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2009-0166-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 90746
Folder ID Number: 90746-005

Folder Title:
Sunday, January 3, 1993

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Talking Points	Points to be made Meeting with President Boris Yeltsin (18 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 04]. (2 pp.)	11/24/1992	(b)(1)	S
03. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 05]. (2 pp.)	08/12/1992	(b)(1)	C
04. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 06]. (2 pp.)	09/02/1992	(b)(1)	C
05. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 07]. (2 pp.)	09/03/1992	(b)(1)	S
06. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 08]. (1 pp.)	09/12/1991	(b)(1)	C
07. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 09]. (1 pp.)	08/25/1989	(b)(1)	C
08. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia [originally closed as 11]. (3 pp.)	01/03/19	(b)(1)	
09. Memo	Lawrence Eagleburger to POTUS Thoughts on the Summit in Sochi [originally closed as 13]. (5 pp.)	12/30/1992	(b)(1)	S
10. Talking Points	Points to be made meeting with President Boris Yeltsin [originally closed as 14]. (9 pp.)	01/01/93	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Pinksheet Number: DJC3181
OA/ID Number: 90746-005
Date Closed: 9/26/2019
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
11. Schedule	Schedule of the President and Mrs. Bush for Moscow, Russia; redaction. (1 pp.)	01/2-3/93	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	
12. Schedule	Schedule of the President and Mrs. Bush for Moscow, Russia; redactions. (4 pp.)	01/2-3/93	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	
13. Diagram	Room diagram, Re: U.S. Ambassador's residence, Moscow, Russia. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	

Page 2 of 2

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daily 3 Jan
[1/3/93]

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your note and for passing along the letter from Mayor David Langston. I was pleased to learn about the City of Lubbock's efforts to bring a Department of Defense accounting facility to the community. It sounds like Lubbock officials have really done their homework.

I hope, however, that you will understand that White House Counsel advises me that it would be inappropriate for me to become personally involved in matters involving competition for Federal Government contract awards. I appreciate your understanding the importance of maintaining this policy.

Best wishes for a happy and rewarding 1993.

Sincerely,

Mr. Robert W. Blake
Post Office Box 2584
Lubbock, Texas 79408

Cleared
- Counsel
- PB
to POTUS

POTUS
signature

Platinum
system
entered
Jul 2
when robots
go out
was pit'd
Jan 3

Jan 3 93

Mr. Robert W. Blake
Post Office Box 2584
Lubbock, Texas 79408

Phone (806) 762-8044

1112 First National Bank Bldg.

Robert W. Blake

Box 3334

Lubbock, Texas 79408

December 21, 1992

President George Bush

The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

The fax from Lubbock Mayor David Langston will give you a short brief of what Lubbock is trying to do regarding their attempt to get the 4500 employee Department of Defense accounting project.

The City of Lubbock has met most of the criteria for obtaining this project and Lubbock is the only city in Texas on the short list. All of Texas is rooting for us. The Secretary of Defense will have a preference before the new administration takes over.

Thanks for all of your help. Have a very merry Christmas and love to all the family.

Sincerely,

Bob Blake

Bob

RWB/km



DAVID R. LANGSTON
MAYOR

CITY OF LUBBOCK
LUBBOCK, TEXAS

December 22, 1992

Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As Mayor of the City of Lubbock, Texas, it is my honor and privilege to recommend the location of one of the regional Department of Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) centers, now under consideration by the Department of Defense, to our city. We were recently notified that Lubbock was among the twenty remaining cities under consideration, and the only Texas city on the short list. A site selection team visited here on December 10, 1992. Our "best and final" proposal will be delivered to DOD on January 4, 1993, and we are to be notified by March 16 as to whether we are one of the sites selected.

The Lubbock proposal seeks the location of one of the 4,500 employee sites and offers approximately \$60 million worth of incentives in the form of prime office, meeting, recreation, child care, and other multi-purpose, fully furnished, building space. All of the space will be new construction located on a 65 acre tract of land on north University Avenue. Our package covers all of the mandatory items requested in the DOD Opportunity for Economic Growth and most of the preferred items as well. This city package will be financed by revenue bonds serviced by the passage of a 1/2 cent sales tax. The election for the sales tax has been called by the City Council for January 16.

In addition to the incentives being offered by the City, the entire Lubbock community has joined together to offer a multitude of proposals from the private sector that will enhance the benefits to the Defense Department if Lubbock is selected as a site. For example, the final offer will include a joint service contract between Lubbock Power & Light and Southwestern Public Service Company that includes \$300,000.00 worth of savings for electric service, the latest telecommunications system from Southwestern Bell Telephone, a special health care package from University Medical Center, job training and degree programs offered by Texas Tech University, Lubbock Christian University, and South Plains College, and other attractive proposals from the financial community and others in the private sector.

Honorable George Bush
Page 2


In a final effort to reduce costs to the Defense Department, I traveled to Austin last week and was able to secure a commitment from the Texas Department of Commerce for \$2.5 to \$3.0 million in job training funds to assist in training the estimated 4,000 new employees who will be hired at the facility.

Needless to say, we think the possible location of one of the DFAS facilities to Lubbock is a tremendous economic development opportunity for us. It will provide jobs for many who are now under-employed or unemployed in our community. It would allow us to stem the out migration from West Texas which has occurred in recent decades because there simply have not been sufficient opportunities for our high school and college graduates. This facility would also enable Lubbock to fully utilize infrastructure which is already in place. The site for the facility has been placed in north Lubbock to encourage development and redevelopment efforts in the north and east quadrants of our city where street, sewer and drainage improvements are already in place, but are under-utilized. We recently opened I-27 through the City, and construction on a \$280 million East-West Expressway will begin in early 1993. Our International airport is ready to triple or quadruple the number of flights without further expansion. Our water supply and treatment facilities are currently being improved in order for us to handle our future development needs for the next 20 to 30 years. Lubbock is ready for the growth which such a federal facility would entail.

Of course, you are familiar with the type of quality of life that Lubbock has to offer its citizens. We have a low cost of living which includes excellent housing, low utility rates, and low property taxes. The site which has been selected will be accessible to employees, no matter where they choose to reside in the City, with no more than a 15 minute commuting time by automobile. The airport is only a seven minute drive from the facility. We have excellent schools, high quality parks, and a variety of cultural, entertainment and recreation opportunities.

We believe all of these factors combine to make Lubbock the ideal choice for one of the DFAS regional centers. We certainly appreciate all of the wonderful things you have done for Lubbock in the past and we would appreciate any assistance you can provide in securing one of these facilities for our City.

Respectfully,



David R. Langston
Mayor

FIRST NATIONAL BANK AT LUBBOCK
P. O. BOX 1241
LUBBOCK, TX 79408

806/765-8861

FAX #806/747-8107

FAX TRANSMISSION SHEET

TRANSMITTING INSTRUCTIONS:

Date: 1/8/93

Number of Sheets (including transmittal sheet): 4

TO:

Robin McLean
The White House

ATTN:

FROM:

Bob BLAKE
Lubbock TX

PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT? Yes X No

IF YES, PLEASE CALL _____ AT _____

MESSAGE:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Appeal Case #:

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Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

PRESIDENT BUSH

JANUARY 3rd, 19 93

	TIME		NAME	ACTION
	PLACED	DISC		
OUT	AM		NO CALLS	
INC	PM			
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daily

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM
SIGNAL SWITCHBOARD

[illegible]

2. 11

DATE 3 January 1993

MOVEMENTS

[illegible]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ^{1/3}MEETING WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

DATE: January 3, 1993

LOCATION: Elysee Palace, Paris

TIME: 5:00 - 6:15pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT I. PURPOSE

To reassure Mitterrand on the U.S. role in Europe and to reach a common understanding on the Yugoslav crisis, on concluding rapidly a GATT agreement and on responding to developments in Iraq, the Middle East, Russia and Somalia.

OBJECTIVES

- To underscore the fundamentals that tie France, the U.S. and Europe as partners despite the end of the Cold War and progress toward European Unity.
- To warn against a self-fulfilling French prophecy that the Clinton administration will not maintain the U.S. role in Europe.
- To reach understanding of the tremendous benefits for France, the United States and the world from a successful Uruguay Round.
- To ensure that France is with us on drawing clear and firm lines for the Serbs in the Yugoslav crisis.
- To suggest French participation if further action is required in response to Iraqi no-fly zone violations.

II. BACKGROUND

Domestic Affairs: Mitterrand's health has recovered somewhat from his prostate cancer treatment. (He even made a private Christmas trip to Turkey.) However, Mitterrand still has a reduced schedule and now makes many decisions by memo rather than in meetings. His longer-term prognosis is unclear, with some reports still saying he may not be able to serve out his term until 1995. Domestically, Mitterrand remains unpopular in the polls. His scandal-tarnished Socialists are even more unpopular. Every public opinion survey predicts that the center-right will win a majority in the March parliamentary elections. While Mitterrand is not pleased with the prospect of another "cohabitation" with the

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By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21

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center-right, he probably believes he can exploit differences among Chirac, Giscard, Balladur and others to retain the initiative and give a socialist a shot to replace him as president.

