

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0166-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0166-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 90549
Folder ID Number: 90549-006

Folder Title:
Sunday, June 3, 1990

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	12	12	1	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Log	White House Telephone Log [President Bush] [redaction of personal information] (3 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(6)	
01b. Log	White House Telephone Log [Signal Switchboard] [redaction of personal information] (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(6)	
02a. Memo	From Command Duty Officer to Distribution Re: CDO [Camp David] Visit Report for 2 June 1990 [redaction] (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(7)(e)	
02b. List	Space Assignments [Camp David] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(e)	
02c. Manifest	Helo Manifest (Staff/guests) [Camp David] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	
02d. List	Carpet/Gov't Vehicle (Staff/Guests) [Camp David] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	
02e. Map	Fair Weather Plan [Camp David] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(e)	
02f. List	Cart Schedule [Camp David] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(e)	
03. Note	Handwritten notes of Presidential Phone call with Kohl (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(1)	
04. Note	Handwritten notes Presidential Phone call with Ronald Reagan (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Pinksheet Number: dw1713

OA/ID Number: 90549-006

Date Closed: 5/21/2010

FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0166-S

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
~~05. Note~~	~~Handwritten notes of Presidential Phone call with M. Thatcher (1 pp.)~~	~~06/03/90~~	~~(b)(1)~~	

Page 2 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Pinksheet Number: dw1713
OA/ID Number: 90549-006
Date Closed: 5/21/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0166-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Log	White House Telephone Log [President Bush] [redaction of personal information] (3 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

PRESIDENT BUSH

JUNE 3RD

, 19⁹⁰

	TIME		DISC	NAME	ACTION
	PLACED				
OUT	8:30	AM	8:35	MRS. MARGARET BUSH (b)(6)	TLKD-OK
INC xxx		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT	8:35	AM		MR. STEVE POTTS (b)(6)	PRESUS CA.
INC xxx		XPM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT	8:53	AM		MR. MARLIN FITZWATER OFC: WASHINGTON, D.C. WHITE HOUSE ADMIN. EXT. 700	PRESUS CA.
INC xxx		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT	8:54	AM		COUNT WILHELM WACHTMEISTER (b)(6)	PRESUS CA.
INC xxx		XPM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT	8:54	AM	8:55	DOCTOR MICHAEL J. BOSKIN (b)(6)	TLKD-OK
INC xxx		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT	9:03	AM	9:05	SENATOR JOHN H. HEINZ RES: PITTSBURGH, PA. 412-782-0522	TLKD-OK
xxx INC		xxx PM			

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

PRESIDENT BUSH

JUNE 3RD

, 19⁹⁰

	TIME		DISC	NAME	ACTION
	PLACED				
OUT	9:08	AM		MRS. PATRICIA (PATTY) A. PRESOCK RES: HERNDON, VA. WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL EXT. 3804	PRESUS CA.
INC xxx		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT xxx	9:33	AM	9:36	MR. MARVIN BUSH (b)(6)	TLKD-K
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT xxx		AM		MRS. PRESCOTT BUSH (b)(6)	TLKD-OK
INC	1:31	PM	1:35		
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT xxx		AM		MR. RONALD W. REAGAN (b)(6)	TLKD-OK 3:52 P.M.
INC	1:50	PM	3:56		
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT xxx		AM		AMBASSADOR RICHARD A. MOORE RES: DUBLIN, IRLAND 011-353-177-3506	TLKD-OK
INC	1:57	PM	2:08		
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT xxx		AM		MR. LEE ATWATER WASHINGTON, D.C. 994-1861	TLKD-OK
INC	2:10	PM	2:13		

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM

PRESIDENT BUSH

JUNE 3RD

, 19 90

	TIME		DISC	NAME	ACTION
	PLACED				
OUT		AM		GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT OFC: WASHINGTON, D.C. WHITE HOUSE ADMIN. EXT. 653	TLKD-OK 4:13 P.M.
INC	4:10	PM	4:16		
OUT		AM			
INC		PM		MRS. BARBARA BUSH RES: WASHINGTON, D.C. WHITE HOUSE ADMIN. EXT. 551	TLKD-OK
OUT		AM			
INC	4:58	PM	4:59		
OUT		AM		AMBASSADOR FREDRICK ZEDER (b)(6)	TLKD-OK 9:17 P.M.
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC	6:10	PM	9:18		
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			
OUT		AM			
INC		PM			

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Log	White House Telephone Log [Signal Switchboard] [redaction of personal information] (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010

OA/ID Number: 90549-006

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE MEMORANDUM
SIGNAL SWITCHBOARD

June 3, 1990

	TIME		NAME	ACTION
	PLACED	DISC		
OUT	AM		Conference Call: Chancellor Helmut Kohl	Tlkd-ok 3:40 PM
INC	3:38 PM	3:50	(b)(6)	
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM		Mr. Robert L. Hutchings White House Situation Room White House Signal 2-2264	
INC	PM			
OUT	AM		Mrs. Giesla Marcuse White House Situation Room White House Signal 2-2264	
INC	PM			
OUT	AM		Conference Call: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher	Tlkd-ok 3:58 PM
INC	3:50 PM	4:09	(b)(6)	
OUT	AM			
INC	PM		Mr. Robert L. Hutchings White House Situation Room White House Signal 2-2264	
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			
OUT	AM			
INC	PM			

PRESIDENTIAL MOVEMENTS

LOCATION Washington, D.C.

DATE 3 June 1990

TIME	MOVEMENTS
0749	State Floor (LOW KEY)
0750	North Grounds (LOW KEY)
0751	Depart North Grounds via Motorcade (LOW KEY)
0752	Arrive St. John's Church (LOW KEY)
0826	Depart St. John's Church via Motorcade (LOW KEY)
0827	Arrive South Grounds (LOW KEY)
0828	Residence
0942	Diplomatic Reception Room
0944	South Grounds
0951	Residence
0952	State Floor
1111	Residence
1126	State Floor
1127	North Grounds
1130	Residence
1140	South Grounds
1346	Residence
1818	South Grounds (LOW KEY)
1819	Depart South Grounds via Motorcade (LOW KEY)
1837	Arrive Peking Gourmet Restaurant (LOW KEY)
1956	Depart Peking Gourmet Restaurant via Motorcade (LOW KEY)
2011	Arrive South Grounds (LOW KEY)
2013	Doctor's Office
2039	Residence



News Summary

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1990 -- 6:00 A.M. EDT EDITION

TODAY'S HEADLINES

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

BUSH, GORBACHEV TALK, LAUGH, TAKE SUN AT MOUNTAIN RESORT -- George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev discussed the world's trouble spots Saturday at a summit Gorbachev is comparing to the anti-Nazi alliance that united Washington and Moscow in World War II.

(Washington Post, AP, UPI, Reuter, Scripps Howard)

STALEMATE BROKEN ON TROOP, ARMS CUTS, OFFICIALS SAY -- U.S. and Soviet officials said Saturday that negotiators have broken a deadlock and moved closer to a historic agreement to slash troop levels and conventional weapons in Europe.

(Los Angeles Times)

SOVIETS DELIGHTED AT HOW WELL THE TALKS HAVE GONE -- After much anguished handwringing over the problems afflicting Soviet-American relations, strategic arms reduction and German reunification, Soviet officials expressed delight Saturday at how well the superpower summit had gone.

(Los Angeles Times)

ISRAEL'S SHAMIR SAYS ENDING U.S.-PLO TALKS WOULD HELP PEACE -- Israeli Prime Minister Shamir said the U.S. would bolster Middle East peace efforts if it stopped talking to the PLO.

(Reuter)

NETWORK NEWS (Saturday Evening)

SUMMIT -- The prospects for progress on some remaining thorny issues became decidedly less clear.

FIRST LADIES -- The summit has contributed to the First Ladies' personal relationship.

FANG LIZHI -- Italy said it is willing to provide a humanitarian haven for Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS...A-1

NATIONAL NEWS.....A-15

NETWORK NEWS.....B-1

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

GORBACHEV, BUSH WRESTLE OVER GERMANY TO CONCLUDE 'A BIG DAY'

CAMP DAVID -- President Bush and Soviet leader Gorbachev wrestled over differences on Germany in a final full day of summitry at this mountain hideaway Saturday. Despite disagreements, Bush said, "I see this glass not half empty, but half full -- and more."

Gorbachev described the talks as instructive but said there were "real problems" the leaders would not "turn a blind eye to."

The leaders met in the relaxed setting of this rustic presidential retreat, accompanied by Barbara Bush and Raisa Gorbachev. The two presidents stripped off their coats and ties for discussions that led Gorbachev to conclude, "It's been a big day."

On a sunny spring day, the Gorbachevs also strolled the paths lacing this sprawling compound and pitched horseshoes. Bush, an aficionado, said Gorbachev had never played horseshoes and yet "literally threw a ringer the first time." ...

Asserting that the Soviet Union has a voice in the unification of Germany, Gorbachev declared, "We must remember that we are all part of this process."

Standling alongside Gorbachev, Bush defended his decision to sign a trade treaty with Gorbachev even though Moscow had not eased its economic pressure on Lithuania.

"I look at the overall relationship," he said, referring to the trade accord as "in the interest of the United States." "Somebody wants to argue with me, fine, we'll take him on," he said.

(Tom Raum, AP)

Bush, Gorbachev Acknowledge Problems Remain After Summit

They joked, pitched horseshoes and shared a helicopter ride, but Presidents Bush and Gorbachev acknowledge that problems remain in U.S.-Soviet relations and maintain a certain formality in their personal relations as well.

"Some will argue that we haven't solved all the problems," Bush told reporters Saturday after the final summit discussions at Camp David. "To me that's not the point.... We've reached an awful lot of common ground."

Chief among the unsolved problems are the controversy over NATO membership for a united Germany and Moscow's response to the independence movement in Lithuania.... They discussed, but made no progress on, such international hotbeds as the Middle East, Kashmir, Cambodia and Afghanistan. (Deborah Zabarenko, Reuter)

Camp David Talks Review Regional Strife

President Bush and President Gorbachev Saturday set aside the contentious issues of Lithuania and Germany and devoted their final talks of a four-day summit to regional conflicts and human rights, White House press secretary Fitzwater announced.

Meanwhile, Administration officials said the two leaders are expected to pledge at their joint White House news conference Sunday that they will continue the pattern of recent years and will hold "regular" summit meetings. While not setting a precise date, officials said the next meeting is expected to be in the Soviet Union, possibly before the end of the year.

Seated around a sunny patio table at Camp David, and with a handful of their top advisers present, Bush and Gorbachev aired long-standing differences and talked about possible solutions to conflicts in Asia, Central American and the Middle East, Fitzwater said.

Last night, as the two leaders finished their discussions at Camp David, they lamented to reporters that they had disagreed on Germany but Gorbachev noted the continuing discussions by the four World War II victors and the two German states over the future of the unified nation. Bush defended his decision to sign a trade agreement with Moscow.

(David Hoffman & Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, A1)

Bush, Gorbachev Discuss World Hot Spots, With No Agreements

CAMP DAVID -- They took off their ties, pitched horseshoes, sat in the sun and talked at length about their differences on hot spots around the world.

Jovial and relaxed, President Bush and President Gorbachev Saturday expressed satisfaction with their third summit day spent at the rustic presidential retreat here.

White House spokesman Fitzwater said the two men discussed the Middle East, Cuba, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, India and Pakistan. He said the two men had a better understanding of each country's positions but that no decisions resulting in a policy change were made. He said Bush commended Gorbachev for improvements in human rights in the Soviet Union and an increase in the number of Jews permitted to emigrate. Both men vowed to work against anti-semitism. Direct air flights from the Soviet Union to Israel were discussed but there is nothing concrete yet. Gorbachev said there are still technical problems.

(Ann McFeatters, Scripps Howard)

No Progress On World Hot Spots At Summit

CAMP DAVID -- President Bush and Soviet leader Gorbachev compared notes Saturday on world hot spots including the Middle East, Kashmir, Cambodia and Afghanistan, but did not seem any closer to breakthroughs.

"The most important thing today we're going to discuss is, go over the planet and its hot flashpoints, to discuss regional issues, in other words," Gorbachev said at the start of informal talks at Bush's mountaintop retreat at Camp David.

They talked. It didn't appear they agreed.

(Reuter)

Bush, Gorbachev Talk, Laugh, Take Sun At Mountain Resort

CAMP DAVID -- George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev discussed the world's trouble spots Saturday at a summit Gorbachev is comparing to the anti-Nazi alliance that united Washington and Moscow in World War II.

With unresolved disputes over German unification and Lithuanian independence still confronting them, the U.S. and Soviet presidents shifted their talks to the sun-dappled oak groves and walking trails of Bush's mountainside hideaway where diplomatic magic sometimes happens.

As they did so, Gorbachev was shown comparing the cooperative spirit emerging at the summit with the grand anti-Nazi alliance in a Soviet television interview taped Friday and broadcast Saturday in the Soviet Union.

"Maybe this event could be equated to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition...when our countries, having put aside their ideological differences, started cooperating," he said shortly after he and Bush had signed an array of accords on arms-control, trade and cultural exchange. "We've passed the stage of confrontation. We're still in a period of rivalry but the signs of partnership have appeared," Gorbachev said.

