

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0166-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0166-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 90597
Folder ID Number: 90597-004

Folder Title:
Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Note	From Douglas P. Mulholland to Secretary Baker (1 pp.)	05/01/91	(b)(1)	TS
02. Coversheet	Agency Coversheet (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
03a. Coversheet	Agency Coversheet (Eyes Only) (1 pp.)	04/30/91	(b)(1)	TS
03b. Coversheet	Report Coversheet (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
03c. Report	To Distribution List (3 pp.)	04/30/91	(b)(1)	TS
04. Cable	Cable Number: 0121122 May 91 (2 pp.)	05/01/91	(b)(1)	TS
05a. Coversheet	Agency Coversheet (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS
05b. Memo	From Douglas F. Mulholland to The Secretary (2 pp.)	05/02/91	(b)(1)	TS
06a. Memo	Agency Report (4 pp.)	03/15/91	(b)(1)	S
06b. List	Countries (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
06c. Point List	View points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07. Memo	From John R. Bolton to The Secretary (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Pinksheet Number: dw2089

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0166-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Talking Points	Points to be Made for Meeting with Shimon Peres (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09. Report	Government Report [double-sided] (1 pp.)	04/04/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Report	Government Report [double-sided] (1 pp.)	04/25/91	(b)(1)	C
11a. Cable	Cable Number: 060921Z May 91 (3 pp.)	05/06/91	(b)(1)	C
11b. Cable	Cable Number: 071515Z May 91 (5 pp.)	05/07/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Pinksheet Number: dw2089

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0166-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

ADDENDUM TO POOL REPORT
Marlin amplifies on thyroid therapy
Thursday, May 9, 1991

In a discussion not heard by your pooler, but reviewed later on tape, Marlin said in the East Room that the radioactive iodine therapy described by the physicians would disable or destroy Bush's thyroid, as it did for Mrs. Bush, not just reduce its output of hormone.

"The amount they did this morning will do that. They will destroy the gland and replace it artificially with a pill a day." He said that would take about a month (although docs said they would wait for two).

Frank Murray, The Washington Times
(who's going to go buy a new tie himself for blowing this)

FOOT

*RETIREDA POL REPORT
(FAXED TO WHITE HOUSE IN THIS
CONDITION)
May 9, 1991*

Foot report at Bethesda Naval Hospital
The president arrived at 6:40 AM in a light spring rain, moving
quickly by limo from the helicopter to a hospital building nearby. He was
accompanied by Andy Card, and Dr. Lee.
He spent about an hour in one building, then moved by limo to the
main hospital entrance where he spent another hour and a half.
At about 8:15, foot pool was given a heads up for a departure, and
all the usual preparations were underway. Suddenly, everything stopped and
without explanation it was announced that Bush would be staying another
hour.
He then, walking to foot pool across a driveway just before heading
back to the heliport. Also, his words were audible.
Bush lifted off the hospital grounds at 9:15.
Shanahan-Newhouse

(END)

POOL REPORT, BUSH AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR

The President did not take any questions. Perez de Cuellar was asked if he wanted all American troops to leave Iraq and said, "That is the wish of our American friends and the wish of our United Nations. We have to be patient."

Asked if he would like to have a United Nations police force in Iraq, Perez de Cuellar said he and Bush would be discussing that issue in their meeting today. But he added, "Today I have received a very clear rejection from the Iraqi Government. They do not want a United Nations police force."

Perez de Cuellar said his envoy to Iraq, Marrack Goulding, who has rank of Under Secretary General, reported back to him this morning that he had received that message from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A United Nations press officer said Goulding had gone there primarily to explore the idea of a civilian police force with the Iraqis and had offered them a variety of proposals for doing that. The Iraqis rejected them.

Andrew Rosenthal
New York Times
May 9, 1991

Pool Report, Bush and Hispanic Alliance For Free Trade

FASHION BULLETIN: President Moves into 1990s in Neckwear.

Bush appeared in the Indian Treaty Room wearing a snappy magenta and cornflower blue NON-REP tie with a floral print. Your international panel of judges gave it a 6.5 with a degree of difficulty of 2. The crowd roared.

Nothing to report apart from what's in the transcript. The group was being briefed by Nick Callio and Carla Hills when we got there. Bush spoke for a few minutes, got a big hand for his thyroid gland and then left.

Andrew Rosenthal
New York Times

MAY 9, 1991

POOL REPORT BUSH AND SELECT SENATORS

Pinstripes all around the Cabinet room conference table. Bush lectured Geler on not asking questions during photo ops and then said something that the assembled SENators laughed uproariously at. Your pool could not make it out. Perhaps the transcript will have it???

Andrew Rosenthal

NY Times

May 9, 1991

~~CLASSIFIED~~

5/9/91

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation

DW 10/18/12

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Note	From Douglas P. Mulholland to Secretary Baker (1 pp.)	05/01/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

~~TOP SECRET~~/ SENSITIVE

UB
**THE ATTACHMENT CONTAINS VERY
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL**

**DO NOT REPRODUCE
DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
DO NOT PLACE IN POUCH**

**CALL THE INR SPECIAL
ASSISTANTS FOR PICK-UP**

647-2249

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
SS 11/8/14

~~TOP SECRET~~/ SENSITIVE

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Coversheet	Agency Coversheet (Eyes Only) (1 pp.)	04/30/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	10/18/2012	OA/ID Number:	90597-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Coversheet	Report Coversheet (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	To Distribution List (3 pp.)	04/30/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012	OA/ID Number: 90597-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Cable	Cable Number: 0121122 May 91 (2 pp.)	05/01/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012 **OA/ID Number:** 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Coversheet	Agency Coversheet (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012 **OA/ID Number:** 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05b. Memo	From Douglas F. Mulholland to The Secretary (2 pp.)	05/02/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012	OA/ID Number: 90597-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memo	Agency Report (4 pp.)	03/15/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed:	10/18/2012	OA/ID Number:	90597-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Countries Which Want a New Secretary General

1. Argentina
 2. Australia (strongly)
 3. Austria
 4. Belgium
 5. Brazil (Africa's turn)
 6. Canada (strongly)
 7. Cote d'Ivoire (whether it's Africa's turn or not)
 8. Denmark
 9. Egypt
 10. Finland
 11. Germany
 12. Indonesia
 13. Israel
 14. Italy
 15. Japan
 16. Mexico
 17. Netherlands
 18. Norway (strongly, and whether or not it's PM Brundtland)
 19. Spain
 20. Sweden
 21. Switzerland
 22. United Kingdom (strongly)
- 

Countries Which Want PDC To Stay

1. China (don't want to offend Africans)
2. France (somewhat unclear exactly what French position is)
3. USSR (don't want to offend Africans)

Countries Whose Positions We Do Not Know

All the rest, except for the Africans, who want an African.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Point List	View points (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1991

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

I read with distress your comments reported in the attached clip from our News Summary.

I can categorically assure you that I never was in Paris as claimed by the rumormongers. I can also categorically assure you that I have no information direct or indirect of any contact with Iranians relating to this hostage question.

I am disappointed that you would feel I might have been a participant in a scheme to keep any American held hostage. I emphatically deny any such complicity.

One of the sad things about public life is you have to suffer attacks on your character, on your honor.

I can readily understand your concern when allegations are made like those made by Mr. Sick. A proposition so fundamentally immoral would certainly concern anyone. Please accept my word that I know nothing about anyone else's involvement in such an insidious plot, and I know for a fact that I had no contact such as those being alleged by Mr. Sick.

I wish you all the best and I hope this has laid to rest some of your understandable concerns.

Sincerely,



Mr. Moorhead Kennedy
The American Forum for Global Education
Moorhead Kennedy Institute
Suite 1200
45 John Street
New York, NY 10038



Mr. Kennedy,
Dear ~~Moerhead~~,

also
I read with distress your comments reported in the attached clip from our News Summary.

I can categorically assure you that I never was in Paris as claimed by the rumor mongers. I can categorically assure you that I have no information direct or indirect of any contact with Iranians *relating to the hostage question.*

I am disappointed that you would feel I might have been a participant in a scheme to keep any American held hostage. I *categorically* deny any such complicity.

One of the sad things about public life is you have to suffer attacks on your character, on your honor.

I can readily understand your concern when allegations are made like those made by Mr. Sick. A proposition so fundamentally immoral would certainly concern anyone involved, but please accept my word that I know *nothing at all* about anyone else's involvement in such an insidious plot, and I know for fact certain that I had no contact such as those being alledged by Mr. Sick.

I wish you all the best and I hope this has laid to rest some of your understandable concerns.

George Bush

FROM THE PRESIDENT

*pls
Type*



Mr. Kennedy,
Dear ~~Moerhead~~,

I read with distress your comments reported in the attached clip from our News Summary.

I can categoricly assure you that I never was in Paris as claimed by the rumor mongers. I can categoricly assure you that I have no information direct or indirect of any contact with Iranians *relating to the hostage question.*

I am disappointed that you would feel I might have been a participant in a scheme to keep any American held hostage. I categoricly deny any such complicity.

One of the sad things ~~about~~ public life is you have to suffer attacks on your character, on your honor.

I can readily understand your concern when allegations are made like those made by Mr. Sick. A proposition so fundamentally immoral would certainly concern anyone involved, but please accept my word that I know ~~nothing~~ at all about anyone else's involvement in such an insidious plot, and I know for fact certain that I had no contact such as those being alledged by Mr. Sick.

I wish you all the best and I hope this has laid to rest some of your understandable concerns.

George Bush

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

EX-IRANIAN HOSTAGE SAYS BUSH DENIAL OF DEAL DOESN'T CONVINCE HIM

FORT LAUDERDALE -- One former Iranian hostage said Wednesday that President Bush's "very limp denial" left him more convinced than ever that the presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan enticed Iranian officials to continue holding the hostages until after the 1980 election....

Moorhead Kennedy...said Bush's denial emphasized only that Bush personally was not involved, but left open the question of whether the deal took place. "If there was nothing to this story," Kennedy said, "the President would have said, 'Number one, there is nothing to this story. Number two, we have investigated our archives and files and found nothing to support such a story. And number three, we welcome a full investigation.'" Kennedy spoke from New York City, where he is a Republican Party deputy district leader.
(Don Melvin, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel)

OUTLOOK ON OVERHAULING FOREIGN AID: LITTLE CHANCE

President Bush's request for an overhaul of the foreign aid program that would override congressional restrictions on aid disbursements appears to have little chance of passage on Capitol Hill, according to Administration and congressional sources....

Administration officials say the ideas emanating from Capitol Hill would produce legislation worse than the existing law; congressional sources reply that what Bush really wants is what one called "unfettered discretion to tilt foreign aid more and more toward military rather than development assistance without any checks from Congress." For that reason, the sources said, Congress clearly intends to rebuff Bush's request, formally submitted last month, that it surrender much of its power to "earmark" aid.

(John Goshko, Washington Post, A19)

CHINA LASHES OUT AT U.S. PRESSURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

BEIJING -- China lashed out at the U.S. Thursday for exerting pressure over human rights, saying nothing could change China's policies -- not even the threat of losing trade privileges worth billions of dollars. A visibly angered Foreign Ministry spokesman, Wu Jianmin, told a news briefing that attempts in Washington to link extension of China's MFN status to its human rights record would not work.... "We do not want to see the deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations but this does not depend entirely on China," he said. "If such a situation does occur it is nothing to be afraid of. China is prepared for it."
(Reuters)

KERRY TO PROPOSE STEPS TO RESOLVE MIA ISSUE

Sen. Kerry...will announce today what his office describes as a major step toward resolving the status of the hundreds of U.S. service personnel still listed as missing in action from the war.

Kerry, who returned this week from a trip to Vietnam and Cambodia, is to announce that Vietnamese officials have agreed to allow Vietnam veterans and the families of those considered missing to travel "freely within the country" and to pursue leads about the missing. In addition, the Vietnamese government has agreed to offer translators and access to government records, a Kerry spokesman said.
("Short Takes," Washington Post, A19)

-more-

240178

PR015-02

COPY
from ORM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1991

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

I read with distress your comments reported in the attached clip from our News Summary.

I can categorically assure you that I never was in Paris as claimed by the rumormongers. I can also categorically assure you that I have no information direct or indirect of any contact with Iranians relating to this hostage question.


I am disappointed that you would feel I might have been a participant in a scheme to keep any American held hostage. I emphatically deny any such complicity.

One of the sad things about public life is you have to suffer attacks on your character, on your honor.

I can readily understand your concern when allegations are made like those made by Mr. Sick. A proposition so fundamentally immoral would certainly concern anyone. Please accept my word that I know nothing about anyone else's involvement in such an insidious plot, and I know for a fact that I had no contact such as those being alleged by Mr. Sick.

I wish you all the best and I hope this has laid to rest some of your understandable concerns.

Sincerely,



Mr. Moorhead Kennedy
The American Forum for Global Education
Moorhead Kennedy Institute
Suite 1200
45 John Street
New York, NY 10038

0510

~Enclosure: page A-16 of May 9 News Summary

~cc: Boyden Gray, Marlin Fitzwater, Bridget Montagne

EX-IRANIAN HOSTAGE SAYS BUSH DENIAL OF DEAL DOESN'T CONVINCE HIM

FORT LAUDERDALE -- One former Iranian hostage said Wednesday that President Bush's "very limp denial" left him more convinced than ever that the presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan enticed Iranian officials to continue holding the hostages until after the 1980 election....

Moorhead Kennedy...said Bush's denial emphasized only that Bush personally was not involved, but left open the question of whether the deal took place. "If there was nothing to this story," Kennedy said, "the President would have said, 'Number one, there is nothing to this story. Number two, we have investigated our archives and files and found nothing to support such a story. And number three, we welcome a full investigation.'" Kennedy spoke from New York City, where he is a Republican Party deputy district leader.

(Don Melvin, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel)

OUTLOOK ON OVERHAULING FOREIGN AID: LITTLE CHANCE

President Bush's request for an overhaul of the foreign aid program that would override congressional restrictions on aid disbursements appears to have little chance of passage on Capitol Hill, according to Administration and congressional sources....

Administration officials say the ideas emanating from Capitol Hill would produce legislation worse than the existing law; congressional sources reply that what Bush really wants is what one called "unfettered discretion to tilt foreign aid more and more toward military rather than development assistance without any checks from Congress." For that reason, the sources said, Congress clearly intends to rebuff Bush's request, formally submitted last month, that it surrender much of its power to "earmark" aid.

(John Goshko, Washington Post, A19)

CHINA LASHES OUT AT U.S. PRESSURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

BEIJING -- China lashed out at the U.S. Thursday for exerting pressure over human rights, saying nothing could change China's policies -- not even the threat of losing trade privileges worth billions of dollars. A visibly angered Foreign Ministry spokesman, Wu Jianmin, told a news briefing that attempts in Washington to link extension of China's MFN status to its human rights record would not work.... "We do not want to see the deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations but this does not depend entirely on China," he said. "If such a situation does occur it is nothing to be afraid of. China is prepared for it."

(Reuter)

KERRY TO PROPOSE STEPS TO RESOLVE MIA ISSUE

Sen. Kerry...will announce today what his office describes as a major step toward resolving the status of the hundreds of U.S. service personnel still listed as missing in action from the war.