One current French concern is the unyielding speculative pressure on the franc. Despite good economic fundamentals, the franc is at the bottom of its agreed exchange-rate band in relation to the German mark. A strong franc has been the cornerstone of French economic policy, and Paris does not want to be forced to devalue, especially close to an election. While the Germans have intervened in currency markets to support the franc, they have not been willing to lower interest rates as the French have privately requested.

Uruguay Round: Domestic politics drives France's persistent efforts to slow progress toward a Uruguay Round agreement. Prime Minister Beregovoy and others are particularly adamant that there should not be a GATT agreement before the March elections and are upset that we and others keep pushing. Mitterrand is reportedly more open to an agreement as long as it is "balanced" overall and can be sold as clearly benefiting France. But he has, nevertheless, put Dumas out front in a French campaign to vilify the November 20 U.S.-EC "Blair House" accord on agriculture and to slow progress in Geneva. In the process, the French are accusing us of shifting positions on industrial tariffs, intellectual property, anti-dumping, standards and the Multilateral Trade Organization.

While Mitterrand will not feel he can yield on agriculture, he will be interested in your reassurance that we want progress on other issues, and he may be flexible about focussing on the tremendous gains that an overall GATT accord can bring and the need to explain that publicly. If you and he could indicate to the press your broad agreement on the value of concluding the Round, it might inhibit French trouble-making in the weeks ahead. Moreover, any positive signal about the Round as a whole coming out of your Paris visit will help create a climate in which Mitterrand can justify French acceptance of sacrifice in agriculture in return for a beneficial overall deal.

Bilateral Relations, the U.S. Role in Europe and Security Architecture: There has been progress here. Just before Christmas, NATO blessed a special arrangement for the "Eurocorps" to serve under SACEUR for common defense and potentially for other Alliance missions. In the process, Mitterrand authorized expanded French participation in NATO's Military Committee. Serious problems remain, however. The French still want to diminish the integrated military command and to enhance Europe's independent defense capability. Related to this, the French continue to obstruct efforts to organize NATO's peacekeeping role.

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Rather than dwelling on the problems, however, you can welcome the progress made toward reconciling European defense cooperation with a renewed NATO. You should also tell Mitterrand that the end of your administration does not mark the beginning of the end of the U.S. role in Europe. Mitterrand has repeatedly said that the U.S. would slip toward isolationism once George Bush was no longer President. He has used this argument to press vigorously for a European defense capability. While not speaking for the new administration, you can share your judgement that America is not headed in that direction and suggest that it would be counter-productive, if not self-fulfilling, to treat the new administration as if it intended to lessen the U.S. role in Europe.

Yugoslavia: Mitterrand has reportedly shifted his views significantly in recent weeks toward the need for military intervention in Bosnia. He apparently now shares our belief that the Serbs are to blame for the deteriorating situation and markers must be set to restrain them. However, he reportedly remains concerned that the historic ties between Russia and Serbia could push Russia to side with Serbia if the West tries to use more force. He will want to hear what Yeltsin had to say on this.

Paris also remains concerned with the security of its troops on the ground in Bosnia from retaliation. This affects their approach to enforcement of the no-fly zone. With the UK, the French continue to argue for a delay in implementation following a new resolution to allow them to reinforce their troops on the ground. They also want the UN SYG to have the ability to stop or suspend the enforcement operation -- something that Boutros Ghali himself does not want; we want that power limited to the Security Council. The French are also promoting the idea of establishing a UN demilitarized zone around Sarajevo. Dumas raised this with Boutros Ghali, who was reportedly reserved. If raised, you can ask where the UN will get the additional troops.

On Kosovo, the French agreed in principle with our demarche but felt we were too bold in our threats. Mitterrand may ask what you meant by "employ military force." You need not go beyond saying that we could use air power against Serbian targets of value.

Russia, the Ukraine, START and Nuclear Testing: Mitterrand will be interested in your impressions of Yeltsin and his standing. He will be concerned about the implications of the START II treaty for France's nuclear forces. In a possible reaction to the treaty accord, France announced that it is considering extending its suspension of nuclear testing, which expired Thursday. In that connection, Secretary Eagleburger informed Dumas recently that we were not interested in a French proposal for five-power talks on nuclear testing in Geneva. Paris also remains very concerned about Ukrainian ratification of the START and have

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asked to participate in our efforts to provide security assurances to the Ukrainians. We have limited countries involved in this effort to co-depositaries of the NPT: U.S., UK, and Russia, and believe that French involvement would raise concerns among others of special status for the four nuclear powers. You can reassure Mitterrand by briefing him on your December 24 phone conversation with Kravchuk.

Somalia: You can thank Mitterrand for his decision to send 2,000 troops to Somalia, which came despite protests from the French military that is feeling the pinch of many peace-keeping operations. Mitterrand will want to hear your impressions and sense of the steps ahead.

The Middle East Peace Process and the Deportees: The French remain engaged in the Middle East and looking for a role. They have proposed a European role in the bilateral talks (in addition to the multilateral talks) and unsuccessfully tried to arrange an Asad-Rabin meeting. In November, Mitterrand visited Israel and Jordan and raised the possibility of a \$1 billion EC regional development package as part of a peace settlement. Paris has also been very active on the deportee impasse, suggesting for example that they be turned over to UNIFIL authority in Lebanon (which President Hariri rejected). Dumas met with Arafat earlier this week in Geneva, where the PLO leader warned that if the impasse is not resolved it will scuttle the peace process.

Iraq: We have been working well with the French on the Kurdish situation and on the no-fly zone. However, you should take this opportunity to gain Mitterrand's agreement in principle to French participation should we need to retaliate for further Iraqi violations.

CWC: The Chemical Weapons Convention will be signed January 13 in Paris. You can thank Mitterrand for his invitation to attend, but explain that given the approach of our transition, you felt it better not to take a second trip.

China and Taiwan: The PRC has ordered France to close its consulate in Guangzhou in response to the sale of 50 Mirage jets to Taiwan. The French rue what they perceive as Beijing's double standard given the relatively muted reaction to our F-16 sales. In a separate matter, we are negotiating an agreement with the French that would allow them to put French nuclear sales to Taiwan under the U.S.-Taiwan-IAEA safeguards agreement. Talks are hung-up over our desire for commitments on French financing arrangements, but efforts continue to find mutually acceptable language.

Civair Talks: In May, France renounced our 1946 civil aviation accord, seeking guarantees for France's share of the passenger traffic. Talks on a new accord have not progressed but will resume soon, with the goal of agreement before May when the previous agreement formally expires.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Curley
Chief of Staff Baker
National Security Advisor Scowcroft

President Mitterrand
Foreign Minister Dumas
Chief of Staff Vedrine
Military Advisor General Quesnot
Economic Advisor Lavergeon

IV. PRESS PLAN

15 minute press availability after the meeting.

V. SEQUENCE

5:00 pm	Meeting
6:15 pm	Press Availability
6:30 pm	Dinner
7:50 pm	Departure

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	Biographies

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP

- I am glad that we were able to arrange this meeting and to see you looking well.
- Our cooperation over the years has meant much to me. I think it has brought many benefits.
- What is clear is that France and the United States are able to work together well when we focus on concrete problems that demand action. Our record is shining in these cases.
- We run into trouble when we get into theological debates over long-term structures. But even here we have been able to make progress, such as the recent agreement on the relationship between the Franco-German corps and NATO.
- As I reflect on U.S.-French relations, what strikes me is that through all of our differences, we seem to agree on certain fundamentals.
- These include the importance of the transatlantic relationship and of an American role in Europe, the desirability of European unity and its compatibility with the Atlantic Alliance, and the need for Europe and the U.S. to lead in addressing world problems.
- Though I can not speak for the next administration, I can offer my judgement that America's commitments to these principles will not diminish.

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DECLASSIFIED

PER NSC WAIVER, #221-03
By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21

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- There are pressures in the U.S. to pull inward, but my strong sense is that they will not prevail in our country and that the next administration will remain committed to the Atlantic partnership and a U.S. presence in Europe.
- I remember from our earlier conversations that you were concerned about American reliability after my presidency. I want to underline that I think it would be a mistake to assume that the next administration will be any less steadfast than mine has been. The mood in America supports our continued international role, especially in Europe and working with our European partners.
- I hope you will assume the best in this regard from my successor. If you assume otherwise, it could become self-fulfilling.

SOMALIA

- I very much appreciate your decision to send 2,00 troops to Somalia despite all of the other demands on your forces. Let me share my impressions of the situation and our thoughts about how we would like to see things develop.
- (We want to move rapidly to a hand-off to UN forces and will appreciate France's support for a quick UNSC resolution.)

RUSSIA

- I had a good talk with Yeltsin. Let me share my impressions.

THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

- As you know, we have concluded that the Serbs have to be warned not to cross certain lines. This is why I sent a clear message to Milosevic.

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- We have said we will use U.S. air power if the Serbs attack the Kosovars, violate the no-fly zone in Bosnia, or attack UN personnel. The Serbs have responded with tough talk, as we expected. But if we let them continue this rampage, the very foundation for international order in this new era will be undermined.
- We may have deterred the Serbs in Kosovo with my warning. ~~If not, would you join us in air strikes? I know this is a very big step, especially if we cannot get UN authorization because of Russian opposition.~~ But there would have to be some forceful reaction if the Serbs begin clearing Kosovo of Albanians.
- Likewise, our credibility is on the line regarding the Bosnian no-fly zone. We need a resolution that permits enforcement to restore the credibility of the Security Council, to show the Serbs that we will not be deterred by their threats against UN relief personnel, and to reassure the Muslim world.
- If we are firm, I believe the Serbs will respect the no-fly zone. In any case, the right response to threats against UN relief personnel is not to stop relief deliveries but to strengthen UNPROFOR and, if useful, employ U.S. and allied air power, which I am prepared to do.
- We remain very concerned about the possibility of a high winter death-toll in Bosnia. With or without enforcement of the no-fly zone, UNPROFOR may need to be reinforced.
- If asked: Boutros Ghali proposal to send 10,000 UN observers to Bosnia's borders: We are studying the

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proposal, but one can only wonder where the UN would get the additional troops and what the costs would be. We need to squeeze Serbia on sanctions.

URUGUAY ROUND

- I know this is a difficult issue with your farmers. But I think there has been too much focus all over on the potential costs of a Uruguay Round Agreement and not enough talk about the tremendous benefits for all of us from a successful accord.
- Let me illustrate this with a couple of estimates by our best government trade specialists. They tell me that over ten years the cumulative gain to the world's gross domestic product from a successful Uruguay Round will be approximately \$5.2 trillion. They estimate that the EC will gain about \$1.4 trillion, with about \$270 billion for France and that the U.S. will gain about \$1.1 trillion.
- These are not gains to be lightly sacrificed because of near-term difficulties.
- Let me add some points about recent developments.
- First, we want rapid agreement on non-agricultural issues. Carla Hills is meeting this weekend with the new EC Trade Commissioner Leon Brittain precisely with the goal of moving forward rapidly on those areas.
- Our hope is that the negotiators in Geneva will be able to reach agreement in principle by mid-January.
- Second, contrary to some assertions, we are not shifting positions on non-agricultural issues in Geneva. As we try to move to conclusion, we are reaffirming some U.S. problems

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that were well-known in advance.

- (If Asked: Multilateral Trade Organization: All along our negotiators said the hasty draft on this caused us real problems. We are willing to work for agreement on this, but our priority should be to get agreement on the substance.)
- Third, from our domestic perspective, if we do not have an agreement done by March 2, the new administration will have to seek renewal of the fast-track authority from Congress.
- This could lead to tougher negotiating positions, thus endangering a successful round and the economic benefits I mentioned earlier.
- If on the other hand, we can reach agreement in principle in Geneva before I leave office, it will make agreement this year likely and would help the new administration.
- I hope we can agree today to support an all out-effort to reach a balanced GATT agreement in the weeks ahead. After these intense negotiations, each of us can make a better judgement as to the overall benefits of an accord covering all of the areas under consideration.
- I also hope that you and I can signal publicly our agreement that France, the United States and the world could reap great benefits from a successful round and our commitment to support an intensive effort to hammer out a comprehensive, balanced accord in Geneva this month.
- If Asked: The November 20 U.S.-EC Agricultural Accord: We consider this settled and are not willing to reopen the agreement. I went beyond our bottom line in order to open the door for a broader GATT accord.

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- We are watching carefully Saddam's challenges to the no-fly zone and are determined to respond firmly.
- If Saddam continues to violate the zone and challenge the coalition, we may be required to respond with attacks not only against aircraft in the air but against those on the ground ~~and related ground facilities.~~
- I very much hope France would be ready to join us, if such actions were necessary.
- In the north, we are extremely concerned about the humanitarian situation of the Kurds. Even with UN guards, relief convoys are not yet running in sufficient numbers to meet the needs.

MIDDLE EAST (IF RAISED)

- Despite the challenges from those who oppose the peace process, all regional parties have reiterated to us their commitment to remain engaged.
- While the parties are frustrated that more progress has not been made, this process remains the only viable arena for resolving the fundamental problems.
- President-elect Clinton has voiced his support for the peace process and the U.S. role as catalyst, driving force and honest broker.
- The vexing problem of the Palestinian deportees in Lebanon has seriously complicated matters, but we should discourage Palestinians and Arabs from linking resumption of the bilateral talks to the deportation issue.

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- We have urged Israel and Lebanon to allow humanitarian relief to reach the deportees and will continue to urge them to be as flexible as possible on the humanitarian questions.
- This should be separate, however, from the ultimate disposition of the deportees. We believe that further action in the Security Council should await the report of the Secretary General's special envoy and that we should be prepared to support an even-handed follow-up.
- However, my reading of the situation suggests that it will take time to work out a solution.

UKRAINE SECURITY ASSURANCES (IF RAISED)

- We share your frustration with the delay in Ukrainian ratification.
- I had a good chat with President Kravchuk on December 24. He was quite certain that the Rada (legislature) will ratify the START and NPT agreements. And he has welcomed the START II accord.
- We have offered Ukraine at least \$175 million in nuclear-related (Nunn-Lugar) assistance. I have also urged Yeltsin to share with Ukraine proceeds from sales of uranium from dismantled weapons. I am heartened that Russia-Ukraine talks on these issues are now scheduled.

NUCLEAR TESTING (IF RAISED)

- Secretary Eagleburger told Foreign Minister Dumas that we had a number of concerns about his proposal for five power nuclear talks on testing on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament. Our policy is now set by law and we don't see how a meeting could be helpful.

CONFIDENTIAL

B

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 04]. (2 pp.)	11/24/1992	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019

OA/ID Number: 90746-005

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 05]. (2 pp.)	08/12/1992	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 06]. (2 pp.)	09/02/1992	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 07]. (2 pp.)	09/03/1992	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 08]. (1 pp.)	09/12/1991	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Report	Government Report [originally closed as 09]. (1 pp.)	08/25/1989	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed:	9/26/2019	OA/ID Number:	90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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I will ask
you to say a
word on

Costs!

1. Ukraine ←
2. Kazakhstan —

in campaign -

1) Did have quarrel

2) mentions fact 3rd
it was given at

could you ask
this guy for
some water

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH U.S. TROOPS

- IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO JOIN YOU TODAY. LET ME BE THE FIRST TO WISH YOU A HAPPY NEW YEAR.
- I WANT TO SAY HOW PROUD I AM OF THE WORK YOU ARE DOING HERE. I TOLD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE YOU WOULD COME TO SOMALIA TO PERFORM A MISSION WITH COURAGE AND COMPASSION -- AND YOU'VE CERTAINLY DONE THAT.
- YOU HAVE SHOWN THE WORLD THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN UNDERTAKE A HUMANITARIAN MISSION AND ACCOMPLISH IT WITH THE UTMOST CARE, SKILL, AND DEDICATION.

- BACK IN THE STATES, WE HAVE ALL BEEN TOUCHED BY THE IMAGES OF YOUNG SOMALIS CHEERING YOUR PRESENCE. YOU HAVE RESTORED HOPE TO THOUSANDS OF STARVING SOMALIS, WHO LESS THAN FOUR WEEKS AGO HAD NONE.
- YOUR MISSION REMAINS A LIMITED ONE. WE STILL HAVE SOME TASKS LEFT TO DO, BUT ONCE THEY ARE COMPLETED YOU'LL RETURN HOME.
- I KNOW IT'S TOUGH BEING AWAY DURING THE HOLIDAYS. BUT YOUR JOB IS AN IMPORTANT ONE AND THERE HAS BEEN AN OUTPOURING OF SUPPORT FOR YOUR PRESENCE HERE.
- YOU HAVE MUCH TO BE PROUD OF AND AMERICA IS PROUD OF YOU. GOD BLESS ALL OF YOU.