(Laurence McQuillan, Reuter)

Gorbachev, Bush Vow To Speak Out Against Anti-Semitism

President Gorbachev and President Bush agreed at their summit Saturday to speak out against anti-Semitism in a move that Jewish leaders hailed as significant....

World Jewish Congress executive director Elan Steinberg called the agreement "significant from a Jewish point of view because the freedom of speech allowed by glasnost has unleashed a rise in anti-Semitic expressions in the Soviet Union." ...

Steinberg said that Jewish leaders had asked Bush to raise with Gorbachev the question of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and the need for direct flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv.

(Arthur Spiegelman, Reuter)

Gorbachev Gets Camp David Spirit, Tosses Horseshoes

CAMP DAVID -- Normally staid Mikhail Gorbachev, recipient of an official blue Camp David windbreaker, relaxed at President Bush's retreat in Maryland's mountains Saturday by tooling around in a golf cart and pitching a few horseshoes.

With arms control and trade agreements completed, the Soviet president made another bit of summit history with Bush when they traveled in a U.S. military helicopter, named for Soviet emigree Igor Sikorsky, to the hideaway.

Although Gorbachev is widely considered a workaholic, he got into the sporting mood shortly after reaching the Catoctin Mountain location....

Just after arriving amid the sparkling streams and towering trees Gorbachev told reporters there were "a lot of subjects" to discuss. But Bush, taking a different approach, said: "We have wonderful trails to walk. It'll be a totally relaxed environment today."

(Thomas Ferraro, UPI)

Two Leaders Hold Informal Talks At Camp David

CAMP DAVID -- When Marine One touched down on the freshly mopped landing pad here this morning, you could tell that President Bush had informality in mind. He and his top aides wore dark blazers and ties instead of dark suits. The Soviets wore suits.

This was to be the getting-to-know-you-better day of the superpower summit, a favorite weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of Bush....

Low-level White House aides were joking last week that an adjective search was on for new ways to describe friendly, informal talks, which they were certain would be the thrust of the mood statement issued here. The two had...constructive talks? Animated? Encouraging? In-depth? Substantive?

But with only the two presidents and four top foreign policy aides present at the discussions on the back deck of the scenic Aspen Lodge, who would know, really, what had gone on?

(Ann Devroy, Washington Post, A23)

STALEMATE BROKEN ON TROOP, ARMS CUTS, OFFICIALS SAY

U.S. and Soviet officials said Saturday that negotiators have broken a deadlock and moved closer to a historic agreement to slash troop levels and conventional weapons in Europe.

There was no official announcement of the development as President Bush and President Gorbachev concluded three days of summit meetings with an informal session at the Camp David retreat. However, a ranking Soviet official said in an interview, "The stalemate you Americans talked about is over. I don't think any problems remain."

U.S. officials were far more cautious in their assessment. "The deal is not done yet," a senior American official cautioned, but he confirmed that the impasse was broken.

(Norman Kempster & Jack Nelson, Los Angeles Times, A1)

UNRESOLVED START ISSUES MINOR, CFE PROBLEMS MAJOR, EXPERTS SAY

With a boost from the superpower summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union most likely will complete within six months the first arms control agreement to force an actual reduction of existing strategic nuclear weapons.

Administration officials and independent arms control analysts generally agreed Saturday that with the progress made immediately before and during the meetings of President Bush and President Gorbachev, there are no remaining unresolved issues to prevent the two leaders from signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty at another summit in Moscow later this year.

Although the two presidents issued a joint statement reaffirming their goal to also complete this year a treaty making deep cuts in the conventional forces in Europe, nearly all analysts seem convinced this is unlikely.

Even if a host of major disputes could be resolved the conventional reduction pact appears stalled until a solution is found for the more difficult questions brought on by the pending reunification of Germany, analysts said. (Otto Kreisher, Copley)

COLD WAR DISPUTES STALL A-ARMS PACT

The U.S. and the Soviet Union may have taken important steps away from the Cold War with understandings on trade and weapons last week, but their attempts to reach final agreement on a new strategic arms accord remain mired in some nagging disputes left over from more frigid times.

Progress on the accord has been complicated by two aging Soviet weapons -- the Backfire bomber, and the large intercontinental SS-18 missile -- that have been the subjects of arguments reaching back more than a decade to Jimmy Carter's abortive SALT II treaty....

Senior U.S. and Soviet military leaders no longer refer to each as other enemies -- Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Powell said recently that the Soviets should be viewed as our "business competitors." But "there is still an insufficient sense that we're in the 'endgame' [or final phase] of negotiations," one U.S. official said. "Various interest groups on each side are still protecting their hobby horses, and no one is inclined to shift in the absence of a new message from the top that we want an agreement right now."

A U.S. official who participated in some of the discussions said "part of the problem is that our counterparts are not in a strong position, and in this business it takes strength to make decisions. The events of the last five months have left Gorbachev with little room to maneuver."

(R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, A25)

BUSH AIDES FEAR A MAJOR FIGHT OVER ARMS TREATY

Even as President Bush and President Gorbachev initialed the broad outlines of a strategic arms reduction treaty on Friday, Bush Administration officials were growing uneasy about the prospects for a major wrangle in the Senate over the ratification of the final START agreement.

In Washington, conservatives have begun to muster their forces for a fight against what they see as U.S. concessions in earlier negotiations between Secretary Baker and his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze. A clutch of vocal Republicans have warned that they may oppose ratification.

What concerns the Administration is not that START might fail in the Senate but that a noisy fight could damage Administration efforts to negotiate further arms cuts with Moscow -- including a conventional forces in Europe.

No more than 20 senators...would be likely to vote against START, according to the Administration's early nose counts. But officials acknowledged that acrimony over the treaty will be a problem. "It's going to be a bloody battle," said one Pentagon official, who added that the conservatives' defection has stung the Bush Administration.

(Melissa Healy, Los Angeles Times, A14)

GERMANY: SUBJECT OF MOST TALK, LEAST PROGRESS

If Germany was the most important topic at the U.S.-Soviet summit, it was also the one that President Bush and President Gorbachev did the least to resolve. And in putting the issue aside, they postponed coming to grips with the sometimes-unwelcome implications of their own policies.

Bush held to his position, supported by all his NATO allies as well as half the nations of the collapsing Warsaw Pact, that a united Germany should be a full member of NATO. As such, it would fall under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and need no nuclear force of its own.

But the U.S. stance, while almost identical with that of West Germany on unification, differs in one crucial respect -- one that could spell trouble in the future.... To allay Moscow's concern...over a resurgence of German military power, Bush has stated that the U.S. wants a united Germany to be a full member of NATO "within its integrated command structure." ...

But some Germans are wondering why a sovereign German state should not have its own independent military command, as other alliance members do. (Robert Toth, Los Angeles Times, A15)

Soviets Still Can't Bite The Bullet Of Germany In NATO

On the third day of the superpower summit, the Soviet Union threw out some new ideas and repeated some old arguments but still failed to bite the bullet of a unified Germany as a member of NATO.

In a series of briefings and interviews, Soviet officials again stressed the deep anguish they said their nation felt about the prospect of Germany, their pre-1945 enemy, joining NATO, their post-1945 enemy.

"NATO...continues to be a military political organization which is looking for an enemy and the obvious choice is the Soviet Union," said Vitaly Churkin, a Soviet Foreign Ministry adviser.

One of the new ideas, which U.S. officials seemed to think was merely an old package with a new wrapping, came from Valentin Falin, a former envoy to West Germany and current head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. He suggested creating a Pan-European security council with a multinational peacekeeping force to head off the risk of another war on the continent. He also said Moscow would consider a united Germany in NATO on a temporary basis if Washington agreed to let the CSCE become the final arbiter on Germany's military status. It was an idea unlikely to appeal to either the U.S. or Germany, much less allies like Britain and France.

(Alan Elsner, Reuter)

SUPERPOWERS TO COOPERATE IN FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS

The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed Saturday to take new cooperative steps in combating narcotics trafficking, authorizing the two countries' customs services for the first time to share intelligence.

The pact will also allow U.S. customs agents to train their Soviet counterparts in methods designed to detect drug smuggling, an increasing concern since border restrictions across Eastern Europe have eased, U.S. officials said.

The officials described the agreement as a major step in an evolving counternarcotics relationship that may soon involve direct ties between American law enforcement agencies and the Soviet KGB.... "With Eastern Europe opening up, we suspect that increased smuggling is going to take place," said one Administration official who specializes in narcotics matters.

(Douglas Jehl, Los Angeles Times, A19)

BUSH AND GORBACHEV SET JOINT RELIEF EFFORT FOR ETHIOPIA

CAMP DAVID -- President Bush and Soviet leader Gorbachev agreed Saturday on an unusual relief effort for Ethiopia in which American food aid will be delivered by Soviet aircraft.

"To deal with the growing problems of starvation, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are prepared to work together and combine their assets. U.S. food will be transported on Soviet aircraft to demonstrate our joint commitment to responding to [this] tragic humanitarian problem," the leaders said in a joint statement on Ethiopia.

They also announced their support for an international conference sponsored by the U.N. to end Ethiopia's 28-year-old civil war and they welcomed the government's decision to allow food relief to enter northern Ethiopia through the port of Massawa.

(Reuter)

SOVIETS GRANT CHEVRON CORP. RIGHTS TO EXPLORE LARGEST NEW OIL FIELD

The Soviet Union Saturday granted the Chevron Corp. exclusive rights for exploration and development of its largest newly discovered oil field, and 8,900-square-mile region near the Caspian Sea -- with reserves that are estimated to be 2.5 times greater than those of the Alaskan North Slope....

But the exploration agreement, signed Saturday in a ceremony at the Soviet Embassy, stopped short of establishing a joint venture between Chevron and its Soviet partners that would actually sell oil and produce badly needed hard currency for Moscow.

(Stuart Auerbach, Washington Post, A26)

SOVIETS DELIGHTED AT HOW WELL THE TALKS HAVE GONE

After much anguished handwringing over the problems afflicting Soviet-American relations, strategic arms reduction and German reunification, Soviet officials expressed delight Saturday at how well the superpower summit had gone.

Their fears gone that President Bush would try to take advantage of Moscow's multiple domestic crises to win key concessions from President Gorbachev, they described the summit as the most successful in the two countries' often troubled relationship. "The most fruitful summit in the history of our relations," Yevgeny Primakov, a key adviser to Gorbachev, declared. "An across-the-board success," exulted another Soviet official. "The spirit of Malta thrives," said Georgy Arbatov, the leading Soviet specialist on the U.S.

With approval by Bush and Gorbachev of the basic outlines of a future treaty to reduce the superpowers' strategic arsenals and of a trade agreement that Moscow had long sought, Soviet expectations for the summit were met, senior Soviet officials said. What made the meeting a more fundamental success in their view, however, was Bush's apparent willingness to meet Gorbachev's needs when he felt he could and his reluctance to use the Soviet Union's political and economic crises for leverage in the negotiations.

"What we have done to reach this point -- the trust that we have developed in one another, the hard questions we have had to resolve, the compromises that he have worked out -- are unprecedented, absolutely unprecedented," said one Gorbachev adviser.

(Michael Parks, Los Angeles Times, A12)

SUSPICIONS FADE AS U.S., SOVIETS ENTER NEW ERA

The Washington summit, the first superpower meeting of the post-Cold War era, has seen relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union begin a historic transformation -- away from almost half a century of frozen enmity toward an active willingness to help each other.

The two countries still have major differences over several fundamental issues. But what has been new at this summit is how quickly the suspicions nurtured over 40 years of hostility have dissipated -- and how clear it is that President Bush and President Gorbachev have decided that mutual support is in their own self-interest.

"We are proceeding from the assumption that anything that is not good for the United States...will not be good for us, either," Gorbachev declared over and over in a startlingly blunt distillation of his new foreign policy....

Bush echoed the Soviet president's view. "Not long ago, some believed that the weight of history condemned our two great countries, our two great peoples, to permanent confrontation," Bush said.... "Well, you and I must challenge history...[and] build a relationship of lasting cooperation."

These grand promises have already borne concrete results -- with political payoffs for both presidents [the free elections in Nicaragua and a trade agreement signed Friday].

(Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times, A1)

-more-

BUSH-GORBACHEV TALKS: A VIEW TO THE FUTURE

"You are a sailor," Mikhail Gorbachev said in a friendly aside to George Bush as they began their discussion of German unification in the White House last week. "You will understand that if one anchor is good, two anchors are better."

The Soviet leader then launched into a long and rambling argument that a unified Germany should belong simultaneously to the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But it was the imaged introduction about anchors, and Bush's response, that captured for some of the American and Soviet officials in the room the chemistry of the still evolving relationship between the two leaders that has made this meeting a summit with difference.

Bush's response was a firm rejection. But the President was careful to explain his reasoning in full and friendly fashion, beginning by saying that it was precisely because he did not understand "how two anchors could work" that he wanted to persuade Gorbachev that German membership in NATO alone was a better idea.

"When people read the record of the conversations of the Washington summit in the future, they will see that they were quite different than previous talks between Soviet and American leaders," said one senior Administration official Saturday on the basis of detailed briefings on the White House conversations.... "By the time George Bush leaves the White House, he could be dealing with the Soviet president as he would [with] a friendly West European nation," the official added.

Bush and Gorbachev...did not expect to renew the discussion on German unification, their press secretaries said late Saturday, even though their earlier conversations established this as the most important question and area of differences on their agenda.

