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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 90559
Folder ID Number: 90559-007

Folder Title:
Sunday, September 9, 1990

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Log	White House Telephone Log [Signal Switchboard] [redaction of personal information] (1 pp.)	09/09/90	(b)(6)	
02a. Notes	George Bush handwritten notes of President Gorbachev Presentation in Helsinki [double-sided] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02b. Note	George Bush handwritten note (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02c. Summary	Summaries of articles [George Bush Handwritten notes] [double-sided] (3 pp.)	08/90	(b)(1)	
02d. Notes	George Bush Handwritten notes (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
02e. Index Cards	Points to be Made in One on One:: Economic Cooperation [Helsinki meeting with Gorbachev] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02f. Index Cards	Talking Points [Gulf Crisis] [Helsinki meeting with Gorbachev] [Card one missing] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02g. Index Cards	Points to be Made in One on One: Human Rights [Helsinki meeting with Gorbachev] [bottom half of second card is torn and has Handwritten notes on back] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
03. Letter	From Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to President Bush (2 pp.)	09/09/90	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, September 9, 1990

Pinksheet Number: dw1814

OA/ID Number: 90559-007

Date Closed: 9/22/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0166-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04. Note	From President Bush to Boyden Gray (1 pp.)	09/09/90	C	

Page 2 of 2

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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM
SIGNAL SWITCHBOARD

September 9, 1990

	TIME		NAME	ACTION
	PLACED	DISC		
OUT	AM		Secretary James A. Baker III Kalastajatorppa Hotel Helsinki, Finland	Tlkd-ok 8:35 PM via Secure Satellite
INC	8:32 PM	8:39	Secure Voice x125	
OUT	AM		Mrs. Nancy Ellis (b)(6)	PRESUS Cancel 10:00 PM via Secure Satellite
INC	9:57 PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

PRESIDENT BUSH

SEPTEMBER 9th, 19 90

	TIME		NAME	ACTION
	PLACED	DISC		
OUT	AM			
INC	PM		NO CALLS	
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
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PRESIDENTIAL MOVEMENTS

LOCATION Helsinki, Finland
Washington, D.C.

DATE 9 September 1990

[illegible]

~~CLASSIFIED~~
Presiden GLE / Holstink-Somm
9/9/90

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

DW

9/22/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE:

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO:

P. Loh -

Personal Notes

Garb - Helmsdale Meet

Sept 9 '90

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September 9, 1990
Helsinki

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

With regard to Iraq's invasion and continued military occupation of Kuwait, President Bush and President Gorbachev issue the following joint statement:

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3, 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today, we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

I read at P. 11
copy with Gorb

Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct their Foreign Ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.

Given me by K. O. I. S. T. O.
He studies Sov. L. U. S. way
A B B C seven

The second reason is that, apart from the fact that factories are under repair and there is a shortage of spare parts, though I think other factories including military factories, could have been brought in to help, of course - the second reason is that there was a shortage of the appropriate materials for making cigarettes - apart from tobacco they contain numerous different materials -

[Lobachenko, interrupting] Paper, yes?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, paper, filters and so on. So here we have a situation in which the factories that were supposed to supply the tobacco factories with these semi-finished goods and materials have stopped supplying them.

Every time I speak on Fridays I say: Comrades, we are a single national economic complex, we cannot divide this complex into parts. As soon as we start tearing it to pieces somewhere it will inevitably cause pain, pain that in the end takes its toll on the people.

This is vividly exemplified in the case of tobacco items. In Yerevan there's a well-known factory called Nairit, it's a very big and important factory which supplies a very large number of chemical products, including some connected with cigarettes. In December that factory came to a standstill. For eight months we have been asking the Armenian leadership to please get the factory working, we are on the verge of stopping - we said that cigarette production may be halted. Further, the situation now there is such that they produce chemical components used for car windscreens and we have only enough stocks of that component to last us until 10th September. Unless we now resolve these issues car production will be brought to a standstill tomorrow. If the conveyor belts stop people will not receive the vehicles they are waiting for.

So this is what has happened with this cigarette business, as it were. All our appeals to the Armenian leadership have so far failed to produce results. The factory has been idle for eight months.

Or then, take the Vladimir chemical works. It also manufactures a certain component which eventually ends up in cigarettes. A couple of days ago - or even yesterday - I had a telegram from Vladimir saying that there was great indignation over the shortage there of tobacco goods, although it is true that there is not enough sugar there either! Fine, but when the chemical works was shut down, did nobody realise that sooner or later this would have an effect? And so, hasty decisions should not be taken. All these ill-thought-through closures - not infrequently they pursue their own narrow, purely - well, perhaps, not just departmental, but maybe narrow territorial objectives. And in the long run the outcome is the situation that has evolved now with tobacco goods. The same thing could occur with our other products - with other articles of produce.

[Lobachenko] So the disruption affects the whole of the machinery of the economy.

[Ryzhkov] Of course! We are inter-linked. Do you understand? Every works has its partners. Not just in its town, but across the country. And if a single technological link in the chain starts to break down, then the effect will undoubtedly be felt somewhere. So what is to be done? Well, those were the reasons. We have now got involved in this.

