

START OF REEL

No.30- 010 / 010

(Pacific Theater)

Microfilmer : Takahiro Tajima

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A
MICROFILM PUBLICATION
OF
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WORLD WAR II OPERATIONS REPORTS


Record Group 407: The Adjutant General's Office,
World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Declassified (NND 735017)

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

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World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

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Folder Title : 98-USF1-2.23: Hq/USAFFE - Censorship
Comment Sheets (28 Oct 1944 - 29 Mar 1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-2.23

Consorship Comment Sheets - Hq. USAFFE

28 Oct 1944-29 Mar 1945

Box 1603

1

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CONFIDENTIAL
CIVIL CENSORSHIP DETACHMENT
G-2
HEADQUARTERS
USAFFE

29 March 1945
(date)

CS #PH/ RA/MAH 654

From: MANUEL P. MANAHAN, PUBLISHER
PSP PRESS
920 LEPANTO ST., MANILA

To: J. A. KRUG
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. ATTENTION:
NEWSPRINT DEPARTMENT

DISTRIBUTION Date of Communication:

Number of Inclosures:

CHQ

G-1

G-2

G-4

Ch Engr

Ch Sig O

PRO

CRO

COIC

PVB

USAFFE

G-1

G-2

G-4

AGD

ETC

Ch Chap

Ch Surg

G Pur Agt

I & E

JAGD

Claims S

Postal CO

PM

Sp Serv

Fis Dir

Civ Aff

Board

P. Sec

Ph R & I

G-2 USASOS

FEAF

ASF

25 March 1945

Comment by:

M. M. DEL GENIO

Type of Communication:

Telegram

Number of Previous Records:

None

RECONSTRUCTION: PRIORITY REQUESTED FOR NEWSPAPER MATERIALS FOR
PUBLICATION OF MANILA NEWSPAPERS.

Radio gram as follows:

"HIT J A KRUG
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D.C.
ATTENTION NEWSPRINT DEPARTMENT

QUESTIONS THE PSP PRESS NOW PUBLISHING THREE NEWSPAPERS IN ENGLISH
TAGALOG AND SPANISH APPLIES FOR A QUOTA OF FORTY TONS OF NEWSPRINT
MONTHLY STOP PLEASE ADVISE AVAILABILITY OF GETTING PRIORITY ON PAPER
STOP AIRMAIL LETTER TO FOLLOW STOP APPRECIATE ANSWER COLLECT STOP

MANUEL P. MANAHAN, PUBLISHER
PSP Press, 920 Lepanto St.
Manila "

NOTE: Newspaper published by PSP Press is Philippine Liberty News.

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION


SEFIC

DECLASSIFIED

DOD Dir. 5200.9 Sept. 27, 1959

NMW by date 8/62

Form No. CDD - 1



CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
USAFPE

26 February 1945
(Date)

CS #PH **MAN** 464

From: **THE QUALITY MUSIC STORE
1000 ARLEBUL, CULAPO
MANILA, PHILIPPINES**

To: **MR. JOSEFINO GONZALEZ
SAN JOSE
NUEVA REIJA**

DISTRIBUTION	Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures: None
GHQ	10 September 1944	Language: ENGLISH
G-1	Comment by:	Disposition of Original Communication:
G-2	MR. J. ARTSUNE	Passed Excised
G-4	Type of Communication:	Condemned Detained PH R & I
Ch Engr	Letter	Returned Submitted to
Ch Sign	Number of Previous Records:	
PRO		
CRO		
COIC		
PWB		
	COMMENT	

P.R.I.O.R.: HIGH COST OF TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT IN MANILA

Writer states:

"The tires which you wanted to know (solid) is at P250.00 each. The factory (local) made 30 x 1 1/2 black exterior is at P200.00 each. Inner Tube 30 x 1 1/2 (local made) which is thicker and stronger than the ordinary is at P210.00 each. Good kind of side cars with the bicycle complete with canvas roof cost from P5,000.00 and up. Tricycle (push car) for passengers, steel body, streamlined from P5,000.00 and up. The price of the push car now is high because it earns P35.00 a day. I have a new one and if I should decide to sell it, it will not be lower than P5,500.00."

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Tires described are bicycle tires. The side cars and push cars are bicycles reconstructed to carry passengers.

From pre-liberation mail found at Nueva Reija, by Conscription Advance Detachment, Sixth Army.

Examiner: **MR. J. ARTSUNE** REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
DISTRICT SECURITY SECTION BY TAG/8W193

SEFIC		
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CONFIDENTIAL



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

20 JUN 1945

(Date)

(2006)

CS #PH/22/MAR - 2001

FROM:

SAMUEL GACHES
C/O AMERICAN CHIEF OF COMMERCE
PEOPLES BANK BLDG. 603
BAMBARINA ST., MANILA

TO:

JOHN MALCOLM
271 MADISON
NEW YORK CITY

DISTRIBUTION

GHC

G-1

G-2

G-4

CI Sec

Ch Engr

Ch Sig O

PRO

CRO

COIC

FWE

AGD

CIC

Ch Chap

Ch Surg

G Pur Act

I & E

JAGD

Claims S

Postal O

PMG

Sp Serv

Fis Dir

Board

PA Sec

Ph R & I

A-2 FEAF

AFWESPAC

G-2

MPC

ASF

Date of Communication:

21 June 1945

Comment by:

W. H. RYAN

Type of Communication:

Radiogram

Number of Previous Records:

REFER TO FILES OF ABOVE CORRESPONDENTS

COMMENT

TRADE: REPRESENTATION OF U.S. TEXTILE FIRM IN PHILIPPINES
BOUGHT

Radiogram reads:

"RMT 59 MANILA 21 JUNE 1945
JOHN MALCOLM
271 MADISON
NEW YORK CITY

CONTACT UNITED STATES EXPORT PRODUCTS COMPANY THIRTEENTH STREET
NEW YORK PURCHASE TEXTILES REMnant FORMERLY FURNISHED MANILA
STOP GET REPRESENTATION PHILIPPINES MY NAME IF POSSIBLE STOP
WILL TAKE ORDERS HERE STOP ESCOLTA BUILDING TAKEN BY ARMY BUT
CAN ARRANGE SELLING STORE ELSEWHERE STOP AIRMAIL PRICES OF
TEXTILES AND OTHER GOODS ESPECIALLY PLATWARE ETCETERA

SAMUEL GACHES"

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION
SEIC

Form No. CCD - 1

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8W193

md

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

27 JUN 1945

CS #PH/ RA/ MAN-1839

(Date)

FROM: TEOFILO ASSILE
2882 TAFT AVENUE
MANILA

TO: ANTHONY BRIMO
395 BROADWAY
NEWYORK

DISTRIBUTION	Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures:
GHQ	16 June 1945	NONE
G-1	Comment by:	Language:
G-2	W. H. RYAN	ENGLISH
G-4	Type of Communication:	Disposition of Original Communication:
CI Sec	✓ Radiogram	Passed....X.....Excised.....
Ch Engr		Condemned.....Detained.....
Ch Sig O		Returned.....Submitted to.....
PRO		
CRO	Number of Previous Records:	
COIC	TAC-1189	
PWB	COMMENT	
AGD		
CIC		
Ch Chap	FINANCE: FUNDS MOVED ON TREASURY LICENSE BEING DIVERTED	
Ch Surg	TO PURCHASE GOODS	
G Pur Agt		
I & E		
JAGD	Radiogram reads:	
Claims S	"NLT 26 16 JUNE 1945 MANILA	
Postal O	ANTHONY BRIMO	
PMG	395 BROADWAY	
Sp Serv	NEWYORK	
Fis Dir	✓	
Board		
PA Sec	REMITTED TELEGRAPHIC FIVETHOUSAND DOLLARS CHASEBANK	
Ph R & I	INSTEAD BEER PREFERABLE TEXTILES ADDRESS HOME TAFT	
A-2 FEAF	AVENUE PARCELOST DRESS MATERIALS FOR WHOLE FAMILY	
AFMESPAC		
G-2		
MPC		
ASF		

TEOFILO ASSILE"

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8W193

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION
SEFIC

Form No. CCD - 1

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CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

14 JUN 1945
(Date)

CS #PH/ 21/JAN-1625

FROM: MANUEL URQUIGO
518 AVILES ST
MANILA

TO: ORVIS BROG
14 WALL STREET
NEW YORK CITY

DISTRIBUTION

GHQ
G-1
G-2
G-4
GI Sec
Ch Engr
Ch Sig O
FRO
CRO
COIC
PWB
AGD
CIC
Ch Chap
Ch Surg
G Fur Agt
I & E
JAGD
Claims S
Postal O
PMG
Sp Serv
Fis Dir
Board
PA Sec
Ph R & I
A-2 FEAF
AF/ESPAC
C-2
MPC
ASF

Date of Communication:

13 June 1945

Comment by:

A. S. DELERIDGE

Type of Communication:

Radiogram

Number of Enclosures:

NONE

Language:

ENGLISH

Disposition of Original Communication:

Passed.....Excised.....

Condemned.....Detained.....

Returned.....Submitted to.....

Number of Previous Records:

NONE

COMMENT

FINANCE: TRANSFER OF FUNDS AUTHORIZED

Radiogram reads:

"23 JUNE 13 1945 MANILA
MR ORVIS BROG
14 WALL STREET NEW YORK CITY

I AUTHORIZE YOU GIVE MY SON TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS STOP REQUEST
GET FOR ME AGENCIES FROM MANUFACTURERS TO SELL THEIR GOODS
ANY KIND IN CONSIGNMENT

MANUEL URQUIGO

NOTE: Communication returned to sender for necessary Treasury
License.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/84193

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION

SEFIC

Form No. CCD - 1

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

20 JUN 1945

(Date)

CS #PH/ RA/MAN - 1738

FROM: WILLIAM MASTERSON
260 SAN RAFAEL
MANILA

TO: WAR RELIEF SERVICE
350 5TH AVE
NEW YORK

DISTRIBUTION	Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures:
GHQ	15 June 1945	NONE
G-1	Comment by:	Language:
G-2	WM. H. RYAN	ENGLISH
G-4	Type of Communication:	Disposition of Original Communication:
CI Sec	Radiogram	Passed... Excised...
Ch Engr		Condemned... Detained...
Ch Sig O		Returned... Submitted to...
PRO		

Number of Previous Records:

RA/MAN - 1535

COMMENT

RELIEF: DIFFICULTY OF WAR RELIEF SOCIETY IN OBTAINING RELIEF SUPPLIES

Radiogram reads:

***1/15370**

NLT MO26 15JUNE45
WAR RELIEF SERVICE
350 5TH AVE NEWYORK
PRIORITIES TEMPORARILY SNAGGED STOP EXPECTING CLEARANCE FEW
DAYS STOP TRANSPORTATION WITHIN PHILIPPINES DESPERATE STOP
MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT URGE INCLUDING OUR SUPPLIES TWO TWO-
TON TRUCKS HELP DISTRIBUTION STOP CLOTHING GREATEST IMMEDIATE
GENERAL NEED STOP CWO PROVIDED CLOTHING TEN THOUSAND STOP
UNABLE SUPPLY OTHER THOUSANDS SINCE BEGINNING JUNE STOP ANY
HOPE GETTING CLOTHING UNITED NATION CAMPAIGN OR WHITE STOP
DETAILED LETTER SENT TODAY

WILLIAM MASTERSON, 260 SAN RAFAEL, MANILA*

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION
SETIC

Form No. CGD - 1

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8W193

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CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Civil Censorship Detachment

2 MAY 1945

(Date)

CS #PH/ MAIL 929

FROM: J. L. MANNING
c/o AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
MANILA

TO: MR. J. S. REESE
GOTHAM HOTEL
5TH AVENUE, 55 STREET
NEW YORK CITY, N. Y.

DISTRIBUTION	Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures:
GHQ	17 April 1945	Two: 1 Letter and 1 Report
G-1	Comment by:	Language:
G-2	R. B. VOSS	ENGLISH
G-4	Type of Communication:	Disposition of Original Communication:
Ch Engr	Letter	Passed. ☒ Excised.
Ch Sig O		Condemned. Detained.
PRO		Returned. Submitted to.
CRO		
COIC	Number of Previous Records:	
PWB	NONE	

USAFPE
G-1
G-2
G-4
AGD
CIC
Ch Chap
Ch Surg
G Pur Agt
I & E
JAGD
Claims S
Postal O
PMG
Sp Serv
Fis Dir
Civ Aff
Board
PA Sec
Ph R & I

CLAIMS: CLAIMS OF MANILA TRADING AND SUPPLY COMPANY AGAINST U. S. ARMY

Writer states:

"The army accounts which are being shown on our books as at December 24, 1941, are as follows:

Philippine Motor Transport	P385,135.40
U. S. Navy, 16th Naval District	16,925.00
Office of Dept. Eng. Port Area	58,803.80
Contractors, Pacific Naval Bases	8,435.14
U. S. Naval Supply Officer, Cavite	7,097.79
Post Exchange, Ft. Stotsenberg	2,659.64

"We have been able to recover signed receipts for spare parts and merchandise delivered to the Army thru our Iloilo Branch during December 1941 and early 1942 which documents totalling P43,680.75 we are presenting to the Claim Office established at Army General Headquarters here in Manila...."

RECONSTRUCTION: REQUIREMENTS OF BUS AND TRANSIT COMPANIES

"Manila Electric Co. estimates that they will require between 200 to 400 transit type busses complete with bus body (prime coat paint) similar to Detroit transit type with curtained side window instead of glass and powered with six cylinder Hercules or Ford Diesel motor. Seating capacity Forty Filipinos. Delivery as soon as possible...."

Examiner: R. B. VOSS

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION
SEFIC

Form No. GCD - 1

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8W193



2 MAY 1945

CS #PH/MAN- S29

Cont'd.

Also Fifty miscellaneous types truck for repair, freight, etc....

"Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. and Batangas Transit Co. now combined, required 240 trucks, 194" wheel base chassis powered with six cylinder diesel engine."

NOTE: J. L. Manning, the addressor, is the Vice President of Manila Trading and Supply Company.



NOTE: J. D. Mendler, the treasurer, is the Vice President of Mendler Trading and Supply Company.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

22 July 1945

(Date)

CS #PH/ 21/MAY 1967

FROM: FAR EAST AMERICAN COMMERCIAL COMPANY 2-302 3RD FLOOR WILSONCO BLDG. MANILA		TO: JULIUS ROTHSCHILD 52 MAIN STREET SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	
DISTRIBUTION: GHQ G-1 G-2 G-4 CI Sec Ch Engr Ch Sig O PRO CRO COIC PWE AGD CIC Ch Chap Ch Surg G Pur Ast I & E JAGD Claims S Postal O PMG Sp Serv Fis Dir Board PA Sec Ph R & I A-2 STAF AFMESPAC G-2 MPC ASF		Date of Communication: 16 July 1945 Comment by: WM. E. KIAN Type of Communication: Radiogram Number of Previous Records: MAN-2424-2844	
		Number of Enclosures: NONE Language: ENGLISH Disposition of Original Communication: Passed.....Excised..... Condemned.....Detained..... Returned.....Submitted to.....	
		COMMENT FINANCIAL PAYMENT FOR SHIPMENTS TO PHILIPPINES ARRANGED Radiogram reads: "MANILA 61 JULY 16 1945 MR JULIUS ROTHSCHILD 52 MAIN ST SANFRANCISCO CAL PLEASE CONTINUE SHIPMENTS WILL TRANSFER SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT STOP GIVE APPROXIMATE AMOUNT FOR MERCHANDISE SHIPPED AND IN PREPARATION FOR SHIPMENT ASSURE prompt PAYMENT AS SOON AS MINOR DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME STOP ACCEPT OFFER AN COME SHIP TO US STOP PREPARE XMAS MERCHANDISE BEST REGARDS FAR EAST AMERICAN COMMERCIAL COMPANY FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL LICENSE NO FI 2132 ISSUED JUNE 23 1945 NOTE: Reference is made to CG #WH/RA/MAN-2844 in which the Far East American Commercial Co. again requests shipments be made with reimbursement following. The addressee is apparently experiencing financial difficulty in either procuring funds or establishing credit.	

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION

SEFIC

~~RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAC/34192~~

Form No. CCD - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

5 JUL 1945

(Date)

CS #PH/RA/LAN - 2227

FROM: HANS HAUSAMANN
HOTEL WELLINGTON
NEW YORK, N. Y.

TO: INHELDER INC.
MANILA

DISTRIBUTION	Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures:
GHQ	26 June 1945	NONE
G-1	Comment by:	Language:
G-2	WM. H. RYAN	ENGLISH
G-4	Type of Communication:	Disposition of Original Communication:
CI Sec	Radiogram	Passed.....Excised.....
Ch Engr		Condemned.....Detained.....
Ch Sig O		Returned.....Submitted to.....
PRO		
CRO	Number of Previous Records:	
COIC	MAN - 900; RA/MAN - 1164	
PWB	COMMENT	
AGD		
CIC		
Ch Chap		
Ch Surg		
G Pur Agt		
I & E		
JAGD		
Claims S		
Postal O		
PLG		
Sp Serv		
Fis Dir		
Board		
PA Sec		
Ph R & I		
A-2 FEAF		
ATC		
AFWESPAC		
G-2		
MPC		
ASF		

FINANCE: ARRANGING COLLECTION OF NOTES AND SHIPMENT OF
PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLIES

Radiogram reads:

"SM 704 CR NEWYORK 132/131 26
DLT INHELDER INC MANILA

RECEIVED YOUR WIRE FROM WELLS FARGO BANK STOP HAD TO SUBMIT
ALL PROMISSORY NOTES TO FEDERAL RESERVE CONTROL NEWYORK
STOP HAVE NOW ARRANGED AND SUBMITTED NOTES TO NATIONAL CITY
BANK HERE FOR COLLECTION AND DEPOSIT IN BLOCKED ACCOUNT
STOP YOUR CABLE REGARDING SHIPMENTS CIBA BASLE PAYMENT BEING
ARRANGED THROUGH NATIONAL CITY BANK NYX SUBJECT TO SATISFAC-
TORY REACTION BY DEBTORS IN COLLECTION NOTES STOP ROCHE
NUTLEY MUCH IMPRESSED OUR SAVING INHELDER CAPITAL THEY WILL
SHIP OVER 100 CASES PHARMACEUTICALS BEGINNING JULY INVOICE
VALUE DOLLARS 124,000 BUT ONLY ON CONSIGNMENT SIMILAR AS
PREVIOUS CONDITIONS ALSO SENDING PRICE LISTS AND LITERATURE
STOP FRIESSNER ARRIVED HERE TODAY BAXTER AND WOCHER WILL ALSO
MAKE SHIPMENTS STOP FRIESSNER ARRANGING RETURN TO MANILA IN
TIME WITH SHIPMENTS STOP WRITING FULLY

HANS HAUSAMANN HOTEL WELLINGTON

Examiner: _____
DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION
SEFIC

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY 51 TAG/8W193

Form No. CCD - 1

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

/rfa

6 July 1945
(Date)

CS #PH/ RA/MAH - 2261

FROM: JOSE E IMANEZ 444 J LAMORA ST MANILA		TO: WEYEMER'S SHOE MANUFACTURING COMPANY MILWAUKEE 1 WISCONSIN
DISTRIBUTION	Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures:
CHQ	29 June 1945	NONE
G-1	Comment by:	Language:
G-2	WM. E. RYAN	ENGLISH
G-4	Type of Communication:	Disposition of Original Communication:
CI Sec	Radiogram	Passed.. ☒ Excised.....
Ch Engr		Condemned..... Detained.....
Ch Sig O		Returned..... Submitted to.....
PRO	Number of Previous Records:	
CRC	NONE	
COIC	COMMENT	
RSB		
ACD		
CIC		
Ch Chap		
Ch Surg		
G Pur Agt		
I & E		
JAGD		
Claims S		
Postal O		
PIG		
Sp Serv		
Fls Dir		
Board		
Pa Sec		
Pl R & L		
A-2 FLAG		
T.P.C.		
AFESPAC		
G-2		
LPC		
ASF		

FINANCE: SEEKS TREASURY LICENSE TO COVER IMPORTATION OF SHOES FROM U.S.

Radiogram reads:

***67 67 NO 29 JUNE 1945**
HLT WEYEMER'S SHOE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
MILWAUKEE 1 WISCONSIN

CAN YOU SHIP IMMEDIATELY ZEPHYR MEN SHOES OTHER ASSORTED LATE MODELS SIZES FIVE TO SEVEN AND HALF TOTAL FIVEHUNDRED PAIRS X INFORM COST CIF INCLUDING WAR RISK X I WILL GET US TREASURY DEPARTMENT LICENSE HERE X IF AVAILABLE WILL WIRE YOU IMMEDIATELY MONEY COVERING SHIPMENT X PLEASE ANSWER BY WIRE C/O PRESS WIRELESS

JOSE E IMANEZ

Examiner: _____
DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION
SPECIFIC
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/ENI93

Form No. CCD - 1

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

CS #PH/ 2A/MAN - 2060

2 July 1945
(Date)

FROM:

OVERTON & HALL
3RD FLOOR, INSULAR LIFE BLDG.
MANILA

TO:

WILLISTON & CO
115 BROADWAY, NEW YORK
N. Y.

DISTRIBUTION

GHQ

G-1

G-2

G-4

CI Sec

Ch Engr

Ch Sig O

PRO

CRO

COIC

PWB

AGD

CIC

Ch Chap

Ch Surg

G Pur Agt

I & E

JAGD

Claims S

Postal O

PLG

Sp Serv

Fis Dir

Board

PA Sec

Ph R & I

A-2 REAF

AFESMPC

G-2

LPC

ASF

Date of Communication:

23 June 1945

Comment by:

WM. H. RYAN

Type of Communication:

Radiogram

Number of Enclosures:

None

Language:

ENGLISH

Disposition of Original Communication:

Passed.....Excised.....

Condemned.....Detained.....

Returned.....Submitted to.....

Number of Previous Records:

None

COMMENT

FINANCIAL: TRANSFER OF STOCKS ORDERED BY MANILA FIRM

Radiogram reads:

"24 NO 215 JUNE 26 1945 MANILA

28 WILLISTON & CO

115 BROADWAY NEWYORK

NIC

MARK HAS NO DEBIT BALANCE THEREFORE DELIVER HIM 100 BACH

COINTEGRATE BURLINGTON BUREAUXS RADIO

OVERTON & HALL"

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION

SEFIC

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8W193

Form No. CCD - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment

CS #PH/ 2A/MAN - 2060

2 July 1945
(Date)

FROM:

REGINALD WAIT
CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA
AUSTRALIA AND CHINA
MANILA

TO:

ROBERT ROBERTS
CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA
AUSTRALIA AND CHINA
NEW YORK

DISTRIBUTION

GHQ

G-1

G-2

G-4

CI Sec

Ch Engr

Ch Sig O

PRO

CRO

COIC

PWB

AGD

CIC

Ch Chap

Ch Surg

G Pur Agt

I & E

JAGD

Claims S

Postal O

PLG

Sp Serv

Fis Dir

Board

PA Sec

Ph R & I

A-2 REAF

AFESMPC

G-2

LPC

ASF

Date of Communication:

23 June 1945

Comment by:

WM. H. RYAN

Type of Communication:

Radiogram

Number of Previous Records:

REF-R TO FILES OF ABOVE CORRESPONDENTS

COMMENT

LIVING CONDITIONS: FOOD AND NECESSITIES IN PHILIPPINES SEVENTEEN
TIMES PREWAR FIGURES

Radiogram reads:

"183 MANILA JUNE 23, 1945

NLT ROBERT ROBERTS

CHARTERED BANK NEWYORK

ADVISE LONDON PRESENT PRICE FOOD AND NECESSITIES AVERAGE SEVENTEEN
TIMES PREWAR PRICE STOP HOPE SHIPMENTS LATER IN YEAR WILL AMELIORATE
SITUATION STOP CITY BANK NEW YORK HAVE APPROVED FOLLOWING SCALE
TEMPORARY ALLOWANCES LOCAL STAFF SALARIES BELOW PESOS SEVENTY FIVE
MONTHLY PESOS 60 ALLOWANCE STOP SALARIES PESOS 80/115 ALLOWANCE 80
PERCENT STOP SALARIES PESOS 120/200 ALLOWANCE 60 PERCENT STOP SALARIES
PESOS 205/300 ALLOWANCE 35 PERCENT STOP MINIMUM LIVING WAGE SINGLE
PERSON CONSIDERED PESOS ONE HUNDRED STOP HONGKONG CHARTERED AFTER
FULL ENQUIRY CONSIDER FOLLOWING SCALE OF MORE GENERAL APPLICATION ON
FIRST HUNDRED PESOS OR UNDER ALLOWANCE EIGHTY PER CENT WITH MINIMUM
OF PESOS FIFTY STOP ON SECOND HUNDRED PESOS OR LESS ALLOWANCE FORTY
PER CENT STOP THUS SALARY OF PESOS 200 WOULD COMMAND ALLOWANCE OF
PESOS ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY WHICH MAXIMUM ALLOWANCE STOP LOWER
SALARIES PRO BATA STOP ALLOWANCE SUBJECT TO CESSATION WITHOUT NOTICE
STOP TOTAL LOCAL STAFF SALARIES CHARTERED WILL BE ABOUT PESOS TWO
SEVEN HUNDRED MONTHLY PROPOSED ALLOWANCE WHICH WE CONSIDER ESSENTIAL
MINIMUM WOULD COST ADDITIONAL PESOS EIGHTEEN HUNDRED MONTHLY
TELEGRAPH APPROVAL

Examiner:

DISTRICT STATION DISTRIBUTION

SEFIC

REGINALD WAIT"

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/8W193

Form No. CCD - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. TAC-12

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

30 Oct 1944

(Date)

(Location)

From: **ALBERTO STA. CRUZ**
TACLOBAN LEYTE

To: **MR. FRANCISCO RIVERA**
MUNICIPAL MAYOR
MADRIDEJOS CEBU

Date of Communication:
6 Sept 44

Number of Enclosures:
None

Comment by:

Type of Communication:

Disposition of Original Communication:

Passed..... Deleted.....
Condemned **.X.** Photographed.....
Returned..... Submitted to **0-5**

Number of Previous Records:

COMMENT

FOOD: FOOD SUPPLY IN LEYTE

"Dear Kikoy and Nieves:

We have received the basket of salted fish which you have sent in care of Capt. Matsui, Finance Officer of Nipponese forces here for which we wish to thank you so much. We lack fish now in Leyte. Sometimes a little supply comes from Samar but not very much. In matters of fish supply Madridejos is becoming well known in these parts. If there were only a regular connection between Tacloban and Madridejos the fish there has a very wide and ready market. I hope conditions there are not very hard in questions of foodstuffs. With us here due to unsettled conditions on account of unlawful disturbances in some parts, specially in some of the interior towns, the production of rice and corn is decreased. The people however manage with the help of edible roots like camote, camoting cahoy, gabi, etc. Rice and corn cost much these days. Even the secondary crops used for food like camote and others cost much more than formerly. How is it in Pantayan? Rice and corn there perhaps cost also very high now."

EXMR NOTE: Above ex tract from pre-liberated mail, Tacloban Civil Post Office.



Copy to	T.C.	G-2 6th A.	CHQ 0-2	CHQ 0-10	CHQ 0-4	FFE-0-1
Date	30-10-44	30-10-44	25-11-44	25-11-44	25-11-44	25-11-44
	FFE-0-2	FFE-0-4	FFE-AG	FFE-CH Surg	FFE-GPA	FFE-Fiscal



CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 92

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

1 Nov 44
(Date)

TACLOBAN LETTER
(Location)

From: REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES COMMISSION OF THE VISAYAS CEBU CITY	To: GENERAL KAWAZOE TACLOBAN LETTER
Date of Communication: 22 June 1944	Number of Enclosures: None
Comment by: None	Disposition of Original Communication: Passed.... Deleted..... Condemned ..X Photographed. Returned..... Submitted to C.S.
Type of Communication: Letter	
Number of Previous Records: COMMENT	

POOR FOOD SITUATION IN THE VISAYAS

Republic of the Philippines, Commissioner of the Visayas,
Cebu City, June 22, 1944. Dear Gen. Kawazoe:

Assemblyman Harbat just arrived in Cebu. Met him on the wharf. Took him immediately to Rito Umata. And an hour later, left for Manila on a big boat.

1. Briefly, he told me about your message: There was an impression, according to him that I had issued an order that a certain amount of rice & corn be brought to Cebu. We never made such an order. It does not exist. All my orders in writing, numbered consecutively. However, we expressed to Gov. Salazar during Convention, privately and in open meeting, to help Cebu in getting rice & corn, for Leyte can furnish us said cereals. I am from Leyte. I have been thru some parts of Leyte. I know it has plenty, what we don't have.

2. The same appeal I make to you now to help Cebu; and thru Cebu also Bohol and Neg. Or. Right at this minute, price of seven of corn here is 7600; of rice 7900. And there is very little to get. The Govt. had to step in, buy all it can & distribute it to civilians and employees who are quitting the govt. Any time food riots may occur. People becoming desperate, jittery, hysterical. Many have left, some have gone to mountains, where they can eat at least tubers, bananas and other fruits. So, please, help us with 2000 seven 1000 rice & 1000 corn, at any reasonable price to tide us over till next harvest. If you need sugar with which to barter said amount, I shall send you

Copy to	T.C.	G-2 6th A.	ONE C-2	ONE C-3	ONE C-5	ONE C-10
Date	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44
	PPH C-1	PPH C-2	PPH C-3	PPH C-4	PPH C-5	PPH C-10

some. The 2000 you may send, will be distributed equitably among the civilians, employees, Japanese firms, etc. That little we have, we shall share together, in accordance with our agreement here at the conference in Office of Gen. Liaison Officer.

3. Sometime ago, we sent sailboats to get rice & corn. They came back empty-handed, because according to them, sometimes PC, sometimes Japanese soldiers, prevented them from bringing with them any. That is why I wired the Governor what officials or officers are complying or not with Presidential Proclamation providing for free flow of food-stuff.

4. I inquired from Governor Salazar about Leyte Foodstuff Association. Also Malacanan inquired from me regarding same Association. Of course, we realize that every province is trying to conserve as much food as possible, as a matter of self-protection, each fearing hunger to strike inhabitants during those days when prices are high; conditions of peace and order, bad. But in my capacity as Commissioner for Visayas I am watching, looking and pleading for interests of entire region; and not for selfish interests of any particular province.

5. When I was in Leyte, I wanted to meet you personally and discuss matters of importance with you. But sorry, at the time you were away.

May I hope that I shall have the privilege to meet you face to face in near future. For we are facing many common problems which in common we must solve for mutual interests of two peoples, engaged in the same war, striving for same victory.

With kindest regards.

Very truly,

REMARK: Letters from mail impounded at Tacloban Civil Post Office 22 Oct 1944. General KANAZOKI's capacity is nowhere set forth.

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 97

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

1 November 1944
(Date)

TACLOBAN, LEYTE
(Location)

From: OFFICE OF MR. INSPECTOR
P.C. CATALOGAN-SAMAR

To: EXECUTIVE OFFICE
P.C. MANILA

Date of Communication:

Number of Enclosures:

16 August 1944

None

Comment by:

Type of Communication:

Letter

Disposition of Original Communication:

Passed....

Deleted.....

Condemned X

Photographed.....

Returned.....

Submitted to

Number of Previous Records:

COMMENT

6-5
CMQ

LACK OF SOAP ON SAMAR
FAILURE OF ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE CANNOTES (YANG)

"1. a. That due to the lack of ingredients, materials and experienced workmen to undertake the work, no soap has been manufactured locally by this command.

2. a. As to the procurement and preservation of cannotes this command has been able to procure cannotes in big quantities but no success has been achieved in its preservation to last for an indefinite length of time, say around several months. The different processes outlined in the memorandum has been painstakingly followed and yet no appreciable result has been realized. The failure of our experiment is account to the adverse weather condition and the lack of good containers for the preserved cannotes."

REMARK: Letter from mail impounded Tacloban Civilian Post Office, 22 October 1944

Copy to: T.C. G-2 6th A CMQ 0-2 CMQ 0-3 CMQ 0-5 CMQ 0010
Date: 10-11-44 17-11-44 17-11-44 17-11-44 17-11-44 17-11-44
PFR 0-1 PFR 0-2 PFR 0-4 PFR-10 PFR-Ch Supg PFR-SPA PFR-Fiscal

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 59

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

31-10-44
(Date)

TACLOBAN LEYTE
(Location)

From: ELIAS BOLINA BASAN SAMAR	To: MRS MARIA D. ALDANA SOGOD LEYTE
Date of Communication: May 16, 1944 BLAZAR	Number of Enclosures: None
Comment by:	Disposition of Original Communication:
Type of Communication: Letter	Passed.... Deleted..... Condemned ...X Photographed..... Returned..... Submitted to G-5
Number of Previous Records:	COMMENT

FOOD AND CLOTHING CONDITION IN BASAN SAMAR

"We are in Sama now since last November, 1942. We have started planting all sorts of foodstuffs including rice. We have enough food here. There is no danger in Basesy. We are all safe and happy. Start coming home as soon as possible.

If you come take with you the following:

1. All sorts of clothings even the rotten ones. They are the need of the people here.
2. Sugar. It is very dear here. One padak, three pesos.
3. Abaca cloth. One dapa 20 pesos.

Come on parac only, direct to Tacloban or Basesy.

EXMR NOTE: This information was gathered from mail impounded at Civilian Post Office, Tacloban, Leyte.

Copy to T.C. G-2 6th A. CHQ G-2 CHQ G-4 CHQ G-5 CHQ COIC
Date 31-10-44 19-11-44 19-11-44 19-11-44 19-11-44 19-11-44
FPR G-2 FPR G-4 FPR AG FPR Ch Surg FPR OPA FPR Fiscal
Dir Intell-Wash

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 69

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

31 October 1944
(Date)

TACLOBAN LEYTE
(Location)

From: VICTORIANO R. BERDAN EXECUTIVE OFFICER PROVINCIAL FOOD PRODUCTION OFFICERY/TACLOBAN LEYTE	To: DIRECTOR BUREAU PLANT INDUSTRY MANILA P.I.
Date of Communication: 6 September, 1944 BLAZAR	Number of Enclosures: One - Monthly Report
Comment by:	Disposition of Original Communication:
Type of Communication: Official letter and report	Passed.... Deleted..... Condemned X.. Photographed..... Returned..... Submitted to G-5
Number of Previous Records:	COMMENT

MONTHLY REPORT FOOD CROPS

"In compliance with your memorandum No. 6, series 1944, I have the honor to submit herewith our monthly report of important, different food crops as covered by our Food Production Campaign corresponding the month of August, 1944, for your information."

(SOD) VICTORIANO R. BERDAN
Executive Officer

EXMR NOTE: Crops included are Low Palay, Up Palay, Camote, Casava Cabi

Information obtained from mail impounded at Civilian Post Office, TAGLOBAN, LEYTE

Copy to T.C. G-2 6th A. CHQ G-2 CHQ G-4 CHQ G-5 CHQ COIC
Date 31-10-44 19-11-44 19-11-44 19-11-44 19-11-44 19-11-44
FPR G-2 FPR G-4 FPR AG FPR Ch Surg FPR OPA FPR Fiscal
Dir Intell-Wash

FISCAL
FFE

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 6

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

30 Oct 44
(Date)

TACLOBAN LEYTE
(Location)

From: OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
TACLOBAN LEYTE

To: MUNICIPAL MAYOR
MARIPIPI LEYTE

Date of Communication:
May 1944

Number of Enclosures:
Five (5) Miscellaneous Reports

Comment by: REESE

Type of Communication:

Official

Disposition of Original Communication:

Passed.... Deleted.....
Condemned .X. Photographed.....
Returned..... Submitted to G-5
GHQ

Number of Previous Records:

COMMENT

PRICE FIXING ON LEYTE UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

"Republic of the Philippines, Province of Leyte, Tacloban, Office
of the Governor

PROVINCIAL ORDINANCE NO. 22 RE FIXING OF PRICES OF VEGETABLES IN
THE DIFFERENT MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PROVINCE OF LEYTE

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law and in order to
stabilize the prices of some commodities, after consulting with
the Provincial Board, it is hereby ordered:

"Section I. The maximum selling prices of vegetables in the
market and sari-sari stores in Tacloban and other municipalities
are hereby fixed as follows:

Name of Vegetables or Fruit	Price in Tacloban		Price in MARIPIPI Municipalities	
1. Camote	P0.40	per kilo	P0.30	per kilo
2. Gabi	0.40	" "	0.30	" "
3. Squash	0.40	" "	0.30	" "
4. Upo	0.75	" "	0.60	" "
5. Sebolleno	1.00	" "	0.80	" "
6. Cancong	0.13	" "	0.10	" "
7. Camote Leaves	0.13	" "	0.10	" "
8. Pepino	1.00	" "	0.80	" "
9. Mustard	0.80	" "	0.70	" "
10. Radish	0.30	" "	0.25	" "
11. Talinum	0.20	" "	0.15	" "

Copy to T.C. G-2 6th A. FISCAL
Date

12. Beans	0.70 per kilo	0.60 per kilo
13. Ginger	0.90 " "	0.70 " "
14. Papaya	0.50 " "	0.30 " "
15. Tomatoes	1.40 " "	1.20 " "
16. Bananas		
a. Costa	0.70 " "	0.50 " "
b. Lacatan	1.00 " "	0.80 " "
17. Melon	1.00 " "	0.80 " "
18. Onion	1.00 " "	0.80 " "
19. Pineapple	0.50 " "	0.40 " "
20. Patola	0.40 " "	0.30 " "
21. Limonsito	1.00 " "	0.70 " "

Section I and III of Ord. 23)

Section I - The maximum buying and selling prices of livestock, meat, chickens and eggs in Tacloban and other municipalities of Leyte are hereby fixed as follows:

1. Livestock - Maximum Buying Price In Tacloban Municipalities

Pig (alive) P1.00 per kilo P1.00 per kilo P.080

Meat

A. Beef

1. Tenderloin, steak pure meat, liver & heart P2.50 P.200
2. For other parts 1.50 1.30
3. Head, feet, tail 1.00 0.70
4. Mutton and all other carcass of livestock same as carabao

B. CARABAO

1. Item 1 (see above) 1.05 0.90
2. Item 2 " " 0.85 0.70
3. Item 3 " " 0.75 0.60

C. PORK

1. Item 1 (see above) 2.00 1.50
2. Item 2 " " 1.70 1.20
3. Item 3 " " 1.00 0.80

D. CHICKENS (Per kilo)

Eggs 0.30 each 0.25 each

A deduction of P0.20 shall be made from the buying price or selling price of the livestock or meat as the case may be on sows. Section III. Any person desiring to slaughter livestock for his own consumption must apply to the municipal mayor for a license for which he has to pay the following charges: 1. For one lechon - 0.20 and 2. For any other kinds of livestock - 0.30. (SGD) PASTOR SALAZAR, Provincial Governor."

EXMR NOTE: Above extract from document impounded at Tacloban Civil Post Office, 30 Oct 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 12

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

30 October 1944
(Date)

Tacloban, Leyte
(Location)

From: ALBERTO SANTA CRUZ TACLOBAN, LEYTE	To: MR. FRANCISCO RIVERA MUNICIPAL MAYOR MADRIDEJOS, Cebu
Date of Communication:	Number of Enclosures:
Comment by:	Disposition of Original Communication:
Type of Communication:	Passed.... Deleted.....
None	Condemned ...X Photographed...
Number of Previous Records:	Returned..... Submitted to CHQ

FOOD SUPPLY IN LEYTE

QUOTE

QUOTE

QUOTE

QUOTE

Tacloban, Leyte, Sept. 6, 1944

Dear Kikey and Nieve:

We have received the basket of salted fish which you have sent in care of Capt. Matsui, Finance Officer of Japanese forces here for which we wish to thank you so much. We lack fish now in Leyte. Sometimes a little supply come from Samar but not very much. In matters of fish supply Madridejos is becoming well known in these parts. If there were only a regular connection between Tacloban and Madridejos the fish there has a very wide and ready market.

I hope condition there is not very hard in questions of food stuff with us here due to unsettled conditions on account of unlawful disturbances in some parts specially in some of the interior towns, the production of rice and corn is decreased. The people however manage with the help of edible roots like camote, camoting sahey, gabi etc. Rice and corn cost much these days. Even the secondary crops used for food like camote and others cost much more than formerly. It is it in Bantayan? Rice and corn there perhaps cost also very high now.

Sincerely yours,

(SGD) ALBERTO SANTA CRUZ

Exmr. Note -- Above extract from document impounded at Tacloban, Post

Copy to T.C. G-2 6th A. 30 Oct 50 30 Oct 50 15 Nov 44

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 22

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

30 Oct 44
(Date)

TACLOBAN LEYTE
(Location)

From: HON. VICENTE FIGUEROA CATALOGAN, SAMAR	To: H.R.P. MR. JUAN YLLA C.P. DIRECTOR DEL SEMINARIO CENTRAL DE MANILA UNIVERSIDAD STO TOMAS PO BOX 117 - MANILA
Date of Communication: 15 Aug 44	Number of Enclosures: One letter
Comment by:	Disposition of Original Communication:
Type of Communication: Letter	Passed.... Deleted..... Condemned .X Photographed..... Returned..... Submitted to G-5
Number of Previous Records:	COMMENT CHQ

SUPPLY ON SAMAR

"We have received nothing from you for six months."

EXER NOTE: Evidently refers to food and supplies. This
extract from document impounded at Tacloban Civil Post Office
30 Oct 44.

Copy to	T.C.	G-2 6th A.	CHQ G-2	CHQ G-3	CHQ G-5	CHQ G-10
Date	30-10-44	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44	17-11-44
	FFE G-1	FFE G-2	FFE G-3	FFE G-4	FFE G-5	FFE G-10

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 15

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

30 Oct 44
(Date)

Tacloban, Leyte
(Location)

From: OFFICE OF THE SR INSPECTOR CATALOGAN, SAMAR	To: THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY MANILA
Date of Communication: MONTHLY NARRATIVE REPORT FOR AUG 44	Number of Enclosures: EIGHT (8) MISC REPORTS
Comment by: HEESE	Disposition of Original Communication:
Type of Communication: MONTHLY NARRATIVE REPORT	Passed.... Deleted..... Condemned X Photographed..... Returned..... Submitted to CIC
Number of Previous Records: NONE	COMMENT

- (1) NOT EXTRACTED ON THIS COPY.
- (2) FOOD PRODUCTION, SAMAR

FOOD PRODUCTION

Kind of:	Area Cult.	Estimated	Actual Pro-	Remarks (Included under this
		Production	duction	decline and reasons therefor or
		(Hectares)		Progress)
RICE	8,500	170,000 Sacks	160,000 S.	Decline in Production
CORN	2,000	30,000 Sacks	25,000 S.	is due to typhoons
CANUTE	7,000	70,000,000 Kilos	70,000,000 K.	insufficient rain water
CASAVA	800	9,600,000 Kilos	9,000,000 K.	seedlings and infestation by insects

NOTE:- Estimated areas planted to different food crops are up to the month of July, 44.

(SGD.) J.A. HERNANDEZ
Lt. Col., PG
Sr. Inspector

X X X

EXER NOTE:- Above extract from document impounded at Tacloban Civil Post Office, 30
Oct. 44

Copy to	T.C.	G-2 6th A.	CIC	FFE G-4, PIS Dir. GFA	CHQ G-5
Date	30 Oct	30 Oct 44	30 Oct 44	24-11-44	24-11-44

CONFIDENTIAL
UNITED STATES MILITARY CENSORSHIP
COMMENT SHEET

C.S. No. 5

FIRST CENSORSHIP AREA DETACHMENT
Headquarters Sixth Army
APO 442

23 October 1944
(Date)

TACLOBAN LEYTE
(Location)

From: BIGABANG BAYAN (BIBA) LEYTE AGENCY TACLOBAN LEYTE	To: THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR TARRAGONAY LEYTE
Date of Communication: 22 AUG 1944	Number of Enclosures: One (1)
Comment by: Type of Communication: Letter	Disposition of Original Communication: Passed.... Deleted..... Condemned ..X Photographed... Returned..... Submitted to G-3 GNQ
Number of Previous Records:	

PRICE LIST OF COMMODITIES

"We are enclosing herewith our latest price of commodities for your information.

"This will take effect immediately in lieu of the previous list.

"Your utmost cooperation and kind help for buying piny, corn and other foodstuffs for the BIBA will save many of our poor countrymen from starvation. So, I appeal to you for their sake, for their hope and salvation and the Province of Leyte as a whole lies in your helping hands.

"Thanking you for your utmost cooperation and oblige."

Yours for cooperation

BIGABANG BAYAN

By (Sgd) M. A. REDONA
Manager

Copy to	T.C.	G-2 6th A	CHQ G-4	CHQ G-5	FFE-GPA	FFE-1
Date	28-10-44	28-10-44	22-11-44	22-11-44	22-11-44	22-11-44

FFE G-4

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1603

Folder : 2

Folder Title : 98-USF1-3.21: Hq/USAFFE - U.S. Army Units
Stationed in the Philippines on 7 Dec 1941
(Dec 1941)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



Box 1603

2

Form Organ 4 Rev *100*
100

LIST OF UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS STATIONED
IN THE PHILIPPINES ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

Hq & Hq Sq, Far East Air Force
2d Observation Squadron
Tow Target Detachment
Hq & Hq Sq, Far East Air Service Command
Hq & Hq Sq, 20th Air Base Group
19th Air Base Squadron
27th Materiel Squadron
28th Materiel Squadron
Air Corps Detachment, Weather
Hq & Hq Sq, 5th Air Base Group
7th Materiel Squadron
48th Materiel Squadron
Hq & Hq Sq, 5th Bomber Command
Hq & Hq Sq, 19th Bomb Group (H)
14th Bomb Squadron (H)
30th Bomb Squadron (H)
28th Bomb Squadron (H)
93rd Bomb Squadron (H)
Hq & Hq Sq, 27th Bomb Group (L)
16th Bomb Squadron (L)
17th Bomb Squadron (L)
91st Bomb Squadron (L)
Hq & Hq Sq, 24th Pursuit Group (I)
3d Pursuit Squadron (I)
17th Pursuit Squadron (I)
20th Pursuit Squadron (I)
21st Pursuit Squadron (I)
34th Pursuit Squadron (I)
Philippine Air Depot
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications -
5th Airways Squadron
5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather

5th Chemical Service Company
1st Platoon, 2d Chemical Company, Service (Avn)
Decontamination Det, 2d Chemical Company, Service (Avn)
Supply Section, 2d Chemical Company, Service (Avn)
Decontamination Det, 3d Chemical Company, Service (Avn)
DP Section, 3d Chemical Company, Service (Avn)
Detachment, 1st Platoon, 3d Chemical Company, Service (Avn)
Decontamination Det, 4th Chemical Company, Service, (Avn)
745th Ordnance Company (Avn) (AB)
698th Ordnance Company (Avn) (Comp)
724th Ordnance Company (Avn) (AB)
701st Ordnance Company (Avn) (AB)
440th Ordnance Company (Avn) (Bomb)
454th Ordnance Company (Avn) (Bomb)

AG-USFI-3.2.1

U.S. Army Units Stationed in Philippines
7 Dec 1941

149. USAFFE
Dec 1941

680th Ordnance Company (Avn) (Pur)
2d & 3d Platoons, 693d Ordnance Company (Avn) (Pur)
Detachment, 2d Quartermaster Company, Supply (Avn)
19th Quartermaster Company (Truck)
30th Quartermaster Company (Light Maint)
Company C, 33d Quartermaster Regiment (Truck)
2d Platoon, Company C, 89th Quartermaster Battalion (Light Maint)
Det, 2d Platoon, Company A, 91st Quartermaster Battalion (Light Maint)
803d Engineer Battalion (Avn)
17th Signal Platoon (AB)
409th Signal Company (Avn)
429th Signal Company (Maint) (Avn) (Sep)
75th Ordnance Company (Depot)
34th Separate Quartermaster Company (LM) (PS)
74th Separate Quartermaster Company (Bkry) (PS)
Chemical Company (Depot) (PS)
228th Signal Operations Company
252d Signal Construction Company (PS)

Hq, United States Army Forces in Far East
Headquarters, Philippine Department
Hq Co, Philippine Department
808th Military Police Company

Philippine Division (PS)
Division Headquarters
Headquarters, Special Troops (PS)
Headquarters Company (PS)
12th Military Police Company (PS)
12th Ordnance Company (PS)
12th Signal Company (PS)
43d Infantry (PS)
45th Infantry (PS)-
57th Infantry (PS)
24th Field Artillery (PS)
23d Field Artillery (PS)
14th Engineers (PS)
12th Medical Regiment (PS)
12th Quartermaster Regiment (PS)

-31st Infantry
1st & 2d Battalions, 88th Field Artillery (PS)
86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS)
4th Vet Company (PS)
65th Separate Quartermaster Troop (Pack) (PS)
66th Separate Quartermaster Troop (Pack) (PS)
17th Ordnance Company (Armd)

200th Coast Artillery (AA)
 Headquarters, Provisional Tank Group
 192d Tank Battalion
 194th Tank Battalion (less Co B)
 Hq & Hq Btry, Harbor Defenses of Manila & Subic Bays
 59th Coast Artillery (HD)
 60th Coast Artillery (AA)
 91st Coast Artillery (HD) (PS)
 92d Coast Artillery (155-mm Gun) (PS)
 US Army Mine Planter "Harrison"

Organization & Directory Section,
 Operations Branch, A.G.O.,
 17 May 1944

LIST OF UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS TRANSFERRED FROM
THE PHILIPPINES SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DECEMBER 1941

Hq. United States Army Forces in Far East
 Hq & Hq Sq, Far East Air Force (now Hq & Hq Sq, Fifth Air Force)
 Hq & Hq Sq, Far East Air Service Command (redesignated 5th Air Force Base
 Command and subsequently disbanded)
 Hq & Hq Sq, 5th Bomber Command
 Hq & Hq Sq, 19th Bomb Group (redesignated Hq & Hq Sq, 19th Bomb Group, VH)
 30th Bomb Squadron (H) (redesignated 30th Bomb Squadron, VH)
 28th Bomb Squadron (H) (redesignated 28th Bomb Squadron, VH)
 93d Bomb Squadron (H) (redesignated 93d Bomb Squadron, VH)
 Hq & Hq Sq, 27th Bomb Group (L) (redesignated Hq & Hq Sq, 27th Fighter Bomber Group)
 16th Bomb Squadron (L) (redesignated 522d Fighter Bomber Squadron)
 17th Bomb Squadron (L) (redesignated 523d Fighter Bomber Squadron)
 91st Bomb Squadron (L) (redesignated 524th Fighter Bomber Squadron)

Organization & Directory Section,
 Operations Branch, A.G.O.,
 17 May 1944



100/2

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1603

Folder : 3

Folder Title : 98-USF1-3.7: Hq/USAFFE - Map - Lower
Bataan Peninsula (13 Feb - 6 Apr 1942)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-3.7

Map - Lower Bataan Peninsula

Hq. USAFFE

13 Feb-6 Apr 1942

Box 1603

3

Oversize Document

See the Oversize Documents Film

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG407)
World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948
Pacific Theater

Box No: 1603
Folder No 3
Serial No: 1
Title: "Road and Trail Map, Lower Bataan Peninsula"
Location:
Reduced Scale: 1" = 1 Mile
Original Seize: 41"x30"
Reference:
Date:

National Diet Library, Japan

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1603

Folder : 4

Folder Title : 98-USF1-3.4: Hq/USAFFE - G-3 Message
(Wainwright) (20 Mar - 17 Apr 1942)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-3.4

G-3 Messages (Wainwright)

Hq, USAFFE

20 Mar-17 Apr 1942

D

Box 1603

4

C-3 OPERATIONS

370 2

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS OPERATIONS REPORTS

20 March 1942 to 17 April 1942

SECRET

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5000.10-2, 1964
LWD by *[signature]* 10, 1960

95--USF1-3.4

24-3

Press-Engine

(Main report)

Box 1603
(4)

SECRET

FROM: MINDANAO

TO: CINC SWPA (FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR)

NO NUMBER NINTH TOR 445P 9th TOO

NORTH FRONT IN FULL RETREAT ENEMY COMES THROUGH RIGHT FLANK. NOTHING
FURTHER CAN BE DONE. MAY SIGN OFF ANY TIME NOW.

SHARP

SECRET

Wood

G-2 (W)
G-3 ✓

RVA

1

SL 3774

R.A.A.F. Form A.14
(R.A.F. Form 683)
(Revised October, 1941.)

3790

CYPHER MESSAGE

Serial No. *Whch*

This message must not be referred to in any but cypher messages.

TO RAAF HEADQUARTERS C. IN C. S.W.P.A.	T.O.O. 1031?/Z/8	
	Receipt	Despatch
FROM U.S.A. WEATHER COND C.H.W. SHARP	Time of 2244/Z/8	
	System BY W/T	

DAILY REPORT END MIDNIGHT 7TH MAY (.) ENEMY SITUATION - INTENSE AIR ACTIVITY TANKULAN FRONT, CARMEN FERRY FRONT, BUKIDMOM PROVINCE - HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE 7 PIECE FOR ONE HOUR 15 MINUTES TANKULAN FRONT ORIGINAL OUR ACTIVITY - RECONNAISSANCE AND COMBAT PATROL - PREPARATION POSITION COVER CACAYAN VALLEY APPROACH INTO BUKIDMOM - NO COMMUNICATION GENERAL PORT WHO IS IN HILLS EAST OF LAJE LATAO

G-2 (W)
G-3

SL 3774

R.A.A.F. Form A.14
(R.A.F. Form 683)
(Revised October, 1941.)

3779

CYPHER MESSAGE

Serial No. *Whch*

This message must not be referred to in any but cypher messages.

TO R.A.A.F. H.Q. C. IN C. S.W.P.A. MELBOURNE.	T.O.O. 2200/Z/8	
	Receipt	Despatch
FROM U.S.A. WEATHER.	Time of 2324/Z/8	
	System BY W/T	

(SITUATION?) MINDANAO TO 6 P.M. 8TH MAY - ENEMY ACTIVITY; HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE THROUGHOUT DAY WITH ACTIVITY AIR SUPPORT OVER DALIRIG AREA - ENEMY (SQUADRON LIGHT BOMBER?) IN MORNING DEVELOPED INTO FORCE ATTACK IN AFTERNOON CONTINUING FOR EACH HOUR. CARMEN FERRY FRONT. SLIGHT ACTIVITY AGUSAN SECTOR NO CHANGE.

SHARP.

? Note A.G. Receipt:
Melbourn Recd 9.44 A.M. - May 9

G-2 (W)
G-3
RMS 2

SECRET

C/S

17TH APRIL, 1942

TO: CG USAFFE PRIORITY

FROM: WAINWRIGHT

NR: 234 SIXTEENTH

6-3
RWS

NO COMMUNICATION WITH CEBU SO CONDITION THERE UNKNOWN STOP JAPANESE FROM EIGHT TRANSPORTS HAVE LANDED AT CAPIZ AND ILOILO COMMA PANAY STOP LANDINGS WERE PROTECTED BY LAND PLANES AND NAVAL CRAFT STOP OUR FORCES ARE RESISTING THE LANDINGS STOP THERE IS NO CHANGE ON OTHER ISLANDS OF THE VISAYAS STOP IN MINDANAO OUR TROOPS ATTACKED ON THE DIGOS FRONT INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES ON ENEMY STOP CONSTANT AND ACTIVE PATROLLING IS IN EFFECT ON THE ZAMBOANGA AND MONCAYO FRONTS STOP HOSTILE AIR ACTIVITY AGAINST CORREGIDOR CONSISTED OF FIVE ATTACKS COMMA EACH ATTACK THREE HEAVY BOMBERS STOP ONE BOMBER WAS HIT BY OUR AA AND WAS NOT SEEN TO FALL EVEN THOUGH IT COULD NOT STAY IN FORMATION STOP A NOTICEABLE DECREASE IN ENEMY SHELLING FROM BATAAN FOR THIRTY HOURS AFTER OUR HEAVY BOMBARDMENT OF HIS POSITIONS STOP A STATEMENT MADE TOKIO RADIO WAS THAT ON BATAAN THERE WERE FORTY , THOUSAND AMERICAN AND FILIPINOS CAPTURED STOP IF THIS STATEMENT IS RIGHT COMMA WHICH INCLUDES ABOUT SIX THOUSAND PATIENTS IN HOSPITAL COMMA IT APPEARS THERE ARE ABOUT TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND COMMA MINUS BATTLE CASUALTIES PAREN THESE UNKNOWN PAREN IN THE JUNGLES AND HILLS STOP IN ALL PROBABILITY AMONG THE LATTER ARE INCLUDED MANY DETERMINED TROOPS AND PHILIPPINE SCOUTS STOP IF SO THEY MOST PROBABLY WILL CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE MOUNTAINS AND JUNGLES FOR QUITE A PERIOD OF TIME

WAINWRIGHT

TOR: 1250 A 17TH

TOR: AG R/C USAFFE 9:45 A 17-4-42

523

IMMEDIATE--SECRET

SECRET

TO: GENERAL MCARTHUR MELBOURNE

FROM: FORT MILLS

226 FOURTEENTH (TOR 930P 14TH)

11th
6-3
RWS

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SENT TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY QUOTE CEBU HAS BEEN INVADED BY SUPERIOR ENEMY FORCE AND OUR TROOPS HEAVILY ENGAGED. OUR FORCE IN MINDANAO ON THE DIGOS FRONT AMBUSHED COLUMN OF ENEMY TRUCKS. THE RESULTS WERE NO CASUALTIES FOR OUR TROOPS AND ENEMY SUFFERED HEAVILY. NO CHANGE IN OTHER FRONTS BUT HEAVY FIGHTING IN THIS SECTOR. INTERMITTENT HOSTILE ARTILLERY WAS DIRECTED ON FORTIFIED ISLANDS FROM SOUTH SHORE OF MANILA BAY AND BATAAN. CORREGIDOR WAS BOMBED FOUR TIMES. ONLY SLIGHT DAMAGE AND SOME CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM AIR ATTACKS. ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS ON BOTH SHORES WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY OUR BATTERIES UNQUOTE.

WAINWRIGHT

Noted. 500
47

SECRET

IMMEDIATE--SECRET

531

IMMEDIATE--SECRET

SECRET

TO: CG USAFFE

FROM: FORT MILLS

223 FOURTEENTH (TOR 330A 15TH)

6-3
RW

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT RECEIVED FROM ROYCE: QUOTE OPERATIONS APRIL 13TH-2 B-17'S WITH ENGINES NOT IN GOOD CONDITION LEFT FOR SOUTH BEFORE DAYLIGHT. OUR P-40'S SHOT DOWN 2 SEAPLANES. PILOT BURNES DEAD AND 1 P-40 BURNED IN TAKE OFF CRASH. 11 B-25'S ATTACKED HOSTILE TROOP FORMATIONS, AIR FIELDS, DOCKS AND HOSTILE SHIPS AT DAVAO AT DAYLIGHT. A NUMBER OF BOMBERS DESTROYED ON AIRDROMES, DOCKS WRECKED, SEAPLANE SHOT DOWN IN AIR, HOSTILE TROOP FORMATIONS BELIEVED TO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. B-25'S ATTACKED CEBU AGAIN AT DUSK AND BOMBED DOCKS WITH RESULTS SIMILAR TO THOSE AT DAVAO. NEAR MISSES ON LARGE TRANSPORT. PERSONNEL AT SANTA BARBARA EVACUATED WITH ONE B-25. BECAUSE OF MOTOR TROUBLE 1 FAILED TO GET OFF. BOMB BAY TANKS NOW BEING INSTALLED ON ALL HERE AND WILL DEPART FOR SOUTH TONIGHT. SIGNED ROYCE UNQUOTE.

WAINWRIGHT

SECRET

IMMEDIATE--SECRET

CG USAFFE PRIORITY
221 THIRTEENTH TOR 215A 14TH

Wainwright 3
RW

Reurad AG 224 requesting Royce be instructed to send operations report, following is paraphrase of report received from Sharp: "Baker-25s made two attacks on Cebu transports. Baker-17s one attack on Nichols Field approximately 1000 damage unknown. 0900 transport Legaspi sunk. Reconnaissance made by pursuit to Nichols Field and Palawan. No hostile naval ships seen. Part of pursuit attacked aircraft at Davao. Some hostile planes destroyed on Davao Air Field but number unknown. One Baker-17 destroyed on ground by enemy dive bombers. One pursuit ship lost in landing accident. Request that none of this information be released to the press for three days in order to allow time for bombers to clear for Australia. Signed Sharp." Your message requesting Royce to submit operations report was transmitted through Sharp.

WAINWRIGHT.

3

CG USAFFE
220 THIRTEENTH TOR 1030P 13th

My headquarters has not been in communication with Cebu since last report so conditions there are not known. Dispositions in Mindanao unchanged. Tamyong and Serib were raided by aggressive combat patrols on Digos front. Eight buildings which held food supplies were burned. Fortified Islands were attacked by heavy bombers ten times but at a height that only allowed area bombing. Continuous enemy artillery fire directed against forts and ships in Bay. Our batteries fired on enemy artillery, tank and truck columns starting fires, and hit two ammunition dumps. Minor damages to our installations and some casualties.

WAINWRIGHT.

SECRET

FORT MILLS

CG USAFFE URGENT

217 THIRTEENTH TOR 330P 13TH

ROYCE ADVISES THAT TWO B-SEVENTEENS DAMAGED IN YESTERDAYS RAIDS WERE PARTLY REPAIRED LAST NIGHT AND DISPATCHED SOUTH AT ZERO FIVE FIVE FIVE AND ZERO FIVE THIRTY. HE REQUESTED THAT YOU BE INFORMED OF THEIR DEPARTURE AT ONCE.

WAINWRIGHT

SECRET

XX

XX

11 April, 1942.

G-3 SJC/cjh

TO: SHARP MINDANAO FOR ROYCE
FOLLOWING RADIO RECEIVED FROM WAINWRIGHT REPEATED FOR YOUR
INFORMATION. QUOTE HOSTILE FORCES HAVE LANDED ON THE ISLAND
OF CEBU. ABOUT TEN TRANSPORTS AND FIVE WARSHIPS ARE IN THE
VICINITY OF CEBU WHILE OFF THE NORTHERN END OF PANAY TEN
HOSTILE WARSHIPS ARE MOVING EAST UNQUOTE. (CITE G-3)

BRETT

OFFICIAL:

(Handwritten signature)

4

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942.

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER'S INFORMATION:

Briefs of events leading up to and including the message of
surrender of Corregidor:

12:30 A.M. The following received in the clear: Broadcast just made to Manila
to arrange meeting for surrender. Talk made by General Beebe. The
white flag is up.

No signature (directed to SGS)

War Department requested verification. Apparently message never
reached Corregidor.

All cryptographic systems and devices destroyed.


Message to Wainwright (paraphrase): The nation will be grateful
forever. Never has so much been done with so little.

Marshall

3:00 A.M. Hawaii no longer in contact with Fort Mills. Messages attempted
to be sent apparently not received.

3:40 A.M. From MacArthur, advising that Wainwright advised him of the
surrender.

(Handwritten signature)



SECRET

6.3 file

~~SECRET~~

CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

FROM FORT MILLS

209 ELEVENTH TOR 200 A 12TH

HOSTILE LANDINGS IN SPITE OF STRONG RESISTANCE WERE MADE BY ENEMY ON CEBU AT TOLEDO, PINAMUNGAJAN ARGAO AND AT CEBU CITY AS WELL AS TALISAY. DIVE BOMBERS AND NAVAL CRAFT SUPPORTED THESE LANDINGS. CONSIDERABLE LOSS WAS SUFFERED BY THE ENEMY. HE HAS NOT AS YET PENETRATED AT ANY POINT TO GREATER DISTANCE THAN A FEW KILOMETERS. CHYNOWETH ESTIMATES ENEMY STRENGTH AT TWELVE THOUSAND. HE HAS SOME TANKS AND PLANES STOP THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR SITUATION ON MINDANAO. ENEMYS POSITION ON DIGOS FRONT ARE BEING CONTINUALLY STRENGTHENED. ON ALL FRONTS ACTIVE PATROLLING CONTINUES. SINCE FALL OF BATAAN, AERIAL EFFORTS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE FROM BOTH SIDES NORTH AND SOUTH SHORES OF MANILA BAY ON CORREGIDOR HAVE BEEN INTENSIFIED. OUR ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY HIT SOME PLANES BUT NONE WERE SEEN TO FALL. OUR HEAVY BATTERIES HAVE BEEN FIRING COUNTER BATTERY ON TARGETS ON BATAAN AND CAVITE.

WAINWRIGHT

~~SECRET~~

COPY

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by SA date 4-2-85

Noted: m.
HD.
CWA.
JHR.
SJC

COPY

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

11th. APRIL, 1942

TO: CG USAFEE


FROM: WAINWRIGHT

NR: 206 TENTH

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY COLON QUOTE OUR VESSELS AND FORTIFIED ISLANDS ARE RECEIVING ARTILLERY FIRE FROM BOTH SHORES WHICH ARE NOW HELD BY HOSTILE FORCES STOP CORREGIDOR HAS BEEN UNDER AIR RAID ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS STOP HOSTILE FORCES HAVE LANDED ON THE ISLAND OF CEBU STOP ABOUT TEN TRANSPORTS AND FIVE WARSHIPS ARE IN THE VICINITY OF CEBU WHILE OFF THE NORTHERN END OF PANAY TEN HOSTILE WARSHIPS ARE MOVING EAST STOP TWO TORPEDO BOATS ATTACKED ENEMY SHIPS AND REPORTED SINKING OF ONE HOSTILE CRUISER STOP OUR GROUND FORCES IN CONTACT AND FIGHTING MINDANAO DASH NO CHANGE STOP PATROLLING ON ALL FRONTS BEING CONTINUED UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

TOR: 145P 11TH



DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by SA date 11-2-81

~~IMMEDIATE--SECRET~~

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

~~SECRET~~

205 TENTH (TOR 1030 TENTH) FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF
MESSAGE JUST RECEIVED FROM CHYNOWETH QUOTE EIGHT OR TEN TROOP
SHIPS AND ABOUT FIVE WAR VESSELS ARE OFF CEBU. HOSTILE TROOPS
ARE LANDING AT CITY OF CEBU AND AT TOLEDO. LANDINGS ARE
SUPPORTED BY AIR. OUR TROOPS ARE IN COMBAT WITH ENEMY UNQUOTE
I RECOMMEND IF PRACTICABLE THAT BOMBERS BE SENT TO ATTACK AT
ONCE.

WAINWRIGHT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by 8 date 11-2-65

~~IMMEDIATE--SECRET~~

3

COPY

~~IMMEDIATE--SECRET~~

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

205 TENTH (TOR 1030 TENTH) FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE
JUST RECEIVED FROM CHYNOWETH QUOTE EIGHT OR TEN TROOP SHIPS AND ABOUT
FIVE WAR VESSELS ARE OFF CEBU. HOSTILE TROOPS ARE LANDING AT CITY
OF CEBU AND AT TOLEDO. LANDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY AIR. OUR TROOPS
ARE IN COMBAT WITH ENEMY UNQUOTE I RECOMMEND IF PRACTICABLE THAT
BOMBERS BE SENT TO ATTACK AT ONCE.

WAINWRIGHT

(Handwritten signature)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by 8 date 11-2-65

321
~~NOT IMMEDIATE SECRET~~

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

~~SECRET~~

199 EIGHTH (TOR 115A NINTH) FOR GENERAL MACARTHUR. IT IS WITH DEEP REGRET THAT I AM FORCED TO REPORT THAT THE TROOPS ON BATAAN ARE FAST FOLDING UP. THE TWENTY FIRST, THIRTY FIRST AND FORTY FIRST DIVISIONS PHILIPPINE ARMY HAVE DISINTEGRATED. THE SECOND CORPS HAS BEEN FORCED SOUTH OF LEMAY. THE FIRST CORPS, TO PROTECT ITS RIGHT HAS WITHDRAWN TO THE LINE OF THE BINUANGAN RIVER. THE TROOPS ARE SO WEAK FROM MALNUTRITION THAT THEY HAVE NO POWER OF RESISTANCE.

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by *AK* date *11-2-65*

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT IMMEDIATE SECRET~~

5

March
6-2 (u)
6-3
RMS
AK
up
Wainwright

324
IMMEDIATE ~~SECRET~~

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

198 EIGHTH (TOR 115A NINTH) FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS:
QUOTE OUR FORCES IN BATAAN WITHDREW LAST NIGHT TO POSITION IN REAR PREVIOUSLY PREPARED TO CORRECT ALIGNMENT. FRESH HOSTILE TROOPS TODAY CONTINUE TO ATTACK VIGOROUSLY. PIERCE FIGHTING IS IN PROGRESS AND HEAVY LOSSES HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY ENEMY FORCES. ENEMY PLANES WHICH ARE NOW BASED ON THIS ISLAND CONSTANTLY ATTACK OUR TROOPS WITH BOMBS AND MACHINE GUN FIRE THEREBY ASSISTING IN ADVANCE OF THEIR FORCES. HOSTILE HEAVY BOMBERS CONTINUOUSLY BOMB REAR AREA IN BATAAN. OUR FORCES IN MINDANAO CONTINUE OFFENSIVE ACTION AND LAST NIGHT STAGED SUDDEN RAID AGAINST SMALL ENEMY FORCE IN ONE AREA CAUSING ENEMY TO WITHDRAW IN CONFUSION. IN VISAYAS NOTHING TO REPORT. AGAIN TODAY NO BOMBING ATTACK ON CORREGIDOR. OUR ARTILLERY FROM HARBOR DEFENSES BROKE UP HOSTILE FORCE ON THE SOUTH SHORE OF MANILA BAY UNQUOTE.

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by *AK* date *11-2-65*

IMMEDIATE ~~SECRET~~

March
6-2 (u)
6-3
RMS
AK
up
Wainwright
✓
115

IMMEDIATE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

197 EIGHTH (TOR 1115A NINTH) FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A RADIO SENT TO GENERAL MARSHALL TODAY: QUOTE FOR SEVERAL DAYS AN ENEMY ATTACK HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS IN BATAAN AND OUR SITUATION THERE HAS BECOME EXTREMELY CRITICAL. INITIALLY, THE CURRENT ATTACK FOLLOWED THE PATTERN ESTABLISHED IN OTHERS WHICH HAD BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST THE FIRST CORPS FRON. AS IN THE OTHER ATTACKS A WEDGE WAS DRIVEN INTO OUR DEFENSIVE POSITION AND HOSTILE FORCES MADE AN EFFORT TO FILTER THROUGH. IN PREVIOUS CASES WE SUCCEEDED IN STOPPING HOSTILE ADVANCES, THEREAFTER CLOSED THE GAP IN THE MFR, AND MOPPED UP ENEMY FORCES FOUND WITHIN THE POCKET. IN THE ATTACK NOW IN PROGRESS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT OUR TROOPS HAVE BEEN SUBSISTED SO LONG ON ONE RATION TO ONE THIRD RATION THAT THEY NO LONGER HAVE THE STAMINA TO TAKE THE STRAIN IMPOSED UPON THEM IN THE ATTACK. DURING THIS HOSTILE EFFORT, AS IN PRECEDING ONES, WE SUCCEEDED IN STOPPING ENEMY ADVANCE. THEREAFTER WE PLACED OUR BEST REGIMENTS IN POSITION TO COUNTERATTACK ON HOSTILE FLANKS TO CLOSE THE GAP IN THE MFR. THESE REGIMENTS WERE CAPABLE OF ONLY A SHORT ADVANCE BEFORE THEY WERE COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED. HOSTILE STRENGTH IN THE POCKET WAS THEREAFTER INCREASED, THE ENEMY ATTACK CONTINUED, AND WAS ASSISTED BY AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF ARTILLERY. IN ADDITION, HOSTILE AIR FORCE REPEATEDLY BOMBED AND STRAFED OUR FRONT LINE TROOPS TO ASSIST HOSTILE ADVANCE. OUR FORCE BECAME WEAKER FROM CONTINUED EXERTIONS AS TIME PASSED. FORCE COMMANDER IN BATAAN ORDERED WITHDRAWAL OF PART OF OUR TROOPS LAST NIGHT IN ORDER TO RECTIFY THE LINE. SIMILARLY TROOPS IN FIRST CORPS WERE ORDERED TO WITHDRAW TO PROTECT THEIR FLANK. NEW POSITION IS NOW OCCUPIED BUT MORALE OF THE FORCES ON BATAAN HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED BECAUSE OF RECENT EXPERIENCES."

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
wainwright by *[signature]* date *[signature]*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

814 APRIL, 1942.

TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE
FROM: FT MILIS
NR: 192 SEVENTH

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS COLON QUOTE IN BATAAN FRONT NEAR RIGHT CENTER FIERCE FIGHTING HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS TODAY STOP FRESH RESERVES HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED PERMITTING ENEMY TO MASS SUPERIOR FORCES AND HE THEN ATTACKED VIGOROUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE AND TANKS STOP ENEMY BOMBERS AND DIVE BOMBERS HAVE ASSISTED IN THE ATTACK BY REPEATEDLY DROPPING BOMBS AND STRAFING FRONT LINE TROOPS STOP SUPERIOR FORCES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN DRIVING A WEDGE INTO BATAAN POSITION BUT GROUND IS BEING GAINED SLOWLY STOP AGAIN AT 5 PYWA OCLOCK TODAY BASE HOSPITAL NUMBER ONE ON BATAAN WAS BOMBED BY THREE SUCCESSIVE FLIGHTS STOP NUMEROUS CASUALTIES RESULTING STOP WHEN ENEMY PLANES BOMBED THIS HOSPITAL A FEW DAYS AGO COMMA HIGH COMMAND OF THE JAP FORCES TENDERED APOLOGY IN MANILA BROADCAST STOP ANOTHER ATTACK ON THE SAME HOSPITAL COMING JUST A FEW DAYS AFTER FIRST INDICATES STRONGLY THAT TODAYS BOMBING WAS INTENTIONAL STOP NO BOMBING ATTACKS TODAY ON CORREGIDOR STOP HOSTILE BATTERIES FROM PICO DE LORO AREA SHELLED FORTIFIED ISLANDS INTERMITTENTLY STOP NO CHANGE IN VISAYAS OR MINDANAO UNQUOTE PARA FOLLOWING FOR YOUR INFORMATION BUT NOT REPEAT NOT SENT TO WAR DEPARTMENT STOP ENEMY WITH AID TERRIFIC AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT HAS PENETRATED TO TRAIL EIGHT WHICH

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by *[signature]* date *[signature]*

~~SECRET~~

NR: 192 SEVENTH

- 2 -

IS SEVEN THOUSAND YARDS SOUTH OF ORIGINAL MAIN LINE OF RESISTENCE
STOP MOUNT SAMAT REPEAT SAMAT NOW WELL WITHIN ENEMY AREA POCKET CREATED
BY SEPARATED FIRST AND SECOND CORPS STOP UNDER PRESSURE OF TERRIFIC
POUNDING ADMINISTERED BY HOSTILE ARTILLERY AND DIVE BOMBERS COMMA
THE FORTY FIRST COMMA TWENTY FIRST AND MOST OF THIRTY FIRST
DIVISIONS HAVE DISPERSED AS OTHER UNITS AID IN PREVIOUS ATTACKS
STOP HAVE BEEN FORCED TO USE ALL PHILIPPINE DIVISIONS AND OTHER
AVAILABLE RESERVES IN EFFORTS TO HAIT THE ATTACK STOP HOSTILE
ADVANCE APPEARS AT THIS TIME TO HAVE BEEN HALTED STOP I AM
ATTACKING TO EAST WITH ELEMENTS OF FIRST CORPS IN AN EFFORT TO
STRIKE ENEMY RIGHT FLANK AND RESTORE COMMUNICATION ON ORIGINAL
FRONT.

WAINWRIGHT

TOR: 1035A 8TH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7TH APRIL, 1942.

TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

FROM: FORT MILLS

PRIORITY 188 SIXTH

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO
WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS COLON QUOTE
SUPPORTED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE AND DIVE BOMBERS STRONG
HOSTILE FORCE CONTINUED ATTACK ON BATAAN POSITION THIS
MORNING STOP OUR TROOPS PUTTING UP STUBBORN RESISTANCE AND
FIERCE FIGHTING IS NOW IN PROGRESS STOP ALTHOUGH SOME
ADDITIONAL GAINS HAVE BEEN MADE BY SUPERIOR HOSTILE FORCES
THE COST HAS BEEN HEAVY TO HIM IN CASUALTIES STOP BEACH
DEFENSE POSITIONS ON THE EAST COAST OF BATAAN WERE AGAIN
HARASSED BY HOSTILE ARTILLERY ON BARGES STOP HOSTILE BARGES
HELD SO FAR OFF SHORE BY OUR ARTILLERY THAT ENEMY FIRE FELL
SHORT OF BEACH DEFENSE POSITIONS STOP ALTHOUGH CORREGIDOR
WAS UNDER AIR RAID ALARM DURING PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS NO
PLANES FLEW OVER THE ISLAND STOP ENEMY PLANES PARTICULARLY
ACTIVE IN BATAAN AND HEAVILY BOMBED FRONT LINES AND REAR AREAS
ARTILLERY
STOP ANTI-AIRCRAFT/SHOT DOWN ONE DIVE BOMBER AND BY HORIZONTAL
FIRE DESTROYED ONE AMPHIBIAN PLANE WHICH LANDED ON MANILLA BAY
WITHIN RANGE STOP NO CHANGE IN SITUATION IN VISAYAN OR MINDANAO
AREAS UNQUOTE

TOR: 1150 P
T.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1952
WAINWRIGHT
RWW by *SA* date *11-2-65*

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1942.

FROM: WAINWRIGHT

TO : C G USAFFE MELBOURNE

178 FIFTH FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT
SUBMITTED TO WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS
COLON QUOTE RIGHT CENTER OF OUR LINE ON BATAAN AGAIN
ATTACKED BY ENEMY LINE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING
IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH STOP NO ADDITIONAL GROUND WAS
GAINED BY HOSTILE FORCES ALTHOUGH HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED
FOR SEVERAL HOURS STOP BARGES ON WHICH SEVENTY FIVE MM GUNS
AND MACHINE GUNS WERE MOUNTED FIRED ON BEACH DEFENSE POSITIONS
LAST NIGHT STOP OUR LIGHT ARTILLERY DIRECTED FIRE AGAINST
THEM AND THEY WERE FORCED TO RETIRE STOP ENEMY BELIEVED
TO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES FROM OUR SMALL ARMS AND
ARTILLERY FIRE STOP HOSTILE DIVE BOMBERS WERE EMPLOYED DURING
ATTACK AGAINST OUR POSITION ON BATAAN STOP BOMBING ATTACK WAS
DIRECTED AGAINST FORT FRANK AND FORT DRUM YESTERDAY BUT
CORREGIDOR WAS AGAIN FREE FROM RAIDS STOP NO CASUALTIES AND
NO DAMAGE FROM RAIDS STOP NO CHANGE IN DISPOSITIONS ON
VISAYAN AND MINDANAO FRONTS ALTHOUGH ACTIVE PATROLLING
CONTINUES IN MINDANAO

TOR 1035A 6TH

WAINWRIGHT
DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by *[signature]* date 11-2-65

IMMEDIATE

CG USAFFE MBN

161 FOURTH (TOR 940A FIFTH)

LATE AFTERNOON THIRD APRIL ENEMY

LAUNCHED ATTACK AGAINST RIGHT CENTER OF OUR BATAAN POSITION STOP
DURING MOST OF THE DAY FURIOUS FIGHTING HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS STOP
ATTACK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF ARTILLERY STOP
SUPERIOR FORCES WERE MASSED IN FRONT OF POSITIONS AND HOSTILE
TROOPS SUCCEEDED IN FORCING OUR LINE BACK A SHORT DISTANCE STOP
HEAVY CASUALTIES BEING INFLICTED ON ENEMY TROOPS BY OUR SMALL
ARMS AND ARTILLERY FIRE STOP PARENTHIS IS A PARAPHRASE
OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR
HOURS PAREN HOSTILE LANDING WAS ATTEMPTED DURING THE NIGHT ON EAST
COAST OF BATAAN STOP ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO LAND SEVENTY FIVE MM
GUNS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS PLACED ON BEACH DEFENCES FROM BARGES
STOP BARGES WERE FIRED UPON BY OUR ARTILLERY AND IT IS BELIEVED
THAT SEVERAL LOADED WITH TROOPS WERE SUNK STOP HOSTILE TROOPS WERE
UNABLE TO LAND AND EVENTUALLY WITHDREW STOP LOSSES FROM THIS GROUP
BELIEVED TO BE SEVERE STOP DURING PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS
CORREGIDOR WAS FREE FROM BOMBING FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE TWENTY
FOUR MARCH STOP HOSTILE POSITIONS AGAIN FIRED ON BY BATTERIES IN
FORTIFIED ISLANDS STOP DISPOSITIONS VISAYAN AND MINDANAO FRONTS
DASH NO CHANGE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by *[signature]* date 11-2-65

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1942.

FROM: WAINWRIGHT

TO : C G USAFFE MELBOURNE

178 FIFTH FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT
SUBMITTED TO WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS
COLON QUOTE RIGHT CENTER OF OUR LINE ON BATAAN AGAIN
ATTACKED BY ENEMY LINE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING
IN AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH STOP NO ADDITIONAL GROUND WAS
GAINED BY HOSTILE FORCES ALTHOUGH HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED
FOR SEVERAL HOURS STOP BARGES ON WHICH SEVENTY FIVE MM GUNS
AND MACHINE GUNS WERE MOUNTED FIRED ON BEACH DEFENSE POSITIONS
LAST NIGHT STOP OUR LIGHT ARTILLERY DIRECTED FIRE AGAINST
THEM AND THEY WERE FORCED TO RETIRE STOP ENEMY BELIEVED
TO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES FROM OUR SMALL ARMS AND
ARTILLERY FIRE STOP HOSTILE DIVE BOMBERS WERE EMPLOYED DURING
ATTACK AGAINST OUR POSITION ON BATAAN STOP BOMBING ATTACK WAS
DIRECTED AGAINST FORT FRANK AND FORT DRUM YESTERDAY BUT
CORREGIDOR WAS AGAIN FREE FROM RAIDS STOP NO CASUALTIES AND
NO DAMAGE FROM RAIDS STOP NO CHANGE IN DISPOSITIONS ON
VISAYAN AND MINDANAO FRONTS ALTHOUGH ACTIVE PATROLLING
CONTINUES IN MINDANAO

TOR 1035A 6TH

DECLASSIFIED
WAINWRIGHT DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by *[signature]* date *11-2-45*

IMMEDIATE

CG USAFFE MBN

161 FOURTH (TOR 94A FIFTH) LATE AFTERNOON THIRD APRIL ENEMY
LAUNCHED ATTACK AGAINST RIGHT CENTER OF OUR BATAAN POSITION STOP
DURING MOST OF THE DAY FURIOUS FIGHTING HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS STOP
ATTACK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF ARTILLERY STOP
SUPERIOR FORCES WERE MASSED IN FRONT OF POSITIONS AND HOSTILE
TROOPS SUCCEEDED IN FORCING OUR LINE BACK A SHORT DISTANCE STOP
HEAVY CASUALTIES BEING INFLICTED ON ENEMY TROOPS BY OUR SMALL
ARMS AND ARTILLERY FIRE STOP PARENTHIS IS A PARA PHRASE
OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR
HOURS PAREN HOSTILE LANDING WAS ATTEMPTED DURING THE NIGHT ON EAST
COAST OF BATAAN STOP TO ASSAULT IN LANDING HOSTILE SEVENTYFIVE MIKE
MIKE AND SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS PLACED ON BEACH DEFENCES FROM BARGES
STOP BARGES WERE FIRED UPON BY OUR ARTILLERY AND IT IS BELIEVED
THAT SEVERAL LOADED WITH TROOPS WERE SUNK STOP HOSTILE TROOPS WERE
UNABLE TO LAND AND EVENTUALLY WITHDREW STOP LOSSES FROM THIS GROUP
BELIEVED TO BE SEVERE STOP DURING PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS
CORREGIDOR WAS FREE FROM BOMBING FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE TWENTY
FOUR MARCH STOP HOSTILE POSITIONS AGAIN FIRED ON BY BATTERIES IN
FORTIFIED ISLANDS STOP DISPOSITIONS VISAYAN AND MINDANAO FROM
DASH NO CHANGE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
MMW by *4* date 11-2-65

R-112

SECRET

CG USAFFE ELBOURNE

RADIO FORT MILLS

156 THIRD TOR 515A FOURTH FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO
THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS COLON QUOTE FRONT LINE TROOPS
AND REAR AREAS IN BATAAN WERE AGAIN BOMBED FURIOUSLY STOP HEAVY PREPARATORY FIRE
FROM HOSTILE ARTILLERY WAS PLACED ON OUR POSITION FOR A PERIOD OF OVER THREE HOURS
TODAY STOP ARTILLERY PREPARATORY FIRE WAS SO HEAVY AS TO INDICATE AN ATTACK STOP
HOWEVER COUNTERBATTERY FIRED BY OUR ARTILLERY SILENCED SEVERAL OF THE HOSTILE
BATTERIES AND DIRECT HITS WERE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN SECURED ON SEVERAL ENEMY PO-
SITIONS STOP NO ATTACK DEVELOPED STOP SHARP CLASHES CONTINUE TO OCCUR ON THE BA-
TAAAN FRONT BETWEEN OUR PATROLS AND THE ENEMY STOP ALMOST INVARIABLY AGGRESSIVE
ACTION ON THE PART OF OUR PATROLS CAUSES SUCH CLASHES STOP OUR TROOPS CONTINUE
TO HARASS AND ANNOY HOSTILE FORCES IN MINDANAO WHO ARE CONTINUALLY PLACED ON
THE DEFENSIVE STOP AT ZAMBOANGA PATROLS MADE A FEINT WHICH CAUSED HOSTILE ARTIL-
LERY TO FIRE LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION USELESSLY STOP DURING PAST TWENTY
FOUR HOURS NUMBER OF FLIGHT OF HOSTILE BOMBERS OVER CORREGIDOR WAS DECREASED TO
A MARKED DEGREE STOP LARGE NUMBER OF PLANES SHOT DOWN BY CORREGIDOR ANTIAIRCRAFT
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY PROBABLY CONVINCED HOSTILE AIR CORPS THAT HIS ATTACKS WERE
UNREMNARATIVE STOP TWO HEAVY BOMBERS SHOT DOWN AND PROBABLY TWO OTHERS DAMAGED
STOP MILITARY OBJECTIVES ON FORTIFIED ISLANDS SUFFERED NO DAMAGE OF CONSEQUENCE
UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
MMW by *4* date 11-2-65

RHC

~~PRIORITY-SECRET~~

TO: CG USAFFE

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP

NR 152 SECOND-TOR 705A THIRD - STRONG HOSTILE FORCE ATTACKED THE CENTER OF OUR POSITION IN BATAAN AND MADE SLIGHT PENETRATION OF OUTPOST LINE LAST NIGHT. WHEN CONTACT WAS MADE OUR TROOPS QUIETLY WITHDREW SO AS TO PERMIT THE ENEMY TO MOVE INTO THE POCKET THUS FORMED. (THIS IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SENT TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS). THE ARTILLERY THEREAFTER PLACED A CONCENTRATION IN THE AREA OCCUPIED BY HOSTILE TROOPS AND AT THE SAME TIME OUR FORCES ADVANCED AND RESTORED THE OUTPOST POSITION. AT TEN O'CLOCK THIS MORNING ENEMY TROOPS WERE MASSED IN FRONT OF THE LEFT CENTER OF OUR LINE. ACCOMPANIED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY AND RIFLE FIRE AND AIR SUPPORT, A COORDINATED ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED. HEAVY FIGHTING FOLLOWED AND THE ENEMY MADE A SMALL PENETRATION IN THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE. THE POCKET THUS FORMED WAS CLOSED CUTTING OFF THE HOSTILE UNITS FROM THEIR OWN TROOPS. RESERVES ARE NOW ENGAGED IN MOPPING UP HOSTILE TROOPS CAUGHT IN THE POCKET. OUR TROOPS HAVE RETURNED TO THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE. DURING THE ATTACK THE ENEMY SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES WHILE WE HAD FEW CASUALTIES. FRONT LINES AND REAR AREAS IN BATAAN WERE BOMBED AND STRAFED BY HOSTILE AIR CORPS DURING THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS. OVER CORREGIDOR ENEMY BOMBING HAS BEEN INTERMITTENT. DUE TO ALTITUDE AT WHICH BOMBERS ARE FORCED TO FLY BOMBING IS INEFFECTIVE. OUR ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SHOT DOWN THREE HEAVY BOMBERS DURING PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS AND IN ADDITION ONE WAS SEEN TO BLOW UP AND FALL INTO MANILA BAY AS IT WAS

~~PRIORITY-SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1968
RMMW by *AK* date 11-2-65

~~PRIORITY-SECRET~~

RETURNING TO AIRPORT. LATTER PLANE NOT CLAIMED BY OUR ANTI-AIRCRAFT. HEAVY ARTILLERY OF HARBOR DEFENSE FORCE AGAIN FIRED ON HOSTILE TARGETS IN PICO DE LORO AREA. VISAYAN AND MINDANAO AREAS NO CHANGE.

FAIRWRIGHT

~~PRIORITY-SECRET~~

R-88

~~SECRET~~G-3
RMW

CG USAFFE

RADIO FORT MILLS

150 FIRST TIME RECEIVED 1255A SECOND HOSTILE BATTERIES SHELLLED CORREGIDOR FROM SOUTH SHORE OF MANILA BAY AFTERNOON MARCH THIRTY FIRST STOP HOSTILE AIR RAIDS AGAINST HARBOR DEFENSES HAVE BEEN CONTINUED DURING THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS STOP ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ON CORREGIDOR SO ACCURATE THAT HOSTILE PLANES ARE FORCED TO FLY ABOUT TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND FEET WHICH MAKES HOSTILE BOMBING INEFFECTIVE STOP NO MATERIAL DAMAGE TO HARBOR DEFENSE PORTS EITHER REPEAT EITHER FROM SHELLS OR BOMBS STOP DURING THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS COUNTERBATTERY FIRED FROM HUGHES COMA DRUM AND FRANK AGAINST HOSTILE POSITIONS ON SOUTH SHORE OF MANILA BAY STOP CITY OF ZAMBOANGA AGAIN SUCCESSFULLY RAIDED BY MEN OF FIRST PROVISIONAL SULUS COMPANY STOP USING DUMBY BAMBOO CANNON AND DYNAMITE SMALL PARTY MADE A FEINT ON ONE SIDE OF CITY WHILE MAIN FORCE ATTACKED FROM OPPOSITE DIRECTION STOP OUR TROOPS DESTROYING HOSTILE MACHINE GUNS AND ENEMY STORES ENROUTE FORWARD TO CENTER OF CITY STOP HOSTILE TROOPS BADLY DEORALIZED AND USED HIS ARTILLERY INEFFECTIVELY IN ATTEMPT TO SILENCE DUMBY CANNON STOP NUMEROUS CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON ENEMY WITH NO LOSS TO OUR TROOPS STOP FOLLOWING HIS DEFEAT ON THE NIGHT OF MARCH THIRTIETH COMA THE ENEMY HAS RESTRICTED HIS ACTION ON BATAAN TO PATROLLING BOMBING AND SHELLING STOP OUR TROOPS CONTINUE TO PATROL AGGRESSIVELY STOP HOSTILE AIR CORPS CONTINUES TO PERTURB BATAAN INSTALLATIONS COMA FRONT LINE TROOPS AND BEACH DEFENSES IN BATAAN STOP SUCH RAIDS GENERALLY INEFFECTIVE STOP ABOVE IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT RENDERED TO WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by SA date 11-7-65

enc.

R-83

~~SECRET~~

Mch

G-3
RMW

CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

RADIO FORT MILLS

148 THIRTY FIRST TOR 200A FIRST FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT RENDERED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY COLON QUOTE ATTACK AGAINST THE RIGHT CENTER OF OUR FRONT IN BATAAN WAS LAUNCHED BY SUPERIOR ENEMY FORCES AT SEVEN FIFTY FIVE PM YESTERDAY STOP HOSTILE TROOPS SUPPORTED BY ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE MADE REPEATED CHARGES WITH BAYONET AND SUCCEEDED IN BREAKING THROUGH OUR OPLR REPEAT OPLR STOP OUR TROOPS STOOD THEIR GROUND WITH RESULT THAT HAND TO HAND FIGHTING ENSUED AND THE HOSTILE ADVANCE WAS BLOCKED BEFORE IT REACHED THE MAIN LINE OF RESISTANCE STOP THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN BROADCAST OF YESTERDAY EVENING APOLOGIZED BECAUSE OF BOMBS DROPPED ON BASE HOSPITAL NUMBER ONE YESTERDAY IN BATAAN STOP BROADCAST STATED THAT ATTACK WAS UNINTENTIONAL STOP CORREGIDOR AND FRONT AND REAR AREAS IN BATAAN CONTINUE TO BE BOMBED WITH ENEMY USING FLIGHTS OF TWO PLANES STOP THE ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH AIR RAID ALARM FOR CORREGIDOR WAS ABRUPTLY TERMINATED AT FIVE OCLOCK YESTERDAY WHEN TWO HEAVY BOMBERS COMPRISING THE ATTACKING FORCE WERE SHOT DOWN ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY STOP OUR FORCES IN MINDANAO STAGED A SURPRISE RAID ON A HOSTILE SUPPLY BASE NEAR PADADA IN MALAAG REPEAT MALALAG RAY WHICH RESULTED IN TWENTY TWO BUILDINGS BEING BURNED STOP BUILDINGS CONTAINED FOOD GASOLINE AND OTHER SUPPLIES OF MILITARY VALUE STOP NO CASUALTIES FOR OUR FORCES UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by SA date 11-2-65

~~SECRET~~

FROM: FORT MILLS USFIP
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

6-3

RWS

145 THIRTIETH RECEIVED THIRTY FIRST 145P FOLLOWING IS A
PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT RENDERED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT
TODAY COLON QUOTE SINCE THEIR FAILURE TO GAIN GROUND IN THEIR ATTACK
ON THE NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHTH COMMA ENEMY FORCES IN BATAAN
HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY QUIET STOP ACTIVE PATROLLING HAS BEEN
CONTINUED BY OUR TROOPS AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HOSTILE PATROLS
WERE SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED STOP OUR FRONT LINES AND REAR AREAS
CONTINUE TO BE BOMBED AND STRAFED IN BATAAN STOP AT NOON TODAY
BASE HOSPITAL NUMBER ONE IN BATAAN WAS BOMBED RESULTING IN NUMEROUS
CASUALTIES STOP HERETOFORE HOSTILE AIR FORCE HAS STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED
THIS HOSPITAL AS IT IS PLAINLY MARKED STOP THERE APPEARS TO BE NO
DOUBT BUT THAT THE ATTACK WAS UNINTENTIONAL STOP HARBOR DEFENSES
CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECTED TO DAY AND NIGHT AIR RAIDS STOP HOSTILE
PLANES COMPELLED TO FLY AT HIGH ALTITUDE BECAUSE OF EFFECTIVE
ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE RENDERING ATTACKS INEFFECTIVE STOP ENEMY TARGETS
ON SOUTH SHORE OF MANILA BAY AGAIN FIRED ON BY HARBOR DEFENSE FORTS
STOP DISPOSITIONS IN VISAYAN MINDANAO AREAS REMAIN UNCHANGED UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1998
NMW by AK date 11-2-65

~~SECRET~~

7/10/11

R-55
CG USAFFE

RADIO FORT MILLS

6-3
RMJ

127 TWENTY EIGHTH TIME RECEIVED 945A FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF
OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR PAST TWENTY FOUR
HOURS COLON QUOTE ON DIGOS FRONT IN MINDANAO VIGOROUS PATROLLING HAS
CAUSED JAPANESE TO WITHDRAW OUTPOSTS IN VICINITY REPEAT OUTPOSTS IN
VICINITY OF SERIB COMMA PANTUKAN AND WANGAN REPEAT SERIB COMMA
PANTUKAN AND WANGAN STOP ENEMY OUTPOST NEAR CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
SUCCESSFULLY RAIDED BY OUR TROOPS COMMA RESULTING IN HEAVY ENEMY
CASUALTIES WITH NO LOSSES TO OUR FORCE STOP ENEMY CONTINUES AIR RAID
AGAINST HARBOR DEFENSES STOP ACCURATE FIRE OF OUR AA REPEAT AA
ARTILLERY DESTROYED ONE HEAVY BOMBER AND FORCED HOSTILE AIRCRAFT TO
FLY AT SUCH HIGH ALTITUDE THAT HIS BOMBING IS INACCURATE STOP JAPANESE
TARGETS ON SOUTHERN SHORE OF MANILA BAY FIRED ON BY HARBOR DEFENSE
FORCES ONE LARGE GROUP OF BOATS ASSEMBLED AT PANPUNGAN BEACH DESTROYED
BY OUR ARTILLERY STOP BATAAN FRONT LINES AND REAR AREAS SUBJECTED TO
HARASSING AIR RAIDS STOP AIR FIELDS RAIDED WITH NO DAMAGE STOP ACTIVE
AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING TO THE FRONT CONTINUES WITH THE RESULT THAT SHARP
CLASHES OCCUR BETWEEN OUR OWN AND HOSTILE FORCES STOP PRESENCE OF ONE
HUNDRED FORTY FIRST REGIMENT OF THE MARA UNIT ESTABLISHED OPPOSITE
CENTER OF OUR LINE STOP OUR ARTILLERY CONTINUES TO SILENCE ENEMY UNITS
BY COUNTER BATTERY AND ALSO ENGAGED TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by SA date 11-2-65

RHC.

R-46
SECRET

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL USAFFE MELBOURNE

FROM: DARWIN

6-3
RMJ

124 TWENTY SEVENTH TIME RECEIVED 415A TWENTY EIGHTH FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE
OF OPERATIONS REPORT SUBMITTED TO WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY COLON QUOTE OUR ANTI-
AIRCRAFT DEFENSES MADE ENEMY DROP BOMBS INDISCRIMINATELY CAUSING NO MILITARY
DAMAGE IN AIR RAIDS WHICH WERE CONTINUED AGAINST CORREGIDOR DURING PAST TWENTY
FOUR HOURS STOP IN ATTEMPTS AT NIGHT RAID HOSTILE PLANES WERE ILLUMINATED BY
SEARCHLIGHTS AND WERE FORCED TO DROP BOMBS IN DAY STOP OUR FRONT LINES AND
REAR AREAS IN BATAAN WERE SUBJECTED TO SPORADIC RAIDS BY HOSTILE AIR FORCE STOP
PATROLS FROM OUR LINES WERE VERY ACTIVE AND CONDUCTED SUCCESSFUL NIGHT RAID AGAINST
HOSTILE POSITION STOP COUNTER BATTERY FIRED BY OUR ARTILLERY STOP HOSTILE TRUCK
CONCENTRATION AND TROOP COLUMNS FIRED UPON AND DISPERSED STOP JAPANESE MOTORIZED
PATROLS AT ZAMBOANGA AND DAVAL ON MINDANAO ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DIS-
CONTINUED STOP ONE DESTROYER AND ONE TRANSPORT REPORTED AT ZAMBOANGA STOP
ROMBLON ISLAND IN VISAYAN GROUP REPORTED TO BE OCCUPIED BY FOUR HUNDRED HOSTILE
TROOPS WITH SOME AA GUNS STOP OCCUPATION OF JABILAUAN INDICATED BY PRESENCE OF
HOSTILE CRUISER COMMA SAUNCHUS AND SEAPLANES UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by SA date 11-2-65

~~SECRET~~

CG USAFFE
FORT MILLS

NR 118 TWENTY SIXTH TIME RECEIVED 415A TWENTY EIGHTH FOLLOWING
PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT SENT TO WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY COLON
QUOTE DURING PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS ACTIVITY IN BATAAN WAS CONFINED
PRINCIPALLY TO PATROLLING AND COUNTERBATTERY STOP FRONT LINES AND SOME
PARTS OF REAR AREAS WERE SUBJECTED TO BO BARDMENT BY HOSTILE AIR FORCE
STOP CORREGIDOR BOMBED YESTERDAY MORNING AND AGAIN IN EARLY MORNING
TWENTY SIXTH MARCH STOP AGAIN TODAY HOSTILE BOMBERS BAGUIVOXHUTON
OPERATED AGAINST CORREGIDOR (STOP RPT STOP AGAIN TODAY CORRECTION STOP
NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED WAS RELATIVELY SMALL WITH NO MILITARY DAMAGE
REPORTED STOP HEAVY TOLL OF HOSTILE BOMBERS BEING TAKEN BY ANTIAIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY STOP JAPANESE ARE REPORTED AS LEAVING ISLAND OF JOLO STOP
REPORT INDICATE THAT NO PLANES OR VESSELS ARE NOW BASED ON JOLO AND
VERY FEW TROOPS REMAIN UNQUOTE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS SUB-
MITTED COLON RADIO TOKYO REPORTED RECENT BOMBING AS HEAVIEST OF THE
WAR STOP THIS REPORT INCORRECT COMMA AS BOMBING OF TWENTY NINTH
DECEMBER WAS MUCH HEAVIER STOP FEWER FLIGHTS WERE IN THE AIR TODAY
AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME PLANES HAVE ALREADY LEFT FOR OTHER
FRONTS STOP DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ENEMY INTENDS TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE
BOMBING OF CORREGIDOR AS HIS LOSSES ARE HEAVY WHILE RESULTS OBTAINED
ARE NEGLIGIBLE STOP

WAINWRIGHT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by date 11-2-65

FROM: FORT MILLS
TO: CG USAFFE

IMPORTANT

NR 117 TWENTY FIFTH RECEIVED TWENTY SIXTH 130 AM FOLLOWING IS
PARAPHRASE OF REPORT SENT TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY QUOTE SHARP
CLASHES BETWEEN OUR TROOPS AND HOSTILE FORCES CONTINUE ON THE
BATAAN FRONT STOP FIFTY FOUR HEAVY BOMBERS BASED ON LUXON
CONTINUED BOMBING OF CORREGIDOR TODAY STOP BEGINNING AT EIGHT
FORTY FIVE THIS MORNING COMMA BOMBERS WHICH ARRIVED YESTERDAY
FROM FORMOSA INTENSIVELY BOMBED CORREGIDOR UP TO TIME ~~IN RPT~~ OF
RENDITION ^{OF} THIS REPORT STOP HEAVIER BOMBS BEING USED STOP FEW
CASUALTIES WITH LITTLE MILITARY DAMAGE STOP ANTICRAFT ARTILLERY
SHOT DOWN FOUR BOMBERS IN ADDITION TO THOSE REPORTED YESTERDAY STOP
LOSSES HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED STOP ON VISAYAN AND MINDANAO FRONTS
THERE IS NO CHANGE UNQUOTE IN ADDITION TO THIS REPORT I DESIRE TO
ADVISE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME ^{SIL} HOSTILE BOMBERS ATTACKED MALINTA
TUNNEL STOP SEVERAL HEAVY BOMBS HIT CLOSE TO EAST ENTRANCE STOP
COLD STORES WERE HIT TODAY AND SINCE HEAVIER BOMBS WERE USED SOME
DAMAGE RESULTED STOP FORCED ISSUE OF MEAT MAY BE NECESSARY STOP
REPORTS YESTERDAY INDICATED TRANSPORTS HAD ARRIVED IN LINGAYEN
GULF BUT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE TODAY FAILED TO SHOW ANY HOSTILE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NMW by date 11-2-65

7-36
#2
~~SECRET~~
ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA OR ON INTERMEDIATE ROADS STOP EITHER
REINFORCEMENT OF BATAAN IS IN PROGRESS OR TROOPS THERE ARE
BEING RELIEVED

WAINWRIGHT

~~SECRET~~

112
~~SECRET~~
TO: CG USAFFE MELBOURNE

FROM: RADIO FORT MILLS USFIP

R-33
63 RNY
MARCH 25, 1942

112 TWENTY FOURTH FOLLOWING PARAPHRASE OF OPERATIONS REPORT

SENT TO WAR DEPARTMENT TODAY COLON QUON^{TE} SEVERAL CLSHES OCCURRED
BETWEEN OUR FORCES AND THE ENEMY ON BATAAN FRONT IN LAST TWENTY^E
FOUR HOURS STOP CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY WERE HEAVY
WITH ONLY SLIGHT LOSSES TO OUR TROOPS STOP HOSTILE POSITION
HEAVILY SHELLLED BY OUR ARTILLERY STOP OUR TROOPS SUCCESSFULLY
KAMBUSHED A JAPANESE MOTOR IXXED COLUM RPT MOTORIXED COLUMN IN
THE VICINITY OF XAMBOANGA WITH HEAVY LOSSES TO THE ENEMY STOP
OUR CASUALTIES COMMA ONE MAN STOP ENEMY MINING OF VISAYAN
WATERS INDICATED BY RECOVERY OF FLO^{FL}ATING MINES STOP FIFTY
FOUR^{EN} TYPE BOMBERS SIMILAR TO NUMBER NINETY SEVEN RAIDED
CORREGIDOR THIS MORN^ING STOP PLANES ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE
ARRIVED DIRECT FROM TXDXMOSA AND ARE NEW IN THIS AREA STOP
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SHOT DOWN AT LEAST THREE PLANES STOP
BATAAN ALSO HEAVILY BOMBED COMMA NEGLIGIBTE DAMAGED UNQUOTE

WAINWRIGHT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Decoded
A Conlett
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1993
NMW by *[signature]* date 1-2-95

SECRET

20 MARCH 1942

TO: CG USAFFE WELLOUGH

FROM: FORT MILLS

PARAPHRASED MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

73 NINETEENTH OPERATIONS REPORT FOR EIGHTEENTH MARCH STOP LUZON FORCE
DASH SLIGHT ENEMY ACTIVITY LIMITED TO PATROLLING STOP SOME INDICATION THAT
ENEMY IS BUILDING UP STRENGTH ON SECOND CORPS FRONT STOP DESTROYERS OF
FUBAKI CLASS ENTERING AND LEAVING SUBIC BAY STOP SUBIC BAY APPARENTLY IS
BASE FOR DESTROYERS WHICH ARE PATROLLING VISAYAN WATERS STOP FOR PAST
TWENTY FOUR HOURS HOSTILE DESTROYERS HAVE BEEN UNUSUALLY ACTIVE IN PATROLLING
AROUND VISAYAN GROUP STOP TROOPS IN MINDORO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED
FROM LUZON STOP MINDANAO FORCE DASH ENEMY HAS OCCUPIED SAN RAMON PENAL
COLONY STOP ALL PRISONERS RELEASED BUT THEIR CONDUCT HAS BEEN ORDERLY STOP
HARBOR DEFENSES DASH SLIGHT ADDITIONAL SHELLING OF HARBOR DEFENSE FORTS
FROM PICO DE LORO AREA STOP NO CASUALTIES COMRA AND NO DAMAGE OF MILITARY
CONSEQUENCE

MARCH 19 TCO: #725 XR-4

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

This is the
information upon
which Lt. Col. Stewart
based his report
to me.

John

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NUMBER 2

15 March 1945

LESSONS FROM THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

The digest of American combat experience and battle lessons from the Italian Campaign contained herein, covering the period from the GARIGLIANO Line to the GOTHIC Line, 1 February - 30 September, 1944, is published for information and guidance in the training of U.S. forces in this Theater.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCARNEY:

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Symbol	Title of Source
ACF/132	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 132, 14 March 1944.
ACF/139	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 139, 31 March 1944.
ACF/140	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 140, 3 April 1944.

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AGF/147	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 147, 21 April 1944.
AGF/148	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 148, 25 April 1944.
AGF/152	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 152, 10 May 1944.
AGF/156	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 156, 27 May 1944.
AGF/165	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 165, 6 July 1944.
AGF/168	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 168, 13 July 1944.
AGF/171	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 171, 19 July 1944.
AGF/172	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 172, 22 July 1944.
AGF/178	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, Report No. 178, 16 August 1944.
AGF/QR	Army Ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, <u>Quarterly Report</u> , 21 April 1944
5A/LL	Training Memorandum No. 12, "Lessons Learned in the Battle from the Garigliano to the North of Rome," HQ Fifth Army, 15 July 1944.
IIC/LL1	Training Memorandum No. 9, "Lessons Learned," HQ II Corps, 9 April 1944.
IIC/LL2	Memorandum, "Lessons Learned," HQ II Corps, 16 June 1944.
IIC/LL3	Training Memorandum No. 18, "Lessons Learned," HQ II Corps, 8 July 1944.
IIC/AIC	Report, "II Corps Artillery in the Italian Campaign," HQ II Corps, 5 June 1944.
VIC/AOP	Memorandum, "Air Observation Post Activities in Italy," HQ VI Corps Artillery, 7 July 1944.
3ID/SR	Special Report, "Cargo and Battle Sleds," HQ 3rd Infantry Division, 18 July 1944.
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36ID/LL	Memorandum, "Lessons Learned in Combat," HQ 36th Infantry Division, 12 April 1944.

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<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Title of Source</u>
45ID/AOP.	"Monthly Air Observation Post Report," HQ 45th Infantry Division, April, 1944.
88ID/DAG.	Memorandum (AG400-2), "Augmentation of Field Artillery Battalions," HQ Division Artillery, 88th Infantry Division, 27 October 1944.
1Amd.D/RO	Report of Operations, 1 May - 10 June, HQ 1st Armored Division, 16 June 1944.
TFC/1Amd.D/VR	Verbal Report, Commanding Officer, Special Task Force, 1st Armored Division, to G-3 AFHQ Observer, Lake Bracciano, 15 June 1944.
CC"A"/SR.	Special Report, "Demolition Snakes," Commanding Officer, Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division, 16 June 1944.
CS/1Amd.D/SR	Special Report, Chief of Staff, 1st Armored Division, 15 June 1944.
CEF/CB	Report, "Conduct of Counterbattery Operations in the Corps <u>Expéditionnaire Française</u> ," HQ, CEF, 2 June 1944.
1Amd.G/IL	Report, "Lessons Learned in Combat," HQ 1st Armored Group, 10 March 1944.
2Amd.G/IL	Memorandum, "Lessons Learned," HQ 2nd Armored Group, 25 June 1944.
2Amd.G/CL	Report, "Combat Lessons," HQ 2nd Armored Group, 10 July 1944.
2Amd.G/SR	Special Report, "Lessons Learned in Combat," HQ 2nd Armored Group, 2 August 1944.
2Amd.G/Ind	Indorsement, 2nd Armored Group, Army Ground Forces Board Special Report, 22 July 1944.
753TB/IL.	Memorandum, "Lessons Learned in Combat," HQ 753 Tank Battalion, 5 March 1944.
894/SR	Special Report, "Report of Actions of 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion," 10 June 1944.
697/24OH.	Memorandum, "Experience with the 240mm Howitzer and 8-inch Gun in the Italian Campaign," HQ 697th Field Artillery Battalion, 4 October 1944.
5A/AOP	"Air Observation Post Bulletin No. 20," HQ Fifth Army, 31 October 1944.
TH14/5A	Training Memorandum No. 14, "Scouting and Patrolling," HQ Fifth Army, 10 August 1944.
L/CG/5A	Letter, Commanding General, Fifth Army, to Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, subject air support in the Spring Offensive, 10 June 1944.

LESSONS FROM THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN


<u>Symbol</u>	<u>List of Major Sources</u>	<u>Title of Source</u>
TN44/AF/43	Training Memorandum No. 44, "Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign," HQ Allied Force, 4 August 1943.	
TN50/AF/43	Training Memorandum No. 50, "Lessons from the Sicilian Campaign," HQ Allied Force, 20 November 1943.	
TN5/AF/44	Training Memorandum No. 5, "Lessons from the Cassino Operation," HQ Allied Force, 4 June 1944.	

PREFACE

The achievements of the Officers and Men of the Fifth Army in their long, difficult, and successful Campaign on the Italian Peninsula require no detailed comment here. The courage, resourcefulness, and self-sacrifice manifested in this Campaign which has driven the enemy more than three hundred miles from the initial Salerno Beaches to the present line and has involved some of the most difficult operations ever experienced in this Theater, are well known to all concerned. The epic period of the Anzio Beachhead, the Great Spring Offensive of 1944 during which the first Axis capital fell to our arms, and the long advance to the Valley of the Po, are now matters of history.

In this Campaign, especially in the latter phases, much has been learned from combat that will be of value to troops now training for further operations against the enemy. For this reason these tactical lessons from battle and combat experiences are published for the benefit of all. What has been learned, and the benefit that this knowledge will provide for troops in training, will stand as tributes to the Officers and Men of the Fifth Army who participated in this Campaign.

15 March 1945


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Commanding Mediterranean Theater of Operations

LESSONS FROM THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

From the Garigliano Line to the Gothic Line, 1 February - 30 September 1944,
Including the Period of the Anzio Beachhead.

SECTION I : INTRODUCTION

1. The lessons from the fighting in Italy during the period from the initial landings at SALERNO to 1 February 1944 have been published in Training Memorandum No. 2, this Headquarters, 10 March 1944. The following memorandum continues the digest of cumulative experience reported by American units through the subsequent phases of the Campaign in the advance to the Gothic Line. It comprises the second of a series of related training publications covering progressively the lessons from the campaign in Italy. Combat experience, battle lessons, and further confirmation of established tactical doctrine already treated in Training Memorandum No. 2 will not be included in the present memorandum. Wherever such experience or lessons previously reported have been given special emphasis in reports of commanders in the period presently considered, appropriate reference to the preceding publication will be made, but repetition of the same published material will be avoided unless such lessons be of warranted importance or have been particularly stressed by field commanders with different approach or application from the treatment given in Training Memorandum No. 2.

2. The material contained in this publication is not to be considered as tactical doctrine. It represents a summary of the major lessons from the Italian Campaign in the period under consideration digested from the reports of Fifth Army and its component corps and divisions; from the reports of the Army Ground Forces Board, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, which include reports of combat experience, lessons, and pertinent comments from field commanders and staffs of all echelons; and from other reliable and appropriate sources. In order that direct quotations and other statements of special importance may be readily identified, a key is provided at the end of the table of contents.

3. Although proper reservation is enjoined in the use of the following materials, it is believed that the lessons and examples they contain will be of value in the training of units and individuals who have not yet entered combat, and also to those who have yet to experience combat under the conditions peculiar to the phases of the Italian Campaign covered herein. In the application of such material to unit and individual training, the exercise of judgment and consideration of individual situations is essential.

4. As has been emphasized in all previous publications covering campaign lessons, the soundness of basic principles prescribed in standard training literature has been confirmed in all reports of battle experience in the period under consideration. In this connection the Commanding General, Fifth Army reported as of 15 July that "no new basic principles of warfare have arisen from the operations...nor have any of the old principles been found to be outmoded" (5A/LL). The application of these principles to the various situations and conditions peculiar to the Campaign, however, has presented a number of valuable examples and experiences that can be used fully to advantage in training.

5. The several phases of the Campaign treated herein have been marked by aspects and peculiarities different from those discussed in Training Memorandum No. 2 covering the earlier period. Similarly the terrain involved in the later phases, especially during the May offensive and the pursuit north of Rome, has differed in a number of respects from that traversed from SALERNO to the Gustav Line. For these reasons the characteristics of the operations and the terrain involved should be understood in order that the tactical lessons from them may be appreciated in their proper perspective. The two succeeding sections in this memorandum are included for this purpose.

SECTION II : PHASES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CAMPAIGN

6. GENERAL

The continued campaign in Italy during the period under present consideration can be divided logically into four distinct operational

phases: the continuation of operations along the static winter line on the GARIGLIANO-CASSINO front; the amphibious landing operation at ANZIO and NETTUNO, with the resulting period of static warfare within the beach-head thus gained; the period of regrouping, training, and preparation for the Spring Offensive; and the operations comprising the Spring Offensive which carried the advance of our forces from the line of the GARIGLIANO to the Gothic Line north of the ARNO River.

7. COMPARISON WITH THE EARLIER PHASES OF THE CAMPAIGN

a. Although the operations under consideration have been a continuation of those of the earlier period, certain differences present in the later stages as compared with the earlier phases are of interest in connection with the lessons learned. For a summary of the characteristics of the Italian Campaign from September, 1943 to February, 1944, see Training Memorandum No. 2, this Headquarters, Section II, pp. 2-6.

b. In the first phase of the present period, the operations presented little difference from those which immediately preceded. One marked feature without comparable predecessor stands out in the large-scale air-ground attack on the strongly defended town of CASSINO and its contiguous defenses. The concentration of air effort on a single objective in close support of ground troops in this action has had no parallel in the past campaign experience in this Theater. Although this attack did not succeed, valuable lessons were derived from action of the combined arms.

c. The ANZIO-NETTUNO landing operation introduced a new type of situation into the Campaign which had not hitherto existed in this Theater. The establishment of the beachhead created two separated fronts which were not joined for a period of four months. This operation differed widely from the previous amphibious assault on SALERNO some four months before. In the ANZIO operation complete surprise was achieved, and the landings were made without appreciable resistance. Absence of surprise, accompanied by strong and determined resistance, characterized

the previous operation. At SALERNO, after the early critical period of the beachhead consolidation and extension, the advance was pushed steadily inland and northward to the enemy winter line. At ANZIO-NETTUNO, a distinctly different situation quickly developed. The landing forces were soon confronted with equal and later greater enemy strength disposed in superior and advantageous positions for defense, and the result was virtual stalemate and static warfare from the end of January until 23 May when the Beachhead Phase of the Spring Offensive broke the German defenses of the perimeter and terminated the beachhead period of the Campaign.

d. The period of regrouping and preparation for the Spring Offensive has no comparable counterpart in the previous stages of the Campaign, and need not be considered in this comparison.

g. In terms of comparison, the Spring Offensive also has no counterpart in the preceding phases of the campaign. Never before in the experience of American troops in this Theater has there been a fully comparable action to that which broke the formidable and long-held German prepared defense lines and developed into an unbroken advance of more than 250 miles. In certain respects the pursuit phases of the operation after the fall of Rome resembled the campaign of the American forces in Sicily, but on a far greater scale and on a much larger front.

f. Contrast in weather and climatic conditions between the earlier and later periods of the Campaign should not be overlooked. During the fall, winter, and early spring, the operations were hampered and rendered severely difficult by the prevailing rainy season and its accompanying obstacles of mud, wet, and cold. In the period during the Spring Offensive, the dry season had set in and these obstacles experienced in the winter period were removed. Dust and heat, however, produced some difficulties, though in far lesser degree.

8. CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE STATIC WINTER LINE

a. The operations after the end of January were mainly characterized by a continued effort to break the prepared enemy positions along

the GARIGLIANO-CASSINO line, and in conjunction with the seaborne thrust which had outflanked the enemy line by the assault landings at ANZIO on 22 January, to effect a general advance north to ROME. A summary of the ANZIO beachhead front is contained in the next succeeding paragraph. On the main front during this period the fighting was similar to that which prevailed in the preceding phase. It consisted mainly of difficult mountain operations against determined resistance from strongly prepared positions, many of which were located on dominant and superior ground.

b. The focal point of our main effort was in the CASSINO sector, where repeated attacks were made to break through this key strongpoint controlling the LIRI Valley. In this area the enemy was materially aided by dominant observation from a number of vantage points on commanding heights which rendered approach and assault preparations virtually impossible to conceal except under the cover of darkness. The action in and around CASSINO was largely a series of infantry operations strongly supported by massed artillery of all available calibers, and by armor wherever the terrain permitted its employment. Close support by tanks and tank destroyers played an important role whenever the situation permitted. Engineer assistance was also of prime importance.

c. Combined with, and between major offensive actions, small unit operations of many types also characterized the period. The action of combat and reconnaissance patrols assumed special importance. The close country and rugged mountainous terrain greatly restricted the employment of armor, and the same problems of supply and communication in the high, rugged mountains prevailed as before.

d. On 15 March, a final all-out frontal effort was launched to carry the CASSINO positions, and this attack was supported by an overwhelming force of bombardment aircraft. The results of this effort and the lessons gained therefrom are treated in SECTION IV, Paragraph 20b, below. Following this air-ground attack of 15 March, a period of regrouping and deliberate preparations for a major spring offensive on

the entire line characterized the operations in the American front.

9. THE ANZIO-NETTUNO LANDINGS AND THE BEACHHEAD OPERATIONS

a. On 22 January a flanking movement by sea around the main line was made, and a second front was opened as a result of the assault landings of a reinforced corps in the ANZIO-NETTUNO area. This operation was carried out in conjunction with a major effort on the main line to break the CASSINO and GARIGLIANO defenses of the enemy and press through to join the newly landed force.

b. The landing operation was a marked success. Almost complete surprise was achieved, and the landings were virtually unopposed. The assault forces pushed inland to their initial objectives, and the consolidation of the beachhead was well under way when the main enemy counterthrust materialized. After a period of critical fighting, the line was stabilized on a perimeter front. The beachhead forces were thereafter confronted by equal and later superior numbers often located on commanding ground affording dominant observation over the beachhead area. The combat operations on the perimeter front resolved into static, holding action, with intense artillery support of the infantry manning the perimeter line.

c. Armor was invaluable for flank and counterattack protection. During the period, the armored division present, together with a separate tank battalion, constituted the main counterattack force. Tank units were also used extensively in their secondary role as artillery with good results, and when the unusual situation demanded, they were at times dug in and employed as armored pillboxes in strong points. On several occasions armored units were profitably used for strong raids on the enemy positions to disrupt his preparations for attack, and for countering strong thrusts at the perimeter line.

d. The operations of the antiaircraft artillery units were outstanding, and the subject of their action is treated in Section IX, below. Throughout the beachhead phase, especially in the critical period of the first enemy main counterthrust, the air cooperation and

naval support were skillfully and powerfully employed and proved to be of utmost importance. Supply and maintenance of the beachhead forces constituted a major achievement of the campaign. The supply operations over the beaches and in the small port of ANZIO demonstrated to excellent advantage the potentialities of our craft, supply organization, and port units.

10. REGROUPING AND PREPARATORY PHASE BEFORE THE SPRING OFFENSIVE

a. During this period American and Allied units were regrouped and realigned, and detailed preparations were made for a major offensive on the entire Allied front. The characteristics of this phase of the campaign are of special interest from the training point of view. In preparation for the large-scale attacks, units on the main GARIGLIANO line conducted intensive training in conformity with the plans for the projected operations. Similarly within the Beachhead area a period of intensive training was held despite the limited areas and the proximity of the front lines. Of major importance was the combined training of infantry and armor, with special emphasis on close cooperation and teamwork between the elements of the two arms which were to work together in the impending operations. In specially selected areas, actual rehearsals were held to perfect the action of the infantry-tank organizations. The briefing of the different commanders and their men was detailed and thorough, and sand-tables were extensively used. On the main GARIGLIANO front, two fresh divisions that had recently been brought into the line perfected their training and fire-hardening during this period. Every opportunity was taken to familiarize the men with the nature of the terrain and other conditions that would be encountered. These units became thoroughly acclimatized to the situation and to battle conditions before the offensive was launched.

b. From the staff viewpoint, the main feature of this phase was the detailed planning and the implementing of the plans for the offensive. The coordination of these plans, and their interlocking with those of the Allied Forces sharing in the operation was of prime

importance. The planning on which the offensive was based was characterized by simplicity, flexibility, and thorough implementing.

2. Operationally, the fighting during this phase was largely confined to strong, aggressive patrolling to obtain all possible information of the enemy positions and dispositions. Small unit operations designed as deceptive measures were also undertaken on a minor scale. Artillery units were sufficiently active to keep the enemy harassed during the period. In summary, the period prior to launching the Spring Offensive was one of realignment, intensive training, planning, and implementing of plans. Combat activity was generally confined to constant patrolling and minor diversionary action.

11. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPRING OFFENSIVE, 11 MAY - 1 AUGUST

a. General Summary

American participation in the Spring Offensive, launched on May 11 after the period of intensive planning, preparation, and training, was characterized by several types of action and operations. Initially it involved a large-scale coordinated attack on a wide front to break the two main enemy prepared defensive lines in the U.S. sector: first, the winter, or Gustav Line, and second, the much publicized Adolf Hitler Line to which the enemy fell back after his initial positions had been overrun. The remaining phases of the campaign involved the maintenance of heavy pressure against a stubbornly withdrawing enemy after his main defenses had been broken, and developed into rapid pursuit action which lasted until the approaches to the Gothic Line were reached after more than 200 miles of unbroken advance. This extended offensive included a wide variety of operations in equally varying types of terrain. The attack and ensuing advance was pushed through a number of hill masses and mountain ranges and their accompanying narrow valleys; along the irregular Tyrranean coastal plain and across and around the flooded littoral and Pontine Marsh area; across the open and rolling country of the Tiber Valley and north of Rome; and finally through the rough, rugged region before the approaches to the Gothic Line in the northern Apennines.

The fighting throughout was marked by aggressive offensive action, vigorous pressure against a yielding enemy, and pursuit after the main defensive lines had been breached and the enemy began a general withdrawal. Its principal features included the attack and envelopment of strong points, the passage of demolitions and obstacles, river crossings, and the attack and passage of towns and villages. The temporary improvisation of specially organized task forces for pursuit after the crossing of the Tiber was of particular importance in the later phases of the offensive. As the country became more open and suited to armored action, the operations of tank units in close cooperation with infantry and artillery played a major role in the advance. The outstanding feature of the whole offensive in all its phases was the high degree of cooperative effort rendered by the combined and associated arms. The quality and effectiveness of the air support and cooperation during the long advance have had no comparable equal in this Campaign or in prior campaigns in this Theater.

b. The First Phase of the American Offensive

The offensive campaign of the U.S. forces during the period under present consideration consisted of five distinct phases. The first of these involved the coordinated attack from the firm base that had been established across the GARIGLIANO River in the vicinity of MINTURNO. The objective of the U.S. effort in this phase of the operation was to drive through the Gustav Line and seize the AUSCIA - MINTURNO road in conjunction with the effort of Allied Forces on the right which advanced simultaneously to capture SAN GIORGIO. The combat operations during this phase were characterized by highly effective cooperative action on the part of all associated arms. The advance was driven through rough, mountainous country, flanked on the left by a narrow, irregular coastal plain bordered by the sea. The main effort was made through the inland hill mass, and the infantry, strongly supported by massed artillery and aided forward by the armor and engineers, overran its sector of the Gustav Line and reached its objective according to plan. The resistance encountered was determined, and the thorough planning, preparations

and training for the attack were most favorably reflected in the success of the operation. In general, the nature of the fighting differed little from that which had prevailed in the earlier operations in the advance to the main enemy line some months before. Tactical surprise was achieved. The artillery preparation was extremely effective, not only in softening the enemy defensive positions but also in creating havoc and destruction throughout his unit communications nets. This latter effect of the artillery bombardment was of particular importance. The entire action in this first phase was marked by aggressiveness and vigorous drive.

g. The Second Phase of the Offensive

The second phase of the offensive consisted of a continuation of the general attack from the newly gained objectives through the PETRALIA Hill mass and the AURUNCI Mountains. The U.S. thrust during this phase converged on the town of ITRI and seized this objective and the southern segment of the ITRI - PICO Road. From this point the American forces continued the advance in a three-pronged drive through the mountainous country, broke the Adolf Hitler line in their sector, and seized FONDI and its road net and the coastal town of SPERLONGA. The end of this phase saw the German army in the U.S. sector in retreat through the AUSONIA Mountains and along the coast towards LITTORIA and the ANZIO Beachhead. The operations in this phase were marked by a continuation of the vigorous, coordinated attack that had characterized the preceding first phase. Again the highly effective cooperation among the supported and supporting arms produced most favorable results. Resistance continued to be stubborn and determined. The advance, except in the latter stages of the thrust to the coast toward SPERLONGA involved the continued attack, envelopment, and overrunning of mutually supporting strong points and defended positions in rugged, difficult country broken by narrow valleys and at intervals by limited areas of less restricted country.

d. The Third Phase of the Offensive

The third phase consisted of two major operations. The

first was the pursuit of the enemy through the AUSONIA Mountains and along the seaward edge of the flooded littoral toward the ANZIO Beachhead. The second operation was the break-out from the Beachhead, directed northeast to cut the main coastal highway (Route No. 7) to ROME and eastward to join the advancing U.S. forces which were pressing up the coast. These two operations succeeded in clearing the entire coastal area southeast of the Beachhead, and prepared the way for the seizure of the last major barrier before ROME. The outstanding feature of the break-out attack from the Beachhead perimeter was the combined infantry-tank-artillery action. In the preparatory period before the offensive, the greatest attention had been given to infantry-tank training, and in the attack of May 23 which crushed the German containing positions about the Beachhead, this preparation and training showed the greatest results. Again, as in the initial attack from the GARIGLIANO Line, the artillery preparation was most effective and the results produced on the enemy positions and communications had a large share in assisting forward the combined infantry-tank attack. The third phase in general was marked by excellent timing and coordination between the action of the forces advancing from the main front and the assault out of the Beachhead positions.

C. The Fourth Phase of the Offensive

The fourth phase, following the break-out from the Beachhead and the joining of the two fronts, developed into an accelerated drive on the disorganized German forces who sought to hold the ALBAN Mountains which formed the last barrier to the open approaches to ROME. The line of advance swerved almost due north to encircle and seize this vital hill mass, and despite the unfavorable country for armored action, the attack was driven rapidly to this objective. The seizure of the ALBAN hill mass terminated practically all serious German resistance in the American sector south of ROME. After some delaying action in the open country beyond this important terrain feature, the enemy abandoned ROME and the city fell to U.S. armor and infantry on June 5.

f. The Fifth Phase of the Offensive

The fifth and last phase of the Campaign in the period covered by this memorandum comprised the passage of the TIBER and the pursuit of the enemy north of ROME. In this period the fighting was generally characterized by the action of provisionally organized pursuit forces composed of combinations of several arms, designed for rapid, aggressive action against a withdrawing enemy. In the earlier stages of the advance north of ROME much of the combat operations consisted of maintaining contact, passing of obstacles and demolitions, and the envelopment and destruction of small rearguard and delaying forces which sought to hold key points and delay the Allied advance. The operations of the small, self-contained, and mobile pursuit forces were prominent in the earlier period of action north of the TIBER. As the enemy withdrew into the more rugged country to the north, he gradually reverted from rapid deliberate withdrawal into increasing organized resistance. When the mountainous approaches to the Gothic Line were reached, the enemy again began offering serious opposition from prepared positions in the hilly and mountainous country in front of the northern APENNINES. The phase under consideration ended with the capture of the stubbornly defended port of LEGHORN and the passage of the ARNO River. The main characteristics of the fighting in this phase were organization and conduct of pursuit action across open rolling country and through rugged hills and mountains; the passage, envelopment and bypassing of obstacles, demolitions and delaying forces; and the continuation of pressure and advance after the enemy shifted from deliberate retreat to organized defense before the approaches to the Gothic Line.

SECTION III : CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRAIN

12. FROM THE CARIGLIANO TO THE ALBAN HILL MASS

a. In the period of continued operations on the CARIGLIANO - CASSINO line before the Spring Offensive (cf. Section II, Paragraph 8,

supra), the terrain features were the same as had prevailed in the earlier period discussed in Section III of Training Memorandum No. 3. The region traversed in the first three stages of the Spring Offensive was also generally similar in many respects to that previously encountered, until the ALBAN hill mass was reached. Dissimilar features from those in the earlier phases of the Campaign are described when appropriate below.

b. In the main, from the GARIGLIANO positions in the American sector to the ALBAN Mountains, the terrain was characterized by a continued series of mountain ranges and ridges situated at varying distance from an irregular coastal plain. The hilly hinterland rose from moderate to strong relief, sharply punctuated by steep slopes and high, rugged mountains, and cut by narrow, enclosed valleys. The ridge formations generally extended parallel to the coastal plain, and were pierced at intervals by transverse valleys and water gaps. The mountains varied in degree of vegetation. Some areas were clothed with considerable forestation; others of volcanic origin were barren, or sparsely covered with scrub and low vegetation. Outcroppings of limestone were prominent in many instances. The valleys were for the most part small and restricted. They were usually under intensive cultivation and were often cut and crossed by drainage and irrigation ditches. Roads were very limited and restricted. In the U.S. sector a single main highway (Route No. 7) was available. The remaining communications and supply routes were confined to unmetalled secondary roads, tracks, and trails.

c. From the GARIGLIANO line, the coastal plain seaward from the mountainous hinterland above described extended as an irregular, flat and rolling belt of varying width. It narrowed sharply in the vicinity of the GAETA peninsula and promontory where the southern reaches of the AURUNCI Mountains thrust out close to the sea. Beyond this promontory the plain widened slightly and again contracted to a narrow bottleneck at TERRACINA, where the AUSONIA range extended likewise almost to the shore. Beyond this point the coastal plain widened out into the littoral and the Pontine Marsh area, which in turn widened

outward to LITTORIA and CISTERNA. Much of this flat region had been effectively flooded by the German forces, and at the time of the advance it consisted of a flat expanse of flooded farmland, drowned fields and villages, and demolished and overflowing irrigation ditches and canals. On the seaward side it was bordered by an irregular dune strip of varying elevation and width. The one main highway in the U.S. sector ran through this area, and because of its elevation was above the water level. Smaller secondary roads followed the shoreline from TERRACINA toward the Beachhead at ANZIO, and were used as the main route of the advance around the flooded areas. Beyond the Beachhead area, the coastal plain continued in flat and undulating, rolling country to the TIBER basin. North of the Beachhead, it extended towards the rising ground toward the ALBAN Mountains.

4. In the fourth phase of the Spring Offensive the main U.S. effort was directed to the seizure of the ALBAN Mountains (cf. Section II, Paragraph 11c, supra). This important terrain feature located at the northeastern end of the coastal plain consisted of an extensive cluster of high, volcanic hills. The upper slopes of these formations have been deeply cut by ravines, and the lower slopes have united to form the barren, ash-covered plain extending towards ROME and the SABINE Mountains. The largest of the extinct cones has become waterfilled to form Lake ALBANO. Large areas in and about these hills were thickly covered with evergreen forest, and the surrounding approaches were characterized by broken, irregular country restricting movement and observation. The hill mass was situated between the two principal highways leading to ROME. Highway No. 7 passing through the towns of VELLETRI, GENZANO, and ALBANO, skirted the hills on the south, and Highway No. 6 passed close to the northern edge of the hills to converge with the former route into the city.