(Jim Hoagland, Washington Post, A24)

DISAPPOINTED LITHUANIANS DEMONSTRATE

A crowd of about 1,000 demonstrated on the steps of the Capitol Saturday afternoon, voicing sometimes bitter disappointment at the outcome of the U.S.-Soviet summit and vowing to continue pressing for Lithuanian independence.

Many of the protesters, who had traveled from Canada, Chicago, Detroit and other major cities, said they felt let down by President Bush's decision Friday to formalize a trade agreement with President Gorbachev without making freedom for the Baltic state a condition.

"Mr. Bush did not negotiate a real historic agreement because he is not a historic type of president," Jonas Bobelis of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania told the cheering protesters. "History just walked right by him."

"He is just being friendly and not doing anything," said Maria Majauskas, 50, of Mount Laurel, N.Y., who fled Lithuania with her family during the Soviet occupation in 1949. "Mr. Bush will not get the Lithuanian vote the next time around." ...

"We are in the strongest position we've ever been in. We should not be giving [the Soviets] everything they ask for to bail them out," D'Amato said, promising the crowd that Congress would fight the Bush Administration if it sought most-favored-nation trading status for the Soviet Union.

(Lisa Leff, Washington Post, A24)

-more-

GORBACHEV'S SECOND VISIT NOT SO HOT AMONG STUDENTS

Perhaps it's the timing of the summit that has clouded the attention span of the region's youth. President Gorbachev arrived in the middle of final examinations week, at the height of prom season and just weeks away from summer vacation.

Unlike the Gorbymania of 1987 that sent young people scurrying to buy T-shirts with Cyrillic slogans, hammer-and-sickle earrings and anything in basic black with a red star, Gorbachev's visit this week was greeted in classrooms and on playgrounds throughout the area with a resounding yawn. (Retha Hill, Washington Post, A24)

ROH DEPARTS FOR HISTORIC MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

SEOUL -- President Roh Tae-woo departed Sunday for San Francisco and a meeting with Soviet leader Gorbachev in the first summit between leaders of the two nations....

In a departure statement, Roh noted the unprecedented and unusual nature of the summit and said he expected it to open a new era in South Korea-Soviet relations.

"I intend to exchange with President Gorbachev extensive views on how to spread to northeast Asia, especially to the Korean peninsula, the waves of openness and cooperation now sweeping the world," Roh said. "In that connection, I will discuss with him not only bilateral relations but will also discuss in particular depth how to pave the way for the peace and unification of the Korean peninsula." (James Kin, UPI)

Roh To Give Gorbachev 'Shopping List' At Historic Meeting

SAN FRANCISCO -- South Korean President Roh Tae-woo has prepared a shopping list for Soviet leader Gorbachev when the two heads of state hold their historic meeting Monday, a senior Korean government official said Saturday....

The official, who spoke on the condition that he was not named, said Roh's top priority was to establish full diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea for the first time. In addition, Roh hopes to persuade Gorbachev to play a key role in the eventual reunification of North and South Korea...and will ask the Soviet leader to lift Moscow's veto on South Korea's full membership of the U.N. Roh would also like to establish stronger trade ties with the Soviet Union. But the official described South Korea's expectations of the meeting as "very modest." (Michael Miller, Reuter)

SOVIET TRADE WITH JAPAN PLUMMETS

TOKYO -- Japan's trade with the Soviet Union is plummeting as a result of delays by the Soviets in paying their bills and Japanese concern over Soviet political instability, even as President Gorbachev looks to this technology-rich region to rescue his beleaguered economy.

Trade contracts between Japan and the Soviets fell by more than 26 percent in April, according to the Japan Trade Council, and May's figures are likely to be even more dismal. Soviet firms are behind in payments by at least \$250 million and probably more, according to officials here. (Fred Hiatt, Washington Post, A31)

-more-

PANEL TO URGE U.S. TO USE AID TO CURTAIL ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

NEW YORK -- An advisory panel in a report to be submitted to Congress [and President Bush] next month plans to recommend using foreign aid to curtail illegal immigration from parts of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, The New York Times reported Sunday. "Greater economic opportunity at home will reduce the pressure to emigrate," the report said, also calling for a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico such as the one signed in 1988 between the U.S. and Canada.

The 12-member panel...concluded that some U.S. trade policies, such as import quotas, had the unintended effect of retarding foreign economic growth and encouraging illegal immigration....

The committee...will also recommend creation of an independent government agency which would formulate immigration policy independently of the President. Officials at the White House, the State Department and the Justice Department said they opposed an independent agency partly because it would undermine the President's ability to control immigration policy, the newspaper said.

(Reuter)

U.S. SAID TO INVOKE LAW TO BAR HOMOSEXUALS FROM AIDS CONFERENCE

NEW YORK -- The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service plans to invoke a rarely enforced law barring homosexuals from entering the country when thousands arrive for a major conference on AIDS in San Francisco later this month, The New York Times reported in its Sunday edition.

The Times said INS officials decided to resurrect the law when they learned that some members of foreign gay-rights groups were planning to test the law by declaring themselves homosexuals when they arrive to attend the sixth International Conference on AIDS beginning on June 20....

The newspaper said U.S. gay organizations did not know of the INS plan and were puzzled by the move since the Bush Administration has relaxed restrictions on AIDS sufferers to allow them to attend the conference....

An INS spokesman told The Times the service was taking the action reluctantly. "We didn't want to implement the statute but we were under a court order to do that," Duke Austin said.

(Reuter)

ISRAEL'S SHAMIR SAYS ENDING U.S.-PLO TALKS WOULD HELP PEACE

JERUSALEM -- Israeli Prime Minister Shamir said the U.S. would bolster Middle East peace efforts if it stopped talking to the PLO.

He told the Jerusalem Post in an interview published Sunday that ending a 17-month-old U.S.-PLO dialogue would "finally allow our peace plan to take off."

"It has not been able to do so because the PLO has been associated" with U.S. peace efforts, he was quoted as saying...

Shamir indicated that a break in the U.S.-PLO dialogue would improve relations with Washington after their deterioration in recent months and provide "new momentum" to Israel peace moves. When asked if he expected talks to stop, Shamir said "It would be a logical step for the U.S.... If the U.S. wants to help, the PLO must be kept out outside the peace process."

(Reuter)

-more-

**ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS GAIN STRENGTH
IN WEST BANK, GAZA AT EXPENSE OF PLO**

GAZA -- Islamic fundamentalists in the West Bank are gaining strength at the expense of the PLO as Palestinians despair of the course of the revolt against Israeli rule and the slow pace of diplomacy abroad.

The strict Muslims preach no compromise on the question of sharing with Israel the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, undercutting the current PLO line of a two-state solution to the conflict.

The PLO...has been trying to persuade fundamentalists of the Islamic Resistance Movement to come under its wing. But the movement, known as Hamas, or zeal, has resisted taking a subordinate role and is demanding parity with Fatah, the majority wing led by Chairman Arafat.

(Daniel Williams, Los Angeles Times, A6)

PROTESTER SHOUTS 'RISE UP!' ON TIANANMEN ANNIVERSARY

BEIJING -- A Chinese man defied massive security in Tiananmen Square Sunday, unfurling a protest flag and imploring countrymen to "Rise up" one year to the day after troops cracked down on peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations.

Police immediately detained the man and later described him as mentally ill.

(Jeffrey Parker, UPI)

THOUSANDS MASS IN HONG KONG FOR TIANANMEN MEMORIAL MARCH

HONG KONG -- Thousands of people, many wearing the traditional Chinese mourning color of white, gathered in central Hong Kong Sunday for a memorial march to honor the dead of Tiananmen Square.

Police estimated 25,000 people had assembled in Chater Gardens in the heart of the British colony's central business district for a march.... One of the organizers, Stephen Ng, said he estimated the crowd at nearer 100,000.

They chanted "Free the pro-democracy demonstrators imprisoned in China," followed by "Free the people of China."

(Reuter)

**TIANANMEN ANNIVERSARY: CHINA'S YEAR OF SILENCE
Dissent Is Crushed But Leaders Nervous, Focus On Short Term**

BEIJING -- In the year since the Chinese army massacred hundreds of demonstrators around Tiananmen Square here, other Communist countries have witnessed extraordinary political reforms. But China has silenced the clamor of calls for democratic change that swept the country last spring.

With seeming ease, through arrests and detentions and endless investigations of suspected dissidents over the past year, the Communist Party leadership has imposed its will. It now faces little more than dispersed and disorganized dissident forces....

And yet, despite a carefully constructed facade of strength and party unity, China's leaders have displayed extreme nervousness at the advent of the first anniversary of the June 3-4 crackdown on the democracy movement.

(Daniel Southerland, Washington Post, A1)

After Emotional Year, Protest Movement Takes Hold In U.S.

ALHAMBRA, Calif. -- ...Nationwide, a Chinese protest movement, born in the anguish of the Beijing crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, seems to be taking firm hold. After a year of emotional demonstrations and painful adjustment to American life, Chinese student activists are establishing political and media organizations that may affect Sino-American relations for years.

Although the movement remains splintered by personal and ideological differences, the students and their American allies, galvanized by the killings near Tiananmen Square last June 3 and 4, have compiled a growing list of political successes and built the beginnings of a potent media enterprise....

"The one thing we learned from last year was the movement was in too much of a hurry," said Liu Yuan, a graduate student at Brandeis University working at the China Information Center in Newton, Mass. "If some people, even a small group of people, can gradually and consistently work toward a goal, they can keep the movement alive." (Jay Mathews & Marianna Yen, Washington Post, A1)

U.S. NAVY LIEUTENANT SLAIN IN APPARENT ROBBERY, POLICE SAY

MANILA -- Two masked men fatally stabbed a U.S. Navy lieutenant in his home near the Subic Bay Naval Base in an apparent robbery, police said Sunday.

U.S. officials ordered all personnel restricted to the naval base immediately following the Saturday night attack, but lifted the restrictions Sunday after determining the killing was not politically motivated.

Police identified the stabbing victim as Lt. Richard Brown, 33, who was assigned to the Navy Supply Depot at the base.

(Robert Reid, AP)

**FILIPINO TROOPS DRIVE THROUGH
COMMUNIST-RUN NEIGHBORHOODS NEAR U.S. BASE**

MANILA -- Hundreds of Filipino troops drove through Communist-held neighborhoods near a U.S. military base Saturday in a show of force after U.S. troops were restricted to the garrison for security reasons.

The military also warned foreign aid workers to watch for terrorism....

Philippine police Lt. Col. Julius Yarcia announced the formation of neighborhood vigilante groups to help fight the rebels. "We just want to convince the people that we are willing to fight and that we have the manpower and the firepower to fight the enemy," Yarcia said.

(Robert Reid, AP)

REBEL FORCES MEET LITTLE RESISTANCE IN DRIVE ON MONROVIA

MONROVIA -- Rebel troops seeking to topple the government of President Samuel Doe advanced on the capital Saturday and appeared to be meeting little resistance from government forces.

Correspondents who drove the 35 miles from Monrovia to the airport, where the rebel advance had stalled earlier, said the only government troops in sight were 20 men manning a roadblock between the airport and the capital....

U.S. Navy warships, meanwhile, were en route from the Mediterranean to Liberia to evacuate Americans if necessary, Pentagon sources said. U.S. military officials said 2,100 Marines were aboard the four ships of the 6th Fleet, which were expected to arrive off Liberia this weekend. "These waters should be in place in the international waters off Liberia shortly," Pentagon spokesman Maj. Shelley Rogers said Saturday night.

(Michelle Faul, AP)

**JAPAN TURNS DEBATE ON U.S. TRADE UPSIDE DOWN:
SURPLUS MAY BE GOOD**

TOKYO -- For most of the past decade, through trade dispute after trade dispute, Japan and the U.S. could always agree on one thing: Japan's trade surplus was bad.

Now, in a radical shift with profound implications for U.S.-Japan relations, the Japanese government appears to be moving away from that orthodoxy. This past week, two key members of Prime Minister Kaifu's cabinet and a government commission both argued that Japan's surplus may, in fact, be good because it leaves Japan with extra funds to lend to Eastern Europe, the developing world and the U.S.

(Fred Hiatt, Washington Post, A35)

EDITOR'S NOTES: "Yeltsin: Russia's Rogue Populist," by Leon Aron, appears in The Washington Post, page D1.

"Gorbachev, Into The Heartland," two articles by David Maraniss and Cynthia Gorney, appears in The Washington Post, page F1.

"To Many, Unification Feels More Like A Takeover," by Marc Fisher, appears in The Washington Post, page A34.

NATIONAL NEWS

SEVERE WEATHER BATTERS MIDWEST

Tornadoes roared across the Midwest Saturday evening, killing seven people in Indiana and one in Illinois and injuring hundreds of others in restaurants, nursing homes and trailer parks in the twisters' paths, authorities said....

Gov. Evan Bayh declared a state of emergency Saturday night, mobilizing the National Guard and sending it to the hard hit southern Indiana cities of Bedford and Petersburg. (UPI)

REPORT QUESTIONS DISCIPLINE BY STATE MEDICAL UNITS

State medical boards that review doctors' behavior discipline physicians at rates far lower than some studies suggest are appropriate, according to a report by the Department of Health and Human Services. The report, [prepared by HHS inspector general Richard Kusserow at the request of Rep. Wyden], said large case backlogs, limited resources and complex hearing procedures with tough standards of proof contribute to seemingly lenient behavior.