Of the 50 tobacco factories, 38 are now operating. In the next few days we will start up all the other factories. As of

yesterday - at the moment I get reports every day on what is going on - the output of cigarettes has topped the 1,000m mark to stand at something like 1,050m. That is, in a few days we will get back to the output we used to have. But now that will not be enough. Now that there's been all this uproar it must be quelled. And it is hard to quell it. We have issued instructions that not only should output be stepped up at our factories, but that there should be an attempt to buy cigarettes abroad.

So that you might have some idea of what this means, I have already said that every day the country gets through 1,200m cigarettes. In order to buy in 1,200m cigarettes, we would have to spend 10m gold roubles! Ten million! In other words, 10m a day would go up in smoke! Nevertheless, we are now engaged in negotiations with Bulgaria to ensure that at the very least they give us what is stipulated under our agreements. They are lagging behind, you see. We are holding talks and have already reached agreement with Turkey. As of September they will supply us with 1,000m cigarettes a month. In other words, that totals 3,000m. Turkey is to supply us for one day of the month! So we are also expecting to get 3,000m from Poland over three months. Talks are ending with Yugoslavia, people were sent - 6,000m, that is two days a month we will have Yugoslav cigarettes. And we are holding talks with India.

So we have now brought in other countries - no matter how difficult it is with hard currency, no matter how difficult it is with all things, because there is not enough children's food, we do not have enough butter in certain areas - but we understand these questions must be resolved. And now, as they say, both internally we are doing everything to increase production, and at the same time we have to undertake this, I would say frankly, not very popular measure - buying abroad. But I do not see any other way out. So the task now, both in the centre and locally, is to pay particular attention to gradually extinguishing this flare-up which has occurred.

[Lobachenko] So smokers have some hope, right?

[Ryzhkov] I think that they undoubtedly have.

[Lobachenko] We see that there are acute problems here, Nikolay Ivanovich, and there are other acute problems in internal life, and they explain why you in your speeches rarely touch on the area of the government's international activities. But nevertheless what have you paid particular attention to in recent weeks in your work?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, Vadim Ivanovich, you are right to note that in my weekly talks I, on the whole, dwell on internal problems, because they are the most important ones today, although as a government we are obliged to work continuously on external political and external political issues. Of all the international issues which we have discussed during this week - and we worked on these issues - I would probably single out two issues.

The first thing, this was today, literally about 30 minutes ago, my meeting with Comrade Najibollah, the President of Afghanistan, finished. And I had a thorough conversation with him during which we considered issues of bilateral relations. We considered political issues as well, in connection with the settlement of the whole Afghan problem. Of course, we are all coming out in favour of this and are doing all of this in our practical steps in order that the bloodshed in Afghanistan

should end. And very much has been done there during recent times and the government, the leadership, headed by President Najibollah, are doing a great deal for national reconciliation. He spoke today about what they have done in connection with changing the constitution, in connection with reforming the party, in connection with the democratic changes of all kinds which are taking place in Afghanistan. All of these are, of course, directed towards a peaceful settlement, towards political stability and towards a political resolution of these issues, and we welcome these steps; although the situation, as you know, is very complex there. War is under way, as they say, and Kabul is under fire. But at least a positive process is taking place.

Of course, the greater part of my conversation with him today was devoted to our bilateral relations. Historically, relations which were not bad have taken shape between us and Afghanistan. I am not speaking about that period when, as they say, our troops were present there. We now need to work out economic relations which would be mutually advantageous. We agreed today on how we are to act further. We must develop trade between ourselves to a maximum extent - and the opportunity for trade is already appearing. We have planned such steps. We consider that our union republics will be able to do very much in this matter. Now, as you know, we are to a maximum degree giving union republics the opportunity to resolve their own foreign economic links. For this reason our Central Asian republics should, of course, concern themselves more and have economic relations with Afghanistan. So I, as they say, am hot on the trail of my meeting with Najibollah.

There is another problem that I would dwell on, and that is the problem of Kuwait - and indeed of the situation that has evolved in the Persian Gulf area. I doubt if there is any need for me to analyse in detail what is going on there, because the organs of the mass media have been covering this issue in sufficient detail. Not least television has been devoting particular attention to it.

As soon as things started happening there - the day afterwards - the government set up a special working group headed by Comrade Igor Sergeyevich Belousov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which incorporates representatives from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence and other organisations which maintain a certain interest. Every day this group is engaged on these matters; every day it monitors what is going on there. In so far as its brief will allow it, it takes decisions by itself. And wherever the President or the government has to take political decisions it puts forward appropriate suggestions.

This past week Hammadi, the Deputy Premier, has visited us. We discussed these issues with him. He put forward the position of the Iraqi leadership. We made matters clear to him, and we are pursuing the line that the Soviet Union is adhering strictly to the resolutions passed by the Security Council. We are not backing down a whit on this, but instead support them clearly.