5. Operations in the regions above discussed were materially influenced by the terrain features prevailing. In the mountainous hinterland, the same problems of movement, maneuver, supply and communication were present as in the earlier period of the Campaign treated in Training Memorandum No. 2. Mountain warfare and its special requirements

of tactics and supply continued until the seizure of the ALBAN Mountains. In the American sector, the limited road net also imposed severe strain on communications and supply. The passage around the drowned littoral and Pontine Marshes to join the forces attacking from the Beachhead involved a new type of terrain and the advance was accordingly governed by the available routes. Cross country movement of vehicles, armored and otherwise, was greatly limited in the entire region, except in certain areas of the coastal plain which were relatively well suited to armored action. Such areas, however, were few and limited.

13. TERRAIN FEATURES OF THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD

The terrain enclosed within the perimeter of the ANZIO Beachhead was entirely part of the coastal plain northwest of the littoral and Pontine Marsh area. From the receding bluffs immediately inland from the beaches and dune strip, the country extended in flat and rolling conformation toward rising ground in the direction of ROME. The volcanic hill mass of COLLI LAZIALI (ALBAN HILLS), some twenty miles inland in this direction, formed a natural barrier and afforded the enemy observation and favorable positions for the defense of this sector. To the east and south, the area extended to the Pontine Marshes. Most of the ground contained within the perimeter had been reclaimed land, and generally consisted of small farms under varying degrees of cultivation. Drainage canals and ditches were present throughout a large part of the area, and a number of small streams, cut into deep gullies by erosion, flowed through the region. During the wet season, the porous, clayey quality of the ground throughout large portions of the Beachhead rendered digging and field excavation difficult and limited in some areas because of the ground water. Immediately inland from the port of ANZIO a strip of scrub timber broken by intermittent open fields served to screen the port and part of the beach areas, and also provided cover for supply dumps and bivouacs. The Beachhead area contained a limited network of secondary roads, generally with gravel and unmetalled surfaces. In the rainy season these roads deteriorated under the heavy traffic of movement and supply, and in the later dry season, the dust resulting from

movement often drew enemy artillery fire. The right flank of the Beach-head was protected by the MUSSOLINI Canal, which provided a formidable barrier against armored attack. The left flank, in the British sector, was likewise protected by the MOLETTA River and a number of deep stream gullies. One of the chief features of the area in general was its vulnerability to enemy observation and shell fire from higher ground inland from the perimeter line.

14. FROM THE TIBER BASIN TO THE VALLEY OF THE ARNO

a. From the ALBAN hill mass northeast to ROME and beyond, the sector of the American advance extended across the basin of the TIBER River toward Lake BRACCIANO and the SABATINI Mountains, and along the coastal plain to CIVITAVECCHIA. The coastal plain, widening inland along the river valley consisted mainly of flat and slightly rolling country under varying degrees of cultivation. Much of the area was cut and crisscrossed by drainage ditches and canals, a number of which were wide and deeply cut into the plain. A large portion of the cultivation was given over to grain, with intermittent tree growth and vineyards. The basin and its contiguous plain extended in a general radius northeast for approximately twenty miles across the American sector, rising to the hilly country beyond. The plain immediately surrounding ROME afforded a good network of primary and secondary roads, extending in spoke formation outward from the city. These roads provided favorable avenues for pursuit after the passage of the TIBER.

b. Beyond the TIBER basin the zone of American operations extended through the continued irregular and narrowing coastal plain and the hilly and mountainous hinterland of TUSCANY. The region traversed inland from the narrow plain varied from low to moderate relief, with intermittent irregular plateaus, rugged hills, and valleys. As compared with the higher, steeper mountains encountered in the advance to ROME, the slopes in this region were generally moderate, but the country, except for some open areas and sections of the coastal plain, was restricted and unsuited for cross-country vehicle movement on a large scale. Thick

forestland dominated considerable parts of the region, and in contrast, other areas of volcanic origin were barren, with treeless slopes and scrub-covered foothills. The water-filled cones of several large extinct volcanoes formed the series of large volcanic lakes - BRACCIANO, VICO, and BOLSENA. Farther north, as the valley of the ARNO was approached, the relief became bolder and stronger, with increasingly steeper and more rugged slopes. A number of rivers and streams crossed the areas of the American advance. These generally flowed west and southwest forming the watershed from the hilly hinterland to the sea. They passed through fairly wide alluvial valleys which were intersected by small tributary streams and their smaller, narrower valleys. The valleys were generally under dense cultivation, grain, vineyards, and fruit culture predominating. The road net in the region covering the American advance continued to be limited. However there prevailed an increasing number of unmetalled secondary roads, which with engineer improvement and maintenance, proved adequate for the advance and supply. In the American sector, only one principal highway, the coastal Route No. 1, was available. This was supplemented by several lateral main roads connecting with the parallel main highway which served the Allied sector on the right.

15. TOWNS AND VILLAGES

The towns and villages throughout the entire area covered during the Campaign under present consideration were similar in character to those described in Section III, Training Memorandum No. 2. Their influence on the nature of the fighting remained the same as before. Thus far there has been no fighting in large cities, since the enemy has evacuated such centers as ROME and LEGHORN without serious opposition after the main defenses were carried.

SECTION IV : GENERAL LESSONS FROM THE COMBINED AND ASSOCIATED ARMS

16. GENERAL

a. From the overall point of view, the main lesson from the Campaign in the entire period under consideration has been the need and achievement of the highest degree of integrated cooperation among all the participating arms. In some instances the Campaign clearly showed that failure to achieve this needed cooperative action in the required degree led to checks, losses, and inability to advance. When the deficiencies in the inter-arm teamwork were corrected, the results were outstanding in success.

b. Broadly considered, the Campaign in this period, particularly during the Spring Offensive, demonstrated forcefully that the skillful use of all the associated arms working in close cooperation and mutual support provides a striking power that cannot be long resisted or withstood, even in terrain highly favorable for defense and disadvantageous for attack. More strongly than ever has the lesson been brought out that no single arm or service can act as an independent agency in the conduct of its own separate operations. Conversely, the unity of action and the integrated effort of all -- naval and land, ground and air, and the component elements of the ground and service forces -- operating appropriately as parts of one integrated force, proved to be the deciding factor in the success of our arms.

2. Of particular importance has been the combined action of infantry and armored units, together with the cooperation of tank destroyers, all in turn supported by massed and flexibly controlled artillery fire. Similarly the same lesson has been drawn from the successful action of the component infantry elements, from the rifle squad to the heaviest of the weapons units. Likewise in appropriate relation to the combined operations as a whole has been the importance of the air support and cooperation with the ground forces, which in the Spring Offensive reached a degree of efficiency and effectiveness not before equaled in this Theater. Although these observations are recognized as

the broadest of generalities, they nevertheless constitute from the overall view the greatest lessons of the Campaign.

d. From the broad, tactical aspect, the principal lessons of all arms have served again to reemphasize the major conclusions drawn from Tunisia, Sicily, and the earlier period of fighting in Italy: that our basic doctrines are fundamentally sound and have been proven correct on every battlefield in the Theater. The outstanding corollary to this conclusion has been the necessity for appropriate application of these doctrines with judgment, flexibility, and due consideration for each individual situation. "You must," observed the Chief of Staff, VI Corps, after the breakout from the Beachhead and the advance to CIVITAVECCHIA, "fit the established principles and organization to the given situation."

e. Improvisation to meet unusual or difficult situations and conditions was also an important element in the success of the Campaign. This included the creation of improvised and provisional units for special purposes, such as pack trains, provisional cavalry detachments, and pack artillery units for difficult mountain operations; specially organized task forces for pursuit action and other special missions; and the improvising of non-standard equipment for particular purposes demanded by existing situations. From this experience the lesson can be drawn that ingenuity and initiative in all echelons with respect to such improvisation is often required under peculiar field conditions that may be encountered.

f. A final broad lesson from the period of the Campaign covered here is merely a restatement of an old tactical principle: that no operation should be undertaken unless all the proper and necessary means are made available to carry it out with reasonable assurance of success. It is of noteworthy interest that one of the major influencing factors in the success of the Spring Offensive was that the offensive was not launched until complete preparations in troops, materiel, and supplies were ready and available to insure success on the entire front.

17. MAJOR FACTORS IN THE SUCCESS OF THE SPRING OFFENSIVE

a. The outstanding success of the General Spring Offensive which broke the period of static and stabilized warfare along the Winter Line and developed into an advance of more than 250 miles stemmed from a combination of different elements, each of which contributed to the results of the operation. These factors in the success of the offensive may be properly viewed as lessons and conclusions drawn from this period of the Campaign which should be of value to commanders of all echelons which may be engaged in operations of a general similar nature.

b. The careful, detailed planning and the thorough preparations which preceded the main attack and the assault out of the Beachhead were of particular influence, and formed the initial basis of success. The units that participated were regrouped and realigned to provide the best possible tactical advantage and surprise. They were fully prepared, fitted, and equipped for all phases of the tasks to be accomplished. The plans for their employment were simple but thorough, and were flexibly coordinated among all arms and services.

c. The attack was launched in sufficient strength in every sector of the line. One key to the success of the offensive, declared the Chief of Staff of a participating Corps, was the use of our forces in sufficient strength at all points.

d. Unit training throughout all echelons, especially in the battalion level, was of special importance. Thorough training in the use of all weapons contributed fully to the success of the operation. Likewise, the special training of the combined arms, with particular emphasis on tank-infantry cooperation in the period of preparation, was an outstanding factor both on the main front and in the Beachhead break-out.

e. Among the most significant elements in the successful offensive were stern battlefield discipline, high morale, aggressive leadership, and individual initiative throughout all ranks. Without these qualities in officers and men alike, the other factors could not have contributed as they did to the success of the operation.

f. A comprehensive knowledge of the situation and of the tasks to be accomplished had been imparted to all participating troops. Such knowledge and familiarization were derived from thorough briefing, the use of sand-tables and terrain study, and constant, aggressive patrolling, probing, and reconnaissance of the enemy positions and dispositions.

g. In the initial attack, the artillery support, directed especially against the enemy reserves and communication system as well as against his defensive positions, was a most powerful influence in the achievement of the opening successes. Continued sustained artillery support of a high order likewise contributed to the unbroken advance.

h. Tactical surprise on a large scale was also attained. The attack was general, on a wide front, and in sufficient force at all points to maintain the heaviest pressure where needed. It is apparent that for considerable time the enemy was unable to determine where the main effort was to be made. With his communications shattered and disrupted by the initial artillery preparation and by the extensive air bombardment, the enemy was unable to control or employ effectively the reserves he had at his disposal, and at every point he was confronted by attacking forces in strength that could not be withstood.

i. An important element making for success was the effective use of accurate intelligence information. During the static period, detailed and valuable data were accumulated concerning the enemy strength, dispositions, and reserves. Full use of this information was made in planning the attack and in directing the effort against critical points where reserves could not be employed in strength to stem the assault.

j. Constant and effective air support of a quality and on a scale without previous parallel was also a major factor in the success of the offensive. The results of the air operations after the enemy had been driven into retreat were devastating in the losses inflicted on personnel and motor transport.

18. LESSONS FROM THE COMBINED AND ASSOCIATED GROUND FORCE ARMS

a. General Considerations

(1) As indicated in the broad lessons drawn from the operations of the combined arms summarized in Paragraph 16, supra, the effective, cooperative action of the ground force arms was of prime importance throughout the Campaign. With respect to the lessons from this subject, the varying situations and terrain conditions prevailing during the period of operations must be considered. Cooperative employment of the different arms in restricted, mountainous country will naturally differ considerably from that in open, rolling areas suited to large scale operations of the several arms together. Hence in any evaluation and use of the lesson material that follows, the varying characteristics of the terrain and existing situation must be kept in mind.

(2) In general, the Campaign despite its outstanding successes revealed the necessity for more effective and more thorough training and coordination among the elements of the ground force arms that will normally fight together as a team, whether in mountains, across plains, or in any other type of terrain. Reports and comments of commanders of all echelons have universally stressed this point. It has been pointed out repeatedly that although the degree of cooperation generally attained was often sufficient to produce success in a majority of the operations undertaken, far more combined training and a greater degree of mutual understanding of the employment of the several arms as a team are required.

(3) The combined infantry-artillery action has been a marked exception. Long association and combined training of the organic artillery with its supported infantry within the division, and the close cooperation of the corps and reinforcing artillery through the present fire control system, have served effectively to coordinate these two arms and render their operations into the closely integrated action of one team. The same, however, has not been the case as between the infantry and armor, the infantry and tank destroyers, the armor and tank destroyers, and further combinations of these arms.

(4) Experience throughout the units of Fifth Army with respect to the combined operations of all three arms generally, has been summarized with special reference to the Spring Offensive in a report of lessons learned from this period of the Campaign:

...The principal lesson derived on this subject, which found concurrence in practically every unit, was that there has been a definite lack of coordination and teamwork vitally necessary in these combinations -- particularly between infantry and tanks, and infantry and tank destroyers. Infantry commanders have not had the proper knowledge and appreciation of the powers, limitations, and capabilities of tanks and tank destroyers. Liaison and communication between infantry, tanks, and tank destroyers has not been satisfactory. Some tank commanders must develop more aggressiveness in immediate support of infantry against machine gun nests and small delaying detachments.

It is the general belief of all units that these obstructions to proper coordination can be eliminated by the combined training of these elements. The suggestion that tank battalions and tank destroyer battalions work, train, and operate with the same infantry division was general. The excellent coordination and teamwork presently existent between the infantry regiment and its attached artillery battalion was pointed out, while it was also cited that in one instance a tank battalion had fought with six different divisions since 11 May, and was not with any one of them long enough to develop the coordination so necessary in these combined actions. The Army fully recognizes the value of coordination between these arms, and its policy is directed towards insuring the maximum time of attachment for its development. However it was true that lack of a sufficient number of tank battalions, and the operational necessity of concentrating tank strength where it could be best employed, at times made it necessary to disregard normal attachment. Artillery is organic; tanks are not and should not be. . (5A/LL)

b. Infantry-Tank Cooperation

(1) Armored Infantry and Normal Infantry. Reports and comments on battle experience from the Army level down to the battalions and companies have all stressed the need of greater cooperation between infantry and armor as a major lesson of the Campaign. This lesson has been applicable to the elements of the armored division, and to the infantry divisions and separate tank battalions alike. One outstanding conclusion has been drawn: that for all practical purposes there is no real difference between the armored infantry and the foot troops of the normal infantry division. Both types have operated with tanks and have participated in similar action throughout the Campaign. In some cases both have been employed together in the same large unit. For example

in the attack of the 1st Armored Division out of the Beachhead, one combat command employed the organic armored infantry; the other operated with a regiment of the 34th Infantry Division. It can be concluded that the troops of the infantry division and the attached separate tank battalions should receive the same degree of training and should learn to operate together as do the organic infantry and tanks of the armored division.

(2) Joint Planning and Understanding. Thorough understanding of the plan of action on the part of both infantry and tank commanders in an operation employing the two arms is paramount to success. In most situations involving elements of the infantry division and attached separate tank battalions, the responsibility for insuring this understanding often rests with the infantry commander. This point has been emphasized by the Commanding General, VI Corps, in a memorandum disseminated to platoon level in the period of preparation for the Spring Offensive:

. . . All infantry commanders must thoroughly realize their personal responsibility for the coordination, communication, and control of the tanks attached to their units in combat. There have been instances in the past when complete cooperation between the tanks and the infantry during combat did not exist. This has inevitably been caused by failure on the part of the infantry commander to sit down with the tank commander concerned and thoroughly familiarize the tank commander with his plan of attack and assure himself that the means of communication and control were set up and tested prior to the jump-off. The infantry commander must know that the tank commander understands the infantry plan, and he must understand the tank commander's plan to support him. Unless this understanding is complete, the attack will bog down before objectives can be reached and organized. . . (AGF/147)

As among the elements of the armored division, responsibility for the complete understanding of the plans of both tank and infantry commanders may vary from one to the other as the situation demands. The requirement of joint planning and mutual understanding, however, remains essentially the same. A battalion commander of the 1st Armored Regiment declared in this connection after the successful operations in the offensive from the Beachhead to VITERBO:

...In any operation, too much time and planning for the first move cannot be provided for. Combined staff discussions, conferences between all associated field commanders, combined field exercises by troops concerned, should all form a part of the preparation whenever time permits. ... Even units which are used to working together should have opportunity to discuss their plans with each other, down at least to companies, prior to the beginning of a particular operation. ... (AGF/172)

(3) Combined Training and Continued Attachment. The value

and necessity of combined training and of continued attachment of tank battalions to the same infantry division with which they will fight were reiterated by all commanders. The substance of this general opinion is that "tank battalions should 'grow up' with the units they will support in battle." Such training and attachment serves to bring about the much needed appreciation and understanding of the characteristics, employment, and limitations of the two arms, and also makes possible the personal association and understanding among staffs and commanders so essential for team cooperation in action. The Commanding General, II Corps, reported in July in a summary of lessons learned from the offensive that

...Operations of tanks and tank destroyers with infantry showed a lack of understanding on the part of commanders of the limitations and capabilities of other arms and services. This should be corrected by intensive combined training. During lulls in combat, rehearsals, command post exercises and conferences can be utilized to smooth out operational procedure of these task forces. ... (IIC/LI2)

Among the several separate tank battalions opinion as a result of continued combat was universal as to the need for combined training. The Commander of the 755th Tank Battalion, whose experience was comparable to that of other similar units, reported towards the middle of the

offensive:

...Too little stress has been placed on tank-infantry-artillery cooperation and liaison. In many cases the infantry and tank units have had little or no training together prior to entry into combat. It is of utmost importance that the infantry, artillery, and tank units train as a team. Infantry commanders and tank commanders should be instructed in the use of both arms, in the limitations and capabilities of each. ... (2dnd.Gp/LI)

Similar opinion has been expressed in a report of the Commander of the 1st Armored Regiment, a unit which conducted intensive training with its infantry before the break-out from the ANZIO Beachhead:

• • • Training problems stressing the control and coordination of the infantry-tank team have revealed lack of knowledge of the characteristics of each arm on the part of both. This type of combined training should be encouraged by higher echelons of command, not only within armored units but also throughout the Army, to familiarize both infantry and tank units with the characteristics and limitations of the infantry-tank team. • • (AGF/152)

Infantry commanders have likewise pointed to the need of this combined training. The effects of such preparatory joint instruction in the period before the break-out from the Beachhead are shown in a report from the Commander of the 6th Armored Infantry:

• • • During the last operation (from the time of the break-through at ANZIO to the capture of Rome), it was found that combined infantry-tank training cannot be stressed too much. The recent training of this regiment with the armored elements of the Division have proved to be the greatest value. This was shown in the closer cooperation, and better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of troops, weapons, and equipment of each arm. • • (AGF/172)

Commanders of separate tank battalions were unanimous in their recommendation that their units should be in continued attachment to the divisions with which they are to operate in battle. Short periods of attachment and frequent change of attachment from one division or task force to another served to prevent the essential degree of teamwork, familiarization of units, and coordination. The Commander of the 760th Tank Battalion declared after extensive action in the Spring Offensive:

• • • Tank battalions should always train with the division with which they are to fight. If the battalions cannot always be part of the division, then time should be allowed for a period of training together before entering combat. • • (AGF/165)

An extreme case may be cited as an example of frequent change of attachment and its results with respect to combined operations of the two arms. The Commander of the 756th Tank Battalion frankly declared in a report of combat lessons that

. . . My battalion was attached so many times that I almost lost count. In one case the battalion was attached to three different organizations within a period of 12 hours. Coordination is impossible under such conditions . . . (AGF/165)

(4) Regulation of Pace and Control in Combat. In the cooperative action of infantry and tanks in combat, control and the regulation of pace has been a serious problem. When the rate of movement of both arms is not properly controlled, the essential mutual support is lost through the infantry and armor becoming separated. Control to keep the two elements together in effective joint action was exercised in some units by the establishment of phase lines. The tanks would advance to the phase lines and wait for the infantry to come up. They would then move on to the next phase line. In one regimental combat team supported by tanks the problem of regulating pace was partially solved by movement in 200-yard bounds by the leading elements. Rear elements would follow and join the leading elements before the next bound was made. Further experience with this problem was reported by Fifth Army in a general summary of lessons from the offensive:

. . . The use of tanks with infantry must be carefully coordinated. Tanks must not be sent too far ahead of the infantry if the best results are to be attained. One case was reported where infantry, mopping up behind the tanks, were so far outdistanced that the tanks were more detrimental than helpful in that they curtailed artillery and heavy weapons support of the infantry. . . (5A/LL)

In the 191st Tank Battalion, it was reported that "the infantry at times would fail to keep up with the tanks even though we slowed down" (AGF/165), and in the 6th Armored Infantry the Commander described his experience with the problem and his solution:

. . . It is felt that while close support of tanks, both medium and light, is desirable, it is not always practicable. In many instances it was found that tanks, either light or medium, maneuvered and moved forward faster than the foot troops can advance. By lingering and waiting for the infantry to mop up, the tanks expose themselves unduly, and if the tanks continue on, enemy infantry will rise up and a regular infantry battle ensues, thereby breaking up the tank-infantry team play. This was remedied by using medium tanks for the assault punch and attaching light tanks to the infantry to assist in mopping up operations . . . (AGF/172)

The excellent cooperation and coordination of the advance of the two arms experienced between the 756th Tank Battalion and the 1st Special Service Force provides a good example of the control that should be attained. The Battalion commander of the tank unit reported after the first phase of the Spring Offensive:

... This Battalion operated with the Special Service Force, and it was a pleasure. There was complete coordination and a thorough understanding of what each was to do. The troops kept up with the tanks and the tanks kept up with the troops. When the tanks hit some bad going that delayed them, the infantry would halt under cover and wait while the tanks could catch up again. If the tanks started to get ahead of the infantry, at the first opportunity the tanks would halt in defile and wait for the infantry to catch up. We made much faster progress that way with far fewer losses. We progressed as a team and each took care of the type of target we were trained for. . . (AGF/172)

(5) Time for Coordination of Plans and Preparations.

When an operation is planned or an attack is contemplated involving the use of armor with the infantry, sufficient time must be allowed the tank commander to learn the infantry plan, make his reconnaissance, coordinate his plan with the infantry, and bring up his tanks into position for the attack. In many instances this essential time for preparation was not allowed the tank commander. The Commanding Officer, 760th Tank Battalion reported that "coordination has sometimes been lacking because we have at times received orders for an attack after an operation has started. . . " (AGF/165). The same condition has also been reported in the experience of the 756th Tank Battalion:

... Many times orders have been received so late that there was no time for coordination of the attack, and in order to help any at all the tanks had to be committed on the run and coordination had to be attempted during combat. That does not work. Given a bit more time for getting together before the attack, the tanks can save the infantry many casualties and the infantry can save many tanks by knowing just what their part is to be against prepared or unexpected antitank defenses. . . (AGF/165)

Attachment of tank units at night to join and support infantry for morning attacks does not allow the tank commanders sufficient time for preparation, reconnaissance, and coordination of plans with the supported infantry. The experience of a separate battalion commander may be cited as an example:

. . . Attachments were usually made at night and sometimes it was practically impossible to find the infantry commanders to whom we were to report. . . The time allowed for coordination in such cases was, as a rule, too short. . . (AGF/165)

(6) Methods of Employment of Infantry-Tank Team. The

most effective method of employment of the infantry and tanks was found to be a strong assault wave of medium tanks in the advance, followed at approximately 100 to 200 yards by the infantry closely supported by light tanks in immediate contact. Previous experience had shown that the leading tanks often bypassed concealed infantry and automatic weapons which would wait until the armor had passed and then attack the following infantry. Without immediate armored support, the infantry would be stopped with losses. The presence of the light tanks with the following infantry gave the needed support and means of dealing with such islands of resistance and strong points left in the wake of the leading tank waves. This formation for the combined action of the two arms was . satisfactorily used in the attack from the Beachhead and in the succeeding operations that drove the enemy north of the TIEP. Its employment has been described in some detail by the Commander of the 1st Battalion,

1st Armored Regiment:

. . . The medium tank-infantry-light tank team was used most successfully in breaking the defenses surrounding the ANZIO Beachhead and in subsequent operations. It was found that the best troop arrangement for a force of this type was a company of medium tanks, a battalion of infantry, and a company of light tanks. The tanks were attached to the infantry battalion. The medium tank company was employed as a whole under the direct command of its company commander. The light tank platoons were attached one to each infantry assault company for closer and faster support. The light tank company commander coordinated the movement of the light tanks.

In this force medium tanks preceded, destroying with their heavier guns the main defenses, directing artillery, or placing fire on the antitank defenses. As the medium tanks moved forward destroying the main obstacles of the defense, they by-passed many enemy infantry strong points. These strong points would then be taken by the infantry. Light tank team following immediately behind the medium tanks to take advantage of the shock effect of the medium tanks. The infantry moved forward followed by the light tanks until resistance was met. At this time the infantry would throw out a green smoke grenade which meant "light tank help wanted here." The light tanks following the infantry would move to this point, and the infantry would designate the target by signal, pointing, firing tracer

ammunition, or by a combination of these. The light tanks then would work the position over with machine gun and 37mm fire and move into the position, followed closely by the infantry, who usually had only to mop up and collect the prisoners. Casualties, particularly among the infantry, were very light through this effective use of the medium tank-infantry-light tank team. . . (AGF/172)

Similar details covering the experience of the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment have been thus reported by its commander, with additional comment on lessons from the operations:

. . . In the past period of combat the most successful engagements carried out in the most economical manner in casualties in both tanks and infantry were those planned as follows: Medium tanks led the attack on enemy positions. Infantry followed at a distance of 100 to 200 yards behind the medium tanks. At times the medium tanks were at considerably greater distances from the infantry. Light tanks stayed right with the infantry where they were able to knock out those positions which the medium tanks had by-passed: positions such as well concealed machinegun nests and enemy personnel with automatic weapons, which can do very serious damage to the infantry. The light tanks, moving with the foot troops, caused the enemy in these positions to give up readily. The infantry used green smoke grenades to call attention of the light tanks to the fact that the individual had a target which he wanted to point out to the tank. Any light tank was to proceed to the location of the smoke and be directed by the individual who set off the smoke, as to just what the target was.

The attack should be made in the early morning or late evening - preferably early morning. In early morning tanks and supporting infantry can assemble under cover of darkness. Ground haze and limited visibility that are usually present in the early morning, is a distinct advantage for the attacking force. Extensive use of supporting artillery should always be made. It should be used for the softening up effect and for screening purposes through the use of smoke. A smoke screen has been found to be more effective in the early morning.

With this type of coordination above described the tanks can give excellent close support for infantry mopping-up squads. Objectives can be taken quickly with a surprisingly low number of casualties to our forces. A few rounds of colored smoke on the objective are a distinct aid in guiding the tankers to the objective. . . (AGF/172)

(7) Employment of Tank-Borne Infantry. Tank-borne infantry

was employed during the Campaign for the first time in the operational history of this Theater. This type of combined employment was initially used in the break-out from the Beachhead, and was later adopted during the pursuit phases. The employment of the two arms in this manner was found especially useful in mopping up strong points of resistance in order to assist forward the main advance. In one combat command of the



1st Armored Division, groups of medium tanks carrying infantry, called "raiders," were used effectively for this purpose. In some instances tank-borne infantry was carried into action for other missions, notably for consolidating ground taken by the armor, and in certain phases of pursuit. This practice gave the advantage of getting the riflemen forward rapidly, and it was also effective as a means of bringing up quickly the heavy weapons needed to support the consolidation. Tank-borne infantry was also used in the operations of the 45th Infantry Division, and the Assistant Division Commander has reported that the results were excellent. One general disadvantage noted in the employment of infantry carried on tanks was the difficulty of reorganization after dismounting and deployment. Proper squad and platoon organization and control could not be maintained while the riflemen were carried forward on the tanks, and consequently after dismounting and deployment for action, some reorganization was required in each instance. Where such employment was appropriate to the situation, however, the advantages of tank borne infantry were found to outweigh the disadvantages above cited.

(8) Employment of Infantry-Tank Combat Sleds. A special operation involving the use of sled-borne infantry towed behind medium tanks was tried in the break-out from the Peachhead for the first time in this Theater. The purpose of this combination was to get the infantry forward with the tanks with a minimum of losses and to have them instantly available to take advantage of the ground gained by the tanks. The sleds were manufactured in the field in "sets." Each set consisted of two "trains" of six sleds each, flexibly connected to each other and also flexibly cross-braced between each pair of sleds. A set of sleds was connected to the towing tank by a bridle that could be disconnected from the tank by pulling a wire connected to the pintle pin. The platoon or squad leader who rode in the right leading sled controlled the wire used for disconnecting the sleds. The same individual was also in communication with the tank commander of the towing tank by means of a headset and microphone connected into the intercommunication system. (AGF/165). The actual combat tests with these sleds was not conclusive.

In one regiment a platoon of tanks and four sets of sleds failed to get into action because of rough ground and the loss of several tanks from enemy mines. In another regiment the results were considered negligible because of the unsuitability of the terrain. In another unit, one platoon was used against a strongly fortified house. The sleds were towed to within 150 yards of the house, and from this position the towed infantry, supported by the tanks, assaulted the house and its defenses. In this case the combination of infantry and armor took the objective. With regard to the conclusions to be drawn from these operations, the Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, with whose command the equipment had been used, declared:

... It is felt that a conclusive test of battle sleds has not been made in combat. Facing new weapons, the leaders were hesitant in their application after the initial rehearsal phase of the attack. Antitank mines and ditches proved to be their worst obstacles. Tests prior to battle demonstrated that generally where the tanks could go, the battle sleds could be towed.

It is believed that the infantry-tank assault sled teams have a place in the assault. Unfavorable terrain and antitank mines have so far proved to be their greatest hindrances. Battle sleds are definitely a special weapon and should be employed against organized positions where terrain and anti-tank defenses permit. . . (3ID/SP)

A battalion commander of the 7th Infantry, in whose unit the sleds were used, also reported that the results were inconclusive but that the new equipment and combination of the two arms have definite possibilities:

... The tank sleds recently used in the breakout from the AVIO Beachhead contributed very little or nothing to the actual break-through. However, they have very definitely proven a possibility well worth further experimentation and test in combat. This may be one method of moving into a determined enemy's position where other methods prove unsuccessful, with the minimum of losses in personnel. When this method of infantry-tank operation is employed, experiments thus far lead me to believe that not less than a tank company should be employed with the appropriate proportion of infantry in sleds, and that tanks not towing sleds should be employed in the echelon of tanks towing sleds, for the purpose of deception, maneuver, and to afford some protection to the tanks towing the sleds. . . (3ID/SK)

The Commander of the 751st Tank Battalion, whose units participated in towing the sleds, reported that the sleds were difficult to handle on the turns, and made a great deal of noise, especially when running over

rough and rocky ground. The speed during the towing operations was held to below ten miles per hour. (AGF/165).

(9) Infantry-Tank Communications in Combat. One of the chief problems experienced in the control and coordination of infantry and tanks in combat has been the need of a satisfactory means of communication between the two elements. Several solutions have been tried with varying degrees of success. One method of control has been the designation of a tank observer, who, accompanying the infantry commander, is in direct radio communication with the tank commander. A converse method was also reported by Fifth Army in having the infantry company or platoon commander ride in one of the tanks. Direct radio communication between the tanks and the infantry by means of the SCR 300 has been reported satisfactory in some instances, and unsatisfactory in others. Fifth Army has reported that the results of this means of communication between cooperating tanks and infantry have not been conclusive, and that further combat testing in the field will be necessary (5A/11). Visual communication between the tanks and infantry has been conducted by the use of colored smoke grenades to indicate to the tanks that assistance is needed in a given locality or position. Target designation by the use of tracer ammunition from small arms has also been used. The use of green smoke proved very satisfactory, according to the comments from most units, and the Commander of the 1st Armored Regiment reported:

. . . In our support of the infantry we arranged for the infantry to set off a smoke grenade -- green -- when they were held up. The nearest tank would go to the infantryman and find out what was holding up the advance. The infantryman would point out or otherwise designate the enemy resistance and the tanks would then overcome it. It worked very well. . . (AGF/165)

(10) Infantry-Tank Liaison in Combat. The question of liaison between the infantry and the supporting tanks was a particularly serious one during the period of rapidly moving action after the opening of the Spring Offensive. Provision for adequate numbers of liaison officers with equipment and transportation has not been made in the tables of organization and equipment of either arm. During the

operations throughout the offensive, separate tank battalions were often attached and detached from infantry units. Frequent change of attachment increases the problem of liaison between the supported and supporting units. Liaison parties were sent from the tank battalions to infantry companies, battalions, regiments, and to the divisions. Radios were removed from tanks not in use and installed in trucks, preferably 1/4-ton, when available. At times tanks were used for liaison parties. The experience of the 191st Tank Battalion with the problem of liaison was thus summarized by the Battalion Commander:

... The number of liaison officers should be increased. I have had fourteen parties out at one time. When attachment is changed there is often no time to recall liaison parties that are out, so new ones have to be formed and sent to the new organizations. There were times when I had to use almost any one, including first sergeants, for liaison work. I used officers from the maintenance platoon in addition to some overstrength officers I fortunately happened to have on hand. They were sent out on foot, in jeeps, in trucks, in tanks, and in any means of transportation that could be found. We usually strip the reconnaissance platoon of all vehicles for liaison parties. . . . (AGF/165)

Further experience from the report of the Commander of the 752nd Tank Battalion is also quoted as of interest on this subject:

... The infantry calls for a great many liaison officers when we are attached to them. We send them to the battalions, to regiments, and to the division. They use any transportation we can scrape up. We try to keep very close contact with the infantry and with our own units. Our liaison officers have been very useful many times in giving locations of the infantry units to their own commanders when they were out of contact. . . . I need from six to eight liaison officers with the battalion at all times when we are in combat. Those officers must be good and have special training prior to the time they are needed if they are going to be of any use in battle. . . . (AGF/165)

2. Infantry-Tank Destroyer Cooperation

(1) General. The primary mission of tank destroyer units is the antitank protection of the formation to which the destroyers are attached or are supporting. An important and profitable secondary role has been found to be general assistance and support of infantry, usually in the role of assault guns for such missions as attack and the reduction by direct fire of strong points, pillboxes, defended buildings,

and similar objectives. In this role, the destroyers and infantry must operate as a team and engage in mutually supporting action. General experience throughout the Campaign has disclosed a number of lessons in the employment of tank destroyers and infantry, which are briefly outlined below.

(2) Joint Planning, Combined Training, and Attachment.

As in the case of infantry-tank cooperation (Paragraph 18b, supra), close understanding and joint planning, combined training, and continued attachment of the destroyer battalions to the same infantry divisions, are essential for proper infantry and tank destroyer cooperation. As indicated in the report of Fifth Army, frequent changes of attachment from one division to another causes lack of coordination and proper cooperation between the two arms, and prevents the achievement of the required teamwork in action. The attachment of destroyer battalions to divisions should be, insofar as possible, on a permanent basis (5A/11).

(3) Necessity for Infantry with the Destroyers. When employed with infantry in the various roles indicated in Subparagraph

(1) preceding, the destroyers should always be accompanied by infantry in close contact. They should not be alone. Artillery support should be available to the two arms working as a team.

(4) Improper Use of Tank Destroyers with Infantry. Tank destroyers should not be used as tanks. They are not adapted to tank missions, and must not be used in advance of the infantry on such missions. One major lesson from the Campaign with respect to the employment of the two arms has been such misuse of destroyers by the infantry commanders to whom they have been attached. One destroyer battalion commander reported that his units had been used as tanks for tank missions no less than nine times in the period from 26 May to 11 June.

This improper use, quoted here as an example, was summarized in his report:

... During the planning stage for an attack it was found that practically without exception the infantry commanders were reasonable in their requirements and expectations of support by the tank destroyers. But once the battle was

joined, the original plans with few exceptions were often discarded and the destroyers were ordered to go forward as tanks ahead of the infantry and overrun the points of resistance. At least nine such missions were assigned to this battalion, some of which were to flank strong points, seize and hold features until the friendly infantry came up. . . (394/SR)

Similar experience has been reported by the Commander of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, though in the attack operation out of the Beachhead, it was declared that faulty employment of the destroyers by the infantry commanders was exceptional rather than the rule:

. . . Generally speaking the employment of the tank destroyers attached to regiments in this operation has been good, but in some instances battalion commanders have insisted on the destroyers preceding the infantry or have ordered them into unsuitable positions to perform certain missions. This has generally been due to the fact that the infantry battalion commander was not fully aware of the potentialities and limitations of these weapons and did not understand their limitations when employed against enemy infantry without sufficient support from friendly infantry.

Continued efforts to educate the infantry battalion commanders in the employment of tank destroyers should be made. Perhaps the most practical form of education will be to put over the idea of telling a tank destroyer company or platoon commander what his mission will be in a certain operation, and permit the tank destroyer officer to suggest positions and methods for accomplishing that mission . . . (AGF/172)

(5) Infantry-Tank Destroyer Liaison. As in the case of infantry and tanks, the maintenance of effective liaison between the infantry and the supporting tank destroyer units is of prime importance. Experience and opinion of the Commander of the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion has been thus reported:

. . . It is essential that adequate liaison be maintained between the tank destroyer company and the infantry regiment. This liaison is not difficult to achieve, but communications do sometimes break down. The battery tank SCR 610 is too heavy and cumbersome to be carried with advancing infantry elements. On one occasion an infantry regiment sent an SCR 300 to the destroyer company. It's worked out very satisfactorily, and it is recommended as the answer to this question of maintaining efficient communications between tank destroyers and infantry. . . (AGF/172)

(6) Target Designation by The Infantry. Target designation by the infantry for the supporting tank destroyers proved to be an important element in the effective cooperation of the two arms in action. The employment of infantry runners, and the use of smoke grenades to call

attention of the destroyers, followed by specific indication by tracer fire have been recommended by the Commander of the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion. His comment on this subject is quoted as follows:

... During operations calling for close support of infantry, a standardized system of target designation is essential. On some occasions the infantry company commander would dispatch runners to come back to the destroyers and point out the exact point of enemy resistance. This generally worked very well, and it is felt that many times this system may be the most satisfactory. Firing of .50 caliber tracer also worked very well, but it was necessary to use a smoke or flare signal to warn the destroyers to "watch my tracer," and a similar signal to "cease fire." . . . (AGF/172)

(7) Support by Destroyers from Prepared Positions. Support of infantry by tank destroyers in prepared positions has been preferable whenever the situation has permitted. Successful employment in this manner has been reported by the Commander of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion:

... In supporting an infantry attack a company of this battalion was in such positions (prepared positions well forward), and rendered valuable assistance and support to the infantry in destroying three enemy pill-boxes, two enemy self-propelled guns, and an enemy tank by direct fire. . . . (AGF/152)

(8) Special Missions in Support of Infantry. In some situations destroyers were used on special missions in support of the infantry to clean out strong points of resistance. An example of the employment of a single destroyer for this purpose with complete success is contained in a report from the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The details of preparation, reconnaissance, and consultation between the infantry commander and the destroyer commander are of special interest and significance:

... The Regimental Commander of the 338th Infantry reported that the advance of his 1st Battalion had been stopped by machine gun fire coming from somewhere on hill 109. I made a careful study of the hill with the infantry battalion commander, and we spotted all the likely locations for machine gun nests, although the infantry did not know their exact position, but only the approximate area from which the fire was coming. A foot reconnaissance for a position from which we could bring fire was made by the sergeant of the 1st Platoon and myself. I identified the targets to him. He then took one destroyer to the position by a defiladed route. The destroyer crew fired eighteen rounds of HE and one round of APC at the target area. Enemy personnel were seen to evacuate one dugout when a neighboring dugout was hit. The APC was used on one

position on which the HE had no visible effect. The APC followed by HE tore up the position effectively. The infantry reported that they received no more trouble from this area. . . (AGF/172)

(9) Movement in Support of Infantry. Effective employment of tank destroyers moving into action in support of infantry, as experienced by a company of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, has been thus reported:

. . . In moving with the assaulting infantry, no more than a section should move at one time. One section should cover the advance at all times. Short, quick moves are the best. If the advancing section is fired on, the covering section should take the enemy under immediate and rapid fire, even if they can't determine the exact spot of the originating fire. The advancing section should proceed to a place of cover without hesitation. I have found that the fire from the covering section tends to confuse the enemy. . . .

When called on by the infantry to flush the enemy from a house, one gun is generally enough to employ. It works well if your remaining guns cover the routes of egress from the house. In one instance when this method was used, not one of an estimated squad of the enemy escaped. . . . (AGF/165)

d. Tank Destroyer-Tank Cooperation

(1) General. The mission of the destroyers in support of tanks is to provide protection from enemy armor and to provide direct fire support when needed. The destroyers should normally engage the enemy armor, but they may be called on to attack with their fire hostile anti-tank guns, self-propelled guns, and other secondary targets when necessary in support of the friendly armor. In the combined action of the two arms, the destroyers should not be employed in offensive action in advance of the supported tanks. An exception to this principle occurs when the destroyers are engaged in countering an enemy armored attack. Overwatching protection has been proven by experience to be the most effective mission for destroyers in cooperation with armor, except in the one instance noted above.

(2) Proportion of Destroyers to Tanks. Reports from units of Fifth Army have all indicated that the most satisfactory proportion of tank destroyers to tanks when operating over terrain that permits their deployment is one platoon of destroyers to a company of tanks. (5A/LL)

(3) The 2-inch Gun in Support of Armor. The value of the high-velocity tank destroyer gun in countering similar enemy high-velocity weapons and in giving support and protection to friendly armor has been stressed by several commanders. "The 3-inch gun of our M-10 tank destroyer," the Commander of the 2nd Armored Group observed,

is the only comparable weapon at hand to the long-barreled German 75 and 88mm guns. Therefore, it is always desirable that tank destroyers overwatch the advance of our tanks. They are best placed in defilade positions, as their armor is not as heavy as that of our medium tank. . . The attachment of a tank destroyer battalion to an armored group will provide the necessary high-velocity guns to destroy the enemy tanks. . . (2d Arm. G. SR)

(4) Tank Destroyer Support of Tanks. The cooperative action of the tank destroyers and their supported armor in the earlier stages of the Spring Offensive revealed in some instances the need of more aggressiveness on the part of the destroyer commanders. Although the destroyers should not be pushed out in front of the armor, except in the emergency of mooting a hostile armored attack, they should nevertheless be well up to cover the movements of the tanks they are supporting. In some instances there was a tendency for the destroyers to remain too far behind, and their support fires on such occasions were less effective than they should have been. On this point the battalion commander of the 1st Armored Regiment reported early in July that

. . . in the recent operations it was evident that the tactical use of the tank destroyers was in some instances not skillfully or properly conducted. The M-10 vehicle, mounting its 3-inch gun, is the only truly dependable weapon to deal with the heavier armed and armored German tanks. At times the M-10 vehicles were not in position to lend their support. In some instances the crews of the M-10's were not sufficiently abreast of the situation, nor did they show the aggressiveness needed. On occasions they stayed back too far and were not overwatching the advance of the leading elements. . . (AGF/172)

In subsequent operations, the cooperation of the destroyers and their tactical employment showed a marked improvement in aggressiveness and close support. The Commander of the 1st Armored Regiment later reported that the destroyer support had been of the greatest assistance in the advance of the armor. In one instance he recorded that

...the destroyers were brought up into position over almost impossible ground, literally crushing down houses, and then succeeded in knocking out by direct fire at over 2,000 yards a German 150mm self-propelled gun. The first shot delivered broke off a track from the enemy self-propelled, and succeeding shots destroyed the gun and vehicle by burning. . . (AGF/172)

(5) Tank Destroyer-Tank Communication. As in the case of infantry and tanks, campaign experience showed a definite need of better communication between the destroyers and the tanks. Radio between the two elements did not prove to be reliable and often the tanks and destroyers were out of communication. A battalion commander of the 1st Armored Regiment drew attention to this problem in a report of lessons learned from the Campaign:

...There has been a definite need for a great deal of improvement in the communication set-up between tanks and tank destroyers. It has been frequently impossible to contact each other by radio, and this condition has helped to bring about a lack of proper cooperation. Some better means of communication between the two arms should be developed. . . (AGF/172)

(6) Attachment of Small Units vs. General Support. Experience in the employment of the destroyers in support of armor has varied somewhat among the different battalions. Generally speaking, the destroyers have been attached to the armored units, usually a platoon to a company, or a company to a battalion. Some destroyer commanders have recommended, especially in view of faulty communications, that the tank destroyers not be attached, but that the commander be given a mission of close support and be relied on to carry it out. The comments of the Commander of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion on this point are quoted below from a report of operations:

...In support of tank attacks the only policy we have been able to adopt has been that of attaching small units, companies or platoons to tank battalions or companies. In this situation the tank destroyers have followed closely behind the tanks until they found positions from which they could cover the advance. These positions have not been prepared, but wherever possible buildings have been used to afford some protection. This system works well only where there is close coordination and good communication between the tanks and tank destroyers. Planning must be done well in advance and all details agreed upon between the units concerned. . . (AGF/152)

Conversely, the Commander of the 191st Tank Battalion, in reporting on the subject, recommended that the destroyers not be attached, but rather the destroyer commander be given a mission and be held responsible for adequate support in the action:

. . . Because of difficulties in communication, it is inadvisable to attach tank destroyers to tank companies. The destroyers should be kept under their own unit control and be charged with furnishing close support to the tank unit. In some cases they should also assist by fire other than against enemy armor. . . (AGF/165)

19. THE COMBINED GROUND FORCE ARMS IN PURSUIT ACTION

a. General

The breaking of the German resistance before ROME resulted in a rapid and general withdrawal of the enemy in the American sector, followed by pursuit action on a large scale and on a wide front. In no other campaign in this Theater has there been a pursuit action involving American forces on a scale comparable to the operations of this period. A number of lesson-experiences were apparent from the action of the combined ground force arms in this phase of the Campaign.

b. Transition from Offensive to Pursuit

Prominent in the experience during this phase was the necessity for rapid transition from normal offensive action to pursuit operations. It was found that all echelons must be prepared to effect this change without delay, and exploit the success of their advance to the maximum degree. Lack of preparedness for the change from normal attack to pursuit often results in large numbers of the enemy escaping, or in the enemy conducting effective delaying rearguard action to permit the main body of his forces to withdraw successfully. In order to effect this transition with the maximum of results, it is necessary that all units be readily prepared to re-organize for pursuit, and have plans ready at all times in the event of such a change in the nature of the action. In some instances, this principle was not fully carried out. An example of frank opinion on this subject is quoted from the Commander of a special task force of the 1st Armored Division which was organized for the pursuit:

. . . An armored division must be prepared for success. We did not contemplate success as rapidly as it came, and the Division did not organize for pursuit as rapidly as it should. We were slow in changing our concept of the action, and as a result we were not properly organized for pursuit such as developed quickly. In the first instance attention was completely directed to the problem of breaking the enemy resistance, and we did not give enough thought to pursuit after the resistance should be broken. As a result, time was lost in organizing for pursuit. Time is the essence of pursuit action. In short, we were not fully prepared for the success we achieved. All divisions should be prepared for success and for the pursuit that follows, by organizing for pursuit while the breakthrough fight is going on. . . . (TFC.LAMd.p/VR)

C. Planning for the Use and Allocation of Roads and Routes

A highly important element in the transition from offense

to pursuit has been the proper advance planning and allocation of available roads and routes for the advance of pursuit columns. In some instances failure to make this preparation, and to allocate properly the routes to the different forces engaged have resulted in confusion, delay, and the slowing down of the pursuit forces. This in turn has resulted in the escape of enemy forces that might have otherwise been cut off, captured, or destroyed. Adequate supply of maps to all elements concerned proved to be an important factor in planning the pursuit and in making proper allocation of routes. Shortage of maps in one instance, and the resulting failure to designate routes for specific units, produced traffic difficulties and delay. The outstanding example of this lesson can be drawn from the action in the passage of the TIBER in pursuit of the enemy north of ROME. The Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, in his report of operations for the period has observed:

. . . After seizing the bridge across the TIBER River, the Division was to push in two columns to seize an initial bridgehead line approximately six miles beyond the TIBER. Due to non-availability of maps and the destruction of bridges south of ROME, tremendous traffic congestion developed and progress was very slow. Both Combat Commands and the Division Reconnaissance were forced into converging routes at the outset. The 36th Division was attempting to advance over the same route as Combat Command "A" and blocked the road when their artillery elements passed in front of our advance reconnaissance elements and made contact with an enemy strongpoint. Elements of another infantry division took the wrong route and were forced to countermarch over the route of advance of Combat Command "B". . . . (LAMd.D/RO)

c. Organization of Pursuit Task Forces

(1) In the transition from normal offensive action to pursuit operations, a number of pursuit task forces were organized and operated by the several major commands. These generally consisted of small, flexible, mobile, and hard-hitting forces composed of the several ground force arms. Insofar as possible, they were self-contained and self-sustaining for the particular missions assigned to them. The exact composition and formation of these task forces varied with the mission to be performed, the terrain involved, the available units at hand for employment, and with the nature of the enemy action in the sector where they were used. In some instances they were used to seek out and locate the enemy retreating forces after contact had been broken. In others they were organized to destroy enemy delaying forces and bring pressure on the main withdrawing force. In still other cases, they were designed to cut off and destroy elements of the enemy seeking to escape. In all situations, speed, mobility, and fire power to meet the enemy situation presently existing were the main considerations in the composition and use of these pursuit task forces. As a result of the experience with several combinations of these composite units, Fifth Army has drawn the conclusion that all pursuit task forces used under conditions such as prevailed in Italy should generally consist of elements of cavalry reconnaissance, artillery forward observers, engineers, tanks, tank destroyers, and mobile infantry. The proportions and order in column of these elements will naturally vary with the mission and the terrain.

(2) The report of lessons learned from Fifth Army has listed several different combinations and proportions of arms organized in pursuit forces for different missions. In the 36th Infantry Division, a successful combination was used as follows, organized initially in column:

3 tanks
3 tank destroyers
Platoon to a battalion of infantry
Continuous artillery support by leapfrogging

In this combination as many of the infantry as possible rode on the tanks, but the speed of the movement conformed to the pace of the foot troops.

In the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the following organization and composition was adopted with success:

Cavalry reconnaissance platoon
Artillery forward observer
Tanks (Carrying from a platoon to
Tank destroyers (a battalion of infantry

In this combination, Fifth Army recommended that a section of engineers, equipped with mine detectors and a bulldozer be added to the task force.

Two effective combinations of pursuit forces were organized by the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, designed for different types of missions, as follows:

(a) Light tank platoon
Artillery and assault gun forward observers
Engineer reconnaissance detachment
Squad to a platoon of infantry
Section of Tank Destroyers

(b) Company of medium tanks
Company of tank-borne infantry
Platoon of tank destroyers
Platoon of engineers
Platoon of light tanks
Cavalry reconnaissance elements to the flanks

(3) Within the 1st Armored Division, several combinations

were successfully employed. These varied with the mission, and especially with the nature of the road net available. The Commander of the 6th

Armored Infantry reported as follows:

. . . Where rapid advance is anticipated, more serious thought and planning should be given to road priorities and alternate routes of advance, so as to aid in eliminating confusion in the column. It is believed that flying columns and advance guards should be smaller. The roads available should be the determining factor in the number and composition of the small columns employed in advancing through a sector. The following formation is recommended where resistance is likely to be spotty or light:

1 platoon of medium tanks
1 section of tank destroyers
1 platoon of infantry
1 section of engineers
1 company of medium tanks, less one platoon
1 company of infantry, less one platoon
1 section of artillery

In pursuit it is essential that a part of the advancing unit be prepared to enter into a fire fight as soon as fired on. This fire will act as covering fire for maneuvering units and allow them to close in on the enemy more rapidly. . . .
(AGT/172)

The Chief of Staff of the same division also commented on the general organization and effective employment of these pursuit forces:

. . . A very successful use was made of small task forces in the rapid advance after the breakthrough. A number of small task forces was organized, each consisting in general of an armored battalion, a company or battalion of infantry, a battery of armored artillery, a platoon of tank destroyers, and a platoon of engineers. These should train together and be ready to hit at once when enemy resistance is encountered. A similar force is ready to follow through and continue the advance when the first force has cleared the way. The force which is passed through is then reorganized and follows behind ready for employment again. When the advance of the division is along several roads, each of the advancing columns should have these small task forces, and employ them in a similar manner. . . (AGF/165)

e. Reconnaissance Elements in Pursuit

- (1) Experience throughout the latter phases of the Campaign

showed that reconnaissance elements have been highly valuable in the pursuit operations, either alone, or in combination with other arms. They have been especially effective in combination with armored units. The following material has been extracted from the report of Fifth Army on lessons learned in the Spring Offensive (5A/LI).

(2) Reconnaissance elements have been successfully used in aggressive armored reconnaissance rather than in the passive security role. This is generally believed to be proper usage. The 36th Division found that the reconnaissance troop could operate at night with success, but should have infantry with it to outflank antitank and self-propelled guns.

(3) A reconnaissance team used with great success in the recent pursuit operations included:

- (a) An artillery forward observer with each platoon
- (b) 1 platoon of infantry with each reconnaissance troop
- (c) An engineer reconnaissance detachment

The infantry in this combination rode in the vehicles of the reconnaissance troop.

(4) Aggressive reconnaissance by the 91st and 117th Reconnaissance Squadrons was the rule rather than the exception throughout the current pursuit.

f. Employment of Pursuit Task Forces

(1) Aggressive action and proper internal organization to permit immediate deployment and flanking movement when resistance and

delaying forces are met were important factors in the employment of these pursuit forces. In some instances, there was failure to achieve these requirements in necessary degree. On this subject the Commanding

General, II Corps reported in the middle of June:

. . . The delay caused us by small enemy detachments is out of all proportion to the numbers and means at our disposal. Among other errors committed has been our failure to leave roads soon enough and make a wide enough envelopment or by-pass. . . Too often a column of tanks was inactive on a road, held up by a single self-propelled or antitank gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy, and attack the gun could have been reduced by 50% or more by rapid deployment of the tanks or a wide development which would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun. Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a road. Again the time wasted waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment. . . (IIC/LL/1)

(2) Experience showed that excellent results are obtained by employing two of these small pursuit task forces on each road or avenue of advance. By having a fully organized force prepared to pass through a leading force which has deployed to deal with delaying positions and forces, the advance can be maintained at a steady, unbroken rate. In this connection, the experience of a pursuit task force commander of the 1st Armored Division is quoted as a pertinent example:

. . . The spearhead of a pursuit should consist of a small, compact, highly mobile task force made up of the combined arms (tanks, tank destroyers, infantry, engineers, and reconnaissance) supported by artillery. Two such forces should advance on each axial road. When the leading force has been forced to deploy by enemy action, the rear force should be prepared to pass rapidly through or around the leading force as soon as the situation permits, so as to relentlessly maintain the continuity of the pursuit. Speed is the essence. All or part of the infantry should be mounted on the tanks rather than on their own carriers so that they may be made immediately available when needed, and so that the column may be made more compact by eliminating the infantry carriers.

When contact with an enemy road block has been made, one or more platoons of tanks with the infantry should immediately be ordered to make a close in envelopment of the enemy after a hasty reconnaissance. This will usually force the enemy to abandon his position, or at least will develop the situation. If carried out with sufficient speed, it will succeed in cutting off enemy rear elements. Time should not be wasted in making elaborate plans at this stage. For example, though an artillery concentration on the road block is doubtless desirable, the envelopment of the road block should not be delayed simply because artillery support is

not available at the moment. The attack and envelopment of the road block must be made at once, otherwise the enemy, having accomplished his delaying mission, will disengage and set his trap up again a few miles further on.

Attached reconnaissance elements should be used principally to patrol side roads. They are too thin-shinned for use as leading vehicles on the main axis.

Generally speaking, medium tanks should lead the pursuing column. When passing through villages or when approaching defiles, the commander should not hesitate to dismount one or more squads of infantry and require them to deploy and precede the tank column a short distance. The infantry must in this case be encouraged to move rapidly and boldly until fired upon, otherwise much time will be lost in skulking from bush to bush when actually the enemy may be miles away. . . (AGF/172)

20. AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS

a. General

Air support of ground operations throughout the period of the Campaign under consideration showed steady improvement and increased effectiveness. During the critical phase of the Beachhead defense at ANZIO, the assistance rendered by the supporting air units was of vital importance and had a full share in the successful holding of the beach-head area. In the Spring Offensive, the results of the air operations in conjunction with the ground advance were exceptionally outstanding. After the fall of ROME, the Commanding General, Fifth Army declared that the air support

. . . was magnificent. Taken from my point of view, this has been a demonstration of air support of the Ground Forces approaching perfection. The XII Tactical Air Command and all other units which have engaged in these operations have at all times given immediate response to every call for assistance with prompt and effective results. The aggressive action of the supporting air units has enabled us to show the enemy how irresistible the air-ground combination can become. . . (L/GG5A)

Two phases of the Campaign in the period here considered, the air-ground assault on CASSINO, and the Spring Offensive, were productive of lessons-experiences especially noted in the reports of the commanders concerned. These are outlined briefly in the succeeding paragraphs.

b. Air-Ground Lessons from the CASSINO Operation, March 1944

- (1) In the effort to take the strongly fortified town of

CASSINO and its contiguous positions by direct assault, close air support was employed on a scale never before attempted on a single objective in this Theater. The plan called for an overwhelming air bombardment by both medium and heavy bombers in large numbers, followed by an artillery preparation which in turn was to be followed by a vigorous infantry assault supported by tanks on the town and its adjoining positions. Although the attacking infantry succeeded in penetrating into a part of the defended town and gained control of part of the German positions, it was not possible to hold the ground thus gained, and the general operation was not successful. Although no specifically "new" lessons were learned from this operation, a number of important conclusions were drawn from the experience and certain methods of improvement in the operational technique of the both arms were advanced by the respective air and ground commanders.

(2) General lesson-experiences applicable to both ground and air operations, as reported by both commanders, were in brief as follows (TM5/AF 44):

Reported by Air Commander

- (a) The bombing of a fortified enemy stronghold such as CASSINO must be followed by a determined and vigorous ground attack which must be initiated in the shortest possible time after the last bomb has been dropped.
- (b) Employed in close support of a ground operation, air bombardment cannot be expected to obliterate strong defenses and determined resistance. This is especially true in the case of a fortified town such as CASSINO.
- (c) Heavy bombing of a strongly defended town will produce craters and masses of rubble from demolished buildings which become serious obstacles in the advance of attacking infantry and armored vehicles. These obstacles will also provide the enemy with advantageous firing points and positions for defense.

Reported by Ground Commander

- (a) The follow up of the infantry must be immediate and aggressive, employing the maximum infantry strength available. The maximum amount of infantry was not employed in this attack, nor was the attack pushed aggressively enough. Too great reliance was placed on the ability of the bombing to do the task alone.
- (b) The town of CASSINO was not only fortified, but use was made of cellars and tunnels. Despite the tremendous air effort, our infantry were met by a determined enemy in well fortified positions. It follows therefore that no aerial bombardment alone can clear an area of infantry who are well dug-in.
- (c) The heavy bombing hindered our advance by cratering and blocking the routes with debris. Due to cratering few tanks could enter the town. The tonnage of bombs dropped must be carefully considered in the ground plan of action, as debris and cratering hinders the use of armor.

Reported by Air Commander

(d) Provision must be made for bomb-line markers which can be clearly identified from the air at bombing altitudes.

(e) The capabilities and limitations of each arm must be mutually understood and appreciated. The closest cooperation must be achieved between the commanders and staffs of both arms.

Reported by Ground Commander

(d) Every possible means must be used to insure accurate identification of the targets by the pilots.

(e) Not specifically stated in the ground commander's report, but clearly implied in the report as a whole.

(3) The general lessons applicable to the air operations in the attack on CASSINO were thus summarized in the report of the Air Commander, and where indicated, by the Ground Commander (TW5/AF 44):

(a) In the CASSINO Operation, both Tactical and Strategic Air Forces were employed. The Tactical Air Force gave better performance and results, largely because close support is a normal operation for this type of air force. Conversely, close support missions are rare operations for the Strategic Air Force, which has little training and experience in such operations.

(b) In general, heavy bombers should not be used in close support operations when there is present an adequate Tactical Air Force.

(c) When operations require the use of heavy bombers in close support of ground operations, the following recommendations are advanced by the air commander:

(aa) When practicable, bomb leaders and bomb navigators should make a previous flight over the target area.

(bb) Bombing altitudes should be specified.

The heavy bombers showed a tendency to bomb from too high an altitude.

(cc) Angles of approach should be specified, especially when ground troops are close to the target area.

(dd) Intervals between bomber groups, especially when the wind is sufficiently strong to clear the smoke from the targets, should be decreased. The whole bombing operation should be concentrated in the briefest possible time.

(ec) A member of the Strategic Air Force Commander's staff should be present in position to observe the bombing action of his units, and should have radio communication with his units in the air.

(d) A percentage of bombs should be fuzeed for delay action to reach collars and penetrate heavily covered emplacements (Reported by the Ground Commander only).

(e) In a large scale air bombardment in which aircraft approach the target area from widely scattered points, an unmistakable artificial landmark such as smoke for the orientation of navigators would assist the entire air effort (Reported by the Ground Commander only).

(f) Alternate targets should be designated in case some flights of aircraft are late at the end of the schedule (Reported by the Ground Commander only).

(g) Despite its casualty effect and morale effect on enemy personnel, air bombardment by heavy bombers is not sufficiently accurate for general use in the tactical area of land battle (Reported by Commander, Allied Armies in Italy).

(4) The general lessons applicable to the ground operations in the attack on CASSINO were thus summarized in reports of the ground commander (TM5/AF 44):

(a) The infantry assault following the air bombardment must be immediate and aggressive and in maximum available strength. The maximum amount of infantry was not employed in this attack, nor was the attack pushed aggressively enough. Too much reliance was placed on the ability of the air bombardment to do the task alone.

(b) The initial assault waves must follow quickly the artillery barrage after the air bombardment. They should not stop to mop up isolated strong points and centers of resistance. Such centers of resistance should be left to clearing up or mopping up parties following the initial assault.

(c) Because of the craters and rubble created by the air bombardment, only a few tanks could enter the town in support of the infantry. Those that did rendered valuable support.

c. General Air-Ground Lessons from the Spring Offensive

The following general lesson-experiences from the air-ground operations in the Spring Offensive have been reported by the Commanding General, Fifth Army, in a report of lessons from this phase of the Campaign (5A/LL):

(1) The general air support was favorably commented on if it was far enough ahead. All units have a definite fear of friendly bombing and strafing from support too close-in.

(2) It has been found that many pilots are not well versed in the use of yellow smoke for ground identification, and those that are often cannot see it when in a dive. Prearranged air support missions with 3 to 4 hours' preparation have worked successfully. The air commander must know the particular plans of the division he is supporting.

(3) The Allied control of the air had a great moralizing influence on the ground troops. Air operations actually visible to the men created much enthusiasm and confidence.

(4) Air support as long range artillery is not only valuable but proved quite essential.

(5) Close-in air support requires additional and surer means of target identification if it is not to be a danger to friendly troops.

(6) Forward fighter bomber controls were established in two corps sectors. Experience in each was as follows:

(a) In one sector the forward control was at an observation post which afforded observation of the battlefield. The controller had available gridded photos and special maps of the area under observation, and had an accurate knowledge of the location of our own troops. This arrangement enabled the controller successfully to direct aircraft on major centers of resistance. An outstanding example was the bombing of CASTELBORATA about 1000 yards in front of our own troops. After the bombing, the resistance was greatly reduced, and our troops secured the town and dominating terrain with little difficulty.

(b) In the other corps sector the forward controller did not have a good view of the battle area. When the position of our

troops was accurately known, the forward controller was successful in directing planes on enemy positions. However as the breakthrough was achieved, and the situation became fluid, some errors were made and several attacks were made on our own troops. Therefore ground controllers must cease operations when the situation becomes fluid and the location of our troops is indefinite.

(7) Air power can be used to deepen and thicken artillery fire to assist the initial forward movement of infantry and tanks.

(8) The best protection from attacks by friendly aircraft on our own troops is a rigidly-adhered-to bomb safety line.

(9) Air support cannot remove isolated centers of resistance holding up the immediate advance. It can be very effective in interrupting enemy defensive preparations at a distance ahead of the advanced elements.

(10) Completely satisfactory identification of ground troops by friendly aircraft is still an unsolved problem.

(11) An element of calculated risk is always involved when aircraft are employed close to our own troops. This calculated risk must be accepted by ground troops in the same manner that it is accepted in connection with supporting artillery.

d. Support by Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft

(1) Armed reconnaissance by fighter-bomber aircraft was employed with great effect in front of the Fifth Army. Over 1000 enemy vehicles have been claimed destroyed or damaged in the course of one day's operations. Certain conditions must be fulfilled before armed reconnaissance can be effectively employed:

(a) Advance by ground troops must be at such a rate as to force enemy movement during daylight.

(b) There must be a disruption of the enemy anti-aircraft capabilities, caused by his forced movement of his anti-aircraft installations.

(c) The air units must have accurate knowledge of the location of our own troops. A clearly recognized bomb safety line must be established.

(d) Rapid means must be established for disseminating to all elements concerned information of changes in the bomb safety line.

(e) Rapid means must be provided for locating enemy movement and for directing attacking aircraft to the targets. This is an air problem and was solved by having all reconnaissance aircraft and fighter-bombers flash their observations to the fighter controller. The controller then directed flights to the targets and passed the information to the Tactical Air Command which could rapidly concentrate additional force on the target as necessary.

(2) Armed reconnaissance operations lose their value as the enemy recovers from his defeat and his daylight movement is reduced.

e. Close Air Support in Moving Situations

(1) In rapidly moving situations it becomes extremely difficult to provide the supporting air units with definite and accurate information as to the location of friendly troops. In such situations the necessity for target indicators is of great importance. Experiments were conducted during the Spring Offensive in the use of L-5 Artillery OP aircraft as target indicators for the supporting Tactical Air Force units. The system, called HOBSELY procedure, was worked out and tested by Fifth Army, and the following details are extracted from their report of lessons learned from the Campaign (5A/LL).

(2) The procedure was designated as follows:

(a) The 324th Fighter-Bomber Group was designated in close support of the 1st Armored Division.

(b) A forward fighter controller with VHF radio was established at the air strip of the 1st Armored Division.

(c) Four L-5 aircraft were secured from the Artillery Section of Fifth Army. VHF radios were installed in each of these aircraft and they were based on the air strip of the 1st Armored Division.

(d) Point to point radio channel was established between the 324th Fighter-Bomber Group and the 1st Armored Division air strip.

(e) The usual air support communications nets were in normal operation.

(f) The forward fighter controller was given a special code name (GREAT BEND).

(g) The L-5 aircraft were given code names (HORSEFLY YELLOW, HORSEFLY BLUE, HORSEFLY RED, AND HORSEFLY WHITE). Each plane was physically designated by having the upper surfaces of its wings painted the corresponding color above indicated for identification by the fighter-bombers.

(3) The procedure in action was as follows:

(a) A target would be discovered by forward observers or by artillery observation planes and would be reported to the Division Assistant G-3 Air, at the division air strip.

(b) A HORSEFLY plane would be dispatched from the air strip to locate the target and keep it under observation pending the arrival of fighter-bombers.

(c) Every hour flights of four fighter-bombers would report to the forward fighter controller (GREAT BEND) and ask for targets. If no targets were available they would be directed to attack some pre-arranged alternate targets. If a target were available they would be directed to rendezvous with the appropriate HORSEFLY plane at some designated point.

(d) The fighter-bombers and the HORSEFLY plane would then establish radio and visual contact. After above contact was established the HORSEFLY plane would describe and point out the target to the fighter-bombers.

(e) The fighter-bombers would attack and the HORSEFLY plane would observe and report the results.

(f) The HORSEFLY planes were flown by air force officers who were responsible for proper description and guidance of the fighter-bombers to the target. An officer of the supported division acted as the observer in each plane and was responsible that the target was enemy and safe to attack. He was also responsible that the pilot had the correct target.

(4) This system worked quite well and resulted in several successful attacks. Targets were few, and most missions were directed

to attack alternate targets. The procedure and communications were proved to be satisfactory. Certain definite limitations were determined as a result of field operations with this system:

(a) The HORSEFLY procedure operates best on a one division front. It should be used on the fronts of the division making the main effort.

(b) The best targets for HORSEFLY procedure are enemy movements forced on the road by aggressively advancing ground troops.

(c) HORSEFLY aircraft can safely operate at a 6,000-foot altitude and to a depth of about five miles into enemy territory.

(d) HORSEFLY procedure cannot be used to attack the opposition holding up the immediate advance, but can be successfully employed to attack delaying forces as they move from one position to another.

(e) A large air effort must be devoted to the operation. Unless the enemy is forced by ground action to move, this effort may be largely wasted.

SECTION V : INFANTRY UNITS

21. GENERAL

A. Infantry combat experience and the various lessons from operations in the period under consideration largely followed the pattern of those outlined in Section V, Training Memorandum No. 2 covering the earlier phases of the Campaign. As in the previous instance, field commanders again reported no "new" lessons as such, but placed further emphasis on a number of those brought out in the earlier period. Again it was demonstrated that our basic, battle-tested principles were productive of successful results whenever applied properly to fit existing and changing conditions. Comparable to the broad, general lessons of the Campaign as a whole (CP, Paragraph 16, Section IV, supra), an outstanding lesson of the Infantry was the need and development of the fullest cooperation and coordination of effort with the other combat

arms. With respect to the Infantry as an individual arm, various commanders have again re-emphasized a principal basic lesson of previous campaigns: the necessity for proper coordination and combined employment of the component infantry elements and support weapons to insure the greatest and most effective combination of fire power directed to meet the situation of the moment. The often-stressed subject of competent and vigorous troop leadership as a primary essential to achieve this end was also reiterated in the comments of commanders of all echelons.

b. The specific subject matter relating to infantry lessons emphasized in reports from field formations generally parallels the various individual topics contained in Section V, Training Memorandum

No. 2. Mountain warfare continued from the GARIBOLDI Line to the ALBAN HILLS. It again prevailed intermittently in the later phases of the pursuit and in the advance as the more rugged areas of TUSCANY were crossed and the defenses of the GOTIC Line were reached in the Northern APENNINES. The same general principles and experience delineated in the study of the previous period of the Campaign were applicable to the later phases: the long-stressed principle of working the high ground and ridges to outflank defended natural approaches and corridors; the problems of transport, communication, supply, and evacuation -- and their solutions under difficult field conditions; and the general principles of infantry tactics and their modifications born of experience in operations in mountainous terrain. All were again brought out in strong relief. One phase of combat not encountered on a large scale since the second phase of the Sicilian Campaign -- pursuit in rugged, mountainous country -- was again experienced. The vital importance of effective patrolling, the use of battle and reconnaissance patrols, especially in the preparatory period preceding the Spring Offensive, were again strongly reemphasized in the reports and comments of combat commanders. Likewise, the basic principles of effective movement, flanking, and envelopment as opposed to frontal attack were continually recognized as fundamental factors in the success of our infantry

operations. Again as in previous experience, town, village, and street fighting; the attack and envelopment of mutually supported strong points, fixed defended posts, pillboxes, and prepared defenses were all given special emphasis in reports of lesson-experience. As the full German retreat developed, the principles and problems of dealing with stubborn delaying forces, of forcing defended routes and blocks, and of destroying or by-passing strong delaying positions were brought out in the Campaign.

c. During the static period of the ANZIO-NETTUNO Beachhead, our infantry was for the first time in this Campaign forced to remain on the defensive for long periods of time. The general previous experience in North Africa, Sicily, and in the earlier phases of the Campaign in Italy had been largely characterized by tactics of attack and the employment of infantry in the offensive role. The Beachhead experience, covering more than three months of static warfare, brought out the prime importance of perfecting the tactics of defense and of applying them to the peculiar conditions that prevailed. Without having learned to maintain this successful defense within the Beachhead perimeter during the critical period under peculiar and difficult conditions, our troops could not have prepared and successfully carried out the break-out attack which contributed so much to the Spring Offensive. Unit commanders and their troops alike must recognize the importance of effective defense measures and tactics applicable to all types of situations. This was one of the great infantry lessons of the Beachhead fighting.

d. Detailed consideration and evaluation of the infantry lessons of the Campaign in the period considered reveal that the various reported lessons were not new, but were often old and familiar lessons re-learned and re-experienced. The individual subjects treated below include only those which have been particularly emphasized in the reports and recommendations of various field commanders. Some of them may repeat, for the sake of their importance, the experience reported in Training Memorandum No. 2. Other subjects already covered in this previous

memorandum and not given special attention in reports of field formations will not be repeated here.

22. INFANTRY PATROLLING

a. General

The subject of infantry patrolling has been treated in every combat lesson publication of this Headquarters from the early period of the Tunisian Campaign to the present. Although the comments and experience in the latter phases of the Italian Campaign do not present new lessons in this subject, they have nevertheless, been given such strong emphasis in current reports of unit commanders that their inclusion here is considered imperative. The importance of the subject is manifest in the terse comment of the Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, who stated in a report of tactical lessons in the early period:

...Patrolling is one of the most important phases of combat. Greater emphasis must be placed on the training of patrols for both day and night operations. . . (36ID/LL)

Likewise, the report of combat lessons from the same general period published by II Corps restated the same point in almost identical terms (IIC/LLL). As indicated in practically all campaign experience, the requirements of individual training, initiative, and proficiency, as well as planned, coordinated teamwork and collective action in the technique of effective patrolling can be achieved and maintained only through sound basic infantry training and constant refresher training. The training of new men in proficient patrol action is a subject of vital interest to all commanders.

b. Patrol Missions

Of special importance to the success of patrol activity is the fixing of a mission capable of accomplishment in the time allowed and under the prevailing conditions. Simplicity of mission has been found essential to success. Proper allowance in time must be made for the necessary preparations, prior planning, and reconnaissance. In many instances these considerations have been overlooked or neglected

under the pressure of combat. In the lessons of the Spring Offensive,

Headquarters Fifth Army reported:

. . . Too often patrols are sent out on missions bordering on the impossible. The fault lies in the failure to appreciate the detailed preparation necessary to the performance of a patrol mission. Patrols are ordered to secure information far in excess of their capabilities. The result is often the return of a patrol which, unable to accomplish all it set out to do, has failed in its mission. . . Patrols must be given simple missions, capable of performance, and when such is the case they will generally secure more information than they are initially ordered to obtain . . . (5A/LL)

The above principles were again re-emphasized in greater detail by Fifth

Army in a special memorandum which directed more intensive troop training in the subject:

. . . Innumerable cases have been cited in which Commanders or members of their staffs have prescribed patrol missions which have been impossible of accomplishment because of limitations and restrictions imposed on the mission. Often the patrol is ordered to return from its mission by a certain time with a detailed list of items of information which cannot, if the mission is properly executed, be gathered in the time allowed. Too often there is failure to consider properly the time involved in the selection of the patrol, assembly of personnel, equipping of the patrol with special equipment it does not normally carry, prior reconnaissance by the patrol leader, briefing of the patrol members, and the movement of the patrol to the initial point from which the mission is to start. . . (TM4/5A)

With respect to the assignment of patrol missions, a Division Commander further reported in a summary of tactical lessons:

. . . Company commanders should be assigned the patrol missions and should be allowed to accomplish them in the manner and with the means they think best. Neither the Division nor Regiment should specify the size and equipment of a patrol . . . (36ID/LL)

c. Patrol Leadership

As reported by units of the Fifth Army, combat experience throughout the Campaign has indicated the vital importance of competent patrol leadership. The success or failure of a patrol depends, in the final analysis, on the qualities of leadership possessed by the patrol leader. In a great majority of cases, commanders have selected their best officers and non-commissioned officers to perform this duty. (TM4/5A).

d. Discipline in Patrol Action

The strictest discipline must be developed among troops selected for patrol duty, and must be maintained throughout all patrol action. There must be rigid control to prevent all unnecessary noise, such as talking, coughing, and particularly firing. All movement must be regulated to take full advantage of prevailing conditions. Failure to observe these principles may often nullify the effort of a patrol which, nearly finished with its mission, may reveal its presence and purpose by ungarded, careless movement or violation of discipline by one of its members. Patience is of extreme importance in this respect, and is properly a most vital element of patrol discipline. (T114/5A).

e. Night Reconnaissance Patrols

Night reconnaissance patrols, as distinguished from battle or combat patrols, should be kept small, and must depend on stealth, control, quietness of movement, and security for their success. Rifle fire should be used by such patrols only when the target is clearly defined and the sights are thoroughly visible. Hand grenades are a most effective weapon for night patrols. (IIC/112).

f. Specially Organized Battle Patrols

Experience in the Campaign, especially in the AVZIO-NERTUNO Beachhead, led a number of commanders to resort to the employment of specially organized, semi-permanent patrols of picked men whose principal duty was to perform patrol missions for the general parent unit. A number of advantages accrued from this system. It developed experts in this type of combat activity, and especially effective results were obtained. These "battle" patrols were found to be particularly effective in the preparatory period before the Spring Offensive, and in the general operations in the Beachhead. In the latter connection the Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, declared:

... As a result of operations on the Beachhead, I have become convinced that we must have the equivalent of the World War I scout platoon to carry out deep patrols and raids where skilled, determined men are essential to success. We are now (10 April 1944) organizing such a

battle patrol group within the Division, and in each infantry regiment. All members of these groups are volunteers who want to get into close combat with the German. . . . (AGF/147)

Similarly Fifth Army Headquarters reported some five months later in a special memorandum on patrolling that:

. . . Some of the units have constituted permanent patrols whose principal function has been to execute various patrol missions. These "professional" battle patrols usually consisted of one officer and fourteen men. The officers selected have been volunteers, the most aggressive, tough, and rugged officers of the battalions. They have been permitted to select from the battalions men possessing the same qualities. . . . (TFL/5A)

Further comment and opinion on the subject is available from the report of a Division G-2, based on wide experience within the ARZIO-RETTINO

Beachhead:

. . . Lateral and close-in security patrols should be left for execution by elements of the front-line infantry battalions, but we have come to the conclusion that reconnaissance for important information must be done by a group of specialists who do nothing else, if you are going to get proper results. A special group of picked men, thoroughly trained and given special rehearsals whenever possible, can be depended upon to do the job properly. . . . (AGF/147).

Of equal interest and significance was the comment of the Regimental Commander of the 7th Infantry on this same subject, who also pointed out the important relationship of patrolling to the combat efficiency of infantry units in the line:

. . . Toward the end of our tour in the line here in the Beachhead, our standard of patrolling got materially worse, because of excessive losses among good officers and NCO patrol leaders. A unit bogs down as soon as the standard of its patrolling drops. I think the Battle Patrol is the solution. These men are used about once in every three days; between missions they can rest and rehearse, and can do an effective job whenever they are called on for a patrol mission. . . . (AGF/147)

G. Employment of New Men in Patrols

The size of a patrol should not be increased merely to give experience to green men. This jeopardizes the success of the entire patrol. New men should be made up into patrols under an experienced leader, and be sent out on minor missions 200 to 300 yards in front of

our lines. As their skill and confidence increases, the distance from the lines and the difficulty of the missions assigned should be increased. Every company commander must know the capabilities and state of training of all men used for patrol work. (IIC/LL)

4. Importance of Patrol Action before the Spring Offensive

During the preparatory period before the Spring Offensive, a particular effort was made in all sectors to secure accurate and detailed information as to the location, disposition, and strength of the enemy defenses. This was accomplished to a great extent by continually active and effective patrols which constantly probed the enemy lines, secured information, and virtually dominated Mo Man's land. Higher commanders have pointed to the value of this patrol activity as one of the important factors in the initial successes of the offensive. From it accurate intelligence data were obtained and effectively used in planning the details of the general attack. The patrol activity in this connection on the AVZIO-RETUO Beachhead was especially important and contributed materially to the success of the break-out attack. Headquarters Fifth Army reported on this point in August:

. . . In the recent attacks from the AVZIO Beachhead, vigorous, aggressive patrolling was largely contributory to the success of the attacks. It is of profound importance that infantry and reconnaissance units receive careful, thorough, and detailed training in scouting and patrolling. . . (TM14/5A)

Likewise the lessons of the Offensive prepared by Fifth Army quoted the significant experience of one infantry regiment:

. . . One Regimental Commander stated that the success of his organization in the break-out from the Beachhead was due to the vigorous, endless patrolling at night which curtailed the enemy's construction of strong defensive works and deepened Mo Man's land by 2,000 yards. The enemy in this particular sector eventually abandoned all small outposts. Another effect of this patrolling was the reduction of accurate fire on our positions in daytime which allowed our troops more than average rest. . . (5A/IL)

I. Miscellaneous

(1) Training in map reading cannot be overemphasized in the preparation of men for patrol activity. (TM14/5A)

(2) Patrols must be taught the vital importance of crawling. Many needless casualties and patrol mission failures can be traced to improper crawling or exposure as a result from failure to crawl. (IIC/LII)

(3) In defense, Mo Man's land should be dominated by patrol action. Aggressive patrolling keeps the enemy off balance. It enables a commander to "take the punch" out of an enemy attack before it is well started. (CG 3ID, AGF/147)

(4) All company officers should be trained and capable of leading patrols. Although officer patrols should be kept to a minimum, company commanders should strive to give each of his officers patrol experience. (36ID)

(5) Radio has been found to be most useful in maintaining contact with the main body, and can be used to send back timely items of information. The use of a simple, pre-arranged code assists materially in this type of transmission of intelligence. (TII4/5A)

(6) Patrols must be imbued with the desire to accomplish their assigned mission. More intensive training should be given in the training centers in patrolling under combat conditions. (30Inf./LI, AGF/147)

23. MOUNTAIN WARFARE

a. General

Infantry experience in mountain warfare in this Theater has been progressively cumulative. Principles initially learned and applied in Northern Tunisia were profitably followed, improved and extended in the brief campaign in Sicily. Throughout the fighting in Italy, the substance of mountain experience has been further developed and applied in the extensive operations in rugged, difficult terrain. In the latter period of the Campaign, no new lessons have been learned, but the reports and comments of commanders represent the cumulative knowledge gained from long experience. The following paragraphs summarize the main points emphasized by various responsible headquarters.

b. Acquacy of Mountain Training in the United States

Reports of units participating in mountain fighting have

all commented favorably on the standard and soundness of the mountain training provided in the United States. In a summary of lessons from the Spring Offensive, Headquarters Fifth Army reported:

. . . Considerable mountain operations have been experienced here in Italy. Some units had special mountain training prior to being committed to action. . . The mountain warfare training as conducted in the United States has been considered sound and effective. . . .
(54/LL)

It was further pointed out, however, that some divisions which had not had prior special training in mountain operations "did not suffer operationally as a result of this omission." Infantry troops without special mountain training, if adequately conditioned physically and given sound basic instruction in the use of mule transport, packboards, and supply functions, have been found to perform well in mountain operations.

9. Major Principles from Combat Experience

(1) Infantry combat in mountainous terrain generally involves the seizure and holding of commanding heights, ridges, communications routes and centers, and other key terrain features. The broad principles of mountain fighting are essentially the same as those in other normal types of country, but often require special application. Mountain operations do, however, impose special problems and difficulties in supply, transport, and communication. Cumulative experience of the 34th Infantry Division, a formation which had not had special training in mountain warfare prior to its arrival in the Theater, was thus summarized in a report of lessons from several campaigns:

. . . Mountain warfare involves no new basic principles and in most instances in Italy it has not required special troops. It does require some special equipment -- particularly warmer clothing and light weapons. The extremely difficult terrain encountered in the Italian mountains requires men to undergo extreme hardship and necessitates top physical condition. . . .
(34ID/LL).

Similarly, Headquarters Fifth Army reported at the conclusion of the Spring Offensive:

. . . Operations in mountains produced particular problems in supply, evacuation, and communication, but there was no difference in the tactical aspects from those in normal terrain. . . (5A/LL).

(2) Advancing forces must work the ridges and high ground, and must avoid natural corridors and approaches. This point has been stressed in the lesson-reports of all previous campaigns in this Theater. The Fifth Army lessons covering the later period of the Italian Campaign include the following significant example:

. . . One division, after the break-through in the MINTURNO area maintained its rate of advance steadily by keeping to the high ground, while the enemy invariably defended the natural avenues of approach, the latter being by-passed by our troops. . . (5A/LL).

The Commanding General, II Corps, likewise summed up the results of this principle after the fall of Rome in a single sentence:

. . . In the long run, speed was made over high ground, and not over roads and flat lands. . . (IIC/LL2).

A month later the same commander again drew attention to this principle in a supplementary report of lessons learned:

. . . In the attack, our troops must stick to the ridge lines and high ground, and avoid draws, valley floors, and other obvious routes of approach. . . (IIC/LL3).

(3) Mountain operations are generally carried out through the action of small units, battalions, companies, and platoons. The individual operations of small combat groups are of especial importance. Elements and detachments frequently must operate separately and may often be isolated from one another. The experience of the 88th Infantry Division was thus summarized:

. . . A unit to operate in the mountains should be trained to a high degree in independent action of small units, plus the addition of pack artillery. . . (5A/LL).

(4) Mountain combat requires the highest standard of individual initiative, resourcefulness, and leadership on the part of commanders and their subordinate officers and non-commissioned officers.

(5) Concentration of adequate strength and fire power at decisive points is especially necessary in mountain warfare. Loose, broad, or extended fronts do not lend themselves to successful operations in mountainous terrain.

(6) The highest standard of physical conditioning of the troops still remains one of the most essential elements in mountain combat.

(7) Infantry troops are most suitable for mountain operations. Specially trained mountain troops are generally required only in difficult sectors.

(8) The time required for the conduct of operations in rugged, mountainous terrain, including planning, preparations, movement, and supply, must be fully considered by all commanders. The logistics involved in such operations differ widely from those applicable to flat or rolling country. This point was emphasized in a summary of experience in II Corps:

... Operations in mountainous terrain are slow. Movement and maneuver of troops require increased time, lengthy reconnaissance, and careful traffic control. Careful planning is also of extreme importance, especially with respect to time. From 24 to 48 hours, after the decision has been made, are often required to bring into action a division reserve unit the size of an infantry regiment. . . (IIC/LL1).

(9) In mountain operations, it is necessary to leave back a portion of the organic supporting weapons because of the difficulties in ammunition supply. A lesser number of weapons well supplied with ammunition is more valuable than the normal allowance poorly supplied. (IIC/LL3).

(10) Provisional mule trains have been found to be indispensable for supply and for transport of heavy infantry weapons. Basic training of infantry in the fundamentals of pack transport is essential to successful mountain operations. (5A/LL).

(11) Fieldcraft, personal self-care of the individual soldier, and proper precautions against cold and inclement weather must be stressed by all unit commanders. These subjects of training are especially important in mountains, where resupply of fresh clothing, supplies, and medical stores is difficult, slow, and limited. (3AD/LL).

(12) Engineer assistance to the infantry in mountain operations is often vital to success. Infantry commanders should learn to make the most of such assistance in furthering their advance and keeping up their supplies through difficult terrain. (AGF/144).

(13) Troops should avoid prominent landmarks, terrain features, trail junctions, and similar locations in establishing their bivouacs and positions. The enemy whenever possible will have registered on such features and will bring fire on them. A platoon commander of the 133rd Infantry reported in this connection:

. . . During one phase of the mountain fighting my platoon dug-in in the vicinity of a prominent trail junction. That evening Jerry threw some 170's on that junction. My platoon suffered three casualties, but the results might well have been worse. The lesson learned was, avoid as much as possible all prominent landmarks on which Jerry may have "zeroed-in," such as cross-roads, trail and road junctions, main stream beds, and the like. . . (34ID/LL).

(14) Maintenance of contact is particularly difficult in offensive action in mountainous terrain. Each platoon should have men especially trained in maintaining contact with units on either flank. Reliance must not be placed on reported locations of friendly flank units. Contact must be maintained physically, and if broken, connecting groups should be sent out to locate the flank units. (IIC/LL3).

24. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS -- ANZIO-NETTUNO BEACHHEAD

a. General

As previously mentioned in Paragraph 21c, *supra*, the operations within the ANZIO-NETTUNO Beachhead provide the only instance in this Theater since the close of the Tunisian Campaign in which large forces of our troops have been compelled to go on the defensive and to resist major German attacks. The main burden of this defense was carried by the infantry, which was forced to conduct its operations in extremely adverse conditions of terrain which in many instances required modification of normal tactics and improvisation. A pertinent example may be quoted from the G-3, 34th Infantry Division, who reported at the end of April, 1944:

. . . The 34th Infantry Division was wholly on the defensive throughout April. At no time in its combat history had the Division been on the defensive in such unfavorable terrain.

Because of the enemy's advantage in observation, movement in the regimental areas was restricted to the hours of darkness, and even the most rearward elements of the Division were dug-in. . . (34ID/11).

The unusual situation which prevailed throughout the Beachhead period did not produce "new" lessons in the tactics of defense, but it did result in impressing strongly on commanders and their troops the vital necessity of perfecting and maintaining their defenses under entirely new conditions. The peculiar characteristics of the terrain and the general situation which gave the enemy superior ground and observation led to the modification of basic principles to fit the local conditions, and to the special application of these principles in a way not before experienced.

b. Limitations Imposed by Terrain

A brief summary of the terrain characteristics of the Beachhead has been given in Section III, Paragraph 13, supra. One of the chief problems in defensive tactics was the limitation on field excavation and position organization imposed by the conformation of terrain and composition of the ground. The open, flat areas were often critically exposed to observation and fire, and one chief difficulty was caused by ground water. In large areas of the Beachhead it was virtually impossible to dig in to any effective depth without striking water which would flood out the position. This condition was especially severe during the winter rainy season, but even in the later and drier period, it still prevailed. During the middle of April a Ground Forces observer who made special study of the terrain and its effect on defensive positions reported:

. . . The impossibility, in large portions of the Beachhead, of digging more than one foot below the surface of the ground without striking water, has been previously reported. To date there has been no improvement in this situation. Many platoon positions are located on the banks of streams or ditches because these are the only locations where the ground is sufficiently drained to permit digging of foxholes. . . (AGF/147).

Similar testimony of experience was recorded in the comments of a Battalion Commander whose unit served in the Beachhead from the initial landing:

. . . The idea of securing all-around defense by organizing positions in depth is sound, but it is not practicable here. Usually the only place where men can dig without hitting water one foot below the surface is along the bank of a stream or ditch. Therefore, everybody in a platoon, and frequently everybody in a company, are practically on a line. However, even with this linear defense, some men are detailed to fire to the flanks and others are prepared to fire to the rear if necessary. . . (CO1Bn.7Inf./AGF/147).

Likewise the Regimental Commander, 7th Infantry, also pointed to the effect of the terrain on organizing his defensive sector:

. . . The most unusual thing about our dispositions here is that they are almost entirely governed by the practicability of digging-in. There are only certain locations where the men can dig foxholes. You put them there because those areas are the only places the men can be and live. This leaves you with gaps and other problems that would never occur if you could place your troops where you would like to have them. . . (CO7Inf./AGF/147).

Experience of a similar nature with respect to the supporting anti-tank weapons was also recorded by the Executive Officer, 15th Infantry after several months of combat in the Beachhead:

. . . We found the defense principles given in the manuals to be sound; but we also found that the usual methods of defense could not be followed blindly in this terrain. At first we tried to put in our antitank guns in depth. We had a 500-yard front to hold, and there were not enough antitank guns to cover the frontage and still have depth. That left gaps in the AT defenses that were filled by bringing tanks and tank destroyers well forward. These were such big targets, since they could not be dug-in; that many of them were knocked out by German 88mm guns and Mark VI tanks. As a result we lost some ground to tank-led attacks. Then we put all our antitank guns right in the front line wherever they could be dug-in to cover the front. We placed the tanks and tank destroyers well back but ready to move up to reinforce the antitank guns. After we took this action, we stopped all the tank-led attacks cold. . . (15Inf./AGF/147).

The flat terrain prevailing throughout large areas of the Beachhead often necessitated re-orientation and readjustment in the tactics of defense that had become habitual among troops who had recently fought for long periods in the mountains. Also, the prevalence of drainage ditches and canals, which afforded the enemy excellent opportunity for infiltration, necessitated special measures of defense. The Operations Officer, 30th Infantry reported early in April:

• • During the German attacks on our position at the end of February, we had two battalions holding the line. The ground in front of our position was a maze of ditches from ten to twenty feet deep. These ditches were winding and had very steep sides. It was necessary to put two or three automatic weapons to fire down each ditch in order to stop the Germans from infiltrating through at night. The allowance of machine guns was entirely inadequate to do that as well as to provide final protective fires across the flat land between the ditches. . . .

• • We did not dig communication trenches in the places where the ground would have permitted, but we realized now that we should have done so wherever we could. This is just one of the ways in which our experience in the mountains affected our actions here. I think everybody had difficulty in adjusting themselves to the change from mountains to land as flat as a table top. . . . (30Inf./AGF/147).

c. Unit Boundaries in Defensive Positions

Defensive operations in the Beachhead demonstrated strongly that boundaries of responsibility between units should not coincide with avenues of approach. Dispositions should be so arranged that such avenues do not become subjects of divided or joint responsibility, but should be included in the sector of one unit. Opinion from the Commander of the 179th Infantry may be quoted as an example from battle experience:

• • The Germans always seem to attack astride the boundaries between units. I cannot emphasize too strongly the necessity of a close tie-in at limiting points. The two commanders concerned should always meet on the ground near the limiting point, and there agree on the details of cooperation. . . . I think our theory of locating boundaries between units in defense is questionable. The boundaries must not run down avenues of approach. One unit must be given complete responsibility for the defense of each road, ravine, or avenue of approach. Split a key terrain feature if you must, but do not divide the responsibility for the defense of any avenue of approach. . . . (30179Inf./AGF/147).

d. Importance of Automatic Weapons

Although the importance of automatic infantry weapons in normal defensive operations is basic and familiar, the peculiar conditions that prevailed in the Beachhead not only reemphasized this point, but also demonstrated that in some situations the complement of infantry automatic weapons must be greatly increased and reinforced if the defense is to be maintained successfully. Many commanders reported that additional heavy and light machine guns, and submachine guns were vital to the defense of the difficult positions that had to be held. This necessity was well illustrated in the report of a Battalion Commander of the 180th Infantry:

... We have found it necessary to use a great number of additional machine guns to hold this beachhead. Each rifle company has four instead of two. The two front-line companies each have a platoon from the heavy weapons company located in their areas. Each of those platoons have four water-cooled guns and four light machine guns. That is a total of twelve machine guns per front-line company, and one company found some extra light machine guns somewhere and actually operated seventeen guns in the line. We held our positions during the German attacks of 16-19 February, but we could not have possibly done so if we had had only the 1/2 allowance of machine guns. . . (OO2En.180Inf./AGF/147).

With reference to the same subject, a Regimental Operations Officer in the same general sector likewise declared that

... such frontages as we have to hold in terrain like this require extra automatic weapons if you are going to hold with reduced-strength companies. We could hold in daylight or on bright moonlit nights, but we were badly worried about the possibility of the Germans storming the positions on dark nights. Therefore for example, our 1st Battalion had four MG's per rifle company, eight heavy machine guns in the heavy weapons company, plus nineteen more machine guns which they took over from the outfit they relieved. . . (179Inf./AGF/147).

Another Battalion Commander likewise stated with respect to automatic weapons in defense, with particular reference to the great German attack of 16-19 February, 1944:

... On defense in terrain like this, you will need all the machine guns you can get. Against such an attack as the Germans pulled in the middle of February, I don't believe we could have possibly held our positions if we had not had them. . . (AGF/147).

In the 34th Infantry Division, similar experience has been reported. The following extract from the combat lessons compiled by this formation is quoted as illustrative not only of the importance of automatic weapons and training in their use but also the importance of sound training in defensive as well as offensive action:

... A stable defensive position requires an entirely different type of training from that required for offensive action. Riflemen should be trained in the operation of machine guns in emergencies, since it will ordinarily be necessary to employ more than the standard number of machine guns. It is also valuable to have rifle company personnel trained in fire adjustment methods. . . (34ID/LL).

e. Stamina and Morale -- Proper Relief of Troops

One of the most significant lessons of the period of static defense in the ANZIO-PTUTUO Beachhead was the effect of long, static defense action on the individual soldier. In offensive action, morale is invariably high, and frustrated, mental weariness does not present so great a problem. Long periods of static defense under the conditions which prevailed in the Beachhead resulted in serious undermining of the stamina, morale, and aggressive will to fight on the part of even the strongest and most battle-seasoned troops. Adequate relief from the line, proper intervals of rest and refit, and frequent, intelligent orientation of the men in the world battle situation especially with reference to their own part in it, all proved to be answers to this serious and difficult problem. A Battalion Commander of the 7th Infantry, whose unit fought continuously from the landings of 22 January to the fall of Rome, summarized the problem as follows:

. . .The biggest defensive lesson from the fighting here is that you cannot leave an outfit in the front line under these conditions for thirty-eight days and have any fighting spirit left. Not in terrain like this where any movement in daylight is suicide. "Texhole-itis" develops. Toward the close of our thirty-eight day stay in the front lines, we could hardly get our former most aggressive NCO's to move out of their fox-holes. Right now I rate my battalion as not over fifty percent as good a fighting outfit as it was before this extended stay in the defensive front line positions. . .Of course, we have never been on the defensive before, and the sudden change from "dismissing it out" to "sitting and taking it" does not help any. . .(CO2Rn.7Inf./ACF/147).

Identical opinion and experience have been reported by various other commanders. An officer of the 168th Infantry, whose unit had not been employed in a defensive role for any length of time, likewise declared:

. . .One of the most neglected problems, neglected out of necessity, is the physical and mental effect of a defensive position over extended periods of time on the individual soldier. In any defensive position the men must remain for long periods at their assigned stations. In a position in which the enemy is in close proximity, they must remain in their slit trenches throughout all hours of daylight, and they must stay in the immediate vicinity at night. The necessity of being constantly on the alert precludes the possibility of sleep at night or rest and diversion in the daytime. . .(34ID/LL).

As to practicable corrective measures and solutions to the problem of morale and stamina, the Chaplain of the 180th Infantry reported from long experience that

. . . it has been shown that the greatest thing in maintaining morale is to keep the men informed of what is going on in the war in general and to convince them that what they are doing is of importance in winning the war. Morale dropped here for a time when the men got the idea that they were stymied on this Beachhead and that their sacrifices were not accomplishing a part in winning the war. We started a campaign to get information daily to every last private in this regiment about the progress of the war in Russia and elsewhere. After this there was a noticeable improvement. . . . Next to lack of information, and its resultant sense of frustration, the biggest handicaps in a defensive situation like this are physical conditions, rations, lack of bathing facilities, and general living conditions. Frequent reliefs from the front line are necessary. . . . (180Inf./AGF/147).

f. Miscellaneous Points in Defensive Action

(1) A major defensive lesson has been the necessity of dominating No Man's land from the beginning. The German consistently works his lines up close, so as to escape mortar and artillery fire. The use of aggressive combat patrols to eliminate enemy outposts and counter-patrol activity is essential to the maintenance of static defense. (3Bn.30Inf./AGF/147).

(2) Improvement of defensive positions must be continuous. Damage from hostile fire and from weather must be promptly repaired.

Good practice is to equip each man with four sandbags, which can be carried tucked in his belt to the rear. They are little hindrance to carry and permit the construction of a strong parapet for foxholes as soon as they are dug. (34ID/LL and 180Inf./AGF/147).

(3) The 37mm Antitank Gun has been used effectively in outposts to destroy or neutralize hostile outposts and machine-gun nests, and also enemy battle groups. (30Inf./AGF/147).

(4) Maintenance of the defensive role in static positions requires a greater and more extensive infantry communication system. Wire assumes exceptional importance under these conditions. (180Inf./AGF/147 and 34ID/LL).

(5) During reliefs of units in the frontlines, the practice of the relieving unit taking over the heavy weapons of the unit relieved

has been found to be sound and practicable. It insures against any disruption of prepared protective fires or disorganization of the fixed defense. (ACF/147).

(6) One defect experienced in position organization has been the placing of wire entanglements too far from the forward defense positions. A distance of 75 to 100 yards, depending on terrain, has been recommended by one Division. (3ID/41).

(7) Foxholes should have some overhead cover to give protection from air-bursts and tree-bursts. Such cover should not, however, restrict the rifleman's field of fire. (IIC/41).

(8) In defensive action, the use of all mines, antitank and anti-personnel, must be carefully coordinated, and the locations of minefields must be accurately recorded. It is vital that accurate and up-to-date information be passed to all units concerned, especially units which relieve those in the affected areas. (157Inf./ACF/147).

(9) Houses are not good locations for strong points in flat terrain such as prevailed in the Beachhead. They are prominent landmarks and become excellent artillery targets. (ACF/147).

(10) When a weakness in a position is recognized, immediate measures must be taken to correct the deficiency. A resourceful enemy will soon detect position weaknesses. (3ID/ACF/148).

25. FLANKING AND ENVELOPMENT vs FRONTAL ATTACK

Experience throughout all phases of the Campaign repeatedly confirmed the soundness of the familiar principle of flanking and envelopment. The nature of the terrain and the characteristics of the fighting in the period under consideration (Cf. Sections II and III, supra) brought out the importance of this principle in stronger relief than ever before. After the fall of Rome and the advance into northern Tuscany, Headquarters Fifth Army reported in the general infantry lessons of the Offensive:

... There appears to be no question as to the value of flanking movements as compared to frontal attacks. The latter were invariably found to be more costly in personnel. The old basic principle of fire and movement is still sound. . . (5A/41).

It is significant in the latter connection that the same point was prominent in the first lessons reported from the early phases of the Tunisian Campaign, in which it has been stated that "in almost every situation the most important single element of infantry combat is the effective use of fire and movement." (TM/44/AFHQ/43). Likewise in Sicily, the lessons compiled gave emphasis to the same subject: "Frontal attack was avoided. The basic principle of fire and movement was adhered to, with emphasis on envelopment from the flanks." (TM/50/AFHQ/43). In almost identical language, the lessons from the Spring Offensive prepared by Fifth Army reported in July, 1944:

... Frontal attacks were avoided, unless they were absolutely essential to the success of the operations. Maneuver was invariably resorted to in order to force the enemy from his positions. Even in one instance in the break-through by an Allied division at MT. FAITO, although a frontal assault was ordered, the direction of the attack was not perpendicular to the front, but in a northeasterly direction along the ridge and high ground. This resulted in throwing the enemy off balance, and was a contributing factor to the success of the break-through. . . (5A/LL).

The same principle was brought out in the combined attack of infantry supported by tanks. In the break-out attack from the ANZIO-NEPTUNO Beachhead, the following illustrative example was given:

... The attack on CISTERNA was carried to a successful conclusion by the use of fire and movement of infantry and tanks. One infantry battalion made a frontal holding attack, while the other two battalions enveloped the town. Tanks by-passed the town and then struck from the rear. . . (5A/LL).

26. ATTACK OF TOWNS AND FORTIFIED BUILDINGS

In the advance from the line of the GARIGLIANO to the Gothic Line, the large number of strongly defended towns, villages and fortified buildings provided wide experience in the attack of these obstacles. As pointed out in the preceding quotation, flanking and envelopment wherever possible has been the best procedure. The Commanding General, II Corps, tersely summed up this principle in a special report of lessons learned: "Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear." (IIC/LL2). From experience of the 36th Infantry Division, the Commander stated that it has been found desirable in operations against towns to isolate them

before closing on the fortified defenses. (5A/11). In another division Fifth Army reported that it has become standard operating procedure in the attack of towns for the assault battalions to by-pass the town and the reserve battalions to remain for mopping-up.

Combat within defended towns and villages, including passage of demolitions, street fighting, and the assault of individual buildings, has added no new lessons from recent campaign experience. In large towns, the use of phase-lines and phase-areas has again been demonstrated essential for control and practicable coordination of supported and supporting elements. Commanders have reported one outstanding principle that has been noted in the fighting at CASSINO and in other towns taken during the long advance to the Gothic Line. In the attack on a defended building, the infantry must press the assault immediately after a breach has been made in the building. A battalion commander reported after extensive experience at CASSINO:

. . . The main thing learned was that you must charge into the building right after a hole has been made. As General Ryder (Commanding General, 34th Infantry Division) has said, "you must take up the slack or else Jerry will." When we were attacking one block of buildings, I gave orders for the tanks to fire on the buildings and then to signal at the end of their firing. The riflemen were to charge these buildings as soon as the signal was given. The tanks fired and gave the signal as prescribed, but the riflemen waited about ten minutes before charging. They were driven back without ever reaching the buildings. Later the same operation was repeated. This time it was carried out exactly as it was originally planned, and it worked. . . (133Inf./AGF/139).

The commanding officer of the same regiment re-affirmed this point, and reported that

. . . The outstanding lesson this Regiment learned in the street fighting in CASSINO was that you must follow up grenades, rockets, or shellfire inside a building with immediate shock action. . . (COL33Inf./AGF/139).

27. NIGHT ATTACK

Experience in the later phases of the Italian Campaign produced no unusual or outstanding lessons in night attack and night operations. The importance of training in night movement and control was again stressed by commanders. The following main points have been extracted

from the reported lessons compiled by Fifth Army and its subordinate units:

- a. The launching of night attacks in the first operation involving green troops is not good practice. (54/LL).
- b. Night operations in mountainous country should be confined to limited objective attacks which put the attacking troops on enemy positions just prior to daylight. (IIC/LL).
- c. Night attacks should not be made against an organized position without a complete reconnaissance for mine fields and an accurate plotting of their locations. (IIC/LL3).
- d. Except for very limited local operations, reconnaissance in force or night attacks in the mountains during the dark of the moon have been found to be impracticable. (IIC/LL).
- e. Because of the difficulties of control, maintenance of direction, and reorganization, night attacks should be launched on limited objectives only. As in ordinary daylight attack, reorganization after the seizure of an objective must be accomplished rapidly and without bunching. (IIC/LL3).
- f. The general and specific lessons reported in Paragraph 31, Section V, Training Memorandum No. 2 are applicable to the period of the Campaign under present consideration.

28. EMPLOYMENT OF THE INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS

A. General

The general lessons enumerated in Paragraphs 27-31, Section V, Training Memorandum No. 2 apply to the later period of the campaign under present consideration as well as to the earlier phases covered by that memorandum. A number of the points covered in this former publication have again been stressed in subsequent reports of battle lessons submitted by field commanders. They are extracted in the following paragraphs as illustrations of experience in the later stages of the Campaign.

b. Principles Emphasized by Field Commanders

- (1) Planning and reconnaissance for an attack should include

the necessary terrain study, the employment of support weapons in the attack, and the scheme for the defense of each objective after its capture, to include the defensive fire plan for all infantry support weapons and artillery. When possible, registration of mortars and artillery for these defensive fires should be accomplished prior to the jump-off for the attack. (IIC/LL).

(2) Assault guns should not be employed habitually as artillery. Their proper place is in close support. The 75mm on the half-track was used by one regimental combat team to fill the gap between the 81mm mortars and the supporting artillery. (5A/LL).

(3) In a fast moving situation, close supporting weapons must continually reconnoiter to the front for firing positions and anticipate forward displacement in time to be in position when needed. (IIC/LL3).

(4) Preceding the attack on CISTINA, all the caliber .50 machine guns of one division were assembled into a provisional machine gun battalion. These guns were manned by artillerymen. Range tables had been devised by test firing into the sea, and by using artillery methods in indirect fire, a heavy concentration was poured into the town right up to the actual assault. (5A/LL).

(5) Every weapon capable of fire should be used to assist in pinning the enemy to the ground during the forward advance of attacking troops. This should include the small arms, mortars, and machine guns of adjacent units. Adjacent units should make demonstrations or holding attacks at the time of the main attack to prevent enemy artillery massing on the attacking force and to prevent the movement of enemy reserves. (IIC/LL).

(6) Rifle grenades are not used sufficiently. Additional emphasis and instruction is needed to show men that they can hit enemy emplacements at ranges of 150 yards. Antitank grenades and rocket launchers should be used against enemy emplacements whenever the improbability of tank attack or the available quantity of ammunition make their use permissible. (IIC/LL3).

(7) A tendency has been noted on the part of infantry commanders to call for artillery fire instead of using their organic supporting

heavy weapons. The training of weapons platoons and their use in combat roles should be stressed. (5A/1L).

(8) The concept of fire must include the use of all weapons in gaining superiority, even when the exact location of the hostile weapons is not known. The Germans are adept at camouflage, and their powder is smokeless and flashless. Their positions are usually difficult to detect. Nevertheless, when the enemy who is not visible opens fire, our troops must return the fire immediately with all appropriate weapons on likely enemy positions. A reaction of this sort is a tremendous morale factor, and often causes the Germans to cease firing and withdraw. (IIC/1L3).

(9) The 4.2 chemical mortar has been proved again to be a most effective and valuable infantry support weapon, with both smoke and high explosive. The following points specially reported by Fifth Army are extracted as examples (5A/1L):

(a) Smoke was used effectively against self-propelled guns. The 4.2 chemical mortar is preferred in lieu of the 81mm.

(b) White phosphorus smoke shell from the 4.2 has been used very successfully against prepared and dug-in positions. A company of 4.2 mortars with each regiment proved particularly helpful at VELLETRI.

(c) The 4.2 mortars with high explosive were extremely valuable in the attack on SANTA MARIA, and on other fortified areas in the initial stages of the offensive. Their fire power had not only a material effect on the enemy, but also provided a morale factor of advantage for our infantry.

(d) The employment of massed fire by 4.2 mortars on the Beachhead indicated the value of this type of support. Too often the tendency of commanders of supported infantry has been to parcel out the mortars in platoons, and even in sections of two mortars. This prevents satisfactory fire control, and loses the main effect possible with a rapid and heavy concentration. Normally breakdown of mortar units into elements less than a company should not be made.

(e) In fast moving situations, the 4.2 mortar companies must keep up with the forward elements rather than depend on their extreme range.

29. COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LOWER INFANTRY ECHELONS

The fundamental basis of all successful combat lies in the qualities of command and leadership. This familiar axiom is particularly applicable to the lower echelons of the Infantry, and has been given special emphasis in the battle lesson reports of commanders in all Campaigns in the Theater. It was stressed throughout the fighting in Tunisia, reiterated in the lesson experiences of the Sicilian Campaign, and was prominently mentioned by many commanders in the early period of the Campaign in Italy. The reported lesson from the previous phases of this Campaign, "that there can be no substitute for troop leadership" (Paragraph 23, Section V, Training Memorandum No. 2), again well summarizes the comments of field commanders in the later stages.

A penetrating example may be quoted from the Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, who declared during the heavy fighting on the

ANZIO-NETTUNO Beachhead:

... In training company officers, impress upon them that they must gain such disciplinary control that will enable them to reach an objective with every man under their command who is not a casualty -- and not to reach an objective with half their men while the other half are straggling all the way back to the line of departure. Too frequently our lieutenants, at least when we receive them, do not understand the imperative necessity for this disciplinary control. They do not properly understand leadership. They do not understand that they are not in command of a platoon of heroes, but in just a platoon of common ordinary men in whom the instinct of self-preservation is very strong. Under strong leaders, our men will do anything. Without strong leadership, your apparent combat strength is misleading because half of the men may not be in the fight ... (ACF/147).

Similarly, the Commanding General, II Corps pointed out in the report of lessons learned, compiled after the fall of Rome:

Squad and platoon leaders must be taught to command their units, and to expect to operate on their own. Once an attack has been launched, it is difficult for the company commander to control closely all four platoons. He will influence the action by his use of the supporting platoon and weapons. His main job lies in planning the action and briefing the platoon leaders. They must carry through the attack. . . (IIC/LL3).

The exercise of individual initiative and the prompt taking of action and acceptance of responsibility cannot be stressed too strongly as essentials

in infantry leadership. This was brought out most strongly in the rapidly moving situations during the Spring Offensive. The Commander of a Corps declared soon after the fall of Rome in a preliminary report of major lessons:

... Too often Commanders of all echelons waited for orders. The rapid advance made the maintenance of communications difficult and resulted in instructions being issued and received which were based on out-of-date information. Under such conditions commanders must act on their own responsibility, initiative, and judgment. Inactivity is inexcusable. (IIG/LL2).

30. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS FROM LESSON REPORTS

a. Movement and maneuver under fire are still vitally important elements in infantry combat. The old adage of "hit the dirt" must not be construed to mean freezing in place. When under enemy small arms fire, men must keep moving forward. If they allow themselves to be pinned down, they will be subjected to mortar and artillery fire. The best way to avoid casualties is to close rapidly with the enemy. Maneuver by rear elements must be employed automatically and immediately. (IIG/LL3).

b. Infantry officers and non-commissioned officers must have a working knowledge of artillery terms and some basic training in the adjustment of artillery fire, so that they can call for fire promptly and call for the type of fire wanted in terms that the artillerymen understand. (ACF/LL7).

c. Surprise has been gained by speed of movement, aggressive reconnaissance and patrolling, by night attacks, and by the use of smoke. As a general rule, it was found that the enemy fortified avenues of approach over low ground quite strongly and to a large extent neglected the ridges, mountain tops and high, rugged terrain. Attacks over such terrain gained surprise and were successful. When surprise was gained, local attacks on enemy defense lines were found to be effective to a limited extent only, if not supported by other attacks along the line. The enemy was quick to appreciate the point of local attack, and rapidly moved units, generally reserves, from other parts of the line to seal off the attack or penetration. (5A/LL).

d. When a support element is ordered to follow an attack element over ground subject to enemy observation, it should follow by different routes whenever possible. Support elements have been caught many times in mortar and artillery fire drawn by the leading attack elements. (IIC/LL3).

e. Once infantry units have halted even temporarily, the infantry commanders should request artillery fire on prominent terrain features as a further aid in orientation. At least one battery of the corps or division artillery should be requested to register immediately on some prominent terrain feature in front of the attacking forces. (IIC/LL1).

f. The casualty rate in platoon leaders is very high. For this reason platoon sergeants must be trained as reserve platoon leaders. This training can be accomplished effectively only by having platoon sergeants actually command platoons under the supervision of the lieutenants. (5A/LL).

g. When units are operating on the front or flanks of an infantry regiment under command of a higher headquarters, the most careful coordination between the infantry regiment and the other units must be assured. If reconnaissance elements operate in the zone of an infantry regiment without the knowledge of the regimental commander, they are apt to be fired upon before their proper identity can be established. (IIC/LL3).

h. In a sustained retreat the Germans will often shell bivouac areas that they formerly occupied. If recently used German bivouac areas are within artillery range, they should be avoided.

SECTION VI : FIELD ARTILLERY UNITS

31. GENERAL

a. Continued Importance of Field Artillery -- New Experience

The vitally important role of field artillery in the earlier phases of the Campaign indicated in Paragraph 43, Section VI, Training Memorandum No. 2 was continued on an unprecedented scale in the later

period. In general, the periods of stabilization on the GARIGLIANO Line and on the ANZIO Beachhead resolved into artillery battles that exceeded all previous experience in this Theater. The mass of available artillery of all calibers, skillfully controlled and accurately directed, so effectively neutralized the enemy counter-metal that the break-through on the line of the GARIGLIANO and the break-out from the Beachhead were assured. A major lesson was again demonstrated that an army, held up by strong and stubbornly-held defenses, must rely to a large extent on its artillery to assist it forward again. New elements in the artillery experience in this period included the tactical employment of weapons new to the Theater, special countermortar measures, the increased use of six-gun batteries, and the extensive employment of pack artillery.

b. Effectiveness of Fire

The effectiveness of artillery fires in the period considered, especially in counterbattery operations, has been revealed in numerous reports from the corps and divisions engaged. The action of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade in the preparation for the Offensive of 11 May in the sector of the Corps Expeditionnaire Francaise on the upper GARIGLIANO provides an excellent example of complete artillery success, as illustrated in the following report:

. . . General neutralization of hostile batteries was provided for forty minutes at H-hour, for thirty minutes at H-plus-2, and again at H-plus-4. . . H-hour was fixed at 2300 hours, 11 May. A large part of our artillery had not disclosed itself until then. . . The first German rockets asking for defensive fires were seen about 2310 hours. Hardly any enemy artillery reaction was reported during the first hour. . .

. . . General neutralization was undertaken again at the prescribed hours. In the intervals, partial neutralization of three groups of enemy batteries had been effected. Observation posts reported the virtual cessation of enemy artillery activity during the period of our fires. Our infantry took MOUNT FAITO. On the following two days our counterbattery fires had the same success. On the evening of 13 May our infantry took MOUNT MAJO and a new phase of the battle began. In this phase counterbattery fires principally coincided with fire on highways over which the enemy's batteries were seeking to retreat. . . (GFF/CB)

The pattern of the artillery preparation in the sector of II Corps on the lower GARIGLIANO on 11 May was similar. The report of the Corps Artillery Officer stated that

. . . the effectiveness of our counterbattery fire also became quickly evident because of the appreciably reduced shelling received from enemy artillery as our forces advanced. . . . Reported results of the 112 observed counterbattery missions from D-plus-1 through D-plus-5 included 5 direct hits on pieces; 21 hits squarely in gun-pits; and 16 fires or explosions in position areas. . . . (IIC/AIC)

Likewise in the break-out from the ANZIO Beachhead, the artillery of VI Corps virtually dominated the battlefield and achieved similar results:

. . . After the attack had been carried beyond the enemy artillery positions, the Counterbattery Staff reconnoitered the target area. Their report is not a complete one, but it revealed a holocaust of German guns. . . . (ACF/178)

The effectiveness of the defensive fires in support of the infantry on the ANZIO Beachhead was also of prime importance in the critical period of this phase of the campaign. During the static period of the perimeter defense, every artillery piece in the Corps was tied-in to a common grid and could be fired on prearranged concentrations in any sector by broadcasting a single code word. For example, on 17 February a force estimated to be about 2500 German infantry were soon moving south on the ALBANO-ANZIO road by the air observation post officer of the 45th Infantry Division. Within twelve minutes the massed fire of all the corps artillery was placed on a short stretch of the road. During the next hour this mass of fire had been shifted by the air observer to four other successive target locations. These fires stopped the German attack. On another occasion, equally prompt and heavy concentrations of fire were delivered on the German thrust from CISTERNA. In this instance they contributed materially in breaking up the attack.

32. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

a. Centralized Control

In Tunisia and Sicily, and in the earlier phases of the Italian Campaign, corps artillery was often employed in furthering the plans of the Division Artillery commanders. Separate artillery combat within the several divisional sectors gave way during the winter of 1943-1944 to a far greater degree of centralized control by Corps and Army. In the later period, especially in the preparation for the Spring Offensive, Army

and Corps Artillery Officers assumed roles of great responsibility. Plans for "isolating the battlefield" before the break-through on the main GARIGLIANO front were coordinated at Army Headquarters, where the responsibilities of the Field Artillery and the Air Force were carefully defined and assigned. At ANZIO, the Corps Artillery Officer became the coordinating agency for all additional support, including naval gunfire and supporting air bombardment. In general, Corps Artillery Officers integrated the divisional artillery fires in the over-all defensive and offensive fire plans. On the line of the GARIGLIANO, lateral liaison between the corps artillery staffs resulted in delivering accurate fires in neighboring sectors to thicken concentrations in those sectors or to deceive hostile counterbattery agencies. Artillery Officers of Corps and Army constantly dealt with the high commanders on matters of artillery policy and plans. An outstanding lesson of the Campaign during the preparations for the Spring Offensive and in the early stages of this general attack was the efficacy and results of centralized control on a large scale.

b. Artillery in the Break-Through and Break-Out

(1) In the preparation for a break-through, counterintelligence measures to conceal artillery positions and the presence of reinforcing units will yield good results whenever the possibility of surprise exists. This situation prevailed on the main GARIGLIANO front, and the artillery preparations were thus described by an observer from the Ground Forces Board:

... After D-day had been decided upon, a program of reconnaissance for position areas with the necessary survey was begun. Each group and separate battalion was given its area, together with a schedule of its preparation. Position areas were selected and prepared before any movement into position was made. During darkness for several weeks prior to D-day the battalions moved into positions a few at a time, being careful that daylight found them camouflaged and dug-in. In many cases dummy guns with fairly complete installations were left in bivouac and former position areas to further the deception. Registration was restricted so that there would be no general increase in fire in the sector, but was so arranged that it was completed prior to the attack. The Division Artillery of II Corps and the Corps Expeditionnaire Francaise had been active for some time, as were also some additional battalions, so this registration worked in conjunction with theirs, thereby making it difficult for the enemy to appreciate the presence of additional artillery.

The habit of registration at last daylight had been established, so when the additional battalions did this on the evening prior to the attack, no change in routine was apparent. . (AGF/156)

(2) In contrast to this policy of deception and concealment on the line of the GARICLIANO, the opposite course was followed on the ANZIO Beachhead. All guns within the Beachhead had fired defensive concentrations against the major German attacks in mid-February and early March. The enemy, on superior ground with excellent observation of our position areas, already had an excellent idea of the number of batteries against them. In order to deceive the enemy as to our intentions despite his excellent observation, TOT concentrations (Time on Target, Cf. Paragraph 471, Training Memorandum No. 2) were fired intermittently for a week prior to the break-out attack. These concentrations were directed on positions and gun emplacements at widely different parts of the enemy line, and were delivered sporadically at odd hours during both daylight and darkness. At first, enemy artillery reaction was very marked. Gradually it fell off in intensity until 23 May when the break-out attack was launched.

(3) From the above summaries of preparation on the main front and on the Beachhead, it can be seen that surprise was achieved from employing diametrically opposite methods.

(4) Another important factor in the artillery preparation for a break-through is the exploitation of all intelligence agencies for the securing of knowledge of enemy locations. Such locations include hostile batteries, mortar positions, command posts, assembly areas, routes of the enemy defensive works. In the artillery preparation for the attacks on the main line and from the Beachhead, the outstanding feature was that only known locations were attacked with fire, and not localities that looked inviting on the map.

(5) Organization of artillery observation well in advance was also an important element in the preparation for the offensive. All observation agencies were carefully regulated and organized, from high-performance aircraft to ground forward observers, to insure that all sectors were covered and that unnecessary crowding of observation post sites was avoided.

(6) Routes and positions, within and without the division boundaries, were allotted in accordance with the general artillery plan.

(7) Fire plans were flexible enough to provide for unforeseen contingencies. For example, the weather just prior to the break-out from ARZIO was unfavorable, and the planned air support was curtailed at the last minute. The artillery was called on to make up the deficiency, and was able to do so because of the flexibility of its fire plans.

2. Decentralized Control -- The Pursuit Phase

In the pursuit phases of the Campaign which involved operations over difficult terrain with limited road nets (cf. Section III, supra), control of corps artillery was generally decentralized. As pointed out in the discussion of task forces for the pursuit (Paragraph 19d, supra), artillery support of these specially organized forces was of primary importance. It was shown also in the pursuit phase that the aggressive employment of long range artillery under Corps control is highly effective.

The Artillery Officer, II Corps, reported:

. . . Long range artillery is very useful in the pursuit. Its mobility is almost equal to that of light artillery, except for the slight additional time required for "Prepare for Action" and "March order," and its range permits accompanying fire during long, rapid advances. In mountainous terrain where routes and positions for artillery are impossible in the forward areas, long range units have at times been the only artillery which could give support to advancing troops. Long range howitzers are particularly valuable in view of dead space frequently encountered. . . (IIC/AIC)

An example of the effectiveness of long range howitzers during the early pursuit period when the enemy fell back from the ALBAN Hills may be quoted from the same report:

. . . Air observation posts continued to take a prominent part in pounding the retreating enemy. In one noteworthy case a 240mm howitzer battery was available at the moment to answer a hurried call from an air observer for fire on the crowded APTIAN WAY leading in to Rome. The observer stated that it was "great sport" to spray the 240mm shells up and down the road and witness the confusion and destruction they created. The damage remained for several days thereafter as mute testimony of the terrific destructive power of those projectiles. . . (IIC/AIC)

d. Employment of Self-Propelled Artillery

Self-Propelled Artillery was fully exploited in both static and mobile phases of the Campaign. In the stabilized periods the M-7 was effectively used on both fronts for roving gun missions. In the advance, this weapon furnished close infantry support in the mobile operations. An illustration of the employment of self-propelled guns on roving missions is quoted from the Artillery Officer, II Corps:

. . . To maintain deception of the enemy as to the amount of artillery in the sector, and also to reduce exposure of fixed positions from gun-flashes at night, much of the nightly harassing, especially the close-in targets was done under the direction of one field artillery group by a provisional battery of self-propelled pieces, consisting of four 105mm howitzers M-7, two M-10 tank destroyers, and two M-4 tanks. This battery averaged fourteen missions each night, moving from one to another of twenty-six previously prepared and surveyed positions across the II Corps front. . . (IIC/AIC)

Effective employment of self-propelled guns in close support during the advance is illustrated in the following report by the Artillery Member of the Ground Forces Board:

. . . The 6th Field Artillery Group has again shown how valuable self-propelled artillery can be when used aggressively. This unit has been invaluable to the supported (88th Infantry) Division. The M-7's were able to stay well forward in areas which had not been completely mopped up. By bold and aggressive reconnaissance, its batteries were always in supporting positions. . . (AGF/171)

In muddy terrain, self-propelled guns have been especially useful in support of the division artillery. The M-7 has also been useful for pulling towed 105mm guns and their prime movers out of mudholes and terrain impassable for non-tracked vehicles.

e. Employment of Six-Gun Batteries

Although some six-gun batteries had been employed in previous campaigns in this Theater, the later period of the Campaign in Italy witnessed the extensive use of this enlarged light battery for the first time. The 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions were equipped with batteries of six 105mm howitzers M-2. The Artillery Commander, 88th Infantry Division, reported the following advantages in this increase of organic pieces:

- . . . (1) More effective defensive fires.
- (2) Wide effective battalion sector of fire.
- (3) Greater shock action.
- (4) Better support during displacement by echelon.
- (5) Less percentage in loss of fire power as a result of one or more howitzers being out of action.
- (6) Handling of sheaf simplified by use of center platoon for adjustment fire.
- (7) Battalion fire power increased fifty percent; personnel increased less than fifteen percent.
- (8) Control of six howitzers by the battery executive is as effective in combat as with four howitzers. . . (DAC/88ID)

The following comment of one of the battalion commanders reflects the unanimous opinion of all unit commanders concerned:

. . . The six-howitzer battery has proved most successful in the present operation. It has been found that the increase of two sections per howitzer battery does not increase or produce any additional difficulties in regard to mobility. The six-howitzer battery can occupy position and displace as easily as the four-howitzer battery. Reconnaissance for positions is not appreciably affected by the increase in sections. The terrain in the present operation has been characterized by mountains, narrow valleys, crooked, steep trails, and mud. Nevertheless, a six-gun position has been occupied in every displacement. The great advantage of the six-howitzer battery is the tremendous increase in fire power given in support of the infantry. A single battery can frequently cover a target which formerly called for the massed fire of a battalion. Continuous fire support in battalion strength can be given the infantry, even while displacement is going on. . . . No additional strain of any kind is placed on communications personnel. Identical basic communication is used in either the four-or six-gun battery. Two more telephones are hooked into the local battery system, in dispersed positions, this being a function of each gun section. . . .

. . . The policy was established of controlling ammunition expenditures to fit the targets taken under fire. In some instances savings have been effected by adjusting with the center platoon of a battery and then firing for effect with the battery instead of the battalion. . . . In defensive fires there is a tendency to expend a greater amount of ammunition than would be the case with four-gun batteries. However, the added fire power under such emergencies more than justified the extra expenditures. The Division Artillery has been credited with repelling, with massed artillery fires alone, a number of determined counterattacks, and the additional fire power developed by the extra strength of the six-howitzer batteries has been a contributing factor in this. . . . (DAC/88ID)

f. Employment of Pack Artillery

In the difficult, mountainous terrain encountered in large areas during the later phases of the Campaign, pack artillery has assumed greater importance than ever before. The following main points on its employment have been extracted from the combat lessons reported by Headquarters Fifth Army (5A/LL):

- (1) Pack Artillery battalion commanders should receive orders at such time as to permit establishment of command-liaison, proper reconnaissance, and considering the disposition and locations of battalions, ample time in which to reach initial positions. In an attack it is imperative that an opportunity be presented for command-liaison prior to formulation of decisions by the infantry commander.
- (2) Mule pack artillery should not be expected to march with infantry columns, especially during darkness. Infantry can advance on routes over which the heavily loaded mules cannot. It must be kept in mind that pack gun loads weigh approximately 240 pounds, which when the weight of the Phillips pack saddle and adapters is added, makes the load weigh at least 350 pounds. This is a great deal more than any infantry pack animal has to carry, and is one of the reasons why pack artillery should not be marched as part of an infantry column.
- (3) Infantry commanders should bear in mind that the pack howitzer has a range of 9500 yards. The pack battalion is field artillery, and not three separate cannon companies. Its primary mission of infantry support can best be accomplished by being in position to give support on call, rather than being marched with the infantry until opposition is met. The battalion can move forward by bounds, part or all of it being ready to fire if needed, and can still keep up with the rate of march of the Infantry.
- (4) Infantry commanders should also remember that the 75mm pack howitzer, not having a low charge to compare with Charge I of the 105mm, is not designed to fire high-angle fire. This makes it impossible to give adequate fire support at close ranges, especially in rugged terrain. By having artillery forward observers and liaison officers with the various infantry elements at all times, proper support can be given by pack artillery from positions in rear of the Infantry.
- (5) The re-supply of ammunition is another problem that must be understood. The number of rounds contemplated for expenditure should be weighed against this factor. Each mule carries about six rounds of ammunition. The maximum distance which pack artillery can be from its truckhead in mountainous terrain is one day's round trip for the pack

animals. Greater displacement will require the additional attachment of mule pack trains. During past operations where little resistance was encountered, pack battalions were able to keep themselves supplied satisfactorily. In the face of heavy resistance, this is impossible.

(6) Distances covered by mule pack artillery cannot be measured in map distance. They must be measured in terms of percent of slope and the condition of the footing. Halts for rest for both animals and men must be made on the same basis and not on any set time schedule. Marching about four hours at dawn, unloading and feeding during the middle of the day, and then marching from three to five hours just prior to darkness was found to be by far the best method for making long marches.

E. Employment of the 240mm Howitzer, M-1

(1) This weapon was first used in combat in this Theater in February, 1944. It has proved to be of great value. Its 25,000-yard range has been exploited for counterbattery fire, for road cratering, and for fire on vehicles, tanks, and horse-drawn artillery on the road. The howitzer has been especially effective in destroying bridges, buildings, fortifications and concrete defenses. In connection with the latter type missions, the Commander of the 697th Field Artillery Battalion has reported:

... Heavy masonry bridges require the T-105 fuze for maximum destruction. Near misses on the approaches produce tremendous craters. Projectiles armed with the T-105 have a tendency to penetrate and burst below light span masonry bridges with little effect. The M51A3 with quick action is most effective on bridges of this type. Light concrete pillboxes and reinforced houses can be destroyed with quick or delayed action on the M51A3 fuze. The projectiles armed with the quick fuze will tear great gaps in stone house walls up to four feet thick. Shell armed with delay fuze burst inside such houses, leaving a small hole in the wall. The T-105 fuze penetrates too deeply for any destructive effect on heavily walled houses. . . .

... Direct hits in artillery gun-pits with quick fuze will demolish any gun in the pit. Visual evidence of this on six German 170mm guns was noted at ITRI. . . (697/240H)

The 240mm howitzer may also be used for interdiction and harassing roles with great effect when the situation demands. Habitual use for these missions must be avoided, however, because of the ammunition limitations and the necessity for conserving the life of the tubes.

(2) Ground observation posts for the conduct of fire with the 240mm howitzer have been of dubious value. Their establishment complicates the problem of communication. In moving situations they have not been established. Air observation with either normal artillery observation or high performance aircraft has been customary.

(3) Unobserved missions have been held to a minimum.

(4) High angle fire has been used on bridges of heavy construction to secure more direct impact. Its destructive effect has been highly satisfactory. This type of fire has been used only on special occasions because of the excessive labor it requires on the part of the gun crews. The tube must be elevated manually for each round to an angle at which the equilibrator is of slight assistance.

(5) Only two battalions of the 240mm howitzer have been available in the Theater. For this reason, emplacement has been by widely scattered batteries or by individual pieces. Before reconnaissance and selection of position, it has been found desirable to determine the type of mission to be fired, the general ranges to be reached, and the azimuth of the center of traverse. It is difficult to shift a piece for direction while occupying a gun-pit, though this has been accomplished when necessary. Engineer assistance is generally needed in the preparation of positions. Positions should be located at least 1000 yards from crossroads, road junctions, or bridges. Experience in the Italian terrain has shown that more space is generally needed than that indicated in the diagrams shown in the field manual on the service of this piece. Training in the United States seldom included emplacement of the howitzer in defiladed positions against the rear slopes of embankments. In Italy, such locations have often proved to be most desirable positions. In some cases the howitzer has been emplaced so close to the bank that a notch had to be cut for the tube when in the loading position. Approximately 14,000 sandbags have been used in each howitzer position. Comment on position is quoted from the Artillery Officer, II Corps:

... Worthy of mention was the movement into position of a 155mm gun battery and a single 240mm howitzer on the night of 10/11 May. This artillery crossed the GARIGLIANO and occupied positions previously dug-in within 1500 yards of

the front line. The guns were protected from enemy observation by our smoke only. The 240mm howitzer, while well defiladed, was in a "hot spot" where over-ranging enemy shells directed at MINTURVO were frequently dropping.

However, we had long since found that there were no suitable gun positions for the Corps artillery on the flat plains of this sector. The risk taken in this case proved well worth while. These weapons from their "sneak positions" were able to reach the German 170mm positions near ITRI, and the enemy there, knowing that he had been out of range of the areas from which the Long Toms and 240's had been firing, was caught entirely by surprise at 11-hour. . . (IIC/AIC)

Obviously in such a situation as above described, and in the warfare that followed, ideal positions could not be realized very frequently.

In the rapidly moving situations, positions had to be selected for firm footing, defilade, and space for emplacing the howitzer without much prior preparation.

