RESULTS OF OUR JOINT DEMARCHES ARE ENCOURAGING. BY
WORKING TOGETHER, WE HAVE CREATED THE MOMENTUM, AND I AM SURE WE
WILL CARRY THE DAY.

THE KIND OF LEADERSHIP YOU HAVE DEMONSTRATED THUS FAR WILL
CONTINUE TO BE CRITICAL TO OUR SUCCESS. KING HASSAN WILL BE
HESITANT TO JOIN US ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION, FOR EXAMPLE. GIVEN
FRANCE'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO, I WOULD APPRECIATE
YOUR THOUGHTS AND ENCOURAGE YOUR EFFORTS TO WIN THE KING'S
SUPPORT. BE ASSURED THAT I WILL ALSO STAY ENGAGED WITH MOROCCO
AND OTHERS TO ASSURE PASSAGE OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

ALL MY BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DECL: OADR

END TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0728-MR
SLC 5/16/11

#0079

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0079 <TOR> 920316101346 MSG000322049626

<DIST>
SIT: VANDRIESEN
<DIST>
PRT: DEAL GOMPERT
<DIST>
PRT: HILL SITTMANN WWDESK
SIT: FILE
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SIT: FILE
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 020315Z APR 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT TO
ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL HUBERT VEDRINE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HUBERT:

I AM WRITING YOU ABOUT THE BREAK DOWN IN OUR BILATERAL CIVIL
AVIATION TALKS AND THE UNILATERAL ACTION NOW CONTEMPLATED BY FRENCH
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES TO RESTRICT OPERATIONS INTO FRANCE BY
U.S. CARRIERS.

I KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT AND YOU ARE HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED AT THE
MOMENT. FOR THAT REASON, I WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT YOU REALIZE
THE GRAVITY OF THIS CURRENT DISPUTE OVER AIR CARRIER CAPACITY FOR
THE SUMMER SEASON. I PARTICULARLY HOPE YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE
CURRENT IMPASSE IS NOT RESOLVED, PRESIDENT BUSH WILL HAVE NO CHOICE
BUT TO TAKE COUNTERMEASURES.

THIS ISSUE IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US, AS WELL AS FOR YOU. I BELIEVE
IT IS IN THE OVERWHELMING INTEREST OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO DO
EVERYTHING WE CAN TO AVOID A DAMAGING CONFRONTATION. IT IS FOR THAT
REASON I WANTED TO CALL THIS ISSUE AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS TO
YOUR ATTENTION.

IF THE FAST APPROACHING DEADLINE IS A BARRIER, THERE IS ONE IDEA
WHICH COMES TO MIND WHICH MIGHT OFFER SOME BREATHING SPACE. IF YOUR
GOVERNMENT ALLOWED THREE OF OUR CARRIERS TO INITIATE THEIR PLANNED
SERVICE FOR THE SUMMER SEASON BEGINNING APRIL 4, WE WOULD HAVE
ALMOST A MONTH TO RESUME AND CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUMMER
SEASON. THIS IS BECAUSE NO OTHER U.S. CARRIERS PLAN CHANGES BEFORE
MAY 1 THAT WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS YOU HAVE
PROPOSED. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, NORTHWEST AND TWA COULD OFFER
PLANNED DAILY SERVICE TO PARIS FROM BOSTON, AND UNITED COULD UTILIZE
A 747 INSTEAD OF A SMALLER 767 ON ITS DAILY WASHINGTON AND PARIS
FLIGHT.

IN ANY EVENT, HUBERT, I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE ON THIS ISSUE IN THE

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0728-MR
SLC 5/16/11

HOPE THAT WE COULD BOTH STEP BACK FROM THE BRINK.

▪
SINCERELY,

▪
BRENT SCOWCROFT

▪
DECL: OADR

#0149

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0149 <TOR> 920401221837 MSG000323475517

<DIST>
SIT: VANDRIESEN
<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT SUM SUM2
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 040010Z APR 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MR. HUBERT VEDRINE
FROM MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HUBERT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PROMPT RESPONSE. I APPRECIATE YOUR
WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS MATTER WHICH, IF NOT
RESOLVED, COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
I WAS PLEASED TO SEE THAT YOUR RESPONSE RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR
BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO STEP BACK FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS.

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO
MAKE A COMMITMENT ON OVERALL CAPACITY. NONETHELESS, I WOULD
UPPE YOU TO ALLOW OUR AIRLINES TO CONTINUE THEIR OPERATIONS WHILE
OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS REVIEW THE OVERALL SITUATION. FOR OUR PART,
I HAVE PERSUADED OUR AUTHORITIES TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AGAINST AIR FRANCE TO PROVIDE A NECESSARY
BREATHING SPELL.

OUR PEOPLE ARE PREPARED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITH YOURS
IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESS THE CAPACITY QUESTION. WE ARE DEDICATED
TO FINDING A SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO ALL CONCERNED. I LOOK
FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0161

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0161 <TOR> 920403191322 MSG000323637202

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0637-MR
SCS 6/27/11

<DIST>
PPT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 171522Z APR 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT TO
GENERAL QESNOT, MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR GENERAL QESNOT:

I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF APRIL 16TH. I HAD ALREADY BEEN INFORMED
OF SOME OF YOUR CONCERNS AFTER YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR VISITING
TEAM EARLIER ON THE 16TH IN PARIS.

I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE AUTHORITATIVE DEMARCHE TO IRAQ ON THIS
ISSUE IS THE ONE WHICH WE MADE JOINTLY WITH YOU AND THE BRITISH AT
THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK. AS YOU KNOW, THAT DEMARCHE STATED
"THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW THAT COALITION AIRCRAFT HAVE THE
RIGHT AND AUTHORITY TO USE APPROPRIATE FORCE IN RESPONSE TO ANY
INDICATION OF HOSTILE INTENT. INDICATORS OF HOSTILE INTENT INCLUDE:
FIRING OF MISSILES, INCLUDING BALLISTIC FIRINGS; ILLUMINATION AND/OR
TRACKING OF AIRCRAFT WITH FIRE CONTROL RADARS; ANY OTHER ACTION
DEEMED THREATENING TO COALITION AIRCRAFT."

WHILE OUR LOCAL MILITARY FORCES HAVE TAKEN APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO
BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THIS DEMARCHE AND TO PROTECT
THEMSELVES, WE HAVE SET NO DEADLINES AND CERTAINLY NOT APRIL 17.
INDEED, OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE IMMEDIATE DANGER HAS RECEDED
SOMEWHAT BECAUSE THE IRAQIS HAVE DISMANTLED SOME OF THE
GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES EARLIER IN PLACE. IF YOU HAVE LINGERING
CONCERNS, I SUGGEST THAT YOU ALSO PURSUE THEM IN
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNELS. BUT REST ASSURED THAT WE WILL REMAIN
IN CLOSE CONTACT.

SINCERELY,

BRENT SCOWCROFT

END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0030

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0030 <TOR> 920417114105 MSG000324819665

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0728-MR

SCS 5/16/11

<DIST>
PRT: GANTT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 052223Z MAY 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

•
MAY 5, 1992

•
BEGIN TEXT:

•
DEAR FRANCOIS,

•
I SAW THOSE VERY GENEROUS COMMENTS THAT YOU MADE REGARDING MY
HANDLING OF THESE VERY DIFFICULT RIOT CONDITIONS. THANK YOU SO
VERY MUCH.

•
THE SITUATION IN LOS ANGELES NOW APPEARS TO BE WELL UNDER
CONTROL. I WILL BE GOING OUT TO CALIFORNIA WEDNESDAY NIGHT TO
SEE WHAT ADDITIONALLY WE CAN DO TO HELP THE MAYOR AND THE
GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA AS THEY GO ABOUT THE PROCESS OF
RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION.

•
AGAIN MY MOST SINCERE THANKS AND, OF COURSE, MY WARMEST PERSONAL
REGARDS.

•
GEORGE BUSH

•
END TEXT

•
DECL: OADR

#0108

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0108 <TOR> 920505183544 MSG000326399744

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CU NARA, Date 8/9/10

<DIST>
PRT: DEAL GANTT GOMPERT HILL COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SITTMANN
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 310110Z MAY 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

ON MONDAY, I PLAN TO ANNOUNCE A MAJOR NEW FOREST
INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE FOREST CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE.

