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Folder Title:
Friday, January 11, 1991: Moynihan

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	12	12	5	2

File here (daily)
POTUS is
finished w/ this

CAMP DAVID


Note to file;

Fearinf possible mis
interpretation if this
original draft of mine got out
I asked Gates & Co to
redraft.

Then I decided juist to
send short hand
written note.

My original draft better
describes my feelings.

gb .12-26-90



1-16-91

Met Pat - Oval 10 AM

His sponsoring Nunn
Mitchell approach.
pleasant visit -

CAMP DAVID

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
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only 1 copy - here

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: 11-28-90 TIME: Incoming/outgoing

WITH: Pat Magnihan

SUBJECT: near Eastern & S. Asia
Affairs -

Nice chat per attached
letter

Will send views

Wants to see me - I said
"yes"

FOLLOW UP:

Patty Reminds other trip

Also be sure to get his

incoming before my trip

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


Wednesday
November 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
JOHN SUNUNU
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FRED MCCLURE

I called Pat Moynihan today regarding the attached letter. He wants to meet with me and I agreed to do so. As you know, he is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations. We had a very pleasant conversation.

Handwritten:
Dundee P. Moynihan
New York
G. Burmester
cc. F. W. Clure



United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
November 26, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

✓ Dick Lugar has told me of your telephone call to him and that settles the matter so far as I am concerned. I would, however, like to note the comment of the Administration official in the Washington Post on November 15, to the effect that "[the President] expects [members of Congress] to tell him their concerns before they run to 'Good Morning America'."

Fair enough, I never called you. But I did spend much of September and October near to pleading with Administration officials to help draft a resolution of support for your policy. Thus, September 24 on the floor:

As the human toll begins to rise, the President may well find his popularity ratings slumping and his congressional support evaporating.... How much better it would be if the Congress and the President take this opportunity to state that in this crisis we stand together in opposing this illegal invasion and enforcing the resolutions of the Security Council.

It happens I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations and necessarily involved with the issue. I had a theory of the case. Namely that the United States was acting, as required by Article 25 of the Charter, to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, to pursue "measures not involving the use of armed force" as provided in Article 41. The issue of war powers did not arise and we could agree on a Joint Resolution endorsing our actions. I grant that there was not a great deal of support for this theory among my colleagues, but there was some. There was, however, none in the Administration. The attitude as conveyed to me was that no Congressional endorsement was required or desired.

We have been friends long enough for me to hope you will see this letter and understand why I have sent it.

Best,



The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

December 1, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

✓ Your secretary Patty called yesterday to say that you really would like to have some thoughts from me to take on your trip to South America. She left instructions as to how to get this through to the Usher's Office. Herewith, then, a few pages worth, which I do hope reach you.

If you were going by sea, this would be longer. Indeed I would send you a book I published in September On the Law of Nations (Harvard, \$22.50). I have already sent you one, but could easily afford another as the book is doing very well, is already in a second printing, and this in large measure is thanks to you.

✓ (You used the term "international law" three times yesterday!) You are coping, as you repeatedly state, with the first crisis of the post-cold war period. From the first hours of this crisis you have defined it in terms of Iraqi violation of international law. You have repeatedly stated that the way in which this crisis is resolved will do much to determine the nature of the new world order. You have been in my view absolutely correct on both scores. Our problem however is that while we are using post-cold war terms we continue with cold war techniques and cold war perspectives.

During the cold war the United States came to define itself in terms of its opposition to the Soviet Union. Anticommunism became the central organizing principle of American politics. The President became Commander in Chief presiding over a more or less permanent crisis. We were locked in a zero-sum game; anything we lost they gained and vice versa. There was no room for error, or at least not much room, and an enormous premium on reaction time. (That football that follows you around.) The idea of international law was pretty much lost in the fog of the cold war; they didn't play by the rules, how could we afford to? Nothing less than civilization was at stake; the issues were such that the United States would pay "*any price*" to prevail. (My italics, of course, but your fellow naval officer of World War II.)

The issues of world order now that the cold war is over are of a wholly different nature. They are, as you have brilliantly perceived, essentially just that. World order. The nature of legal entitlements, legal obligations, legal authority. There is a structure in place in the United Nations Charter. A structure almost wholly of our design. You automatically and instantly turned to that structure, and have stayed with it ever since.