(6) In mobile situations, reconnaissance for positions has been conducted as far forward as the infantry lines. Pieces were normally placed not more than 200 yards behind the front lines, and frequently by the time emplacement had been completed, the infantry had advanced as far as 4000 and 5000 yards in front of the selected howitzer positions. In reconnaissance, therefore, the selection of positions well forward has been standard practice. Great care has been observed in the selection of routes, with especial attention to road surfaces, the turning radii of curves, and examination of bridges, culverts, by-passes and fills. The combined prime mover-towed load is Class 50. By the use of winching, Class 30 bridges can be crossed with reasonable safety. Lighter bridges can be crossed if the loads are moved very slowly, but this is always a dangerous risk. On one occasion the Germans had undermined a paved commercial highway without leaving any breaks in the surface. The front wheels of a 240mm carriage broke through after the prime mover had crossed safely.

h. Employment of the 8-Inch Gun, M-1

(1) The arrival of the first 8-inch gun on the main Italian front on 11 May 1944 not only involved the first combat test of a new weapon but also provided the answer to the German 170mm guns which had hitherto harassed the Fifth Army with relative impunity. Capable of a

range of 35,000 yards, the new gun outranged the German 170mm by 3,000 yards. Two 8-inch guns were attached initially to each of the 240mm howitzer battalions. Later, the separate 575th Field Artillery Battalion (less Battery "C") was organized to man the new weapons.

(2) After service in combat, it was found that the dispersion indicated in the firing tables for these guns was equalled if not exceeded, particularly at extreme ranges. Average life of the gun is believed to be between 400 and 500 rounds.

(3) General comment from experience with this new gun is quoted from a report of the Artillery Member of the Ground Forces Board:

... The primary use of these guns was on long range missions to harass command posts and positions of the enemy 170mm guns which heretofore had been out of range of any weapon we had available. The only type of adjustment possible was by artillery reconnaissance aircraft, followed in some cases by transfers of fire. In most cases the wide dispersion at extreme ranges made it impossible to do more than harass or interdict an area. No point targets could be engaged. . . . (AGF/168)

(4) Additional comment is available from a Battalion Commander of 240mm howitzers, to whose unit the 8-inch guns had been attached for combat:

... Positions, movements, communications, survey, and supply of the 8-inch gun are practically identical with those of the 240mm howitzer. . . . Gunnery technique varies but little from that employed for the 240mm. . . . In the computation of initial data, it is necessary to include an allowance for tube wear. In addition, corrections should be made during long fire missions for wear on the tube during the mission. This amounts to a decrease in muzzle velocity of approximately 2 feet per second in every five rounds. . . . (AGF/168)

33. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUE

A. General

Experience in the latter phases of the Campaign revealed little new in the operational technique of field artillery. The general subjects and lesson-experience recited in Section VI, Training Memorandum No. 2 were again applicable to the later period. The following points are included as being particularly emphasized in the reports and comments of field commanders.

b. Forward Observation

This method of fire adjustment is still most prevalent and is of the greatest importance in field artillery operations. It has been in some instances superseded by air observation adjustment and by more accurate adjustment from normal artillery ground observation posts. During training and reorganization great emphasis has been placed on instruction of infantry personnel down to include platoon sergeants, and tank and tank destroyer commanders, in the technique of field artillery forward observation procedure. The results were very satisfactory. When artillery observers became casualties or were in position where observation was not possible, supporting fires were called for and directed by infantry observers using normal artillery procedure. Enlisted personnel of artillery forward observation sections also became proficient in adjusting fire.

In the highly compartmented terrain before the GUSTAV Line, it often became necessary to use as many as ten forward observer parties in one battalion, and in such situations non-commissioned observers functioned well. In the mountains it was found desirable to establish a forward rest center during cold and inclement weather, from which forward observation parties were rotated every five or six hours.

c. Naval Gunfire Support

Naval gunfire support reinforcing the fires of the ground artillery has proved to be of great value throughout various phases of the Campaign. It was especially effective during the Spring Offensive in the coastal sectors of the advance. The Artillery Officer, II Corps, reported in summary on this type of artillery action:

. . . During the battle of 11-17 May, one American cruiser mounting nine 6-inch guns with range of 23,000 yards, and one British cruiser of ten 5.25-inch guns with range of 24,000 yards, were alternately employed in support of the main (CARIGLIANO) front. On 12 May one cruiser heavily shelled the principal road intersection at TERRACINA, adjusting fire with an observer in a Spitfire aircraft. Later that day, an observer in an artillery observation (Cub) aircraft adjusted most effective fire on a German 170mm gun position near ITRI. For the remaining days, the cruisers engaged an average of eight targets daily. Their fire did material damage. Highlights were the pounding of ITRI, SERRA LONGA, and TERRACINA, bracketing fires delivered on many enemy gun batteries; zone fire

on four known supply dumps; and straddling fire on the reported command post of the 94th German Infantry Division. Although the cruisers were fired on by enemy guns, they were never hit. Several times the corps artillery neutralized enemy batteries engaging the ships. On one occasion a cruiser transferred its fire temporarily from a planned target and silenced an enemy 4-inch shore battery that had become a nuisance. . . (IIC/AIC)

In the AVZIO-~~RENTUNO~~ sector, off-shore mined areas prevented the cruisers from delivering close support of the break-out attack from the Beachhead.

In the subsequent stages of the advance in this sector, naval gunfire support was effective and rendered valuable assistance to the ground forces. The artillery observer of the Ground Forces Board later reported:

. . . It was not until 1 June that effective naval fire support was obtained. This was delivered by the French cruiser Jean Bertin, which steamed several thousand yards farther west along the coast than its companions and delivered fire well into the main enemy artillery areas. Corps artillery Cub planes provided the observation and all observers participating commented on the accuracy of the fire. . . The most profitable targets for naval gunfire support in this sector were assembly and bivouac areas and routes, rather than pinpoint targets such as hostile batteries. Naval support was used to great advantage in the West sector of the Beachhead until the fall of Rome. . . (ACF/171)

d. Block Plot

"Radial Line Block" proved a valuable aid to the Corps Artillery Fire Control Centers and Counterbattery Sections in providing a means of determining approximately true coordinates of pinpoints located on air photographs. This technique was especially helpful before the acquisition of 1:25,000 maps.

e. Battery Fire Direction Centers

In combat, the posts of battery executives have generally been in dugouts or some type of covered position. The establishment of intra-battery communications has been standard practice. In addition to normal combat control of the gun sections, the battery executives have functioned in a general S-3 capacity for their batteries. Normally the firing battery keeps a firing chart and from time to time receives overlays from the battalion fire direction center. This procedure permits the individual batteries to continue in action effectively in the event that the battalion fire direction center is knocked out. To keep a high

standard of training and proficiency among the battery fire direction personnel, individual battery fire direction centers are at times required to take over conduct of fire for the battalion. Scout corporals and recorders are trained in addition to their other duties as vertical and horizontal control operators.

F. Gunnery

(1) Throughout the period of the Campaign under consideration, particular effort has been made in all echelons to improve the accuracy of fire. Especially on the main GARIGLIANO front prior to the Spring Offensive, deliberate training was carried out to achieve this end.

The number of unobserved, long-range missions was reduced. Conversely, observed fires, conducted by air and ground observation, were increased.

(2) High-angle fire was necessary when batteries in positions on low ground engaged enemy targets on successive ranges of mountains which extended through the sectors of advance. This type of fire has been used only when targets cannot be reached with other methods. It has not been preferred to low-angle fire by light or medium weapons. The need of a reduced charge to permit high-angle fire by pack artillery has been commented on by some commanders.

(3) Field conditions have permitted very little ricochet fire to be used, though unit commanders have been aware of its possibilities and have employed it when appropriate. Effects similar to ricochet fire have been obtained from fire directed against rocky mountainous slopes. Stone fragments as well as shell splinter have been observed to cover unusually effective patterns.

G. Long-Range Adjustment by High Performance Aircraft

This type of adjustment continues to have its difficulties of briefing and communication. All fire direction centers have been trained to handle either fire commands or round sensings from the observer, depending upon which system the pilot uses. Many satisfactory missions have been fired, but experience to date indicates clearly that further training for both air and artillery personnel will be required to perfect this type of adjustment. (ACF/QU)

34. ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE

a. General

The vital importance of accurate and extensive artillery intelligence has again been clearly demonstrated throughout the Campaign. Combat experience has shown that on the whole the initial training of the average artillery S-2 has not been as thorough and sound as that of the average S-3. In many instances S-2's have had to absorb the finer points of artillery intelligence functions during combat operations. Commanders have stressed the necessity of intensive training of intelligence personnel before being committed to action.

b. Counterbattery

(1) In counterbattery operations it has been found practically impossible to compartment sharply the functions of the S-2 and S-3. No sharp line can or should be drawn between the operations of these two sections in counterbattery functions. An entirely separate counterbattery section, dealing only in counterbattery missions and unconcerned with other types of fire or targets, has been found to be undesirable. Throughout Fifth Army a practicable solution has been reached by assigning the responsibility for counterbattery intelligence to the S-2, with the additional title of Counterbattery Officer. Junior officers are assigned to assist the S-2 in counterbattery functions or in other duties as the situation may require.

(2) Successful counterbattery operations are based on the fullest possible cooperation of all units concerned, irrespective of arm or service, in passing in to appropriate artillery command posts pertinent information; on intensified study of the data accumulated; and on piecing together this information for use in directing fire on hostile batteries. In the latter period of the Italian Campaign, counterbattery operations have been organized on a scale not hitherto experienced, and have employed more intelligence agencies than ever before. Counterbattery was of critical importance to the success of the Spring Offensive. It has been operated largely through the medium of shelling reports ("Shellreps"), which have been turned in to artillery units by organizations

of all arms and services within hostile artillery range. On the ANZIO Beachhead, shellreps were received from ordnance ammunition depots and quartermaster bakery companies. Fifth Army adopted a standard form for the recording of counterbattery data, which includes the following items of information:

- (a) Time of report
- (b) Map location of observer
- (c) Direction by flash, sound, or furrow
- (d) Estimated distance or location of battery
- (e) Location of area receiving fire
- (f) Hour and duration of fire
- (g) Number and type of guns employed
- (h) Caliber and type of projectiles
- (i) Nature of fire
- (j) Damage sustained
- (k) "Flash-bang" - time from flash to sound of gun

In some situations special flash observation posts were organized which provided observation over our own rear areas. Military police on exposed posts were furnished with direction boards to aid them in estimating the direction of enemy fire so that they could turn in shell reports. Handbooks were prepared so that shells could be readily identified from splinters, case fragments, and pieces of rotating bands. Calibers and flexible steel rulers were improvised for this purpose.

(3) Information from shell reports also gave indications as to which hostile batteries already located, were active. They also served to direct the attention of photo interpreters to special localities. Photo interpretation provided the bulk of identifications. This function was well carried out by an expert interpreter stationed with the AAF Photo Reconnaissance Unit. His extensive files of comparative photographs proved to be of special value.

(4) Location by sound was a secondary prolific source of locations of enemy battery positions. It was found, however, to be not entirely reliable in mountainous terrain, and could not keep up with a rapid advance.

(5) Location by flash technique gave excellent results. It was aggressively used.

(6) German draped camouflage proved to be highly deceptive, and air observation posts could rarely locate silent hostile guns. This proved equally true of observation from artillery/reconnaissance aircraft.

Both types of aircraft were able, at times, to provide excellent oblique air photographs. Prisoner of war and civilian interrogation, and special intelligence agencies also provided good information of enemy batteries. The antiaircraft artillery radar stations were also helpful.

c. Countermortar

Systematic countermortar programs have been in use by British artillery formations for some time. At the beginning of May 1944 the 45th Infantry Division on the ANZIO Beachhead initiated a divisional countermortar program in which existing counterbattery facilities and personnel were employed. Mortar reports ("mortreps") were employed much the same as shell reports, and appropriate columns of the adopted shellrep form were used to record pertinent data. All means of observation and intelligence within the division were coordinated. Experience showed that the best means of silencing hostile mortars is counter fire with friendly mortars. The 83rd Chemical Battalion (4.2 mortars) was tied into the division artillery net and established a hastily improvised fire direction center. Observed missions were fired by artillery air observers, and by ground observers from field artillery and chemical units. Approximately one-half of all countermortar missions were assigned to the 4.2-inch mortars. Similar countermortar programs were soon adopted by the 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions, and by the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion during the period in which it functioned as an artillery group headquarters. The 3-inch tank destroyer guns firing high explosive, 90mm antiaircraft guns using time fuse, and 81mm Infantry mortars have all been used as countermortar weapons, as have also divisional artillery guns. Division countermortar programs have since been generally adopted throughout the Theater.

d. Counterflak

Counterbattery programs against known hostile antiaircraft artillery positions, fired just prior to and at the close of friendly tactical bombing missions, were first employed during the defensive period on the ANZIO Beachhead. These counterflak missions were essentially harassing fires. As a rule one gun per target was used on such missions.

Unobserved counterflak fires were generally supplemented by observed missions directed by air observers on any hostile antiaircraft batteries which opened fire on the friendly bombers. The effect of the counterflak fires on the enemy antiaircraft batteries in reducing the intensity and accuracy of their fire was most favorably commented on by the air force officers involved.

g. Organization of Field Artillery Intelligence

(1) Among artillery staffs which had not experienced combat, an impression appears to have prevailed that the S-3 is generally charged with general executive responsibility while the functions of the S-2 are more specialized and compartmented. Successful field artillery units in Italy have developed closely cooperative, smoothly functioning S-3 -- S-2 teams. The functions of these two staff sections cannot be separated and independent; close, interdependent and interlocking action of both is essential to successful operations. The following outline provides an example of procedure as followed in the Campaign. Well in advance of action, the S-3 will calculate the amount of ammunition that will be required in the planned operations. Concurrently the S-2 will begin advance arrangements for air-photo coverage and map supply. As the time of action approaches, the S-3 begins his consideration and plan of positions and fire possibilities. In close cooperation, the S-2 will consider and plan observation posts and zones of observation. The S-3 will include in his plans all the fire possibilities of the auxiliary and reinforcing artillery weapons, such as tank destroyers, tanks, antiaircraft artillery guns in the ground role, infantry cannon company weapons, and assault guns. The S-2 will insure that all the observation facilities for these reinforcing units are integrated in his artillery observation plan. In general, the functions and activities of these two staff sections, in organizing intelligence and planning for its use, both before and during combat, must be integral parts of the common cooperative effort of both.

(2) Organization of field artillery intelligence in advance of action should be followed by full exploitation of normal and auxiliary observation posts. Observers in these posts normally provide more than

half of the operational intelligence data received at division and higher headquarters. Evaluation of intelligence by artillery battalion S-2's of the information they pass back to higher headquarters is valuable and should accompany their intelligence reports and messages. Fact and interpretation should be kept separate.

35. FIELD ARTILLERY COMMUNICATIONS

Field Artillery communications in the latter stages of the Campaign have not presented any new aspects or lessons. Flexibility, improvisation, and fitting the communication plan and operations to the existing situation have continued to be the main points of interest from combat experience. The following comments in general have been extracted from the published lessons of Fifth Army (5A/LL):

a. Experience has shown that any attempt to standardize completely communication for all units is in error. Special situations arise constantly which necessitate special equipment. Switchboards and extra radios SCR 193, 603, and 610 should be kept in reserve by Corps and Army to meet special requirements.

b. Artillery communications often provide the only link between the front line and command headquarters.

c. In a fast moving situation, wire cannot be recovered by artillery units with their existing authorized personnel and equipment.

d. A number of air adjustments by high performance aircraft have failed because of communication failures.

36. ARTILLERY AIR OP

a. General

The outstanding value of artillery air observation aircraft has been again demonstrated fully in the later period of the Campaign. The air observers no longer constitute an auxiliary agency of fire control, but have become one of the most important observation facilities available to all field artillery units. All divisions and field artillery groups maintain a system of constant air observation post patrols along the front lines of their sectors from daylight to dark in order

to locate targets of opportunity and to discourage enemy artillery activity. This system of patrols is generally accomplished by consolidating under centralized control all the artillery battalion air sections of the division and groups for operations from a common field. The patrol flights are coordinated by the division or group air officers. The patrol system and its centralized control do not, however, interfere with special flights for individual battalions or prearranged missions.

b. Communication

(1) At each division or group airfield an SCR 608 is located to maintain continuous communication with the headquarters fire direction center and to act as net control station to coordinate air observation missions. The aircraft use a common frequency, and experience indicates that several concurrent missions can be fired without jamming if proper radio procedure is followed.

(2) A hostile aircraft warning system has been developed which utilizes ground observation of light antiaircraft units displaced well forward as well as the radar warning system of the Antiaircraft Artillery Information Service. The warnings are received by SCR 593 receivers and are relayed by SCR 608 to all observation aircraft in the air in time to enable the observers to land or escape before the enemy aircraft arrive.

(3) Although communications details may vary within individual battalions, provisions are made whereby any artillery air observer can call for and direct fire from any battalion. In this manner the division observers can obtain fire from corps units, and the corps observers are able to call for the fire of heavier, long-range units, or fire from any unit that may be in position to reach the desired target.

c. Adjustment of Naval Gunfire by Air OP

Artillery observation aircraft pilots have had considerable experience in the adjustment of naval gunfire. The main problem has been adequate communication, and it has been satisfactorily solved by installing an SCR 610 on board the warship. An SCR 193 is normally located at the artillery airfield as an emergency relay link, but these have been rarely needed. Normal artillery sensing procedure has been used by the observers.

As between Allied warships and U.S. artillery air observers, a standardized procedure has been adopted in the Theater for such joint operations.

g. Adjustment of 4.2 Chemical Mortar by Air OP

Adjustment of the 4.2 Chemical Mortar by artillery air observers has been successfully conducted on a number of occasions. The Air OP Officer, 45th Infantry Division, reported:

...Our experience with adjustment of 4.2 mortars has been, on the whole, successful. An SCR 610 with division artillery frequency is generally placed with each mortar platoon, and enables us to keep in contact with them directly. . . To date, all our firing has been on a "countermortar" campaign. The 4.2 mortars are easy to adjust. . . (45ID/AOP)

g. Use of Photo Locations and Photo Maps

In static situations considerable use has been made of photo locations. Enemy targets, such as hostile batteries, have been taken under fire by air observer adjusting from the photo location with respect to visible terrain features. A psychological advantage has been noted through providing the observer with latest cover photographs, actually showing the location of the targets; however excellent results have been obtained by the use of locations transferred to "basic cover" photographs maintained at the airfield. Such procedures require close cooperation from the corps and division photo interpreters.

f. Operational Altitudes of Observation Aircraft

The recent deviation from the old doctrine of observation aircraft operating at minimum altitudes is of especial interest as a development from the campaign. The Air OP Officer, VI Corps reported that

...after considerable experience with attacks from hostile fighter aircraft, most pilots agree that altitude is a protection rather than a hazard, because enemy fighters concentrating on the Cubs at low altitude come in too low for antiaircraft fire and frequently make their attack undetected. . . (VIC/AOP)

The Air OP Officer, Fifth Army also reported that "the artillery observation aircraft have been operating between 8000 and 11000 feet to avoid light flak and to enable them to adjust fire on enemy gun positions on the reverse sides of numerous razor-back ridges." (5A/AOP)

37. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS FROM FIFTH ARTILLERY EXPERIENCE

a. Angledozers. Tractors with scraper blades were found to be indispensable to artillery units during the winter and spring in Italy. A minimum of one per medium or heavy battalion was required.

b. Meteorological Corrections. Predicted meteorological data have proved superior to standard or "spot" data. Radio-sonde winds from the antiaircraft artillery stations and predicted temperatures and densities from the air force stations have been broadcast regularly in the Theater. Correction of the weighting factors for high velocity weapons has been necessary, and the older series of graphical firing tables proved to be inaccurate in certain cases.

c. Calibration. Fifth Army has established relative calibration of artillery weapons by use of the portable 76 field chronograph equipment. Speed and accuracy have been gained as a result.

d. Illuminating Shell. First attempts to use illuminating shell were made during operations on the ANZIO Beachhead. Three-inch naval shell in tank destroyer guns was employed. These trials indicated the possibilities of this type of projectile, the need of which has been long-felt in artillery operations.

e. Command Post Lighting. The 1½ kilowatt and 3 kilowatt generators issued to units for lighting command posts have proved to be unreliable. The development of sturdier and more reliable equipment for this purpose is desired by all unit commanders.

f. Ammunition Handling. Proper training and discipline in the handling and stacking of ammunition is of the utmost importance. The Artillery Officer, Fifth Army declared:

... This subject is vital. There must be extreme care in limiting the amount of ammunition placed at a gun position, and it must be protected. . . The artillery of one division lost one complete battery of 155mm ML howitzers by not applying properly the principles of ammunition dispersal and protection. . . (AGF/168)

a. Precision Adjustment. More emphasis should be placed on precision adjustments, particularly with heavy artillery, for the purpose of destruction rather than neutralization.

b. Map Supply. The issue of maps must be coordinated closely by the Army artillery officer. All units must use the same editions, unless the Engineers specifically state that the latest edition can be used concurrently with a preceding issue.

i. Photographic Requirements. Photographic requirements should be anticipated and requests should be made for delivery well in advance of the time they will be required.

SECTION VII : ARMORED UNITS

38. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. The main points of lesson-experience emphasized by field commanders with respect to the combined operations of armored units with infantry, tank destroyers, and other arms have been treated in detail in Section IV, supra. The following material relates only to the individual action of armored units as a separate arm.

b. In the period under consideration prior to the Spring Offensive, terrain conditions prevailing in Italy presented little or no opportunity for the employment of armor in mass. Before the offensive was launched, neither the 1st Armored Division nor the various separate tank battalions could be used in their normal offensive roles. Operations during this period were largely confined to small unit action, special missions, defensive operations on the Beachhead, and various secondary roles. This situation is well illustrated by the comment of a Group Commander in a report of combat lessons:

... In mountainous terrain such as that over which the units of this Armored Group have operated in Italy, employment of tanks in mass has been impossible. Seldom have tactical units larger than the tank company been used. To date, entire tank battalions have not been employed as such under group control.

For the most part, tanks and tank destroyers have been confined to existing roads because of extremely steep and rocky terrain and the presence of stone terraces, walls, deep gullies, and soft stream beds. . . (2Arm.G/OL)

2. Opportunity was first presented for large-scale armored operations after the landing of our forces in the ANZIO-NEPTUNO area. The temporary period of static and defensive warfare that developed in the Beachhead, however, again prevented for some time the normal offensive role of armor. It was not until the breakout attack in conjunction with the Spring Offensive that the 1st Armored Division and the separate tank battalions were committed to offensive combat in the normal manner. In the operations that followed, continuous offensive armored action prevailed throughout the advance in Tuscany until the approaches of the Gothic Line were reached.

3. The static period of the ANZIO Beachhead presented a number of lesson-experiences with respect to armor in the defensive role under peculiar conditions and in various secondary missions.

39. EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

a. Tactical Limitations Imposed by Terrain

As indicated in the preceding paragraph, tank operations in the mountainous terrain of Italy were largely confined to the action of small units. Lack of maneuver space because of the rugged, close country, inability of units to avoid becoming road-bound, and observation afforded the enemy by mountain ranges and commanding peaks all materially influenced the tactical employment of armor. An observer from the Ground Forces Board reported after detailed consultation with numerous unit commanders:

. . . Doctrines set forth in the employment of tanks has always favored the employment of tanks in large numbers. However, from the lessons learned in actual combat here during inclement weather in mountainous country, employment of tanks in greater strength than a company has its limitations. The most deciding limitation is the lack of terrain to maneuver in. Tanks must remain on roads where they are able to move. . . . Throughout engagements in the mountains tanks were used in very small numbers. The nature of the terrain dictated such employment, as it has been impossible to move tanks across country. . . . Where tanks could support infantry attacks from fixed positions, it was possible to use a few

more, but even then the field of fire was usually so narrow and the suitable positions so scarce that not more than one platoon could be used. In this type of employment the tanks would be brought into previously selected positions at night. They would fire on objectives with the first morning light during the initial phases of the infantry attack, and then withdrew to defiladed positions after the infantry had passed beyond supporting range. Or, they would remain in supporting position to repulse enemy counter attacks. . . . (AGF/140)

b. Employment of Tanks on Roads

Terrain conditions often confined the operations of tanks almost entirely to roads and small areas closely adjacent to them. The Ground Forces Board observer reported that often the mountains precluded the use of tanks anywhere except on roads and that

. . . .occasionally a spot large enough for the tanks to get off the road could be found, but for the most part in this period (March 1944) the roads in both the American and French divisional areas were cut out of the sides of the mountains, slopes which varied from 30° to the perpendicular. . . . (AGF/140)

Operational technique of tank action confined to road nets

In this type of terrain was thus reported by a Group Commander in a summary of combat lessons:

. . . .Then terrain conditions confine the tanks and tank destroyers to roads, a very narrow front results and seldom can more than one or two platoons be used. While one to three tanks advance, the others take overwatching positions and fire on enemy gun flashes, houses, or other objects that might conceal strongpoints or anti-tank guns. Often it is advantageous to fire on suspected enemy locations without waiting actually to see the target -- the enemy is clever and thorough with his camouflage. When the leading tanks reach advantageous points still within support of the overwatching tanks the leading vehicles take overwatching positions and allow the formerly overwatching tanks to advance under their protection. Thus, fire and movement is adhered to, even under these roadbound conditions. In such action the availability of additional tanks to displace forward with full loads of ammunition is an advantage, for those which were first overwatching may have expended much of their load as well as those which made the first advance. . . . (2dnd.G/OL)

Movement and maneuver of tanks on the narrow roads, especially in negotiating sharp turns became increasingly important in these small unit operations. A Battalion Commander described briefly his experience:

. . . Roads in many cases were so narrow and winding that it became necessary to back up the tanks and then go forward again in order to negotiate the turns. The tanks frequently found it very difficult to turn around on the roads, and when under enemy observation they were protected by overwatching tanks during the turn-around. Each tank often took approximately five minutes to turn about after finding a spot wide enough to back up and execute the turn. . . .
(ACF/140)

c. Value of Small Unit Operations in Mountains

Although the terrain prevailing in many parts of the zone of operations has been considered entirely unsuited for the action of tanks in the conventional role, the Campaign showed conclusively that even in adverse conditions and in close road-bound areas, small unit tank operations can be of great value and usefulness in the advance. A group commander made this point in a current report:

. . . Many experienced tank commanders say that this country is no country for tanks. This is undoubtedly true, but when used in small numbers and adapted to the situation prevailing, they have a definite usefulness and have been highly praised by the infantry units which have been supported. . . .(ACF/140)

d. Necessity of Adequate Engineer Support

Mountainous terrain and action confined to road areas have rendered adequate engineer support and assistance to tank operations of vital importance. In many instances armored units could not have operated at all without aggressive and close support of engineers. A battalion commander made the following comment:

. . . In this country the use of roads for tank operations is of utmost importance. The retreating enemy realizes this and does a thorough job of demolitions, leaving road blocks, destroyed bridges, landslides, and mines. Our engineers have done a remarkable job in repairing the roads and clearing the mines. Bulldozers are used well forward, often under enemy fire. Without such assistance, tanks would be of no use whatever in the type of terrain over which they did operate very successfully. . . .(ACF/140)

e. Surprise Gained by Employment of Tanks in Mountains

Fifth Army has reported that surprise may be achieved successfully by employing tanks in mountainous terrain where their use is not expected. In the compilation of lessons learned, the following example has been given:

. . .The Germans do not look for tanks in mountains. At TERRACIA considerable surprise was gained by taking elements of the 750th Tank Battalion up a mountain trail in order to flank and force the enemy position instead of going down the road which was a defile between the mountains and the sea. . . . (52/112)

40. RECONNAISSANCE

a. General

All commanders have reiterated the importance of thorough and careful reconnaissance prior to all armored operations, whether in mountains or in open terrain. It is essential that the full implications and detail necessary to reconnaissance be understood by elements of all echelons. It has been pointed out that planning and reconnaissance are interdependent, and both must become a continuous process during all periods of action. The Commander of the 2nd Armored Group declared in a report of lessons from combat that

. . .reconnaissance continues to be the most important prerequisite to a well planned attack, and timely knowledge of the situation as it develops is of utmost importance in the control and coordination of the separate elements of a command. Nothing can take the place of foot reconnaissance well forward prior to an attack. In moving situations, foot reconnaissance is often too slow. In the latter situation, Cub planes are ideal for such work. . . . (2AmG/CL)

Similarly a battalion commander also reported with respect to small unit operations along the main GARIGLIANO Line:

. . .The vital importance of reconnaissance was emphasized time and time again. The meaning of reconnaissance planning and continuous reconnaissance must be fully understood by all concerned. Map reconnaissance is very important in planning, but interpretation of aerial photographs may be misleading if the information is not impartially confirmed. Reconnaissance could be improved if it were organized on a larger and more comprehensive scale. Very frequently reconnaissance information most desired and of most importance is the information that comes in just a few hours, or sometimes just a few minutes, before the action affected by the reconnaissance is to be initiated. This "close to action" information over a considerable front is seldom available to the tank battalion commander. . . . (ACF/140)

Further comment on the necessity of adequate reconnaissance is quoted from another battalion commander, with special reference to small unit operations in close country:

. . . Reconnaissance is absolutely necessary, if any time at all is available, to perform any given mission. One particular reason here is that in this terrain the enemy can choose his ground, and you have to devise the means to choose yours. . . . Reconnaissance of roads by platoon and tank commanders is essential. Near the enemy, this is usually done at night, but when necessary it may be done in daylight within enemy observation if the men go singly or in pairs. The enemy usually hesitates to fire on unprofitable targets lest he give away his own position. . . . Tanks are definitely limited in their movements in mountainous terrain, and positions for tanks are difficult to find. Reconnaissance before the tanks move into position is absolutely necessary, and since the tanks may often be used beyond the infantry lines, patrols at night should be made. By sending several reliable enlisted men or an officer, with the infantry patrols, valuable information may be obtained. Full dependence may not be placed on reports of infantry patrols alone, since these patrols are not seeking information relative to the use of tanks. Men who understand the capabilities and limitations of tanks must be used for such patrols and reconnaissance. . . .
(AGF/140)

Experience of the 1st Armored Division in the break-out operations from the ANZIO Beachhead likewise re-emphasized the importance of thorough reconnaissance prior to the attack. Fifth Army reported in brief:

. . . Gaining knowledge of fixed defenses through constant reconnaissance and patrolling is 75% of the problem. The 1st Armored Division reports that during the Beachhead breakthrough they had considerable knowledge of the enemy defenses on their left, and experienced little difficulty in this sector. However, on the right where they had little such knowledge, the task was much more difficult. . . . (5A/11)

b. Employment of the Armored Reconnaissance Company

The following material has been extracted from the reports of the Commander, Reconnaissance Company, 1st Armored Regiment, on combat experience and lessons learned during the Spring Offensive (AGF/172):

(1) In maintaining contact with infantry on our flanks, more time in advance of attack is needed to establish contact with the infantry and set up radio communication.

(2) If reconnaissance elements are to operate as point vehicles in the advance guard formation, light tanks are essential for this purpose because of mined roads, snipers, and artillery fire.

(3) In an attack with tanks in which the reconnaissance elements are to maintain close contact between the combat commands, light tanks are essential for protection against artillery fire, especially against concentrations of fire such as were encountered at CAMPOLEONE.

(4) If operations are scheduled for a certain area, reconnaissance elements should be sent out well in advance of the main body to reconnoiter the road nets and trails during daylight hours.

(5) Maps should be issued in sufficient time prior to the operation to allow breakdown issue to the inner units of the organization. There should be available at least four sets of maps per platoon.

41. EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES

The established principle that tanks should not be used in towns and villages where the crooked, narrow streets and thick-walled buildings provide the enemy with excellent opportunity for tank traps and antitank gun positions has been proved entirely sound. However, in the fighting in Italy, it has been found necessary and effective under certain conditions to employ tanks in towns and villages. In any case, such employment must be closely supported and combined with close infantry action. Similarly the doctrine that routes through towns should be avoided, and towns by-passed by armor is also sound; but again, in the existing regions traversed, this has often been rendered impossible because the only route available for armor has often led through the town. Experience in Italy has demonstrated that the basic principles must in such cases be modified to fit local conditions, and proper precautions and care in tactical employment, especially through the medium of close infantry support, must be exercised to offset the unusual hazards to armor. A group commander has summed up his experience as follows:

... The doctrine which teaches that tanks should by-pass hostile towns and villages is correct, but in Italy the roads invariably lead through the hearts of towns and routes around them seldom exist. If the attack is to be continued beyond the village or town, there is nothing for the tanks to do but go through. A case of this kind requires careful consideration and the maximum coordination of all arms. Artillery can destroy many of the houses and keep the defenders down; air reconnaissance can spot vehicles in and beyond the town; the tanks can deliver direct fire at medium range, but the infantry must enter the town first close behind the artillery barrage. The tanks can overwatch the infantry and fire on targets much closer to them than would be safe for the artillery. Yes, there will be times when tanks must enter villages and towns, but never before the infantry. At CASTELFIDATE tanks were pre-sent in such numbers around the town that the antitank guns hidden in the buildings were afraid to open fire. It would have been suicide to have attempted to enter the town with tanks in column. . . (2nd.G/CL)

Likewise the Commander of the 751st Tank Battalion reported after extensive operations through town and village-dotted terrain:

. . . If possible, tanks should not use the main routes into towns but should work in over the secondary streets. Infantry should be right with the tanks, which can fire over the heads of the infantry when machine guns and other small arms open up on them. . . (5A/LL)

Another Battalion Commander also reported after the fall of Rome and during the advance into Viscary that

. . . it is disastrous for tanks to go unattended by infantry into small towns with narrow, winding streets where they are easily boxed in and knocked out. . . (5A/LL)

Further experience from combat in towns and villages has been reported by the Ground Forces Board observer after detailed discussion with participating commanders:

. . . Throughout the fluctuating battle for the town (name omitted) the tanks have been used in close support of the infantry. These tanks have made from five to six sorties daily, each lasting about two hours. Six or seven tanks are usually employed in each sortie. Deployment has varied. A favorite method is for two tanks to cover another three which move and engage targets from positions between houses. At the same time one or two tanks give flank protection and carry out a diversionary shoot. . . Tank crews are briefed before sorties from aerial photographs and large scale diagrams of the town. A precise destination in the town is allotted each tank, and each is given a target or a definite covering task. . .

. . . An enemy behind solid walls is difficult to dislodge. The walls must be first destroyed. By continuous fire at heavily fortified buildings, the 75mm HE shell with delay fuse will finally reduce the strongest building. . . (AGF/140)

42. THE USE OF TERRAIN IN TANK OPERATIONS

a. Alternate Routes

Whenever possible, alternate routes should always be available in the event that tanks become disabled in such positions as to block the continued advance of following vehicles. Unless there is an alternate route or terrain suitable for movement off the road, the assistance of tanks in an attack cannot be relied on, since the disabling of one tank at a critical point may hold up an entire unit's tank attack. Every

piece of commanding terrain must be considered and utilized as far as possible. (COLAmc.G/AGF/132). Likewise, in planning armored operations, full consideration should be given to alternate routes of action, in the event that enemy antitank defenses make the original line of attack impracticable. This latter principle becomes part of the established doctrine of fire and movement. (753TEn/IL).

b. Assembly Areas

Assembly areas should be selected with full consideration of the enemy's capabilities of observation and artillery fire. Tank crews should remain in their vehicles until it is established that the enemy has not discovered the area or is prepared to range in on it with his artillery. The Commander of the 760th Tank Battalion reported that

...the Germans will range in on assembly areas. After an assembly area is occupied, tank personnel should wait for a time before leaving their tanks, because the Germans will frequently wait a few minutes for the crews to enter the open before opening fire with their artillery. . . (AGF/132)

In an assembly area, only one tank should be used for radio communication, and this vehicle should be located at an average of 600 yards from the main area containing the unit. Transmission should be kept at a minimum. Extended transmissions by radio enable the enemy to locate the position of the transmitter. (COLAmc.G/IL)

c. Cover and Concealment in Forward Areas

In forward areas it is vital that tank personnel know the proper use of cover, camouflage, and the natural means of concealing vehicles and movements. In many cases, nets are not used to proper advantage, and reveal rather than conceal positions and vehicles. A unit commander observed after extensive experience in Italy:

...Troops frequently do not understand the importance of staying on single trails and tracks in bivouac areas. Vehicle drivers must understand that the tracks they leave tell a story to the enemy. When dispersion cannot be obtained, proper and effective camouflage principles must be followed. . . . (AGF/132)

d. Firing Positions in Close Terrain

When a tank attack is confined to the general axis of

a road because of close terrain, it is essential that suitable firing positions be located well forward from which stationary tanks can overwatch the advance as long as possible. In mountainous terrain, especially when the enemy occupies commanding heights, reconnaissance for these positions must be made dismounted and the tanks should be moved into position only a short time before the attack. Very often it is desirable to occupy these positions at night to support a daylight attack. (2Amd.C/CL)

e. The Importance of Considering Space

The importance of considering the available space for routes, maneuver, and general action, especially in close and mountainous country, has been emphasized by many tank unit commanders. An armored regimental commander brought out this point in a report of lessons learned in the period of the Spring Offensive:

... A tank battalion commander has the following to say on this subject, and his views have received general concurrence: "There terrain conditions severely limit maneuver and routes of movement particular care should be taken by all commanders to avoid committing more tanks than can be used effectively on the contemplated mission. Time for reconnaissance and air-photo and map study should be ample whenever at all possible, for such determination by each echelon of command. It will be found, under such conditions, that the number of tanks to be committed can best be determined from the bottom up, that is, by determining the number of platoon missions, available cover, probable direct fire support missions, and fields of fire; thereafter the number of companies to be committed may be determined. . . During the latter part of February (1944) this battalion erred in pushing more tanks at the enemy than could be profitably employed on the usable terrain. No possible advantage can accrue from such an error. The resultant exposure of the excess vehicles caused unnecessary casualties; and any psychological effect on an intelligent enemy by a mere showing of numbers would back-fire by his knowledge that we were merely being tactically clumsy. He knew the terrain as well as we did. . . (1st Amd.Rgt./AGF/152)

43. REORGANIZATION AND COUNTERATTACK

The Commanding General of a special armored task force which operated prior to the opening of the Spring Offensive commented on the subject of reorganization of armored units to meet enemy counterattack:

... The enemy will invariably counterattack. Upon reaching an objective it is vital that the tank units reorganize quickly. If reorganization is accomplished prior to the counterattack, the enemy will suffer his heaviest casualties. Plans for this

reorganization, including the fire support of all weapons, must be made prior to the attack. . . Aggressive action forward should be carried out when the enemy is disorganized.

The time for this is immediately following the repulse of a counterattack. Armor can be used with the most telling effect under these conditions. Bold, forward action at this time will produce most effective results. . . (TFA/ACF/132)

44. USE OF DEMOLITION SNAKES IN ASSISTING ARMOR

During the Spring Offensive, demolition snakes were used for the first time to assist the armored units through minefields and strong points. The results of these weapons varied, and valuable lessons were gained through the experience from their first use in combat. Fifth Army has reported the following:

. . . The 1st Armored Division used snakes at several points during the break-out attack from the ANZIO Beachhead. Experience has shown that they must be assembled close to the front, and the entire operation must be well planned and coordinated in advance. One great drawback to the use of snakes is vulnerability to artillery fire and mines, which may explode the snakes prematurely and create heavy casualties among our own troops nearby. Two enemy strong points close to the line of departure were completely disorganized during the break-out from the Beachhead by snakes being pushed into the positions and detonated. . . (54/11)

Details of the two outstandingly successful operations with snakes are of value and interest as examples of how these weapons can be effectively employed. The Commander of Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division, declares shortly after the successful break-out attack:

. . . The initial attack out of the Beachhead perimeter was rapid and successful. In Combat Command "A" the assault was materially aided by the use of demolition snakes for the first time. Since these weapons were entirely new, some details of their use and results will be of interest. They were used against two critical strong points generally consisting of wired-in machine gun nests and heavily defended trenches covered by mined approaches. Two snakes were used on each one. In each instance one snake was dragged up by a medium tank and placed in position. The pre-selected position had been marked by stakes that had been accurately located for direction by azimuth. The snake was then pushed into firing position by a second tank, the distance having been checked by odometer in accordance with pre-calculations. It was then detonated. The second snake in the meanwhile had been dragged up until its head reached the beginning of the furrow created by the explosion of the first. It was then pushed through the furrow by a third tank and brought into position beyond and in prolongation of the furrow. There it was detonated. A two-hundred-yard furrow, wide enough for the passage of a medium tank was blasted out by the two snakes. The entire

operation from its start (the snakes having been previously assembled) to the detonation of the second snake required only 35 minutes. The operation was conducted under cover of artillery preparation, and no tank or personnel casualties were sustained. Similar procedure was carried out with snakes at the second point. The results were excellent.

The detonations not only cleared adequate gaps in the mined approaches but also killed or stunned the enemy personnel in the strong points, and initial waves of infantry riding on medium tanks were able to mop up the positions without appreciable opposition. It is regretted that more of these weapons were not used by both Combat Commands in this operation. . . (CO"AN/SR)

In contrast to the highly successful operation with snakes above outlined, the attempt to use these weapons at ISOLA BELLA proved ineffective because the snakes were assembled too far in rear of the forward positions in which they were to be used. Fifth Army reported on this instance as follows:

. . . An attempt to use snakes was made at ISOLA BELLA, but without success. They were assembled too far behind the line of departure, and in the long move across country all of the hitches became broken. In future operations they should be assembled close up behind the line of departure, and their installation should require only a short, straight forward tow without turning or twisting across country. . . (5A/LL)

45. DEFENSIVE ROLE OF ARMOR ON THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD

During the static defensive period of the ANZIO Beachhead, the 1st Armored Division was mainly employed as a Corps Reserve, with the primary mission of providing the main counterattack force against large-scale enemy assault. Its general role was to provide powerful support at any point of the perimeter line that might be seriously threatened. Positions were prepared at all critical points along the line, and the tanks, assault guns, and attached tank destroyers were held ready to occupy them in any locality and at any time that the necessity should arise. This armored reserve was also charged with clearing out any salients that the enemy might drive into the perimeter line, and flexible plans were accordingly prepared in detail for dealing with such eventualities in all critical sectors. The armored reconnaissance elements also had the mission of maintaining continual patrols along the coast and also along the Mussolini Canal on the right flank of the Beachhead positions. Armored elements were also used in strong raids to disorganize and disrupt the enemy lines, and on two occasions strong attacks of the armor in force were launched to relieve enemy pressure on the left flank. One of these

attacks served successfully to break up a powerful German attack that threatened a critical sector of the line. (CSLard.Div./SR)

46. EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS AS ARTILLERY

A few tank units had been employed in their secondary role as artillery in the previous period of the Campaign covered in Training Memorandum No. 2. In the later period, especially during the static period of the AVZIO Beachhead, tanks were for the first time used extensively in this role, and the results proved to be successful and desirable under the conditions prevailing. The Chief of Staff, 1st Armored Division, informally reported after the break-out attack:

... During this period (defensive phase of the Beachhead) the tanks, assault guns, and attached tank destroyers were used frequently in their secondary role of reinforcing artillery. This constituted the first extensive use of tanks in this role, though the destroyers had been in considerable use as artillery previously in the main southern line on the Fifth Army front. ... The assault guns of the armored infantry and tank units were also organized and employed as "batteries" with good results. Every weapon in the division was employed whenever possible to reinforce and sustain the fire power of the units supporting the line. . . (CSLard.Div./SR)

Experience and comment from the Commanding Officer, 1st Armored Regiment, with emphasis on training of armored units in this secondary role, is also available:

... Medium tanks have done a great deal of firing on the Beachhead as conventional artillery. Tankers of the old school will be horrified at this. The experience has proven highly worthwhile, however, both from the standpoint of damage inflicted on the enemy and from the standpoint of morale. Our guns have proved to be remarkably accurate at extreme ranges -- as great as 14,000 yards -- and have frequently been used on targets which the 105mm gun-howitzer could not reach. From the standpoint of morale it has proved worthwhile because it has provided effective employment for the tankers during many periods when conditions have prevented the use of tanks in their primary role. Medium tank platoons have operated as batteries and have usually been attached to artillery battalions. In some cases, however, tank companies have operated their own fire direction centers. Medium tank officers have regularly done their own forward observation.

... It is believed that all medium tank units should be trained and equipped to operate in a secondary role as conventional artillery, in as much as experience indicates that there are bound to be many periods during combat when terrain conditions and enemy defenses will preclude the use of tanks in their primary assault role. The equipment of medium tanks should include such items as telephones, protractors, range-deflection fans, plotting boards, firing tables, etc. . . . (AGF/152)

Further comment on experience with armored units in the secondary role as artillery just prior to the break-out attack from the Beachhead is extracted from another report of the same Commander:

... Most of our work now (April 25, 1944) is firing indirect fire as artillery. We have been firing up to 16,000 yards with these tanks by digging them in to get the necessary elevation. There was a time when we could outshoot any other weapon on the Beachhead. . . We are organized to operate our own fire direction center although right now the artillery with whom we work does it for us. I feel that it is highly desirable to be well-trained in indirect fire for the role of reinforcing artillery. However, the tank crews must first be properly trained in direct fire with all their weapons. I will say, however, that tank gunnery has improved in my regiment since we have been shooting indirect fire. I attribute this to the fact that the gunners are getting accustomed to laying more carefully, both for range and deflection. . . (AGF/148)

47. MARCHES AND MOVEMENTS

a. General

Operations throughout the Italian Peninsula have afforded extensive experience in the movement of armored units through difficult terrain and over limited and inadequate road nets. Operational movements and marches have served to bring out the importance of this phase of action in the training of tank units, and commanders have emphasized repeatedly the necessity of thorough training of all echelons in such functions as warning orders, road priorities and discipline, use, and marking of routes, and traffic control as applied to armored units.

b. Specific Points of Lesson-Experience

The following specific points have been extracted from reports of various battalion commanders whose units operated with the 2nd Armored Group in Italy (2nd.C/Ind.):

(1) During relatively static conditions, such as prevailed before the Spring Offensive, warning orders for movements and marches were issued from eight to forty-eight hours before the movement. Under these conditions, most warning orders were written, and units were directed to obtain traffic clearance from the Corps Traffic Control Center. During the moving situation that followed the opening of the Spring Offensive, warning orders were oral. Time in such warning orders varies from

instructions to "move when ready" to several hours, depending on the situation and road conditions.

(2) In stable situations, road priorities and clearances were normally established through the Corps Traffic Control Center. Movements for elements of battalion strength were handled through the armored group headquarters. Company movements were arranged by the battalions concerned. When the situation changed to one of movement during the Offensive, the establishment of road clearance and priorities was made to fit the tactical situation of the moment. It often became necessary to rush an armored unit to the front line, and in such cases, special priority was always sought. In such instances it became necessary to instruct the commander concerned to report or rendezvous at a certain point in the shortest possible time, and to make the best possible movement that traffic conditions would allow. Such situations, which were rendered unavoidable by tactical necessity, often made traffic conditions difficult because of the many units using the limited roads. Whenever possible, routes were reconnoitered in advance by reconnaissance elements of the tank battalions.

(3) Experience has shown that when the tactical situation permits, the best time for starting an armored column for a march or movement is at daybreak. Faster time can be safely made without mishap, drivers have better visibility, and traffic is generally lighter at this hour.

(4) The poor condition of most roads and the few first-class highways prohibited the movement of tanks by transporter in most cases. In several instances transporters were used, but the necessity of taking the tanks off the transporters where deviations occurred and then placing them back on, tied up traffic and lost more hours than would have been required had the tanks proceeded on their own traction. This experience does not detract from the usefulness and necessity of transporters. The poor road net and peculiar terrain conditions simply made them impracticable in many instances.

(5) When there was sufficient time between the warning order and the movement, battalion reconnaissance elements reconnoitered routes and posted guides and markers where any confusion as to direction might arise. Military police and tape were often used to guide units around

by-passes or through particularly difficult or dangerous portions of the route. During a night movement guides were equipped with masked flashlight if the movement was to be conducted forward of the light line.

48. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS FROM TANK EXPERIENCE

a. Drivers must be instructed that during night operations it is safer to avoid shifting gears. Travel must be performed at a slow and even speed. In moving from a front line position to the rear at night, a disengagement of the clutch in order to shift gears will cause flames to come out of the exhaust. This is often spotted by enemy observers and soon brings down artillery fire.

b. Some gunners have a tendency to be too anxious to fire on distant targets which are moving towards them. Gunners must be taught to be patient, to wait until the target reaches suitable range, and then open up with the assurance that the target can be hit with one or two rounds.

c. Valuable use can be made of aerial photograph interpretation for tank operations if a trained interpreter is with the unit headquarters and has the equipment with which to work.

d. More instruction is needed in recording information at observation posts and in the return of correctly filled out S-2 reports. Unit S-2's, especially those of the battalion level, must make all possible use of, and forward to higher headquarters, all papers, maps, overlays, and similar items left on the field by the enemy.

e. The dissemination of information in armored units, both up and down, and laterally, should be improved.

f. Small terrain features should not be overlooked or their importance neglected in planning an attack. The enemy fights in any type of terrain, and will hold to the last, any area of commanding ground.

g. Liaison officers of tank units should be considered as staff officers and emphasis must be placed on their training as such.

h. The 75mm tank gun has been proven to be excellent for close-range direct fire on enemy machine gun nests and infantry strong points. Tanks in Italy have been invariably used whenever possible for direct fire missions.

i. Armored units should be withdrawn at night for refuelling and replenishment of ammunition. The tanks should remain in position as armored pillboxes only as a last resort of tactical necessity.

SECTION VIII : TANK DESTROYER UNITS

49. GENERAL

During the period under consideration, the operations of tank destroyer units were more varied than they had been throughout the earlier phases of the Campaign. More opportunities occurred for the employment of destroyers in their primary role of direct fire weapons against enemy armor. They were also used frequently as assault guns in close support of attacking infantry, and in this role engaged enemy observation posts, machine gun nests, strong points, and pillboxes with direct fire. The various types of action varied from immobile employment during the static period before the line of the GARIGLIANO and on the ANZIO Beachhead to highly mobile pursuit action during the Spring Offensive. In the latter stage, parts of the terrain fought over were sufficiently open for the employment of tanks, and when such conditions prevailed, the destroyers often engaged enemy tanks in considerable numbers. In Section IV, *supra*, the general experience in the employment of tank destroyers with the other combat arms has already been described. The following paragraphs will deal mainly with the particular problems and field experience which relate to tank destroyer battalions as individual units.

50. EMPLOYMENT OF TANK DESTROYERS AS ARTILLERY

a. General

Since the publication of Training Memorandum No. 2, in which the experience of destroyers in the artillery role to 1 February 1944 was briefly discussed (Paragraph 59, *ibid.*), no new or outstanding principles of employment in this role have been developed. However, certain details have come into sharper focus as a result of later experience, which are treated in the succeeding sub-paragraphs.

2. Organization of Tank Destroyer Units for Artillery Missions

Under ordinary circumstances when a destroyer battalion was committed to action with all three of its gun companies engaged in the primary anti-tank role, each company usually held one platoon in company reserve in rear of the main positions. In such cases it was normal to register the reserve platoon of each company as a separate four-gun battery for indirect fire. In some cases the indirect fire of these four-gun batteries was conducted by the tank destroyer battalion; in other instances the destroyer "batteries" were tied-in to a field artillery fire direction center. When a destroyer battalion was committed to action with two companies in the primary role and one company in reserve, it was found to be advantageous to divide the reserve company into two six-gun "batteries" for indirect fire. In such cases the company was capable of operating its own fire direction center, and officers and non-commissioned officers who could be spared, as a result of special organization for indirect fire were employed in observation posts or as relief personnel for twenty-four hour operation of the company in the artillery role.

3. Observation Posts

In stabilized situations, the reconnaissance company of the tank destroyer battalion was extensively employed in manning observation posts for indirect fire operations. Experience demonstrated that combat seasoned tank destroyer personnel possessed of intimate knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of destroyer weapons were able to adjust the indirect fire of a company rapidly and effectively. The high velocity and flat trajectory of the 3-inch tank destroyer gun presents problems in adjustment and fire for effect that differ from those of the howitzer. For example, it was found that uneven ground in the impact area has little effect on the adjustment of plunging fire of a high-angle weapon, but a small correction in range with the 3-inch destroyer gun will often result in lost rounds when firing on terrain with only slight rolling conformation. Battalion commanders have been unanimous in their praise of the usefulness of the artillery observation aircraft for adjusting tank destroyer fire in the artillery role. Because of the relatively small burst of the

3-inch shell, it has often been difficult to sense rounds from ground observation posts, especially in terrain covered with brush or vineyards. On the ANZIO Beachhead operations were conducted on unfavorably low ground without natural features commanding observation. The only points on the ground where observation could be satisfactorily obtained were in buildings, and many of these were destroyed by enemy artillery fire. Under these circumstances artillery air observation posts were used extensively to direct the fire of tank destroyers in their secondary role. Some battalion commanders felt that these observation aircraft should be included in the organic equipment of tank destroyer battalions. A majority opinion, however, among unit commanders holds that such addition in equipment is unnecessary because divisional or corps observation aircraft can always be made available when necessary. Tank destroyer battalions habitually sent one of their own officers up with the aircraft pilot to observe and adjust fire.

A. Tank Destroyer Positions for Indirect Fire

In the selection of gun positions for indirect fire, the differences in characteristics between the 3-inch tank destroyer gun and other light artillery weapons must be fully considered if maximum effective fire is to be obtained. These principal differences include flat trajectory, relatively long range, 360° traverse, high velocity, some armor protection for the crew, and unusually large muzzle flash. Consideration must also be given to the type of mission to be assigned to the destroyers. Generally they are best used for road interdiction, harassing fires, and area fire in enemy rear areas, rather than for close support of friendly infantry. Also, the fact that the destroyers when employed as artillery are engaged in a secondary role, and must be able to abandon such missions for their primary task on short notice, must be kept in mind, especially in the matter of position selection. Positions have been normally sought well forward behind a low mask. The immediate vicinity of the guns should be free of trees so as to permit full use of the wide-angle fire that is possible with the turret-mounted gun. When time has permitted, the destroyers have been dug in to minimize damage to radiator, tracks, and other vulnerable parts as a result of

counterbattery fire. Such retaliatory fire must be expected if the positions are occupied longer than a day or two. Maximum range can be appreciably increased by digging in the rear of the vehicle in order to increase elevation of the piece. Pug-in positions should be prepared so that the destroyers can be driven into them from the rear. Fox-holes and pits for ammunition should not be dug in or near the rear approaches to the gun positions which must be kept clear at all times to permit prompt movement of the destroyer in the event that it is necessary to assume the primary antitank role. This consideration of eventual primary missions while the destroyers are engaged in the secondary role also requires that covered routes from the position be available and usable in all weather conditions whenever possible.

e. Targets and Missions

Tank destroyers have been used as artillery for a wide variety of missions. One battalion took over the sector and responsibility of the artillery of a division, and with six platoons of tanks and two batteries of 105mm self-propelled guns attached, functioned for more than a month as task force artillery in support of four antiaircraft artillery battalions which were serving in the line as infantry. All tank destroyer battalions throughout the Campaign have engaged targets varying from precision adjustment on enemy observation posts in houses to participation with all thirty-six guns in large-scale prearranged fires on area targets.

f. Fire Control and Gunnery as Artillery

In some cases the tank destroyer battalions have been tied-in to field artillery battalion fire direction centers for the conduct of fire. In other instances destroyer battalions and companies have operated their own fire direction centers. Experience has demonstrated that all battalions in this Theater are capable of assuming the role of artillery with their own fire direction centers, with certain limitations with respect to equipment and personnel. For example the Table of Organization and Equipment does not provide the destroyer battalion or company with personnel or equipment to organize and maintain the communication system required when operating as artillery. By drawing additional wire,

telephones and switchboards, and by training their own wire crews from rear-echelon personnel, the destroyer units have successfully operated the necessary communication nets when functioning as artillery. Provision for inclusion in the tables of organization of additional trained personnel for fire direction centers, including metro-message computers, horizontal and vertical control operators, will enable these units to fire both observed and unobserved missions more efficiently. Up to this time, metro-message No. 4, designed for high velocity guns, has not been used in this Theater. Almost without exception destroyer units have ignored metro data, and there can be no doubt that the accuracy of their unobserved missions has suffered from this omission.

E. Instruments and Equipment

Tank destroyers equipped with only the azimuth indicator and also those equipped with the panoramic sight have been used as artillery. Those with the panoramic sight have been found superior for normal artillery missions. Observers' instruments of greater power than the normal binoculars are necessary. A survey set such as is issued to the field artillery battalions would free the destroyer battalions from dependence on other units for the running of necessary surveys. The need of additional wire and communications equipment has been mentioned above. Improved night-lighting devices have worked satisfactorily. Tank destroyer battalions in this Theater have always been able to handle their own ammunition supply, but this has been largely the result of additional transport being authorized over and above the Table of Equipment allowance. At present much of this additional transport is being recalled and turned in. In the future it will be likely that destroyer units engaged as reinforcing artillery may have to call on supported units to assist in supplying ammunition to their guns. It is standard operating procedure that none of the basic load of ammunition is used for artillery missions. The destroyers must be supplied at all times for eventual reversion to their primary role.

51. TANK DESTROYERS IN THEIR PRIMARY ROLE

a. General

In the later phases of the Campaign, especially during the Spring Offensive, tank destroyers have been more extensively used than in previous periods in Italy in their primary role as direct fire weapons. Although the following points from combat experience do not represent new or unusual lessons, they have been sufficiently emphasized by various commanders to warrant detailed inclusion in this study.

b. Self-Propelled vs. Towed Antitank Guns

(1) Battle experience throughout the period of the Campaign under present consideration indicates that the self-propelled antitank gun is tactically superior to the towed weapon. The chief advantages of the former weapon are mobility and armored protection for the crew while in action. Although it presents a higher silhouette and requires greater preparation for dug-in positions, the other advantages have been found to outweigh these lesser disadvantages.

(2) During the first three months of the period considered, one battalion in Italy employed towed three-inch guns. The use of these weapons was so limited that the battalion was converted at the first opportunity to the self-propelled 76mm gun motor carriage, M16. While equipped with towed guns, the battalion was primarily used for indirect fire. During operations on the Fifth Army front on the GARICLIANO where the enemy was on the defensive in mountainous country, this battalion had practically no opportunity to engage enemy tanks. Later, after it had been transferred to the ANZIO Beachhead, it deployed its guns in normal antitank positions, but in the relatively quiet southeastern sector where it was assigned, the battalion again had little opportunity to assume an active combat role.

(3) A most conclusive lesson on the relative merits of towed and self-propelled guns can be drawn from the action of both types of units during the great German attack on the ANZIO Beachhead in February 1944. An Allied antitank regiment equipped with the equivalent weapons to the 57mm and 3-inch guns occupied forward antitank positions in the critical

sector of the attack. When the first heavy German assault with strong armored formations supported by infantry drove down the ANZIO-ALBANO Road, the forward positions of this regiment were overrun by the sheer weight of the attack. Losses in antitank guns and crews were exceptionally heavy. At the same time, a battalion of self-propelled tank destroyers was engaged in the same general sector of the attack. It lost a number of destroyers, but managed to withdraw approximately half of its weapons while heavily engaged under intense small arms and artillery fire. In doing so it destroyed and disabled a large number of enemy tanks, and maintained substantially defensive positions during its withdrawal and continued to sustain the supported infantry. Conversely, no towed guns could be withdrawn from the positions overrun by the enemy attack.

(4) The armor protection afforded the crews of the self-propelled destroyers has been found to be of advantage in many instances. On numerous occasions it was found that intense artillery and mortar fire which usually accompanies a hostile attack will prevent the crews of towed guns from effectively manning their weapons during the attack. In the case of self-propelled destroyers, the armor protection has been found to overcome this problem. The entire experience on the ANZIO Beachhead led to the conclusion that the greater ease of concealment of the towed guns and their greater strategic mobility have been outweighed by other advantages of the self-propelled weapon.

2. Concealment and Camouflage

The necessity of digging-in the destroyers, of careful use of camouflage, and the enforcement of camouflage discipline have been repeatedly demonstrated throughout the Campaign. Observance of these principles was of especial importance in the ANZIO Beachhead where the situation required that guns be placed in the open to cover the approach of possible armored attacks. In a number of instances positions were selected on open ground, the M-10's being dug-in and emplaced at night, and covered with shrimp-type camouflage nets. These guns were placed well forward close behind friendly infantry, and some of them remained in position for almost two months without being discovered by the enemy. The crews were strictly

prohibited from making any movement during the day, and supplies were carried in by hand at night from a point on a nearby road to eliminate tracks leading into the positions.

G. Cover Positions and Prepared Firing Positions

Whenever the nature of the terrain permitted, the tank destroyers were concealed in depressions in the ground or behind rolling hills with firing positions dug into the reverse slopes near the crest. In such locations they were shielded from observation and could move laterally along the front without being seen to occupy any one of a number of prepared firing positions selected to repel possible armored attack. In some instances the cover positions were located in wide ditches along lateral roads, from which the destroyers could move under partial concealment, to previously dug firing positions. It was found that guns so emplaced were not discovered by the enemy and drew no concentrated artillery fire.

H. Close Liaison with the Supported Infantry

The need of close liaison and communication between the infantry and supporting tanks and tank destroyers has been discussed in Section IV, supra. The necessity for this liaison and communication is present in equal degree in static situations when the destroyers are dug-in well forward. Friendly and enemy patrol activity prevails in such situations even though no major effort may be made by either side, and it is important that the tank destroyers know what friendly patrols are operating in the immediate front, the exact location of all outposts, and above all, the infantry plans. On more than one occasion the infantry withdrew at night without notifying the closely supporting destroyer units in advance of their intentions, with the result that the destroyers had difficulty in withdrawing and were needlessly exposed. Experience demonstrated that small infantry units may often forget to keep the supporting destroyers informed on all matters of mutual importance. The lesson is that destroyer commanders must have close liaison with the infantry at all times, and the liaison officers must be constantly alert and active to keep the destroyer units informed of the plans and impending movements of the supported infantry.

F. Careful Ground Reconnaissance

Careful reconnaissance of the ground was carried out whenever possible and proved to be of greatest value in every case. In some instances it was not possible to precede the vehicles by foot reconnaissance because the destroyers moved up with the friendly infantry and assisted in taking the ground traversed. In several cases of this sort, in spite of careful study of good maps and in some instances despite aerial reconnaissance, the destroyers sank into ground that was believed to be solid and became hopelessly stuck. In such cases, some of the immobilized vehicles were recovered at night; others were lost as a result of enemy counterattack before they could be retrieved. Artillery air observation aircraft were used on a number of occasions for reconnaissance and proved to be of great value. When foot reconnaissance proved impossible company commanders and platoon leaders were flown over the area in which they were to operate. They were unanimous in attesting the value of this type of reconnaissance. Wide experience has demonstrated, however, that nothing can take the place of careful foot reconnaissance in determining routes and terrain passable for the destroyers.

G. Use of Buildings for Concealment and Protection

Frequent use has been made of substantially-built houses and buildings for concealment and protection of tank destroyers. This was especially true in the relatively flat and open country on the ANZIO Beachhead. In this area, where the Germans had good observation commanding all unwooded areas and the only alternative was well-dug-in camouflaged positions which required much time, scattered farmhouses and buildings often proved to be excellent for cover and protection. Their use was found to be a good expedient even though the buildings made good targets for hostile artillery. The large number of buildings in this area and their scattered pattern on the ground often facilitated the concealment of whole companies of destroyers, permitting the siting of one or two destroyers behind each building with interlocking fields of fire in the same general area. On one occasion six German tanks attacked along a road close to which a company of destroyers were located in concealment

behind buildings as above mentioned. The company commander called for artillery fire, which made the tanks "button up," and partially blinded them. He then moved his destroyers simultaneously from behind the scattered buildings in the vicinity and destroyed all six enemy tanks before they were aware of the destroyer threat. No losses were sustained by the destroyer company.

52. ATTACHMENT OF TANK DESTROYERS TO SMALL INFANTRY UNITS

a. Improper employment of tank destroyers in Italy has stemmed largely from the common practice of attaching portions of destroyer battalions to small infantry units. Frequently a division to which a destroyer battalion is attached has sub-attached one destroyer company to each of the three infantry regiments. Infantry regimental commanders in turn frequently would sub-attach a destroyer platoon to each of his three battalions. The infantry battalion commanders, in their turn, would often complete the chain of decentralization by dividing the attached destroyer platoons into two sections and sub-attaching these sections to each of his companies in the line. As a result of this practice, the tank destroyer battalion commander, and often his company commanders, lost control of the tactical employment of their units and weapons, and became relegated almost entirely to supply and administrative functions. Thus the services of highly trained, expert officers in their own arm were virtually wasted, and furthermore, the tactical employment of their weapons was often assumed by commanders of small infantry units who were not fully versed in the capabilities and limitations of the tank destroyers. As a result, improper missions were often assigned to the small destroyer units, and the massed and effective weight of the tank destroyer battalion became dissipated over wide sectors, when it might have been more profitably employed under the trained knowledge of its own commander.

b. It is recognized that terrain and peculiar conditions arising under tactical situations often preclude the employment of whole battalions of destroyers, and some decentralization and breakdown is necessary. However, the problem remains: How best to achieve effective teamwork and

coordination of effort between the infantry and the destroyers. A long step in this direction was the adoption of a policy throughout the Theater which does not permit, except in extreme necessity, the attachment of tank destroyer units below the level of divisions. The effect of this policy has been to place elements of tank destroyer battalions in support, but not attached directly to, small infantry units as the situation may require. Thus the destroyer battalion commander and his company commanders retain their proper measure of tactical control. This policy has resulted in fewer losses in destroyers from improper use, and in their more effective employment without lessening their support and cooperation in the team-play of the infantry-tank destroyer combination. The close support that infantry demands and is entitled to receive at all times has not been weakened, but has been strengthened.

53. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS FROM TANK DESTROYER EXPERIENCE

a. Essential Cleanliness of Vehicles

A number of destroyers were burned in action when hit by high explosive shell or by armor-piercing shot. It is to be expected that some vehicles will burn, and there is no way to eliminate that possibility. Quite a number of destroyers, however, have taken one or more hits without burning. Battalion commanders are unanimous in the opinion that the most important precaution that can be taken to lessen the hazard of fire is to keep the vehicles spotlessly clean inside and free from all excess oil on exterior parts. It is known from experience that those vehicles that were hit and did not burn were all especially clean and free from trash and excess oil. Every effort should be made to indoctrinate crews with the vital importance of vehicle cleanliness.

b. Cover for Open Destroyer Turrets

Several destroyer battalions have experimented with improvised covers for the vehicle turrets. These experiments have ranged from heavy timbers laid over the top and covered by sandbags, to light armored plates salvaged from halftracks and hinged to the turret. All commanders agreed that any top cover must be capable of being jettisoned quickly and

should not be used when the destroyers are engaging or are preparing to engage enemy tanks. Such cover provides protection from artillery air bursts and from hand grenades. Disadvantages also accrued from the use of these improvised protective turret covers. In one instance the gun crew of an M-10 was lost when the vehicle was hit and burned. The driver and assistant driver escaped through their hatches, and it is believed that the gun crew might have escaped also had it not been for the improvised cover which was on the turret. The weight of opinion of battalion commanders holds that a turret cover, fitted as an integral part of the destroyer, would be more of a hindrance than a help.

G. Need of Additional Liaison Officers

A tank destroyer battalion attached to a division normally has one company in support of each infantry regiment. Under this arrangement one liaison officer is required at division headquarters and at each regimental headquarters. Liaison must also be maintained with at least one and at times two of the battalions of each infantry regiment. The destroyer companies have been able to keep up part of the necessary liaison with the infantry battalions by using the company executive and good non-commissioned officers. This is the worst that a destroyer company can provide, and in some cases the company cannot always do this, since casualties may prevent such use of essential personnel. As a result the destroyer battalion headquarters must assume the burden of liaison with the division and all three infantry regiments. The Table of Organization provides but two liaison officers for the battalion headquarters. In Italy it has often been necessary to use the commander of the headquarters company for liaison duties, and also the battalion executive. At times it has also been necessary to employ platoon leaders from the reconnaissance company for this important duty when they could be spared from their primary functions.

H. Necessity for Continual Crew Training

Experience in Italy has demonstrated the absolute necessity of continual crew training of M-10 drivers and gunners. Casualties must be expected, and when a destroyer is knocked out, members of the crew are also likely to be lost or out of action for some time. Replacement weapons

and vehicles have been much more readily available than have been replacement crews. Several battalions in Italy have conducted almost continuous drivers' and gunners' schools at battalion rear echelons. For such training vehicles have been borrowed from ordnance stock, or destroyers not in action have been used. This system of continuous training proved to be of great value and advantage, and provided combat-trained replacement crews on short notice.

SECTION IX : ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS

54. GENERAL

With respect to anti-aircraft artillery, experience in the Italian Campaign during the presently considered period is logically divided into two separate phases: anti-aircraft defense in the static role before the Spring Offensive, of which the actions on the ANZIO Beachhead are probably the outstanding examples in this Theater to date; and the anti-aircraft defense required in a rapidly moving situation which prevailed during the offensive from the line of the GARIBOLDI to the Gothic Line. The following paragraphs outline the major lesson-experiences considered appropriate for recording in this study.

55. ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY IN THE STATIC DEFENSE ROLE -- ANZIO BEACHHEAD

a. Planning for the Assault Landings

Amphibious landings prior to those at ANZIO, and the ANZIO operation have definitely confirmed that sufficient anti-aircraft artillery must be included in the landing forces to defend properly the beachhead against both high and low level bombing and against strafing attacks. Rough weather and attending unloading difficulties resulted in insufficient initial anti-aircraft defense of the Beachhead. Experience has shown that anti-aircraft units must be landed early in the amphibious operation to cover and protect the beaches and following units. Such early landed elements should include heavy and light anti-aircraft guns, automatic weapons, smoke, balloons, and early warning facilities. When the beachhead has been extended sufficiently to prevent hostile artillery fire on port

and unloading areas, searchlight units are desirable to provide illumination of hostile aircraft, especially those at low altitudes.

b. Organization and Control

All elements of the antiaircraft defenses of the Beachhead were centralized under an Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade containing an appropriate number of groups. In this operation it was conclusively demonstrated that antiaircraft artillery weapons are most effectively and economically employed under such centralized control. The skilled coordination which can be effected by these centralizing headquarters produced the maximum results with the weapons available. Attachment of antiaircraft artillery units to divisions or lower units, especially under conditions as prevailed in the Beachhead, results not only in greater difficulty in achieving a properly coordinated defense, but also ultimately lowers the efficiency of the units from lack of proper technical and tactical supervision. Only the higher antiaircraft artillery commanders and their staffs are professionally qualified to supervise the training, operation, and tactical employment of antiaircraft units, and by control, inspection, and supervision insure that they possess satisfactory standards of technical proficiency.

c. Effectiveness of the Defense

Antiaircraft action on the ANZIO Beachhead proved beyond doubt that a properly coordinated antiaircraft defense conducted with a sufficient number of latest-type weapons and adequate ammunition can defeat aerial attacks of great severity and frequency. Such attacks were experienced at ANZIO. It is well established that the German Air Force employed to a maximum the equipment and resources available in a determined effort to dislodge the Beachhead forces. After the SCR 584 sets were received in the area, antiaircraft fire consistently broke up his formations, turned them from their objectives, and caused hostile planes to drop their bombs wide of their targets. This effective fire also inflicted heavy losses among enemy aircraft. Every evading measure and decoy device known was used by the German Air Force over the Beachhead without success, and German artillery commanding the area even laid down fire on our antiaircraft

artillery positions during air raids. It can be officially stated without reservation that the antiaircraft defense that was established and maintained was a major factor in holding the beachhead, especially in the early critical period.

d. Employment of Radar

(1) Equipment. Gun battalions which landed at ANZIO were initially equipped with the SCR 268 as the gun-laying radar. The enemy soon employed radar counter-measures including "window" dropped from aircraft, ground jamming stations, and "spoofing." Against these measures the SCR 268 was useless. Shortly after the landings, sufficient SCR 584 radars arrived in this Theater to equip all gun battalions. These were rushed to the Beachhead, where after considerable adjustment and removal of manufacturing deficiencies, they were placed in operation. To a large degree the training of operators and unit maintenance personnel on these sets was effected during combat. The sets proved to be entirely adequate, and German counter-measures were ineffective. It should be noted that in this instance of emergency, immediate movement of the new and untested sets to the Beachhead was justified by the critical situation then prevailing. However, whenever tactical situations permit, new sets of such equipment should be thoroughly checked and manufacturing faults corrected and adjusted before issue to front line units. Similarly, training of the operating and maintenance personnel should be completed before the units are equipped.

(2) Long Range Early Warning. Long range early warning is essential to an adequate antiaircraft artillery defense. On the Beachhead, its importance was of vital necessity. Difficulty was experienced, because of excessive angular travel, in picking up targets with the SCR 584 when they were closer than 10,000 yards. Sufficient long range early warning facilities should be made available to enable antiaircraft artillery radars to initiate search for targets while the latter are still at least 20,000 yards from their objectives. It is also important that good communications exist between the Sector Operations Rooms (Air Force) and the Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Rooms. Radio alone was found to be inadequate.

Two or three parallel telephone lines laid over different routes were required to maintain proper communication because of line damage sustained during bombing raids and periods of hostile artillery fire. The broadcast frequency of long range warning should be disseminated to other troops that would benefit therefrom. An example is the benefit to artillery air observation aircraft which may receive such warning and take refuge from hostile aircraft before they attack.

g. 20mm Antiaircraft Gun Defense

A sufficient number of gun batteries to insure 360° coverage should be assigned and limited to primary searching and engaging sectors. Others may also be assigned primary searching and engaging sectors, and some should be left free to conduct 360° search and to engage any selected targets. At ANZIO it was found that the best results were obtained with four batteries (radars) assigned to primary sectors, six batteries assigned to primary and secondary sectors, and two batteries left free for all-around search and engagement. In April a fourth gun battalion was added to the defense. Without such definite and fixed assignments, all or most of the antiaircraft fire may be drawn into one sector by means of a hostile feint attack, and then when the defenses are so engaged, the enemy may press his main attack through a different sector. Such a plan for assigning sectors and definite missions for each battery also provides for adequate defense against simultaneous attacks from several directions. Although the assignment of primary and secondary sectors is not a new technique, the soundness of this procedure was conclusively demonstrated at ANZIO.

f. Fighter -- Antiaircraft Artillery Defense

The ANZIO Beachhead was designated as an Inner Artillery Zone by night and as a Gun Defended Area by day. Subject to conditions of weather, landing strip conditions, and other commitments, air fighter cover was provided by day. The Gun Defended Area Regulations insured coordination of friendly fighters and antiaircraft artillery during the daylight hours, and placed primary responsibility for the antiaircraft defense on fighter cover when present, but did not seriously restrict antiaircraft artillery fire when friendly fighters were not available. During the hours of

darkness, primary responsibility passed to the antiaircraft artillery, and night-fighters furnished support by operations outside the limits of the artillery defended area. These arrangements permitted maximum effectiveness of both fighters and antiaircraft artillery throughout the operations on the Beachhead.

F. 40mm Antiaircraft Gun Defense

Although the 90mm gun is capable of conducting accurate "unseen" fire at enemy targets by means of the SCR 584 radar, the 40mm gun has no such means at present. At night, or under conditions that precluded visual observation, 40mm fire was conducted by means of barrages. The effectiveness of the barrage as a deterrent to attacking aircraft had been recognized prior to the ANZIO operation, but because of the lack of destructive effect and the high ammunition expenditure, it was not seriously accepted fully by all U.S. antiaircraft artillery commanders. At ANZIO light antiaircraft barrages at "unseen" targets proved highly successful in forcing attacking formations of aircraft to turn away from their objectives or to fly at altitudes above the barrages where they became suitable heavy gun targets. Although still to be used only when observed fire is impossible, the effectiveness of barrage fire has been clearly demonstrated.

H. Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Barrages at ANZIO

Seven major automatic weapons barrages were used in the defense of the ANZIO Beachhead. These included: The General Barrage, the ANZIO Barrage, the NETTUNO Barrage, the ANZIO-NETTUNO Barrage, the NETTUNO Airfield Barrage, the Airfield Barrage, and the Forward Area Barrage. Each of these automatic weapons barrages consisted of six rounds per gun at three seconds' interval at 50° elevation. For the forward area barrages guns were pointed to fire inward over the area occupied by the fire unit. The first round was fired from this initial position, and each successive round at one handwheel turn to the right. Time interval was effected by making two handwheel turns to the right and then reversing one handwheel turn to the left. Initial directions were assigned each gun by platoon commanders. Barrages were generally fired on the order of the

Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Room. Forward area barrages were fired only on the order of the Brigade Commander or the Antiaircraft Defense Commander, ANZIO.

1. Counterbattery Fire in Support of Antiaircraft Artillery

Before and during enemy raids on the ANZIO Beachhead, German artillery commanding the area often supported their air attack by firing on our antiaircraft artillery positions. To neutralize this hostile fire, arrangements were completed whereby on such occasions friendly field artillery conducted counterbattery fire at the request of the Antiaircraft Defense Commander.

1. Equipment

Adequate supplies of equipment, including gun and radar power plants, balloons, hydrogen, and other materiel must be made available for adequate conduct of antiaircraft defense. Shortage of Theater spare parts for the balloons at ANZIO necessitated withdrawal of spare parts from balloons at PALERMO, Sicily, to such an extent that the balloon defenses at the latter port became inoperative for a short period. The necessary state of readiness of antiaircraft defenses require that power plants for guns and radar be in operation almost constantly. Difficulty was experienced at ANZIO in the supply of necessary parts for these power plants.

56. THE MOBILE CAMPAIGN FROM THE GARIGLIANO TO THE GOTHIC LINE

a. Centralized Control

With the launching of the Spring Offensive, antiaircraft artillery units assumed a mobile role in the advance from the GARIGLIANO to the Gothic Line. In this operation, centralized control by Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades again proved essential for economy of weapons and for efficient tactical supervision. Where situations properly require that antiaircraft artillery elements be placed in direct support of other ground force units, the continued control by antiaircraft artillery commanders is still essential. In this connection the Antiaircraft Artillery Commander, Fifth Army reported:

• . . . When necessary in mobile situations to decentralize operational control, antiaircraft artillery units can be placed by brigade or group commanders in "direct support" of other mobile troop units, and the same result may be achieved as though they had been attached. The advantage is that the higher antiaircraft artillery commander, by retaining command, can relinquish or resume control at any time that the situation demands. . . .

Similarly the Commanding General, 35th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade observed in a report of operations that

• . . . experience has shown that in practically all cases where an antiaircraft artillery battalion is attached to a division there is a noticeable decline in the discipline, training, and general effectiveness of such battalions. When these battalions revert to antiaircraft artillery command, considerable time is required to bring them again up to the necessary standards. The practice of attaching one battalion of automatic weapons to a division is not necessarily sound. On occasion this will result in an excess of antiaircraft artillery with the division, and at other times additional antiaircraft units may be required. From the viewpoint of cooperation of units working in close proximity, permanent attachment to divisions is desirable. From the viewpoint of technical training and supervision, establishment of a well-coordinated Corps defense and maximum flexibility, attachment to divisions is not desirable. . . .

b. Early Warning and the Operations Rooms in the Mobile Role

With the breakthrough on the GARIGLIANO front, provision for early warning of all units became difficult. Two reasons for this difficulty were apparent. First was the slow movement of the Sector Operations Room (Air Force) and its radars; second was poor communications during mobile operations between the Sector Operations Room (Air Force) and the Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Room. The Air Force Fighter Wing solved the first of these problems by providing three operations rooms permitting one to be on the move while the other two remained operational. The second difficulty was not so easily solved. During movements, wire communication was impossible, and lack of experience, clear frequencies, and mountainous terrain rendered radio communication far from satisfactory. Two clear frequencies were assigned each sector operations room, one for transmission and the other for reception to and from the Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Rooms. More attention was given to the proper and suitable physical locations of the Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Rooms. Difficulty was also experienced with transmission within the antiaircraft

artillery net. This was often occasioned by weak transmitting power of the SCR 543 and the lack of dependability of the SCR 593 receiving sets. Finally by careful siting of radios, and with more operational experience under the conditions prevailing, communications were improved and became generally satisfactory.

57. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY EXPERIENCE

a. The defensive ability of the anti-aircraft artillery at ANZIO proved itself beyond any doubt. Against an enemy air force whose strength is no greater than the Germans had available for use against the beachhead the anti-aircraft artillery, when given sufficient modern weapons of all types, ample ammunition, centralized control, and adequate long range early warning, can be expected properly to defend a beachhead or any vital area regardless of the experience or determination of the enemy air force.

b. Anti-aircraft units should remain under centralized anti-aircraft artillery command. Attachments to divisions should be exceptional. Automatic weapons battalions may be placed in direct support of ground force units when engaged in a moving situation, but command of these units should remain under the appropriate anti-aircraft artillery Brigade or Group Commander.

c. When planning for an amphibious operation due consideration should be given to insure that sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is made available on the beach at the earliest practicable time. It should be borne in mind by all planners that of all the anti-aircraft artillery weapons only heavy guns equipped with radar are capable of conducting accurate fire at night or on "unseen" targets. Hence, heavy guns with their radars, must be in position to fire by dusk of the first night.

d. Adequate long range warning must be made available and gun radars assigned sectors of search. It was found over the ANZIO Beachhead that during periods of intense aerial activity more than 50% of the enemy aircraft entering the defended area were first picked up by anti-aircraft radars. Unless definite sectors are assigned radars may be lured away from

normal fronts and permit the unobserved entry of other enemy aircraft.

D. Until such time as means are developed to permit light anti-aircraft guns to deliver aimed fire at "unseen" targets, barrage fire must be used. The principles of barrage fire have been taught to all anti-aircraft artillery units since the opening of this Theater of Operations. It was, however, always considered a means to be used only as a last resort because of the excessive expenditure of ammunition with limited destructive effect. Action at ANZIO proved that barrage fire is feasible and that satisfactory results can be obtained though better means of fire control should be devised.

E. The rapid northward movement of the Fifth Army demonstrated the difficulties to be encountered by the Sector Operations Rooms and Anti-aircraft Artillery Operations Rooms in a moving situation. Often radio will be the only available communication. Definite clear frequencies must be assigned, radio operators well trained, and Anti-aircraft Artillery Operations Rooms established at terrain features insuring reception from the Sector Operations Room. Anti-aircraft Commanders must insure that transmission within the anti-aircraft artillery net can be satisfactorily performed using relay stations if direct communication is not possible.

O-O-O-O-O-O-O-O

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

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G-4 JHW
File

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

FEAP/84 210.68

A.P.O. 501
27 Nov 1944

SUBJECT: Rotation and Temporary Duty Quotas.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, APO 422.

1. In order to establish a more equitable distribution of rotational and temporary duty quotas, it is contemplated that future quotas will be based upon the number of men within each command who have served a minimum amount of 18 months overseas proportionately to the total number of men within the theater who have served a like period of time.

2. It is desired that a report be submitted to this headquarters indicating by number, officers and enlisted men who on 31 October 1944 had served overseas from:

- 18 to 21 months
- 21 to 24 months
- 24 to 27 months
- 27 to 30 months
- 30 or more months

No one individual will be included more than once on the report, i.e., an individual who has served 28 months overseas will be included in the 27 to 30 months period, but will not be included in any of the lesser periods. Only completed months will be counted.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

s/ GEO L. EITEL
t/ GEO L. EITEL,
Major, A.G.D.
Asst Maj Gen

Reproduced Hq. NVTr, 20 Dec 44

44-4851-219 Admin. Information Manual

149-4851-219

1441

AG 210.68-E
(27 Nov 44)
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY, APO 442, 5 December 1944.

To: See distribution.

1. Report required by paragraph 2 basic communication will be forwarded to this headquarters without delay. Radio report is desired.

2. Units assigned to another major command and attached to Sixth Army will comply with instructions issued by the major command to which assigned.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

JOHN L. WERNE,
Ed Lt., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Reproduced Hq. WVTF, 20 Dec 44

Dist "D"

6-4
SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
ADVANCE UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

GWD/bbm

APO 501

17 November 1944

FECC 400

SUBJECT: Computation of Allowances for Oversea Bases.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, APO 442.
Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 343.
Commanding General, XIV Corps, APO 455.
Commanding General, USAFOS, APO 707.
Commanding General, 14th AA Command, APO 501.

1. Notification has been received from the War Department that paragraph 1 k of letter, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, SPX 400 (6 Jul 44) OB-S-SPDDL-M, dated 8 July 1944, subject as above is being rescinded and the following will be substituted therefor:

"In any instance where the reorganization of a unit or a change in T/E or T/A increases its T/E or T/A allowance, existing special organizational allowances for the unit be reduced by an amount equal to the increase in allowance of any specified item in T/E or T/A."

2. The provisions of the above quoted substitutionary paragraph apply to Special Lists of Equipment, Special Changes to T/O & E's, and Tables of Allowances published by the War Department or by this headquarters, and to special equipment allowances authorized by War Department Movement Orders.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

/s/ G. E. Tomberlin
/t/ G. E. TOMBERLIN,
1st Lt., AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

Reproduced Hq Sixth Army, 24 Nov 44.

AG 400 D-3
(17 Nov 44)
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY, APO 442, 24 November 1944.

1st Ind.

TO: See distribution:

For compliance with paragraph 1, basic communication.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"
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- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

Chas. W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

6-4
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HEADQUARTERS
ADVANCE UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
A.F.O. 501

CKH/hc
7 November 1944

EEGC 471 (16 Jul 44)

SUBJECT: Training Ammunition Allowances

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, A.P.O. 442.

1. Reference letter, this headquarters, EAGC 471, subject as above, 16 July 1944, copy of which was furnished your headquarters.
2. Inclosure to above letter. "Annual Training Ammunition Allowances, SWPA," is amended as follows:

Page 2 - Pyrotechnic

Delete:

Aircraft, Ground or Very	Per pistol or projector	15
--------------------------	-------------------------	----

Add:

Light, signal, very (Assorted types) for Very Pistol	Per pistol	5
---	------------	---

Signal, Aircraft (Assorted types) for Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9 or Pistol, pyrotechnic, M2	Per Projector or Pistol	5
--	-------------------------	---

Signal, ground (Assorted types) for Launcher, grenade, M1, M2, M7 or M8	Per launcher	* 5
---	--------------	-----

Signal, ground (Assorted types) for Projector, signal, ground, M1, M3 or M4	Per Projector	5
---	---------------	---

* Not to exceed 100 per company or similar unit.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

Reproduced Hq. Sixth Army, 25 Dec. 44.

/s/ G. E. Tomberlin
/t/ G. E. TOMBERLIN,
1st Lt., AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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BASIC: Ltr. Adv. USAFFE, APO 501, dtd 7 Nov 44, FECC 471 (16 Jul 44), subject
"Training Ammunition Allowances".

AG 471 0 15

1st. Ind.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY, APO 442, 25 December 1944.

To: See Distribution.

1. For your information and guidance.
2. The USAFFE letter referred to in paragraph 1, basic letter, was published by 1st indorsement, this headquarters, file AG 471 0 15, 1 August 1944.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

DISTRIBUTION:
B (less Med)

Chas W Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

FORM 400.24

A.P.O. 501,
21 August 1945

SUBJECT: Preservation of Supplies.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, A.P.O. 442
Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, A.P.O. 925
Commanding General, USASOS, A.P.O. 501.

1. The deterioration of subsistence in the Advanced Areas has reached such large proportions as to be a matter of grave concern. The health of this command is at stake. Supply is not unlimited and serious difficulties are being encountered in effecting the necessary supply of many items.

2. It is therefore desired that all Commanders give the preservation of not only Class I but also Class II supplies high priority in order to protect them against the elements. In order that all may have the advantage of the experience gained in this theater, the following suggestions are made:

a. Upon initial landing, planning should be so comprehensive as to give maximum assurance against unnecessary rehandling of supplies by providing locations adequately removed from air installations, and where good drainage and good roads can be provided.

b. Provisions should be made for a large initial supply of paulins. However, the wasteage of paulins is very great - large paulins are used where small ones will furnish adequate protection and vice versa. The usual method of placing paulins over the top of a pile is unsatisfactory and results in the generation of heat which results in rapid deterioration. Ventilation must be provided not only under the paulin but between the packages.

c. Ordinary working details around dumps rarely, if ever, replace a disturbed paulin, therefore a paulin detail of two or three men should be provided to ensure that supplies are adequately protected from the elements at all times.

d. Where storage tents are used the tent walls should remain raised.

e. Foodstuffs should not be used as dunnage. In most areas, there are ample saplings or palm trees available which can be used for this purpose. Initial landing parties should have, if at all possible, a portable saw for providing a quick supply of saplings for frame work under paulins and for providing dunnage.

f. Since the maintenance of supply levels is based on inventories, all stores should be so piled that reasonably accurate inventories can be taken.

By Command of General MacARTHUR:

/s/ L. S. Ostrander

L. S. OSTRANDER
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.
Adjutant General

Reproduced by Hq, Sixth Army, 30 Aug 43.

Ltr q USAFFE, FEQMC 400.24, 21 August 1943, Subject: Preservation of Supplies

AG 400.24 D-3
(21 Aug '43)

1st Inc.

HEADQUARTERS STATE ARMY, A.P.O. 442, 24 August 1943.

TO: See distribution below.

For compliance.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

DISTRIBUTION:
"L" & "C"

Information Copy:
CG, 1st Marine Div.

Alan W. Hall

ALAN W. HALL,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

FEGC 400.34 (13 Jun 44)

A.P.O. 501.
21 July 1944

SUBJECT: Excess Equipment.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, A.P.O. 442.
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces (P), A.P.O. 925.
Commanding General, XIV Corps, A.P.O. 453.
Commanding General, United States Army Services of Supply,
A.P.O. 501.
Commanding General, 14th Antiaircraft Command, A.P.O. 501.

1. USARFE regulation 20-10, dated 3 May 1944 as amended, was published to establish control over the issue of equipment in order to conserve replacement stocks. The following remarks are intended to emphasize the purpose of this regulation and the responsibilities of Commanders requesting and approving additional equipment.

2. The need for equipment in excess of T/E falls into two categories as follows:

a. Additional equipment which is required for a limited period to accomplish a specific mission.

b. Additional equipment which is permanently required to accomplish the normal mission of a unit.

3. a. Temporary requirements for excess equipment must be met, whenever possible, through reallocation of equipment under the control of the commander concerned. Where this is not possible, issue must be provided from theater replacement stocks. Such issues must be held to an absolute minimum, since theater reserves are supplied by the War Department to maintain the authorized level of Table of Equipment items.

b. Permanent requirements for excess equipment cannot be met from theater stocks. Where experience indicates that T/E equipment is not adequate to perform the normal mission of a unit in this theater, War Department approval must be secured for a change in T/E, or for Special List of Equipment. Such approval results in an increase in the theater authorized level of T/E items or Class IV items; makes the additional equipment required available from the United States, and increases theater replacement stocks accordingly.

4. It is desired that each commander submitting, or approving a

FECC 400.34 (13 June 44) cont'd.

request for additional equipment, and equipment for special purposes consider:

- a. The specific use for which the equipment is required.
- b. The necessity for additional equipment to accomplish the mission.
- c. Whether the need is temporary or permanent.
- d. The need for all similar type units for the equipment request

5. Each commander must continuously review all excess equipment in the hands of units under his command, for the purpose of returning to theater stocks all equipment not being utilized to the fullest extent.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

/s/ J. W. Donnell
/t/ J. W. DONNELL,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

Reproduced Headquarters Sixth Army,
3 August 1944.

AG 400.34 D-3 1st Ind.
(21 July 44)
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY, A.P.O. 442, 3 August 1944.

TO: See distribution.

For compliance.

By command of Lieutenant General KHUEGER:

O. A. Nickerson
O. A. NICKERSON,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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6-4
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

FEK 430

AFPO 501
14 April 1944

SUBJECT: Subsistence Losses.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, AFPO 1442.
Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, AFPO 925.
Commanding General, 14th AF Command, AFPO 501.

1. The War Department has brought to my attention that the disappearance in overseas theaters of subsistence is estimated at approximately twenty per cent over and above the amounts that can be accounted for in the overseas troop strength. Emergency issues and losses by enemy action account for only a small portion of the losses. The main causes of loss appear to be pilferage, rough handling, improper storage, and a number of other controllable causes.

2. It is essential that prompt and continuing action be taken by all commanders. I have charged the Commanding General, United States Army Services of Supply with the problem of determining where the major losses are occurring and for the necessary corrective action within the scope of his authority. You are likewise charged with giving this matter your personal attention to ensure that supply discipline is enforced within your command and that controllable losses are reduced to an absolute minimum.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
General, United States Army.

- 1 -

SECRET

S E C R E T

Ltr Hq USAFFE, dated 14 April 44, file FEX 430, sub: "Subsistence Losses", continued.

AG 430 Q-6 1st Ind.
(14 April 44)
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY, APO 442, 29 April 1944.

TO: See Distribution.

1. Attention is directed to letter, this headquarters, dated 10 April 1943, copy attached. This letter was republished and distributed to Sixth Army units under date of 6 March 1944.

2. The subject matter of the Commander-in-Chief's letter will be brought to the attention of all officers and enlisted men. All ranks will be instructed in the importance of conservation and made to appreciate the disastrous effect that wastage of supplies will have upon our mission of winning a speedy and decisive victory over the enemy. You will take prompt and effective action to insure that all controllable causes leading to the loss of supplies in your command are eliminated. By frequent personal inspections you will insure strict compliance with orders on the proper handling of supplies.

3. You will take prompt disciplinary action against any person under your command responsible for the loss of supplies through negligence and will report to this headquarters all instances of avoidable loss, wastage or pilferage of supplies which come to your attention under circumstances beyond your control.

Walter Krueger
WALTER KRUEGER,
Lieutenant General, U. S. ARMY,
Commanding.

1 Incl (Added):
Copy ltr file AG 400.73
Q-6, 10 April 43, Hq Sixth
Army.

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"D"

- 2 -
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
APO 442

April 10, 1943

AG 400.73 Q-6

Subject: Conservation of Equipment and Supplies.

To: See distribution below.

1. Limited production facilities in this theater and the critical shortage of ship tonnage available to this theater make it imperative that all commanders concerned institute and maintain a system of effective supervision to insure conservation of equipment and supplies.

2. While this applies to all types of equipment and supplies an especially noticeable deficiency exists in certain units in the case of rations. Garbage cans have been noted to contain large quantities of edible food components which generally indicates poor mess management.

3. Conservation of equipment and supplies is a command responsibility. Commanders of all Sixth Army units will give their continued personal attention to this important matter.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

/s/ L. H. Rockafellow
L. H. ROCKAFELLOW
Col., A. G. D.,
Adj. Gen.

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Incl #1

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

FECD 471.87

AFO 501
6 April 1944

SUBJECT: Salvage of Brass Cartridge Cases.

TO : Commanding General, Sixth Army, APO 442.
Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, APO 925.
Commanding General, USASOS, AFO 501.
Commanding General, 11th Antiaircraft Command, AFO 501.

1. The War Department has directed that, consistent with the tactical mission and available personnel, the return of fired small arms and artillery brass cartridge cases be accelerated.
2. Insofar as the tactical situation permits, troops will return fired brass cartridge cases to USASOS installations as expeditiously as possible.
3. All concerned will be guided by the general instructions published in USARFE Regulation 35-60, "Salvage of Ammunition Components and Packing Materials."

By command of General MacARTHUR:

/s/ L. S. Ostrander
/t/ L. S. OSTRANDER,
Brig Gen., U.S.A.,
Adjutant General.

Reproduced Headquarters Sixth Army, 22 April 1944.

LG 471 0 15
(6 April 1944)
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY, A.F.O.-442, 22 April 1944.

1st Ind.

To: See distribution.

1. For compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3, basic letter.
2. Insofar as practicable, ammunition packing boxes, fiber containers and metal containers, in addition to fired small arms and artillery cartridge cases, will be returned to USASOS Bases.
3. The instructions contained herein supersede those prescribed in the following letters:

- a. Letter, Headquarters Sixth Army, file LG 457 0 14, subject: "Salvage of Ammunition Containers", dated 28 December 1943.
- b. Letter, Headquarters Memo Force, file AG 471/225 0 3, subject: "Salvage of Ammunition Containers", dated 3 January 1944.

By command of Lieutenant General KRUEGER:

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O. A. Nickerson
O. A. NICKERSON,
Lt. Col., A. C. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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Bulk Supply High Octane Aviation Gasoline in
SWPA (1 Aug 1943 - 1 Aug 1944)

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Report - Bulk Supply High Octane Aviation Gasoline in ~~SWA~~

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

A.P.O. 501
12 August 1944

FMGC 463.7

SUBJECT: Report on Bulk Supply High Octane Aviation Gasoline in
Southwest Pacific Theater.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D.C.
(Attention: Operations Division, War Department General Staff).


Inclosed is a report on Bulk Supply High Octane Aviation Gasoline,
Southwest Pacific Area. It is believed that this report is suitable for
publication in the Operations Division Information Bulletin as a matter
of interest to commanders and higher staffs in other theaters.

For the Commanding General:

L. S. Ostrander

1 Incl:
As described above.

L. S. OSTRANDER
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.,
Adjutant General



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OPD 463.7 (12 Aug 44)

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Ref: -

*Bureau Supply High Octane
Aviation Gasoline in SWPA*

14g. USAFFE

1 Aug 43 - 1 Aug 44



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BULK SUPPLY HIGH OCTANE AVIATION GASOLINE, SWPA

A technique has been developed in the Southwest Pacific Area which has proven very successful in effecting the supply of high octane aviation gasoline in bulk for meeting operational requirements immediately on capture and putting into use of enemy airfields.

CONSIDERATIONS

Enemy airfields are captured, reconditioned and placed in operation as early as D/2. By D/15 requirements of high octane aviation gasoline are considerably greater than can be efficiently handled by decanting of drums into tank trucks or other equipment for refueling aircraft. In island warfare initial supply of aviation gasoline in drums must either be flown in or transported by amphibious craft. Unloading and handling of aviation gasoline in drums requires the use of a large number of troops, causes congestion on beachheads and roads, and ties up transportation and equipment at a time when it is urgently needed for other high priority effort. Five drums of aviation gasoline weigh approximately 1 ton and $3\frac{1}{2}$ drums are equal to 1 ship ton, occupying 40 cubic feet of space. A C-47 transport plane, fully loaded, can carry a maximum of only 14 drums and every cubic foot of space on amphibious craft that can be made available is needed for combat troops and Engineer equipment. Although desirable to take in some aviation gasoline in drums, to be carried as a reserve, and meet unforeseen contingencies, every effort must be made to provide a bulk supply of this vital product at the earliest practicable date.

DESCRIPTION

The bulk supply of aviation gasoline in a new area in the SWPA is accomplished in three phases. The extent and time of providing facilities depends on the size, location and objective of operation. Following is a brief outline of facilities and procedure for establishing bulk supply of aviation gasoline for an average or normal operation.

PHASE I

Two (2) barges with an approximate capacity of 5,000 barrels (210,000 U. S. gallons) each are towed by LST or other suitable craft to shore as soon as the tactical situation permits mooring or anchoring in a secluded inlet or bay. Normally, this can be accomplished by the date the first airfield is placed in operation.

Each barge is deckloaded with one (1) knocked down 500 barrel bolted steel tank and sufficient hose, pipe and connections to permit delivering the product carried in the barge to shore at a rate up to 100,000 U. S. gallons per 24 hours. Pending erection of the 500 barrel bolted tank on shore, deliveries can be made direct from barge into tank trucks for refueling

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aircraft. The 500 barrel tank can be erected in 48 hours, after which it is used as a surge tank for filling tank trucks or refilling drums.

Resupply for the barge is effected by using a Y tanker or other small type tanker, lifting cargoes from the nearest base or from a mother ship.

PHASE II

This phase covers a period of from 20 to 25 days, beginning with the date it is possible to land knocked down bolted tanks, pumps, pipe and fittings carried in by amphibious craft. During this period construction will be carried out and facilities provided as outlined below:

A petroleum pier or dock which will permit accommodating small tankers drawing up to 17 foot draft and with an overall length up to 340 feet. This petroleum pier consists only of breasting dolphins and a T-head cat walk to support the pipe line. Usually piling for the breasting dolphins can be cut from native timber in the occupied area.

Three (3) 5,000 barrel bolted tanks will be erected on shore, conveniently located, to receive aviation gasoline from a small tanker discharging at the petroleum pier. The initial tankage and petroleum pier are designed with sufficient capacity to accommodate the small tankers operating in the SWPA.

Sufficient pipe, suitable pumps and connections will be installed to permit receiving aviation gasoline from tankers and distribute by pipe line to the different air strips placed in operation.

One (1) 2,000 barrel bolted tank will be erected in the vicinity of each air strip, from which tank trucks or other fueling equipment can draw supplies for refueling aircraft.

PHASE III

If it is planned that consumption in the area will extend for some period of time (4 months or longer), additional tankage is constructed in units of 10,000 barrel bolted steel tanks to provide storage equal to approximately 30 days supply. Docking facilities are also extended to permit accommodating larger tankers. If a base is to be established in the area, bulk storage and handling facilities are also provided for motor gasoline and automotive diesel fuel, with sufficient docking facilities to permit handling overseas tankers and making offshore shipments.

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EXPERIENCE

During the 12 month period ending 1 August 1944, 13 of these installations have been completed in the SWPA and placed in operation under various circumstances and conditions. All have proven their worth.

The installation for handling high octane aviation gasoline in bulk for the Dobodura airfields, located 12 miles inland from Buna on the North Coast of New Guinea, comprised one (1) petroleum pier for small tankers, four (4) 2,000 barrel bolted tanks located at Buna Bay; a 4-inch line, constructed of invasion pipe with victaulic couplings, connecting four (4) 2,000 barrel bolted tanks erected in the vicinity of the Dobodura airfields. This installation was operated by 1 officer and 22 enlisted men and handled between 1 October 1943 and 1 April 1944 (6 months) a total of 15,350,000 U. S. gallons of aviation gasoline. This is the equivalent of approximately 300,000 drums.

To serve the airdromes at Nadzab, some 24 miles inland from Lae on the Huon Gulf, a similar system was installed, using 2,000 barrel and 10,000 barrel tanks. The small installation at Lae, where small tankers discharged, was connected with the tanks at the Nadzab airfields with a 4-inch line constructed of invasion pipe with victaulic couplings. Between 1 January 1944 and 1 July 1944 (6 months) a total of 22,730,000 U. S. gallons was handled, the equivalent of approximately 430,000 drums.

For supplying requirements of high octane aviation gasoline on Wakde Island, off the North Coast of New Guinea, two (2) 5,000 barrel barges were towed in and placed in operation by D/9. The first shore tanks were completed and placed in operation on D/47. During the 38 days comparatively little aviation gasoline had to be handled in drums and 2,665,000 U. S. gallons, or the equivalent of 50,000 drums, were handled in bulk through the barges. The barges were resupplied by a Y tanker, lifting its cargo from a mother ship anchored at Hollandia, a distance of 110 miles.

EQUIPMENT

Complete information is given in War Department Technical Manual TM 5-350, dated 15 November 1943, on bolted tanks, pipe, pumps and equipment required for the shore installations described in this article. The Chief of Transportation, War Department, Washington, D. C. can supply full particulars on the 120-foot, 5,000 barrel barges (Design No. 231-W). Also, the Chief of Transportation, War Department, Washington, D. C. can supply complete data on the 162-foot and 182-foot Y tankers used in this theater in conjunction with U. S. Navy tankers of the Susquehanna and Sakatonchee class.

Inclosed are 3 diagrammatic sketches prepared to indicate the lay-out and facilities provided for Phases I, II and III, as described in this article.

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
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
PHASE I

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PHASE II



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PHASE III

REFUELING PT BOATS

DRUM
FILLING



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1603

Folder : 9

Folder Title : 98-USF1-5.2: Journal & File - U.S. Army
Forces Far East, Philippine Civil Affairs Unit 27
(12 Jun 1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



This folder includes Oversize items
(maps, overlays, charts, etc).
It takes several frames to cover each
item in its entirety.

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Jnl & file

U.S. Army Forces, Far East
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit 27

12 June 45

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US Army Forces, Far East
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12 June 45

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DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept 27, 1988
AND by *[signature]* 8-8-72

Jul 21 Nov 44 ... 10 Jan 45

Crocker-Hart Area Study No 3
Leyle Prairie ACCSG 2

Maps

AGO Mount Jordan 11 Oct 44

HEADQUARTERS
PHILIPPINE CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT 27
USAFFE

HT/p

APO 501
12 June 1945

SUBJECT: Unit History

TO : Commanding General
USAFFE
APO 501 Att: Civil Affairs Section

1. Transmitted herewith Unit History, this organization, from date of activation, 21 November 1944 to 10 June 1945 inclusive.

For the Commanding Officer:

HENRY TERRELL
Major, Ord
Executive Officer

1 Incl:
1-Unit History, PCAU #27

21 November 1944

Unit activated per par 1 General Orders #5, dtd 20 November 1944, Hq CAD, USAFFE, APO 503. All officers and enlisted personnel assigned to team per par's. 9 and 10 Special Orders #13 dtd 21 November 1944, Hq CAD, USAFFE, APO 503. Lt Col Helmer H. Holmstrom CAC assumed command.

22 November 1944

All officers and enlisted men assigned duties to respective sections within team.

23 November 1944

Unit proceeded with training and instruction under master schedule Hq., CAD, USAFFE, APO 503.

24 November 1944

Unit continued with training and instruction under master schedule Hq., CAD, USAFFE, APO 503.

25 November 1944

Unit continued with training and instruction under master schedule Hq., CAD, USAFFE, APO 503. Firing on pistol range.

26 November 1944

Team prepared for bivouac in connection with CPX as directed by Hq CAD, USAFFE, APO 503.

27 November 1944

All personnel, personal and organizational equipment were loaded on vehicles. Convoy cleared IP at 0800 and arrived at Buna, New Guinea at 0945. Bivouac was completed at 1100.

At 1200 personnel assumed roles of Filipino civilians of Publication of Dos Hermanos.

28 November 1944

Personnel continued the activities of the preceeding day. Pcau Team #18 entered the area and assisted in the establishment of local government.

29 November 1944

Departed Buna, New Guinea at 1045 and arrived at H2, CAD area at 1335. All personnel and organizational equipment unloaded.

30 November 1944

Critique of CPX held by Staff Officers of Hq, CAD. This unit tied with PCAU Team #25 for first place with reference to the manner of performance in assuming the roles of Filipino civilians.

31 November 1944

Unit proceeded with unit training and instructional under master schedule Hq, CAD.

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1 December 1944

Unit continued with unit training and instructions under master schedule Hq, CAD.

2 December 1944

Unit continued with unit training and instructions under master schedule Hq, CAD.

3 December 1944

Unit continued with unit training and instructions under master schedule Hq, CAD.

4 December 1944

Unit continued with unit training and instructions under master schedule Hq, CAD.

5 December 1944

Unit continued with unit training and instructions under master schedule Hq, CAD.

6 December 1944

Team alerted at 0100 and proceeded to load all vehicles with personal and organizational equipment. All loading completed at 0530. While awaiting orders to depart, the remainder of the day was spent in recreation and free time.

7 December 1944

Awaiting orders to depart, three (3) vehicles loaded on "S.S. David F. Barry".

8 December 1944

Depart for Hq, CAD, USAFFE, APO 503 at 1700 all personnel and equipment loaded on "S.S. David F. Barry" at 2000. Departed Oro Bay at 1100.

9 December 1944

At sea

10 December 1944

At sea

11 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Master training program consisting of orientation on the Philippines was followed.

12 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Master training program consisting of orientation on the Philippines was followed.

13 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Master training program consisting of orientation on the Philippines was followed.

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14 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Master training program consisting of orientation on the Philippines was followed.

15 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Master training program consisting of orientation on the Philippines was followed.

16 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Master training program consisting of orientation on the Philippines was followed.

17 December 1944

Anchored in the harbour of Hollandia, NEI. Church services were held.

18 December 1944

Departed Hollandia at 1500. Training program continued.

19 December 1944

At sea. Training program was followed.

20 December 1944

At sea. Training program was followed.

21 December 1944

At sea. Training program was followed.

22 December 1944

At sea. Training program was followed.

23 December 1944

At sea. Training program was followed.

24 December 1944

At sea. Training program was followed. Christmas services held at 1600.

25 December 1944

At sea.

26 December 1944

Arrived at Leyte Gulf Harbour, Philippines early morning. Lecture of Finance was presented. Disembarked at Telegrapho, Leyte, P.I.. Bivouced near Headquarters Eight Army, APO 343.

27 December 1944

Remained in bivouac while awaiting further orders.

28 December 1944

Advance party of five (5) officers and eighteen (18) enlisted men departed at 0200, for Abuyog, Leyte to relieve PCAU 4, 6th Army. Party arrived at 0500 and set up temporary quarters in the market square. Remainder of the team to follow later with organizational equipment.

29 December 1944

Arrangements made with PCAU #7 as to temporary messing and quartering of personnel. Each staff officer of this team contacted staff officers of PCAU #4 so as to orient themselves to their future duties. Col Holmstrom had numerous discussions with Abuyog officials and lengthy discussion with Major Parker, Commanding Officer of PCAU 4, in which plans were made to inspect records of PCAU 4 in regards to Abuyog. Remainder of personnel, with exception of two (2) officers and five (5) enlisted men arrived from former bivouac area at Hq Eight Army.

30 December 1944

All officers continued to function with the officers of PCAU 4. Local merchants were met and inventories of stock started.

31 December 1944

Inventories completed. Lt Rensholm, Relief and Welfare Officer took over all warehouses. Capt Chaudoin, Finance Officer continued with checking of all finance records.

1 January 1945

Lt Col Holmstrom contacted Major Williams at 11th Airborne Division concerning mutual cooperation with regard to future activities.

PCAT #27 officially took over the administration of Civil Affairs in Abuyog.

Mess was established.

All records were taken over from PCAU #4.

Lt Rensholm signed for civilian supplies as inventoried.

Engineer Officer, Major Dwyer, arranged with Epifanio Enclona for use of lot at corner of Washington St and Revolution de Filipino for housing generating plant and to plant vegetables and flowers.

At approximately 0100 personnel in quarters were awakened by general attack signal. Heavy volume of small arms fire ensued in village. Personnel evacuated quarters and took up perimeter defense near quarters believing the incident to be a Japanese attack. It was later determined that the sporadic firing was initiated by celebrants of the New Year. Filipino guerrillas believed it a proper gesture to join in the festivities by discharging large quantities of ammunition. Full report and recommendations of PSO are in file.

PSO discovered dud in Church Yard.

Lt Osborn, Transportation Officer and Lt Waller, Supply Officer made contacts for purposes as follows:

1. Capt Kastlebaum and Bennet at Abuyog for QM Rations
2. G-1 and G-4, XXIV Corps for T/A Supplies
3. G-1 and G-4, Eight Army for T/A and Medical Supplies.
4. Major Davidson, Basik for T/A equipment
Major Cagote, Basik, Ordnance for T/A equipment.
5. Reconnaissance of supply route to Tacloban.

1 January 1945 (Cont'd)

Miss Glosa, Civilian stenographer employed. Legal Officer adjusted dispute between Mr. Macio, Municipal Councilor and U.S. Army Engineer unit regarding location of Carpenter Shop.

Medical Officer visited Dr. Filemon Verzosa and Alamo Scouts Training Center.

Capt Terrell, Labor Officer hired 220 laborers. He also interviewed Mrs. Mandia, PCAU labor assistant in Charge of Tarragona PCAU labor office. The Tarragona Office placed 100 laborers this date.

Capt Ralph E. Baker, Capt Tc and ten (10) enlisted men were attached unassigned for duty with PCAU 27.

2 January 1945

Lt Fisher, 149th Inf conferred with Commanding Officer with reference to civilian labor and legal problems of this territory.

The Mayor was granted permission to haul corn to outlying barrios.

Request for aid from Mrs. Ines de Viros referred to Relief Officer. Capt Ralph E. Baker assigned to assist Finance Officer. Mayor requested by letter to route all correspondence for PCAU 27 through Headquarters.

220 laborers placed with hiring authorities; 60 new requests received.

PSO recommends control of firing small arms in beach area. At 1100 PSO investigated theft of money from Lt Alferin, Alamo scouts. At 1300 CIC was requested to assist in the Alferin case. At 1400 75 mm. dud was removed.

Engineer officer directed work at Headquarters and Mess. Engineer lot was established at Washington and Revolution de Filipino.

Medical Officer conferred with Mayor and Civilian physician concerning sanitary measures to be undertaken. Also had conference with Capt Cross of the Malaria Control Unit. Tour of Abuyog inspecting trash and human waste disposal. He visited Co I of Philippine soldiers to furnish them with necessary medical aid and supplies.

Transportation with Mayor Gallego made reconnaissance of road to Buglis for hauling corn to coastal vessels.

Lt Wendt deposited P100.00 with Adjutant for purchase of 50 chickens and one monkey. Request with money delivered to Lt. Rensholm.

Medical equipment was moved into the dispensary.

Relief and Welfare Officer recommends establishment of one store in unit.

3 January 1945

Mayor's request to open three (3) stores in Barros deferred for two (2) weeks.

Capt Baker was sent to XXIV Corps Headquarters for information on civilian supplies.

At the request of the Mayor, Civilians were prohibited from entering quarters of unit personnel.

Capt R.T. Marfori, agricultural expert, Office of the President and Mr. Macario A. Mariano, Bureau of Forestry called. They discussed agricultural problems and stated that an agricultural expert will be assigned to this province to assist local officials and PCAU units.

Work commenced on Engineering workshop. Twenty (20 additional workman are being used by Engineer.

Unit Finance Officer reported to Lt Col. L.B. Graham, F.D. XXIV Corps.

CSO inspected misconduct of S Sgt Gonzales and filed report thereon. S Sgt Conrad L. Gonzales reduced to private for misconduct and insubordination.

From 1400 to 1425 Legal Officer conferred with Attorney Closa, Common Justice of Peace for Dulag, Data on Philippine Court System and Sundry legal matters are filed in information file, Legal Sections. At 1430 Legal Officer referred Lt Wendt to Lt. Rensholm. See entry on prior day. At 1435 Lt Chenevent, 127th Engineer, 11th Airborne Division complained to Legal Officer all prices charged and services rendered by Filipino laundress. He will return with additional information and recommendations.

Transportation and Supply Officers went to Eight Army and XXIV Corps in search of miscellaneous supplies.

Capt Baker conferred with Major Jarrett, XXIV Corps, who stated PCAU 27 would be connected with Civilian Supply of the West Coast.

4 January 1945

2d Lt Reid, C.A. from the 11th Airborne Division called in regard to evacuation of civilian in their area. Delegated Captain Moeller to investigate and report next a.m.

Capt Lord from XXIV Corps M.P.'s called in regard to passes. CIC must approve all passes before submitting to Corps. Also discussed various other common police problems.

Capt Chua and the Supply Officer of PCAU #26 called. Will give them 750 parachutes and one (1) International truck.

Capt Banzet, Legal Officer, conferred with Attorney Ciriaco Tupaz. Newly appointed Justice of the Peace for Abuyog Mr. Tupaz will begin investigating cases today and will open his court as soon as conditions of docket and availability of witnesses permit. Mr. Tupaz appears to be an intelligent and diligent official.

Report of Capt Banzet ad O.D. "Due to special hazards from potential ambush an extra guard was detailed for second and third relief." Recommend that present post be abolished and one guard be stationed at EM's quarters and one guard at Mess Hall. The latter will observe about Motor Pool."

Medical Officer went to Tacloban for supplies.

5th January 1945

Commanding Officer was notified by Major Coleman PCAU #17 at 0900 that Eight Army had directed that we send an advance detachment to take over their duties at Mayorga. Went to Mayorga with Capts Baker and Moeller and made arrangements to take over. Went

5th January 1945 (Cont'd)

to XXIV Corps, saw Col Sinclair and Col Gaylord. They clarified the new order and obtained policy on various problems. He covered our responsibilities on the new job.

Col Holmstrom went with Capt Moeller to 11th Airborne Division and found where the civilians were that were to be evacuated. Saw Mayor Gallego concerning new location for them. Capt Moeller to handle matter.

Mayor Gallego called with four civilians:

Salvador Demetrio - former Governor of Leyte
Bernardino Demetrio
Vicente Sergon
Vicente Kanelon

Made arrangements for them to go to Tacloban with Major Dwyer and Capt Banzet.

Capt Baker went to Mayorga with S Sgt Koehne, Tec 4 Puszakowski, Tec 5 Del Pilar, Tec 5 Ernst, Sgt Bradof, Sgt. Levings, Pvt Kaminsky Pvt. Carpenter.

Capt Baker returned to Abuyog at 2000 and reported that Supply and Finance situation in Mayorga was in very bad condition. We decided to send Lt Rensholm and Lt Osborn up there as well as Pvt Cabanilla and Pvt Diga. Instructed Capt Baker to start new accounts system and not to pay previous accounts held by PCAU 17 until payrolls were checked. Some laborers have been paid arbitrary labor rates in excess of ceiling rates. Lt Waller will take over Transportation Supply at Abuyog and Lt Osborn Transportation and Supply at Mayorga. Lt Rensholm will handle Relief & Labor. Capt Baker Class "A" Agent Officer.

Sent one (1) 1 1/2 truck and one (1) 1/4 truck to Mayorga.

At 0940 Sgt Neilson, Sgt of Officer's Mess, 511 Parachute (Inf) reported violations of ceiling prices.

At 1520 Mr. Botadeciano Camas, High School principal wants rent for private buildings and for school purposes.

Lt Rensholm visited barrios with Capt Roberts, also set up organization of warehouses.

The Medical Officer secured and delivered medical supplies for Abuyog Civilian Dispensary. He checked vaccines at Alamo Scouts refrigeration. Prepared supplies for shipping to Bay Bay Dispensary. Had conference with Capt Dives of Malaria Control Unit pertaining to Abuyog garbage and human waste disposal.

6th January 1945

(C.O.) Pvt Emerson assigned to Capt Bakery. Went to Mayorga headquarters and determined Capt Baker's needs and discussed policy for the future. Went to Municipal Building in Mayorga. Mayor Bautista was not in. Talked with his Chief Clerk and gave him all information. I (Col Holmstrom) had as to future operations asked that the Mayor correspond informally or formally to me thru Capt Baker. Met Chief of Police from La Paz and discussed their problems. Made arrangements for more supplies to go to Mayorga.

Received letter from Eight Army to send all attached personnel back to Fourth Replacement Depot.

Capt Baker came in at 2000 from Mayorga.

Major Dwyer and Capt Banzet departed with party mentioned in report of CO. Arrived Eight Army, CAD, Hq at 1045 exchanged mail and departed at 1055. Arrived at Tacloban at 1235. Launched with Capt Marfori. Interviewed Col Erena, Major Guebell, Legal Officer, Hq, CAD, USAFFE. The latter will furnish opinion on rental of school building. Departed Tacloban 1510, arrived Hq CAD, Eight Army, picked up mail, departed 1535. Deposited official mail at M/C XXIV Corps at 1810, returned to Abuyog at 1855.

CSO went to Mayorga with Municipal legal adviser to move village for use of 11th Airborne Division. Notified every house and after conference agreed to move Monday.

Mrs. Basilisa Belleza, land owner states she was ordered to report to Lt Col Holmstrom Monday, 8 Jan 45.

Medical Officer moved supplies to dispensary at Duñog. Had meeting with ten (10) ennuclators working through our area. Obtained complete reports as to number, type and reaction. Supplied innoculator with typhoid and cholera vaccines.

Engineer section had projects working on interior of Court house, landscaping of Court house and bamboo cutting.

Capt Baker took over activities at Mayorga from PCAU 17 as of 0730. Assigned EM to their respective duties. PCAU 27 turned over a list of the accounts receivable which represents the amount each store operator was indebted to PCAU.

7 January 1945

Lt Osborn, Lt Rensholm and two (2) EM to Mayorga. CO went to Mayorga, XXIV Corps and 8th Army. Will be able to keep Capt Baker at least for awhile. Talked with Col Vance and Major Wiggins.

Air alarm at 2400, some people heard 6 shots. 4 officers went down on street to investigate.

The shortage of tools and lack of supplies are holding up a large number of jobs that have been requested.

Medical officer when to Mayorga to study medical supplies available. Plans made for two dispensaries in Mayorga. Hired 4 dispensary assistants. Have arranged to hire registered nurses for dispensary in La Paz and one in Pabocungon.

Supply Officer obtained 1 1/2 ton "gutless wonder" otherwise International trucks not in running shape.

Lt Osborn and Lt Rensholm reported to Capt Baker for duty and were assigned to their respective jobs.

8 January 1945

Capt Terrell went to the 4th Replacement Depot with 10 EM.

Received report that Negro Soldiers continued to disturb natives.

Got verbal information thru Capt Chaudoin, from XXIV Corps that Administrative Bulletin No. 80 from USAFFE prohibits the payment of Government officials and employees without first having payrolls signed by Ismael Mathay, the Director of the Budget and Finance, Commonwealth Government, Mayor informed.

Lt Reid, CA from 11th Airborne called again in regard to evacuating civilians out of their area. Capt Moeller discussed it further with the Mayor.

Capt Banzet conferred with Mr. Closa on irregularities in distribution of relief supplies as follows:

- (1) Hence Eyo, employee of one Climaco, a Chinese merchant works in PCAU Wdse #1, Eyo has 36 parachutes. A son of Climaco also works in PCAU wdse.
- (2) Pauline Elale, also a Chinaman, was found with 50 cans of milk.
- (3) Widespread violation of ceiling prices on rice and sugar reported.

Mr. Closa has names of witnesses. He will instruct Chief of Police and Mr. Tupaz to arrest and prosecute violators.

At 1140 conferred with Mr. Tan., Municipal Secretary. All Officials have been sworn in. Copies of oath will be furnish this office.

PSO went with MP to have civilian testimony of Negro breaking into civilian houses.

Payment of municipal, provincial government projects and payrolls is discontinued.

Capt Baker had a long talk with Lt Apolonio Lumen, CO 2nd Leyte Co., Philippine Constabulary. Mr. Cesario Saño, Chief of Police of Dulag and Mr. Doroteo Lacandato, Acting Municipal Treasurer of Dulag.

Lt Rensholm at Mayorga, selected together with Chief Foreman necessary capatas to supervise number of laborers required. It has been established that we work under handicap with regard to procurement of sufficient laborers since other Army units follow higher wage scale than the one authorized by us.

9 January 1945

Commanding Officer sent Capt Moeller to 11th AB to handle evacuation of civilians.

Lt Col Brown and Lt Col O'Rourke called about getting parachutes. Referred them to Lt Col Vance. They ate with us and disclosed that they had purchased locally two pieces of cloth for \$15 and \$10 respectively. I (C.O) turned cloth over to Mayor's secretary and Mayor will take proper action. All personnel available attended medical lecture by Lt Coltman at dispensary. Received \$25 back from merchant Perferio Turmagod and turned matter over to Legal Officer. Also talked to Mayor about the matter, and about laundry difficulties.

Mr. T.M. Wright, Chief of CIC in Abuyog called and gave the CO his opinion as follows:

"The Guerillas have established an outer perimeter defense around the Abuyog area. As a side line there seems to be some strain between Mayor Gallego and the CO of the Guerrillas., Capt. Land. Also the Volunteer guards, who are guarding the collaborationists compound in Abuyog are under the supervision of the Guerrillas. He is also of the opinion that the people of Abuyog are unusually faithful and trustworthy. He believes that there is no subversive element whatever in Abuyog. Mr. Wright wrote to his headquarters concerning the problem

of Negro troops mingling with native woman. There was one incident the breaking into native houses by colored troops, which he thought might have serious consequences. The Mayor has issued an executive order to his people concerning entry of women into any quarters and the entry of any personnel into native houses."

In his opinion the local police are generally incompetent and I (C.O) agree. I have talked with the Mayor concerning this matter.

At 0800 Capt Moeller, P30, went with Mayor and Municipal Legal Advisor to 511th Air Borne Headquarters. They picked up Lt Reid and made house to house calls on civilians re to moving them out. All agreed to clear by 0900 10 Jan. Limited motor transportation available according to Lt Reid although 511th agreed to furnish same. Made survey of area and natives are hard pushed to find place to live except in swamps. All elevated land being used by troops. Mayor arranged for some to stay in school house, Tarragona.

Engineer Officer went to Mayorga for survey and engineer requirement. Informed Capt Baker to use native material and nipa construction whenever possible.

Lt Waller pick up 2 "Gutless Wonders" 1 1/2 ton International trucks at 8th Army. He contacted Major Wiggins who will approve all T/E equipment and try to get excess mess equipment and tentage. Capt Banzet referred matter of price ceiling violators to Capt Moeller to handle with local enforcement agencies.

Capt Baker had a talk with Mayor Bautista of Dulag and explained to him the procedure through which he must go to pay his teachers, all relief, all municipal construction projects and municipal officials. He also set up a system of guard duty and system of defense at night.

10 January 1945

Col Holmstrom had talk with late President Quezon's physician, a Major in the Philippine Army. He called in reference to transportation to Tacloban. Arrangements were made for Friday morning.

Lt Col Crossman, Civil Affairs Officer, USAFFE called and stayed overnight. Many problems were discussed and some sections of SOP 27 and Instructional notes cleared up. We may use our discretion in establishing wage rates for professional employees and report the wage scale set to USAFFE. Discussed the relief of Lt Rensholm from team and the possibility of retaining Capt Baker. He said he would try.

Brought to Col Crossman's attention that PCAU #7 and #17 extended credit to the merchants of Dulag Municipality. Total amount of credits extended by PCAU #7 and #17 was P42,000.00.

Capt Moeller and Mayor Gallego went to Maya and 511th AB to check moving of village. He believed it to be proceeding but transportation is lacking, also heavy rain in progress.

Capt Parks, Finance Officer PCAU #26 visited today.

Capt Baker made trip to Abuyog to turn in cash collected for merchandise sold to store owners.

Lt Colman visited and inspected dispensaries in Mayorga. Reports from dispensary in La Paz. Visited XXIV Corps and Eight Army Headquarters regarding medical supplies.

11 January 1945

Jose Climaco, merchant called and reported that the Mayor (Gallego) was selling corn for P15.00 to the Guerrillas and that he wanted to get a written statement to that effect. Talked with local Priest about town conditions and he will attempt to influence the people in our drive for sanitary conditions.

Capt Moeller went to Mayorga and 511th AB to check on moving of natives.

Major Dwyer reports that the equipment, 1/4 tons and trucks are being used without being properly maintained.

Capt Banzet at 1015 conferred with Mr. Tupaz, J P on matters of prosecution in black market operation. See memo to Capt Moeller 9 Jan. Mr. Tupaz was authorized to proceed with Climaco's case by letter this date.

Capt Terrell reported that payrolls totaling P2989.00 paid, vouchers prepared and submitted to Finance Officer.

Capt Baker consulted with Mayor Bautista of Dulag on procedure for civilian passes. They way will work towards turning the government back to him as soon as possible.

After all the work and explaining I (Capt Baker) went to the 1st day to straighten out the wage scale of the employees here. Lt Rensholm informed Pvt Emerson to put them on the payroll at a higher wage than were my orders. This has been corrected and Rensholm will be promptly and definitely told to comply with those orders. Carried on with routine activities.

12 January 1945

Lt Col Crossman left for Tacloban. He was going to stop at Corps with Capt Chaudoin to clarify some finance matters.

Major Kuellke of the 11th Airborne Division came in and said we could have 1500 more parachutes.

Major White, Major Patrick and Capt Roberts of the 38th Division called at Hqs in regard to parachutes.

Got statement from Capt Roberts in connection with black markets operations of Mayor, also statement in regard to Rensholm and parachutes.

At 1020 Capt John M. Havies, 50th Engr Bn requests use of building recently evacuated by Dispensary (municipality). Permission obtained from Councilor Maico. Capt Harris notified by phone at 1400.

Capt Chaudoin visited XXIV Corps. Closed accounts with L. B. Graham, Colonel FD. From now on we will operate on revenue from civilian sales providing the collections continue as in the past.

Activities at Sub-Hqs at Mayorga.

Capt Baker went to Abuyog to pick up money for back payrolls. In his absence Col Gensburg USSASOs, Col Chaddock, BASE "K" and Major

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Fisk of PCAU 24 above Dulog visited our campsite. They were looking over the situation and Lt Osborn gathered from their remarks that the area is considered being taken over by PCAU 24.

13 January 1945

CIC man, Mr. Wright called and investigations of Jr. Joe Climaco and the Mayor were discussed. He also told me of strange funeral conducted at 0200 entirely out of line with usual customs. There has been a report that there were guns and ammunitions in the coffins. There are rumbled rumors of Revolution.

At 1430 Capt Banzet conferred with W.O. Hoffman, JAG Section, 11th Airborne Division, re-bamboo poles taken for military use.

P 4 supplies drawn at Tacloban.

Lt Coltman went to 116th Station Hospital to make arrangements for possible admission in the future. Went to Mayorga dispensary. Visited Eight Army Surgeon at Eight Army Headquarters and Civil Affairs Medical Chief.

14 January 1945

Col Holmstrom received call from Lt Col Gaylord of XXIV Corps. We are to stage with the 38th Division on or about the 18th Base "K" will take over.

15 January 1945

Col Holmstrom went to Eight Army and found out we will be attached to XI Corps for next operation.

Met Lt Col Eldridge, Civil Affairs Officer, XI Corps. He (Col H) visited Mayorga Sub-Hq at noon.

Capt Baker reported that Pfc Kaminsky was accidentally shot by Tec 4 Puszakowski at Mayorga in connection with horse play activities.

Appointed Capt Baker, Lt Coltman and Lt Osborn as Line of Duty board.

16 January 1945

CO received call from XI Corps to report there at 1000 17 Jan 45. Also to contact Major White, 38th Division. Talked with Col Vance and Major Morris in detailed about political situation in Abuyog. Col Eldridge C.A. XI Corps stated that PCAU 24 was coming in to take over.

Air alert at 2100. All clear in 45 minutes.

Lt Coltman went to 76th Station Hospital to examine and interview Kaminsky in shooting affair.

Capt Baker investigated the accidental shooting of 15 January 45.

17 January 1945

CO went to XI Corps had conference with Lt Eldridge CA officer and with Executive Officer, PCAU 16. Went over operational plan in detail.

Had conference with officers concerning Corps annex to Administrative Order.

Capt Beecher and two other officers from PCAU 24 called at Hq PCAU 24 expects to take over Abuyog when we're called out.

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18 January 1945

Lt Col Gaylord called and confirmed Lt Col Morgans death.

19 January 1945

Organization received orders for new operation. Unit prepared for move.

20 January 1945

Personnel of unit engaged in preparation for move. Major Dwyer admitted to 76th Station Hospital. Lt Rensholm relieved from unit and reported to Hq Eight Army for further orders. Capt Terrell appointed Executive Officer for unit.

21 January 1945

Affairs of Abuyog were turned over to PCAU 24. Preparations for move continued.

22 January 1945

Preparation for move continued.

23 January 1945

Unit prepared for movement. M-7 operation and proceeded to Red Beach, San Pedro Bay, Leyte P.I.

24 January 1945

Six (6) officers and 21 EM embarked on USS President Polk. Lt Col Holmstrom Commanding.

25 January 1945

Capt Chaudoin, Lt Osborn and 9 EM embarked on SS Argal. Jeeps and trailers loaded. Capt Moeller and 8 EM embarked on LST 26 & 27 with heavy equipment.

26 January 1945

At sea

27 January 1945

At sea

28 January 1945

At sea

29 January 1945

At 1100 landed on Beach near San Felipe, Zambales, Luzon, P.I., proceeded on foot to San Narciso arrived 1330. Proceeded by Motor (PCAU 16) to San Antonio. Arrived 1615. Quarters for officers and EM located. C.O. conferred with Priest, Rev. Emilio Castro. Mayor was Capt Juan Dancel not there when we arrived. Meet Mayor in evening and made arrangements for labor, etc. Lt Kearney of Unit 16 was with C.O. C.O. saw Major Seens of CIC.

30 January 1945

C.O. went to San Marcelino at 1000 with Col Eldridge. Had conferred with Mayor and other officials. Laid out complete plan for Civil Affairs. Made arrangements for 300 laborers for airfield. Jeeps not in as yet. Unit moved to San Marcelino. Quarters for personnel located. Headquarters set up in Municipal Building.

Medical officer at San Antonio examined several medical situations. No acute civilian found, no civilian war casualties. Dispensary organized in Municipal Building. It was learned that the City water supply came from the hills but proper chlorination had been lacking. Sewage system was in good order. Electrical plant present, but not functioning. At San Marcelino Dispensary set up opposite Municipal Bldg.

31 January 1945

Capt Moeller to Castilyose to take over. 364 laborers available to work. Capt Baker with Major Patrick and Mr. Morris, ARC to Castellajos, Subic and Olongapo. Sent reports to Col Eldridge. Capt Chaudoin and Lt Osborn came in with Jeeps.

PCAU #16 to take over tomorrow.

Capt Baker made reconnaissance trip as far as Olongapo. Spoke with Mayor at Castellajos and Subic. No official present in Olongapo. Information that was required was sent back to San Marcelino by runner. Returned in P.M. with recommendations we should move headquarters to Subic.

1 February 1945

C.O. went to Castellajos with Mayors of Castellajos and San Marcelino. They were officially appointed by General Hall, XI Corps Commander.

Administration of Castellajos was turned over to PCAU 16. Unit moved to Subic in afternoon and officers returned to San Marcelino for party in evening. Moved in Mayor's house and went over in general all the problems confronting us.

Major Loomis Patrick, JA GD asgd to USAFFE, and Mr. Morris, ARC, attached to our unit.

2 February 1945

Unit started setting up Headquarters at Subic and recruitment of labor. Col Eldridge called in regard to labor for 592nd Engineers. Major White called concerning labor payrolls.

Capt Moeller went to Olongapo to set up Sub-Hq.

Labor situation is entirely muddled up and confused.

Capt Baker located warehouse to be used by his section, and set up mechanics of relief distribution.

Capt Banzet recommended appointment of Jose Malino as J.P. Verbal approval received from Lt Starbeech, CIC Detachment.

3 February 1945

Col Holmstrom went to Olongapo to see Capt Moeller

Capt Chaudoin visited Capt Wilkinson, XI Corps, Headquarters, San Antonio and turned in officers and Em pay vouchers.

Capt Moeller handicapped by vehicle breakdown. Set up PCAU Hq. Was shelled by Japs last night. Not many civilians in town, but are returning. Labor demands great but as yet no available supply. Civilians buying food from Army kitchens. Great need for civilian food stocks.

Lt Waller contacted Col Eldridge to have 2 civilian trucks repaired at 20400rd.