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH GENERAL JOHNSTON

- IT'S GREAT TO SEE YOU. LET ME THANK YOU AND YOUR TROOPS FOR THE TREMENDOUS JOB YOU'RE DOING IN SOMALIA. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE VERY PROUD OF YOUR EFFORTS.
- WHEN I ANNOUNCED OUR PLANS TO DEPLOY INTO SOMALIA, I TOLD THE NATION OUR TROOPS WOULD PERFORM THEIR MISSION WITH COURAGE AND COMPASSION -- AND YOU CERTAINLY HAVE DONE THAT.
- THE RESULTS OF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. YOU ARE ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION WITH MINIMAL LOSS OF LIFE ON BOTH SIDES, AND I SALUTE YOUR LEADERSHIP.
- THE COMPLETION OF THE PHASE II OBJECTIVES AHEAD OF SCHEDULE IS TESTAMENT TO THE STRENGTH AND SKILL OF THE COALITION FORCES AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

- NOW THAT ALL EIGHT REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION CENTERS ARE UNDER COALITION CONTROLS, I THINK WE WILL SEE A MARKED IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND.
- I'M ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE EFFORTS OF AMBASSADOR OAKLEY AND YOURSELF IN WORKING WITH LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS TO ENSURE A SMOOTH DEPLOYMENT.
- THE SPEED WITH WHICH YOU ARE ACCOMPLISHING THIS MISSION MEANS WE CAN TURN THE OPERATION OVER TO THE UN EVEN EARLIER THAN WE EXPECTED. WE'RE NOW LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON UNOSOOM II. I HOPE TO SEE ITS PASSAGE BEFORE I LEAVE OFFICE.
- I'D LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON WHERE THINGS STAND AND WHAT YOUR NEXT OBJECTIVES ARE.

POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
COALITION COMMANDERS

- IT'S A PLEASURE TO BE HERE TODAY. I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORK IN MAKING OPERATION RESTORE HOPE A SUCCESS.
- YOU AND YOUR TROOPS ARE PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENSURING THAT OUR EFFORTS IN SOMALIA ARE SUCCESSFUL.
- YOUR COUNTRIES RESPONDED TO AN INTERNATIONAL CALL TO ADDRESS THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY IN THIS COUNTRY. IN LESS THAN FOUR WEEKS TIME, YOUR EFFORTS HAVE GIVEN THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA NEW HOPE.

- WE ARE WELL ON OUR WAY TO CREATING A
SECURE ENVIRONMENT TO GET THE FOOD TO THE
STARVING PEOPLE. ONCE WE DO THAT, THE
COALITION WHICH GENERAL JOHNSTON IS
LEADING CAN TURN OVER THE MISSION TO THE
UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. I AM VERY PLEASED
THAT MANY OF YOU WILL BE A PART OF THE
PEACEKEEPING MISSION.
- THERE ARE NOW 17 COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING
IN OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. FROM
CANADIANS IN BELET WEYNE TO BELGIANS IN
KISMAYO, THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
THIS OPERATION IS TRULY REMARKABLE AND
ONE OF THE KEYS TO ITS SUCCESS.
- OUR WORK HERE IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO
THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA. WE ARE
DEMONSTRATING THAT THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY CAN WORK TOGETHER, THROUGH THE
UNITED NATIONS, TO ALLEVIATE SUFFERING
AND RESTORE HOPE TO A PEOPLE DEVASTATED
BY CIVIL WAR.

-- I THANK YOU FOR YOUR SACRIFICE, YOUR
COMMITMENT AND YOUR SPIRIT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CARD 1 OF 2

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ISMAT KITTANI

- IT'S GOOD TO SEE YOU AGAIN. I'VE HEARD GREAT REPORTS ABOUT THE SUPERB JOB YOU ARE DOING IN VERY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.
- YOUR CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH AMBASSADOR OAKLEY HAS PRODUCED EXCELLENT RESULTS. WE WANT TO KEEP UP THIS PARTNERSHIP.
- I HOPE THAT THE JANUARY 4 PREPARATORY MEETING IN ADDIS ABABA WILL ENCOURAGE THE SOMALIS THEMSELVES TO BUILD A SOCIETY FREE OF BITTER RIVALRIES AND HOSTILITIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

PER NSC WAIVER #2021-02
By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21

CONFIDENTIAL

CARD 2 OF 2

- HOWEVER, THE LONG PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION MUST BE BUILT FROM THE GROUND UP, STARTING AT THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL AS THE COALITION AND UN FORCES MARGINALIZE THE THUGS AND WARLORDS.
- ON THE MILITARY SIDE, WE LOOK FORWARD TO A SMOOTH AND PROMPT TRANSITION TO UN PEACEKEEPERS WHO WILL MAINTAIN SECURITY FOR THE RELIEF OPERATIONS AND HELP SOMALIS REBUILD THEIR SOCIETY.
- THIS WILL REQUIRE PROMPT UN ACTION TO AUTHORIZE WITH UNOSOM II. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITH YOUR SUPPORT, WE CAN REACH RAPID AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION FOR UNOSOM II AND THEN PROMPTLY IMPLEMENT A SMOOTH TRANSITION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PIERRE CARRON
né le 16 décembre 1932 à Fécamp

Huile sur toile, 1988
H. 20 cm. × L. 30 cm.

IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE



Dinner

offert en l'honneur de

Son Excellence

Monsieur le Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
et de Madame George Bush

par

Monsieur François Mitterrand
Président de la République

Dimanche 3 janvier 1993

Symphonie de l'océan aux huîtres

Chapon Landais aux petits louches

Morilles en étuvée

Fromages

Feuilles d'automne

Corton Charlemagne (L. Latour) 1981

Château Chaval Blanc 1971

Magnum de Hug Grande Cuvée

CHECKLIST FOR YELTSIN MEETING

I. Points For One-on-One Meeting

- Reassure on U.S. bipartisan support economic aid to Russia
- Reassure on importance of Russia for Clinton Administration
- Inquire about Yeltsin's plans to maintain reform in face of conservative opposition.

II. Points for Expanded Meeting (Four-on-Four)

Economic Issues

- Important continue reform and avoid hyperinflation
- Urge accept Paris Club offer on Debt Rescheduling
 - defer \$15 billion
 - pay only \$2.75 billion in 1993
- Resume payments on CCC debt to U.S.
 - currently over \$100 million in default
 - Has frozen U.S. grain sales
- Reinvigorate negotiations for IMF stand-by
 - will allow G-7 and IFI assistance
 - encourage private sector
- Do better to encourage Western Trade and Investment
 - too many bureaucratic obstacles

Regional Issues

- Somalia - Encourage Russian participation
- Iraq - Need convince Saddam will enforce UN resolutions
- Bosnia/Kosovo - U.S. needs Russian support in UN on enforcement of No-Fly-Zone
- Baltic Troop Withdrawal

Security Issues

- Need Ukraine/Belarus/Kazhakstan ratification of START I and NPT
- Want Russian cooperation on Proliferation
 - Urge Yeltsin not to sell Iran nuclear research reactor
- Should build closer U.S.-Russian mil-mil ties

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia [originally closed as 11]. (3 pp.)	01/03/19	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Tab A

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	Lawrence Eagleburger to POTUS Thoughts on the Summit in Sochi [originally closed as 13]. (5 pp.)	12/30/1992	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
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Tab B

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Talking Points	Points to be made meeting with President Boris Yeltsin [originally closed as 14]. (9 pp.)	01/01/93	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019 **OA/ID Number:** 90746-005

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]

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Tab C

PARTICIPANTS FOR RESTRICTED MEETING

The President
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Secretary of State
James A. Baker III, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dmitriy Zarechnak, Interpreter

RUSSIA

Boris Yeltsin, President
Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vladimir Grachev, Minister of Defense
Dmitriy Ruryikov, Aide to President Yeltsin
Interpreter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Schedule	Schedule of the President and Mrs. Bush for Moscow, Russia; redaction. (1 pp.)	01/2-3/93	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019 **OA/ID Number:** 90746-005

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]

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AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Mrs Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

FOR

MOSCOW, RUSSIA

JANUARY 2 - 3, 1993

EVENTS:

Dinner with President and Mrs. Yeltsin
Tour of Kremlin
Four on Four Bilateral Meeting
Expanded Bilateral Meeting
Signing Ceremony/Joint Press Conference

DRESS:

Men - Business Suit
Women - Day Dress

CONTACTS:

Office of Presidential Advance
John G. Keller, Jr. - 202/456-7565

Trip Coordinator
Paige Scheer/Lori Rosso - 202/456-7565

ADVANCE:

Ed Murnane	- LEAD	Gordon James	- SITE
Kelley Gannon	- PRESS	Lyn Kennelly	- SITE
(b)(7)(C)(b)(7)(e)(b)(7)(f)	- USSS	David Anderson	- SITE
Rusty Schorsch	- MIL. AIDE	Bernard Presock	- SITE
Jim Curtis	- WHCA	Topper Ray	- PRESS SITE
Doug White	- AFI	Greg Jenkins	- PRESS SITE

WEATHER:

Freezing Temperatures

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Schedule	Schedule of the President and Mrs. Bush for Moscow, Russia; redactions. (4 pp.)	01/2-3/93	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

FOR

MOSCOW, RUSSIA

JANUARY 2 - 3, 1993

Saturday, January 2, 1993

2:40 pm

THE PRESIDENT arrives Sheremetyezo Airport,
Moscow, Russia and boards Motorcade.

Met by:

The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
President, Russian Federation

2:50 pm

THE PRESIDENT departs Sheremetyezo Airport en
route Ambassador's Residence.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)




(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)





(Drive Time: 30 Minutes)

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

Upon arrival at Ambassador's Residence, Guests and Staff will be transported to Staff Hotel.