It could turn out that history will record your Presidency as the one which finally, at the end of the twentieth century put in place something like the world order that Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had so hoped for at the outset of the century.

The problem is this. Can we ease our way out of cold war ways? I think of that great remark of Acheson's after World War II when he said that Britain had lost an empire and not yet found a role. Before they could find that role, (and maybe they are yet to do; such changes do not come easily) they tried Suez. They have never been the same since; never will be. My hope is that we will not attempt the equivalent.

What do I mean? Two things basically. First of all, our rush of forces to the Gulf had too much of crisis about it to begin with and thereafter became much too large and too nearly unilateral. *not question brutality alone but "appears"*
What was the hurry? Iraq is a regional power, nothing more. Semi-stable internally; surrounded by enemies. Saddam would seem to be marginally more brutal than his counterparts, say Assad. But nothing notable for the region. (Wait 'til we get to know Nawaz Sharif better. He with our F-16's and his bomb.) Kuwait is an oil emirate, with borders drawn 1922-23. The whole region is an artifact of the Treaty of Sevres. These two particular "countries" have oil fields but neither would withhold its oil from world markets voluntarily. Iraq is just now the "strongest" regime in the region; but if it goes down another goes up. Syria most likely. The world will then be dealing with the aggressions of Syria. *Remember Arab League UN*

The only large risk to the United States that I can see in the

Gulf is that the world will lose sight of your insistence that what is involved here is the world community upholding international law and instead come to see that this is a conflict between the United States and a third world country over access to raw materials. That later "model" is one the Soviets and Marxists generally have tirelessly proselytized for three generations and is readily enough believed in many countries of the world, not least our own.

we are → That is why I had hoped we would take sanctions with great seriousness. This requires first of all that we realize sanctions take time. You may recall meeting in the West Room with a group of us just returned from the Gulf on the morning of August 28th. We were all behind you. Had been throughout our trip. That evening I was interviewed by Tom Brokaw on NBC Nightly News. Here are excerpts:

BROKAW: Among the lawmakers briefed today by the President was Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and an authority on international law. Senator Moynihan, does President Bush want Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait or out of Kuwait and Iraq, as well?

MOYNIHAN: I think it was clear from today's meeting that question is one Mr. Saddam Hussein can decide because it will depend on how he gets out of Kuwait. If he forces us to stay in there on sanctions that could last six months Tom, a year, surely, and still doesn't move and forces the next step which is obviously the use of armed force, then it's all over for him in both situations.

BROKAW: Some people believe that there ought to be a surgical U.S. strike of some kind, or we ought to commission an assassination squad.

MOYNIHAN: The President has said something important today. He said that what we are doing could well define the world order for decades to come. And that's not the world order he is trying to put in place. There has been a crime against international law

in the invasion. The use of gas was a crime against international law. But the first step is to do what we're doing and to understand that we have to hang in there. Six months would be a blessing. A year would be normal, but it's a world order we're trying to define.

Yes
BROKAW: But Senator Moynihan, it's going to be very tough to get the American people to be patient for six months at these costs, with the American military extended out into the Persian Gulf and subject to attacks of all kinds, both political and military, isn't it?

MOYNIHAN: It is going to be harder for us to do this peaceably than to do it with surgical strikes and all that. But that's going to the test of our understanding of the kind of world order the President obviously understands and would like to see in place. He's going to need a lot of luck and a lot of help. He certainly got a lot of support today.

"5 Dinars"
 I hope I am not naif. I know something of the history of sanctions. But if ever there was a chance that Article 41 could be made to work, we have it here. The place has one export, of which the world has in any event a sufficient supply. It imports most of its food and almost all its technology. (It even imports its currency. I attach a five dinar note printed in London. This is an old arrangement. Under the Mandate the rupee was the official monetary unit in Iraq. Currency like this wears out in twelve months.) Moreover, as the leader of a minority regime, Saddam has shown himself hugely sensitive to matters such as consumer goods. No shortages were allowed during the war with Iran; hence in part the post war debt.