4 February 1945

Capt Moeller will be attached to Colored Service Co for rations. Major White called and will stay with Moeller to help straighten out labor. Local treasurer reported and school principal. Warned Mayor to get all men to stay out of bay after dark or Navy will fire on them.

Capt Moeller reported that Japs came in with mortars to knock out bridge but missed bridge, but almost knocked out PCAU 27. Some 25 shells fired by Japs before out artillery found them. Medical unit has treated approximately 25 civilians and one soldier. There is a constant demand for labor from all units.

5 February 1945

Col Holmstrom went to XI Corps and got all new directives from Sixth Army. Corps will handle priorities on labor. He went to Olongapo and arranged for new Headquarters. Contacted Mr. Gomez, the vice Mayor.

Capt Chaudoin attended meeting at Corps Hq. Received Sixth Army bulletins regarding payment of temporary officials.

XI Corps disapproved requisition by Lt Waller for 3 1/4 trailers.

Lt Colman went to Olongapo to inspect dispensary, poor location, too far from civilians. Recommended new site.

6 February 1945

Lt Osburn was detailed in Olongapo Sub-Hq. Mayor Salong duly appointed by Commanding General XI Corps.

Lt Colman went to Olongapo with Major Patrick and Mr. Morris to move dispensary.

7 February 1945

C.O. made tour of town. Suspect one House of Prostitution. Went to Olongapo to see new Hq. Very good location.

Capt Terrell attended conference at Corps Hq on labor problems.

Capt Baker met with Mayor and his brother who is to be the wholesaler and explained to him the operation and procedure to be followed in his capacity as wholesaler.

8 February 1945

C.O. went to Castellajos to witness appointment of Provincial Governor, Ramon Magsaysay.

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8 February 1945 (Cont'd)

Lt Coltman went to Olongapo, dispensary set up and operating.
Capt Baker made trip to Castellejos, San Marcelino, San Antonio and San Narciso in the interest of procuring rice.

9 February 1945

C.O. made trip to Castellejos, San Marcelino, San Antonio, San Narciso and San Felipe with Major Patrick and Mr. Morris.

10 February 1945

Major Loomis Patrick and Mr. Morris, ARC departed for Manila.
Major White 38th Division, CAS was in .
The Commanding Officer met Governor and in conference with Col Eldridge, it was decided to give us the Provincial Hq. The Governor will move in next week.
Capt Banzet went to XI Corps. Talked with Governor Magsaysay. He accepted invitation for reception.
Reception at officer's quarters attended by Mr. Ramos Magsaysay, Provincial Governor Mr. Gustice Labrador, Judge of Court of First Instance, Mr. Salong, Mayor of Subic and many others lesser officials, their wives and families.

11 February 1945

C.O. went to Olongapo with Capt. Terrell.
Heard that we'll take over Northerners towns within a few days.
Dr. Rodolfo's house in evening. Talked with Judge Pablo.

12 February 1945

Col Holmstrom with Governor to Olongapo, Castellejos, San Marcelino, San Antonio, San Narciso and San Felipe.
Capt Baker reported that only persons actually needing relief are being issued it. All other rice is being sold. All needy persons are first investigated through relief section set up on Saturday, 10 Feb 45. Olongapo will start on same basis 13 February 1945.

13 February 1945

Lt Col Eldridge, Governor Magsaysay, Mayor Salong and the Commanding Officer went to Barrio of Maitin to arrange for movement of civilians.
Governor started to function.
C.O. went to Olongapo
Capt Banzet notified Jose Malino that he is no longer Justice of Peace. Mayor informed Capt Banzet that Ireneo Felarca, Castellejos is available. Fleraco will come here with Governor tomorrow.

14 February 1945

Lt Col Eldridge called re: two (2) Chev. sedans for us at 204th Ordnance. Talked (C.O.) with Governor about his suggested appointees on his staff.

Lt Coltman visited dispensaries in Castellejos, San Marcelino, San Antonio, San Narciso, San Felipe. Discussed taking over of PCAU 16 medical set up. Met Major Knoll, Medical Officer of PCAU 16. To

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14 February 1945 (Cont'd)

Cabongon, Panau and Fusac to bring medical supplies to natives and guerrilla forces. Sent supplies to Iba.

15 February 1945

Governor, Col Holmstrom with Judge Pablo talked over Provincial matters. C.O. talked with Governor at lunch about problems of outer barrios.

16 February 1945

Major Patrick returned with much news of Manila.

17 February 1945

Capt Davidson reported for duty. He is to take over labor.
Capt Puckett called in regard to taking over our territory when we leave for our next station.
Lt Coltman went through Zigzag Pass to estimate the medical attention.
Unit informally alerted for movement to Manila.

18 February 1945

Routine duties.

19 February 1945

Preparation for movement to Manila.

20 February 1945

Lt Col Holmstrom and Capt Baker went to Manila on reconnaissance preparation to unit's movement to that city. Reported to Col Sears, Civil Affairs Section, Sixth Army.

21 February 1945

Col Holmstrom and Capt Baker returned at 1230 and reported on conditions in Manila.
Unit alerted to move at 0800 hours 23 February 1945.

22 February 1945

Preparation for move.
At 1700 to 1800 programs by Subic School children, attended by Lt Col Holmstrom and the unit. Capt Puckett of PCAU 16 and representative of his staff and Gov. Magsaysay.
PCAU 16 moved in and took over administration of Civil Affairs in Subic.

23 February 1945

Departed Subic at 0800 by Motor Convoy. Convoy moved accordingly to plan and without incident. Arrived in Manila at 1500.
Lt Col Holmstrom reported to Major Gordon, Civil Affairs Section, XIV Corps.
Officers and EM set up quarters in home of Mr. Stewart Tait located on the west bank of Pasig River facing Inverness Street.

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24 February 1945

Col Holmstrom toured installations with Major Carlyle, PCAU 8. Not definite whether we or Team 8 will stay in this area.

25 February 1945

Col Holmstrom went to Santo Thomas to see Mrs. Tait. Mr. Berkenkotter was along.

26 February 1945

Col Holmstrom made tour of hospitals and refugee centers. Met Col Holmstein.

27 February 1945

Set up Headquarters in Philippine Films Industry bldg. Major Gordon called at quarters. Went to USAFFE meeting at Hq Team #4, Lt Col Rauh presided - nothing accomplished.

Capt Terrell set up labor section. PCAU 8 Labor Office was contacted and he agreed to pay all labor before he left.

Lt Coltman visited all PCAU 27 hospitals (8) and inspected areas.

Finance office opened for business, funds have not yet been received.

28 February 1945

Jap captured in front of office, surrendered. Major Carlyle called. Major from Far Eastern Air Force called in regard to labor at Fort McKinley.

1 March 1945

Col Holmstrom made rounds of full installations. Black market is flagrant. Many complaints on distribution system. Last day under control of XIV Corps.

2 March 1945

Col Holmstrom went with Capt Chaudoin to LUBSEC and XIV Corps Hq. Also to Unit #4 and talked with Major Patrick. Major Patrick called in PM and told us that Team #8 will return to take over south half of district.

Hq USAFFE, will set up on Commerce and Trade Bldg. All reports submitted now will be submitted to Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE.

Luzon District Engineers were supplied 50 laborers and were requested to take action concerning removal of mines.

Capt Terrell instructed Guerrilla Forces employed by PCAU #8 to continue operations of preventing looting and directing refugees.

3 March 1945

(CO) Major Patrick and Commander Cobb called. Lt Col Duvalle (G-I) called in regard to personnel matters. Had talk with Lt. Waller.

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4 March 1945

Engineer bomb disposal unit examined area around quarters, one live mine was neutralized. Area declared safe.

5 March 1945

Capt Baker started evacuation of refugees from the Lechanco place which should be finished by Wednesday or Thursday. He plans to have four D.P's (Pandacan), and allocate approximately 3000 people to each. He has a man making a survey of another area in Paco and should be able to open another D.P. there soon.

Lt Coltman made plans to clean up and take over Sacred Heart Hospital.

6 March 1945

Col Holmstrom made rounds of hospitals. Conditions very much improved. Major Patrick and Commander Cobb called. The colonel also went thru North west part of our area for first time.

7 March 1945

Col Holmstrom, Capt Baker and Lt Waller attended meeting at USAFFE, Civil Affairs Headquarters at Commerce Bldg at 1900.

8 March 1945

Legal Officer (Capt Banzet) accompanied Governor Magsaysay to PMG office in Bilibid Prison and effected release of Plymouth automobile which brought the Governor to Manila.

At 0910 Personnel of PCAU 27 engaged in a skirmish with one Japanese officer and four enlisted men, near the factory on Inverness St about 300 yards from Headquarters. All five of the enemy were killed. No casualties sustained by PCAU 27.

Investigation of markets by civilian assistants under the direction of Capt Moeller reveals: (1) Universal violations of price ceiling in stores not operated by PCAU; (2) Possession by civilians of Army goods; (3) "Bandit" practice of guerrillas in exacting tributes from small dealers.

Civilian assistants employed to take census of area served by PCAU 27.

9 March 1945

Eleven PCAU stores were opened for sale of Army supplies (food) to residents of this area. These stores are operated under the direction of the supply officer.

10 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, relief and welfare.

11 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, relief and welfare.

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12 March 1945

A bed factory has been placed in operation by Lt Charles Osburn, Engineering Section. Beds are supplied to institutions.

13 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, Relief & Welfare.

14 March 1945

Capt Horne, 38th Malarial Control Unit, reported that his unit has been assigned to an area south of the Pasig River embracing the territory of PCAU 27. His mission is to eradicate dengue fever, reduce flies and establish latrines.

Major Newland Baldwin, Precinct Commissioner, Manila Police Dept. 1335 Oregon St., requests that we assist in establishing an open air market on Herran St across from the Emergency Hospital. Lt Osburn will handle matter. Major Baldwin will issue passes for our employees. Officers concerned notified.

15 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, Relief & Welfare.

16 March 1945

The C.O. was informally notified that this unit would take over the Intramuros District of Manila. LUSSEC assumed responsibility of all civilian labor and procurement of civilian property.

17 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, Relief & Welfare.

18 March 1945

Engineer Officer reported that toilets and garbage pits are being constructed in vicinity of Concordia College. Two unidentified bodies were removed to City Sanitation Department.

19 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, Relief and Welfare.

20 March 1945

Commanding Officer was informed by Lt Col Crossman, Executive Officer, Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, that this unit would be assigned the area consisting of the Districts of Singalong, Makati, San Pedro Makati, and parts of Ermita and Malate, now administered by PCAU # 8.

21 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs, Relief & Welfare.

22 March 1945

Colonels Taylor and Brown, IGD, inspected installations. Comments were favorable.

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23 March 1945

Preparation for taking over territory of PCAU 8 (Singalong, Makati, San Pedro Makati, parts of Ermita and Malate) are under way.

1st Lt Sebastian B. Lorenzo reported for duty per VOCO, Lt Col Duval.

24 March 1945

Preparations continued for taking over new territory. Major Carlisle stated that he was being temporarily released as C.O.

25 March 1945

Capt Lorenti, PCAU # 8 delivered to headquarters certain records maps and charts of area. Official notes of transfer of territory has not been received.

26 March 1945

Mr. Corkery, 441st CIC Detachment, tel. Jockey 4474 near T & C Bldg asked us to furnish 10 desks and 20. Sent him out with Mr. Castro.

Mr. A. W. Adolfo representing Commonwealth Government reported for orientation in administration technique, looking forward to civilian assumption of control of PCAU # 8 former area.

Mr. Adolfo will organize a civil staff on the pattern of a PCAU T/O. This is the initial experiment in the assumption PCAU functions by Commonwealth Government personnel.

27 March 1945

Lt Col Snyder and Lt Col Schnck, Civil Affairs Detachment called and conferred with Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and Adjutant.

28 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs

29 March 1945

Routine administration of Civil Affairs. Capt R. E. Baker assigned to organization from TDY with orgn. S Sgt Claude Brackett returned for duty from 39 Evac Hosp. Six (6) privates promoted to Pfc.

30 March 1945

Two Lt Colonels, Inspector General Dept, Hq USAFFE inspected office. Suggested record of gasoline consumption and discontinuance of feeding hospital employees. Comments favorable.

At weekly meeting 1930 hours, Hq USAFFE VOCO Gen Whitney (Lt Col Rauh) Hospital employees will continue to be feed.

31 March 1945

Athlyn B. Waller, CAC promoted from 2d Lt to 1st Lt per par 1 SO 82 Hq USAFFE. Date of Rank from 25 March 1945.

1 April 1945

Lt Col Schenck will loan unit 1 truck driver, 2 cooks and one clerk-typist.

2 April 1945

Mr. Adolfo, Commonwealth Administration selected staff for administering PCAU # 8 old territory.

Capt Edward Moeller, CMP reld for asgmt and atchd to 5th Repl Depot APO 711 per letter order 1352, dtd 30 March 1945 EDCMR 31 March 1945.

3 April 1945

Six enlisted men loaned to orgn from CAD, 2 cooks, 1 supply man, 1 truck driver, 1 labor and 1 engineer. Assigned to the various officers concerned.

4 April 1945

Usual Civil Affairs duties.

5 April 1945

Capt Banzet reld of his duties as Adjutant and designated Civilian Supply Officer. Lt Waller designated as Organizational Supply Officer. Capt Terrell in addition to his other duties appointed Adjutant.

ECA #1 will take over officially 8 April 45. They will operate all D.P.'s, Sales Stores and Refugee Center in the area formerly administered by PCAU # 8. We will continue to operate all hospitals and dispensaries.

6 April 1945

Continued investigation of Black Market activities. Usual Civil Affairs duties.

7 April 1945

Lt Waller designated Unit Censor Officer vice Capt Banzet. He (Lt Waller) was reld of his duties as Asst Relief & Welfare Officer.

8 April 1945

ECA #1 officially taken over territory part of Santa Ana, Singalong, Makati, San Pedro Makati and parts of Ermita and Malate.

Personnel of Unit attended concert given Santa Church. Concert was given in honor of the unit.

9 April 1945

2d Lt Donald V. Bailey reported to dtdy from Civil Affairs Detachment. Was appointed Asst Civilian Supply Officer and reported to Capt Banzet for duty.

Mr. Adolfo, ECA #1 conferred with Capt Terrell as to problems that have come up since they have taken over the territory allocated to them.

14 enlisted men relieved from assignment per par 2 Letter Order 1406, Hq USAFFE, atchd unasgd to 4th Repl Depot, APO 703.

10 April 1945

Lt Lorenzo relieved from assignment, atchd unassigned to 5th Repl Depot, APO 711.

Eight (8) enlisted men reported for duty.

Usual organizational and civil affairs duty.

11 April 1945

Orders changed on enlisted men reld from assignment 9 April. Atchd unassigned to 5th Replacement Depot. Departed for the 5th Replacement Depot at 1000 hours.

12 April 1945

Capt Terrell promoted to Major and 1st Lt Osburn to Capt. Both officers rank from 7 April 1945.

Six (6) additional men reported for duty.

All new men assigned to their respective duties.

Lt Waller sick in quarters.

13 April 1945

Entire organization shocked by the news of President Roosevelt's death.

Lt Waller reported back to duty from sick in quarters.

14 April 1945

Medical Officer, Arthur B. Coltman promoted to Capt. Date of rank 14 April 1945.

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duties.

15 April 1945

No activity at all, Enlisted men had a party in evening.

16 April 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duties.

17 April 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duty.

18 April 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duty.

19 April 1945

Col Holmstrom visited installations and made several recommendations to the Staff Officers concerned.

20 April 1945

21 April 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duty.

22 April 1945

Capt Chaudoin relieved as Mess Officer and made Price Control Officer.

Lt Bailey appointed Mess Officer

23 April 1945

Civilian Supply Section opened two (2) additional retail food stores.

Relief & Welfare planning to close several D.P.'s to cut down on the relief work. Stores to be opened instead.

24 April 1945

Civilian Supply closed two (2) retail stores due to inefficiency. Two (2) additional stores opened along with another bakery.

25 April 1945

Usual organizational and civil affairs duty.

26 April 1945

2d Lt Willie C. Hyder, QMC asgd to unit from 5th Replacement Depot. Aptd Asst. Relief and Welfare Officer.

Civilian Supply reallocated all retail food stores under 3 food wholesalers.

27 April 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duty.

28 April 1945

Col. Holmstrom submitted annex to Daily Report re: Price Control pointing out the faults of present system and contributing causes for high prices which in turn lead to black Market activities.

Received word from Civil Affairs section (Medical) that we are to close three (3) hospitals.

29 April 1945

Four (4) D.P.'s closed today. Retail stores to be opened instead.

30 April 1945

Medical Section worked on the closing of the three (3) hospitals.

Central Registry office continued to register and issue May Ration Cards. All civilians using PCAU 27 retail food stores will in time be registered there.

1 May 1945

Continued investigation of Black Market activities and High Prices.

Have asked Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE, for clarification concerning confiscated property of U.S. Army.

Poorly worded articles in the newspapers of Manila concerning payment of Labor and other duties continued to make the work of PCAU's more difficult.

2 May 1945

Capt Chaudoin held as Detachment Commander in order to devote more time to Price Control.

Lt Hyder aptd Detachment Commander.

3 May 1945

4 May 1945

Usual organizational and civil affairs duty.

5 May 1945

Usual organizational and civil affairs duty.

Pvt King carried into quarters at 2330 with broken leg.

6 May 1945

Pvt King removed to 60th General Hospital at 0030.

Line of Duty Board appointed to determine LOD of Pvt King's broken leg. Capt Banzet, President and Capt Coltman and Lt Hyder on board.

7 May 1945

Capt Banzet continued to confiscate U.S. Army property from civilians.

To date haven't received any clarification from USAFFE as to disposal of the confiscated property.

8 May 1945

War with Germany at an end.

Usual activities.

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9 May 1945

Continued investigation of Black Market and high prices.

10 May 1945

Received request from Base X to move civilians presently at Pace. Major Terrell turned the problem over to Relief & Welfare (Lt Hyder) to move the people immediately. Area to be used by a Ordnance unit which Base X leased for them.

S Sgt Koehn admitted to 60th General Hospital APO 1009.

11 May 1945

Suggested to C&S, USAFFE, that Radio publicity be used to orient Military Personnel as the Commonwealth Government policy price control.

Also suggested that Army operate large restaurants to keep bring prices down to a normal level.

12 May 1945

Relief & Welfare closed four (4) refugee centers and one (1) D.P.

Capt Banzet, Civilian Supply Officer closed one (1) store for inefficiency.

13 May 1945

Sunday: Usual organizational duties.

14 May 1945

L.O.D. board submitted Report of Investigation in case of Pvt King. Findings were in Line of Duty, not due to own misconduct.

Cel Holmstrom submitted to C&S, USAFFE thru Daily PCAU Report a report with my facts and recommendation concerning BOA and the PCAU Areas they have taken over to date.

Major Harry J. Knottveries, NEI Army reported for TDY for Hq USAFFE.

To stay with orga about one (1) week orienting himself as to Civil Affairs.

15 May 1945

Usual Civil Affairs and organizational duties.

16 May 1945

Usual Civil Affairs and organizational duties.

17 May 1945

Medical Section closed one (1) Hospital, Guadalupe Hospital. All patients moved to Philippine General Hospital.

18 May 1945

Have asked C&S, USAFFE for clarification as to clarification or disposal of food stuffs confiscated by this organization.

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19 May 1945

20 May 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duty.

21 May 1945

All privates of organization promoted to Private First Class. Total of 7.

22 May 1945

Received Special Orders promoting Ralph E. Baker to Major. Date of rank from 17 May 1945.

23 May 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duty.

24 May 1945

Received letter Order Hq USAFFE that Pvt Nathan Sattler was to be atchd unassgd and be returned to U. S. for discharge on dependency.

25 May 1945

Major Baker preparing to re-allocate 100 civilians to the Islands of Panay, Cebu and Leyte. Lt Bailey to assist along with M Sgt Switzer, Tec 4 Puszakowski and Cpl Emerson.

26 May 1945

One (1) D.P. closed today, which now leaves one (1) D.P. open and two (2) Refugee Centers.

27 May 1945

Sunday: Usual organizational duties. EM had party for S Sgt Dela Cruz who is to be married tomorrow. Permission has been obtained from Hq, USAFFE.

All officers attend a dinner given by Marylander Club, of which Lt Waller is secretary. Dinner was held at La Concordia in honor of Senator Tydings from Maryland who is here in the Philippines on Special Mission for the President of U. S.

28 May 1945

Pvt Sattler dropped from rolls of orgn. Awaiting transportation to Base "K" Leyte to return home.

29 May 1945

Pvt Sattler departed for Leyte via air transportation. Major Knottveries rel'd for TDY to Hq with PCAU #7, APO 442.

30 May 1945

Usual organizational and Civil Affairs duties.

- 23 -

31 May 1945

Usual duties.

1 June 1945

S Sgt W. R. Ellis rel'd from asgt and asgd to USAFFE Training Group.

Major Baker, Lt Bailey, M Sgt Switzer, Tec 4 Puszakowski and Cpl Emerson left on TDY to reallocate about 100 civilians on the Islands of Cebu, Panay, and Leyte. To be gone about two (2) weeks.

2 June 1945

Unit started to prepare to turn over to ECA on 10 June 1945.

3 June 1945

Usual duties.

Capt Chaudoin tripped and fell in hole near quarters and broke left wrist.

4 June 1945

Capt Osburn rel'd from asgt and asgd to PCAU #4. To be engineer officer at Camp Morgan, San Esteban.

5 June 1945

Usual duties.

6 June 1945

7 June 1945

8 June 1945

9 June 1945

Usual duties.

10 June 1945

Transferred all functions over to ECA #1. Awaiting further orders to proceed to Camp Morgan.

ACPOLA 210.31
(10 Oct 44)

Subject: Movement Orders.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington 25, D. C.

AIRMAIL

Thru : Commanding Officer,
Port of Aerial Embarkation, ATC,
Hamilton Field, California.

To : Officers Involved.

BDC/bls/2416 Ma
Br. 77167

11 October 1944

~~SECRET~~

AUTH: T. A. G.

INIT: *[Signature]*

DATE: 11 Oct 44

1. Each of the following named officers is relieved from assignment to the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, and temporary duties indicated, and is assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, Oro Bay, New Guinea, effective upon departure in compliance with this order. He will proceed from his present station to Hamilton Field, California, reporting not later than 22 October 1944, to the Commanding Officer, Aerial Port of Embarkation for air transportation to destination. Upon arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East for duty with Civil Affairs, STPA.

NAMES		TEMPORARY DUTY
Maj. Henry C. Barrow,	C328988,	Inf. Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois.
1st Lt. Gladwyn A. Barry,	C383017,	CE Ditto
Maj. John H. Brodie, Jr.,	C277251,	Inf. Ditto
Lt. Col. Rophi G. Christiansen,	C269791,	AC Ditto
Maj. Eugene B. Cratfield,	C304055,	Sig C Ditto
Capt. Carl I. Fletz,	C196683,	Inf. Ditto
2d Lt. Arnold E. Gluck,	C681736,	AC Ditto
1st Lt. Allyn E. Harpel,	C924379,	CE Ditto
Lt. Col. Truman E. Hinton,	C253922,	Ord. Dept. Ditto
Capt. Edward Hoeller,	C467736,	CMP Ditto
1st Lt. Joseph H. Pataky,	C508499,	AGD Ditto
1st Lt. Peter Rehsholm,	C1003429,	AUS Ditto
Capt. James W. Skipper,	C265053,	AC Ditto
Major Milva B. Staig,	C239279,	Inf. Ditto
Major Bjorn E. Tunold,	C911583,	TC Ditto
1st Lt. Ralph J. Turner,	C570586,	AUS Ditto
Lt. Col. Walter F. Winters,	C245132,	CAC Ditto
1st Lt. Robert H. Ellis,	C1109915,	CR Stanford University, Palo Alto, California.
1st Lt. Ralph T. Johnson,	C1824754,	AUS Ditto
1st Lt. Allen H. Jones,	C914260,	TC Ditto
Capt. Jay Kerstergan,	C299123,	FA Ditto
1st Lt. James L. Meador,	C144081,	Ord. Dept. Ditto
Lt. Col. Halmer Holmstrom,	C291898,	AC Ditto

~~SECRET~~

AGPO-A 210.31
(10 Oct 44)

ls/2416 Ma
77167

2. Permanent change of station. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-31 P 431-01, 02, 03, 07, 08, 212/50425. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft from Hamilton Field, California, to destination is directed as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. (APR-2-280542-WDP). A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft. While traveling on official business outside continental limits of the United States, provisions of War Department Circular 356, GS, apply.

3. a. Clothing (tropical) as prescribed in TE #21, 1 June 1944, and changes thereto will be taken. One (1) set of woolen outer garments (garfisch cap, wool knit or cotton field cap, gloves and overcoat (or mackinaw) shirt and trousers) and field jacket are authorized for comfort en route and for use at destination.

b. Additional equipment authorized:
1 headnet
1 mattress cover
1 insect bar
1 first aid packet
Chemical Warfare accessories and equipment
1 pair mosquito gloves
1 pair sun glasses
1 insect repellent, 2-oz bottle
1 insecticide powder, 2-oz can

c. Canteen may be plastic, aluminum or stainless steel.

4. Cholera and typhus inoculations will be administered to the officers immediately upon receipt of orders.

5. Special instructions: Provisions of POR apply. Temporary APO 4305, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. Baggage not to exceed 110 pounds, will be shipped through the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Fort Mason, California. Necessary equipment will be obtained at destination.

3 Incls.
AG Ltr 4 July 1944
AG Form 43
Travel Book

Distribution:
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Ch/Signal Officer, 3C-138, The Pentagon
Ch/Ord. 1D-454, The Pentagon
PM, 1847 Ma.
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(Major Masters)
CG, AGF, ATC, Rm. 4

Adjutant General

AGPO-A 210.31
(10 Oct 44)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE
Washington 25, D. C.

EDC/bls/2416 Ma
Br. 77167

Subject: Movement Orders.

AIRMAIL

11 October 1944

Thru : Commanding Officer,
Aerial Port of Embarkation, ATC
Hamilton Field, California.

To : Officers Involved

SECRET
AUTH: T. 1. 0
INIT: T. 1. 0
DATE: 11 Oct 44

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NAMES		TEMPORARY DUTY
Major Robert M. Overton,	0271857 CAC	Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Major Charles E. Scott,	0219534 AC	Ditto
2d Lt. Edward A. Weatherbee,	0576629 AC	Ditto
Capt. Gustall L. Wheeler,	0921764, Sig C.	Ditto
Capt. Stanley A. Tesukiewicz,	0305991, QMC	Ditto
1st Lt. Oscar H. Anderson,	0298892, Inf.	Michigan University, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Major William E. Eadden,	0463480, Sig C	Ditto
Capt. Frank B. Banzer,	01302542, Inf	Ditto
1st Lt. Warren D. Barr,	01795754, CMP	Ditto
Major Willard R. Beall,	0168778, AC	Ditto
Major Byron T. Curry,	0461794, FD	Ditto
2d Lt. William L. Dewart,	01584132, QMC	Ditto
Lt. Col. Fred M. Fuecker,	0154055, CMP	Ditto
2d Lt. James F. Gordon,	01797992, CMP	Ditto
Major Paul F. Hickie,	0262866, Cav	Ditto
Lt. Col. Oscar F. Looker,	0900448, FD	Ditto
2d Lt. Thomas H. Ludrick,	0874356, AC	Ditto
2d Lt. Donald A. McLean,	01798941, CMP	Ditto
1st Lt. Anthony J. Sabella,	01796532, CMP	Ditto
2d Lt. Bernard Seifer,	01016404, Cav	Ditto
Lt. Col. Walter E. Tracy,	0272941, AC	Ditto
Major Edward T. Walker,	0264378, Inf.	Ditto
Capt. Edward Z. White,	0271081, TC	Ditto

2. Permanent change of station. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-31 P 431-01, 02, 03, 07, 08, 212/50425. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft from Hamilton Field, California, to destination is directed as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. (APR-2-280542-WDP). A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft. While traveling on official business outside continental limits of the United States, provisions of War Department Circular 356, GS, apply.

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1.45 40
190 50
335 175

AGFO-A 210.21
(10 Oct 44)

BDK/61/2416 M1
Br. 7757

a. Clothing tropical as prescribed in TE #21, 1 June 1944, and changed thereto will be taken. One (1) set of women outer garments (garrison cap, wool knit or cotton field top, gloves and overcoat (or mackinaw) shirt and trousers) and field jacket are authorized for comfort en route.

b. Additional equipment authorized:

1 headnet	Chemical Warfare accessories and equipment
1 mattress cover	1 pair mosquito gloves
1 insect bar	1 pair sun glasses
1 first aid packet	1 insect repellent, 2-oz bottle
	1 insecticide powder, 2-oz can.

c. Canteens may be plastic, aluminum or stainless steel.

d. Cholera and typhus inoculations will be administered to the officers immediately upon receipt of orders.

e. Special Instructions: Provisions of POM apply. Temporary AIC 4305, c/o postmaster, San Francisco, California. Baggage not to exceed 110 pounds, will be shipped through the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Fort Mason, California. Necessary equipment will be obtained at destination.

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Travel Book 1001

W. D. Ballston
Adjutant General.

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
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
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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AREA STUDY NO. 3.

LEYTE PROVINCE

Issued by the
A.C. OF S., G-2
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APO 501

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This Area Study is a compilation of Counter-Intelligence information received from G-1, GHQ; G-2, GHQ; AGS; ATIS; MID War Department; ONI; CINPAC; JICPOA.; JANIS; FCC Radio Intercepts and the interrogation of evacuees and prisoners of war. It is designed primarily for use in field operations of the CIC; Censorship Detachment, USJFET; and other similar agencies. It contains classified information which should be disclosed to authorized personnel only.

~~SECRET~~

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US COAST & GEODETIC SURVEY MAP : LEYTE 1:200,000 (1937)

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CORRECTIONS TO COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AREA STUDY
No. 3

LEYTE PROVINCE

Page 50:

Add the following:

C. BURAUEN

Kan69 20Sep44: Dugout 15m square roofed with canvas 150m west of church in Burauen is quarters of Air Corps chief; important plane repair parts hidden there too; four blocks west and southwest of church are restricted area, plane parts kept in buildings there; public market is plane repair shop, buildings across the street south of it contain spare parts for planes; at barrio Buri hundreds of gas drums hidden in bamboo groves half km from Burauen-Dagami highway.

Page 54:

Change "CINCO, Antonio C." to "CINCO, Antonio G."

Page 57:

Change "JAIN" to "JAIN, Porfirio E."

Page 58:

Change "KANGLEON, Ruperto" to "KANGLEON, Ruperto K."

Page 60:

Change "MIRANDA, Blas" to "MIRANDA, Blas E."

Correct first sentence to read: (Brevet) Brig. Gen. formerly a Lt. in USAFFE; leader of guerrilla unit which controlled territory from Baybay to Palompon in winter of 43.

Page 61:


Change "NAZARIN, Jose" to "NAZARENO, Jose"

Insert "PABILLONA, Felimon

(Brevet) Lt. Col. and guerrilla leader. Formerly with the Leyte Provisional Regiment under the command of Col. CORNELL.

Change "PAMANIAN, Felix" to "PAMANIAN, Felix M."

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AREA STUDY NO. 3.

LEYTE PROVINCE

I. LOCATION

A. GENERAL.

1. Leyte Province is located in the Visayan Group of the Philippine Archipelago. It is composed of Leyte and the satellite islands of Biliran, Maripipi, and Panaon. Leyte Island itself is the eighth largest in the Philippines and has an area of 2,785 square miles.

B. COORDINATES.

1. The province lies between latitudes 9°53'N and 11°50'N and between longitudes 124°15'E and 125°20'E.

II. TOWNS AND VILLAGES

A. GENERAL.

In the following list of towns and villages, Tacloban, capital and largest city, is placed first. Other settlements follow in alphabetical order. Among these, the most important are Carigara and Barugo on the north coast; Ormoc and Baybay on the west coast; and Palo, Tanauan, Burauen and Abuyog on the east coast.

B. TACLOBAN (11°15'N, 125°00'E)

1. General.

Tacloban was the provincial capital, seat of its municipality, and the only sizable port on Leyte Island. Exporting produce of the Leyte northeast plain and southern Samar, it was the largest commercial center of the island and immediate area, and ships up to 2,000 ton register made semi-weekly connection with Manila.

2. Situation.

Tacloban is on the northeast tip of Leyte Island, at the head of San Pedro Bay near the lower end of San Juanico Strait. The town and its environs occupies two-thirds of a peninsula which terminates at Panirugan Point. The remaining one-third, or northeast area, comprises a large pond bordered by grassland used for domestic carabao grazing. A ridge, running NW/SE, hinged west of the town at the base of Anibong Point, separating the town from a section of Tacloban Valley rice fields. On the Panirugan Peninsula there is a small ridge at the north end and a 310 foot height on the east side, facing into Cancabato Bay. The lower reaches of the Mangon-bangon River, a small stream discharging west of the town, were used as a log pond and sea outlet. Although this river sometimes overflowed its banks, water did not reach the town area except in times of abnormal storms. The only asphalt thoroughfare was President Wilson St.; the others had firm

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gravel surfaces which remained hard in wet weather. Average street width was 20 feet. The principal commercial thoroughfares were Rizal St.; the northwest end of Gran Capitan; and the south end of President Wilson St.

3. Population.

The municipality of Tacloban had a population of 31,233, and the poblacion had 19,048. Of the Asiatics, 26 were Japanese and 726 Chinese. Influential inhabitants included several Americans, owners of Leyte Transportation Co., Tacloban Electric Light Co., and the Ice Plant.

4. Political Divisions.

The town had 4 divisions: Panalaron District, which was the north section and wharf area; Kapangian, the west area of town; Sawang, the central and business section; and San Fernando, the southern part of town.

5. Buildings.

Most of the buildings in the business section were wooden, two-story structures, and some had galvanized-iron roofs. The Provincial Capitol, Map of Tacloban, Ref. 23, was a large two-story concrete building, situated at the north end of town and facing a square plaza that extended from President Wilson St. to Trece Martires. The Municipal Building, which included the fire department, was a wooden, two-story structure with iron roofing and situated 300 yards east of the Mangonbango River mouth. The Leyte Land Transportation Co. had a large garage, consisting of two large buildings and an office, on Gran Capitan St. opposite the north end of Santo Nino St. The Provincial Jail was a large concrete single story building with a prison yard quadrangle. The market stood on concrete piles and had a galvanized iron roof. In 1938, Camp Bumpus comprised 2 wood frame barracks in good condition and capable of housing 250 men; several frame office buildings in fair to poor condition; and several officers' quarters in fair condition. The land in the business section has been filled to a depth of two to three feet, and is now reasonably well-drained.

For other buildings in town, see Map, Town of Tacloban, fronting page 2.


6. Industries.


- a. Eureka Sawmill & Co. Inc. 5,000 board feet daily output.
- b. Leyte Sawmill Inc. 5,000 board feet daily output.
- c. Visayan Sawmill Co., owned by Marcelo Abesamin, had a 5,000 board feet daily output.
- d. A small tannery.
- e. A quarry.
- f. An ice plant capable of producing 12 metric tons daily.

7. Transportation.

- a. There were 634 registered motor vehicles on

Tacloban





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Leyte Island in 1940. Of these, 208 were autos, and 426 were trucks, and buses used for passenger traffic. Most of these vehicles were centered in the northeastern end of the island, in the Leyte-Tacloban Valley area. The Leyte Land Transportation Co. maintained an efficient bus service all over the island.

b. Tacloban had road connection with towns on Samar Island by the Guintiguian-La Paz automobile ferry. Routes 1 and 2 of the provincial highway link Tacloban, via Palo, with Abuyog, Baybay, Maasin, Carigara and Ormoc.

c. There were no railways or tramways.

8. Vital Installations.

a. Water Supply.

The construction of a municipal water system for Tanauan, Palo and Tacloban, using cast iron piping, was completed early in 1940. The mains varied from 8 to 12 inches in diameter, and distribution lines were of 4 inch pipe. Formerly, water was obtained from catchments and wells, dug 9 to 10 feet deep.

The Tacloban Army Cadre had a pumping plant, capacity 14,400 gallons daily, which served 350 people, in 1935.

b. Electric Power.

Tacloban had the largest power plant on the island, a diesel-powered, 451 kw, 22 volt unit of the Tacloban Electric, Inc., owned by J.V. House, an American. There was an unknown number of small electric power units from 500 watt to 10 kw, owned by individuals and private commercial concerns. Reports conflict on the capacities of the above plants and the recency, 1935 and 1937 respectively, of the above information.

c. Communications.

(1) There was no telephone system on the island of Leyte.

(2) The Leyte telegraph net was an inter-province system, well-distributed over the island and connected by cable to the telegraph lines of Samar. Other inter-island telegraph communication involved wire messages to one of the Bureau of Posts radio stations, from where it was sent via radio to other stations on other islands. Equipment was all American, with standard keys and other accessories. There was a telegraph office in Tacloban and a direct cable connection with Basey, Samar, directly opposite.

(3) There were 3 radio stations, maintained by the Bureau of Posts, although not for commercial broadcasting. They were a Westinghouse SW tube transmitter, with a 200 watts power rating; an SW tube transmitter, with 150 watts power rating; and an RCA LW tube transmitter with a 50 watts power rating. The Government wireless station, KTS, broadcast on

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58, 64, 94, 600 and 952 meters.

d. Storage Facilities.

The largest warehouses were located behind the wharves across a reclaimed area in the Panalaron, or north district. There were several large warehouses and bodegas (storerooms) which were used for storing abaca, rice, corn, foodstuffs and supplies. Paved streets connected warehouses with wharves.

e. Repair Facilities.

Repair facilities on Leyte are militarily unimportant, and were limited to a few commercial garages, some bus repair garages, and private machine shops.

f. Hospitals.

The following hospitals were available prior to Japanese occupation:

- (1) Tacloban Maternity House, with 6 beds.
- (2) Bethang (Mission) Hospital, with 30 beds.
- (3) Hospital San Diego, with 18 beds.

C. ABUYOG. (10°45'N, 125°01'E)

Abuyog is situated on a level plain just north of Cadacan River on the east coast of Leyte. Population of the municipality was 39,111, and of the town 4,744. There were two stone buildings with galvanized iron roofs; one was a large church and the other the Municipal Building. There were no port installations. Water came from dug wells; there were none of the artesian type. River water was considered unsafe. The telegraph office was the eastern terminus of a line extending north through Tacloban, then around the island via Panaon Island to Hinunangan on the extreme southeast coast. The Abuyog Maternity House had 5 beds. Located here was the Abuyog Sawmill, owned by Dalmacio Agaton, and the Philippine Lumber Co., each with daily outputs of 5,000 board feet.

D. ALANGALANG. (11°12'N, 124°50'E).

Alangalang is located in the northern interior, on the road running west from Tacloban to Bonset. Municipal population was 21,084, and town population 3,231. The municipality is reportedly under Japanese control. (See Section IV, I). There was a telegraph office located here, on the main island network.

E. ALBUERA. (10°55'N, 124°42'E).

Albuera, a municipality seat, is on the shore of Ormoc Bay on the west coast of the island. It consisted of a church, about 200 wood houses, and 150 nipa dwellings. Population of the municipality was 13,696, and of the town 1,415. The telegraph line ran through town, but the nearest station appears to have been at Ormoc. Local sugar, abaca, and copra interests sent products to Ormoc for shipment.

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Water was obtained from a nearby river, wells, and spring wells in the area behind the church. The well-drained slopes of neighboring mountains provided good camp space.

F. BABATNGON. (11°25'N, 124°05'E).

Babatngon is located in the region near Baluarte Point on Janabatas Channel coast on the northeastern part of the island. It was at the end of the extension of Route 1 from Bagahupi. Surrounding country was mountainous. Population of the municipality was 8,000 and of the town 2,290. There is no information on water supply, but the settlement was known to be in an area deficient in surface water and with few or no perennial streams. The nearest telegraph appears to have been at Barugo, southwest along the coast of Carigara Bay, but the line ran through Babatngon, where it connected with an underwater cable that crossed Janabatas Channel to Samar Island.

G. BARUGO. (11°19'N, 124°44'E).

Barugo is near the head of Carigara Bay, 8 miles southwest of Baluarte Point and $\frac{1}{2}$ mile east of the mouth of Minuswang River, on the north coast of the island. It is in a country of plains and rice fields, with a dense area of mangroves west of the town. Population of the municipality was 19,564 and of the town 3,797. There was a road connection with the main island route. The municipality is reportedly under Japanese control. (See Section IV, I). Water was obtained from springs, and there was an office of the island telegraph line. References mention a large white storehouse, prominent on the coastline.

H. BATO. (10°15'N, 124°50'E).

Bato is situated $\frac{1}{2}$ mile below the Banoquirojan River mouth on the southwest coast of Leyte. Population of the municipality was 14,706, and of the town 3,060. Bato is in an area of wide open fields, suitable for agriculture; and fishing, weaving and farming were the main occupations. It consisted of 1 stone and 51 wooden houses, including a Catholic church, municipal building, public school, and hospital. The central light and power plant, Hijos de Escano was diesel operated, supplied 220 volts DC, and had a 12 kw capacity. The hospital, Bato Maternity House, had 5 beds. There is no information on the water supply. The telegraph office was connected with the island network.

I. BAYBAY. (10°41'N, 124°48'E).

1. General.

Baybay is located near the mouth of Pagbaganan River on the west coast of the island. A regular port for coasting steamers, it shipped considerable hemp and copra from the surrounding area. There was a large stone church near the beach and 2 stone buildings in the town, in addition to an estimated 100 wood or part-concrete houses. At Lago-lago, about 5 miles north of Baybay, there was an agricultural school and some buildings of concrete and wood. Population of Baybay municipality was 42,526, and of the town 5,943.

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Baybay was connected with Ormoc, Abuyog and Maasin by sections of Routes 1 and 2 of the provincial highway; in 1939 normal auto time between Baybay and Abuyog was about 3½ hours.

2. Vital Installations.

a. Water Supply.

In 1941 there was a gravity water system that supplied 136,800 gallons daily. Several dug wells yielded 7,200 gallons daily. A 475 foot deep artesian well supplied 5.2 gallons per minute by free flow and 10.2 gallons by pump. Another, 354 feet deep, produced 6 gallons per minute by free flow and 20 by pumping. The agricultural school at Lagolago to the north had a gravity system that supplied 72,000 gallons daily.

b. Electric Power.

Completed in 1938 and reputedly owned by the city of Baguio, a 3.5 horsepower hydro-electric plant operated on Calvigan River (not shown on maps), supplying current for industrial purposes. The central light and power plant, owned by Manuel Moraga, was diesel-driven, had a 54.5 kw capacity, and supplied 220 volts DC.

c. Communications.

(1) There was a telegraph office and line on the island net.

(2) There were two radio stations, one of 100 watts and another of 20 watts with REL LW tube type transmitter. One of these was maintained by the Bureau of Posts and located on Washington St.

d. Pier Facilities.

Pier facilities included piped fresh water and a small marine railway with a 40 foot cradling for launches.

e. Ice Plants.

Ice was available. No further data.

f. Lumber Mills.

Baybay Lumber Co., owned by Patino & Co., operated a sawmill capable of producing 300 board feet daily.

g. Storage Facilities.

Hemp warehouses were located at the base of the pier.

J. BURAUEN. (10°58'N, 124°53'E).

1. General.

An inland town, Burauen is on the west side of Leyte Northeast Plain one mile from the central range. South

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of the town was the Daguitan River and east were meadows, a swamp and some ricefields. Burauen is 25 miles southwest of Tacloban by existing highway. Rice, corn, and vegetables were grown, and industries included copra and tobacco. Population of the municipality was 33,505, and of the town 5,288. Real St., running approximately N/S was the main thoroughfare. Buildings consisted of an old school, a municipal building, a convent, a market, a dispensary, and Sontowa Residence. Burauen has a road link with Dulag to the east and with Dagami, a slightly smaller town, to the north. On the right hand side, going north to Dagami, is a hill, the center of which has been excavated since Spanish times. This hill is Japanese occupied and opposite it is a Japanese barracks. The municipality is reportedly under Japanese control. (See Section IV, I).

2. Utilities.

Well water provided the drinking supply; river water was used for animals and considered unsafe for human consumption. It is believed that much progress had been made on the proposed Burauen-Dagami-Palo-Tacloban system; its source of supply, Hitumnog Falls, was near Burauen. There was a telegraph office and line connected to the Leyte Island system.

K. CABALIAN. (10°16'N, 125°10'E).

Cabalian is located on the shore of Cabalian Bay on the south coast. Cornfields and ricefields immediately surround the town, and the background is hilly, with an abundance of coconut and abaca farms. There was 1 stone, and 197 wooden buildings, including a Catholic church and an elementary school. Water was obtained from wells. There was a telegraph office, and the line here was connected with an underwater cable that crossed Cabalian Bay to Lilcan, Panaon Island. Celang Sawmill Co. had a daily output of 1,000 board feet.

L. CABUCGAYAN. (11°23'N, 124°34'E).

Cabucgayan is a barrio on the south side of Mt. Suiro, elevation 4,265, and on the south coast of Biliran Island, fronting Carigara Bay. Population was 2,074. It consisted of 1 small frame schoolhouse and some nipa shacks. There was no telegraph connection. Cabucgayan River furnished an ample supply of fresh water, but drinking water was drawn from 4 wells. A moderate supply of secondary growth timber can be obtained from the upper mountain slopes. Usable sand for concrete mixing could be taken from the beach, and stones for crushing from the bed of the river.

M. CAIBIRAN (11°34'N, 124°35'E).

1. General.

Caibiran is located on the north slope of Mt. Suiro on the east coast of Biliran Island. Population of the municipality was 19,522 and of the town 4,306. Corn, camotes, rice and native vegetables were grown in the area. Among the several sizable buildings were a school, 2 story and 50' x 50'; a school shop building, 20' x 50'; Caibiran Primary Building, with concrete walls, wooden trusses, and galvanized iron roof-

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ing; the Municipal Building, a 2 story, wooden frame structure; Intermediate School, a 2 story, wooden frame building; and a church, with log columns, wood trusses, galvanized iron sides and roof. An earth road extends about a mile west, from which point a rough foot trail runs to Naval on the opposite side of the island. A foot trail is said to connect with Cabucgayan to the south. There are only unpaved roads and trails in the area.

2. Facilities.

Caibiran had a telegraph station that was the terminus for a line that ran, via Naval on the west coast, south to Leyte Island. Fresh water was pumped from Tinago River (possibly the unnamed stream shown on Coast & Geodetic Survey Maps discharging immediately north of town). This water would have to be treated. The town was supplied with drinking water from 3 small springs. There is a supply of secondary growth native lumber. A moderate amount of skilled labor was available.

N. CALUBIAN. (11°27'N, 124°25'E).

Calubian is located in the northwestern part of Leyte Island; 2½ miles southeast of Uson Point and facing Baliran Strait. It is in an area of low hills and broad valleys. Only 20 wooden houses are reported as being in the town. Population of the municipality was 14,027, and of the town 2,563. A gravity water system, with a capacity of 72,000 gallons daily, served 700 people. There was also a large spring with water piped to shore through bamboo pipes. There was a telegraph station with lines connected to the island net. Calubian Sawmill Inc. had an output of 5,000 board feet daily. Short one-lane seasonal roads ran southwest and southeast from town. There was a concrete pier, in 8 feet of water at high tide.

O. CAPOOCAN. (11°18'N, 124°38'E).

Capoocan was on the north coast at the head of Carigara Bay and directly west of Carigara. It was in an area of agricultural flats and ricefields. Population of the municipality was 8,907 and of the town 965. There was a gravity water system supplying 4,320 gallons daily. Although on the telegraph line, the nearest office appears to have been at Carigara.

P. CARIGARA. (11°18'N, 124°41'E).

1. General.

Carigara, a commercial center of upper Leyte, was the main port of the north coastline of the Leyte Valley Plain. It was situated near the mouth of Cabiuyangan River at the head of Carigara Bay. Population of the municipality was 23,236 and of the town 5,851. Some vessels stopped here, but most of the products were transported by truck to Tacloban for shipment. The municipality is reportedly under Japanese control. (See Section IV, I.) Several hundred wooden and nipa houses were spread through the town area and along the waterfront. Prominent among the buildings were a church and school. Large warehouses stood just inside the river mouth.

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2. Facilities.

Artesian wells provided the town water supply, and the Carigara Army Cadre, population 200, had a pumping unit that produced a daily capacity of 5,000 gallons. Carigara Electric Co. had a diesel-driven light and power plant, 27 kw capacity, that supplied 220 volts AC. There were road connections with Tacloban via the Leyte Valley, with Ormoc via Capococan and Pinamopoan, and with Barugo via the coast. The road to Barugo and Capococan passed behind the town, about 400-600 yards from the beach. About 11 dirt streets crossed the intervening plain to the water front. There was an office on the island telegraph net. The Oriental Lumber and Sawmill Inc. operated a plant with a daily capacity of 2,000 board feet. A supply of sand and gravel can be obtained from Cabiuyongan River at an existing Bureau of Works screening plant, located at the point where the Carigara-Tacloban highway crosses the river.

Q. DAGAMI. (11°04'N, 124°54'E).

Dagami was a municipality seat situated on a branch of Binahaan River toward the center of the northeast plain, and inland from Tanauan on the east coast. Population of the municipality was 22,776, and of the town 3,189. There was a gravity water system south of town, and a branch of the Binahaan River was the intake for the Burauen-Dagami-Palo-Tanauan-Tacloban distribution system, completed early in 1940. It had a water capacity of 20 daily gallons per capita. There were good road connections on the main island routes. The town had a telegraph office on the island network.

R. DULAG. (10°57'N, 125°02'E).

Dulag is situated in open grass country about 1 mile from the east coast at Leyte Gulf and 8 miles south of Vigia Point, the west entrance to San Pedro Bay. It was an important hemp and copra shipping port. The municipality is reported to be under complete Japanese control. (See Section IV, I). Population of the municipality was 23,693, and of the town 4,861. There were 100 nipa houses, 10 wood, and 2 stone buildings. Of the latter, one was a large cathedral. Conspicuous from offshore were the iron roofs, the large stone church, and the chapel in the cemetery north of town. There was a road connection with Palo, Burauen, and Abuyog; and a telegraph office connected with the Leyte system. The water supply was pumped from wells. Construction of a wharf by the Japanese is reported. This is an adjunct to their program of airfield development in the area.

S. HINUNANGAN. (10°24'N, 125°12'E).

1. General.

Hinunangan, a small copra exporting town, is located on a wide open agricultural flat north of the Malaga River mouth, in Hinunangan Bay on the southeast coast of Leyte. Population of the municipality was 16,983 and of the town 1,972. There was one semi-stone, 20 wooden, and many nipa buildings. The old church is reportedly in disrepair. No information is available on the water supply.

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The Hinunangan office of the Leyte telegraph system marks the terminus of the line on the extreme southeast coast; from here the wire, following the island south coast, makes a complete loop around Leyte and ends at Abuyog on the coast just north of Hinunangan. The town was connected by road with Hinundayan, Anahawan, and Cabalian, with the route to Cabalian running close to the beach. Several miles north of town, near Calagitán River, Candionco Lumber Mill Inc. had a sawmill that produced 2,000 board feet daily. Lagoma Sawmill, 11½ miles north of Hinunangan and near the Lagona anchorage, had a daily output of 5,000 board feet. There are possible airfield sites in the Hinunangan area.

T. JARO. (11°11'N, 124°47'E).

Jaro was an inland municipality seat and important marketing center located south of Carigara in the northern part of Leyte. Municipal population was 23,914, and that of the town was 4,198. The municipality is reportedly under complete Japanese control. (See Section IV, I). Water was obtained from an artesian well. There was a telegraph office which appears to have been a junction for east and west coast lines which unite here and extend north to Carigara. The town had good road connections with the island system. In 1943, consolidation of guerrilla forces was accomplished here by Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon.

U. LA PAZ. (10°53'N, 124°57'E).

La Paz is a municipal seat south west of Dulag and at the end of a one-lane, season road that ran inland, and west from Mayorga on Route 1. Dug wells supplied water. The town was not on the telegraph line, and the nearest office appears to have been at Dulag. Population of the municipality was 12,970, and of the town 2,228. Northwest of the town is the supposed location of sulphur springs and fumaroles.

V. LEYTE. (11°23'N, 124°29'E).

The town of Leyte is located behind mangrove swamps at the head of Leyte Bay on the north shore of the island. It was accessible through the Palapay River, which is navigable for boats of 6 feet draught to the end of the town pier. Population of the municipality was 18,862 and of the town 1,269. The town consisted of 8 occupied blocks with 7 or 8 conspicuous galvanized iron roofed buildings, including the municipal building. Probably water was supplied by wells and mountain streams. There is no record of a water system. There was a telegraph, from which the island line branched west to San Isidro, northwest to Calubrian, and north to an underwater cable connection with Biliran Island. There were no constructed roads, although one had been proposed between Leyte and Pinamopoan. Within the town area, Leyte was connected to its pier by a raised road that traversed the mangrove swamp.

W. LILUAN. (10°9'N, 125°07'E). (Panaon Island).

Liloan was the principal barrio and port of Panaon Island. It was situated just south of Ilijan Point facing Panaon Strait on the northwest tip of the island. Motor vessels from Cebu called frequently for copra. Population

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was 1,067. There was a gravity water system, and water was pumped to the pier, a T-shaped structure in 17 feet of water. The telegraph office was apparently a junction for the line running to Pintuyan on the southern tip of the island; and for two underwater cable connections, one crossing Cabalian Bay to Cabalian on Leyte, and the other crossing Sogod Bay to Malitbog on Leyte. The radio station had an SCR 130 LW tube transmitter and a 15 watt capacity. There were no roads, but trails left the town on either side and skirted both coasts. Level terrain near the town was planted with coconuts.

X. MAASIN (10°08'N, 124°50'E).

1. General.

Maasin, a regular stop for coastal steamers, is a small town that shipped large quantities of hemp and copra. It is situated on a small plain, bearing many coconut trees, between Green Point and Amparo Point, on the south coast of Leyte. Population of the municipality was 29,264, and of the town, 4,861. Close to the pier, the beach was lined with fishermen's huts, and on the right side of the street leading inland from the pier was a concrete bodega (storehouse). A short distance to the left, on the first N/S cross street, was the post office, second largest building in town; it was 30 feet by 50 feet, 2 stories high, and built of old stucco. A block north, on the east side of the street, was a stone church, the strongest building; it was 75 feet by 150 feet by 200 feet, and had once been used as a fort. It is a landmark from the sea. About 3 blocks east of the pier was a school with large wooden dormitories.

2. Facilities.

In 1941 there was a gravity water system, supplied by 2 springs, and producing 72,000 gallons daily for 3,300 people. The electric power plant, privately owned and operated by Gil Garcia, had a 45 kw capacity. There was an office on the island system. The town also contained an ice plant. There was one hospital, Maasin Maternity House, with 4 beds. Road connections existed west and north with Baybay, and east and north with Sogod.

Y. MALITBOG (10°10'N, 125°00'E).

1. General.

Malitbog is situated on the west shore of Sogod Bay, 11 miles north of Taanacan Point. It is on a level area that extends inland for more than $\frac{1}{2}$ mile and is covered with coconuts, corn, and sugar cane. The single street extended inland from the pier, at the base of which was 1 stone, and 2 wood and galvanized iron warehouses. A large old Spanish residence, built entirely of stone, and a stone watchtower are nearby. A stone church, convent and school building were about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile inland. Constabulary barracks overlooked the town from hills on the west. Population of the municipality was 22,259 and of the town 1,752. Most of the inhabitants were farmers, fishermen, or laborers.

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2. Facilities.

Malitbog Army Cadre, population 200, was supplied with water by pumps which had a 5,000 gallon daily capacity. Water for washing was available from the Biliran and Taburan Rivers. The diesel-powered electric plant, owned and operated by Hijos de Escano, had a 45 kw capacity. There was a telegraph office, from which point connections were made by underwater cable to Liloan, Panaon Island, across Sogod Bay. The town was on the coastal road to Sogod and Maasin.

Z. MATALOM. (10°17'N, 124°47'E).

Matalom is located in an area of large coconut plantations on the southwest coast, and north of Green Point. Population of the municipality was 17,129, and of the town 1,435. Hills command the settlement, with mountain ridges to the south and east. There are 7 stone and 43 wooden buildings. Matalom Army Cadre Training Camp was located here. The water supply was pumped from a large spring. There was a telegraph office. The town was on the coastal road. Rivers in the locality need substantial bridges.

AA. MERIDA. (10°55'N, 124°32'E).

Merida is a small village on the west coast of Ormoc Bay, about 4 miles south of Port Bello. Population of the municipality was 26,794, and of the town 2,000. There is a concrete landing with a cargo shed for small boats. About 1/2 mile north, on the east side of Pangtail Point is the Hacienda Carlota, which had a pier with a 3-ton crane and 8-foot water depth. Farm sugar cane was shipped from here to Ormoc. Best means of transport was by sea. The town had an office on the Leyte telegraph system. Water was obtained from 2 artesian wells, each providing 2 gallons per minute by pumping. There was also a gravity system that produced 28,800 gallons daily and served 1000 people. Other water systems in the municipality were gravity operated and located in the following villages: Libas, 21,600 gallons daily for 600 people; Quiot, 28,800 gallons daily for 1,000 people; and Tolingon, 28,800 gallons daily for 800 people.

BB. NAVAL. (11°34'N, 124°23'E).

Naval was a small shipping port on the west coast of Biliran Island, 1 1/2 miles northwest of Saban Point. Motor vessels from Cebu called weekly for corn and copra. Anas River supplied ample fresh water, but it needed treatment for drinking purposes. A spring at Liko, 5 miles east, was one source of potable water. The remainder was probably obtained from dug wells. The town was on the Leyte telegraph system. A road has been surveyed over the mountains to Calibiran, on the east coast, and construction is reported to have started. Available in the Anas River bed are waterworn stones and small boulders seemingly suitable for crushing. There is no suitable supply of sand for concrete in the locality. A moderate amount of secondary growth timber is available in mountains to the east. An ample supply of skilled labor exists here.

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CC. ORMOC. (11°00'N, 124°36'E).

1. General.

Ormoc is the largest and most important commercial center in West Leyte, and prominent as a shipping port for sugar interests along Ormoc Bay as far as Albuera. Vessels from Cebu stopped almost daily. It was situated on the northeast section of Ormoc Bay, on a slope gradually ascending east. Informants state that the town area is subject to floods during the wet season. Several dykes were constructed behind the town and on the Antilao River bank in late 1934-35. Two streets, Real and Aviles, were of asphalt; others were of dirt and gravel. Most of the buildings in the business area were of concrete, with galvanized iron roofing. There were several 2 story buildings. The market was built on concrete piles and had a galvanized iron roof. The municipal buildings included a 2 story wooden building with a galvanized iron roof. Public buildings consisted of 3 schools, 1 yellow stone church, and a dispensary. The largest number of stores and warehouses was owned by Jesus F. Escano and Aboitez. The Ormoc Land Transportation Co. had a garage capable of accommodating 20 large buses in the west end of town. For names and locations of buildings, see Map 18, Town Plan of Ormoc.

2. Population and Government.

Population of the municipality was 77,349, and of the town 7,446. The largest non-Filipino element was a group of 204 Chinese. The town was divided into 4 districts: Cantobo, the area from the town proper to Cantobo Bridge over Antilao River; Sabagn, west of the pier in front of town; Kandalong, in the immediate vicinity of and to the east of the pier; and Kanajing, the eastern section. The municipality is reportedly under complete Japanese control. (See Section IV, I).

3. Vital Installations.

a. Water.

Potable water sources were the numerous artesian wells at many street corners in the town area. A plentiful supply of water for washing was drawn from the Antilao and Malbasag Rivers. Camp Downes, the Military Cadre southeast of town, had a pump unit that supplied 10,000 gallons daily for 200 people. Dolores Barrio had a gravity system, capacity 43,200 gallons daily, for a population of 500.

b. Electric Power.

The Ormoc Electric Light and Ice plant shared half a building with a concrete-walled bodega (storehouse), owned by Aboitez & Co., near the end of the pier. The Ormoc Electric Light Co. operated the plant, which supplied 220 volts AC and had a 64 kw capacity.

c. Ormoc had an office on the Leyte telegraph system.

d. The hospital, Ormoc Maternity House, had 4 beds.

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e. There was a concrete and pile pier with piped fresh water.

f. In addition to provincial highway links, the town was the focal point for numerous municipal roads.

4. Industries.

a. Ormoc Lumber Mill, on the far shore near the municipal building, and with a log pond in front of the mill. It had a capacity of 2,000 board feet daily.

b. Other sawmills in the municipality were Commonwealth Sawmill and Co. Ltd. at Naungan, 2 miles WNW, and with a daily capacity of 1,000 board feet; and Serafica Sawmill & Co. It. at Ionoy (Cananga), 12½ miles WNW of Ormoc, and with a daily capacity of 3,000 board feet.

c. The Rosario Sugar Mill, near Cantobo Bridge, had a daily capacity of 200 tons.

d. The Ormoc Sugar Co., at Ipil, had a daily capacity of 600 tons.

e. A few small cattle ranches were located in the valleys north of Ormoc.

DD. PALO. (11°10'N, 124°59'E).

1. General.

Palo is situated on the south side of Palo(Malirong) River, about a mile inland from the mouth. It was 7½ miles from Tacloban by Route 1, which, north east of town, crossed the river on a 3 span steel bridge with concrete piers. Population of the municipality was 23,471, and of the town 5,555. The municipality is reportedly under complete Japanese control. (See Section IV, 1). There were about 50 wooden and 350 nipa shacks; and there were several conspicuous structures: a large, part-stone Spanish church with 2 towers; a private 2 story residence (Alvarado's house); a municipal building; a garage; and 2 monuments. There was also an intermediate school and a Roman Catholic college. The more important streets were about 20 feet wide and of asphalt. Streets north and west of the central municipal building were San Roque St. and Ave. Acebedo. The provincial road passed east of the municipal building toward Tanauan, and branched west behind the building toward Carigara.

2. Facilities.

Water was obtained from wells and the river through a gravity system. The Palo Electric Light Plant Co., 64 kw and 220 volts DC, supplied power for industrial and other purposes. There was a telegraph office that was connected with the main island system. The Santo Nino Hospital, a General Hospital, had 6 beds. A large rock quarry, with mechanical crusher and screens, was ½ mile distant on the opposite side of the river, at Mt. Guinandang. The town was the center of the local ropemaking industry, and a distribution point for a large farming district. It was also an important road

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LEGEND

TOWN PLAN OF ORMOG

1. Power House and Ice Plant.
2. Light House.
3. Public Market.
4. Public Dispensary.
5. Municipal Building.
6. Church Building and Tower.
7. Sawmill (Ormoc Lumber Company)
8. Hotel
9. Yrsterza Residence.
10. Theater.
11. Abcitez Residence.
12. Church Plaza.
13. Torres Residence.
14. Abaca, copra and rice bodega (concrete).
15. Elementary School.
16. Domestic Science Building.
17. Athletic Field.
18. Rice Mill and Corn Granary (Chinese.)
19. Convent School - St. Peters' Institute.
20. Ormoc Institute - Private School.
21. Japanese Bazaars.
22. Chinese Business Area.
23. Chinese Bakery and Merchandise Store.
24. Town Mayor's Residence.
25. Camp Downes Water Supply Pump.
26. Escano Building.
27. Ormoc Land Transportation Co. Garage.
28. Abcitez & Co. Bodega.
29. Rosario Sugar Mill.
30. Alegria Bridge.
31. Cantobe Bridge.
32. Kanajing Bridge.

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junction, of the Leyte Valley inland and east shore road systems, both of which are reported to be good for motor transport. The river is reported to be navigable for barges as far as the town.

EE. PALOMPON. (11°03'N, 124°23'E).

1. General.

Palompon is situated 1½ miles southeast of Canaguayan Point on the northwest coast of Leyte Island. Second most important port on the west coast, it exported hemp, copra, and corn on motor vessels calling almost daily from Cebu. It had a limited, year-round deep water anchorage sheltered from all winds. Population of the municipality was 29,120 and of the town, 4,290. Estimates on the number of houses vary; one lists 326 and the other 400. There was a 2 story government building of concrete; a large stone church; and apparently from 200-300 houses, most of them 2 story wooden buildings.

2. Facilities.

There was a partially developed gravity water system, with a daily capacity of 144,000 gallons, and serving a population of 3,500. In 1935, the central light and power plant, owned and operated by Abolizo Co. Inc., was a 22 kw diesel apparatus, supplying 22 volts DC. A telegraph office, maintained by the Bureau of Posts, was located in the municipal building. At the base of the pier was a 1 story bodega (storehouse) of coral rock. It is safe to assume that numerous bodegas (storehouses) were available for storage, although definite information is lacking. Overland connections with the Ormoc-Carigara road, and a small seasonal coastal section, running north for 2 miles, were the only significant roads.

FF. PASTRANA. (11°08'N, 124°53'E).

Pastrana was situated in a narrow portion of Leyte Valley, midway between the coasts of Carigara Bay to the north and Leyte Gulf to the east. Population of the municipality was 8,078 and of the town, 1,271. It was connected with the main road network. There is no information on the water supply. The town was not on the telegraph line; the nearest telegraph offices were apparently at Dagami, to the south, and at Alangalang to the north.

GG. SAN ISIDRO. (11°27'N, 124°25'E).

San Isidro, a port of call for small coasting vessels, is a small town at the head of San Isidro Bay on the extreme northwest coast of Leyte. There were good municipal, church and school buildings. An L-shaped landing pier and red-roofed cargo shed nearby were located ½ mile southwest of town. Apparently there were no road connections, but a well-defined trail crossed the peninsula to Calubian on the west shore of Leyte Bay. The town had a telegraph office which seems to have been the northwest terminus of an extension of line from the junction at the town of Leyte. There was a very small normal water flow; no further data. The town was in an area of large plantations. Population of the municipality was 30,063, and of the town 7,200.

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HH. SAN MIGUEL (11°18'N, 124°50'E)

San Miguel was situated inland from the north coast. It was on the east side of the Sanpaniton River and on the highway approximately midway between Barugo to the northwest and Alangalang to the south. There is no information on water supply. The town was not on the island telegraph line; the nearest offices were at Barugo and Alangalang.

II. SANTA FE. (11°10'N, 124°55'E).

Santa Fe was an inland barrio on the Palo-Carigan road, 13.7 miles southwest of Tacloban. Muslog River (not shown on Coast and Geodetic Survey Maps) is to the southwest and a tributary stream is on the northwest. Population was 2,301. Buildings include a church, convent, school house and many smaller houses on each side of the provincial highway, which is the main street. Approaching from Palo, to the east, the church is on the left hand side of the road and the school opposite. The road to Pastrana turns southwest just before the school. The town is on the telegraph line, but the nearest office appears to have been at Alangalang to the northwest. Two streams, and possibly wells, provide water.

JJ. SOGOD (10°23'N, 125°18'E).

Sogod is situated on a small plain, 1½ by 2 miles in extent, at the head of Sogod Bay on the south coast of the island. Coastal vessels made 3 regular stops weekly for copra. Population of the municipality was 28,222, and of the town 2,291. The buildings consisted of a few stores, about 100 wooden, and about 400 nipa dwellings. Several structures had stone foundations, but none was built of durable materials. The water supply was obtained from dug wells and a spring, while rivers at the eastern and western ends of town provided ample washing water. The town was not on the telegraph line; the nearest office appears to have been at Malitbog to the south. It is reported that there was a radio station, but references apparently have not confirmed this. In 1938, a pier with a 30-foot depth at the end, was under construction. There were road connections with Masin on the southwest coast via Taanacan Point, and with Himayangan part way down the east coast of Sogod Bay.

KK. TANAUAN. (11°07'N, 125°01'E).

Tanauan is situated just south of the Binahaan River mouth, on the east coast of Leyte. Population of the municipality was 21,934, and of the town 5,241. The municipality is reportedly under Japanese control. (See Section IV, I). There were 50 wooden houses, several stone or concrete structures, and 400 nipa dwellings. Several dug wells furnished a daily water capacity of 1,000 gallons by gravity system. The Tanauan Electric Light Co. had a diesel-driven plant, 18kw capacity, furnishing 220 volts DC. There was a telegraph office on the island system. The Tanauan Maternity House contained 15 beds. The town was on the main road network.

LL. TOLOSA. (11°04'N, 125°02'E).

Tolosa is situated south of Tanauan, on Leyte north-

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east plain, on the east coast of the island. Population of the municipality was 6,660, and of the town, 1,633. The municipality is reportedly under complete Japanese control. (See Section IV, I). Except for a few 2 story masonry buildings, the dwellings are 1 and 2 story frame structures and nipa shacks. Industries were mainly fishing, farming and preparation of copra. The main streets were about 20 feet wide and paved with asphalt macadam. Water was obtained from shallow wells. The town was not on the island telegraph line; the nearest office appears to have been north at Tanauan. The coastal road ran through town.

M. VILLABA (11° 13' N, 124° 23' E).

Villaba is a small town on the northwest coast, approximately midway between Rabin and Apali Points. It was a regular stop for coastal vessels from Cebu. The settlement is hemmed in by semi-mountainous terrain to the east. Population of the municipality was 16,823, and of the town, 3,262. The Japanese have been observed using Silad Bay, a coastal indentation to the north; several transports, a supply ship, destroyer and launches were reported here in May 1943. There were about 102 nipa houses. There was a telegraph office, an apparent terminus for a branch line running to this part of the coast. A gravity water system, with a 36,000 gallon daily capacity, served 1,700 people. There were no large road links. A rock causeway, $\frac{1}{2}$ mile southwest of town, had a 5-foot depth at the end. The Manila Rock and Asphalt Co.'s wooden wharf was located $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south on the coast. A good quality asphalt deposit here was originally estimated as having 2,000,000 tons. Its suitability for use in airfield and road construction has been proved.

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III. ROADS

A. GENERAL

Geographically, the roads on Leyte are divided as follows:

1. Northern Road Net

The northern road net, designed to transport the produce of the inland agricultural regions to the port of Tacloban. This highway system can be easily expanded for military purposes, with a wealth of construction material available. Generally, the northern portion includes the road running from Guintiguian on the northeast coast south to Abuyog, midway on the east coast; and several branch routes inland that converge at Carigara on the north coast.

2. Southern Coastal Road Net

The southern coastal road net, designed to link the narrow coastal plains when water movement was impossible. This was a narrow, circuitous route which presented many maintenance problems. Lack of objective should greatly limit the amount of time spent on improving this system; it would require much heavy construction equipment and considerable effort. Generally, the southern portion includes the road running from Baybay, midway on the west coast, south and around Sogod Bay to Hinayangan, the terminus.

3. Southeastern Section

An isolated section that extends around the southeast corner of the island, from Himatagon on Cabalian Bay to Tanawan on Hinunangan Bay, a distance of about 31 miles. It is a one-lane, seasonal highway.

4. North-South Highway Link

The links between the northern and southern systems, a winding road that crosses the island west from Abuyog, proceeding through mountains and large timber forests to Baybay, midway on the west coast; and a long narrow road, running north from Baybay through Ormoc to Carigara Bay on the north coast.

5. Biliran Island Roads

On Biliran Island, there is no evidence of any work having been started on proposed routes around and across the island. There are several plantation tracks over which vehicles could travel for short distances around the towns of Naval, Biliran and Calbiran.

6. Panaon Island Roads

On Panaon Island, there is no evidence of any road construction. There is said to be about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles of trail over which motor transport might travel from the town of Polo to Bolobolo Point around the south coast.

B. TACLOBAN TO GUINTIGUIAN (on Route 1)

Guintiguian is on the northeastern tip of Leyte, and on the tip of a riverlike channel that separates Bacol Island from the mainland. The road extends here, although the Coast & Geodetic Survey Map: Leyte 1:200,000 (1937) shows that it ends at Uban directly south and on the coast. Route 1 is said to be a one-lane, all-weather road here, leaves Tacloban in a northwesterly direction, and at .6 mile reaches Quarry Road Junction, where

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1. A branch turns south for about $\frac{1}{4}$ mile, past Chinese cemetery, to a large quarry with crusher and mechanical screens.

Continuing, the road crosses a bridge at 1 mile north, and commences a course that is from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile inland from San Juanico Strait, and with mangrove-covered lowlands to the west and forested hills to the east of the road. At 3.7 miles north of Tacloban, Rigbaw River is crossed on a bridge 100 feet by 10 by 8 feet. This is a muddy tidal, unfordable stream with steep banks. Beyond, at 4.4 miles, there is a bridge across Dilit River, 100 by 10 by 8 feet. This is also an unfordable, muddy tidal stream with steep banks. 10.6 miles from Tacloban is Bagahupi Road Junction, where

1. A one-lane seasonal road is said to run northwest to Babatngon, 14.3 miles from the junction, and situated on the north coast near the west entrance to San Juanico Strait.

Continuing north, Route 1 passes through the barrio of Uban at 13 miles, and reaches Guintiguian, 14.6 miles north of Tacloban. From Guintiguian, a barrio on the northeast corner of the island, there is a vehicle ferry that crosses San Juanico Strait to La Paz, Samar Island.

0. TACLOBAN TO HIMAYANGAN (on Route 1)

Leaving Tacloban and starting southward, Route 1 is a 2-lane all-weather road with asphalt surfacing completed in 1939. It follows the western shore of Canabato Bay to a point about 2.7 miles south, where

1. A one-lane, all-weather branch goes east through San Jose to Catnisan Point airfield.

From here, Route 1 heads southwest through the wide Tacloban Valley with patches of coconuts and open cultivation. All bridges in this section are said to be concrete, with nearest bridge timber some 3 miles west. At 7. miles, the route passes Mt. Guinandang Quarry, with mechanical crusher and screens north of the road. Beyond, the highway winds down a side cut area where road blocks could be easily effected. Crossing Malirong River, 7.3 miles, on a one-way steel span bridge on concrete piers, the route enters Palo, 7.5 miles, a town located at the junction of Tacloban Valley and the wide Layte Valley. Route 2 runs northwest from here.

1. There is an unconfirmed branch running southwest, 3.1 miles, to Cavite.

The black top surfacing ends at Palo, and Route 1 becomes one-lane, all-weather with a 16 foot wide base. The section south of here is said to be an excellent highway on which two buses can pass without leaving the surface. It may prove to be 4-lane for military purposes, but until more information can be obtained concerning its capacity, it should be rated as one-lane all-weather. The road runs from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile inland from the coast through terrain similar to that north of Palo. At 11.7 miles, the road crosses Binahuan River on an old stone slab (Roman arch) bridge, said to have been in doubtful condition in 1939. This bridge may have been replaced, but the river is fordable in dry weather. At Tanauan, 12.3 miles

1. From Tanauan, there is a branch inland to Dagami, from which a road runs northward to an intersection with Route 2, and another road runs southward through Burauen to Dulag on the coast. The bulk of traffic to the south follows this route although it added some 6.8 miles to the distance between Tanauan and Dulag. It is described as an excellent route.

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by motor traffic in dry weather. At Kuyaga, 37.3 miles south of Tacloban.

1. A one-lane seasonal branch goes west for 3 miles to La Paz. Route 1 continues south through level, coconut areas, crossing bridges over many small streams. At Bito, 19.7 miles.

1. There is an unconfirmed, one-lane season branch west.

At 51.6 miles, the route reaches Abuyog, a municipality near the mouth of Cadacan River. From Abuyog turns in and on one of the designated links with the southern coast road system, and starts across the island. This section is one-lane all weather, and it winds and climbs into a heavily forested mountain area. Grades are said seldom to exceed 6%. There are many good road block and ambush areas. Bridges are mostly of short wood with the exception of Pangasinan River bridge, 73.1 miles from Tacloban, and consisting of one 240 foot steel span on concrete piers. At 80.1 miles from Tacloban, Route 1 reaches a junction on the west coast of Leyte at Baybay.

1. The southern end of Route 2, previously designated as a link between the north and south road systems, starts here and runs north via Ormoc to Carigara.

From this point, Route 1, one-lane all-weather, turns southward along the coast, crossing many small streams and passing through many small fishing villages. Generally, the road runs through a fringe of coconuts on a narrow coastal plain. At 96.3 miles from Tacloban, it passes through Inopacan, and, at 110.6 miles, reaches Bato, where

1. A one-lane seasonal road branches east to Kandoang.

South of Bato, the road passes rocky side-cuts, said to be an excellent road block or ambush area. From here, the road runs south through Matalan, Maasin, around Tannan Point, up Segod Bay, then south again to its end at Himayangan, 194.5 miles from Tacloban.

D. HIMATAGON TO TANAWAY (on Route 1A)

Starting at Himatagon, in Cabalian Bay, Route 1A runs around the southeast corner of Leyte to Tanawan on the east coast, a distance of 31 miles. There is no confirmation of work done on a proposed link along the west shore of Cabalian Bay to Route 1, a distance of about 8 miles. From Hinundayan, south of Hinunangan, (not confirmed by informants), the US Army Map Service, (103995) 1943, records a 2nd class, one-lane season road running northwest inland across several large streams.

E. PALO TO BAYBAY (on Route 2)

Starting at Palo, the junction point with Route 1 on the east coast of Leyte, Route 2, a one-lane all-weather strip 12 feet wide, follows the northeastern edge of the wide Leyte Valley, into which many trails are supposed to lead. The road runs westward over a generally level area, with only occasional patches of light timber, bamboo or abaca for cover. At a point 13.7 miles from Tacloban (6.2 miles from Palo), the road reaches Santa Fe, where,

1. A one-lane, all-weather branch runs 4 miles southwest to Pastrana, from where a one-lane seasonal branch goes south for 5 miles to Dagami.

From here there is a direct connection to the east with Tinawan on Route 1, and another connection via Burauen with Dulag on Route 1. Another branch runs northwest from Pastrana to Jaro, a distance of 8½ miles. This completes an important inland link from Carigara to Dulag along the west and central part of Leyte Valley.

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From Tanauan, Route 1, one-lane all-weather, follows a winding course south. It is not as good as the inland branch detour. It crosses bridges, said to be of wood, and frequently runs through a fringe of coconuts, with patches of abaca and corn or camote cultivation. About 2 miles south of Tanauan, or 14.6 miles south of Tacloban, the route passes a side-cut in rock, said to be a good road block or ambush area. Throughout the wide Leyte Valley area to the west and northwest are said to be numerous unsurfaced roads and trails suitable for jeeps, connecting small farming communities. At 31.7 miles, the road reaches Dulag, where

1. The above-mentioned side route runs west toward Burauan. Leaving Dulag, Route 1 is said to be one-lane all-weather, but with a better surface than that north of Dulag. It runs generally about one mile from the coast through a fringe of coconuts, but with frequent areas of rice paddies or swampy land, especially on the coast side, where it would be impossible to drive off the highway. Many large streams are crossed, and most of them are said to be sandy with low banks and fordable

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by motor traffic in dry weather. At Mayuga, 37.3 miles south of Tacloban.

1. A one-lane seasonal branch goes west for 3 miles to La Paz.

Route 1 continues south through level, coconut areas, crossing bridges over many small streams. At Bito, 19.7 miles.

1. There is an unconfirmed, one-lane season branch west.

At 51.6 miles, the route reaches Abuyog, a municipality near the mouth of Cadzuan River. From Abuyog turns in and on one of the designated links with the southern coast road system, and starts across the island. This section is one-lane all weather, and it winds and climbs into a heavily forested mountain area. Grades are said seldom to exceed 6%. There are many good road block and ambush areas. Bridges are mostly of short wood with the exception of Pangasinan River bridge, 73.2 miles from Tacloban, and consisting of one 240 foot steel span on concrete piers. At 80.1 miles from Tacloban, Route 1 reaches a junction on the west coast of Leyte at Baybay.

1. The southern end of Route 2, previously designated as a link between the north and south road systems, starts here and runs north via Ormoc to Carigara.

From this point, Route 1, one-lane all-weather, turns southward along the coast, crossing many small streams and passing through many small fishing villages. Generally, the road runs through a fringe of coconuts on a narrow coastal plain. At 96.3 miles from Tacloban, it passes through Inopacan, and, at 110.6 miles, reaches Bato, where

1. A one-lane seasonal road branches east to Kandoang.

South of Bato, the road passes rocky side-cuts, said to be an excellent road block or ambush area. From here, the road runs south through Matalan, Masin, around Tancian Point, up Segod Bay, then south again to its end at Hinayangan, 194.5 miles from Tacloban.

D. HIMATAGON TO TANAWAN (on Route 1A)

Starting at Himatagon, in Cabalian Bay, Route 1A runs around the southeast corner of Leyte to Tanawan on the east coast, a distance of 31 miles. There is no confirmation of work done on a proposed link along the west shore of Cabalian Bay to Route 1, a distance of about 8 miles. From Hinundayan, south of Hinunangan, (not confirmed by informants), the US Army Map Service, (103995) 1943, records a 2nd class, one-lane season road running northwest inland across several large streams.

E. PALO TO BAYBAY (on Route 2)

Starting at Palo, the junction point with Route 1 on the east coast of Leyte, Route 2, a one-lane all-weather strip 12 feet wide, follows the northeastern edge of the wide Loyte Valley, into which many trails are supposed to lead. The road runs westward over a generally level area, with only occasional patches of light timber, bamboo or abaca for cover. At a point 13.7 miles from Tacloban (6.2 miles from Palo), the road reaches Santa Fe, where,

1. A one-lane, all-weather branch runs 4 miles southwest to Pastrana, from where a one-lane seasonal branch goes south for 5 miles to Dagami.

From here there is a direct connection to the east with Tinaan on Route 1, and another connection via Burauen with Dulag on Route 1. Another branch runs northwest from Pastrana to Jaro, a distance of 8 1/2 miles. This completes an important inland link from Carigara to Dulag along the west and central part of Loyte Valley.

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To the northwest, 22.4 miles from Tacloban, there is an important junction, where,

1. A one-lane all-weather branch goes southwest along the Mainit River to Jaro, from which the road continues to the northwest and rejoins Route 2 at Carigara.
2. From Jaro, there are also several unconfirmed unsurfaced roads connecting lowlands east to mountain areas west.

From the junction, Route 2 turns north and continues to San Miguel, where it abruptly turns west to Barugo on Carigara Bay. From here westward along the coast, the road becomes a one-lane seasonal stretch that was only opened since 1939. It follows a wide river valley. At 43.5 miles from Tacloban, Carigara, at the head of the bay is reached. This is a junction point for the road connecting from Jaro. Beyond, at Finafapaon, Route 2 turns abruptly from the coast and goes southward. It is one-lane seasonal type for the first 18 miles. It climbs and winds over a coastal range about 800 feet high, then dips to a rolling clay soil inland plateau. Many good road block and ambush areas occur on the side-cuts over this coastal range. At Libengao, 70.2 miles from Tacloban,

1. An important one-lane seasonal branch runs about 15½ miles southwest to Palompon, an important port, and thence northward along the coast for about 3 miles to Sabang.

Continuing, Route 2 is one-lane, all-weather, and said to be asphalt-surfaced beyond Valencia, 74.6 miles from Tacloban. From here, the road runs through patches of rice and sugar cane, with frequent clumps of bamboo or small trees near the sides. At 76.4 miles is a site cut in a steep rocky spur, a possible road block area. At 80.2 miles, in the barrier of Simangan,

1. There is a one-lane, all-weather branch northeast through Delores to Fajlecson, 2.4 miles, from where a good trail leads north into heavily forested mountains.

Beyond to the south, at 83.3 miles from Tacloban,

1. A one-lane, seasonal branch goes west to Jalubon, 2.8 miles, where the road forks, with one branch leading north to Liloan and the other branch continuing west and south through Margen to Fort Belle on the coast of Ormoc Bay.

From here, Route 2 continues south through Ceyon de Paz, then descends gently past Ormoc Sugar Mill, crosses Antilao River, and reaches Ormoc, a municipal port on Ormoc Bay, 85.1 miles from Tacloban.

1. From Ormoc, a branch road goes west along the coast and through a swampy area to Naungan.

Continuing south from Ormoc, Route 2 is one-lane, all-weather, and is said to have a black-top surface as far as Camp Downes, at 86.4 miles, a large Philippine army training camp. Beyond this point, Route 2 is one-lane seasonal, and is said to have a 9 ft wide gravel or coral surface with 3 ft shoulders. It runs through Ipil at 88.9 miles, and Albuera at 95.7 miles. Immediately south of here, there is said to be some narrow, one-way, side cuts. Below the barrier of Damulan, at 100 miles, Route 2 has only recently been completed, but all streams are said to be bridged or fordable in all except severe storms. At 116.8 miles from Tacloban, Route 2 reaches Baybay, an important junction point, where Route 1, coming across the island from the east coast, turns sharply southward into the southern coastal road system.

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F. TIBUR TO SILAD (on Route 2A)

This is a small isolated section of one-lane seasonal road on the northwest coast. From Tibur, it runs northward along the coast for about 3½ miles to Villaba, from where it continues up the coast for about 1 mile to Silad. Its main significance is the transport facilities connected with a large asphalt deposit near Baliti, 1.9 miles south of Villaba. Here a short branch road connects the open cuts with a small weed jetty with dump bucket rig for loading barges.

G. TALID TO BUSAY (on Route 2B)

This is also a small isolated section of road, a one-lane seasonal strip that runs northwest for about 2 miles to the municipal port of San Isidro, on the northwest coast of the island. From here, it continues northward about 1 mile to Busay. An old carabao sled trail continues eastwards to Santa Cruz, but it is unsuitable for motor transport.

H. SANTA CRUZ TO GUTUSAN (on Route 2C)

This is a small isolated stretch that runs northeast from Santa Cruz to Calubian, a port on Biliran Strait, and about 1 mile distant. From here, a very doubtful stretch continues southeast along the coast for 1 mile to Gutusan.

I. LEYTE TO A LANDING ON LEYTE BAY (on Route 2D)

This tiny stretch at Leyte, on Leyte Bay on the north coast of the island, is more of a town road than a highway. (See Leyte, Towns and Villages) References indicate that it is a good coral-surfaced road that is said to have been completed from Leyte westward for about 1 mile to a landing on Leyte Bay.

J. ROAD BLOCKS

The following possible road blocks are intended as a suggested means of controlling traffic from one settlement area to another. They are mainly based on pre-war information, and, therefore, may be affected by changes instituted by the Japanese, especially in the development of native trails. Primarily, only roads capable of supporting motor traffic are considered, although several tracks at apparent vital points are listed.

1. At Tacloban

a. On the western bank of Manzanabanon River, just beyond the bridge crossing from the town, and at a point on Route 1 where a trail branches west and a track branches north toward Anibang Point.

b. At a junction, 2.7 miles south of town, where a road branches east from Route 1 to San Jose and an airstrip on Cataisan Point.

2. Between Tacloban and Guintiguian (on Route 1)

a. At Bagahupi Road Junction, 10.6 miles north of Tacloban. This would control traffic coming south from Guintiguian and southeast from Babatngon on the north coast.

b. At the ferry vehicle wharf in Guintiguian, 14.6 miles north of Tacloban.

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3. Between Tacloban and Himayangan (on Route 1).

a. Palo

- (1) At a point on the north bank of the Palo River, just east of the quarry. This is about 7.3 miles south of Tacloban and just across the river from the town of Palo.
- (2) At a point on the southwest outskirts of Palo, on an unconfirmed branch running 3.1 miles southwest to Cavite.
- (3) Northwest of Palo, on the beginning of Route 2.
- (4) South of Palo, on Route 1 at the San Joaquin River Bridge.

b. Tanauan.

- (1) At the Binasaan River Bridge, 11.7 miles south of Tacloban on Route 1, and north of Tanauan.
- (2) Southwest of Tanauan, on a branch inland to Dagami.
 - (a) At Dagami, at the junction of roads north to Pastrana and south to Burauen.
- (3) At a point 2 miles south of Tanauan, or 14.6 miles south of Tacloban, where Route 1 is a side-cut in rock, said to be a good road block or ambush area.

c. Dulag.

- (1) At the Dulag junction, 31.7 miles south of Tacloban, where a side route turns west toward Burauen.

d. South of Dulag, at Mayorga, 37.3 miles from Tacloban, and from where a branch goes inland to La Paz.

e. At one of several points on Route 1, inland and west of Abuyog, which is 51.6 miles from Tacloban. References state that this entire route across the island has many good road block areas. There is a bridge spanning Pongan River, west of Abuyog. Still farther west is a bridge over Nalibunan River. In addition, there are grades bordered by heavy fire forest along most of this route.

f. Baybay.

- (1) At the Baybay junction, 73.4 miles from Tacloban, and just south of Baybay.
- (2) At the Pagbangan (Pagbangan) River bridge, 0.3 miles north of Baybay on Route 2.

g. Bato.

At Bato on Route 1 south of Baybay, and 110.6 miles from Tacloban. A seasonal road branches east here to

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Kandoeng. From Bato around the coast to the road's end at Hinayangnan, there are no known branch roads. A block at, or near, the villages of Matalon, Maasin, Burgos, Sojed or Hinayangnan would apparently isolate any part of the section desired. Possibly a block should be considered at Hinayangnan on the southeastern tip of Sojed Bay, where Route 1 ends.

4. Between Himatagon and Tanawan.

The road from Himatagon to Tanawan is an isolated stretch running along the coast of the southeastern tip of the island. A block at, or near, the villages of Himatagon, Cabalian, Anahawan, Hinundayan, Hinunangan, or Tanawan would apparently isolate any desired section of the road. Highway 1A has been completed north from Hinunangan to Tanawan which is on the southeast coast of Leyte directly north of Hinunangan and west of the tip of Cabagan Grande Island. Early maps do not indicate this.

a. Himatagon.

Possibly a block might be considered at Himatagon, on the southern end, from where a track runs southwestward across the peninsula to Hinayangnan at the end of Route 1. From Hinundayan, an unconfirmed branch purportedly runs northwest inland. From Kanipaen, near the northern extremity of Route 1A, a track runs north along the coast to Abuyog.

4. Between Palo and Baybay (on Route 2).

a. At the Santa Fe Junction. This junction is 6.2 miles west of Palo and 13.7 miles from Tacloban, on Route 2.

(1) Inland on this branch road at Pastrana, at a junction where roads run west to Jaro and south to Dagani.

b. At the Mainit River Junction. This junction is 22.4 miles from Tacloban or 14.9 miles west of Palo, where a branch goes south west to Jaro. A possible block is,

(1) Inland on this branch road at Jaro, from where a road goes northwest to Carigara and another road goes southeast to Pastrana.

c. Barugo.

If there is need to isolate the town of Barugo on Carigara Bay, the following two blocks are possible:

(1) east of town on Route 2.

(2) at the river bridge on the western outskirts of town, on Route 2.

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d. At Carigara.

Carigara is at the western junction of the branch route through Jaro, 43.5 miles from Tacloban. Possible blocks are:

- (1) About a mile east of town on Route 2.
- (2) Beyond the southeastern outskirts of town on the branch road to Jaro.
- (3) At the river bridge on Route 2, on the western outskirts of town.

e. Between Pinamopon and Libongao

Between Pinamopon on Carigara Bay and Libongao, 18 miles inland, many good road block areas occur on the side-cuts over the coastal range. A block here would separate the coast from Libongao inland.

f. Libongao Junction

At the Libongao Junction, 70.2 miles from Tacloban, where an important branch starts southwest toward Palompon.

g. At Palompon

On the island west coast at the northern outskirts of Palompon, 15½ miles from Libongao. A block here would cut off traffic from Sabang, 3 miles up the coast.

h. At Simangan

At a junction in Simangan, 80.2 miles from Tacloban, where a road leads north into heavily forested mountains.

i. At Ormoc

At a point on Route 2, 2 miles north of Ormoc, and just north of Cogon de Paz, where a branch goes west to Jalubon. Other possible blocks are:

- (1) At Jalubon, 2.8 miles from the intersection with Route 2. There is a junction here where a road goes north to Liluan, and a road goes southwest to Port Bello on Ormoc Bay.
- (2) Beyond the Anilao River Bridge on Route 2, in the northwestern outskirts of town. The river is fordable south of the bridge here.
- (3) Beyond the Anilao River foot-bridge, at a point well back from the river bank (river fordable here), on the road running west to Naungan.
- (4) At a junction on Route 2, southeast of town and across the Malbasag River. At this point, a branch leaves Route 2 for the bay shore.

j. South of Ormoc on Route 2, a block could be used at any point to isolate the towns of Albueria, Darulaan or Hilapnitan. Possibly a block might be considered 1.3 miles south of Ormoc on Route 2 at Camp Downes, a large Philippine Army and constabulary training camp.

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6. Between Tibur and Silad (on Route 2A).

a. Villaba.

Blocks at either entrance to Villaba, the main settlement, would control traffic on this isolated route, although a block might be considered 1.9 miles to the south at Daliti where there is a small weed jetty for barges.

7. Between Palid and Busay (on Route 2B)

a. San Isidoro & Busay

Apparently blocks at the village of San Isidoro, a port would control this very small isolated stretch near the northwestern tip of the island. At Busay, on the road's northern terminus, a trail starts across the northwestern peninsula to Santa Cruz. A block might be considered here,

8. Between Santa Cruz and Gutusan (on Route 2C)

a. Santa Cruz

At Santa Cruz, a block might be considered to block a trail southwestward to Busay and San Isidoro.

b. Calubian

Blocks on either side of Calubian, a port on Biliran Strait, would apparently control all other traffic on this very short stretch of road.

c. Gutusan

At Gutusan, eastern terminus of this route, a block might be considered at the entrance to a trail that pursues a tortuous inland route to Pinamopan and Route 2 on Carigara Bay.

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IV. POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT

A. GENERAL

1. According to the 1939 Census of the Philippines there were 915,853 persons on Leyte, 48,934 on Biliran, 5,433 on Maripipi, and 27,786 on Panaon Islands. Population increase is reported to be 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ % per year, which would give a 1944 total for the entire province of approximately 1,125,000. Of this total yellow, white, and mixed races constituted slightly more than one-half of 1%.

B. EUROPEANS

1. In 1939 there were 56 Americans among the 197 Europeans in Leyte Province. Almost one-third of them were students, and the others worked in agriculture, mining, or other industries. A number of these Americans probably evacuated prior to the war, and others have been reported hiding on the island or with the guerrillas. Those who stayed in areas occupied by the Japanese have all been interned.

2. There were 40 Spanish nationals in the province in 1939. Seven of them were students, and the remainder were engaged in retail trade, the sugar industry, or agricultural pursuits. Regarding Spaniards in general it is reported that in 1940 there were many rumors of fifth column activity among the Spanish in Manila and the Visayan Islands. Agents of the Falange, the Spanish fascist party, were reported to have been organizing Filipino units and disseminating Axis propaganda. When the war came, the Spanish, siding entirely with the Japanese, threw open their homes and gave them the greatest welcome. Nevertheless, the Japanese did not seem to trust them. The Spanish were not interned, but their business activity was curtailed and they were given no voice in their affairs. The present Filipino attitude toward the Spanish is one of intense hatred, and there have been several assassinations.

There is no information on Falangist activities, nor are there specific data on collaboration by the Spanish on Leyte.

3. Other Europeans included 20 Germans and 81 British, French, etc. The Germans were mostly pharmacists and druggists. There is no information on their activities after Japanese occupation. The 81 persons of other nationalities were engaged mostly in professional services and water transportation.

C. ASIATICS

1. There were 2,076 Chinese in the province in 1939. Half of those were engaged in retail trade - mostly store owners, bazaar or sari-sari owners, or store clerks. Chinese controlled 80% of the pre-war retail trade in the Philippines; and although their relations with the Filipinos were close, pure Chinese were regarded as aliens. On the other hand, descendants from a Chinese and Filipino marriage, Mestizos, are considered Filipinos.

2. Pre-war Japanese influence was slight. There were 73 of them, divided into 20 fishermen, 19 traders, and 34 engaged in farming or manufacturing.

D. MESTIZOS

1. Mestizos in Leyte numbered approximately 12,000 in 1939. Throughout the Philippines this group is the most powerful politically and included such persons as the late Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. The two main combinations are of Spanish and Chinese mixtures with the native Filipinos. Mestizos are the most prosperous, best educated, and highly influential among the other peoples.

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E. VISAYANS

1. Visayans, who constitute the majority of inhabitants of the central and southern Philippines, numbered 912,488 in Leyte Province in 1939. These people are predominantly Christian in religion, mixing a long background of Spanish Catholicism with a surface of American Protestantism. They are reported to be usually placid, kind, and tolerant of foreign and American persons or attitudes. It is estimated that 41.9% of the population over ten years of age was able to read and write at the time of the census. The Visayan Filipino is primarily an agriculturist. However, he is said to be an able and willing worker and sympathetic to the Allied cause. There are estimated to be 250,000 unskilled and a few semi-skilled persons of working age available for general use in the Leyte area.

2. There are two Bisayan (Visayan) dialects common in Leyte. These are Cebu Bisaya and Samar-Leyte Bisaya. The former was the most important and was spoken by 556,839 people or more than 60% of the population in 1939. The east, south, and southeast parts of the province have adopted this dialect. Samar-Leyte Bisaya is the second important dialect. It was spoken by 357,110 people or nearly 40% of the population. Most of these people lived in the area north of a line drawn diagonally across the island from Rabin Point in the northwest to Amagusan Point in the southeast. Panay Bisaya, or Hiligaynon, is a minor dialect spoken by only 567 persons, almost half of whom lived on the shores of Cabalian Bay, southeast Leyte. English and Spanish were spoken by 20 and 1% of the population respectively. Tagalog was relatively unimportant. In 1939 only 1% of the provincial population spoke it. However, both Tagalog and Japanese have been made official languages under the Japanese administration. Tagalog may be more common at the present time in areas under Japanese control.

F. GEOGRAPHICAL LIST OF PERSONALITIES

1. The following is a geographical list of persons of all racial classes who have been identified in Leyte Province, with the exception of loyal of puppet officials and guerrillas, who are included in the sections on government, paragraphs H and I below. Information on the list has been set out as received by this office. Its reliability is uncertain, and it may reflect the informant's personal bias, opinion, political ambition, etc. It should be used as a guide and be supplemented by investigation before definitive action is taken.

2. Believed loyal

a. Unspecified location

BABCOCK, Orville A. : Was Superintendent of Schools in Leyte for many years. In fall of 43 was the only American living at unspecified location in the hills.

BOWLER, William

An American mestizo from Cebu City who helped American evacuees in Baybay, Leyte, in May 42. In spring of 44 acting as intelligence agent for Col. FERTIG. Has many contacts among influential people and is able to obtain good information.

CABAJUG, M.

50 years, 5'8", 160 lbs., former Governor of Cebu and Judge of the Court of First Instance in Negros Oriental. Experienced official with excellent record and character. Fled to Leyte when Japs came and has stayed there. Can be used for post war reconstruction.

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CARMONY

Pre-War Representative in Leyte. Maintains passive attitude and has little prestige. Evacuated to Maripipi Island.

CHAVARRIA, Jeso

District Engineer in Lanao. Native of Mindoro. Fled to Leyte at time of Jap invasion.

CUENCO, Jeso M.

Brother of loyal Congressman CUENCO, Miguel. Reported to be with his brother in Leyte, Nov 43.

MACASA, Jesus

Spaniard from Cebu City; met American evacuees at Baybay, Leyte, in May 42 and helped them.

TAYLOR, Ed (?)

Was manager of cement plant at Naga, Cebu. Would not permit demolition of plant. Believed to be on Leyte as of Apr 44.

VELOSO, Domingo

Political rival of Dominador TAN, Assistant Director of Kalibapi in Manila. Actively helps guerrillas on Leyte.

b. Burauen

SALAZAR, Inez

Captured by Japs at Burauen. One report states she is obliged to live with a Jap soldier; another is that she is the wife of a Jap officer and has a child.

c. Leyte

DY, Tiaou Seng

Chinese of Leyte, Leyte. He and his wife have aided guerrillas and American evacuees. Have managed to retain some property and may be envied by Filipinos.

GRANADOS, Enrique

Mayer of Leyte, Leyte. Related by marriage to PASONCUI.

GRANADOS, Luis

Former Chief of Police in Leyte, Leyte. Reported to work for PASONCUI as guerrilla intelligence agent.

d. Maasin

DENETERIO, Bernardino

Son of loyal Governor; was residing at Maasin in Oct 43.

JONES, Leroy A.

Member of old 11th Infantry Association. At Maasin in Apr 43. Friend of F. W. SEEFELT. Has lived in Philippines for over 40 years.

PETERS, Mrs. Hans

Living at Maasin in Jun 43.

SALVADOR, Lucas

At Maasin in Apr 43.

SEEFELT, F. W.

Major, USA (evidently retired). Member of old 11th Infantry Association, 1898-1902. Residing at Maasin, Nov 43. A friend of Leroy A. JONES.

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- e. Malitbog
- ESCANO Wealthy Spanish mestizo from Cebu. Formerly of Cebu Electric Company and a steamship company. Reported spring 44 living with his family near Malitbog. Has helped guerrillas and Americans.
- f. Ormoc
- IBALLAROSA Rev. IBALLAROSA and wife reported in Ormoc under the Japs in Oct 43.
- g. San Isidro
- BALLORIA, Fortunatu Is reported a trustworthy resident of San Isidro. Took care of group of Americans for more than a year, moving them from place to place as their safety demanded.
- BALLORIA, Nicolas Nephew of Fortunatu BALLORIA. Reportedly trustworthy, lives at San Isidro.
- h. Tacloban
- FREI, Ernest J. Swiss; possibly still Swiss citizen; American Presbyterian missionary at Tacloban. He and his wife and daughters, Elizabeth and Jean, were in Tacloban under the Japs in 43. Had very little food. Evacuee reports in Apr 44 that they are probably now all interned in Manila.

3. Other Categories

a. Unspecified locations

- ALA, Teofilo Reported to have acted as guide in Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in the spring of 43.
- CAING, Eleuterio, Capt. Reported pro-Jap on Leyte Jun 43.
- CORMERO, Baltazar Reported Jap guide on Leyte
- CORMERO, Melchor Reported Jap guide on Leyte.
- ENRIQUEZ, Antonio Reported to have acted as Jap guide on Leyte.
- ENRIQUEZ, Cirinco Reported to have acted as Jap guide on Leyte.
- ERANDIO, Fermin Reported to have acted as guide in Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in the spring of 43.
- GONZALES, Eustaquio Reported to be working for Japs on Leyte in Jun 43.
- LUMBRE 42 years, 5'5", 145 lbs., black hair, brown eyes, 2" scar on face, former photographer in Puerto Princesa,

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LUMBRE
(continued)

Palawan. Lived in Cuyo May 42. Met Japs when they landed on Cuyo in May 42 and offered full cooperation. Served them as guide, gave full information pertaining to American soldiers in Cuyo, identified captured Americans and named other Americans still on the island, whom he asked the Japs to round up. Reportedly showed photos of said Americans to prove their presence on Cuyo and said photos were taken without knowledge of the men. Subject was aided by Mayor Pedro Ponce de LEON to escape and is believed to be hiding on Leyte Island with his parents.

MARAYO, Tallo

Reported to have acted as guide for Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte. Is former Police Chief of San MIGUEL.

PACHECO, Juan
REYES, Francisco
RONSON, Felix

Reported Jun 43 as pre-Jap on Leyte. Reported to have acted as Jap guide on Leyte /Leyte
Reported Jap guide.

TAN, Dominador M.

Assistant Director of Kalibapi in Manila. In pre-war time was member of the National Assembly from Leyte. May be related to other TANS mentioned on Leyte.

TAN, Jorge

Is an attorney, reported to be pre-Jap, and brother of Jose and Carlos.

TAN, Jose

Doctor, reportedly pre-Jap, and brother of Jose and Jorge and Carlos.

TAN, Manulo

Reported Jun 43 to be working for Japs on Leyte.

VELOSO, Jose

Reported Jun 43 as pre-Jap on Leyte.

VILLACER, Julian

Acted as guide for Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in spring of 43.

b. Burauen

LAGARIO, Blas

Reported to be acting as Jap spy in Burauen, Leyte.

LAGATIO, Badol

Reported to be acting as Jap spy in Burauen, Leyte.

TEJONIRA, Conrado

Reported to be Jap spy in Burauen, Leyte.

VILLEGAS, Felipe

Reported to be Jap spy in Burauen, Leyte.

c. Calubian

ENAGE, Enrique

Mayor Enrique ENAGE of Calubian, Leyte, is reliably stated to be a traitor and

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ENAGE, Enrique
(continued)

and turncoat. Surrendered to the Japs again and tried to help the Japs capture American evacuees.

VELOSO, Juanin;

Judge at Calubian, Leyte, and brother of Jose; Is reported to be pro-Jap and to have given instructions to the civilians to shoot Americans on sight without fear of standing trial afterwards.

VELOSO, Julian

Filipino boy; accompanied Americans on a visit to American evacuees. Is suspected of subsequently betraying first group of Americans to the Japs.

d. Ormoc

CODILLA, Vasilio

Reported to be working for Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.

KILANTANG, Gregorio

Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.

OLIVER, Antonio

Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.

TAN, Angel

Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.

TAN, Teofilo

Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.

YRASTORZA, Rafael

Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.

e. San Isidro

ESPELETA, Joaquin

Mayor of San Isidro. Is reported a heavy drinker and unreliable.

f. Tacloban

MARTINEZ, Rafael

Reportedly a henchman of Jose VELOSO and No. 1 Jap agent in Leyte. Lives at Tacloban.

GASCON, Popo

Was reported brought by the Japs from Cebu to Tacloban. Has killed many people.

SALVATERA, Antonio

Reported to have acted as guide for Jap drive from Tacloban to the interior of Leyte.

g. Villaba

GONZALES, Lt.

Reported Jun 43 to be a pro-Jap at Villaba, Leyte.

LAUDE

Filipino superintendent at the Manila Rock Asphalt Mine, Baliti, Leyte. Claims to have been a sergeant in the AEF of the last war. Is reported to be wanted by the Japs for having taken funds from a Japanese owned company

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LAUDE (continued) Is said to be unsuspected, undepe-
nable, and suspected of forgery.

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G. PRE-WAR GOVERNMENT

1. Government in the Philippines was republican in form, based on the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The President of the Philippines had complete power over all executive departments, bureau, and offices and a strong influence in provincial and municipal governments. Legislative power was vested in a bicameral National Assembly with representatives elected from provinces according to population. Judicial power was in a Supreme Court and courts of inferior jurisdiction. All justices and judges were appointed by the president with the consent of the Committee on Appointments. Members of the higher court held office during good behavior. The electorate was composed of all literate citizens who had reached 21 years of age.

2. Local government consisted of 48 provinces of which Leyte was one, and 12 chartered cities. Leyte, Liriran, Maripipi, and Panaon Islands made up Leyte Province but had no chartered cities on them. The governing body of a province was the Provincial Board, consisting of a provincial governor and two members elected by direct vote of the people. Duties of the governor and the board included supervising the municipal councils, maintenance of the provincial roads, and collection of taxes for the Insular Government. The governor was chief executive and administrative head of the province. There were a number of other provincial officers including the Treasurer, Provincial Fiscal (District Attorney), Auditor, Engineer, District Health Officer, Superintendent of Schools, District Veterinarian, Post Office Inspector, District Forester, Senior Inspector of Constabulary, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Clerk of the Court, Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, Provincial Warden, Chief Agent, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Register of Deeds. These men aided in the administration of the province but were responsible, except the Treasurer and Provincial Fiscal, to their bureau chiefs and departmental heads in Manila rather than to the provincial governor. This arrangement reduced to a large extent the sphere of the local government.

3. Provinces were divided into municipalities, which corresponded to American counties, and the municipalities were subdivided into a poblacion (central village) and several barrios (secondary villages). The poblacion itself consisted of two or more barrios. The Municipal Council was the legislative body in a municipality. It consisted of the municipal mayor, vice-mayor, and councilors, whose number depended upon the class to which the municipality belonged. Like the provincial governor and the board members, the municipal officials were elected by direct vote of qualified electors, and they held office for three years. The councilors were the various poblacion heads, and the number of councilors depended on the number of poblaciones in a municipality. The lowest official in this hierarchy was the barrio teniente, who was the law officer in each barrio. In Leyte Province there were 47 municipalities incorporating 940 poblaciones and barrios. The largest municipality in terms of population was Ormoc and the smallest Anahawan.

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H. LOYAL GOVERNMENT AND GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

1. The loyal government and majority of the Guerrilla forces on Leyte are under the direction of Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, CO, 92nd Division, which is the force on Leyte. Colonel Kangleon reestablished the Commonwealth Government by proclamation, appointed provincial and municipal officers, and organized civilians into agencies for intelligence work or guerrilla activities. He also contacted guerrilla leaders on islands neighboring Leyte to effect cooperation and coordination of guerrilla movements and supplies. All the guerrilla units on the island with the exception of a group under 2nd Lt Blas Miranda, self-called General Breguez, joined the 92nd Division. Miranda's group comes from the vicinity of Ormoc and was strongest in western Leyte. It reportedly would not join Colonel Kangleon because of the backing of Captain Waters, an American on the staff of Colonel McClish in Mindanao. Colonel Kangleon's group claimed that Captain Waters was working for the disintegration of the Leyte guerrilla forces. Latest information indicates that the Miranda unit may have broken up, for the leaders are reported to have surrendered to the Japanese in the spring of 1944.

2. The capital of Free Leyte was formerly located at Maasin, from where control was exercised over most of southern and central Leyte. The latest information available indicates that a Japanese drive was made against the guerrillas in the spring of 1944 which resulted in the capture of the governor and other provincial officials and the surrender of many guerrilleros. Colonel Kangleon took over the position of governor and later appointed a new one. However, names of the new officials and location of the capital or areas directly controlled by the free government are not available at the present time.

3. The following is a list of persons identified with the loyal Provincial Government of the guerrilla movement. It has been reported that municipal officials were appointed in certain areas; however, their names have not been forwarded this office. Asterisks have been used to denote derogatory information.

Loyal Governor	See Salvador DEMETERIO	
Congressman	Miguel CUENCO	Congressman from Cebu. Was in Macarhon, Leyte, as of Oct 43. Was reported as the High Counselor of Kangleon and Demeterio and doing good work.
Provincial Board Member	See Angel C. ESPINA	
Provincial Board Member	See Eleuterio TOMAS	
Provincial Treasurer	Proceso KADAVERO	Recommended by Kangleon as Provincial Auditor on 9th Military District Emergency Currency Board. Appointed Provincial Treasurer by Kangleon in the winter of 43.

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Judge of the Court of 1st Instance, Branch No. 1, 8th Judicial District	Atilano CINCO	Leyte politician appointed Judge of the Court of 1st Instance by Kangleon in the winter of 43.
Provincial Auditor	Enrique POTENTE	Recommended by Kangleon for Chairman of Leyte Emergency Currency Board in Sep 43. Appointed Provincial Auditor of Leyte by Kangleon in winter of 43.
District Provincial Auditor	Eustaquio LIGUTAN	Appointed by Kangleon in winter of 43.
District Provincial Auditor	Pedro MILITANTE	Appointed by Kangleon in winter of 43.
Provincial Fiscal	Filemon SAAVEDRA	In Sep 43 recommended by Kangleon as Provincial Treasurer of Leyte Emergency Currency Board. Appointed Provincial Auditor by Kangleon in winter of 43.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal	Memerto RIBO	Appointed Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Leyte, by Kangleon in winter of 43.
Assistant Provincial Treasurer	Francisco TANTUICO	Appointed Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Cashier of Leyte by Kangleon in the winter of 43.
Provincial Health Officer	Dr. Jose MERCADO, Jr.	Appointed by Kangleon in winter of 43.
Court Clerk	Isidro MACALLANES	Appointed Clerk of Court of 1st Instance, Branch No. 2 by Kangleon in winter of 43.
*DEMETERIO, Salvador K.		Appointed Civil Governor of Leyte at Maasin by Kangleon in winter of 43. In spring of 44 was reported caught and confined by the Japs. Kangleon assumed control of the Provincial Government. One report states that DEMETERIO surrendered to Japs and pledged to support them.
*ESFINA, Angel C.		Director of Maasin Institute at Maasin; was living there with wife and child when Philippines fell. Later refused to serve on puppet Provincial Board and left. Called a

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conference at Maasin Institute and organized a government for the town, including a puppet Mayor to serve under the Japs. Was appointed Military Governor of the province by Colonel McCLISH but did not serve due to difficulties with Kangleon. Later was appointed Member of Provincial Board by Kangleon at Maasin. Reported captured by or surrendered to Japs in spring 44.

*TOMAS, Eleuterio

Appointed Provincial Board Member for Leyte by Kangleon in Nov 43. Reported captured by or surrendered to Japs in spring 44.

4. The following is a list of persons identified with the guerrilla movements in Leyte province. Asterisks denote derogatory information.

a. 9th Military District

Commanding Officer	Col. Ruperto KANGLEON	Re-established civil government of Leyte province at Maasin in fall and winter of 43. Also unified guerrilla control in Leyte and Samar provinces. Has code names of KING NEGAT or KIN.
Commanding Officer, Northern Leyte	Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN	Commanding Officer of North Leyte guerrillas under Kangleon. Had headquarters near Jaro, inland from Tacloban, in spring of 44.
G-1	Lt. Loreto MICABEL	G-1 on Leyte in Aug 43.
G-2	Capt. Ralph POSUNGDAY	Chinese mestizo at Carigara, Leyte. G-2 to Kangleon in Aug 43. Reported to know radio and photography, to be working as a dentist in Mar 44
Assistant G-2	Lt. Domingo RADAZA	Assistant G-2 in Aug 43.
G-3	Maj. Alfonso JAYME	G-3 to Kangleon in Aug 43.
Assistant G-3	Cresencio CORPIN	Was USAFFE soldier on Bataan. Organized guerrilla unit on Biliran Island. Later joined with PAMANIAN on North Leyte. Assistant G-3 to Kangleon in summer of 43.
G-4	Maj. Martin JABELOSA	G-4 to Kangleon in Aug 43.

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Inspector General	Lt. Col. Louis QUINTERO	Inspector General to Kangleon in Aug 43. Retired member of Philippine Constabulary. Lives in northernmost Leyte. Is old and deaf but reportedly staunch and generally respected. In Mar 44 he is stated to have attended a meeting of mayors called by the Japs and later to have given himself up to the Japs in return for the freedom of his family.
Liaison Officer	Lt. (J5) or Ensign Cliff David RICHARDSON	Of MTB Sq. #3. Sent to install large radio set for Kangleon in Feb 44. Was reported to act as Liaison Officer from Fert to Kangleon.

Unspecified Locations.

BADUYA	Guerrilla Lt. on Leyte in summer 43.
BARKILLIAN	Lt. leading group of guerrillas on Leyte. Alias Col. FLORES.
BARRANTES	Guerrilla Lt. on Leyte in summer of 43.
BARRAZA, E.	Guerrilla on Leyte Jul 43.
CABILING, H	Guerrilla on Leyte Jul 43.
CAPON	Guerrilla Captain on Leyte Jul 43.
CENTINO, Isabelo	Bvt. Maj., Commanding Officer of a guerrilla unit. Reported in North Leyte in summer of 43. Son of Grialco CENTINO.
CHAPMAN, Gerald S.	USA; possibly 2nd Lt. Reported acting as code man at radio station on Leyte in Mar 44.
DADULA, D	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
FABILONA	Pvt. Lt. Col., Guerrilla on Leyte in Aug 43.
FLORES, C.J.	Alias of BARKILLIAN.
FERNANDEZ, F.	Guerrilla Captain on Leyte in Aug 43.
FRANCISCO	Guerrilla Major on Leyte in Aug 43.
HEMINGWAY, Truman Jr.	Lt. from Vermont, belonged to 14th Bomb Sq., 19th Cn. Member of Mindanao guerrilla forces in 43. Reported acting with ST. JOHN, at radio station in Leyte in Mar 44.

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JAIM	Guerrilla major on Leyte in Aug 43.
KIERULE, C	Guerrilla on Leyte Jul 43.
KING NEGAT or KIN	Code name for KANGLEON.
MELGAR, F.	Guerrilla on Leyte Jul 43.
MURILLA, A.M.	Guerrilla Lt. on Leyte Jul 43.
PAREDES	Lt. Was former member of Constabulary. Active in the Leyte-Cebu area after Jap occupation. Met by evacuee on way south and believed to be loyal.
FORE, F.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
RAMODO, Elpedio	Guerrilla Lt. on Leyte in Aug 43.
RANGAS	Guerrilla Lt. on Leyte in Jul 43.
REYES, T.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
RIEL, C.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
SMITH, Russell Howard	Lt. (former sergeant) from Rapid City, South Dakota. Was in 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Gp. Member of Mindanao guerrilla forces in 43. Reported at radio station on Leyte in Mar 44.
ST. JOHN	From 14th Bomb Sq., 19th Gp. Was operating radio station on Leyte in spring 44.
URIBE, B.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
de VEYRA, F.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
<u>Borabod</u>	
CENTINO, CIRIACO	Major with guerrillas in North Leyte. Was in command of Borabod, Leyte, Garrison in May 43. Other men at Jaro, Cepas, and Santa Cruz.
<u>Carigara</u>	
PAMANIAN, Felix	Bvt. Lt. Col. in Aug 43. In Mar 44 reported as Major, commander of guerrillas from Carigara and Villaba northwards including Biliran Island; under KANGLEON.
<u>Leyte</u>	
CORTON, Filomeno	Former engineering student at Silliman. Guerrilla captain commanding the area around Leyte, for KANGLEON. Is reported pro-American, hard-working and courageous.

Liloan

NAZARIN, Jose

Came from Mindanao after surrender. Worked with Capt. JAIM and was reported commanding guerrilla garrison between Liloan and Cabalian, date unknown.

Maasin

LANC, Gordon A.

U. S. Navy man from Cebu. Is guerrilla captain on Leyte with KANGLEON. Ambushed truckload of Japs near Segod Bay in summer 43. Lived with family of Angel ESPINA in Maasin for almost a year. In Mar 44 was reported as Supply Officer for KANGLEON.

Tanauan

CINCO, Antonio C.

Discharged USAFFE soldier. Worked for Japs as informant till Japs heard he was a soldier. Escaped from them and is reported a guerrilla leader in North Leyte near Tanauan in Spring 43.

1. Miranda Unit

*MIRANDA, Blas

Lt; leader of guerrilla unit which controlled territory from Baybay to Palompon in winter 43. Also appointed commander on Leyte by Lt. Col. McCLISH. Would not cooperate with KANGLEON. Had clashes with KANGLEON and forces around Baybay in which a number of people were killed. Later reported to control territory around Ormoc and also reported to have surrendered to Japs along with officers in his unit in Feb 44.

*SOLIMAN, Marcos

Major; graduate of Ft. Benning. Chief of Staff for MIRANDA. Reported to have either surrendered to the Japs in Leyte or evacuated to northern islands of Bohol in Jan/Feb 44.

WATERS

Captain; living near Ormoc in May 43. Was on staff of Col. McCLISH on Mindanao.

I JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION

1. The Japanese have followed the existing government setup with a few changes. One has been to make all officials appointive by the president; another has been to add officials such as the head of the Kalibapi and of the Neighborhood Associations to help further propaganda and pacification campaigns. The following is a brief summary of the duties of provincial and municipal officials under the Japanese.

2. The governor of Leyte Province, formerly elected by the people, is now appointed by the President of the Republic. He is chief executive and administrative head of the province. His decision on administrative matters is final. The treasurer, also formerly elected by the people and now appointed by the president, answers directly to the governor but has no voice in administrative matters. The treasurer collects all taxes, fees, and charges throughout the province whether they be national, provincial, or municipal. He also prepares any financial statements required by the governor. The provincial fiscal is the law officer of the province and the legal advisor of the provincial government, of its officers, and of municipal mayors. He has no voice in the administration of the province other than in an advisory capacity. Other provincial officers, the auditor, engineer, district health officer, etc., have continued with few changes in their functions by the Japanese.

3. The head of the Provincial Kalibapi is a new officer in the provincial setup. The Kalibapi is the sole legal political party in the islands. It is also one of the principal agencies of propaganda for the puppet governments, taking the lead in pacification campaigns in the province and exercising a general supervisory influence over the work of the Neighborhood Associations. Membership in the Kalibapi is theoretically voluntary, but no government employee or official, even day laborers, may collect pay without exhibiting a membership card. Rice and other rationed commodities are sold at government prices only to holders of Kalibapi membership cards. Furthermore, anyone dealing with the government in any way, especially people applying for licenses of concessions, are required to produce membership cards before action is taken on their application.

4. The Philippine Bureau of Constabulary was the main pre-war law enforcement agency in the islands and has been taken over and enlarged by the Japanese. It was organized along military lines into infantry companies equipped with trench mortars, hand grenades, and individual weapons. At present the composition is an assortment of pre-war members forced or willing to continue in their function of collaborators, and of former prisoners of war promised freedom if they would join the constabulary. Some of its members have helped the guerrillas; others have worked strongly against them. There is no complete estimate on the number of BC's (constabulary personnel) on Leyte. Up to May 1944 there were between 30-40 stationed at Tacloban, but the numbers at outlying garrisons were unknown. Since May at least 60 more have been brought in by the Japanese, but there have been no reports as to the distribution of these last arrivals.

5. The following is a list of those persons who have been identified with the Japanese Provincial Government

a. Provincial Government	Pastor SALAZAR	Pre-war member of Leyte
Puppet Governor	Salazar-Pastor	Provincial Board and Brother
		in law of Jose Veloso.

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4. Provincial Government (cont'd)

Pastor SALAZAR
Salazar-PASTOR

Was left in Leyte to assist Governor Torres in collaborating with the Japs. Was formerly Chief of the Jap Propaganda Corps at Tacloban. Reported Puppet Governor of Leyte in spring of 1944.

Puppet Vice Governor

Manuel MARTINEZ

Puppet Vice Governor in June 1943

Assemblyman

Jose M. VELOSO

Reported collaborator with Japs

Puppet Treasurer

Ildefonso JIENEZ

Reappointed by President Laurel on 26 March 1944

Puppet Secretary

Antonio BENEDICTO

Reported Secretary in March 1944

Senior Constabulary Inspector

Arturo REYES

At Tacloban as of April, 1944. Is in charge of all constabulary personnel in Leyte and responsible direct to Manila

Judge of the Court of First Instance

Fernando HERNANDEZ

Puppet Judge of Court of First Instance in March 43

Clerk of the Court

Vicente MATE

Puppet Clerk to the Court in March, 1943

Provincial Auditor

Alberto SANTA CRUZ

Puppet Auditor of Leyte as of December 1943

Kalibapi Leader

Sat R. GONZALES

Kalibapi Leader of Leyte. Attended Puppet Convention in Cebu City in April 1944. Also a member of the Propaganda Corps.

District Engineer

Ambrosio OSUNA

First reported in Office in March 1943. Later reported June 1944. Quotes him as saying that he cannot take any more work for Jap Navy due to lack of labor and tools.

Provincial Fiscal

Ambrosio UTELL

Succeeded Quintin PAREDES as provincial fiscal in February, 1944. Was also appointed Special Prosecutor of the Courts of Special Criminal Jurisdiction for Leyte in March 1944.

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2. Provincial Government (cont'd)

Puppet Registrar	Instancio AGUIRRE	Puppet Registrar of deeds in March 1943.
Postal Inspector	Benedicto CUMMINS	Puppet Post Office Inspector in March, 1943
Provincial Warden	Francisco REYES	Puppet Provincial Warden in March 1943
Health Officer	Adolfo ALDABE	Puppet District Health Officer in March 1943
Chief of Provincial Hospital	Ciriaco BAGABAND	Chief of Leyte Provincial Hospital March 1943
District Forester	Inocencio RAMIREZ	Puppet District Forester in March 1943
District Veterinarian	REYNA	District Veterinarian in March 1943
Agricultural Superintendent	Mauro RODRIGUEZ	Puppet Provincial Agricultural Superintendent in March 1943.
Chief Agent, Bureau of Internal Revenue Bureau of Constabulary	Caferino SEVILLA	Chief Agent, Bureau of Internal Revenue in March 1943

(1) Unspecified Location:

AGUIRRE, Guadioso	Member of Constabulary in Leyte, April 1943
AMADORILLO, Gorgenio	Member of Constabulary in Leyte, April 1943
AUNINTO, Doring	Member of Constabulary in Leyte, April 1943
AUNINTO, Felino	Member of Constabulary in Leyte, April 1943
BASEBEAS, Crisologo	Sergeant in Constabulary on Leyte in April 1943
CASULLA, Jose	Member of Constabulary on Leyte in April 1943
CASULLO, Pasual	Capt in Constabulary on Leyte, April 1943
EGSCK, Felix	Member of Constabulary on Leyte April 1943
ETSON, Fortunato	Member of Constabulary on Leyte April 1943
ETSON, Jose	Member of Constabulary on Leyte April 1943
LACARIO, Modesto	Member of Constabulary on Leyte April 1943

b. Bureau of Constabulary (Cont'd)

(1) Unspecified location (cont'd)

LERON, Luis Corporal in Constabulary on Leyte in April 1943

PARADES, Osiang Member of Constabulary on Leyte, April 1943

QUENTANA, Basilio Member of Constabulary on Leyte, April 1943

REMADOR Cristito Member of Constabulary on Leyte, April 1943

SALVACION Sergeant in Constabulary on Leyte, June 1943. Reported very active.

(2) Jaro:

CERINCE, Raymundo

Sergeant in Constabulary. Acting 1st Sgt of Second Leyte Company, BC, Jaro, Leyte. Is 34 years old, a native of Burauen, Leyte and was wounded on a mission with Japs in April, 1944.

COMERO, Jose

Member of Second Leyte Company, BC, Jaro, Leyte, April, 1944.

ROMAN, Azcarias R.

Second Lieutenant and Company Commander of Second Leyte Company, BC, Jaro, Leyte

(3) Tacloban:

Aya-ay

Lt, BC, 5th Class inspector at Tacloban, August, 1943.

FLUIDAI, Nolasco T.

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April, 1944.

GABRIEL, Rafael V.

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April 1944.

GLORIA, Jose S.

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April 1944.

KAGANAN, Alfredo T.

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April 1944.

LUCENTE

BC Inspector at Tacloban, August, 1943.

MARTINEZ

3rd Class Inspector of Constabulary at Tacloban August 1943.

MOLINA

BC Inspector in Tacloban, August, 1943.

PUNDAVELA, Emilio L. Jr.

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April 1944.

PUNDAVELA, Manuel K.

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April, 1944.

de los REYES Serafin

3rd Lt, BC. Arrived at Tacloban from Manila in April 1944

ROMAN

Constabulary Inspector at Tacloban in August 1943.

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c. Propaganda Corps

ABRA, Eugenio

Chaplain; member of the Jap Propaganda Corps at Tacloban.

GONZALES

Lt, member of Jap Propaganda Corps in Tacloban in June, 1943.

GONZALES, Sat R.

Member of Jap Propaganda Corps, also leader of Kalibapi on Leyte

PACHOCO, Juan

Capt. Member of the Jap Propaganda Corps in June, 1943.

PALACIO, Gregorio

Member of the Jap Propaganda Corps in June 1943

VINES, Jose

Reported spokesman of Jap Propaganda Corps in Tacloban, June 1943

VELOSO, Antonio

Member of the Propaganda Corps

6. Municipal government consists of the mayor, municipal treasurer, municipal board, and barrio lieutenants. For first, second, and third-class municipalities there are four board members, for fourth and fifth-class barrios there are only two. The barrio lieutenant is assigned duties by the mayor but has no salary.

7. Neighborhood Associations (Kapisanan Paglilingkod Sa Bagong Filipinas) are local organizations with a president designated by the mayor. Their purpose is to help in maintaining peace and order, to assist the Constabulary, to inform the authorities of any threats to public order, to aid in the distribution of scarce commodities, to take periodic family census, and to function in many other sub-government duties. The system of organization rests on heads of small groups of residents (usually 10 families is the smallest group) who are responsible for the behavior of the people within the group. A census of all people of the group is filed with the Military Police, and no person may enter or leave the group area without a permit. In this manner the Japanese are able to control the infiltration of guerrilla agents into occupied areas. Group leaders know that if an unlisted person is found living with their groups, they and possibly all members of the group may be subjected to severe punishment. As an example for the population, executions of all members of a group have taken place in retaliation for the acts of one member. There have been 30 Neighborhood Associations identified on Leyte. Tacbuan has been divided into 19 districts with associations 1-16 in the town itself, 17-18 at Barrio San Jose, and 19 at Barrio Karasabaras. Palo has 4 associations, divided into the districts of Buri, Cavite, Luntad, and Santa Cruz. Dulga is divided into 7 districts. Neighborhood associations have not been located in other municipalities, and in some places, Tanuan and Burauen particularly, Volunteer Guards or Home Guards have been organized to carry out the functions of the associations. In areas where Home Guards of Volunteer Guards are used the Chief of Police in the municipality is head of the organization instead of an appointee by the mayor.

8. At the time of the writing of this report the following municipalities were the only ones reported completely under Japanese control and having puppet governments: Alangalang, Barugo, Burauen, Carigara, Dulag, Jaro, Ormoc, Palo, Tocloban, Tanauan and Tolosa. The following is a list of their puppet officials:

a. Alangalang

Mayor	Nicolas SALAZAR
Vice Mayor	Hilario AVILA
Chief of Police	Autero SERONA
Judge of Court	Eliseo de VEYRA

b. Barugo

Mayor	Manuel ARPON
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c. Burauen

Mayor	Jose CONDERO	Succeeded Jose Dining TORENC
Secretary	Pascual CASUELA	Reported captain in the constabulary, and puppet Secretary of Burauen Apr 43.

Treasurer

Dining TORENO Formerly puppet mayor.

Chief of Police and Head of Home Guard

Doogracias CONDE

Members of Home Guard Apr 43

Daniel ADALLA

Quirico ALCOVER

Fructuoso ALOVER

Cesarito ANTOYA

Miguel BAYONA

Nicanor BAYONA

Felimon BERNAL

Conrado CAMEADILA

Jesus CABALIDA

Otilio CAMALIG

Maximo CAMIRO

Olimpio CAMIRO

Dioscoro CASUELA

Members of Home
Guard Apr 43

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Teodorico C. SUELA

Elias ENGAO

Jose ENGAO

Gaudioso HINITA

Loreto INDIING

Victor de JESUS

Andres LACARIO

Engcoy LAGARIO

Pabling LAGARIO

Felipe LASARTE

Prisco LAZARTE

Juan MACAYENIS

Godofredo MALADOR

Marcelo MOLO

Pifo MORON

Pastor PENADA

Emilio del PILAR

Hipolito REFERRE

Ricardo RELADOR

Constancio ROBINIOL

Laudelino TORENO

Baleriano VALTERO

d. Carigara

Mayor

Prudencio BERGUETA

Secretary

Feliciano LIBERAL

e. Dulag

Mayor

Marcial LAGUNZAD

Vice Mayor

Casiano SANO

Treasurer

Balbino LAGUNZAD

Chief of Police

Nicolas SANO

Policeman

Aquilino TUGA

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f. Jaro

Mayor Clemente LASTRILLA
Treasurer Pacifico REYNA

g. Ormoc

Mayor Catalino HERMOSILLA Reported mayor in Jun 43

Vice Mayor Solviro ZAMORA Reported vice mayor Jun 43

Treasurer Rafael OMEGA Reported treasurer in Jun 43

Cashier Herbasio GERVAILLAS Reported cashier in Jun 43

Clerk Mariano CONUI Reported clerk in Jun 43

Clerk Melanio MEDROSO Reported clerk in Jun 43

Chief of Police Victor PENALOSA

h. Palo

Mayor Generoso ALVAREDO

Secretary Margarito MAGLINTE

Treasurer Pedro SEVILLA

i. Tacloban

Mayor Vicente QUINTERO Reported mayor or Tacloban in Mar 43

Secretary Marcos MANZANARES

Treasurer Cornelio OLIVER

President of Neighborhood Association

MONTEJO

Former representative from Leyte. Reported to have little prestige and to have maintained a passive attitude. Reported president of Neighborhood Association in Sep 43.

Justice of the Peace

Eugenio BRILLO

Appointed by Chairman of the Executive Commission in May 43.

Chief of Police ASIS

Sergeants of Police Victor ALBA

Miguel PEVIDAL

J. Tanauan

Mayor Eugenio AVILA Puppet mayor in Jun 43.
Secretary Vicente de VEYRA Reported secretary in Jun 43
Treasurer Cirilo MORANTE
Clerks Rafael AVILA Reported puppet clerk as of Jun 43.
Somon ROA Reported puppet clerk as of Jun 43.

Chief of Ingracio QUIJANO Reported Chief of Volunteer Guard as of Jun 43
Sanitary Inspector- Basilio MERCADO Reported Sanitary Inspector Jun 43. Also reported as Valero MERCADO.
Foreman Tranquilino FARON
Capataz Petronila ESCORDA

Fabian SABAIZA
School Principal Alberto PASAQUI Principal in Jun 43.
School Teachers Eugenio AVILA, Jr. School teacher in Jun 43.
Salud AVILA School teacher in Jun 43.
Pedro ROFA, Sr. School teacher in Jun 43.
Gonzalo TAMFIL School teacher in Jun 43.

K. Tolosa

Mayor Mariano CAHANO
Secretary Ricardo ADVINCULA
Treasurer Francisco PETILLA

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V. JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

A. TACLOBAN

1. The only reported installations of counter intelligence interest are located in Tacloban. These which have been pin-pointed on the map, Town of Tacloban, are the civil administration; military administration; Japanese headquarters, commanding officer's residence, officers' quarters, and barracks; constabulary administration building, barracks, and guard house; press building; concentration camp; warehouses; and base hospital.

2. Two other organizations are known to be in Tacloban, but their locations have not been established. These are the Japanese Propaganda Corps School and the Daido Booki Kaisha. The latter is a Japanese firm which buys copra and abaca.

B. OTHER LOCATIONS

In the various municipalities, especially those under complete Japanese control, there are offices of the Neighborhood Associations, Home and Volunteer Guards, Bureau of Constabulary, and military and civil administration. However, these have not been reported in available information and cannot be included in this report.