Kerry, who returned this week from a trip to Vietnam and Cambodia, is to announce that Vietnamese officials have agreed to allow Vietnam veterans and the families of those considered missing to travel "freely within the country" and to pursue leads about the missing. In addition, the Vietnamese government has agreed to offer translators and access to government records, a Kerry spokesman said.

("Short Takes," Washington Post, A19)

-more-

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

OK
File

For Immediate Release

May 9, 1991

OK
GP
5-9-91

TRAVEL POLICY

The New Policy on the Use of Military Aircraft
by the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser

The President has directed the adoption of a new White House Policy on the use of military aircraft by the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser, based upon the recommendations of Counsel to the President C. Boyden Gray. The new policy is designed to avoid any questions about their use of military aircraft.

- o The President believes that the national security-related reasons behind the former policy remain sound and make commercial air travel an unacceptable alternative for the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser in many instances.
- o Nonetheless, to ensure that military aircraft are used only when necessary ~~and to protect the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser from further unwarranted criticism~~, the new policy will require the White House Counsel's Office to review on a case-by-case basis all requests for travel on military aircraft.
- o In the case of official travel, use of military aircraft will be authorized where security, communications or scheduling needs require the use of military aircraft.
- o In the case of personal travel, the President has decided that not only must there be a determination that security, communications or scheduling needs require use of military aircraft, but also that there is an immediate and compelling need for personal travel. The policy would permit, for example, travel on military aircraft to attend to the serious illness of a close relative when security, communications or scheduling needs would prevent travel on commercial aircraft.

- more -

- o The policy does not require that the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser always travel commercially because such a policy would unreasonably interfere with their personal lives. When compelling personal needs arise and national security considerations require use of military aircraft, the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser should not be prevented from attending to those needs.
- o To avoid the appearance that taxpayer dollars are being used to subsidize political travel, the President has decided to prohibit political travel on military aircraft by the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser unless the official purpose for travel is predominant or the President approves the travel.
- o For mixed official and political travel or mixed official and personal travel, the policy allows the use of military aircraft for predominantly official travel if security, communications or scheduling needs require the use of military aircraft. To ensure that there is no question about the official purpose behind any trip, the Counsel's Office will be required to make a determination that a trip is predominantly official before the trip will be treated as official.
- o The current reimbursement policy for all nonofficial travel is being retained. The Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser will be required to reimburse the government at commercial coach rates plus one dollar any time that they travel on military aircraft for personal or political reasons. Where the Chief of Staff or National Security Adviser take an official trip and also engage in an incidental political activity on the trip, some part of commercial coach fare will be charged to the sponsor of the political event.
- o *not specific mention st. & Def.*
The new policy does not apply to those members of the Cabinet who, pursuant to longstanding policies, regularly use government aircraft for official and unofficial travel. The responsibilities of these Cabinet members are such that they require instantaneous secure communications capability with the White House, their Departments, other agencies and the Congress. In an emergency, they must also be able to return to Washington, or to proceed to other destinations, on an expedited basis. These Cabinet members also have a heightened need for security because the nature of their official duties and their public visibility substantially increase the likelihood of threats to their personal safety.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY *cmg*
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Travel by the Chief of Staff and
the National Security Advisor

You have asked me and others to review Administration policy concerning the use by the Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor of military aircraft for official, political and personal travel. Our recommendation is that you retain the fundamental policy that official travel generally be by military jet, for the same national security-related reasons that were cited in the White House policy initiated in the Reagan Administration in 1987. At the same time, however, we also recommend that certain new procedures for travel be instituted to avoid any appearance that military aircraft is being misused. A set of options is set out below.

Authorization for use of military aircraft. In 1987, President Reagan determined that the Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor be directed to use military aircraft for all travel. Three reasons were given for this policy: these members of the President's staff needed to have immediate and secure voice contact with the President, the White House and the Departments at all times; it was important that they not be subject to the scheduling difficulties and risks of delay inherent in commercial air travel; and it was important that they receive the increased security provided by military aircraft.

Legitimate concerns underlay the 1987 determination. Given the extraordinary time demands on the Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor, and the limitations of commercial air travel, the practical consequence of denying them access to military transport would be to prohibit travel altogether in many cases.

It is instructive to recall the events that precipitated the Chief of Staff's use of military aircraft. At the outset of the Administration, the first three trips Governor Sununu took were on commercial aircraft. The first two were personal travel and caused no difficulty. However, the third trip included a much-delayed leg with a long wait in the Newark Airport that prevented close coordination on some of the finishing details of the 1989 budget agreement. These difficulties prompted Assistant to the President for Management and Operations Bonnie Newman and Colonel Krulak of the military office to apprise Governor Sununu of the existing policy that required the Chief of Staff to travel by

military jet.

While the reasons for requiring travel on military aircraft in many if not most cases remain valid, it would be preferable to examine their applicability on a case-by-case basis. A case-by-case review would, among other things, avoid any unfavorable appearance when the Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor use military aircraft for travel. Accordingly, I recommend that use of military jets for all official, political and personal travel should be reviewed and authorized by the Counsel's office on a case-by-case basis pursuant to a determination that security, communication or scheduling needs dictate the use of military aircraft. In evaluating security concerns, the Counsel's office would consult as appropriate with the security agencies.

Your options are:

- _____ Designate the Counsel's office to approve each travel authorization for the Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor that would entail use of military aircraft in light of security, communication, or scheduling needs; or
- _____ Retain the current policy that requires the Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor to use military aircraft for all travel.

Additional considerations for personal and political travel. In addition, there is always the risk of public criticism in using government aircraft, in whole or in part, for other than official travel. Therefore, I recommend additional standards that will limit the availability of government aircraft for personal and political travel.

For personal travel, I recommend that travel by military jet should only be authorized upon an additional, independent determination that there is an immediate and compelling need to travel. An immediate and compelling need would include, for example, the need to attend to a serious illness in the family.

Your options are to:

- _____ Require that personal travel may be on military aircraft only after an additional determination by Counsel's office that the need to travel is immediate and compelling.

_____ Do not require any additional determination.

Where use of a military aircraft is authorized for personal travel, I recommend that you retain the current policy of requiring reimbursement at commercial coach rates plus one dollar.

_____ Accept

_____ Reject

For political travel, there is a similar risk of criticism in using government aircraft for partisan political purposes. When a trip is wholly political, under longstanding practice of the military, each political traveller is billed the cost of commercial coach fare plus one dollar. For example, when Air Force One is taken on wholly political trips, the RNC or other political organization pays the cost of commercial coach fare plus one dollar for each political traveller. (When the traveller is a candidate for Federal office, however, as in 1984 and 1988, FEC rules require reimbursement for all political travellers at the first class rate.)

Reimbursement adequately answers any charge that either the traveller or the political party is being unjustly enriched. But reimbursement to the government of the cost of a coach fare for all passengers who are travelling for political purposes may not entirely respond to criticism that the remainder of the cost is being borne by the taxpayer. The best way to confront this criticism is to eliminate purely political travel of the Chief of Staff on military aircraft, except where personally directed by you and where, of course, the security, communication and scheduling criteria are met.¹

_____ Accept

_____ Reject

¹Of course, the Chief of Staff, like previous Chiefs of Staff, should be able to travel on aircraft provided by the RNC or political campaign, and so long as suitable communications, if needed, are available.

Official and mixed travel. Occasionally, a trip will be made for both official and political or official and personal reasons.² In order to determine whether military aircraft may be used for such trips, I recommend that an independent review determine whether a trip is predominantly official. This policy should avoid the appearance in all cases that anything other than official government business is the reason for taking a trip for which a military aircraft is used.

If the purpose of the trip is not predominantly official, I recommend that military aircraft be used only in the rare circumstance where it would be authorized if the trip were purely personal or political.

_____ Accept

_____ Reject

If a trip is determined to be predominantly official, military aircraft would be able to be used after a determination that security, communication, or scheduling needs so require. The Chief of Staff would also be able to engage in a personal activity or attend a political event assuming it does not result in any increase in costs to the government. Under longstanding practice throughout the government concerning official travel, where an official also engages in a personal activity that does not result in any increase in cost to the government, no reimbursement is sought, and I see no reason to revisit this practice. Where he attends a political event, however, I recommend applying the current allocation procedures to the percentage of the trip that is political. Applying the allocation policy would ensure that appropriated funds are not being used in part for political purposes.

_____ Accept

_____ Reject

²Connecting flights to or from the Presidential party for an official purpose will continue to be considered official travel.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Results of our review of your travel on military aircraft

My office has concluded the review you requested of your travel on board military aircraft from the beginning of the Administration to the present. We very much appreciate the cooperation we received from you and your staff, especially over last weekend.

While our review has found that several minor adjustments need to be made, it is our view that the answer to whether these trips were properly characterized and whether appropriate reimbursements have been made is essentially yes. We believe that application of the new review and approval procedures should eliminate the risk of any future mistakes in characterization or reimbursement. Moreover, with the exception of two trips, each trip which you have characterized as official instead of personal was within your discretion to make under the policies then in place. Application of the new travel policies for use of military aircraft may, however, result in different characterizations in the future.

More specifically, some adjustment should be made for official trips in which you attended a political event and political trips in which you also served an official purpose by a separate activity. We also concur in your office's recent recharacterization of three trips during the course of your own review, and the resulting adjustments already made. One trip of which a separate leg was required to attend primarily to a personal matter requires some reimbursement.¹ Two trips to

¹In the course of reviewing your travel records, we have also reviewed the travel records of other Federal employees who travelled with you or otherwise were passengers on flights you took on military aircraft. Reimbursement is required in a few instances where passengers travelled for other than official purposes, and we will work with the Military Office and the individual travellers to ensure that appropriate reimbursements are made. The travel of your wife and family is fully addressed in this memorandum. Any reimbursement required from other travellers is of course their responsibility and not yours, and these issues are accordingly not addressed in this memorandum.

participate in the Christa McAuliffe Celebrity Ski Event should have been considered unofficial, although we recognize that the status of charitable events is often misunderstood. For one of these trips, reimbursement was made contemporaneously for all travellers in your family including yourself, and for the other trip reimbursement was made contemporaneously for all travellers in your family except yourself. Reimbursement for your travel on this trip is warranted.

We also conclude that acceptance by you, Mrs. Sununu and members of your family of payment of travel expenses by the Republican National Committee and other outside organizations was consistent with applicable ethics laws. Finally, none of the reimbursements addressed in this memorandum were required to be reported on your calendar year 1989 public financial disclosure report.

Our review consisted of an examination of all available and relevant documentation in the custody of the Military Office, the White House travel office, and the Office of the Chief of Staff relating to all trips taken by the Chief of Staff on board military aircraft other than when accompanying the President or Vice President on Air Force One and Two. This consisted of travel manifests, travel itineraries, the Chief of Staff's schedule, the President's schedule, travel authorizations, travel vouchers, billing memoranda and cancelled checks. In addition, as you know, we discussed many of these trips with you and your staff. Finally, we consulted with the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department concerning legal questions raised in the course of our review.

The results of our review are presented in two parts.

I. Characterization of Trips as Official, Political or Personal.

At the outset it must be pointed out that the practice of characterizing a trip as official or political, but never mixed, is inconsistent with existing policy for senior Administration officials, as set forth in my February 12, 1990 memorandum to the Cabinet and previous White House Counsel memoranda. The allocation policy for mixed official and political trips is required by two fundamental principles of appropriations law. First, official activities should be paid for only from appropriated funds, subject to very limited exceptions, in order to avoid an impermissible augmentation of appropriations. Second, appropriated funds may not be used for other than official (*i.e.*, political) purposes. For Federal election campaigns, allocation is also required by Federal Election Commission regulations. 11 C.F.R. 106.3 (non-Presidential campaigns); 11 C.F.R. 9004.7 (Presidential campaigns).

Your staff has indicated that this policy has never been applied to the travel of the Chief of Staff, and the Military Office has never billed you for mixed official and political trips. I agree that the failure to apply the allocation policy resulted from an innocent misunderstanding. This may accordingly be corrected through appropriate reimbursements as indicated below.

A. Official trips that could be characterized as political, in whole or in part.

On May 21, 1989, you gave the commencement address at Manhattan College and St. John's College in New York City. Later that day, you spoke at the Verrazzano Day Award Dinner in honor of Governor DiPrete. Although I believe this dinner properly could be characterized as official (we are informed that no election campaign was under way, and the event was not a fundraiser), the White House travel authorization lists it as a "political event" and the "political" box is checked in addition to the "official" and "other (DiPrete)" boxes. Also, your travel voucher signed on June 1, 1989, deducted a small amount of the per diem expenses to which you were entitled, for the "political portion" of the trip. A notation on the worksheet states "6:30 pm begin political time;" 6:30 corresponds to your flight to Providence for the dinner for Governor DiPrete. Therefore, to avoid any question about whether this trip was properly characterized, the government should be reimbursed for the portion of your May 21 travel that reflects the Verrazzano Day dinner.

On May 24, 1989, you spoke at a testimonial dinner for the Speaker of the New Hampshire House, Doug Scammon. Our review confirms that this was not a partisan event, and that therefore it was properly characterized as official.

On December 15, 1989, you attended a fundraising event for Representative Bill Grant in Tallahassee, Florida. Your office has recently recognized that this trip was erroneously termed official, and on April 25, 1991 sought from the RNC appropriate reimbursement to the government. We agree that this event should be characterized as political, and that reimbursement is required.

On May 26, 1990, you delivered the commencement address at Akron University. You also briefly attended a State Republican Party event for the Voinovich for Governor campaign. Application of the White House allocation policy of mixed trips requires a partial reimbursement to the government for that portion of the Akron trip that was political.

You attended a fundraiser for the Massachusetts Republican party on June 9, 1990, and gave the commencement address at Suffolk University on June 10. The White House travel authorization lists the trip as both official and political. Application of the White House allocation policy for mixed trips requires some reimbursement to the government for the political portion of your trip.

B. Political trips that could be characterized as official, in whole or in part.

On October 20, 1989, you delivered the keynote address at the University of Florida Blue Key Banquet. Your office has indicated that this trip was erroneously characterized as political, and that the amount the RNC reimbursed the government for your travel should be returned to the RNC. We agree. The White House travel authorization lists the event as official, and we know of no reason to characterize your participation as anything other than official. Therefore, the amount paid by the RNC should be returned to the RNC.

On June 19, 1990, you spoke at an Allegheny County Republican fundraiser. Your trip was characterized as political on the White House travel authorization, and the RNC reimbursed the government. However, you also attended a Westinghouse Management Council reception with an estimated crowd of 200 in attendance. From our office's discussions with you, you confirmed that you spoke to influential business leaders without reference to any campaign, and that you gave a standard speech on the policies of the Administration that in other circumstances would readily be viewed as official. Therefore, it is our view that your attendance at the reception was an official activity. Under the White House allocation policy for mixed trips, some amount should be returned to the RNC.

On July 29, 1990, you attended the National Governors' Association meeting. This event was initially characterized as political, and the RNC reimbursed the government. Your office believes that trip ought to be considered official, and we agree. Attendance of White House officials at National Governors' Association events is normally considered official. Therefore, the amount the RNC reimbursed the government should be returned.