During September I went to the floor a number of times to talk about sanctions. I began to ask why the administration wasn't preparing the nation for the fact that sanctions, obviously, would

take a long time to have any effect, and that they would not be pretty. They would in fact be brutal. Brutal, but better than war from our point of view. And as for Saddam, he was free to choose. I was particularly puzzled that there was no discussion of whether we were going to include food. A rational strategy could be to confine the blockade to manufactured goods. There used to be a huge literature on this subject in the United States. Thus, the 1932 report of The Committee on Economic Sanctions set up by the Twentieth Century Fund. John Foster Dulles was a member; Nicholas Murray Butler was chairman. In an opening statement Butler explained that as a result of the Kellogg-Briand Pact: "War is no longer either necessary or even respectable; it is illegal." But some miscreant might come along and would have to be dealt with. How, if other nations such as ours had renounced war as an instrument of national policy? By sanctions, of course. These however could be rough. Here is the passage on food:

Food embargoes will be extremely efficacious in some cases, and useless in others; again, the problem must be studied with reference to the particular country under punishment. But in considering them at all, we must in all honesty admit that food embargoes, placed against a country which really needs the food, are not persuasive measures, but the most savage of war measures. They are particularly difficult to uphold on merely moral grounds, since they bear more heavily on the civilian population than on the army, and more heavily on women and children than on the men. For effectiveness, and for moral standing, a really successful food embargo ranks well in advance of torpedoing hospital ships and is somewhere near the class of gassing maternity hospitals.

One may agree or disagree. The essential point is that they were trying to think about the subject. We haven't been doing that for a long while, albeit for perfectly understandable reasons.

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The executive branch has done no real planning for economic sanctions as a serious instrument of foreign policy. Cold war policy, that is. (Carter embargoed wheat to Russia after the invasion of Afghanistan; Reagan promptly dropped the measure.) The world was never united; all one did was impose costs on oneself. Nothing changed with the end of the cold war. On November 14, after the announcement that additional forces would be sent to the Gulf, Secretaries Baker and Cheney briefed us on events to date. I got the second or third question, asking how long it was felt it would take before sanctions began to bite. Jim replied that "two major countries" had told us that sanctions would do the job in "two to three months." I responded, that if that represented their grasp of economics they wouldn't be major countries long. The room took the point to be that sanctions had been tried and had not worked and that war was now necessary. I came away with a slightly different view, simply that we had never thought through this subject, it having no place in cold war plans. Hence we asked the opinion of others; just as you talked with President Ozal who offered the truly astonishing thought that three weeks might suffice.

Well, you will have got my point. The cold war construct does not work very well in shaping a new world order after the cold war. A legal world order will surely be boring, if not tedious. So are domestic legal regimes. But the alternative to violence is thought

worth it. (One legal nitpick? The United Nations is under no legal obligation to restore the Sabahs. Nor are you under any political obligation to endure Hill & Knowlton.

But if they tell the truth to a world audience, it's a disaster. In rape kids - it's her good vs evil

A final thought. You have written the My Turn column in the current Newsweek. It happens that I have written the next one which will appear Monday. It is not irrelevant to what you are now dealing with. Back in 1979 Newsweek had a symposium on what Big Events would take place in the 1980s. In a brief entry I predicted that by the end of the 1980s the Soviet Union would break up and that this could lead to some dicey moments as they parcelled out those ten thousand nuclear warheads. I argued that the break up would come about because their economy was in ruins and ethnic hostilities were reaching a prerevolutionary phase. (A nice Marxist term!) Inasmuch as Marxism-Leninism could not account for either event, indeed depended doctrinally on just the opposite happening, there would be a crisis of belief and the U.S.S.R. would blow up or collapse or whatever. The purpose of Monday's My Turn is to ask why U.S. foreign policy could not grasp, could not even entertain this possibility. I wasn't guessing. I was proceeding from method; I proved to be right. I offer two suggestions. The first is that the advent of nuclear weapons gave great comparative advantage to strategic analysts who had little if any interest in political ideas. They never bothered with the Marxist analysis of the necessary disappearance of ethnic/nationalist attachments, for instance. Second, the vast secrecy system that grew up during the