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APPENDIX "A"

ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF PERSONS MENTIONED IN BODY OF REPORT

ABILA, Eugenio	Chaplain; member of the Jap Propaganda Corps at Tacloban.
ADILLA, Daniel	Reported member of Home Guard, Baracuen, Apr 43.
ADVINCULA, Ricardo	Municipal secretary, Tolosa.
AGUIRRE, Gaudioso	Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.
AIA, Teofilo	Reported to have acted as guide in Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in the spring of 43.
AIRA, Victor	Sgt of police, Tacloban.
ALCOVER, Quirico	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
AIDABE, Adolfo	Puppet District Health Officer for Leyte Province in Mar 43.
ALBUINO, Queremon	Appointed Judge, Court of 1st Instance, Branch #2, 8th Judicial District, by KANGLEON in Nov 43; reported surrendered to Japs and pledged support to puppet government in Feb 44.
ALOVER, Fructuoso	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
ALVARADO, Generoso	Puppet mayor of Palc.
ALZORILLO, Corgonio	Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.
ANEUBE, Anastacio	Puppet Registrar of Deeds for Leyte Province in Mar 43.
ANTOYA, Cesario	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
ARPON, Amador	3rd Lt, BC, junior officer in 1st Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
ARPON, Manuel	Puppet mayor of Barugo.
ASIS	Puppet chief of police, Tacloban.
AUNINTO, Doring	Member of Constabulary on Leyte in Apr 43.
AUNINTO, Felino	Member of Constabulary on Leyte in Apr 43.
AVILA, Eugenio	Puppet mayor of Tanauan, Jun 43.
AVILA, Eugenio, Jr.	Puppet school teacher in Tanauan, Jun 43.

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AVILA, Hilario	Puppet vice-mayor of Alangalang.
AVILA, Rafael	Puppet clerk of Tanauan in Jun 43.
AVILA, Salud	Puppet school teacher of Tanauan in Jun 43.
AYA-AY, Antonio N.	Lt, BC, 5th class inspector, at Tacloban in Aug 43; still there in Mar 44.
BABCOCK, Orville A.	Was Superintendent of Schools in Leyte for many years. In fall of 43 was the only American living at an unspecified location in the hills.
BADUYA	Guerrilla Lt on Leyte in summer 43.
BAGABIDO, Ciriaco	Puppet chief of Leyte Provincial Hospital in Mar 43.
BALDERIAN, Alejandro	Bvt Col; Commanding Officer of North Leyte guerrillas under KANGLEON. Had headquarters near Jaro, inland from Tacloban, in spring of 44.
BALMORA, Fortunatu	Is reported a trustworthy resident of San Isidro. Took care of group of Americans for more than a year, moving them from place to place as their safety demanded.
BALMORA, Nicolas	Nephew of Fortunatu BALMORA. Reportedly is trustworthy; lives at San Isidro.
BARKILLIAN	Lt leading group of guerrillas on Leyte. Alias Col FLORES.
BARRANTES	Guerrilla Lt on Leyte in summer of 43.
BARRAZA, E.	Guerrilla on Leyte Jul 43.
BASEBAS, Crisologo	Sgt in Constabulary on Leyte in Apr 43.
BAYONA, Miguel	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
BAYONA, Nicamor	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
BENEDICTO, Antonio	Puppet Secretary of Leyte Province in Mar 44.
BERGUETA, Prudencio	Puppet mayor of Carigara.
BERNAL, Felimon	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
BOWLER, William	An American mestizo from Cebu City who helped American evacuees in Baybay, May 42. Is reported now acting as intelligence agent for Col FERTIG. Has many contacts among influential people and is able to obtain good information.

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BRILLO, Eugenio	Appointed justice of the peace, Tacloban, by chairman of puppet Executive Commission in May 43.
BRINGAS, Luis P.	3rd Lt. BC, junior officer of 2nd Leyte Co. (Jaro), Mar 44.
CABADILLA, Conrado	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CABAJUG, M.	50 years, 5'8", 160 lbs, former Governor of Cebu and Judge of the Court of First Instance in Negros Oriental. Experienced official with good record and character. Fled to Leyte when Japs came and has stayed there. Reportedly would be useful for post-war reconstruction.
CABALIDA, Jesus	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CABILING, H.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
CABRANO, Mariano	Secretary of Tolosa, Leyte.
CADING, Eleuterio	Capt; reported pro-Jap on Leyte Jun 43.
CAMALIG, Otilio	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CAMIRO, Maximo	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CAMIRO, Olimpio	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CANONON	Pre-war Representative in Leyte. Maintains passive attitude and has little prestige. Evacuated to Maripipi Island, Sop 43.
CAPILI, Florentino	Puppet Division Superintendent of Schools for Leyte Province in Mar 43.
CAPON	Guerrilla Capt on Leyte in Jul 43.
CASUELA, Dioscoro	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CASUELA, Jose	Member of Constabulary on Leyte in Apr 43.
CASUELA, Pascual	Reported Capt in Constabulary and puppet secretary of Burauen, Apr 43.
CASUELA, Teodorico	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
CENTINO, Ciriaco	Major with guerrillas in North Leyte. Was in command of Borabod, Leyte, Garrison in May 43. Had other men at Jaro, Capas, and Santa Cruz.

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CENTINO, Isabolo	Bvt Maj, Commanding Officer of a guerrilla unit. Reported in North Leyte in summer of 43. Son of Cirinco CENTINO.
CERINCE, Raymundo	Sgt in Constabulary. Acting 1st Sgt of 2nd Leyte Co, BC, Jaro, Leyte. Is 34 years old, native of Burauen, and was wounded on a mission with Japs in Apr 44.
CHAPMAN, Gerald S.	US., possibly 2nd Lt. Reported acting as cede man at radio station on Leyte in Mar 44.
CHAVARRIA, Jose	District Engineer in Lanao, Mindanao; native of Mindoro. Fleed to Leyte at time of Jap invasion.
CINCO, Antonio C.	Discharged USAFFE soldier. Worked for Japs as informant till Japs heard he was a soldier. Escaped from them and reported a guerrilla leader in North Leyte near Tanauan in spring 43.
CINCO, Atilano	Appointed Judge of the Court of 1st Instance, Branch No. 1, 8th Judicial District, by KANGLEON in winter of 43.
CLAUDIO, Enrique	Puppet Treasurer of Leyte Province in Aug 43.
CODILLA, Basilio	Reported to be working for Japs at Ormoc in Jun 43.
COMERO, Jose	Member of 2nd Leyte Co, BC, Jaro, Leyte in Apr 44.
CONDE, Doegracias	Puppet Chief of Police and Head of Home Guard, Burauen.
CONUI, Mariano	Reported puppet clerk of Ormoc in Jun 43.
CORDERO, Jose	Puppet mayor of Burauen; succeeded Jose Dining TORENO.
CORMERO, Baltazar	Reported Jap guide on Leyte.
CORMERO, Melchor	Reported Jap guide on Leyte.
CORFIN, Cresencio	Was USAFFE soldier on Bataan. Organized guerrilla unit on Biliran Island. Later joined with RAMANIAN on North Leyte. Assistant G-3 to KANGLEON in summer of 43.
CORTON, Filomeno	Former engineering student at Silliman. Guerrilla Capt commanding the area around Leyte, Leyte, for KANGLEON in spring 44. Is reported pro-American, hard-working, and courageous.

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de la CRUZ, Vicente

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Former Provincial Governor, ex-Under Secretary of Labor and Associate Justice in Court of Industrial Relations; was severely beaten and kept in jail for two weeks by Jap MP's at Tacloban in Jul 42 on grounds of not keeping promises to them; named as Editor in Chief of the Leyte Shimbun but publication suspended in early 43 due to lack of materials; went to Manila in Jun 43 to confer with Japs; in Jan 44 reported appointed puppet Judge of Court of 1st Instance of Leyte and Samar, 5th Judicial District, with permanent residence in Samar; also reported Judge of Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction of Leyte and Samar in spring of 44.

CUENCO, Jose M.

Brother of loyal Congressman Miguel CUENCO. Reported to be with his brother in Leyte, Nov 43.

CUENCO, Miguel

Congressman from Cebu, brother of Jose. Was in Macrohon, Leyte, as of Oct 43. Was reported as the high counselor of KANGLEON and DEMETERIO.

CUVANAN, Benedicto

Puppet Post Office Inspector of Leyte Province in Mar 43.

DADULA, D.

Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.

DEMETERIO, Bernardino

Son of loyal Governor; was residing at Maasin in Oct 43.

DEMETERIO, Salvador K.

Appointed Civil Governor of Leyte by KANGLEON in winter of 43; resided at Maasin. In spring of 44 was reported caught and confined by Japs. KANGLEON assumed control of the Provincial Government. One report states that DEMETERIO surrendered to Japs and pledged to support them.

DY Tinou Song

Chinese of Leyte, Leyte. He and his wife have aided guerrillas and American evacuees. Have managed to retain some property and may be envied by Filipinos.

EGSOK, Felix

Member of Constabulary on Leyte in Apr 43.

ENGCE, Enrique

Mayor Enrique ENGCE of Calubian, Leyte, is reliably stated to be a traitor and turncoat. Surrendered to Japs but later became a guerrilla Capt. He is said to have surrendered to the Japs again and tried to help the Japs capture American evacuees.

ENGCAO, Elias

Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.

ENGCAO, Jose

Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.

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ENRIQUEZ, Antonio	Reported to have acted as Jap guide on Leyte.
ENRIQUEZ, Ciriaco	Reported to have acted as Jap guide on Leyte.
ERANDIO, Fermin	Reported to have acted as guide in Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in the spring of 43.
ESCANO	Wealthy Spanish mestizo from Cebu. Formerly of Cebu Electric Company and a steamship company. Reported Mar 44 living with his family near Malibog. Has helped guerrillas and American evacuees.
ESCORDA, Petronila	Puppet capataz of Tanauan.
ESFELETA, Joaquin	Mayor of San Isidro; reported heavy drinker and undependable.
ESPINA, Angel Beaunoni	At Masin in Apr 43.
ESPINA, Angel C.	Director of Masin Institute at Masin. Was living there with wife and child when Philippines fell. Later refused to serve on puppet Provincial Board and left. Called a conference at Masin Institute and organized a government of the town including a puppet mayor to serve under the Japs. Was appointed Military Governor of the province by Col McCLISH but did not serve due to difficulties with KANGLEON. Later was appointed member of Provincial Board by KANGLEON at Masin. Reported captured by, or surrendered to Japs in spring 44.
ETSON, Fortunato	Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.
ETSON, Jose	Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.
FABILONA	Bvt Lt Col; guerrilla on Leyte in Aug 43.
FARON, Tranquilino	Puppet foreman of Tanauan.
FERNANDEZ, F.	Guerrilla Capt on Leyte in Aug 43.
FEVIDAL, Nolasco T.	3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.
FLORES, Col	Alias of BARKILLIAN.
FRANCISCO	Guerrilla Maj on Leyte in Aug 43.
FREI, Ernest J.	Swiss, possibly still Swiss citizen. American Presbyterian missionary at Tacloban. He and his wife and daughters, Elizabeth and Joan, were in Tacloban under the Japs in 43. Had very little food. Evacuee reports in Apr 44 that they are probably now all interned in Manila.

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GABRIEL, Rafael V.	3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.
GASCON, Pepe	Was reported brought by Japs from Cebu; in Tacloban Apr 43; reported to have killed many people.
GERVILLAS, Herbasio	Puppet cashier at Ormoc in Jun 43.
GLORIA, Jose S.	3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.
GONZALES	Lt; member of Jap Propaganda Corps at Tacloban in Jun 43.
GONZALES	Lt; pro-Jap at Villaba in Jun 43.
GONZALES, Eustaquio	Reported working for Japs on Leyte in Jun 43.
GONZALES, Sat R.	Kalibapi Leader for Leyte Province. Attended puppet convention in Cebu City in Apr 44. Also a member of the Propaganda Corps.
GRANADOS, Enrique	Mayor of Leyte, Leyte. Related by marriage to POSONGUY.
GRANADOS, Luis	Former Chief of Police in Leyte, Leyte. Reported to work for POSONGUY as guerrilla intelligence agent.
HEMINGWAY, Truman, Jr.	Lt from Verront; belonged to 14th Bomb Sq, 19th Gp. Member of Mindanao guerrilla forces in 43. Reported acting with ST JOHN at radio station in Leyte Mar 44.
HERMOSILLA, Catalino	Puppet mayor of Ormoc in Jun 43.
HERNANDEZ, Fernando	Pre-war Judge of Court of 1st Instance; was puppet Judge of Court of 1st Instance for Leyte Province in Mar 43; Jan 44 reported Associate Justice of Court of Appeals of the Visayas, Mindanao, and Sulu.
HINITA, Gaudioso	Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.
IBALLAROSA	Rev. IBALLAROSA and wife reported in Ormoc under the Japs in Oct 43.
INDING, Loreto	Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.
JABELOSA, Martin	Maj; G-4 to KANGLEON in Aug 43.
JAIN	Guerrilla Maj on Leyte in Aug 43.
JARO, Eugenio	Ex-Governor of Leyte; reported pro-Jap in Jun 43.

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JAYME, Alfonso	Mr. j; G-3 to KANGLEON in Aug 43.
de JESUS, Victor	Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.
JIMENEZ, Ildefonso	Puppet Treasurer of Leyte Province; re-appointed by Pres Laurel on 26 Mar 44.
JONES, Leroy A.	Member of old 11th Infantry Association; at Maasin in Apr 43. Friend of F. W. STEFFELT. Has lived in Philippines for over 40 years.
KADAVERO, Proceso	Recommended by KANGLEON as Provincial Auditor on 9th Military District Emergency Currency Board. Appointed Provincial Treasurer by KANGLEON in winter of 43.
KAGAWAN, Alfredo T.	3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.
KANGLEON, Ruperto	Col; re-established civil government of Leyte Province at Maasin in fall and winter of 43. Also unified guerrilla forces in Leyte and Samar Provinces and is their Commanding Officer. Has code names of KING NEGAT or KIN.
KIERULF, C	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
KILANTANG, Gregorio	Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.
KING NEGAT or KIN	Code name for KANGLEON.
LAGARIO, Andres	Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.
LAGARIO, Blas	Reported to be acting as Jap spy in Burauen, Apr 43.
LAGARIO, Encocoy	Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.
LAGARIO, Modesto	Reported member of Constabulary on Leyte in Apr 43.
LAGARIO, Pabbling	Reported member of Home Guard, Bureau, Apr 43.
LAGATIO, Badol	Reported to be acting as Jap spy in Burauen, Apr 43.
LAGUNZAD, Balbino	Puppet treasurer of Dulag.
LAGUNZAD, Marcial	Puppet mayor of Dulag.
LANG, Gordon A.	US Navy man from Cebu. Is guerrilla Capt on Leyte with KANGLEON. Ambushed truckload of Japs near Sogod Bay in summer 43. Lived with family of Angel ESPINA in Maasin for almost a year. In Mar 44 was reported as Supply Officer for KANGLEON.

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LAZARTE, Felipe	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
LASTRILLA, Clemente	Puppet mayor of Jaro.
LAUDE	Filipino superintendent at the Manila Rock Asphalt Mine, Baliti, Leyte. Claims to have been a Sgt in the AEF of the last war. Is reported to be wanted by the Japs for having taken funds from a Jap owned company. Is said to be unrespected, undependable and suspected of forgery.
LAZARTE, Prisco	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
LIBERAL, Feliciano	Puppet secretary of Carigara.
LIGUTAN, Eustaquio	Appointed District Provincial Auditor by KANGLEON in winter of 43.
LUCENTE, Ciriseco	BC Inspector at Tacloban in Aug 43: Commanding Officer of 1st Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
LUMBRE	42 years, 5'5", 145 lbs, black hair, brown eyes, 2-inch scar on face, former photographer in Puerto Princessa, Palawan. Lived in Cuyo in May 42. Met Japs when they landed on Cuyo and offered full co- operation. Served them as guide, gave full information pertaining to American soldiers in Cuyo, iden- tified captured Americans, and named other Americans still on the island, whom he asked the Japs to round up. Reportedly showed photos of said Americans to prove their presence on Cuyo and stated photos were taken without knowledge of the men. Subject was aided by Mayor Pedro Ponce de LEON to escape and is believed to be hiding on Leyte Island with his parents.
LUZ	2nd Lt, BC; Junior officer of 5th Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
MACABIOLA, Pablo	3rd Lt, BC, Junior officer of 1st Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
MACASA, Jesus	Spaniard from Cebu City; met American evacuees at Paybay, Leyte in May 42 and helped them.
MACALLANTES, Isidro	Appointed Clerk of Court of 1st Instance, Branch No.2, by KANGLEON in winter of 43.

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MAGAYENIS, Juan	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
MACLINTE, Margarito	Puppet Secretary of Palo.
MALADOR, Godofredo	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
MANZANARES, Marcos	Puppet secretary of Tacloban.
MARAYA, Tallo	Reported to have acted as guide for Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in spring 43. Is former chief of police in San Miguel.
MARTINEZ	3rd Class Inspector, BC; at Tacloban in Aug 43.
MARTINEZ, Manuel	Pupper Vice-Governor of Leyte Province, Jun 43.
MARTINEZ, Rafael	Reportedly a henchman of Jose VELOSO and No.1 Jap agent in Leyte. Lives at Tacloban.
MATE, Vicente	Pupper Clerk of Court of 1st Instance for Leyte Province.
MEDROSO, Melanio	Puppet clerk of Ormoc in Jun 43.
MELGAR, F.	Guerilla on Leyte Jul 43.
MERCADO, Basilio	Puppet Sanitary Inspector of Leyte Province; also reported as Valerio MERCADO.
MERCADO, Jose, Jr.	Dr; Appointed Provincial Health Officer by KANGLEON in winter of 43. see Basilio MERCADO.
MERCADO, Valerio	Lt; C-1 to KANGLEON in Aug 43.
MICABEL, Loreto	Appointed District Provincial Auditor by KANGLEON in winter 43.
MILITANTE, Pedro	Lt; leader of guerilla unit with controlled territory from Baybay to Palompon in winter of 43. Also appointed commander on Leyte by Col McCLISH of Mindanao. Would not cooperate with KANGLEON. Had clashes with KANGLEON's forces around Baybay in which a number of people were killed. Later reported to control territory around Ormoc and also reported to have surrendered to Japs along with officers of his unit in Feb 44.
MIRANDA, Blas	

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MOLINA, Felix P.	BC Inspector in Tacloban Aug 43. Commanding Officer of 5th Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
MOLO, Marcelo	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
MONTEJO	Pre-war Representative from Leyte. Reported to have little prestige and to have maintained a passive attitude. Listed as President of Neighborhood Association in Tacloban Sep 43.
MORALES, Eduardo	2nd Lt, BC; Commanding Officer of 3rd Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
MORANTE, Cirilo	Puppet treasurer of Tanauan.
MORON, Luis	Cpl in Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.
MORON, Elfo	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
MURILLA, A.M.	Guerilla Lt on Leyte in Jul 43.
NAZARIN, Jose	Came from Mindanao after surrender. Worked with Capt JAIN and was re- ported commanding guerrilla garrison between Liloan and Cabalian, Apr 43.
OLIVER, Antonio	Reported to be working for Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.
OLIVER, Cornelia	Puppet treasurer of Tacloban.
OMECA, Rafael	Puppet treasurer of Ormoc, Jun 43.
ORGILES, Vicente	2nd Lt, BC; Commanding Officer of 4th Leyte Co, Tacloban.
OSIENA, Ambrosio	Puppet District Engineer for Leyte Province. First reported in office Mar 43; report of Jun 44 quotes him as saying he cannot take any more work for the Jap Navy due to lack of labor and tools.
PACHECO, Juan	Capt; member of Jap Propaganda Corps in Jun 43.
PALACIO, Gregorio	Member of Jap Propaganda Corps in Jun 43.
PAMANIAN, Felix	Bvt Lt Col in Aug 43. In Mar 44 reported as Major commanding guer- rillas from Carigara and Villaba northwards including Biliran Is- land; under KANGLEON.
PAREDES	Lt; was former member of Constabu- lary. Active in the Leyte-Cebu area

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PAREDES (Cont'd)

after Jap occupation. Met by evacuee on way south and believed loyal.

PAREDES, Osing

Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.

PAREDES, Quintin, Jr.

Former Provincial Fiscal for Leyte. Succeeded by Ambrosio UMALI. Reports of Jan and Mar 44 state that Quintin PAREDES, Jr, was appointed Judge of the Court of 1st Instance of the Province and City of Cebu and the Province of Bohol, with permanent residence in Cebu. Also Judge of Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction for same district.

PASAGUI, Alberto

Puppet school principal at Tanauan, Jun 43.

PENADA, Pastor

Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.

PENALOSA, Victor

Puppet chief of police of Ormoc.

PETERS, Mrs. Hans

Living at Maasin in Jun 43.

PETILLA, Francisco

Puppet treasurer of Tolosa.

PEVIDAL, Miguel

Sgt of Police at Tacloban.

del PILAR, Emilio

Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.

PORE, F.

Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.

POSONGUY

Chinese mestizo at Carigara. C-2 to KANGLEON, Aug 43. Knows radio and photography. Reported to be working as a dentist in Mar 44.

POTENTE, Enrique

Recommended by KANGLEON as Chairman of Leyte Emergency Currency Board in Sep 43. Appointed Provincial Auditor of Leyte by KANGLEON in winter of 43.

PUNDAVELA, Emilio L., Jr.

3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.

PUNDAVELA, Manuel K.

3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.

QUEINTANA, Basilio

Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.

QUIJANO, Engracio

Reported Chief of Volunteer Guard at Tanauan, Jun 43.

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QUINTERO, Luis	Lt Col; Inspector General to KANGLEON in Aug 43. Retired member of Philippine Constabulary. Lives in northernmost Leyte. Is old and deaf but reportedly staunch and generally respected. In Mar 44 is stated to have attended a meeting of mayors called by the Japs and later to have given himself up to the Japs in return for the freedom of his family.
QUINTERO, Vicente	Puppet mayor of Tacloban, Mar 43.
RADAZA, Domingo	Lt; Assistant G-2 to KANGLEON in Aug 43.
RAMIREZ, Inocencio	Puppet District Forester of Leyte Province in Mar 43.
RAMODO, Elpedio	Guerrilla Lt on Leyte in Aug 43.
RANGAS	Guerrilla Lt on Leyte in Jul 43.
REFERZE, Hipolito	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
RELADOR, Cristito	Member of Constabulary on Leyte, Apr 43.
RELADOR, Ricardo	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
REYES, Arturo A.	Capt; Senior Constabulary Inspector; at Tacloban in Apr 44. Is in charge of all Constabulary personnel in Leyte and responsible direct to Manila.
REYES, Francisco	Puppet Provincial Warden for Leyte, Mar 43.
REYES, Francisco	Reported to have acted as Jap guide on Leyte, May 43.
de los REYES, Serafin	3rd Lt, BC, arrived at Tacloban from Manila in Apr 44.
REYES, T.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
REYNA	Puppet District Veterinarian for Leyte Province in Mar 43.
REYNA, Pacifico	Puppet treasurer of Jaro.
RIBO, Mamerto	Appointed Assistant Provincial Fiscal by KANGLEON in winter of 43.
RICHARDSON, Iliff David	Lt JG or Ensign; of MTB Sq No.3; sent to install large radio set for KANGLEON in Feb 44. Was reported to act as Liaison Officer from FERTIG to KANGLEON.

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RIEL, C.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
ROA, Semon	Puppet clerk of Tanauan, Jun 43.
ROBINIOL, Constancio	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
RODRIGUEZ, Mauro	Puppet Provincial Agricultural Superintendent for Leyte, Mar 43.
ROMAN	Constabulary Inspector at Tacloban in Aug 43.
ROMAN, Zacarias R.	2nd Lt, BC; Commanding Officer of 2nd Leyte Co, Jaro, Apr 44.
RONSON, Felix	Reported Jap guide on Leyte.
ROPA, Pedro, Sr.	Reported puppet school teacher at Tanauan in Jun 43.
SAAVEDRA, Filemon	In Sep 43 recommended by KINGLEON as Provincial Treasurer of Leyte Emergency Currency Board. Appointed Provincial Auditor by KINGLEON in winter of 43.
SABALZA, Fabian	Puppet capataz of Tanauan.
ST JOHN	From 14th Bomb Sq, 19th Gp; was operating radio station on Leyte in spring 44.
SALAZAR, Inez	Captured by Japs at Burauen. One report states she is obliged to live with a Jap soldier; another is that she is the wife of a Jap officer and has a child.
SALAZAR, Nicolas	Puppet mayor of Alangalang.
SALAZAR, Pastor	Pre-war member of Leyte Provincial Board and brother-in-law of Jose VELOSO. Was left in Leyte to assist Governor TORRES in collaborating with the Japs. Was formerly Chief of the Jap Propaganda Corps at Tacloban. Reported puppet Governor of Leyte in spring of 44.
SILVACION	Sgt in Constabulary on Leyte, Jun 43; reported very active.
SALVADOR, Lucas	Rev; at Masin, Apr 43.
SALVATIERRA, Antonio	Reported as guide in Jap drive from Tacloban to the interior of Leyte in Jun 43.
SANO, Casiano	Puppet vice-mayor of Dulag.
SANO, Nicolas	Puppet chief of police of Dulag.

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SANTA CRUZ, Alberto	Puppet Provincial Auditor of Leyte in Dec 43; same position in Mar 44.
SEEFELT, F.W.	Maj, USA (evidently retired). Member of old 11th Infantry Association, 1898-1902. Living at Maasin Nov 43. A friend of Leroy A. JONES.
SERONA, Autero	Puppet chief of police at Alangalang.
SEVILLA, Ceferino	Puppet Chief Agent, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Leyte Province, Mar 43.
SEVILLA, Pedro	Puppet treasurer of Palo.
SMITH, Russell Howard	Lt (former Sgt) from Rapid City, South Dakota. Was in 28th Bomb Sq, 19th Gp. Member of Mindanao Guerrilla forces in 43. Reported at radio station on Leyte in Mar 44.
SOLIMAN, Marcos	Maj; graduate of Ft. Benning. Chief of Staff for MIRANDA. Reported to have either surrendered to Japs in Leyte or evacuated to northern islands of Bohol in Jan-Feb 44.
TAMPIL, Gonzalo	Puppet school teacher in Tanauan, Jun 43.
TAN, Angel	Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Jun 43.
TAN, Carlos	Brother of Jorge and Jose.
TAN, Dominador M.	Assistant Director of Kalibapi in Manila. In pre-war time was member of the National Assembly from Leyte. May be related to other TANS mentioned on Leyte. Political rival of Domingo VELOSO.
TAN, Jorge	Attorney; reported to be pro-Jap and brother of Jose and Carlos.
TAN, Jose	Dr; reportedly pro-Jap; brother of Jorge and Carlos.
TAN, Manulo	Reported Jun 43 to be working for Japs on Leyte.
TAN, Teofilo	Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc, Leyte.
TANTUICO, Francisco	Appointed Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Cashier of Leyte by KANGLEON in winter of 43.
TAYLOR, Ed (?)	Was manager of cement plant at Naga on Cebu. Would not permit demolition of plant. Believed to be on Leyte as of Apr 44.

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TEMONIRA, Conrado	Reported to be Jap spy in Burauen.
TOMAS, Eleuterio	Appointed Provincial Board member for Leyte by KANGLEON in Nov '43. Reported captured by or surrendered to Japs in spring '44.
TORENO, Dining	Puppet treasurer of Burauen; was formerly mayor but succeeded by Jose CORDERO.
TORENO, Laudelino	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
TORRES, Bernardo	Puppet Governor of Leyte Province in '43; succeeded by Pastor SALAZAR. Reported to have actively campaigned for the Japs. Was manager of food production campaign in Mindanao in May '44. In Jun '44 became Director of Bureau of Agricultural Development, Ministry of Agricultural and Natural Resources, Manila.
TRUCINO, José	Reported puppet mayor of Burauen, Mar 43; succeeded by Dining TORENO.
TUMADIO, Vicente, T	3rd Lt, BC; junior officer of 3rd Leyte Co, Tacloban, Mar 44.
TUP., Aquilino	Puppet policeman in Dulag.
UMALI, Ambrosio	Succeeded Quintin PAREDES as puppet Provincial Fiscal in Feb '44. Was also appointed Special Prosecutor of the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction for Leyte in Mar 44.
URIBE, B.	Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.
VALTERO, Baleriano	Reported member of Home Guard, Burauen, Apr 43.
VELES, Jose	Reported spokesman of the Jap Propaganda Corps in Tacloban, Jun 43.
VELOSO, Antonio	Reported member of the Jap Propaganda Corps.
VELOSO, Domingo	Political rival of Dominador TAN, Assistant Director of Kalibapi in Manila. Actively helps guerrillas on Leyte.
VELOSO, Jose M.	Member of Provisional Council of State in Jan 42. Delegate from Leyte Province to 1st National Assembly under the Japs in Sep 43.

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VELOSO, Juaring

Judge at Calubian and brother of Jose. Is reported to be pro-Jap and to have given instructions to the civilians to shoot Americans on sight without fear of standing trial afterwards.

VELOSO, Julian

Filipino boy from Calubian; accompanied several Americans on a visit to American evacuees. Is suspected of subsequently betraying first group of Americans to the Japs.

de VEYRA, Eliseo

Puppet Judge of Court in Alangalang.

de VEYRA, F.

Guerrilla on Leyte in Jul 43.

de VEYRA, Vicente

Puppet secretary of Tanauan in Jun 43.

VILLAGER, Julian

Acted as guide for Jap drive from Santa Fe to the interior of Leyte in spring of 43.

VILLEGAS, Felipe

Reported to be Jap spy in Burauen.

WATERS

Capt; lived near Ormoc in May 43. Was on staff of Col McClISH, guerrilla on Mindanao. (See Blas MIRANDA).

YRASTORZA, Rafael

Reported to be working for the Japs at Ormoc.

ZAMORA, Selverio

Puppet vice-mayor of Ormoc in Jun 43.

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APPENDIX "B"

Introduction: Information set forth in this Appendix "B" supplements the data regarding guerrilla leaders in the main body of the report.

1. Guerrilla leaders:

- a. Northern Leyte: As of 7 April, 1943, Northern Leyte had the following recognized guerrilla leaders:

- (1) (Brevet) Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN
- (2) (Brevet) Col. Antonio G. CINCO
- (3) (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felix M. PAMANIAN
- (4) (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felimon PABILLONA
- (5) (Brevet) Major Isabelo CENTINO
- (6) (Brevet) Major Cirilaco CENTINO
- (7) (Brevet) Brig. Gen. Blas E. MIRANDA

- b. Southern Leyte: As of 7 April 1943 had the following recognized guerrilla leaders:

- (1) Col. Ruperto K. KANGLEON
- (2) Major Porfirio E. JAIN
- (3) Lt. Jose NAZARENO
- (4) Lt. Gordon A. LANDO U.S.N.

2. Organization:

- a. Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN had organized the whole of Northern Leyte into one division with himself as Division Commander.

- b. The Regimental Commanders were (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felix M. PAMANIAN, 95th; (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felimon PABILLONA, 96th; and (Brevet) Lt. Col. Antonio G. CINCO, 97th

- c. All of Southern Leyte was formerly organized into a "Southern Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Unit" under the leadership of Lt. Gordon A. LANDO, U.S.N., and later the command was transferred to Capt. Porfirio E. JAIN. Col. Ruperto KANGLEON then reorganized the Island's organization into two regiments, one regiment in the North under (Brevet) Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN, and in the SOUTH, one regiment under Capt. Porfirio E. JAIN. As of April 1943 the reorganization was being carried out. However, the leader of the Ormoc Sector (Brevet) Brig. Gen. Blas E. MIRANDA consistently refused to join the other groups into a unified organization for the entire island.

3. Personal background of each of the guerrilla leaders:

- a. Col. Ruperto KANGLEON was a Colonel of USAFFE and has had long service with the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary. He possesses a broad military education. He surrendered in Mindanao to the Japanese Imperial Forces, but later escaped from the concentration camp.

- b. (Brevet) Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN was formerly a 2nd Lt. in USAFFE, fought in Pangasinan against the Japanese Imperial Forces with the 91st Inf. He did not surrender to the Japanese. He eluded the Japanese, went to Rizal and Bulacan and proceeded to organize a small guerrilla unit. Later he moved to Leyte and joined the Leyte Provisional Regiment under the command of Col. CORNELL. The Japanese invaded Leyte but again BALDERIAN refused to surrender and started to organize a guerrilla unit. His activities and many encounters with Japanese Patrols have made him famous and he was recognized as the leader of all of Northern Leyte.

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- c. (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felimon PABILONA: was formerly a 1st Sgt. with the Leyte Provisional Regiment of Col. CORNELL. At the order of surrender he refused and escaped to the mountains. He then joined a guerrilla unit under the leadership of Sgt. TERRAZA, also of the Leyte Provisional Regiment. Sgt. TERRAZA was killed in action and another Sgt. by name Antonio JUAN assumed leadership. JUAN was also killed in action. Subsequently the unit was divided. Part of the men followed Sgt. PABILONA and the other part followed Ciriaco CENTINO. Sgt. Pabillon's unit increased in size and he finally became the recognized leader of one sector.
- d. (Brevet) Majors CIRIACO and Isabelo CENTINO: The two are father and son, Ciriaco CENTINO being the father and Isabelo CENTINO being the son. Ciriaco CENTINO was formerly a soldier of Sgt. TERRAZA and Sgt. Antonio JUAN (cf. Para. (c) above). When both said Sgts. were killed in action CENTINO took some of the units men and formed a separate unit. Isabelo CENTINO: was formerly a soldier of Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN. When BALDERIAN reorganized the sector BALDERIAN assigned the son, Isabelo as leader of some of his (BALDERIAN'S) own soldiers with the soldiers of Ciriaco CENTINO. Both Ciriaco and Isabelo are unschooled civilians.
- e. (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felix M. PAMANIAN: was formerly a Technical Sgt. in the Leyte Provisional Regiment. He organized a guerrilla unit and became the recognized leader of a large sector.
- f. Capt. C. CORPIN: formerly of USAFFE; fought in Pangasinan and Batangas. After the surrender he went home to Biliran Island and served with some guerrilla groups in Zambales. Later he organized the small groups of guerrillas existing on Biliran and joined the forces of (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felix M. PAMANIAN.
- g. (Brevet) Brig. Gen. Blas E. MIRANDA: was formerly a Lieutenant in the USAFFE, P.C. He disregarded the order of surrender and escaped to the mountains in back of Ormoc. He then proceeded to organize a guerrilla unit. He is an isolationist and prefers not to join with other groups on Leyte.
- h. (Brevet) Lt. Col. Antonio CINCO: was a discharged Philippine Constabulary soldier. Subsequent to the Japanese occupation of Tacloban, he was employed by the Japanese as an informer. He was reported to the Japanese authorities as being a soldier of USAFFE. He was forthwith imprisoned and was on the point of being executed when he escaped. He proceeded to the mountains and valleys of Tanauan and organized a guerrilla unit.
- i. Major Porfirio E. JAIN: was formerly assigned as the Cadre Commander at Catarman, Samar. He refused to obey the order to surrender and escaped from Samar. He proceeded to Pentuyan, Panaon Island, Leyte. Here he organized a guerrilla group in conjunction with a Lt. Nazareno who had escaped from Mindanao.
- j. Lt. Gordon A. LANG: was a yeoman in the U.S.N. who arrived in Leyte prior to the order of surrender. He went to southern Leyte to join other Americans who intended not to surrender. During the Japanese occupation he lead a group of unsundered soldiers. Through his able leadership and bravery, he was acclaimed leader of the south of Leyte and held said leadership until being succeeded by Capt. P.E. JAIN, now a Major.
- k. Capt. Pedro MERRITT: was formerly a Capt. in USAFFE, with station at Ormoc under the Leyte Provisional Regiment of Col. CORNELL. He refused to surrender and escaped to the mountains.

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He escaped to Samar and there with one Lt. Ederardo SOLIMAN, another former USAFF man, organized and led a guerrilla unit in Northern Samar.

4. Attitude of various guerrilla leaders towards each other:

All the guerrilla leaders have recognized the necessity of a unified command and a single leadership, with the exception of (Brevet) Brig. Gen. Blas E. MIRANDA, who prefers not to subordinate himself to the leadership of Col. R. KANGLEON. Apparently MIRANDA will never join with other forces unless forced so to do by higher headquarters. (This opinion is held by (Brevet) Ralph J. POSONCUI, the S-2 of the 95th Inf. Reg., 92nd Div., and concurred in by Lt. Col. J. CAUSING, Chief of Staff of the 92nd Div.)

5. Attitude of Leyte's guerrilla leaders towards leaders in other islands:

- a. To put it succinctly: There are as many attitudes as leaders.
- b. In Northern Leyte the leaders have always shown a willingness to collaborate with other leaders both inside and outside of the Province. As an example, the G-2 of the 6th Military District receives most of the information regarding Leyte, Samar and Cebu through Northern Leyte. There is also a liaison officer from the 6th MD serving with the G-2 of Northern Leyte.
- c. In Southern Leyte the leaders have been in close contact with Mindanao and Bohol by virtue of proximity. As of April, 1943, there existed an amicability towards Mindanao the 10th MD.
- d. It has been stated that "the future holds much for the unification of Leyte, and for the collaboration of Leyte and Samar with other portions of the Philippines."

6. Attitude towards released prisoners of War

a. Northern Leyte:

The policy of justice and common sense has been followed in the handling of released prisoners. All released prisoners are investigated by the G-2 Section. After a review of the situation, the prisoners are either released on pass or employed in the guerrilla organization.

b. Southern Leyte:

The policy set forth above is likewise followed in Southern Leyte; however, (Brevet) Brig. Gen. Blas MIRANDA has been very diligent in killing off many released prisoners on the pretext they are paid spies of the Japanese.

- c. It is worthy of note that both in Northern and Southern Leyte, surrendered Filipino soldiers captured by the guerrillas are not killed but interned.

7. Modus operandi of guerrillas towards civilians:

- a. General: All the guerrillas avow that their primary purpose is to help the civilians to maintain peace and order, to check the Japanese from abusing the civilians. The guerrillas have undertaken the restoration of civilian government and have taken steps to place the administration of justice and the government in civilian hands. The guerrilla leaders, as a general policy, only intervene in communal activities insofar as they relate to military matters in all its phases.

- b. Northern Leyte: The guerrilla leaders have refrained to burden the people with the support of many men under arms. They have waited for the voluntary contributions of the people to support the messing of the troops. They have not created any tax for supporting the struggle. Too, they are engaged in the restoration of the civilian rights guaranteed in the bill of rights except those of free speech

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assembly and press as these are the channels that the enemy and subversive elements may use in harming the guerrillas.

- c. Southern Leyte: The southern part of Leyte broadly follows the same principals of northern Leyte as enunciated above; however, they exact a loyalty tax on all citizens, the funds being used to support the mess and cash advances of the guerrillas to the troops.

8. Guerrilla units: Under the command of (Brevet) Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN:

- a. Northern Leyte Sector: Under the command of (Brevet) Lt. Col. Felix PAMANIAN, comprising the towns of: Carigara, Baruge, Capocan, Leyte, Calubian, San Isidro, Villaba, Biliran, Caibiran, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval.
- b. Northeastern Leyte Sector: Under the command of (Brevet) Lt. Col. Filimon PABILLON, comprising the towns of: San Miguel, Babatngon, Alangalong, and unoccupied portion of Tacloban.
- c. Jaro Pastrana Sector: Under the command of (Brevet) Major Isabelo CENTINO, comprising the towns of: Jaro, Pastrana and Palo.
- d. Eastern Leyte Sector: Under the command of (Brevet) Lt. Col. Antonio CINCO, comprising the towns of: Tanauan, Dagami, Tolosa, unoccupied portions of Burawen, Dulag and La Paz.

9. Guerrilla units: Under the command of (Brevet) Brig. Gen. MIRANDA: the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Unit, comprising the towns of: Palompon, Merida, Albuera, Baybay, and unoccupied Ormoc. (According to information of February, 1944, the Japanese landed in MIRANDA'S area and all members of the staff fled to Bohol).

10. Guerrilla units: Under the command of Col. Ruperto KANGLEON, PA: The Southern Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Unit, comprising the towns of: Hilongos, Hidaug, Inopacan, Bato, Matalon, Maasin, Macabon, Malitbog, Sogod, Libagon, Liloan, Pintuyan, Cabalian, Hinundayan, Hinunangan and Abuyog. N.B. The units under the command of (Brevet) Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN are now under the command of Col. R. Kangleon by virtue of the fact that (Brevet) Col. BALDERIAN has placed himself under the command of Col. KANGLEON.

11. Location of troops and the CP's as of 7 April, 1943:

- a. Col. Ruperto KANGLEON, CP at large.
- b. (Brevet) Col. Alejandro BALDERIAN, CP Dagami.
- c. (Brevet) Lt. Col. F. PAMANIAN, CP Capocan.
- d. (Brevet) Lt. Col. F. PABILLON, CP San Miguel.
- e. (Brevet) Lt. Col. A. CINCO, CP Tanauan (Cabasaran).
- f. (Brevet) Major P. E. JAIN, CP Bato
- g. (Brevet) Major I. Centino, CP Jaro

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HEADQUARTERS
ADVANCE ECHELON
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE F.R. EAST

A. P. O. 501
13 January 1945.

INSTRUCTIONAL NOTES

ON

PHILIPPINE CIVIL AFFAIRS

This is not a directive. It is a set of notes prepared for the instruction and use of PCAU personnel. It amplifies and supplements data contained in USAFFE Circular No. 7, dated 13 January, 1945. In the light of experience these Instructional Notes will be amended and revised from time to time.

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INSTRUCTIONAL NOTES

ON

PHILIPPINE CIVIL AFFAIRS

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- Emergency Payment Vouchers.
- Emergency Purchase Vouchers.
- Agreement for Purchase of Civilian Houses.

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PHILIPPINE CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. POLICY.

a. Proclamations.

The Commander-in-Chief's broad policy toward the Filipino people is contained in the proclamations attached hereto and marked "Annex A". The Commonwealth Government's policy as to currency, banks, and debt moratorium is contained in the Executive Order No. 25 of President Osmena attached hereto and marked "Annex B".

b. General.

- (1) During the landings and subsequent periods of active combat, the existing local administrative organizations in most cases will be dislocated and ineffective. PCAU's are the agency which assist the Commander in carrying out his responsibility for civil affairs and relief. They are not combat units, and are to be used primarily for civil administration and relief.
- (2) One of the most important functions of PCAU's is to help the provincial and municipal officials to assume full measure of responsibility for civil government as promptly as possible. The performance of a PCAU, other than one accompanying actual combat units, will be largely judged by the speed with which effective and unaided civil government by civilian officials is established in areas in which the unit is operating.

2. ORGANIZATION OF PCAU's.

- a. Composition: The composition and strength of PCAU's will be kept flexible. Units will be formed to meet the special requirements of the area to which they are assigned. In areas of major operations, units may be used in multiple. For planning purposes only the following may be considered as a basic type of PCAU:-

OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
1 Unit Commander	(1 Clerk 6 Assistants 2 Carpenters)
1 Labor Officer	1 Clerk
1 Legal Officer	1 Clerk
1 Supply Officer	3 Assistants
1 Relief & Welfare Officer	(1 Mess Sergeant 4 Cooks)
1 Finance Officer	1 Assistant

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OFFICERS (Cont'd)

ENLISTED MEN (Cont'd)

1 Public Safety Officer	10 Policemen
1 Medical Officer	4 Medical Assistants
1 Transportation Officer	1 Assistant
1 Engineer Officer	(2 Engineer Assistants 2 Carpenters)

TOTAL: 10 Officers & 39 Enlisted Men.

NOTE: The above duty assignments are tentative. Personnel must be trained to assist in any phase of civil administration and relief.

- b. Duties of PCAU: PCAU's are prepared to assist the appropriate commanders in civil administration and relief as set forth in 2a, USAFFE Circular No. 1.

c. Functions PCAU Personnel are Trained to Perform:

- (1) Unit Commander will be responsible for the execution and supervision of duties assigned to PCAU's. He and his officers will utilize the services of qualified local personnel to the maximum extent possible. Appointment of temporary municipal officials will be made promptly. Notification of such appointment and names of appointees will be forwarded promptly to Civil Affairs Section USAFFE for transmission to the Commonwealth Government.
- (2) Labor Officer will be responsible for the procurement of civilian labor as stated in Section 3c.
- (3) The Legal Officer will:
 - (a) Prepare public instructions and other legal papers.
 - (b) Assist in securing property required for the use of combat units or of PCAU's.
 - (c) Direct persons asserting claims against the United States to the Base Claims Officer.
 - (d) Ascertain the availability of the local Justice of the Peace. It is probable that in many municipalities there are Justices of the Peace, properly appointed before the war, who are legally qualified to function as Justices of the Peace. PCAU's are authorized to continue such officials in office, after approval by the CIC Detachment in the area, pending action by the Commonwealth Government.

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(4) Supply Officer will:

- (a) Draw relief and essential supplies from Army or Base Commanders.
- (b) Sell supplies for cash only, in accordance with Section 7, to commercial distributors at the earliest opportunity, turning in the receipts of sales to the PCAU Finance Officer. QMC Form 386 will be used in all such cash sales with the signature of the civilian purchaser affixed thereto. No credit will be given.
- (c) See that ceiling prices are not exceeded in the resale of these supplies.

(5) Relief and Welfare Officer will:

- (a) Distribute relief supplies except those sold to commercial distributors. The advice of responsible local citizens should be sought as to what families are actually in need of relief.
- (b) Obtain receipts for free relief supplies wherever practicable.
- (c) Assist the Supply Officer in the maintenance of ceiling prices.
- (d) Assist in reopening schools. Textbooks and equipment should be collected and school building made available as soon as practical.

(6) Finance Officer will:

- (a) Be responsible for the execution of the functions laid down in Section 2c.
- (b) He will pay employees and assistants of PCAU's and labor recruited by PCAU's.
- (c) He will pay, in accordance with USAFPE Circular No. 7 temporary officials and school teachers at basic rates prevailing on 31 December 1941 or as modified by subsequent action of the Commonwealth Government. "Temporary Officials" includes all officials, school teachers, doctors, nurses and other governmental employees including Philippine National Government officials or employees actually working for provinces or municipalities. Such payments will cease when acting or permanent officials are appointed by the Commonwealth Government and funds made available for payrolls by the Commonwealth Government. Additional compensation for temporary officials as PCAU assistants is authorized to be paid by PCAU's only if services are performed for PCAU's over and above the normal pre-war duties of the individuals concerned. Basic compensation

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will be paid on a voucher or payroll under "Temporary Officials." Additional compensation will be paid on a separate voucher or payroll under "PCAU Assistants." Vouchers for payment of temporary officials will include only the type and number employed on 31 December 1941, so far as determinable. All other persons employed by PCAU's will be included on the vouchers as PCAU assistants. Both types of voucher will be charged against War Department appropriations.

- (d) In making payments under paragraph (c) vouchers or payrolls will be used which clearly show that the payments are being made to temporary officials, or PCAU assistants, listing their type of work in reasonable detail, and the period covered by the payments. Each voucher or payroll for basic compensation of temporary officials will be signed by the payee with the certification that the salary paid does not exceed the prescribed rate. Such vouchers or payrolls will be forwarded by the PCAU Finance Officer through channels in the same manner as other vouchers or payrolls.

- (e) Inasmuch as these vouchers or payrolls may be presented to the Commonwealth Government for re-imbursment, they should be prepared carefully in accordance with these instructions.

(7) Public Safety Officer, in cooperation with the military police, will:

- (a) Assist in re-establishing the local police force and enforce law and order among the civilian population.
- (b) Assist in guarding supplies and public buildings.
- (c) Be responsible for preventing civilians from interfering with military operations and for enforcing safety regulations.
- (d) Cooperate with members of C.I.C. who will inform him of civilians being detained by them.
- (e) Be particularly vigilant to aid in maintaining proper relations between the guerillas and the civilian populations. Guerillas are military forces and have no responsibility for civil government in liberated areas.

NOTE. It has been reported that gold bullion is in circulation in some provinces of the Philippines. Bullion bars are reported to have been stolen from mining companies shortly before the actual occupation by the Japanese. Persons found in possession of gold bullion should be subjected to thorough investigation and the bullion impounded.

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- (8) Medical Officer is responsible for carrying out the medical program as stated in Section 2d.
- (9) Transportation Officer will be responsible, primarily for providing essential transportation for PCAU. He will assist in re-establishment of local transportation.
- (10) Engineer Officer will be responsible, to the extent of his capabilities, for the repair of utilities, bridges, water supply, and other facilities which have not been taken over by the military authorities, but which are essential to the civil population.

d. Medical Responsibility.

(1) Local Personnel: The PCAU Medical Officer will:

- (a) Obtain information relative to the availability of local physicians, nurses, school teachers, midwives, pharmacists and qualified helpers.
- (b) Allocate and coordinate the activities of local physicians and nurses employed by the PCAU for the care of the civilian population.
- (c) Establish rates of pay for doctors and nurses.
 1. Doctors will be paid 150 to 200 pesos per month depending upon specialized training. Doctors employed by PCAU will not be permitted to maintain outside practice without the specific written permission of the PCAU Medical Officer.
 2. Nurses will be paid 75 pesos per month.

(2) Health and Sanitation: The PCAU Medical Officer is responsible for:

- (a) The detection, control and prevention of all communicable diseases in the civilian population, particularly those diseases which may be a hazard to military operations.
- (b) The institution and the control of quarantine and isolation procedures among civilian population when justified by the medical situation.
- (c) The institution of measures for the prevention, control, and treatment of Malaria in the civilian population and the prevention of the spread of Malaria from civilians to military personnel.

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(a) The immunization, when necessary, of civilians against:

1. Cholera.
2. Smallpox.
3. Other diseases when the situation demands.

(c) Keeping himself informed of the causes of civilian deaths in occupied areas.

(3) Hospitals and Dispensaries. The PCAU Medical Officer, if means are available, will establish and operate hospitals and mobile and fixed dispensaries for the treatment of civilians in liberated areas, prior to the establishment of facilities for such medical care by the Philippine Commonwealth Government.

(4) Coordination, Reports, and Medical Supplies. The PCAU Medical Officer will:

- (a) Work in close coordination with the Army and Base Surgeon on matters relating to communicable diseases in occupied areas.
- (b) Keep the PCAU Commander informed of the medical situation among civilians, the status and distribution of medical supplies and equipment and other relevant matters.
- (c) Prepare and send through channels to the Chief Public Health Officer, Civil Affairs Section, USAFME, APO 501, a monthly report as of 2400 hours the last day of each month, covering the following subjects:
 1. The general situation and progress in the control of communicable diseases.
 2. The situation and development of facilities for civilian medical care. The number and location of hospitals and dispensaries established by PCAU. The number of hospital patients and the number of out-patients will be listed and classified whether treated by PCAU, Philippine Government, Army, or privately operated facilities.
 3. The state of sanitation and the progress of improvements in sanitation.
 4. Approximate amount of medical and sanitation supplies used and estimates for future needs on a 60-day basis.

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(d) Prepare as of 2400 hours each Friday, except the first Friday after entering the area, a weekly communicable disease report (Form HH-1, copy attached as Annex C). This report will be dispatched by the most expeditious means directly to the Chief Public Health Officer, Civil Affairs Section USAFFE, APO 501, and information copies will be sent to intermediate headquarters as required.

(5) Civilian Labor: PCAU Medical Officers will not examine civilian laborers or provide medical care of Philippine labor assigned to the military establishments except in emergencies. Their primary function is to organize measures to promote the health of the civilian population.

c. Finance.

- (1) The use of Japanese Notes (A-a), Philippine National Bank Notes, other than duly authorized emergency notes, Bank of the Philippine Islands Notes, and new Central Bank Notes is forbidden.
- (2) Victory Series of Philippine Treasury Certificates will be exchanged at par for old Philippine Treasury Certificates.
- (3) For the purpose of carrying out his functions, the PCAU Finance Officer will be appointed Class B Agent Officer to the accountable disbursing officer of the unit to which the PCAU is attached, or to the accountable disbursing officer in the area in which PCAU is operating. The PCAU Finance Officer will obtain funds from his disbursing officer in an amount to be determined by estimated labor requirements in the area of operations together with whatever amount it is estimated will be needed for exchange purposes. The PCAU Finance Officer will turn over the currencies exchanged to the accountable disbursing officer and receive credit therefor.
- (4) Fiscal Director USAFFE will publish a list of appropriations to which disbursements will be charged. The disbursing officer will supply this information to the PCAU Finance Officers and to the various U. S. Army Officers certifying payrolls.

f. Price Fixing:

The ceiling price of basic commodities and charges for certain personal services have been fixed for the Province of Leyte by Executive Order No. 24 as amended by Executive Order No. 26 of the Commonwealth Government, a copy of each of which is attached and marked "Annex D". These prices are maximum prices. (Appropriate adjustment below these prices should be made where local conditions, age or condition of property, or similar factors warrant.) These prices and charges will also prevail in other liberated areas until otherwise ordered. Additional price lists may be issued to cover items not included in Orders of the Commonwealth. Where additional price lists are issued, under the authority of Army or Base Commanders, copies should be sent to Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE so that a measure of uniformity may be maintained.

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3. CIVILIAN LABOR:

- a. In each operation, Commanders will make maximum use of Philippine Labor.
- b. President Osmona has urged his people to assist the military forces by offering their services.
- c. The tactical commander is responsible for the recruitment and pay of civilian labor in combat areas as long as any area is under his jurisdiction. In view of the limited personnel assigned to PCAs and the special training for the task with which they are charged, it will be necessary to restrict their responsibility for recruiting labor. PCAs will, therefore, be limited to recruiting labor for combat units, for all units in areas where there is no ASCOM representative and for their own use in carrying out their prescribed functions, except in areas specifically designated by the appropriate commander. ASCOM will recruit and pay labor for all other purposes in combat areas.
- d. As soon as control of an area passes to the Commanding General, USASOS, the latter is charged with the responsibility for recruitment and pay of civilian labor within that area.
- e. All PCA's will be charged generally with the duty of notifying civilians of the need for civilian labor and directing them to, and so far as possible helping them to reach, the nearest recruiting point for labor for other than combat units.
- f. Civilians will only be employed on essential projects. Civilians will not be employed on "made work" as a relief measure.

4. PAYMENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR:

a. Wages:

Wage and salary rates for all labor and other civilian personnel hired by the armed forces will be paid in accordance with the schedule set forth in "Annex E" attached.

b. Vouchers:

Emergency Payment vouchers (Annex F attached) may be used until an area passes to the control of the Commanding General USASOS. They will be certified by the officer having general supervisory responsibility, or his deputy. In areas under USASOS control, payments will be made on Standard Form #1015 (Payroll for Personal Services), and in form as prescribed by Finance Bulletin 150, 1942. Vouchers will be prepared in quadruplicate, and if meeting the requirements above, will be accepted by the accountable officer as evidence of proper payment. Distribution of copies will be as shown on the voucher. Payment may be made by the disbursing officer or his class "A" or "B" agent officers.

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- c. Payment will ordinarily be made weekly or at the termination of the job if less than a week. Payment to caregivers and others hired on a daily basis may be made daily. Payment may also be made daily where necessary to avoid hardship to laborers. Payment will be made to each individual laborer. Under no circumstances will payments be made to a capataz or straw boss for distribution to laborers.

5. PURCHASE OF LOCAL SUPPLIES:

Until an area comes under USASOS control, PC&U's may make purchases of such supplies on the Emergency Purchase Voucher attached, (see Annex G), except in areas specifically designated by appropriate commanders. In areas under USASOS control, purchasing will be the responsibility of SOS and payment will follow normal purchase procedure. WD Form #332, (Public Voucher for Emergency Purchases and Non-personal Services, not exceeding \$100.) with proper supporting invoice, may be utilized for this purpose.

6. MOVEMENT OF CIVILIAN HOUSES:

- a. In connection with the movement of civilians from areas required by the Armed Forces, it is advisable to pay immediately the owners of nipa houses for the property to be destroyed or moved. PC&U's may make such payments on the basis of the agreement form set forth in Annex H. This form may be used in any areas other than Areas under the control of the Commanding General USASOS. The forms will be prepared in five copies by the PC&U officer who has been assigned the responsibility for execution of the transactions. He will be designated a Class A finance agent officer to effect on-the-spot payments. He will furnish the original and one signed copy to the PC&U finance officer, one signed copy to the Base Engineer, one signed copy to the Base Claims Officer and he will retain one copy for his file. Leases of land will be handled subsequently by USASOS.

- b. The ceiling price to be paid will be figured as follows:

<u>Type of Construction</u>	<u>Payment per sq ft.</u>
(1) Nipa roof and walls with floors	P0.45
(2) Nipa roof and walls with third group (opitang, red Luan) or fourth group (white Luan) lumber flooring	P0.60
(3) Nipa roof, third group (opitang red Luan) or fourth group (white Luan) lumber for walls and floors.	P1.30

Two story houses should be figured on the basis of the first floor area times 1.50.

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- c. Wherever possible, the owner of the nipa house should be allowed all salvage and given time to effect its removal. It is also recommended, where practicable, that the unit concerned provide transportation for this purpose.

7. EMERGENCY RELIEF.

Civilian Emergency free relief will be provided only as long as and to the extent necessary. At the earliest practicable date, all relief supplies, including captured enemy property and excess, unserviceable and salvaged U. S. military supplies, will be sold. Such sales will be made for cash through normal civilian commercial channels to the maximum extent practicable, but if commercial channels are not available, sale of relief supplies to the civil population through U. S. Army sales commissaries are authorized. Sales to employees of U. S. Military Forces through U. S. sales commissaries, or in an emergency through PC&U's, is authorized. No credit will be given.

8. REPORTS.

Army commanders and the CG, USASOS will be called upon to make various reports on civil affairs and relief activities. Standard forms will be prescribed for such reports by the commander responsible for the area reported upon.

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ANNEX A

PROCLAMATION

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES:

I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil - soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed, to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people.

At my side is your President, Sergio Osmona, worthy successor of that great patriot, Manuel Quezon, with members of his cabinet. The seat of your government is now, therefore, firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

The hour of your redemption is here. Your patriots have demonstrated an unswerving and resolute devotion to the principles of freedom that challenges the best that is written on the pages of human history. I now call upon your supreme effort that the enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people within that he has a force there to contend with no less violent than is the force committed from without.

Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike. Strike at every favorable opportunity. For your homes and hearths, strike! For future generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of your sacred dead, strike! Let no heart be faint. Let every arm be steeled. The guidance of divine God points the way. Follow in His Name to the Holy Grail of righteous victory!

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

PROCLAMATION

PATRIOTS OF THE PHILIPPINES:

Seldom has a military commander penetrated enemy occupied shores with a greater potential of interior support than that which I today rely upon from the people of the Philippines.

It is a support whose strength is measured largely in value of the spirit - an unconquerable spirit which despite the ordeal of war still remains unbroken and defiant. Such a spirit, born of a desire and nurtured upon a determination to be free, inevitably overwhelms material force however ruthlessly applied and rises to its heights when the hour for liberation strikes. That hour has struck!

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It but remains to guide this great interior force to maximum utilization without exposing the people to undue and needless sacrifice.

I shall from time to time promulgate specific instructions to guide your effort relying fully, however, upon your innate common sense to gauge the limitation of your local action. Your general course of conduct should conform as far as practicable with the following concepts:-

1. Secure your families with such food as is available to you, as rapidly as possible at points away from vital enemy installations which our military forces shall ceaselessly attack with increasing violence until destroyed.
2. Support the local commander whom I appoint over the area in which you reside or, if none is so appointed, the local leader of the resistance movement.
3. Avoid any assistance to the enemy, but to the contrary, harass him incessantly, taking full advantage of every favorable opportunity to do so; harass him by disrupting his means of communication and his essential lines; harass him by destroying his munitions, food, fuel, transport and other vital supplies; and harass him by cutting down or subduing him at every turn, to the end that he may know no rest or relaxation within your community - that no enemy soldier may escape the fate which inexorably confronts all - death or surrender.
4. To the people in areas far removed from the zone of active operations, I counsel a period of alertness and preparation - a period in which full advantage must be taken of favorable opportunities to strike decisive blows, but in which premature or ill-considered action, if it be at the expense of needless loss of life, is to be avoided.
5. Above all, I call for unity among the people - that unity so essential to the development of maximum strength at this critical time. Let the depth of your patriotism and your love of freedom rise above all differences, factional quarrels, disputes and petty jealousies, that all patriots unflinchingly may march shoulder to shoulder toward a common destiny.

The duration of the campaign and the human suffering which inevitably follows in the wake of war will be determined, in large measure, by the extent of your support. May God strengthen you to meet this test.

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

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PROCLAMATION
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whereas, the military forces under my command have landed on Philippine soil as a prelude to the liberation of the entire territory of the Philippines; and

Whereas, the seat of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines has been re-established in the Philippines under President Sergio Osmena and the members of his cabinet; and

Whereas, under enemy duress a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on 14 October 1943 based upon neither the free expression of the peoples' will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States, and is purporting to exercise Executive, Judicial and Legislative powers of government over the people.

Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

1. That the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippine free of enemy occupation and control; and,
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and extend to the people of the Philippines the sacred right of government by constitutional process under the regularly constituted Commonwealth Government as rapidly as the several occupied areas are liberated and the military situation will otherwise permit; and

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
General, U. S. Army,
Commander-in-Chief.

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RESTRICTED
PROCLAMATION

PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID, COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.

WHEREAS, evidence is before me that certain Citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations.

NOW THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army, as Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.

Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day of December 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army, United States Army
Commander in Chief

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ANNEX B

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 25

PROMULGATING RULES AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING CURRENCY, BOOKS
AND ACCOUNTS OF BANKS AND THEIR BRANCHES AND AGENCIES IN THE
PROVINCES, PROVINCIAL, CITY AND MUNICIPAL TREASURIES AND OTHER
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS AND DEBT MORATORIUM

WHEREAS, it is essential that the financial and monetary structure of the Commonwealth of the Philippines be maintained on a sound basis.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SERGIO OSMEÑA, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, do hereby promulgate the following rules and regulations concerning currency, books and accounts and debt moratorium for all areas free from enemy occupation and control throughout the Philippines.

I. CURRENCY

1. The new Victory Series of Philippine Treasury Certificates (Victory Pesos) and the Philippine coins identical to pre-war issues now in circulation will be legal tender.

2. All pre-war Philippine Treasury Certificates and coins will continue to be legal tender and may be exchanged at par for the Victory Pesos if so desired by the holders.

3. The rate of exchange will be two Victory Pesos for one United States dollar. Transactions at any other rate are prohibited.

4. For each province liberated from the enemy, an Emergency Currency Committee will be appointed by the United States Army and the Commonwealth Government to study, investigate and report on the bona-fide emergency currencies issued by duly authorized currency boards. The Committee will ascertain the extent of the authority given to such boards, the amount of emergency currency actually printed and issued, and will recommend as soon as possible the redemption of the currencies found to be legally issued. In case it is found out that in a given province more emergency currencies were in circulation than the amount actually authorized to be issued, the Committee will recommend what action shall be taken: Provided, however, that counterfeit emergency currencies will not be redeemed.

5. The printing and issuance of additional emergency currencies are hereby prohibited.

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6. Japanese currency, Philippine National Bank Notes (except duly authorized emergency issues), Notes of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, New Central Bank Notes and unauthorized emergency currencies are not legal tender. Transactions in these currencies are prohibited.

II. BANKS, TREASURIES AND OTHER
ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS

1. The books of banks, their branches and agencies in the provinces, provincial, city and municipal treasuries and other government accountable officers will be sealed forthwith and existing accounts frozen, as of the date the province, city, or municipality is liberated from enemy occupation and control, pending further action by the Government. All books, accounts and previous records as closed shall become inactive, filed and preserved for reference and other purposes as may be required.

2. Provincial and municipal treasurers and other accountable officials will open new books of account as soon as their respective offices are duly reconstituted, observing strictly the existing accounting laws, rules and regulations pertaining to accounts and accounting system of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

3. Provincial treasurers will accept for safekeeping new savings deposits in pre-war Philippine Treasury Certificates and Victory Pesos. Withdrawals in cash only of not less than one peso may be made from each savings account upon presentation of the deposit book. No interest will accrue on such deposit. In addition to opening new savings accounts, provincial treasuries will provide facilities for exchanging United States dollar for Victory Pesos.

III. DEBT MORATORIUM

1. Payment of all debts and other monetary obligations contracted after December 31, 1941, except debts and other monetary obligations entered into in any area after declaration by Executive Order that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.

Done at the Seat of Government in the Field, this 18th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-four, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the tenth.

/s/ Sergio Osmeña
President of the Philippines

BY THE PRESIDENT:

/s/ Arturo B. Rotor
Secretary to the President

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COMMUNICABLE DISEASE REPORT
(WEEKLY)

PHILIPPINE CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT

GEOGRAPHIC AREA:

ESTIMATED PRESENT POPULATION
OF THIS AREA:

PERIOD OF THE REPORT:

FROM TO 24
DATE REPORT DISPATCHED

SIGNATURE OF PCAU OFFICER

First case to be
found should be
reported immedi-
ately by telegraph
or radio(Typhus, epid-
emic, louse
bown
Leishmaniasis
(Malaria, Dengue,
Dysentery, etc.)NUMBER OF NEW CASES
FOUND DURING THE
PERIOD OF THIS
REPORT.ESTIMATE AS TO WHETHER
THE NUMBER OF CASES IS
"MORE", "AVERAGE", OR
"LESS" THAN THE USUAL
NUMBER EXPECTED IN THE
AREA.

1. Malaria
2. Dengue
3. Dysentery, bacillary
4. Dysentery, amoebic
5. Dysentery, undiagnosed cause
6. Gastro-enteritis
7. Typhoid fever
8. Paratyphoid fever
9. Meningitis, epidemic
10. Measles
11. Chickenpox
12. Diphtheria
13. Encephalitis
14. Poliomyelitis
15. Influenza
16. Mumps
17. Pneumonia
18. Weil's disease
19. Typhus, murine, flea borne
20. Jaundice epidemic
21. Yaws
22. Ascariasis
23. Hookworm
24. Schistosomiasis
25. Tuberculosis, active,
infective
26. Syphilis
27. Gonorrhea
28. Lymphopatia Venereum
29. Granuloma inguinale
30. Leprosy
31. Rabies
32. Tetanus
33. Anthrax
34. Favaemia

I. PCAU MEDICAL ASSISTANTS EMPLOYED:

(Name)

PHYSICIANS
(Duty)

(Location)

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

DENTISTS

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

REGISTERED NURSES

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

VETERINARIANS, PHARMACISTS & OTHERS

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

II. STATUS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

III. GENERAL SANITATION.

IV. IMPROVEMENTS MADE OR CONTEMPLATED DURING PERIOD OF REPORT.

V. REMARKS.

Medical Officer

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report will be accomplished by the PCAU Medical Officer as of Friday midnight each week and one (1) copy sent directly by the most expeditious means to the Chief Public Health Officer, Advance Echelon, USAFFE, Civil Affairs Section, APO 501. Copies will be furnished Surgeons of intermediate headquarters as required.
2. If there are no changes in the PCAU medical assistants employed (par. 1), the words "No change" will be written in the appropriate columns in subsequent reports.

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ANNEX D

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 24

Amending Executive Order No. 371 of October 2, 1941, fixing the maximum selling prices of certain articles of prime necessity, and promulgating rules and regulations for the enforcement thereof.

WHEREAS, in view of the shortage of food, other articles of prime necessity, and services caused by the war, it is essential to the welfare of the people that the fixing of the maximum selling prices of such articles as promulgated on October 2, 1941, be continued with such modifications as circumstances may require;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SERGIO OSMENA, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, do hereby prescribe and promulgate the following schedule of maximum prices in the province of Leyte:

A. MAXIMUM SELLING PRICES

PRODUCT	UNIT	PRICES PAID BY WHOLESALE	PRICE PAID BY RETAILER	PRICES PAID BY CONSUMERS
1. RICE-ELON	cavan ganta litro	P 7.20	P 7.30	.32 .11
2. RICE NATIVE UNHUSKED (PALAY)	cavan	3.00		
3. CORN-MILLED	cavan ganta litro	4.45	4.60	.21 .07
4. CORN-GRAIN	cavan ganta litro	3.62	3.73	.18 .06
5. WHEAT-FLOUR-AMERICAN OR AUSTRALIAN	49-lb sack kilo	3.01	3.10	.15
6. VEGETABLE LARD	kilo	.32	.33	.35

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MAXIMUM SELLING PRICES (Cont'd)

PRODUCT	UNIT	PRICES PAID BY WHOLESALE	PRICE PAID BY RETAILER	PRICES PAID BY CONSUMERS
7. CORN BEEF, CANNED	12 oz tin(case 48) 12 oz tin	P15.50	P15.98	.35
8. SARDINES, CANNED	15 oz tin(case 48) 15 oz tin	6.91	7.15	.16
9. SUGAR, BROWN REFINED	picul(63.25 kilo) kilo	8.34	8.60	.14
10. SALT	ganta kilo	.08	.09	.10 .05
11. MILK-CONDENSED	case 48 cans(14oz) 14 oz can	13.38	13.79	.30
12. MILK EVAPORATED	case 48 cans(14oz) 14 oz can	7.58	7.73	.17
13. VIENNA SAUSAGE, CANNED	case 48 cans(4 oz) 4 oz cans	6.88	7.09	.16
14. PORK AND BEANS, CANNED	case 48 cans(16 oz) 16 oz can	4.05	4.18	.09
PORK	kilo			.40
BEEF	kilo			.60
CARABAO MEAT				.45
FISH (FRESH):				
First class	kilo			.40
Second class	"			.30
Third class	"			.20
Fourth class	"			.10
19. FISH (DRIED):				
First class	kilo			.80
Second class	"			.60
Third class	"			.40
Fourth class	"			.20

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R E S T R I C T E D
MAXIMUM SELLING PRICES (Cont'd)

PRODUCT	UNIT	PRICES PAID BY WHOLESALE	PRICE PAID BY RETAILER	PRICES PAID BY CONSUMERS
20. FISH (SALTED BUT NOT DRIED):				
First class	kilo			P .60
Second class	"			.45
Third class	"			.30
Fourth class	"			.15
21. FISH: SALTED, SMALL, such as Ginamos, Bolinaw, Bagon etc.	Petroleum can (5 gal) (See Appendix)			5.00
22. EGGS	Dozen			.36
23. VEGETABLES				
Cenotos	1 Petroleum can (5 gal)			.50
Hantac	Small bundle			.01
Patola	For each 3			.10
Opo	Each			.10
Caguedilla	Bundle			.01
Tancong	"			.01
Tomatoes	For each 2			.01
Holabtog	For each 5			.01
Gabi	Each			.05
24. CHICKENS	Each depending on size			.25 to 1.20
25. BANANAS	Each			.01
26. SOAP				
Large size bars (approx. 1 kilo)	Each			.30
Small size bars (approx. 1/2 kilo)	Each			.16
27. LAUNDRY				
Pants	Each (pair)			.15
Slacks	Each			.15
Shirt	"			.15
Drawers	"			.05
Under shirt	"			.05
Towel	"			.05
Wash cloth	"			.02
Handkerchief	"			.02
Sox	" (pair)			.02

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R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D
MAXIMUM SELLING PRICES (Cont'd)

PRODUCT	UNIT	PRICES PAID BY WHOLESALE	PRICE PAID BY RETAILER	PRICES PAID BY CONSUMERS
27. LAUNDRY (Cont'd)				
Sheet	Each			P .15
Pillow case	"			.05
Mattress cover	"			.20
Denims per suit	"			.25
Cap	"			.05
Minimum charge				.50
28. HAIRCUT				.50
29. SHAVE				.20

The maximum selling prices herein fixed will supersede the prices provided for in Executive Order No. 371.

Any person, firm or corporation who shall sell any article included in the above schedule at prices in excess of the maximum selling prices herein fixed shall be punished as provided in Section 3 of Commonwealth Act Numbered Six Hundred as amended.

Done in the seat of Government in the field, this 6th day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen and forty-four, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the ninth.

SERGIO OSMEÑA
President of the Philippines

By the President:

ARTURO B. ROTOR
Secretary to the President

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R E S T R I C T E D

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APPENDIX TO EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 24

CLASSIFICATION OF FISH

First Class

- | | | |
|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1. Aguas | 21. Duyong | 41. Morenay |
| 2. Agumaa | 22. Guingao | 42. Mublad |
| 3. Agu-ot | 23. Hawolhawol | 43. No-os |
| 4. Apahan | 24. Kabasi | 44. Pagapa (big) |
| 5. Babakulan | 25. Kalapion | 45. Pahabela |
| 6. Badlong | 26. Kasili | 46. Panapsapan |
| 7. Bag-angan | 27. Konihan | 47. Pargo |
| 8. Bagtao | 28. Labajora | 48. Pasayan |
| 9. Baha-ulo | 29. Langasi | 49. Pawikan |
| 10. Bakoko | 30. Langooy | 50. Rome Candado |
| 11. Balanak | 31. Lapis | 51. Sakalan |
| 12. Balo | 32. Lapulapu | 52. Sandatan |
| 13. Bangos | 33. Lokon | 53. Sandig |
| 14. Bangros | 34. Lomod | 54. Tabangugu |
| 15. Bankules | 35. Magka-agum | 55. Tangigui |
| 16. Baragsikul | 36. Magkutod | 56. Tarukitok |
| 17. Bayang | 37. Malasugi | 57. Tasi |
| 18. Bilibol | 38. Mamsa | 58. Tawa-ay |
| 19. Buntok | 39. Mangagat | 59. Turingan |
| 20. Buraw | 40. Maripati | 60. Ugapang |
| | | 61. Urang (big) |

Second Class

- | | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Adgawan | 15. Kikiro | 29. Palad |
| 2. Aguyong | 16. Kirawan (small) | 30. Paratpot |
| 3. Bugaong | 17. Kini | 31. Sagisi-on |
| 4. Balira | 18. Kugita | 32. Sarobasib |
| 5. Bolinao | 19. Labongan | 33. Silag |
| 6. Borokon | 20. Lahing | 34. Sinaw-an |
| 7. Busaw | 21. Langbiyaw | 35. Solid |
| 8. Crabs | 22. Lonong | 36. Sonog |
| 9. Dalagang bukid | 23. Losod | 37. Talho |
| 10. Dapak | 24. Malatindok | 38. Tamyok |
| 11. Darapugan | 25. Hangit | 39. Tanbantamban |
| 12. Gapasgapas | 26. Mayanaya (small) | 40. Tamban |
| 13. Hapon | 27. Molanbolan (small) | 41. Tambong |
| 14. I-ito | 28. Oso-os | 42. Ogdok |

Third Class

- | | | |
|--------------------|------------|---------------|
| 1. Gono | 5. Malimno | 9. Solaybagyo |
| 2. Gutan | 6. Pakol | 10. Talho |
| 3. Ibis | 7. Sapsap | 11. Tigui |
| 4. Tomo-on (small) | 8. Sir | 12. Yawo |

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APPENDIX TO EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 24 (Cont'd)

CLASSIFICATION OF FISH (Cont'd)

Fourth Class

- | | | |
|----------|--------------|-------------------|
| 1. Bakul | 2. Pali-ad | 3. Bokawil |
| | 4. Sangpiyad | 5. Talaba & bhong |

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 26

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWENTY-FOUR
ENTITLED "AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 371 OF
OCTOBER 2, 1941, FIXING THE MAXIMUM SELLING
PRICES OF CERTAIN ARTICLES OF PRIME NECESSITY
AND PROMULGATING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
THE ENFORCEMENT THEREOF."

In order that cases of violation of the ceiling prices set forth in Executive Order No. 24 of November 6, 1944 could be handled by Justice of the Peace courts, the paragraph prescribing penalties for said cases of violation should be amended to read as follows:

"Any person, firm or corporation who shall sell any article included in the above schedule at prices in excess of the maximum selling prices herein fixed shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or a fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both."

Done in the Seat of Government in the Field, this 21st day of November, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-four, and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the tenth.

SERGIO OSMENA
President of the Philippines

By the President:

ARTURO B. ROTOR
Secretary to the President

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ANNEX E

WAGES AND SALARIES

Wage and salary rates for labor and other civilian personnel employed by the Armed Forces will be established in accordance with the following scale:

- | (1) <u>Daily Wage (8 hr. day)</u> | <u>Classification</u> |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1.00 peso (plus rations) | Common labor. |
| 1.20 pesos (plus rations) | Semi-skilled labor (sub-foreman, apprentice tradesman) |
| 1.50 pesos (plus rations) | Skilled labor--tradesmen, foreman or capataz, clerks, (cargadores in actual combat zones) |
| 2.00 pesos (plus rations) | Chief foreman or chief capataz, chief clerks, (Foreman or capataz in actual combat zones) |
| 2.50 pesos (plus rations) | Chief foreman or chief capataz in actual combat zones. |
- (2) Each wage will be increased by 25 centavos when rations are not furnished.
- (3) No increase in wage rate will be made for overtime. Overtime will be computed on an hourly basis in ratio to base pay. Base pay equals the daily wage in (1) above plus 25 centavos.
- (4) Common laborers working on shifts beginning at 1700 hrs and 2400 hours will be paid 1.50 pesos when rations are not furnished for working from 5 p.m. to midnight and from midnight to 7 p.m. with one hour out for feeding on both shifts. This is 25 centavos more than the standard day wage for an 8 hour day. The same differential of 25 centavos is applicable for skilled laborers and capatazes working on these shifts.
- (5) Small Boat Crews:
- | <u>Daily Wage</u> | <u>Classification</u> |
|-------------------|------------------------------|
| 1.25 pesos | Sailor |
| 1.50 pesos | Quartermaster |
| 4.00 pesos | Qualified, licensed Engineer |

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- | <u>Daily Wage (Cont'd)</u> | <u>Classification (Cont'd)</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 3.00 to 3.50 pesos | Qualified, Assistant Engineer |
| 4.50 pesos | Qualified, licensed Captain |
| 3.00 to 4.00 pesos | Qualified, licensed Pilot |

Quarters and rations will be furnished in addition to the above wages.

(6) Other Civilian Personnel:

- | <u>Monthly Wage</u> | <u>Classification</u> |
|---------------------|--|
| 200/250 pesos | Chief Clerks, Trained Accountants, Supervisors of Office and Field Personnel, Engineers, having considerable responsibility and exercising independent judgment. |
| 125/175 pesos | Skilled Stenographers, Bookkeepers, Shipping and Property Clerks, Surveyors and Assistant Engineers. |
| 60/100 pesos | Typists, General Office Clerks, Telephone Operators, Investigators. |
| 50/75 pesos | Relief and First Aid Helpers. |

These rates are established principally for the Manila area with the minimum rate applicable to other urban areas such as Cebu, Iloilo, Davao, and Zamboanga, but if necessary these rates may be used elsewhere. In Leyte it has been found that the wage rate for labor is usually adequate for the limited office personnel required. If employees with different or higher qualifications than those listed above are required, the unit commander or other employing authority may establish temporary salary scales for such employees. Such temporary salary scales should have a reasonable relationship to the above listed scales and should be reported to Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE as soon as established so that a measure of uniformity may be maintained.

RESTRICTED

Voucher paid by _____, Class B agent
to _____, Accountable Disbursing Officer.

EMERGENCY PAYMENT VOUCHER
(Approved, GHQ, SWPA December
1944 under combat conditions)

Date _____

The services obtained by this instrument are necessary and have been authorized and performed satisfactorily under my general supervisory responsibility.

[illegible]

I certify that I have this date paid to the following number of Philippine civilian laborers for services rendered Army of the United States the amounts indicated:

[illegible]

Signature of U.S. Army Officer
making payment _____

Rank, Serial Number and Unit _____

Signature of U.S. Army Officer
or Civilian witnessing payment _____

Rank or title and address _____

Designation of using agency _____

Purpose for which services rendered _____

(This space for use of Accountable Disbursing Officer)

Appropriation

Amount

(Converted @ \$.50 to the Peso)

NOTE: To be prepared in quadruplicate. Original and duplicate to Accountable Disbursing Officer, triplicate retained by Class B agent, quadruplicate copy to Fiscal Director, USAFTE, APO 923.

Agent's Vou. No. _____ ANNEX G _____ D. O's. Vou. No. _____

Voucher Paid by _____, Class B Agent
to _____, Accountable Disbursing Officer

EMERGENCY PURCHASE VOUCHER
(Revised form appd. CHQ., SWPA,
Dec. '44 under combat conditions)

[illegible]

The United States, DR., Date

To _____
(Payee)

Address _____

[illegible]

I certify that the above bill is just and correct and that payment therefor has not been received.

Payee _____ (Sign Original Only)

I certify that the above articles were purchased under emergency conditions; that prices paid were just and reasonable; that the articles have been received and will be used for the following purposes:

Signature of Army Officer
making purchase

(Sign Original Only)

Rank	Title
------	-------

Received the sum of P _____ in payment of the above bill.

(Payee Sign Original Only)

(This space for use of Accountable Disbursing Officer)

Appropriation

Amount

(Converted @ \$1.50 to the Peso)

NOTE: To be prepared in quadruplicate. Original and duplicate to Accountable Disbursing Officer, triplicate retained by Class B agent, quadruplicate to Fiscal Director, USAFPE, APO 923.

The supplies obtained by this instrument are necessary and have been obtained under my general supervisory responsibility.

FORM S (Purchase of Improvements)

ANNEX H

DATE _____, 194__.

This agreement made the _____ day of _____, 194__, between _____

_____ who represents himself as having the right or authority to sell the property described herein, hereinafter called the OWNER, and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter called THE GOVERNMENT,

WITNESSETH:

That in consideration (of the furnishing by THE GOVERNMENT of other accommodations and)¹ (of the sum of _____ pesos paid by THE GOVERNMENT to the OWNER, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged as full consideration for any sums due under this agreement).

the OWNER sells to THE GOVERNMENT all structures and improvements located upon, and conveys any right of possession to, the premises described as follows:

and consents to the removal of all structures and improvements by THE GOVERNMENT from the premises described.

In the event that the OWNER owns the real property described, it is agreed that the compensation provided for herein does not cover the rental value of the real estate.

This agreement supersedes any previous agreement between the parties affecting the same property and includes all agreements covering the property in question and no alteration shall be effective, except an alteration in writing.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have this day set their hands and seals in duplicate.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY: _____

OWNER: _____

WITNESSED:

Philippine Commonwealth, Provincial or Municipal Official.

True Copy:

E. G. Crossman, Lt. Col. A.U.S.

Executive Officer, Civil Affairs Section, USAFFE.

¹Note: Strike out language not applicable.

B1603
S.50
R/8

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1603

Folder : 11

Folder Title : 98-USF1-15: Hq/USAFFE - Report - USAFFE
Board Report No. 185 (40mm AAA Gun Fire
against Ground Targets) (9 May 1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-2715

Report - USAFFE Board Report No. 185 (40MM AAA Gun Fire Against Ground Targets)

Hq. USAFFE

9 May 1945

Box 1603

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
APO 501

EAK/r

9 May 1945

FEED 334

USAFPE Board Report No. 185.

SUBJECT: Effectiveness of 40mm AAA Gun Fire Against Ground Targets.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.
(Thru: Combat Analysis Section, Operations Division, WDGS -
To : The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces).

1. PURPOSE: To report the effectiveness, as determined by test firings, of 40mm AAA gun fire against ground targets.

2. SOURCE: A report to the Commanding General, 14th AA Command submitted by Lt Colonel JOHN L. HITCHINGS, CAC, Commanding Officer 6th AAA Group, under whose supervision the test described herein was conducted. The firing was done by the 382nd AAA Battalion, commanded by Lt Colonel D. M. CRAIG, CAC.

3. THE TEST: To determine the effectiveness of the 40mm AA gun against representative ground targets, five problems were fired by the 382nd AAA Battalion of the 6th AAA Group.

4. PRELIMINARY FIRING: Before the problems, a vertical tin target was set up at a range of six hundred (600) yards and thirty (30) rounds were fired on it with armor-piercing ammunition to determine the approximate probable error of the gun with average gunners. After ranging shots had put the gun on the target, two slow fire problems of ten (10) rounds each were fired. In the first, half of the shots were inclosed in a rectangle eleven (11) inches wide by twenty-six and one-half (26½) inches high. In the second, half of the shots were inclosed in a rectangle twenty-four (24) inches wide by fourteen (14) inches high. In a ten shot rapid fire problem, half of the shots were inclosed in a rectangle twenty-six and one-half (26½) inches wide and eighteen (18) inches high. It was thus found that with average gunners firing at a range of 600 yards a probable error of approximately one foot both laterally and vertically could be expected in both slow and rapid fire.

Firing on water targets indicated that a very slight increase in accuracy was obtained by using a mortar sight, M2A1 (81mm), or by using the Weiss M-7 sight. The final tests were made, however, with the issue forward area sight. In all problems, preliminary and final, direct fire only was used. Ranges selected for the final problems were believed representative of actual battle conditions.

5. PROBLEMS:

a. Problem 1 (See Series 1 Photos).

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CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200-9, Sent. 27, 1958
NWE *Aug 18, 1960*

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC: USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 185, subj: "Effectiveness of 40mm AAA Gun Fire Against Ground Targets", dtd 9 May 45. (cont'd)

Target: An actual Japanese light machine gun with three prone silhouettes, partially concealed in grass.

Range: 350 yards

Visibility: In spite of bright sunlight, this target was extremely hard to pick up with the naked eye; the gunners were furnished with field glasses and permitted to study it.

Number of guns firing: One

Type of ammunition: 4 ranging shots of AP; 16 rounds of HE.

Rounds to silence: One

Rounds to neutralize: After a total of 20 rounds, the silhouettes were blown to small bits. The machine gun was knocked over and one of the legs of its bipod broken off; it was otherwise unharmed.

Firing time (first to last shot): 1 minute 42 seconds.

b. Problem 2 (See Series 2 Photos).

Target: Two stationary armored vehicles; an American half track facing sideways, and an American scout car, with the motor intact, head on. Two sitting and three standing silhouettes were placed in each car. The armor (one-half inch front shield for personnel and one-fourth inch side), was at least as heavy as that used in any Japanese tank likely to be encountered.

Range: 460 yards.

Visibility: Targets were in the open, perfectly visible in bright sunlight.

Number of guns firing: Two guns engaged each target.

Type of ammunition: Each gun fired eight (8) rounds alternating between AP and HE, then followed with four (4) rounds of HE on each target.

Rounds to halt: The half track would have been halted by the seventh round. The head-on scout car would have been halted by the first round, which struck the motor.

Rounds to neutralize: At the end of twenty-four (24) rounds the body of the half track was blasted open and all silhouettes completely destroyed, (see series 2HT Photos). At the end of an equal number of rounds the scout car had its radiator blown off, its motor

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC: USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 185, subj: "Effectiveness of 40mm AAA Gun Fire Against Ground Targets", dtd 9 May 45. (cont'd)

wrecked, its upper front armor blasted open, and its silhouettes completely destroyed. The gas tank, which ignited on the second round, turned the vehicle into a furnace completing its destruction (See Series 2SC Photos).

c. Problem 3 (See Series 3 Photos).

Target: An actual Japanese 37mm anti-tank gun, in good condition, with three (3) kneeling silhouettes, partially concealed by grass in a little natural hollow on a hilltop.

Range: 560 yards.

Visibility: Fair; about as might be expected in combat. Bright sunlight.

Number of guns firing: Two guns.

Type of ammunition: Each gun fired four (4) rounds of AP, then two (2) rounds of AP alternating with two (2) of HE, then nine (9) rounds of HE.

Rounds to silence: After seven (7) rounds all personnel at the gun would have been casualties; the gun appeared out of commission.

Rounds to neutralize: After a total of thirty-four (34) rounds, the shield was blasted off, the barrel blasted loose, and the traversing mechanism ruptured. The silhouettes were completely destroyed.

Firing time (first shot to last shot): 2 minutes 16 seconds.

d. Problem 4 (See Series 4 Photos).

Target: An actual Japanese 75mm mountain howitzer, in good condition, with three (3) kneeling silhouettes partially concealed in grass on a crest, but not skylined.

Range: 650 yards.

Visibility: Poor, in spite of bright sunlight. The target was difficult to pick up with the naked eye.

Number of guns firing: Two guns.

Type of ammunition: Each gun fired eight (8) rounds alternating between AP and HE, then followed with eight (8) rounds HE.

Rounds to silence: After eight (8) rounds, all personnel at the gun would have been casualties.

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC: USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 185, subj: "Effectiveness of 40mm AAA Gun Fire Against Ground Targets", dtd 9 May 45. (cont'd)

Rounds to neutralize: After a total of thirty-two (32) rounds snowheel was knocked off the gun, the shield blasted off, and the instrument seats blasted out of shape. All silhouettes were completely destroyed.

Firing time (first to last shot): 2 minutes 23 seconds.

e. Problem 5 (See Series 5 Photos).

Target: A pillbox, constructed of nine (9) inch logs with an open embrasure about eight (8) inches by twenty-four (24) inches. Coral was piled up in front. An actual Japanese heavy machine gun was sited through the embrasure. There were five silhouettes, three (3) prone, and two (2) kneeling, in the pillbox. Camouflage was better than usually found on similar Jap installations in this area. Construction was checked by Captain WILLIAM E. WINTERSTEIN, Ord, of the Technical Intelligence, who stated that it was of representative Japanese construction.

Range: 600 yards

Visibility: Only the embrasure could be distinguished with either the naked eye or field glasses.

Number of guns firing: Four guns.

Type of ammunition: Each gun fired four (4) rounds of AP and eight (8) rounds of HE.

Rounds to silence: It took approximately twelve (12) rounds to get an HE round through the embrasure. This perforated all the silhouettes inside the pillbox.

Rounds to neutralize: After a total of forty-eight (48) rounds the coral was blown away from the front of the pillbox and the logs forming its face were blasted out. The entire inside of the pillbox was riddled with HE fragments, and the silhouettes were completely destroyed. The Japanese machine gun was virtually unharmed.

Firing time (first to last shot): 1 minute 45 seconds.

6. CONCLUSIONS:

a. That the probable error of the 40mm AA gun, in either slow or rapid fire, at ranges up to 1500 yards is (with well trained gunners) approximately half a mil, laterally and vertically.

b. That at 400 yards the opening round can usually be put on the target. That from 600 - 1000 yards about five (5) ranging rounds are required for an adjustment by each gun.

- 4 -


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BASIC: USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 185, subj: "Effectiveness of 40mm AAA Gun Fire Against Ground Targets", dtd 9 May 45. (cont'd)

- c. That where AP hits will show, adjustment should be made by AP instead of HE, to prevent obscuring the target with smoke.
- d. That on stationary ground targets too rapid a rate of fire in adjustment should be avoided since the target remains obscured by smoke. That the rate of fire during adjustment should be just rapid enough to prevent return fire (about one round every five seconds).
- e. That when an adjusting round is secured well placed on the target, it is possible to change to automatic fire and place a number of rounds almost through the same hole.
- f. That a "mixed clip" of two (2) rounds of AP alternating with two (2) rounds of HE is a highly effective load against all targets, including heavy materiel such as armored vehicles and cannon. (See Series 2, 3, and 4 Photos).
- g. That against moving armored vehicles, fire should be opened with mixed clips using full automatic fire.
- h. That the 40mm AP shell, when striking thin armor plate will splinter the plate with deadly effect on the personnel behind it. (See Photo 2HTc, front door).
- i. That the 40mm HE shell has a local but violent effect, capable of rendering personnel within ten (10) yards of it casualties, of blasting a hole six (6) inches or more in diameter in thin armor plate to riddle everything behind the plate, (See Photo 2HTc); and of twisting small gun parts which have been directly hit. (See Photos 3b, 3c, 4b).
- j. That the accuracy of the 40mm AA gun makes it possible to shoot through the embrasures of pillboxes and neutralize them up to a range of 1000 yards. (See Photo 5c).

For the COMMANDING GENERAL:


JAMES A. CALLENDER,
Captain, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

18 Incls;
18 Photos in 5 Series
Series 1 - 2 Photos
Series 2 - 8 Photos
Series 3 - 3 Photos
Series 4 - 2 Photos
Series 5 - 3 Photos

- 5 -


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






1866








1466



2 HTa



2 HTa

1466




2HT6



24T6

1466



2HTc




2HTc



2HTc



PLH2



2HTc



PLH2

1465





2504



1466



RSCb




RSCb

1466




2SCC



2SCD



25C2



25C2




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1466.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

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Folder : 12

Folder Title : 98-USF1-15.0: Antiaircraft Intelligence (21 Aug
1943)

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12 (end)

98-USFI-15.0 A/G Intelligence

21 Aug 43

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Box 1603
13 (end)

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ANTIAIRCRAFT
INTELLIGENCE

Prepared by
Office of the Antiaircraft Officer
Headquarters, USAFFE, APO 501

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*Approved for Release
When Not Usable*

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—
ANTI-AIRCRAFT INTELLIGENCE
—

Prepared By:
Office of the Antiaircraft Officer
Headquarters, USAFFE, APO 501
21 August 1943

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ANTI-AIRCRAFT INTELLIGENCE

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ANTI-AIRCRAFT INTELLIGENCE

I. GENERAL

A. Purpose

1. The purpose of this manual is to interpret certain basic instructions outlined in official documents as they apply to antiaircraft artillery brigades, groups and separate battalions and to standardize methods of reporting, recording and disseminating information. Under conditions where it is impracticable to withdraw personnel from combat for centralized instruction it is intended that this manual serve as a guide to intelligence officers in the field.

B. Military Intelligence

1. Definition

Military Intelligence has been defined as interpreted information concerning a possible or actual enemy or theatre of operations from which conclusions are drawn. It includes information concerning enemy capabilities and possible lines of action as well as details pertaining to the territory controlled by him or subject to his influence.

2. Kinds of Intelligence

Military Intelligence as applied to antiaircraft artillery

combat units is divided into three classes as follows:

- a. Combat Intelligence
- b. Counterintelligence
- c. Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service (AAAIS)

II. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

A. Definition

1. Combat Intelligence generally includes military information in the field after the outbreak of hostilities by Military Intelligence Sections of all units.

2. Antiaircraft Combat Intelligence is the information produced as indicated above upon which commanders of antiaircraft units in the field may take appropriate action regarding the emplacement of weapons and materiel, the warning against air attack, and the coordination of activity.

B. Responsibility

1. Intelligence constitutes a vital element in the commander's

estimate of the situation. It is a basic function of command to initiate and coordinate the search for the necessary information. In addition, a commander may be given reconnaissance missions or demands for specific information by higher authority. Requests for information are made by lower and neighboring units. These may or may not coincide with his requirements for information.

2. The Intelligence Section under the direct control of the Intelligence Officer is a means provided to assist the unit commander in accomplishing his mission. The Intelligence Staff is charged with collecting, collating and interpreting information and disseminating it to all concerned.

C. Sources of Information

1. Sources of information are generally as follows:

- a. Captured documents
- b. Interrogation of prisoners
- c. Inspection and analysis of captured equipment
- d. Interview of informed individuals
- e. Reports from higher or adjacent units
- f. Maps and aerial photographs
- g. Observation and personal reconnaissance

2. Prompt action should be taken to prevent prisoners of war from destroying captured documents or materiel.

3. The battalion intelligence officer should conduct such interrogation of prisoners as may be necessary or specifically prescribed by higher authority. Normally prisoners of war are evacuated to higher headquarters at the earliest opportunity. A brief report should be forwarded stating circumstances of capture to include the following data:

- a. Unit making capture
 - b. Date, hour, and place of capture
 - c. Total prisoners captured by class (officers, non-commissioned officers and privates)
 - d. Degree of resistance encountered and casualties inflicted.
4. Papers, documents, identifying garments, or insignia stripped from prisoners or casualties should be forwarded to the next higher headquarters with reports.

5. Examination of captured documents and materiel is a function of the intelligence officer. Disabled aircraft, tanks, and similar materiel should be examined promptly and stripped of items of technical design that will be of interest. These should be forwarded to higher headquarters without delay.

D. Channels of Information

1. There is a regularly established channel of antiaircraft intelligence which, if closely followed will circulate necessary information to those who must make use of it. The chain of collecting and reporting of information normally travels from lower units to higher authority. That of dissemination of military intelligence normally travels from higher to lower echelon.

E. Duties of Intelligence Officers

1. The duties of the antiaircraft intelligence officers in the echelons of command are as follows:

a. Battalion Intelligence Officer

This officer is charged with the duty of collecting, collating, and forwarding to higher authority all information concerning the enemy which may be received from any source. He must set up and maintain the AAAIS in his battalion, coordinating it with other intelligence available. He must be in a position to advise the battalion commander concerning the terrain, customs, habits, and language of friendly or possibly friendly peoples which his unit may encounter. He must obtain for his commander all available information concerning enemy activities. He is responsible for the counterintelligence of his unit and must initiate whatever steps may be necessary to insure combat security.

b. Group Intelligence Officer

The duties of this officer are much the same as those of the battalion intelligence officer outlined above, although his capacity primarily is supervisory.

c. Brigade Intelligence Officer

This officer is responsible for the supervision of the functioning of intelligence sections of subordinate units or the brigade. He prepares for publication, the necessary instructional memoranda, conducts

intelligence and aircraft recognition schools, consolidates unit reports, and supervises the dissemination of military intelligence received from higher headquarters.

d. Antiaircraft Intelligence Officers of Staff Sections or Higher Commands

An antiaircraft intelligence officer may be appointed within the appropriate staff section of a higher command. This officer is charged with coordinating the efficient and effective functioning of antiaircraft intelligence within the command. Supervision of antiaircraft combat intelligence, AAAS, and counterintelligence come within his immediate control. He acts in an advisory capacity to the staff section chief on matters which may be related to the employment of friendly antiaircraft units. Memoranda regarding pertinent information of value and interest to antiaircraft and related units issue from his section. Close cooperation with other staff sections is necessary in order that proper duties may be performed.

e. A table of duties of antiaircraft intelligence officers is included in the Appendix (A)

F. Reliability of Information

Information transmitted should be complete in every known detail. Facts which seem unimportant may, when compared with those already received, assume primary importance. In reports it is advisable to state the source from which information has been obtained. Verification from separate sources of equal reliability is preferable. Unverified information should be used with caution. At times certain military activity may verify information received from questionable sources.

G. Collation of Information

1. The purpose of collation is the arrangement of information in a systematic manner to facilitate its use by the antiaircraft intelligence officer immediately concerned. The process involves the maintenance of a suitable classification and filing system and the use of a situation map.

a. Classification and Filing System

The intelligence officer of each unit must adapt his procedure to the needs of his unit. Simplification of method is advisable.

b. Situation Maps

(1) The employment of a situation map by the unit intelligence officer simplifies the location of geographical points or features mentioned in dispatches and permits the unit commander to follow the general action in progress. In some cases a joint operations and intelligence map is advisable.

(2) It is often necessary to show on the situation map certain friendly dispositions in order that the enemy situation might be more readily understood. The information necessary to accomplish this purpose is obtained from S-3 and all information in regard to enemy dispositions should be furnished promptly to S-3 for inclusion on the operations map.

(3) The intelligence situation map is used to record graphically enemy ground dispositions and the known presence of enemy naval vessels so that proper precautions may be taken against attack from land or sea by commanding officers. All available information concerning the disposition of enemy aircraft should be plotted on the map so that the direction, probable intensity, and type of enemy air attack might be anticipated.

H. Dissemination of Intelligence

1. Intelligence is normally disseminated in the following.

a. Personal contact

It is frequently possible for the intelligence officer to transmit information either in person or by telephone. When the latter method is used, careful attention must be given the type of network used and remarks should be guarded accordingly. In cases where commercial telephone is used, the conversation should be introduced by the statement, "This is a commercial phone". Dissemination of military intelligence by means of the telephone should not be employed except in cases where the information is wholly innocuous, where speed of transmission is a factor, or where no other means of communication is available.

b. Special Messages

When it is impossible or impracticable to transmit important information either in person or by telephone, special messages

may be dispatched. The most expeditious means of transmittal should be employed. These may assume the form of simple messages, informal letters, or formal reports.

c. Conferences

The exchange of information between the various military intelligence sections of higher, lower and adjacent units is facilitated by frequent conferences between the staff officers concerned. The conference is a means of developing unity of thought and interest. It is felt that frequent conferences will be of more benefit to the lower units than will infrequent formal inspections.

d. Reports

These are classified as follows:

(1) Formal reports. Reports of this nature may refer to situations, operations, or conditions and may take the form of periodic or special reports. Normally reports cover a single subject or situation.

Copies of formal reports may be considered an essential part of the intelligence file.

(2) Informal reports. Informal interoffice or desk memoranda, drafts, and check sheets should be resorted to when possible to save time. These may be supplemented at some future date by a more formal document or may be disposed of. Carelessness in transmitting highly secret information to informally is to be avoided.

e. Summaries

These are authentic digests of up-to-date information issued periodically.

f. Bulletins and Publications

These are matters of general information pertaining to combat intelligence, counterintelligence, and similar subjects. They may be reproduced in whole or in part and published to the command. Frequently this type of document includes historical data of local or general nature.

g. Classification of Documents

(1) All orders, pamphlets, maps, diagrams, publications, or manuals and similar matter, except messages, originating in this theatre of operations are classified as "restricted" unless given a more

restrictive classification.

(2) Documents containing confidential or secret matter will be prepared, classified, marked, and transmitted, and safeguarded as prescribed in AR 380-5.

h. Forms

Forms of reports appearing in the Appendix (B, C, D) are the results of trials in the field and have been found to be adequate. They are to be used as guides rather than requirements. Changes may be made to fit specifications and special needs of units.

III COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. Definition

Surprise is highly important to permit military forces to gain their objectives within minimum time and with minimum losses. It is dependent among other things upon the efficiency and effectiveness of counterintelligence measures. These measures are either negative, designed to conceal actual situations and intentions, or positive, intended to create in the minds of the enemy certain erroneous estimates of our situation, plans or capabilities.

B. Responsibility

The commander is responsible for all counterintelligence measures within the command. In the appropriate echelons the intelligence officer is responsible to the commander for the preparation of plans for such measures and for their coordination and surveillance.

C. Secrecy Discipline

1. It is expected that the enemy will have a highly organized espionage system, against which military personnel in all echelons must be constantly on guard. Even though continuous attack is made upon hostile underground activity, it will not be broken up completely. It is only through continuous vigilance and strict obedience of security regulations that the efforts of espionage may be frustrated.

2. Officers and enlisted men should not discuss military instructions, plans, operations, movements, composition or location of troops, casualties, morale, military equipment or supply, results of sabotage, air action or gunfire, or any other military subject in the

presence or hearing of any strangers, military or civil. Staff officers and their clerical assistants should be extremely discreet.

3. In making preparations for operations, frequently it will be advisable to take special precautions to maintain secrecy. Conferences regarding troop movements, projected operations and like matters should be attended only by individuals directly concerned. Proper precautions should be taken to prevent the attendance of others.

4. The intelligence officer of the unit participating in a movement should provide for the destruction of all files, documents, and papers not essential to the further operations of the unit. Under certain conditions these files, documents, maps, etc. will be properly marked and transferred to higher echelon.

5. The intelligence officer should inspect all positions formerly occupied by his unit to insure that all traces of identification and other information of possible value to the enemy have been eliminated. Through policing of areas to destroy all abandoned papers is mandatory.

D. Censorship

1. The object of censorship is to prevent information of military value from reaching the enemy, to insure that only accurate accounts of military activities are published, and to maintain friendly relations with allied and neutral nations.

2. All officers charged with censorship duties should delete statements in a private communication which contravene censorship regulations without destroying or suppressing the letter. However, an officer charged with such duties may destroy the communication when the whole is objectionable. In any case, the writer need not be informed of the action of the censor unless formally investigated with a view to trial.

3. Censorship officers will respect and observe the secrecy of information which comes into their possession. They will never discuss of divulge such matters either in public or in private, except when the interests of the service require a report to higher authority.

E. Enforcement of Security Regulations

If necessary, Articles Of War 104, 96 and in certain cases 81 may be invoked in order to enforce security regulations. Before resorting to Courts Martial, however, officers and men should understand thoroughly

the importance of security and the damage which can be caused through careless conversation or actions.

IV. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAAIS)

A. Definition

1. The great speed and wide radius of action of aircraft require that surveillance of the air by means of observation from the ground be continuous even beyond the defended area. This observation is maintained by the personnel of antiaircraft artillery units and comprises, with the communication net, the Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service (AAAIS).

2. The Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) is not established with antiaircraft personnel and should not be confused with AAAIS.

B. Responsibility

The AAAIS is established by the commander of the antiaircraft organization concerned. The duty of supervising the system for the commanding officer falls upon the intelligence officer.

C. Personnel.

1. The operation of the AAAIS requires especially trained and supervised observers. Sufficient personnel for this purpose is not authorized by the Tables of Organization. In consequence, men must be taken from other assignments.

2. The observer makes a slow and thorough search of the sky within his sector. All aircraft observed should be identified as to type, number of planes, direction of flight and estimated altitude. This information is then transmitted immediately to the appropriate authority. In addition to this duty, the observer studies the surrounding terrain, reporting all activity which may arouse his suspicion. If the observation post overlooks the sea, additional precaution must be taken to report all naval activity observed.

3. The observer should be trained to develop keenness of sight and hearing, to operate the signal equipment with which he is issued, to recognize aircraft both hostile and friendly, and to estimate altitudes and distances.

4. A properly trained observer will be able to report accurately the types and numbers of approaching aircraft. This will be of value to

antiaircraft troops in anticipating the type of attack about to be launched and will provide a certain amount of time for the preparation of appropriate counter measures.

D. Radar

1. The use of fire direction or searchlight direction radar equipment for AAAIS purposes to supplement or substitute for AWS information is not the normal employment of this equipment and should be closely supervised by the Intelligence Officer to prevent needless deterioration. There is no organic radar equipment allotted for AAAIS operation.

2. The ideal AAAIS includes the judicious and efficient use of radar equipment with trained visual observers. The observers comprise the outposts of the defended area. Special attention must be given to the "blind spots" in radar reception where terrain or other influences interfere with proper operation.

3. It must be assumed that the enemy has knowledge of inherent weaknesses of radar equipment and that he will profit by this knowledge unless the instruments are augmented by visual observers.

E. Filter Centers

1. A filter center should be established by the highest antiaircraft headquarters in the defended area. The purpose of the filter center is as follows:

- a. To filter simultaneously received reports on the same flight by different observers.
- b. To simplify the communications problem by decentralization.
- c. To assist in the identification of aircraft reported but not recognized by radar equipment or by observers at night or at such times when weather conditions preclude accurate reporting.
- d. To assist in Fighter-Antiaircraft cooperation
- e. To avoid unnecessary alerting of personnel.

2. The filter center should be an installation free from all other unrelated activities.

3. A filter board of such size that the operator may plot a flight by hand should be maintained at the filter center. By use of the

filter board targets may be segregated, classified and assigned.

F. Communications

1. Complete communications nets with all antiaircraft elements, air force, ground force and other operating forces in the vicinity must be maintained to insure the effective employment of AAAS information. In order to reduce the extent of telephone wire installations radio should be used discriminately.

2. It is a definite requirement that communications nets permit prompt receipt from outside sources and prompt transmittal of alerts and warnings to integral units.

3. Written reports form a basis of subsequent reports to higher headquarters and should be complete. The use of a standard form saves time and insures uniformity. A simple form for recording AAAS messages is included (Appendix E).

G. Priority

It is essential for the safety of the command that AAAS installations be set up as soon as possible after the occupation of an area. While in the early stages of the operation this may take the form of air guards, the system should be completed and in operation as an early priority.

V. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

A. Basic Principles

Military intelligence training in all echelons of command should include instructions in map and aerial photograph reading, in the collection, recording and interpretation and dissemination of information and in counterintelligence.

B. Methods

1. There are two methods of intelligence training, as follows:

a. Schools

Where the situation permits, it is recommended that schools be conducted to provide specialized training to intelligence personnel. All commissioned and enlisted members of battalion, group, and brigade intelligence sections should undergo the course of instruction. A suggested training schedule for intelligence personnel is included in the Appendix (F).

b. Training in the Field

In instances where antiaircraft units are widely dispersed in forward areas, the conduct of intelligence schools is a difficult task. To detach an intelligence officer or intelligence personnel from combat units to attend schools may detract from the use of these individuals in the field. In such cases the training of the enlisted personnel as work progresses becomes a function of the unit intelligence officer. The training schedule for intelligence personnel referred to in the preceding paragraph should be followed as closely as the situation will permit. Appropriate field manuals should be studied by enlisted personnel and informal talks on the subject covered in the schedule given to them by the unit intelligence officer.

c. Qualifications of Personnel

Officers and enlisted men selected for intelligence duty should be a good judgement, observant mind, and possess initiative, imagination, zeal, energy, and a keen sense of responsibility. Success of the Intelligence Service as a whole will depend in a large measure upon the selection of suitable personnel and their proper training.

APPENDIX

CONTENTS

- A. Duties of Antiaircraft Intelligence Officer
 - B. Form: Combat Intelligence Report
 - C. Form: Antiaircraft Intelligence Periodic Report
 - D. Form: Weekly Antiaircraft Intelligence Summary
 - E. Form: Flash Message
 - F. Training Schedule for Intelligence Personnel
-

APPENDIX "A"

UNIT		PREPARES	SUBMITS TO	SUPERVISES
A/A Brigade, S-2	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	Terrain reports Action reports Daily intelligence summary Weekly intelligence summary Replies to request for info. Bulletins and memoranda	Appropriate Task Force AA units Next higher echelon All lower units All lower units, next higher echelon Unit requesting same All lower units	All AA intelligence activity of units in brigade Censorship Security AAAIS Procurement and distribution of maps
A/A Group, S-2	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	Action reports Daily intelligence summary Replies to requests for info Periodic AA intelligence rept. AW reports Terrain reports	Next higher unit All lower units Unit requesting same Next higher unit Lower units affected Transmit as ordered	All AA intelligence activity of units in group Censorship Security AAAIS Procurement & distribution of maps
A/A Battalion, S-2	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	Action reports Daily intelligence summary Information & news bulletins Replies to requests for info. Terrain reports Memoranda	Next higher unit Batteries Batteries Unit requesting same Transmit as ordered	All AA intelligence activity of battalion Censorship Security AAAIS Procurement & distribution of maps

Duties of AA Intelligence Officers (Combat)

APPENDIX "B"

SECRET

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Organization: _____ Date: _____ 194____.

Location: _____.

Time Action Began: _____ Total Time Of Action: _____.

Time Action Ended: _____.

Time Warning Received: _____ Method of Warning: _____
(visual, sound, radar)

Range At Which Target Picked Up: _____.

Number of Planes: _____ Type of Planes: _____.

Formation of Planes: _____ Speed (approx): _____.

Altitude (approx): _____ Direction of Flight: _____.

Number of Runs: _____.

Enemy Bombs Dropped: Number of Bombs: _____
Type of Bombs : _____
Damage (est) : _____.

Remarks: (Brief description of combat, morale, etc.)

NOTE: Sketch of Enemy Runs over target area to be
submitted as part of this report.

(Name & Rank)

(Organization)

APPENDIX "C"
ANTI-AIRCRAFT INTELLIGENCE PERIODIC REPORT

From: (date)

To : (date)

Issuing Unit
Place

Date of Issue

NO : _____

MAPS: _____

1. Enemy Operations During Period:

a. Air Operations:

(Chronological information of enemy flights over area, results of activity, types of aircraft, altitude and direction of flight.)

b. Ground Operations:

(If any activity in vicinity a summary of that activity should be reported.)

c. Miscellaneous:

(Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in (a) or (b) above)

2. Enemy's Probable Knowledge of Our Situation:

(Include herein basis of statement)

3. Enemy Capabilities:

(A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission in the order of their possible imminence. For present known dispositions and other factors in the situation should be evaluated.

4. Our Own Situation:

- a. Morale
- b. Security
- c. AAAIS
- d. Liaison with adjacent units
- e. Weather, visibility, meteorological conditions.
- f. Miscellaneous.

(Name and Rank)

(Organization)

APPENDIX "D"

WEEKLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. Situation and Operations During Period:

a. General:

(Statement of situation generally)

b. Our Operations:

(Results of Air Attacks, Ground Engagements etc.)

c. Enemy Operations:

2. Enemy Weapons and Materiel:

(Information concerning new antiaircraft weapons, aircraft, and other enemy materiel not reported)

3. Enemy Tactics:

(Additional information concerning enemy antiaircraft and air tactics not reported.)

4. Miscellaneous:

(Notes on security, censorship, etc. not of sufficient importance to the basis of memorandum or bulletin)

(Name and Rank)

(Organization)

APPENDIX "E"

FORM FOR FLASH MESSAGE

(AAAIIS)

Serial No. . Date: . Time Sent:

Observation Post Number

(1) Number (1)	(2) Type of Aircraft (general)	(3) Time seen or heard	(4) Altitude	(5) Sector	(6) Direction of Flight
One	Heavy Embr		Very Low		North
Two	Observation		Low		NE
Three	Pursuit		Medium		East
—	Light Embr.		High		SE
Several	Unidentified		— ft.		South
Many					SW
					West
					NW

APPENDIX "F"

TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

SUBJECT	HRS	DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE
1. Military Organization	2	General organization of the Army. Organization of anti-aircraft artillery.	FM 101-10, Chap. I TF 25,-670 TM #14, Hq. AAC, 1943
2. Organization and duties of Intelligence Section. Fundamentals of Combat Intelligence.	4	General organization of Intelligence sections and flow of combat intelligence. Detailed functions and duties of intelligence personnel in AA units.	FM 30-5, Sect. I, II FM 101-10, Chap I FM 4-105, Par. 45 FM 4-101, Par. 9 FM 101-5, Par. 15
3. Elementary Tactics	3	Elementary instruction on the employment of gun, AW, and SL Battalions in forward and rear areas, and with other arms; cross country movements by day and by night.	FM 4-105, Par. 117 123, 137, 142, 165, 170, 171, 176, 291, 292. FM 4-101, Par. 32, 36. WDTC, #19, 1942 WDTC, #42, 1943 TM #21, Hq, AAC, 1942.
4. Collection of information.	2	Methods of collecting information by agencies within AA units; coordination with outside agencies; nature of information required; intelligence plan.	FM 30-5, Sect. III FM 4-105, Chap. 9 FM 4-101, Par. 9
5. Collation of information.	3	Includes practical instruction in the procedure of recording information in observation posts and in command posts.	FM 30-5, Sect. IV FM 4-101, Par. 9 FM 4-105, Chap. IX FM 101-5, Page 122
6. Evaluation and interpretation of information.	1	General instruction in evaluation and interpretation of information received in unit.	FM 30-5, Sect. V
7. Dissemination of Military information.	2	Disposition of information. Necessity that important information reaches units and individuals quickly.	FM 30-5, Sect VII FM 101-5, Page 114 FM 4-105, Chap. IX
8. Map Reading.	12	General course in map reading covering subject matter in references indicated; practical exercises involving location of terrain features on maps, on ground, use of foreign maps for this same purpose. This program is in addition to the 4 hour instruction prescribed in MTP 4-3 for all enlisted personnel.	FM 21-25 FM 30-20 Tent. TM "Use of Foreign Maps". T.F. 5-12, 7-233.

SUBJECT	HRS.	DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE
9. Aerial Photography	8	Practical instruction in role of aerial photography and interpretation of aerial photographs.	FM 30-21 TM 5-246
10. Conventional signs, Military symbols and abbreviations.	3	Instruction designed to familiarize personnel with subject matter as used in reading military maps including foreign maps: include exercise in drawing symbols.	FM 30-10 FM E-101-10 Chap. 4, Part 4.
11. Theory and practice of observation and operation of observation posts	20	General instruction in organization and theory of observation in AA units; Technique of observation; Practical instruction in selection, construction, and operation of observation posts; Operation of detectors.	FM 30-10 Practical demonstration of detectors.
12. Antiaircraft Artillery Intelligence Service and Aircraft Warning Service.	10	Functions of the AAAIS and AWS. Practical exercise in operation of AAAIS, including use of filter board.	FM 4-105, Chap. IX WDTC #93, 1942 WDTC #42, 1943
13. Communication	8	Include instruction in all means of communication. Include practical instruction in these means.	FM 24-5, Chap. 1 sec. II; Chap. 2, Sec. I & III; Chap. 3, Sec. 3 Chap. 5, 6, 7; Chap. 8, Sec. I, II and III. WDTC #93, 1942.
14. Allowance, requisition, distribution, use and care of maps and aerial photographs.	2.	Instruction in requisition and distribution of maps and aerial photographs; Care and use of maps; Allowance and filing of maps; filing of aerial photographs.	FM 30-20, Sec. IIX
15. Situation map and preparation of overlay.	6	Preparation and maintenance of situation maps and making of overlays; Include making of overlays under field conditions.	FM 101-5, App. III FM 30-5, Par. 21.
16. Verbal and written reports and messages	4	Practical instruction in receiving, writing, and transmission of verbal and written messages.	FM 24-5, App. III FM 4-105, Chap. 8 & 9.
17. Examination of enemy personnel, repatriates.	4	Practical instruction in procedure of handling prisoners.	FM 30-15 WDTC #81, 1942

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Folder Title : 98-USF1-19.0: (26593) Hq/USAFPE - Report -
Activities - Chemical Warfare Services,
Philippine Islands, WW II (By Colonel Stuart A.
Hamilton) (1941 - 42)

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This folder includes Oversize items
(maps, overlays, charts, etc).
It takes several frames to cover each
item in its entirety.

(NDL)

98-USF1-19.0

(26593)



Report - Activities - Chemical Warfare Service, Philippine Islands,
WWII (By Col. Stuart A. Hamilton)

Hq, USAFFE

1941-42

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ACTIVITIES
CHEMICAL WARFARE
SERVICE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
WORLD WAR II



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DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

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JAN 8 1947

26593

98-4151-19.0

To:
Major General Edward F. Wilson
The Adjutant General

With my compliments
Sincerely

"Hamm"

Stuart J. Hamilton
Colonel, CWG

Dec/46

RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS

ARMY CHEMICAL CENTER

EDGEWOOD ARSENAL, MARYLAND

IN REPLY REFER TO:

22 November 1946.

SUBJECT: Activities Chemical Warfare Service,
Philippine Islands, World War II

TO: Commanding General,
United States Forces in the Philippines
(General Jonathan M. Wainwright, Commanding General,
Fourth Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.)

1. The undersigned, formerly Chemical Officer of the Philippine Department (under Major General George Grunert), the United States Army Forces in the Far East (under General Douglas MacArthur), and the United States Forces in the Philippines (under General Jonathan M. Wainwright), successively between 14 February 1940 and 6 May 1942, was carries in a patient status at Letterman General Hospital, San Francisco, California, and at Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C., from 15 September 1945 to 27 May 1946. On 1 June 1946, he reported for temporary limited service at the Army Chemical Center, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and was assigned to duty thereat as Deputy Commander. Due to the lack of ready access to War Department records and availability of stenographic assistance while in a patient status, subject report has been delayed.

2. No attempt has been made to color or embellish the activities of the Chemical Warfare Service during the Philippine phase of World War II. Wherever possible copies of pertinent official 1942 reports and memoranda which were transmitted to the United States via various methods by the undersigned during the seige, and which are now of record in the War Department, have been included. Data and comments based upon memory and copies of personel reports made during and since release from Japanese prison camps complete the report.

3. When World War II started there were fourteen (14) officers (American), approximately two hundred seventy-five (275) enlisted men (American), and some twelve (12) Philippine Scouts (the Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment at Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I.) assigned to duty with the Chemical Warfare Service in the Philippines. This included three (3) officers and about two hundred (200) American enlisted men (CWS) on duty with the Far Eastern Air Force. By December 25, 1941 four (4) Filipino Officers and seventy (70) Filipino enlisted men had been inducted to form the 301st Chemical Depot Company (PA). This made a grand total of eighteen (18) officers and approximately three hundred fifty-seven (357) enlisted men then on duty with the Chemical Warfare Service, P. I.

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BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

William D. Telford, Adj. Gen.
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 7 Jan 46

4. The Philippine Army expansion program called for twenty-eight (28) CWS officers and seven hundred eight (708) enlisted men, all Filipinos, to be inducted into the Federal service on or about January 1, 1942. This personnel was to provide an Impregnating Company, a Maintenance Company, a Laboratory Company, and a Depot Company; however none were ever inducted except a portion of the 301st Chemical Depot Company (PA), i.e., the four (4) Filipino officers and seventy (70) enlisted men referred to above.

5. Under the provisions of WPO-3, Headquarters Philippine Department, 1941 Revision, all Chemical Warfare instruction and supply was being decentralized to better serve the rapidly growing Philippine Army. Three Chemical Warfare sub-depots were under construction on the Island of Luzon. The main Chemical Warfare Depot, which for years had been located at Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I., continued to take care of the needs of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays and attached troops. Frame warehouses approximately 50' x 200' with concrete floors and galvanized iron roofs were partially completed as follows:

Three (3) at Fort Wm. McKinley, Rizal, P.I. (90% complete)

Two (2) at Fort Stotenburg (Clark Field, Pampanga, P.I. (80% complete)

Three (3) at Nichols Field, Manila, P.I. (50% complete) - The ends and sides of these warehouses were of adobe material.

About twelve (12) adobe magazines (20' x 20') had been completed at Fort Wm. McKinley, Rizal, P. I., for storage of chemical munitions and high test fasoline and oil which were to be used in filling airplane incendiary bombs. Empty cases and fuses for these bombs were then understood (7 December 1941) to be enroute to Manila from the United States. The two warehouses at Fort Stotenburg (Clark Field), were destroyed by enemy air activity a few days after the war started as were those at Nichols Field. Those at Fort Wm. McKinley, together with their contents were set on fire by Chemical Warfare Service details on the afternoon of 31 December 1941, just prior to the entry of Japanese advance detachments into the Manila area (Pages 33, 36, and 39. Section C). There was also under construction and 95% complete a Chemical Warfare Receiving and Shipping Warehouse (50' x 180') in the Port Area, Manila, P. I. Due to the lack of storage space for supplies fast being unloaded in the Port Area, this building was turned over to the Philippine Department Quartermaster, Brigadier General C. C. Drake, QMC, (then Colonel).

6. The new Chemical Warfare Impregnating Plant, located adjacent to the Quartermaster Central Power Plant in the Port Area, had been in commission since the Spring of 1941. Impregnating operations were immediately stepped up and shifts started on a 24 hour basis. This continued subject only to suspensions due to enemy aerial activity until December 23d. The Quartermaster central power plant which supplied our power, shut down during enemy air raids. The undersigned personally supervised the destruction of the technical machinery and equipment in this impregnating plant on the afternoon of 30 December 1941. Beginning in January 1942 an emergency field method of impregnating clothing for unit Decontamination Details was carried out on Bataan and Corregidor, to the limit of QM clothing available. The impregnated outfits were packed in individual

containers and marked for the organization concerned. When the surrender of Corregidor took place practically all unit decontamination details in the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays had been equipped to include coveralls, hoods, socks, underwear, gloves, shoes and leggings. The average number was about five (5) complete sets per battery or like unit (Pages 35 to 39 incl. Section A). On Bataan the bulk of the impregnated sets was never sent to the individual decontamination units but the sets were packed, tagged and stored in the Chemical Warfare Depot (Bataan).

7. In the Manila Port Area (City delivery of the Department Quartermaster), there were some 200,000 service gas masks and approximately 80,000 training gas masks which had been received shortly before the war began. These gas masks were shipped to the Philippines in accordance with a personal request from the undersigned to the Chief Chemical Warfare Service in the summer of 1941 before Tables of Organization and Basic Allowances had been prepared and approved for the Philippine Army. Considerable amounts of other gas mask repair kits, and impregnating materials, etc., had also recently arrived from the United States based upon this same letter which indicated a probable overall strength of 200,000 for the Philippine Army as a basis of computation of Chemical Warfare requirements. As these supplies arrived they were temporarily stored in the Manila Bay area pending shipment to the sub-depots referred to in paragraph 3 above, as soon as construction of the warehouses was sufficiently far completed to house them.

8. After war broke, immediate and strenuous efforts were made to disperse the Chemical Warfare stocks in the Manila Area to the limit of available transportation (water, rail and motor) by issue to troops, and to the depots at Fort Mills, Fort Wm. McKinley, Tabacelara Warehouse, El Deposito (Old Spanish Mains), and later to the depot on Bataan. By Christmas 1941, all newly organized Philippine Army divisions and special troops on Luzon had been equipped with their initial allowance of new service gas masks in lieu of training masks. Total strength of a division (PA) was about 6,700 officers and enlisted men. Some 18,000 service masks with maintenance allowances decontamination supplies, etc., were loaded aboard the SS Corregidor at Pier #1, Manila, for shipment to the Southern Islands. She was sunk off Fort Mills on or about 18 December 1941, with a loss of all her cargo and many of the personnel aboard. Approximately 20 Filipino officers and non-commissioned officers, who had just graduated from a special one-month course in Chemical Warfare, conducted at Fort Wm. McKinley, under direction of the Department Chemical Officer were among those lost. These Filipinos were to have served as Chemical Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Southern Island Forces under Major General F. W. Sharp. An additional 18,000 service gas masks, maintenance parts, etc., were immediately loaded aboard another inter-island steamer at Pier #1, Manila. This ship also departed for the Southern Islands prior to 31 December 1941 but due to enemy activity never reached her destination. This loading and dispatching of ships, trucks, and railroad cars from the Manila Area was a slow process due to enemy air raids. One of the two Chemical Warfare Sub-depots provided for on Bataan in WPO-3, was established 24 December 1941 when the first convoy with operating personnel, depot supplies, etc., left Manila. Lack of personnel and transportation had prevented opening this depot at an earlier date. Incidentally when the advanced depot party reached the previously selected and approved site for this depot on Bataan, (according to WPO-3) the site was found to be already occupied by a Quartermaster ration dump. After a

hasty reconnaissance another area some twenty-two kilometers distant was picked out and used throughout the War. This CW-Depot at KmP-175 on the Mariveles Cut-off was destroyed by CW personnel on the night of 8-9 April 1942. Actual orders to begin destruction of this depot were received at about 10:00 P.M., 8 April 1942, although plans therefor had already been made (Page 57 - Section C). The second C. W. Depot provided for on Bataan by WPO-# was never established.

9. Practically all Chemical Warfare personnel; i.e., Headquarters Philippine Department Detachment, Fourth Separate Chemical Company (Weapons), the Chemical Warfare Service Detachments (Aviation), and the 301st Chemical Company (Depot) (PA), had departed for either Bataan or Corregidor by Christmas 1941. The undersigned remained in Manila pursuant to direct orders of the Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, Major General R. C. Marshall, (then Brigadier General), to coordinate and supervise the further shipment of Chemical Warfare supplies from Fort Wm. McKinley and the Manila Area to Corregidor and to the newly established Chemical Warfare Depot at KmP-175 on the Mariveles Cut-off on Bataan. Due both to the lack of transportation (water, rail and motor) and enemy aerial activity, it was physically impossible to transfer to either Bataan and/or Corregidor before 31 December 1941 all Chemical Warfare supplies on hand at Fort Wm. McKinley and in the Manila Bay area. The CW supplies thus remaining were made available by the undersigned in the name of General Douglas MacArthur to the senior representative of the American Red Cross (Mr. Thomas Wolfe); the Public Health Service (Dr. Aguilar); and the Civilian Emergency Administration (Secretary Sison). These latter two were agencies of the Philippine Commonwealth Government.

10. For detailed accounts of Chemical Warfare Activities after the arrival of all CWS personnel and units on Bataan and/or Corregidor (31 December 1941) copies of War Department records have been made and arranged chronologically in Section A herewith. These reports (except for a few photographs and sketches smuggled through Japanese prison camps), were prepared during the war and dispatched from Corregidor by the undersigned before 6 May 1942. Sections B and C contain reproductions respectively of an office journal and a file of miscellaneous memoranda, mimeographs, etc., kept in the Chemical Warfare Office between 7 December 1941 and 17 April 1942, which reached the War Department on 10 August 1942. Numerous other files, records, etc. were maintained throughout this period but same were destroyed, some before leaving Manila and others just prior to the surrender of Corregidor. Section D has been reproduced from copies of reports made by the undersigned subsequent to the surrender of Corregidor 6 May 1942.

11. Some amplification and coordination of certain major entries appearing in sections A, B, C, and D follows:

SECTION A

a. (Page 8, Section A), Report to Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, dated 14 March 1942, with four (4) inclosures. Note: My report of 25 February 1942, with five (5) inclosures, referred to in paragraph 1 of this report (14 March 1942) apparently did not reach the War Department as it is not in the files with other similar Chemical Warfare reports referred to herein. I have no recollection what subjects were covered in the February, 1942, report.

b. (Page 10, Section A), Report dated 14 March 1942 by 2d Lt. John A. Davis, CWS, O-393397, now deceased, on the emergency manufacture of sulfuric acid (battery electrolyte). The need for and use of this vital chemical is shown by statement from Major J. H. Shanks, QMC, Department Maintenance Officer, dated 16 March 1942, to the Quartermaster (General Drake), which reads in part -- "without which motor transportation would be out of the picture by this time". (Page 60, Section A). The first emergency sulfuric acid plant located on Cavalry-Infantry Point was bombed the latter part of March, 1942. All five (5) members of this operating detail were awarded the Silver Star in orders issued by Headquarters, USFIP (Pages 60, 61, and 62, Section C); four (4) members were killed and one member survived this Japanese air raid. A second temporary plant was immediately set up at Bottomside near the Old Coast Artillery Mine Cable Tank on Corregidor. More members of the Chemical Warfare Service (both Americans and Filipinos) immediately volunteered for the next operating detail than could be accommodated or worked at one time thereon. This second plant continued to operate intermittently until about 4 May 1942, to meet the demands for this vital chemical and still maintain a small reserve. By this time the Artillery Engineer, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, and the Signal Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines, required sulphuric acid for storage batteries of the 25 KW sets, radio batteries and batteries for the anti-aircraft artillery. (Page 47, Section B). Some 10 gallons were delivered to the HDAE and SO, USFIP, during the week immediately preceding the surrender of Corregidor, 6 May 1942.

c. (Page 11, Section A). Report of Captain Bleuford F. Daniel, CWS, 301687 (now deceased), on Method of Using Powdered Quinine in the Field. Continued efforts were made by the Chemical Warfare Service during the siege to find a substitute for this sorely needed drug, quinine. (Pages 28-31, Section A).

d. (Page 15, Section A). Thousands of emergency type "Molotov" cocktails were made at the Bataan CW Depot, using salvaged beer and Coca Cola bottles as containers, filled with a mixture of kerosene, gasoline, and crude oil. They were ignited with a wick and match (Page 15, Section A). Many of these grenades were also turned out at the Corregidor CW Depot and issued to the four forts (Mills, Hughes, Drum, and Frank) during April 1942.

e. (Pages 53-58, Section A). Report of Commander F. J. Bridget, USN, Commanding Officer of the Naval Battalion at Mariveles, contains a very commendable report of services rendered by Lieutenant Colonel Louis E. Roemer, CWS, O-15081 (now deceased), during the Logoskawayan Point operation against the Japanese in January 1942 (Page 59, Section A).

f. (Page 63-68, Section A). Report of Development of an improvised flame thrower by Captain Frank L. Schaf, Jr., CWS 396583 (then First Lieutenant), who was in direct charge of this excellent development. The pilot model employed principles of the captured Japanese flame throwers. There were no American made flame throwers on hand in the Philippine Islands on 7 December 1941 and none were received before the surrender of Corregidor on 6 May 1942, although radio information indicated that some forty (40) flame throwers had been shipped from the United States.

SECTION B

This section, as the caption and first page indicate, is a reproduction of a brief log maintained in the Chemical Office under supervision of Warrant Officer R. W. Jackson, CWS (now deceased), while at HPD, Fort Santiago, Manila, and later when the Chemical Office was moved to Hq. USAFFE, Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I. Specific reference to entries in this section would be too varied and voluminous to be included here. Only by a through reading of this section can even a small picture be visualized of the conditions, happenings, and reactions at the time these entries were made.

SECTION C

The same comments made under the preceding Section B apply to Section C.

SECTION D

a. (Page 1, Section D). Copy of report ordered and required from the undersigned while a Prisoner of War at Tarlac Concentration Camp, Tarlac, P. I., on 14 June 1942 by the Nipponese Camp Commander (Colonel Ito).

b. (Page 2, Section D). Copy of a report ordered and required from the undersigned while a prisoner of War at Karenko, Taiwan, P. I., on 22 March 1943, by the Nipponese Camp Commander.

c. (Pages 5 - 12, Section D). Reconstructed roster of Fourth Separate Chemical Company (Weapons), with tabulation of casualties, name and address of next of kin, etc. This Chemical Company was turned over to the 31st Infantry (American) for duty as individual infantryman on 1 February 1942 and fought as such on Bataan until the surrender on 9 April 1942. The total casualties (deaths from all causes) in this company amounted to sixty-six (66) percent.

d. (Pages 13 - 26, Section D). Reconstructed roster of the Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation) with tabulation of casualties, name and address of next of kin, etc. This Chemical Company was turned over to the 31st Infantry (American) for duty as individual infantrymen on 1 February 1942 and fought as such on Bataan until the surrender on 9 April 1942. The total casualties (deaths from all causes) in this company amounted to sixty-five (65) percent.

e. (Page 27, Section D). Copy of recommendation for Award of the Combat Infantrymen Badge, to the above Chemical Companies, the original of which the undersigned forwarded by personal letter to Brigadier General L. C. Beebe, GS, Chief of Staff, Fourth Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, sometime during the Spring of 1946 for consideration and approval of General Jonathan M. Wainwright. A review of the rosters of these two companies, sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) immediately above, shows that a total of one (1) officer and seventy-six (76) enlisted men returned to the United States, who would be entitled to the extra compensation authorized with this award. How many of these seventy-seven (77) individuals are still in the service is unknown to the undersigned. I again earnestly recommend that the Infantry Combat Badge be awarded to the organizations referred to above.

12. Some other activities of the Chemical Warfare Service during the siege which are not covered elsewhere in this report or inclosure thereto follow:

a. The disposal of seven (7) one-ton chlorine containers (six full and one empty) which were stored in a galvanized iron shed near Infantry-Cavalry Point on Corregidor, presented a very difficult problem due to Japanese air raids, let alone a most serious danger to the defenders of Corregidor if exploded by enemy fire prior to disposal. A heavy air raid occurred on 5 January 1942, when attempts were again being made to bleed these one-ton chlorine containers. For special meritorious action which the undersigned personally observed during this raid, Captain Frank L. Schaf, Jr., (then First Lieutenant) was awarded the Silver Star (See Page 70, Section C). Finally, by means of a prime mover, the six ton containers (filled with chlorine) were gotten down to the North Mine Dock (one at a time) during darkness, put aboard a barge and dumped overboard in the North Channel, midway between Mariveles and Corregidor. The seventh (empty) container was turned over to a Coast Artillery Battery for local storage of water.