AS A FIRST STEP, I PROPOSE THAT WE IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD DOUBLE
OUR CURRENT COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL FOREST CONSERVATION
PROGRAMS FROM \$1.35 BILLION TO \$2.7 BILLION ANNUALLY. THE ADDED
RESOURCES COULD BE INVESTED THROUGH EXISTING BILATERAL AND
MULTILATERAL MECHANISMS AND PROGRAMS, INCLUDING THE WORLD BANK'S
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY. OVER THE NEXT DECADE, THIS WILL AMOUNT
TO A SIZEABLE INVESTMENT AND PUT US ON THE PATH TOWARD OUR ULTIMATE
GOAL OF HALTING THE LOSS OF THE WORLD'S FORESTS. WE ARE PREPARED
TO MEET OUR SHARE OF THE \$2.7 BILLION TOTAL, AND I PLAN TO ANNOUNCE
ON MONDAY OUR FIRST INSTALLMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL \$150 MILLION FOR
INTERNATIONAL FOREST ASSISTANCE.

AS IMPORTANT AS MONEY IS, THE KEY TO OUR INITIATIVE IS ITS
FLEXIBLE APPROACH: IT RELIES ON COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS THAT
RESPECT SOVEREIGNTY, ENSURE THAT RESOURCES ARE DEVOTED TO THE MOST
EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PROGRAMS, AND FOSTER REAL PARTNERSHIPS
BETWEEN INTERESTED COUNTRIES.

I HOPE THAT BY STRESSING THIS FLEXIBLE APPROACH, AND BY MAKING A
SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL COMMITMENT, WE CAN GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO OUR
EFFORT TO REACH AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON A STRONG STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES ON FORESTS LEADING TO A FORESTS CONVENTION. TO ENSURE
THAT WE MAINTAIN MOMENTUM FROM THIS INITIATIVE AND OUR WORK IN RIO,
I ALSO PROPOSE TO CONVENE A "FORESTS PARTNERSHIPS FORUM" TOWARDS
THE END OF THIS YEAR TO BRING TOGETHER POTENTIAL INVESTORS AND
RECIPIENTS AND TO SHARE IDEAS ON FOREST CONSERVATION OPPORTUNITIES.

I HOPE THAT YOU CAN SUPPORT OUR INITIATIVE IN CONCEPT AND THAT
WE CAN WORK ON THIS FURTHER OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. LAUNCHING
A COMMON EFFORT AT RIO ON THIS ISSUE WOULD GIVE THE SUMMIT A BIG
BOOST.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

#0079

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0079 <TOR> 920530224055 MSG000328574455

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0728-MR
SCS 5/16/11

<DIST>
SIT: HEWETT
<DIST>
PRT: GANTT GOMPERT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 211526Z JUN 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
Q000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

•
BEGIN TEXT:

•
DEAR FRANCOIS,

•
THOUGH YOU HAVE CERTAINLY HEARD ABOUT THE RESULTS OF MY MEETINGS
WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN THIS WEEK FROM ROLAND DUMAS AND THE MEDIA
ACCOUNTS, I WANTED TO SHARE SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF WHAT I
BELIEVED WAS SIGNIFICANT IN OUR EXCHANGES. YOU AND I SHARE A SENSE
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHANGES UNDER WAY IN THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION, AND I KNOW YOU JUST MET WITH PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IN PARIS.
BORIS YELTSIN AND I HAD AN EXCELLENT TWO DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WHICH
WERE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT IN SCOPE AND TONE THAN ANY I COULD
HAVE IMAGINED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

•
PRESIDENT YELTSIN CAME TO WASHINGTON WITH A FEW OBJECTIVES FIRMLY
IN MIND. FIRST, HE WAS CLEARLY DETERMINED AFTER OUR MEETING AT
CAMP DAVID IN FEBRUARY TO AGREE ON THE DETAILS OF A NEW MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA WHICH WOULD
BRING IMMEDIATE AND TANGIBLE SUPPORT FOR HIM. SECOND, HE
EMPHASIZED THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIS DEMOCRATIC AND MARKET REFORMS
AND THE MORE GRADUAL REFORM POLICY OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV. THIRD, HE
WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ASSURE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OF HIS
COMMITMENT TO A NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH US WHICH PRECLUDED THE
POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE CONFLICT. HE EMPHASIZED THESE LAST POINTS IN
A TRIUMPHANT APPEARANCE BEFORE THE CONGRESS AND IN A VERY
SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO WICHITA, KANSAS.

•
WE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL TOGETHER. WE ISSUED A JOINT DOCUMENT,
THE WASHINGTON CHARTER, THAT OUTLINES OUR MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO A
PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC FUTURE. AS YOU KNOW, WE ALSO CONCLUDED A
FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT TO REDUCE OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES.
BY THE YEAR 2003 (OR EARLIER IF WE ARE ABLE TO HELP RUSSIA IN
WEAPONS DESTRUCTION), THE U.S. AND RUSSIA WILL REDUCE THE NUMBER OF
OUR WARHEADS TO 3000-3500, WITH EACH NATION DETERMINING ITS OWN
FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN THAT RANGE. RUSSIA WILL ELIMINATE ALL OF
ITS MIRVED ICBMS DURING THIS PERIOD, AND EACH SIDE MAY HAVE NO MORE
THAN 1700-1750 SLBM WARHEADS. I THINK THIS AGREEMENT WILL ASSURE A
MUCH GREATER MEASURE OF NUCLEAR STABILITY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE
UNITED STATES AND THUS FOR FRANCE AND OTHERS.

•
WE AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER WITH ALLIES AND OTHER INTERESTED STATES
TO DEVELOP A CONCEPT FOR A GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AGAINST
BALLISTIC MISSILES. PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND I ALSO ESTABLISHED A

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SCS 7/18/13

HIGH-LEVEL WORKING GROUP TO EXPLORE PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD THIS
END. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO PURSUE
THE CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND OUR OTHER ALLIES ON THIS
ISSUE. IN OTHER INITIATIVES, PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND I DECIDED TO
EXPAND CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR TWO MILITARIES. WE HOPE
TO BEGIN A SERIES OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS, FOR EXAMPLE,
DESIGNED TO HELP THE RUSSIAN MILITARY ADAPT TO CIVILIAN RULE. WE
ALSO DECIDED TO LAUNCH A REGULAR, HIGH-LEVEL SECURITY DIALOGUE ON
THE MAJOR ISSUES BEFORE US.

THE OTHER MAJOR ISSUE WAS PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S DESIRE TO CONCLUDE A
STANDBY AGREEMENT QUICKLY WITH THE IMF IN ORDER TO UNLOCK THE G-7'S
\$24 BILLION ECONOMIC SUPPORT PACKAGE. YELTSIN REAFFIRMED TO ME IN
STRONG TERMS HIS COMMITMENT TO THE REFORM PROGRAM. HE WAS
FORCEFUL AND CANDID, HOWEVER, IN DESCRIBING HIS FRUSTRATION WITH
THE IMF IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE STANDBY. HE SAID RUSSIA SIMPLY
COULD NOT AFFORD TO WAIT MUCH LONGER FOR ASSISTANCE WHICH WAS
NEEDED THIS SUMMER. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT RUSSIA'S SITUATION WAS
UNIQUE AND THAT THE IMF SHOULD THEREFORE NOT INSIST ON HAVING ALL
OF ITS NORMAL REQUIREMENTS MET BEFORE AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED.

YELTSIN'S OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE THE NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETED BY THE
TIME OF OUR MEETING IN MUNICH. I ASSURED HIM OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH
THIS TIMETABLE BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF RUSSIA MEETING THE
CORE REFORM ELEMENTS AGREED EARLIER WITH THE IMF: A CREDIBLE PLAN
TO REDUCE THE BUDGET DEFICIT; A MECHANISM TO CONTROL THE MONEY
SUPPLY; AND AN EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM WHICH RELATES THE RUBLE TO
OTHER CURRENCIES THROUGH ONE RATE, SET BY THE MARKET.

I ALSO ASSURED YELTSIN THAT WE INTENDED TO CONTINUE OUR
HUMANITARIAN AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS AFTER THE LISBON
CONFERENCE AND THAT I BELIEVED THE EC, JAPAN AND OTHERS WERE
EQUALLY COMMITTED TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS. FINALLY, I SHOULD
NOTE THAT YELTSIN MADE A DIRECT APPEAL TO JOIN THE G-7. I
DEFLECTED HIM, BUT HE MAY APPROACH YOU TOO.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MUNICH,
WITH MY PERSONAL BEST REGARDS,
SINCERELY,
GEORGE

END TEXT
#0165

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0165 <TOR> 920621124045 MSG000330439245

<DIST>
PRT: GANTT GOMPERT HILL COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT SITTMANN
WAYNE
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT FILE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 232116Z JUN 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

.
BEGIN TEXT:

.
DEAR FRANCOIS:

.
I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN MUNICH. AS WE DISCUSSED IN
RIO, WE MUST FIND TIME FOR A LONGER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THOUGH
TIME SIMPLY WILL NOT PERMIT ME TO ACCEPT YOUR KIND HOSPITALITY
AND STOP IN PARIS BEFORE THE SUMMIT, I WANT TO CONFIRM MY
INVITATION THAT YOU JOIN ME FOR DINNER ON JULY 5 IN MUNICH. THIS
WILL NOT PROVIDE AS MUCH TIME AS WE BOTH WANT, BUT IT WILL ALLOW
US TO BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE MANY ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA.