(Spencer Rich, Washington Post, A17)

BARRY PLEA NEGOTIATIONS APPEAR DEADLOCKED

U.S. Attorney Jay Stephens and lawyers for Mayor Marion Barry Saturday did not appear close to reaching a plea agreement, according to sources familiar with the case.

Although the sources said that negotiations are continuing, it was likely that jury selection in the case would start as scheduled tomorrow.

(Michael York, Washington Post, A18)

POLITICS: MONTANA CHALLENGER STRUGGLES TO WIN GOP SENATE NOMINATION

The Republican Party's handpicked candidate to challenge Sen. Baucus in November is struggling to win the GOP nomination. Montana Lt. Gov. Allen Kolstad, who had been urged to run by President Bush, Vice President Quayle and Sen. Dole -- after the party had failed to persuade three other top state officials to run -- held a narrow lead going into Tuesday's primary over his nearest rival, Bruce Vorhauer, the inventor of the contraceptive sponge.

A newspaper poll last week showed Kolstad with 30 percent support; Vorhauer had 27 percent....

"Those numbers reflect that Kolstad has not had the money or the ability to get his message out," said a national GOP official who asked not to be identified.

(Washington Post, A12)

MASSACHUSETTS DEMOCRATS TAP 3 FOR PRIMARY

SPRINGFIELD -- A bitterly divided Massachusetts Democratic convention Saturday night allowed John Silber, a backer of Republicans Ronald Reagan and George Bush, to challenge two veteran party office-holders for the gubernatorial nomination in a September primary.

(David Broder, Washington Post, A4)

NETWORK NEWS

Saturday evening, June 2

SUMMIT

ABC's Carole Simpson: With their major work behind them -- the agreements they signed Friday on arms reduction and trade -- George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev moved their superpower summit to the mountain retreat of Camp David Saturday. The atmosphere of their talks became decidedly less formal and the prospects for progress on some of the thorny issues that remained became decidedly less clear.

ABC's Brit Hume: Getting off the helicopter to the tolling of a ship's bell by the Navy, which manages Camp David, the two leaders and their wives posed briefly for pictures.

(TV coverage: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev with First Lady and Raisa Gorbachev getting off Marine One, then posing for pictures.) A reporter wanted to know what they would talk about. Gorbachev, as usual, was quick to answer first.

(Gorbachev: "The most important thing today we're going to discuss is go over the climate and its hot flashpoints, to discuss regional issues, in other words.")

Regional issues normally means such things as Afghanistan, Cuba and Central America. Gorbachev said the leaders would also continue general discussions but the focus on regional issues suggested the hard bargaining on the central issues of this summit -- Germany, Lithuania, arms control -- may be over. The president, though, was still working on his guest trying to make him feel at home, even in the golf cart.

(President: "You want to drive?")

Gorbachev, who looked as if he'd never seen such a thing before, declined.

(Gorbachev: "Nyet.")

Nyet seems to be a word the Soviet leader and his team have used often this week. There is little evidence of major progress on any of the issues that had not been agreed on before the summit. Secretary Baker acknowledged as much Friday night when asked about Germany and Lithuania.

(Secretary Baker: "While we did not narrow our differences on these two issues, we did heighten, I think, our understanding of each others' concerns.")

The two leaders had been meeting in shirt sleeves for about five hours and were still talking when press secretary Fitzwater came to say that indeed, regional issues had been the focus but there had been no breakthroughs on them either.

(Fitzwater: "President Bush and President Gorbachev have spent a relaxing and productive day at Camp David discussing a number of regional issues and agreeing that they should work cooperatively to ease tensions wherever possible.")

Fitzwater said neither Germany, Lithuania nor arms control was discussed in any depth. Rather, he said, Saturday's talks were for a different purpose.

-more-

Hume continues:

(Fitzwater: "And I think there's a lot of understanding that the two men are getting, but essentially these talks this afternoon were meant for that purpose, for understanding and not to make decisions about new policies or course changes.")

But the President did manage to change Mr. Gorbachev's attitude on one thing: When the two leaders took a brief ride around the Camp David grounds this afternoon, Mr. Gorbachev drove the golf cart.

Simpson reports that Gorbachev was interviewed Saturday on Soviet television. He said that during this summit, he and President Bush have been cooperating in the same way Washington and Moscow cooperated to defeat Nazi Germany in World War II. It was a curious choice of words because negotiations on the reunification of Germany and whether the new Germany should belong to NATO have been a point of some disagreement in these superpower talks.

ABC's Bob Zelnick reports that President Gorbachev has defied many summit expectations by refusing to yield on Germany and NATO. His advisors insist there will be no backing down.

(Yevgeny Primakov, Member Supreme Soviet: "I do not think that we will have to send tank divisions to Germany. But if the Soviet Union's security interests are ignored we will have to envisage a set of unilateral measures to insure its security.")

Some see the Soviet position as short-sighted.

(Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institute: "A peace-time NATO alliance would not be seen by wises and moderate Soviets as causing a particular threat to themselves.")

Many Germans see NATO membership as the logical consequence of Gorbachev letting Eastern Europe go.

(Peter Straich, Correspondent, German TV ARD: "Therefore he will take the last step, he will swallow the German NATO membership.") Gorbachev may be playing for time. At the NATO summit in July, the alliance is expected to cut back on troops and eliminate its forward defense strategy. At the same time, other European institutions like the 35-nation CSCE and the EC are likely to grow stronger. In just three days West German Chancellor Kohl comes to town to make sure no deals were made on his behalf and to reaffirm Germany's commitment to NATO. Hard U.S.-Soviet bargaining lies ahead as Gorbachev keeps the pressure on.

Simpson reports that some lesser agreements that came out of the summit were signed by American and Soviet officials at the State Department Saturday morning. In one accord, the U.S. and USSR agreed to open cultural centers in each others' capitals. They also agreed to step up customs cooperation and to increase circulation of America and Soviet Life magazines in both countries. The trade agreement Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev signed Friday has already touched off a controversy. As he did just days ago with China, Mr. Bush ignored widespread congressional opposition and entered into a trade agreement with a regime whose human rights policies are under attack.

ABC's Sheilah Kast reports that hours after the two presidents signed the trade agreement, Gorbachev toasted it as crucial for the future of perestroika.

Kast continues:

(TV coverage: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev toasting each other at dinner.)

Advocates of independence for Lithuania, who demonstrated at the Capitol again Saturday, criticized the trade agreement.

(**Danut Harmon**, demonstrator: "It's another cop-out. We have been sold down the river once again.")

Congressional leaders of both parties said they'd hold out until the Soviets lift the blockade of Lithuania and negotiate Baltic independence.

(**Sen. Dole**: "And unless there's some iron-clad assurances that they're going to resolve it, it's going to be very difficult to get a trade agreement passed.")

(**Rep. Gephardt**: "If the negotiations sour and if the Soviets start using force against Lithuania, they're going to have to think long and hard if they want this trade treaty, which they really want, to be torn apart, which it would be in that case.")

The White House won't even ask Congress to approve the trade agreement until the Soviet Union changes its laws so its citizens can emigrate freely. The Soviets say they'll do that. But they reject any link between the trade agreement and Lithuania. The question is whether Congress can enforce one. (ABC-Lead)

NBC's Garrick Utley: This was a day in the country for George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. No state dinners, no ceremonies, the formal agreements behind them. This was a day to talk privately in the seclusion of the President's retreat at Camp David in the Maryland mountains. But when the two presidents took off from the White House Saturday morning, they faced big issues: About the future of Europe and Germany, about where the Soviet-American relationship goes from here.

(TV coverage: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev boarding Marine One.)

CBS' John Cochran: Camp David is a mountain retreat far from the ocean, but it is run by the U.S. Navy, so the two leaders were welcomed by ships' bells.

(TV coverage: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev arriving at Camp David.)

With much of their work already completed -- agreements on arms and trade -- the question was, what do you talk about today? The answer: a lot.

(**Gorbachev**: "The most important thing today we're going to discuss is go over the climate and the hot flashpoints, to discuss regional issues, in other words.")

Secretary Baker said President Bush hoped for agreements on trouble spots like the Middle East. But Bush said the talks would be relaxed.

(**President Bush**: "We have lovely trails that we can walk on if we decide to do it. Totally relaxed environment for today.")

But the environment in Washington was not so relaxed as pro-Lithuanian demonstrators protested Bush's decision to sign a trade agreement with Gorbachev.

(**Sen. D'Amato**, speaking to demonstrators: "And the Soviet Union should not get most-favored-nation status and, Mr. Gorbachev, we're going to fight you on the floor of the Senate." [applause].)

Cochran continues:

(Rep. Fassel): "As long as that embargo is clamped down on the Lithuanian people and they're suffering with unemployment and hunger and all of those things, it'll be very difficult to get an approval of the trade agreement through the Congress of the United States.")

President Bush admits it will be extremely hard to persuade Congress to approve the trade deal. Senior Republicans say Gorbachev must first ease the pressure on Lithuania.

(Sen. Dole): "So I guess the bottom line is he has to do enough to satisfy the Baltic states' leaders, in this case particularly Lithuania.")

Having failed earlier to budge Gorbachev on Lithuania, Bush didn't even mention it Saturday nor did Bush bring up the other tough subject: the future of Germany. Before the summit, Bush said it would be his job to persuade Gorbachev that it's better for everyone, the Soviets included, if a united Germany belongs to NATO. And early in the summit, Bush did try but no sale. Now it's up to Secretary Baker to try to persuade his Soviet counterpart, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, when they meet again in Europe next week.

NBC's Mike Boettcher reports from Berlin that German officials are divided over what course an emerging Germany should take. Germans East and West do agree that they would like to be in control of their own destiny. East Germany's reformed communist party continues to demand that the new nation be neutral. A reunified Germany should be demilitarized, observed Gregor Gysi, the party's leader. That means not in NATO. One of the real powerholders, West German Foreign Minister Genscher, insists that Germany must be aligned with NATO. We have already made that decision and we have made that decision public, he said. That a unified Germany in a Western alliance will be a factor for stability. However, Soviet troops remain in East Germany. (NBC-Lead)

CBS's Bob Schieffer: One of President Bush's people said the other day that Mikhail Gorbachev really wasn't a golf-shirt kind of guy. But he and President Bush did get down to some shirt-sleeve discussions Saturday as the summit shifted to the more informal surroundings of the presidential retreat in Maryland.

CBS's Dan Rather: George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev packed up a world of problems Saturday and flew off to one of the most serene places on earth -- the mountains of nearby Maryland. It was a day to put aside the formalities of superpower summitry and try to talk out differences man-to-man for hours on end. While the official focus was on regional issues, what Gorbachev called flashpoints, it was a day to talk about anything and everything.

(TV coverage: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev boarding Marine One.) As President Bush and Gorbachev Saturday headed for the hills of Camp David, it was a change of scene and setting but more of what this summit has been all about -- talk. And that means a lot of talk. At least 8 hours so far and still counting. About everything in a relationship that's evolving and growing deeper. Big talk about nuclear weapons and trade. Small talk about the weather. Talk one-on-one. Talk to the folks back home. Informal talk during state dinners.

Rather continues:

(TV coverage: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev walking in Camp David, toasting one another at dinner, signing agreements, sitting in Oval Office and laughing together over dinner.)

At this summit they've tried to leave behind the Cold War but they're still groping for what comes next. From all accounts the talks have been serious, not just exchanging views but going the next step and saying, what are we going to do about it.

(**Marlin Fitzwater**: "This afternoon is really an opportunity for them to just lean back and reflect on how they might help, what their differences are, what their areas of mutual understanding are.")

Talks aimed at normalizing a new relationship after decades of Cold War and mistrust. But Gorbachev himself called this week a U.S.-Soviet relationship of clarity, stability and predictability. At a late day briefing, a spokesman for President Bush said the Camp David talks had been wide-ranging but the superpower leaders were avoiding the most contentious issues such as Lithuania and Germany.

(TV coverage: Photo of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev sitting at outside table with Gen. Scowcroft and Eduard Shevardnadze.)

CBS's Wyatt Andrews: They piped President Gorbachev aboard Camp David, this being a naval base some 2,000 feet up in the mountains. A formal beginning to the informal talks Mr. Bush hopes to use to his advantage and which Gorbachev said would be about everything.

(**Gorbachev**: "The most important thing today we're going to discuss is go over the climate and the hot flashpoints, to discuss regional issues, in other words.")

The talks in the mountains proved to be a tour of the world. President Bush wants Gorbachev to improve relations with Israel and wants to know why the Soviets still spend \$4 billion a year supporting Cuba. Mr. Bush also hoped the mountain air would soften Gorbachev's resistance to having Germany stay in NATO. It at least loosened Gorbachev's tie. The White House even disclosed Gorbachev took a break to drive the President around in a golf cart.

(**Marlin Fitzwater**: "The parties stopped at various sites around the camp, including the gym where both Presidents had a brief discussion with marines who were working out there at the time.") Camp David also removed the President Saturday from criticism over what some say was a surprising concession: the trade deal he signed despite his own hints he expected a breakthrough on Lithuania in return. Baltic sympathizers Saturday demanded that Congress not approve the deal.

(**Sen. D'Amato**, speaking to demonstrators: "On the alter of political expedience, we should never turn our back on those people who are held in bondage and who seek one thing: freedom.")