In the same area with the ton containers there were a number of 150 pound cylinders containing chlorine, Phosgene, CNB and CNS. No valves or gauges could be found with which to bleed these cylinders. The contents of the 150-lb. cylinders of Phosgene, CNS and CNB was disposed of by puncturing them with a 30-cal. rifle bullet from a distance of about twenty feet. Incidentally, the force with which the gas came out of one punctured hole of a phosgene cylinder was sufficient to cause a heavy concentration for some twenty feet directly in front of the hole; so much so that the gas mask of one individual in the line of the escaping gas, although properly fitted and adjusted prior to firing, leaked sufficiently for the wearer to feel the effects of the Phosgene. The remaining seventy odd chlorine cylinders (150-lb.) were dispersed in four different locations on Corregidor and buried about four feet underground. So far as it is known these buried cylinders were never discovered by the Japanese.

b. There were also some 100-lb. mustard filled aviation bombs stored at Ft. Wm. McKinley, Rizal, P. I., which the Ordnance Department disposed of by dumping overboard in Manila Bay shortly before Christmas, 1941. I do not recollect just where these bombs were dropped overboard.

c. An emergency chemical laboratory was established in the rear of Lateral No. 10 in Malinta Tunnel, Corregidor, P. I. Here varied analyses and tests of captured Japanese materials, gas masks, land mine explosive charges, flame throwers, etc. were made. Water analysis tests, blood sugar analysis of patients in the hospital in Malinta Tunnel, tests for quinine substitutes, impregnated clothing, manufacture of small amounts of disinfectants and insecticides, tests on explosives, and numerous other unrelated analyses were likewise made. Reports of important tests were made to the War Department (Japanese canister analysis, Pages 5-6, Section A). Another laboratory procedure was the determination of the amount of HTH (commercial high test hypochlorite) required for the purification of drinking water. This HTH was furnished the Chemical Warfare Service originally for use in demustardizing operations. Section B contains numerous references to activities of this laboratory. Early in February 1942, when the Quartermaster ran short of water purification material, the Chemical Warfare Service was requested to help out in this matter. Small vials of HTH sufficient to give 5-ppm free chlorine for approximately 300 gallons (10 lister bag charges) were issued to troops by the CWS through the Quartermaster Corps. This continued until the surrender. The issue of vials of HTH was also continued by the CWS after the surrender of Corregidor and to a slight extent throughout the two senior American Prisoner of War Camps insofar as the supply of HTH and the small number of glass containers taken by the undersigned when leaving Corregidor on 23 May 1942 would permit. The use of this HTH for water purification undoubtedly saved many individuals from dysentery during the Bataan-Corregidor siege, as well as during interment in POW Camps.

d. Emergency field plants were set up on Bataan and on Corregidor for the manufacture of liquid bleach which was found excellent for killing mosquitos, vermin, flies, etc. Originally this lime and chlorine were furnished the CWS for use in demustardizing operations. The plant at the CW Sub-Depot on Mariveles Cut-Off, Bataan, continued manufacturing this bleach up until 8 April 1942 (Pages 55, Section C). About 300 gallons of this liquid bleach were delivered to Hospital No. 2 during the last few days immediately preceding the surrender of Bataan. In order to prepare for the continued operation of this plant the journal shows that approximately 700 lbs. of lime and one 150 pound cylinder of liquid chlorine were shipped to the CW Depot on Bataan from Corregidor on 7 April 1942 (Page 42, Section B). No surrender of Bataan was then contemplated by the Chemical Officer (Page 55 - Section C). On Corregidor the manufacture of liquid bleach for sanitary purposes continued after the surrender thereof on 6 May 1942. By special arrangement between the undersigned, the Chief Surgeon, USFIP (Colonel W. Cooper, MC) and a Nipponese interpreter, a Chemical Warfare detail was granted permission by the Nipponese Commander to continue the manufacture of this bleach up until the American

Hospital contingent left Corregidor in July 1942. This bleach was not only used within the areas occupied by the American and Filipino Prisoners of War but within the Japanese troop areas as well.

13. Probably the most important and also the least known activity and responsibility of the Chemical Warfare Service incident to the siege of Corregidor was the rushing to completion with the assistance of the Department Engineer of the Chemical Warfare Gas-Proofing Project in Malinta Tunnel (the hospital area) before 7 December 1941. This included the purchase and installation of four large blowers, each with 5,000 cubic ft. capacity per minute, construction of air ducts, vents, completion of tunnel hospital, etc. Three blowers forced fresh air circulation on the hospital side (north); the fourth was originally intended as a reserve. When the war started this reserve blower was installed so as to furnish ventilation for laterals on the south side of the tunnel. All four blowers ran practically continuously from 7 December 1941 to July 1942 when the American hospital group left Corregidor. Had it not been for the fresh air ventilation and circulation furnished by this Chemical Warfare project, which was designed and installed primarily for use in gasproofing the original two hundred and fifty (250) bed station hospital, life would have been unbearable in the tunnel. This is a fact which anyone who lived in the various laterals of the Malinta Tunnel during World War II knows only too well. Without the air ventilation and circulation, Corregidor might have been forced to surrender before Bataan.

14. The undersigned cannot praise too highly the Chemical Warfare Service personnel, both American and Filipino, officers, enlisted men, and civilians, covered by this report for the superior and outstanding manner in which they performed their many diversified and unadvertised but vitally important duties during the defense of the Philippine Islands 1941-1942.

15. For obvious reasons specific reference to my recommendations for Awards and Decorations of Chemical Warfare Service personnel during World War II, which are now being submitted in a separate communication, have been omitted in this report. A list of those which are finally approved will be made and submitted later with request that same be added to this report.



STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, Cml. C.,
Deputy Commander.

1 Incl.

RESTRICTED

SECTION A

Copies of letters, memoranda, records, and reports
which were prepared in and forwarded from the

Office of the Chemical Officer,

United States Army Forces in the Far East

and

United States Forces in the Philippines,

during the Japanese blockade of Manila Bay in 1942

These data finally reached and are now on file in
the War Department, Washington, D. C.

RESTRICTED

SECTION A

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RESTRICTED

SECTION A

Subject: Chemical Warfare Intelligence (Japanese Gas Masks)

(1) To: G-2, USAFFE.

CWS - 16 January 1942.

1. There follows below translation of markings on sample Japanese gas masks #2 and #3 (both masks alike) made by Major Stuart Wood, G-2, HPD, January 15, 1942, who also furnished the masks. Organization from which captured and date of capture not turned over to CWS representative (1st Lt. F. L. Schaf, CWS).

FACEPIECE: - Left inside - stamped "KaKo" which is probably a trade name 1940. Faint "M" marked underneath date. If it means "Medium size" this may indicate foreign manufacture, otherwise meaning vage. Right inside stamped "Kyo," probably means "Made in Kyoto."


HOSE TUBE: - No marks.

CANISTER: - Marked on top "KaKo," trade name. "Kyo" also on top meaning made in Kyoto. Other writing in red translated to mean "Military Secret." Canister, bottom "1940 Ro-43934."

THE LENS CASE: - Same as on sample Japanese mask #1, i.e. "contains 5 lens," this lens will be used during sub-zero weather. Change glass lens to this lens in cold weather.


BLACK PLASTIC SYRINGE: - No translation of markings made. (The undersigned will take action to have this done.

RUBBEROID POUCH: - Filled with white powder smelling like chloride of lime. This pouch was attached to a gas mask carrier. Front side (side containing side pouch for applicator) -



RUBBEROID POUCH: -

Back side (side containing the binding and sling straps).



Japanese Gas Masks, Contd.

2. Chemical analysis will be made of the white powder in the Rubberoid Pouch (Gas Mask #2) and of the powder in the metal container (Gas Mask #1) as soon as the chemical laboratory is completed in the Malinta Hill Tunnel System. One of the canisters will likewise then be broken down.

3. The above gas masks have been retained in the Chemical Office and will be submitted for inspection if and when desired.

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

Subject: Japanese Smoke Projector Model "99"

(1) To: A C of S, G-2, USAFFE

CWS 21 January 1942.

1. A live Japanese smoke projector Model "99" was obtained recently on the front of the I Corps and turned over to G-2, HPD. A translation of the instruction accompanying this projector as furnished by the A C of S, G-2, HPD, Major Stuart Wood, GSC, follows -

Smoke - White
Maximum distance - 300 meters.
Effective duration of the smoke - 1 minute and a half
Life - one year
Manufactured date - June, 1941.

Notite in using:

1. Before use, take off tape, remove bottom cover, pull out string therein, remove ringing band and take out friction device.
2. Insert tube in ground at 45 degrees angle. (Keep mark up) light fuze on bottom with friction device.
3. If distance greater than 200 meters is desired select hard ground or wood on which to place tube.
4. To reduce distance increase or decrease angle.
5. Stay at least three meters away from candle for sake of safety. Tube ignites seven seconds after lighting fuse.
6. In case it is desired to use tube again, remove contents, and clean inside of tube. Keep old charge away from new.
7. Be careful not to damage shape of tube by denting, etc. Never apply force in transporting (in order to preserve shape).
8. Projector makes loud explosion, so use cotton inside tube to protect ear drums.
9. Part "A" (see drawing) may be used to facilitate transportation.

Chemical Warfare Service comments -

(1) This smoke projector which weighs about six pounds including one smoke charge is now stored at the CW Depot on Bataan. The contents thereof will be analyzed as soon as the chemical laboratory set up at Fort Mills is completed.

(2) No report has been obtained indicating that any of these smoke projectiles have actually been fired by Japanese forces in the Philippines.

Recommendations -

(1) A secret radio substantially as follows be sent to the War Department for Chief, Chemical Warfare Service -

"A live smoke projector containing one smoke charge total weight about six pounds has been captured on Bataan. No report of use of these smoke projectors yet obtained. Translation in part of instructions accompanying this projector follow quote smoke white, maximum distance 300 meters, effective duration one minute and half, life one year, manufactured June 1941 unquote. Chemical analysis of contents will be made as soon as practicable."

(2) The above radio be sent to the Assistant G-2 in Singapore (Colonel Brink.)

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHEMICAL OFFICER

In the Field, P.I.
January 24, 1942.

Dear General Porter:

Am hoping this Japanese gas mask reaches you for thorough analysis. Enclosed are copies of radios I have requested be sent to you also translations on which they were based.

Lost one chemical laboratory due to air raid fire near where Burns used to be located. Hope to have another and much more complete one working in a bomb proof lateral before long.

Gas masks on hand sufficient for present strength of USAFFE with a small maintenance factor - thanks to your foresight in getting plenty out here before December 8th as losses from all causes have been considerable. Standard collective protector canister situation is same as when I left Manila on PM Dec. 28th. Ludington not in sight. Collective clothing about 600 complete suits.

Mrs. Green - a temporary stenographer (\$1440.00) and a junior storekeeper (\$1260) ceased employment with CWS as of December 31, 1941 thru no fault of their own. Could use a stenographer patching up from memory some files - official and personal - lost as result of enemy activity.

All CWS officers out here well and on the job except one 1st Lieut. but I've forced him out and to the front with a F. A. unit.

My guess is - (in absence of chemical analysis) that these Japanese canisters will not protect against our toxic smokes, etc. - maybe the CWS and Air Corps will win this war yet. By the way I am ready for a GHQ Air Force Detail - Gen. Brett or Brereton.

If you see Ethel or Ralph Haines - please tell them I saw young Johnny at the A & N Club late in November - looked well and asked me to send them his love when I wrote.

Please forward the enclosed letters for George Moore and me - we will set up the bottles in return some day.

Everything going along pretty fair - manage to visit the CWS officers and units via boat and car once a week. Miss my appetizers and sweets - something the medicos could never enforce.

Best to Gladys, yourself and my friends in D. C.

As ever -

Sincerely -

Hammy -

P.S. - If Mary Jane is in D. C. - tell her she would be surprised to see some of the activities in the places she once visited with Lucy and Bob Burns - but Monja looks just the same - dawn or sunset - !!

SAH

JANUARY 27, 1942.

152P M

FROM: CORREGIDOR

TO: CHIEF OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

138 TWENTY SEVENTH

SEVERAL DIAPHRAGM AND SERVICE TYPE JAPANESE GAS MASKS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED
SAMPLES WILL BE FORWARDED BY FIRST AVAILABLE MEANS STOP TRANSLATION IN
PART OF PERTINENT MARKINGS ON SOME COMPONENTS FOLLOW COLON ONE CANISTER
QUOTE MILITARY SECRET MODEL ONE NINE THREE EIGHT COMMA MANUFACTURERS
(TUBE MODEL)
NUMBER NINE THREE SIX SEVEN TUVEGUODEL RO ONE NINE THREE NINE NUMBER FIFTY
FIVE UNQUOTE SECOND CANISTER QUOTE MILITARY SECRET ONE NINE FOUR ZERO RO
REPEAT RO DASH FOUR THREE NINE THREE FOUR UNQUOTE CARRIER HAS DASH METAL
LENS CASE CONTAINING FIVE LENSES QUOTE THIS LENS WILL BE USED DURING SUB ZERO
WEATHER CHANGE GLASS LENS TO THIS LENS IN COLD WEATHER UNQUOTE METAL FLUID
BOTTLE QUOTE THIS FLUID WILL BE USED DURING SUB ZERO WEATHER STOP BRUSH
INSIDE OF LENS PUT ON INSIDE WITH BRUSH UNQUOTE METAL CONTAINER WITH POWDER
QUOTE FOR WIPING OFF POISON OPEN THIS COVER AND ADD SOME WATER STOP WITH
THUMB PRESS ON OPENING AND SHAKE UP WELL STOP MOISTEN THE COTTON WITH A
LITTLE OF THE SOLUTION AND WIPE IT ON THE MUSTARD BURNS STOP WHEN POISONED
ON SKIN RUB ON THE SOLUTION WITH COTTON UNQUOTE SMALL PACKET IN SACK
CONTAINING THE METAL POWDER CAN QUOTE COTTON FOR USE WITH POWDER UNQUOTE
ANOTHER CARRIER CONTAINED PLASTIC SYRINGE AND RUBBEROID POUCH IN LIEU OF
THE METAL FLUID BOTTLE AND METAL POWDER CAN EACH WITH THE FOLLOWING
MARKINGS RESPECTIVELY QUOTE UPON FREEZING FLUID UNQUOTE AND QUOTE
BLEACHING POWDER NINE TOKYO DISINFECTING PACKAGE ONE NINE FOUR ONE UNQUOTE
THE LIQUID FLUID CONTAINERS WERE EMPTY STOP METAL AND RUBBEROID POWDER
CONTAINERS ALMOST FULL STOP CANISTERS MADE OF BRASS WITH CONTENTS ARRANGED
SIMILAR TO CUT NUMBER ONE ZERO FOUR ON PAGE THREE TWO THREE OF FRIES AND
WEST FIRST EDITION OF ONE NINE TWO ONE STOP CANISTERS SMALLER THAN OURS HAVE
LOW RESISTENCE CONTAIN ABOUT FOUR ZERO ZERO CC REPEAT CC CHARCOAL
WEIGHING THREE HUNDRED GRAMS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN CAST STOP NO
REPEAT NO EVIDENCE OF SODA LIME POSSIBLE IT IS CAST AS INTEGRAL PART OF

PAGE TWO OF NO. 138 JANUARY 27

CHARCOAL GRANULES STOP NO REPEAT NO FINE FILTER FOUND STOP SOME FIFTEEN
UNITS EACH CONSISTING OF OUTER AND INNER LAYER OF COTTON GAUZE ABOUT THIRTY
FIVE MESH WITH INNER FILLER OF THIN FELT MATERIAL STOP FACEPIECE AND
CORRUGATED HOSE TUBE OF APPARENTLY GOOD STOCKINETTE COVERED RUBBER STOP
FURTHER ANALYSIS WILL BE MADE WHEN NEW CHEMICAL LABORATORY IS COMPLETED

HAMILTON

USAFPE
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P. I.
February 24, 1942.

Major General William N. Porter
Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Porter:

In addition to the sample fuel nozzle and firing mechanism of a Japanese flame thrower
there are enclosed herewith samples of the following Japanese equipment recovered by the 301st
Chemical Depot Company (PA) while on Bataan, P.I. -

- 1 bottle creosote balls (pills)
- 1 can water purifier
- 1 can preservative
- 1 can Army ration
- 1 pouch demustardizing agent (from Japanese gas mask)
- 2 pouches lime container (from Japanese gas mask)

It is hoped samples of the gas mask container for lime have already reached your office -
if so, the two herewith will make good tobacco pouches!

Am endeavoring to assemble a museum set of Chemical Warfare items of Japanese equip-
ment for eventual shipment as such to your office. Have you any special wishes in this connection
or in general with other Chemical Warfare matters in this theatre of operations?

Respectfully and sincerely,

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.,
Chemical Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
OFFICE OF THE CHEMICAL OFFICER

CWS 319

USAFFE APO #501
Fort Mills, P.I.
March 14, 1942.

SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Service Activities, USAFFE.

TO: The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service,
War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Since my last letter of February 25, 1942, with five inclosures, thereto, the following consolidated report of activities is submitted:

a. Flame Throwers. - Your radio number 1137 indicating that forty flame throwers would be dispatched from the port of embarkation received, also your 1113 re method of developing locally a firing mechanism therefor when using the 3 gallon demustardizing apparatus. This and the other similar methods of flame ignition have been tried here without success. The development of an ignition system using blank .45 caliber cartridge shell filled with a special mixture is now underway. All indicates thus far point to success. It is a local adaptation of the Japanese principle as covered in a previous special report. Detailed description with working drawings of the local product will be forwarded if final tests warrant.

b. Manufacture of Sulphuric Acid. - Pursuant to instructions in your radio #1058 approximately 55 gallons of sulphuric acid have thus far been manufactured by using the chlor-sulphonic acid in Livens Projector shells. Expect to obtain about 65 gallons from the 20 LP shells available after filtering, settling, etc. May have to use some 4.2" CM shells (FS) later in order to supply this critical item for storage batteries. Fortunately the Chemical Warfare Service has been able to meet the immediate demands for sulphuric acid. Enclosed is a copy of report of the detailed method of producing this sulphuric acid from the chlorosulphonic acid in LP shell.

c. Chemical Warfare Method of Administering Quine. - A method of mixing powdered quine sulphate with flour, baking and administering same in bread tablet form has recently been developed by one of the CWS officers out here. Copy of report attached.

d. Issue of HTH for Water Purification - A small amount of HTH furnished for demustardizing purposes has been put up in the CW laboratory in glass vials containing sufficient HTH for ten lister bags full of water. This was done in conjunction with the Medical Department. Some blood sugar analyses are also being run in the CW laboratory for the Medical Department.

e. Supply of Critical Items. - Attached is copy of office memorandum on this subject, dated March 1, 1942. Please note that no chemicals for field impregnation of any protective clothing that may be shipped to the Philippine Islands as a result of the Quartermaster USAFFE request thereof, is included in this CW memorandum of March 1, 1942.

f. Chemical Warfare Training and Supply - Recently the undersigned made an inspection of front line units and sent to the Chief of Staff of each of two Corps a summary of pertinent CW data in connection therewith. Copy inclosed.

g. Chemical Warfare Personnel - All of the CWS commissioned personnel out here are in good condition, health, etc., and wish to be remembered to you and their families in the United States. At present, the assignment and USAFFE Army Post Office address of each is as follows:

Lieut. Colonel Louis E. Roemer - Assistant Chemical Officer and Commanding
Officer Philippine CW Depot, APO #401.
Major Charles F. Harrison - Chemical Officer, Philippine Division - APO #9.

Letter to Chief, CWS, cont'd.

Captain Leland D. Bartlett - 4th Separate Chemical Company (attached to 31st Infantry) - APO #9.
Captain Buford D. Daniel - Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, APO #401.
Captain Louis T. Lazzarini - Assistant Chemical Officer, APO #401.
1st Lieut. Oel Johnson (FA), attached for duty with the CWS, CW laboratory, APO #501.
1st Lieut. Samuel J. Winn - AC - CW laboratory, APO #501.
1st Lieut. Charles A. Morgan, Jr., - Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, APO #401.
1st Lieut. Frank L. Schaf, Jr., - CW laboratory, APO #501.
2nd Lieut. John A. Davis - CW laboratory, APO #501.
2nd Lieut. George Small - 7th Chemical Company Service (Avn) (attached to 31st Infantry) - APO #9.
2nd Lieut. William F. Miles - 4th Separate Chemical Company, (attached to 31st Infantry) - APO #9.
Warrant Officer Robert A. Jackson - Chemical Office, USAFFE, APO #501.

4 Incls.

Incl. 1 - Production sulphuric acid
Incl. 2 - Quinine administration
Incl. 3 - Office Memo 3/1/42
Incl. 4 - CW data to C/S Corps (I & II on Bataan).

/s/ Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C.W.S.
Chemical Officer.

LABORATORY
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
Fort Mills, P. I.

14 March 1942

SUBJECT: Field Manufacture of Sulphuric Acid from FS Smoke Mixture.

TO: Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

1. Due to a need which existed in this command for electrolytic sulphuric acid, a search was made for a method of producing it utilizing materials which were on hand. After confirmation of its feasibility by the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service at Washington, it was decided to attempt production of sulphuric acid from FS smoke mixture, (chlorsulfonic acid) approximately thirty-five (35) gallons of this being on hand, which was contained in Livens projectiles.

2. The procedure following was finally arrived at and used in the production of the final product:

A wooden platform was first constructed for the support of two (2) Livens shells (see attached sketch). These being held in such a manner that the outlet pointed downward allowing the shells to drain by gravity and with the shells slanted at approximately a 45° angle to allow sediment which was found to be present to settle at the side so as not to clog the valve opening. Brass portable chemical cylinder valves being fairly resistant to the action of FS and having the same size fitting as the factory loading end of the Livens projectiles, were used to regulate the flow of the mixture from the shell. Soldered to the valve opening was a copper tubing leading the mixture from the shell to the reaction vessel (a two gallon Pyrex bell jar was used) which it entered a few inches below the surface of the water.


As the mixture flows thru the tube and enters the water, a violent reaction takes place with such spattering of liquid, evolution of heat and the loss of some SO_3 along with the by-product, HCl gas. To avoid spattering acid, a rubber shield was hung between the operator and the reaction vessel and daily consideration was given to the direction of the wind so that the apparatus could be arranged with the vapors blowing away from the operator.

The mixture was allowed to flow into the reaction vessel at such a rate that the temperature remained around 110°C ., to allow the HCl gas to boil out of the liquid and still avoid excess frothing. When the acid mixture formed in the water and became quite saturated and its specific gravity was fairly high (above 1.30), the sample was removed and another vessel of water put in its place. The crude acid so formed is black in color. In order to remove the solid impurities present (primarily iron oxide) as far as possible it was mixed with about one-half its volume of activated coconut charcoal and allowed to stand from 24 to 48 hours, then filtered thru cotton, giving a final product of a clear yellow green color. This acid was found by determination to contain approximately .78% solid matter, primarily $\text{Fe}_2(\text{SO}_4)_3$ (Ferric Sulphate). The operation of storage batteries was found to be unimpaired by the use of acid of the above purity. The results of operation over a long period, however, have not as yet been determined.

3. A total of approximately 65 gallons of sulphuric acid of the above purity and having a specific gravity of 1/28 was produced from approximately 35 gallons of FS smoke mixture contained in 20 Livens Projector shells, or an average of 3-1/4 gallons of acid per shell. A higher yield might have been possible if not for the fact that some SO_3 was unavoidably lost into the air and a certain amount of the crude acid was lost by spattering during the reaction and absorption in the filtering process.

/s/ John A. Davis
JOHN A. DAVIS
2nd Lieut., CWS

Chemical Warfare Laboratory, USAFFE - 3/14/42.



Apparatus Used In Field Manufacture
of
 H_2SO_4 from FS Smoke Mixture

12 March 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Hamilton

re: Suggested Method of Using Powdered Quinine in the Field.

1. Empty the contents of one-ounce bottle of powdered quinine into a mixing bowl. Add an equal volume of flour (the empty quinine bottle may be used for measuring) and stir with a spoon until thoroughly mixed.
2. Add potable water slowly and mix until a doughy mixture is obtained. The amount of water required is roughly six (6) Tablespoonfuls.
3. Add one-half teaspoonful of any cooking oil or substitute and again mix thoroughly.
4. Roll the dough into a flat thin square (about 5 inches) of the same thickness throughout. This may be done on a wooden board.
5. Sprinkle small amount of flour on the wooden board to prevent sticking of the dough while rolling.
6. Mark off by partially cutting through the dough with a knife into one hundred squares of equal size. This may be done by making ten rows across the dough in one direction and then ten rows at right angle to the original ten rows. The marking of rows should be as exact as possible.
7. After marking, place the dough in a pan for cooking. The lid of a mess kit will serve the purpose.
8. The dough is now placed in an oven and cook until lightly brown. Remove from the oven, allow to cool, and break or cut the quinine-bread along the markings into one hundred pieces.

COMMENTS:

- a. Each of the one hundred squares of bread will contain 4.8 grains of quinine. It is felt that this is close enough, for all practical purposes, to the usual commercial 5 grain tablet of quinine.
- b. An exact 5 grain tablet of quinine may be made by marking the square of dough into 96 equal squares. Obviously this is not as convenient as marking into 100 equal squares.
- c. The quinine-bread tablet of 4.8 grains each as made in this manner is about three (3) times as large as the usual commercial 5 grain tablet of quinine. It is recommended that no attempt be made to swallow this large tablet. It is recommended the tablet be broken into several small pieces and each piece swallowed separately.
- d. The quinine-bread tablets described here have been made and used in the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot for about the past seven (7) days. The men in the camp were informed that no more commercial tablets of quinine were available and the quinine-bread tablets were explained. No difficulty in getting the men to take the quinine-bread tablets was experienced.

B.F. DANIEL,
Captain, C.W.S.,
Asst. Camp Commander.

Subject: Chemical Warfare Supplies and Equipment.

(1) To: G-4 and C/S, USAFFE

Cml. O. USAFFE, 1 March 1942.

Re: verbal instruction this date recommend following Chemical Warfare items of supply be included in shipment to Philippine Islands by first available transportation. Some of these items are for initial issues (Visayan and Mindanao Forces never received any CWS supplies) and others for maintenance. The normal maintenance factor on gas masks and components is twelve percent (12%) per month.

	QUANTITY	ESTIMATED WEIGHT	TOTAL CUBIC FEET
Masks, gas, service	70,000 ea.	542,542	32,870
Mask, gas, diaphragm	30,000 ea	300,000	17,250
Dust respirators (for truck drivers)	5,000 ea	2,500	200
Standard Collective Protector Canisters	100 ea	38,000	2,000
Ointment, protective, MI	80,000 ea	50,000	1,668
Gloves, rubber, heavy	1,000 pr	750	90
Goggles, shatter-proof and resisting	500 pr	360	24
Flame Throwers	40 ea	3,200	160
Kits, repair, regimental, service	80 ea	1,872	94
" " company, "	500 ea	260	6
Gas mask spare parts sufficient to maintain 80,000 gas masks for six (6) months			
CC2	3,000 lb	3,000	200
Acetylene Tetrachloride in drums	1,100 gal	15,000	190
Protectors, collective	15 ea	7,500	450
Canisters, protectors, collective	15 ea	5,400	300
Apparatus, Demustardizing, 3 gallon type	100 ea	2,500	300

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office, Chemical Officer
Field

12 March 1942

SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Training and Supply Instructions Issued in the Field by Hq. USAFFE and HPD.

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff, I Corps and II Corps, Bataan, P.I.

1. Attached hereto are copies of and extracts from recent instructions issued in this theatre of operations pertaining to CW training and supply:

USAFFE	Letter	1/3/42 Use of Chemical Munitions.
Hq. II Phil Corps & 1st Ind. thereon USAFFE 11 Jan 1942	Training Memo No. 1	1/10/42 Directions for the preparation and use of Anti-tank bottles
USAFFE	Training Memo No. 2	1/11/42 Addition to column on Hydrocyanic Acid to page 6 of BFM 21-40, "Defense Against Chemical Attack."
USAFFE	Letter	1/12/42 Care and Maintenance of Gas Masks.
USAFFE	Training Memo No. 5	1/15/42 Willful destruction of gas masks.
USAFFE	Training Memo No. 6	1/15/42 Inspection of Gas Masks after aerial attack.
HPD	Memo (Sect. 1)	2/7/42 Willful destruction of Gas Masks.
HPD	Memo (Sec. III)	2/11/42 Misuse of government property.
USAFFE	Memorandum	2/21/42 Treatment of White Phosphorus burns.
USAFFE	G-2 Memo No. 12	3/7/42 Investigation and disposition of enemy materiel.

2. The following WD references cover Chemical Warfare data some of which are applicable in this area:

- (a) First Aid, Sect VI, page 72, BFM 21-40.
- (b) Organization and Duties, BFM 21-40, Defense Against Chemical Attack, Sect VII, page 15.

3. The above data are furnished re our recent conversation.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C.W.S.
Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Incl. No. 4 (With 10 Incls.)

Inclosures: 10

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

3 January 1942.

Subject: Use of Chemical Munitions.

To: Commanding General, Philippine Division.

1. Chemical Munitions of all types: grenades, projectors, smoke pots, shell, etc., regardless of whether filled with white phosphorus, training smoke, or tear gas, will not be used in any form or manner.

2. All chemical munitions in the hands of troops will be returned to the nearest Chemical Warfare or Ordnance Department sub-depot depending upon the service responsible for the storage and issue thereof.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

E.T. HALSTEAD,
Lt. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
HEADQUARTERS II PHILIPPINE CORPS
In the Field


10 January 1942

TRAINING MEMORANDUM:

No. 1

DIRECTIONS FOR PREPARATION AND USE
OF ANTI-TANK BOTTLES

1. Bottle should be at least one pint capacity.
2. Bottle should be filled with mixture of 1/2 gasoline and either 1/2 kerosene or diesel oil to within about 1 and 1/2 inches of the top of the bottle.
3. Plug should consist of a loosely fitting wood or cork stopper wrapped with a loose weave cloth. Cloth should extend down into liquid in the bottle and should have at least 12 square inches exposed above the plug for lighting. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT TO INSURE IGNITION OF CONTENTS OF THE BOTTLE AFTER IT IS BROKEN BY BEING THROWN AGAINST THE TANK. (See illustration.)
4. To use, turn bottle upside down briefly to insure cloth wick being saturated with mixture in bottle, then light cloth wick allowing it to fully ignite, and throw against tank, preferably against drivers windshield.
5. Several bottles should be broken against each tank if possible.



By command of Major General PARKER

LOUIS R. DOUGHERTY,
Colonel, F.A.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

sgd/ H.D. Johnston,
Lt. Col., Inf.,
AC of S, G-3.

1st Ind.

HQ USAFFE, In the Field, 11 January 1942. TO: Addresses listed in Distribution List below.

For your information, and for distribution to troops in your sector.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C. L. IRWIN,
Colonel, G.S.C.
C of S, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:
K CORPS (50)
Phil Div (20)
HPD (10)
Prov Tank Group (20)
28th FA Bn (5)
301st FA (5)
2d Div (PA)(10)
USAFFE STAFF (1 each except g-3-3)
AG File (1)

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

11 January 1942

TRAINING MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 2)

1. Page 5 of Field Manual 21-40, "Defense Against Chemical Attack" will be temporarily amended by adding column 5 thereto as follows:

HYDROCYANIC ACID GAS (HCN)

Name and symbol - - - - - Hydrocyanic Acid (HCN)
Odor - - - - - Bitter almonds.
Color and state in field - - - - - Colorless, mobile, volatile liquid, changing rapidly to colorless vapor.
Effects of body - - - - - Systemic poison, causes a cessation and finally total abolition of the functions of the central nervous system readily recognized by early redness and itching of the skin.
First Aid Treatment - - - - - Fresh air, cool water on face, artificial respiration, keep patient quiet, and give nerve stimulant.
Persistency - - - - - Vaporizes almost instantly. 5 minutes in the open and 10 minutes in the woods.
Action on Food and Water - - - - - Contaminates; very difficult to remove.
Action on metal - - - - - Dry - none, except copper; wet - corrosive.
How used - - - - - For casualty effects. Used in glass grenades released against apertures of confined spaces; tanks, pill boxes, beach defense; installation, etc.
Protection required - - - - - Gas Mask.

2. Hydrocyanic acid gas may be used in hand grenades against tanks, pill boxes, and beach defense installations having small openings through which the gas may enter. In confined spaces this gas will produce casualties. Commanders will be especially alert for the possible use of this chemical agent in grenades and will plan for the rapid ventilation of units, installations, etc., should such grenades be released against them.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
C.L. IRWIN
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
MANILA, P. I.

January 12, 1942.

SUBJECT: Care and Maintenance of Gas Masks.

TO: Commanding General, I Corps,
Commanding General, II Corps,
Chief of Staff, Philippine Department.

1. It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that gas masks issued to individuals are not being properly taken care of and in some cases have been discarded in order to facilitate movement of the individual to whom issued. This practice will stop.

2. The supply of gas masks is limited and every precaution will be taken by commanders of all echelons to insure that gas masks issued to their commands are properly taken care of and not wantonly discarded or lost.

3. The Chemical Officer will take necessary action to conserve the supply of gas masks and insure that replacement issues are fully justified.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

CARL H. SEALS,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East

15 January 1942

TRAINING MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 5)

1. It has been observed that some gas masks in possession of personnel on Bataan have been wantonly destroyed as such, in order to provide dust respirators. This practice is not confined to any one single sector or unit.

2. Other instances have been observed where the complete gas mask is being worn for the same purpose by personnel riding in Army motor vehicles. This latter use of the complete gas mask will eventually render it unfit for the purpose for which intended.

3. Appropriate commanders will take necessary action to insure that gas masks are used only for the purposes for which issued.

4. The Chemical Officer will not replace mutilated gas masks or those rendered unserviceable as a result of having been used as dust respirators.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R.K. SUTHERLAND
Major General, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C.L. IRWIN
Colonel, G.S.C.
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
In the Field

15 January 1942.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM)
NO. 6)

1. The explosion of aerial bombs causes the inlet valve and inlet valve retainer to be forced out of the gas mask of personnel in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. There is also the possibility that parts of the gas masks may be ruptured when personnel fall to the ground to escape shrapnel and that minute particles of shrapnel may actually puncture the gas mask unnoticed.

2. In view of the above, commanders of organizations and detachments which have been subjected to an aerial attack will take steps to see that all personnel inspect their gas masks immediately after such an attack as set forth in paragraph 29, FM 21-40. (Defense Against Chemical Attack). Defective gas masks will be turned over to appropriate unit gas officers for repair or replacement as may be necessary.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
In the Field

7 February 1942.

MEMORANDUM: .

TO: All Units, Philippine Department Service Command.

SECTION I

1. Attention is invited to Training Memorandum Number 5, Headquarters United States Army Forces in the Far East, dated January 15, 1942, concerning the wanton destruction of gas masks in order to provide dust respirators.

2. In view of the fact that patients are being received in the hospital with mutilated gas masks it is apparent that appropriate commanders have not taken the necessary action to insure that gas masks are used only for the purposes for which issued.

3. Gas masks will not be issued by any supply officer as replacement for those rendered unserviceable by mutilation.

4. Disciplinary action will be taken where cases warrant for the wanton destruction of government property.

x x x x x

By command of General MacARTHUR:

J. T. MENKIE,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
In the Field

11 February 1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: All Units, Philippine Department, Service Command.

EXTRACT

x x x

Section III

1. Definite information indicates following misuse of government property by troops on Bataan:
 - (a) Powder from 50 cal. and 30 cal. shells being used to start fires for cooking purposes instead of matches.
 - (b) Goggles are being cut from gas mask hoods and are being used as protection against dust.
2. It was observed also that many wounded patients entering the hospital have removed their gas masks from the container - the containers are then used as musette bags.
3. Commanders will take necessary action to prevent this misuse of government property.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

J.T. MENZIE,
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Ft. Mills, P. I.

February 21, 1942

471.6
Misc-AG

Subject: Treatment of White Phosphorous Burns.

To: All Members of this Command.

Treatment for burns received from white phosphorus, a commodity which may sometimes be contained in enemy bombs, should be of a special nature. This phosphorus content has a tendency to linger on the clothing or flesh and must be removed as the first step of the treatment. The (missing) first aid is to immerse the wound caused by white phosphorus into water, preferably hot. While under water, the white phosphorus should be removed by picking the particles from the wound. Hot water will cause the phosphorus to melt and the chemical may be removed by lightly rubbing.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

CARL H. SEALS
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Adjutant General.

N.B.

CWS did not prepare these instructions but initiated the action which resulted in their promulgation.
S.A.H.

United States Army Forces in the Far East

G-2 MEMORANDUM)
NUMBER 12)

7 March 1942

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAFFE, in the Field, Bataan, is charged with the investigation, study of and disposition of captured or abandoned enemy material.
2. All captured or abandoned enemy material should be forwarded immediately, thru command channels (with the exception of the items listed below) to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAFFE, in the Field, Bataan.
3. All items of material, clothing, equipment, documents, personal paper, etc., no matter what their content must be turned over, as any of these items might prove of invaluable use for Combat Intelligence.
4. Excepted Items (a) Ordnance material (Material corresponding to that issued by the Ordnance Dept., U.S. Army) should be forwarded, through command channels, to the Ordnance Officer, USAFFE, in the Field, Bataan.
(b) Chemical material (material corresponding to that issued by the Chemical Warfare Service, U.S. Army) should be forwarded, through command channels to the Chemical Officer, USAFFE, in the Field, Bataan.
5. The Ordnance Officer, Chemical Officer, and the heads of the various services to which material may be forwarded will follow, without delay, the procedure indicated below:
(a) In the case of items not thoroughly described in TM 30-480, a report will be prepared, together with appropriate photographs and drawings in sufficient detail to insure correct interpretation of the item reported upon. This will be forwarded in triplicate, through channels, to the A.C. of S., G-2, USAFFE.
(b) The branch of service preparing the report, except in cases where the item is necessary for inspection or display, should pack the item for shipment to the War Department or to the branch or service concerned in Washington.
(c) All captured items which will not be prepared for shipment to the War Department will pass through a suitable process of reclamation by the service concerned and, if indicated, will be used against the enemy in the Field.
6. The necessity of turning over to the A. C. of S., G-2, USAFFE, all items captured in the field cannot be too strongly emphasized. All officers are reminded of the provisions of A.W. 79 & 80, dealing with captured or abandoned property, and are requested to inform their troops of the necessity of forwarding all abandoned material to the Intelligence Section for analysis, study and evaluation.
7. There has been a marked tendency to retain enemy equipment and relics, as individual souvenirs; and disappearance, in transmittal, of such items has been noted. S-2's are responsible for the collection and transfer, through channels, of such items.

For the Chief of Staff:

C.A. WILLOUGHBY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S, G-2

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P.I.
March 31, 1942.

Subject: Major Chemical Warfare Service Activities, USFIP

To: The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service,
War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. My letter of March 14, 1942, with four inclosures is still awaiting dispatch so will refer to my carbon copy thereof and continue. Now expect that both letters will leave Fort Mills at the same time.
 - a. Flame Throwers. Development very satisfactory up to the point of snapping or pulling the firing trigger which sets off a specially filled .45 caliber pistol cartridge. Development work on this project has been slightly retarded lately due to illness with malaria of personnel engaged thereon and enemy air activity.
 - b. Manufacture of Sulphuric Acid. The sulphur trioxide chlorsulphonic acid in the 20 LP shell was converted into about 65 gallons of sulphuric acid for storage batteries. The QM, to whom most of this product went reports same entirely satisfactory. Some of this acid has also been turned over to the Signal Corps and some to the HD Artillery Engineer. Work has been started on removing FS filling from 4.2" CM shell and converting same into sulphuric acid. Expect to obtain in all about 125 gallons more from these chemical mortar shells. On March 25, 1942 we unfortunately lost four CWS enlisted men from the detail assigned to this duty when the heavy reinforced concrete drainage ditch in which they had taken cover during an air raid received a direct hit with at least a 500 pound bomb, based upon my observation of craters out here (Inclosure #1).
 - c. Chemical Warfare Method of Administering Quinine. No general instructions were issued on the subject as the supply of quinine as a preventative stopped shortly after my memorandums thereon were submitted March 10th and 12th. This shortage is very serious. Only quinine now administered is to malaria patients sick in hospitals. CWS experiments and research for a substitute cinchona alkaloid are continuing however using the native Dita tree and Makahubay Vine, both of which are available on Bataan. The quantity available, however, has not yet been determined. (Inclosure #2.)
 - d. Issue of HTH for Water Purification. No further demands have been made on the CWS for any supply of HTH for this purpose.
 - e. Supply of Critical Items. No change from previous report.
 - f. CW Training and Supply.
 - (1) A memorandum covering suggestions for the inspection, repair and replacement of gas masks in the hands of troops on Bataan, P. I., was submitted to the Chief of Staff, Luzon Force, 18 March 1942 (Inclosure #3). A full report will be rendered on this subject at a later date.
 - (2) A set for the field testing of water to determine arsenic and cyanide content was prepared in the CW laboratory and sent to one of the outlying forts in these defenses. Copy of description and use of this set is attached. (Inclosure #4.)
 - (3) A plan for the issue and distribution of protective clothing and decontamination apparatus was prepared for the CG, HD of M & SB (Inclosure #5).
 - (4) The Forces in the Philippines were recently reorganized. This reorganization included practically the inactivation of the former Headquarters Philippine Department and the organization of a Service Command on Bataan, P. I., in lieu thereof, together with the creation

Letter to Chief, CWS cont'd.

of the Luzon Force on Bataan, P.I. It is understood that these plans were all formulated, commanders and key staff positions provided therefor prior to the removal of Headquarters USAFFE from Fort Mills, P.I., to Australia. Copies or extracts of pertinent orders pertaining to the CWS in the premises are attached. (Inclosure #6.)

(5) Effort toward local production of an extract (Tiki-tiki) from rice hulls which contains vitamin B used in treatment of beri-beri is being made (Inclosure #7).

2. Observation of the effects of considerable firing of Coast Artillery fixed batteries and the effect of enemy bombing in the vicinity thereof convinces me that some of our earlier ideas about gas-proofing such batteries need revision. This subject however involves in great measure the Engineer Corps and accordingly further study and observation will be made in conjunction with their appropriate local representatives.

3. Enclosed herewith are some snapshots of the Chemical Warfare Depot Warehouses which were under construction at Fort McKinley, P.I., when the present war began. Four of these warehouses were going up at Fort McKinley, three at Clark Field, and three at Nichols Field. The latter three were of adobe material.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.
Chemical Officer.

7 Incls.

- Incl. #1 - Report of Casualties
- Incl. #2 - CW Method of Adm. Quinine
- Incl. #3 - Memo re Mask Insp. & repair
- Incl. #4 - Field Testing Set
- Incl. #5 - Issue & Dis. Pro. Clothing
- Incl. #6 - Reorganization Orders.
- Incl. #7 - Tiki-tiki Extract.

Subject: Casualties.

(1) TO: Adjutant General, USFIP

Cml. O. USFIP 27 March 1942.

1. The following named enlisted men belonging to Chemical Warfare Organizations indicated below were killed during an enemy air raid on Fort Mills, P.I. about 10:00 A.M., 25 March 1942. These four men were part of a detail of five men engaged in emergency field manufacture of the critical item of sulphuric acid for the USFIP. A bomb estimated at about 500 pounds made a direct hit on a steel reinforced concrete culvert near RJ 33 on Target Range Trail in which these men had taken cover -

Sergeant Boyle H. Knight, #36152188, CWS, attached from 7th Cml. Co. Serv. (Avn)

Pvt 1cl Spec 4cl Henry G. Gansz, #36036054, CWS, attached from 7th Cml. Co. Serv. (Avn)

Pvt Rufino G. Leonardo, #10305548, CWS, Phil. CW Depot Det. (PS)

Corp. Florentino Guillermo (no serial number) CWS, 301st Cml. Co. Depot (PA)

Copy to - Adjutant - HD of M & SB, Fort Mills, P.I.
Commanding Officer, - Chemical Depot, Bataan, P.I.

S.A.H.

Subject: Issue of Quinine in any form.

CN (1) To: Commanding General, HPD

CWS - 10 March 1942.

1. A request submitted this date to the C.O., PCWD, to C.O., PMD to exchange some powdered quinine for quinine in tablet form, was returned with following notation, "No tablets or powder of quinine is now available at the Medical Depot for issue into the field" signed H. H. Goldberg, Lt., MAC.
2. The small amount of powdered quinine now on hand was issued about March 2, 1942.
3. No instructions have been received from the Medical Department as to how to mix up the proper dosage or the best method of administering powdered quinine. This depot mixes it with flour, there may be a better way or ways.
4. Recommend immediate action be taken:
 - (a) To insure that proper mixing and administering instructions are issued when powdered quinine is substituted for the tablet form.
 - (b) To provide quinine in some form for units in the field. Possibly an inventory of quinine stocks on hand in this theater of operation might enable a redistribution thereof so as to permit the issue of same to continue.

S.A.H.
D.C.O.

Subject: Emergency Development and Use of Quinine Substitute from the Dita Tree.

(1) C/S USFIP

Cml. O. USFIP, 29 March 1942.

1. Reference verbal instructions this date subject data are submitted:
 - a. When this office first learned of the shortage of quinine CN (1) dated March 10th and CN (1) dated March 12, 1942, were sent to the CG, HPD.
 - b. The following steps have been taken to find a substitute for quinine.
 - (1) On or about March 15, 1942, CW Depot personnel on Bataan collected bark from the native Dita tree which was pointed out and described by some natives in the Depot as a "Medicine Tree." They reported same was used for malaria by cutting up the bark, boiling in water and drinking the hot brew two or three times daily.
 - (2) Some of this brew was boiled. It was bitter and tasted like quinine.
 - (3) Extensive laboratory tests have since been made in the CW Laboratory, Fort Mills, of samples of this Dita bark from young and older trees and all have shown no evidence of quinine. It was therefore definitely established that the Dita tree did not contain a cinchona alkaloid.
 - (4) The Army Surgeon (Colonel Cooper) has been consulted on the subject and reports that the Dita tree extracts have no medicinal value, preventative or in the treatment of malaria.
 - (5) Lt. Colonel H.C. Fischer, GS, an authority on native forest products was then consulted. He stated substantially that the Dita tree had no medicinal value, yet solutions from boiling the bark did lower a person's temperature somewhat, however, its action was psychological. Local people in the Philippines had tried to exploit the product but had given it up as not worth while. One species of the Dita tree was used by natives to poison arrows, but that this was not the species under consideration for a quinine substitute. This point is being checked further.

2. The undersigned concurs substantially in the following extracts from a report of one of my assistants who has worked on this project. "Why should the action of Dita brew be psychological, because it tastes like quinine? The drug must have some effect or even a primitive people would have discarded it. The only remaining paths, then are either to abandon the Dita method, or try to make something of it in a desperate attempt to alleviate the malaria suffering. If the latter be chosen it is recommended that scouting parties be sent out to plot positions of Dita trees to determine if there are enough of them to make enough alkaloid to make further research worthwhile. If the tree is found in abundance then work on extraction and identification should begin, clinical samples prepared and tried on control cases in the hospital. Malaria cultures should be obtained and the action of the alkaloid on the Protozoa determined. If all of these prove positive, then "work can start on gathering the bark and working out the fastest but most effective method of extraction. It may be that the native brew is as good as anything elaborate. It is in my estimation worth a try. There is nothing to lose, everything to gain----."

3. Recommendations:
 - a. That if only for psychological reasons and a slight lowering of an individual's temperature, bark from the Dita tree can be prepared in the field and used without injurious effects, such usage be officially recognized and appropriate instructions issued thereon for American and Filipino personnel on Bataan. It is understood some native evacuees and Filipino troops on Bataan have already removed bark from numerous Dita trees for this purpose, a practice which should be controlled if any product of this bark is to be required for military personnel.
 - b. This subject be referred to the Surgeon, USFIP for technical review and recommendation.

NB -
Samples of "Makabuhay vine" received
from Bataan 28 March are now under-
going laboratory tests for quinine.

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

(2) To: G-4

C/S 3/29/42

For necessary action.

L.B.

(3) To: Surgeon, USFIP

G-4 3/29/42

For technical review and recommendation.

F.F.C.

Subject: Quinine Substitute (Cont'd)

CN (4) To: Asst C of S, G-4, USFIP

Surgeon, Marcy 30, 1942

The medicinal quality of this plant is not proven by any scientific data. Extensive research under present circumstances is not practicable and of doubtful value. Its use as a substitute for quinine in prophylaxis of malaria is not recommended.

W.E.C.

(5) To: Chemical Officer.

G-4, USFIP, March 30, 1942.

1. In view of the Surgeon's statement in CN (4) use of bark from the Dita tree as a quinine substitute is not favorably considered.

2. The high quality of your laboratory work and subsequent report has been noted.

N.F.B.

N.B. 1 September 1946.

This memorandum (29 March 1942) re Quinine substitute has been inserted here with memorandum (12 March 1942) re Powdered Quinine. It was obtained from another file.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chemical Officer
In the Field.

12 March 1942

Subject: Suggested Method of Using Powdered Quinine (Sulfate) in the Field.

To: Commanding General, H.P.D.

1. Re CN (1) this office, dated March 10, 1942, subject: Issue of Quinine, and my verbal report of the same date, there is attached hereto a report of the method used at the Chemical Warfare Depot for administering quinine when same is not issued in tablet form. Powdered quinine is practically insoluble in water and particularly disagreeable to swallow when mixed. The undersigned has experienced no unpleasantness in swallowing the quinine-bread tablets made as indicated herein.

2. Recommend that the attached report be technically reviewed by the Medical Department, and if deemed advisable, appropriate instructions in the premises be issued to the field.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.,
Department Chemical Officer

Subject: Gas Mask Supply, Training and Repair; Luzon Force.

CN (1) To: C/S, Luzon Force, Bataan, P.I.

Cml. O. USAFFE - 18 March 1942.

1. Re conversation this date, it is recommended that two Chemical Warfare instruction and repair details be dispatched one to I Corps and one to the II Corps for the purpose of inspecting, repairing, and replacing gas masks now in the hands of troops so far as availability of present stocks will permit. A report of actual needs can thus be secured. These details to be attached for rations to the division or unit whose masks are being repaired. Unit gas officer and gas NCOs as prescribed in paragraphs 44 and 45, Field Manual 21-40, to be instructed and assist in making necessary repairs, training, etc. The priority of repairs, etc., of divisions and units in each Corps to be designated by the Corps Commander. The Commanding General, Luzon Service Command, to furnish the bulk of the CWS personnel (PCWD and HPD), supplies and transportation for these details. A part of the personnel for the II Corps detail together with a proportional share of the available CW supplies in that Corps to be furnished by the Commanding General, Philippine Division (this Division has a Regular Army Chemical Officer, 2 NCO CWS American and 3 NCO (PS) in the Chemical Section of Division Headquarters and a fairly well stocked CW dump). Details to consist of not over six persons including an American officer in charge of each. First priority to be given to the 15th Inf. (PS), 57th Inf. (PS), 28th Cav (PS), 24th and 88th FA (PS). The 31st Infantry (Am) already has attached thereto 3 Chemical Officers and some 230 enlisted men and it is understood their CW requirements are fully taken care of. All details regarding transportation, itineraries, etc., to be arranged for directly between the Commanding General, Luzon Service Command and respective Corps Commanders. The execution of this plan to be expedited.

2. From my personal observation in the field and from numerous reports received, it is believed that (a) many masks now in hands of troops need only minor repairs to make them serviceable,

(b) serviceable components from other gas masks can be reassembled in the field to make up complete serviceable masks,

(c) some new issues should be made,

(d) many individuals in the field need instruction in the adjusting, wearing and caring for the mask,

(e) neither sufficient training personnel nor facilities are now available in the field to do this work,

(f) if practicable, the gas masks of Artillery units should be inspected, repaired or replaced prior to those of Infantry units (except the 31st (Am), 45th and 57th Inf) as the Artillery units are more likely to need minor repairs (reference Training Memorandum No. 6, Jan. 15, 1942, Hq. USAFFE) and these units are more suitable targets for chemical attack (opinion only) than Infantry front line units in heavily wooded terrain,

(g) the morale effect of personnel having had their gas masks repaired or replaced and having been instructed in how to use same should not be overlooked.

To carry out the above, instructions, substantially as follows, might be issued:

a. To Commanding General, Luzon Service Command, P.I. --

(1) It is desired that two CWS details be dispatched at the earliest practicable date one each to the I and II Corps for the purpose of inspecting, repairing, and replacing where necessary, gas masks now in the possession of the personnel in each Corps. A part of the CW personnel and CW supplies now assigned to the Philippine Division will be made available by the Commanding General, II Corps, for the repair detail assigned to the II Corps. Where practicable, unit gas officers and gas noncommissioned officers will assist and be given suitable instruction in this repair work. Details with respect to the above will be arranged directly between Corps Commanders concerned and the Commanding General, Luzon Service Command.

Copy of the above to Commanding General I Corps
Commanding General II Corps for necessary action.

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

(2) To: Chemical Officer, Luzon Force

G-3, Hq. Luzon Force 21 March 1942.

1. Re par 1 C/N (1) details to I and II Corps have already been dispatched.

2. Chemical Officer is authorized to complete details for repair or replacement of gas masks direct with I and II Corps.

J.V.C.
G-3

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Chemical Officer
Fort Mills, P. I.

20 March 1942

Subject: Field Testing Set, Arsenic and Cyanide in Water.

To: Commanding General, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, Fort Mills, P. I.

1. It is suggested, subject to technical review by the Medical Department, that a portable chemical field testing set be issued to the Commanding Officer at each out-post in these Defenses with instructions for using substantially as indicated below -

This chemical testing kit, consisting of six (6) bottles (capacity about 3 or 4 ounces) is designed for testing drinking water for the presence of arsenic and cyanide. Bottles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 contain the chemicals needed in testing. Bottle 6 is a water solution containing arsenic and cyanide so that from time to time one can run a test both to familiarize himself in making same, and also as a check on the chemicals, as they are liable to deteriorate with time.

a. Directions for using water testing kit.

(1) Detecting arsenic -

- (a) Fill test tube 1/2 full of water suspected of containing arsenic.
- (b) Add a few drops of bottle No. 1 (ignore cloudiness which forms).
- (c) Add a few drops of bottle No. 2.

If arsenic is present a yellow-brown color will form.

(2) Detecting cyanide -

- (a) Fill test tube 1/2 full of water suspected of containing cyanide.
- (b) Add a few drops of bottle No. 3 (no change).
- (c) Add a few drops of bottle No. 4.

If cyanide is present a greenish color will form.

- (d) Add a few drops of bottle No. 5.

The presence of cyanide is confirmed if the greenish color turns to a Prussian blue color.

2. When running the above two tests, it is advisable to run them in duplicate, one test tube having the contaminated arsenic or cyanide, the other test tube having pure water. A comparison of the two will remove any doubt that may arise during the running of the test.

3. If desirable, the Chemical Warfare laboratory at this Headquarters is prepared to fit up three of the above described test sets. Testing of local Fort Mills sources of water supply can be made in the Chemical Warfare laboratory whenever desired.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.
Chemical Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Office of the Chemical Officer
Fort Mills, P. I.

24 March 1942.

Subject: Issue of Demustardizing Chemicals and Equipment.

To: Commanding General, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, Fort Mills, P. I.

1. A plan for the issue of demustardizing chemicals and equipment from USFIP reserves is submitted herewith.

a. Fifty-ninth Coast Artillery:

Battery	3 gal DeHS Apparatus	Complete Suits Impregnated Clothing	Lbs Agent DeHS, HTH	Remarks
Hdq Section	-	-	-	Btry Wheeler to supply decontaminating equipment and men.
Smith	2	6	None	A bleach plant has been set up at this battery also supplying Battery Hearn.
Hearn	2	5	None	Will obtain bleach from Battery Smith.
Crockett	2	6	None	A bleach plant has been set up at this battery also supplying Battery Geary.
Geary	2	5	None	Will obtain bleach from Battery Crockett.
Wheeler	2	5	100	To furnish Headquarters Section.
Cheney	2	6	None	A bleach plant has been set up at this battery also supplying Btry "F", 60th CA.
Total	12	33	100 lbs	

The eight (8) Searchlight units of Battery "K", 59th CA to be furnished by the nearest battery having decontaminating equipment. Example: Searchlight unit Geary Point to be taken care of by Battery "L", 60th AA. A total of three (3) bleach plants have been set up, one each at Batteries Smith, Crockett, and Cheney (to be operated by battery personnel). One additional bleach plant to be operated by Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment (PS), will be set up in the vicinity of the West entrance to Malinta Tunnel.

b. Sixtieth Coast Artillery (AA)

Battery	3 gal DeHS apparatus	Complete suits Impregnated Clothing	Lbs Agent DeHS, HTH	Remarks
Hdq Section	-	-	-	To be supplied by Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment (PS)
"F" near Cheney	2	5	None	To obtain bleach from battery Cheney.
"B" near Wheeler	2	5	100	Independent Supply.
"C" top Morrison Hill	2	5	100	Also furnishes Btry Morrison, 91st CA.
"L" near Hamilton	2	5	100	To furnish Btry Hamilton and nearby Searchlight details.
"H" near Ramsey	2	5	100	To furnish Btry Ramsey if and when Ramsey is manned. Also Quartermaster Motor Pool.
"D" Hill above Ordnance Pt.	2	5	100	To furnish MG units at Landing Field.
"I" Sultan Hill	2	5	-	Obtain bleach from Rock Point.
"M" (MG & Pom-pom) top Malinta Hill	4	5	100	Independent Supply.
"K" Old Spanish Fort	-	-	-	To be supplied by Btries "A" & "G", 91st CA.
Total	20	45	600 lbs.	

c. Ninety-first Coast Artillery (PS):

Battery	3 gal DeHS Apparatus	Complete Suits Impregnated Clothing	Lbs Agent DeHS, HTH	Remarks
"A"	2	(	100)	These two Batteries are adjacent.
"G"	2	(		
Hdq Section	2	4	100	To supply other Hdq units in James Ravine.
"B" (Rock Pt.)	2	4	100	Supplies Btry "I", 60th CA (AA).
"B" (James)	2	4	100	Independent Supply.
"B" (Hanna)	-	-	-	Supplied by Battery Sunset.
"D" (Sunset)	3	4	100	Supplies Battery Hanna.
Total	13	21	500 lbs.	

d. Ninety-second Coast Artillery (PS):

Battery	3 gal DeHS Apparatus	Complete Suits Impregnated Clothing	Lbs Agent DeHS, HTH	Remarks
Hdq Btry	2	4	100	To furnish other units at Middleside Barracks.
"Monja" Wheeler Pt.	2	4	100	Supplies Battery Cushing
"Cushing" Wheeler Pt.	2	-	-	To obtain bleach from "Monja"
"Hamilton" near "L" 60th	2	-	-	To obtain agent from Battery "L", 60th CA.
"Ramsey" near "H" 60th	-	-	-	To be supplied by Battery "H", 60th CA, if and when manned.
"Ordnance Pt." Ordnance Pt.	2	4	100	All supplies 92nd Garage.
"Kysor" near Inf Pt.	2	4	100	Independent Supply.
"Keyes" near Monkey Pt.	2	-	-)	These four Batteries will be furnished by the Chemical Warfare Mobile Unit.
"A" near Hooker Pt.	2	-	-)	
"A" near North Pt.	2	-	-)	
"A" near Artillery Pt.	2	-	-)	
"A" top Malinta Hill	2	-	-	Obtains agent from Btry "M", 60th CA.
Total	22	16	400 lbs.	

e. 4th Marines:

8 Apparatus DeHS, 3 gallon type,
16 Complete Suits Impregnated Clothing,
400 lbs Agent DeHS, HTH.
To be distributed equally among 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns and Regimental Headquarters Company. Each Bn to take care of its units.

f. Engineers:

2 Apparatus DeHS, 3 gallon type,
4 Complete Suits Impregnated Clothing,
100 lbs Agent, (decontaminating) HTH.
Independent Supply.

g. General:

In general, small isolated groups not covered by the above to be taken care of at the nearest battery or unit having decontaminating equipment.

2. Outposts.

a. Fort Frank:

91st Coast Artillery:

2 Apparatus Decontaminating, 3 gallon type,
4 complete suits of Impregnated Clothing,
100 lbs Decontaminating Agent (HTH).

92nd Coast Artillery:

To be supplied by the 91st CA which will also supply beach defenses and other units on Fort Frank.

b. Fort Drum:

59th Coast Artillery:
2 Apparatus Decontaminating, 3 gallon type,
4 Complete Suits Impregnated Clothing.
100 lbs Decontaminating Agent (HTH).

c. Fort Hughes:

59th Coast Artillery:
4 Apparatus Decontaminating, 3 gallon type,
8 Complete suits Impregnated Clothing,
200 lbs Decontaminating Agent (HTH).

3. The above listed supplies and equipment are available at the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, Fort Mills, P.I., for immediate issue to unit supply officers concerned. In some cases partial issues have been made for instruction purposes and in order to take advantage of available transportation.

4. It is suggested that if the above plan is approved same be issued in the form of a directive from Headquarters, HD of M & SB.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C.W.S.,
Chemical Officer.

3 Incls.
Sample receipts & Instructions.

Form of Receipt Required for Decontamination Detachment Supplies

Certificate for Receipt of Impregnated Clothing

1. I certify that I have, this date, received from Chemical Warfare Depot, Fort Mills, P. I., _____ complete suits of impregnated clothing. It is understood that this is special clothing and that same is not to be used except for purpose for which issued, i.e., "For protection of personnel actually engaged in decontamination of mustardized areas and materiel." It is further understood that this clothing will be stored in as dark, dry and cool a place as local conditions permit, and that at all times same will be adequately protected against theft or unauthorized use.

2. One complete suit of impregnated clothing consists of:

1 pair of coveralls,
1 pair of socks, light wool,
1 pair of shoes, impermeable,
1 pair of drawers, long,
1 undershirt, long,
1 hood, wool,
1 pair of gloves,
1 pair of leggings, dismounted.

Date _____

Signed _____
Rank & Organization _____

COPY

Instructions re Use of HTH for Demustardizing

When mixing HTH (High Test Hypochlorite), a demustardizing agent, with water the proportion should be one (1) to three (3) by weight. That is, one pound of HTH to three (3) pounds of water or approximately three (3) pounds of HTH per gallon of water.

The solution can best be prepared by weighing or measuring out the quantity of water desired depending upon the area to be decontaminated, adding one-third (1/3) by weight of HTH, stirring or agitating vigorously for five or ten minutes. Allow solution to stand five or ten minutes and pour through strainer and funnel into demustardizer (one strainer and funnel is provided with each demustardizer). The solution is then ready to spray on contaminated area.

For decontaminating shell holes or heavily concentrated areas it is recommended that the HTH be used by mixing it with earth. One part of HTH to six parts of earth. By use of a shovel the mixture is spread over the entire decon. area.

RECEIPT

CERTIFICATE FOR RECEIPT OF DECONTAMINATING AGENT

I certify that I have, this date, received from the Chemical Warfare Depot, Fort Mills, P. I., _____ pounds of Decontaminating Agent, HTH. I understand that this material is not to be used for any other purpose than that for which issued, i.e., for the decontamination of mustardized areas and materiel.

DATE _____

(signature)

(rank and organization)

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Fort Mills, P. I.

SPECIAL ORDERS
NO. 66

EXTRACT

11 March 1942

X X X X X X

12. Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, O-2131, USA, is relieved from assignment to the I Philippine Corps, effective 11 March, 1942, is then assigned to the Luzon Force and will assume command thereof.

13. Brigadier General Albert M. Jones, O-3186, USA, is relieved from assignment to the 51st Division (PA), is then assigned to the I Philippine Corps, and will assume command thereof.

14. Brigadier General Allan C. McBride, O-2461, USA, is relieved from assignment as Chief of Staff, Philippine Department, effective 11 March, 1942, is then assigned to the Service Command, Luzon Force and will assume command thereof.

15. Brigadier General William F. Marquat, O-6533, USA, is relieved from assignment to the Philippine Coast Artillery Command effective 11 March 1942, is then assigned to this Headquarters, and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

16. Brigadier General Arnold J. Funk, O-5580, USA, is relieved from assignment to this Headquarters, effective 11 March 1942, is then assigned to the Luzon Force and will report to the Commanding General, for duty.

17. Each of the following named officers is relieved from assignment to this headquarters, effective 11 March 1942, is then assigned to Headquarters Luzon Force and will report to the Commanding General for duty:

GENERAL STAFF SECTION

Lieutenant Colonel James V. Collier, O-15474, GSC.
Lieutenant Colonel Jesse T. Traywick, Jr., O-15818, GSC.
Lieutenant Colonel Frank F. Carpenter, Jr., O-15870, GSC.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION

Lieutenant Colonel Earl T. Halstead, O-109786, AGD.

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Lieutenant Colonel Richard G. Rogers, O-11698, QMC
Captain Louis E. Nantz, O-890070, QMC.

ENGINEER SECTION

Major William A. Gay, O-21070, CE
Major Albert J. Kircher, O-300017, FA
Captain Thomas H. Delamore, O-363944, CE
Captain Ralph McGuire, O-890206, CE
1st Lieut. William C. Ramme, O-890257, CE
2nd Lieut. Charles J. Cushing, O-890207, CE

SIGNAL SECTION

Major John A. McCain, O-890212, SC.
Major James N. Vaughn, O-18074, SC.
Captain Frank H. Todd, O-22636, SC.
2nd Lieut. Frank M. Goss, O-890030, SC.

ARTILLERY SECTION

Major General Edward P. King, Jr., 0-2442, USA.
Colonel Everett C. Williams, 0-5125, FA.
Colonel William E. Corkill, 0-7055, FA.
Colonel Ralph Hirsch, 0-7587, FA.
Major Philip G. Lauman, Jr., 0-20674, FA.
Captain Achille C. Tisdelle, Jr., 0-346043, Cav, ADC
Captain Wade R. Cothran, 0-890014, FA.

ORDNANCE SECTION

Captain Howard J. Galbraith, 0-272861, OD.

18. Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, 0-4663, CWS, is relieved from assignment to Headquarters Philippine Department, from additional duty as Chemical Officer, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is then assigned to Headquarters, Luzon Force, and will report to the Commanding General for Duty.

19. Colonel George W. Hirsch, 0-8580, OD, is relieved from assignment to Philippine Ordnance Depot, from additional duty as ordnance officer, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is then assigned to Headquarters, Luzon Force, and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

20. Each of the following named officers is relieved from assignment to Headquarters, Philippine Department, and from further temporary duty at this Headquarters, is then assigned to Headquarters Luzon Force and will report to the Commanding General for duty, effective this date:

Major Robert W. Jackson, 0-255320, SC.
Captain Joseph V. Iacobucci, 0-22910, SC.
1st Lieutenant John M. Kerry, 0-392311, SC.

21. Each of the following named officers is relieved from assignment as indicated and from temporary duty at this Headquarters, effective 11 March, 1942, is then assigned to Headquarters Luzon Force, and will report to the Commanding General for duty with the Signal Corps:

1st Lieutenant John R. McShane, 0-388763, Inf.,
Headquarters Philippine Department
2nd Lieutenant Lloyd A. Coleman, 0-411963, AC, 21st Pursuit Squadron.

22. Each of the following named officers is relieved from assignment to Headquarters Philippine Department, effective 11 March 1942, is then assigned to this Headquarters, and will report to the Commanding General for duty:

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Fischer, 0-173378, MI.
Major Charles P. Shearn, 0-312230, GSC.

23. 3d Lieutenant Alfred G. McMicking, Inf-Res., Philippine Army, is relieved from attachment and duty at this Headquarters, is then attached to Headquarters, Luzon Force and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

24. Each of the following named officers is relieved from assignment to Headquarters Philippine Department, is then assigned to Headquarters Luzon Force and will report to the Commanding General for duty:

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Wood, 0-16857, FA.
Major Nelson W. Raymond, 0-235991, MI.
Captain Raymond E. Bibee, 0-364633, FD.
1st Lieut. Jack Erwin, 0-337557, MI.
1st Lieut. Robert E. Roseveare, 0-311189, MI.

25. Major Lawrence A. Bosworth, 0-18039, CAC, is relieved from temporary duty at this Headquarters, and will report to the Commanding General, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, for duty.

26. Captain Emilio V. Viardo, 0-1488, CE, Philippine Army, is relieved from temporary duty at this Headquarters, is then attached to Headquarters Luzon Force and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

27. Lieutenant Colonel Narciso L. Manzano, 0-14790, (PS) CE, is relieved from his present assignment and from further temporary duty at this Headquarters is then assigned to Headquarters Luzon Force, and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

28. Each of the following Air Corps Officers is relieved from temporary duty at this Headquarters, and will report to the Commanding General, 5th Interceptor Command, Far East Air Force, for duty:

Captain William J. Cummings, Jr., 0-369651.
Captain Louis M. Bell, 0-343832.

29. Major George T. Britt, 0-223349, AGD, is relieved from assignment to Headquarters Philippine Department and from temporary duty at this Headquarters, is then assigned to Headquarters, Luzon Force, and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

30. Lieutenant Colonel Roy C. Hilton, 0-5554, Inf., is relieved from assignment to this Headquarters, effective 11 March 1942, is then assigned to Headquarters, Luzon Force, and will report to the Commanding General for duty.

X X X X X X

By command of General MacARTHUR:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Carl H. Seals
CARL H. SEALS,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

TAG (5)
Staff (3)
CG Luzon Force (30)
HPD (3)
I Phil Corps (2)
Serv. Command Luzon Force (2)
21st Pur. Sq. (2)
5th Int Com (4)
51st Div (PA) (2)
Each Off. (2)
PCAC (2)
HPA (2)
FS PA Cas Det (1)
CS PA (1)
Gas Det. Hq. USAFFE (1)
HDM&S Bays (1)
14th Eng (PS) (2)
Chem Off. USAFFE (1)

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff.

S.O. No. 66 (Cont'd).

DISTRIBUTION: (Cont'd)
Dept Chem Off (1)
POD (1)
Ord. Off. USAFFE (1)
PER-Div (4)
FO USA (30)
File (35)

NOTE: Read Par. 18 above. Par. 5, S.O. No. 75 HQ USAFFE dated March 21, 1942 revoked so much of paragraph 18, Special Order No. 66, HQ USAFFE dated March 11, 1942 as assigned Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, CWS to HQ Luzon Force.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Fort Mills, P. I.

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO. 42)

14 March 1942.

1. There is constituted effective 11 March, 1942, the Luzon Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East, as follows:

Commander: Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright, (O-2131), USA.

Troops: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Luzon Force (see Par. 2)
Headquarters Company, Luzon Force (see Par. 3).
I Philippine Corps.
II Philippine Corps.
5th Interceptor Command, Far East Air Force.
Provisional Tank Group, United States Army Forces in the Far East.
Service Command, Luzon Force (see pars. 4 & 5).
14th Engineer Battalion (PS).
Motor Transport Service, Luzon Force (see par. 6).
31st Infantry
57th Infantry (PS)
803rd Engineer Battalion (Ava) (less Co. "A").
200th Coast Artillery (AA)
515th Coast Artillery (AA)
Battery "A", 2nd Coast Artillery (AA), Philippine Army.
Provisional Signal Battalion, United States Army Forces in the Far East.

2. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Luzon Force, is activated effective 11 March 1942.

3. Headquarters Company, United States Army Forces in the Far East, is redesignated Headquarters Company, Luzon Force, effective 11 March 1942, and is assigned to the Luzon Force.

4. There is constituted effective 11 March 1942, the Service Command, Luzon Force, as follows:

Commander: Brigadier General Allan C. McBride (O-2461), USA.

Troops: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Service Command.
Headquarters Company, Philippine Department.
808th Military Police Company.
19th Quartermaster Company (Truck) (Avn.)
Headquarters Philippine Army.
Detachment, 26th Cavalry (PS).
Finance Detachment (from Finance Department, Philippine Department).
Ordnance:
Philippine Ordnance Depot
75th Ordnance Company (Depot)
745th Ordnance Company (Avn).
698th Ordnance Company (Avn).
693rd Ordnance Company (Avn).
454th Ordnance Company (Avn).
Chemical:
301st Chemical Company (Depot) (PA)
Signal:
Philippine Signal Depot.
Engineer:
Philippine Engineer Depot
301st Engineer Company (Depot) (PA)
Quartermaster:
Philippine Quartermaster Depot.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 42 (Cont'd).

74th Separate Quartermaster Company (Bakery) (PS)
School for Bakers and Cooks
Graves Registration Company (PA).
Philippine Motor Transport Depot.
Fort McKinley Light Maintenance Detachment (PS)
Medical:
Philippine Medical Depot.
General Hospital No. 1
General Hospital No. 2
Philippine Army General Hospital.
Veterinary General Hospital, Philippine Department.
1st Platoon, 4th Veterinary Company (PS).

5. a. The records, detachments, and units composing Headquarters Philippine Department, less those assigned elsewhere herein are transferred to Fort Mills. The following elements will specifically continue in active operation at Fort Mills:

- (1) Personnel Division, Adjutant General's Section, Headquarters Philippine Department.
- (2) Judge Advocate General's Section, Headquarters Philippine Department.
- (3) Finance Section, Headquarters Philippine Department.
- (4) Medical Section, Headquarters Philippine Department.
- (5) Chemical Warfare Service Section, Headquarters Philippine Department.

b. The personnel of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Philippine Department, not assigned elsewhere in paragraphs 4 and 5 a, of the foregoing, are transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Service Command, Luzon Force.

6. All motor transportation of the Luzon Force not assigned organically to units or attached thereto, together with operating personnel and equipment, are hereby organized into a Motor Transport Service, Luzon Force, under the direct control of the Commanding General, Luzon Force.

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Quinn (O-10882), QMC
Troops: Provisional Battalion, 12th Quartermaster Regiment (PS), consisting of
Companies "A", "B", and "C".
34th Separate Quartermaster Company (Light Maint) (PS)
Company "C", 33rd Quartermaster Regiment (Avn).
30th Quartermaster Company (Light Maint) (Avn).
91st Quartermaster Company (Truck) (Avn.)

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Sgd/ CARL H. SEALS
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Fort Mills, P. I.

22 March 1942

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO. 3)

	Section
Announcement of Quartermaster	I
Announcement of Engineer Officer	II
Announcement of Chemical Warfare Officer	III
Announcement of Surgeon	IV
Announcement of Ordnance Officer	V
Announcement of Inspector General.	VI
Announcement of Air Officer.	VII
Announcement of Finance Officer.	VIII
Announcement of Signal Officer	IX
Announcement of Judge Advocate	X

- I. Brigadier General Charles C. Drake, O-3415, Quartermaster Corps is announced as Quartermaster, United States Forces in the Philippines.
- II. Colonel Henry H. Stickney, O-3319, Corps of Engineers, is announced as Engineer Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.
- III. Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, O-4663, Chemical Warfare Service, is announced as Chemical Warfare Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.
- IV. Colonel Webb E. Cooper, O-2819, Medical Corps, is announced as Surgeon, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.
- V. Colonel George W. Hirsch, O-8580, Ordnance Department, is announced as Ordnance Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.
- VI. Colonel Milton A. Hill, O-10177, Inspector General's Department, is announced as Inspector General, United States Forces in the Philippines.
- VII. Colonel Charles M. Savage, O-8939, Air Corps, is announced as Air Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines.
- VIII. Colonel Royal G. Jenks, O-5417, Finance Department, is announced as Finance Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.
- IX. Lieutenant Colonel Theodore T. Teague, O-11678, Signal Corps, is announced as Signal Officer, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.
- X. Lt. Col. Thomas A. Lynch, O-3237, Judge Advocate General's Department, is announced as Judge Advocate, United States Forces in the Philippines, in addition to his other duties.

By command of Lieutenant General WAINWRIGHT:

LEWIS C. BEEBE
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Carl H. Seals
CARL H. SEALS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Fort Mills, P. I.

21 March 1942

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 2

	Section
Announcement of Aides-de-camp	I
Announcement of Commanding General, Luzon Force	II
Announcement of Chief of Staff	III
Announcement of Chief of Staff, G-1.	IV
Announcement of Chief of Staff, G-2.	V
Announcement of Chief of Staff, G-3.	VI
Announcement of Chief of Staff, G-4.	VII
Announcement of Adjutant General	VIII

I. Major John R. Pugh, (O-18790), Cavalry, is announced as Aide-de-Camp to Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, United States Army.

Captain Thomas Dooley, (O-328542), Cavalry, is announced as Aide-de-Camp to Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, United States Army.

II. Major General Edward P. King, Jr., (O-2442), United States Army, is announced as the Commanding General of the Luzon Force, United States Forces in the Philippines.

III. Brigadier General Lewis C. Beebe, (O-6292), General Staff Corps, is announced as Chief of Staff, United States Forces in the Philippines.

IV. Lieutenant Colonel Nunez C. Pilet, (O-15931), General Staff Corps, is announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Forces in the Philippines.

V. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Wood, (O-16857), Field Artillery, is announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Forces in the Philippines.

VI. Colonel Constant L. Irwin, (O-4757), General Staff Corps, is announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Forces in the Philippines.

VII. Lieutenant Colonel Nicoll F. Galbraith, (O-11588), General Staff Corps, is announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Forces in the Philippines.

VIII. Brigadier General Carl H. Seals, (O-3325), United States Army, is announced as Adjutant General, United States Forces in the Philippines.

/s/ J. M. Wainwright
J. M. WAINWRIGHT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

Use of Tiki-tiki Preparation from Rice Hulls.

(1) To: G-4 and C/S, USFIP.

Cml. O. USFIP - 31 March 1942.

1. Reference is made to letter of March 25, 1942, from the Commanding General, 61st Division, Iloilo, P. I. subject: Use of Tiki-tiki Extract. This extract was made by the CWS laboratory of the 61st Division from rice hulls and is used for treatment of beri beri. It is a heavy liquid and the samples received by plane from Iloilo were shipped in beer bottles. There are several rice mills on Bataan under US Army control and it may be possible to produce this extract locally even with the limited facilities now available, if the process be known. If so, this will save air transport space, time, etc.

2. It is recommended that a secret radio, substantially as follows, be sent to the Commanding General, Visayan Force, for the Commanding General, 61st Division, Iloilo, Panay. -

"Detailed information desired on Tiki-tiki preparation from rice hulls also method used in finding vitamin equivalent."

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

USAFFE
Visayan Force
Headquarters Sixty-first Medical Battalion

March 25, 1942.

Subject: Use of Tiki-Tiki Extract.

To: Commanding General, 61st Division.

1. The Tiki-tiki Extract manufactured by the Chemical Warfare Service of the 61st Division is obtained from rice bran, one cc. of this extract being equivalent to 14.5 grams of the rice bran. One cc. of this extract has the potency equivalent to at least 20 International Units of Vitamin B₁.

2. The maintenance prophylactic dose is one tablespoonful of the extract daily.

3. Therapeutic Dosage: In severe beri beri and polyneuritis, large dosages are advised. At least two tablespoonfuls three times daily should be given. More can be given depending upon the advice of the physician.

JOSE P. CAEDO,
Lt. Col., MC,
Division Surgeon.

1st Ind.

Hq 61st Division, USAFFE, March 25, 1942.

To: Commanding General, USAFFE, Ft. Mills.

1. We have on hand at the present time considerable amount of this Tiki-tiki and can sent it on to you by the first available transportation if you so desire.

2. If you desire an airplane, which stops off on Panay, to pick this up on its return trip, if you will give the orders to the pilot we can arrange shipment at the airport.

3. Radio us if you need it.

F. M. FLINLAU,
Lt. Col., US Army,
Chief of Staff, 61st Division.

(1) To: Surgeon

Misc AG 3/28/42

For indication of action.

C.H.S.

(2) To: G-4, USFIP

Surgeon 3/28/42

Recommend that Tiki-tiki in full quantities available from Panay be obtained and turned over to Philippine Medical Depot.

W.E.C.

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, United States Forces in the Philippine Islands, In the Field, March 28, 1942.
To: Commanding Officer, Fifth Interceptor Command.

1. To note and return.

2. Priorities of movement of supplies north by air are established as follows:

a. Supplies at Del Monte air-shipped from Australia.

b. Tiki-tiki from Iloilo.

c. First class mail from Cebu.

3. Maintenance of contact through Air Liaison Officer at this Headquarters will permit timely warning to southern island personnel to have shipments prepared for dispatch.

By command of Lieutenant General WAINWRIGHT:

CARL H. SEALS
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P. I.
April 10, 1942

Subject: Report of CWS Activities.

To: The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Subject report for the period ending April 10, 1942, is submitted. My previous report with seven inclosures was dated March 31, 1942.

2. There has been no material change in items 1, a, b, c, d, and e, of report of March 31, 1942, except for report by the Transportation Officer, Major J. N. Shanks, QMC re the urgency for the supply of sulphuric acid manufactured by the CWS, Inclosure No. 2.

f. CW Training and Supply -

(1) The inspection and repair of gas masks for the Luzon Force referred to in paragraph 1 e (2) of letter dated March 31, 1942 was completed and report thereon submitted by the Commanding Officer, Chemical Depot on April 6, 1942. Approximately 15,000 gas masks required for all personnel on Bataan.

(2) No further action has been taken toward production of Tiki-tiki because of lack of instruction regarding procedure.

g. A copy of a very commendable Navy report on Lt. Col. Roemer during the Pucot Hill action in January, 1942, is inclosed. His work was personally observed by me several times during this period and I thoroughly concur in the official report thereof by Commander F. J. Bridgett, USN (Incl. No. 1).

h. One ammonia canister was manufactured by the CW laboratory for use of the QMC.

i. Reference your recent radio the five items and the five extra samples have been prepared for dispatch and it is hoped that suitable transportation will become available therefor within the next few days.

3. The above information was in general blocked out and prepared for completion prior to this date, April 10, 1942.

4. The inclosed copy of the News Bulletin from this Hq. dated April 10, 1942, which is broadcast locally over the Voice of Freedom, is self-explanatory. (Incl. No. 3.)

5. The present disposition of CWS Commissioned personnel according to latest information is as follows:

On Bataan, P. I.

Lt. Col. Louis E. Roemer, Major Harrison, Captain Daniel, 1st Lt. Webb,
2nd Lt. Small, 2nd Lt. Miles.

On Fort Mills, P. I.

Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, Captain Bartlett, Captain Lazzarini,
1st Lt. Winn, 1st Lt. Morgan, 1st Lt. Schaf, 2nd Lt. Davis, W.O. Jackson.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. NAVAL
BATTALION, MARIVELES, P.I.
9 February 1942.

From: The Battalion Commander.
To: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Via: The Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Units
Ashore, Mariveles, P. I.

Reference: (a) Commanding Officer, Naval Battalion,
letter of 9 February 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Original and five copies of Ref. (a)

1. Enclosures (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) of Enclosure "A", are in the course of preparation and will be forwarded as rapidly as completed.

F. J. BRIDGET.

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVAL
BATTALION, MARIVELES, P.I.
February 9, 1942.

From: The Battalion Commander
To: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Via: The Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Units
Ashore, Mariveles, P.I.

Subject: Action of Longoskawayan Point against
Japanese Forces.

Enclosures: (A) Naval and Marine Officers engaged.
(B) Army Officers engaged.
(C) Reports of individual performances of Army and Navy and
Marine Officers as observed.
(D) Reports and comments on U.S. Navy and Marine
enlisted personnel
(E) Casualties.

1. Essentially, this action by the Naval Battalion, Mariveles, consisted of clearing Mount Pucot, after occupation by the Japanese, localizing the Japanese at their prepared positions on Laplay Point, at the foot of Mount Pucot, and on Longoskawayan Point, clearing Laplay Point and localizing and attacking the enemy on Longoskawayan Point. Continuous action for five days and four nights was required. Final annihilation of the enemy was accomplished in two days on Longoskawayan Point by the Fifty-seventh Regiment of Infantry (P.S.), USA, under the command of Colonel P.T. Fry using his Second Battalion commanded by Lieut. Colonel H.C. Granberry. Two additional days were occupied in mopping up operations directed against isolated groups of enemy personnel along the beach line of Kinalalakan Bay. Two units, each consisting of a lightly armoured motor launch and a motor whale-boat, were used for this purpose. After clearing up coastal points occupied by the enemy these boat units closely examined the balance of the coast line from Bataan Point to Cochinas Point and found it clear of enemy.

2. An outstanding feature of the engagement was that practically all elements of the armed forces of the United States in this area were represented in the action and that they operated smoothly and with coordination to achieve a minor but most decisive victory in an area of vital strategic importance to the Army and Navy in Bataan Peninsula, Mariveles Harbor and Corregidor. It is believed that weight of artillery support and vigorous continuous offensive action were responsible for the destruction of the Japanese force. It is significant that Japanese naval support was not forthcoming.

3. Although minor in nature, from the standpoint of the forces originally engaged (a characteristic of Japanese landings in the Bataan Peninsula), the loss of Mount Pucot would have resulted in:

- (a) Control with light artillery by the Japanese of main road down the western coast of Bataan.
- (b) Control of Mariveles Harbor.
- (c) Control of the main road leading to the east coast of Bataan.
- (d) Partial control of the Mariveles cut-off road.

All these elements are in the rear of the U.S. Army forces on Bataan. It was previous realization and study of the value of Mount Pucot and adjacent areas (although within the area covered by gunfire from Corregidor), which led to immediate action when the Naval Battalion lookout station on Mount Pucot reported the presence of Japanese Forces at 0840 local DST January 23, 1942. This plan of action had been discussed and agreed upon with General Clyde A. Sellock, U.S.A., in command of the Army forces in Western Bataan. The time element, inaccessibility of the coast, lack of water, comparative accessibility by small boat, and joint interest led to this agreement under which the Naval Battalion would move in immediately should the area become threatened

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

HEADQUARTERS U.S. NAVAL
BATTALION, MARIVELES, P.I.
February 9, 1942.

Subject: Action of Longoskawayan Point against Japanese Forces.

prior to Army occupation. The concise western limit of the Naval Battalion area was noted to General Sellock and to USAFFE Headquarters on Bataan. This limit extends north from Apatot Bay.

4. The Japanese force was estimated by U.S. Army and Navy Officers at 200. A Japanese prisoner later stated that 7 officers and 294 men were landed. The Naval Battalion, Mariveles, consists of 602 men. It is a self contained unit with many duties other than field service and its activities are spread over a large area. In spite of this, it was possible to muster approximately 200 men on the front line on Longoskawayan Point on the fifth day of action. It was fully realized that the Naval Battalion forces were overextended but against this was balanced the necessity for continued offensive action in order to contain the enemy.

5. At the end of five days and four nights of action, relief became absolutely essential. It was furnished without hesitation by Colonel P.T. Fry and Lieut. Colonel F.M. Brokaw, who dispatched the Second Battalion of the 7th Regiment (P.S.) to the scene under the command of Lieut. Colonel H.C. Granberry. Although supported in the area by other United States Forces, this battalion through its own operations thoroughly and decisively polished off the Japanese in smart fashion. Too much credit cannot be given to the officers and men of this unit.

6. Japanese and Naval Battalion Forces as stated before: 23 January 1942:

Missions accomplished - Mount Pucot retaken, Slopes cleared of machine gun nests.

Reinforcements received - From Colonel S.A. Hamilton, 60 men from the 301st Chemical Company under command of Lieut. Colonel L. E. Roemer. From Second Regular Division Philippine Army, 3rd Lieut. A. A. Peroz with 8 men and a mountain pack howitzer.

Disposal of forces for the night. 301st Chemical Company on the north slope of Mount Pucot, which placed them in contact with the 3rd Pursuit Squadron who maintained a line from Km 180 to Bataan Point. Battery "A" (Marines and Blue jackets) on Mount Pucot. Battery "C" (Marines and Blue jackets), Aircraft Asiatic, and Naval Ammunition Depot Companies along mountain ridges from Mount Pucot to Talaga Bay. General Detail company as reserve along main road from Km. 178 to Km. 179. The howitzer was assembled and located at the saddle southeast of Mount Pucot.

7. 24 January 1942: The enemy had reoccupied certain positions on the west and south slopes of Mount Pucot. These were attacked and the enemy localized at the tips of Longoskawayan Point and Laplay Point. Night positions were taken along the ridges commanding these points. Enemy 37 mm trench mortars and machine guns were operating on the points, and it was evident that artillery support would be necessary to reduce them.

8. 25 January 1942: At 0000 the 59th Coast Artillery, 12" mortars from Corregidor under command of Colonel N.B. Simmons and Major D.D. Edison delivered a bombardment on Longoskawayan Point which appeared from the observation posts at Mount Pucot at the time to be most effective. Two trench mortars from the Fourth Marine Regiment, Colonel F.L. Howard, under Lieut. M. E. Peshek arrived at 1400 and took up positions on reverse slopes northwest of Mount Pucot. The infantry attack was continued under cover of mortar fire with machine gun fire being encountered at the tips of the Points the same as the day before. Enemy trench mortar fire from Longoskawayan Point continued. Evening positions were the same as the day before.

9. 26 January 1942: Light infantry attacks were made on this day as time was required for artillery preparation. Fire was delivered by the trench mortars under Lieut. Peshek on both Longoskawayan Point and Lapalay Point. Lapalay Point was evacuated by the enemy leaving Longoskawayan Point as their remaining beach head. The loss of one side of Kinalalakan Bay prevented its use by the enemy for further landings.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

HEADQUARTERS U.S. NAVAL
BATTALION, MARIVELES, P. I.
February 9, 1942.

Subject: Action of Longoskawayan Point against Japanese Forces.

10. 27 January 1942: At 0700 bombardment commenced with the 12" mortars from Corregidor, 75 mm of the 88th Field Artillery, mountain pack howitzers under Lieut. Perez, and 81 mm field mortars under Lieut. Peshek, the latter using one light and one heavy fire. At cessation of the artillery fire the morning attack was delivered by a maximum of 200 men of the Naval Battalion. In this attack the left flank, reportedly having retired, had in fact advanced quickly and opened the line allowing infiltration. Retirement was effected under cover of the trench mortars under Lieut. Peshek and the mountain pack howitzer, under Lieut. Perez. Both of these units proved themselves efficient and effective. Without their help it is doubtful whether retirement could have been effected certainly heavier losses would have resulted. At 1800 the Second Battalion of the 57th Regiment Philippine Scouts under Lieut. Colonel Granberry moved in to relieve the Naval Battalion and to take over the offensive. The Naval Battalion, Mariveles, from this time acted as a supporting unit to the 2nd Battalion, 57th Regiment. The Fourth Marine artillery and machine gun company commanded by Lieut. Peshek remained at their position in the field.

11. 28 January 1942: The 2nd Battalion developed the approaches to Longoskawayan Point maneuvering sweeping elements with the 57th Regiment Sniper Company, Captain Wermouth, WA. Accurate fire by the 88th Field Artillery, Major Howard, continued. The trench mortars under Lieut. Peshek were in use. The mountain pack howitzer, Lieut. Perez, was removed from its exposed position.

12. 29 January 1942: At 0700 the 12" mortars of the 59th Coast Artillery, 75's of the 88th Field Artillery, trench mortars of the Fourth Marines, Lieut. Peshek, 50 caliber machine guns of the Naval Battalion, and two 3-inch 50 calibers of the USS QUAIL, Lieut. Comdr. J. H. Morrill, USN, were brought to bear on the Japanese position. The position of the QUAIL was exposed to possible fire from a Japanese cruiser reported to be 30,000 yards from Corregidor. Several dive bombers were operating in the vicinity but did not attack.

13. 30 January 1942: Scouting in the vicinity of Longoskawayan and Lapalay Points was continued by the 57th Infantry. Enemy were reported in the vicinity of Lalium Point about 1400 necessitating placing of Naval Battalion units in reserve positions along the ridges leading to Mount Pucot. Major Scholes and Lieut. Hogaboom with a small detachment of scouts proceeded to Lalium Point and wiped out a group of 7 enemy. No other enemy being encountered Naval Battalion units were returned to their base camps. During the day the U.S.S. CANAPUS completed preparing a 40 foot motor launch with light armour. A 3/8" shield of boiler plate was installed in front of the engine extending aft about eight feet. Similar plating was placed on the bow. The gasoline tank was protected by sandbags. One 37 mm and two 50 caliber machine guns were placed in the bow and two 30 caliber machine guns installed in the waist.

14. 31 January 1942: The armored motor boat and unit under command of Lieut. Comdr. R.W. Goodall proceeded to Lapalay Point where the beach line was inspected. One Japanese was captured and one killed. In the afternoon this unit scouted Longoskawayan Point shore line. Three more Japanese were captured in caves and four killed. The three captured surrendering to Major Scholes.

15. 1 February 1942: One motor boat unit continued the beach line search under Lieut. Comdr. Goodall accounting for four enemy. A second unit under Chief Radio Electrician B. C. Fuller accompanied by Major Scholes scouted the beach line north of Mount Pucot finding no enemy in any of the coast caverns.

16. The elements of material and substantial assistance to the ground troops of first, the Naval Battalion, and, second, the 2nd Battalion of the 57th Regiment during the entire engagement were:

(a) The Eighty Eighth Field Artillery with 75 mm guns: Major C.E.N. Howard, Jr., Major C.L. Johnson, Captain F. Ginsberg, Captain E. Camelguard, and 1st Lt. C. Francis.

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

HEADQUARTERS U.S. NAVAL
BATTALION, MARIVELES, P. I.
February 9, 1942.

Subject: Action of Longoskawayan Point against Japanese Forces.

(b) The Fifty Ninth Coast Artillery of Corregidor: Colonel P.S. Bunker, Colonel N.B. Simmons, Major D.D. Edison, 2nd Lieut. R.P. Fulner and Lieut. F.W. Bliss. Night artillery fire was conducted effectively and efficiently in addition to day firing. The orders were changed during the barrage adding to its effectiveness.

(c) The heavy and light trench mortar fire by the unit of the Fourth Marine Regiment, Colonel F.L. Howard and Lieut. M.E. Peshek. It was most effective.

(d) The firing of the guns of the U.S.S. QUAIL, Lieut. Comdr. Morrill, USN, Commanding, was most accurate and the conductance of the ship in accordance with the best Navy traditions. The fire of this ship on the enemy rear was a factor in the ultimate success of the U.S. Forces.

(e) The mountain pack howitzer, 3rd Lieut. A.A. Perez, was fired accurately and with telling effect when most needed. The performance of this officer was outstanding in that it was his and his crews first firing of this gun. The accurate fire delivered when needed was point blank and from a position on Mount Pucot's slopes exposed to return point blank fire of the enemy.

(f) The U.S.S. CANAPUS - Comdr. E.L. Sackett, USN, cooperated fully in furnishing supplies, water and aid in the large problem of supporting the troops on the seaboard slopes. In addition armored forty foot motor launches equipped by the CANAPUS permitted complete mopping up operations.

17. The complete and thorough cooperation of the U.S. Army General officer personnel and that of the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, was a factor of importance. The experience, advice and counsel of Colonel W.T. Clement, USMC, was made available by Admiral F.W. Rockwell, USN, after the second day. Colonel Clement gave his full time unhesitatingly to the Naval Battalion and his action in conjunction with Lieut. Colonel Brokaw of the 57th Regiment brought reinforcements at a very critical time of the engagement. Had this been delayed or not forthcoming, the work of the first five days could well have been rendered useless. Lieut. Comdr. M. Cheek, USN, of Admiral Rockwell's Staff coordinated many elements used in the engagement and his work was an additional factor to the ultimate success. The coordination of Captain H.G. Thorne, Jr., AC, USA, on the right flank at Biaa Point was complete.

18. Enclosure (A) lists those Naval and Marine Officers engaged. Enclosure (B) lists those Army Officers engaged. Enclosure (C) comprises reports on individual performances of officers of the Army and the Navy as observed. Enclosure (D) are reports and recommendations on U.S. Navy enlisted personnel.

19. Naval casualties are listed in Enclosure (E).
Total casualties in action were:

Navy and Marine Corps:	11 dead, 28 injured.
Army:	11 dead, 27 injured.
Total U.S.:	22 dead, 53 injured.

Japanese casualties were between 200 and 300.

F.J. BRIDGET

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C.W.S.

U.S. NAVAL BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
MARIVELES, P. I.
19 February 1942.

From: The Battalion Commander.
To: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

SUBJECT: Action of Longoskawayan Point Against the Japanese Forces.

1. The following officers of the U.S. Army were engaged in or operating in support of the action at Longoskawayan Point:

BENTON, B.A.	Lieut.	24th Pursuit Group
BLISS, R.W.	Lieut.	59th C.A.C.
BROKAW, F.E.	Lt. Col.	57th Inf.
BUNKER, P.D.	Colonel	59th C.A.C.
CHRISTIE,	2nd Lt.	
DANIELS, B. F.	Captain <i>left</i>	301st Chem. Co.
EDISON, D.D.	Major	59th C.A.C.
ELLIS, H.E.	1st Lieut.	3rd Pursuit Group
FRANCIS, T.C.	1st Lt.	88th Field Artillery
FRY, P.T.	Colonel, 57th Inf.	
FULMER, R.P.	2nd Lieut.	59th C.A.C.
GAMELGAARD, E.	Captain	88th F.A.
GINSBERG, F.	Captain	88th F.A.
GRANBERRY, H.C.	Lt. Col.	57th Inf.
HAMILTON, S.A.	Colonel	301st Chem. Co.
HOWARD, Jr. C.E.M.	Major	88th F.A.
JOHNSON, C.L.	Major	88th F.A.
MITTENTHAL, H.H.	Lieut.	57th Inf.
MOORE, J. Morgan, C.D.	Captain	301st Chem. Co.
NEWMAN, R.W.	2nd Lieut.	3rd Pursuit Group
OBRIEN, F.S.	2nd Lieut.	3rd Pursuit Group
PEREZ, A.A.	3rd Lieut.	301st Art.
ROBBIE,	Captain	
ROEMER, L.E.	Lt. Col.	301st Chem. Co.
SANTOS,	3rd Lieut.	301st Chem. Co.
SCHOLES, R.D.	Major	57th Inf.
SIMMONS, W.B.	Colonel	59th C.A.C.
THORNE, Jr. H.G.	Captain	3rd Pursuit Group
WERMOUTH, A.W.	Captain	57th Inf.

2. It is realized that this list is not complete due to the difficulty of keeping accurate records during periods of action against the enemy, however, it is hoped that Commanding Officers of individual units will be able to add any names which have been inadvertently omitted.

ENCLOSURE (B):

F. J. BRIDGET

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.

U.S. NAVAL BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
MARIVELES, P. I.
19 February 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer
To: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

SUBJECT: Specific commendatory report of outstanding performance of duty of personnel of the 301st Chemical Co., U.S. Army during the action of Longoskawayan, Lapiay and Quinauan Points, 23 January to 8 February 1942 against the Japanese Forces.

1. On 24 January upon the request of the Naval Battalion, Gen. McBride sent sixty men of the 301st Chemical Company, U.S. Army, Col. S.A. Hamilton, Commander, under Lt. Col. L.E. Roemer.

2. These troops were used on the right flank of the Naval Battalion on the north slope of Mount Pucot, to prevent the Japanese forces from circling Mount Pucot and obtaining access to the Mariveles Road. During the action it became necessary that a detailed search of the coast be made. This search was made personally over extremely rugged terrain prior to the disintegration of the Japanese Forces on Longoskawayan Point. In carrying out this duty Lt. Col. Roemer was exposed to small parties of Japanese who were known to be in the area. At this and other times the willingness of Lt. Col. Roemer to take immediate and direct action was decidedly in keeping with the best traditions of the U.S. Military Forces.

F.J. BRIDGET

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.

Phil. Dept. Motor Transport Depot
Fourth Echelon Base Shop
Corregidor, P. I.

March 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: General Drake, Q.M.C.

Recently the supply of sulphuric acid for battery electrolyte became depleted. The situation was extremely serious until the Chemical Warfare Service came to our aid by manufacturing a suitable acid for our purpose. The acid manufactured by them has proven satisfactory so far. Many batteries filled with this acid are now in daily operation, and to date no malfunctioning of batteries has been traceable to the acid.

The Chemical Warfare Service deserves much credit for their service in this case, without which motor transportation would be out of the picture by this time.

J. N. SHANKS
Capt., Q.M.C.
Dept. Maintenance Officer.

Headquarters United States Forces in the Philippines
Press Relations Section, General Staff
INTERNATIONAL NEWS SUMMARY

No. 106

April 10, 1942.

PHILIPPINES: From Lieutenant General Wainwright's Headquarters, United States Forces in the Philippines, 9:00 a. m., press release:- Except for occasional flurries of resistance fighting subsided in Bataan late in the morning April 9th. Last reports stated that Major General Edward P. King, Junior, commanding Luzon Force, had gone forward to arrange a truce. Up to a late hour yesterday evening he had not returned and terms of truce were not disclosed. Wire communication was cut on Bataan side last evening. Corregidor under air raid alarm most of day. Bombs were dropped on four occasions. Most of them fell in the water. No Military damage reported. Corregidor shelled from mainland intermittently during afternoon. Many projectiles were fired, but damage slight. No reports from Southern Islands. Several hostile ships including cruisers and transports sighted off southern Negros and northern Mindanao.

THE FALL OF BATAAN: Bataan has fallen. The Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and blood-stained peninsula have laid down their arms. With heads bloody, but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior force and numbers of the enemy.

The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the jungle fastnesses and along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the constant and gruelling fire of the enemy for more than three months. Besieged on land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and in America, these intrepid fighters have done all that human endurance could bear.

For what sustained them through all these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than merely physical. It was the force of an unconquerable faith, something in the heart and soul that physical hardship and adversity could not destroy. It was the thought of native land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity, and pride in these most priceless of all our human prerogatives.

The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will credit our troops with nothing less than the courage and fortitude his own troops have shown in battle. Our men have fought a brave and bitterly contested struggle; all the world will testify to the almost super-human endurance with which they stood up until the last in the face of overwhelming odds.

But the decision had to come. Men fighting under the banner of an unshakable faith are made of something more than flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last, endurance melts away, and the end of the battle must come.

Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand--a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the world--cannot fall.

X X X X X X X X

HEADQUARTERS USFIP
Office of the Chemical Officer
FORT MILLS, P. I.

7:00 P. M. 11 April 42.

Dear General Porter -

Unexpected delay in getting these off in compliance with your AG - radio. Hope they are able to leave to-night.

The inclosed will bring you up to date -- Everything OK here in the HDM & SB - just a little crowded which was to be expected under the circumstances.

Best regards to all -----

Sincerely -----

Hamilton

N.B.

1 September 1946

This letter was inclosed in one of two boxes weighing approximately fifteen pounds each which contained Japanese gas masks.

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P. I.
April 19, 1942.

Subject: Improvised Flame Thrower.

To: The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. A copy of the report on the local development of an improvised flame thrower is inclosed herewith. The original is being transmitted through the USAFFE in Australia and a carbon thereof is being sent to the Commanding General, Mindanao Force.

2. Effort is being made to have photographs taken by the Signal Corps of this improvised flame thrower and also of a captured Japanese flame thrower. A sample of the Japanese flame thrower mechanism was forwarded to your office in March, 1942. A complete set of prints of each type of flame thrower will be forwarded for the information of your office at a later date.

3. Five Japanese canisters have been individually packed and are being mailed direct to your office in addition to the five sample gas masks and five extra canisters packed in two boxes weighing about 15 pounds each which are still waiting for suitable transportation.

4. Some additional inclosures have been added hereto for the information and records of your office.

/s/ Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.,
Chemical Officer.

6 Incls.

- No. 1, Report of Flame Thrower w/Blueprints
- No. 2, Master Chart-Bataan, 1-63380
- No. 3, Pocket Chart-Bataan, 1-100,000
- No. 4, Pictures of old PCWD
- No. 5, Itinerary SAH since Dec. 8, 1941
- No. 6, CN to G-4, re storage supplies.

"COPY"

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P. I.
April 16, 1942

SUBJECT: Status of Improved Flame Thrower, Philippine Islands.

TO: The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, Washington, D. C.
(Thru: Commanding General, USFIP).

1. The undersigned was personally directed by the Commanding General, USAFFE, (General MacArthur) and also by the Chief of Staff, USAFFE, (General Sutherland) during the latter part of February, 1942, to press the local development of a flame thrower which had already been initiated by this office after observation of Japanese action on the west coast of Bataan, P.I.

2. All likely sources of advice and practical assistance (exclusive of CWS personnel) in the HD of M & SB and on Bataan, P. I., including personnel of the USS Canopus were contacted on one or more occasions on this subject. The helpful suggestions given and practical assistance rendered by such individuals and their subordinates aided materially in the development of one pilot model improved flame thrower. Further experimentation and development of this project cannot be carried out on Bataan, P. I., at this time. Insofar as present conditions and facilities at Fort Mills, P. I., permit, effort will be made to improve this pilot model.

3. The status of development of flame throwers in the United States is not definitely known. However, the most recent information obtainable on this subject, reports from CWS personnel arriving in the Philippine Department during October-November, 1941, and inclosure 2 of the attached report, indicate that the United States principle and basis of flame thrower research and development is somewhat inferior and less practicable than the Japanese principle. The improved flame thrower described in the attached report of 1st Lt. Frank L. Schaf, Jr., CWS., who was placed in immediate charge of this project, is a local adaptation of the Japanese principle.

4. Recommend special effort be made to dispatch this report by the fastest available transportation to the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, Washington, D. C.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

1 Incl -
Report w/2 incls.

CHEMICAL WARFARE LABORATORY
FORT MILLS, P. I.

13 APRIL 1942.

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF THE FLAME THROWER (IMPROVED)

TO : CHEMICAL OFFICER, USFIP, FORT MILLS, P. I.

From previous reports on the progress of the developments of the improved flame thrower it can be seen that many changes and refinements must be made before the weapon could be trusted in actual front line use. With the short-comings of the original model in mind it was decided that first, the weight must be cut to a minimum but with no loss as to volume of fuel. Second, an entirely new and reliable ignition mechanism must be developed. Third, experimentation on different nozzle arrangements in combination with various fuel mixtures to realize the full efficiency of the weapon. In looking back on the original model, which consisted of two 3 gallon demustardizers hooked in series to a single spray outlet, with a cigarette lighter attached to the nozzle for an igniter, it was realized that without proper machines and tools this was as far as we could go. Therefore the alternative was accepted and the machine shop of the Submarine Tender USS Canopus was procured for use. Chief Machinist L. L. Alcutt was assigned to me as assistant.

Plans for a compact fuel tank, with adequate volume were set upon. Most issue flame throwers consist of more than one tank, one for fuel and the other for the propelling gas. As we were limited to low pressure by the small pump of the demustardizer, two tanks would not be feasible. One complete demustardizer, as was proven in preliminary tests mentioned above, was bulky, clumsy, and short of volume necessary. The final design of the fuel tank can be seen in the blue-prints. It has the form of an inverted "T" and therefore was called the T-tank. This tank was made in the machine shop by Seaman First Class R. Hill. It was made in the machine shop by cutting one third off three demustardizers from the bottom. A pattern was cut, the two bottoms and one top were fitted together and welded. This complete process from the time the drawings were finished to the complete tank was four hours. This T-tank gave us the volume of two demustardizers, and also a tank that would fit the back of the operator. The outlet opening of the demustardizer is at the top, but we soldered this up and cut a new outlet in the front bottom of the tank on the operator's right side. This refinement increased the range of the weapon since it added the force of gravity and the weight of the fuel to the nozzle. From an old IC haversack, the carrying straps and harness were fashioned. A pad was sewn to fit the tank to ease the weight on the operator.

After the completion of the T-tank and during the design of a new ignition system, a cablegram was received from the Office of the Chief of CWS with recommendations for the manufacture of a flame thrower. A copy of this radiogram is attached for reference. A model of this flame thrower was made strictly to instructions. In the resulting tests we had, however, to abandon it since it was inferior to what we had already developed. The main defects were as follows: The range was only 11-1/2 feet as compared with 30 feet obtained from our original model. The pilot light was determined to get out of control and melt the solder joints, disassembling the entire mechanism. Other methods of securing the joints were attempted but with little success.

By the time these above mentioned tests were completed I had in mind a new ignition system, the principle being much the same as the Japanese Flame Thrower, namely, ignition by firing a cartridge into the fuel stream. Before final decision however it was decided to make a test model. The model was made of brass and embodied the principal of the Moro shotgun. That is, the cartridge was inserted into a travelling barrel or piston, propelled by a spring against a firing nipple set in a cylinder which contained the piston. The rapid travel and subsequent striking on the nipple discharged the cartridge into the stream of fuel. Here at this point we came upon the main stumbling block of the entire project. Ordinary blank .45 caliber ammunition would not ignite the stream; this meant designing a new cartridge. Many blank cartridges were emptied and all sorts of powders and mixtures of powders were tested. The final testing narrowed the field down to nitrocellulose increments of a 155 mm propelling charge and the mixture in a red ball aeroplane signal flare. In the first case, the increments were turned down by hand to fit the casing. A well was drilled down the center of the increment. While this type of cartridge worked it was not consistent and was very difficult and time wasting to make. The other presented a different problem. The flare mixture when lit, ignited the stream but the full fire value was not

realized because the detonating of the primer tended to blow out the mix instead of lighting it and letting it burn out. After exhaustive tests the final cartridge was designed as follows: Black powder was filled into the casing to a height of one eighth inch from the bottom, and loosely packed. Then an eighth inch metal rod was held in the center of the casing and the flare mixture was packed very tightly around it. The rod was withdrawn, leaving an eighth inch well down the center. A cardboard wad was put in the top to seal it. Now the primer started the black powder, expended its pressure down the well but left the flare mix in but burning. The result was that a stream of red flare was emitted from the barrel to a distance of six inches, and remained burning momentarily. This continuance to burn after the primer detonation was unforeseen but helped tremendously in igniting the stream in twelve o'clock winds. Further tests with this firing mechanism and cartridge proved that they were reliable. The firing of the igniter was accomplished by a cable going through a tube exactly like the fuel tube and coming out the handle, where by pulling the ring attached to it, the trigger of the igniter would release the travelling barrel or piston. In tests before CWS personnel held at CW depot on Bataan, the weapon worked well, obtaining a range of 30 feet consistently with one hundred per cent ignition regardless of the direction of the wind. However, in discussing the tests [it was] recommended that instead of a single shot igniter, why not add more barrels and therefore insure ignition in case one failed and also cut out reloading so often. This suggestion was immediately seized upon and plans for a five shot igniter were started. Such a mechanism was designed and with little changes in principle from the one mentioned above. The problem of reloading a five barrel single action igniter is worth special mention. This at first seemed difficult, and looked as if a lot of unscrewing and screwing of barrels would have to be done every time the igniter was reloaded. The idea was hit upon to build the igniter in two segments, one the barrel segment and the other the hammer segment. Both were mounted on circular plates and the hammer plate secured to the nozzle. The barrel plate was allowed to revolve by loosening a set screw; thus, after firing the plate could be revolved half way therefore exposing the loading end of the barrel.

The barrels were set in the plate at a four degree angle so that the igniter flame would intersect the fuel stream about six inches from the tip of the nozzle, thus decreasing the possibilities of a suck back. The blue prints fully show the details of the igniter. The firing of the cartridges was carried out as before but this time with five cables instead of one, and a distributor at the handle end to keep the five cables separated.

With a reliable igniter and a satisfactory fuel tank, the only remaining problem was to determine the best nozzle aperture in combination with various fuel mixtures. Suffice to say that with a fifty per cent gasoline-kerosene mixture and fifty per cent lubrication oil (SAE No. 20) tests proved that the best nozzle was one tapered from one quarter inch to one eighth inch in three and one half inches.

With the completed weapon tests showed that from 30 to 35 feet range could be expected with a twelve o'clock wind and from 35 to 40 feet with a six o'clock wind. With five rounds now available, five separate bursts could be obtained. On normal targets that would move out of range quickly, sufficient flame could be played on each of five so that at the same time the last cartridge was fired the fuel tank would be nearly empty. Redesign of the cable system of firing was attempted, since this was the weak spot of the entire weapon, but this was found to be too much of a job, and was abandoned.

FRANK L. SCHAF Jr.
1st Lieutenant CWS
Chief of the Lab. Section.

Incl.

1. set of blue prints.
2. copy of cablegram from C/CWS.



N.B.

This sketch was made subsequent to rendition of basic report dated 13 April 1942.
S.A.H.

26 September 1946

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FRANK L. SCHAF Jr.
1st Lieutenant CWS
Chief of the Lab. Section.

Incl.

1. set of blue prints.
2. copy of cablegram from C/CWS.



N.B.

This sketch was made subsequent to rendition of basic report dated 13 April 1942.
S.A.H.

26 September 1946

COPY

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

NR 20 WTA WD

WASHINGTON D. C. MARCH 2, 1942


COMMANDING GENERAL

USAFFE FORT MILLS, P.I.

FOR CHEMICAL OFFICER ONE ONE ONE THREE - ADVISE CUTTING OFF EXTENSION PIPE
AT END OF STRAIGHT PORTION REMOVING BURR AND CONSTRUCTING PILOT LIGHT FROM
SMALL CAN PROVIDED WITH WICK USING ALCOHOL OR KEROSENE FOR PILOT FLAME
WHICH SHOULD BURN ABOUT TWO INCHES HIGH PERIOD PERIOD ATTACH CAN TO PIPE SO
THAT WICK IS TWO OR THREE INCHES IN FRONT OF AND ONE TO TWO INCHES BELOW END
OF PIPE IN FIRING POSITION WITH SHIELDS SIDES AND TOP FROM WIND PERIOD FLAME
LIT WITH MATCH SHOULD IMPINGE ON FUEL JET PERIOD RECOMMENDED FUEL EQUAL
PARTS GASOLINE KEROSENE AND NUMBER SIX FUEL OIL PERIOD ESTIMATED RANGE TEN
TO FIFTEEN YARDS.

PORTER

INCLOSURE NO. 2



Secret

DATE 4/14/42	FLAME THROWER (IMPROVISED)	 EWS Scale F/S
DESIGNED BY <i>Robert S. Skiff</i>	TESTED BY <i>W.S.</i>	
APPROVED BY <i>Robert S. Skiff</i>	DATE 4/14/42	

ITINERARY OF COLONEL HAMILTON

from

December 8, 1941 to date

April 19, 1942

FROM	TO	AT
December 8, 1941	pm December 30, 1941	Manila
pm December 30, 1941	am December 31, 1941	Bataan
am December 31, 1941	am January 12, 1942	Fort Mills
am January 12, 1942	pm January 13, 1942	Bataan
pm January 13, 1942	pm January 16, 1942	Fort Mills
pm January 16, 1942	pm January 18, 1942	Bataan
pm January 18, 1942	pm January 27, 1942	Fort Mills
pm January 27, 1942	pm January 30, 1942	Bataan
pm January 30, 1942	pm January 31, 1942	Fort Mills
pm January 31, 1942	am February 6, 1942	Bataan
am February 6, 1942	pm February 12, 1942	Fort Mills
pm February 12, 1942	pm February 16, 1942	Bataan
pm February 16, 1942	pm March 1, 1942	Fort Mills
pm March 1, 1942	pm March 3, 1942	Bataan
pm March 3, 1942	pm March 5, 1942	Fort Mills
pm March 5, 1942	pm March 13, 1942	Bataan
pm March 13, 1942	am March 17, 1942	Fort Mills
am March 17, 1942	pm March 18, 1942	Bataan
pm March 18, 1942	pm March 20, 1942	Fort Mills
pm March 20, 1942	pm March 21, 1942	Bataan
pm March 21, 1942	am April 4, 1942	Fort Mills
am April 4, 1942	am April 9, 1942	Bataan
am April 9, 1942	to date	Fort Mills.

(1) To: Chemical Warfare Officer, USFIP.

G-4, USFIP, April 17, 1942.

1. It is desired that an immediate restudy be made of storage locations of all items pertaining to your activity, regardless of who may have jurisdiction of those supplies at the moment. The more critical the item, the greater protection it will be given from enemy action. Each item should be so dispersed that no major loss of any item will occur from any single bombing.

2. An early report with recommendations is requested in order to establish priorities that will permit greatest security for most critical items.

N.F.G.
G-4

(2) To: G-4, USFIP

Cml. O. USFIP, April 19, 1942.


All CWS equipment and supplies in this theatre of operations are stored in dispersed locations of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, Fort Mills, P.I. This depot has been in operation at Fort Mills, since 1932. Within mobilization allowances and subject to the availability thereof, initial issues of principal items of CW equipment have already been made to units and installations of the HD of M & SB including the outposts and the 4th Marine beach defense units. Only maintenance, repair and replacement stocks are in the depot. These items include in general, gas masks and component parts, demustardizing apparatus and supplies, protective clothing, impregnating chemicals, and electrolyte manufactured locally under emergency field conditions.

While all remaining CW supplies are not under bomb-proof storage, the bulk of the most critical items thereof are under such type storage. It is believed that the present storage arrangement offers the maximum amount of security possible under existing conditions. Almost daily shifts of remaining stocks are being made in order to improve and safeguard critical items as contemplated in paragraph one of CN (1) above.

S.A.H.
Cml. O.



View number one of Main Chemical Warfare Warehouse, Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I., when World War II started. This building with all contents completely destroyed by burning 5 January 1942 as a result of Japanese air raids. There were approximately 19 widely separated and diversified types of warehouses, barracks, magazines, bombproof shelters, etc., on Fort Mills which were assigned to and comprised the main Chemical Warfare Depot in the Philippine Islands on 7 December 1941.



View number two of Main Chemical Warfare Warehouse, Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I.



Two of the four (50' x 200') warehouses under construction at the new Chemical Warfare Sub-depot at Fort William McKinley, Rizal, P. I., when World War II started. Project was about ninety per cent complete. All warehouses with contents remaining therein were burned by Chemical Warfare details on 31 December 1941 shortly before Japanese advance elements reached the Manila Area.



One of the four (50' x 200') warehouses and the motor vehicle shed which were under construction at the new Chemical Warfare Sub-depot at Fort William McKinley, Rizal, P. I. in December 1941. Personnel right to left:

Pfc Henry G. Gansz, 36036064, 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation) killed in action on Corregidor, 17 March 1942 by Japanese aerial bomb while manufacturing sulphuric acid for motor vehicle batteries. Awarded Silver Star posthumously.

Tech. Sgt. Alfred F. Tornsi, 32024752, 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation), returned to Military Control - Sept. 1945.

Sgt. Robert V. Mainert, 38053345, 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation) - Died March 1945 while a Prisoner of War of the Japanese.

Louis Velos - Filipino civilian driver for the Chemical Officer USFIP. Reported still living but blinded during recapture of Manila.



The hedge and trees show all that remained of the Carabao Club at Nichols Field, P. I., after a Japanese air raid early in December 1941.



Burning of the Intendencia Building and San Dominican Cathedral, Manila, P. I., caused by Japanese air raid during latter part of December 1941. Picture taken from balcony at Headquarters Philippine Department, Fort Santiago, P. I., outside Chemical Office. Manila Post Office and Jones Bridge appear in left center of picture.




Staff officers' parking area at Headquarters Philippine Department, Fort Santiago, Manila, P. I., damaged by Japanese air raid during latter part of December 1941.



Staff officers' parking area at Headquarters Philippine Department, Fort Santiago, Manila, P. I., after a Japanese air raid during latter part of December 1941.




Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, CWS, O-4663, Chemical Officer, USFIP, and 1st Lieut. Frank L. Schaf, Jr., CWS, O-396583, Assistant, on an inspection trip at Fort Mills, P. I., March 1942. The side of a Chemical Warfare galvanized iron storage shed recently damaged by Japanese air raid can be seen at left.



View number one of emergency Chemical Warfare Laboratory set up in rear of lateral Number 10 in Malinta Tunnel, Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I., in January 1942. The oval top door in the right center leads to the suite of General Douglas MacArthur and his general staff. Later this suite was occupied by General Wainwright and his staff. After the surrender of Corregidor on 6 May 1942, in addition to General Wainwright and his staff, Major General George Moore, Commanding General, Harbor Defenses Manila and Subic Bays; Captain Sam Howard, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding Officer, 4th Marines; and Captain Kenneth Hoeffel, USN, Commander, 16th Naval District, with the senior members of their respective staffs, were crowded into this same Lateral No. 10. The last of this composite group was evacuated on 23 May 1942 to Japanese prison camps in Manila (Pasay Accommodation Place and Bilibid Prison).

Enclosure at right contains sink, stool, and shower. Bunks on upper flooring were so near rock ceiling one could not sit upright on them. The three 50-gal. drums at upper left contained an emergency supply of drinking water.

The main circulation and ventilation of air in Malinta Tunnel, exclusive of that from office fans, was furnished by the Chemical Warfare gas-proofing project. This consisted primarily of the installation of four 5000-cu. ft. per minute blowers (three on the north (hospital) side, and one on the south side) with ducts, shafts, vents, etc. The original gas-proof plan for Malinta Tunnel covered only the station hospital of 250-bed capacity. By the time of the surrender of Corregidor approximately 1000 persons occupied this hospital area, and in the tunnel proper, including laterals, it has been estimated that there were some 8000-9000 more persons. Without the circulation and ventilation furnished by these blowers, life would have been unbearable in Malinta Tunnel, a fact anyone who lived in this tunnel knows only too well. Without this ventilation Corregidor might have surrendered before Bataan.



View number two of emergency Chemical Warfare Laboratory set up in rear of lateral number 10 in Malinta Tunnel, Fort Mills, Corregidor, P. I., in January 1942. The opening at right leads through a rock ventilation shaft to a 5000 cu. ft. per minute blower which furnished the only ventilation to connecting laterals on the south side of Malinta Tunnel.

LAST ASSIGNMENT "ORDERS" - CWS OFFICERS AND NCO - STAFF OFFICERS ON DUTY IN
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AS OF 22 MARCH 1942 AND STATUS AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1948.

(RMC = Returned to Military Control)

Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton - 04,863	Chemical Officer, USFIP, in addition to his other duties--Section 3, GO 3, HQ, USFIP - 3-22-42 RMC
Lt. Colonel L. E. Roemer - 15,081	Assigned to PCWD, Fort Mills, and attached to HQ, Philippine Department, for duty with CWS, per Par. 5, SO 248, HPD, 10-23-41. Stationed on Bataan in command of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Sub-Depot. Buried at sea January 1945 enroute from Formosa to Japan.
Major C. F. Harrison - 19,173	Chemical Officer, Philippine Division, Par. 1, SO 127, HQ, Philippine Division, 11-1-41. Executed by Japs in Davao, Mindanao - date ?
Captain L. D. Bartlett - 213,258	Service Command (CWS), Luzon Force, Par. 2, SO 2, SO 3, HQ, Luzon Force, 3-18-42. RMC
Captain Bleuford F. Daniel - 301,687	Assistant Chemical Officer, HQ, Philippine Department, Par. 1, SO 85, HPD, 4-12-41. Deceased.
Captain L. T. Lazzarini - 343,324	HQ, Philippine Department (CWS) Par 4, SO 57, HQ, USAFFE, 3-2-42. RMC
1st Lt. Samuel J. Winn - 294,869	HQ, Philippine Department (CW Laboratory), Par. 10, SO 84, USAFFE, 3-9-42. Deceased.
1st Lt. Charles A. Morgan - 374,346	Chemical Office, HQ, Philippine Department, Par. 23, SO 145, HPD, 6-23-41. RMC
1st Lt. Frank L. Schaf, Jr. - 396,583	Philippine CWS Depot, Fort Mills, Par. 41, SO 145, HPD, 6-23-41. RMC
1st Lt. John A. Webb - 393, 858	301st Field Infantry, II Corps, Philippine Army Par. 1, SO 15, HPD, 1-16-42. Deceased.
2nd Lt. J. A. Davis - 393,397	PCWD (Fort McKinley), Par. 7, SO 286, HPD, 12-8-41, Deceased.
2nd Lt. George W. Small - 380,788	On duty with 31st Infantry (American), FO 13, HQ, USAFFE, 1-3-42. RMC
2nd Lt. William F. Miles - 388,843	Attached to 31st Infantry (American), FO 13, HQ, USAFFE, 1-3-42. Deceased.
1st Lt. Ole Johnson - 304,854	(F.A.) Chemical Office, HPD. Special Orders, HPD, early December 1941. This officer was transferred about March 26 to the Provisional Field Artillery Brigade on Bataan, at the special request of Major General E. D. King. RMC and discharged.
W/O R. W. Jackson	Chemical Office, HPD, since November, 1941. Deceased.
T/Sgt. George M. McKinnon - 6,843,170	On duty at Fort Hughes, Caballo, P.I. RMC
S/Sgt. Alfred F. Torrissi - 32,029,752	CW Laboratory, Fort Mills, Philippine Island. RMC

T/Sgt. Andrew A. Geiger - 6,532,887	Assigned to Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, Fort Mills. RMC.
S/Sgt. Joseph Crea - 6,881,561	Chemical Section HQ, Philippine Division. RMC
T/Sgt. Samuel J. Rouse - 6,842,414	Chemical Section, HQ, Philippine Division. RMC
Sgt. Louis Sachwald - 33,010,038	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation), Fort Frank. RMC
Cpl. Otto DeJong - 36,035,931	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation), Fort Frank. RMC
Cpl. Robert C. Bruce - 14,049,516	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation), Fort Hughes. RMC
Cpl. Arthur A. Haley - 36,152,382	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation), Fort Mills. Deceased
Cpl. John J. Breur - 36,212,250	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation), Fort Mills. RMC
Cpl. David L. Gow - 35,012,012	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation), Fort Mills. Deceased
Pfc. Spec. 4c) Louis L. Ignaszewski - 37,044,065	Attached from Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation) Fort Mills. RMC

* * * * *

N.B. 28 September 1946
(a) Pvt. --- Bolger, CWS, who was on duty in the Department Chemical Office, Fort Santiago, Manila, P.I., on 7 December 1941, remained in Manila as a patient in Sternberg General Hospital on 31 December 1941. I saw him in Bilibid Prison in June, 1942, and from verbal reports he was returned to military control in 1945.

(b) Mr. --- Ball, a former soldier but who was employed as a civilian storekeeper in the CWS Depot at Fort William McKinley, Rizal, P.I., remained in Manila as of 31 December 1941. His present status is unknown to the undersigned.

(c) Mrs. E. J. Green who for years had been employed as secretary for the Philippine Department Chemical Officer, Fort Santiago, Manila, P.I., was interned at Santo Tomas with her two minor children and American husband throughout the war. Fortunately the entire family survived this internment and were safely evacuated to the United States in 1945. I cannot praise too highly the courage and loyalty of Mrs. Green. She continued on duty daily until Headquarters Philippine Department was moved to Fort Mills, Corregidor, P.I., on 24 December 1941, when she was transferred to duty at Sternberg General Hospital, Manila, P.I., and subsequently interned by the Japanese in 1942.

(d) Mr. Luis Velos, my Filipino civilian driver in Manila and on Bataan, who was carried on the payroll of the Chemical Warfare Depot (Bataan), was most faithful and loyal throughout. I last saw him on the dock at Mariveles about day-break on 9 April 1942 when I was returning to my office at Headquarters United States Forces in the Philippines. I have heard since (November 1945) that he is being cared for by the Philippine Red Cross, having lost his eyesight during the recapture of Manila in 1945.

S.H.

CHEMICAL DEPOT DETACHMENT (PHILIPPINE SCOUTS)

FORT MILLS, P. I.

7 December 1941



Status as of 1 September 1946 is shown in parenthesis after name of each soldier.

FRONT ROW (Left to Right): Pfc Prospero G. Delalamon, 10,306,771 (RMC - P.I.); Pvt. ---
Muyco, Number unknown (status unknown); Pvt. Spec 3c) Alejandro
Mondala, 10,306,759 (RMC - P.I.)

SECOND ROW (Left to Right): Pfc Melecio Cureg, 10,306,767 (unknown); Pvt. Joaquin S. Santos,
10,304,438 (unknown); Sgt. Miguel C. Sandoval, Number unknown.
(This soldier was commissioned as 3d Lieutenant, Philippine Army,
about 15 December 1941 and assigned to 301st Chemical Depot
Company (PA) on Bataan. Reported to have died at Camp O'Donnell,
P. I., 1942.); Pfc Eufrazio Llavore, 10,304,475 (unknown); Pvt.
Enrique Alpuerto, 10,304,476 (unknown).

THIRD ROW (Left to Right): Pvt. Herminio Macarubbo, Number unknown (reported bayoneted on
Bataan, March, 1942); Sgt. Mariano Fernando, 10,305,544 (awarded
Purple Heart on Corregidor, 26 April 1942; died from shock and
concussion on Corregidor, 9 May 1942); Cpl. Deogracias Nunez,
10,305,507 (unknown); Pvt. Rufino Leonardo, 10,305,548 (killed in
action on detail making sulphuric acid, 25 March 1942, on
Corregidor; awarded Silver Star posthumously).

Scale 1:100,000

KILOMETERS
MILES

ZAMBALES


MANILA
BAY

Chemical Officer
NSFIP

1942 -

Colonel Stuart

MOD





Chemical Officer
NSFIP

1942 -

Colonel Stuart Hamilton

MOD

MANILA
BAY

BALANGA

ZAMBALES

Pumpung Bay

Mt. Sta. Rosa

Mt. Silangan

OPLR

MLR

XXX
P

Coll Pt

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Evac

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XXX

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Vet

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
Carabao

General
A. M. Jones

General
George Patton

March
29-1942

April 8



Chemical Officer
ASPIF

1942 -

Colonel Street to Honolulu
Cm. X


MAD OF BATAAN

LEGEND

- Provincial Boundary
- Municipal Boundary
- Capital
- Present Municipality
- Old Municipality
- Barrio
- Sitio
- First Class Road
- Second Class Road
- Third Class Road
- Trail
- Under Construction or Proposed



Traced by Marine Engineer's Office, Fort Mifflin, Pa. Jan. 1942.
Base Map
LM Rice Mill



March -
31st 1942

OPLR
MLR
RRL

MLR
RRL

Mar 31st
1942

1860

59

58

57

56

55

54

53

52

51

1850

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48

47

46

1845

44

43

42

41

1840

39

38

To reform on this line

April 8, 1942

26 45 57 31(AM) 31 31

Gen AM Jones

Service Command Area
(Gen McBride)

Gen Pierce

Gen Parker

LUZON FORCE
(Gen King)

Strat A Hamilton
Colonel, A.C.S.

Chemical Officer

USFIP

ROAD AND TRAIL MAP
BATAAN PENINSULA

Scale 1:100,000

Estimated under the direction of the
DEPARTMENT ENGINEER
BATAAN PENINSULA

Submitted by
J.E. L...

Approved by
J.E. L...

XXXX XXX
EQ

NAY HEAD
Cml
S
B
Q

312 ECHP
34 1/2 LM

BASE OPD
RICE MISS

RESTRICTED

SECTION B

LOG BOOK - CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

H.P.D. - USAFFE

USFIP

December 8, 1941 - March 31, 1942 Inclusive
and April 1 - 17, 1942 Inclusive

RESTRICTED

SECTION B

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P.I.
April 17, 1942.

Memorandum for: The Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, Washington, D.C.

This is not really a Journal within the meaning of the "Staff Officers Manual, FM 101-5." It would have required a good stenographer full time to keep abreast of all the actions taken, recommendations made, etc., by this office since December 8, 1941. My Chief Clerk, Mr. Jackson, had a clerk keep it up in addition to all other typing, filing, etc. Upon my return these brief notes however, will enable me to elaborate more in detail upon related subjects, incidents, etc.

On Bataan, Lt. Col. L. E. Roemer, CWS., had one maintained for his depot and the 301st Chemical Company (Depot) (PA) activities but am afraid that has been disposed of by now.

Colonel Roemer, Major C. F. Harrison, Captain B. F. Daniel, 2nd Lt. Wm. F. Miles and 2nd Lt. George Small were on Bataan when last heard from April 9, 1942.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

SECTION B

SECTION B

SECTION B

SECTION B

SECTION B

SECTION B

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE LOG BOOK AND
JOURNAL

Manila, P. I., December 8, 1941.

Official notification of a state of war existing between the United States and Japan was received in this office at 8:30 am.

Many calls were received during the day requesting information on the procedure required to draw gas masks. Some calls came from Philippine Army Units, while others came from War (HPD) Department Offices requesting gas masks for the civilian employees in their office.

Work was commenced moving the gas masks from warehouses in Port Area to new warehouse constructed at Fort Wm. McKinley. Major Roemer was placed in charge of the storing at McKinley, while Captain Daniel assisted by Lt. Morgan handled the loading of trucks at Port Area. After about 8 hours of hauling approximately 8,000 masks had been moved.

The first local air raid alarm of the war was sounded at 12:45 pm.

Arrangements were completed to keep an operating office force on duty in the Department Chemical Office on a 24 hour day basis.

* * * * *

Manila, P. I., December 9, 1941.

The movement of gas masks to Fort McKinley from the Port Area was continued again today. A check revealed that 12,000 service masks and 6,000 diaphragm gas masks were at McKinley at the end of the day.

Again there were a good many requests for gas masks. The Philippine Army made several inquiries regarding the issue of the service gas mask to their units. The information was passed along that until USAFFE approved the issue of masks to them no action was contemplated by the CWS.

* * * * *

Manila, P. I., December 10, 1941.

Air raids for the past several days have centered about Nichols Field, Nielson Airport and Cavite.

Gas masks were issued (Service) to the 1st and 2nd Infantry, Philippine Constabulary.

Radio instructions from USAFFE directed all commanding officers to open gas masks in unit containers and issue same to troops in lieu of the training masks. The latter masks were to be collected and held pending instructions from Headquarters Philippine Department.

At 11:00 pm, Major Roemer reported that the movement of gas masks from Port Area was about 40% complete. During the air raid of yesterday he also reported that an attempt was made to machine gun personnel on duty at our gas mask warehouse at McKinley.

* * * * *

Manila, P. I., December 11, 1941.

The transfer of gas masks from Port Area continues. However, it is rather difficult to make much headway due to lack of transportation and labor. A warehouse at the Tabacalera Bodega is being used as storage space for some of the masks and canisters taken from Port Area. There are still approximately 100,000 gas masks to be moved.

Plans have been made to evacuate the office at Fort Santiago and a list of supplies and equipment has been prepared. It is planned to divide the present office into two offices, moving the first echelon out at some time in the near future to new Commonwealth Building on Gral Luna, San Luis and Taft Avenue.

First run of protective clothing came off today at the impregnating plant in Port Area. There was some confusion at first in getting the CC2 from Fort Mills.

Manila, P. I., December 12, 1941.

The request for gas masks for others than military personnel continue to come in but Colonel Hamilton has set a policy regarding the issue of same and unless it is plainly shown that masks are for such personnel, issues are disapproved. However, some few training masks have been issued to civilian personnel. In this connection, it might be well to mention here that no report of surplus training masks have been received from unit commanders. Information so far received indicates that these commanders are re-issuing training masks just as fast as they are turned in. This issue is usually made to civilians at the various posts. One specific instance is the issue of some 300 gas masks (training) to the Filipino convicts working at Fort Mills.