.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO INVITE YOU TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF
JOINING ME AT CAMP DAVID FOR A LONGER DISCUSSION DURING JULY.
JULY 26 AND JULY 27 WOULD WORK WELL FOR ME, BUT IF THAT IS A BAD
TIME FOR YOU, WE CAN LOOK AT OTHER DATES. I AM SURE THAT WE
COULD HAVE A FRUITFUL EXCHANGE AND WORK THROUGH SOME OF THE
NAGGING ISSUES THAT CONTINUE TO CONFRONT US. I VERY MUCH WANT TO
GET OUR COOPERATION ON TRACK, AND I KNOW YOU SHARE THIS DESIRE.

.
I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR DINNER IN MUNICH, AND TO THE OPPORTUNITY
FOR A LONGER, MORE RELAXED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

.
WITH MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES,

.
SINCERELY,

.
GEORGE

.
END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0177

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0177 <TOR> 920623171725 MSG000330628645

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0728-MR

SCS 5/16/11

<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT HOWE SCOWCROFT
SIT: GOMPERT HOTLINE_OUT FILE HUTCHINGS
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 262104Z JUN 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

EN ROUTE TO MUNICH, I WILL BE STOPPING BRIEFLY IN WARSAW, WHERE I
WILL JOIN PRESIDENT WALESIA IN CEREMONIES MARKING THE RETURN OF THE
REMAINS OF THE DISTINGUISHED POLISH STATESMAN IGNACY JAN
PADEREWSKI. BUT MY MAIN REASON FOR GOING IS TO REAFFIRM OUR
SUPPORT FOR POLAND, DESPITE ITS PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, AND URGE THE
POLES TO GET BACK ON TRACK WITH ECONOMIC REFORM. THEY NEED A
POSITIVE SIGNAL RIGHT NOW, SO A NEW POLISH GOVERNMENT CAN REBUILD
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A SOUND ECONOMIC PROGRAM THAT GAINS THE SUPPORT
OF THE IMF.

IN THAT REGARD, THE POLES HAVE APPROACHED US ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF CONVERTING THE \$1 BILLION STABILIZATION FUND TO NEW USES ONCE
ITS INITIAL PURPOSE OF STABILIZING THE POLISH ZLOTY IS FULFILLED.
OUR VIEW, WHICH I BELIEVE THE POLES FULLY ACCEPT, IS THAT THE FUND
SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED ONLY AFTER POLAND HAS RETURNED SECURELY TO
COMPLIANCE WITH THE IMF ON AN AGREED ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND AGREEMENT
BY THE CONTRIBUTORS. AT THE SAME TIME, A POSITIVE SIGNAL FROM THE
G-7 ABOUT THIS IDEA AS A FUTURE PROSPECT MIGHT GIVE THE POLES AN
ADDED INCENTIVE TO RETURN TO THE REFORM TRACK.

WHILE THERE, I PLAN TO SAY THAT THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO CONVERT ITS
\$200 MILLION GRANT SHARE OF THE FUND TO NEW PRODUCTIVE USES ONCE
POLAND RETURNS TO IMF COMPLIANCE AND THE FUND'S CONTRIBUTORS AGREE
IT CAN SAFELY BE LIQUIDATED. I WILL ALSO SUGGEST THAT OTHER
PARTICIPANTS IN THE FUND CONSIDER MAKING AVAILABLE THEIR PRESENT
CONTRIBUTIONS (WHETHER GRANTS, LOANS, OR LINES OF CREDIT) ON TERMS
AND FOR PURPOSES TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN EACH GOVERNMENT AND
POLAND.

I KNOW THAT OUR SITUATIONS ARE DIFFERENT AND THAT IT MAY BE HARDER
FOR YOU TO MAKE THIS COMMITMENT BECAUSE YOUR CONTRIBUTION WAS NOT
IN THE FORM OF A CASH GRANT. BUT BECAUSE THE NEEDS ARE SO URGENT
IN POLAND AND THE STAKES SO HIGH, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER
CONTINUING YOUR PRESENT COMMITMENT FOR NEW PURPOSES (AND
POTENTIALLY FOR ANOTHER PERIOD OF LIMITED DURATION, DEPENDING ON
WHAT YOU MIGHT EVENTUALLY AGREE WITH THE POLES).

IN ANY CASE, I SUGGEST THAT WE DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER IN

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2009-0728-MR; 2010-0457-MR
SCS 5/16/11

MUNICH, ALONG WITH ANY IDEAS YOU HAVE FOR WAYS WE CAN SUPPORT
POLAND AND THE OTHER NEW DEMOCRACIES. I WOULD ALSO WELCOME ANY
ADVICE YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING MY TRIP TO WARSAW, PARTICULARLY AS TO
HOW WE CAN HELP POLAND FIND ITS WAY BACK TO THE REFORM PATH.

•
WITH WARM REGARDS,

•
•
SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH

•
•
END TEXT:

#0013

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0013 <TOR> 920626173512 MSG000330888912

<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: GOMPERT HAASS HOTLINE OUT HULL RIEDEL WAYNE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 251735Z JUL 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I FIRST WANT TO UNDERLINE HOW VALUABLE I FOUND OUR DINNER
DISCUSSION IN MUNICH. WE WERE ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT OUR
CONCERNS AND TO MOVE TOWARD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON SOME OF THE
ISSUES WHICH DIVIDED US RECENTLY. I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT
WE COULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF CSCE PEACEKEEPING, WHILE OUR
EXCHANGES LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO FIND COMMON
GROUND ON OTHER EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND.
IN THIS VEIN, BRENT SCOWCROFT AND COLIN POWELL TELL ME THAT THEY
JUST HAD A VERY PRODUCTIVE VISIT WITH ADMIRAL LANXADE.

ALL OF THIS UNDERLINES AGAIN THAT WHEN WE GET DOWN TO THE
ESSENTIALS, THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE CAN AND WILL WORK
TOGETHER. WHILE WE WILL NATURALLY HAVE DIFFERENCES WHICH MUST BE
RESOLVED, OUR RELATIONSHIP IS SPECIAL BECAUSE WE ARE CONSISTENTLY
ABLE TO FIND COMMON GROUND AND TO ACT BOLDLY IN PARTNERSHIP WHEN
OUR SHARED VALUES AND PRINCIPLES ARE AT STAKE.

WITH THAT IN MIND, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY ASSESSMENT OF THE
SERIOUS SITUATION WE FACE IN IRAQ AND PARTICULARLY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
DETERMINATION TO RESIST UNITED NATIONS' AUTHORITY. UNLIKE PREVIOUS
PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ SINCE THE END OF HOSTILITIES, BAGHDAD'S DEFIANCE
OF UN AUTHORITY IS ACROSS THE BOARD AND UNIFORMLY BOLD. WE ARE NOT
SURE IF THIS IS BECAUSE SADDAM THINKS WE ARE DISTRACTED BY
YUGOSLAVIA AND DOMESTIC CONCERNS OR IF IT HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH
HIS DOMESTIC POSITION AFTER THE FAILED COUP PLOTTING. BUT THIS
PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR IS SO FLAGRANT AND WIDESPREAD THAT WE ARE LED
TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SADDAM WILL CONTINUE TO DEFFY THE UN IN
UNACCEPTABLE WAYS AND THAT WE MAY NEED TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY ACTION
TO DEMONSTRATE AGAIN OUR RESOLVE TO DEFEND THE UN'S AUTHORITY AND
THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LED US TO REVERSE IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT.

PERHAPS MOST WORRISOME IS SADDAM'S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO DIVULGE
FULLY THE EXTENT OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS.
AS YOU KNOW, THE UN HAS REPEATEDLY FOUND IRAQ GUILTY OF OBSTRUCTING
THE UN'S SPECIAL COMMISSION AND THE IAEA. THE IRAQI REFUSAL TO
ALLOW INSPECTION OF THE AGRICULTURE MINISTRY IS ONLY THE LATEST
EXAMPLE OF THIS. WE BELIEVE IRAQ IS STILL CONCEALING DOZENS OF
SCUD MISSILES AND ITS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM
THE UN. IF IRAQ IS ABLE TO PRESERVE ITS WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, MUCH OF WHAT WE WORKED AND FOUGHT FOR WILL BE
UNDERMINED.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2005-1151-MR
@ 4/27/10

BEYOND THIS SERIOUS ISSUE IS A WIDE PATTERN OF DEFIANCE WHICH LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT SADDAM INTENDS TO RETURN TO PAST PRACTICES. IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE IRAQ-KUWAIT BOUNDARY COMMISSION, AS REQUIRED BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687, AND TO RENEW THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE UN HUMANITARIAN PRESENCE INSIDE THE COUNTRY. BAGHDAD HAS ALSO REFUSED TO ACCEPT UNSCR'S 706 AND 712, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A MECHANISM FOR IRAQ TO EXPORT OIL FOR FOOD, AND UNSCR'S 707 AND 715, WHICH PROVIDE FOR LONG TERM MONITORING OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. HARASSMENT OF UN OFFICERS IN IRAQ HAS INCREASED SHAPPLY IN THE LAST MONTH.