The White House Saturday admitted the President in fact used the trade deal to get Gorbachev's attention.

(**Fitzwater**: "It has given us an extraordinary opportunity to make our case on Lithuania in the strongest and most direct fashion.") Senior White House officials explained what it was that led to the President's concessions, saying that Gorbachev "had really put the pressure on." That Gorbachev bluntly told the President that trade was what he came for, that it was crucial to his perestroika. It was only at the last minute Friday afternoon that the President decided that his policy of helping Gorbachev was much more important than any moral statement he might make on Lithuania.

Rather: With Lithuania underscoring it, it is clear now that this summit was designed and orchestrated by both sides, at least in part, to give Gorbachev a much-needed boost at home.

CBS's Barry Peterson reports on how the summit is playing in the Soviet media. On Soviet television news they were telling their people they did just fine in the summit. The point was hard to miss. Viewers were told this summit "exceeded all expectations," that it was "very significant indeed." And Gorbachev added his own interpretation on Soviet TV Saturday night. There are still influential politicians who say our two peoples will always be rivals, he said. I don't think so. Signs of partnership are already appearing. The summit of partnership: remember that word. Gorbachev and George as friends. That was the theme to the Soviets night after night who watched the summit coverage. And partnership was clear at last night's state dinner, said a top Soviet advisor who was there to see it.

(**Yuri Ossipyan**, Gorbachev's Presidential Council: "I myself thought it was a very friendly atmosphere and atmosphere of understanding of partnership and I can say some friendship too.") Soviet TV showed Gorbachev using to summit to promote solutions to his domestic troubles. Make the new American partners new allies in perestroika. You can see it in the faces of ordinary people, he told his countrymen. The Americans want perestroika to succeed. They understand; they need it as much as we do.

(TV coverage: Gorbachev being swarmed by American crowd.)

If the Soviets can be convinced that America is buying into perestroika, I think it helps Gorbachev buy some time with his own unhappy population.

(CBS-Lead)

Schliefer asks **Rather** what has really come out of this summit.

Rather: Not a lot. This summit, so far, has been -- once you get beyond the pre-cooked deals, the already arranged commitments such as reducing chemical weapons -- it has been long on intentions, possibilities, but short on actual commitment. In American slang, the question becomes...you can talk that talk but can you walk that walk on Lithuania and Germany? And it isn't over yet but up to now you'd have to say they talked a lot about possibilities but not so much about commitments.

Schliefer: If you had to name one thing that you thought would be remembered about this summit, what would that be?

Rather: Easy. Barbara Bush's speech Saturday. This was, by my judgement, the best speech made by any person in connection with any summit. And I think that's what this summit is going to be best remembered for and justifiably so.

Schliefer: I agree with you. I think that's absolutely right. After all it really was a reminder that this country's real strength is based on its values and not on its trade agreements or its nuclear arsenal.

(CBS-3)

Schliefer asks **Rep. Gephardt** if the President has done the right thing on the trade agreement, saying he will sign a trade agreement if Gorbachev liberalizes their emigration policies.

-more-

Gephardt: I think it is. I gave a speech about three months ago and said that the President needs to lead to open up greater economic relationships with Eastern European countries, with the Soviet Union. When you do that you have to take a leap of faith, and I think he did that Friday and I think it was the right thing to do, and I think we can do that without sacrificing the freedom of the Lithuanians or the right of the Soviet people to leave the country.

Schieffer says that Lithuanian pro-independence demonstrators will say that the President has put himself in the position of backing a trade agreement no matter what kind of actions his army takes against Lithuania. What can the U.S. do?

Gephardt says the President really didn't do that. I think what he said was that the treaty is signed. It has to be approved by the Congress and I can assure the Congress will not grant MFN or better trade treatment unless the Soviets have taken the actions on their part. Mr. Fitzwater made a good statement Friday afternoon. He said that when you increase trade relationships, strings get attached. And I think by having this trade relationship Mr. Gorbachev is going to think twice before he sends tanks into Lithuania or does other things that we wouldn't want him to do.

Schieffer asks if the U.S. should be trying to boost up Gorbachev in the USSR.

Gephardt says we shouldn't worry about personalities. I think we've got to worry about the interests of the U.S. I think this summit did two things for the American people that we now have to concentrate on. One is that with the arms agreement it means we can cut down our defense budget, get our own budget straightened out, get interest rates down in this country. Second, if we can open up trade with Russia and other countries it simply means jobs in the U.S. for products that we can now sell in these markets. Just remember this: This is the first summit I can remember where there was more talk about trade than there maybe was about arms control. The future of the world, power is going to be measured in megabytes and not megatons. I think you're seeing the start of a new era, the end of the Cold War, and this is going to be real important to the self-interest of the American people. (CBS-4)

NBC's Tom Brokaw says that in all the years he's been covering U.S.-Soviet summits, he has never seen the Soviet delegation so uncertain about their domestic situation. They're privately using words like, it's a mess, we have a real crisis. Gorbachev must try to bring Boris Yeltsin into the tent to share responsibility. Secondly, he needs to get the people to buy into the economic restructuring that he's involved in. This trade agreement that he received here is good for him from an international political point of view, but it's not going to lower the price of bread, it's not going to put shoes in the stores.

Utley comments that President Bush met with Yeltsin when he visited the U.S. several months ago.

Brokaw says the administration is hedging its bets. All the Soviet experts I talked to say they don't know how it's going to turn out. I think we have to remember that there are problems for Gorbachev on every front and it won't be resolved by what he has received here in the U.S. this time.

Utley comments that President Bush should be happy with the results of the summit.

Brokaw: I would think that this has been good for President Bush. The Gorbachev people have been happy with what they've gotten, but they also know that it's probably not enough to go back and resolve the problems that they have to deal with. (NBC-3)

SOVIET REFORM

Simpson reports that Gorbachev's economic reform program took another heavy hit Saturday. Byelorussia became the second republic to reject the central government's plan for price hikes. (ABC-2)

CBS's Bruce Morton reports on the low level of technology in the Soviet Union. (CBS-2)

CBS's Mark Phillips reports on American students who are preparing to head for Eastern Europe to teach how market economies work. (CBS-5)

U.S. IMMIGRATION

NBC's Lisa Myers reports that the Soviet Union is now allowing large numbers of Jews to leave the country and the U.S. is in the embarrassing position of turning away two-thirds of those who want to come here.

(Vladimir Pozner: "After saying come hither for so many years and saying this is paradise, this is where you want to come, let them come.")

Reporter: "All of them?"

Pozner: "All of them, absolutely.")

The Bush administration says it won't take all of them as a matter of fairness and money. It costs about \$7,500 to resettle each refugee. Because of budget constraints, the U.S. will take only about one percent of some 10 million refugees from around the world this year. The administration says Soviet Jews must be subject to the same rules and limits as every other ethnic group fleeing persecution.

(Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State: "We cannot simply admit everyone in the world. What we are trying to do is to have a policy that really reached across the world, that really deals with every group more or less equally.")

This year's refugee quota is full. The door is slammed shut until at least October.

(Dimitri Simes, Soviet critic: "I think that this is a rare case when I completely agree with the Soviet diplomacy. I just do not see how the United States can turn its back on these people.") There is precedent for throwing the doors wide open. It was done for the Cubans after the Bay of Pigs and for the Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon. But not even the American Jewish community is calling for that.

Myers continues:

(Mark Talisman, Council on Jewish Federations: "There are large numbers of people going to Israel. Canada is happily accepting people as well. So overall things are good. This is a dream come true for all of us worldwide.")

This also is a dream come true for Israel which sees the thousands of Soviet Jews arriving each month as a way to offset the growing Arab population.

Utley asks what rationale the U.S. has in keeping the trade door closed when the Soviets are allowing free emigration.

Myers replies that the U.S. wants to be certain the freedom recently extended to Soviet Jews is written into law so that it can't be revoked in two months and to guarantee that all Soviet citizens have the right to emigrate. Once the Soviet Union does that, President Bush says he will go ahead with the trade deal.

(NBC-5)

FIRST LADIES

ABC's Carole Simpson: While all has not been particularly smooth sailing in negotiations between President Bush and Soviet leader Gorbachev, the summit has contributed to their personal relationship and certainly to that of their wives. The summit takes place at a time when the President and Mrs. Bush are enjoying the highest popularity of any first couple in history. In fact, a Boston Globe poll this week found that Barbara Bush is the most popular person in America.

(TV coverage: President and First Lady walking by Rose Garden towards South Lawn.)

For the Gorbachevs, it's a time of great popularity abroad, but their lowest popularity ever at home.... While of course the most important thing is how Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev get along, many people are also interested in relations between their wives, and what a difference we've seen this week.

(Nancy Reagan, standing next to Raisa Gorbachev: "I want to say something, I want to say something.")

Fresh in many minds are the images of Nancy Reagan and Raisa Gorbachev at summits past. The strained smiles, the forced handshakes, the frosty looks at each other, the fashion contest.... But Barbara Bush, after taking tea with Mrs. Gorbachev in the White House family quarters, reported that she think Raisa is beautiful and she said she feels totally comfortable with the Soviet leader's wife.

(Donnie Radcliffe, Washington Post: "I think Barbara is a far more outgoing, comfortable, welcoming person than Nancy was and that there is no contest here, no worry about being upstaged or being one-upped or that kind of thing.")

It was at commencement exercises and Wellesley College that Barbara Bush demonstrated more clearly than ever that as far as Raisa Gorbachev is concerned, she is no Nancy Reagan. Mrs. Bush invited Mrs. Gorbachev to share the limelight with her and deliver her first public speech in the United States. The two women have been seen holding hands, chatting comfortably, sharing easy smiles.

-more-

Simpson continues:

That they both love children was unmistakable during a visit in Boston.

(TV coverage: First Lady and Raisa Gorbachev standing amidst singing children.)

Is it good that they seem to be getting on a little better?

(Radcliffe: "I think its wonderful that they seem to be getting along because it hopefully means that maybe their husbands will be getting along and then maybe their countries will be getting along and maybe the world will eventually.") (ABC-3)

KARL MARXSTAD

Utley reports that the city council of Karl Marxstad voted overwhelmingly to restore the city's original, pre-communist name. (CBS-2)

CHINA

Simpson reports that on the eve of the first anniversary of the massacre at Tiananmen Square, Italy said it is willing to provide a humanitarian haven for Chinese dissident Fang Li Zhu and his wife. (ABC-4)

CBS's Bob Simon reports that tens of thousands of children were brought into Tiananmen Square for Children's Day. Heavy troops, some with fixed bayonets, kept a close watch on the square. The government is trying to eradicate any memory of last year's pro-democracy protests. (CBS-7, NBC-6)

LIBERIA

Schieffer reports that the rebel soldiers are continuing their advance on Monrovia. Forces loyal to President Samuel Doe have offered little resistance. (CBS-6)

TORNADOES

Simpson reports that there was severe weather in several midwestern states late Friday. In Iraan, Texas, two people were killed and 19 injured when tornadoes touched down and whipped autos through the air. (ABC-5)

OLYMPIC ROWING

ABC's Mike Lee reports that the 1980 U.S. Olympic Rowing Team reunited to compete against their Soviet counterparts in Moscow - ten years after their appearance was cancelled because of the U.S. Olympic boycott. (ABC-6)

###

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	From Command Duty Officer to Distribution Re: CDO [Camp David] Visit Report for 2 June 1990 [redaction] (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(7)(e)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

3 June 1990

From: Command Duty Officer
To: Distribution
Via: Commanding Officer
Executive Officer

11/21/90

Subj: CDO VISIT REPORT FOR 2 JUNE 1990

Encl: (1) Revised cabin assignments and access lists
(2) Action items
(3) Arrival helo plan

ARRIVALS/DEPARTURES

Saturday, 2 June 1990

0845 - Press busses aboard (C25).
0956 - NH #4 aboard (H2).
1015 - NH #3 aboard (H1).
1023 - NH #2 aboard (H3).
1025 - Marine One aboard (H4).
1050 - Press busses ashore (C25).
1055 - Mr. Marlin Fitzwater ashore to Round Meadow.
1701 - Mr. Marlin Fitzwater aboard.
1708 - Marine Two aboard (H5).
1728 - NH #5 aboard (H6).
1734 - NH #5 ashore (H6).
1915 - Press busses aboard (C25).
2020 - Marine One ashore (H7).
2022 - NH #2 ashore (H8).
2024 - NH #4 ashore (H11).
2027 - Marine Two ashore (H9).
2028 - NH #3 ashore (H10).
2031 - NH #5 ashore (H12).
2034 - Press busses ashore (C25).

2042 - NH #5 ashore (H12).

2048 - Last Soviets ashore.

GUEST ACTIVITIES

Movies:

None shown.

Wye Oak:

President and Mrs. Bush gave President and Mrs. Gorbachev a tour of the facility.

Jogging/Fit/Nature Trail:

Not used.

Driving Range:

Not used.

Horseshoes:

President Bush and President Gorbachev played Saturday afternoon. President Gorbachev threw a ringer. The ringer horseshoe was mounted onto a plaque and presented that evening.

Chapel Service:

None.

Aspen Pool:

Not used.

Tennis Courts:

Not used.