Report was received tonight that the three Philippine Army Divisions comprising the North Luzon Force was practically equipped with service gas masks.

The Impregnating Plant is running in good order, except that during air raid signals everything is shut off, including water, current, etc.

Manila, P. I., December 13, 1941.

During a rather heavy air raid at Nichols Field and Nielson Airport about noon today, our anti-aircraft fire went into action, but the planes evidently were out of range as the shrapnel bursts seemed to indicate.

A secret directive giving instructions for the opening of the unit containers for the service mask was distributed to the USAFFE.

Thirty suits of protective clothing were issued to Clark Field today.

The transfer of gas masks from Port Area continued.

Manila, P. I., December 14, 1941.

The transfer of gas masks to Tabacalera and Fort McKinley continued. As stated previously, this work has gone rather slowly due to lack of sufficient transportation and labor. Another factor has been the difficulty of working at night without lights due to blackouts.

Thirty suits of protective clothing were issued to Nichols Field and twenty suits to the 27th Bomb Gp - 2nd Chemical Service Company Aviation.

The Impregnating Plant continues to run, but whenever an air raid alarm is sounded, all personnel leave the Port Area and do not return until the ALL CLEAR is sounded. This interval sometimes is as much as two hours.

The office force has been very busy, handling a great many requests for chemical supplies, especially gas masks.

Manila, P. I., December 15, 1941.

Service gas masks for the following units of the Philippine Army were shipped by Inter-Island Steamer today:

- 61st Division - 6500 gas masks.
- 81st Division - 6500 gas masks.
- 101st Division - 5000 gas masks.

The masks above mentioned were loaded on the SS Corregidor which was bound for southern ports.

The transfer of gas masks from the Port Area moved faster today than usual.

The usual run of requests for chemical supplies was received in the office today. The Impregnating Plant continued to run today.

Manila, P. I., December 16, 1941.

The "SS CORREGIDOR" was sunk by one of our mines near the entrance of Manila Bay at Corregidor. All supplies were lost, including the 18,000 gas masks for units of the Philippine Army. On board were unit gas officer and noncommissioned officer personnel of the 61st, 81st, and 101st Divisions who had been attending a special course of instruction at Fort McKinley under the direction of Captains Harrison and Bartlett. Some 20 of these officers and noncommissioned officers were among the survivors.

The space available for storage of gas masks at Tabacalera is nearly full. Plans are being made to utilize space for this purpose at "El Deposito."

Manila, P. I., December 17, 1941.

The list of graduates of the special course for gas personnel at Ft. McKinley was furnished by Captain Bartlett and the office personnel began preparing certificates of graduation for students.

An inventory of supplies stored at Tabacalera was made by Captain Daniel and is as follows:

- Masks, gas, service 22,368
- Masks, gas, diaphragm 6,820
- Canisters, service 6,630

Passenger motor vehicles for use by the Department Chemical Officer and the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot. Truck transportation was also assigned.

Manila, P. I., December 18, 1941.

A survey of all American Chemical Warfare Reserve Officers in the Philippines was begun with a view to providing sufficient officer personnel for the CW units with the Air Corps.

One hundred suits of protective clothing were shipped from the Impregnating Plant to the PCWD at Fort Mills for storage.

In accordance with instructions received from the Chief, CWS, the purchase of gasoline for the filling of Incendiary Bombs was begun. The empty bombs are to be shipped from the U.S. In addition motor oil was purchased. As delivery was made these materials were transported for storage at Fort McKinley.

The Impregnating Plant continued to run. The Filipino Detachment from the PCWD at Fort Mills was brought over to assist with this work.

Manila, P. I., December 19, 1941.

The enemy was active in the air again today. For the past several days they have been bombing Nichols Field, Nielson Airport and Cavite. On one or two occasions they have dropped a few bombs at Ft. McKinley.

The removal of gas masks and other chemical supplies from Port Area has continued. The issue of service gas masks to all components of the Philippine Army is progressing rapidly.

Frequent requests for other Chemical Warfare equipment, including demustardizing agent, ammunition such as tear gas, etc., have been received from time to time. However, due to lack of these materials, none have been issued.

Manila, P. I., December 20, 1941.

The Navy requested the impregnation of a few suits of protective clothing. This request was granted and six suits were impregnated.

The Impregnating Plant is operating on a full day schedule. One hundred and two (102) complete suits of impregnated protective clothing were shipped to Fort Mills for storage today.

The issue of gas masks to Army Units has continued - practically all organizations are now equipped on a 100% basis.

Manila, P. I., December 21, 1941.

Private Bolger, formerly a staff sergeant and chief clerk in this office and who was returned to duty December 15th, was admitted to the hospital (Sternberg) today.

Twenty-five (25) suits of protective clothing were issued to the Air Corps At Large and thirty (30) suits to the Medical Department on duty with the Air Corps.

The delivery of gasoline and oil for bomb filling has continued and storage at Ft. McKinley for same is satisfactory.

Manila, P. I., December 22, 1941.

Transportation of gasoline and oil from Oil Companies from whom purchased continued during the day and night.

1st Lieutenant Lawler was assigned to duty with the CWS from the PX office, HPD. 1st Lt. Oel Johnson, CW-Reserve, was placed on active duty and assigned with the CWS.

Two hundred and three (203) complete suits of protective clothing were shipped to the PCWD at Fort Mills for storage.

Manila, P. I., December 23, 1941.

Instructions were received from HPD this afternoon to prepare for evacuation of office at HQ, also for the removal of all property and supplies from the PCWD at Port Area and Ft. McKinley and the supplies and equipment at the Impregnating Plant. Plans for the above were drawn up.

All office files were destroyed and a minimum amount of office supplies were packed for immediate shipment.

The 1st Echelon, including a convoy of trucks loaded with chemical supplies was prepared for the trip to Batann. The 2nd Echelon to be prepared to proceed to Fort Mills when directed to do so.

Manila, P. I., December 24, 1941.

Major Roemer left with a convoy of supplies for Bataan at 9:00 AM. Other personnel included Captain Daniel, Sgt. McKinnon and about 10 men from the PS Detachment.

There was an air raid on Port Area (the first) today and some damage was done.

During the day Lt. Morgan packed and shipped supplies including protective clothing from the Impregnating Plant to Fort Mills.

The office supplies were also shipped to Fort Mills and were accompanied by Lt. Morgan and Sgt. Jackson, the boat leaving at 7:00 PM.

Captain Bartlett assembled personnel of the 301st Cml Depot Co., and a convoy of supplies and left late that evening for Bataan.

Colonel Hamilton remained in Manila to supervise final evacuation of CW supplies from Port Area, Tabacalera, Ft. McKinley and El Deposito.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 25, 1941.

Arrived at about 9:30 PM last night and this morning we were assigned office space in barracks of the 60th CAC at Middleside. Our office supplies were brought up from the dock and with the addition of equipment from the PCWD a fairly complete office was established.

Arrangements for the shipment of 400 rounds of WP 4" Chemical Mortar ammunition to the PCWD at Bataan were made.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 30, 1941.

A recommendation for the promotion of Lieutenants Schaf, Davis, Miles, and Small was submitted to HPD today. A similar recommendation for the promotion of Staff Sergeant to the grade of Technical Sergeant was submitted.

On orders from Headquarters Harbor Defenses we commenced vacating about 1/3 of the space in Lateral No. 10. This space is to be used as offices for the Finance and Water Transportation. The gas masks stored in this space were moved into the rear of the lateral proper and stored in the passageway.

Lt. Schaf and the PCWD Detachment conducted a demonstration showing the operation of a bleach plant and decontamination of clothing to unit gas officers and gas noncommissioned officers of the Post.

Colonel Hamilton left Manila by automobile about 5:00 pm, arriving at the PCWD on Bataan (KM 176 on Mariveles Cut-off) late at night after delivering important papers from Hq, USAFFE in Manila to Major General Wainwright, CG Northern Luzon Force at Bacaloor Cathedral west of San Fernando.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 31, 1941.

Colonel Hamilton arrived from Bataan this morning.

Instructions issued from the Headquarters USAFFE today directing that the PCWD be moved out of the Malinta Tunnel. Space now occupied is to be utilized for Officers quarters. Colonel Hamilton sent a carrier note to the CG, USAFFE covering the necessity for bomb proof storage space for critical items of CW equipment. Also the details of the funds originally furnished by the CWS for the construction of the Malinta Tunnel and the space that was to be set aside for use by the CWS. He also mentioned that compliance with this order meant the storage of badly needed items of equipment in the open in non-bomb proof shelters.

In compliance with the above mentioned letter, supplies were taken from Lateral No. 10 and stored in the warehouse at Bottomside and along the sides of the main tunnel.

The positive and repeated representations of Colonel Hamilton against this action were ignored. G-4 (Col. Beebe) and the C/S (Gen. Sutherland) personally ordered that this Lateral No. 10 be cleared as fast as possible so "Utilities" could prepare same as quarters for General MacArthur and his General Staff. Find a place or any place to put the CWS materials now stored therein.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 1, 1942.

The moving of CW supplies from Lateral No. 10, Malinta Tunnel, was continued during the day. A space outside of entrance to Tunnel under railroad trestle was used to store 160 boxes of service masks and 18 boxes of training canisters.

A request for bomb proof storage space for critical items of CW equipment was disapproved by USAFFE. The correspondence on this subject is filed in the regular files of the Dept. Cml Office under property and supplies. Later, this correspondence was removed and filed under storage space.

The PCWD Detachment was busy storing CW supplies that arrived from Manila. Some of these supplies were stored in Lateral No. 10 of the Malinta Tunnel. Others were stored in warehouses at Bottom and Middleside.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 28, 1941.

The PCWD Detachment continued storing CW supplies which arrived from Manila. Three flat cars were taken to Malinta Tunnel and stored in Lateral No. 10.

The 400 rounds of WP 4" Chemical Mortar were loaded on a barge and sent to Cabcaben for the PCWD on Bataan. Major Roemer was notified of the shipment by radio.

Telephone call received from Colonel Hamilton in Manila - He is still supervising the preparations and shipment of CW supplies out of Manila by convoy and water transportation.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 27, 1941.

Supplies continued to arrive during the day and arrangements for their storage completed. Lateral No. 10 in Malinta Tunnel has been filled. Additional bomb proof storage has been found on the walks of the main entrance to the tunnel.

The Chief of Staff, HPD, instructed this office to notify Colonel Hamilton to join him at Bataan. This information was transmitted and Colonel Hamilton stated that he was instructed by higher authority to continue supervision of evacuation of supplies from the Manila Area.

An attempt was made to reach the PCWD on Bataan by phone but connection was not established.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 28, 1941.

The remainder of the 4" WP Mortar Shell (about 500 rounds) was prepared for shipment to the PCWD on Bataan and delivered to the dock today.

Colonel Hamilton called from Manila and states that additional CW supplies were shipped from Manila to Fort Mills. However, that this shipment was probably the last that could be made before complete evacuation took place.

Orders were received from HPD appointing Sgt. Jackson as Warrant Officer, Junior Grade, effective December 27, 1941. Appointment was in the Infantry but place of duty was indicated as this office.

Fort Mills, P. I., December 29, 1941.

A heavy enemy air raid was made on Fort Mills today. The bombing lasted from noon to 2:30 pm. Considerable damage was done. The barracks of the 60th CAC where HPD had offices was hit several times. The damage to office furniture and equipment was light.

The balance of the HPD offices were moved to Bataan this evening. However, on instructions from Colonel Hamilton, the Department Chemical Office did not go along. We moved into the lateral of the Malinta Tunnel occupied by the PCWD.

Due to the raid mentioned above but very little was done in the way of storing CW supplies at the various installations available.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 2, 1942.

Removal of gas masks and other CW supplies from Lateral No. 10 continued today - 14 boxes of optical masks and 36 boxes of diaphragm masks were stored in Lateral No. 7, Harbor Defense Artillery Engineer.

Four enlisted men from the 4th Separate Chemical Company reported in to Colonel Hamilton. They told a rambling story of having gone to Manila with the Company Commander (Lt. Webb) and after spending several days there made their way to Ft. Mills. Colonel questioned each man in detail and took statements from each one. They were ordered to return to their organization on Bataan and left at 4:30 PM.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 3, 1942.

Removal of CW supplies from Lateral No. 10 was continued - some supplies were stored with the Harbor Defense Artillery Engineer (Lateral No. 7) 20 boxes diaphragm gas masks.

During an air raid one cylinder of chlorine (150 lb.) was struck by a bomb in vicinity of Battery Way, CP of C.O., 60th CA (AA) and personnel in vicinity were "gassed" - however, adjustment of masks gave them complete protection and they continued to function satisfactorily while operating their AA material and equipment. Plans for disposal of bulk chlorine held in warehouse storage on Post were discussed (about 7 one ton containers on hand).

Fort Mills, P. I., January 4, 1942.

Destruction of chlorine and other toxic agents commenced - evacuation of Lateral No. 10 continued - 6000 canisters stored at Bottomside.

During an air raid this afternoon the CW warehouse at Bottomside was destroyed by fire resulting in loss of considerable equipment and supplies, viz., gas masks, canisters, laboratory equipment, etc.; Colonel Hamilton lost practically all personal effects in fire.

Disposal of chlorine progressed rather slowly due to high pressure in drums and rapid freezing of valves when opened.

An inventory was received from the Depot on Bataan.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 5, 1942.

Removal of supplies from Lateral No. 10 into various places of Malinta System was continued. Protective clothing was brought down from warehouse 155 and stored in Quartermaster lateral. 32 boxes of gas masks (dia) were stored in Lateral No. 7 and 25 boxes dia. masks were stored in Lateral No. 9.

Lt. Schaf and detail of men proceeded to North Point to dispose of the toxic gases stored there. Two cylinders of CG were punctured with .30 caliber rifle fire and drained. One cylinder of PS disposed of in the same manner. 12 cylinders of CNB and CNS were dumped with the one ton Cl containers. The one ton Cl containers were lifted from the cement rests with pole and 2 ton hoist. They were then loaded on a prime mover and transported to the North Dock and loaded on a barge. Six of these one ton containers were removed and dumped in the North Channel at a point midway between Corregidor and Bataan on a line Corregidor - Cabcaben. The above operations were supervised by Colonel Hamilton.

The detachment worked until about midnight removing supplies from warehouse 155.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 6, 1942.

All Chemical Warfare supplies were removed from Lateral No. 10 and the office was moved to Lateral No. 1 where space was temporarily assigned. The equipment was stored on sidewalks of the main entrance. Impregnated clothing was stored in the QM lateral.

The service records of the CWS enlisted men, HPD, were received from the 75th Ordnance Company today.

The one remaining cylinder (1 ton) chlorine was removed from the toxic warehouse and disposed of in the bay on a line Corregidor - Cabcaben when equidistant from Cabcaben and Corregidor.

Another heavy air raid on Corregidor today - many bombs dropped and considerable damage caused.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 7, 1942.

Protective clothing which was stored at warehouse No. 551 at Middleside was removed and placed in the Malinta Tunnel, some being placed along the walks and some in the HD QM lateral.

Approximately 40 drums of chlorine (150 lb.) were transferred from warehouse No. 551 and stored under water near south mine docks at Bottomside.

In addition to the above, the following CW supplies were removed from warehouse 551 and stored in the Malinta Tunnel: 111 boxes canisters, 21 boxes protective shoes, 42 drums acetylene tetrachloride, 26 boxes service gas masks, and 4 boxes of rubber gloves and spare parts.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 8, 1942.

Five cylinders of chlorine at North Point were buried during the evening. At the same time a detail buried 20 cylinders of chlorine at Middleside (near warehouse No. 551). These cylinders were buried in order to cut down the probability of being hit by enemy bombs.

138 boxes of service gas masks in unit containers, 21 boxes of service canisters and 20 boxes of protective shoes were stored in the HD QM lateral.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 9, 1942.

66 regimental gas mask repair kits and 420 diaphragm gas masks were received at the docks today and stored in main entrance to Malinta Tunnel. This property was part of that salvaged and sent over by boat from Manila.

5 drums of acetylene tetrachloride and 2 drums of chlorinated paraffin were salvaged from Bottomside and placed between two hills near the PCWD site. The burial of chlorine cylinders near south mine docks continued.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 10, 1942.

An inventory of CW supplies and equipment at Fort Mills was taken today.

The Detachment completed the burial of chlorine cylinders in the vicinity of South Mine Dock, Bottomside. A total of 40 cylinders were buried. A chart showing the location of these cylinders was drawn and filed under "property and supplies" file.

Lt. Morgan went to Bataan tonight to check with Major Roemer regarding the division of CW supplies and equipment between Fort Mills and Bataan. The amount stored at each place will be governed by the number of troops stationed thereat.

Colonel Hamilton prepared and submitted a carrier note to G-2 and G-3, USAFFE, reference the use of HCN hand grenades. This was based upon a radio report from Singapore (Col. Brink, Military Attache) that Japanese prisoners were found to have such grenades in their possession.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 11, 1942.

A radiogram was dispatched to the Chief, CWS making inquiry as to what additional protection, if any, may be improvised against HCN with materials known to be available here.

The Detachment was busy repacking and restoring CW supplies along the walks of the Tunnel.

A floor in the proposed combination laboratory and office in rear of Lateral No. 10 is being installed.

Lt. Sandoval of the 301st Chemical Depot Company arrived from Bataan. He brought several communications from Major Roemer and on his return tonight he took 50 pairs of rubber gloves and several gas mask repair kits (regimental).

Lt. Morgan accompanied by Lt. Johnson returned from Bataan at 10:30 PM. He brought back a Japanese gas mask captured on the previous day. Major Roemer sent over a free translation of characters on the various parts of the mask. Spare parts include extra eyepieces for cold weather, a small can filled with powder (___?) for first aid treatment against mustard gas.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 12, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton left for Bataan to confer with Major Roemer on CW supply matters.

The Chemical Field Laboratory was assembled and placed in rear of Lateral No. 10. The CW supplies stored in same space were rearranged in a more orderly manner. The Detachment continued salvage operations at the site of the PCWD (destroyed by enemy bomb fire).

Provisions made to provide a supply of extra service canisters for personnel who may encounter HCN.

A radio received from the War Department states that the following service canisters offer complete protection against HCN - Mark 4, 8, and 9.

Colonel Hamilton preparing a directive for issue to the USAFFE regarding the conservation of gas masks now on hand.

60 boxes of service gas masks were removed from storage under the RR trestle and placed on the walks of the main entrance to Tunnel.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 13, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan at 11:00 PM.

Chemical Warfare supplies were sent to the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan. Included in the shipment were gas mask repair parts, spare parts and protective clothing.

Several empty CNB, CNS, and chlorine cylinders were buried at North Point during the day. The police of the warehouse area (Bottomside) was continued by the Detachment.

Data on losses of Chemical Warfare property being assembled for report to the Chief, CWS. Included in this data are losses by fire of enemy air attacks, sinkings, and destruction by our troops.

Major Roemer was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and 2nd Lieutenant Schaf to 1st Lieutenant in orders effective December 18, 1941.

A diagram of tunnel storage of CW equipment was completed.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 14, 1942.

The Detachment was busy rearranging CW supplies in the Tunnel, also the continuation of police work in area of old warehouse.

A memorandum was submitted to Headquarters USAFFE regarding the mutilation and use of gas masks as dust respirators by troops on Bataan.

Lt. Schaf went to Bataan tonight to confer with Col. Roemer re CW supplies. The Depot at Bataan is assembling equipment and filling quantities of anti-tank mines for the forces there.

Protective clothing yet to be impregnated was stored in rear of Lateral No. 10 and some with the Harbor Defense Quartermaster.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 15, 1942.

The Detachment continued salvage operations in the vicinity of the old CW warehouse.

The inventory of CW property at Fort Mills was rechecked and a diagram of storage in the tunnel was completed.

Lt. Schaf returned from Bataan tonight with two Japanese gas masks which were captured there. The canisters appear to be somewhat different from the first mask brought in. The contents of the carriers also vary.

A report of the disposition of liquid chlorine was prepared and submitted to the Commanding General, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 16, 1942.

A field impregnation plant was set up today. Impregnation of protective clothing will commence tomorrow.

A training memorandum prohibiting the mutilation and use of gas masks as dust respirators was issued by USAFFE today (Tr. Memo. No. 5).

Colonel Hamilton departed for Bataan tonight.

Translation of characters found on Japanese gas masks were translated by Lt. Colonels Engelhart and Scherer and report of same was submitted to G-2, USAFFE.

Copies of methods of field impregnation were made and distributed to CWS officers concerned.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 17, 1942.

The Field Impregnating Plant commenced work today. 100 undershirts were impregnated and a detail of four men from the Detachment was posted over night to guard this clothing while it dried.

Part of the Detachment worked in the Tunnel during the day rearranging Chemical Warfare supplies stored on walks of main tunnel. Boxes were stacked in a more orderly manner and like items were stored together.

Lt. Schaf started work on setting up the chemical laboratory in the rear of Lateral No. 10.

Data for radio to the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, re Chemical Warfare items of supply lost through fire, destruction, etc., was being prepared by Lt. Morgan.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 18, 1942.

The Impregnating Plant operated again today - 57 pairs of coveralls were impregnated late in the afternoon and allowed to dry during the night. The usual guard detail was posted.

The set up of the chemical laboratory was completed during the day.

The office was moved back to the rear of Lateral No. 10 from its temporary location in Lateral No. 1.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan at 8:45 PM. He brought back two captured Japanese gas masks, one canister of which was opened for inspection. He also had a "circular" describing the operation of a Japanese "smoke projector, model 99," a device for projecting smoke.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 19, 1942.

The details of arranging office and laboratory equipment and supplies were completed during the day.

A physical inventory of all Chemical Warfare magazines at Fort Mills was taken.

The following clothing was impregnated today - 50 pairs of gloves and 74 hoods.

A call was received from the PCWD on Bataan regarding the issue of additional gas masks to the 11th Division. Information received indicates that this organization abandoned a considerable number of their masks while retreating about 2 weeks ago. They requested 60 diaphragm and 600 service masks. Colonel Hamilton approved an issue of 40 diaphragm and 400 service masks.

According to information received this date by phone there are on hand at the present time in the PCWD on Bataan 3660 diaphragm and 2720 service gas masks.

Members of the 301st Depot Company and attached personnel at the PCWD were placed on beach control along with other personnel of the Service Command.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 20, 1942.

The Detachment continued their salvage operations at the site on Bottomside formerly occupied by the CW Depot. A small number of gas masks and carriers were salvaged.

The following clothing was impregnated and dried during the night - 80 pairs gloves, 51 hoods, 50 pairs leggings and 50 drawers.

Corporal Mussen and Private 1cl Brown were relieved from duty with the PCWD and sent to Bataan to join their organization, the 4th Separate Chemical Company.

A request was submitted to the Engineer Construction and Utilities Officer to provide overhead protection for Chemical Laboratory in rear of Lateral No. 10.

Information received to the effect that 237 cases of service canisters were brought in by the QM and were awaiting disposition at the docks.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 21, 1942.

The Detachment stored 237 cases of gas mask service canisters along the sides of the main tunnel.

Lieutenant Morgan was relieved from duty with the PCWD at this station and left for Bataan where he is assigned to the PCWD.

A copy of report of a reconnaissance of Bataan made by Colonel Hamilton is attached.

The Quartermaster began installing an overhead cover for the laboratory bench. Request was also made for overhead protection for the remainder of space occupied in rear of Lateral No. 10.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 22, 1942.

30 pairs service shoes were drawn from the Harbor Defense Quartermaster for members of the 301st Chemical Depot Company. The Company was unable to obtain the proper sizes at Bataan. The shoes were boxed and shipped over the same day.

The Detachment continued salvage operations and arranged a gas mask repair table at the Mine Casemate on Bottomside.

The following protective clothing was impregnated to complete outfits already impregnated: 84 pairs coveralls and 51 pairs socks. This clothing was not in stock so was drawn from the HD Quartermaster.

A description of a Japanese Smoke Projector, Model 99, recently captured on Bataan was prepared and submitted to G-2, USAFFE. Copies of this were placed in the Department Chemical Office files.

Arrangements made to commence analysis of sample of gasoline submitted by the Navy. Also work on Japanese gas mask canister.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 23, 1942.

Private Wydel was relieved from duty with the PCWD at this station and left tonight for Bataan for duty with the PCWD thereat.

Private Gow of the 7th Chemical Company Service Aviation reported for duty from Bataan tonight.

A radiogram furnishing detailed description of captured Japanese gas masks was prepared and submitted to G-2, USAFFE for approval prior to transmittal to the Chief, CWS.

Request recently submitted for overhead protection in office was returned from the Engineer and Utilities Officer with information that present space is unsafe under present set up. It is expected that approval of original request will be made shortly.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 24, 1942.

Equipment sent over from Bataan for packing protective clothing one suit per individual package was received. This included cardboard gas mask box, cellophane and tin gas mask box.

Private Gow was assigned to duty in the office. He will perform clerical work.

One captured Japanese gas mask and an extra canister were packed and delivered to the Air Office, USAFFE, for shipment to the United States. Included in the package were several pertinent papers. All of this to be delivered to the Chief, CWS.

Test of Navy gasoline being continued in chemical laboratory. First tests on Japanese canister started.

Telephonic report of experiences of 301st Chemical Depot Company on beach defense duty received and submitted to G-2, USAFFE.

Three fountain pens were brought in by a captain from the USAFFE Ordnance office. They were taken from a Japanese prisoner by the Navy. The Japanese characters on these pens is to be translated before they are opened to ascertain contents.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 25, 1942.

The three captured Japanese fountain pens were examined by Lt. Col. Engelhart, GSC, who translated the characters found on them. It appears that they are ordinarily fountain pens as translations merely indicated the name of the owner and the manufacturer. A report on these pens is being prepared for submission to G-2, USAFFE.

112 gas mask carriers were shipped to the PCWD on Bataan tonight.

There is attached an extract from the International News Summary published by USAFFE under this date. This is in reply to radio broadcasts emanating from Tokyo to the effect that the American Forces used poison gas against the Japanese on Bataan January 12, 1942.

(Extract of par. 1 of the referred to bulletin)

PHILIPPINES: Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, 9:00 AM., press release: - - The fighting on our left is now becoming stabilized. On our right a reconnaissance in force showed that our powerful artillery concentrations had been deadly. Our infantry found this sector disorganized with hundreds of enemy dead left on the ground and quantities of supplies and equipment abandoned.-- A Tokyo report of January 23 stated that the Japanese claim our troops

have fired poison gas into their encampments. General MacArthur categorically denied this in the following statement: "There is absolutely no truth in the statement that our forces fired poison gas shells in Japanese encampments. The report was probably set forth in fear of such action as many Japanese soldiers are not provided with gas masks. I have absolutely no intention under any condition or provocation of violating the laws of war. However foul the enemy may act, I shall abide by the dictates of humanity and civilization as far as such concepts can apply to combat."

Fort Mills, P. I., January 26, 1942.

The Detachment sewed up side of 83 pairs of coveralls drawn from the Quartermaster for impregnation. Storage of CW supplies was rearranged in the Tunnel. We now have 315 complete suits of impregnated clothing from Port Area. 130 complete suits of same were brought up from Mine Casemate and stored with the suits above mentioned. 110 of these suits are packed in cellophane and 20 in cardboard boxes. All unimpregnated clothing was removed from the QM lateral and stored in rear of Lateral No. 10.

Final and complete examination and test of Japanese fountain pens was made today. This showed that the pens were ordinary ones, all being filled with the same type of ink. This report was turned into G-2, USAFFE for transmittal to Navy.

Information received from PCWD on Bataan that plans were made for the shipment to Mills of about 15 tons of CW items for storage. Colonel Hamilton instructed the ATS at Cabcaben to withhold shipment until further instructions. G-4, HPD was then called re the proposed shipment and information furnished was to the effect that this was being done on orders from USAFFE. Colonel Hamilton then contacted G-4, USAFFE and made arrangements for the Cml Off to make the final decision as to what would be shipped. The PCWD was given this information and directed to make no shipments until advised. Among the items in question were all the gas masks, CC2, paraffin, HTH, and demustardizing outfits.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 27, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton was appointed USAFFE Acting Chemical Officer per paragraph 4, special orders No. 25, Headquarters, USAFFE, dated January 27, 1942.

The following items of CW equipment were approved for transfer from the PCWD on Bataan to Fort Mills for storage: 500 service gas masks, 500 diaphragm gas masks, all paraffin, all acetylene tetrachloride, all HTH and all the CC2, the remainder of supplies are to remain on Bataan.

Colonel Hamilton left for Bataan at 6:30 PM.

Tests on the Navy gasoline and Japanese gas mask were continued in the CW laboratory.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 28, 1942.

The Engineer and Utilities Officer accompanied by the Harbor Defense Engineer made final inspection of our office and laboratory space. The latter again pronounced space very unsafe and gave instruction for us to move everything out in order that timbering might commence. The lab was packed in cases and desk space was provided in the HD Quartermaster lateral.

The PCWD on Bataan informed us that the following CW supplies were shipped for storage on Fort Mills: 34 drums HTH, 3 paraffin, 101 boxes diaphragm masks, and 53 boxes service gas masks.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 29, 1942.

44 boxes of diaphragm gas masks were received from the PCWD on Bataan and were stored in the Middleside barracks of the 60th CAC.

Work on providing overhead protection for laboratory and office was not begun today. However, measurements were taken and it is understood that timbers were being cut to size.

Colonel Hamilton called but remained on Bataan.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 30, 1942.

The following CW supplies were received from the PCWD on Bataan today: thirty-six 50 pound cans of HTH, 1 drum of paraffin, and 3 drums of tetrachlorethane. These supplies were stored at Middleside barracks of the 60th Coast Artillery.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan tonight.

An up to date inventory of CW supplies and property on hand at the PCWD on Bataan was received.

Work on overhead construction of office space was started.

Fort Mills, P. I., January 31, 1942.

A report of supplies recently received from Bataan was commenced in accordance with instructions received from the Commanding General, Harbor Defenses. This report will be continued daily until shipments are completed. This report is to serve as a check on the amounts of various types of supplies being stored at Fort Mills.

Lt Schaf left for Bataan at 5:30 AM for the purpose of inspecting and selecting any items of laboratory equipment available at the Medical Hospital recently evacuated there.

Colonel Hamilton returned to Bataan tonight at 7:30 PM for the purpose of coordinating disposition of members of the 4th Separate Chemical Co., and the 7th Chemical Company Service (Avn). These units are to be attached to line organizations on Bataan.

The following CW supplies were received from Bataan: 10 cans HTH, 3 drums tetrachlorethane, 2 drums paraffin, 48 boxes diaphragm gas masks, 50 boxes service gas masks and 32 jars and 2 boxes of CC2.

A tour of inspection was made by Colonel Hamilton of the storage areas with a view to deciding best spaces available for supplies sent over from Bataan.

An estimate was prepared showing the amount of impregnating supplies available also the complete number of suits the supply will impregnate.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 1, 1942.

Lt. Schaf returned from Bataan. In addition to laboratory equipment he obtained one 1-1/2 ton truck from the 301st Chemical Company Depot for the use of the PCWD.

14 boxes of 4.2" CM shell (CNS and CNB) were brought over on the barge and disposed of in accordance with instructions issued by Colonel Hamilton.

The following property was received from the PCWD on Bataan and stored at Middleside Barracks of the 60th CAC and Depot area: 157 boxes gas masks diaphragm, 53 boxes service gas masks, 8 cans of HTH, 200 boxes service canisters, 2 drums paraffin and 1 drum acetylene tetrachloride. The rooms in which these supplies were stored were nailed up and the following sign placed on each entrance: "Danger, Chemicals, USAFFE RESERVE."

Fort Mills, P. I., February 2, 1942.

Private 1st class Bond was relieved from duty with the PCWD, Fort Mills and returned to his organization (4th Sep Cml Co) on Bataan.

Colonel Hamilton continued on Bataan.

Work on overhead protection and timbering of space in rear of Lateral No. 10 is progressing and should be completed shortly.

The Detachment was busy sewing 18 blankets that will be used on 4 gas proof doors of Hospital. The details of this project were worked out with Major Richardson, Gas Officer for Post Hospital.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 3, 1942.

The blankets for the gas proof entrances to the Hospital were completed today. Due to variance of sizes of frames it was necessary to add strips to some of the blankets.

Batteries Crockett, Geary, Way, and Smith were visited today for a check on quantities of lime, chlorine, and acetylene tetrachloride on hand. It appears some units have used the latter item for purposes other than which intended as a number of empty cans were found. The Ice Plant was also inspected and a similar condition was found there. A report of the above was prepared.

Colonel Hamilton was announced as Chemical Officer, USAFFE in orders published today (Paragraph 1, SO No. 19, Hq. USAFFE).

Fort Mills, P. I., February 4, 1942.

Construction on overhead protection in office and laboratory space in rear of Lateral No. 10 is progressing rapidly and should be completed in a day or so.

The Detachment was busy policing up the impregnating area at Bottomside after completion of impregnating operations the previous night.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 5, 1942.

The Engineer Utilities finished work on timbering office and laboratory space. Accordingly the office was moved from the QM lateral and all equipment was set up.

The following supplies were shipped to the PCWD on Bataan this morning - 20 barrel, L. P., 20 baseplates, L. P., 20 WP shell, L. P., 20 Fuses, L. P., and 20 burster tubes, L. P.

Tests on the Navy gasoline were continued today after a delay of several days while the overhead protection was being installed.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 6, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan at 7:00 AM.

Three enlisted men of the 7th Chemical Company Service (Avn) who have been placed on detached service with the PCWD and one man from the HPD detachment also arrived from Bataan. They are Staff Sergeant Torrisi, Sergeant Knight, Corporal De Jong, and Private 1st class Gansz.

A description of the Japanese Smoke Projector recently captured on Bataan was forwarded to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service.

All American enlisted men recently arrived for duty with the PCWD were taken on a tour of our warehouses in order to familiarize them with the storage of CW supplies at Fort Mills.

The old Chevrolet truck in use at this station for some time was sent to the PCWD on Bataan today. Two 2-1/2 ton demustardizing trucks with equipment were received from Bataan today. One of these trucks was sent to the motor pool for repair and general grease job.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 7, 1942.

A set of seven (7) Japanese propaganda pamphlets or leaflets dropped on Bataan from the air in recent weeks was brought over by Colonel Hamilton February 6th, and submitted to G-2, USAFFE, for his information. Copies of these leaflets and illustrations thereon were made for our files.

Staff Sergeant Torrisi was assigned to duty as an assistant in the chemical laboratory and Corporal De Jong was assigned to clerical duty in the office.

Tests on the Navy gasoline are nearing completion.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 8, 1942.

The second of the two decontamination trucks was taken to the motor pool for overhaul and reservicing. Later during the day both trucks were taken to the PCWD depot. Enlisted crews from the Detachment were assigned to each truck for operation in the field. Instruction in these duties is being given to the men.

Lt. Johnson went to the PCWD on Bataan tonight.

Tests on Navy gasoline continued in the chemical laboratory.

A report to the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service is being prepared covering complete description of the first Japanese gas mask captured on Bataan in January, 1942.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 9, 1942.

Lt. Johnson returned from Bataan.

Colonel Hamilton submitted a carrier note to G-4, USAFFE, re the proposed issue of HTH to the Quartermaster for water purification purposes. He objected to the issue of this item for the purpose mentioned since it was not issued by the War Department for that purpose; in addition, the supply of HTH is very limited.

Inventories of CW property taken in by the PCWD, Bataan from the 4th Separate Chemical Company and the 7th Chemical Company Service (Avn) were received today.

All warehouses and magazines containing CW supplies at this station were inspected with a view to determining condition of storage and the availability of additional space therein.

The Detachment was engaged in overhauling the apparatus on the demustardizing trucks. Some difficulty is being encountered due to the fact that pumps are not functioning properly.

A set of instructions governing the use and operation of the chemical laboratory was prepared and posted for the information and guidance of all concerned.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 10, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton prepared a letter for transmittal to the Chief, CWS, Washington, D. C., giving detailed description of the first Japanese gas mask captured on Bataan in January, 1942. Included with the letter were several drawings of the canister.

Forty-four (44) cans HTH were transferred from the 60th Coast Artillery barracks, Middle-side: 14 cans to Magazine No. 5, 23 cans to tunnel above Lateral No. 2, and 7 cans to the PCWD office. The steering on the Dodge truck was fixed. Work continued on the mounted demustardizers.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 11, 1942.

Lt. Johnson accompanied Colonel Hamilton on a reconnaissance to Coast Artillery CP to see Colonel Bunker and Lt. Colonel Foster regarding demonstration of bleaching plant.

One of the large demustardizers was sent to the Engineers to check bolting and hose connections, the other was in the Motor Pool having the pump checked.

A report of the captured Japanese canister was submitted to Hq. USAFFE for transmittal to Chief, CWS.

A final report of the analysis of the Navy gasoline sample was being drafted for submittal to Hq. USAFFE (copies to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commanding General, F.E.A.F.).

A radio was submitted to USAFFE for transmittal to Chief, CWS, re use of FS in the field manufacture of sulphuric acid for use in storage batteries.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 12, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton left for Bataan at 7:45 PM tonight.

From Bataan was received a report of an improvised diving apparatus. This consists of a training gas mask facepiece attached to one end of a length of garden hose, and three 3-gallon demustardizing outfits attached to the other end. Air is pumped through by use of the demustardizer pumps.

Lt. Schaf began work developing an improvised flame thrower using two 3-gallon demustardizers. Tests will be made on completion of assembly.

The Detachment set up a bleach plant at Battery Cheney and prepared a 50 lb. batch of bleach in a demonstration. Representatives of all batteries of the 59th C.A. and 2 batteries of the 60th C.A. were present. Details of preparing bleach were gone into and all noncommissioned officers present helped in the various tests and operations to familiarize them with the process. The 3-gallon type demustardizer was demonstrated. The Chemical Officer visited the demonstration.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 13, 1942.

The Detachment completed the diving helmet which was tested with good results. Success was also obtained in getting the water pumps on the 300-gallon demustardizers operating.

One thousand vials of HTH, containing 5 grams of HTH per vial, were prepared for QM, HPD, for use in water treatment. These were to be despatched by courier the following morning.

Tests were continued on the improvised flame thrower.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 14, 1942.

Request for memorandum on the 1st aid treatment of WP burns was made by Harbor Defense Hq. This information was telephoned to Colonel Hamilton who instructed that the matter be held in abeyance for the present.

The Surgeon called and requested information regarding the amount of copper sulphate available in the CW Laboratory. He was informed that there was none.

Lt. Schaf conducted additional experiments with the improvised flame thrower. Colonel Hamilton directed that he be prepared to bring same to Bataan for further tests.

The 2nd demustardizer crew worked with Pvt. Gansz learning how to operate the unit. The Detachment moved boxes of supplies in the south end of the tunnel to other locations in the tunnel. Completion of the moving of bleach plant from Battery Way was accomplished.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 15, 1942.

Lt. Schaf went to Bataan this morning for the purpose of conducting tests with an improvised flame thrower. He returned tonight at 10:45.

A certificate was received from the Surgical Chief, Base Hospital No. 2, Bataan, stating that wounds received by personnel at Cabcaben, February 13, were from white phosphorus.

Several inquiries were received from Hq. HD, Post Hospital, etc., regarding the amount of copper sulphate on hand.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 16, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan tonight.

Tests were conducted in the chemical laboratory today to determine definitely whether or not the bombs used by the Japanese at Cabcaben on February 13th contained white phosphorus. The tests confirmed this (that WP was used) and a detailed report covering the tests was prepared.

The service records of Sgt. Knight, Corp. De Jong, and Pvt. Gansz were received from the 31st Infantry today.

The Detachment spent the day digging fox holes at their Barracks.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 17, 1942.

It was reported that the Japanese are using flame throwers on our forces on Bataan. A report, including testimony of eye witnesses, was submitted to USAFFE.

A captured "flare or smoke pot" (Japanese) was brought over by Col. Hamilton. The characters on this smoke pot were translated, the contents were removed and are being analyzed. A brief report on this munition was submitted to G-2, USAFFE.

The Detachment continued digging fox holes.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 18, 1942.

Japanese chloride of lime taken from captured pouch in gas mask was analysed to determine the amount of free chlorine it contained.

Analysis of well water sample taken from well on Kindley Field was completed and the results turned over to the Quartermaster, HD.

The analysis of the powder contained in the Japanese flare or smoke pot was continued.

A report was submitted to G-2, USAFFE, on a green can captured on Bataan recently. The can contained white tablets, which have not as yet been analyzed.

Two captured Japanese flame throwers were brought over from Bataan tonight. They will be taken apart, examined and tests made to determine a duplication of same.

The Detachment is still digging fox holes.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 19, 1942.

Another sample of well water was brought in for test of salt content. The analysis was completed and report rendered to the Engineers.

Lt. Schaf made a physical examination of the Japanese flame throwers and submitted a report on same to the Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Tests were started to determine the correct proportion to use in mixing HTH with water in decontamination work.

A radiogram was received from the Chief, CWS, concerning the method of manufacture of sulphuric acid from FS for use in motor batteries.

A letter was prepared for transmission to the Chief, CWS, and inclosures of the principal matters undertaken were included.

Lt. Johnson departed for Bataan depot tonight.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 20, 1942.

A report covering the physical examination and details of the functioning of the captured Japanese flame thrower was submitted to G-2, USAFFE.

Lt. Davis came over from Bataan. He brought samples of fragments of WP bombs used by the Japanese and a typewriter for the office.

A field sampling kit was built for Lt. Schaf by the detachment.

Tests with the various mixtures of HTH were completed and a report was submitted to the USAFFE Chemical Officer by Lt. Schaf.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 21, 1942.

The WP samples of Japanese incendiary brought over by Lt. Davis were obtained by Major Harrison after the bombing at Mt. Limay, February 19th. These proved to be identical with the specimen obtained by the USAFFE Chemical Officer from the bombing at Cabcaben.

The captured Japanese flame thrower was tested by the laboratory staff under the supervision of the USAFFE Chemical Officer. Results were not satisfactory because of the lack of pressure.

Instructions were received from G-3, USAFFE, to direct that the PCWD personnel on Bataan and the 301st Depot Company be given complete instruction and training in CW weapons. As a result of the above, the USAFFE Chemical Officer directed the Commanding Officer, PCWD, to comply with the above.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 22, 1942.

Request was made to C/S, USAFFE for the transmittal of a radio to Chief, CWS, re description of fuel nozzle and ignition mechanism of the captured Japanese flame thrower.

Lt. Schaf ran some blood sugars for the hospital.

The laboratory section identified the explosive of a Japanese dud, submitted by Philippine Ordnance Depot, as Picric Acid.

Lt. Davis made a check up of Fort Mills chemical warfare supplies inventory in preparation for the shipment to Bataan of L. P. parts, equipment, and ammunition.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 23, 1942.

Lt. Davis supervised the shipment of the following articles to the Bataan depot:

- 9 Barrels, L.P.
- 9 Baseplates, L.P.
- 252 Charges, Propellent.
- 240 Tubes, Burster.
- 219 Shells, L.P. (WP).
- 298 Fuses, L.P.
- 1 Box Tools & Spare Parts.

Pfc. Macarubbe of the PS detachment went with the shipment as guard.

The CW laboratory were analyzing the explosive of a captured Japanese land mine in an attempt to identify it.

The detachment worked hauling the articles of the Bataan shipment from the place of storage to the dock.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 24, 1942.

Complete data re losses of Chemical Warfare supplies and equipment by sinking were furnished by the PCWD - copy filed in journal.

The office staff engaged in the preparations of inclosures to be submitted to Chief, CWS, Washington, D.C., in a few days.

The detachment hauled more L.P. parts and ammunition to the dock for shipment to the Bataan depot. Some of the detachment under the supervision of S/Sgt. Geiger cemented the approach to the Chemical Office.

Colonel Hamilton and Lt. Schaf made a reconnaissance of the island to determine the feasibility of setting up L.P.s to be loaded with scrap iron for shooting at low flying planes.

Lt. Davis supervised the shipment of L.P. parts and ammunition to Bataan. Following is a list of articles shipped:

- 9 Barrels, L.P.
- 9 Baseplates, L.P.
- 252 Charges, Propellent.
- 220 Tubes, Burster.
- 219 Shells, L.P. (WP).
- 215 Fuses, L.P.

Pfc. Delalamon accompanied the shipment as guard. Pfc. Macarubbe returned from Bataan with a captured Japanese Medical chest.

The laboratory section continued work on the identification of the Japanese land mine explosive.

The following items were received from Bataan depot:

- 5 boxes (20) Optical Masks
- 1 can (50 lbs.) HTH
- 1 can (100 lbs.) HTH.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 25, 1942.

Instructions were published for the Commanding Officers of the PCWD, Mills and Bataan, re: No more issue of gas masks except as replacement for masks rendered unserviceable incident to service.

Instructions were also issued re combining supplies for shipment to and from Bataan and Fort Mills; also a courier must accompany each shipment.

The detachment hauled more L.P. equipment and ammunition for shipment to Bataan from the storage dump to the dock. The shipment supervised by Lt. Davis was as follows:

- 224 Tubes, Burster, L.P.
- 200 Fuses, L.P.
- 212 Shells, L.P. (WP).
- 223 Charges, Propellent, L.P.
- 9 Barrels, L.P.
- 9 Baseplates, L.P.

1 Box L.P. Equipment.
4 CM, 4", Complete with bipods, barrels, baseplates. (These 4" CM
were salvaged from the depot fire.)

Pvt. Leonardo went as guard.

The laboratory section continued work on the Japanese explosive.

The following was received from Bataan tonight:
18 cans (100 lbs. each) HTH.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 26, 1942.

Work was completed on the cementing of the approach to the Chemical Office.

Part of the detachment assisted by Lt. Davis and Sgt. in the preparation of a set-up for the
field manufacture of sulphuric acid. The rest of the detachment cleaned and arranged the storage
of Chemical Warfare supplies.

Lt. Davis supervised the following shipment to PCWD, Bataan:
6 boxes containing 2 CM, 4", complete with spare parts and tools.

Lt. Schaf left for Bataan to work on an experimental flame thrower.

Lt. Johnson returned from Bataan.

The laboratory continued investigation of the Japanese explosive.

Mr. Jackson was designated by memorandum of the Chemical Officer, as administrative and
executive assistant to the Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 27, 1942.

A report on the identification of the Japanese explosive was submitted to the Assistant Chemi-
cal Officer by S/Sgt. Torrisi.

A test set-up for the manufacture of sulphuric acid was tried out under the supervision of
Lt. Johnson and Lt. Davis. The Chemical Officer, USAFFE, inspected the plant.

The ignition and firing mechanism of the captured Japanese flame thrower, together with
various samples of captured Japanese Chemical Warfare equipment, was packed for shipment to
the Chief, CWS, Washington, D.C.

The detachment assembled and delivered 18 complete suits of impregnated clothing to Bat-
teries Cheney, Crockett, and Smith (6 suits each).

The detachment also cleaned up Magazines No. 5 and No. 6.

Fort Mills, P. I., February 28, 1942.

A secret letter to Chief, CWS, dealing with items of supply was readied for transmittal.

The Chemical Officer, USAFFE, issued a memorandum allowing 2 hours off in the afternoon
to personnel on duty in the office.

Sixteen 50-gallon drums with 4" pipe connections were moved to Magazine No. 5, 19 demus-
tardizers and 201 salvaged training facepieces were transferred from Mine Casemate to
Magazine No. 5. Magazines No. 1 and No. 2 were cleaned up.

Lt. Johnson ascertained the locations of the intakes to Malinta Tunnel.

Lt. Johnson submitted a report on the explosive in the Magnetic Mine (Japanese) to the
USAFFE chemical officer.

Lt. Davis continued the experimental manufacture of sulphuric acid.

The use of stock record cards in accounting for the depot supplies was suggested by Lt.
Davis.

The laboratory section experimented with the purification of gasoline by extraction as op-
posed to distillation. This latter method had previously been recommended by Lt. Schaf in a
report to the Chemical Officer, USAFFE, made February 10, 1942, on the purification of a Navy
gasoline sample, submitted to this laboratory for analysis.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 1, 1942.

The laboratory continued work on the purification of gasoline. A Japanese explosive from a
150mm dud, found on Topside, Corregidor, was identified as TNT. A report on this was sub-
mitted by carrier note to the Ordnance Officer, USAFFE.

A list of critical items of C.W. supplies and equipment to be sent to the Philippine Islands by
the first available transportation was submitted to G-4, USAFFE.

Lt. Davis continued work on the manufacture of sulphuric acid and attempts were made to
purify the product by discoloration with charcoal.

Colonel Hamilton left tonight for Bataan taking Pfc Macarrube as orderly to replace Pvt.
Santos who returned to Fort Mills.

The detachment cleaned up the old depot area and dug a foxhole near the Mine Casemate.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 2, 1942.

A call from the Chemical Officer in Bataan instructed Lt. Davis to follow War Dept. direc-
tions (radiogram) implicitly in the manufacture of the sulphuric acid. So far, 2 gallons of fairly
pure product have been obtained. Work at the plant continued.

The Mine Casemate was converted into a gas mask repair shop. The detachment also worked
on the foxhole by the repair shop.

A CN from the Philippine Ordnance Officer, concerning a Japanese bottle grenade, was re-
ceived. The grenade was being despatched at a later date.

The laboratory continued work on the purification of gasoline.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 3, 1942.

The detachment camouflaged the big demustardizer in Building 551, with 26 boxes of canis-
ters. They collected 301 quart bottles (empty). They also continued work on their foxholes.

A CN was received from G-3, USAFFE, regarding the transfer of activities of the Philippine
Department to USAFFE and the Service Command. (This latter being organized for the purpose
of assuming the functions of HPD.)

Lt. Davis continued work on the manufacture of sulphuric acid. A sample of the purified acid was delivered to Motor Transport for test.

Stock record cards were made for Chemical Warfare supplies and equipment as of the last inventory dated February 25, 1942.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 4, 1942.

The manufacture of sulphuric acid continued with Lt. Davis supervising a crew of 2 American enlisted men and 2 Philippine Scouts.

The laboratory section began the preparation of sample kits for testing water in the field. These kits, which will be distributed to various units, will contain small quantities of reagents for making simple spot tests for contaminating materials (As, Cn), in drinking water to be used in the field.

It was also planned by the laboratory section to attempt purification of gasoline by hydrogenation of unsaturated oils and fats in the gasoline.

A report embodying recommendation for the transfer of Chemical Warfare activities and personnel with HPD to USAFFE and the Service Command was submitted in compliance with orders received from Hq, USAFFE, CS, G-3, March 3, 1942.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 5, 1942.

A laboratory report of the analysis of the explosive from the captured Japanese anti-tank mine was submitted to the Ordnance Officer, USAFFE, thru the Ordnance Officer, HD, for his information. A somewhat similar report was prepared for the Chief, CWS, and forwarded to G-2, USAFFE, for transmittal.

Stock record cards were brought up to date, several small issues having been made since the inventory was recorded.

In the absence of Lt. Davis who was confined to the hospital, Lt. Johnson and S/Sgt. Torrisi supervised the manufacture of the sulphuric acid.

The detachment collected empty quart bottles for use as "Molotov Cocktails."

Colonel Hamilton left for Bataan on the 6:30 PM boat.

One carton of corks for use in the Molotov bottles was received tonight from Bataan. These corks were made by the 301st Chemical Co. Depot.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 6, 1942.

Work at the sulphuric acid manufacturing plant was under the supervision of S/Sgt Torrisi.

The following items, to be used in the manufacture of Molotov cocktails were received:

From the QM - 50 gallons diesel oil
50 gallons gasoline
50 gallons kerosene.
From the Engineers - 400 feet of wire.

The detachment continued searching and collecting empty quart bottles.

A telephone from Bataan said that someone should meet the boat in the morning since Lt. Colonel Roemer and Lt. Schaf were coming to Fort Mills.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 7, 1942.

Lt. Colonel Roemer and Lt. Schaf did not arrive this morning because of a change of plans at Bataan depot.

Sgt. Knight supervised the manufacture of sulphuric acid today. A report from Motor Repair stated that the acid given them for test was satisfactory and more was requested. S/Sgt Larsen of the Motor Repair picked up 5 gallons more acid at the plant.

A combined Table of Basic Allowances of Chemical Warfare Supplies and Equipment is being prepared from the T/BA of the various organizations.

Captain Bartlett (4th Separate Chemical Co. attached to the 31st Inf) arrived at Fort Mills on the 8:30 PM boat.

Lt. Morgan called from the Bataan depot with figures on the recent shipments of LP ammunition and equipment from Mills. These figures were verified by Lt. Johnson's figures.

A problem of extracting water from a water-gasoline mixture was solved by the laboratory section. This problem was presented by Col. Quinn, HPD. Attempts will be made to purify watered gasoline in control of Col. Quinn. A sample is to be forwarded to the laboratory for testing on the same lines as was used in the problem.

A sample of water was brought from the hospital to see if it was pure distilled water. Tests indicated the water to be distilled.

A copy of a report of the reconnaissance made by Colonel Hamilton, Lt. Colonel Roemer, and Major Harrison in Bataan is filed in the journal.

A copy of G-2 Memo No. 12, from Headquarters, USAFFE, concerning the forwarding of captured Japanese materiel to the proper branches, issued this date, is filed in the journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 8, 1942.

A request was forwarded to G-1, USAFFE, for relief of Lt. Winn from assignment to 7th Chemical Co. Service (Avn) and attachment to 31st Infantry and reassignment to duty with the Chemical Warfare Laboratory Section, Fort Mills, P. I.

The combined T/BA of Chemical Warfare Supplies and Equipment was completed and checked.

The sulphuric acid plant continued operations and 5 more gallons were delivered to Motor Repair through S/Sgt. Larsen.

The detachment collected more bottles and made preparations for the manufacture of Molotov Cocktails.

Captain Bartlett returned to Bataan.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 9, 1942.

The order (Par 10, SO 64, Hq. USAFFE) transferring Lt. Winn from assignment to 7th Chemical Co., Service (Avn) and attachment to the 31st Infantry, to duty with the Chemical Warfare Laboratory Section, Fort Mills, was issued today, effective this date.

Colonel Hamilton called Lt. Johnson from Bataan to order the making of Molotov Cocktails to begin tomorrow. Precautions are to be taken to keep the materials spread out in case of hostile action.

A diagrammatic layout of the Chemical Warfare storage on Corregidor was completed subject to approval of the Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Part of the detachment assisted in the manufacture of sulphuric acid, the others continued the search for bottles.

Captain Schmidt of the Ordnance requested that standard gasoline be tested for lead tetraethyl. Preliminary tests for lead were negative. Reagents for testing for lead tetraethyl are being obtained from the hospital.

A setup for the separation of water from a water-gasoline mixture was sketched by Lt. Johnson and forwarded to Bataan where the sample of watered will be sent.

A copy of the above sketch is filed in this journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 10, 1942.

The sulphuric acid plant continued operations successfully.

180 Molotov Cocktails were manufactured and shipped to Fort Frank with instructions for use. 100 pounds of HTH were also shipped to Fort Frank with instructions for use as a decontamination agent.

A radio from Washington dated March 9, 1942, re our radio requesting 40 latest type flame throwers by first available transportation, states that shipment to port of embarkation of material requested has been made together with fuel oil.

In the laboratory, tests were made on gasoline for lead tetraethyl with negative results. (?) (Turbidity of Pb found at 3-30-41.)

Saline water was brought from the hospital for salt analysis. Tests made by S/Sgt. Torrisi found the salt content to be .903%. This report was transmitted verbally by Lt. Johnson to the hospital. This % salt was the exact amount added by the Medical Detachment in the preparation of the saline solution.

Report and overlay of reconnaissance made on Bataan by Colonel Hamilton, Lt. Colonel Roemer, and Captain Lazzarini, this date is filed in the journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 11, 1942.

Lt. Colonel Roemer arrived from Bataan this morning to inspect and plan the gas-proofing projects for Malinta Tunnel and Harbor Defense of Manila and Subic Bays.

The sulphuric acid plant continued operations, working until dark to complete the project as soon as possible.

The Detachment manufactured more Molotov Cocktails for Harbor Defense.

Requisition was received from the Regimental Supply Officer of the 59th CA for 400 pounds of HTH and 4 apparatus demustardizing (3 gal. type) to be issued to the Naval and Marine detachments at Fort Hughes.

Information was also requested as to approximate time of issue of 3000 pounds HTH requisitioned for the 59th CA. The requisition was held for necessary action.

180 Molotov Cocktails were prepared and delivered to Fort Frank today.

An extract from U.S. Navy Press News (Mariveles Area) this date, on the significance of the fall of Rangoon to the enemy, is filed in the journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 12, 1942.

The sulphuric acid plant is now on a full time basis, from 8:00 AM until dark. The plant has now produced 56 gallons of acid to date. 35 gallons have already been delivered to the Motor Pool.

Lt. Colonel Roemer completed tentative plans for gas-proofing, subject to approval of the Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Lt. Colonel Roemer returned to Bataan tonight by the 6:30 PM boat.

The manufacture of Molotov Cocktails was completed. 300 were delivered to the 4th Marines as per request of Harbor Defense Headquarters dated March 4, 1942.

The Molotov Cocktails for Forts Drum and Hughes (as per Hq HD request March 4, 1942) were also made. These cocktails (120 for Ft. Hughes and 90 for Ft. Drum) are being stored by CWS until the next available boat for those places.

Seven extra cocktails were made and tested by Lt. Colonel Roemer and Lt. Johnson with entirely satisfactory results.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 13, 1942.

Work continued on the manufacture of Sulphuric acid.

Instructions were delivered to the 4th Marines on the use of the Molotov Cocktails which were delivered to them yesterday.

The Detachment, acting on the suggestion of Lt. Colonel Roemer, salvaged from the old depot the following items for possible future use:

- 60 portable chemical cylinders
- 1 collective protective canister
- chloride of lime.

15 gallons of acetylene tetrachloride and 1/2 pint of carbon disulphide were delivered to the Bataan depot by Corporal Gow who returned on completion of his mission.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan to Fort Mills tonight.

A report by Lt. Johnson on the production of sulphuric acid is filed in this journal.

A report by Lt. Johnson on the completion of the manufacture of Molotov Cocktails for Harbor Defense is filed in this journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 14, 1942.

The last FS smoke shell, LP, was emptied at the field manufacturing plant for sulphuric acid today. Some crude acid remains to be filtered before the conclusion of operations.

Shipment of 16 complete suits of impregnated clothing and 16 pairs of impervious shoes was made to the 2nd Bn., 4th Marines.

Lt. Johnson went to Fort Hughes tonight to deliver the following:
120 Molotov Cocktails (with directions for use)
200 lbs. Agent, DeHS, HTH (with directions for use)
4 Apparatus, DeHS, (3 gallon pressure type)
8 complete suits impregnated clothing (with shoes)

Certificates of receipt with each shipment of HTH and impregnated clothing are signed by the officer who receives the shipment, acknowledging that these items will be used only for the purpose for which issued by the Chemical Warfare Service and that necessary precautions will be taken to safeguard these items.

Four (4) complete suits of impregnated clothing (with shoes) are being stored temporarily in the Mine Casemate awaiting the next boat to Ft. Drum.

The package containing the nozzle and ignition mechanism of the Japanese flame thrower was mailed to Chief of CWS. A letter from the Chemical Officer, USAFFE, covering CW activities from February 25 to March 10 was also mailed to Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Washington, D. C.

The Detachment packed and arranged the shipments mentioned above.

The laboratory section standardized solutions in preparation for analysis of miscellaneous small Japanese items.

Lt. Davis in a memo to Colonel Hamilton outlined the lead chamber and contact processes of manufacturing sulphuric acid. This memo is filed in the journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 15, 1942.

The manufacture of sulphuric acid in the field was completed today. A total of 63 gallons of acid suitable for use in storage batteries was obtained from 20 FS smoke shell, L.P. Of this amount 35 gallons have already been delivered to the Motor Pool, and the remainder held in CW storage pending issue.

In the laboratory a sample of water from Fort Frank was tested for As and Cn with negative results.

Lt. Davis began analysis of the Japanese flare mixture. Preliminary tests were made on the Japanese water purification vials.

Seventy-seven (77) service gas masks were issued to PAAC (on beach defense with 4th Marines) in exchange for 77 training masks to be turned into the CW Depot as soon as possible.

Lt. Schaf returned from Bataan with the improvised flame thrower with which he has been experimenting.

General Order No. 42, Hq. USAFFE, covering the reorganization of the USAFFE was published. It was noted that CW installations were not all included, particularly, PCWD, Bataan. A memorandum requesting these changes and additions will be sent to G-1, USAFFE.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 16, 1942.

Sizes of impregnated clothing and shoes were obtained from the 60th CA (AA) and steps were taken to initiate issue of the same.

Lt. Johnson and Lt. Davis worked out a plan for the issue of Decontaminating Agent - HTH, and Demustardizing Apparatus.

Japanese medicine pills analysed by the laboratory were found to contain quinine and some starchy material.

Bark from a tree on Bataan was tested for quinine with negative results.

Pfc Gansz went to PCWD, Bataan, on official business.

The USAFFE Chemical Officer and Lt. Schaf made an inspection trip of CW installations on Corregidor.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 17, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton left this morning on the navy barge for Bataan.

A Carrier Note to USAFFE staff was prepared for the signature of the Chemical Officer, USAFFE, summarizing the main projects and analyses conducted by the CW Laboratory since its inception, reports submitted and action taken thereof by the USAFFE Chemical Officer.

Lt Davis salvaged some anti-dims and training canisters from the remains of the old depot.

In the laboratory further work was done on the Japanese quinine.

A sample of a cotton shirt, impregnated April, 1941, was submitted from the Bataan depot for analysis. The % free chlorine found was .021%.

A sample of CC2 burned in the depot fire was analysed and only 7.5% of the CC2 was found to be undestroyed.

Lt. Schaf continued work on the improvised flame thrower.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 18, 1942.

Lt. Johnson and Lt. Davis prepared a draft of a letter to Commanding General, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, outlining a general plan of issue of protective and decontaminating materiel to the various batteries.

The following shipments were made today:

5 gallons sulphuric acid to QM Motor Pool.
4 complete suits (incl. shoes) impregnated clothing to 91st C.A. (for Fort Frank).
4 complete suits (incl. shoes) impregnated clothing) These items to
100 lbs. HTH) 59th C.A. for
90 Molotov Cocktails) Fort Drum.

From PCWD on Bataan the following was received:
500 each Anti-dims.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan tonight. T/Sgt. McKinnon and Pfc. Gansz also arrived tonight.

A number of CW text books and publications were brought from Bataan to supplement the library of the Chemical Office, USAFFE.

Forty-five complete suits impregnated clothing were arranged by the detachment and stored in Mine Casemate, pending issue.

The laboratory section experimented with the extraction of quinine from bark of a tree growing on Bataan.

Filed in the journal is copy of CN from Chemical Officer, USAFFE, to C/S, Luzon Force re training and repair of gas masks of the Luzon Force.

The report with attached affidavits of the destruction of the Stock Record Account of the PCWD in Manila is filed in the journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 19, 1942.

Carrier Note was submitted to C/S, Luzon Force covering details of sending out to the I and II Corps, CW personnel to inspect, repair, and replace gas masks in the hands of troops. A copy of this CN was filed yesterday in the Journal.

Lt. Davis worked on a plan to manufacture sulphuric acid from FS shell-4.2" Chemical Mortar. Some additions and modifications of the method used in the manufacture from L.P. shells are necessary.

Samples of well water from Kindley Field and Middleside Pipe line were analysed for salt content. (Kindley Field sample - .313%, Middleside - .076%.)

No traces of quinine were found in the bark brought by Pfc. Gansz from Bataan.

Lt. Schaf continued work on the flame thrower.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 20, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton left for Bataan today to report to the Commanding General, Luzon Force, in compliance with paragraph No. 18, SO 66, Hq. USAFFE, dated March 11, 1942, which were issued today.

Following are condensations of pertinent orders of Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton since his arrival in the Philippines:

Par. 11, SO 22, HPD, 1/30/40 - assignment to HPD on arrival from U.S.A.

Sect. 11, GO 2, HPD, 2/19/40 - announced as Department Chemical Officer.

Par. 4, SO 25, Hq. USAFFE - 1/27/42 - acting Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Par. 1, GO 19, Hq., USAFFE - 2/3/42 - announced as Chemical Officer, USAFFE

Par. 18, SO 66, Hq. USAFFE - 3/11/42 - relieved as Chemical Officer, HPD & USAFFE and assigned to Hq. Luzon Force

Par. 5a, GO 42, Hq. USAFFE - 3/14/42 - transferring CWS section, HPD to Fort Mills.

Lt. Schaf supervised part of the Detachment in the filling of CN capsules to be sent to PCWD, Bataan for training purposes.

A water testing kit was revised and completed by Lt. Davis.

Further investigation of the possibility of obtaining sulphuric acid from 4.2" CM smoke (FS) shell.

Plans were made for the operation of one of the bleach plants at the batteries.

Work was begun on analysis of solder for Motor Pool for possible reproduction. A Japanese explosive from a 240mm dud found on Fort Frank was in process of analysis. Sample of water from Fort Frank was tested for As and CN with negative results.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 21, 1942.

A duplicate copy of the Log Book and Journal is being typed for use as a reference in the office.

Sergeant Knight left on the morning boat for Bataan to deliver the CN capsules to PCWD, Bataan.

Progress was made in the contemplated manufacture of sulphuric acid from 4.2" CM smoke (FS) shells. The actual manufacture is expected to start in a few days.

S/Sgt Gelger operated a bleach plant at Battery Crockett. A 200 lb. batch of bleach was made. Lt. Johnson and Lt. Davis inspected the plant. An analysis of the bleach produced will be made in the laboratory. Decontaminating squads of Btry Crockett, Geary, Wheeler participated in the operations.

The solder analysis was completed and found to be 60% tin and 40% lead. This was reported to Captain Shanks of the Motor Pool who will attempt to reproduce the solder with raw materials on hand.

Colonel Hamilton returned from Bataan tonight, as did Sergeant Knight.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 22, 1942.

A Carrier Note was submitted to G-4, and C/S, USFIP, requesting authority to move some 100 rounds of 4.2" CM smoke (FS) shell from Bataan to Fort Mills for use in the emergency field manufacture of sulphuric acid for storage batteries.

In the field manufacture of sulphuric acid, the preliminary operations are almost completed. The FS smoke mixture has to be transferred from the 4.2" CM shells to a LP shell to facilitate regulation of flow.

The analysis of the liquid bleach made at Battery Crockett yesterday was made in the laboratory and the free chlorine content was found to be 17.8%.

Lt. Schaf continued work on the flame thrower which is almost ready for field tests.

An index of all War Dept. and CWS School textbooks, manuals, pamphlets, and mimeographs was made.

A letter from Hq I Phil Corps, to units of the Corps was published re: Schedule of repairs of gas masks by a CWS maintenance Group. A copy of same is filed in the journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 23, 1942.

In the field manufacture of sulphuric acid the valves were repaired and operations began. Three gallons of crude acid were produced.

Inquiry was received from the Engineers on Bataan on making disinfectant for killing maggots by converting raw sulphur. A sample will be furnished for initial tests.

Hq. USAFFE, SO 75 dated March 21, 1942, were published. Paragraph 5 of this order revoked the assignment of Colonel Hamilton to Hq. Luzon Force. Hq. USFIP, GO No. 3, March 22, 1942, was published. Section III of this order announced Colonel Hamilton as Chemical Officer, USFIP.

Orders were issued transferring Lt. Johnson to the Field Artillery and assigning Captain Bartlett now attached to the 31st Infantry to duty with the CWS.

67 lbs. of hydrochloric acid and 20 lbs. of nitric acid were received from the navy for use in the CWS laboratory.

Colonel Fischer (an authority on Philippine Botany) was consulted on the bark of the Dita tree which natives use as medicine. He said that this tree is not a cinchona (quinine tree) - that the medicinal effect was more psychological than anything. However, research will be made to see if this bark can be used.

Authority for shipment of the FS smoke shells from Bataan to Mills was granted by C/S - about 100 rounds of 4.2" CM shells (FS) to come over for use in manufacturing sulphuric acid.

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Fort Mills, P. I., March 24, 1942.

The field manufacture of sulphuric acid was interrupted by enemy air raids. However, at the end of the day 2-1/2 gallons of crude acid had been made and the 3 gallons made yesterday was filtered.

The bleach plant run by S/Sgt Torrisi was also interrupted by enemy raids. The plant at James Ravine was forced to discontinue because no power was available and the batteries present for instruction were alerted. Salvaged slaked lime used after straining.

Lt. Johnson left tonight for Bataan to join the F.A. unit to which he was assigned by orders received yesterday.

Lt. Winn arrived at Fort Mills tonight in compliance with orders issued March 9, assigning him to duty with the CW laboratory. The delay in compliance was because of Lt. Winn's confinement to the Hospital.

The translations on captured Japanese medicine containers was made today but the translation gave no indications as to chemical contents.

Corporal Guillermo of the 301st Chemical Co. Depot brought over a shipment of FS smoke shells from Bataan for use in the emergency field manufacture of sulphuric acid.

Pfc Cureg and Pfc Llavore accompanied Lt. Johnson to Bataan, with three Ordnance 12" mortar powder cans partially filled with bleach for use at CWS Depot, General Hospital No. 2, and Engineer Depot, all on Bataan, for sanitary purposes.

Copy of CN to CG, HD of M & SB, re: Gas Protection, Malinta Hospital Tunnel (recommendations to Hospital Executive Officer, Major Hartmann) is filed in the journal.

Copy of request for quinine filed in journal.

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Fort Mills, P. I., March 25, 1942.

Four CWS enlisted men were killed while engaged in the emergency manufacture of sulphuric acid, when a heavy bomb made a direct hit on a reinforced concrete culvert in which they took shelter. The men were:

Sergeant Doyle H. Knight (attached from 7th Cml Co Serv (Avn))
Private 1st Class Henry G. Gansz (attached from 7th Cml Co Serv (Avn))
Private Rufino Leonardo (PS) (PCWD detachment)
Corporal Florentino Guillermo (PA) (301st Cml Co Depot)

Heavy enemy bombing during the entire day reduced outside work to a minimum. Damage to CW installations has not been ascertained.

The distribution of protective clothing to the Harbor Defense batteries has been delayed.

Received from Major Harrison samples of cigarettes dropped by enemy planes behind our lines on Bataan. These are to be analysed for narcotics, poison, and bacteria.

A copy of the report made to the Fort Mills Station Hospital Gas Officer, Major Richardson, is filed in the journal.

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Fort Mills, P. I., March 26, 1942.

Enemy air raids continued and little outside work was done.

The following issues of CW materiel were made:

To R.S.O., 59th CA -
100 lbs. Agent Decontaminating, HTH
15 Complete Suits impregnated clothing (w/shoes)
To Gas Officer, Station Hospital -
200 Training canisters (These are to be assembled under supervision of Gas Officer,
200 Training facepieces (Hospital, to be placed on new beds set up in hospital.)
200 Training carriers
To civilian employee, PX -
1 Training mask to replace mask lost in burning of PX.

S/Sgt Torrisi and S/Sgt Geiger dumped two (2) 55-gallon drums of CNB (all on hand) over a cliff near Navy Tunnel. The drums were opened by rifle fire of S/Sgt Geiger.

Harbor Defense QM approved a request from this office for the issue of 152 pair of coveralls which are needed to make 176 complete suits impregnated clothing. This will be done as soon as possible.

The plan for the issue of decontaminating chemicals and equipment for the HD of M & SB was submitted to the CG. Plan details amount of supplies and equipment of this type to be issued. Supplies are already being issued pending approval of the plan.

Lt. Schaf analysed the green chemical sprayed by the explosion of a Japanese bomb, near Malinta Hospital entrance on the night of March 25-26, 1942. It was found to be Picric acid (Jap. Shimose) explosive which had not detonated due to some fault in the fuse of the bomb.

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Fort Mills, P. I., March 27, 1942.

Air raid alarms continued but little bombing was done.

Colonel Hamilton made a survey of CW installations to determine extent of damage done by bombing of last few days. The mobile demustardizing truck in Bldg. No. 551 was so badly damaged by bombing that it is no longer usable. Duds (75mm & 3") from the explosion of the Ordnance magazine close by, are all around Bldg. No. 551, making it unsafe for personnel to approach.

Recommendation was submitted to Harbor Defense Hq. regarding the addition of gas sentry duties to those of the MP's acting as guards at the entrances to Malinta Tunnel.

Report of CWS casualties on March 25, was submitted to AG, USFIP.

Lt. Schaf was confined to hospital with malaria.

A water testing kit was completed for Fort Frank and is being held, pending means of shipment to Fort Frank.

The following issues of CW materiel were made today:

- To RSO, 60th CA (AA) for issue to the various batteries of the 60th -
600 lbs. HTH (demustardizing agent)
45 complete suits impregnated clothing (w/shoes)
7 Apparatus demustardizing (3-gallon)
- To RSO 91st CA (PS) -
500 lbs. HTH (demustardizing agent)
21 Complete suits impregnated clothing (w/shoes)
13 Apparatus demustardizing (3-gallon)
- To 4th Marines -
400 lbs. HTH (demustardizing agent)
8 Apparatus demustardizing (3-gallon)
- To SC enlisted man -
1 Training mask to replace mask lost in fire.

The detachment filled 20 demustardizers with water, to be placed in tunnel for emergency. Some damaged masks were repaired and 20 masks were brought into the office for emergency issue.

The 301st Cml Co Depot (PA) on Bataan engaged in rifle marksmanship today - 15 men completed the course and did well. The Depot Company, Bataan, fought forest fires this AM caused by WP bombs in the vicinity of CW Depot, KP175, on Mariveles Cut-off.

Filled in the Journal are memos from Lt. Winn to Colonel Hamilton - one, re: Balance of Impregnating Chemicals after all Acetylene Tetrachloride is used; the other re: Amount of Bleach that can be made from materiel on hand.

Journal file Field Order No. 2, Hq. Group No. 3.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 28, 1942.

Memo from Colonel Hamilton as follows: "No CWS personnel to approach Bldg. 551 because of extreme danger." (due to duds) was initialed by all CWS personnel.

The various RSO, Fort Mills were instructed to inspect valves and valve seats of the demustardizing apparatus issued before using - look for corrosion of same. Apparatus should be cleaned after using.

Following is a sick report of CWS as of today:

11 men sick in hospital, 9 sick in camp at Bataan depot form a total of 70 PA men (301st Cml Co Depot), 5 Enl men (Am) and 4 officers (Am). One officer just returned to duty from hospital after malaria attack.

At Fort Mills, 1 officer, 2 enl men of a total of 4 officers (Am), 5 enl men (Am) and 8 enl men (PS). Two officers just returned to duty after bad attacks of malaria.

Enemy air raids lessened in intensity although Fort Mills was under alarm almost all day thus preventing much outside activity.

Major Bennett, MC, from Bataan conferred with Colonel Hamilton on the possible medicinal values of the Ditá tree and the Makabuhay vine. Reagents were furnished by the laboratory to him for experiment on Bataan. Specimen of the Makabuhay vine were left here for tests here.

An outline of brief instruction for MPs in connection with duties as gas sentries was prepared. Arrangement was made for the conduct of this instruction, March 29.

Lt. Davis ran some blood sugars for the hospital.

- Issued to RSO 92nd CA (PS) - 18 complete suits impregnated clothing - 22 apparatus demust. (3-gal.) - 400 lbs. HTH.
- Issued to Hospital - 500 lbs. HTH, 20 demustardizing apparatus (3-gal.)
- Issued for Navy Tunnel - 4 complete suits impregnated clothing - 4 apparatus demustardizing - 100 lbs. HTH.
- Issued to Engineers - 100 lbs. HTH, 2 demustardizing apparatus (3-gal. type).

Fort Mills, P. I., March 29, 1942.

Enemy air raids continued throughout the day as follows: 9:55 am to 1:10 pm, 4:00 pm to 5:20 pm, 8 pm to 9:45 pm. Damage was very slight, most of the bombs fell in the bay, according to USFIP press release.

Lt. Davis ran some blood sugars for the hospital. He also ran tests on the Makabuhay vine in an effort to isolate some medicinal alkaloid to be used in the treatment of malaria.

The following issues were made:

- 1 Diaphragm mask to replace mask lost in bombing raid - 4th Marines (PAAC)
- 1 Training mask to replace one destroyed by bombing - Enl man, HPD

Colonel Hamilton delivered informally to CG, HD of M & SB, his recommendations for the emergency gas proofing protection for Station Hospital, Fort Mills, and for the handling of contaminated patients. Colonel Hamilton recommended that since this project directly affected the entire command and technically the Medical Corps, the Engineer Corps, and the CWS, a representative Board of Officers be appointed to survey, recommend, and supervise the execution of recommendations made. Colonel Hamilton designated Lt. Schaf as local representative for CWS.

Mr. Jackson, WO, gave instruction in the duties of gas sentries to approximately 20 MPs (Captain Benson in charge) at the entrance to Malinta tunnel. From Basic Field Manual 21-40, Defense Against Chemical Attack, paragraphs 8, 25e, and 47 were briefly discussed.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 30, 1942.

Air raid alarms today were as follows: 8:40 am - 12:40 pm, 3:00 pm - 4:10 pm, 5:00 pm - 5:25 pm, 6:45 pm - 7:20 pm, 8:10 pm - 8:40 pm and several short alarms throughout the night.

Today, 4 service masks were issued to an officer for use by men in the Off-Shore Patrol. One training mask was issued to an enlisted man of the QMC to replace mask destroyed by bombing. The Hospital were issued some of the protective clothing allowed them but as no shoe sizes were sent in the issue was not completed.

At direction of CG, HD of M & SB, 2 footlockers, 1 box, 3 bags, and 3 toys (kiddy cars), property of General MacArthur were stored in the attic of the office.

Orders were issued (par. 4, SO 7, 29/Mar/42) relieving Sergeant Sachwald, Corporal Haley, Pvt 1st Class Ignaszewski, of the 7th Cml Co Service (Avn) from attachment to the 31st Infantry and assigning them to duty with CWS, Fort Mills.

Colonel Hamilton had his car photographed and went to Topside with the photographer where he visited some of the batteries.

Lt. Davis ran blood sugars for the hospital and continued his work with the Makabuhay vine.

The Chevrolet truck which had been at Magazine No. 6 since March 25, was brought in. Four boxes of lime were salvaged from the old depot site to be shipped to PCWD, Bataan. The members of the detachment who were left assembled training masks for emergency issue.

Pvt. Macarubbe arrived from Bataan with sample of Dita leaves to be analyzed in the CW laboratory.

Copy of CN from Cml O. to C/S, USFIP on the Dita tree and subsequent recommendations thereon is filed in the Journal.

Copy of HD bulletin re: Cholera shots is also filed.

Copy of report on controlled experiment with impregnated clothing is filed in the Journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., March 31, 1942.

Air raids today as follows: 9:30 am - 12:30 pm, 12:40 pm - 1:30 pm, 3:10 pm - 5:10 pm, 8:05 pm - 8:30 pm, and several short raids throughout the night.

S/Sgt Torrisi worked on the making of a sulfur candle for use as a germicide. A report thereon was made to the Chemical Officer, USFIP, on the results.

A letter was prepared and mailed to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, on the major activities of the CWS since the last letter to date. Inclosures on the various activities were mailed with the letter.

The PS detachment continued assembling training masks. A total of 200 masks have been assembled in two days.

Lt. Winn was confined to quarters today with a return of a malaria attack.

Leaves of the Dita tree brought by Pfc Macarubbe from Bataan were identified as not being of the poisonous variety of Dita.

The following shipment was sent to PCWD, Bataan with Pfc Macarubbe as guard:

- 4 boxes lime (salvaged)
- 89 burster tubes, 4" CM
- 417 Squibs, electric
- 3158 Detonators, No. 6, electric
- 25 Fuses, LP
- 25 Detonators for Burster Tubes, 4" CM
- 40 Burster tubes LP
- 40 Charges Propellent, LP

- 464 Discs, Propellent, 4.2" CM
- 46 Cartridges, Ignition
- 230 Rings propellent, Hivel
- 15 Shells, FM, smoke, LP
- 6 Shells, CN, gas, LP
- 17 Shells, CNB, gas, 4.2" CM

A report of use of Tiki-tiki extract from CG, 61st Division, Visayan Force, together with indorsements thereon and recommendations of the Chemical Officer USFIP is filed in Journal.

Fort Mills, P. I., 1 April, 1942.

Air raid alarms today - 10: am to 1: pm, 3:10 pm to 4:00 pm, 4:50 pm to 7:20 pm and short alarms throughout the night. No bombs fell in the vicinity of Malinta Tunnel.

The detachment worked patching the truck tires and repairing gas masks damaged in bombing raids.

S/Sgt Torrisi made up some sulfur candles for use as a germicide which were sent to General Hospital No. 2 thru Surgeon, USFIP as per request of surgeon. The Hospital will make reports on the effectiveness of these candles when burning to determine if more extensive use is practicable.

Lt. Davis continued work on the Makabuhay vine.

Lt. Winn was confined to the hospital with another attack of malaria.

Sgt. Sachwald, Cpl. Haley, Pfc Ignaszewski, all 7th Cml Co Ser (Avn) attached to the 31st Infantry, reported for duty with the CWS Fort Mills in compliance with Par. 4, SO No. 7, Hq USFIP, dated 29 March, 1942. No individual assignments to these men have been made.

Fort Mills, P. I., 2 April, 1942.

Only one air raid alarm today - from 9:10 am to 1:20 pm. Bombs were dropped on the island near Malinta Tunnel at 10:00 am and again at 11:40 am.

The free chlorine content of the Japanese water purification kit powder was found on analysis to be 9.0%.

The government and personal effects of Sgt. Knight and Pvt 1st Class Gansz, who were killed in action, March 25, 1942, were inventoried and prepared for disposition.

Drafts of letters re Promotions of Officers, CWS, were prepared.

A report of the survivors of the SS Corregidor which sank December 16, 1941 (see Log entry Dec 16) were received in this office. The report and list are filed under this date in the journal.

Plan for the distribution of demustardizing equipment and chemicals to the Harbor Defenses was returned for several minor revisions.

Four (4) complete suits of impregnated clothing were issued to the Engineers.

Eight Gallons of sulphuric acid were issued to the QM Motor Pool.

Lt. Davis continued work on the extract from the Makabuhay vine.

Lt. Morgan called from Bataan - message substantially as follows: "Cpl. Bruce, 7th Cml Co Ser (Avn), working under direction of Surgeon's Office, Hq Luzon Force under supervision of Major Bennett, has extracted some crystals from the Makabuhay vine. These crystals are being tested at one of the three Clearing Stations of Subsector D and at the 12th Medical Bn Clearing Station." Cpl Bruce has been released from attachment with the 31st Infantry to perform this work.

Fort Mills, P. I., 3 April 1942.

Air raid today at 9:00 am until 12:20 pm but no bombs dropped near by.

Lt. Schaf returned to duty and started work on making gas mask canisters to protect against Ammonia gas. These are for personnel working in the ice plant. They will be tested before being used.

Sample of contents of a Japanese bomb dropped on General Hospital No. 1, March 30, 1942 were received from Lt. Colonel Roemer for examination and analysis in the laboratory.

In the Lab., Lt. Davis continued work on the Makabuhay vine. S/Sgt. Torrisi tested sample of water from the hospital for hardness (temporary or permanent hardness). It was found to be permanent hardness - hardness that cannot be removed by boiling.

A recommendation for the promotion of 2nd Lt. William F. Miles, 4th Sep. Cml. Co. attached to the 31st Infantry, to 1st Lieutenant was forwarded to the Commanding General, USFIP.

A letter recommending the award posthumously of the Silver Star to Sgt. Doyle H. Knight, Pvt 1st Class Henry G. Gansz, Cpl. Florentino Guillermo, Pvt. Rufino Leonardo, all of whom were killed in action March 25, 1942, while engaged in the necessary emergency field manufacture of Sulphuric acid, and the award of Silver Star to Pfc Prospero Delalamon who was uninjured on the same detail, was forwarded to the Commanding General, USFIP.

Fort Mills, P. I., 4 April, 1942.

Air raid alarms today confined to a few short alerts - no bombing.

Colonel Hamilton left on the morning boat for Bataan.

The sample of explosive received yesterday from Bataan was not H.E. but was identified as WP in rubber which had been reduced to a gummy mass by burning. It was probably part of a rubber pellet of WP similar to those obtained at an earlier date. A report was made by Lt. Schaf to the Cml Officer.

Lt. Schaf submitted the following reports to the Chemical Officer, USFIP: Report on igniter for incendiary grenade submitted by Major Harrison. Recommendations as per letter Hq USFIP, March 31, for temporary commissions for enlisted men of the detachment. Recommendations concerning laboratory space on Bataan for field laboratory.

Lt. Davis' report and recommendations of personnel of crews on decontaminating work (emergency) at the entrances of Malinta Tunnel were mailed to the Chemical Officer, USFIP, on Bataan.

The detachment repaired some gas masks and patched the tires of the trucks. Several flats have been experienced lately.

Fort Mills, P. I., 5 April, 1942.

Several more short alarms today but no bombs dropped on the island.

Recommendation for the promotion of 1st Lieutenant Samuel J. Winn to Captain was returned from Hq, USFIP - not favorably considered at this time.

Recommendation of this office to Hq, USFIP regarding survey of Malinta Hospital for gas proofing equipment thereof submitted recently and including recommendation for appointment of Board of Officers returned with instructions for Chemical Officer to conduct an individual survey and report recommendations thereon. This report was communicated by telephone to the Chemical Officer.

Lt. Davis made a report of the findings of the work with the Makabuhay vine for the Chemical Officer on his return from Bataan.

Lt. Schaf commenced the drawing of the plans of the flame thrower which he has developed.

Part of the detachment assembled training masks.

Filed in Journal - copy of program of Easter Sunrise Service held at Hq, Luzon Force, Bataan, P. I., this morning.

Fort Mills, P. I., 6 April, 1942.

Several short air raid alerts during the day and night but no planes over the island.

Lt. Schaf continued the drawing of the plans for the flame thrower.

Letters of condolence to the mothers of Sergeant Knight and Pvt 1st Class Gansz who were Killed in Action, March 25, 1942, were written by Lt. Schaf.

The sulphuric acid plant was transferred to the vicinity of the Mine Casemate where Corporal Haley and Pvt 1st Class Ignaszewski were instructed in the procedure preparatory to resumption of the manufacture. On the advice of the Chemical Officer by telephone from Bataan the shells are to be drilled on the base instead of the side as previously.

Lt. Davis prepared a report on the Japanese water purification kit for submittal to the Chemical Officer on his return from Bataan.

Preliminary tests by Lt. Davis of Japanese cigarettes dropped behind our lines by enemy planes indicated arsenic but further confirmation was necessary. The information was issued prematurely to the Chemical Officer before confirmation was established.

Three complete suits of impregnated clothing with shoes and one extra pair of shoes were shipped to Fort Hughes tonight to Lt. Turner who telephoned the requisition earlier in the day.

When not busy elsewhere the Detachment assembled gas masks - training.

Lt. Schaf called the Engineer Utilities and the power plant about their supply of chlorine. At this time they use HTH and have 80 pounds left. Captain Hatch says that he appreciated the offer (of chlorine) and would have to use chlorine when the HTH gave out.

Fort Mills, P. I., April 7, 1942.

All the crude acid left from previous operations was filtered. A total of 23-1/2 gallons of acid remain on hand. Resumption of the manufacture of the acid was delayed because necessary repairs to parts had to be made.

Lt. Schaf prepared a report on his recommendations for the gas proofing of Station Hospital, Malinta Tunnel.

A call from Colonel Hamilton ordered the shipment of all the old lime on hand at Mills to the PCWD, Bataan. A total of approximately 700 lbs. lime was shipped along with 150 lb. cylinder of chlorine, which was requested later by another call. Corporal Nunez accompanied the shipment as guard.

Further investigation of the Japanese cigarettes indicated that Arsenic was not present in large enough quantities to have a poisonous effect. The test used was so delicate that traces of As were found in ordinary tobacco.

A gas mask was assembled using the ammonia protective canister which is to be field tested.

Sergeant Sachwald and Pvt 1cl Cureg were confined to the hospital.

AC/S, G-3, requested information regarding amounts of WP filled munitions on hand in P. I. Reason for request not stated.

The water testing kit was shipped to Fort Frank.

Search was started for ball bearings to fill empty FS shells but large enough quantities are not available so 1/2" lengths of 1/4, 3/8, and 1/2" solid steel rod were cut to be used in lieu of ball bearing.

150 pairs of coveralls were received from HD QM to be impregnated. The detachment sewed up the side seams in preparation for the impregnation.

* * * * *

Fort Mills, P. I., April 8, 1942.

Several air raid alerts today but no bombs dropped on island - heavy bombing and shelling on Bataan coupled with enemy drive - situation becoming critical.

Manufacture of sulphuric acid resumed today - 8 gallons of crude acid being made by dark.

Inquiry from Colonel Stennis, Fort Frank, re: installations of gas proofing blowers on Fort Frank was replied to by Lt. Schaf who said that installation was a job for the Engineers.

Colonel Wood, G-2, came with a telegram from War Dept ordering the shipment of five complete Japanese gas masks and five extra canisters to Washington and for penetration tests to be made of the canister for Arsenic, HCN, Cyanogen Chloride. Lt. Schaf packed the masks for shipment, one box containing 2 masks (large canisters) and 3 separate small canisters, the other containing 3 masks (small canisters) and two separate large canisters.

To Batteries Smith, Crockett, and Cheney were issued 300 pounds of HTH each, a total of 900 pounds.

Pfc Llavore of the PS detachment turned into the hospital with malaria.

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Fort Mills, P. I., April 9, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton, Captain Bartlett, Captain Lazzarini, Lt. Morgan, Corp. Bruer, and Corp. Nunez arrived from Bataan. Many soldiers and civilians are coming from Bataan; the enemy have gained practically complete control of the peninsula, and evacuees are coming to Corregidor by any means available.

Effort was made all day to contact Colonel Roemer at PCWD, Bataan, but the lines were down. Two American officers - Lt. Col. Roemer, and Capt. Daniel - and 4 American enlisted men - S/Sgt Williams, Sgt Mainer, Pvt 1cl Novinski, and Pvt 1cl Dondich - were left on Bataan as well as the entire 301st Cml Co Depot (PA).

Air raids practically all day - bombs falling around on the island. Heavy shelling accompanied the bombing later in the day.

Not much work possible because of the air raids and the confusion resulting from the arrivals of evacuees from the peninsula.

Several requests for gas masks from evacuees who left their equipment on Bataan were received. On orders of the Chemical Officer, these men will not be issued masks until assigned to some unit, with priority to be given to C.A. and A.A. units.

The detachment opened unit containers and completed the sewing of the coveralls to be impregnated.

Filed in Journal - pass used by Colonel Hamilton on his last trip to PCWD, Bataan from which he returned today.

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Fort Mills, P. I., April 10, 1942.

Enemy air raids thru entire day with bombs dropping at random.

The Cml Officer arranged the duties of the CWS officers on Mills. Two officers on duty at all times in the office - a 24-hour daily schedule of officers on duty was published for the information of all concerned.

Lt. Winn and T/Sgt McKinnon returned to duty after attacks of malaria.

Because of the many requests for gas masks, the Chemical Officer ordered that all masks be issued from Mine Casemate and all repairing done there. Lt. Morgan is in charge of this area with a detail of 1 NCO (Am) and 5 PS det.

The detachment continued opening unit containers and 2 noncoms were stationed at the entrance to the QM lateral to police lateral entrance.

Two conferences were held today by the Chemical Officer with the CWS commissioned personnel re: handling of CW duties under present conditions.

A number of former CWS enlisted men who had been attached to the 31st Infantry have managed to escape to Corregidor; in most cases these men have been assigned to the 4th Marines on beach defense. Lt. Morgan has been charged with obtaining the name, rank, organization of these men, for record in the office, and for possible duty in event of an enemy gas attack.

A letter covering CWS activities over a period of April 1-10 to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service was prepared and mailed tonight.

The following CWS munitions were dumped in the bay tonight (from Mills reserves):
30 shells 4.2" CM (FS) with fuses (shells emptied in mfg. of H₂SO₄)

10 shells, L. P. (WP)
10 L.P. barrels & 10 L.P. base plates.

Lt. Davis brought the inventory of CW supplies on Mills up to date.

Filed in Journal - separate accounts of the experiences of Capt. Bartlett, Capt. Lazzarini, and Lt. Morgan, with comments by Colonel Hamilton, re: happenings on Bataan on the night of April 8-9, 1942.

Fort Mills, P. I., April 11, 1942.

Island under continual air raid all day. Enemy planes dropped bombs at random. Intermittent shelling by enemy batteries also during the day.

Report of probable death of 2nd Lt. William F. Miles, O-388943, CWS, attached to the 31st Infantry, was received by Lt. Morgan from Lt. Strong of the 31st Infantry - report thereof filed in journal.

Captain Lazzarini worked on plans for gas proofing Malinta Hospital and on plans for decontaminating gassed areas (in event of enemy gas attack) at the entrances to Malinta Tunnel.

Captain Bartlett began research on the manufacture of soap but was hampered in outside work by the continuous air raids.

The detachment assembled training masks and repaired some masks from Fort Drum. The demustardizing apparatus in the office were checked.

Pvt 1cl Ignaszewski was confined to the hospital.

Fort Mills, P. I., April 12, 1942.

Air raids practically all day except for about 2 hours all clear in the afternoon. Bombs fell at random. Heavy enemy shelling from both Bataan and Cavite mainland throughout the day. Our coastal defense units engaged in strong counter-battery.

Lt. Schaf made a concentrated solution of HTH for use in water purification.

Some tests were made on the Japanese canister by Lt. Schaf.

The detachment assembled training masks and moved the unimpregnated clothing from the attic of the Chemical Office to the lateral in the QM where the other impregnated clothing is stored.

The 300 gallon tank from the mobile demustardizing truck was placed in the main tunnel for the purpose of storing drinking water for tunnel personnel. The tank is mounted on wheels so that in event of a gas attack it can be wheeled by man power to the contaminated area. Arrangements with U.S.E.D. (Capt. Hatch) were made by Captain Lazzarini. Any additions or attachments such as spigot and water connections made by the Utilities section, will be made so as to be easily removed in event the tank has to be used for decontamination.

General Orders No. 24, Hq, USFIP were published today, awarding posthumously a Silver Star to the CWS personnel, killed in action, March 25 (Sgt Knight, Cpl. Guillermo, Pvt 1cl Gansz, Pvt Leonardo) and awarding a Silver Star to Pvt 1cl Delalamon. These men were engaged in the manufacture of a critical item of supply. Copy of these orders filed in Journal File.

Sergeant Sachwald was returned to duty from the hospital.

Fort Mills, P. I., April 13, 1942.

Heavy enemy shelling from both Bataan and Cavite mainland accompanied the aerial bombing today. Bombing was not so heavy today. The Harbor Defenses engaged in strong counter-battery.

Office routine was interrupted by temporary failure of the emergency power line for 3 periods of half an hour duration - 9:35 am to 10:05 am; 3:10 pm to 3:40 pm; 7:50 pm to 8:20 pm.

Because of the wrecking of one of our demustardizing trucks by enemy bombing, the plan to service some of the 60th CA (AA) units by a CWS mobile demustardizing was discarded. Accordingly, the following issue was made to RSO, 60th CA, to give the above mentioned units an independent supply:

12 complete suits impregnated clothing
6 apparatus demustardizing (3-gallon type)
300 lbs. HTH

Recommendation of means of disposal of all CC2 on hand was made to the Chemical Officer by Lt. Schaf. He recommended that it should be dumped into the water from the South Shore Road since sea water would make analysis difficult. A boat was not advocated for use in disposal because of the possible delay in getting a boat in a hurry. Plan was held by Chemical Officer in case disposal becomes necessary.

A requisition dated December 15, 1941 for various items of chemical equipment for 101st Division, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, was received today. Notation made by Cml. O., "This req. dated Dec. 15, 1941 - received at Fort Mills, P. I., April 13, 1942. No boats available and no where near the amounts or types requested now at Mills." Copy filed in Journal file.

The water (reserve supply) in two of the drums in the office was changed.

According to Lt. Morgan's report, 14 CWS enlisted men who were attached to the 31st Infantry escaped to Corregidor. In most cases these men have been assigned to the 4th Marines or 808th MPs.

Fort Mills, P. I., April 14, 1942.

The revised plan of issue of protective clothing and demustardizing equipment was sent to the Commanding General, HD of M&SB.

Recommendations (with drawings) for the gas proofing of Malinta Hospital with present facilities, was sent to G-4.

Lt. Davis reported on the Japanese water purification kit to the Chemical Officer, USFIP. A CN on same was forwarded by the Chemical Officer to G-2 for his information.

Heavy enemy shelling all day from Bataan and Cavite and periodic bombing by hostile planes.

Lt. Schaf took his completed tracings of the improvised flame thrower to the Engineer office to have them blue-printed.

Two service masks and two training masks were issued today, and 128 training masks were turned over to the hospital.

Journal File today - Menus of USFIP mess, both officers and American enlisted men from April 2 to April 14, 1942, inclusive.

10 shells, L. P. (WP)
10 L.P. barrels & 10 L.P. base plates.

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Two service masks and two training masks were issued today, and 128 training masks were turned over to the hospital.

Journal File today - Menus of USFIP mess, both officers and American enlisted men from April 2 to April 14, 1942, inclusive.

Fort Mills, P. I., April 15, 1942.

There was a marked decrease in aerial activity today but heavy enemy shelling still persisted.

Power failed this morning and was off from 9:35 until 9:50 am.

A CN was sent to C/S re: Delay in shipment to U.S.A. of 5 Japanese masks and 5 additional canisters.

Directive for use of HTH was submitted to CG, HD of M&SB with recommendation that it be published in the daily bulletin.

The CWS commissioned personnel met to discuss the proposed improvised collective protective canisters to be used in the gas proofing of Malinta Hospital.

Captain Lazzarini and Lt. Winn discussed plans for making incendiary grenades using thermite if the ingredients are available.

Eleven service masks were issued to QMC, G.R.S.

The original radio from War Dept re: Forwarding of Japanese masks to War Dept was finally received here today. Filed in Journal is copy of original radio, copy of paraphrase received by Lt. Schaf, April 8, remarks by Colonel Hamilton, and copy of radio in reply to War Dept. and CN's from the Chemical Officer to G-4 and C/S, USFIP, recommending the immediate shipment of items requested by radiogram.

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Fort Mills, P. I., April 16, 1942.

Little enemy aerial activity today but heavy enemy shelling in the morning and afternoon.

Colonel Mieling, C.E., inquired as to the availability of thermite - none available. Colonel Hamilton said that 100 one pound grenades (thermite) could be manufactured if 35 lbs of finely powdered Aluminum and 100 lbs. of finely powdered Ferric Oxide (Fe_2O_3) could be found. Search for these items to be instituted by the Engineers and CWS.

Sample of water from a spring was brought by the Engineers for analysis as to salt content. The salt content was found to be .026%. The sample was turned over to the hospital for bacteria analysis to determine if it is fit for drinking purposes.

A memo was sent to CG, HD of M&SB, re: Turning in of gas masks in hands of AA units for replacement, repair and preparation for future issue. An authorized representative of these units to call Chemical Office for information as to the procedure involved.

20 suits of impregnated clothing were issued to the Navy and 5 service masks to Major Richardson, M.C.

Arrangements were made with the 4th Marines for the issue of gas masks to personnel who came from Bataan and are now attached to the 4th Marines.

A report on the status of the improvised flame thrower was submitted to CG, USFIP, for transmittal to the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service immediately.

At the end of the day, the CWS had collected 18 lbs. of powdered Aluminum and 3 gallons of iron filings.

Captain Bartlett made a report on the possibility of the manufacture of soap. His report stated that this project was not practical because of the lack of necessary materials.

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Fort Mills, P. I., April 17, 1942.

Enemy shelling decreases today but some bombing was done by hostile aircraft. Our coastal defenses fired at enemy positions on Bataan and Cavite.

The following issues were made today:

To RSO 92nd CA (PS) -

200 lbs. agent demustardizing, HTH.

16 suits impregnated clothing

2 apparatus demustardizing (3 Gal.).

To Hospital -

26 suits impregnated clothing.

To 4th Marines for extra men assigned to beach defense (men who escaped from Bataan) -

750 gas masks, service (made up to size thus 110 Size 1, 120 Size 2, 510 Size 3,

10 size 4).

One diaphragm mask was issued to an officer of the S.C.

According to a message from Major McNair, Executive Officer, 60th C.A. (AA), the C.A. (AA) and C.D.A.E. are badly in need of sulphuric acid. Five (5) gallons of H_2SO_4 from the CW reserve stock were turned over to the RSO 60th CA (AA); the balance on hand is 13 gallons. Directions were given to Lt. Davis to resume manufacture thereof immediately.

A careful checking of location of CW material in Malinta Tunnel was made by Lt. Winn and Lt. Davis. A chart of Malinta Tunnel was made showing number and location of the 3 gallon demustardizing apparatus (filled with water). There are in all 55 of them at various strategic places in the tunnel.

In the resumption of operations at the acid plant, three (3) gallons of crude acid were made, and 4-1/2 gallons of acid were filtered.

A CN was received from G-4, USFIP, re: Bomb proof storage of critical items of CW supply that are not at present in such storage. Recommendations will be forwarded by the Chemical Officer in order to establish priorities of such storage.

Captain Lazzarini continued experimenting with the manufacture of incendiary grenades with thermite.

Lt. Morgan was confined to the hospital.

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SECTION C

FILE TO ACCOMPANY
LOG BOOK AND JOURNAL

BOOK I

December 8, 1941 to April 17, 1942

RESTRICTED

FILE UNDER NO. JOURNAL FILE - DECEMBER, 1941.

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

1. Letter Hq USAFFE, Subject: Over-obligations.
2. Letter HPD, Subject: Administrative Directive (Emergency)
3. Extract Harbor Defense Official Bulletin re: Turning in of Training masks and no service masks for civilians. - O.B. 294
4. Extract Harbor Defense Official Bulletin 295 re: Deadline for return of training masks in hands of troops.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-6848

Q. M. C. Form 251 (Old Form 489)
Revised July 24, 1918

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2-2842

Q. M. C. Form 251 (Old Form 480)
Revised July 26, 1918

1941 DEC 8

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1. Letter Hq USAFFE, Subject: Over-obligations.
2. Letter HPD, Subject: Administrative Directive (Emergency)
3. Extract Harbor Defense Official Bulletin re: Turning in of Training masks and no service masks for civilians. - O.B. 294
4. Extract Harbor Defense Official Bulletin 295 re: Deadline for return of training masks in hands of troops.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

INSTRUCTIONS.—Under "Synopsis" make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 3-5842

Q. M. C. Form 551 (Old Form 406)
Revised July 26, 1918

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Office of the Commanding General
Manila, P. I.

December 10, 1941.

Subject: Over-obligations.

To : Commanding General, Philippine Department and Chiefs of all Supply Arms and Services.

1. The War Department has authorized the incurrence of all obligations necessary to meet the urgent requirements of the present situation, with instructions that all over-obligations be made a matter of record.

2. To this end it is desired that all obligations be made by agencies to whom allotments, or sub-allotments of funds have been currently made.

3. Over-obligations, regardless of the purpose for which incurred, should be charged against an existing purpose number. The purpose of the expenditure and the purpose number do not have to be in agreement, if the spending agency does not have the appropriate purpose number.

4. Recording expenditures as heretofore will constitute compliance with War Department instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR:

E. T. HALSTEAD,
Major, A.G.D.
Assistant Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
CG-Phil Dept (50)
CG-FEAF (10)
CG-Phil CA Command (10)
QM-USAFPE (10)
Engineer Officer (10)
Ordnance Officer (10)
Signal Officer (10)
Chemical Officer (10)
Finance Officer (10)

HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT
Office of the Department Commander
Manila, P. I.

140.1
AG-Misc(el)

December 10, 1941

SUBJECT: Administrative Directive (Emergency).

TO: All Services; All Post, Camps, Station and Depot Commanders, Division Commanders;
Rail Head and Navigation Head Officers.

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 21, AR 35-6520 and paragraph 520, FM 100-10, provision is made for ceasing property accountability during war.
2. Under the above regulations, accountability for property is suspended during the present emergency.
3. Due to the difficulty of replenishing stocks of property, responsibility becomes more acute.

By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR:

GEORGE T. BRITT
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"A" to "E" Inclusive
"G"
All Rail Head Officers

HEADQUARTERS HARBOR DEFENSES OF MANILA & SUBIC BAYS
Fort Mills, Philippine Islands

- OFFICIAL BULLETIN -

Phones 761, 762, 763 Monday, December 15, 1941. O.B. No. 294

EXTRACT

3. GAS MASKS: a. It is desired that the turning in of training gas masks now in the hands of troops or organizations be expedited.
b. The service mask will not be issued to civilians. Such masks already issued to civilians will be taken up and replaced by training masks.

XXX XXX XXX

O. B. No. 295 Tuesday, December 16, 1941. O.B. 295

EXTRACT

1. TRAINING GAS MASKS: All training gas masks in the hands of American and Philippine Scout troops will be turned in to the Chemical Warfare not later than noon December 19, 1941.

XXX XXX XXX

January 18, 1942

RECONNAISSANCE OF BATAAN

Left Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan (KM 174 on Mariveles Cut-Off) at 3:10 PM, January 18, 1942. Passed KM 184 (4th Sep Cml Co) at 3:55 PM, and a QM Ration Dump located at KM 186, road fairly good up to this point. At KM 189 passed Trail No. 7 West which leads up Signal Hill to the forward echelon of the USAFFE, further on at KM 189.8 is the CP - 1st Regiment (P.C.) - C.P. 71st Division (West Sector) located at KM 191. Passed Agloloma Cut-Off at 4:00 PM where trails lead to the 71st Division, 71st Engineers, 34th Pursuit Group, and a detachment of American Signal Corps. Then crossed a branch of the Saysayan River at KM 191.5 and the Quinauan River, a little further on. (KM 197) is the furthest north that the 7th Cml Co Serv (Avn) has to guard bridges. Some of the guards were very lax in their jobs, hardly any of them knew what units or detachments were on either side of the bridges they were guarding. At KM 198 trails lead to the 71st FA Bn., 71st Med. Bn., and Collecting Companies A & B of the 71st Med Bn. At KM 201 is Co. "A", 803rd Engineer Bn. Ammunition supply points at KM 204 and KM 205. The 17th Pursuit Group is in vicinity of KM 205. Crossed the Payasuan River where the M.P. Control Station and a detachment of the 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation) is located. Lt. Small, (CWS) in command of this detachment which is camped on the right of the road at the south end of the bridge. Arrived at Hdqrs 1st Corps CP at 5:00 PM, which is located near KM 212. Major General Wainwright, Commanding, Col. Mayer, C of S, Col. Nelson, G-3, Col. Jones, G-4, and Col. Skerry, Engr Officer, were present. Left 1st Corps Hdqrs at 5:30 PM. Co "D" Motor Transport at KM 213. 26th Cav Supply Dump at KM 213. Continued northwest along with Bagac Bay to west, good beaches and a broad view out to sea. Along some of the beaches as well as further back barbed wire entanglements were observed also piles of barbed wire along the road. The 91st QM Dump and Battery "B" PC, CAC, in vicinity of KM 215. At KM 220, the CP, 72nd Inf Regt. Turned off Bagac-Pilar Road to NW on road to Moron. Arrived CP 26th Cav at 6:00 PM (Col. Pierce in command) - along creek about 200 yards off the east side of the Moron Road some 2 KM from Bagac-Pilar turn off. Left 26th Cav at 6:20 PM. Passed many wrecked cars and trucks along the road to Pilar-Mariveles turn off. Trails to the 91st Engrs at KM 153 and to the 31st Engrs at KM 149 where the Binukuan River is crossed. North entrance to Trail No. 7 is also near this KM post (149). Crossed the Culvo Bridge at KM 145 and the Pantagan Bridge at KM 142. Medical Bn Collecting Station located at KM 140 and the Uyong River at KM 138. Turned right at the Pilar Monument and went through Pilar at KM 133, passed Orion, KM 135 at 6:45 PM. From this point the road was covered with crankcase oil and was very good driving, it began getting dark at this time and no more notes were kept. Picked up a soldier after being flagged down by Pvt. Frances Mumford, 843rd Ord Co on M. P. duty. Soldier (Pvt. Williams) was returning from Base Hospital No. 2 to his organization, the 3rd Pursuit Group, located near KM 182, which is now designated as the 1st Bn of the 2d Regiment of the 71st Division. He was without helmet and gas mask but had pistol.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Department Chemical Officer.

FILE UNDER NO. JOURNAL FILE FOR FEBRUARY, 1942.

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

1. Correspondence on action of Naval Bn, Mariveles against the enemy at Longoskawayan Point, Jan. 23-27 and Quinauan Point, February 8. (See Appendix A, Pages 53-59.)
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3. Report dated Feb. 20, 1942 by S/Sgt Williams on use of WP by the enemy.
4. Propaganda leaflets.
5. Report by Lt. Schaf, Feb 20, on Japanese Demustardizing agent.
6. Correspondence re: use of WP by enemy and subsequent action by Chemical Officer.
7. Memo from Cml. O. to CO PCWD, Bataan and Mills, re: Issue of gas masks.
8. Overlays of disposition of 301st Cml Co Depot (PA) and adjacent units on Feb 13 and Feb 18 - on beach defense.
9. Memo to Cml O from Lt Johnson Re: Shipment of CWS supplies via "Kolambugan."

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2-2845

Q. M. C. Form 251 (Old Form 499)
Revised July 28, 1918

January 18, 1942

RECONNAISSANCE OF BATAAN

Left Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan (KM 174 on Mariveles Cut-Off) at 3:10 PM, January 18, 1942. Passed KM 184 (4th Sep Cml Co) at 3:55 PM, and a QM Ration Dump located at KM 186, road fairly good up to this point. At KM 189 passed Trail No. 7 West which leads up Signal Hill to the forward echelon of the USAFFE, further on at KM 189.8 is the CP - 1st Regiment (P.C.) - C.P. 71st Division (West Sector) located at KM 191. Passed Agloloma Cut-Off at 4:00 PM where trails lead to the 71st Division, 71st Engineers, 34th Pursuit Group, and a detachment of American Signal Corps. Then crossed a branch of the Saysayan River at KM 191.5 and the Quinawan River, a little further on. (KM 197) is the furthest north that the 7th Cml Co Serv (Avn) has to guard bridges. Some of the guards were very lax in their jobs, hardly any of them knew what units or detachments were on either side of the bridges they were guarding. At KM 198 trails lead to the 71st FA Bn., 71st Med. Bn., and Collecting Companies A & B of the 71st Med Bn. At KM 201 is Co. "A", 803rd Engineer Bn. Ammunition supply points at KM 204 and KM 205. The 17th Pursuit Group is in vicinity of KM 205. Crossed the Payasuan River where the M.P. Control Station and a detachment of the 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation) is located. Lt. Small, (CWS) in command of this detachment which is camped on the right of the road at the south end of the bridge. Arrived at Hdqrs 1st Corps CP at 5:00 PM, which is located near KM 212. Major General Wainwright, Commanding, Col. Mayer, C of S, Col. Nelson, G-3, Col. Jones, G-4, and Col. Skerry, Engr Officer, were present. Left 1st Corps Hdqrs at 5:30 PM. Co "D" Motor Transport at KM 213. 28th Cav Supply Dump at KM 213. Continued northwest along with Bagac Bay to west, good beaches and a broad view out to sea. Along some of the beaches as well as further back barbed wire entanglements were observed also piles of barbed wire along the road. The 91st QM Dump and Battery "B" PC, CAC, in vicinity of KM 215. At KM 220, the CP, 72nd Inf Regt. Turned off Bagac-Pilar Road to NW on road to Moron. Arrived CP 28th Cav at 6:00 PM (Col. Pierce in command) - along creek about 200 yards off the east side of the Moron Road some 2 KM from Bagac-Pilar turn off. Left 28th Cav at 6:20 PM. Passed many wrecked cars and trucks along the road to Pilar-Mariveles turn off. Trails to the 91st Engrs at KM 153 and to the 31st Engrs at KM 149 where the Binukuan River is crossed. North entrance to Trail No. 7 is also near this KM post (149). Crossed the Culvo Bridge at KM 145 and the Pantagan Bridge at KM 142. Medical Bn Collecting Station located at KM 140 and the Uyong River at KM 138. Turned right at the Pilar Monument and went through Pilar at KM 133, passed Orion, KM 135 at 6:45 PM. From this point the road was covered with crankcase oil and was very good driving, it began getting dark at this time and no more notes were kept. Picked up a soldier after being flagged down by Pvt. Frances Mumford, 843rd Ord Co on M. P. duty. Soldier (Pvt. Williams) was returning from Base Hospital No. 2 to his organization, the 3rd Pursuit Group, located near KM 182, which is now designated as the 1st Bn of the 2d Regiment of the 71st Division. He was without helmet and gas mask but had pistol.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Department Chemical Officer.

FILE UNDER NO. JOURNAL FILE FOR FEBRUARY, 1942.

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DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

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Q. M. C. Form 351 (Old Form 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 9-5542

HEADQUARTERS HARBOR DEFENSES OF MANILA AND SUBIC BAYS Fort Mills, Philippine Islands

February 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM: Return of Misplaced equipment.

1. It has come to the attention of this headquarters that during the period of bombing attacks on Corregidor a number of items of military equipment were removed from damaged buildings, batteries and storage points either for the purpose of salvage of such equipment or for other reasons. Much of this equipment has not been recovered by the proper authorities and is of vital importance in the general scheme of defense.

2. In order that no loyal member of the military establishment may be hindered by any consideration from returning such items of equipment to the proper using agency, a period of one week, beginning February 11, 1942, and ending at midnight, February 17, 1942, has been set aside for the return of equipment to the proper agency, during which period no questions will be asked and the identity of the person returning the equipment will be safeguarded. After February 17, 1942, a thorough search will be made for all missing equipment and offenders will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

3. Return of equipment will be made as follows:

Ordnance equipment - to be delivered or reported to the Ordnance Officer, Lateral 17, Malinta Tunnel.

Quartermaster equipment - to the Quartermaster, Lateral 8, Malinta Tunnel.


Engineer equipment - to the Engineer, Engineer Tunnel, near Power Plant.

Radio equipment - to the Artillery Engineer, Lateral 7, Malinta Tunnel.

Other equipment - to be reported to S-4, Lateral 2, Malinta Tunnel, who will direct the proper disposition.

4. It is expected that loyalty and the spirit of cooperation in the defense of this garrison will outweigh any consideration of self-interest or embarrassment on the part of any individual who has possession or knowledge of misplaced military equipment. Organization commanders are urged to exert their utmost influence in the furtherance of this project, and will have this letter read to organizations.

By command of Major General MOORE:


L. J. BOWLER,
Colonel, CAC,
Adjutant.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" to "E".

PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
In the Field

February 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Hamilton

1. At about 11:00 I was instructed by Lt. Morgan to prepare to accompany him to the Saysain Ridge to investigate and report on the bombing of the area by the enemy using incendiaries.

2. We then proceeded to the CP of the 71st Division where Lt. Morgan contacted Col. Bell and received additional information on the bombing and the approximate location on the map. The location was near Trail 9 or at KP 215.5. We then continued to the CP of the 2nd Bn of the 91st F.A. (PA) where Lt. Morgan got the information as to the exact location of the bombing.

3. From the CP of the 2nd Bn of the 91st F.A. we proceeded to the bombed area which was located near the gun positions of Battery C, 2nd Bn 91st F.A. where Lt. Morgan contacted Lt. Stillman who commanded the Battery. Lt. Stillman then showed us around the area and we examined the craters and the burned areas. In the middle of each burnt area there would be a small pile of ashes which we examined carefully for evidence of Phosphorus. We found several small pellets that had the appearance of cinders in these piles and upon placing them in the water-filled bottles that we carried for this purpose the pellets sizzled and did not dissolve. A tail fin from one of the bombs was also found in the area and it smelled very strongly to me of Red Phosphorus. We also found fragments of bombs but as [the enemy] had dropped fragmentation bombs with the incendiaries I believe that they were merely part of the fragmentation bombs.

S/Sgt. R.W. Williams
S/Sgt. R.W. Williams,
C.W.S.



REPRODUCTION OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA LEAFLET



REPRODUCTION OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA LEAFLET



REPRODUCTION OF
JAPANESE PROPAGANDA LEAFLET

Propaganda from Japanese Plane -
Bataan, P. I. - February 1942

SUNDALONG FILIPINO!

Iligpit ninyo sa madaling panahon
ang mga oficiales na Amerikano.

Sumama kayo sa Hukbong Nippon.

(Translation)

FILIPINO SOLDIERS!

Dispose of, as soon as possible,
American officers.

Join the Japanese Imperial Army.

(Picked up by Mr. Jackson at 301st Chemical Company Depot on Bataan)

Tune: My Bonnie Lies Over the Ocean

I

Our bombers fly over the ocean
Our bombers fly over Japan
They drop some big bombs on Formosa
And fly back again to Bataan.

Chorus

Oh Japan, Oh Japan
The empire that soon will wind up
..... all wet!
Oh Japan, Oh Japan
Where the "rising sun" soon will be set.

II

Old Tojo he thinks he can lick us
He tried it for months but in vain
His "Maytags" fly over to bomb us
But they never see Tokyo again.

III

USAFFE will soon be victorious
With "Tojo's" lying around us in piles
While "Hirohito's" face is contorted
MacArthur's is covered with smiles.

LABORATORY
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
Fort Mills, P. I.

20 February, 1942.

SUBJECT: Report on Japanese Demustardizing Agent.

TO : Chemical Officer, USAFFE, Fort Mills, P. I.

1. From the green rubber pouch which was captured along with a Japanese gas mask, was taken a sample of white powder. This powder was slightly damp and smelled strongly of Chlorine gas. Upon examination it was found that this powder was Chloride of Lime and Calcium Hypochlorite. The Iodine-Thiosulphate method was used to determine the percentage of available Chlorine in a weighed amount of the sample. In the first determination the sample was analyzed just as it was found in the pouch, i.e., slightly damp. It was found that it took 6.8 cc's of .1N Sodium Thiosulphate to liberate all the free chlorine in a .1 gram sample. The percent of free Chlorine is, then, 24.1%. A portion of the sample, in the second determination, was dried overnight in a silica gel desiccator. In this determination it took 55 cc's of .1N Sodium Thiosulphate to completely liberate all the free Chlorine in .730 grams of sample. The percent of free Chlorine is, then, 26.7%. It is noted that the percent increased with the drying process. This is due only to the fact that the water, weighed along with the sample, decreased the percent. If the soldier had carried the powder in a tropical climate for a long period of time, the original percent of free Chlorine may have been much greater than 26.7%. This may or may not be of importance since it is not the original percentage of free Chlorine that neutralizes mustard burns but the percentage of Chlorine in the powder when the soldier has to use it. An identical analysis was run on our own H T H and the results checked with the specifications on the container label, that is, 70% available Chlorine.

2. The results in tabulated form are as follows:

SAMPLE	PERCENTAGE OF AVAILABLE CHLORINE
Japanese Chloride of Lime	24.1%
Japanese Chloride of Lime - dried	26.7%
HTH	70 %

FRANK L. SCHAF, JR.
1st Lieut. C.W.S.
Chief of Laboratory Section.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P. I.
21 February, 1942.

Subject: Instruction (Chemical Warfare Weapons) for PCWD Personnel.

To : Commanding Officer, Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, Bataan, P. I.
(Thru - Commanding General, Headquarters Philippine Department.)

1. There is attached a copy of Carrier Note (1) this office, 17 February, 1942, to C/S, USAFFE, regarding the use of White Phosphorus Aerial Bombs by Japanese forces. The following instructions have been received on this subject:

"CN (1) To: Chemical Officer G-3, USAFFE 19 Feb 42.

The following amounts of WP-filled munitions, as listed in your CN 17 February 1942, will be kept stored and prepared for issue and use when ordered by this headquarters:

915 rounds 4" Cml Mortar shell
735 rounds Livens Projector Shell
2000 rounds 30-lb Airplane drop bombs.

Chemical Warfare Depot personnel should be given as much training as possible in the use of the 4" mortar and the Livens Projector.

C. L. I.,
G-3"

2. In compliance with the above and also with the previous verbal instructions of this office on the training of Depot personnel in the operation of special Chemical Warfare weapons it is desired that immediate steps be taken to initiate the training of all military personnel on duty at the PCWD on Bataan substantially as indicated below:

a. The Depot personnel will be divided into at least two groups for purpose of this instruction and training.

b. Each group will be so trained that it will contain personnel fully qualified to install and fire both the 4" and 4.2" chemical mortar and the Livens Projector.

c. The instruction given will be progressive and as laid down in:

- (1) CWS Field Manual, Vol I, Tactics and Technique
- (2) FM 3-10, Examination for Gunners
- (3) Book 3, Chemical Weapons and Ammunition - CW School.

d. Personnel undergoing this instruction should, upon completion of same, be able to qualify as Gunners (Expert, 1st class or 2nd class) in so far as these phases of the examination are concerned.

e. Manning tables for the above will be prepared and maintained up to date so that at all times one trained group is available in the vicinity of the Depot for the execution of chemical missions in any sector, regardless of the type of duty being performed at the same time by the balance of the Depot personnel on Bataan.

f. Immediate provision will be made for suitable storage on and removal to Bataan of the balance of LP projectors, components and WP fillings shown by the latest inventory to be on hand elsewhere in the Philippine Islands.

3. As the 2000 rounds of 30-lb airplane bombs are stored and issued by the Ordnance Department, a copy of CN (1) from G-3, USAFFE (par. 1 above) has been forwarded to the Ordnance Officer, USAFFE.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

1 Incl -
CN (1) 2/17/42

Subject: Use of W.P. Aerial Bombs by Japanese.

CN (1) To: G-4, G-3, and C/S, USAFFE, in turn.

CWS - 17 February, 1942.

1. As a result of my personal investigation supported by

a. Oral testimony of -

Major Joseph J. Hughes, QMC,
Major Wm. J. Latimer, Jr., Ord.,
Lt. Col. W. D. North, MC,
Lt. Col. J. W. Schwartz, MC.

b. Physical examination of recovered metal parts and fillings from Japanese aerial bombs.

c. Report of chemical analysis of recovered fillings made by 1st Lt. Frank L. Schaf Jr.,
CWS.

the undersigned is convinced that white phosphorus was used as an incendiary filling in some of the bombs dropped by Japanese aircraft at Cabcaban, Bataan, P. I., around mid-day February 13, 1942.

2. The above confirms my verbal report of PM. February 16, 1942.

Note -

Approximately the following amounts of WP filled munitions are now available to this Headquarters:

915 rounds 4" Chemical Mortar shell (7-1/2 lbs of WP), maximum range, about 1050 yards.
735 rounds of Livens Projector shell (30 lbs. of WP), maximum range, about 1450 yards.
2000 rounds of 30-lb airplane drop bombs.

S.A.H.
Cml. O.

Incl - 1
Certificate.

Fort Mills, P. I.
February 22, 1942.

Memorandum for: Commanding Officers, CW-Depots, Bataan and Fort Mills, P. I.

1. The previous verbal instructions from this office regarding the issue of gas masks at the CW-Depot, Bataan and Fort Mills, P. I., will be continued in effect until receipt of further advice:

"1. No more gas masks will be issued except as replacement for gas masks, rendered unserviceable incident to the service and not the result of mutilation or unauthorized use thereof.

2. The salvage, repair, and preparation for re-issue of Chemical Warfare equipment will be stressed. These salvage operations to include arrangement with appropriate forward echelon staff officers for the recovery and return to the Depot of CW equipment and supplies."

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

24/Feb/1942

Colonel Hamilton:

Following is the comparison of the overlays submitted by 301st Cml. Co., Depot:-

Kenallputan Pt. - Overlay of Feb. 13, shows C.P. of 3rd Pursuit Group, that of the 18 Feb., shows this position occupied by CP of 71st F. A. [O.K. A change of unit - S.A.H.]


Cutad Pt. - One unit of the 5th Interceptor Command, situated between units of the 301 Cml. Co., Depot on latest overlay. (From OD report of Feb. 17, 1942, this unit appears to be the 23rd Pursuit Group). Additional CP of 5th Interceptor Command situated due east of Laplay Pt. across the bay. [O.K. A change in position of units - S.A.H.]


Armament. - One additional BAR on North side of Cutad Pt. (301 Cml. Co. Depot) shown on latest overlay.

Suggestions. - Since no mention is made in latest overlay of 3rd Pursuit Group, believe that this Group was meant to be 23rd Pursuit Group on first overlay. [Correct - S.A.H.]

On Naiklec, Longoskawayan, and Laplay Points, the units on last overlay are designated as 5 IC or 5th Interceptor Command. Units occupying the same positions on overlay of Feb. 13, 1942 are designated in this manner AT. This symbol is not shown in FM 21-30, but would presumably designate an Anti-Tank unit. No mention of such a unit is made in OD reports and thus seems to indicate that it is meant to be 5th I.C. symbol. [Correct - S.A.H.]

bpl. Low.





STRENGTH: 301st CML CO, D: 2 OFFICERS, 27 EM
301st ENGR CO, D: 2 OFFICERS, 15 EM

TOTAL - 4 OFFICERS 42 EM

ARMAMENT: 301st CML CO, D: 2 BREWING ME 30 cal
2 LEWIS ME 30 cal.
4 BAR
301st ENGR CO, D: 1 LEWIS ME 30 cal
1 BAR


2 BREWING ME 30 cal
3 LEWIS ME 30 cal
TOTAL: 5 BAR.

NOTE - EVERY EM EQUIPPED WITH 30 cal RIFLE AND 100 RDS

LAYOUT SHOWING SECTOR OCCUPIED BY THE 301st CML CO. AND THE 301st ENGR CO. IN CONJUNCTION WITH A PLATOON OF 30 MEN AND OFFICER OF THE 5th INTERCEPTOR COMMAND.

SKETCHED BY: LT M A SANTOS
CO 301st CML CO

DATE FEB 18, 1942



STRENGTH: 301st CML CO, D: 2 OFFICERS, 27 EM
301st ENGR CO, D: 2 OFFICERS, 15 EM

TOTAL - 4 OFFICERS 42 EM

ARMAMENT: 301st CML CO, D: 2 BROWNING ME 30 cal.
2 LEWIS ME 30 cal.
4 BAR
301st ENGR CO, D: 1 LEWIS ME 30 cal.
1 BAR

2 BROWNING ME 30 cal.
3 LEWIS ME 30 cal.
TOTAL: 5 BAR.

NOTE: EVERY EM EQUIPPED WITH 30 cal RIFLE AND 100 RPS

• LAYOUT SHOWING SECTOR OCCUPIED BY THE 301st CML. CO. AND THE 301st ENGR. CO. IN CONJUNCTION WITH A PLATOON OF 30 MEN AND OFFICER OF THE 5th INTERCEPTOR COMMAND.

SKETCHED BY: LT M A SANTOS
CO 301st CML CO

DATE FEB 18, 1942

PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
Fort Mills, P. I.

27 February, 1942

MEMORANDUM)

TO : Chemical Officer, USAFFE.

Re: Shipment of CWS supplies via "KOLAMBUGAN."

On December 24, 1941 the following was shipped from Port Area, Manila, to Fort Mills, Corregidor Island via "The Kolambugan":

159 boxes Masks, gas, service
850 boxes Canisters, service
12 boxes Chemical Warfare materials.

According to Capt. Norton who was then in ATS, the "Kolambugan" docked at Fort Mills and discharged its cargo. According to the Captain of the ship Captain Norton says, all CWS materials were discharged. The ship did not make another trip to Manila. Then during the first week of February a further 138 boxes of Canisters were removed from the ship. This unloading evidently took place just prior to the departure of the ship from this vicinity. It is possible that these boxes were not discharged in the beginning because of the code name "Plum" on the boxes. The CWS has experienced other instances of gas masks and canisters being taken for Subsistence supplies [because boxes were stencilled "Plum" or "Peach." - S.A.H.]

O. L. Johnson
O. L. JOHNSON
1st Lt., CWS

FILE UNDER NO. JOURNAL FILE FOR MARCH, 1942

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

1. Report of reconnaissance made by Col. Hamilton, Lt Col. Roemer, and Major Harrison - attached overlay - Date March 7.
2. G-2 Memo #12, March 7, on disposition of captured enemy materiel.
3. Diagram on Separation of Gasoline and Water - March 9.
4. Report and overlay of reconnaissance made by Colonel Hamilton, Lt. Col. Roemer, and Capt. Lazzarini on March 10.
5. Extract from USN Press News, Mariveles Area, (11 March 1942) on the Fall of Rangoon to the enemy.
6. Report on Manufacture of Sulphuric Acid - 13 March - by Lt. Johnson.
7. Memo to Col. Hamilton by Lt Davis on the Contact Process and Lead Chamber Process of manufacturing H_2SO_4 - March 14.
8. CN to C/S, Luzon Force on: Gas Mask Supply, Training and Repair: Luzon Force date March 18. (See Appendix A, pages 32-33.)
9. Correspondence on Loss of Stock Record Account of PCWD with affidavits of personnel concerned.
10. Letter, Hq I Phil Corps, March 22, subject: Repair of Gas Masks. This repair to be made by CW personnel.
11. Request for Quinine, March 24, by Lt. Col. Roemer
12. Gas protection Malinta Hospital - March 24 and 25.
13. Hq Group 3, FO #2 - Extract. March 27.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

14. Report to Cml Officer by Lt Winn on amount of bleach possible from material on hand. - March 27.
15. Report to Cml Officer by Lt Winn on amount of impregnating chemicals left after all acetylene tetrachloride. - March 27.
16. Harbor Defense O.B. 59, March 30, re Cholera Shots.
17. Report on controlled experiment with impregnated clothing - March 30.
18. CN from Cml Officer to C/S, USFIP. Subject: Emergency Development and Use of Quinine Substitute from the Dita Tree. - (See Appendix A, pages 25-26.)
19. Correspondence on Use of Tiki-tiki Preparation from Rice Hulls. (See Appendix A, pages 49-51.)


INSTRUCTIONS.—Under "Synopsis" make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

Q. M. C. Form 851 (Old Form 486)
Revised July 26, 1918

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2-2842

Colonel Hamilton, Lt. Col. Roemer and Major Harrison made a reconnaissance on March 7th, 1942 via the East road - Damalog Trail - Trail 38 - Patoc Trail - Trail 2 - Trail 44 and Trail 4A to General Lough Hdqrs. of Sector D. Prior to reaching sector hdqrs contact was made with General Parker, Commanding General of 2nd Corps. The C.P. of the 21st Division, General Capinpin, was visited and later on the Commanding General of the 41st Division, General Lim was contacted, upon return the G-4, 21 Div. (Major Mariano Tanwangco) and Lieut Arambulo met Colonel Hamilton and discussed supplies and training. The party proceeded to the C.P. of Gen. Blumel. Later the rear echelon of the 2nd Corps was visited and the party returned to camp at midnight.

At all C.P.s supply and training was discussed by Colonel Hamilton with respective commanders.



HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East

7 March 1942

G-2 MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 12)

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAFFE, In the Field, Bataan is charged with the investigation, study of and disposition of captured or abandoned enemy materiel.
2. All captured or abandoned enemy materiel should be forwarded immediately, thru command channels (with the exception of the items listed below) to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAFFE, In the Field, Bataan.
3. All items of materiel, clothing, equipment, documents, personal papers, etc., no matter what their contents, must be turned over, as any of these items might prove of invaluable use for Combat Intelligence.
4. Excepted Items - (a). Ordnance materiel (materiel corresponding to that issued by the Ordnance Dept., U.S. Army) should be forwarded, through command channels, to the Ordnance Officer, USAFFE, In the Field, Bataan.
(b). Chemical materiel (materiel corresponding to that issued by the Chemical Warfare Dept., U.S. Army) should be forwarded, through command channels, to the Chemical Officer, USAFFE, In the Field, Bataan.
5. The Ordnance Officer, Chemical Officer, and the heads of the various services to which materiel may be forwarded will follow, without delay, the procedure indicated below:
 - (a). In the case of items not thoroughly described in TM 30-480, a report will be prepared, together with appropriate photographs and drawings in sufficient detail to insure correct interpretation of the item reported upon. This will be forwarded in triplicate, through channels, to the A. C. of S., G-2, USAFFE.
 - (b). The branch of service preparing the report, except in cases where the item is necessary for inspection or display, should pack the item for shipment to the War Department or to the branch or service concerned in Washington.
 - (c). All captured items which will not be prepared for shipment to the War Dept. will pass through a suitable process of reclamation by the service concerned and, if indicated, will be used against the enemy in the field.
6. The necessity of turning over to the A.C. of S., G-2, USAFFE, all items captured in the field cannot be too strongly emphasized. All officers are reminded of the provisions of A.W. 79 & 80, dealing with captured or abandoned property, and are requested to inform their troops of the necessity of forwarding all abandoned materiel to the Intelligence Section for analysis, study and evaluation.
7. There has been a marked tendency to retain enemy equipment and relics, as individual souvenirs; the disappearance, in transmittal, of such items has been noted. S-2's are responsible for the collection and transfer, through channels, of such items.


For the Chief of Staff:

C.A. WILLOUGHBY,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.


SUBJECT - SEPARATION OF GASOLINE AND WATER

TO - CHEMICAL OFFICER USAFFE

NOTE - OUTLETS MUST BE
LOCATED ON OPPOSITE SIDES
OF DRUM FROM INLET PIPE



NOTE - PROCESS SHOULD BE CONTINUOUS. WATER PIPE VALVE TO BE OPENED TO DRAIN



PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
In the Field

March 10, 1942

At 10:00 a.m. on March 9, 1942, Col. Hamilton, Lt. Col. Roemer and Capt. Lazzarini started from the PCWD for a reconnaissance in the 1st Corps Sector. Reached the C.P. of the 1st Corps at 10:45, where information pertaining to the location of front line units was obtained and CWS matters were discussed by Col. Hamilton and Chief of Staff, Col. Maher.