IRAQ ALSO CONTINUES TO VIOLATE UNSCR 688 BY MAINTAINING AN ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF IRAQ'S THREE KURDISH PROVINCES IN THE NORTH AND BY VIOLENT PERSECUTION OF THE KURDISH AND SHIA POPULATIONS. ATTACKS ON SHIA OPPOSITION TARGETS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ HAVE ESCALATED SHARPLY THIS MONTH, INCLUDING USE OF JET AIRCRAFT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE GULF WAR. IN THE NORTH, IRAQI USE OF TERROR TACTICS AGAINST THE KURDS HAS BECOME FLAGRANT. AS YOU WILL RECALL, UNSCR 688 LABELED SUCH ACTIONS A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. I KNOW THAT MADAME MITTERRAND RECENTLY HAD FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE WITH THE HORRORS OF THAT SITUATION, AND AGAIN WE ARE GRATEFUL SHE WAS UNHARMED BY THE ATTACK ON HER MOTORCADE.

IF MILITARY ACTION IS NEEDED I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT FRANCE -- AND THE UNITED KINGDOM -- WILL JOIN US AGAIN IN DEFENSE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND VALUES WHICH OUR DEMOCRACIES REPRESENT. WE, AS WELL AS OUR DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ADVISORS, MUST STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT AS WE DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND TO IRAQ'S BEHAVIOR. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COORDINATION WITH FRANCE ON THIS MATTER.

I ALSO HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO FIND MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATES FOR THE VISIT WE DISCUSSED. WE BOTH FACE EXTRAORDINARY PRESSURES ON OUR SCHEDULES THESE DAYS, BUT BE ASSURED THAT I HIGHLY VALUE OUR OPPORTUNITIES TO MEET AT LENGTH. WITH MY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT:

#0115

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0115 <TOR> 920725135306 MSG000333381186

<DIST>
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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 052031Z AUG 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL HUBERT VEDRINE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HUBERT,

THE CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA SHOWS NO SIGN OF ABATING. WITH THE
MOUNTING REFUGEE PROBLEM AND CONTINUED VIOLENCE, WE WILL FACE
CRITICAL DECISIONS ON ADDITIONAL STEPS TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF
THE UN EFFORT IN THAT WAR-RAVAGED LAND.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I AM TROUBLED THAT OUR NATO
REPRESENTATIVES FIND THEMSELVES ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF THE ISSUE
OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN NATO. AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL AND LEADING MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, WE MUST
FIND WAYS TO COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN DOING WHAT WE CAN TO
AMELIORATE THE HUMAN SUFFERING AND TRAGEDY IN BOSNIA.

LET ME BE CLEAR: WE SUPPORT FULLY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND COMMON
EFFORTS, INCLUDING CONTINGENCY PLANNING VIA THE WEU. IN NO WAY
DO WE SEE NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING COMPETING WITH OR TRYING TO
DOMINATE THESE DELIBERATIONS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE INTERESTS AT
STAKE IN THE BALKAN CRISIS, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO PURSUE THEM IF
NECESSARY TO HELP CARRY OUT THE WILL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY. WE NEED TO DISCUSS AND CONSIDER THESE OPTIONS WITH
OUR ALLIES IN THE NATO CONTEXT. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF A WEU ROLE IN BOSNIA AT THE REQUEST OF THE UN,
JUST AS WE MAY DECIDE TOGETHER ON POSSIBLE ALLIANCE ROLES IN
HELPING TO SOLVE THE CRISIS.

IN MUNICH OUR PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WORK HARD TO SORT
OUT DIFFERENCES ON SUCH QUESTIONS. YOU CAN COUNT ON US TO
CONDUCT OURSELVES IN THAT SPIRIT. I HOPE FRANCE WILL JOIN WITH
US IN ASSURING THE CLOSEST COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE WEU
AND IN ALLOWING THE ALLIANCE TO PROCEED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING
AS PART OF THAT COOPERATION. THIS COULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO
DEMONSTRATE THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN AN EFFECTIVE ALLIANCE AND
EUROPE'S PURSUIT OF COMMON SECURITY POLICIES.

SINCERELY,

BRENT

END TEXT

#0010

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0010 <TOR> 920805193936 MSG000334352376

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0774-MR
SCS 4/2/13

<DIST>
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SIT: BARTH GOMPERT HOTLINE OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 171437Z AUG 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QRRQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

ON AUGUST 12, THE UNITED STATES COMPLETED NEGOTIATIONS WITH MEXICO AND CANADA ON A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA). THIS MAJOR NEW TRADE LIBERALIZING INITIATIVE WILL PHASE OUT BARRIERS TO TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, ELIMINATE RESTRICTIONS ON INVESTMENT, AND STRENGTHEN THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ALL THREE COUNTRIES.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NAFTA NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE START HAS BEEN TO OPEN MARKETS AND EXPAND REGIONAL TRADE -- AND NOT TO ERECT NEW BARRIERS TO NON-PARTICIPANTS. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO AN OPEN INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM AND WANT TO SEE THAT SYSTEM STRENGTHENED AND IMPROVED IN THE URUGUAY ROUND.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR FOURTEEN MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE THREE SIDES ADDRESSED A VARIETY OF COMPLEX AND POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUES INVOLVING AGRICULTURE, FINANCIAL SERVICES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT. WE WERE ABLE TO REACH PRACTICAL COMPROMISES THAT ACCOMMODATED THE CONCERNS OF EACH OF THE COUNTRIES. AS A RESULT, WE NOW HAVE A BALANCED AGREEMENT WHICH BENEFITS ALL THREE COUNTRIES, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH GATT CRITERIA FOR FREE TRADE AREAS. INDEED, WE SEE NAFTA AND A NEW GATT AGREEMENT AS COMPLEMENTARY.

AT THE MUNICH SUMMIT, WE ALL AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE URUGUAY ROUND FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. EXPERIENCE WITH THE NAFTA NEGOTIATIONS GIVES ME RENEWED CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF OVERCOMING THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO A SUCCESSFUL URUGUAY ROUND, PROVIDED WE ALL SHOW THE SAME POLITICAL WILL. WE HAVE NARROWED OUR DIFFERENCES TO A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF ISSUES. IF WE APPROACH THESE DIFFERENCES CONSTRUCTIVELY AND WITH DETERMINATION, I AM CONFIDENT THAT ALL THE PARTIES CAN FIND AGREEABLE SOLUTIONS.

THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON KEY OUTSTANDING ISSUES AT ANY TIME. I RECOGNIZE THAT CONCERNS ABOUT APPROVAL OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY HAVE PREOCCUPIED MANY IN EUROPE. BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE BOLDLY IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO WORK ON AGRICULTURE, WE MUST ALSO MOVE FORWARD ON SERVICES AND MARKET ACCESS.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1999-0062-F
06/12/2009 MM

•
I ASSURE YOU THAT I AM PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO DO ALL THAT I CAN
TO COMPLETE THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS THIS YEAR. I WOULD
WELCOME ANY THOUGHTS THAT YOU MAY HAVE ON HOW WE CAN WORK TOGETHER
TO REACH THAT OBJECTIVE.

•
SINCERELY,

•
GEORGE BUSH

•
END TEXT:

DECL: OADR

#0050

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0050 <TOR> 920817113624 MSG000335360184

<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 191627Z AUG 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME
MINISTER MAJOR BE SHARED WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

•
BEGIN TEXT:

•
DEAR JOHN:

•
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. I
AGREE THAT, THANKS TO HELMUT'S EFFORTS, OUR MEETING IN MUNICH WAS
MORE INFORMAL. YET I SHARE FULLY YOUR FRUSTRATION THAT THE
ECONOMIC SUMMIT HAS DRIFTED FAR FROM ITS ORIGINS OF AN INFORMAL
GATHERING TO DISCUSS KEY ISSUES OF CONCERN TO HEADS. I AM AN
ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTER OF YOUR SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORMING THE
PROCESS.

WITH THE HOPE THAT WE CAN SOON ADOPT CHANGES SUCH AS THOSE
YOU SUGGEST, I AM COPYING THIS MESSAGE TO OUR COLLEAGUES.

•
SINCERELY,

•
GEORGE BUSH

•
END TEXT.