Walks/Tours:

Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev toured the entire Camp by golf cart, stopping on the perimeter to talk with Marine Security guards and stopping at Hickory. President Bush and President Gorbachev also toured the Camp briefly by golf cart with President Gorbachev sharing the driving duty.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications between USSS, TSD, Laurel, Marines, WHCA and the NSF Duty Section was excellent with the exception of the November Net which had intermittent problems. Soviet Net bled over to November and Sierra.

Security:

(b)(7)(e)

DUTY SECTIONS

Saturday

Sections Four and Three were combined.

NOOD: EOC RICE
JOOD: SW1 ASHCRAFT

Facilities/Transportation: LT DAWKINS
BUCS MOORE
EO1 HUDSON - Round Meadow dispatch

Very respectfully,



P. F. NICHOLS
LT, SC, USN

Distribution:
Marine Security Company
Department Heads
WHCA Detachment
Command Master Chief
Visit File
OOD Pass Down Log

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. List	Space Assignments [Camp David] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(e)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Manifest	Helo Manifest (Staff/guests) [Camp David] (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed:	5/21/2010	OA/ID Number:	90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. List	Carpet/Gov't Vehicle (Staff/Guests) [Camp David] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(c), (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed:	5/21/2010	OA/ID Number:	90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02e. Map	Fair Weather Plan [Camp David] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(e)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02f. List	Cart Schedule [Camp David] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(7)(e)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Note	Handwritten notes of Presidential Phone call with Kohl (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Office of the President
Series: Daily Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Note	Handwritten notes Presidential Phone call with Ronald Reagan (1 pp.)	06/03/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: Office of the President

Series: Daily Files

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Sunday, June 3, 1990

Date Closed: 5/21/2010	OA/ID Number: 90549-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0166-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: 6-3-90 TIME: 4 PM
incoming/outgoing

WITH: M. Thatcher

SUBJECT: "Fill" Gorb visit

interesting -

given

Barbara manelous -

FOLLOW UP: _____

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE \ EAST ROOM
JUNE 3, 1990 \ 10:00 A.M.

WHEN PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I WERE AT MALTA, WE AGREED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO BUILD A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP -- ONE THAT WOULD MOVE BEYOND CONTAINMENT TO AN ERA OF ENDURING COOPERATION. AT THE TIME, NO ONE KNEW THE MOMENTOUS EVENTS THAT WOULD UNFOLD AROUND THE WORLD. OUR TASK IS -- IF ANYTHING -- MORE URGENT AND THE CASE FOR A NEW U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP MORE COMPELLING -- BECAUSE THE OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE US ARE SO GREAT.

WE HAVE NOT SHIED AWAY FROM DISCUSSING ISSUES ABOUT WHICH WE DISAGREE. THERE WERE SOME TOUGH ONES BEFORE US -- PARTICULARLY THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES -- A CAUSE WHICH THE UNITED STATES FULLY SUPPORTS. I THINK IT IS A MARK OF HOW FAR THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS COME THAT IN ALL OF OUR EXCHANGES -- WHETHER ABOUT ISSUES ON WHICH WE AGREED OR DISAGREED -- THE SPIRIT OF CANDOR AND OPENNESS -- A DESIRE NOT JUST TO UNDERSTAND BUT TO BUILD BRIDGES -- SHONE THROUGH.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I HAD INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE TRANSFORMING EVENTS IN EUROPE -- EVENTS THAT HAVE PUT BEFORE US OUR BEST CHANCE IN FOUR DECADES TO SEE EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE. I STRESSED THAT THE LONG HELD ASPIRATIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE SHOULD BE MET WITHOUT DELAY. ON THE MATTER OF GERMANY'S EXTERNAL ALLIANCES -- I BELIEVE -- AS DO CHANCELLOR KOHL AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE -- THAT THE UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

DOES NOT HOLD THAT VIEW. BUT WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT -- THAT THE MATTER OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP IS -- IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT -- A MATTER FOR THE GERMANS TO DECIDE.

OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS AND IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK, WE MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN OUR MUTUAL EFFORT TOWARD BUILDING A MORE PEACEFUL AND STABLE WORLD.

WE SIGNED A VERY IMPORTANT CHEMICAL WEAPONS ACCORD AND NUCLEAR TESTING PROTOCOLS, AND GAVE A POLITICAL PUSH TO OTHERS -- INCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE. I AM ^{ALSO} HOPEFUL THAT THE GOOD DISCUSSION PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I HAD ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF "OPEN SKIES" WILL REVIVE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

WE DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND MADE PROGRESS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE -- CONCLUDING A COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT AND A LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT.

IN CLOSING LET ME SAY HOW PRODUCTIVE I THINK THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE BEEN. PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS, PERHAPS ANNUALLY. BOTH OF US WOULD LIKE TO THINK WE CAN GET TOGETHER MORE OFTEN WITH LESS FORMALITY.

- 7 -

WE ARE NOW AT A STAGE -- IN THE U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP AND IN WORLD HISTORY -- WHERE WE SHOULD
MISS NO OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLETE THE EXTRAORDINARY TASKS
BEFORE US.

#

7103
6-3-9
Behind Garrison
The President
169

DON. R

Bush

PRESS CONFERENCE

June 3, 1990

P. Saxe

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

1. Did President Gorbachev give you any guarantees or meet any conditions in return for the trade agreement? Did you request any movement on Lithuania as a quid pro quo?
2. What did President Gorbachev mean when he said there were new ideas on Germany in your meetings? When will Baker and Shevardnadze meet on this question?
3. Is a future Summit dependent on a START agreement?
4. Why did you sign the trade agreement, particularly since you said Lithuania was causing tension for the Summit?
5. Did the Soviets balk on signing a grain agreement if they did not get a trade agreement in return?
6. Did you resolve your differences on Cuba or Afghanistan?
7. Do you anticipate problems with Congress over the trade agreement?
8. Is failure to solve the German issue likely to delay a CFE agreement?
9. What makes you believe you can solve the remaining START issues since you haven't done so over the past few months?
10. Isn't it true that the arms agreements in START are being achieved by sacrificing our positions on issues such as ALCMs and SLCMs?
11. What is your reaction to the Soviet plan for an enhanced role for CSCE?
12. Did you present Gorbachev with a nine-point program to solve the Germany issue?
13. How much were your decisions influenced by your personal contact with Gorbachev?
14. Is there any movement on the issue of direct flights to Israel?
15. How can you claim you support Baltic self-determination when you signed economic agreements that encompass the Baltics?
16. Did you promise Gorbachev future limits on the German military?
17. Can you now move towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban?

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

1. 6/5/90
2. heavily
3. non-circumvent

} appropriate
reservations
not necessary
in comp.
of Baltic

16 years to get there

*PNET - TTB
threshold*

let's see if we can then work

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 3, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT
AND PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

The East Room

10:00 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, everybody. Please be seated.

Well, when President Gorbachev and I were at Malta we agreed that we would try to build a fundamentally different U.S.-Soviet relationship; one that would move beyond containment to an era of enduring cooperation. At the time, no one knew the momentous events that would unfold around the world. And our task is, if anything, more urgent and the case for a new U.S.-Soviet relationship more compelling because the opportunities before us are so great.

We've not shied away from discussing issues about which we disagree. There were some tough ones before us, particularly the aspiration of the Baltic peoples -- a cause which the United States fully supports. I think it's a mark of how far the U.S.-Soviet relationship has come that in all our exchanges, whether about issues on which we agreed or disagreed, the spirit of candor and openness, a desire not just to understand but to build bridges, shown through.

President Gorbachev and I had intensive discussions on the transforming events in Europe, events that have put before us our best chance in four decades to see Europe whole and free. I stressed that the long-held aspirations of the German people should be met without delay. On the matter of Germany's external alliances, I believe, as do Chancellor Kohl and members of the Alliance, that the united Germany should be a full member of NATO. President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view. But we are in full agreement that the matter of Alliance membership is, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide.

Over the last six months and in Washington this week, we made great progress in our mutual effort toward building a more peaceful and stable world. We signed a very important chemical weapons accord, nuclear testing protocols, and gave a political push to others, including negotiations to reduce U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear forces and conventional military forces in Europe.

I'm also hopeful that the good discussion between President Gorbachev and -- the one we had about the importance of open skies, we'll revive those negotiations.

We discussed regional issues and human rights in considerable detail, made progress in the economic sphere concluding a commercial agreement, a long-term grains agreement.

In closing, let me say how productive I really feel the last few days have been. President Gorbachev and I have agreed to meet on a regular basis, perhaps annually. Both of us would like to think that we can get together more often with less formality. Because, you see, we're now at a stage in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and, indeed, in world history where we should miss no opportunity to complete the extraordinary tasks before us.

Mr. President, it's been a pleasure having you here, sir.

MORE

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: Ladies and gentlemen, comrades. What has happened over these days enables me to characterize this summit meeting as an event of enormous importance, both for our bilateral relations and in the context of world politics. President Bush has listed the results of the work that we have done together here which enables you to see the scope, the scale of this work, and I think confirms the conclusion that I have drawn.

I agree with President Bush fully, who many times emphasized that we took Malta as a point of departure. And it is Malta that added momentum to the process which, of course, given all the difficulties and disagreements which we have and which we do not deny, still leads us to a qualitatively new relationship with the USSR and the USA. The atmosphere and the results of this meeting make it possible for us to speak really of a new phase of cooperation which the President has just mentioned.

I believe that this transition is both the result and a factor for further changes that affect all countries. The constructive spirit of these days, the spirit of responsibility in which we discussed all questions, have made our success possible. And that's very important because that has a stabilizing effect on the entire international situation at a time when we are addressing fundamental issues of civilization.

I would not want to now give a listing of all that we discussed to mention all the agreements, all the important questions and statements that we have made and that have a lot of potential for the future. But let me still mention what is most important: we signed the main provision for a treaty on the reduction of strategic arms. And I would like to emphasize that this is the first time that we're not just limiting, but we will be reducing the most devastating means of warfare. And I hope that we will sign the treaty itself this year.

We also signed a statement about the future treaty negotiations on nuclear and space arms. We have agreed to make sure that we will complete the Vienna talks this year and sign an agreement on conventional arms at a European summit by the end of this year. Not everything depends on us, but this is our position; we want to achieve that.

We also discussed problems relating to the European process, specifically, external aspects of German unification. I cannot say that we have reached agreement, but that does not mean that our efforts were futile. Many new arguments emerged as a result of these discussions, and new possible perspectives. We have clarified our positions and it is our position that we will continue discussion in order to find a mutually acceptable solution. We could not resolve this issue in Washington with the President -- the two of us. There is also the two-plus-four formula and other European countries which are concerned and which want to see a mutually acceptable solution -- a solution acceptable to all of us. The position of the Soviet Union is that we have to find solutions that would fit into the overall positive trend of changes in Europe and in the world that would strengthen and not erode security.

I would like in particular to emphasize the importance of our dialogue at Camp David where we talked during the day yesterday, and this is a new phase in strengthening mutual understanding and trust between us. We really discussed all world problems. We compared our political perspectives and we did that in an atmosphere of frankness, a constructive atmosphere, an atmosphere of growing trust. We discussed specifically such urgent international issues as the situation in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, Cambodia, Central America. That is just some of what we have discussed.

I would not want to go into detail right now. I think that you will probably seek to get clarification on this. But anyway, I think that the Camp David dialogue was very important.

MORE

We have agreed to make a special statement on Ethiopia, to support efforts to reestablish peace there and also with the help of the United Nations to give humanitarian relief to the Ethiopian people.

Speaking of bilateral relations, we have some important political achievements here. Specifically, there is movement on such important areas as trade agreement, grain trade, agreement on civil aviation cooperation, maritime agreement, peaceful uses of the atomic energy science and technology and education. While we and the President were working and our Ministers were also discussing things, there were important contacts and discussions with the various American companies, and some important decisions were made, such as Chevron, that will be participating in the exploration of the Tengiz oil fields. That will mean an investment of about 10 billion rubles.

A group of our academicians were here with me, and they had a good discussion which resulted in the signing of a memorandum of intent with IBM, which will participate in the program of using computers for education in the Soviet Union. I think that this economic area and other areas create a good foundation for our political dialogue and creates a kind of solid support, solid pillar of support for our cooperation.

I would like to express my profound gratification at this work that we have done together with President George Bush. I appreciate very much him as a political leader who is able in a very human way and in a politically responsible way to engage in dialogue and cooperation. We spent many hours together and were able to come to know each other very well. I don't know whether anyone will be ever able to say that we know each other totally well or completely. I think that would take many, many years. But now we have a good human relationship and I think a good human atmosphere between us.

The President has said, and I would like to confirm this, that we have decided to have regular meetings on a working basis in a businesslike manner, and this is really what is necessary. I would like to tell you that I've invited President George Bush, the President of the United States, to visit the Soviet Union to come for a state visit to our country, in concluding -- and that is something that is not within the framework of the official negotiations but was part of our visit.

I would like to say both to the Americans and to the Soviet people that here, we, the Soviet delegation, we have felt very good feelings of the American people, feelings of solidarity, and a lot of interest from the Americans toward what we are doing in the Soviet Union for perestroika. I have felt that on many occasions in my short exchanges with the Americans and also in various talks. I would like to thank all Americans for that, and they certainly can expect reciprocity from the Soviet Union for that.

And finally, we, the two of us, were discussing things of concern to us, various regions, various problems affecting the lives of other countries. But that does not mean that we were trying to decide anything for others anyway. We remembered always that what we were doing must be useful not only for our countries, but for the world and, of course, specifically for the Third World.