Between April 19 and 22, 1991, you attended a Manchester Republican Party event (April 19), engaged in various personal activities, and spoke at the Robert Frost Award dinner (April 21). The entire trip was characterized as political, and reimbursement has been sought. However, from discussions with

you, it is clear that the Robert Frost dinner was not political. Plymouth State College in New Hampshire each year presents the Robert Frost award to a distinguished citizen, and you attended to give a speech and present the award. Therefore, your participation at the Robert Frost dinner was official, and under the White House policy for mixed trips, the amount of reimbursement sought should be reduced by the application of the allocation formula.

C. Official trips that could be characterized as personal.

As you know, the new policy with regard to travel on military aircraft would require that a bona fide official activity must be the predominant purpose of the travel for a trip to be characterized as official. If the official purpose does not predominate, a higher standard would need to be met to use military aircraft for personal travel. However, we have analyzed the four trips which included weekend ski activities below under the two relevant White House policies in effect at the time you took these trips. First, there is a presumption that speaking engagements by White House officials are official activities, regardless of the setting or circumstances, so long as the official addresses matters of interest to the Administration. Second, high-level White House officials determine for themselves whether it is in the interests of the White House to attend a particular event.

On December 6, 1989, you flew from Washington, D.C. to Salt Lake City in the morning to address the Council of State Governments. Before returning to Washington, you flew to Vail to attend and speak at the 19th Annual Ski Magazine Week. This event is sponsored each year by Times Mirror, which publishes Ski Magazine and many other publications covering outdoor activities. You have informed my staff that your attendance that weekend was in furtherance of the Administration's efforts to explain and promote its policies concerning conservation and natural resources. Ski Magazine Week includes a series of conferences and meetings about skiing and other outdoor activities. The first evening you presented a letter from the President at the reception and gave remarks. The second evening you recall you spoke at the dinner banquet. The morning of the 9th you met with a group of citizens from around the country who had asked for a meeting with you to express their concerns about the Administration's conservation and natural resources policies. Each of these activities is properly considered official. Moreover, your determination that it was in the interests of the Administration for you to attend this event in order to participate in these particular activities is one that was within your discretion to make under then-current White House policies.

You have also characterized as official your travel to Aspen in December 1990 to attend the 20th Annual Ski Magazine Week. After arriving on December 6, you held several short meetings where you discussed Administration policy on conservation and natural resources. On December 7, you spoke in the morning on the situation in the Persian Gulf, and continued your discussion of conservation and natural resource policies in several informal meetings later that day. You spoke at the dinner banquet that night, and returned to Washington the afternoon of the 9th. Your characterization of the trip may stand for the same reasons given with respect to the Vail trip.

On February 8-11, 1990, and February 7-10, 1991, you participated in the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund Celebrity Ski Event. Our review indicates that the schedule of activities both years was substantially the same. Most of the three days of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday were devoted to the skiing event or open skiing. Each day included a luncheon or brunch; there was a dinner and fashion show on Friday evening; and a dinner, auction and awards ceremony on Saturday evening; both dinners were preceded by cocktail receptions. You characterized these trips as official², primarily because of your significant participation in orchestrating the Celebrity Ski Event, and speaking frequently at Event-sponsored luncheons and dinners. You have stated that your main message in all your speaking engagements during the two Ski Event weekends was to thank the participants for supporting the Trust Fund, how the benefits of the Trust Fund related to the Administration's approach to education, and to encourage them to continue their support of charitable activities such as this one. You also noted that the organization of the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund is a positive example of the public sector-private sector partnership (several New Hampshire state officials sit on the Trust Fund's Board of Directors) encouraged by this Administration.

You have participated in this event from its inception in 1986, when you were Governor. You have continued your participation in the organization and event in response to the President's call to all senior Administration officials to promote volunteer and charitable activities as Points of Light. You believe therefore that your participation in and promotion of a Point of Light is in furtherance of your official duties. While the President's

²The 1991 trip was initially considered personal travel by your office. On this basis, reimbursement was sought for your travel and obtained for your travel and the travel of others from the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund Ski Race.

Points of Light objectives are clearly furthered by your activities on behalf of the Christa McAuliffe organization, the participation of Federal officials in charitable activities such as this one is usually considered a personal volunteer activity. It cannot be the case that any Federal official's participation in a particular charitable activity of his choice is official solely because it is in furtherance of the goals of the President's Points of Light initiative. Generally speaking, for the activity properly to be considered official, it must at least be the case that either the speech given before the charitable organization relates to the official's duties, or the event is in furtherance of the Administration's objectives and it is important that the Administration be represented at the event. However, there has been understandable confusion about the extent to which the support of and participation in private charitable activities is considered official, given the official status of the Points of Light initiative in the White House. On balance, these two trips should be considered unofficial, and you should provide appropriate reimbursement.³

On January 19, 1990, you participated in the Celebrity Cup Ski Invitational being sponsored by the Genesis Foundation. The Foundation helps fund the National Birth Defects Center at the Franciscan Hospital in Brighton, Massachusetts. You arrived at the event in the late morning, participated in a luncheon, skied during the afternoon, and spoke at the Dinner and Awards Banquet. Your speech addressed private sector health care and the Administration's emphasis on children as reflected in the budget. You had no prior involvement with the Genesis Foundation, and have had no subsequent involvement with the Fund. You viewed your participation in the event as primarily in furtherance of the Administration's policy goals in those fields. We concur that your travel was predominantly official and that any personal enjoyment you gained from participating in the ski-related activities was incidental to the reason for your travel.

On June 14, 1989, you spoke to the Foundation for Economic Research in Boston, and later that day you attended your son Christopher's 8th grade graduation ceremony. You have informed my staff that the speaking engagement in Boston was not planned or scheduled around your son's graduation, but rather, your presence in Boston to speak to this group allowed you to attend the graduation for which you otherwise would not have travelled to attend. Moreover, you regard the speech to the Foundation as

³As noted previously, the government was previously reimbursed for all travellers to the 1991 Ski Event, and all travellers but you to the 1990 Ski Event.

an excellent opportunity to explain the Administration's policies to an influential group of business and civic leaders. Therefore, your trip was properly characterized as official.

On June 21, 1990, you attended the dedication of the Christa McAuliffe Planetarium in Concord. Later that day you spoke to the International Business Center of New England in Boston. Your participation in both of these events is properly considered official. However, there does not appear to be any official purpose for the first leg of the trip, to Boston, where you visited your dentist. Where travel is by commercial aircraft and a separate leg of an official trip is the result of personal travel, Executive Branch practice is to require the traveller to reimburse the government for the personal leg of the trip. This is also the practice of the White House Travel Office in calculating mixed official and political travel where there is a separate political leg of an official trip. Therefore, you should reimburse the government for that initial trip to Boston.

II. Reimbursements Made by Outside Organizations

For a number of trips for which you were required to reimburse the government for your travel or the travel of Mrs. Sununu or members of your family, the required reimbursement was made by an outside organization. Depending upon the circumstances, a payment made by an outside organization for the travel of a federal employee, his spouse or his family members raises three questions under ethics laws and regulations: (1) whether the payment was consistent with the applicable agency gift regulations and 5 U.S.C. § 7353;⁴ (2) whether the payment was

⁴The gift regulations for the Executive Office of the President are found at 3 C.F.R. § 100.735-14. They provide, in relevant part, that:

an employee shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or any other thing of monetary value from a person who:

- (1) Has, or is seeking to obtain contractual or other business or financial relations with his agency;
- (2) Conducts operations or activities which are regulated by his agency; or
- (3) Has interests which may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of his official duty.

consistent with the supplementation of salary statute, 18 U.S.C. § 209;⁵ and (3) whether the payment was properly reflected on the employee's public financial disclosure form for the relevant reporting period if the employee was required to file for that reporting period.

Based upon our review of the records and based upon our discussions with you, your staff, and Mary Matalin, Chief of Staff of the Republican National Committee, we believe that none of the reimbursements that have been accepted from outside organizations violate any substantive ethics law or regulation.⁶

3 C.F.R. § 100.735-14(a). The gift statute was enacted by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, P.L. 101-194 (Nov. 30, 1989). It provides, in relevant part, that:

no . . . employee of the executive . . . branch shall solicit or accept anything of value from a person --

(1) seeking official action from, doing business with or (in the case of executive branch officers and employees) conducting activities regulated by, the individual's employing agency; or

(2) whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual's official duties.

5 U.S.C. § 7353(a).

⁵The supplementation of salary statute provides that no employee of the executive branch may:

receive[] any salary, or any contribution to or supplementation of salary, as compensation for his services as an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government . . .

18 U.S.C. § 209(a).

⁶In three instances, we found that payments were accepted from organizations or individuals that were not qualified to reimburse a federal employee (or his spouse or family) for travel-related expenses. In each instance, however, your office corrected the erroneous payment prior to our review of the travel records.

A. Payments Made by Republican Party Organizations for Mrs. Sununu's Travel

The records of the Military Office show that the Republican National Committee (the "RNC") and the Republican Governors Association (the "RGA") reimbursed the government on a number of occasions when Mrs. Sununu travelled with you. Based upon our review of the records, and our discussions with you and Mary Matalin, we do not believe that any of these payments give rise to any issues under the applicable ethics statutes and regulations.

We understand that these payments were made in connection with Mrs. Sununu's independent relationship with the RNC and the RGA. She has worked on the staff of the RGA since February 1989, and was also made a consultant to the RNC in March 1990. We understand from the RNC that Mrs. Sununu has played an important role in fundraising efforts for the Republican Party. Ms. Matalin stated that Mrs. Sununu has "independent political credentials" and that she does not need a specific assignment from the RNC or RGA in order to serve their interests. In the RNC's view, "every group is a potential donor base." The RNC has assured us that, in each instance in which the RNC or the RGA reimbursed the government for travelling on military aircraft, the Republican Party had an interest in having Mrs. Sununu travel.

Because this independent relationship was the basis of payments by the RNC and the RGA for Mrs. Sununu's travel, the payments were consistent with the applicable gift regulations, 5 U.S.C. § 7353 and 18 U.S.C. § 209. Reimbursements by political organizations in connection with legitimate political activities of Federal employees, their spouses or family members are not prohibited under the gift regulations for the Executive Office of the President or the gift statute. These reimbursements are not considered "gifts." Moreover, when the reimbursement is provided to a Federal employee's spouse or family member in connection with the spouse's or family member's own political activities, they clearly do not constitute compensation for the services of the Federal employee. Accordingly, these payments do not implicate 18 U.S.C. § 209.⁷ Finally, the Office of Government

⁷The Office of Government Ethics has issued an informal advisory letter -- involving nearly identical facts -- that clearly supports this view of 18 U.S.C. § 209. Informal Advisory Letter 83 x 3, Office of Government Ethics (February 4, 1983). In that letter, OGE reviewed reimbursements that were made by outside organizations for the travel of the spouse of a federal

Ethics has informed us that payments by national political party organizations for the travel of Federal employees and their family members in connection with political activities do not need to be reported on an employee's public financial disclosure form.

B. Payments Made for Sununu Family Members by the RNC

On one occasion, the RNC reimbursed the Military Office for the cost of Mrs. Sununu, Peter Sununu and Christopher Sununu to travel from Washington to Boston and back. In addition, the RNC also reimbursed the Military Office for the flights of your parents on the return trip to Washington.⁸ These reimbursements were made in connection with a New Hampshire GOP Senate reception and an award given to you at the New England Lebanese American Dinner on September 17, 1989.

From discussing this trip with you, we understand that RNC Chairman Lee Atwater advised you that the dinner represented an important political opportunity. We further understand that the entire family was an important part of your appearance at the event, which in part celebrated Americans of Lebanese descent. The New England Lebanese American Foundation invited the entire family, and we have confirmed with the RNC that in these circumstances the attendance of the entire family furthered the political interests of the Republican party.

Because of the RNC's independent interest in having the family members attend, it is our view that, under the analysis discussed above, the payments do not implicate 18 U.S.C. § 209. In addition, because the family members were attending the event in a political capacity, the gift statute and regulations are not implicated by the payments. Reimbursements by political organizations in connection with the legitimate political activities of Federal employees and their family members are not prohibited under the gift regulations of the Executive Office of the President or the gift statute. Finally, as noted above,

employee. OGE concluded that the payments could not be properly characterized as "compensation for the services" of the federal employee if the spouse were travelling "in his or her own right." Id.

⁸You and Ed Rogers were originally listed as official travellers for this trip. In the course of reviewing available records, you determined that you and Mr. Rogers should have been listed as political travellers. The Military Office has been notified and a bill has been prepared for the trip.

payments by the RNC for the travel of federal employees and their family members in connection with political activities do not need to be reported under the public financial disclosure laws.

C. Payments Made Out of Excess Sununu Campaign Funds

In several instances, the White House Military Office was paid from the funds of "The Sununu Committee," your last gubernatorial campaign fund. We understand that the fund is subject to regulation under New Hampshire law and that New Hampshire law allows you to use the fund for personal and political purposes other than those related to the gubernatorial campaigns for which the funds were raised.⁹ Because you are allowed to so use the funds, it is our view that any payments made from the campaign fund are properly treated as if they were made out of your own personal funds for purposes of the applicable ethics laws and regulations. Accordingly, the payments that were received by the White House Military Office from the Sununu Committee do not raise any questions under the applicable ethical laws and regulations.

D. Payments by Other Outside Organizations

On seven occasions, organizations other than the RNC, the RGA and the Sununu Committee paid for the travel of Mrs. Sununu or Sununu Family members in connection with your official travel. In each instance, your office believed that it was accepting reimbursement pursuant to an exception to the gift and appropriations laws, 5 U.S.C. § 4111, that allows a government employee to accept reimbursement for official travel from an organization that has been recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal

⁹In a May 7, 1991 letter to you, William M. Gardner, Secretary of State for New Hampshire, concluded:

There is no prohibition whatsoever as to how funds in this account may be used. The only requirement is that every 6 months an accounting be made of how the funds were used, which you have complied with.

In 1990 a new law placed restrictions on the use of excess funds on candidates who voluntarily agreed to limit spending. This law in no way applies to you because you were neither a candidate in 1990 nor did you nor could you agree to the voluntary limit because the law was not in effect at the time of your candidacy in 1986.

Revenue Code.¹⁰

For four of those occasions, we have confirmed that a 501(c)(3) organization made the payments, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 4111. The reimbursements were made by the following organizations: (1) the Catholic Home Bureau paid for Mrs. Sununu's travel to a speech in New York on October 5, 1989, where you and your wife received the Child of Peace Award;¹¹ (2) Iona College paid for Mrs. Sununu's travel on September 23, 1990, to attend your keynote speech there; (3) The Jimmy Heuga Center paid for Mrs. Sununu's travel to attend your dinner speech on November 7, 1990; (4) and the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund paid for the travel expenses of the Sununu family and the Quayle family in connection with the Christa McAuliffe Celebrity Ski Event on February 7-10, 1991.¹²

¹⁰Regulations recently promulgated by the General Services Administration allow the government to accept reimbursement for travel expenses of their employees and their spouses from a much wider range of outside organizations, including for-profit corporations. Under the GSA rule, which became effective in March 1991, payment may be accepted for an accompanying spouse when the agency determines that the spouse's presence at the event will support the mission of the agency or substantially assist the official in carrying out his duties through attendance at or participation in the function. Both the official and spouse must travel pursuant to an official travel authorization. In the White House, the Counsel's Office reviews and approves requests for agency acceptance of payment by outside sources under the conflict of interest standards provided in the rule.