3:20 pm THE PRESIDENT arrives Ambassador's Residence and proceeds to Suite.

3:25 pm THE PRESIDENT arrives Suite for Private Time.

(PRIVATE TIME: 3 HOURS 10 MINUTES)

NOTE: Mrs. Bush joins THE PRESIDENT at this time.

6:35 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush depart Suite and board Motorcade.

6:40 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush depart Ambassador's Residence en route Kremlin.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Same as on Arrival.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

Upon arrival at Kremlin, Guests and Staff will be escorted to Holding Room.

Please board Motorcade no later than 9:25 pm for transport to Ambassador's Residence.

6:50 pm

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Kremlin and proceed to Winter Garden Room.

Met by:

The Honorable Boris and Mrs. Yeltsin
President, Russian Federation

EVENT: DINNER WITH PRESIDENT AND MRS. YELTSIN

POOL COVERAGE (at beginning only)

TOASTS

CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION

7:00 pm

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Winter Garden Room and begin participation in Dinner with President and Mrs. Yeltsin.

NOTE: 80 Guests - 60 Russian/20 U.S.

9:15 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush conclude participation in Dinner with President and Mrs. Yeltsin, depart Winter Garden Room and board Motorcade.

9:25 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush depart Kremlin en route Ambassador's Residence.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Same as on Arrival.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

9:35 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Ambassador's Residence and proceed to Suite.

9:40 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Suite for RON.

RON Moscow, Russia

Sunday, January 3, 1993

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

8:00 am **Baggage Call.** Please place all unlocked baggage outside your Room at this time.

8:35 am Please board Motorcade for transport to Kremlin at this time.


8:45 am

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush depart Suite and board Motorcade.


8:50 am

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush depart Ambassador's Residence en route Kremlin.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)


(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)



(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

GUEST AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

Upon arrival at Kremlin, Guests and Staff will be escorted to Holding Room/Staff Viewing Area.

Please board Motorcade no later than
1:15 pm for transport to Sheremetyezo
Airport.

9:00 am THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Kremlin and
proceed to Greeting Area.

Met by:

The Honorable Boris and Mrs. Yeltsin
President, Russian Federation

EVENT: TOUR OF KREMLIN

POOL COVERAGE (at beginning only)

U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT
Mrs. Bush

RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS:

President Yeltsin
Mrs. Yeltsin

9:00 am THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush, accompanied by
President and Mrs. Yeltsin, depart Greeting Area
and begin participation in Tour of Kremlin.

9:50 am THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush, accompanied by
President and Mrs. Yeltsin, concludes
participation in Tour of Kremlin and proceed to
Green Room.

NOTE: Mrs. Bush assumes a separate schedule at
this time.

EVENT: FOUR ON FOUR BILATERAL MEETING

POOL COVERAGE (at beginning only)

CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION

U.S. Participants:

THE PRESIDENT
Secretary Eagleburger
J. Baker
General Scowcroft
Interpreter

Russian Participants:

President Yeltsin
TBD
Interpreter

9:55 am THE PRESIDENT arrives Green Room and begins participation in Four on Four Bilateral Meeting.

10:30 am THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Four on Four Bilateral Meeting, departs Green Room and proceeds to St. Katherine Room.

EVENT: EXPANDED BILATERAL MEETING

POOL COVERAGE (at beginning only)

CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION

U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT
Secretary Eagleburger
J. Baker
General Scowcroft
J. Collins
M. Fitzwater
F. Wisner
T. Niles
J. Gordon
N. Burns
Interpreter

RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS:

President Yeltsin
TBD
Interpreter

10:35 am THE PRESIDENT arrives St. Katherine Room and begins participation in Expanded Bilateral Meeting.

12:00 pm THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Expanded Bilateral Meeting, departs St. Katherine Room and proceeds to Holding Room.

12:05 pm THE PRESIDENT arrives Holding Room and holds briefly.

12:10 pm THE PRESIDENT departs Holding Room and proceeds to Winter Garden Room.

12:12 pm THE PRESIDENT arrives Winter Garden Room.

Met by:

The Honorable Boris Yeltsin
President, Russian Federation

12:15 pm THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by President Yeltsin, departs Winter Garden Room and proceeds to St. Vladimir's Hall.

EVENT: SIGNING CEREMONY/JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

OPEN PRESS

SIGNING CEREMONY

STATEMENTS

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION

U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

THE PRESIDENT

RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS:

President Yeltsin

12:18 pm

THE PRESIDENT, accompanied by President Yeltsin, arrives Vladimir's Hall and begins participation in Signing Ceremony.

NOTE: Mrs. Bush re-joins THE PRESIDENT at this time.

12:25 pm

THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Signing Ceremony and begins participation in Joint Press Conference.

1:15 pm

THE PRESIDENT concludes participation in Joint Press Conference, and with Mrs. Bush, President and Mrs. Yeltsin, departs St. Vladimir's Hall and boards Motorcade.

1:20 pm

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush, accompanied by President and Mrs. Yeltsin, depart Kremlin en route Sheremetyezo Airport.

MOTORCADE ASSIGNMENTS:

Same as on Arrival Except:

(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)

(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)

(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)

(Drive Time: 30 Minutes)

1:50 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Sheremetyezo
Airport and board Air Force One.

2:00 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush depart Moscow, Russia
en route Paris, France.

(Flying Time: 3 Hours 30 Minutes)
(Interchange: No)
(Time Change: Back 2 Hours)
(Food Service: TBD)

3:30 pm THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Bush arrive Orly
International Airport, Paris, France.

AMPHIBIOUS

AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON THREE'S MISSION

BACKGROUND- AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON THREE was originally commissioned as AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON SEVEN and consisted of some twenty one ships. Initially homeported in Long Beach, California, the Squadron moved to San Diego, California in 1973, and returned to Long Beach in 1984. With the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force, AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON SEVEN was redesignated AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON THREE and moved once again to San Diego on 1 August 1986.

MISSION- The mission of AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON THREE (PHIBRON 3) is to prepare plans, embark amphibious forces, conduct rehearsals, movements and perform assaults upon hostile shores in support of national policy during low intensity conflicts and as a component of an integrated battle force during major conflicts. The Squadron has the capability to land troops and equipment by air and sea simultaneously, and to support troops in the field with fixed and rotary wing transport and attack aircraft. When deployed, PHIBRON 3 normally carries a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) plus the equipment and supplies to keep it fighting. The Squadron's history includes involvement in the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam conflict, the Iranian crisis, Desert Storm and Operation Pledge Vigil. PHIBRON 3 was the first Squadron to deploy in an LHA (Amphibious Assault Ship) to the Western Pacific and the first to operationally employ the USMC AV-8 Harrier vertical take off jet in the Indian Ocean as part of an Amphibious Ready Group. PHIBRON 3 is certified as a special operations capable unit.




15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT

In April of 1983, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved the original permanent Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Headquarters concept, providing for the sourcing of two Marine Amphibious Unit headquarters from each Marine Amphibious Brigade headquarters. The Commandant directed the establishment of two additional MAU headquarters in November of 1985. As a result, on 1 July 1987, at Camp Pendleton, California, the Headquarters, 15th Marine Amphibious Unit, was activated.

In August of 1987, the Commandant directed the replacement of the title "Headquarters" with the name "Command Element" in the titles of MAGTFs. The 15th Marine Amphibious Unit's designation was further changed in February of 1988 to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Both changes were made to more accurately reflect the operational and expeditionary nature of the MAGTF. Prior to World War II, and in the period between the war and conflict in Vietnam, Marine units dispatched for overseas service were generally designated as "expeditionary brigades".

From its activation in July of 1987, the 15th MEU has been organizing and training to meet its mission in the rotation with 11th and 13th MEUs as Landing Force Seventh Fleet (a contingent of United States presence in the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf) and as a ready MAGTF in the U. S. or at sea.



CAPTAIN JOHN W. PETERSON
UNITED STATES NAVY

Born in Lynn Massachusetts, Captain Peterson earned his degree in Economics from Dartmouth College and was commissioned an Ensign in June 1967 through the Aviation Officer Candidate Program. Following flight training, he was designated a Naval Aviator in September 1968 and reported to VA-44 at NAS Cecil Field to commence training as a Light Attack Pilot in the A-4B.

His long association with the Light Attack Community began with sea tours with VA-106 on USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62), VA-36 on USS FORRESTAL (CV-59) and transition to the A-7E with VA-66 again on USS INDEPENDENCE. Subsequent tours included time as a Flight Instructor with VA-45 and VA-174, three years as Catapult Officer on USS ROOSEVELT (CV-42) and a Department Head tour with VA-37 on USS SARATOGA (CV-60).