Aside from the foreign policy aspect, it has been our task to tackle the purely human issues. When this crisis arose, there were, if I am not mistaken, 880 of our Soviet citizens in Kuwait working in the embassy, in the trade missions or at facilities on

which we held agreements - yes, 882 people. We did everything we could to evacuate these people and bring them out. We got two groups of people out through Iraq and Baghdad to Jordan. From Jordan we airlifted them to the Soviet Union. Today at 0500 the last 180 people arrived.

[Lobachenko] So the evacuation is complete?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, it's complete. But they were evacuated directly from Baghdad, directly from Baghdad. It is a result of the understanding, of the talks, we had with Hammadi here. The task now is to bring women and children out of Iraq itself. We evacuated 882 people from Kuwait, but in Iraq our colony of specialists, our people, stands at around 8,000. They work at various enterprises and construction sites there, they are involved in geological prospecting work. All the sorts of things you get under normal relations. It is a colony of around 8,000. It has now been decided to bring out the women and children, the women and children. There are around 900 of them.

A timetable has been set. And we discussed this matter with the Iraqi leadership, in the person of Deputy Premier Hammadi, and agreed that we would take these citizens of ours directly from Baghdad. A timetable from the working commission was outlined and confirmed today, and the first batch, the first group of people, our women and children, would fly out under this timetable on Sunday the 26th. Then the next group would leave on the 28th, and then on the 30th and 31st. We hope that by 1st September we shall have evacuated these 900 women and children from there in order not to take any risks, not to take any risks. The specialists will remain, but we shall be carrying out this sort of evacuation.

[Lobachenko] The situation there is deteriorating more and more, isn't it?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, the situation is deteriorating, and so we are obliged first and foremost to look after the women and children. Well, you know that our citizens are not considered hostages there, as it were, or a ban on exit - there is no such thing, for the Soviet Union this does not apply. But nonetheless we cannot take risks with children and women. For this reason such a decision has been taken by the government and I hope that we will do all of this within these time limits which were announced to me today by the working group. This is perhaps one of the most acute, burning, international issues with which the government was concerned during this week. And so we are of course, as they say, all the time keeping our finger on the pulse, are keeping up both with the international situation which is taking shape and, well, of course the government has, especially during recent times, had to concern itself more and more with our internal affairs.

[Lobachenko] Thank you very much. Thank you.

[Ryzhkov] Goodbye.

[2]

CPSU SECRETARIAT HEARS REPORTS ON VISITS TO LOCALITIES

Tass in Russian for abroad 1535 gmt 22 Aug 90

Text of report

Questions posed to the delegates of the 28th Congress, to members of the Central Committee and the Central Control

agricultural machinery plant at Frunze and Urgench forage-harvesting machinery works are in no hurry to repay their debts. They do not respond to appeals or criticism.

What are the entreaties, groans, prayers and threats of agricultural workers to them? The enterprises have their own entirely understandable concerns. But is the concern for feeds and grain a matter for the rural workers alone, or does it concern us all? And is the silence of the executives of industrial enterprises really the gold that is needed today? Although, of course, it does turn into gold in the end, since the country is having to spend foreign currency in order to acquire grain, feed, meat and butter abroad.

[28]

WHY GRAIN PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS DISLIKE A BIG HARVEST

'Izvestiya' morning edition 11 Aug 90

Excerpts from article by V.Kononov

Many elevators in various regions of the country resemble inaccessible fortresses these days. Inaccessible to vehicles carrying grain from this year's harvest. It has long been no cause for amazement that a bumper harvest always comes as a big surprise to us and no one knows what to do with it. Yet there are quite diverse reasons for refusal to accept the grain.

For instance, our non-staff correspondent A. Kozlov reports that in the Bashkir ASSR the first vehicles carrying grain were turned away at many elevators because procurement workers suddenly recalled a USSR Council of Ministers' decision adopted a few years ago. This decision stated that grain should only be accepted if accompanied by a certificate indicating its residual pesticide content. The decision is clearly a correct one, but, like many others, its adoption was far easier than its implementation.

The harvest in the Bashkir ASSR is an unprecedented one. There are only six toxicological laboratories for the republic's 54 rayons, of which two are in Ufa, moreover. In these conditions it is virtually impossible to analyse each grain consignment...

Another reason for refusal to take grain at Bashkir elevators is of precisely the same nature. There was a lack of floodwater there for three years. The elevators' drying facilities stood idle. There seemed to be quite enough time to prepare them for work in the event of a rainy harvest and a bumper crop. And then this year's harvest had scarcely begun when the rains came. But procurement workers refused to accept grain with a high moisture content, turning the grain lorries back to the farms. The ASSR's government had to intervene to ensure that drying facilities at the elevators were - at last, at the height of the harvest - prepared for operation and switched on.

Rostov Oblast has its own reasons for having too much grain on hand. Reports coming in from localities there say that on many farms grain is being collected directly in the fields, on prepared sites on the ground, in old barns and in hastily vacated feeding yards. On the one hand, vehicles and barges to carry the grain out are in short supply and, on the other hand, capacities at certain grain-receiving enterprises are inadequate...