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

cold war hid from us our own mistakes. Thus the CIA estimated that in 1975 Soviet GNP reached 62 percent of U.S. product. Which is to say twice, maybe three times greater than we now know it to have been. (We know it because the Russians have told us!) Nobody was to blame, as such. The system was to blame. Our mistakes, you see, were secret. Hence we could not correct them. I make this point because I have been trying to get hold of various estimates now being made within the government of the effect of the embargo. I am told they are secret.

flag arts
In sum. Get us out of a war fighting posture. A war to be fought by the U.S. and Britain, that is. Insist that others send troops, phase down ours as others arrive. Get a United Nations commander. Get a UN flag. Send Perez de Cuellar to Baghdad. Hunker down, as LBJ would say, like a jack rabbit in a hail storm. When it is all over declare victory, for you will have earned one.

his been there
 4

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

December 5, 1990

Mr. President:

As you requested, a few thoughts on Pat Moynihan's memorandum:

-- Pages 1-3: The problem with Pat's discussion of international law is that he describes world order essentially without an enforcement mechanism. He is prepared to tell the criminal only that he cannot commit more crimes (i.e., sanctions) as opposed to an enforcement mechanism that tells him that he not only cannot keep the loot but that he also will be punished. The history of sanctions from the Continental System of the British against Napoleon to the present time is that they are usually insufficiently effective to bring about a change of behavior.

-- Page 3: Pat asks what was the hurry. Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait were far in excess of those needed to subdue little Kuwait and those armored forces moved quickly to the Saudi border. Most observers, including both King Fahd and the U. S., believed there was an imminent danger of an invasion of Saudi Arabia. (I don't know whether you want to use it but an observation by King Fahd to Cheney and me is interesting: he told us as well as his royal colleagues, "The Amir waited to ask for help until there was no ambiguity, until it was clear. Now the Kuwaitis are a nation living in hotels.")

-- Page 3: Pat spoke disparagingly of Iraq as nothing more than a regional power, semi-stable internally. In fact he has the sixth largest army and air force in the world. Had he been able to conquer Kuwait without international reaction and military support for Saudi Arabia, he would have direct or indirect control of 40 percent of the world's oil -- thereby giving him an economic power at least comparable to Japan's in terms of its effect on global economy. You could cite the pain already felt by Brazil and Uruguay. As far as being semi-stable, Saddam Hussein has (I believe) been in power some 17 years. He is neither as smart nor as cunning as Assad and repeatedly has shown a willingness to use all of the weapons at his disposal. Thus, to dismiss him as just a regional power is a serious under-estimation.

-- Page 3: Pat notes that Kuwait is an emirate with borders drawn in 1922-23 and speaks of the whole region as an artifact of the Treaty of Sevres. One can infer from what he says that as a Johnny come lately in the family of nations, Kuwait somehow is a lesser entity, its sovereignty less significant. The fact is that virtually all of the Third World borders are "artifacts" of modern history. Israel and Jordan would seem to fit his definition as well.

-- Page 5: Pat says the world oil supply is sufficient but, he does not face up to the cost of oil on the Third World or even the developed world.

-- Pages 6 and 7: Regarding Pat's thoughts on sanctions, you might refer him to a very good study by CIA about three years ago on the effectiveness of sanctions historically. The paper deals with about one dozen case studies from Napoleonic times to more recent examples such as Rhodesia, Libya and Cuba. It makes quite clear the limitations of sanctions as a mechanism of international discipline.

-- Page 9: Pat makes mention of the secrecy of CIA Estimates and the resulting mistakes ("Our mistakes, you see, were secret. Hence we could not correct them"). Pat conveniently forgets as a former member of the Senate Intelligence Committee that for a number of years all CIA's Estimates have been provided to the Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress. CIA provides numerous briefings on the Hill on countless subjects and CIA for nearly twenty years did a great deal of unclassified analyses ^{on the Soviet economy} which ~~was~~ ^{was} briefed to and published for public use by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. Thus this notion of secrecy being responsible is pure hogwash. He had plenty of chances to criticize those Estimates. Similarly, briefings are being provided all over the Hill on the

embargo and its effect. Several members of Congress have cited those briefings to you in Leadership Meetings.