DECL: OADR

#0024

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0024 <TOR> 920819130035 MSG000335538035

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0762 - MR

SCS 11/21/11

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
84. Cable	Re: Message to Hubert Vedrine from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	8/20/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed:	2/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

<DIST>
PRT: GANTT
<DIST>
PRT: GOMPERT COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT WAYNE
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 081807Z SEP 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR FRANCOIS,

-
I AM GENUINELY SORRY THAT WE HAVE NOT YET FOUND A MUTUALLY
CONVENIENT DATE TO GET TOGETHER. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF OUR
COUNTRIES THAT WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET REGULARLY FOR
IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS OF THE ISSUES. FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS I WILL
NEED TO SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL. THEREFORE,
I WOULD SUGGEST WE AIM FOR THE POST ELECTION PERIOD (NOVEMBER-
DECEMBER) FOR OUR NEXT GET TOGETHER.

-
BECAUSE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP, I WANTED TO BE CERTAIN YOU KNEW THAT MY
THOUGHTS ARE WITH YOU AS FRANCE MOVES TOWARD ITS OWN DECISIVE VOTE
ON SEPTEMBER 20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE WILL BE
IMPORTANT FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD. I KNOW THIS PLACES AN
ESPECIALLY HEAVY WEIGHT ON YOUR SHOULDERS AT THIS TIME.

-
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAVE SUPPORTED
THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. AS A COUNTRY BORN OF EUROPE
AND ONE WHICH SACRIFICED MANY OF ITS SONS IN THE EUROPEAN CONFLICTS
OF THIS CENTURY, WE HAVE A GREAT STAKE IN YOUR FUTURE. WE WANT
NOTHING MORE THAN A STABLE, FREE AND PROSPEROUS EUROPE AS OUR
PARTNER IN THE WORLD. MY CONVICTIONS IN THIS REGARD REMAIN AS FIRM
AND CLEAR AS WHEN WE SAT TOGETHER AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY IN 1989 AND
I SPOKE ON THIS SUBJECT -- EUROPEAN UNITY IS GOOD FOR EUROPE, GOOD
FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND GOOD FOR THE WORLD.

-
THE LONG FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED
STATES GIVES US GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE WISDOM OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE
AS THEY VOTE LATER THIS MONTH. AS ALWAYS, I ADMIRE YOUR VISION AND
DETERMINATION. YOU HAVE MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES FOR THE VIGOROUS
WEEKS AHEAD.

-
SINCERELY,

-
GEORGE BUSH

-
END TEXT
#0153

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0158 <TOR> 920908143411 MSG000337271651

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2005-0818-MR
02/18/2005 MM

<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 120150Z SEP 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL
HUBERT VEDRINE FROM GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HUBERT:

PRESIDENT BUSH IS COMMUNICATING HIS SENTIMENTS DIRECTLY IN A
PERSONAL MESSAGE, BUT I WANTED TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
UNDERScore OUR CONCERN FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S HEALTH AND OUR
SINCERE BEST WISHES FOR HIS RAPID RECOVERY.

I AM ALSO WRITING TODAY TO URGE THAT WE COME TO AGREEMENT SOON ON
AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF OUR COMMON EFFORTS REGARDING IRAQ -- THE
TEXT OF A UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO TRANSFER FROZEN IRAQI
ASSETS TO THE UN. WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH YOUR EXPERTS ON
ALL BUT ONE ELEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION.

THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCE IS PARAGRAPH ELEVEN WHICH PROHIBITS
ANYONE FROM TRANSFERRING ASSETS EXCEPT VIA THE UN. THIS IS AN
IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH GUARANTEES UN SUPERVISION
OF ANY UNFROZEN ASSETS. IT WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM TO
ACCEPT RESOLUTIONS 706 AND 712 AND DEMONSTRATE THAT THE UN GRIP IS
GETTING TIGHTER.

THE PROVISION WOULD NOT PREVENT FUNDS FROM BEING USED FOR
HUMANITARIAN AID; ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD ENSURE THAT THEY COULD
ONLY BE USED FOR HUMANITARIAN AID, SINCE THE UN WOULD MONITOR THEIR
USE. MOREOVER, THE RESOLUTION MAKES NEW SOURCES OF FUNDING
AVAILABLE FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. IT WILL ALSO PROHIBIT THE BANK
OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT FROM RELEASING \$300 MILLION TO IRAQ, AS
IT IS BEING PRESSURED TO DO.

WE KNOW WE CANNOT RELY ON SADDAM'S GOOD WILL TO ENSURE UNFROZEN
ASSETS ARE USED TO HELP THOSE -- ESPECIALLY THE KURDS AND SHIA
-- WHO NEED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ. ONLY THE UN CAN DO
SO. ASSETS RELEASED TO IRAQ BY OTHER COUNTRIES, PRIVATE UNFROZEN
HARD CURRENCY ACCOUNTS, AND FUTURE OIL DELIVERIES HAVE ALL BEEN
USED BY IRAQ TO SECURE IMPORTANT FINANCING SINCE THE GULF WAR.
GOODS IMPORTED HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO SADDAM'S CRONIES AND
VULNERABLE GROUPS HAVE BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN
GOODS. RECENT REPORTS FROM BULGARIA REGARDING ARMS SHIPMENTS AND
EARLIER REPORTS FROM JORDAN ON ILLEGAL GOODS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
CLEARLY INDICATE IRAQ'S COVERT PROCUREMENT NETWORKS ARE STILL
OPERATIONAL.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-07-74-MR
SCS 4/2/13

-
PRESIDENT BUSH BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT THIS PROVISION IS AN
IMPORTANT PART OF THE RESOLUTION, AND WILL CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO
OUR COMMON GOALS OF ENSURING HUMANITARIAN AID TO IRAQ, ENFORCING
SANCTIONS, AND FUNDING UN OPERATIONS. THE BRITISH AGREE THAT THIS
PROVISION IS VITAL. I URGE YOU TO SEEK A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM
YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT WILL ALLOW US TO MOVE THE RESOLUTION TO A VOTE
IN THE COUNCIL THIS MONTH. WE HAVE SEIZED THE INITIATIVE FROM
SADDAM BY OUR ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF RESOLUTIONS 687 AND 688. THIS
RESOLUTION IS THE BEST WAY TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM NOW.
-

SINCERELY,

BRENT

-
END TEXT
-

DECL: OADR

#0008

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0008 <TOP> 920911215110 MSG000337557070

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SIT: HOTLINE_OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 120050Z SEP 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

-
THIS MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL FOR TRANSMISSION
PURPOSES ONLY. THE ACTUAL MESSAGE TEXT IS UNCLASSIFIED.

-
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH.

-
BEGIN TEXT:

-
DEAR FRANCOIS,

-
I WAS CONCERNED TO LEARN THAT YOU HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION.
BARBARA JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR WARMEST WISHES FOR A RAPID AND
COMPLETE RECOVERY. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE THE VERY BEST MEDICAL
SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO YOU IN FRANCE, BUT IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE
CAN DO TO BE HELPFUL PLEASE LET ME KNOW. I HAVE THE GREATEST
RESPECT FOR YOU AND THE CONTRIBUTION YOU HAVE MADE AND WILL
CONTINUE TO MAKE TO FRANCE AND THE WORLD. MY THOUGHTS ARE WITH
YOU.

-
SINCERELY,

-
GEORGE BUSH

-
END TEXT

#0027

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0027 <TOR> 920911225427 MSG000337560867

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 05/09/2011

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 211644Z SEP 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I WANT TO OFFER MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS ON THE RESULTS OF
SUNDAY'S VOTE. I AM SURE IT WAS CLOSER THAN YOU WOULD HAVE
PREFERRED, BUT WHAT COUNTS IS THAT A MAJORITY VOTED FOR THE
MAASTRICHT TREATY. I KNOW HOW IMPORTANT THE RESULTS WILL BE FOR
FRANCE AND EUROPE, AND THUS FOR US. AS I WROTE YOU RECENTLY, THE
UNITED STATES SUPPORTS EUROPE IN ITS DESIRE FOR POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. THIS HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE A
BIPARTISAN POLICY HERE, AND I REMAIN COMMITTED TO IT.

I HAVE ALSO BEEN CONCERNED SINCE YOUR OPERATION AND ESPECIALLY
SINCE I HEARD ABOUT THE CONDITION YOUR DOCTORS DISCOVERED. YOU
HAVE MY EVERY WISH FOR A SPEEDY RECOVERY AND SUCCESSFUL FOLLOW-UP
TREATMENT. I WAS RELIEVED TO READ THAT YOUR DOCTORS BELIEVE THIS
WILL NOT AFFECT YOUR LONG-TERM HEALTH OR YOUR DAILY ACTIVITIES. IF
THERE IS ANYTHING AT ALL I CAN DO, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

WITH MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES,
SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR
#0050

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0050 <TOR> 920921130603 MSG000338389563

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 05/09/2011

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
89. Cable	Re: Message to General Quesnot from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	10/5/92	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed: 2/10/2009	OA/ID Number: 91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 061253Z OCT 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

THIS TRANSMISSION IS CLASSIFIED TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF
PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

•
OCTOBER 06, 1992

•
BEGIN TEXT:

•
DEAR FRANCOIS,

•
I AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT YOU HAVE SO QUICKLY RESUMED AN ACTIVE
SCHEDULE. THESE ARE IMPORTANT DAYS FOR EUROPE, AND YOUR LEADERSHIP
IS NEEDED.