One could continue with these examples almost ad infinitum. The reasons why the big harvest is burdensome for the organisers of grain procurement only seem diverse at first glance. At the core they are the same. Officials who act by administrative-command methods are unable to organise anything intelligently. Therefore they do not need either the harvest or the trouble it brings. It is much more convenient and tranquil for them to buy grain abroad. But for you and me, and for the country, the cost is considerable. And because the switch to new economic relations based on interest and responsibility is continually being put off, it is time to call to account those people for whom normal work first comes as a surprise and then proves to be a failure.

[29]

CLASH BETWEEN HARVEST NEEDS AND GRAIN IMPORT SCHEDULES

'Pravda' second edition 21 Aug 90

Text of article by Vasilij Parfenov

The bumper harvest of 1990, the like of which, it is said, has not been seen before in our country's history, caught unawares not so much country folk as government departments.

The buyers from the foreign trade management structures made fools of themselves last year. They failed to agree with overseas grain sellers the precise times for delivering grain to our ports. And this has resulted in a grave tragedy now. At the height of the harvesting season, when mountains of home-grown grain are piling up on the open threshing floors in the south of our country, foreign ships carrying last year's maize and feed grain have set off one after another for ports all round the USSR. There is no possibility at all of unloading and transporting this cargo with the harvest in full swing; the grain trains are needed to carry our own grain.

So how did the purchasers of foreign grain "forget" when drawing up the documents to specify WINTER delivery schedules? After all, that is the sole reason why ships carrying last year's grain have been swaying for weeks in the roads, waiting to be unloaded. The foreign captains do quite well out of this waiting. We are obliged to pay them 12,000-15,000 dollars for every 24 hours which just one ship spends standing idle.

And there are several dozen such ships swaying in the waves and at moorings close to Soviet ports. On 6th August, there were five ships, whose holds contained half a million tonnes of grain, close by the port of Odessa alone; while three ships were at the port of Novorossiysk, waiting for more than 100,000t of cereals to be unloaded. Ships have arrived at Berdyansk, Mariupol, Poti, Batumi, Nakhodka, Vladivostok...

The transport departments are holding heated discussions among themselves and dashing off letters, but meanwhile it is our treasury - that is to say, you and I - which pays for this excessive idling.

We paid shipping companies, according to various figures, from 600,000,000 to 1bn dollars last year just for delivering 30,000,000t of foreign grain. And how much more money is disappearing to pay for still-laden ships to stand idle in excess of the norm?

Concerned at the big losses, staff of the USSR Ministry of the Merchant Marine unflinchingly write anxious letters to the State Commission for Foodstuffs and Procurements of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the USSR People's Control Committee, to the CPSU Central Committee...

N.P. Tsakh, USSR Deputy Minister of the Merchant Marine, talks about this with alarm. The department issued due warning, but was simply unable to get drawn up a clear-cut programme for shipments during the period from November to June, when the harvesting of the new crop has not yet begun. Perhaps it is advantageous to some of the traders and buyers for foreign grain to arrive at our ports precisely at the peak of the harvest?!

Now, certain of our planners and economic managers are constantly citing in the press and on television likely figures for our current grain losses - many tens of millions of tonnes. Will they really make us put up with this again?

Our country is large, and harvesting in the different zones, fortunately, does not start at the same time. And this helps us in many respects. But the goods trains take 50 days, or at best 30 days, to go from the west to the east of the country and back. This exacerbates the shortage of wagons, which are so essential for carrying grain in the European part of the country. In addition to which, around 4,000 grain wagons remain unemptied daily, turning into warehouses on wheels.

And there is yet another failure. The pace and rhythm of the railways has been disrupted this year because of the political actions of members of informal organisations on the Transcaucasus Railway and strikes by miners in the Donbass and the Kuzbass... Compared with last year, the average daily load carried by rolling stock has fallen by 200,000t.

Moreover, because of a shortsighted policy in purchasing grain across the ocean and arranging for its delivery, railway workers have been simultaneously loaded, as we can see, with "two harvests" - the home-grown and the foreign - and the two streams of grain have merged. But if we are to be completely frank, quite a bit of blame for these "two harvests" also attaches to the railway department. Because of the low level of organisation of the railwaymen and the laxness of the government, more than 3,000,000t of grain remained in port warehouses throughout the winter. This carried-over residue was simply shunted from place to place from month to month until the very start of harvesting. Even on 5th August more than 700,000t of imported grain remained in the ports.

No ship, motor vehicle or rolling stock can move without fuel. But in the month of July alone country folk received 175,000t of petrol and 616,000t of diesel fuel less than required. Our country has mighty departments responsible for extracting oil, refining it, selling it abroad, distributing fuel to the republics and delivering it to consumers. For all these departments (not to mention the economic headquarters - the USSR State Planning Committee) the abundant harvest was, it seems, also unexpected and something hindering, as it were, the customary measured pace of work. Why precisely now have we reduced oil recovery and cut back the production of petrol and lubricants, while generously sending crude oil and fuel oil abroad? Is this really a progressive export structure?