¹¹This reimbursement was not required to be reported on your 1989 public financial disclosure form because the amount of reimbursement (\$200) fell below reporting thresholds for gifts or reimbursements of transportation.

¹²Recent news reports have incorrectly concluded that the reimbursement by the Trust Fund is improper because payment was made from the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund Ski Race bank account. As Tom Corcoran, Co-host of the Ski Event, wrote in a note to the media on May 5, 1991, this account was specifically authorized by the trustees of the Trust Fund and designated for the exclusive purpose of running the ski event each year. Mr. Corcoran has stated, "This account is not used for any other purpose, there is no commingling of funds, it is not a corporate account, and it is not a company or resort account. . . . Technically the account and all monies in it belong to the Trust Fund."

On the other three occasions, reimbursement was mistakenly made by an organization or individual that was not a 501(c)(3) organization. In each instance, your office corrected the payments before we began our review. Reimbursement was made by Irving E. Rogers for Mrs. Sununu, Elizabeth, Peter and Christopher Sununu to travel to attend the 100th Anniversary Dinner for the Lawrence Eagle Tribune on June 16, 1990. It was originally intended that the Rogers Foundation pay for this travel. When your office discovered that the travel had been paid for by Mr. Rogers personally, the Military Office was reimbursed by the Sununu Committee with directions to refund Mr. Rogers for the payment he had erroneously made. Similarly, reimbursement was made for a June 5, 1990 trip to New Hampshire by the Business and Industry Association of New Hampshire. It was subsequently discovered that the Association is a 501(c)(6) organization and not a 501(c)(3) organization and reimbursement was instead made by the Sununu Committee. Finally, the American Ski Federation paid for Mrs. Sununu to travel to Aspen in connection with your speaking engagements there on December 6-8, 1990. It was discovered that the SIA Ski Educational Foundation, an affiliated organization of the Federation, should have paid for the trip, and the Foundation has made the appropriate payment to the government.

The only remaining issue is whether 5 U.S.C. § 4111 constituted authority for Mrs. Sununu and your family members to accept reimbursement of their travel expenses. Their travel would not ordinarily be considered official travel, and the government could not pay for their travel. Nonetheless, the Office of Government Ethics has informed us that, under long-standing interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 4111, a 501(c)(3) organization may also reimburse for the travel-related expenses of a spouse or family members who accompany a federal employee on official travel.

At your request, we also looked into charges that your family's expenses for several trips were paid for by corporate interests in violation of applicable standards of conduct. We confined our review to the five trips that included skiing or ski activities (Vail, Aspen, Attitash and the two Christa McAuliffe events), reviewed available records, and discussed these trips with your staff.

The trip to Vail in December 1989 was to attend the 19th Annual Ski Magazine Week. While in Vail, you stayed with friends and paid for your own meals. As a speaker at the dinner banquet, you were permitted to accept the dinner from the sponsor of the event under a longstanding exception to the gift restrictions. The Office of Government Ethics has confirmed that this exception also applies to your wife's dinner, if she was invited to

accompany you as the wife of a speaker and participant. In addition, Ski Magazine paid for ski lift privileges for you and your wife. We understand that spouses of speakers were invited to attend the event, and that all invited speakers and official participants and their spouses were given credentials that included skiing privileges. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the skiing privileges were given to Mrs. Sununu because of your government position, and therefore acceptance of the skiing privileges was not improper for reasons similar to those applying to your acceptance of the dinner.

In January 1990, you attended the Celebrity Cup Ski Invitational in Attitash, New Hampshire, and spoke at the Dinner and Awards Banquet, but neither you nor Mrs. Sununu lodged at the resort, spending the night instead in your home. The Genesis Foundation, a 501(c)(3) organization, sponsored the event. You and your wife could properly accept the dinner, because you spoke at the dinner. It is our understanding that the skiing privileges that were bestowed on you were provided by the Genesis Foundation.

In December 1990, the you and your wife travelled to Aspen to attend the 20th Annual Ski Magazine Week. It appears that Times Mirror or Ski Magazine paid for your lodging and meal expenses. This payment should not have been made. Ski Magazine is not a 501(c)(3) organization and is probably considered a "prohibited source" under the EOP standards of conduct, because it is difficult to conclude that this organization has no interests that may be substantially be affected by the performance of your job. This payment has been corrected, however: on May 2, 1991, the SAI Ski Educational Foundation, a 501(c)(3) organization, sent a check to the government to cover expenses for meals and lodging. We understand that the dinner and skiing privileges were given to you and your wife as they were in Vail.

In February 1990 and 1991, you and your family attended the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund Celebrity Ski Event in Waterville Valley, New Hampshire. Tom Corcoran, Co-host of the 1991 Event, has recently confirmed that the Trust Fund paid for all other expenses incurred by your family, "the same as any other celebrity. Everybody was treated alike. The Sununus didn't get any special treatment." Although he apparently was referring to the 1991 Event, we understand that the Trust Fund paid for the expenses in 1990 in the same manner. As noted earlier, the Trust Fund is a 501(c)(3) organization.

The issue as it now stands with respect to the expenses incurred at Attitash, Aspen, and Waterville Valley is whether you may accept reimbursements from 501(c)(3) organizations under applicable standards of conduct. As noted earlier, under 5

U.S.C. 4111, a Federal official and his spouse may accept reimbursement from a 501(c)(3) organization of travel and related expenses for official travel. "Related expenses" include lodging and meals, and registration or conference fees where they are charged.¹³

The gift provision included in the standards of conduct for the Executive Office of the President is very strict. For nearly all Departments and agencies, the term "prohibited source" generally includes all those who do business with or are regulated or affected by the policies and programs of the particular Department or agency. Yet the White House definition of "prohibited source" is much broader: it casts its net across the entire Executive Branch, in recognition of the President's supervision of all Executive agencies, and the significant role the President's subordinates play in that supervision. However, 5 U.S.C. 4111 specifically authorizes an exception to the general prohibition of the acceptance of travel and related expenses from outside organizations.¹⁴

The regulation implementing 5 U.S.C. 4111 allows an employee and his spouse to accept these expenses so long as no conflict of interest or an appearance of a conflict arises from acceptance.¹⁵

¹³The issue with respect to the expenses incurred at the Christa McAuliffe events is somewhat different, however, given our recharacterization of these trips as unofficial travel. Whether 5 U.S.C. 4111 can be used by an employee and his spouse to accept payments for travel and related expenses for personal travel is an open question. The plain language of the statute does not limit the payments to official travel, and we have not discovered any opinion or ruling either way. Without determining the reach of the statute in all situations, I believe it is appropriate in the case of the two McAuliffe events to apply the statute to your unofficial travel. In any case, we do not believe the Christa McAuliffe Sabbatical Trust Fund is a prohibited source under applicable standards of conduct.

¹⁴The recently issued GSA rule implements a more general exception, but was not in effect at the time of the payments discussed in this memorandum.

¹⁵Under 5 C.F.R. 410.701(b), payments may be accepted from 501(c)(3) organizations if payment

(1) Would not reflect unfavorably on the ability of the employee to carry out his official duties in a fair and objective manner;

We have considered the interests of each of the 501(c)(3) organizations that have paid for your and your wife's meals, lodging and skiing privileges, the nature of your official duties and your relationship with these organizations, and have determined that acceptance of lodging and meal expenses and skiing privileges from these organizations did not create any conflict or appearance of conflict of interest.¹⁶

* * * * *

This memorandum completes the review you requested of your travel on board military aircraft from the beginning of the Administration to the present. We will work expeditiously with your office, the Military Office, the White House Travel Office, and the RNC as appropriate to effect the few adjustments identified by our review.

(2) Would not compromise the honesty and integrity of Government programs or of Government employees and their official actions or decisions;

(3) Would be compatible with the Code of Ethics for Government Service expressed in House Concurrent Resolution 175, 85th Congress, second session; and

(4) Would otherwise be proper and ethical for the employee concerned under the circumstances in his particular case.

¹⁶Charges have also been made that the Lawrence Eagle Tribune paid for certain expenses for you and your family for your attendance at the 100th Anniversary Dinner for the newspaper. As noted above in connection with other trips, you (and your accompanying wife) may accept a dinner from an organization where you have been invited to speak to that organization.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS EVERGREEN

TO: The Secretary
FROM: IO - John R. Bolton *JRB*
SUBJECT: The Next UN Secretary General

I. Candidates

I recommend we decide among the following five candidates (listed alphabetically):

-- Ali Abdullah ALATAS (Foreign Minister of Indonesia): 59 years old, has served as Indonesia's permrep to the UN. Educated in Indonesia with a degree in Law Policy, he is a Muslim of Arab descent. Known to be a "detail" man not fond of delegating and impatient with what he perceives to be mediocrity. Speaks English.

-- Bernard Thomas Givson CHIDZERO (Zimbabwe's Senior Minister of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development): 64 years old, educated in Canada, with extensive service in international organizations. Chief Advisor to President Mugabe on economic reform, Chidzero advocates moderate economic policies. Speaks English and French. He would be the first African SYG. Not well known in international political circles; managerial skills unknown.

-- Tommy KOH Thong Bee (Singapore, Ambassador-at-large): 53 years old, has extensive experience at the UN, educated in Singapore, Harvard, and Cambridge. Active proponent of ASEAN, free market economics, considered father of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Speaks English and Chinese.

-- SADRUDDIN Aga Khan (UN Executive Delegate for Gulf Relief): 58 years old, educated at Harvard, has been involved in UN humanitarian issues for more than 30 years. His previous candidacy for SYG (nominated by Jordan) in 1981 was vetoed by the Soviets. Has been criticized for managerial shortcomings. Isma'ili Muslim. Speaks English, French, Arabic, Farsi, German, and Italian.

DECLASSIFIED

PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 11/8/24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

-- Krzysztof SKUBISZEWSKI (Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs): 65 years old, educated at Poznan, Harvard, and Columbia. Has specialized academically in international organizations. Seeks to develop closer ties with NATO and the West generally, focus on economic stability as key to Poland's security. Speaks English and French.

As a possible later round candidate, we might look at Ismat ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt's Foreign Minister): 68 years old, educated in Alexandria, with Ph.D in international law from the Sorbonne. Extensive service in international organizations, slated to be next Secretary General of the Arab League. Has history of coronary bypass surgery. Muslim. Speaks French and English.

II. Game Plan

- o It is clear that others already look to Washington to see if we have a favored candidate. Once we decide on a candidate, he is more likely to succeed if we take a prompt and assertive role, carefully structured to bring along the necessary General Assembly endorsement of a Security Council recommendation.
- o Once we've decided on our preferred candidate, we need to intensify our discussions with the UK, French, and Soviets. While the Chinese have said they would support an African candidate, the door has also been left open for a non-African.
- o Then, move out selectively to the ten non-permanent SC members, starting with Belgium, Austria, and Ecuador. The Indian perm rep has proposed that the fifteen members of the Council meet in private without notetakers to discuss the selection of the next syg. We should take up that offer, during May while the Chinese are in the SC Presidency to undercut complaints that the NAM are being undercut or minimized by Perm Five secrecy.
- o We will want to enter into full consultations with key non-Council members by August in the hope of completing the process during the French Council Presidency in September and before the Indian Presidency in October.
- o We should structure a geographically and politically carefully balanced series of endorsements of our candidates as we approach the Fall.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Talking Points	Points to be Made for Meeting with Shimon Peres (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Report	Government Report [double-sided] (1 pp.)	04/04/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Report	Government Report [double-sided] (1 pp.)	04/25/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012	OA/ID Number: 90597-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT: HOTLINE IN PRES MSGS

THE PRESIDENT HAS GLEN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET

<DTG> 050900Z MAY 91

FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET CHANNELS

0000

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TEXT:

DEAR GEORGE,

I WAS SO RELIEVED TO HEAR THAT YOU ARE ALL RIGHT. EVERYONE
HERE IS THINKING ABOUT YOU AND BARBARA AND WISHING YOU WELL.

YOU MAY JUST HAVE TO GET USED TO LEADING THE WORLD AT A FAST
WALK.

WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES,

JOHN

#0001

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By Dr NARA, Date 10/23/12

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5 May 1991

THE PRESIDENT HAS SLEEN

Situation Room Memorandum

The following calls were received by the Situation Room since the the President's arrival at Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Mr. Kergin of the Canadian Embassy called with the following message from Prime Minister Mulroney.

Dear George:

Mila and I were traveling in Quebec when we got the word. Since the news reports have been encouraging, we just wanted to send along our very best. Regards,
Brian

Saudi Prince Bandar called to express concern...requested to speak to Haass or Charles.

UK Ambassador Acland called to express the concern of Prime Minister Major and the Queen...requested to speak to General Scowcroft.

Bob Hutchings received call from Italian Charge...requested the following note be passed to General Scowcroft for the President.

President Cossiga heard the news and wanted to communicate to President Bush his best wishes for a prompt recovery.

Australian Embassy conveyed Prime Minister Hawke's message.

Delighted and relieved to hear you are feeling better and will be up and about soon.

Office of Mayor Dinkins of New York called...requested Cabinet-level official to whom the mayor could express his concern for President's welfare...referred to Mr. Rogers of the Chief of Staff's office.

ROK Embassy called to express the concern of President Roh...faxed message from President Roh (attached).

MAY 5. 1991

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT :

IT WAS WITH MUCH SURPRISE THAT I LEARNED OF YOUR SUDDEN HOSPITALIZATION.
ALTHOUGH NOW I AM RELIEVED TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE IN A STABLE AND SAFE
CONDITION, PLEASE ACCEPT MY EARNEST WISHES FOR YOUR SPEEDY RECOVERY.
WITH WARMEST REGARDS.