And let me, at this, wrap up my initial remarks at this press conference.

Q I'd like to ask both Presidents about Germany. President Bush, you've mentioned that you still have a disagreement about a united Germany being in NATO. In any concrete sense did you narrow your differences on this subject and are any alternatives being seriously considered?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure we narrowed them. I feel I understand President Gorbachev's position. But I know this for fact certain: I had every opportunity to explain in considerable detail

MORE

why I felt a united Germany in NATO would be stabilizing, would be important for the stability of a post-German unification Europe.

So I can't say whether we narrowed them, but the benefit of a meeting like this is, once again, you can talk in great frankness about it. I have no suspicion about his position, and I hope he has no suspicion about mine. And we've got collective decisions to take with NATO allies on matters of this nature, but in the final analysis, it's the question for Germany to decide that. And maybe we're closer on that, but I would defer to President Gorbachev.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: Since I have already made quite a few remarks on many occasions during these days on this subject, I will confine myself to comments which I think important in order to emphasize the thinking on this score and in order for us to understand better what we are after. We're not insisting that it should be an option of the Soviet Union. We are not saying that this should be a version by the United States of America or anybody else's option. What we are talking about is an option or a solution of external problems related to German unification which would organically incorporate the European process and improvement of international politics as a whole.

So that a solution of these issues would help enrich this process and make it more stable and reliable, we're opposed to any options whatever it may come from. We, ourselves, are not going to offer one that would weaken these processes or create difficulties for the unfolding processes in the European continent. We're not going to put spokes in the wheels, as it were. So I believe the fact that the President, myself, and our colleagues have devoted a great deal of time to this issue, we have thrashed out this idea very, very thoroughly, I think it has been very helpful and beneficial because we will continue our debates on this.

Q I have this question to address to you. You have just mentioned President Bush as having qualities of a statesman. Could you tell us what role they played in helping you make so many accomplishments at this summit meeting and advance the solution of many problems that seek to be intractable?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I can reiterate what I have said, and I can add the following: Mr. Bush and I met each other a bit earlier before finding ourselves in this position together. And during my contacts with him I felt, and it was during my first visit here in 1987, that this is the kind of person to do business with, to build our relations with. Then we had contacts at Governors Island, which persuaded me even more of that.

We have maintained correspondence between us, and perhaps Malta was exactly the point where President Bush and I could get to know each other even better and to engage in some thinking on one-on-one meetings. I must say that everything began with discovering the fact that President Bush and myself have a desire to do business informally, which is very, very important. If we added to this the fact that each of us, while being himself and while representing their own people, should react in a responsible fashion to everything, and in context of the real role played by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, we could very well imagine the human compatibility which exist between people and which enables them to create a kind of atmosphere that makes it possible to clarify the root causes of some particular processes.

I can say that this dialogue is well-underway. And as to yesterday's meetings at Camp David, they were a great accomplishment in and by themselves. This is my assessment and I think the fact that we have established a rapport will be very important.

Q This is a two-pronged question for both Presidents. Beyond words, what guarantees can you give the Palestinians that the decisions you made on emigration will not result in the further usurpation of their lands? And why is it that President Gorbachev

MORE

has shown so much human sympathy for the Palestinians, while the U.S. vetoes even a U.N. look at their plight under military seige?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Did you have a particular order you wanted us to answer that question in? (Laughter.)

Q If you can.

PRESIDENT BUSH: The United States policy on settlement in the occupied territories is unchanged and is clear. And that is we oppose new settlements in territories beyond the 1967 lines -- the stated, reaffirmed policy over and over again. Now, we do not oppose the Secretary General sending an emissary to the Middle East to look at this important question. The question is compounded, however, when you see on the eve of discussion of that an outrageous guerrilla attack on Israel launched from another country. That is unacceptable to the United States. Having said that, we don't want to -- the position of our country is we do not think that it needs U.N. troops or U.N. Security Council missions, but we do favor Mr. Goulding, a representative of the Secretary General, going there.

So when the question came and we differed with the Soviet Union -- indeed, we differed with many of our other allies on this question -- it is our view that the most productive way to handle that question was to have an emissary from the Secretary General -- not as the other countries in the Security Council favored a Security Council delegation go there.

Q But, Mr. President, you agree that there have been settlements, even though this has been our policy for many years?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Yes, I agree there are settlements that go contrary to the United States policy. And I will continue to represent the policy, reiterate the policy, and try to persuade the government of Israel that it is counterproductive to go forward with additional settlements in these territories. Our objective is to get the parties to the peace table. And our Secretary of State has worked diligently with the Israelis, and I've tried to do my best to get them talking. And that's what we think is the most immediate step that is needed. And I will continue to reiterate American policy and continue to push for peace talks.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: Just a moment. I'd like to respond, too. You formulated your question in precise terms. Namely, what kind of guarantees can we issue so that those who want to leave, those who have chosen Israel as their place of residence, those who leave from the Soviet Union should not be resettled on occupied territories.

This is not a simple question, and this is what I have to say in this connection. The Soviet Union is now being bombarded by a lot of criticism from Arab countries lately. I have had meetings with President Assad of Syria and President Mubarak of Egypt. Those were very important talks with them. Nevertheless, this question -- this was the question that was also raised by them in acute terms -- the question of guarantees now. We are facing the following situation.

Either after these meetings and exchanges with the President of the United States of America on this particular issue, our concern would be heeded in Israel and they will make certain conclusions, or else we must give further thought to it in terms of what we can do with issuing permits for exit. And some people are raising the matter in these terms in the Soviet Union. Namely, as long as there are no assurances from the Israelis that this is not going to be done by them for the -- to postpone issuing permits for exit, to put it off. But I hope they will heed what the two Presidents strongly advise them, that they should act in a wise fashion. Perhaps this is what I would like to express by way of reacting.

Q My question is addressed to Comrade Gorbachev. Your

MORE

relationship with President Bush, perestroika activities well-assured inside, but there is a cooling of interest. Everybody's concerned with internal matters at home. Taking advantage of this opportunity, I'd like to ask you what do you think of your relationship with Yeltsin? Are you going to offer an olive branch of peace to each other?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I don't think you have chosen the best place for clarifying our internal problems. (Laughter.) But c'est la vie, as they say. (Laughter.) There is real life. There are certain processes underway back home. And I thought I tried to respond to this question when I was in Canada. As soon as I stepped out of the plane, they asked me this particular question. And I said that what I was worrying about most was a kind of an impasse which emerged at the Congress itself because there is no strong preponderance. It took really three rounds for Comrade Yeltsin to gain a majority of votes by just a few votes to be elected. So the situation remains.

And I said that in recent days something has happened which calls for thinking on our part. Comrade Yeltsin with respect to some very serious important political fundamental issues has changed his position. At least he has introduced clarity. And I said if this is not a political gain for him to hold high office it is one thing. A certain approach can be adopted on the basis of that, and we could certainly forecast a certain kind of developments in the Supreme Soviet and in Russia.

But if this is nothing but a maneuver and he will return to what he has been doing in recent years -- not only critical terms if Americans believe this is to be constructive, but also in destructive activities, destructive efforts. He went as far as to fertilize in the framework of perestroika our efforts with some ideas, with ideas regarding forms of life where we are making a turn around in all spheres. So if he is going to come back to this, then, of course, his chairmanship will certainly complicate these processes.

I should say that after that he gave an interview and people began to see that he is changing again. The very next day he was interrogated at a session. He tried to explain his position.

In short, I always say life will place everything in proper perspective. Now that we have reached a phase of radical fundamental change where everybody is supposed to show great responsibility for their country, where we're changing everything, now that we're about to make a radical change in our economy, it is all very serious. Everything will become clear pretty soon what Comrade Yeltsin is after.

Q Mr. President, President Bush, I'd like to ask you about the trade agreement that you signed yesterday, already a matter of some political controversy and criticism in this country. Secretary Baker has indicated it will not go to Congress for its action until the Soviet codification of its new emigration policies. Does that mean, sir, that when that law is passed in the Soviet Union that you are prepared to go ahead as well with most-favored-nation trading status for the Soviet Union, or will that further step require some action, some loosening, some shift on the Baltics?

THE PRESIDENT: We had a chance to discuss the Baltics, and I made clear that the Baltics -- I think I said it at a U.S. press conference several weeks ago -- caused some tensions. But the linkage is between the trade agreement and the emigration legislation. I'm not going to send that legislation up -- and I've tried to be very frank -- until the Soviet Union has completed action on the legislation guaranteeing the right of emigration.

Q Well, what about, sir, the further step of actually granting most-favored-nation status?

THE PRESIDENT: I've given our position in the linkages

MORE

between the emigration, and that's it.

Q May we take it, then, sir, that most-favored-nation status would then be forthcoming if this emigration law is codified?

THE PRESIDENT: We'll cross that bridge when we get to it. But the trade agreement linkage is between the -- MFN is hooked into the emigration law being passed. That's it.

We have other agreements -- the grain agreement, and we have a maritime agreement. And the concern over -- the difference of position we have on the Baltics, you might say, affects -- is one of the thorns in the side of an overall relationship. We've always had a difference on this. We have not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union; that's been the historic position of the United States. But that concern, you might say, affects a wide array of issues that we have with the Soviet Union.

Frankly, I've been very pleased -- first place, I've tried to be very frank with President Gorbachev -- not just here, but before he came here -- saying the difficulties that I face. And Jim Baker was very frank with Eduard Shevardnadze, saying the problems we face. I think it is important in this emerging relationship that we share as directly as we can with the Soviet side the political problems we face. We've got a Congress that has its rights. They have every right to look at what I've signed and every obligation to do that and make their judgment as to whether it's in the best interests.

I signed the trade agreement because I am convinced that it is in the best interests of the United States. I believe the same thing about the grain agreement. I believe the same thing about the maritime agreement. But I don't want to mislead the American people and say that I have lessened my concern over the Baltic States. I've tried to be frank with the Soviet side on this. But the linkage -- back to your question -- is with -- the linkage with trade is on MFN -- emigration law being passed. And then we go forward.

Q In connection with this meeting, there was a lot of speculation about weak and strong points. Somebody speaks from a position of strength, someone from a position of weakness. How would you define what a strong position is, a position of strength? What is the place where a factor of force or strength holds? What are the components of force? What does politics -- what makes politics strong? This is a question that is addressed to both Presidents.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: Let me begin first in order to let President Bush have a little rest. (Laughter.) I think this is a certain speculation on this score. Both during the preceding period and in the course of our talks, we have been acting -- representing our peoples and countries, well-aware of what the dialogue is all about. And I think to assume that someone -- myself or President Bush -- can dictate to each other or to the Soviet Union is absurd. This would be the greatest misconception, on the basis of which no progress could ever be made.

I think that this idea is suggested because at this point in time the Soviet Union is deep into profound change. And since fundamental change is involved, we are walking away from one particular way of life toward different forms of life: we're changing our political system, we're introducing a new model in economy. All these are fundamental things, indeed. Debates are underway, doubts are being expressed, views are being compared, and this is very important, because what is at stake is our destiny.

Of course, when you look from outside, well, we ourselves can feel the strain of our society; it is very much politicized. But a look from outside, without knowing all the subtleties, without knowing all the depth of sentiments, one could certainly arrive at some erroneous conclusions.

Hence, the question of how long will Gorbachev stay in

MORE

his office and how this whole perestroika will end and so on and so forth. Even this I think fits into this process of profound change, and perhaps this is something we cannot do without. But the most important thing is that everything that is happening confirms not only the fact that we're cleaning up our courtyard, we are really revamping our entire society. We are trying to adapt it to human needs on the basis of freedom and democracy. We want to make it more open toward the outside world.

That is the essence. And therein, Soviet people do not differ. And I hope there are no differences on that among the journalistic corps. Perhaps some part of society thinks otherwise, but the question is how to do all this to avoid losing everything that we should keep and jettison everything that we don't need, that stands in the way.

I don't think we have ever tackled tasks like this in the history of our country. I don't know whether anybody else has been able to resolve so many tasks within such a short period of time. So it is for this particular reason that we appreciate so highly the fact that the whole world understands this correctly.

So from this particular perspective, I wish to state -- and this goes to show the farsightedness of President Bush and his colleagues, to say nothing of the American public, which overall understands what is happening in the Soviet Union today, understands that this is something that we need. Above all, of course, it's up to us to solve all of these problems, but, of course everybody understands full well that this is something that the whole world, all the nations need. For without such changes, without a stronger balanced, harmonized world, we will not accomplish our objectives.

So today, the pivotal point of world politics is perestroika in the Soviet Union -- not because we are there, but because this is an objective reality.

THE PRESIDENT: May I simply add that the United States is not trying to deal from strength or weakness. I tried to say this at the welcoming ceremony for President Gorbachev. We have a unique responsibility to deal with world peace. No other countries have the same degree of responsibility that the Soviet Union and the United States have. So we're not looking for winners or losers. We salute reforms that make our systems more compatible on the economic side, on the human rights side, the openness side. But we're not looking for trying to achieve advantage. We sat down here, one-on-one, and tried to hammer out agreements and get closer together on vital matters affecting other countries.