Science is also rightly being reproached. Where are our scientists with their economic forecasts? Our potential "sponsors" across the ocean are keeping a close watch on how we gather in this year's harvest. An August issue of 'Newsweek' reports that "although the peasants have grown a record crop, it could rot because of a lack of equipment, storage facilities, fuel and manpower". So the hint to American farmers is clear: Get ready to sell your grain to the USSR.

If our peasants need trucks to carry grain, the towns can and must provide them. If only to gather in the whole of the harvest and deliver it without loss to the granaries. And finally abandon purchasing grain from the West. This is not just a socio-economic issue; it is also a major political issue.

ENERGY

OIL AND NATURAL GAS

[30]

BARGAINING OVER BALTIC REPUBLICS' HELP IN DEVELOPING W SIBERIAN FUEL COMPLEX

'Izvestiya' evening edition 18 Aug 90

Text of report from Tallinn by L. Levitskiy

Experts from the Baltic republics and the USSR Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry have had two days of talks. The subject of their discussion was how the Baltic region could continue to take part in the development of the West Siberian fuel complex.

Let us recall that about 10 years ago, by decision of the country's government, a number of republics became involved in the construction of towns and settlements and the setting up of surface facilities at deposits in the Ob region. The logic of this was that fuel needed by all should be extracted jointly. The logic of that way of life which was constructed around a vertical administrative axis. However, at the present time the all-union oil "duty tour" has begun to be perceived as a burdensome obligation. Each republic is short of both manpower and materials for its own construction projects.

Fuel fever and the petrol shortage have had a sobering effect. Centralised stocks no longer serve as a guarantee of sufficiency. The Baltic region is the first to try to effect direct links with the Siberians. Building workers from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are willing to go on working in the Ob region in exchange for guaranteed deliveries of oil and oil products. Of course, this is still not a market, but it is a kind of approach to one. And it suddenly emerged that the demand-supply equation has more than one solution. The assessments of the Baltic experts also differed as regards the advantageousness of the deal. The general agreement between the Baltic region and Siberia was replaced by three protocols concluded by the republics on co-operation in the new oil fields.

building up on the threshing floors of collective and state farms. Given the bad weather at the moment, this is of concern to everybody. It is our job to make sure that this grain is brought indoors more quickly. Of course, some of the grain remains with the collective and state farms, but some of it is taken to the grain acceptance points. The statistics are that each day some 3m tonnes of grain are scattered on the threshing floors of the collective and state farms. Every day. At present one third is transported by rail and road to the granaries - 1m tonnes. And so, the main task at the present time is to make sure that the grain is transported without hiccups, so that it can dry out and be brought up to standard the way it should be, and then be reliably stored in our corn-bins.

There is a lot of talk at the moment to the effect that there is a shortage of granaries and that the country was unprepared for such a harvest. I should tell you that we have enough granaries to cope with a harvest of up to 300m tonnes. That is the volume of our granaries. Thus we can store all the grain. All we need do now is take some very serious steps to ensure that the grain is transported. Not everything is quite right on this score.

In the first place, there is a shortage of goods wagons. We have now issued instructions for some more wagons to be specially readied for grain transport. But the wagons are standing idle for very long periods in the union republics and at the grain acceptance points. In each case several thousand wagons are not being unloaded in time, and of course urgent steps will have to be taken now to ensure that this conveyor operates without interruption. Particularly since just yesterday or today Kazakhstan is embarking on its large-scale harvesting. That's an awful lot of grain, and it takes a lot of shifting. As you know, we are now dispatching a lot of motor vehicles, particularly to Kazakhstan, so that these issues might be resolved rapidly.

As regards the material supply question - something that is always under scrutiny - we are trying to resolve urgently any questions that arise during the harvest. And so, the situation is complicated, and we are being hindered terribly by the weather, but I believe the feeling is that the harvest must be brought in.

And I saw this for myself when last Saturday I visited Ryazan and Tula Oblasts. I gave Saturday over to visiting two or three farming enterprises and to viewing at first hand the way in which all the work is organised. And of course to examining the prospects - how we should proceed with agriculture, what issues are surfacing - the trip was very successful and very interesting. Because not only did we see the way in which the people are working today in difficult circumstances. In difficult circumstances. But we also saw something of the prospects. People are wondering how to raise the yields further. And so, we are following these issues at first hand, so to speak.

[Lobachenko] Another thorny issue, Nikolay Ivanovich, is the problem of tobacco and the problem of supplying our people with smokers' goods. You know, personally I do not smoke, but I know just how worked up my colleagues who do smoke get over this problem. What are the reasons behind this situation, and what is the government doing to rectify it?

[Ryzhkov] It is true that this problem has grown very much more acute in recent times. I might even say that it has snowballed, and with every day that passes the situation is deteriorating further and further. But to be candid, strictly speaking this issue needs to be put to the representatives of the governments of the union republics. That's what needs doing if you look into it. The reason is that, as one knows, around two years ago the whole of the agro-industrial complex, the enterprises of the agro-industrial complex, the whole of the agro-industrial complex network, was transferred to the union republics, and they are dealing with these issues directly, and that includes these matters to do with tobacco.