In August of 1981, Captain Peterson reported to VA-46 where he served as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer on USS AMERICA (CV-66) until June 1984. After his initial command tour, he attended the Naval War College where he graduated with distinction in June 1985. Following the War College, Captain Peterson took command of VFA-106, the East Coast F/A-18 FRS, in December 1985. In February 1987, he assumed command of Light Attack Wing ONE at Cecil Field. In April of 1988, Captain Peterson reported to USS SARATOGA (CV-60) as Executive Officer where he served until September 1989. In May of 1990 he took command of USS ST LOUIS (LKA-116) where he remained until December 1991. Captain Peterson assumed duties as Commander, Amphibious Squadron 3 on 27 February 1992.

Captain Peterson has accumulated over 4000 hours in three generations of carrier based Light Attack Aircraft. He has earned two Legion of Merits, three Meritorious Service Medals, and various other ribbons and awards.

COLONEL G. S. NEWBOLD
COMMANDING OFFICER
15TH MEU

Colonel Newbold was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in June 1970 after attending The Basic School and subsequently served in the 1st Marine Division as an Infantry Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer. Assigned to the 3rd Marine Division, Lieutenant Newbold served as Assistant Operations Officer, Company Executive Officer, and Assistant Logistics Officer. Captain Newbold was next assigned as Tactics Instructor at The Basic School.

After attending Amphibious Warfare School, Captain Newbold served in 2nd Marine Division as a Regimental S-3A, Company Commander, and Assistant Division Training Officer. Captain Newbold was then assigned to Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps where he served in the Officer Assignment Branch.

Following a year at U. S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Major Newbold served as Operations Officer at 4th Expeditionary Brigade, and was then ordered to the 2nd Marine Division where he was Regimental S-3, Executive Officer and Battalion Commander.

In 1988, Lieutenant Colonel Newbold attended the National War College and following graduation was ordered to the Joint Staff where he served in the Strategic Plans and Policies Directorate.

Colonel Newbold assumed command of 15th MEU on 7 February 1992.

Colonel Newbold's personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medal. Two awards of the Joint Service Achievement Medal and a Navy Achievement Medal.

AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE

Navy forces:

The TRIPOLI Amphibious Task Unit consists of USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10), USS JUNEAU (LPD 10) USS RUSHMORE (LSD 47) and Motor Vessel 1st Lt JACK LUMMUS.

Embarked in USS TRIPOLI are:

(1) Commander Amphibious Squadron THREE (COMPHIBRON THREE), who is the Officer in Tactical Command and the Composite Warfare Commander of the Amphibious Task Force. (CTF 156)

(2) Fleet Surgical Team Five

(3) Tactical Air Control Squadron Eleven Detachment

(4) Explosive Ordinance Disposal Mine Unit Three Detachment

(5) Helicopter Support Squadron Eleven Detachment

Embarked in USS RUSHMORE are:

(1) Amphibious Craft Unit Five Detachment

(2) Beach Masters Unit One Detachment

Embarked in USS JUNEAU are:

(1) Seal Team One Platoon Alpha

(2) Special Boat Unit Twelve Detachment

Embarked in MV 1st Lt JACK LUMMUS:

(1) Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Military Detachment

Marine Forces:

Special Marine Air Ground Task Force Central Command Special Operations Capable (SPMAGTAF CENT SOC) consists of:

(1) Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC) Command Element, embarked in USS TRIPOLI. (CTF 158)

(2) Battalion Landing Team Two Slant Nine, embarked in USS TRIPOLI, USS JUNEAU and USS RUSHMORE

(3) Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) One Six Four, embarked in USS TRIPOLI

(4) Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group Fifteen, embarked in USS TRIPOLI, USS JUNEAU and USS RUSHMORE.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Diagram	Room diagram, Re: U.S. Ambassador's residence, Moscow, Russia. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, January 3, 1993

Date Closed: 9/26/2019	OA/ID Number: 90746-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S[4]	Appeal Case #:
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

✓
Dana Carvey

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
Paula Zwagerman

CRB
1-3
December 18, 1992

Dear President & Mrs. Bush,

Thank you so much for your
gracious invitation & for making
us feel so welcome during our
stay with you.

It is a trip that we will
remember & talk about for the
rest of our lives.

Best wishes for a happy new
year. I hope our paths
cross again in the future.

Fondly,
Dana & Paula

TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON
FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war,

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992,

fw 25

Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

- (a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;
- (b) 1200, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
- (c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500.

4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed:

W

25

- (a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750;
- (b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
- (c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.

6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000.

Article II

1. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), with the exception of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Each Party shall carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article.

7/15

AL

2. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of this Treaty.

3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:

- (a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty; or
- (b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted.

4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.

5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall only be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.

6. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty.

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8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty.

9. Beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:

- (a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty;
- (b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMs, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time exceed the limit of 500 warheads for each Party provided for in subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty;
- (c) each Party shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and

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- (d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry vehicle platform.

3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:

- (a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it under this Treaty; and
- (b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.

3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution.

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4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is actually equipped.

5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution.

6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

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8. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements:

- (a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time;
- (b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles;
- (c) such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and
- (d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role.

10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.

11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.

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12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party.

14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty.

2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission to:

- (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
- (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution, Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty.

2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the date of its signature.

3. This Treaty shall remain in force so long as the START Treaty remains in force.

4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

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PROTOCOL
ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMS
AND ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONVERSION OF SILO LAUNCHERS
OF HEAVY ICBMS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such ICBMs.

I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty or shall be carried out by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

- (a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles;
- (b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, and other elements that shall not be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section;
- (c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into stages;
- (d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;
- (e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;

- (f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and
- (g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMs:

- (a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed.

5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection.

7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

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II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for Heavy ICBMs, and Silo Test Launchers for Heavy ICBMs

1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to inspection.

2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps:

- (a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher;
- (b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and
- (c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.

5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these procedures have been carried out:

- (a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:
 - (i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence; and

- (ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section; and
- (b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted.

6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

- (a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question;
- (b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured;
- (c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;
- (d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

- (e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;
- (f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
- (g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:

- (a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete;
- (b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo launcher can be measured;
- (c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete;
- (d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to remeasure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;

- (e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened;
- (f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;
- (g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
- (h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.

9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct visual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring.

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10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.

III. Equipment; Costs

1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete. The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

PROTOCOL
ON EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS
RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.

I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers

1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.

2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions:

- (a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party;
- (b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the exhibition;
- (c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours;
- (d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty;

- (e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and variant of a type that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection; and
- (f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty.

II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers

1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to perform, during data update and new facility inspections conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the inspection:

- (a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior;

- (b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and
- (c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.

2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection.

3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

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This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ON WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION AND HEAVY BOMBER DATA RELATING TO THE
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped. No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty, according to the categories of data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs.

Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty are included in this Memorandum.

I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers
Other than Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party undertakes not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the number specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty. The Party making a change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to demonstrate the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:

(a) United States of America
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type*

Number of Warheads

B-52G	12
B-52H	20
B-1B	16
B-2	16

Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role

(b) Russian Federation
Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type

Number of Warheads

Bear B	1
Bear G	2
Bear H6	6
Bear H16	16
Blackjack	12

Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role

II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and
Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have
Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role

1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented
to a conventional role are as follows:

*Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period.

(a) United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
_____	_____
_____	_____

(b) Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
_____	_____
_____	_____

2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows:

(a) United States of America Air Bases: Name/Location	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
_____	_____
Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role	Number

(b) Russian Federation Air Bases: Name/Location	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
_____	_____
Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role	Number

3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:

(a) United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Difference
_____	_____
(b) Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of Type	Difference
_____	_____

4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role are as follows:

(a) United States of America	
Heavy Bomber Type	Difference
and Variant of a Type	
_____	_____
(b) Russian Federation	
Heavy Bomber Type	Difference
and Variant of a Type	
_____	_____

III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs to Which a Reduced Number of Warheads Is Attributed

For each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases, and on ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed to them is reduced pursuant to Article III of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) United States of America	Type of ICBM or SLBM
Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs, on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	_____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	_____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced	_____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs of that Type	_____

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location

ICBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced

Deployed ICBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs of that Type

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location

SLBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced

Deployed SLBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed SLBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each SLBM Was
Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed SLBMs of that Type

(b) Russian Federation

Type of ICBM or SLBM

Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the Number
of Warheads Attributed to
Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed
ICBMs Is Reduced:

Name/Location

ICBM Type on Which
the Number of Warheads
Is Reduced

Deployed ICBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Warheads Attributed to Each
Deployed ICBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on It

Number of Warheads by Which
the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced

Aggregate Reduction in the
Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs of that Type

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:

<u>Name/Location</u>	SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced
Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	_____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	_____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM Was Reduced	_____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs of that Type	_____

IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs

1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers _____

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location	ICBM Type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher
--	--

Silo Launcher Group: (designation)

Silo Launchers: _____

(b) Russian Federation

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers _____

ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location

ICBM Type Installed
In a Converted Silo
Launcher

Silo Launcher Group: (designation)

Silo Launchers: _____

2. For each Party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are as follows:

(a) United States of America Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs _____

Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs _____

Eliminated Heavy ICBMs _____

(b) Russian Federation Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs _____

Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs _____

Eliminated Heavy ICBMs _____

V. Changes

Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum.