/S/ ROH TAE WOO

PRESIDENT

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

HIS EXCELLENCY

GEORGE HERBERT WALKER BUSH

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CB

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT GATES SCOWCROFT SIT
SIT BURNS FILE HEWETT SANNER SIT SUM VAX-----
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 060921Z MAY 91

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2485
INFO RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0525

DECLASSIFIED

PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 11/8/24~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 12378
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV ON U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS-----
SUMMARY AND COMMENT

1. (P) FOR SEVERAL MONTHS NOW, GORBACHEV HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED HIS DISPLEASURE AT THE FICKLE NATURE OF THE WESTERN PRESS AND ITS PREPAREDNESS TO QUICKLY REEVALUATE ITS VIEW OF THE DIRECTION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, AND OF HIM PERSONALLY -- TO THE POINT OF BETRAYAL. GORBACHEV USED HIS MAY 5 MEETING WITH MEDIA MOGUL RUPERT MURDOCH TO HAMMER HOME THE POINT THAT THESE WERE DIFFICULT TIMES AND THAT THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS ON PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S., WAS A KEY FACTOR. HE STRESSED THAT SUPPRESSION OF CHAOTIC ELEMENTS WAS NOT THE ANSWER AND THAT PERESTROYKA MUST MOVE FORWARD. NEVERTHELESS, HE WARNED THAT THE PRESENT TIME HARBORED SERIOUS RISK. GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS REGARDING THE STATE OF U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT INDICATE CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY. HIS WARNINGS THAT RELATIONS SHOULD NOT BE PUT TO "UNNECESSARY TESTS" AND THAT THE WORLD

BUSH LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY - GEORGE BUSH HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

COULD ONCE AGAIN PLUNGE INTO COLD WAR IF THE GAINS ACHIEVED WITH THE U.S. IN THE LAST FEW YEARS ARE UNDERMINED.. SUGGEST A GROWING PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT -- LIKE THE WESTERN PRESS BEFORE IT -- IS SLOWLY WITHDRAWING ITS SUPPORT. "UNNECESSARY TESTS" COULD WELL BE A REFERENCE TO U.S. POSITIONS ON RESOLUTION OF CFE AND THE NEED TO PASS THE EMIGRATION LAW (SCHEDULED FOR DEBATE ON MAY 7) BEFORE ECONOMIC TIES CAN BE IMPROVED.

END SUMMARY AND COMMENT

2. (U) ON MAY 5, PRESIDENT GORBACHEV MET WITH MEDIA MOGUL RUPERT MURDOCH AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY THE NEWS MEDIA. DETAILS OF THE MEETING WERE MADE PUBLIC IN BOTH "PRAVDA" AND TASS. GORBACHEV UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE FOREIGN PUBLIC CORRECTLY UNDERSTAND WHAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE USSR, NOTING THAT THIS TOOK ON PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AS U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WERE THE CORNERSTONE.

3. (U) GORBACHEV DECLARED THAT NO ONE COULD PREDICT WHAT WILL COME ABOUT FROM PERESTROYKA. HE SAID THAT "CHAOTIC ELEMENTS WERE INEVITABLE DURING THE TRANSITION OF ANY COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY A COUNTRY AS VAST AS (THE USSR)." HE STRESSED THAT "SIMPLY SUPPRESSING THEM WOULD MEAN A REVERSAL TO THE PAST, WHICH, IN TURN SPELLS RUIN." HE SAID MOVEMENT CAN ONLY BE FORWARD AND THAT THE IMMEDIATE TASK OF POLICY WAS TO PREVENT ELEMENTS OF CHAOS FROM ESCALATING TO CATASTROPHIC PROPORTIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE PRESENT TIME OFFERS A GREAT CHANCE, BUT HARBORS A SERIOUS RISK.

4. (U) GORBACHEV NOTED TO MURDOCH HIS CONCERN WITH EMERGING SIGNS THAT THE U.S. WAS READJUSTING ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. HE DECLARED THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THIS WAS REFLECTED NOT ONLY IN STATEMENTS, BUT ALSO IN CERTAIN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STEPS. GORBACHEV WARNED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO THINK CONSTANTLY ABOUT THE "SPECIAL VALUE" OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND TO REFRAIN FROM PUTTING THEM TO "UNNECESSARY TESTS," LET ALONE AT SUCH A CRUCIAL MOMENT. HE CONCLUDED THAT IF WHAT HAD BEEN ATTAINED AT THE END OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION WAS UNDERMINED, THE WORLD WOULD AGAIN PLUNGE INTO A "COLD" OR "SEMI-COLD" WAR.—

5. (U) ASKED ABOUT A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, GORBACHEV SAID THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED ON HIS PART. HE ARGUED THAT THESE MEETINGS MUST BECOME REGULAR AND FREE FROM SENSATIONALISM, AS IS CURRENTLY THE CASE WITH MEETINGS WITH THE LEADERS OF EUROPEAN STATES. HE

BT

#2378

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 12378

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

CONCLUDED THAT IF WASHINGTON IS STILL CONVINCED THAT THE SCHEDULED MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS WAS NEEDED, WE SHOULD ADVANCE TOWARD THIS GOAL CALMLY AND STEADILY. MATLOCK

BT

#2378

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11b. Cable	Cable Number: 071515Z May 91 (5 pp.)	05/07/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Thursday, May 9, 1991 [2]

Date Closed: 10/18/2012

OA/ID Number: 90597-004

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]


(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECE



07

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

FLASH!

RELEASER: _____

DTG: 052351Z

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Unclass. For PAGES 5

FROM MacLin Fitzwater
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
<u>Bethesda</u>	<u>Gov. Sammons</u>		

REMARKS _____

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

May 5, 1991
(7:45 p.m.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: Marlin Fitzwater

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Marlin", is written over the typed name "Marlin Fitzwater".

The attached statement is proposed to open a press conference tonight, within the next two hours, to describe the President's condition.

If a medical expert will brief on the President's condition and the procedure for tomorrow morning, the press conference should be held at the hospital. If no medical expert is available, I would brief at the White House.

I strongly recommend a briefing this evening that follows this course of action.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

May 5, 1991

President Bush's medical diagnosis today remains essentially the same as last night. He continues to take digoxin and procainamide for the atrial fibrillation. While there have been some indications of a response to the medicine, the President's heartbeat has not returned to its normal rhythm. The President is wearing a heart monitor and the doctors continue to watch his progress.

In order to allow continued observation of the President, he and Mrs. Bush will remain overnight at Bethesda Naval Hospital.

The President has spent a relatively active day at the hospital conferring with Governor Sununu, General Scowcroft, his doctors, Mrs. Bush, and other friends that he has called. He visited with his son, Marvin, and his daughter, Dorothy, at the hospital, as well as his grandchildren, Sam and Ellie LeBlond.

The President's medical team met for nearly two hours this evening (4:00 - 6:00 p.m.) to discuss the latest test data. They report that the President is in fine condition, good spirits, and showing some response to the medicine. They will review the President's progress again tomorrow morning, perhaps as early as 5:00 or 6:00 a.m.

The doctors report that atrial fibrillation can last for varying periods of time, sometimes only a few hours, sometimes longer. It is a condition that must be continually analyzed, but can be treated in a number of ways.

Because the President is now entering his third day with this heart irregularity, there has been considerable speculation about courses of medical treatment. We want to assure the American people that the President is in essentially healthy condition. He has not suffered a heart attack. He has not suffered heart muscle damage.

We remain hopeful that the medication will return his heart to normal rhythm. If by morning that is not the case, the doctors will consider another procedure which could involve (description of procedure). This procedure is well-known and relatively commonplace. The risk is minimal and roughly akin to that of a _____ procedure. Nevertheless, it would require general anesthesia, which would be expected to incapacitate the President for only a few hours. The final decision on this will be made tomorrow morning.

In that regard, I would remind you again that the President met with the Vice President, the Chief of Staff, the White House Counsel, the Physician to the President, the Secret Service, and the First Lady early in his Administration, in April 1989, to develop a workable plan for invoking the 25th Amendment, which provides for the transfer of power to the Vice President, should he ever be incapacitated, however brief the duration of that episode might be.

You will recall that then-Vice President Bush, on July 13, 1985, assumed the powers of the Presidency during President Reagan's operation. Aware of the complexity of that situation, President Bush wanted a contingency plan so that any similar situation would be handled efficiently and effectively. He wants the American people to know that these kinds of medical situations, which must be considered common to the life of all Americans, can be carried out without unnecessary alarm.

At this time, no determination has been made that such treatment or the resulting invocation of the 25th Amendment will be required. But we do want to address the speculation today by pointing out that a plan is in place should any kind of a treatment be necessary that would require the President to be incapacitated for any period of time.

Once again, I want to emphasize that there is every possibility the President will respond to his medicine in a way that returns his heartbeat to normal and no further treatment will be needed. The doctors will make that evaluation early tomorrow morning.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Seating
according
to
protocol

P

+ foreign affairs
meeting I should

be followed by

NSC State

590

Today JS was with
to me, but it should
be Brent

5/10/91 Tell S. T. man

BLH FLO P

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

CALL
BRADY

will stop
by

after
DPC
mtg.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 9, 1991

OK
GP
5-9-91

TRAVEL POLICY

The New Policy on the Use of Military Aircraft
by the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser

The President has directed the adoption of a new White House Policy on the use of military aircraft by the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser, based upon the recommendations of Counsel to the President C. Boyden Gray. The new policy is designed to avoid any questions about their use of military aircraft.

- o The President believes that the national security-related reasons behind the former policy remain sound and make commercial air travel an unacceptable alternative for the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser in many instances.
- o Nonetheless, to ensure that military aircraft are used only when necessary ~~and to protect the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser from further unwarranted criticism~~, the new policy will require the White House Counsel's Office to review on a case-by-case basis all requests for travel on military aircraft.
- o In the case of official travel, use of military aircraft will be authorized where security, communications or scheduling needs require the use of military aircraft.
- o In the case of personal travel, the President has decided that not only must there be a determination that security, communications or scheduling needs require use of military aircraft, but also that there is an immediate and compelling need for personal travel. The policy would permit, for example, travel on military aircraft to attend to the serious illness of a close relative when security, communications or scheduling needs would prevent travel on commercial aircraft.

- more -

- o The policy does not require that the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser always travel commercially because such a policy would unreasonably interfere with their personal lives. When compelling personal needs arise and national security considerations require use of military aircraft, the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser should not be prevented from attending to those needs.
- o To avoid the appearance that taxpayer dollars are being used to subsidize political travel, the President has decided to prohibit political travel on military aircraft by the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser unless the official purpose for travel is predominant or the President approves the travel.
- o For mixed official and political travel or mixed official and personal travel, the policy allows the use of military aircraft for predominantly official travel if security, communications or scheduling needs require the use of military aircraft. To ensure that there is no question about the official purpose behind any trip, the Counsel's Office will be required to make a determination that a trip is predominantly official before the trip will be treated as official.
- o The current reimbursement policy for all nonofficial travel is being retained. The Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser will be required to reimburse the government at commercial coach rates plus one dollar any time that they travel on military aircraft for personal or political reasons. Where the Chief of Staff or National Security Adviser take an official trip and also engage in an incidental political activity on the trip, some part of commercial coach fare will be charged to the sponsor of the political event.
- o *with specific mention of Sec. & Def.*
The new policy does not apply to those members of the Cabinet who, pursuant to longstanding policies, regularly use government aircraft for official and unofficial travel. The responsibilities of these Cabinet members are such that they require instantaneous secure communications capability with the White House, their Departments, other agencies and the Congress. In an emergency, they must also be able to return to Washington, or to proceed to other destinations, on an expedited basis. These Cabinet members also have a heightened need for security because the nature of their official duties and their public visibility substantially increase the likelihood of threats to their personal safety.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 2, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Travel by the Chief of Staff and
the National Security Advisor

You have asked me and others to review Administration policy concerning the use by the Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor of military aircraft for official, political and personal travel. Our recommendation is that you retain the fundamental policy that official travel generally be by military jet, for the same national security-related reasons that were cited in the White House policy initiated in the Reagan Administration in 1987. At the same time, however, we also recommend that certain new procedures for travel be instituted to avoid any appearance that military aircraft is being misused. A set of options is set out below.

Authorization for use of military aircraft. In 1987, President Reagan determined that the Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor be directed to use military aircraft for all travel. Three reasons were given for this policy: these members of the President's staff needed to have immediate and secure voice contact with the President, the White House and the Departments at all times; it was important that they not be subject to the scheduling difficulties and risks of delay inherent in commercial air travel; and it was important that they receive the increased security provided by military aircraft.

Legitimate concerns underlay the 1987 determination. Given the extraordinary time demands on the Chief of Staff and the National Security Advisor, and the limitations of commercial air travel, the practical consequence of denying them access to military transport would be to prohibit travel altogether in many cases.

It is instructive to recall the events that precipitated the Chief of Staff's use of military aircraft. At the outset of the Administration, the first three trips Governor Sununu took were on commercial aircraft. The first two were personal travel and caused no difficulty. However, the third trip included a much-delayed leg with a long wait in the Newark Airport that prevented close coordination on some of the finishing details of the 1989 budget agreement. These difficulties prompted Assistant to the President for Management and Operations Bonnie Newman and Colonel Krulak of the military office to apprise Governor Sununu of the

5/9/91

* TOLD CHARLIE BARTLETT--
DID NOT MAIL

Patty Presock



**Coleman/Bartlett's
Washington Focus**

John Coleman, Jr.
222 E. Wisconsin Ave. - Suite 115
Lake Forest, IL 60045
(312) 234-0082
FAX: (312) 234-0903

Charles L. Bartlett
1529 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 234-3681
FAX: (202) 483-6018

Mr. & the President
from Charles Coleman

All is well that ends well and I am

glad to learn that Al Murtha didn't wind up

in an Iraqi clinic. I still think he

deserves residence in the USA for the part

he played in getting Saddam to turn loose

the hostages.

5-8-91

Charlie
I'm glad his actions were safe, the
but his was tough
going hard to All Bart
Cyr

5/8/91

a0642reute

r i.. AM-CANADA-IRAQ 05-08 0477

AM-CANADA-IRAQ

IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO U.S. FEARED FOR LIFE, CANADA SAYS

By Robert Kozak

OTTAWA, Reuter - Canada has granted permanent resident status to Iraq's former ambassador to the United States because he feared for his life, and he will be eligible for citizenship in three years, a government spokeswoman said Wednesday.

Mohammed al-Mashat, who was Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's voice in Washington in the tense months ahead of the Gulf War, and two unnamed dependents received landed immigrant status, an External Affairs Department spokeswoman said.

"Basically he was unhappy with the regime and didn't want to go back," said the spokeswoman who requested anonymity. "We examined it (his claim) closely and found it to be okay."

Al-Mashat, who gained attention last year as the chief defender in Washington of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, left the United States for Europe in mid-January.

The 59-year-old former minister of higher education in Baghdad was a frequent guest on U.S. television current affairs programs. He often stressed that Iraq wanted to resolve the dispute through peaceful means.

The former Iraqi envoy approached Canada's mission in Vienna and applied for entry to Canada, although not as a refugee.

"He was admitted (into Canada) under a fear-for-life consideration, which meant his life may be at risk. We looked at this quite seriously," the spokeswoman said. The former diplomat entered Canada on March 30.

Diplomatic sources said he is a gregarious man who loves Shakespeare and is and a fashionable dresser.

He studied criminology in California 40 years ago and has a doctor's degree in sociology from a Maryland university.

Before transferring to Washington in the fall of 1989 he served as Iraq's ambassador in London for two years after postings to France and Austria.

Opposition party officials say the ambassador received approval to enter Canada about five times faster than most foreigners seeking landed immigrant status.

A spokesman for the Canadian Immigration Department said immigration procedures can take from two months to a year, depending on how long it takes an immigrant to satisfy three requirements.

The prospective immigrant must prove his medical and financial well-being and demonstrate that he poses no security or criminal risk.

"It's taking two or three years. The fact of the matter is this guy got it done very quickly," a spokesman for the opposition New Democratic Party said.

"Here we have an apologist for Saddam Hussein and all of a sudden he is fast-tracked into Canada. It leaves everyone else scratching their head and wondering why," said Tom Wappel of the opposition Liberal party.