Regrettably, however, all the complaints from smokers, the whole cutting edge of criticism and indignation from smokers has been brought to bear on the central government. People write letters to me asking what I'm up to and why I'm not adopting measures. And when we saw that a very difficult situation was really emerging, we were forced to get involved in this problem. I gave instructions to my deputies that, irrespective of whether this lies in the domain of the republics, so to speak, they should immediately get involved in this problem and deal with it straight away, because we realise how thorny this is and what an acute issue is involved.

What has happened? Let's deal with the causes first of all. In June and July, of the 50 existing factories in the Soviet Union, in all the republics, 24 factories were halted for overhaul.

[Lobachenko] Half of them, in other words.

[Ryzhkov] That means half of the factories were halted. Let me check the details - yes, 24 factories were halted for overhaul, and, correspondingly, a sharp drop in the production of tobacco goods, cigarettes and papirosy [Russian-style cigarettes with cardboard mouthpieces] was immediately felt. Take the RSFSR, for instance. Of the 24 factories, 18 ended up being overhauled: 18. Every day - we have now studied all the statistics! Every day our people smoke, consume 1,200m cigarettes. And that is the quantity our factories used to produce. Everything was fine - we produced as much as people smoked. As the saying goes, there was an equilibrium, there was a balance. As soon as half the factories were halted, production was immediately halved, and the daily production rate became 500,000,000. Given that production had fallen, the stocks in the trade network went down steeply. Previously we kept up a 2.5-month supply of cigarettes in the trade network. So any fluctuations that occurred - and that is only natural in the retail network - were always absorbed by those stocks.

You will recall there was panic-buying of salt and matches, but it went no further because there were large stocks. Everything was wheeled in, and the whole thing was absorbed. In this case the stocks have been used up and caused what I would call this wave of panic-buying, a wave of panic-buying. We have a very great deal of experience of this panic-buying. You remember how we battled with the soap problem, soap powder - we spent an entire year, an entire year, stamping out the problem. True, now there is soap powder lying about everywhere, as they say, but we were forced to buy up all the powders abroad and sharply increase domestic production. The same sort of thing has now happened with tobacco items. So this wave is under way, and it's a very intense one.

B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

[1]

RYZHKOV ON CIGARETTE SHORTAGE AND IRAQ

Soviet television 1746 gmt 24 Aug 90

Text of "In the USSR Government" interview by V. Lobachenko with Nikolay Ryzhkov

[Lobachenko] Nikolay Ivanovich, in the "Vremya" programme yesterday (SU/0852 B/1) Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the USSR President, described his meeting with members of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. What is your view of the meeting?

[Ryzhkov] Yes indeed, at my request, Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the country's President, yesterday met members of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. It was a lengthy meeting: it lasted six hours. We believe we attained a certain goal in our conversation with Mikhail Sergeyevich, which was to express our views on the development of the national economy this year and on how we evaluate the socio-political situation in the country, and, most importantly, to define our position on what measures need to be adopted in order to improve the situation in our state.

We are very worried by the situation that has evolved in 1990, by the fact that the economy is developing with a great deal of strain, that there are very many shortcomings. And we feel this in our everyday lives. And of course it is imperative to adopt urgent measures to rectify the situation. We are no less worried by the prospects for 1991. I mention this every Friday, in effect: the fact that four months remain to the new year, but the preparation of the whole of the national economy for work next year is being pursued in a very weak fashion.

There are very many reasons here. This is a major separate topic. There are also objective reasons here. There are many subjective factors, whereby circumstances are created in the country which hamper normal relations today. In the final analysis, all this has an influence, it affects the functioning of the national economy.

This was the first issue, and we asked the President to ensure that, in all our further actions, alongside the need to tackle major political problems, long-term problems, we should under no circumstances lose sight of what needs to be done today.

Secondly, the question of the union treaty was discussed. The government considers that the process of concluding a union treaty needs to be accelerated, appropriately, that is firstly the elaboration and then the conclusion of the union treaty. The fate of our country in many ways depends on this and accordingly the life of our people, for we consider that all efforts need to be concentrated now for such an elaboration to be carried out, for all those tendencies, opinions which are being expressed by the union republics and those proposals which are being elaborated by various programmes at the present time to be taken into account in the union treaty. These need to be considered very thoroughly during the

elaboration of the union treaty. And for this reason our opinion was such that efforts need to be concentrated there, on this issue, and the main thing is to consider all the proposals, of which there are very many today. These roughly are the problems or the main topics of our meeting with our country's President yesterday.

As a result of this meeting we satisfied ourselves once again that we have every opportunity to correct the situation if decisions are taken appropriately, if there is consolidation in society and if this is all directed so that society can be united today for the resolution of all of the problems which arise before us. The main thing today, in my view, is understanding, the understanding that we need to unite to resolve both today's issues and possible future ones. Only if this is the case can we resolve them. If the destructive tendencies do not cease then, of course, something very awkward will await us. But yesterday's conversation, as it were, an open exchange of opinions, the exchange was very open, showed once again that there are such possibilities.