-- Page 9: Finally, Pat refers to this war to be fought by the U.S. and Britain and our war-fighting posture. He overlooks the fact that our Allies have some 200,000 troops on the line in Saudi Arabia, now representing 27 countries. When he talks about the UN, he must recognize that a military operation of this size in 1990 could not but have an American commander (as in Korea) and that political circumstances ^{today} make this almost impossible. But, he cannot simply ignore the twelve United Nations Resolutions and the sanction the United Nations has given to this operation.

I have not added or commented on some of the points you have already noted in the margins.

Boz f

DRAFT

DRAFT
December 8, 1990

Dear Pat:

Your December 5th letter caught up with me somewhere over the Amazon. It was a good letter. It deserves a longer, more thoughtful reply than I can hammer out after leaving Venezuela's air space and before Andrews comes into view.

A new world order will benefit by a more effective UN peacekeeping function. In using the UN as much as we have, I believe the UN is coming much closer to the original "vision thing" of the founders.

But here's where we may differ. Unless I'm missing something, you describe world order essentially without an enforcement mechanism. The last UN resolution taken by the Security Council after full consideration of the sanctions purposely used language that said if Saddam isn't out by January 15th, then all means should be used to get him out. Clearly this means "force" -- an enforcement provision.

Is it an oversimplification to put it this way:

You say -- only, this criminal cannot commit more crimes (sanctions) and can't keep the loot.

The enforcement provisions say -- no more crimes, no loot, and after January 15, you may be severely punished.

Now to page 3 of your letter. There is a hurry. Maybe Saddam will release all hostages. Fine. I'm very glad. But he

shouldn't have kidnapped them in the first place, and he damn sure doesn't need "something in return" or "face" for releasing them. But there is a "hurry."

The coalition is not easy to hold together.

The cost to other countries is devastating. Havel says \$1.5 billion for Czechoslovakia; Collor says \$5 billion for Brazil; Uruguay, "substantial;" Chile -- it's hurting a lot. Carlos Andres Peres says the Central Americans are getting clobbered, and Diouf of Senegal has wanted to take a group of Third World Moslem countries to see Saddam and tell him, "You are killing us."

Then, Pat, you have trouble recognizing Kuwait, a member of the UN and the Arab League as a "country." Kuwait is a country. They have been invaded by a bully of their border -- their women raped, their treasure plundered, their records obliterated.

You're probably right about the Treaty of Sèvres, but for me, if the borders of this emirate had been drawn 2000 years ago or two years ago, the moral principle would be the same.

You simply don't bully and brutalize a nation in this day and get away with it or have the matter resolved without a sense of urgency. Besides, by January 15 we will have been patient -- we will have given sanctions "time to work." (I put this in quotes because editorialists, MCs, supporters, critics say give sanctions "time to work." I have been. I am.

I think you put your finger on something when you cite the "large risk" of delay. It would be sad indeed, the UN having mobilized itself effectively for the first time in ages, to have

time and delay make it impossible to have its own resolutions enforced.

Further, you said, "What was the hurry?" The original "hurry" stemmed from the fact that Saddam's original force, after conquering Kuwait, headed towards Saudi Arabia. That caused the "hurry."

I can't dismiss Saddam as a regional power. Maybe now, but unchecked, he'd be much, much more.

In your Brokaw interview, I notice that at some point you apparently do favor use of force. Brokaw talks "assassination squad." ~~We~~ both know our own law on that one.

I like the way you came back to Tom with the "world order" point.

I'm up to page 5 now. Here's your fiver back -- point made.

On pages 6 and 7, you talk sanctions. I guess my point here is that inspite of the good job done in getting more support for sanctions at the UN, there are some interesting studies that make clear sanctions over the course of history have had serious limitations (good CIA study on this about three years ago).

I don't think what we're about here is cold war construct - - not at all. It is the first post-cold war test of the world's collective resolve.

I note your point about return of the Sabahs, but overriding your concern here should be abhorrence on the fundamental point. It simply is unacceptable to bully, rape (literally) and obliterate a member state of the UN.

Lastly, we are not alone in the Gulf. With world leadership goes a disproportionate responsibility to do a lot -- not all, but a lot -- of the heavy lifting.