•
I WANTED TO GET BACK TO YOU ON THE URUGUAY ROUND. FROM MY
PERSPECTIVE, U.S.-EC ACCORD ON THE ROUND IS REQUIRED MORE THAN EVER
TO RESTORE AND INVIGORATE MARKET AND BUSINESS CONFIDENCE. THE
TRADE EXPANSION RESULTING FROM AN AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO SPUR THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY WE SEEK ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC AS WELL AS
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. FINALLY, WE MADE A PLEDGE IN MUNICH TO
REACH AN OVERALL URUGUAY ROUND ACCORD BY THE END OF THE YEAR. I AM
READY TO WORK FOR THAT GOAL.

•
IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT THE U.S. AND THE EC ARE NOT FAR APART ON
THE ROUND ISSUES. CERTAINLY, THERE ARE GAPS TO BRIDGE, BUT I AM
PREPARED TO MAKE A DRIVE TOWARD REACHING BROAD U.S.-EC AGREEMENT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE WILL NEGOTIATE AS INTENSELY AS NEEDED AND
IRRESPECTIVE OF OUR POLITICAL CALENDARS TO REACH AN OVERALL GATT
ACCORD BY YEAR'S END. WE SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE SOME
BILATERAL U.S.-EC DISPUTES, SUCH AS OILSEEDS, IN THIS CONTEXT.

•
I WANT TO BE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR NEEDS. IN MUNICH, YOU STRESSED THE
NEED FOR U.S.-EC TALKS TO FOCUS ON SERVICES AND INDUSTRY AS WELL AS
AGRICULTURE. I HAVE TAKEN YOUR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR
APPROACH. WE AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE MOVEMENT IN ALL SECTORS,
AND ARE READY TO WORK TO THAT END. INDEED, IN RECENT DAYS, WE HAVE
UNDERTAKEN A CONCERTED EFFORT, INCLUDING ORGANIZING A SPECIAL G-7
MEETING, TO FORGE A COMMON APPROACH TO FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE
TRADE ROUND. THIS IS A VITAL AREA OF FUTURE GROWTH FOR FRANCE AND
THE UNITED STATES. WE WILL STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH THE EC
TO GET THE BEST RESULTS POSSIBLE FOR THIS SECTOR IN THE GATT TALKS.

•
YOUR SEPTEMBER LETTER MADE CLEAR YOUR UNHAPPINESS WITH OUR
INTENTION TO INCREASE THE EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM (EEP). LET ME
UNDERLINE THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN NO WAY INDICATES A CHANGE IN MY
DESIRE AND WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES AS PART OF
A SUCCESSFUL URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT. NOR DOES THE ANNOUNCEMENT
REPRESENT AN INCREASE IN THE EEP PROGRAM BUT RATHER A BUNDLING OF
ANNOUNCEMENTS THAT IN PAST YEARS HAVE BEEN MADE SEPARATELY. IN ANY
CASE, THE SOLUTION, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS TO BRIDGE OUR DIFFERENCES ON

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AGRICULTURE SOON WITH A BALANCED AND FAIR AGREEMENT, AS YOU WROTE ME. THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO CUT SUPPORTS TOO AS PART OF AN ACCORD.

WE EACH HAVE OUR PARTICULAR DOMESTIC CONCERNS. BUT WE ALSO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A DECISIVE DISPLAY OF LEADERSHIP BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES THAT WOULD BRING GREAT ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND WOULD SHOW THE WORLD WHAT THE EC AND THE U.S. CAN DO AS PARTNERS. YOU AND I HAVE ALWAYS FOUND A WAY TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES SO THAT FRANCE AND THE U.S. CAN ACT AS PARTNERS. THIS IS SUCH A TIME. OUR INDUSTRY, OUR FARMERS AND OUR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE AMONG THE MOST COMPETITIVE IN THE WORLD. WE OWE IT TO THEM TO OPEN FOREIGN MARKETS AND TO UNLOCK THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE URUGUAY ROUND.

WITH MY PERSONAL BEST REGARDS,
SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0113

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0113 <TOR> 921006101707 MSG000339675427

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 150134Z OCT 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I HAVE WRITTEN TO THE OTHER EC LEADERS TO URGE THAT EVERY EFFORT BE
MADE TO SETTLE THE FEW REMAINING ISSUES SO THE WORLD CAN HAVE A NEW
TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE ECONOMIC LIFT THAT WOULD BRING. BUT I FELT
A MORE PERSONAL LETTER TO YOU WAS FITTING BECAUSE OF OUR LONG
FRIENDSHIP AND WHAT I AM TOLD IS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S
HESITATION.

I RECALL VERY WELL ALL YOU HAVE SAID TO ME ABOUT THE URUGUAY ROUND.
YOU WANTED TO BE SATISFIED THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS BALANCED AND FAIR,
BOTH IN BENEFITS AND IN SACRIFICES. I WANT TO BE SURE THAT YOU
KNOW HOW FAR WE HAVE COME TO MEET YOUR NEEDS. YOU WANTED MOVEMENT
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND OTHER AREAS IMPORTANT TO THE FRENCH
ECONOMY, AND WE HAVE DELIVERED THIS. YOU SAID YOU HAD A MAJOR
PROBLEM WITH DUNKEL'S PROPOSAL ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES, AND WE HAVE NOW
MADE AN OFFER THAT IS LESS DEMANDING THAN DUNKEL. THE EC AS A
WHOLE WANTED ITS NEW CAP REFORM PAYMENTS SPARED IN A NEW GATT
AGREEMENT, AND WE HAVE MADE GOOD ON THAT. AND OF COURSE, YOU
WANTED TO PUT OFF FINAL NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 20 SO
THAT THEY WOULD NOT IMPERIL THE CRITICAL MAASTRICHT REFERENDUM, AND
WE HONORED THAT REQUEST. NOT ONLY HAVE WE GONE AS FAR AS WE CAN
WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF A NEW AGREEMENT
HERE, BUT WE HAVE ADDRESSED EVERY MAJOR EUROPEAN CONCERN. AND, I
THINK YOU WILL FIND THAT YOUR BASIC CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET.

THE WORLD IS WAITING FOR EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES TO LEAD THE
WAY TO A NEW TRADE AGREEMENT, AS WE PROMISED WE WOULD. THE POOR
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DESPERATELY NEED THIS AGREEMENT. OUR OWN
ECONOMIES CONTINUE TO LANGUISH; A NEW TRADE AGREEMENT WOULD GET US
ALL MOVING AGAIN. FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
NEED A STRONG SIGNAL FROM THE WORLD'S LEADERS. WE HAVE AT HAND AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO MUCH FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, I FEAR WE WILL NOT
BE FORGIVEN IF WE LET IT SLIP THROUGH OUR HANDS.

YOU MAY BELIEVE THAT FURTHER DELAY IS ACCEPTABLE, EVEN WISE. IF
SO, I WOULD HAVE TO DISAGREE. FURTHER DELAY COULD HAVE SEVERE
CONSEQUENCES. IT COULD LEAD US TOWARD A WORLD NONE OF US WANT, IN
WHICH AN ESCALATING TRADE CONFLICT COMBINED WITH A COLLAPSE OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND WOULD DO SEVERE DAMAGE NOT ONLY TO WORLD TRADE BUT TO
OUR ECONOMIES. THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE MAY NOT BE IDEAL FOR
A NEW TRADE AGREEMENT, BUT IT WILL CLEARLY NOT GET BETTER AND COULD
WELL GET WORSE. A EUROPEAN-AMERICAN AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN
BRINGING THE URUGUAY ROUND TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION WOULD

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GIVE THE WORLD RENEWED CONFIDENCE AND UNDERSCORE THE CRITICAL
LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE EC.

WE HAVE TACKLED MANY PROBLEMS TOGETHER, AND I PLACE GREAT VALUE ON
OUR RELATIONSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN AN ADEQUATE
SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR DIRECT AND FRANK COMMUNICATIONS. I HAVE TRIED
MY BEST TO APPRECIATE AND ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS. ABOVE ALL, I
WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

#0164

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0164 <TOR> 921014214350 MSG000340407830

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 150149Z OCT 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

I HAVE WRITTEN TO THE OTHER EC LEADERS TO URGE THAT EVERY EFFORT BE
MADE TO SETTLE THE FEW REMAINING ISSUES SO THE WORLD CAN HAVE A NEW
TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE ECONOMIC LIFT THAT WOULD BRING. BUT I FELT
A MORE PERSONAL LETTER TO YOU WAS FITTING BECAUSE OF OUR LONG
FRIENDSHIP AND WHAT I AM TOLD IS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S
HESITATION.