Yesterday a thought, such a thought, was expressed - and we support this - that at the end of the month, to be more exact, I think, on the 31st, a sitting of the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council will take place - which should consider all issues - the development of our country, issues relating to the union treaty, that is everything which disturbs our society today, all the more so as we are on the threshold of a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Lobachenko] Nikolay Ivanovich, in your weekly appearances on Central Television you have, in recent times, been placing particular emphasis on the problem of the harvest. Judging by everything, the government's prompt decisions are having a positive effect on this process. What has changed in this regard of late?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, in these past weeks I have begun my meetings with TV viewers by reviewing the process of bringing in the harvest. This is only to be expected, because - and I want to reiterate this - there is no more serious, burning or topical issue facing the country today.

As of 20th August cereals had been harvested on almost half the fields of our country. Some 28.9 - almost 29q - of grain are being obtained from every hectare. If we compare this with last year, that is 6.8q more than last year's harvest on every hectare.

[Lobachenko] On average.

[Ryzhkov] Yes, if we take 1978, which is reckoned to have had the most bountiful harvest, then we are getting 5q more than in 1978. In all, since the start of the harvesting, a total of 133m tonnes of grain have been threshed. That is the gross harvest. The state's granaries have been filled with 40m tonnes. I have already explained to TV viewers that we - the state - are only buying a certain proportion of the grain. The rest of the grain remains with the leadership of the collective and state farms, and with the farmers, to feed their cattle and for their own needs.

So what are the problems that concern us and worry us today? Today the situation is such that a lot of grain is

Ambassador and Mrs. John Giffen Weinmann selected the paintings and bronze sculptures for the Residence living room and foyer from the extensive collection of Western American Art at the National Cowboy Hall of Fame and Museum of Western Heritage in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The works of art were loaned to the American Embassy, Helsinki, in 1990 under the auspices of the Art-in-Embassies Program of the United States Department of State.



The three-story Residence of the American Ambassador to Finland, recently redecorated by Ambassador and Mrs. Weinmann, is the central section of a U-shaped structure designed as an Embassy in the Colonial Williamsburg style and completed in 1940. One wing of the Embassy contains offices and the other wing contains kitchen, staff and garage areas. To house additional offices an adjacent apartment building was acquired. It contains the Consular, Commercial and Administrative Sections, as well as the American Embassy Club and a sauna. The Embassy compound comprises approximately three acres in the elegant Kaivopuisto quarter of Helsinki.

ART
in
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE
HELSINKI, FINLAND
1990

PAINTINGS

BRONZE SCULPTURES

ENTRY FOYER:

"American Bison" - Eli W. Harvey

LIVING ROOM:

Dining Room Wall (left to right):

"Buffalo Runner" - Robert Scriver

"A Lack of Slack" - Harry Jackson

Fireplace Mantel:

"Changing Outfits" - C.M. Russell

Coffee Table:

"Boomer" - Harold Holden

ENTRY FOYER:

"Land of Plenty" - John Clymer

LIVING ROOM:

Garden Wall (left to right):

"Target Practice" - Tom Lovell

"Back to the Herd" - Olaf Weighorst

"The Wolfmen" - Tom Lovell

Inside Wall (left to right):

"Windswept" - John Clymer

"Moving Day on the Flatland" - Howard
Terpning

DINING ROOM:

Over the Mantel:

Portrait of Virginia Eason Weinmann
(Mrs. John Giffen Weinmann) -
Richard Goetz

Garden Wall (left to right):

Portrait of Mrs. Rudolph John
Weinmann (mother of Ambassador
Weinmann) - Ella M. Wood

Portrait of Ambassador John Giffen
Weinmann - Ella M. Wood

Stair Hall:

Portrait of George Gustaf Sohlberg
(maternal grandfather of Mrs.
Weinmann) - Howard Chandler Christy

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Notes	George Bush Handwritten notes (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, September 9, 1990

Date Closed: 9/22/2010	OA/ID Number: 90559-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



LUNCHEON

9TH SEPTEMBER 1990

COLD ROLLS OF PIKE-PERCH

ROE SAUCE

FILET OF ELK

CHANTERELLE SAUCE

ARCTIC BRAMBLE BAVAROIS

COFFEE

*

POUILLY-FUISSÉ 1988

BEAUNE-TEURONS 1985

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Index Cards	Points to be Made in One on One:: Economic Cooperation [Helsinki meeting with Gorbachev] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. Index Cards	Talking Points [Gulf Crisis] [Helsinki meeting with Gorbachev] [Card one missing] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, September 9, 1990

Date Closed: 9/22/2010	OA/ID Number: 90559-007
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02g. Index Cards	Points to be Made in One on One: Human Rights [Helsinki meeting with Gorbachev] [bottom half of second card is torn and has Handwritten notes on back] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, September 9, 1990

Date Closed: 9/22/2010	OA/ID Number: 90559-007
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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Letter	From Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to President Bush (2 pp.)	09/09/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, September 9, 1990

Date Closed: 9/22/2010	OA/ID Number: 90559-007
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

s of America



CANADA

PRIME MIN

PREMIER MI
OTTAWA K1A 0A2

The
T



ABOARD

Air Force One

OUR DESTINATION IS: ANDREWS AFB, MD

THE EXPECTED ARRIVAL TIME IS: 9:45 P.M.