And it is because of the standing of the Soviet Union and the standing of the United States in the world that we have responsibilities. So I can tell you -- all the journalists from the Soviet side, the European journalists -- the United States is dealing with mutual respect here. We salute the changes, of course. But we have a unique responsibility in the world. And I plan to -- one of the things I'm pleased about in our agreement is that we will be meeting more often now, and we can't miss an opportunity to enhance stability and peace in the world. So that's where I'm coming from on your question.

MR. FITZWATER: Let's turn to the international press.

Q Following on President Bush's comment, on a scale that had adversaries at one end and allies at the other, would you now say that each other's country was more of an ally than an adversary?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't want to get into semantics. Alliances have a connotation to some that they might not have for another. Adversaries sometimes convey the concept of hostility or enmity. In my view we've moved a long, long way from the depths of the Cold War. We've moved towards a -- I don't quite know how to quantify it for you, but we could never have had the discussions at

Camp David yesterday or as we sat in the Oval Office a couple of days before with President Gorbachev 20 years ago. We all know that. So there's been dramatic move. And the more this reform and openness takes place, the more compatible the relationship becomes. Neither of us tried to cover over the differences.

So I know that's too general for you, but that's where I'd leave it.

Q Question to President Bush, if I may, to follow-up my colleague's one. Are there circumstances under which you would be prepared to recommend the total dissolution of NATO? What's the threat that still keeps it in business?

And a question to President Gorbachev, too. How long do you think the transition period should last before the responsibilities of the Four Powers run out -- the four victorious powers in World War II?

PRESIDENT BUSH: You want me to start with that one?

The threat -- as I look at the world, the threat is unpredictability and stability -- or instability is the threat. We feel that a continued U.S. presence in Europe should not be seen as hostile to the Soviet interests, but, indeed, we hope a continued U.S. presence there will be seen as something that's stabilizing. And NATO is the existing machinery that we feel, with an expanded mission, can best provide that stability. And herein, we have a difference with the Soviet Union.

But it is that, rather than some kind of Cold War mentality, that drives our decision to, one, remain in Europe, and two, to try to have a broader role for NATO. Under Article II of the NATO Treaty -- there is language put in there, I'm told by Lester Pearson years ago that provides a broader than just military assignment for NATO. So we see this as not exclusive to an expanded role for CSCE, not contradictory to the aspirations of many Europeans for an expanded EC, but as a way in which we can continue without hostility to anyone to provide a stabilizing presence.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I'd like to respond to this extremely important question if I may.

First, as an overall statement of the fact, it seems to me that if some kind of option is suggested, one that would replace or would be accompanied by replacing an isolation on the European continent, either of the United States of America or of the Soviet Union, then I would say in no uncertain terms -- and I could even make a forecast -- that that particular option would be doomed. It would be doomed in the sense that it would be difficult to put into effect. But what matters most, it would lead to exacerbation rather than improvement in the situation.

For that reason, we believe that we will not be able to make any further progress in restructuring international relations, including in the main European area without an active participation of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. These are realities. And there's also a great sense of responsibility behind those realities. This is the first point.

The second point now. Yes, indeed, we believe that the option which we think will be found eventually and which will provide powerful momentum and which would contribute to the strengthening of the European process must necessarily include some kind of a transition period during which we could join our efforts to conclude a final document, exhausting thereby the rights we are endowed with as the victorious Four Powers under the results of the Second World War. These are the issues that were raised by history itself and so, therefore, in the framework of international law it must be brought to conclusion.

A concurrent unification of Germany and its presence

MORE

would mean the coincidence of these two events. This would mean that this would be an independent and sovereign state. I really don't know and I wouldn't like to engage in speculation about the timeliness, but I think that we must be very, very active now so as to ensure some kind of synchronization between the internal processes which lead to the unification of Germany and the settlement of external aspects so that they would be combined.

I can see -- and I offered many options in our position -- those options are there, and it seems to me there are some points the American side has noticed. I am expressing my supposition. I am not saying that I heard this from the President, but I think they have something to think about and I think we will give serious thinking to the U.S. position, too.

Q President Gorbachev, on the subject of NATO membership for a united Germany, you have complained in the past about Western sensitivity to your security concerns. Some of your aides say privately that a united Germany could belong to NATO and your security concerns could be satisfied by both a limited American presence in Germany, and primarily by strict limits on German troops and armaments. The real problem, they say, is psychological -- a matter of national pride. They say that if you accept Germany in NATO, it will be a humiliating admission to the Soviet people that you've lost the Cold War.

In your talks with President Bush, were you frank about this? Is this a problem for you? And, President Bush, have you considered this problem yourself in your own thoughts?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: First, I do not think that whatever I am saying on this extremely important question of world politics appears to be a complaint from me or from the Soviet Union -- "this would be humiliating for the Soviet Union" to pass, you said, around -- to come here to Washington or to Bonn or elsewhere -- this is out of the question. And please bear that in mind. This is the first point.

The second point is, you know there is a process underway, a beneficial process, and look how far we have progressed in this process. We're entitled to raise the question in these terms. Each subsequent step must strengthen it rather than weaken it. We have a right to that. Take for example our negotiations on 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. If this whole negotiating process were to be depicted to you in its entirety, you would certainly see the kind of battles we are having on each and every point. Why? Because nobody really wants his security to be diminished.

Incidentally, our own position is that we find it unacceptable that we should have greater security than the United States of America. In a situation like this, we won't be able to move forward. I would recommend to all our partners to give some thought to this position. If decisions are made of the kind that will cause concern to the Soviet Union, this would not be beneficial to the Soviet Union, this would not be beneficial to others as well.

So the question arises: a united Germany, its advent on the horizon -- all this is very important and serious. While applauding the Germans' desire to be united, we must at the same time think about ways of preserving the balance that has been emerging and taking shape for decades.

Here is the central point. If we were to adopt only one point of view, then I would think that it would not be complete, for it gives rise to concerns. And if that is the case, then if there were no other way out -- but I believe that such a way out will be found to mutual satisfaction -- but if this were to be the only option and some would like to impose it on us and say that we reject this, then we should go back and see where we are. What's happening to our security? What should we be doing with our armed forces, which we are both reforming and reducing? What should we do about

Vienna? How should we behave there? All these are matters of strategic importance for everything happening in Europe; it is really the highest level of strategy.

This is one way, one pathway which gives rise to some doubts or suspicions; one that can certainly slow down things. But there is another pathway that we are offering -- let it be American, or German, or British. We are not claiming to have it as our own. We are claiming one thing only: we want to see an option that would strengthen everything in Europe rather than weaken things.

As to the second part, it's a question of pride. Well, I'd say that the problem is not pride really. If today I have to remind you once again that we lost 27 million people in the fronts in partisan detachments -- 27 million people during World War II. And 18 million people were wounded and maimed. Then I think it's not a matter of pride, but of justice -- supreme justice. For these sacrifices of our people enable us to raise these matters with all nations. And we have a moral right to do so, so that everything that was obtained at such tremendous costs, that so many sacrifices would not spell new perils. So this is what I wanted to say. And I think that this is what you just said.

THE PRESIDENT: May I just add -- Mr. President, may I simply add, in answer to your question, the answer is, no, because our policy is not predicated on pride or on humiliation or on arrogance. It is predicated on what do we see from the U.S. standpoint is the best for the future, best for stability and peace in Europe and elsewhere. So the considerations that you asked about have nothing to do with the formulation of U.S. policy on these important questions.

I'm just going to do what I think is best for the United States and the rest of the free world and the Soviets. So we're not dwelling on what you asked about.

Q Mr. Gorbachev, you say that you have established new relations with the United States. Could you tell us how you are going to develop the process in the area of the Pacific Ocean and whether you're going to convene some kind of representative conference or meeting to discuss those matters with representatives of different zones?

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: It seems to me that I have already expressed myself in rather a great detail on this score. And it also seems to me that what I said back in Vladivostok, in Krasnoyarsk, remains today. And I reiterate that approach. And it seems to me that this is not a thing of the past, for the processes are beginning to develop in that region too, which is inhabited by billions of people. One way or another things will be more complex with due regard for the real specifics over there. We must act with due regard for those specifics without copying blindly the European process, but borrowing something from it.

At this time I can say that what happened with armaments, with INF missiles along the border with China and the kind of dialogue which is underway now between countries and, finally, the fact that we have traveled a certain distance toward a settlement of the situation of Afghanistan -- all these are signs showing that there is a positive process emerging over there.

Of course, I think this road will be longer and more thorny. But still, it is especially necessary over there, because those peoples need an opportunity to reallocate their resources to overcome a lot of social problems that have been accumulated. This is number one.

And number two, I'd like to say that, following the intensive contacts we have had and the dialogue that we are developing with India and now with China and other countries such as Indonesia, I am planning to go on a visit to Japan so as to open that area for discussions. So we're going to intensify our efforts in

MORE

that direction.

I wish to say right away that here, too, we must cooperate with the United States of America. I said this before in my statements, and now, too, I wish to reiterate it once again in the presence of the President of the United States of America.

Q Mr. President -- this question is directed to President Bush, but President Gorbachev, feel free to join in, of course. Mr. President, about six weeks ago you suggested your patience was nearing an end in regards to the Lithuanian situation. I was wondering if that's still the case. If not, what has changed? And specifically, have you received any assurances that the embargo will be lifted?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there have been no such assurances. I'm not sure anything has changed. I don't recall placing it that my patience is nearing an end. I've tried to make clear to everybody that we have not recognized the incorporation of these Baltic States into the Soviet Union and, therefore, we have a difference with the Soviet Union. They consider this an internal matter, and we say that, having not recognized the inclusion, why, we have a different problem.

But we had some good discussions of this. I've been encouraged to see discussions going on over there between various leaders, and let's hope the matter can be resolved. Because I haven't lessened my view as to people's aspirations for self-determination, and I feel strongly about that. That's a hallmark of American belief and policy. And I haven't changed one bit on that. But I would turn it over to President Gorbachev, who has a different view on it.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV: I really don't even know what I can tell you now because two days ago, in a meeting with representatives of the congressional leadership I explained our position in great detail. It seems to me that our position is constructive and convincing. Our Constitution has recorded the right for each people to make a choice for self-determination up to and including secession.

We did not have laws or legislation that would regulate -- we did not have a mechanism that would regulate the implementation of that right. Now we have it recorded in the law. So we are reforming our federations, we are expanding the Republic's sovereign rights. And we hope that a full federation is something that we are in vital need of to resolve all the problems that have been accumulated. This is our conviction, this is the way we're acting, and shortly in the next few days, there is to be a Federation Council meeting convened to consider specific steps, dates, and ways of resolving this particular problem in specific concrete terms.

Perhaps this particular process will develop in a way that would imply the presence of different levels of federative ties. Just like various ties or links between the republics. This will be a new process, new forms of links of the kind that would be in consonant with the purposes of our perestroika, with the goals of reforming our federation. This is one direction.

If, nevertheless, in the framework of this process, some Republic or other is going to raise this question -- and I'm sure they will -- they must be addressed and dealt with in the framework of the constitutional process. We want to see this happen precisely on the basis of the Constitution. Any other different approach leads only to an impasse. And the experience that we have by now, not only with respect to Lithuania, but also with respect to other republics in terms of dealing with ethnic problems where some people are trying to resolve the problem by different methods, without due regard for the Constitution, leads to exacerbation, aggravation, and confrontation. And this is not beneficial either for people, for their families or for the economy or for the overall atmosphere in our country.

MORE

The President of the Soviet Union, just like the President of the United States of America -- and I happen to know the American Constitution -- have as one of their main responsibilities to defend and protect the constitutional system. I swore an oath of allegiance to the Constitution. And for that reason, we are prepared and willing to address any issue, including those that have been raised by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR in the framework of the constitutional process. This implies a referendum, incidentally. As to the referendum, those who have engineered this kind of solution, if I may say so, regarding the statehood of Lithuania will also address our own option.

And let the people decide. After they make a choice, I'm sure no fewer than five or seven years would be required for us to sort things out. There will be this divorce proceeding underway, for there are 800,000 non-Lithuanians who live there. Defense, missiles, Navy -- they're all there. Today, Lithuania's territory includes five areas that used to belong to Byelorussia. Stalin ceded Klaipeda, which the Soviet Union, as the basis of the results of World War II, received just as it did Kaliningrad in Eastern Prussia. It received Lithuanian territories. So they raise this question to return to Russia these lands.

Recently, the President of France -- I held a press conference with President Mitterrand of France, just as I am doing now with President Bush here. And I said, listen, in order to make a decision how to act with respect to overseas territories such as Caledonia, France has projected a period of 10 years. How is it possible for us to resolve issues such as this overnight when people met pending the opening of the Third Congress of People's Deputies and put the question to the vote? Is that a responsible policy really, I ask myself. I really think that we are acting in accordance with the mandate from the Third Congress of People's Deputies, and we have a vast reserve of goodwill and constructive spirit and we do our best in order to resolve, on the basis of constitutional approaches, this particular issue. But any other way would be unacceptable.

I keep referring to -- well, I'm not asking the President to come over to us and bring order to our house. But I keep saying that President Bush would have resolved an issue like this within 24 hours and he would have restored the validity of his Constitution within 24 hours in any state. (Laughter.)

But we are going to resolve it. We are going to do it ourselves. With full responsibility, I wish to declare here now for all of you to know that we are anxious to see this issue resolved in such a way as everybody's interest would be taken into account and within the Constitution's framework.

MR. FITZWATER: Our hour is up. We thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

11:09 A.M. EDT