Canada recently established a five-year immigration plan. Preliminary figures show that in 1990 about 211,000 people were admitted. The target for 1991 is 220,000 immigrants.

REUTER

Reut13:05 05-08

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

PRESS RELEASE

EMBARGOED UNTIL THURSDAY, 6:00 P.M., MAY 2, 1991
(FOR FRIDAY AM'S)
CONTACT: FRANK SIEVERTS, (202) 224-5220

**REPORT SAYS U.S. LOST OPPORTUNITY TO OUST SADDAM;
URGES EXPANSION OF SAFE HAVEN TO PROTECT KURDS**

Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today released a staff study on the civil war in Iraq. The report says that only an expanded safe haven can accommodate all two million Kurds that are now refugees, and that foreign protection for the Kurds may have to continue indefinitely. The report says that the United States may have lost an opportunity to oust Saddam Hussein in March and faults an Administration policy of no contacts with the Iraqi opposition for the failure to anticipate the uprising and to respond effectively to it.

The report is prepared by Peter W. Galbraith of the Committee's professional staff. Over the Easter weekend, Galbraith travelled through Iraqi Kurdistan with the Kurdish rebels. As the Kurdish resistance collapsed, he narrowly escaped across the Tigris River to Syria. Galbraith has previously carried out Committee studies on Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and on the Iran-Iraq war.

Attached is the staff study "Civil War in Iraq."

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

CIVIL WAR IN IRAQ

**A Staff Report
to the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
May 1, 1991**

CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal.....	iii
Summary of Key Findings.....	iv
I. Civil War.....	1
A. The Revolution Begins.....	1
B. The Kurdish Rebellion.....	3
C. Meanwhile in the South.....	6
D. The Collapse of the Kurdish Insurgency in the North..	7
II. The Humanitarian Crisis in the North.....	10
A. March 30-31, 1991.....	10
B. The Destruction of Kurdish Villages.....	11
C. The Concentration Camps.....	13
D. The Killing Machine.....	15
E. Effective Relief.....	16
III. United States Policy and the Lost Revolution.....	22
A. The "No Contacts" Policy.....	22
B. The Iraqi Opposition.....	24
C. An Opportunity Lost.....	27
D. The Relief Effort: Too Late for Too Many.....	29
IV. Prospects.....	32
A. The Kurdish-Iraqi Deal.....	32
B. Saddam Hussein's Future.....	34

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Humanitarian Issues

● Iraq's civil war has cost tens of thousands of lives in the Kurdish and Shi'a regions of the country, and has precipitated an immense humanitarian catastrophe. In northern and southern Iraq, forces loyal to Saddam Hussein have shelled cities intensely, have leveled neighborhoods, and have engaged in wholesale massacres of civilians. More than 2 million Iraqi Kurds have sought refuge on the Iraq-Turkey and the Iraq-Iran borders and they are dying at a rate of up to 2,000 a day.

● The safe havens created by U.S. and coalition forces around the northern Iraqi city of Zakho will draw thousands of Kurdish refugees out of the mountains. However, the Kurds are likely to remain in the Zakho vicinity only as long as foreign forces are there to protect them. Other refugees may not go to the safe havens because of uncertainty over the duration of international protection. The Kurds are at risk of slaughter as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, and so the foreign protection will need to continue indefinitely.

● The more than one million Kurds languishing in Iraqi resettlement areas are the invisible victims of Iraq's civil war and repression. The resettlement areas, euphemistically known as "victory cities" but really concentration camps, were set up to accommodate rural Kurds made homeless by the regime's program to destroy all the villages of Kurdistan. Mostly unemployed since their arrival in the settlements in the mid-1980's, these Kurds have had little food and no transport to facilitate an escape to the mountains. Prior to the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion, the plight of these concentration camp Kurds was precarious. After a month of possible starvation and retribution, the death toll in the resettlement areas could be very high.

● Only an expanded safe haven encompassing towns along Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran can accommodate all 2 million Kurdish refugees. The large size of the zone required is one by-product of Iraq's policy of destroying the villages in Kurdistan. The current policy of permitting the Baghdad administration and police to remain in the safe haven risks U.S. and coalition involvement in the conflict between the Kurds and the Saddam Hussein regime. Such a result can be avoided, and law and order better preserved, if the Kurds are allowed to administer and police towns in the safe havens themselves.

May 1, 1991

The Honorable Claiborne Pell

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. Senate

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

At your direction, I have prepared and am transmitting a staff report on the future of Iraq. Over the Easter recess I travelled to the Middle East and to Iraq. I visited the coalition-held areas on the Iraq-Kuwait border, and travelled more than 150 miles through rebel-controlled Iraqi Kurdistan. Cities visited included Zakho, Dihok, and Amadiyah.

My visit to liberated Kurdistan, over the weekend of March 30-31, coincided with the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion and the beginning of the humanitarian catastrophe now overwhelming the Kurdish people. I was an eyewitness to many of the atrocities being committed by the Iraqi army, including the heavy shelling of cities, the use of phosphorous artillery shells, and the creation of tens of thousands of refugees. From Kurdish leaders and refugees I heard first-hand accounts of other horrors including mass executions and the leveling of large sections of Kurdish cities.

The Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani was my host in northern Iraq, and I also met with other leaders including Samy Abdul Rahman and the Assyrian Jacob Yousif. In Damascus, Frankfurt, Paris, and Washington I met with other Iraqi opposition representatives including leaders of the religious and secular Shi'a parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Assyrian and Chaldean communities, and the Sunni Arab independents. I would like to express my appreciation to my Kurdish hosts and escorts who not only provided an opportunity to see first-hand the situation in liberated Kurdistan but who also protected me during a rapidly deteriorating military situation.

The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or any Members thereof.

Sincerely,

Peter W. Galbraith

A. The Revolution Begins

On February 27 at midnight E.S.T., President Bush halted Operation Desert Storm after 100 spectacularly successful hours of a ground campaign. American forces had not only liberated Kuwait but were in occupation of 15 percent of southern Iraq and located adjacent to such southern Iraqi cities as Basra, Nasiriyah, and Sud al-shuyukh

The Iraqi army was decimated. Of a pre-war size of

1,000,000, as many as 100,000 were dead. Most of its tanks, armor, and artillery had been either destroyed by coalition bombing, or abandoned and captured during the ground war.

Ordinary Iraqi soldiers, like the people in towns under U.S. military control, viewed the Americans as liberators. This attitude, seen graphically in television images of defeated soldiers kissing the American victors, was combined with an intense hatred for the man who had inflicted so much misery in

Iraq, Saddam Hussein.

On March 2, two days after President Bush halted the ground war, a surviving Iraqi tank driver in the southern city of Basra halted his tank before one of the 2-story high portraits of Saddam Hussein that hang everywhere in Iraqi cities. Through the portrait he fired a shell. This shell

Policy Issues

- The United States was unprepared for the peace that followed the Gulf War. Although President Bush fueled the rebellion inside Iraq by calling on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the Administration did not anticipate the uprising either in northern or southern Iraq. As a result, the United States may have lost an opportunity to overthrow Saddam Hussein in mid-March, and it was unprepared to cope with the humanitarian crisis that followed the brutal repression of the rebellion.

- The Administration's surprise at events inside Iraq is directly traceable to a policy of no contact with the Iraqi opposition. This policy, originally dictated in response to Iraqi and Turkish protests over a 1988 State Department meeting with a Kurdish leader, continued until the end of the Gulf War and even after Turkey initiated its own dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds.

- Perhaps as a result of not speaking with the Iraqi opposition, the Administration mischaracterized the goals of both the Shi'a rebels in southern Iraq and the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. This mischaracterization may have contributed to the decision not to assist the rebels at a time they had the possibility of ousting Saddam Hussein.

- As the anti-Saddam rebellion gained force in mid-March, several strategically located Iraqi military figures were in contact with the Joint Action Committee of the combined Iraqi opposition. According to opposition sources, these leaders looked for a signal that the United States supported the rebellion. Not only was no signal given, but the public snub of the Iraqi opposition combined with background statements that the Administration sought a military, not a popular alternative to Saddam Hussein, served to deter defections to the rebellion, thus helping to doom the anti-Saddam cause. The United States also failed to respond to a Saudi proposal to assist the rebels.

- In spite of clear warnings, the Administration responded too late to the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Iraq's civil war. Military efforts now underway are at last providing effective relief.

- Saddam Hussein has greatly strengthened his internal position in the two months since the end of Operation Desert Storm. While he no longer poses a military threat to the region, he continues to menace his own people. Therefore, unless the United States is prepared to abandon the Iraqi people, it will be involved in the Iraqi quagmire for a long time to come.

Also from Iran in the early days of the Shi'a rebellion came elements of the Badr Brigade, an Iranian-trained force of exiled Iraqi Shi'a. Inside Iraq the Badr Brigade was a disaster. It organized (perhaps with some local rebels) the execution of surrendering and captured Iraqi army units. These executions promptly ended the surrenders and the defections.

him. Many of the Shi'a rebels would have associated themselves with neither its instigator, nor its leader, and it is unclear how visible person associated with the Shi'a uprising but he was result, Badr Hakim, from his exile in Iran, became the most a man whose six brothers had been executed by Saddam. As a Hakim, the son of the Shi'a spiritual leader Muhsin Hakim, and Republic. These Iraqis brought with them pictures of Badr predominantly Arab southwestern corner of the Islamic came Iraqi Shi'a who had long been refugees in the later, some Shi'a clerics. From Iran to join the rebellion group comprising military defectors, outraged citizenry, and, populated areas of southern Iraq. The rebels were a motley Within days anti-Saddam rebels controlled most of the

southern Iraq. Kuwaiti oil fire, through the Shi'a-dominated cities of ignited a spontaneous rebellion that raged, like a nearby

As the Shi'a rebellion spread, the Iraqi regime pulled its forces out of northern Iraq to protect Baghdad and put down the rebellion in the south. This gave the Iraqi Kurds their chance.

B. The Kurdish Rebellion

Long suppressed by Sunni Arab regimes in Baghdad, Iraq's Kurds have almost invariably seized on weakness in the center as an opportunity for rebellion in the mountainous Kurdish areas of northern and eastern Iraq. Thus the Kurds took advantage of revolutionary confusion in Iraq in the 1960's and 1970's to rebel (a rebellion crushed after a U.S.-approved Iraq-Iran deal led to the cut-off of CIA assistance in 1975) and of the Iran-Iraq war to rebel in the 1980's. This time, however, the Kurdish leadership was more cautious.

The 1980's rebellion had been crushed with incredible ferocity. Beginning in 1985, the Iraqi regime had engaged in an accelerated program of destroying all the villages of Kurdistan. In March 1988 the regime used poison gas on the city of Halabja, and then in August launched a broad chemical weapons attack on more than 70 villages along the Iraq-Turkey and Iraq-Iran borders. With that rebellion taking the lives of more than 100,000 Kurds and costing another 2,000,000 their homes, the Kurdish leadership was reluctant to proceed without an assurance of success. To many in the Kurdish leadership the

calls made by President Bush for the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam Hussein and, in particular, the promise to shoot down Iraqi aircraft ("You fly, you die") provided such an assurance.

The spearhead of the Kurdish rebellion was not, however, the longtime leadership of the anti-Saddam Kurdish political parties. As in the south, there was a spontaneous popular uprising followed by the near simultaneous defection of some 300 officers of an all-Kurdish territorial military force. The defection of these officers and their units, locally known as the "jash" (or "mules") and long on the payroll of the Baghdad regime, effectively brought all the cities of Kurdistan under Kurdish control. It was only at this point that the two principal Kurdish leaders --- Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan --- emerged to take control of the rebel forces.

For a brief 2-week period at the end of March euphoria reigned in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds set up local administrations, restored basic services including electricity (Zakho in far north Iraq had electricity on Easter weekend; Baghdad did not), and prepared defenses. The Kurds inherited vast quantities of Iraqi military equipment including trucks, tanks, artillery, mortars, and light arms. They even captured an airfield with several Iraqi war planes.

For the first time the Kurdish population at large was exposed to the Kurdish insurgent movement and to the recent history of the movement. In the cities there were town meetings providing for give-and-take between Kurdish leaders and community leaders and professionals. Movie houses showed video footage of the Halabja poison gas attacks, including documentaries made by Western television networks. Kurds were able to visit the torture centers of the regime as well as the 15 or more extravagant palaces owned by Saddam Hussein in the Kurdish mountains. Ba'ath party headquarters were torched as were the local mukhabarat (secret police) offices. Abandoned army barracks were stripped of their tin roofs as well as other valuables.

The Kurds distributed weapons to every able-bodied man and claimed to have more than 400,000 men under arms. An observer could see that virtually every man in the Kurdish-controlled cities was armed but, as the Kurds discovered, an armed population does not an army make.

The Kurds also took large numbers of Iraqi prisoners. Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, estimated the total to be more than 100,000 but noted the Kurds could not hold these prisoners as they had no food or other means to take care of them. Interestingly the Kurds reported that their prisoners included more than 100 members of the Peoples Mojahideen, an anti-Khomeini Iranian group led by

Massoud Rajavi, that apparently was fighting with Saddam Hussein in Iraq's civil war.¹

C. Meanwhile in the South

Kurdish euphoria proved short-lived. In the south, forces loyal to Saddam Hussein recaptured the main cities and engaged in a brutal campaign of repression. According to refugees, captured rebels typically were lined up, nooses strung from the lowered barrel of a tank gun were placed around their necks, and then the rebels were hanged as the gun barrel was raised. Shi'a holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala became abattoirs for the slaughter of rebels, clerics, and alleged sympathizers.

In addition to these activities, the Ba'ath regime apparently indulged its favorite pacification technique in the south. Whole neighborhoods were destroyed in March and early April, depriving urban rebels of sanctuary and punishing a hostile population.

¹The People's Mojahideen have sent a crude propaganda video to Members of Congress alleging that Iranian Revolutionary Guards, disguised as Kurds, launched a broad attack on northern Iraqi cities including Sulaymaniyah. In the video the People's Mojahideen boast of their role in defeating this supposed Iranian attack. In fact, Sulaymaniyah and other Kurdish cities were controlled by the Iraqi Kurds and any battle waged by the People's Mojahideen was on behalf of Saddam Hussein and against the Kurdish rebels.

The south's flat terrain, combined with the absence of experienced Shi'a guerrilla fighters, facilitated Saddam Hussein's repression of the southern revolt. The refugee flow out of the south -- approximately 40,000 to the U.S. zone and 70,000 to Iran -- did not compare to that which subsequently occurred in the north in part because the Iraqi army was able to surround cities and close off exit points prior to initiating the slaughter. The plight of Iraq's Shi'as, while far less visible than that of the Kurds, is certainly more severe than currently depicted.

D. The Collapse of the Kurdish Insurgency in the North

By March 28 the military tide was beginning to turn against the Kurds. Iraqi forces, backed up by helicopter gunships, launched a ferocious assault on the city of Kirkuk. As parts of the city were retaken, Kurdish insurgents reported that remaining residents of Kurdish neighborhoods were machinegunned and slaughtered. Within days Iraqi army forces moved into other Kurdish cities and towns: Dihok and Irbil fell on March 31, Zakho, and Sulaymaniyah on April 1.