TIME CHANGE ON THIS LEG: GAIN SEVEN HOURS

OUR FLIGHT ALTITUDE WILL BE: 31,000 FEET,
AND OUR SPEED WILL AVERAGE: 530 M.P.H.

WE WILL FLY OVER: ICELAND & GREENLAND

DESTINATION WEATHER FORECAST

CONDITIONS: CLOUDY

TEMPERATURE: 59 DEGREES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: September 19, 1990

TO: PATTY PRESOCK

FROM: ED ROGERS

I thought it would be best to send this in through you, given the nature of the attached information on Sharon Pratt Dixon.

Thanks.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Note	From President Bush to Boyden Gray (1 pp.)	09/09/90	C	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, September 9, 1990

Date Closed: 9/22/2010	OA/ID Number: 90559-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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☐ Routine Matter

☐ Fairly Important

☒ The future of Western Civilization
hangs in the balance

P

✓
done
bmm
9/10

save one copy
send sig sealed
eyes only - hand
carried

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Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

PRESIDENT/IRAQI TRIAL (Baghdad) -- Iraq said Monday it has drawn up a charge sheet for the trial of "criminal" President Bush for sending troops to the Persian Gulf.... The Iraqi News Agency quoted al-Shabib al-Maliki, Iraqi secretary-general of the Arab Lawyers Union, as saying Bush should stand trial by a people's court this month.... Maliki said the charges against Bush included:

- * Sending American troops to the Gulf region and occupying Moslem shrines in Saudi Arabia.
- * Threatening to attack Iraq and the Arab nation.
- * Imposing economic measures against Iraq....
- * Issuing orders to the CIA to conspire against Saddam.

GULF/JAPAN/D'AMATO (Albany/UPI) -- Sen. D'Amato Monday characterized the Japanese as greedy profiteers who will not take part in the Persian Gulf crisis unless there is a buck in it. "I certainly believe the Japanese have been acting totally within the character that they usually do," D'Amato said. In demanding more participation, especially financial, from the U.S. allies in the gulf, D'Amato also pulled no punches in assessing the participation of West Germany and Egypt. But he saved his harshest commentary for Japan. "They are motivated by profit, greed and avarice, and for them to not step forward and make a contribution to this mission is unconscionable," D'Amato said.

IRAQI OIL OFFER/THIRD WORLD (Paris/Reuter) -- Surprise, disbelief and mockery were the initial reactions of poor countries to Saddam Hussein's offer of free oil. "How do you get there? The Americans are there. How do you bring oil back through a blockade?" said Thomas Chery, Haiti's delegate to a U.N. conference on the Least Developed Countries.... Most of the delegates from the world's 41 poorest nations attending the two-week conference in Paris had similar sentiments.... "(Saddam) doesn't mean it. It is propaganda," Botswana representative F.G. Mogae. "Did Saddam Hussein not know before that we needed oil? If he wanted to help developing countries he should not have attacked (Kuwait) in the first place."

LIBERIA/DOE (Monrovia/AP) -- Liberian President Doe has been killed, the State Department said today. The department said it had been informed by various sources that Doe died after a weekend shootout with rebel forces. State Department officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said U.S. officials regard the reports as reliable and consider them confirmation of Doe's death.

September 9, 1990
Helsinki

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

With regard to Iraq's invasion and continued military occupation of Kuwait, President Bush and President Gorbachev issue the following joint statement:

We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors.

We reaffirm the joint statement of our Foreign Ministers of August 3, 1990 and our support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. Today, we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait.

Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions is acceptable.

Nothing short of a return to the pre-August 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isolation.

We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that UN Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian circumstances, the importation into Iraq and

Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Committee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute humanitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority being given to meeting the needs of children.

Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the UN Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay.

As soon as the objectives mandated by the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not pay, the Presidents direct their Foreign Ministers to work with countries in the region and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time.

daily
phone call

ETHAN A. H. SHEPLEY, JR.

215 GRAYBRIDGE ROAD

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63124

September 9, 1990

(314) 921-7065

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

Dear George -

17

Your telephone call was almost
with having a cancer operation! I can't
thank you enough for your thoughtfulness

ETHAN A. H. SHEPLEY, JR.
215 GRAYBRIDGE ROAD
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63124

and words of encouragement. I'm happy
to report that my prognosis is excellent
so maybe after your second term is over
I can help you with your golf swing!

My love to Bar -

Z
Een

and made of encouragement. I'm hoping
to report that my program is successful.

ETHAN A. H. SHEPLEY, JR.
215 GRAYBRIDGE ROAD
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63124

September 9, 1990
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