I RECALL VERY WELL ALL YOU HAVE SAID TO ME ABOUT THE URUGUAY ROUND.
YOU WANTED TO BE SATISFIED THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS BALANCED AND FAIR,
BOTH IN BENEFITS AND IN SACRIFICES. I WANT TO BE SURE THAT YOU
KNOW HOW FAR WE HAVE COME TO MEET YOUR NEEDS. YOU WANTED MOVEMENT
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES AND OTHER AREAS IMPORTANT TO THE FRENCH
ECONOMY, AND WE HAVE DELIVERED THIS. YOU SAID YOU HAD A MAJOR
PROBLEM WITH DUNKEL'S PROPOSAL ON EXPORT SUBSIDIES, AND WE HAVE NOW
MADE AN OFFER THAT IS LESS DEMANDING THAN DUNKEL. THE EC AS A
WHOLE WANTED ITS NEW CAP REFORM PAYMENTS SPARED IN A NEW GATT
AGREEMENT, AND WE HAVE MADE GOOD ON THAT. AND OF COURSE, YOU
WANTED TO PUT OFF FINAL NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 20 SO
THAT THEY WOULD NOT IMPERIL THE CRITICAL MAASTRICHT REFERENDUM, AND
WE HONORED THAT REQUEST. NOT ONLY HAVE WE GONE AS FAR AS WE CAN
WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF A NEW AGREEMENT
HERE, BUT WE HAVE ADDRESSED EVERY MAJOR EUROPEAN CONCERN. AND, I
THINK YOU WILL FIND THAT YOUR BASIC CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET.

THE WORLD IS WAITING FOR EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES TO LEAD THE
WAY TO A NEW TRADE AGREEMENT, AS WE PROMISED WE WOULD. THE POOR
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DESPERATELY NEED THIS AGREEMENT. OUR OWN
ECONOMIES CONTINUE TO LANGUISH; A NEW TRADE AGREEMENT WOULD GET US
ALL MOVING AGAIN. FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
NEED A STRONG SIGNAL FROM THE WORLD'S LEADERS. WE HAVE AT HAND AN
OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO MUCH FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, I FEAR WE WILL NOT
BE FORGIVEN IF WE LET IT SLIP THROUGH OUR HANDS.

YOU MAY BELIEVE THAT FURTHER DELAY IS ACCEPTABLE, EVEN WISE. IF
SO, I WOULD HAVE TO DISAGREE. FURTHER DELAY COULD HAVE SEVERE
CONSEQUENCES. IT COULD LEAD US TOWARD A WORLD NONE OF US WANT, IN
WHICH AN ESCALATING TRADE CONFLICT COMBINED WITH A COLLAPSE OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND WOULD DO SEVERE DAMAGE NOT ONLY TO WORLD TRADE BUT TO
OUR ECONOMIES. THE CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE MAY NOT BE IDEAL FOR
A NEW TRADE AGREEMENT, BUT IT WILL CLEARLY NOT GET BETTER AND COULD
WELL GET WORSE. A EUROPEAN-AMERICAN AGREEMENT TO TAKE THE LEAD IN
BRINGING THE URUGUAY ROUND TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION WOULD

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0774-MR
SCS 4/2/13

GIVE THE WORLD RENEWED CONFIDENCE AND UNDERScore THE CRITICAL
LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE EC.

WE HAVE TACKLED MANY PROBLEMS TOGETHER, AND I PLACE GREAT VALUE ON
OUR RELATIONSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN AN ADEQUATE
SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR DIRECT AND FRANK COMMUNICATIONS. I HAVE TRIED
MY BEST TO APPRECIATE AND ADDRESS YOUR CONCERNS. ABOVE ALL, I
WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

#0165

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0165 <TOR> 921014214633 MSG000340407993

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YELADA <DTG> 022221Z NOV 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

•
BEGIN TEXT:

•
DEAR FRANCOIS,

•
THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR WARM MESSAGE. I FEEL JUST AS STRONGLY
AS YOU ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP AND OF OUR
PARTNERSHIP DURING THE MOMENTOUS TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE WORLD WHICH
WE HAVE HELPED TO SHAPE.

•
BARBARA AND I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR KIND SENTIMENT AT THIS
CHALLENGING MOMENT. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S VOTE, I
WILL HIGHLY VALUE OUR CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP AND WHAT WE, WORKING
WITH THE OTHER LEADERS OF THE FREE WORLD, HAVE ACCOMPLISHED
TOGETHER. FRANCO-AMERICAN COOPERATION WILL REMAIN VITAL IF WE ARE
TO SURMOUNT SUCCESSFULLY THE CHALLENGES OF THIS NEW ERA. I WILL
REMAIN DEDICATED TO THAT OBJECTIVE.

•
BARBARA ALSO JOINS ME IN SENDING AGAIN OUR WARMEST WISHES FOR YOUR
COMPLETE AND SPEEDY RECOVERY TO FULL HEALTH.

•
SINCERELY,

•
GEORGE BUSH

•
END TEXT

#0064

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0064 <TOR> 921102172552 MSG000342033952

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PER E.O. 13526
2009-0774-MR
SCS 4/2/13

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 051412Z NOV 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS
QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE
NOVEMBER 4, 1992

DEAR FRANCOIS:

THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF UNDERSTANDING AND
FRIENDSHIP. THE SUN HAS SET ON MY PUBLIC LIFE, A LIFE IN WHICH I
ENJOYED WORKING WITH YOU SO CLOSELY. AHEAD LIES A PRIVATE LIFE.
IN THAT ONE, I WILL BE FOLLOWING YOUR WORK, ALWAYS WISHING YOU
WELL AND LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AT SOME TIME DOWN THE
ROAD.

THIS COMES TO YOU WITH MY THANKS AND MY RESPECT AND WITH A
FRIENDSHIP THAT I WILL ALWAYS TREASURE.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0073

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0073 <TOR> 921105093514 MSG000342264914

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 05/09/2011

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

Q000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND,
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS WE ARE ALL AWARE, THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1991 AND THE EMERGENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA DURING THE PAST YEAR HAVE HAD PROFOUND AND POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL OF OUR COUNTRIES. WE AGREED IN MUNICH THAT THE SUCCESS OF REFORM IN RUSSIA IS AMONG OUR MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS DECADE AND INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, AND THAT WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP THOSE REFORM EFFORTS SUCCEED. AFTER HAVING SPOKEN WITH BORIS YELTSIN TWICE DURING THE LAST TEN DAYS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA, I BELIEVE WE MUST ALL NOW UNITE TO SUPPORT YELTSIN AND THE FORCES OF REFORM IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

BORIS YELTSIN TOLD ME THAT THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES SESSION ON DECEMBER 1 IS AN ATTEMPT BY THOSE WHO LOST POWER LAST YEAR TO GAIN IT BACK AND TO ALTER THE COURSE OF REFORM IN RUSSIA. HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES FIND A WAY TO DEMONSTRATE PUBLICLY AND TANGIBLY OUR SUPPORT FOR YEGOR GAYDAR'S ECONOMIC REFORMS BEFORE THE CONGRESS BEGINS ON DECEMBER 1.

I INTEND TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO ALL CONCERNED THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS UNEQUIVOCALLY THE REFORM GOVERNMENT IN MOSCOW. I BELIEVE IT WILL ALSO BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR ALL OF US TO EXPRESS THIS SUPPORT IN CONCRETE TERMS. THE BEST WAY FOR US TO DO SO NOW IS TO HONOR THE COMMITMENT WE MADE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT MUNICH TO CONCLUDE A PARIS CLUB DEBT RESCHEDULING FOR RUSSIA. I THINK IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE DO SO IMMEDIATELY. THIS WOULD PROVIDE, BEFORE THE CONGRESS CONVENES, A STRONG SIGNAL OF SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY.