Partly the Kurdish defeat is explainable by the ferocity of the Iraqi attack. Cities were subject to intense bombardment. Dihok, for example, was shelled incessantly the night before it fell. Phosphorous shells, which can instantly cremate their victims, were used extensively and with maximum

terror impact. Unlike the Iraqis, the Kurdish leaders were unwilling to subject their own people to this sort of devastation. Kurdish forces pulled out of cities not only because they believed they could not hold them over the long term, but also because they wanted to spare civilians and facilitate their flight to safety.

While the Kurds captured large quantities of Iraqi weapons, they were unable to make effective use of them. Artillery pieces were often idle for lack of firing pins. The Kurds had quite a collection of captured Soviet-made tanks (some disabled in the capture were restored by the Kurds) but did not necessarily have the ordnance to go with the tanks. All Kurdish military operations were hampered by a lack of gasoline and in some cases food for the guerrillas.

The Kurds also suffered from command and control deficiencies. Communication between commanders was often by written note and, when they had electronic communications, these were limited and not effectively utilized. Logistically, the Kurds had difficulty matching ordnance with weapons. The tank drivers would not necessarily know of a supply of ordnance stockpiled in a different part of Kurdistan.

From the cities of Kurdistan hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to the high mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders. The flight was not easy. After 8 months

of sanctions and 2 months of war, little gasoline remained in Kurdistan. Thus, most refugees travelled by foot. The vehicles seen heading out of Dihok, presumably typical of the flight from other cities, were heavily overloaded. Dump-trucks carried loads of fifty or more, private cars were filled and even carried adults and children in the trunks.

Not all the refugees were Kurds. Living among the Kurds in the north were more than 500,000 Christian Assyrians and Chaldeans. In Dihok, on Easter Sunday, Yacoub Yousif, an Assyrian leader, was eager to take his American visitor to the midnight service in an ancient Assyrian church, the first such service there since the Ba'ath regime had closed it years before. Heavy shelling of the city forced the priest to postpone the midnight mass to 2:00 a.m. and then, as the shelling continued unabated, to postpone to Easter morning.

Easter morning the last of the Dihok residents were moving out and the Easter service was not held. And a day which Kurds, Assyrians, and Chaldeans hoped might be part of their national resurrection instead marked the beginning of a new chapter of suffering and death.

II. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN THE NORTH

A. March 30-31, 1991

As the Easter weekend concluded, it was clear an immense catastrophe was about to overtake the Kurdish people. People travelling to mountains on foot carried little food and not much with which to shelter themselves; adults shepherding children or assisting the elderly were able to bring even less. Those with cars and trucks were better off as they could carry more and arrived in the mountains less exhausted. However, even before the Kurds left their cities, little food was available. Typically a family group of ten finding refuge in the high mountains on the Iraqi side of the border arrived on Easter Sunday with a hundred pounds of rice and perhaps some other more perishable foodstuffs. It would be another 3 weeks before any significant international relief reached these people, and the Easter Sunday arrivals were the lucky refugees: they had come by truck or car.

Ultimately, some 800,000 Kurds actually reached the Turkish border while up to 1,500,000 are in Iran or along the Iranian border. The television images of these refugees -- desperate people living in filth, fighting for food, and burying their babies -- have shocked governments into action. Yet, they only represent part of the catastrophe.

Some unknown number of Kurds are still in the high mountains on the Iraq side of the Iraq-Turkey border, and perhaps on the Iraq side of the Iran-Iraq border. These are people camped out along the high Amadiyah-Zahko road, and on spur roads to the north. Almost certainly other refugees are camped along the road from Amadiyah to Rawanduz and in the mountains rising up to the Turkish border. These people are in areas where the Peshmerga, the Kurdish insurgents, operate, and of their plight little is now known except they are receiving no aid.

Another group invisible to the outside world but almost certainly in desperate condition are the residents of the so-called "victory cities," concentration camps created by the Saddam Hussein regime to house the villagers made homeless by the regime's depopulation program.

B. The Destruction of Kurdish Villages

Beginning in 1985 the Iraqi regime hit upon the ultimate solution to the persistent problem of Kurdish insurgencies: every village in Kurdistan was to be razed so as to deny the Peshmerga any base of support. During a 1987 trip through government-controlled Kurdistan, this author saw (and chronicled for the Foreign Relations Committee) the destruction process as it was underway. Along the principal highways in Kurdistan, villages and towns stood half destroyed. Sometimes

rice and wheat. With the U.N. sanctions, the American war, and entirely dependent on imported food, and in particular, U.S. indigenous food supply. As a result, the Kurds have become deprived the inhabitants of this pastoral land of any By destroying rural Kurdistan, the Iraqi regime also

village, was a key support system for the Peshmerga. burden can be found in Iraqi Kurdistan. The donkey, like the were the donkeys and few of these once ubiquitous beasts of and farm animals, and burned orchards. A particular target Together with the villages, the Iraqi regime killed sheep

people. churches and mosques, and a way of life for a proud, pastoral oblivion. Lost with the villages were schools, ancient of civilization, has been dynamited and bulldozed into village, including some that dated back almost to the beginning Today there are no villages left in Kurdistan. Every

grid patterns. just under construction, piles of cinderblock laid out in vast 1987, as seen from the highways, these concentration camps were eye of the Iraqi army, the police, and the Ba'ath party. In "victory cities," really concentration camps under the watchful being relocated to what the Iraqi officials described as other side there was nothing but rubble. The villagers were the houses on one side of the road stood vacant while on the

the civil war, these imported supplies disappeared. Kurds fleeing the cities at the end of March could find no food in the countryside and no village shelter in a still freezing mountain environment. The absence of indigenous food and shelter have greatly exacerbated the humanitarian crisis overtaking the Kurds.

C. The Concentration Camps

Perhaps as many as two million Kurds, Assyrians, and Chaldeans were moved from their villages after 1985. The luckier ones went to the cities to stay with relatives. There they were able to find employment or at least could live off the income of employed relatives. When the Kurdish military collapse came, these newly urbanized villagers, along with other city dwellers, had the food resources (often acquired at exorbitant blackmarket rates) and sometimes even the transport to flee.

Not so the inhabitants of the concentration camps, who number, according to Massoud Barzani, 1.1 million in 104 separate settlements. (This writer's independent estimate of the population was one million.) Mostly unemployed since the destruction of their villages, the concentration camp dwellers do not have the money to acquire food reserves.

The one million inhabitants of the concentration camps are the invisible victims of the Kurdish disaster. They are not

The concentration camp inhabitants had no food resources to make possible an escape to Turkey or Iran and, unlike the city dwellers, there was no transport of any kind available to these people. Thus as the urban Kurds fled, the concentration camp people stayed behind.

The plight of the 10,000 Kurds in this Zakho area victory city is emblematic of the one million or more concentration camp inhabitants. As of Easter Sunday, when catastrophe was just beginning to overtake other Iraqi Kurds, these people already had no food and their children were already dying.

In this particular concentration camp, there was just one well and it was highly polluted. Camp leaders said several children were dying each day of dysentery.

In 1987 the Iraqi authorities would not permit a visit to the victory cities; in 1991 these concentration camps were liberated and thus accessible. They were also every bit as grim as they seemed from the highway four years ago. In a sprawling settlement of more than 10,000 near Zakho, a man was carrying grain treated with a vermin poison. To feed his family, the man intended to wash the poison off the grain. He said that several washings would be required.

seen on television but their plight may be worse than that of the more visible refugees. These invisible Kurds have no food, no sanitation, and are at the mercy of a vindictive Iraqi army.

D. The Killing Machine

On August 25, 1988 -- five days after the end of the Iran-Iraq war -- the Iraqi air force launched massive chemical weapons attacks on Kurdish villages along the Iraq-Turkey border. The villages had been in areas where the Peshmerga operated, and because the Peshmerga had sided with Iran during the war, the area was marked for retribution.

But in seeking retribution the Iraqi regime did not attack the Peshmerga camps on the mountains above the villages, camps presumably quite visible from the air on the barren Kurdish hillsides. Rather, the regime targetted villages inhabited almost exclusively by women, children and non-combatant men. The terror impact of poison gas was thus maximized.

This history, and others like it, is well known to the people of Kurdistan. With the entire region under Kurdish control during the recent rebellion, entire urban populations feared a retribution aimed at maximizing civilian deaths. The actual experience of the March 1991 revolt -- the shelling of cities, the use of phosphorous and napalm, the killing of Kurds in recaptured neighborhoods -- seemed to justify these fears.

E. Effective Relief

The United States, the United Kingdom, and France are now creating safe havens in northern Iraq so that Kurdish refugees can return to areas where they can be sheltered, protected, and more readily fed. This plan is a variant on one proposed by British Prime Minister John Major. In its present form, however, it is questionable whether it will work.

The coalition has created a safe haven around the city of Zakho, ten miles from the Turkish border. The Iraqi army has been ordered out of a zone within a 30 kilometer radius of Zakho, and tent cities are being set up in a green valley along the Zakho-Amadiyah road. Many of the refugees in nearby Isikveren refugee camp are from Zakho, and the hope is that these people will return home. Kurds from other areas are to be accommodated in the tents. Supplies can be readily brought in from Turkey, and one of the two bridges that connect Zakho with Cizre in Turkey has been repaired. The road system is a good one, and as soon as bureaucratic impediments on the Turkish side are swept away, ample food and other supplies can be brought in. The safe haven now is in the process of being extended to the town of Amadiyah and vicinity, some 50 miles east of Zakho.

Many Kurds are now abandoning their miserable mountainside existence for the comforts of Zakho and its vicinity. As

things now stand, they are not likely to stay. Others will not come at all. The reason, quite simply, is the absence of sufficient guarantees for the safety of the Kurdish civilians.

Initially the Kurds were concerned that the army and the mukhabarat would continue to stay in Zakho under the guise of being ordinary police. They feared these professional killers could continue to murder even while the allies surrounded Zakho, or alternatively, that the mukhabarat would take names in anticipation of a coalition withdrawal.

The coalition resolved this fear by ordering all but 50 of the "police" out of Zakho and by insisting that the remaining police carry identity cards issued by the allies and wear arm bands. This solution, while probably adequate to allay short-term civilian fears, is part of a policy to leave the Iraqi power structure in place in the towns of the safe haven. It is a plan that risks embroiling the coalition in the very activity it seeks to avoid: the administration and policing of Iraqi towns.

The small Baghdad presence in the safe haven towns -- in Zakho the presence consists of the mayor, his administration, and the 50 police -- could well come under attack from angry Kurds. This would leave the coalition in the undesirable position of having to protect the Baghdad representatives, and

presence in northern Iraq, and the suggestion is that after the

Bush Administration talks only of a short-term military
civilian population for as long as the threat remains. The
coalition partners to guarantee the physical safety of the
haven plan is the unwillingness of the United States and its
The more serious impediment to the success of the safe

the people and the Baghdad representatives.
refugees and avoid coalition involvement in conflicts between
and other local peoples would increase the confidence of the
policing of towns and camps in the protected zone to the Kurds
conducted almost as usual. Leaving the administration and
under Ba'ath regime administration and business seemed to be
attack, the atmosphere was far more relaxed than that of towns
these towns seemed very good. When not under Iraqi military
Zakho, Dohok, and Amadiyah, the law and order situation in
safe haven to the Kurds themselves. When the Kurds governed
administration and policing of Kurdish towns and camps in the
A more workable alternative would leave the civil

presence.

course, the refugees would not return home with such a
administrative and police presence to maintain order. Of
One alternative would have a large enough Iraqi

policies.

could draw the coalition into the quagmire of Iraq's Kurdish

camps are established, they will be turned over to the United Nations.

A United Nations relief presence, not backed up by military force, is likely to leave most Kurdish refugees unpersuaded of the efficacy of the safe haven plan. Many are unlikely to return to Iraq under these circumstances, and those who do return are likely to go back to the mountains as the coalition forces withdraw.

The Kurds know Saddam Hussein and their fears are almost certainly justified. Without foreign military protection the Kurds face the risk of a renewed slaughter. The current discussion of a United Nations police force in northern Iraq may assuage legitimate Kurdish security concerns, but only if the mandate of the U.N. police extends to protection against the Iraqi police and army.

Two elements are essential to the success of any plan to persuade the Kurds to leave the mountains and to protect them if they do. First, the Kurds must be adequately protected from the Iraqi army and police as long as these elements pose a threat to Kurdish and other civilians. This threat will certainly continue as long as Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath regime are in power. Adequate protection for the Kurds will exist only if the Iraqi army and police are kept at a distance from Kurdish towns and camps, and if there is sufficient

The zone suggested here is the minimum needed to accommodate all the Kurdish refugees and yet does not contest Iraqi sovereignty over Kurdistan itself. Excluded from the

a large number of people in a more compact area. destroyed villages that might otherwise have accommodated such is made necessary by the Baghdad regime's policy of having and Halabja. The extension of the safe haven to so many towns Amadiyah, Dohok, Rawanduz, Shaqlawa, Sulaymaniyah, Khanakin, foreign military forces would include such towns as Zakho, be accommodated. Under this plan the safe haven protected by 50 miles, the entire Kurdish and other displaced peoples could Iraq-Turkey border and the Iraq-Iran border to a depth of up to extending the zone to cities and towns along the entire extended. Currently it is being extended to Amadiyah. By water, and sanitation the protected zone will have to be accommodate all the displaced Kurds with adequate shelter, 300,000 or 2 to 3 times the area's normal population. To surrounding tent camps can accommodate between 200,000 and displaced Kurds, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. Zakho and the must be sufficiently large to house the more than 2 million Second, any protected enclave for the Kurdish civilians

coalition.

involve renewed hostilities with the United Nations or the Iraqis understand that any renewed attack on the Kurds will military force between the Kurds and the Iraqis so that the

proposed zone are the politically critical cities of Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk. Within the zone, the Kurds should be permitted to rebuild their villages and to resume agricultural activities. This will ease the financial burden of providing for Iraq's Kurds as well as serving as a first step to righting a terrible wrong.

III. UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE LOST REVOLUTION

A. The "No Contacts" Policy

The United States was unprepared for the peace that followed the Gulf War. It did not comprehend the depth of popular anger inside Iraq at Saddam Hussein and therefore did not anticipate the uprisings either in the south or the north. The Administration in its policy assessments seemed to mischaracterize the positions of the Kurdish and Shi'a rebels. As a result, an opportunity to overthrow Saddam Hussein in mid-March may have been lost. Further, neither anticipating the rebellion it had called for nor the brutal nature of the Iraqi response, the Administration was unprepared to cope with the subsequent humanitarian crisis. Being caught by surprise may be directly traceable to a policy of no-contact with the Iraqi opposition.

In April 1988, during a call at the State Department the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani met with the Director for Northern Gulf Affairs, the Iraq desk officer, and the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. (Talabani also met Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell during the same visit). This meeting, of which Secretary Shultz was unaware, produced an explosive reaction from Iraq and Turkey. Secretary Shultz felt blindsided and an edict went forth mandating no contact with the Iraqi opposition. Subsequent developments --

Iraq's use of chemical weapons on the Kurds, an evolution of Turkey's policy towards a more generous view of its own Kurdish population, Iraqi violations of international law, and even the invasion of Kuwait -- did not change this policy. When Talabani came to the United States in August 1990, he met with Senators Pell and Kerry but was again cold-shouldered by the State Department.