I don't think this is the time for the President of the United States to hunker down, as LBJ would say; but I guess it is the time when some will "paint their tails white and run with the antelope" (a classic by LBJ).

You haven't done that, Pat. Please don't. I need you with me. Your letter was great.

I hope if we have to move to implement the last UN resolution, that you will support me.

Sincerely,

FROM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate
SR 464
Washington, D.C. 20510

PERSONAL-EYES ONLY



CAMP DAVID

Dec 26, 1990

Dear Pat,
At long last this thank you
for your long and thoughtful letter
of exactly 3 weeks ago.
We differ on how much time
is enough. The Amnesty International
Report has further influenced my thinking
on timing. Please read it - it's horrible

what Saddam's people have
done and are still doing. -2-

Pres. Havel of the Czechs & Slovaks
doesn't feel we have a lot of time, nor
does Brazil's Collor, nor Africa's
leaders including that currently
sensible Drouot of Senegal. They're being
devastated by Saddam's actions.

Lastly, Pat. & his isn't about
the Sabahs, it's about aggression
and when we succeed (and we must)
it's about the promise of a new world
order with a respected U.N. playing



CAMP DAVID

- 3 -


a key peacekeeping role.
I want us to do our part
to see that all 12 UN resolutions
on this subject are implemented
fully.

Thanks for a wonderful
letter. (Here's your "Fiver" back

I don't want our ethics
man to put me on his
list.)

I hope you had as
happy a Christmas as we did.
Warmest personal regards

Agne



DRAFT
December 19, 1990

Dear Pat:

Your December 5th letter caught up with me somewhere over the Amazon. It is a good letter. It deserves a much more thoughtful reply than I could hammer out after leaving Venezuela's air space and before Andrews came into view, thus the delay in responding. Let me now go through your letter, page by page.

A new world order will benefit by a more effective UN peacekeeping function. In deliberately using the UN as much as we have, I believe we are moving it much closer to the original "vision thing" of the founders.

But here's where we may differ. Unless I'm missing something, you describe on pages one through three a world order essentially without an enforcement mechanism. The last UN resolution taken by the Security Council after full consideration of the sanctions purposely used language that said if Saddam isn't out by January 15th, then all means should be used to get him out. Clearly this means "force" -- an enforcement provision.

Maybe it is an oversimplification, but let me put it this way:

You seem to say simply that a kidnapper with a months- or years-long supply of weapons and food can't get more (sanctions) until he gives up his victim -- regardless of the impact on the

victim or the neighborhood or on law-abiding society itself as it sees a criminal hold civil authority at bay indefinitely.

The UN enforcement provisions against Iraq, in effect, say -
- I'll give you some time (nearly six months) cut off from supplies to see if you'll voluntarily give up because I hate to get people hurt -- but after a certain time, the law must be enforced. The UN provisions implicitly say that after a certain time, the fate of the person kidnapped and the whole ordered nature of society are placed at risk when the kidnapper sees that force will not be used.

My analogy may be overdrawn, but the point is that no aggressor can be allowed to loot and pillage without a clear indication that this will not be tolerated after a certain interval. The UN Security Council deemed such an interval in the case of Iraq to be five and a half months. An enforcement mechanism -- beyond sanctions -- and the will to use it are critical to a new order based on the UN and international law.

Now to page three of your letter. Pat, you seem to have trouble recognizing Kuwait, a member of the UN and the Arab League as a "country." Kuwait is a country. It has a history. It has a sense of community. It's people have been invaded by a bully on their border -- their women raped, their treasure plundered, their records obliterated.

You're probably right about the Treaty of Sevres, but for me, if the borders of this emirate had been drawn 2,000 years ago or two years ago, the moral principle would be the same.

An aggressor simply can't be allowed to bully and brutalize another sovereign nation in this day. Nor can it be allowed to invade and plunder a sovereign nation and then sit on its ill-gotten gains indefinitely while world outrage fades. By January 15 we will have been patient -- we will have given sanctions "time to work." (I put this in quotes because editorialists, MCs, supporters, critics say give sanctions "time to work." I have been. I am.)