I BELIEVE G-7 FINANCE MINISTERS ARE MAKING SOME PROGRESS TOWARD A RESCHEDULING. TWO MAJOR ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, MUST STILL BE RESOLVED. FIRST, WE MUST AGREE ON A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESCHEDULING THAT ACCOMMODATES THE INTERESTS OF BOTH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE. BUT LET ME NOTE THAT I BELIEVE IT'S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR US TO ENGAGE IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ON OWNERSHIP OF FOREIGN ASSETS. THERE ARE VERY FEW LIQUID ASSETS THAT WOULD ASSIST THE DEBT PAYMENT PROBLEM. THE WEST NEEDS UKRAINE'S SUPPORT FOR START AND NPT RATIFICATION. CHOOSING SIDES IN THE DEBATE OVER ASSETS COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE OUR DEALINGS ON THESE ISSUES WITH UKRAINE. I ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE VISIT THIS WEEK TO KIEV BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARIS CLUB, MR. JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET, TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE, BUT I THINK WE ALSO NEED TO

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2009-0774-MR

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BE OPEN MINDED AND CREATIVE ABOUT APPROACHES THAT ALLOW DEBT RESCHEDULING TO GO FORWARD WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE TO BE FINALLY RESOLVED.

• SECOND, THERE ARE DIFFERENCES AMONG US ON THE TERMS OF THE RESCHEDULING. WE HAVE PROMISED PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT THE RESCHEDULING SHOULD PROVIDE REAL AND MEANINGFUL BREATHING SPACE TO MANAGE RUSSIA'S DEBT OBLIGATIONS. WE MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY GENEROUS TO PERMIT RUSSIA TO HONOR ITS COMMITMENTS, TRULY CONSISTENT WITH A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF ITS CAPACITY TO REPAY, AND TO FINANCE ITS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN 1993. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS NOT AN EASY STEP FOR YOUR COUNTRY OR MINE, BUT I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO A VERY GENEROUS RESCHEDULING.

• AT THIS CRITICAL TIME FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND THE REFORM PROCESS IN RUSSIA, I BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY THAT WE MUST FOCUS ON THE URGENT ACTIONS WE NEED TO TAKE TO ACHIEVE THE LONG-TERM BENEFITS TO THE WEST OF A CONTINUATION OF THE REFORM PROCESS IN RUSSIA. SHOULD REFORM BE DEFEATED, THE RESULT WOULD JEOPARDIZE MANY OF THE HISTORIC GAINS WE HAVE ACHIEVED DUE TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE MUST THEREFORE WORK TOGETHER TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE YELTSIN GOVERNMENT DURING THE MONTH AHEAD. I SUGGEST THAT EACH OF US INSTRUCT OUR RESPECTIVE FINANCE MINISTERS TO COMPLETE THE RESCHEDULING BY DECEMBER 1.

• WITH MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES,

• SINCERELY,

• GEORGE BUSH

• END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0102

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0102 <TOR> 921111022206 MSG000342757326

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 280437Z NOV 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

SINCE ACTING SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER WROTE TO HIS COLLEAGUES ON
NOVEMBER 26, MY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE
UNITED NATIONS REGARDING THE TRAGEDY UNFOLDING IN SOMALIA. AS
YOU NO DOUBT HAVE LEARNED, UN SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS
BOUTROS-GHALI IS GIVING CAREFUL THOUGHT TO HOW THE UN AND ITS
MEMBER STATES CAN BEST AMELIORATE THE SUFFERING OF THE SOMALI
PEOPLE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL PLANS TO
OUTLINE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS EARLY AS MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30
POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR FURTHER UN ACTION IN SOMALIA.

AS THE ACTING SECRETARY MADE CLEAR IN HIS PREVIOUS LETTER, THE
U.S. VIEWS THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AS EXTRAORDINARILY
COMPELLING. THE U.S. STANDS READY TO MAKE A MAJOR
CONTRIBUTION, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES,
TO AN EFFORT THAT WILL ENSURE THE DELIVERY OF FOOD AND
ESSENTIAL HUMANITARIAN SERVICES IN THE CRITICAL AREA OF STARVATION
IN SOUTH-CENTRAL SOMALIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH
YOU IN THIS EFFORT. YOUR LEADERSHIP WOULD MAKE A VITAL
CONTRIBUTION.

WE VIEW THE COOPERATIVE EFFORT AS OF RELATIVELY SHORT
DURATION. IT WOULD LEAD TO A MORE SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN
WHICH A TRADITIONAL UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE COULD SAFEGUARD THE
RELIEF EFFORT AND HELP THE SOMALIS RECONSTRUCT THEIR OWN CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION.

BEFORE DISCUSSING NEXT STEPS IN DETAIL, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT
WE SHOULD AWAIT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEWS. I WILL BE IN
TOUCH WITH YOU AS SOON AS WE HAVE REVIEWED THE SECRETARY
GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

#0010

<ECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0010 <TOP> 921128003944 MSG000344219984

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
1998-0101-F
11/23/98 MM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 141710Z DEC 92

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS:

AS I COME TO THE END OF MY ADMINISTRATION, I WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF
YOU WOULD CONSIDER ACCEPTING MY INVITATION TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO
MEET AGAIN FOR A VISIT. AS I MENTIONED WHEN WE TALKED LAST WEEK, I
HAVE IN MIND SPENDING SOME INFORMAL TIME WITH YOU AT CAMP DAVID. IF
YOU AGREE, I PROPOSE AN OVERNIGHT STAY FOR JANUARY 5, 11, OR, IF
THOSE TWO DATES ARE NOT POSSIBLE, JANUARY 18.

YOUR VISIT WILL GIVE US A CHANCE TO TAKE STOCK OF ALL THAT HAS
HAPPENED. I REMEMBER VIVIDLY THE DAY IN BOSTON IN MAY 1989 WHEN YOU
AND I RECEIVED HONORARY DEGREES. WE SPOKE THEN OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
WORKING TOGETHER, OF A STRONG AMERICA AND A STRONG EUROPE FORGING A
DURABLE PARTNERSHIP THAT WOULD GUIDE US FROM THE COLD WAR TO A NEW
ENVIRONMENT, ONE RICH WITH OPPORTUNITIES, YET STILL FRAUGHT WITH
PERIL.

SO MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE THEN: THE END TO THE DIVISION OF EUROPE
AND WITH THAT, THE END OF THE COLD WAR; THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET
UNION; AND THE VICTORY OF OUR COALITION IN LIBERATING KUWAIT. THAT
WE HAVE HAD OUR DIFFICULTIES AND DIFFERENCES WE ARE AWARE. BUT WE
HAVE NEVER FORGOTTEN THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE RECORD OF
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN MEETING THESE CHALLENGES.

I ALSO SEE THE VISIT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS THE
FUTURE OF TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS. WE MIGHT ALSO SPEND SOME TIME
DISCUSSING THE KEY GLOBAL CHALLENGES OUR COUNTRIES WILL FACE IN THE
YEARS TO COME.

I HOPE ONE OF THE DATES I HAVE SUGGESTED IS POSSIBLE FOR YOU. IF
YOU CAN ACCEPT MY INVITATION, PLEASE HAVE HUBERT VEDRINE OR JEAN
VIDAL GET IN TOUCH WITH BRENT SCOWCROFT TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS.
LET ME CLOSE BY WISHING YOU AND YOUR FAMILY THE BEST OF HOLIDAYS,
AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN JANUARY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

#0051

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0051 <TOR> 921214124832 MSG000345646112

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0774-MR
SCS 4/2/13

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> YEXXWHX <DTG> 011623Z JAN 93

<ORIG>FM WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO ELYSEE PALACE

<TEXT>ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS

QQQQ

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS -

THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. EITHER OF TWO ALTERNATIVES WOULD
BE FINE WITH ME.

I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO MEET YOU ON JANUARY 3RD IN PARIS.
BARBARA, JIM & SUSAN BAKER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT WILL BE WITH ME IN
MOSCOW AND WOULD BE FLYING WITH ME TO THE USA. I COULD ARRIVE PARIS
AT ABOUT 3:30 PM. THE ONLY PROBLEM IS THAT WE MUST LEAVE PARIS NO
LATER THAN 9 PM.

I WOULD ALSO BE DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE YOU AT CAMP DAVID ON
JAN 11TH, HOPING THAT YOU COULD ARRIVE CAMP DAVID ON SUNDAY THE 10TH
IN TIME FOR A VERY INFORMAL DINNER AND TO SPEND THE NIGHT. ON MONDAY
JAN 11TH WE COULD TALK AND YOU'D BE FREE TO LEAVE WHENEVER YOU
WISHED. IF THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT CONVENIENT, I WOULD, OF
COURSE, RECEIVE YOU WARMLY ON MONDAY, JAN 11TH RECOGNIZING
THAT YOU COULDN'T SPEND THE NIGHT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO EITHER OF THESE OPPORTUNITIES TO SEE
YOU. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHAT SUITS YOU BEST.

WITH MY PERSONAL BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

#0033

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0033 <TOR> 930101112957 MSG000347196597

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0774-MK
SCS 4/2/13

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
99. Cable	Re: Message to General Brent Scowcroft from General Quesnot (1 pp.)	1/6/93	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Presidential Correspondence Files
Subseries: Head of State Message Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: France (Outgoing) 1989 - 1993

Date Closed:	2/10/2009	OA/ID Number:	91114-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