After the war began on January 16, the Iraqi opposition approached the Administration with offers of military cooperation and of military intelligence. They were again spurned. Ultimately a channel to provide military intelligence was established by having information pass through the office of a Senate staffer. However, by the time this channel was established the war was nearly over.

On the day the war ended, a group of Iraqi Kurdish leaders were meeting in Washington at a conference held under the sponsorship of Chairman Pell in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing room. Both in the conference, in the side conversations, and at a private lunch hosted by the Committee, these leaders gave a detailed account of developments in Kurdistan, of the depth of the anti-Saddam (and pro-U.S.) sentiment, and of the likelihood of a mass uprising. Subsequent developments would not have surprised a participant attending these events. The Administration, which again

The Iraqi opposition consists of Shi'a parties, Sunni Arab parties, Kurdish parties, and ideologically-based parties. The Shi'a parties include religious parties (the Dawa, or "Call" party, the Islamic Action party of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq of Baqir Hakim) and secular independents, of which the London-based Kurdish parties include the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The ideological parties, which are dominated by Sunni Arabs, include the Iraqi Communist Party and a dissident Ba'ath Party. The most prominent Sunni Arab

Iraq is a nation divided on confessional and ethnic grounds. Fifty-five percent of the population are Shi'a, 40 percent are Sunni, and 5 percent are Christian. Ethnically the division is 70 percent Arab, 25 percent Kurd, 5 percent Assyrian, Chaldean, and others. The Iraqi opposition is as diverse as the country itself. However, it has achieved a degree of coherence that its critics (especially those who do not talk to the opposition) never imagined.

B. The Iraqi Opposition

snubbed the opposition on March 1, was apparently unprepared for the uprising that began March 2.

opposition figure is Damascus-based former Iraqi General Hassan Nequib.

In March these parties met in Beirut to forge an alliance and a common program. Brought together by a shared objective -- the removal of Saddam Hussein -- they achieved agreement on a broad program for a democratic and federal Iraq with very substantive provisions for Kurdish autonomy.

Strikingly, each of the parties in the Joint Action Committee -- the cumbersome name the opposition coalition arrogated to itself -- made tangible concessions in the interests of opposition unity. The Kurdish parties abandoned their dream of an independent Kurdistan, accepting that their rights can only be accommodated within Iraq. The Shi'a religious parties abandoned the idea of an Islamic state, recognizing the rights of religious minorities as well as those of the more secular Sunni Arabs and Kurds. The ideological parties accepted the idea of democracy in lieu of fascist or communist dictatorship.

The Beirut compromises reflect the reality of Iraqi politics. Based in the south and without a strong force in the army, the religious Shi'a could not hope to impose their will on all of Iraq. At a minimum they would need the assistance of the Kurds in the north who would hardly subscribe to a fundamentalist agenda. The Kurds could never rule Iraq by

themselves and likely could not obtain independence without either outside intervention or the acquiescence of the other Iraqis. The Arab Sunni opposition had the choice between Saddam Hussein (or a comparably repressive structure aimed at preserving the Sunni Arab monopoly of power) or a powersharing arrangement with the more populous Iraqi groups.

Meanwhile, official Washington continued to see the opposition in caricature. The Iraqi Shi'a were viewed as pawns of Iran seeking to impose a Khomeini-style regime, in spite of a very different history. Theologically the Iraqi Shi'a follow the Najaf school of religious thought; Najaf being a more modern and influential center of Shi'a learning than the Persian holy city of Qom. Politically, the Iraqi Shi'a never responded to Iranian calls for rebellion during the Iran-Iraq war. And, unlike the strong tradition of anti-U.S. sentiment among the Iranian clerics, the Iraqi Shi'a parties, including the Dawa and the Islamic Action, have been desperately seeking U.S. support and military involvement in the effort to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein. (There are also many fewer clerics in Iraq than Iran, Saddam Hussein having killed most of them.) All this was apparently never comprehended in Washington.

Similarly, the Iraqi Kurds have long made it clear that they recognize that an independent Kurdistan is not realistic. To his followers in Dihok, Jalal Talabani made much the same statement as he had to the Foreign Relations Committee: "It is

very difficult to change the borders of five countries. We are not for an independent Kurdistan; we are asking for our national rights within the framework of Iraq. I know of dreams and reality. All Kurds dream of an independent, unified Kurdistan, but we have to face the reality."

Nonetheless, Washington characterized him as seeking the break-up of Iraq and of being antagonistic to Turkey. Interestingly, after being snubbed by the State Department on February 28, 1991, ostensibly because a meeting would upset Turkey, Talabani left for Ankara for meetings requested by Turkish President Turgut Ozal.

C. An Opportunity Lost

As the anti-Saddam rebellion gained force in early March, several strategically located Iraqi military figures contacted the Joint Action Committee, according to both Arab and Kurdish opposition leaders. As the Iraqi military figures contemplated bringing possibly decisive force to the side of the rebels, they looked for a sign that the sponsors of the rebellion had the support of the United States, the one country preeminent militarily and politically in Iraq.

No such signal was given. On the contrary, the public snub of Kurdish and other Iraqi opposition leaders was read as a clear indication the United States did not want the popular

During the time the Kurds controlled northern Iraq, Syria generously permitted access to liberated Kurdistan through its territory. Syrian officials responded enthusiastically to suggestions of assistance from coalition countries to the Iraqi opposition to oust Saddam Hussein. However, Syrian officials were reluctant to go too far alone and looked to the United States for leadership. None was forthcoming.

Other countries in the region were eager to assist the forces battling Saddam Hussein. Syria was the country in the region most strongly supportive of the anti-Saddam rebels and provided significant support to Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish opposition groups. Parties from all three ethnic/confessional groups make their headquarters in Damascus.

Any potential defector to the rebel cause put everything at risk: his position, his life, his family's lives, the lives of his relatives. Given the negative signals from Washington, the potential military defectors sat on the fence. And while they did so, the anti-Saddam rebellion was crushed.

rebellion to succeed. This was confirmed by background statements from Administration officials that they were looking for a military, not a popular, alternative to Saddam Hussein. As one NSC aide put it on March 1, "Our policy is to get rid of Saddam Hussein, not his regime."

One reason suggested for U.S. reluctance to aid the anti-Saddam rebels was Saudi fears over the subversive impact of Shi'a or democratic success in Iraq. However, while the anti-Saddam rebellion was still underway, Saudi officials proposed that the United States and Saudi Arabia together militarily assist both Shi'a and Kurdish rebels. The Saudis indicated they had only recently developed contacts with the mainstream Iraqi opposition groups, but said they were prepared to support the Shi'a foes of Saddam as well as the Kurds. The Dawa party has sent Saudi Arabia a message assuring the Kingdom it has no intention of causing problems among the Shi'a in the strategically sensitive Eastern Province, and the Saudis expressly denied that concerns about the Shi'a would affect their plans to assist the rebellion.

According to the Saudis, the United States had not even responded to their proposal by the end of March. If a response came later, it was too late to tip the balance in favor of the rebels.

D. The Relief Effort: Too Late For Too Many

Not anticipating either the rebellion or the subsequent repression, the United States was unprepared for the humanitarian crisis that followed. Although clear warnings came from the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey just three days after the March 31 Kurdish collapse (along with warnings from

journalists and others escaping Iraq), U.S. Government disaster specialists were still performing assessments two weeks after the crisis began. So little is known about conditions inside Kurdistan that relief officials continue to refer to Kurdish villages even though villages have not existed in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1988. At a Congressional briefing on April 12, a senior U.S. Government official responsible for the relief effort praised the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society for its fine relief effort, even though this society had dropped the Shah's Red Lion and Sun name and emblem in 1979 in favor of the Islamic Red Crescent.

The United States armed forces are now doing an extraordinary job delivering food and other assistance to the Kurdish refugees. Because of the terrain and limited road access to the mountains, the delivery of assistance is a logistical nightmare that is only being overcome by the ingenuity and dedication of U.S. servicemen and women.

However, it did take three weeks before these military operations were bringing adequate food to the Kurdish refugees on the Turkish border. Even now the mountain camps have inadequate sanitation and only limited water. Further, the much larger refugee population on the Iranian border has so far been excluded from U.S. assistance.

According to State Department estimates, Kurds are dying at a rate of 600 a day on the Turkish border. Another 1,000 or more may be dying on the Iranian border and, as always seems to be true with these megacatastrophes, the victims are the weakest of the community, the children and the aged. It is impossible not to conclude that this toll could have been much lower had the United States and other nations anticipated the uprising and its consequences. Instead, the Kurds were for too long a problem policymakers wished would go away.

IV. PROSPECTS

A. The Kurdish-Iraqi Deal

In the third week of April, a delegation of Kurdish leaders led by Jalal Talabani met in Baghdad with Saddam Hussein. They agreed to implement a 1970 pact providing for Kurdish autonomy. Previous efforts to implement this agreement foundered over arguments about the mixed Kurdish-Arab-Turkish city of Kirkuk (together with control of its oil revenues), and because Saddam Hussein has never been willing to relinquish his absolute control in Iraq. The current arrangement, agreed in principle but not yet signed, may yet fall apart over the details of autonomy or over Kurdish insistence on international guarantees for their autonomy.

The Kurds, more than anyone, know that Saddam Hussein cannot be trusted to honor any deal. The question arises then as to why their leaders even tentatively concluded such a deal.

Jalal Talabani foreshadowed such an arrangement when he told an American visitor in Dihok at the end of March (when the Kurds still controlled the city) that circumstance might force the Kurdish leadership to negotiate. At that time Baghdad was desperate for a truce and proposed to send Tariq Aziz, the former Foreign Minister, to Kurdistan to negotiate. Said

peace by ousting Saddam.

Saddam Hussein also desperately needs peace in the north if his regime is to survive. As long as Kurds remain in Iraq's borders, international pressure on his regime continues. Further, without a deal, Baghdad faces a renewed guerrilla war at a time it needs to be devoting resources to reconstruction. A simmering civil war in the north could produce a flare-up of the Shi'a rebellion or could tempt an Iraqi general to seek

provide the only hope for saving lives. decision to move into northern Iraq, seemed at the time to mountains. A deal, which was in the making prior to the U.S. of their people stranded in difficult circumstances in the the Kurdish leaders were concerned about the physical wellbeing prospect for autonomy within Iraq would be moot. In addition, the depopulation of Iraqi Kurdistan. Without Kurds any of the refugees, the Kurdish leaders feared he would complete Kurdistan; without some accommodation providing for the return situation. Saddam Hussein had already depopulated rural borders of Iraq, the Kurdish leadership faced a desperate with no help forthcoming and 2 million Kurds on the

negotiate."

negotiate. If there is no hope we cannot refuse to Talabani, "If we have hope for outside help we will never

In the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, Iraq's army was dissolving and the regime's security apparatus was fading

The developments in the two months since the end of Operation Desert Storm have very much strengthened Saddam Hussein's position inside Iraq. He has defeated serious challenges in both the north and the south. The Kurdish autonomy deal threatens to split the unity of the Iraqi opposition as it was a sine qua non of the Beirut declaration setting up the Joint Action Committee that there be no separate deals between opposition groups and the regime. Worse, the price paid in blood by Kurdish and Shi'a civilians is almost certain to deter potential opponents and coup makers, unless there is a very strong likelihood for success.

B. Saddam Hussein's Future

These factors may auger for a successful deal over the short term. However, as Saddam's internal position is strengthened, and as international attention shifts from Iraq, there is every prospect that Saddam Hussein will renew his campaign against Kurdish civilians. Once the coalition has pulled out of Iraq, Saddam Hussein knows it is not likely to move back in. The Kurds understand this which is why many wish the coalition forces to remain in northern Iraq and why the Kurdish leadership seeks international guarantees for any autonomy deal.

away. Secret police went underground as did many Ba'ath officials. Few wanted to risk the retribution associated with a doomed regime. Now that Saddam has survived the crucible of civil war, his instruments of control -- the mukhabarat, the Ba'ath party, and the army -- are rallying around him.

Having lost the best opportunities for removing Saddam Hussein both during Operation Desert Storm and the March rebellion, it now appears the United States, the coalition, and the region will have to endure this dictator for some time to come.

Iraq is no longer a significant military threat to its neighbors or to the region. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 will force Iraq to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction and will keep it from effectively rearming.

Saddam Hussein does, however, continue to menace his own people. Unless the world community is prepared to consign the Iraqi people to a fate which many have fought to avoid, the United States and its coalition partners are stuck in the Iraqi quagmire. Only the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime can get us out, and the best hope for this result has passed. Saddam Hussein just turned 54 and could be around for years to come.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

THROUGH: RONALD C. KAUFMAN *AK*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLITICAL
AFFAIRS

DAVID M. CARNEY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

FROM: CATHY HUTCHINSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
POLITICAL AFFAIRS *CH*

SUBJECT: ARIZONA SPECIAL ELECTION

Governor Symington announced yesterday that the primary will be held August 13, 1991 and the general will be held September 24, 1991 for the special election to fill retiring Congressman Mo Udall's second district seat.

This district is approximately 61% Democrat and more than one third hispanic. Approximately one half of this seat is located in Phoenix and the other half is located in Tucson. It will be very difficult for a Republican to win this seat given the demographic make-up of the district. Republicans best chance to pick up this seat would be to have a very strong hispanic candidate.

At the present time Democrats Mayor Tom Volgy and Maricopa County Supervisor Ed Pastor have announced their intentions to run for the seat. Former Evan Mecham aide Al Rodriguez is the only Republican who has announced at this time.

Democrat Ed Pastor is hispanic and a very viable candidate who has the ability to raise a substantial amount of money. If he wins the Democrat primary it will be very difficult for the Republican candidate to win the special election.

Most GOP officials think that Al Rodriguez is not a strong candidate for the Republicans. Senator McCain and Congressmen Rhodes, Stump, and Kyl who have all urged hispanic Phoenix Chief of Police Ruben Ortega to run in the special election. He is very popular among the hispanics and a very viable candidate. At this point he has stated that he is not interested in running for the seat.

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1991

Dear Jimmy and Rosalynn:

Thank you for your message and thank you for caring. I am feeling fine and am delighted to be back at work.

You were thoughtful to express your concern, and I'm grateful. Best wishes.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Jimmy Carter
and Mrs. Carter
The Carter Center
1 Copenhill Avenue
Atlanta, Georgia 30307

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

BB
B E D R
GAMPY
PLOTTE
P
E C L P E

5-9-91

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 9, 1991

Bridget:


The gift received today for President Bush from U.N. Secretary General Perez De Cuellar is a sculpture on a black base of a dove of peace.

Photograph attached.


Gary Walters

NLM

cc: Gift Unit



Thursday
May 9, 1991

Mr. President and Mrs. Bush,

You will be meeting this afternoon at 4:00 p.m. in the Residence with Terri Lacey to go over the following:

- gifts
- disclosure forms
- royalty (from book)
- codicil to will

(A notary and 1 witness will be present -- Don Rhodes cannot be the witness.)

Patty Presock