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy only of its own data.

This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

enroute Paris to Washington

January 3, 1993

Dear Ed:

As I fly back to the United States from Moscow and the historic signing of the START II agreement with President Yeltsin, I wanted to thank you for your tremendous service in the cause of peace. I thought of you while I was in Moscow -- you deserve much of the credit for our new partnership with Russia.

I know you are experiencing tough times. Barbara and I are praying for your speedy recovery and we send our best wishes to you and Nancy.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "G. Tenet", written in a cursive style.

The Honorable Ed Hewett
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Russia and
Eurasian Affairs
National Security Council

Daily 1-3-93

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~cc: (in=&=out)~~

~~Rose Zamaria (lec)~~

The Honorable and Mrs. William H. Webster
9409 Brooke Drive
Bethesda, Maryland 20817

Paris to D.C.

1-3-93


My family and I are
back with you

of course - I hope

you are well

and hope to see you

Dear Bill & Lynda -
Thanks for your great card
and those very kind words - Love
Cy



TAIDEI 1992

快前日假



Lynda & Bill Webster
wish you a
Royal Holiday Season

received only official
White House Christmas
card

LN

Dear Mr President and Bar,
Shouldn't it seem as it won't be
like and our love, friendship and
gratitude for your years together,
for all the good you have done for
so many - what then it was to
serve with you.
God Bless - the small point of light
stand ready for your car.
Myra and Bill

The Honorable Richard A. Moore
1801 Kalorama Square, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008



Aboard Air Force One

Moscow to Paris

1-3-93

Dear Rich,

*Thanks for your
note on the pardon. I
wish Ben Bradlee would
tell his W.P. associates
that it's OK. They have
been ugly; and so has
bitter Judge Walsh.*

cc: (in & out)
Rose Zamaria (lcc) ✓

*I did the right
thing but now it looks
like I'll be paying a*

high price for that.

The trip has
gone well.

Somalia so
sad, so moving.

Moscow a farewell
to a friend and a great
treaty. Now in to
Paris to say au revoir
to a man I genuinely
like, Francois Mitterrand.

Thanks, Rich
for weighing in - "pro" on
the parcel. All Best CB

RICHARD A. MOORE

Christmas Eve, 1992

Dear Mr. President:

Have just heard the news of the pardons and I find it difficult to tell you how thrilled I was. If there are any two qualities which Americans--or people everywhere--most admire in a leader they are courage and compassion, and you demonstrated both--in spades! You should rest assured history will recognize today's decision as an act of true statesmanship.

There is another aspect too. It has seemed to me that shortly after the election the inevitable return to a positive view of you and your presidency had already begun, and today's news will speed the process, Thus I trust that this Christmas Eve will be remembered by you and Bar and all the family as the beginning of the really happy years.

Esther joins in sending Christmas wishes and love to all the Bushes from all the Moores.

God Bless

Rich

P. S. Ironically my source of today's news was none other than Ben Bradlee, whom I encountered Christmas shopping. He acknowledge that he thought Cap should never have been indicted.

Self typed (obviously)

FROM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
Office of Richard Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675



THE PRESIDENT

Daily
Flying Moscow to Paris
1-3-93

Dear Dick,
Now it's my turn. Thanks
so very much for that lovely
edition of Seize the Moment,
a genuine keepsake.
We are now shifting

gears, looking forward to
a new quiet life in
Texas. I will try to conduct
myself as you have, avoiding
anything that would appear
to diminish the Presidency -

The Somalia visit was
emotional for me; and Moscow
went well. A belated Happy 1993!
C

cc: (in & out)
Rose Zamaria (2cc) ✓
Charles Free (book to
go to the Pres' ofc
in Houston)

RICHARD NIXON
December 28, 1992

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Jim Jones & Barbara

As you can imagine, this was a somewhat depressing Christmas for us as I know it was for you because of the outcome of the election.

I want you to know that your thoughtful gift of another classic book, Boorstin, helped make the day a very special one for us because it reminded us of the friendship we have enjoyed with you and your family going back over forty years.

Pat joins me in sending our very best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Phil

President and Mrs. George Bush

PS Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the leather bound edition of my last book, Seize The Moment, for your personal library.

Mr. J. Hugh Liedtke
Post Office Box 2967
Houston, Texas 77252-2967



THE PRESIDENT

flying Moscow to Paris
1-3-93

Dear Hugh -

Thanks, pal.

Now that prosecutor,
bitter and tired, has turned
his guns on me. It's ugly
and I hate it; but I

know I did the right
thing. Thanks for that
note of support.

I'll be back on the
20th ready to low-key my
life; ready to see more of
close loyal friends. That's
where you come in — *Ly*

CC: (in & out)
Rose Zamaria (lcc) ✓

J. HUGH LIEDTKE
POST OFFICE BOX 2967
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77252-2967

December 28, 1992

The President
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear George:

I read your statement in connection with pardons of Cap Weinberger, Clair George, et al in the New York Times. It was a truly great statement and brings to an end a terrible derisive episode which has led absolutely nowhere over several years. In fact, it has degenerated into a mean and vindictive effort by an old man to bolster his tattered legal reputation which has resulted from his ludicrous performance.

Many years ago toward the end of WW II, I was assigned to the Antietam, an Essex class carrier. It was the better part of three blocks long. The executive officer was one "Bugle" John Alderman. He was called Bugle John because you could hear him anywhere on the ship. He never used a hailer or power megaphone. Bugle John had taken a short round of ammunition and other explosives into the Guadalcanal and unloaded it. In the process, the stern of his ship was blown off. He shored it up with coconut logs and sailed back to a safe port. In his office on the hangar deck he had a short wave dispatch which read: "I like your guts. Halsey." The same to you.

With best regards.

Sincerely,



J. Hugh Liedtke

Dictated December 26; signed in his absence.

The Honorable Tommy G. Thompson
Governor
State of Wisconsin
115
State Capitol
Madison, Wisconsin 53702



THE PRESIDENT

1-3-93
Flying Moscow to Paris

Dear Tommy,

Thanks for your letter
of Dec 21. Yes, I believe
we did the right thing in
Somalia. Having just
been there I'm more convinced


of that than ever.

What magnificent
troops we have there - young,
highly motivated, they've given
relief and love to the
children of a ravaged nation.

I choke up just thinking
about them.

I'm going to miss working
with you, my friend. Love to all
any

Cc: (in & out)
Rose Zamaria (lcc) ✓



TOMMY G. THOMPSON

Governor
State of Wisconsin

December 21, 1992

The President
The White House
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I take this opportunity to express my wholehearted support of your decision to send U.S. troops into Somalia for Operation Restore Hope.


I can imagine how difficult it must be to send thousands of young military men and women to a foreign land during the holiday season. But, you should take solace in the fact that our efforts are saving the lives of tens of thousands suffering and starving Somalians.

One just has to watch the television news or read the newspaper to recognize the significance of this humanitarian effort. The gratitude displayed by the many innocent Somalians as our Marines pave the way for food and supplies is something that the American people will not soon forget.

While it may will be difficult for this warring nation to find peace among its factions and to restore a centralized government, I am confident that our efforts will begin the healing process.

Thank you for the leadership and courage that you have displayed in implementing Operation Restore Hope. Once again, you have shown the American people your ability to do what's just and good for our great nation and the world.

With warm regards,


TOMMY G. THOMPSON
Governor

TGT/jmh

Mr. Peter Rusthoven
Barnes & Thornburgh
1313 Merchants Bank Building
11 South Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204



Moscow to Paris

1-3-93

Aboard Air Force One

Dear Peter,
My pal Buck
Bradly sent me
that "Fair Comment"
column you did on
my service. Others have
been less kind; so
I hasten to send
these thanks that
come with my sincere
best wishes, Ag 13

cc: (in & outs)
Rose Zamaria (lcc)

Mr. C. Harvey Bradley, Jr.
Pinegate Farm
1310 South State Road 421
Zionsville, Indiana 46077



Moscow & Paris
ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE 1-3-93

Dear Buck,

It was
great seeing
you back in
D.C. ; but damn
it, no time for
a good visit.

I wrote
Peter Rusthoven
the attached.

I hope you
and Mary to
love you but
N. Year ever
love to all

CS

Blind cc:
C. Harvey Bradley



Moscow to Paris

1-3-93


Aboard Air Force One

Dear Peter
My pal Bush
Bradly sent me
that "Fair Comment"
column you did on
my service. Others have
been less kind; so
I hasten to send
these thanks that
come with my sincere
best wishes. GIB

Mr. Peter Rusthoven
Barnes & Thornburgh
1313 Merchants Bank Building
11 South Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

C. HARVEY BRADLEY
1310 S. STATE RD. 421
ZIONSVILLE, INDIANA 46077

Dec. 23, 1992



Dear George:

Enclosed is a most touching tribute to you written by Peter Rusthoven, a successful attorney (no tassels) with Barnes & Thornburgh in Indianapolis who was always willing to pitch in for your cause when asked.