Further, you say on page three that "our rush of forces to the Gulf had too much of crisis about it." The original "hurry" stemmed from the fact that Saddam's original force, after conquering Kuwait, headed towards Saudi Arabia. Most observers, especially the Saudis and we, believed there was an imminent danger of an invasion -- an invasion which the Saudis could not have withstood. That caused the "hurry."

I can't dismiss Saddam as a regional power. Even now he has the world's sixth largest army, complete with chemical, biological and incipient nuclear weapons. Unchecked, he'd have much, much more. Further, should he come out of this ahead in any way, he will be regarded as the winner against an extraordinary coalition -- a winner able to control directly or indirectly some 40 percent of world oil -- making him an economic superpower.

I think you put your finger on something on page four when you worry about the "large risk" of delay leading the world to lose sight here of the principle of upholding international law.

But not with the alternative of a U.S. ambition to gain access to oil. Rather, it would be sad, the UN having mobilized itself effectively for the first time in ages, to have time and delay make it impossible to have its own resolutions enforced.

In your Brokaw interview on pages four and five, I notice that at some point you apparently do favor use of force. Brokaw talks "assassination squad." We both know our own law on that one.

I like the way you came back to Tom and the "world order" point.

I'm up to page five now. Here's your fiver back -- point made.

On pages six and seven, you talk sanctions. I guess my point here is that in spite of the good job done in getting more support for sanctions at the UN, there are some interesting studies that make clear sanctions over the course of history have had serious limitations (good CIA study on this about three years ago). I urge you to get a copy of Bill Webster's public testimony a couple of weeks ago on the effect of sanctions. Sure, the Iraqi economy is hurting, but food supplies are okay, the military won't be affected for months, and then it'll be his air force -- which we don't think much of -- and not his powerful ground forces that are primarily affected -- and that's in nine months or more.

Moreover, the coalition is not as easy as many assume to hold together.

The cost to other countries is devastating. Havel says \$1.5 billion for Czechoslovakia; Collor says \$5 billion for Brazil; Uruguay, "substantial"; Chile -- it's hurting a lot. Carlos Andres Peres says the Central Americans are getting clobbered, and Diouf of Senegal has wanted to take a group of Third World Moslem countries to see Saddam and tell him, "You are killing us."

Finally, Pat, you simply must read the Amnesty International Report out this week. It reports in graphic and horrifying detail the atrocities that have been and continue to be inflicted on the people of Kuwait. When you say wait, I say, read this and then decide if we can let more months go by while these brave people are brutalized and killed.

I don't think what we're about here is cold war construct (your page seven) -- not at all. It is the first post-cold war test of the world's collective resolve. With success against this aggressor -- whether by threat of force and sanctions or by use of force, I firmly believe that any future aggressor will think twice about acting. Failure to act decisively though, will only ensure that the cold war will be replaced by repeated regional hot wars in which the U.S. and the UN are helpless to protect and preserve a new world order.

I note your point about return of the Sabahs, but overriding your concern here should be abhorrence on the fundamental point. It simply is unacceptable to bully, rape (literally) and obliterate a member state of the UN. The alternative is some

sort of implicit right of an aggressor to invade ^{and destroy} any country whose government does not entirely meet our standards or tastes. Some world. Some peace.

Lastly, your page nine, we are not alone in the Gulf. Over 200,000 troops of our coalition partners are on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Tens of thousands more are on the way. But, regardless of that, with world leadership goes a disproportionate responsibility to do a lot -- not all, but a lot -- of the heavy lifting.

Your letter was great, Pat. Please don't make common cause with those who would doom a new world as their earlier counterparts did after World War I for lack of will and means to enforce peace and order against an aggressor. I need you with me.

I hope if we have to move to implement the last UN resolution, that you will support me.

Sincerely,

Dear Pat,

Your December 5th letter caught up with me somewhere over the Amazon. It was a good letter. It deserves a longer more thoughtful reply than I can manage out after leaving Venezuela's air space and before Audre's comes into view.

A new world order will benefit by a more effective U.N. peacekeeping function. I'm using the U.N. as much as we have. I believe the U.N. is coming much closer to the original "vision" of the founders.

But here's where we may differ. Unlike I'm using "sanctions," you describe would order essentially without an enforcement mechanism.