We certainly enjoyed the Christmas party a few days ago. You and Barbara are great. We shall always be in your debt for the inspiration and leadership you have given us. Hang in!!!!

Yours,

Buck

Chief. No, the most special thing about the photo, as I've since told my children, is that the man swearing in their father as a Naval officer was the youngest Navy pilot in World War II.

I thought of that this Nov. 3, as I watched President Bush graciously concede electoral defeat, and then again about an hour later when Sen. Gore observed that he and the new president-elect were two "children of modern America." It struck this 40-something author as an accurate observation, and one that could not be made of George Bush. The "torch passing" metaphor is getting a heavy workout these days. Perhaps, as election-year rhetoric fades and we join in wishing a new president well, we could spend a moment reflecting on the hands doing the passing.

George Bush was only 17 years old on the day he volunteered for the Navy right after Pearl Harbor. Before he was old enough to vote, he would earn three air

ed Flying Cross.

in World War II, Bush's later : affected by his birth to a alth and prominence. This id he been born in similar d have put aside such priv- venture far from home and

ho has been fairly active in ld have relished the various rtook. Agreeing to chair the ittee in the midst of Water- print for building political t U.S. legation to mainland ' job nor one likely to score of his party. Taking charge of , and morale were in tatters gnment. George Bush han- ge and honor and consider-

icy, each of us will have a othe Luce once observed, gle sentence for each presi- cation Secretary Bill Bennett lays after the 1992 election, : will say that he successfully

saw America through to the end of the long twilight struggle between freedom and imperial communism, and then led the nation and the world with equal courage and success in facing down the first major challenge of the post-Cold War era.


It strikes me as a very good sentence indeed, as I look at the man standing on the other side of the Bible in the photo of my Navy swearing-in ceremony. There is much that is troubling about the "modern America" of which I and others of my generation are children. But much that remains good is owed to his generation, and to him personally.

For that, far more for than his personal kindness and courtesy, I thank him. I hope that others of my generation will thank him as well, and that our own children will someday judge us to have performed even half so honorably as he did, when the time comes again, as surely it will, to pass the torch once more.



fair comment

Peter J. Rusthoven
The author practices law in Indianapolis.



A word of thanks to George Bush

On my office wall hangs a decade-old photo of a younger version of the author being sworn in to the Naval Reserve JAG Corps by the vice president of the United States. Vice presidents, you see, have a little-known power denied to presidents — authority to administer federal oaths of office. For my fellow pedants in the bar, the cite is 5 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(1). As Sen. Al Gore will discover, this obscure statute's major impact is to allow the president's staff to deflect to the vice president's office a host of requests for ceremonial oath takings.

White House lawyers soon learn, as I did in the Reagan years, that vice presidential staffers believe repeal of this subsection should be high on any legal reform agenda. But when my Reserve commission issued, Vice President George Bush cheerfully agreed to do the honors. For him, this was another gesture in response to a small service (drafting a speech to a judicial audience) for which he had already sent a pair of handwritten notes and called me at home after delivering the speech.

For me, of course, the results were a special moment and the memento that records it. What makes them special is not simply that the oath-giver was a vice president, nor even that he later became Commander in Chief. No, the most special thing about the photo, as I've since told my children, is that the man swearing in their father as a Naval officer was the youngest Navy pilot in World War II.

I thought of that this Nov. 3, as I watched President Bush graciously concede electoral defeat, and then again about an hour later when Sen. Gore observed that he and the new president-elect were two "children of modern America." It struck this 40-something author as an accurate observation, and one that could not be made of George Bush. The "torch passing" metaphor is getting a heavy workout these days. Perhaps, as election-year rhetoric fades and we join in wishing a new president well, we could spend a moment reflecting on the hands doing the passing.

George Bush was only 17 years old on the day he volunteered for the Navy right after Pearl Harbor. Before he was old enough to vote, he would earn three air

medals and the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Like his voluntary service in World War II, Bush's later career decisions were little affected by his birth to a family that had earned wealth and prominence. This "baby boomer" doubts, had he been born in similar circumstances, that he could have put aside such privilege as George Bush did to venture far from home and make his own way.

Nor do I, as someone who has been fairly active in political affairs, think I would have relished the various public tasks Bush later undertook. Agreeing to chair the Republican National Committee in the midst of Watergate was on no one's blueprint for building political popularity. Heading the first U.S. legation to mainland China was neither a "cushy" job nor one likely to score points with a large segment of his party. Taking charge of the CIA when its reputation and morale were in tatters was a third unenviable assignment. George Bush handled these jobs with courage and honor and considerable skill.

As to the Bush presidency, each of us will have a judgment. But as Clare Boothe Luce once observed, history finally reserves a single sentence for each president. And I think former Education Secretary Bill Bennett was right in noting, a few days after the 1992 election, that George Bush's sentence will say that he successfully saw America through to the end of the long twilight struggle between freedom and imperial communism, and then led the nation and the world with equal courage and success in facing down the first major challenge of the post-Cold War era.

It strikes me as a very good sentence indeed, as I look at the man standing on the other side of the Bible in the photo of my Navy swearing-in ceremony. There is much that is troubling about the "modern America" of which I and others of my generation are children. But much that remains good is owed to his generation, and to him personally.

For that, far more for than his personal kindness and courtesy, I thank him. I hope that others of my generation will thank him as well, and that our own children will someday judge us to have performed even half so honorably as he did, when the time comes again, as surely it will, to pass the torch once more.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR CURLEYEMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PARIS

January 3, 1992

THE AMBASSADOR

Dear Mr. President:

Francois Mitterrand is genuinely and personally delighted that you are coming to Paris, Elysee staffers tell us. Your visit is gratifying to his pride as French president. But even more than that it caps a relationship to which he attaches the highest value, and it gives him a chance to welcome you and Barbara for a farewell chat and dinner in relaxed surroundings.

During my time here as ambassador, and specifically in the occasional private sessions with President Mitterrand, I have the repeated conviction that he likes and admires you very much, and considers you a trusted friend. Because of this feeling about you, Francois Mitterrand has always been extremely warm and kind to me -- in his fashion -- which has been a great help in my job.

In view of his dinner guest list tonight -- Bushes, Bakers, Scowcroft, Dumas, Curleys -- he may sense a Kennebunkport reprise, a cherished memory for the President of France.

This has not been a good year for Francois Mitterrand, though it doesn't particularly show on him. His political fortunes and domestic reputation have declined steadily but he remains philosophical and somewhat skeptical about the vicissitudes of politics and is determined to finish out his mandate which ends in 1995 -- unless his health makes this truly impossible.

At the moment this is a question mark. Despite his operation in October, the President's cancer of the prostate continues to progress. He has endured appalling pain, as the following anecdote suggests. Some weeks before the Maastricht referendum and the operation which followed it, Mitterrand went on television for three hours to defend the Maastricht treaty. As even his enemies agreed he put on a dazzling performance, occupying center stage virtually non-stop. And yet, according to what he told a friend later, he was in excruciating pain the entire time, despite massive doses of morphine -- and doubted at one point that he could carry on to the end.

But you will see little outward sign of illness. Mitterrand's appearance, as you know, is often pale and waxy at the best of times. He may seem a touch more frail and is said to tire more quickly but he still seems to have energy and curiosity to spare. Thus for Christmas, he went to Turkey on a private visit.

- 2 -

The subjects he will want to touch on are the obvious ones -- Somalia, Bosnia, Russia, and possibly general comment on Germany, a theme he gravitates toward with relish. He will probably not raise GATT himself but will certainly expect you to do so. He will want to have your impressions of your trip.

But in addition, Mitterrand is a man with an ever present sense of historic occasion. He will wish the principal message of the meeting to be the abiding strength of the US-French relationship, despite the frictions, and the many tasks we have accomplished together during your presidency. You have well understood that the US-French relationship, more than most, needs constant attention at the top. President Mitterrand believes a too powerful America is bad for the world, a view which continues to create endless unnecessary difficulties between us. At the same time he feels that he -- and France -- have had a firm friend and an understanding interlocutor in George Bush. He hopes, but is not sure, that the same will be true of your successor and for that reason will wish to make this meeting something special.

While dinner with Francois (and Roland) cannot even be expected to be jolly, the short evening should be interesting, relatively easy-going, and, in my view, enduringly useful to the U.S.-France relationship.

I hasten to add, with emphasis, that Taltsie and I, as well as all of Embassy Paris, are looking forward with pride and joy to being with you. Warmest wishes and Happy New Year to Bar, you, Susan, Jim, Brent, and your party.

Yours ever,

Walter

The Honorable
George H. Bush
President of the United States

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