The last U.N. resolution taken by the Security Council after full consideration of the sanctions purposely used language that said if ~~he~~ not Saddam isn't put by Jan 15th then all means should be used to get him out. Clearly this means "force" — an enforcement provision — is it an oversimplification

(sanctions)

to put it this way:

You say, only, this criminal cannot commit more crimes. ~~He say~~ and can't help the last.

The enforcement provisions

say - "No more crimes, no loot, and after Jan 15 you may be severely punished"

~~It~~ Now to page 3 of your

letter. There is a hurry. Maybe Saddam will release all hostages

Five, I'm very glad. But he shouldn't have kidnapped them in the first place and he damn sure doesn't need "something in return" or "face" for releasing them. But there is a "hurry"

The coalition is not easy to hold together.

The cost to other countries is devastating. Havel says \$1.5 bill for Czechoslovakia. Collier says \$ bill

for Brazil, Uruguay - "substantial" Chile - it's hurting a lot. Carlos Anula

Perez says the Central Americans are getting clobbered and Diack

3
of Senegal has wanted to take a
group of ~~rest~~ 3rd world Northern
Countries to see Saddam and tell
him "You're killing us" -

Then Pat you have trouble
recognizing Kuwait, a Member of the U.N.
and the Arab League as a
"country". ~~They~~ Kuwait is a
country. They have been invaded
by a bully of their border - their
women raped, their ~~nation~~ ~~population~~
treasure plundered, their records
obliterated -

You're probably right about
the Treaty of Sevres, but
for me if the borders of this
emirate had been drawn 2000
years ago or 2 years ago
the moral principle would
be the same.

You simply don't bully & brutalize
a Nations in this day and get
away with it or have the
matter resolved without a
sense of urgency - Borders
by Jan 15 we will have been
patient - we will have given sanction

41
"Fine to work" (I put two in
quintus became editorials,
MC's, supporters, critics say
Give sanctions 'time to work'.
I have been, I am.

I think you put your finger
on something when you sight the
"large risk" of delay - I would
be sad indeed the U.N. having
mobilized itself effectively for the first
time in ages, to have time
and delay make it impossible to have
its own resolution forced.

On page ~~11~~

Q Further you said "What
was the hurry" - The original "hurry"
stemmed from the fact that
Saddams original force, after
conquering Kuwait, was ~~to~~ ~~go~~ ~~and~~ it
headed towards Saudi Arabia.
That ~~caused~~ the "hurry"

I can't dismiss Saddam
as a regional power. Maybe now,
but uncheckered ~~past~~ ~~had~~ ~~be~~
much much more

Page

→ In your Bohan ~~piece~~ interview

I notice that at one point you apparently do favor use of force.

Bohman talks assassination squad

~~new page~~ We both know our law on that one
I like this way - you can back to
I am with the "would order" point.

I'm up to page 5 now - there
you fire back - point made.

~~Passing note~~

On pages 6-7 you talk
sanctions. I guess my point here
is, that despite of the good job
done in getting wide support for
sanctions at the U.N., there
are some interesting studies that
make clear sanctions are the
cause of victory have had serious
limitations - (good CIA study on this
about 3 years ago)

I don't think what we're
about here is cold war construct -
not at all. It is the first
post cold war test of the

woulds collective resolve.

~~But, please it's not restoring~~
~~the So~~

I note your points about
return of the Sabahs - but
outraging your concern here should
be abhorrence ~~about~~ ^{on} the
fundamental point; - It simply
is unacceptable to bully ~~out~~
rape (literally) and obliterate
a member state of the UN.

~~Now for strategy~~

Lastly, we are not alone
in the Gulf. With world ~~wide~~
leadership goes a disproportionate
responsibility to do a lot, not
all, but a lot of the heavy lifting.

I don't think this is the time
for the President of the U.S. to
hunker down, as LBJ would say.
~~Now is it a time for~~; but I guess
it is the time when you will
"paint their tails white and
run into the antelope" (a classic
by LBJ). ~~Now you have~~

You haven't done that, Pat.
Please don't. I need you with
me & your letter was great.
I hope if we have to move
~~and~~ the ~~UN~~ to implement
the UN resolution by any force
that you will support me.

Your friend, ~~Robert~~

Sincerely,