Left 1st Corps C.P. at 11:45 a.m. and continued north along the Bagac-Mariveles road to Trail No. 9 which was reached by leaving the B-M road at KP 212.5 and taking the right fork for a distance of 1-1/4 km. Traveled east on Trail No. 9 passing the C.P. of the 91st Div. at R. J. of Trails No. 9 and No. 39. Continuing on Trail No. 9 passed over the new Brougher bridge (X-817.1 Y-1857.7) and reached the C.P. of the 11th Div. and Rt. Sub-Sector (X-818.0 Y-1858.6) commanded by Brig. Gen. Brougher, at 12:15 p.m. after traveling approximately 4-1/2 km on Trail No. 9. Here Col. Hamilton discussed the CWS supply and training programs with the Div. Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Moran, G-3 and G-2, Major Noble.

Left the 11th Div. C.P. accompanied by Lt. Baldwin (PA) at 2:30 p.m. and traveled north on Trail No. 7 stopping at the C.P. 1st Inf. 1st Reg. Div. near (X-818 Y-1860) where some details pertaining to the "Pocket Area" battle were discussed by Col. Hamilton with the commanding officer and a group of six or seven Marine officers who were inspecting the "Pocket Area" and front lines. Continuing north on Trail No. 7 a reconnaissance over the "Pocket Area" was made (in area around coordinates 817-1861). Fox-holes and trenches occupied by the Japanese were studied and a few damaged and incomplete American and Japanese gas masks were found. (Might be worth while to send a small salvaging party to this area.)

Leaving the "Pocket Area" the party continued north along Trail No. 7 to the C.P., 4th Bn., 1st Inf., 1st Reg. Div., at which Col. Hamilton again discussed the chemical situation with Brig. Gen. A. M. Jones, Chief of Staff Col. McDonald, Col. Berry and Lt. Col. McCollum. Here it was noted by Lt. Col. Roemer that only a few of the men possessed gas masks. Several unserviceable gas masks were found in the area of the Bn. C.P.

Accompanied by Lt. Col. McCollum and walking approximately 300 yards north on Trail No. 7 the Bn. R L and M L R (near X-816 Y-1863) were inspected and the 50 cal. and 30 cal. machine gun installations were studied.

Leaving the M L R at 5:00 p.m. the party returned via Trails No. 7, No. 9, and the Bagac-Mariveles road to the PCWD arriving there 6:45 p.m.

L. T. Lazzarini
L. T. LAZZARINI
Captain, C. W. S.,

EXTRACT FROM U S NAVY PRESS NEWS
MARIVELES AREA
PUBLISHED IN TUNNEL NO. 4

11 MARCH 1942

The fall of Rangoon evidenced two distinctly sad reactions among British circles. First: the war was brought nearer to India Eastern Bastion has been captured. Second: it is a serious blow to mighty ally, China.

Strategically it has following indications: First, Burma road is closed at its mouth, consequently supplies beyond those already moved in could only reach China after completion of the new India route, although the problem could be temporarily be solved in certain measure by air transport. Second, the capture of Rangoon would enable the enemy to: 1. Land larger forces for further operations in Burma Bay of Bengal on the Indian Ocean with Calcutta as an objective for attacks on Nicobar, Andaman Island with Ceylon and Madras as an Objective. 2. It will deny British and Chinese forces access to the sea by cutting off whole South Burma. Third, it would give - after clearing debris caused by scorching and demolitions - first class seaport with adequate facilities. The enemy has but to improve road communications with Siam. Harbour facilities at Moulmein are considered inadequate for requirements of a major military naval operation. Fourth, enemy occupied keypoints from Singapore to North-Sumatra, Penang, Mergui, Tennasserim, Moulmein, Rangoon - and if Andaman and Nicobar Islands were in their hands they would be able to safeguard seaplanes through the Straits of Malacca to Burma for assault on India.

PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
Fort Mills, P. I.

13 March 1942

Subject: Manufacture of Sulphuric Acid.

To : Chemical Officer, USAFFE, Fort Mills, P. I.

1. Total acid produced to date from seventeen (17) FS shells has been fifty-eight (58) gallons.

2. Acid delivered to Motor Pool on Fort Mills as follows:

3 March 1942	-	1 gallon,
7 " "	-	5 gallons,
8 " "	-	5 gallons,
9 " "	-	4 gallons,
10 " "	-	5 gallons,
11 " "	-	5 gallons,
12 " "	-	10 gallons,

Total 35 gallons.

3. Approximate total gallonage expected from twenty (20) FS shell is sixty-five (65) gallons.

OEL JOHNSON,
1st Lt., CWS,
Commanding.

14 March, 1942

Memo to Col. Hamilton:

The two processes in general use in the commercial production of sulphuric [acid] are namely:


- 1) The contact Process
- 2) The lead chamber process

The first is the newest and the one in more general use today. In this process platinized asbestos is used as a catalyst in converting the sulfur dioxide to sulfur trioxide and thence to sulfuric acid. Due to the catalyst used this method is not feasible with the means at our disposal.

The second or chamber process is quite a few years old and so called because the most important reactions take place in a lead-lined chamber. In this process sulfur dioxide from burning sulfur is converted into sulphuric acid by its reaction with live steam and the oxides of nitrogen.

The process, in general, consists of heating crude sulfur or iron pyrites (Iron sulfide) in a furnace with access to a large amount of air forming sulfur dioxide which is carried by forced draught into a lead chamber where further reactions take place. Commercially these lead chambers are bottomless lead-lined boxes 100 x 40 x 20 ft. each suspended over lead-lined pans into which the newly formed acid drips. The acid in the pans form a hydraulic seal. All of the gases do not react in the first chamber therefore 3 to five of them are connected in series.

Into each chamber along with the hot gases must be fed steam, oxides of nitrogen (or nitric acid vaporized) with the reaction taking place in general as follows:




The greatest difficulty is in having the correct amount of steam and the oxides of nitrogen present at all times and to keep the draught on the gases up (fans used comm.). In the commercial set-up glass windows are placed in the walls of the chamber so that the process can be continually observed. If the process is not adjusted exactly right, nitric acid, crystalline nitrosyl sulfuric acid, and other side products are formed.

The lead is used only because it is the most resistant to sulfuric acid among the common metals.

The commercial method is made to pay by re-using the oxides of nitrogen and using the heat from the hot gases to concentrate the weak acid produced.

The production of sulfuric acid in the field by this method would require equipment which would take quite some time to build and the efficiency of the resulting apparatus is a question. Approximately 64 sq. ft. of 1/4" sheet lead would be necessary.



VERY MUCH SIMPLIFIED SKETCH OF GENERAL PROCESS IN LEAD CHAMBER METHOD

- 30 -

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Office of the Chemical Officer

Fort Mills, P. I.
February 22, 1942.

Memorandum for: Commanding Officer, PCWD, Bataan, P. I.

1. Inquiry at this headquarters indicates that the Stock Record Account of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, as a result of not being properly safe guarded has been destroyed, presumably by not having been removed to Bataan from Manila Area along with company, depot and other supplies in December, 1941.

2. A complete summary of facts, instructions, etc., in the premises is desired.

3. A statement is also desired showing what policy or system, if any, was followed during January and February, 1942, to check and insure that CW shipments from Fort Mills to Bataan and vice versa were received, properly recorded, accounted for, discrepancies investigated, etc. An outline of any recommended changes therein should be submitted.

Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

1st Ind.

Commanding Officer, Phil Chemical Warfare Depot, Bataan, P.I., 18 March, 1942.
To: Chemical Officer, USAFFE, Fort Mills, P. I.

1. The stock record account of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot was destroyed at Fort Wm. McKinley on December 31, 1941, by 1st Lieut. L. U. Lawlor, Infantry. Extracts from the Journal of the P.C.W.D. and statements of officers and non-commissioned officers who have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the destruction are attached. The undersigned departed from the Manila area on December 24, 1941 to establish a depot in Bataan and was not present during the destruction of supplies or stock record account.

2. Shortly after the declaration of war the undersigned ordered 2nd Lieut. John A. Davis to proceed to Fort Mills, P. I. and secure the stock record account. At that time the great bulk of the chemical supplies were in the Manila area. Poor telephone communications and the time element involved in water transportation made it appear to the undersigned, who was stationed at Fort McKinley, that it was desirable to have the records readily available for reference. It was the intention of the undersigned to balance the stocks at these several depots. This could only be done by study of, and constant reference to, the stock record account. Even though a directive was published shortly after hostilities with Japan began to the effect that stock record accounts no longer need be kept, the order issued by Headquarters Philippine Department is not on file at this office or at those Headquarters. The Adjutant General, Philippine Department has stated to me that such a communication would have been in his miscellaneous files which were destroyed or left in Manila when that city was evacuated. The instruction issued by HPD emphasizes that while accountability ceases in the combat zone during time of war, the responsibility for property was greatly increased.

3. An extract of FM 3-15, Chemical Warfare Service Field Manual, "Supply and Field Service" is attached hereto. It states in part, "In the combat zone, no formal accounting for supplies is required, but receipt will be taken for all supplies issued. Strict adherence to formality and insistence on special forms in requisitioning supplies be avoided. Requests for supplies made in any manner by those responsible for filling supply needs of troops engaged in active operations are honored. However, the normal method of requisitioning supplies is used when practicable."

- 31 -

18 March 1942.

It was the intention of the undersigned as stated in paragraph 2, above to use the records to enable the depot to operate more efficiently.

4. The statements of witnesses attached hereto show the efforts made to safeguard the property and records with the means at the disposal of the depot commander. The urgent need of a Chemical Company (Depot) had been brought to the attention of higher headquarters by means of a carrier note which was composed by the undersigned for the signature of the Department Chemical Officer. The initial depot personnel at Fort Wm. McKinley consisted of three privates untrained in depot work.

5. I do not recall with certainty that I directed Lieut. Lawlor to bring back the stock record account. I am certain that I instructed both S/Sgt. Moore, S/Sgt. Torrisi, and Sgt. Mainer of the importance of guarding the records and that in the event there was grave danger of them falling into the hands of the hostile force, to destroy them rather than have the status of our chemical supplies known to the Japanese.

6. The system used in checking shipments from Bataan to Fort Mills during January and February, 1942 was to arrange by telephone to have shipments met by representatives of either depot. Tally out slips were made for shipments from Bataan and tally in slips accomplished for materials received from Fort Mills. Some shipments were accompanied by representatives of either depot but not all shipments. Telephone messages were frequently used between depots to check shipments. The only discrepancy in shipments that was not immediately traced down was one small shipment of non-impregnated clothing. The cause of the loss was not determined and might have occurred at any one of a number of places. Part of the clothing was recovered and the final loss was negligible.

7. It is recommended that the present method of checking shipment be continued, that is, a commissioned officer will check out a shipment, which will be accompanied by a representative of the depot. The shipment will be received by, and the tally out slip signed by, the receiving officer. The signed tally out slip to be returned to the Bataan depot for file or to Fort Mills depot as the case might be.

L. E. Roemer
L. E. ROEMER,
Lieut. Colonel, C.W.S.,
Commanding

6 Incls:

1. Extract PCWD Journal
2. Statement of Capt. Bartlett
3. Statement of Sgt. Mainer
4. Statement of Lieut. Davis
5. Statement of S/Sgt. Torrisi
6. Extract FM 3-15

The following is an extract from the Journal of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot on December 31, 1941:

X X X

Early in the morning a convoy returned to Manila to complete two final missions. One to blow up the warehouses at Fort McKinley and the other to bring back to Bataan region, truck loads of gas masks and gasoline.

Arriving in Manila about noon, one group went to Ft. McKinley where destruction of the warehouses was to take place. Upon arrival, the warehouses of the Ordnance and Quartermaster departments were all being blown up. Fort McKinley had already been evacuated and only a few officers and enlisted men were on duty there and they in turn were prepared to leave by seven o'clock that night.

The party proceeded to the B-Range road where the Chemical Warfare Bodegas were located. Three of the bodegas were filled with gasoline. There were piles of gasoline in the woods near the bodegas. They were all mined and ready to be blown up. There was also one warehouse containing gas masks, to be destroyed. All available trucks were filled with gasoline tins and cases of masks.

This being completed, the order was given to blow up the bodegas and piles of gasoline tins.

All of the bodegas blew up and fire destroyed the contents. The fires were confined to the area of the bodegas and did not spread.

The next order given was to blow up the warehouse. The plunger was pressed down but due to a faulty connection the warehouse did not blow up. Gasoline was taken and poured on the warehouse and fire was set to it.

Satisfied that everything was being destroyed by fire, the convoy pulled away from Ft. McKinley about five thirty o'clock in the evening. This was one and a half hours before the final evacuation of all personnel and a few hours before the entrance of the Japanese to that region.

The Chemical Warfare Service was the last unit to stop loading supplies at Ft. McKinley and to put their bodegas to the torch.

X X X

The above extract from the Journal of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot in Bataan, P. I. was written by Lieut. L. U. Lawlor by direction of the undersigned.

L. E. Roemer
L. E. ROEMER,
Lieut. Colonel, C.W.S.

March 11, 1942.

SUBJECT: Records of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot

TO : Commanding Officer, P. C. W. D.,
In the Field.

1. The dates mentioned herein are a close approximation of exact dates as all dates are based on memory.

2. The night of December 8, I camped west of the P.C.W.D. warehouses (then under construction) with the 4th Separate Chemical Company. There was a guard detachment from the 2nd Separate Chemical Company on duty at the depot. The 4th Separate Chemical Company departed the next day with the exception of myself and Sgt. Stroh, who were on special duty as instructors of the Chemical Warfare School for the Philippine Army Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers at Fort McKinley. The major units of Ft. Wm. McKinley had also left. Nothing at this time, the few left to guard the warehouses, I assisted in guarding the depot during the night of December 9 and 10 against possible Fifth Column activities. At this time (Dec. 10) additional guard personnel having arrived, I left the depot in charge of S/Sgt. Moore who was in charge previously.

3. On December 15, the P.A. Chemical Warfare School having terminated, I was assigned to P.C.W.D., Fort McKinley. The stocking of the usable warehouse had been under way so that the building was approximately one-half full. A record had been kept of all shipments received. I supervised a physical count to verify these figures which proved to be correct. At this time I inducted the 1st Chemical Company, PA, composed of two detachments, one at PA Motor Transport, Port Area, Manila and the other at Camp Murphy; the company taking the new designation of 301st Chemical Company Depot (PA). The 301st Chemical Company was then encamped west of the P.C.W.D. warehouses on B-range, Fort Wm. McKinley.

4. On December 20, Colonel Roemer started in shipping gasoline in 5-gal tins to be stored in the P.C.W.D. magazines around the cemetery southeast of the warehouses on B-range. The unloading was done by the 301st Chemical Company Depot and some civilians. This continued until the afternoon of December 23. An accurate account was kept of this gasoline which was in round numbers of 56,600 gallons.

5. On December 23 in the afternoon I received instructions to load all available trucks using those that were transporting gasoline and any other available trucks with gasoline and gas masks, organization equipment of the 301st Chemical Company and personnel consisting of 2 PA officers and 30 enlisted men of the 301st Chemical Company. The convoy was to depart at dark for Bataan with Colonel Roemer and other trucks loaded at Port Area. I was to prepare the remaining supplies for destruction upon order of Colonel Hamilton.

6. December 24 I was instructed to load 6 trucks sent from Port Area with the remaining personnel of the 301st Chemical Company and the available space with demustardizers, for Lieut. Davis to take to Bataan at dusk. Lieut. Davis had not arrived at 7:00 PM so I made contact with Colonel Hamilton by phone and was told that Lieut. Davis had departed for Bataan and I was to take the convoy to Bataan.

7. December 25 I arrived with the convoy at Bataan and found that the Depot was not located at Km Post 152 as I had previously been informed so I instigated a search for it. Failing in this search the company bivouaced by the bridge at Km Post 145.

8. On December 26 Lieut. Santos, while picking up some demustardizers that had been stored at Km Post 115 due to a truck wreck, met Lieut. Colonel Roemer and was informed as to the location of Depot (at Km Post 175.8 Mariveles Cut-off Road).

9. December 27 the Chemical Company and supplies were moved to the Depot and a record of the supplies was made by Lieut. Colonel Roemer.

10. On December 28 I took two trucks and drivers and departed for Ft. Wm. McKinley arriving early in the afternoon with one truck, the other having a broken shaft at Pilar. I loaded gasoline and about 12 boxes of gas masks, diaphragm. S/Sgt. Moore then at the Depot phoned to


(Records of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot - cont'd)

March 11, 1942.

Colonel Hamilton at HPD, Manila for authority to ship the load. Colonel Hamilton disapproved of the gas masks and instructed that they be unloaded and that 4.2" Chemical Mortar shells containing tear gas solution be loaded instead and whatever smoke pots were available be taken. The masks were unloaded and the shell loaded in the truck, an accurate account being made of all supplies loaded. I then started for the McKinley dock to get some smoke pots left there by the Ordnance barge going to Fort Mills. At this time a heavy air attack of seven Japanese dive bombers began. I directed that the trucks drive toward Manila and away from the stored munitions as the truck had a large load of gasoline and was very vulnerable to the tracer bullets being used by the Japanese. The Japanese planes were flying in wide circles close to the ground apparently looking for trucks or convoys. I directed the truck to park under the native roof that was extending partially over the road and the enlisted men on the truck to take cover in a nearby concrete ditch. After about 10 minutes flying, hostile planes appeared to concentrate on Fort McKinley so I directed the truck to continue on to Manila and to Port Area. At Port Area the QM was open to all military personnel to take what they needed or wanted. I loaded the remainder of the truck with food and shoes that were needed by the 301st Chemical Company and started back towards Bataan. I arrived at the P.C.W.D. early on December 29. All supplies and equipment of the truck immediately unloaded and contents recorded.

11. On December 30 I was attached by verbal order as C.O., 4th Separate Chemical Company in Bataan and instructed to go to its camp area and assume command immediately.

12. On December 28, which was my last contact with the records of the P.C.W.D. at Fort Wm. McKinley, they were being kept by S/Sgt. Moore under the direction of Colonel Hamilton.


LELAND BARTLETT,
Captain, CWS.

PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
In the Field

1 March, 1942.


SUBJECT: Disposal of Stock Records.

TO : Chemical Officer, USAFFE,
Fort Mills, P. I.

1. In December, 1941, while at the C.W.S. Depot at Ft. Wm. McKinley, "B" range, an inventory of stock supplies was kept daily and was frequently transmitted to Colonel Hamilton by telephone. However, in order to have a record of our stock, we made a new inventory every two or three days and kept it in a waterproof cellphane jacket and hid it in a corner of the dugout for safekeeping. On or about December 20, 1941, Lieut. Colonel Roemer gave us some depot records to safeguard. On December 22, 1941, Col. Roemer gave us a War Planning Chart and other valuable records, with the instructions that we were to keep them locked away as they were secret and in case of a hasty evacuation to destroy them to keep them from falling into other hands. I kept these records in my footlocker except during bombing raids. During bombing raids they were carried to the safety of the dugout.

2. On December 31, 1941, upon receiving instruction to destroy all C. W. S. supplies and vacate the premises immediately, the stock records which were in our possession were destroyed by S/Sgt. Moore and myself who were the only Americans present except Lieut. Lawlor. We came to Bataan that night with the C. W. S. Convoy.

3. At the P.C.W.D., Bataan, all C. W. S. stock records were kept by Lieut. Lawlor. S/Sgt. Torrissi and myself were placed in charge of Depot supplies. We immediately made as accurate an inventory as was possible. Everything going out to organizations in the field was tallied out, and shipments from Fort Mills and elsewhere were likewise tallied in. This system has been followed throughout January and February, and all C. W. S. materials and supplies are thereby accounted for as to the best of my knowledge.


ROBERT V. MAINER,
Sergeant, C. W. S.,
Depot Supply.

6 March, 1942.

Statement of 2nd Lieut. JOHN A. DAVIS, CWS.

In accordance with telephonic request herewith is furnished in general the events with which I was connected concerning the transfer of the stock record account of the Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot from Fort Mills to Fort Wm. McKinley and its later disposition.

On December 8, 1941 I, then stationed with the PCWD at Fort Mills, was given orders by telephone from the Department Chemical Office, in Manila to report as soon as possible to Fort Santiago for further instructions.

Upon arrival I was instructed to make an inventory of the stock in one of the warehouses of the new chemical depot which was then under construction. During the weeks following I was engaged in the transfer of gas masks and other Chemical Warfare material from Port Area to various other storage centers as Tabacalera, El Deposito as well as aiding in sending convoys to the Azcarraga Railroad station, to Northern and Southern Luzon and to Pier No. 1 for boat shipment to the Southern Islands.

On or about December 15 I was ordered to return to Fort Mills for one day to obtain records and other items which could be used in operating the new depot at Ft. McKinley. I brought back with me to Manila the stock records cards of PCWD, vouchers, and memorandum receipts, secret files concerning status of CW supplies in P.I. and files on operation of an impregnating plant, and a typewriter, upon orders from Lieut. Colonel Roemer. I left the typewriter at Ft. Santiago and brought the stock record account and certain files to Ft. McKinley where they were stored in the only warehouse in use until the office adjacent to it had been completed.

The above steps taken appeared logical considering the fact that Fort Mills would be the sub-depot while at Ft. McKinley would be the main depot where such records would be most needed. Because of the fact that the office had not been completed but would be soon coupled with the fact that the warehouse was under a 24 hour guard in command of Staff Sergeant Torrissi, it appeared to be a logical temporary storage place for the records.

After depositing depot records at Ft. McKinley I had only few occasions revisited the warehouse in which they were stored and at those times did not examine the stored records. The last visit was made on or about December 21. On December 28, I left for Bataan, having made previously two trips with convoys.

Incl. 3

2 March, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Colonel ROEMER.

As per your request I, S/Sgt. Alfred F. Torrissi, am enumerating some of the events of the management of the Fort W. McKinley Chemical Depot. Since I have kept no diary, I may be slightly in error as to exact dates, but otherwise I have a complete recollection of orders and the execution of them.

About Tuesday December 9, 1941, Lt. Miles of the 2nd Cml Co., brought Cpl. Cohan and myself to the Fort Wm. McKinley Chemical Depot on "B" range. It seems that two non-commissioned officers were needed to help in the depot work. At that time Major Roemer was in charge of the depot with Lt. Davis, PFC Bell, PFC Pinto, PFC Scanlon, and Pvt Wilson making up the rest of the detachment. There were also present some civilian workers, who loaded, unloaded and stored boxes in the warehouse. The whole of the depot which consisted of about four large warehouses and several smaller ones, was still under construction for the most part and the building occupied by us was newly completed.

I was put in charge of the enlisted men and posted an immediate guard and duty roster covering 24 hour service. Our duties were to receive and tally-in all gas masks and CW equipment which were coming in, mainly from Port Area. We were given explicit orders not to tally-out unless be [by] order of Major Roemer, Colonel Hamilton, or General MacArthur.

About December 11, Major Roemer left the warehouse in charge of Lt. Davis and myself and went to Port Area and Fort Santiago. About a day or so later he returned to Ft. McKinley warehouse and asked for one non-commissioned officer and two enlisted men to assist him at Port Area. PFC Scanlon, Pvt Wilson and myself accompanied Major Roemer to Manila, leaving Cpl. Cohan in charge of the enlisted men. Our duties were to dispatch the loaded trucks out of Port Area to Ft. McKinley and Tobacalera [Tabacalera] warehouses. Our duty hours were from 5 PM to 7 AM, as Mr. Ball was in charge during the day. We slept during the day at the 808 M.P. barracks. During this time we were in constant contact with Major Roemer, who was very actively keeping in touch with the evacuation of the CW materials from Port Area to Tobacalera [Tabacalera] and Ft. McKinley warehouses, and to various units who needed supplies.

About the 15th of December Major Roemer called me aside and said he was not quite satisfied in leaving the Ft. McKinley warehouse in the hands of the Corporal and wished me to go back and take charge of it. At this time Sgt. Mainer and S/Sgt. Moore joined me at the Ft. McKinley warehouse. Major Roemer gave us four distinct orders:

- (1) To take and keep inventories on all stock,
- (2) To maintain a 24 hour guard duty roster,
- (3) That during air raids were were to take shelter in such a position as to watch the warehouse and hear the phone if it should ring. We were not to abandon the warehouse under any circumstances.
- (4) No issues were to be made to any outfit unless by order of Major Roemer, Colonel Hamilton, or General MacArthur.

Captain Bartlett was to be in charge of us.

From the period of December 15 to December 31, S/Sgt. Moore, Sgt Mainer, and myself took charge of the depot in keeping records, tallying CWS material in and out, arranging the material in proper stacks, cleaning up, posting 24 hour guard, managing civilian workers when obtainable, etc. Our duty rosters were so arranged that one of the three of us was on duty at all times. About the 18th of December we asked our company commander (Lt. Miles) if we could have four men to assist us at the depot. We received permission and PFC Gow, PFC Knight, Pvt Gansz, and Pvt Novinski joined us at the depot together with PFC Bell and Pvt Morton. A few days later Sgt. Strohl and Pvt Solomon arrived who slept in the warehouse at night and helped guard at night.

Major Roemer kept in daily contact with us as did Capt. Bartlett and occasionally Colonel Hamilton. Major Roemer had us keep a copy of our records in a nearby shelter so that in the event of destruction of the warehouse by Japanese bombing we would have a record of the damage done. About the third week of December Major Roemer left for Bataan with the 301st Depot to establish a depot in Bataan. He emphasized all previous orders before leaving and told us Capt.

Bartlett would be in charge with Colonel Hamilton giving us our final orders. After Major Roemer left, we continued our duties and set up demolition charges in our warehouse and in the bodegas in back which were loaded with gasoline so that we could destroy our supply at a moments notice.

About the 27th of December PFC Gow, PFC Knight and myself went to Tobacalera by order of Colonel Hamilton to assist Lt. Lawlor in leading a convoy of about eight (8) trucks (4 of them loaded at Ft. McKinley warehouse) to Bataan. We reported to Colonel Roemer in Bataan and unloaded our supplies at the 301st CW Depot. We returned to Ft. McKinley the following day with the empty trucks. (Lts. Johnson and Davis in charge.) We loaded the trucks partly at Ft. McKinley warehouse and partly at Port Area and returned to Bataan about December 30, 1941. The warehouse at this time was in the hands of S/Sgt. Moore, Sgt. Mainer, and Mr. Ball. S/Sgt. Moore and Sgt. Mainer joined us at the 301st depot in Bataan about December 31, 1941.

During the last week of December most of the outfits had evacuated Fort McKinley. Nichols Field, which was not far from us was destroying its field and equipment by demolition and fire over a period of several days. It seemed that the Chemical Depot was among the very last to function as a depot and until December 29 (about the day I left) we were still supplying outfits with CW Materials. The last week of December we were in constant touch with Colonel Hamilton, all other CWS officers having been ordered to Bataan and other places. Col. Hamilton had us keep inventories and records and gave us orders not to destroy them until we destroyed the warehouse and that the warehouse and records should burn at the same time.

The destruction of the warehouse was under the direction of Lt. Lawlor with S/Sgt. Moore and Sgt. Mainer assisting. It took place after I was ordered to Bataan.

signed F. Torrissi
ALFRED F. TORRISI,
Staff Sergeant, CWS

WAR DEPARTMENT
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE FIELD MANUAL 3 - 15

Supply and Field Service
February 17, 1942

(EXTRACT)

X X X X X X

29. Issue and Accounting. - a. Issue of supplies to troops is initiated by a statement of their requirements. They must be furnished their authorized requirements when and where needed and, in an emergency, without the necessity of formal requisitions.

b. Troops must not be encumbered with a greater quantity of supplies than is necessary to insure their readiness for action. Supplies must be made available to meet the needs of the forces promptly and with safety. This is done by advancing supplies as far as conditions permit and by their distribution in depth and width.

c. In the combat zone, no formal accounting for supplies is required, but receipt will be taken for all supplies issued. Strict adherence to formality and insistence on special form in requisitioning supplies are avoided. Requests for supplies made in any manner by those responsible for filling supply needs of troops engaged in active operations are honored. However, the normal method of requisitioning supplies is used whenever practicable. The responsibility for requisitions, their necessity, sufficiency, and accuracy rests with the regimental or similar commander.

X X X X X X

HEADQUARTERS, I PHILIPPINE CORPS, IN THE FIELD

22 March, 1942.

AG 470.72

Subject: Repair of Gas Masks.

To :

1. A Chemical Warfare Service Maintenance Group will repair the unserviceable gas masks of your units on the day and at the place indicated in paragraph 3, below.

2. Prior to the specified date, organization commanders will have all gas masks inspected by the best qualified officers available. Unserviceable masks will be segregated for delivery to the repair point and a list prepared by each unit in the following form:

Gas Masks on Hand	Serviceable	Unserviceable	Total
Diaphragm:			
Service:			
Training:			
Strength of Unit:	Officers _____	Enlisted Men _____	

C.O., _____

3. Schedule for repair work:

Unit	Date	Place
South Sub-Sector	Mar 25,26	Near Sub-Sector CP
11th Division	Mar 27	Ration Dump near KM 209.7
91st Division	Mar 28	Ration Dump near KM 209.7
1st Division	Mar 29	Ration Dump near KM 209.7
Corps Troops	Mar 29	Ration Dump near KM 209.7

4. The unserviceable masks accompanied by unit gas officers and noncommissioned officers together with the list mentioned in paragraph 2, will proceed to the place designated on the ration trucks so as to arrive prior to 8:00 AM of the date specified. The repaired masks and personnel will return to their organization by the ration truck returning on the following evening.

5. Inspecting officers will examine every mask in their organization paying particular attention to the canisters, to make sure that the rubber inlet valve has not been damaged and to the outlet valve to be certain that it is not torn and does not leak.

By command of Major General JONES:

A. E. UDDENBERG,
Lieut. Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General

PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
In the Field

24 March, 1942.

SUBJECT: Request for Quinine.

TO : Medical Officer,
Phil Medical Depot.

1. Request that this organization be supplied with the following Medical supplies.

Quinine 2,000 tablets
Toilet soap - 2
Toilet paper - 6

Total strength of company

122 officers and men

L. E. ROEMER,
Lieut. Colonel, C. W. S.,
Commanding.

(In the above request, the first item was crossed out, the first word in the second item was crossed out, and the designation "GI" written in. The quantities given for the second and third items are written in, presumably by some one in the Medical Depot.)

On the reverse of the above request, the following written communications appear:

Memo To: Col. Roemer.

There is no quinine available at this Depot for prophylaxis use. Only for the actual treatment of malaria.

H.H. GOLDBERG
Lt., MAC

To Col. Hamilton -

For your information.

L.E.R.

I.G. -

Col. Hill says nothing can be done - just not enough on hand for prophylaxis.

S.A.H.

DRAFT

March 24, 1942

Subject: Gas Protection, Malinta Hospital Tunnel.

CN to: CG, HD of M & SB.

1. The Executive Officer, Station Hospital, Fort Mills (Major Hartmann) was advised on March 24, 1942, substantially as follows -
 - a. Blankets previously impregnated by the CWS for protection against mustard gas should be installed in the airlock entrances to hospital tunnel already constructed by the Engineers. After installation, a thorough check and necessary adjustment be made to insure a gas tight fit.
 - b. Selection and instruction of details for the opening and closing of these entrances and instruction of decontaminating personnel should be undertaken immediately. The possibility of determining by actual test the length of time that normal routine duties and functions can be carried on within the hospital tunnel without undue discomfort when one or both of the 5000 CFM blowers are out of order should also be considered. These blowers may have to be shut down for repairs not only shut down during a chemical attack.
 - c. Organization and instruction of selected hospital personnel in the operation and use of the three gallon type demustardizing apparatus should be given and the assignment of such apparatus to definite areas including the three intakes or vents from which contaminated air might be drawn into the tunnel.

2. Major Hartmann to have Hospital Gas Officer (Major Richardson) take up this and consult Colonel Hamilton.

25 March 1942

1. Fort Mills Station Hospital Gas Officer (Major Richardson) advised substantially as was Executive Officer on March 24. Provision made to turn over components to make up 200 more training masks to go on additional patient bunks set up in hospital. To be made up under supervision of Hospital Gas Officer. Additional HTH (400 lb), protective clothing (20 sets) and 20 DeHS apparatus turned over to Hospital.

2. An emergency degassing station set up in open near North entrance to Hospital Tunnel.

3. Use of original L-shaped lateral leading from main Malinta Tunnel into south entrance of Hospital for an air lock and decontamination section of hospital as originally intended not favorably considered by HD M&SB (Adj - Col. Bowler) until actual need arises. This space now used for housing personnel.

S.A.H.

Headquarters Group No. 3.
In the Field.
27 March, 1942.

Field Order)
No..... 2)

MAP: Geographic Index Luzon N 1430-E 12020/10 x 20, Sheets 31H and 34B, Scale 1:31680

1. a. Omitted.
- b. Group No. 2 is defending the area west of KM 183 to Mariveles. Group No. 4 is defending the area east of KM 170.
2. Group No. 3 consisting of the 301st Chemical Company Depot, the 301st Engineers, and the Engineer Depot Detachment, will defend the Mariveles Cut-off.
3. a. The 301st Chemical Company (Depot) will organize and defend the areas within its sector shown on overlay.
- b. The 301st Engineers will organize and defend the areas within its sector shown on overlay.
- c. The Engineer Depot Detachment will constitute the reserve and will remain in present bivouac. Plans will be prepared by the C.O., Engineer Depot for the destruction of all bridges on the road and the construction of road blocks at either end of Mariveles Cut-off Road.
- X. (1) Fox holes, mortar positions and machine gun emplacements will be prepared at once.
- (2) Mortars will be manned by personnel of the 301st Chemical Co (depot)
- (3) Instruction in small arms and mortars, including firing, will be conducted daily, as opportunity offers by each unit and detachment commanders until each man has fired 10 rounds.
- (4) Upon orders from this headquarters, patrols consisting of not more than three men will cover the approaches shown on overlay.
- (5) Destruction of bridges and construction of road blocks will not be accomplished except on orders of this or higher headquarters.
4. (1) Ammunition D.P. at Chemical Depot KM 175.8.
- (2) Stragglers from front line units will be rallied and attached to nearest combat group.
5. Command Posts: Headquarters Group No. 3 - Chemical Depot KM 175.8
Engineer Detachment - KM 179
301st Engineers - KM 179
301st Chemical Co Depot - KM 175.8

L. E. Roemer
L. E. ROEMER,
Lieut. Colonel, C. W. S.,
Commanding.

Distributions:

Hq Phil Dept 2
USFIP Cml Off 1
C.O., Group No. 2 1
C.O., Group No. 4 1
All units 1

27 March 1942

MEMO TO: Colonel Hamilton.

Subject : Rechecking Amount of Bleach Mixture.

1. I find 77 batches of bleach correct due to the fact that each 200 lb batch uses 100 lb of lime and 7735 lb of lime was on hand on 17 March, 1942.
2. I find an error in the calculated number of batches which can be made from the chlorine on hand. 12750 lb of chlorine available and 62 lb per batch = 205 batches, not 280 as reported. However, as the lime is the limiting factor, the error does not affect the maximum calculated number of batches of bleaching mixture possible which would be 77.
3. 77 batches of bleach with 60 gallons solution per batch = 4620 gallons of bleach mixture. 4620 gallons ÷ 3 (capacity of DeHS) = 1540 DeHS apparatus which could be filled. This figure checks Lt. Johnson.

S. J. Winn
SAMUEL J. WINN,
1st Lt., AC.

27 March 1942

MEMO TO: Colonel Hamilton.

Subject : Balances of Impregnating Chemicals after 690 gallons of Acetylene Tetrachloride are used.

1. Chemicals on hand:
690 gallons Acetylene Tetrachloride,
4000 pounds CC2,
367 gallons Chlorinated Paraffin.
2. 20 gallons of acetylene tetrachloride are used per batch:
 $690 \div 20 = 34.5 \text{ batches.}$
3. Each batch requires 7 lb CC2 by weight or 17.5 quarts and 5 lb 5 ounces of chlorinated paraffin by weight or 6.5 quarts.
4. 34.5 batches x 7 lb CC2 per batch = 241.5 lb CC2 used.
4000 lb of CC2 - 241.5 lb used = 3758.5 lb of CC2 balance after 690 gallons acetylene tetrachloride are used.
5. 6-1/2 quarts or 1.62 gallons of chlorinated paraffin per batch are used.
34.5 batches x 1.62 gallons = 55.9 gallons chlorinated paraffin used.
367 gallons - 55.9 gallons = 311.1 gallons of chlorinated paraffin balance after 690 gallons of acetylene tetrachloride are used.

S. J. Winn
SAMUEL J. WINN,
1st Lieut., AC.

HEADQUARTERS
HARBOR DEFENSES OF MANILA AND SUBIC BAYS,
Fort Mills, P.I.

- OFFICIAL BULLETIN -

O. B. No. 59. Monday, March 30, 1942. O. B. No. 59.

1. CHOLERA VACCINATION: a. All officers on duty in the Malinta Tunnel area who have not received cholera vaccination within the past three months will report at Lateral No. 5 of the hospital between the hours of 1:00 and 1:30 PM either Tuesday, March 31st, or Wednesday, April 1st.


b. All enlisted men on duty in the Malinta Tunnel area who have not received cholera vaccination within the past three months will report at Lateral No. 5 of the hospital between the hours of 1:30 and 2:30 pm, either Tuesday, March 31st, or Wednesday, April 1st.

2. GOOD FRIDAY SERVICE: The last Lenten Service will be held in the Hospital Mess Friday, April 3, 1942 at 7:00 PM. Next Sunday is Easter.

DAILY PRAYER:

O Lord God, whose blessed Son, our Savior, gave his back to the smiters, and hid not His face from shame; Grant us grace to take joyfully the sufferings of the present time, in full assurance of the glory that shall be revealed; through Thy Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord.
Amen.

By command of Major General MOORE:


JNO. V. KING,
Captain, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant.

O. B. No. 59. Monday, March 30, 1942. O. B. No. 59.

(At the bottom of this page is a pencilled note by Cpl. Gow: - "Notified S/Sgt Geiger, 11 AM, March 31.")

LABORATORY
PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT
Fort Mills, P.I.

30 March 1942.

MEMO TO: Colonel Hamilton.

The following report is submitted concerning the analysis for CC2 content of two (2) samples of impregnated clothing received from the 301st Chemical Company Depot, Bataan, P.I.

The first sample was received by this laboratory on March 17, 1942, and was a cotton shirt impregnated April, 1941, which had never been laundered since. Analysis showed a CC2 content of 7.5%.

The second sample was received by this laboratory on March 17, 1942, and was a cotton shirt impregnated April, 1941 which had been worn and laundered native fashion four (4) times. Analysis showed a CC2 content of 4.5% or a drop of 3% CC2 due to wear and laundering.

JOHN A. DAVIS,
2nd Lieut., CWS,
Assisting.

FILE UNDER NO. JOURNAL FILE FOR APRIL 1 - 17, 1942, incl.

INDEX SHEET

SYNOPSIS

1. List of Survivors of the Sinking of the SS Corregidor.
2. Program Easter Sunrise Service at Hq. Luzon Force.
3. Pass used by Colonel Hamilton on Last Trip to Bataan from where he returned the morning Bataan fell.
4. Accounts of Capt. Bartlett, Capt. Lazzarini, Lt. Morgan, on experiences on Bataan during the night of April 8-9, with comments by Colonel Hamilton.
5. Report of probable death of Lt Miles, CWS.
6. Citation of enlisted men KIA, March 25, 1942, and citation of enlisted man who was unhurt. These are CWS men.
7. Requisition from Bukidnon dated Dec. 15, received in Chemical Office April 13, with remarks by Colonel Hamilton.
8. Menus - USFIP mess - officers - enlisted men - April 2 - 14 incl.
9. Copy of radiogram as finally received April 15, paraphrase received April 8, by Lt Schaf and comments by Colonel Hamilton, reply radioed to WD, and CWS from Colonel Hamilton to G-4 and C/S, USFIP advocating speed in making shipment.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER NO.

INSTRUCTIONS.—Under "Synopsis" make brief entry showing date of communication and from whom received and synopsis sufficient to identify the papers. When these index sheets become numerous under a subject they will be entered on the consolidated index sheet and then destroyed.

Q. M. C. Form 251 (Old Form 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2-5842

Survivors of the Sinking of the SS Corregidor.

Personnel from CW School.

The following PA personnel who attended CWS School at Fort William McKinley during December, 1941, were among the survivors of the sinking of the SS Corregidor in Manila Bay on December 16, 1941. It is presumed these personnel have returned to their respective organizations.

61st Division

1st Lieutenant Andres Montano
2nd Lieutenant Irenio Pascua
2nd Lieutenant Ernesto Fullon
2nd Lieutenant William Raymond
3rd Lieutenant Victorino C. Gaabucayan
3rd Lieutenant Alfredo Masigan
S/Sergeant Nunala Elizardo
Sergeant David Enano

81st Division

2nd Lieutenant Eugenio Avila
Staff Sergeant Cesar Dakay
Sergeant Jesus Pelansa
Sergeant Adan Kintanar
Corporal Juan Lingo

101st Division

1st Lieutenant Pedro Cagalawan
1st Lieutenant Federico Icamina
Master-Sergeant Canuto Domingo
Staff Sergeant Victor Arjona
Staff Sergeant Venustiano Ludena
Sergeant Carmelo Quernben
Sergeant Josal Jesuc
Corporal Asterio Olive

For Journal File of April 2, 1942.

Pass No. 211

Headquarters U. S. Army Forces in
the Far East.

April 3, 1942
(Date)

COLONEL STUART A. HAMILTON -


is authorized to travel by boat -

From Fort Mills, P. I. -

To Bataan, P. I. -

April 4, 1942 and return on completion of duty.

on 1942.


CARL H. SEALS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

(Colonel Hamilton returned to Fort Mills, P. I. from Bataan 6:45 AM, April 9, 1942.)

EASTER SUNRISE SERVICE
HEADQUARTERS, LUZON FORCE - BATAAN, P.I.
5 April 1942

CHAPLAIN A.C. OLIVER, Jr.

ORDER OF WORSHIP

Chaplain - "OH, COME, LET US WORSHIP AND BOW DOWN;
LET US KNEEL BEFORE THE LORD OUR MAKER:
FOR HE IS OUR GOD,
AND WE ARE THE PEOPLE OF HIS PASTURE,
AND THE SHEEP OF HIS HAND."

"THE LORD IS NIGH UNTO ALL THEM THAT CALL UPON HIM,
TO ALL THAT CALL UPON HIM IN TRUTH.
HE WILL FULFILL THE DESIRE OF THEM THAT REVERENCE HIM;
HE ALSO WILL HEAR THEIR CRY, AND SAVE THEM."

HYMN *** ALL STANDING.

ALL *** A DECLARATION OF FAITH:- "I believe in God, our Father, infinite in wisdom, goodness, and love, and in His Son, our Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who for us men and our salvation lived and died and liveth evermore, exalted at the right hand of the Father, Whose Kingdom shall have no end.

And I believe in the Holy Spirit of God, the Lord and Giver of Life, proceeding from the Father and Son exalted and glorified; taking of the things of Christ, revealing them to us; comforting, renewing, inspiring our spirits.

I believe in the persistence of personality and the immortality of the soul and I am resolved through the grace given unto me to order my life in the works of faith and in the ways of the Holy Commandments, looking for the victory of righteousness over evil, life over death, and for the life of the world to come. Amen"

Chaplain - "For GOD sent not His SON into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through HIM might be saved." John - 3.

ALL - For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, no angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the Love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." ROM.8.

PRAYER --- CHAPLAIN.

HYMN --- ALL STANDING.

SERMON --- CHAPLAIN.

Prayer by Chaplain at the close of which ALL REPEAT THE FOLLOWING:

"O LORD, SUPPORT US ALL THE DAY LONG OF THIS TROUBLOUS LIFE, UNTIL THE SHADOWS LENGTHEN, AND THE EVENING COMES, AND THE BUSY WORLD IS HUSHED, AND THE FEVER OF LIFE IS OVER, AND OUR WORK IS DONE. THEN OF THY GREAT MERCY GRANT US A SAFE LODGING, AND A HOLY REST, AND PEACE AT LAST, THROUGH JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD. AMEN"

BENEDICTION ***

N.B.

The following notes appear in Colonel Hamilton's handwriting:-

"Jap planes heard in distance."

"Took Communion with Gen. King and Col. Collier."

"CWS - Lt. Col. Roemer, Capt. Lazzarini, 1st Lt. Morgan."

(Easter Sunrise Service, Cont'd.)

SELECTED HYMNS

1.

My country, 'tis of thee
Sweet land of liberty
Of thee I sing;
Land where my fathers died,
Land of the Pilgrims pride,
From every mountain side
Let Freedom ring!

Our father's God, to Thee,
Author of Liberty,
To thee we sing;
Long may our land be bright
With Freedom's holy light;
Protect us by Thy might,
Great God, our King.

2.

God bless America,
Land that I love,
Stand beside her
And guide her
Thru the night with a light from above.
From the mountains to the prairies
To the oceans white with foam
God bless America,
My Home, sweet Home.

3.

Break Thou the Bread of Life,
Dear Lord, to me.
As Thou didst break the Loaves
beside the sea.
Beyond the sacred page I seek
Thee, Lord,
My spirit pants for Thee,
O Living Word.

Bless Thou the truth, Dear Lord,
to me, to me
As Thou didst bless the Bread
by Galilee,
'Then shall all bondage cease,
all fetters fall,
And I shall find my peace,
my All in All.

4.

Holy, Holy, Holy! Lord God
Almighty!
Early in the morning our songs
shall rise to Thee;
Holy, Holy, Holy! Merciful and
Mighty!
God in Three persons, Blessed
Trinity!

4. (Continued)

Holy, Holy, Holy! Tho' the darkness hide Thee,
Though the eye of sinful man Thy Glory may not
see,
Only Thou art Holy, there is none besides Thee
Perfect in power, in love, and purity.

Holy, Holy, Holy! Lord God Almighty!
All Thy works shall praise Thy name in earth,
and sky, and sea.
Holy, Holy, Holy! Merciful and Mighty!
God in three persons, Blessed Trinity!

5.

I need Thee every hour, Most Gracious Lord;
No tender voice like Thine can peace afford.

- REFRAIN -

I need Thee, Oh, I need Thee, every hour I need
Thee
Oh, bless me now, my Savior, I come to Thee.

I need Thee every hour stay Thou near by;
Temptations lose their power when Thou are nigh. -
- REFRAIN -

6.

O beautiful for spacious skies,
For amber waves of grain,
For purple mountains majesties
Above the fruited plain!
America, America, God shed His grace on thee,
And crown thy good with brotherhood
From sea to shining sea.

O beautiful for patriot dream
That sees beyond the years,
Thine alabaster cities gleam
Undimmed by human tears!
America, America, God shed His grace on thee,
And crown thy good with brotherhood
From sea to shining sea.

7.

All hail the power of Jesus' Name!
Let angels prostrate fall;
Bring forth the royal diadem
And crown Him Lord of All,
Bring forth the royal Diadem
And crown Him Lord of All.

Let every kindred, every tribe
On this terrestrial ball,
To Him all majesty ascribe,
And crown Him Lord of All,
To Him all majesty ascribe,
And crown Him Lord of All.

(Easter Sunrise Service - Cont'd.)

7. (Continued)

O that with yonder sacred throng
We at His feet may fall;
We'll join the everlasting song,
And crown Him Lord of All,
We'll join the everlasting song,
And crown Him Lord of All.

8.

On a hill far away stood an old
rugged cross,
The emblem of suffering and shame;
And I love that old cross where the
Dearest and Best,
For a world of lost sinners was slain.

CHORUS

So I'll cherish the old rugged cross,
Till my trophies at last I lay down;
I will cling to the old rugged cross,
And exchange it some day for a crown.

Oh, that old rugged cross, so despised
by the world,
Has a wondrous attraction for me;
For the Dear Lamb of God left his
Glory above
To bear it to dark Calvary.

CHORUS

To the old rugged cross I will ever
be true,
Its shame and reproach gladly bear;
For 'twas on that old cross Jesus
suffered and died
To pardon and sanctify me.

CHORUS

9.

My hope is built on nothing less
Than Jesus' blood and righteousness.
I dare not trust the sweetest frame,
But wholly lean on Jesus' Name.

CHORUS

On Christ, the solid rock I stand;
All other ground is sinking sand.
All other ground is sinking sand.

His oath, His covenant, His blood
Support me in the whelming flood.
When all around my soul gives way,
He is then all my hope and stay.

CHORUS

When He shall come with trumpet sound
O, may I then in Him be found
Dress'd in His righteousness alone
Faultless to stand before the Throne

CHORUS

10.

Just as I am, without one plea
But that Thy Blood was shed for me,
And that Thou bid'st me come to Thee,
O Lamb of God, I come, I come.

Just as I am, tho' tossed about
With many a conflict, many a doubt,
Fightings and fears within, without,
O Lamb of God, I come, I come

Just as I am, Thou wilt receive
Wilt welcome, pardon, cleanse, relieve;
Because Thy promise I believe,
O Lamb of God, I come, I come.

11.

What a friend we have in Jesus,
All our sins and griefs to bear;
What a privilege to carry
Everything to God in prayer!
O What peace we often forfeit
O What needless pain we bear,
All because we do not carry
Everything to God in prayer.

Fort Mills, P. I.
10 April, 1942.

Memo To: Colonel Hamilton.

Re: Operations during the Night of 8-9 April 1942 on Bataan.

About 7 PM on the 8th of April Lt. Col. Roemer came into the tent getting his equipment together and at that time he informed me he could use some extra help if I felt like it. I was informed then for the first time that the depot was being destroyed. Prior to this time I had been sick in quarters from diarrhea. I told Col. Roemer that I felt weak but would try anything once. I dressed and took over the telephone switchboard and started the kitchen force preparing midnight chow for the organization. About 12 midnight, Colonel Hamilton arrived in camp and directed that trucks and equipment proceed to the docks in Mariveles and to make sure that they got through the traffic. No one there being available I offered to take the trucks and proceeded towards Mariveles and arrived thereat about 2 hours later having had to straighten out several traffic jams. I met Colonel Hamilton again near KM 176 and assisted him in getting the traffic to move.

About 1 AM Colonel Hamilton told me to take his car and go back to camp and inform Col. Roemer not to ship any more supplies to the dock but to destroy them. I then tried to go back two different routes, one by way of the connecting roads and then via the main road but was unable to move more than a kilometer in either direction. Finally about 2 AM I found myself again near my original two trucks so I took them to the dock where I met Colonel Hamilton and told him that I was unable to get back; he then instructed me to take the trucks to the end of the dock and get them unloaded which I did. It was at this time that Captain Lazzarini turned the loading detail over to me and said that he was going to try to make it back to camp. Since there were other units unloading at the same time, the unloading of my two trucks was a slow process. The "Tilly" was partially loaded with equipment from another one of our trucks and one of my trucks completed the loading. We made a trip out into the bay and dumped the load and returned to the dock to unload the other truck. I then unloaded and second truck and had just finished when Captain Bartlett arrived with two more trucks of supplies. Part of this later cargo was loaded on the "Tilly" and the remainder upon a barge docked alongside. Captain Lazzarini returned with Colonel Hamilton just as the loading was completed. Captain Bartlett and I were given instructions to dump the supplies on the barge into the North Channel as it was being towed towards Fort Mills. This we did. We arrived at Fort Mills about 8 AM on the morning of the 9th.

Charles A. Morgan Jr.
CHARLES A. MORGAN, JR.
1st Lieutenant, C. W. S.

Fort Mills, P. I.
10 April, 1942.

MEMO TO: Col. S. A. Hamilton.

From noon to 5:00 PM Apr 8th, Capt Bartlett operated the chlorination plant at PCWD. At 5:00 PM after the evening meal he was ordered to bed as he had been on duty approx. 36 hours by Lt Col L. E. Roemer. He was awakened about 1:30 AM April 9th and informed that certain munitions were to be destroyed by dumping in Manila Bay and that some trucks carrying them to Mariveles were blocked on the connecting road between the cut-off and the main road. His mission was to reopen the road and see that the trucks reached the Eng. docks at Mariveles and to contact Capt Lazzarini thereat who was supervising the unloading of the trucks and the loading of the motor launch "Tilly" and a barge.

The road block was caused by a truck "Canadian type" mired in the mud of which could not be removed without mechanical equipment, as the embankment was not steep at this point a little widening of the road with rocks from the vicinity permitted the passage of trucks around the "Canadian." An ambulance was found about 250 yards further with the front end over the bank and the rear blocking the road, a convoy, believed to be Eng P.I. had come up in rear of the CW trucks during this time so the needed personnel was taken from them to roll the ambulance off the road over the embankment and the entire traffic proceeded without hindrance to the main Mariveles road.

The main road was very heavy with traffic and at the time stopped. Foreseeing difficulties at the dock Capt Bartlett turned the trucks over to 2nd Lt. Santos and proceeded towards Mariveles on foot to arrange for the trucks at the dock. After walking about 2 KM the traffic started to move so Capt Bartlett stood on the rear step of one of the passing trucks and rode to Mariveles at the dock turnoff and went to the Eng. dock. Col. S. A. Hamilton was at the dock and Capt Bartlett reported to him and returned to the junction of the dock road and the main road with Col. Hamilton. Capt Bartlett identified the trucks as they arrived and directed them to the docks, trucks under Lt Santos and 2 other under Lt Sandoval that had taken the main road from PCWD.

On returning to the dock it was found that Capt Lazzarini had loaded the "Tilly" and was loading the last truck on a barge. The time then being about 4:30 AM, April 9th 1942.

Capt Bartlett and Lt Morgan who had been assisting Capt Lazzarini were instructed by Col. Hamilton to accompany the barge and see that the ammunition was dumped into the bay at approximately mid channel. They were accompanied by two American CW enlisted men, one PS enlisted man. Colonel S. A. Hamilton and Capt Lazzarini left on the "Tilly" at approximately 5:00 AM and the barge departed at about 5:30 AM the ammunition being disposed of by dumping into the North Channel.

Leland D. Bartlett
LELAND D. BARTLETT,
Captain, C. W. S.


Fort Mills, P. I.
April 10, 1942.

NB

On or about 4:45 am., April 9, 1942, at Mariveles Dock, P. I., Captain Leland D. Bartlett, CWS., was directed by the undersigned in his official capacity as Chemical Officer, USFIP, to proceed by barge on which some WP munitions were loaded and supervise the disposal thereof in the North Channel while enroute to Fort Mills, P. I., and to report to me upon arrival at Fort Mills.

Captain Bartlett lost all of his personal belongings and equipment in carrying out this order as same were left at his last station, the Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan, P. I.

I did not anticipate that such orders to Captain Bartlett would become necessary for the best interests of the CWS and the United States when I left the Chemical Warfare Depot on Mariveles Cut-off, during the evening of April 8, 1942, or Captain Bartlett would have been properly informed thereof.


STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.


Fort Mills, P. I.
April 10, 1942

NB

On or about 4:45 am., April 9, 1942, at Mariveles Dock, P. I., 1st Lt. Charles A. Morgan, Jr., CWS., was directed by the undersigned in his official capacity as Chemical Officer, USFIP, to proceed by barge on which some WP munitions were loaded and to assist in disposing thereof in the North Channel while enroute to Fort Mills, P. I., and to report to me upon arrival at Fort Mills.

Lieutenant Morgan lost all of his personal belongings and equipment in carrying out this order as same were left at his last station, the Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan, P. I.

I did not anticipate that such orders to Lieutenant Morgan would become necessary for the best interests of the CWS and the United States when I left the Chemical Warfare Depot on Mariveles Cut-off, during the evening of April 8, 1942, or Lieutenant Morgan would have been properly informed thereof.


STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

Fort Mills, P. I.
April 10, 1942.


At approximately 10:00 A.M. on April 8, 1942 a communication was received from HPD at the PCWD, stating that preparation and plans were to be made for the destruction of all material and supplies which would be of value to the enemy. The communication also stated that the destruction would not begin until receipt of orders from that or higher Headquarters.

Upon receipt of the above mentioned communication, Col. S. A. Hamilton, Lt. Col. L. E. Roemer, and Capt. Lazzarini discussed ways and means of destroying all material and supplies then on hand in the PCWD on Bataan. It was finally concluded that the best method of destroying the supplies and assuring that none would fall into the hands of the enemy would be to dump as much of the chemical munitions as time would permit in the middle of Mariveles Bay and to destroy the rest of the munitions and depot stocks by fire.

Having decided upon this method, Col. S. A. Hamilton left the PCWD to make arrangements for the use of a barge to carry out the plan decided upon. In the meantime the officers and men of the 301st Chemical depot moved approximately 1000 rounds of WP Livens shells and 4.2" chemical mortar shells from small scattered piles in the hills to positions where they could be placed in trucks and sent to Mariveles for loading on a barge. The Motor Transport Service was contacted and five trucks were made available to the PCWD in addition to unit transportation (3 trucks) for the carrying out (of) the previously arranged plan of destruction. At approximately 10:00 P.M. word was received to put the plan of destruction into effect. Loading of seven trucks available to the PCWD had already begun and as the first truck load was ready it was immediately dispatched to the Engineer docks, Mariveles accompanied by Col. S. A. Hamilton, Capt. Lazzarini and Mr. Flatland, a civilian employee with the Engineer depot. Col. S. A. Hamilton and Mr. Flatland made final arrangements pertaining to loading and unloading with Sgt. England of the Engineer Corps who was in charge of the "Tilly" which was to be used for dumping the chemical munitions in the bay. Col. S. A. Hamilton returned to the PCWD to expedite the movements of the trucks from the PCWD to Mariveles. Capt. Lazzarini remained at the Engineer dock in Mariveles to supervise the loading and unloading of the "Tilly", a barge, and the incoming trucks.

The first load was transferred to the "Tilly" and then dumped in the Bay. In the meantime six more loaded trucks were dispatched to Mariveles, two in charge of Capt. Bartlett, two under Lt. Morgan and two under 2nd Lt. Santos. All six trucks were tied up by traffic jams which were straightened out by Col. Hamilton, Capt. Bartlett and Lt. Morgan the first two arriving at Mariveles approximately at 2 am, April 9th. This load was immediately transferred to the "Tilly" under the supervision of Lt. Morgan while Capt. Lazzarini returned to the PCWD to determine what was holding up the remaining truck. At approximately 3:30 am, Capt. Lazzarini reached the PCWD and was notified by Lt. Col. Roemer that the remaining trucks had been dispatched to Mariveles and that all other munitions, supplies, official papers were about to be burned. Capt. Lazzarini returned to Mariveles arriving at approximately 5:00 am, reporting to Col. Hamilton that all trucks had been dispatched and that the remaining supplies, munitions, arms and official papers were ready to be burned at approximately 3:30 am.

Between 2:20 and 5:00 am the remaining trucks arrived in Mariveles and the "Tilly" loaded to capacity. The remaining munitions were placed on a barge heading for Corregidor and a detail consisting of Capt. Bartlett, Lt. Morgan, Corporal Bruer and Pvt McHam stayed on the barge which left at approximately 5:30 am and unloaded the chemical munitions in the bay, the detail arriving at Corregidor several hours later. Colonel Hamilton and Captain Lazzarini accompanied the chemical munitions on the "Tilly," the munitions being dumped into the bay as the "Tilly" proceeded to Corregidor, arriving there sometime after daybreak.


LOUIS T. LAZZARINI,
Captain, C. W. S.


Fort Mills, P. I.
April 10, 1942.

NB

On or about 4:45 am., April 9, 1942, at Mariveles Dock, P. I., Captain Louis T. Lazzarini, CWS., was directed by the undersigned in his official capacity as Chemical Officer, USFIP, to proceed by the Engineer tug "Tilly" on which some WP munitions were loaded and supervise the disposal thereof in the North Channel while enroute to Fort Mills, P. I., and to report to me upon arrival at Fort Mills.

Captain Lazzarini lost all of his personal belongings and equipment in carrying out this order as same were left at his last station, the Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan, P. I.

I did not anticipate that such orders to Captain Lazzarini would become necessary for the best interests of the CWS and the United States when I left the Chemical Warfare Depot on Mariveles Cut-off, during the evening of April 8, 1942, or Captain Lazzarini would have been properly informed thereof.



STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, C. W. S.,
Chemical Officer.

11 April 1942

Memo To: Colonel Hamilton

Re: Lt. Miles.

1st Lieut. Walter S. Strong, Hqrs. Company, 31st Infantry now on Corregidor made a statement to the undersigned substantially as follows:

"Lt. Miles was in a Mango Grove on Trail 2 about 3 kilometers this side of the San Vicente River Valley during the withdrawal of the 31st Infantry about 10 AM, April 7, when four Japanese artillery shells landing in the grove killing many and wounding several. I saw Lt. Miles and he had very severe wounds which I am certain that he would not pull through with. To my knowledge he was not evacuated and I am certain that he died from them. The location of the grove on the map is near Trail 2, the grid coordinates being 1863.4-826.3. Lt. Miles had been made the Adjutant of the 3rd Bn last Sunday."



(1st Lt. Charles A. Morgan, Jr.)

HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces in the Philippines
Fort Mills, P. I.

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO. 24)

12 April 1942.

	SECTION
Awards of Silver Star, Posthumous -----	I
Awards of Silver Star -----	II

I - Awards of Silver Star, Posthumous: Under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, War Department, August 8, 1932, the Silver Star is awarded posthumously by the Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, for gallantry in action, to the following named enlisted men of the United States Forces in the Philippines:

DOYLE H. KNIGHT, (38152188), Sergeant, 7th Chemical Company Service, (Aviation). For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on March 25, 1942. While in charge of a detail of five enlisted men engaged in the emergency field manufacture of a critical chemical(*) item of war material, Sergeant Knight, realizing the need for constant attention to, and regulation of the process, voluntarily remained in the immediate vicinity of the plant in the face of an alarm announcing an aerial bombardment by the enemy. A direct hit by a heavy enemy bomb killed this gallant noncommissioned officer and three of his associates. The example of heroic devotion to duty provided by this exploit, however, served as an inspiration to the entire personnel of his unit.
Next of kin: Mrs. Myrtle Knight, (Mother), Lennon, Michigan.

FLORENTINO GUILLERMO, Corporal, 301st Chemical Depot Company, Philippine Army. For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on March 25, 1942. While engaged, with four other enlisted men, in the emergency field manufacture of a critical chemical(*) item of war material, Corporal Guillermo, realizing the need for constant attention to, and regulation of the process, voluntarily remained in the immediate vicinity of the plant in the face of an alarm announcing an aerial bombardment by the enemy. A direct hit by a heavy bomb killed this gallant soldier and three of his associates. The example of heroic devotion to duty provided by this exploit, however, served as an inspiration to the entire personnel of his unit.

HENRY G. GANSZ, (38038084), Private First Class, 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation). For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on March 25, 1942. While engaged, with four other enlisted men, in the emergency field manufacture of a critical chemical(*) item of war material, Private First Class Gansz, realizing the need for constant attention to, and regulation of the process, voluntarily remained in the immediate vicinity of the plant in the face of an alarm announcing an aerial bombardment by the enemy. A direct hit by a heavy bomb killed this gallant soldier and three of his associates. The example of heroic devotion to duty provided by this exploit, however, served as an inspiration to the entire personnel of his unit.
Next of kin: Mrs. Ada Gansz, (Mother), 5831 Winthrop Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

RUFINO G. LEONARDO, (10305548), Private, Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment, Philippine Scouts. For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on March 25, 1942. While engaged with four other enlisted men in the emergency field manufacture of a critical chemical(*) item of war material, Private Leonardo, realizing the need for constant attention to and regulation of the process, voluntarily remained in the immediate vicinity of the plant in the face of an alarm announcing an aerial bombardment by the enemy. A direct hit by a heavy enemy bomb killed this gallant non-commissioned officer and three of his associates. The example of heroic devotion to duty provided by this exploit, however, served as an inspiration to the entire personnel of his unit.
Next of kin: (illegible)

*This word, chemical, has been pencilled out and a note by Col. Hamilton reads as follows:
"Not in my draft - G-1 (Col. Pilet and Major Murray) requested to have the word chemical knocked out - S.A.H."
Following this another note, dated April 14, reads:
"This GO to be recalled and retyped later."

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 24 (Cont'd)

II. Awards of Silver Star. Under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-45, War Department, August 8, 1932, the Silver Star is awarded by the Commanding General, United States Forces in the Philippines, for gallantry in action, to the following named officers and enlisted men of the United States Forces in the Philippines:

MAXON S. LOUGH, (0-3165), Brigadier General, U. S. Army. For gallantry in action in the vicinity of Abucay Hacienda, Bataan, Philippine Islands, during the period January 12-24, 1942. When the Philippine Division, under command of Brigadier General Lough was heavily engaged with enemy forces on the Abucay line, this gallant commander, disregarding almost continuous aerial bombardment and artillery fire, went forward on January 17, in a quarter-ton truck, to the combat zone where he personally supervised the counter attacks of his regiments. From this advanced and exposed command post, maintained against the advice of his subordinates, in total disregard of personal safety and for days without sleep, Brigadier General Lough exhibited courage and devotion to duty in the highest degree by maintaining constant contact with, and direct supervision over, the various units of his command. His consistent leadership, unselfish courage, and concern with the welfare of the personnel of his command were significant factors contributing to the successful operations against the enemy.

ROBERT B. LOTHROP, (0-18033), Major, Corps of Engineers. For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on January 5, 1942. When an enemy air attack had set fire to an oil storage tank and to barges along the dock nearby, Major Lothrop hastily obtained a group of civilian laborers and assisted in extinguishing the fires, thereby preventing the probable destruction of the power station and other important facilities in that vicinity. This courageous exploit was accomplished despite the imminent risk of being bombed from the air and of being engulfed in a flood of burning oil from conflagrations on both sides of the area.

JOSE RAZON, Major Philippine Army. For gallantry in action in Batangas Province, Philippine Islands, during the periods February 1-6 and February 12-13, 1942, respectively. When certain supplies became urgently needed by his garrison, Major Razon, in company with one other officer, voluntarily proceeded on two occasions to enemy held territory, and despite the hazards of imminent capture or death, remained therein for the periods mentioned above, reconnoitering the area in close proximity to hostile troops, and arranging for the procurement of shipments of supplies. On both occasions this officer's initiative and devotion to duty in the face of obstacles resulted in a successful culmination when the urgently needed cargoes were discharged at their destination.

LOUIS E. NANTZ, (0-890070), Captain, Quartermaster Corps. For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on January 5, 1942. When an enemy air attack had set fire to an oil storage tank and to barges along the dock nearby, Captain Nantz hastily obtained a group of civilian laborers and, notwithstanding the continuation of the air raids, assisted in extinguishing the fires, thereby preventing the probable destruction of the power station and other important facilities in that vicinity. This courageous exploit was accomplished despite the imminent risk of being engulfed in a flood of burning oil from conflagrations on both sides of the area.

JOSE P. RUEDA, Captain, Philippine Constabulary. For gallantry in action in Batangas Province, Philippine Islands, during the months of January and February, 1942. When certain supplies became urgently needed by his garrison, Captain Rueda voluntarily made repeated trips to territory occupied by enemy forces, and despite the hazards of imminent capture or death, remained therein for extensive periods, reconnoitering areas in close proximity to hostile troops and arranging for the procurement of shipments of supplies. On three occasions this officer's initiative and devotion to duty in the face of obstacles resulted in a successful culmination when the urgently needed cargoes were safely discharged at their destination.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 24 (Cont'd)

II. Awards of Silver Star. (Cont'd)

PROSPERO G. DELALAMON, (10306771), Private First Class, Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment, Philippine Scouts. For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, on March 25, 1942. While engaged, with four other enlisted men, in the emergency field manufacture of a critical chemical(*) item of war material, Private First Class Delalamon, realizing the need for constant attention to, and regulation of the process, voluntarily remained in the immediate vicinity of the plant in the face of an alarm announcing an aerial bombardment by the enemy. A direct hit by a heavy bomb killed the four associates of this gallant soldier. The example of heroic devotion to duty provided by this exploit, however, served as an inspiration to the entire personnel of his unit.
Home address: 143 Kabitunan Street, Cebu, Cebu, Philippine Islands.

By command of Lieutenant General WAINWRIGHT:

LEWIS C. BEEBE,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Carl H. Seals
CARL H. SEALS,
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General.

*This word, chemical, has been pencilled out and a note by Col. Hamilton reads as follows:
"Not in my draft - G-1 (Col. Pilet and Major Murray) requested to have the word chemical knocked out - S.A.H."
Following this another note, dated April 14, reads:
"This GO to be recalled and retyped later."

CEBU ADVANCE QUARTERMASTER DEPOT
Office of the Commanding Officer

Cebu, Cebu, P. I.

Wrapper Ind.

Office of the C.O. Cebu Advance Q.M.D. Dec. 17/41
To: Department Quartermaster, Philippine Dept., Manila, P. I.

1. None of the items requested are available in this office. They appear to be chemical warfare equipment.

J.D. Cook
J.D. COOK,
Lt. Colonel, QMC,
Commanding

Attch.

(The following pencilled notes appear at the bottom of this wrapper indorsement:

"To Chemical Officer, Col. Hamilton."

"This reqn. dated Dec. 15, 1941 - - Received at Fort Mills, P. I. April 13, 1942. No boats available and nowhere near the amounts or types requested now at Mills - File in Journal.

S.A.H.")


REQUISITION


To: Department Quartermaster, U.S. Army No. of sheets 1 Sheet No. 1
Port Area, Manila, P.I.
Requisition No. Date December 15, 1941 Period emergency

SHIP TO: Division Quartermaster, 101st Division, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, P. I.

REQUISITIONED BY: (show Signature, Rank, Organization,
Destination. If different from "SHIP TO" include address)

APPROVED BY:


D. G. SORIANO
Captain, Infantry
Division Quartermaster, 101st Div.


J. P. VACHON,
Colonel, Inf (USA)
Comdg, 101st Division

STOCK NO.	ARTICLE	UNIT	ON HAND & DUE	CONSUMED	REQUIRED	APPROVED
	Alarm, gas, siren type	ea.	none	none	222	222
	Agent, Demustardizing, Bleach	lb	none	none	17800	17800
	Agent, Demustardizing, non-corrosive	qt	none	none	3793	3793
	Apparatus, Demustardizing, pressure type, 3-gal	ea	none	none	216	216
	Apparatus, Demustardizing, 1-1/2 qt., 1 per vehicle	ea	none	none	801	801
	Canister, Diaphragm & Service, (5% additional)	ea	none	none	454	454
	Collective Protector, Field	ea	none	none	1	1
	Curtain, Gas Proof	ea	none	none	890	890
	Impregnite, Shoe	lb	none	none	4365	4365
	Kit, repair, gas mask, Company	ea	none	none	83	83
	Kit, repair, gas mask, Regiment	ea	none	none	7	7
	Mask, gas, Diaphragm	ea	none	none	2143	2143
	Mask, gas, Service	ea	none	none	6562	6562
	Mask, gas, Training	ea	none	none	8705	8705
	Ointment, Protective	tube	none	none	8705	8705
	Opener, Unit Container, CT.	ea	none	none	22	22
	Respirator, Dust, M-1,	ea	none	none	8004	8004
	Respirator, Dust, Commercial Type	ea	none	none	341	341
	Set, anti-dim, (20% additional)	ea	none	none	1752	1752

Basis of Issue - TBA

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the items requisitioned are urgently needed to completely equip the different units of the 101st Division, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.


D. G. SORIANO
Captain, Infantry
Division Quartermaster, 101st Div.

AMERICAN ENLISTED MEN'S MESS - USFIP
Fort Mills, P. I.

MENUS

April 2, 1942 - Breakfast - Prunes, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Baked beans, bread, water.
Supper - Baked salmon, rice, tomatoes, jello and coffee.

April 3, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Spaghetti, bread and ice tea.
Supper - Beef hash, rice, cocoanut pudding, coffee.

April 4, 1942 - Breakfast - Fried rice, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Rice soup, bread and water.
Supper - Rice, breaded tomatoes, coffee, bread, raisin pudding.

April 5, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, toast, bacon and coffee.
Dinner - Baked beans, bread and coffee.
Supper - Vienna sausage, potatoes, bread, coffee, ice cream.

April 6, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Baked salmon, rice, bread and water.
Supper - Corned beef hash, rice, corn, bread, cocoanut pudding, coffee.

April 7, 1942 - Breakfast - Prunes, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Vienna sausage, rice, biscuits, ice tea.
Supper - Corned beef hash, rice, breaded tomatoes, coffee, bread, jello.

April 8, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Baked beans, bread and ice tea.
Supper - Baked ham, rice, breaded tomatoes, corn bread, pie, coffee.

April 9, 1942 - Breakfast - Raisins, toast, bacon and coffee.
Dinner - Rice-tomato soup, bread and water.
Supper - Corned beef, rice, peas, bread pudding, bread and coffee.

April 10, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Baked beans, bread and water.
Supper - Corned beef hash, rice, breaded tomatoes, rice pudding, coffee.

April 11, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, toast and coffee.
Dinner - Corned beef, rice, bread.
Supper - Corned beef, corn, rice, bread, and pineapple squares.

April 12, 1942 - Breakfast - Corned beef, boiled potato, bread, and coffee.
Dinner - Baked beans, bread and water.
Supper - Stew, rice, bread, cocoanut (ground).

April 13, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, bread and coffee.
Dinner - Corned beef, rice, bread and water.
Supper - Corned beef, rice, breaded tomatoes, bread, cocoanut-raisin pudding.

April 14, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, bacon, bread and tea.
Dinner - Spaghetti and bread.
Supper - Vienna sausage, peas, rice, bread, peach pie.

NOTE: - Mess has been without sugar, condiments (except salt and pepper) for weeks. An occasional bottle of ketchup is served. Servings usually rather small.

OFFICERS MESS - USFIP.
Fort Mills, P. I.

MENUS

April 2, 1942 - Breakfast - Cracked wheat, creamed beef, bread, coffee, milk.
Supper - Stew, 2 slices bread, bread-raisin pudding, water.

April 3, 1942 - Breakfast - 1 slice French toast w/imitation syrup, bacon, cracked wheat, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corned beef, rice and gravy, 2 slices bread, iced tea.

April 4, 1942 - Breakfast - Creamed salmon, 2 slices bread, cracked wheat, coffee, milk.
Supper - Vienna sausage, rice, tomatoes, 2 slices, rice-raisin-cocoanut pudding, water.

April 5, 1942 - Breakfast - Creamed beef (very thin), cracked wheat, 2 slices bread, coffee, milk.
Supper - Baked beans, tomatoes, peas, rice, gravy, 2 slices bread, water.

April 6, 1942 - Breakfast - Creamed meat, 1 slice bread, cracked wheat, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corned beef hash, navy beans, rice, gravy, tomatoes, 1 slice bread, apple pie, iced tea.

April 7, 1942 - Breakfast - Bacon scraps, corn fritter, w/imitation syrup, raisins, cracked wheat, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corned beef hash, spaghetti, corn, 1 slice Dill pickle, 1 slice bread, raisin-cocoanut pudding, water.

April 8, 1942 - Breakfast - Creamed salmon, prunes, 1 slice bread, potatoes creamed, coffee, milk.
Supper - Vienna sausage, rice, tomatoes, 2 slices bread, water.

April 9, 1942 - Breakfast - Creamed ham (very thin), cracked wheat, raisins, 1 slice bread, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corned beef hash, peas, rice, navy beans, 1 slice bread, tea.

April 10, 1942 - Breakfast - Creamed salmon, cracked wheat, 1 slice bread, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corned beef hash, baked beans, rice, 1 slice bread, water.

April 11, 1942 - Breakfast - Sardines, cracked wheat, 1 slice bread, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corned beef, 2 slices bread, gravy, corn, raisin pudding, iced tea (sweetened)

April 12, 1942 - Breakfast - Baked beans, cracked wheat, 2 slices bread, coffee, milk.
Supper - Stew, rice, 2 slices bread, raisin-bread-cocoanut pudding.

April 13, 1942 - Breakfast - Meat gravy, 2 slices bread, cracked wheat, coffee, milk.
Supper - Corn beef hash, gravy, tomatoes, 1 slice bread, fruit-cocoanut pudding, water.

April 14, 1942 - Breakfast - Slice French toast, imitation syrup, bacon, prunes, cracked wheat, tea, milk.
Supper - Rice, gravy, peas, Vienna sausage, 1 slice bread, rice-raisin pudding, water.

NOTE: - Mess has been without sugar for weeks. Pepper, salt only available. Milk in above menus is watered evaporated milk. "Creamed" in the menus is flour and water. Servings not large but adequate.

No lunches were served to the officers.

Log Book for April 15, 1942.

Original Radiogram as received finally today.

10 RN

WASH DC 07 1540

Commanding General,
USFIP, Fort Mills, P. I.

ONE THREE TWO ONE - IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS JAPANESE GAS MASKS
DEFICIENT IN PROTECTION AGAINST CYANOGEN CHLORIDE COMMA HYDROCYANIC ACID
AND ARSENIC DESIRE SHIP FASTEST AVAILABLE MEANS MINIMUM FIVE MASKS AND FIVE
ADDITIONAL CANISTERS

ULIO

Received in secret code.

(Note by Colonel Hamilton: The actual wording of this radio not obtained nor obtainable to CWS office until April 15th, 1942. S.A.H.)

Paraphrase of radiogram received April 8 by Lt. Schaf from G-2.

RADIOGRAM FROM WASHINGTON
BROUGHT IN BY COL. WOOD G-2

PARAPHRASE: SEND MINIMUM OF FIVE MASKS WITH FIVE ADDITIONAL
CANISTERS. TEST MASK FOR CYANOGEN CHLORIDE, HCN, ARSENIC.
ULIO.

Remark by Colonel Hamilton re: Paraphrase of Radiogram received by Lt. Schaf.

"Incorrect and misleading paraphrase." S. A. H.

Radiogram in reply.
Secret Code
AG WAR WASHINGTON

7:30 pm., 4/11/42.

REURAD ONE THREE TWO ONE STOP FIVE JAPANESE GAS MASKS AND FIVE ADDITIONAL
CANISTERS WILL BE SHIPPED ON FIRST AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION END

WAINWRIGHT

Shipment of Japanese Gas Masks

(1) To: C/S, USFIP.

Cml. O. - 15 April, 1942.

1. War Department secret radio dated April 7th directs shipment to US by fastest available means minimum five masks and five additional canisters in order to investigate report Japanese gas masks deficient in protection against cyanogen chloride, hydrocyanic acid and arsenic.

2. Two boxes each weighing 15 pounds, displacement about three quarters (3/4) cubic foot were turned over for shipment as directed on April 8, 1942. Please note CN (1) dated April 11, 1942, copy attached.

3. The US Army gas mask protects against normal field concentrations of the above mentioned gases. If definitely established that Japanese gas masks do not so protect (some of those captured on Bataan bear manufacture dates of 1940 and 1941), it is barely possible that the US defensive policy on this subject may be changed in order to more rapidly terminate the present conflict.

4. It is again recommended that special effort be made to dispatch these samples as directed by the War Department.

S. A. H.
S. A. H.
Cml. O.

1 Incl.
Copy CN (1) 4/11/42

Shipment of Japanese Gas Masks to US

(1) To: G-4 and C/S, USFIP.

Cml. O. USFIP, 11 April, 1942.

Two boxes containing the items referred to in WD radio dated April 7, 1942, were packed and turned over to the AC/S, G-2, USFIP (Col. Wood) on April 8, 1942. The WD directed that these items be shipped by the fastest transportation available. The boxes are still at Fort Mills, P. I.

Recommend that (1) same be shipped as directed by the War Department

(2) the three attached shipping tags be authenticated as indicated, one to be attached to each box and one to be delivered to the officer courier first transporting these boxes from Fort Mills, P. I. to _____.

The tests directed in this WD radio have not been completed as certain phases thereof must be conducted in the open and special apparatus prepared therefor, both of which have been delayed due to enemy aerial activity.

S. A. H.
Cml. O.

3 Incls -
Shipping Tags.

Copied from original furnished emergency addressee

DECORATIONS AND AWARDS BRANCH
MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION, AGO

Initials fn
Date 12-1-42

RECORD OF AWARD OF DECORATION BY AGENCY OTHER THAN WAR DEPARTMENT

Last Name	First Name	Middle Initial	Serial No.	Grade
SCHAF JR.	FRANK	L	0-396 583	1st Lt.
Organization	Foreign		Others	
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE				
Headquarters	Sta. or APO	C.O. No.	Section	Date
US ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST, FORT MILLS, P.I.		9		14 Jan 42
Type of Award	Posthumous			
SILVER STAR	NO			
Oak Leaf Clusters	Number	Posthumous		
By Command of	Amended	Revoked		

CITATION

For gallantry in action at Fort Mills, Corregidor, Philippine Islands, January 5, 1942. A hostile aerial bombardment began while quantities of a chemical agent were being disposed of under the supervision of Lieutenant Schaf. Realizing that a heavy concentration of this chemical would force masking by nearby troops and lessen their effectiveness, Lieutenant Schaf left his place of shelter during the bombardment without regard for his personal safety, and closed the valves of the chemical containers, thus materially aiding our forces in their defensive efforts.

Home address: Mrs. F. L. Schaf (Mother)
2532 Bell Place,
Walnut Hills,
Cincinnati, Ohio.

Copy
3-13-45
APF

WD,AGO Form No. 079
1 October 1943

RESTRICTED

SECTION D

REPRODUCTION OF REPORTS
MADE BY UNDERSIGNED
SINCE SURRENDER OF CORREGIDOR
6 MAY 1942

RESTRICTED

SECTION 11

6 MAY 1941

Tarlac Concentration Camp
Tarlac, Philippine Islands
14 June 1942

SUBJECT: My Reminiscences of Corregidor

TO : Concentration Camp Commander

1. Several dates during the siege of Corregidor come vividly to my mind:

a. January 4, 1942, around midday a heavy aerial attack took place with Bottomside area apparently the objective. Numerous fires were started around the warehouses, work shops, central power plant and the Engineer area. These fires could not be brought under control for many hours. In one of the warehouses, I lost practically all of my personal effects, clothing, files, etc., including a small file safe containing official maps and records from my office at Headquarters, Philippine Department.

b. March 25, 1942, during a heavy air raid my Oldsmobile sedan, which was parked near the Bottomside Post Exchange was almost completely demolished. The Post Exchange was burned to the ground. While driving my car to the gravel pit near the Navy Tunnel, another air raid took place during which I was struck on the buttocks by a rock, while laying flat in a gutter near the Bottomside Bakery. My car was subsequently partially repaired and made usable minus two doors, windows and part of the top.

c. April 13, 1942, my car was hit several times by Artillery fire from Bataan and completely burned up while parked in Malinta Cove.

d. Night of May 5-6, 1942. From 10 P.M. May 5 to 12:30 A.M. May 6, I was on the small boat landing on the South Mine Dock, Corregidor. During this time a terrific steady artillery attack took place which I clearly observed from this location. The concussions and vibrations caused by these shells were plainly heard, some seen and felt from my exposed position. Toward the latter part of the bombardment, machine gun fire was heard from the tail of the island, Monkey Point. A searchlight from Fort Hughes came into action and played on this sector. I returned to Malinta Tunnel about 1:00 A.M. May 6, 1942 and learned shortly afterward that the Japanese had landed on the tail of the island.

e. May 6, 1942. From the radio booth in Malinta Tunnel I listened to the Chief of Staff, USFIP (Brig. Gen. L. C. Beebe), broadcast the surrender of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays.

f. May 6 to May 23, 1942. A Prisoner of War in Lateral No. 10 of Malinta Tunnel, until boarding the S. S. Hokko Maru on the afternoon of the twenty-third enroute to Manila.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C. W.S.

N.B.

Report required by
Nipponese Camp Commander (Col. Ito)

PERSONAL EXPERIENCES DURING WORLD WAR II
(Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, CWS, 0-4663)

Copy of Report called for by Nipponese Camp Commander at Karenko - Taiwan, March 22, 1943.

1. On December 8, 1941, when War Department Radio:

"A state of war exists between Japan and the U. S."

was received in my office at Headquarters Philippine Department, Fort Santiago, Manila, P. I., I was preparing an itinerary of my next annual inspections to begin January 1942 with one of Pettitt Barracks, Zamboanga, Mindanao. During the present war, and in fact since my arrival in the P.I. in February 1940, my official duties have been those of the Chemical Officer on the staff respectively of the Commanding Generals, (a) Philippine Department, (b) United States Army Forces in the Far East, (c) United States Forces in the Philippines, as long as their respective headquarters continued to function in the Philippine Islands.

Immediately upon receipt of the above mentioned radio, strenuous effort was made to expedite construction of warehouses at Fort William McKinley, Clark, and Nichols Fields, and also to expedite movement from the Port Area, Manila, of gas masks and gas defensive supplies.

From the 8th to the 25th of December 1941, the undersigned slept at his office at Fort Santiago, returning to his quarters on Military Plaza twice daily for meals, change of uniform, etc. From December 25th to 30th inclusive, the Chemical Office was operated on a 24-hour basis from my quarters, No. 6, Military Plaza. This office was closed at 4:00 P.M. December 30th and opened same time and date at Headquarters United States Army Forces in the Far East, Fort Mills, P.I.

In Manila, the shortage of transportation (motor, rail and water) and the impossibility of keeping Filipino laborers at work during a Nipponese air raid anywhere near their place of work, coupled with the frequency and severity of such raids in the Cavité - Nichols Field - Manila Area, greatly delayed and often prevented the shipment of many supplies to their ultimate destinations. The result was that many gas masks and kindred supplies had to be abandoned in the Manila Area. Numerous masks were turned over to civilian agencies such as the American Red Cross, Civilian Emergency Administration, and to the Public Health Service. These latter two were agencies of the Philippine Commonwealth Government.

I vividly recollect watching the Nipponese air raids in December 1941 on the Cavité Navy Yard - Nichols Field and Port Area. As soon as possible after such air raids the effective results thereof were inspected. I also witnessed the burning of the Intendencia Building and the St. Dominican Cathedral near the Pasig River and the bombing of Fort Santiago. The latter bombing wrecked the offices of the Department Commander and of the Adjutant General - also the Army Pasig River parking area. Numerous bombings of the Port Area and Quartermaster installations were also observed.

In Manila, general supervision through commissioned assistants and unit commanders was exercised over the mobilizing, equipping and moving of the 301st Chemical Depot Company (Philippine Army) to and the establishment on Bataan of a Chemical Depot. Like supervision was exercised over the movement of the 4th Separate Chemical Company and of the 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation) to Bataan.

During the period, January 1st to May 6th, 1942, my main office was in the improvised Chemical Laboratory of the USAFFE in the Malinta Tunnel, Fort Mills, P. I. Up until the fall of Bataan on April 9th, 1942, I also maintained a secondary office in a Nipa shack at the Chemical Warfare Depot on Bataan. By means of frequent inspections on Bataan and within the Harbor Defenses of Manila Bay, the undersigned, as a special staff officer, kept his Commanding General informed concerning all matters of chemical defensive training and supply within the command.

As I do not have a diary with which to refresh my memory, the 1942 calendar record of my inspection trips together with a brief of those activities or events which now come to my mind follows:

1942

Days on Bataan

January 12-13; 16-18; 27-31
February 1-5; 17-28
March 1-3; 5-13; 17-18; 20-21
April 4-9th (6:00 A.M.)

Days on Corregidor

January 1-11; 14-15; 19-26
February 6-11; 12-16
March 4; 14-16; 19; 22-31
April 1-3; 9-30
May 1-6th (Surrender)
May 7-23 (Prisoner of War)

These inspection trips covered general supervision and actual check of the following activities:

I Bataan

- (a) Chemical Warfare Depot: Normal depot activities.

(b) 301st Chemical Depot Company (Philippine Army) and the American Chemical Depot Detachment. This Company and detachment were assigned to additional duty as Infantry in defense of the Cutad Bay sector during the Pucot Hill fight in January - February 1942. Frequent inspections of these units while in position during Nipponese action. Subsequently these units continued in reserve in this sector until April 8, 1942, and were frequently inspected there.

- (c) 4th Separate Chemical Company while on duty as Infantry in the southwest sector of Bataan.

(d) 7th Chemical Company Service (Aviation) while on Military Police duty on the Bagac-Mariveles Road. After February 1st, 1942, the functioning of this company and the 4th Separate Chemical Company when they were attached to the 31st Infantry (American) for duty as Infantrymen - was also followed.

(e) Investigation of the effects of Nipponese bombing of Cabcaban with white phosphorus in February 1942 and later WP bombings in the Bagac and Mt. Limay sectors.

(f) Gas defense training and supply through headquarters 26th Cav. 31st Inf. (American), each Corps, division and rear echelon commander.

- (g) Improvised field manufacture and distribution of liquid bleach for sanitary purposes.

II (Harbor Defenses of Manila Bay)

Here my experiences and responsibilities were in general similar to those on Bataan insofar as applicable to local installations and personnel with the following additions:

- (a) Operation of an improvised chemical laboratory in Malinta.

(b) Improvised field manufacture of sulphuric acid for use as electrolyte in storage batteries. In March 1942 four of my soldier detail (2 American NCO's - 1 Philippine Scout NCO and 1 Philippine Army Private) were killed instantly by a direct hit from a Nipponese airplane while operating this field plant.

(c) Preparation for issue to troops of high test hypochlorite for the purification of drinking water.

(d) January 4, 1942 - Supervision and direction of our futile efforts to save the main Chemical Warfare Depot which had been set afire by Nipponese bombers. The effects of this bombing were most disastrous to the Bottomside installations.

(e) March 25, 1942 - I was struck by a heavy rock while taking shelter in an open concrete drainage ditch near the Bottomside Bakery during a Nipponese air raid. This same raid destroyed the Post Exchange and native barracks at Bottomside and damaged my official car.

(f) April 13, 1942 - From a defiladed position I observed the final destruction of my official car by burning caused by Nipponese artillery fire from Bataan. The car was parked in Malinta Cove just below the north entrance to the Malinta Tunnel Hospital.

(g) Night of May 5th, 6th, 1942 - From the South Dock at Fort Mills, I observed in this exposed position the terrific artillery bombardment of Corregidor during the early evening - especially on the Middleside Scout Garrison - Morrison Hill - Bottomside - Malinta Hill and Kindley Field sectors. Toward the latter part of this bombardment (11:30 P. M.) I heard machine gun fire toward the tail of the island (Monkey Point - east end) and saw several white and greenish flares in this direction. Upon my return to Malinta Tunnel early May 6th I learned that some Nipponese troops had landed near the tail of the island.

(h) About 10:30 A. M. May 6th, 1942, from the door of the radio booth in Malinta Tunnel I listened to Brigadier General L. C. Beebe, G. S., C/S - USFIP, broadcast the surrender of the four fortified islands in the H. D. of Manila Bay, same to become effective at noon May 6th, 1942.

Since May 6th, 1942, I have been a prisoner of war under control of the Imperial Nipponese Army successively to Corregidor, Pasay Accommodation Place (Manila), Bilibid Prison and Tarlac Concentration Camp, all in the P. I. I arrived in Taiwan Prison Camp No. 4, Karenko on August 17, 1942, the day that I completed 30 years service in the armed forces of the United States.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
P. W. No. 51

Taiwan Prison Camp No. 4
March 22d, 1943.

RECONSTRUCTED ROSTER

of the

FOURTH SEPARATE CHEMICAL COMPANY (WEAPONS)

FORT MCKINLEY, P. I.

1941

The attached tabulation is based upon data extracted from Casualty Branch, Visi-Card and Report, War Department AGO Forms 035 dated 1 October 1945, which were received from the Adjutant General, War Department, as inclosures to 2nd Indorsement, dated 29 June 1946, file AGPC-G 704.1 (18 Jun 46).

The code used in this tabulation is as follows:

EUS - Evacuated to the United States
DED - Determined dead
KIA - Killed in action
RMC - Returned to military control
D - Dead
DNB - Died, non-battle
RTD - Returned to duty

Strength of this company two officers and sixty-four enlisted men. Casualties from all causes amounted to forty-three men or sixty-five per cent. Returned to military control and evacuated to the United States twenty-two men or thirty-five per cent.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, CWS.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>
<u>Major</u>			
Harrison, Charles F. (Transferred to Philippine Division 1 December 1941) Mr. Charles F. Harrison (Father) Leesburg, Virginia	019173	31 May 44	DED
<u>Captain</u>			
Bartlett, Leland D. Mrs. Grace Bartlett (Wife) P. O. Box 705, El Paso, Texas	0213258	27 Sep 45	EUS
<u>1st Lieutenant</u>			
Webb, John T. Mr. John E. Webb (Father) Route No. 2, Ironton, Ohio	0393858	15 Dec 44	KIA
<u>1st Sergeant</u>			
LeBlanc, Joseph R., Jr. Mr. Joseph R. LeBlanc, Sr. (Father) Rt. No. 2, Box 135, Abbeville, La.	6920916	6 Sep 45	RMC & EUS
<u>Staff Sergeant</u>			
Reed, Raymond Mrs. Marie D. Reed (Mother) Eunice, La.	6371181	10 Oct 45	EUS
<u>Sergeant</u>			
Geiger, Andrew Mrs. Frances Spittel (Sister) 217 Centre Street, Horicon, Wisconsin	6532887	10 Oct 45	EUS
Mullins, Jasper C. Mrs. Dora Mullins (Mother) Sneedville, Tennessee	6571240	NS	RMC & EUS
Wallace, Oscar Mrs. Mattie L. Wallace (Mother) 1123 N. Flores St., San Antonio, Texas	6275223	10 Jul 45	DNB
Stroh, James W., Jr. Mr. James W. Stroh, Sr. (Father) Stuttgart, Arkansas	17013740	23 Jan 43	DNB
<u>Corporal</u>			
Batton, William J. Mr. Harvey A. Batton (Father) General Delivery, Bogaluse, La.	6561073	3 Jul 42	Died
Briggs, Peter Mr. Josia Briggs (Father) Box 1603, Carmel, California	39011385	9 Jul 43	D
Chambers, Robert L. Mr. Robert Chambers (Father) 6041 Hoeveler Street, Pittsburgh, Penna.	13009030	8 Oct 45	EUS
Davis, Calvin L. Esther I. Porter (Sister) 222 First Avenue, Haddon Heights, N. J.	6891416	8 May 44	DED
Mitchell, Wayman R. Mrs. Laverne Mitchell (Mother) Rt. No. 1, Kosse, Texas	6295235	16 Jan 42	Died
Parrett, Wilmer L. Mrs. Cora Bowers (Mother) 574 S. Carroll St., Wabash, Indiana	6641813	1 Oct 45	EUS
Pinto, Gene N. Mr. Antonio Pinto (Father) 8034 Lyons Avenue, Philadelphia 42, Penna.	6891413	22 May 42	DNB
Scanlon, John F. Mrs. Anna Sagendorf (Step-Mother) 1155 Decatur St., Brooklyn, N.Y.	12007330	1 Oct 45	EUS
Solomon, Donald L. E. Mr. Charles Solomon (Father) 430 S. Benton St., Hastings, Michigan	6828273	1 Jun 42	DNB
Weatherman, Lester L. Mr. Jack B. Weatherman (Brother) 1248 W. 11th St., Los Angeles, California	19003070	10 Oct 45	EUS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>
<u>Private First Class</u>			
Bell, Walter L. Mrs. Myrtle Bell (Mother) Whitehead, North Carolina	6993796	10 Oct 45	EUS
Bond, Richard W. Mrs. Martha Bond (Mother) 416-1/2 W. Cameron St., Hanford, California	19000487	6 Sep 45	RMC & EUS
Brown, James C. Mr. Frank S. Brown (Brother) c/o Miss Mildred A. Rowan, Executive Secretary, ARC, Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho	6532983	20 Oct 42	Died
Carter, Jonnie T. Mr. Dock A. Carter (Father) Rt. No. 4, Box 259, Danville, Virginia	6896200	10 Sep 45	RMC & EUS
Chenoweth, Arthur A. Mrs. Pearl M. Chenoweth (Mother) General Delivery, Jennings, Kansas	19053175	NS	EUS
Harrell, Thomas E. Mrs. Alta Mae Harrell (Mother) 1012 Montrose Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee	7082022	NS	EUS
Leavitt, Ernest E. Mrs. Evelyn Leavitt (Mother) 190 Main St., Bridgton, Maine	6149290	1 Jul 42	DNB
Ryan, Daniel F. Miss Virginia Ryan (Sister) 68 Harmon, Brooklyn, N.Y. (c/o May King)	19006227	20 Jun 42	DNB
<u>Private</u>			
Ballard, James M. Louise M. Ballard (Mother) 836 W. Cherry St., Compton, California	6286126	NS	EUS
Bardin, Robert V. Mrs. Vera Bardin (Mother) General Delivery, Canal Point, Florida	19051905	1 Oct 45	EUS
Bates, Arthur E. Mrs. Neva Bates (Mother) General Delivery, Smithville, Oklahoma	18052530	24 Oct 44	DED
Bloom, Charles Mrs. Mannie Moseman (Sister) 23 Dock Drive, Freeport, New York	R-2451081	13 May 42	Died
Burns, Dan W. Mrs. Edith L. Burns (Mother) P. O. Box 15, Alpaugh, California	19002235	9 Dec 43	RTD
Butler, James D. Mrs. Miriam Butler (Mother) 309 Linwood St., Houston, Texas	18080121	24 Oct 44	DED
Chilcoat, Harold R. Mrs. Dora Chilcoat (Mother) Riverside Inn, Woodland, Washington	19004354	2 Jul 42	Died
Clinkscales, Edgar H., Jr. Mr. Edgar H. Clinkscales (Father) 5053 Casaloma Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio	19013525	18 Sep 42	DNB
Conway, John D., Jr. Mr. & Mrs. John D. Conway (Parents) 2421 N. Orkney St., Philadelphia, Penna.	13027786	8 Jun 42	DNB
Daniels, Elgin W. Mr. Edward G. Daniels (Father) Rt. No. 1, Eldorado, Arkansas	17027608	6 Jul 42	DNB
Davis, Paul Mrs. Mary Davis (Mother) 108 Hudson St., Philipsburg, New Jersey	6897680	14 Oct 45	EUS
Dawson, James D. Mr. Roy Dawson (Father) 2011-1/2 Western Avenue, Mattoon, Illinois	16019359	23 Sep 42	Died
Evans, Tommie Mr. James W. Evans (Father) General Delivery, Brook, Oklahoma	18052382	30 May 42	Died
Gagnon, Arthur J. Mr. Juddle G. Gagnon (Father), 437 Beech Street, Holyoke, Massachusetts.	6148663	14 Jun 42	DNB

NAME	SERIAL NO.	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY
Private (Cont'd.)			
Gaines, Delmar E. Mrs. Gladys Gaines (Mother) Rt. No. 3, Box 222, Hood River, Oregon	19021171	20 Sep 45	EUS
Garner, Clyde A. Mr. William C. Garner (Brother) Cedar City, Utah	39678695	26 Jun 42	DNB
Golland, Daniel G. Mrs. Sophie Golland (Mother) 2340 N. 15th St., Milwaukee, Wisconsin	16046196	10 Sep 42	Died
Grant, Vaughn P. Mrs. Eva Grant (Mother) 150 Brown Street, Waltham, Massachusetts	11030584	26 Jul 42	Died
Henson, Lee R. Mrs. Lydia E. Waggoner (Mother) 120 Maderia Street, Salinas, California	18052527	27 Sep 45	EUS
Hollingsworth, James L. Mr. Robert E. Hollingsworth (Father) 7620 Florissant, Normandy, Missouri	17030941	24 Oct 44	Died
Huff, Vernon G. Mr. Marvin Huff (Brother) Camp Robinson, Little Rock, Arkansas	19052637	7 Sep 45	RMC & EUS
Isbell, Gerald W. Mr. George Isbell (Father) Rt. No. 5, Clarksville, Texas	18063060	24 Oct 44	KIA
Lindley, Eugene W. Mr. Herman Tholen (Uncle) 5811 Katy Street, Houston, Texas	18060098	15 Oct 42	Died
May, Raymond W. Mrs. Myrtle B. May (Mother) 810 E. Avenue C, Sweetwater, Texas	18015659	24 Oct 44	DED
McCain, Edward J. Mrs. Pauline R. McCain (Mother) 103 Milwaukee St., Mt. Vernon, Washington	19059032	16 Jun 42	Died
Mercado, Fred F. Mrs. Amelia Mercado (Mother) 1124 E. 4th Street, Santa Ana, California	18043892	1 Jul 43	D
Morton, Harold K. Emergency Addressee and Beneficiary not designated.	6214160	17 Jun 42	Died
Mussen, Alvin W. Mrs. N. Evangela Mussen (Mother) 2445 N. Myers St., Burbank, California	19048616	1 Jul 44	DED
Robinson, Charles C. Mrs. Ella G. Robinson (Mother) 189 Santa Clara Ave., Oakland, California	19052615	28 May 42	DNB
Rogers, George W. Mrs. Cecelia M. Rogers (Mother) 1086-A S. Kings Highway, St. Louis, Mo.	17030895	1 Oct 45	EUS
Spear, Frank Mrs. Leola L. Pruett (Mother) 1537 Wabash St., Kansas City, Missouri	19011594	19 Jul 45	DNB
Steele, William G., Jr. Mr. William G. Steele, Sr. (Father) General Delivery, Iowa Park, Texas	18063061	11 May 42	Died
Stier, James A. Mr. Leo J. Stier (Father) Grandmeadow, Minnesota	37030360	8 May 44	D
Taylor, Robert W. Mrs. Mary J. Taylor (Mother) 199 S. Oakland Avenue, Los Angeles, California	19055015	26 May 42	DNB
Wallace, Leonard A. Mr. Dan Wallace (Father) Rt. No. 2, Battle Ground, Washington	19004353	20 Jun 42	DNB
Weitzner, Daniel N. Mrs. Rose Weitzner (Mother) 1539 Fairfield Avenue, Bridgeport, Conn.	6299215	NS	EUS
Wilson, Charles M. Mrs. Flora Wilson (Mother) 1027 Downey Street, Radford, Virginia	6852931	14 July 45	DNB
Wisz, Edward J. Mrs. Francis Wisz (Mother) 218 Broad Street, Johnstown, Penna.	6893321	24 Oct 44	DED
Wydel, Joseph A. Mrs. Catherine Wydel (Mother) 2 Weatherill St., New Philadelphia, Silver Creek, Penna.	13004893	24 Oct 44	DED

EA 330.32-201
EA (18 June 46)
HQ. 9710 TSU-CWS, CW Center, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland

1st Ind.

RJP/vmm

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Casualty Branch

1. Request this Headquarters be furnished information as outlined in paragraph 2 of basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

/s/ Raymond J. Pettine
RAYMOND J. PETTINE
Captain, AGD
Adjutant

AGPC-G 704.1
(18 Jun 46)

2nd Ind.

SCF/erb

WD, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 29 June 1946

TO: CG, 9710 TSU-CWS, CW Center, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland.

1. Information requested in basic communication is inclosed.
2. Private Manuel L. Cruse and Private Walter M. Seldonridge cannot be identified.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

/s/ Katherine F. Whelan
Adjutant General

Inclosures

ARMY SERVICE FORCES
CHEMICAL WARFARE CENTER
EDGEWOOD ARSENAL, MARYLAND

18 June 1946

SUBJECT: Fourth Separate Chemical Company (W) Fort McKinley, P. I., 1941

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Casualty Branch

1. There follows below a reconstructed roster of subject company which was prepared from memory and notes of some former enlisted men of this organization who were prisoners of war with the undersigned in Manchuria in 1945.

2. In order to obtain data for my final report to General Jonathan M. Wainwright, Fourth Army, on Chemical Warfare activities during the Philippine Island phase of World War II, it is requested that this roster be checked and the present military station or home address of each individual be furnished the undersigned as soon as practicable. There has been entered alongside each name the last information available as to his status. The code used is as follows:

D = Dead
OD = Camp O'Donnell
C = Cabanatuan
J = Some P. W. Camp in Japan
DAV = Davao, Mindanao
Camp No. 17 = Prison Camp at Fukuoka, Island of Kyoshu, Japan.

Major Charles F. Harrison, 019173 D - DAV - 1943
Capt. Leland D. Bartlett
1st Lt. John A. Webb, 0393858 D - At sea - enroute to Japan 16 January 1945
1st Sgt. Joseph R. Lebank
Sgt. Jasper C. Mullins, 6 571 240
Sgt. Wilmer L. Parrott D - OD - 1942
Sgt. Oscar Wallace
Sgt. Raymond Reed D - C - 1942
Sgt. Raymond May
Sgt. James Stroh D - C - 1942
Corporal Calvin Davis D - OD - 1942
Corporal Walter L. Bell Permanently disabled - P.I. - 1944
Corporal Donald T. Solomon D - Tarlac, P.I. - June 1, 1942
Corporal Wayman Mitchell
Corporal Robert L. Chambers
Corporal William Batton D - OD - 7-3-42 - Burial Plot No. 0-8-8
Corporal Gene N. Pinto D - OD - 1942
Pfc. Daniel Ryan D - OD - 1942
Pfc. John F. Scanlon, 12 007 330
Pvt. ----- Ballard Transferred to 31 Infantry December 1941
Pvt. Robert V. Bardin
Pvt. Arthur Bates
Pvt. Richard Bond
Pvt. Peter Briggs
Pvt. James Brown D - C - 1942
Pvt. ----- Burns
Pvt. James D. Butler J
Pvt. Jonnie Carter
Pvt. Arthur Chenwith

Pvt. Harold Chilcoate D - OD - 1942
Pvt. Edgar Clinkscales D - OD - 1942
Pvt. John Conway D - OD - 1942
Pvt. Manuel L. Cruze D - OD - 1942
Pvt. Elgin W. Daniels D - OD - 1942
Pvt. James Dawson
Pvt. Paul Davis Camp No. 17
Pvt. Tommie Evans
Pvt. Arthur Gagnon
Pvt. ----- Gaines Transferred to 31st Infantry December 1941
Pvt. Clyde Garner D - OD - 6-26-42, Burial Plot No. 0-5-5
Pvt. Andrew A. Geiger, 6 532 887 (Later T/Sgt., Philippine Chemical Warfare Depot, Fort Mills)

Pvt. Daniel Golland
Pvt. Vaughn Grant
Pvt. ----- Harrell Permanently disabled - P. I. - 1944
Pvt. Lee R. Henson
Pvt. ----- Hollingsworth D - OD - 1942
Pvt. Vernon G. Huff
Pvt. ----- Isibell Transferred to 31st Infantry, March 1942
Pvt. Ernest E. Leavitt Transferred to Ordnance Detachment December 1941
Pvt. Eugene Linden
Pvt. Edward McCain D - C - 1942
Pvt. Fred Mercado
Pvt. Harold Morton D - OD - 1942
Pvt. Alven W. Mussen D - D - 6-12-42
Pvt. Charles Robinson D - OD - 1942
Pvt. George W. Rogers J
Pvt. Walter M. Seldonridge Picked up after surrender as 2nd Lt., Infantry (Philippine Army). Died and buried at sea while enroute to Japan, January 1945.

Pvt. Frank Spear
Pvt. James Stear D - C - 1942
Pvt. William G. Steel
Pvt. Robert Taylor D - Hospital No. 1 - Bataan - 1942
Pvt. Lawrence Wallace D - OD - 1942
Pvt. Daniel N. Weitzner, 6299215 Transferred to Medical Department, Hospital No. 1, Bataan, January 1, 1942.

Pvt. Lester Weatherman
Pvt. ----- Wilson Transferred to 31st Infantry, March 1942.
Pvt. Edward Wise
Pvt. James A. Wydell
Pvt. Charles Bloom D - OD - 1942

ITINERARY

December 7, 1941 Fort McKinley
December 8, 1941 Placed in reserve and held under direct control of G3 USAFFE (Colonel Irwin)
December 10, 1941 Bivouac, Rosario Norte, Rizal Province (Lt. Webb, Acting C.O.) Captain Bartlett was mobilizing the 301st Chemical Company Depot (P.A.) and also assisting in depot activities, Fort McKinley and port area, Manila.
December 12, 1941 Bivouac, Binagonan.
December 15, 1941 Bivouac, Antipolo.
December 25, 1941 Broke camp and started for Bataan. Temporary bivouac first night on Mariveles Cut-Off. Upon arrival in Bataan December 26, the company went into bivouac in the Pucot River near the Mariveles Cut-Off and in the vicinity of K.P. 184 on the Bagac-Mariveles Road.

ITINERARY (Cont'd.)

January 4, 1942 Assigned to beach defense reserve, West Sub-Sector, with Air Corps Units, in the front lines.
February 1, 1942 Attached to 31st Infantry (American) for duty as Infantrymen. This regiment was then a front line unit under command of Colonel Charles L. Steel in the East Sector, II Corps (P. A.)

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, C.W.S.

RECONSTRUCTED ROSTER

of the

SEVENTH CHEMICAL COMPANY SERVICE (AVIATION)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

1941 - 1942

The attached tabulation is based upon data extracted from Casualty Branch, Visi-Card and Report, War Department AGO Forms 035 dated 1 October 1945, which were received from Headquarters, Army Service Forces, AGO, Washington, D. C., as inclosures to 1st Indorsement, dated 10 April 1946, file SPXPC-G 704.1 (14 Mar 46).

The code used in this tabulation is as follows:

EUS - Evacuated to the United States
RMC - Returned to Military Control
DNB - Died, non-battle
DIE - Died
KIA - Killed in action
DED - Determined dead
NS - Not shown
EA - Emergency addressee

Strength of this company one officer and one hundred eighty-two enlisted men. Total casualties from all causes amounted to one hundred and twenty men or sixty-six per cent. Returned to military control and evacuated to the United States sixty-two men or thirty-four per cent.

STUART A. HAMILTON,
Colonel, CWS.

N.B.

26 September 1946.

Some fifteen or twenty enlisted men of this Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation) which was made up by consolidating several small separate chemical detachments (aviation), left Iba Field, Clark Field, and Nichols Field on Luzon with Air Corps personnel bound for Del Monte, Mindanao, shortly after war began. The names of these individuals are not known to the undersigned.

sah

NAME	SERIAL NO.	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY
<u>First Lieutenant</u>			
Small, George Mrs. William Small (Mother) 1511 Sheridan Avenue, New York, N.Y.	0380788	27 Sept. 45	EUS
<u>First Sergeant</u>			
Lloyd, Joel Mr. Arthur Lloyd (Father) 210 6th Avenue, New York, N.Y.	6274992	8 Oct 45	EUS
<u>T/Sergeant</u>			
Broach, William E. Mr. William E. Broach (Father) Route No. 1, Roxboro, N.C.	14037583	6 Jun 42	DNB
<u>S/Sergeant</u>			
Dagon, John T. Mrs. Bessie M. Dagon (Mother) 1049 Lincoln St., Easton, Penna.	6897724	12 Nov 42	DIED
Gorham, Sidney H. Mrs. Irma Gorham (Mother) General Delivery, Moorehead City, N.C.	14039231	30 Jun 44	KIA
McCallum, Richard E. Mr. John McCallum (Father) Box 304, Rowland, N.C.	14037577	11 Jul 42	DNB
Moore, Morris L. Mr. Joshua J. Moore (Father) N. W. Boulevard, Danville, Va.	7023332	21 May 42	DIED
Torrissi, Alfred F. Mr. Mario Torrissi (Father) 86 N. Fulton Avenue, Mt. Vernon, N.Y.	32024752	19 Sept 45	EUS
Trawinski, Casimira Mrs. Julia Trawinski (Mother) 18 N. Linwood Avenue, Baltimore, Md.	13001078	8 April 42	KIA
Williams, Robert W. Mr. Harry J. Williams (Father) Lake County Infirmary, Crownpoint, Ind.	6906708	23 Feb 43	DNB
Taylor, Robert B. Mrs. Harriet F. Taylor (Mother) Weatherbee Road, Acton, Mass.	11015141	9 May 42	DNB
<u>Sergeant</u>			
Ajduczyk, Edmund C. Mrs. Lottie Ajduczyk (Mother) 1419 Cedar Avenue, Scranton, Penna.	33021735	28 May 42	DNB
Becher, Wesley L. Mr. Gustay Becher (Father) 375 East 199th St., New York, N.Y.	7070644	12 Sept 43	RMC & EUS
Clem, James H. Mrs. Mamie L. Clem (Mother) 233 Worth St., Greenwood, S.C.	14040686	NS	EUS
Destefan, Frank J. Mrs. C. P. Onofrio (Mother) 218 Morrison St., DuBois, Penna.	7021069	8 Oct 45	EUS
Harrill, Thomas T. Mr. Ossie M. Harrill (Father) 109 S. Limestone St., Gaffney, S.C.	14037592	NS	EUS
Hansell, John A. Mrs. Elida C. Hansell (Mother) Box 1302, Cut Bank, Montana	19054437	18 Jun 43	DIED
Johnson, Pearlle Mr. Charlie Johnson (Brother) c/o Lum Ham, Rt. No. 1, Effingham, S.C.	6787145	4 Sept 45	EUS
Kerekesh, George Mrs. Mary Kerekesh (Mother) Rt. No. 13, Delmar, Maryland	6998843	17 Jan 43	DNB
Knopick, Bernard C. Mrs. Rosie Knopick (Mother) 17 Gold St., Shamokin, Penna.	13003418	12 Jun 42	KIA
Krick, Julius J. Mrs. Mary Krick (Mother) 334 E. Mahanoy Avenue, Girardville, Penna.	7021947	20 Sept 45	EUS

NAME	SERIAL NO.	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY
<u>Sergeant (Cont'd.)</u>			
Litch, Thomas M. Mrs. Lowrenne M. Litch (Mother) Box No. 205, Kimball & Martin St., Seaside, Calif.	19013625	16 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Mainer, Robert V. Mr. William W. Mainer (Father) Rural Route No. 3, Rusk, Texas	38053345	20 Mar 45	DNB
Powell, John T. Mae Woodward (Sister) 1119 E. Second St., Monroe, Michigan	16010909	10 Sept 45	EUS
Quesenberry, William H. Mrs. William J. Duncan (Sister) 709 E. Fifth St., Pulaski, Va.	6891343	11 Jun 42	DNB
Rabon, Henry C. Mrs. Alma P. Rabon (Mother) Route No. 3, Camden, S.C.	14020988	16 Jan 43	DNB
Rhoades, Harold B. Mrs. Genevieve P. Turner (Mother) c/o Mr. Henry C. Patterson, 910 N. Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, Calif.	19056429	7 Jun 42	DNB
Sachwald, Louis Mr. Morris Sachwald (Father) 611 Pearl St., Lancaster, Penna.	33010038	8 Oct 45	EUS
Schmidt, John L. Mr. Edwin Schmidt (Father) Rural Free Del. No. 2, Carroll, Ohio	35004787	21 Jun 42	DNB
Squires, Earl J. Mrs. Dessia Squires (Mother) Box 382, Stevensville, Montana	19054427	19 May 42	DNB
Williamson, Harvey D. Mr. Bernard C. Williamson (Father) Route No. 2, Stigler, Okla.	38021953	24 Apr 42	KIA
Wilson, Claude E. Mrs. Virginia C. Wilson (Mother) c/o Mrs. B. T. Atkins, North Main, Marion, Va.	33061510	2 Jun 42	DNB
Zubik, Vincent Mrs. Josephine Kaczor (Mother) Route No. 1, Box 388, Tarantum, Penna.	6889313	24 Oct 44	KIA
Knight, Doyle H. Mr. Hommer Knight (Father) Lennon, Michigan	36152188	25 Mar 42	KIA
Green, Marvin L. Mrs. Mable Green (Mother) 2502 St. Marys Av., Omaha, Nebraska	19056463	6 Oct 45	EUS
<u>Corporals</u>			
Barlosky, Leo J. Mr. John Barlosky (Father) Audenreid, Penna.	6897692	27 Jul 42	DNB
Barnett, William, Jr. Mr. William Barnett, Sr. (Father) Rosebud, South Dakota	19021228	1 Jul 44	DIED
Bruce, Robert C., Jr. Mrs. Robert C. Bruce, Sr., 636 N. Main St., Greenville, S.C.	14049156	1 Oct 45	EUS
Bruer, John J. Mrs. Elvina Bruer (Mother) 218 N. 9th St., Eau Claire, Wisconsin	36212250	13 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Buchholz, David F. Mrs. Lyda Rucker (Sister) 553 Douglas St., San Francisco, Calif.	20946274	31 May 42	DNB
Cartrette, Lester Mr. John J. Cartrette (Father) Rt. No. 3, Lyons, Georgia	14040558	6 Apr 42	KIA
Cohan, Edward A. Mrs. Mamie Cohan (Mother) 110 Shore Blvd., Brooklyn, N.Y.	32024709	27 Oct 44	DNB
DeJong, Otto Mr. Otto De Jong, Sr. (Father) 5936 S. Sacramento Ave., Chicago, Ill.	36035931	5 Feb 43	DNB
Demaray, Ralph F. Mr. Fred Demaray (Father) Route No. 3, Sladwin, Michigan	36152247	4 Jul 42	DNB

NAME	SERIAL NO.	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY
<u>Corporals (Cont'd.)</u>			
Gow, David L. Mrs. Isabelle Gow (Mother) 1768 Fay Avenue, East Cleveland, Ohio	35012012	7 Sept 44	KIA
Haley, Arthur A. Mrs. Ethel I. Haley (Mother) 615 W. Genessee Ave., Saginaw, Michigan	36152382	17 Dec 43	DNB
Hall, Joe M. Mrs. Martha F. Hall (Mother) Rt. No. 1, Swainsboro, Ga.	34083023	8 Oct 45	EUS
Horton, LeRoy Mrs. Clara Ford (Mother) Lakewood Apt., 717 S. Lake St., Los Angeles, Calif.	19013626	12 Jul 42	DNB
Horton, Ralph M. Mrs. Ruth E. O'Jea (Sister) Rt. No. 1, Box 417 A, Monterey, Calif.	19052323	31 Jul 42	DNB
Johnson, Terral H. Mrs. Verr M. Newman (Mother) Cut Bank, Montana	19054434	12 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Laird, James C. Mrs. Ada Laird (Grandmother), Marston, Missouri also Mrs. Mary Danells (Mother) 5562 M 97, Mount Clemens, Michigan	6939000	NS	RMC & EUS
Lawrence, Albert J. Mrs. Rose Lawrence (Mother) Hunt St., Rowayton, Connecticut	11019656	23 Nov 42	DIED
Macarovich, Walter Mrs. Julia Macarovich (Mother) Box 71, Indianola, Penna.	33033002	20 Aug 45	RMC & EUS
Mueller, Charles O. Miss Leona E. Mueller (Sister) 685 East 118th St., Cleveland, Ohio	6562237	1 Jun 42	DNB
Mason, Walter J. Mr. Walter F. Mason (Father) USA 15336942, Army Air Base, 337th School Squadron, Newport, Arkansas	6988325	5 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Merino, Henry R. Mr. Louis Merino (Father) 4359 Highland, San Diego, Calif.	39159783	9 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Polikoff, William Mrs. Mary Polikoff (Mother) 186 Division Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y.	32092860	5 Sept 45	EUS
Tucker, Charles W. Mrs. Annie V. Tucker (Mother) Knoxville, Md. Box 16	13000715	15 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Querback, Alfred Mrs. Gertrude V. Querback (Mother) 1005 Court St., Clare, Michigan	36152245	7 May 42	DNB
Wood, Henry F. Mrs. Jennie Wood (Mother) 25 Church St., Chatham, N.Y.	32044013	13 Jul 42	DNB
Zynda, Raymond A. Mrs. Mary R. Zynda (Mother) 3208 Raymond Ave., Brookfield, Ill.	19002569	12 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Anderson, James S. Mr. Linwood L. Severance (Step-Father) 331 S. Torrence St., Charlotte, N.C.	14037594	21 May 42	DNB
<u>Private, First Class:</u>			
Albertia, Damon C. Mr. James Albertia (Brother) 15 Spruce St., Greensboro, N.C.	14037897	4 Sept 45	EUS
Bales, Eugene E. Mrs. Marie M. Bales (Mother) 1248-1/2 5th Ave., Seattle, Washington	19002567	13 Jun 42	DNB
Beach, Thomas J., Jr. Mr. Thomas J. Beach, Sr. (Father) 1033 Richardson St., Baltimore, Md.	14039114	11 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Becker, Harry M. Mrs. Anna Becker (Mother) 627 N. Market St., Lancaster, Penna.	7021046	25 Apr 42	DNB

NAME	SERIAL NO.	DATE OF CASUALTY	TYPE OF CASUALTY
<u>Private, First Class (Cont'd.)</u>			
Bidwell, George E. Mrs. Mae J. Himes (Mother) 1021 Portola Drive, San Francisco, Calif.	19052016	30 Jul 42	DNB
Bock, George W. Mrs. Blanche Evans (Mother) 1044 Memorial Ave., Williamsport, Penna.	33021263	5 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Boyer, Fred Mr. Hubert Boyer (Brother) Sikeston, Missouri	37053244	13 Jul 42	DNB
Clark, Freeland G. Mrs. Leone K. Clark (Mother) General Delivery, Tieton, Washington	6575742	19 Sept 42	DNB
Dondich, Alexander P. Mrs. Josie Dondich (Mother) 522 S. 7th St., Las Vegas, Nevada	19056925	5 Jul 42	DNB
Dykes, Jack Mrs. Viola Dykes (Mother) 221 N. F Street, Lompac, Calif.	20918692	3 Feb 45	DNB
Gansz, Henry G. Mrs. Ada Gansz (Mother) 5831 Winthrop Ave., Chicago, Ill.	36036064	25 Mar 42	KIA
Grant, J. C. Mr. Jesse Grant (Father) Hollywood, Georgia	14037603	25 Sept 45	EUS
Gray, Clarence A. Mrs. Pearl Gray (Mother) 5th & Boston, Paden City, W. Va.	15011730	NS	EUS
Ignaszewski, Louis L. Mr. Lawrence Ignaszewski (Father) Rt. No. 1, Minnesota Lake, Minn.	37045854	14 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Jones, Arthur M. Mr. Charles H. Jones (Father) Route No. 3, Canton, N.C.	14037581	23 Jun 42	DNB
Kokitas, Albert J. Mrs. Mary Kokitas (Mother) 14 E. Clay Ave., West Hazleton, Penna.	13004748	9 Aug 42	DNB
Laster, Ralph H. Mr. Render T. Laster (Brother) Route No. 1, Roopville, Ga.	34083069	9 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Lawrence, John B. Mr. George R. Lawrence (Brother) 4426 Sheffield Ave., Philadelphia, Penna.	33027214	12 Oct 44	DNB
Loveless, Gilbert L. Mrs. Addie M. Loveless (Mother) Cooksville, Maryland	13001038	1 Feb 46	DED
Leckron, Cecil D. Mrs. Edna Adcock (Mother) 339 Purvis Ave., Bremen, Ohio	35004707	19 Jul 42	DNB
Macormic, Ora A. Mr. Robert A. Macormic (Father) 4221 Chateau, St. Louis, Missouri	37053503	20 Jul 42	DIED
Majors, Frank A. Mrs. Fannie Adolphus McCullers Majors (Mother) 707 W. James, Claxton, Ga.	34083024	NS	RMC
Mason, Jessie K. Mrs. Annie Mason (Mother) Evington, Virginia	13017808	9 Mar 43	DIED
Matz, Rocco H. Mrs. Theresa Lonsetta (Mother) R. 604 N. Wyoming, Hazleton, Penna.	33021793	9 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
McCarty, Lawrence L. Mrs. Hester McCarty (Step-Mother) Rural Free Delivery No. 2, LaFollette, Tenn.	34140141	4 Jul 42	DNB
McCoy, James F. Mrs. Emma Elliot (Mother) Rural Free Delivery No. 1, Pelzer, S. C.	14040582	10 May 42	DNB
McCraw, Brock B. Mr. M. E. McCraw (Father) Hendersonville, N.C.	6398662	1 Feb 46	DED

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>
McHam, Reese S., Jr. Mrs. Myrtle H. Burns (Mother) 11 Ballenger Ave., Inman, S.C.	1403797	12 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Nealey, Leon Mr. Dock M. Nealey (Father) Star Route, Pickens, S.C.	14047343	10 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
O'Donoghue, Anthony A. Mr. & Mrs. John K. O'Donoghue (Parents) 1025 N. Caldwell St., Charlotte, N.C.	14037728	11 Jul 42	DNB
Parker, Virgil L. Mr. William Parker (Father) Box 143, Cut Bank, Montana	19054440	1 Feb 48	DED
Reichert, Paul Mrs. Margaret Stickel (Mother) 619 Huron St., Owosso, Michigan	38152210	8 Oct 45	EUS
Sasek, Louis Mrs. Mary Sasek (Mother) Rt. No. 1, Box 228, Enumclaw, Washington	19000544	20 Sept 45	EUS
Schlappich, Earl, Jr. Mr. Earl Schlappich (Father) 4002 Northwest 23rd Court, Miami, Fla.	13009595	24 Sept 42	DNB
Scronce, Louis R. Mrs. Annie L. Scronce (Mother) 609 Tazwell St., Alexander Park, Portsmouth, Va.	14037574	7 Sept 44	KIA
Thurman, Milburn Mrs. Deva Thurman (Mother) 213 N. 6th St., Santa Paula, Calif.	19002574	28 Jul 42	DNB
Walker, George E. Mrs. Lela Gosnell (Mother) 110 Belmont Ave., West Asheville, N.C.	14043888	24 Oct 44	KIA
Vassey, Ralph Mrs. Nazle V. Gamble (Mother) Box 73, Chesnee, S.C.	14047162	7 May 42	DIED
<u>Private</u>			
Abernathy, Don L. Mrs. Lilla E. Bell (Mother) Frenchtown, Montana	19054806	7 May 42	DNB
Armond, Cleveland Mrs. Lease Armond (Mother) Flora, Louisiana	19003085	24 Oct 44	DED
Bass, Luther D. Mr. Andrew J. Bass (Brother) Milan, Georgia	34083030	8 Sept 45	EUS
Barker, Matthew F. Mrs. Alzada McLeroy Barker (Mother) 801 24th St., Columbus, Ga.	34083079	8 Oct 45	EUS
Baskett, Ashby Mrs. Dora Anne Baskett (Mother) Atlee, Virginia	33044952	18 May 42	DNB
Baty, James H. Mr. Henry J. Baty (Father) Highlands, N.C.	14037882	7 Apr 42	KIA
Becker, Julius Mrs. Rose Becker (Mother) 200 Azusa, Azusa, Calif.	19056963	11 Jul 42	DNB
Bernd, Wellington W. Mr. Victor Bernd (Father) Argus, Penna.	33070093	3 Oct 42	DIED
Blair, Amon M. Mrs. Lina Blair (Mother) Rt. No. 4, Box 89 B, Santa Ana, Calif.	19002803	24 Oct 44	DED
Bordeaux, Allen V. Mrs. Nellie Bordeaux (Mother) Claverack, N.Y.	32043947	8 May 42	DED
Bovee, James G. Mr. William Bovee (Father) Rt. No. 2, Oskaloosa, Iowa	19021249	9 Oct 42	DED
Boyett, William C. Mr. Comer Boyett (Brother) 435 W. Barbour, Eufaula, Alabama	34083080	19 Aug 42	DNB
Brown, Jack R. Mrs. Agnes Williams (Mother) 11601 Haynes St., N. Hollywood, Calif.	19003009	14 Sept 45	RMC & EUS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>
<u>Private (Cont'd.)</u>			
Caplan, Hilbert Mr. Harry B. Caplan (Father) 645 Linden Ave., Portsmouth, Va.	33040762	7 Sept 44	KIA
Carmichael, Cephus L. Mrs. Kate Lou C. Smith (Sister) 1319 11th Ave., Columbus, Ga.	34083081	24 Oct 44	DED
Cheholts, Harry J. Mrs. Katie Wulf (Mother) Salkum, Washington	19017627	6 Jul 42	DNB
Cobb, Carl C. Mrs. Mattie T. Cobb (Mother) Rt. No. 1, Box 510, Atlanta, Ga.	34083046	13 May 42	DNB
Costello, Edmund M. Mr. Michael J. Costello (Father) 4862 San Francisco, St. Louis, Missouri	37059990	19 Jun 42	DNB
Cutalo, Nickolas Mrs. Beatrice Cutalo (Mother) 31 Minetta Place, Huntington, N.Y.	32092732	12 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Darby, James, W. Mr. Bill Darby (Father) 825 W. End Ave., Anderson, S.C.	14047327	20 May 42	DNB
Dishman, Floyd A. Mrs. Elton F. Dishman (Mother) Rappahannock Academy, Caroline County, Va.	33044934	24 Oct 45	EUS
Dixon, W. John L. Mr. John A. Dixon (Father) Box 74, Dillard, Oregon	19003088	15 Sept 45	EUS
Drake, Richard F. Mrs. Cora Drake (Mother) 18 River Ave., Patchogue, N.Y.	32092930	9 Jul 43	DIED
Duckworth, Hansel E. Mr. George W. Duckworth (Father) Gen. Del., Six Mile, S. C.	14049091	13 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Early, Charlie L. Mrs. Mattie Early (Mother) Rt. No. 2, McDonald, Tenn.	34044958	1 Feb 46	DED
Eldridge, Donald W. Mrs. Nettie Eldridge (Mother) Arlee, Montana	19021223	3 Jun 42	DNB
Fadorchak, Michael Mrs. Catherine Molotzak (Mother) 216 Fisher Ave., Coaldale, Penna.	33021778	24 Oct 44	DED
Fitzgerald, Joseph F. Mrs. William H. Fitzgerald (Mother) 346 Chestnut St., Incont, N. Y.	32044030	18 Jul 42	DNB
Fulghum, John Mr. Kenneth M. Fulghum (Father) Elm City, N.C.	14037904	2 Feb 45	RMC
Gladewitz, Carl E. Mrs. Evelyn M. Gladewitz (Mother) 1111 Packer St., Williamsport, Penna.	33021251	8 Apr 42	KIA
Gregory, Romie C., Jr. Mr. Romie C. Gregory, Sr., (Father) 22 Joyner St., Coolumee, N.C.	14049032	20 Sept 45	EUS
Harris, Joseph W. Mr. Watkins Harris (Father) 614 Ohio Ave., Glassport, Penna.	13009747	30 Aug 45	RMC & EUS
Heart, William W. Mrs. Gladys Wilde (Mother) Abbotsford, Wisconsin	18004868	9 Nov 42	DIED
Hottenbach, Darwin J. Mrs. Dorothy Jo Keith (Mother) 4520 Edgewood Place, Los Angeles, Calif.	19002532	17 Jun 42	DIED
Hinson, Cecil T. Mr. Vernie Hinson (Father) Post Office Box 627, Charleston, S. C.	14037802	28 Jul 42	DNB
Jenkins, William J. Mrs. Mary A. Jenkins (Mother) Box 104, Sebrell, Va.	33044965	24 Oct 44	KIA
Jones, Troy O. Mrs. Ethel Jones (Mother) Rt. No. 3, Winston-Salem, N.C.	14037996	2 Jun 42	DNB

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>
** Joyner, Charles Mrs. Katherine Joyner (905 Santa Monica St., San Antonio, Texas	R-1114757	11 Nov 42	DIED
King, Howard H. Mr. B. J. King (Father) Rt. No. 3, Nashville, Michigan	38152212	10 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Kiro, George Mr. Alek Kiro (Father) Box 71, R.D. No. 1, Leechburg, Penna.	13010606	10 Sept 45	EUS
Knighton, Belton E. Mr. Ed E. Knighton (Father) Rt. No. 3, Woodruff, S. C.	14043727	7 Sept 44	KIA
Lane, Edward Mrs. Zatta Lane (Mother) Lasker, N.C.	14039368	17 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Lankford, Coy D. Mr. Clarence Lankford (Brother) Rt. No. 5, Shelley, N.C.	14049030	NS	RMC & EUS
Lanning, Clifford J. Mrs. Emma H. Lanning (Mother) Ellijoy, Georgia	34083048	NS	RMC & EUS
Larkin, Louis C. Mr. Louis Larkin (Father) 1 Kenley St., Pittston, Penna.	33021152	15 Aug 42	DNB
Loveless, Charles M. Mrs. Addie M. Loveless (Mother) c/o Mrs. Carl Barron, Rt. No. 1, Shepherdstown, W. Va.	1300108	9 Apr 42	KIA
Mock, John T. Mr. Miles M. Mock (Father) Rt. No. 4, Fitzgerald, Georgia	34082937	20 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Maksymchok, Walter Mrs. Mary Maksymchok (Mother) 386 W. Mahoney Ave., Girardville, Penna.	13005904	9 May 42	DNB
Marfuta, Victor M. Mr. Michael L. Marfuta (Father) 1706 Marquette St., Saginaw, Mich.	38152302	13 Sept 45	RMC & EUS
Matlock, Clarence L. Mrs. Dellar Sanders (Mother) Box 13, Cushing, Texas	38053399	NS	RMC & EUS
McCann, Gerard J. Mrs. Mary McCann (Mother) 4215 43rd Ave., Long Island City, N. Y.	32062865	8 Jul 42	DNB
McConnell, Christopher J. Mrs. Ellen Swinger (Sister) Ridge St., Hawley, Penna.	33021393	15 May 42	DNB
McCrary, Harrison L., Jr. Mr. Harrison L. McCrary, Sr. (Father) Royston, Ga.	34082977	27 May 42	DIED
McDuffie, Willie D. Mr. James D. McDuffie (Father) 304 Packard Ave., Rt. No. 2, Kannapolis, N.C.	14037591	1 Oct 45	EUS
Merritt, Carl E. Mr. Lee Merritt (Father) Chincoteague, Virginia	33043392	26 Jul 42	DNB
Minugh, Londen M. Mr. Alfred Minugh (Father) Box 162, Dodson, Montana	19054730		***
Moore, Junius D. Mrs. Myrtle H. Moore (Mother) Vancebow, N.C.	33043023	24 Oct 44	DED
Nichols, Clarence E. Mr. Edward Nichols (Father) 623 S. Wilson St., Fort Scott, Kansas	19021143	30 Apr 42	DIED
Nichols, William P. Mrs. Myrtle Nichols (Mother) 345 Main St., Hudson Falls, N.Y.	19011477	1 Jun 42	DIED

** The Adjutant General's Records, Casualty Branch, indicate M/Sgt. Charles Joyner of the Air Corps died in the Philippine Islands 11 Nov 42; next of kin Mrs. Katherine Joyner, 905 Santa Monica St., San Antonio, Texas. This man may or may not have been the "Joyner" referred to in the tabulation by Chemical Warfare prisoners of war in Mukden in 1945.

*** Honorably discharged at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix, New Jersey on 9 Sept 42.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>DATE OF CASUALTY</u>	<u>TYPE OF CASUALTY</u>
Norman, Lawrence L. Mrs. Ella Mae Norman (Mother) Rt. No. 4, Lincolnton, Georgia	14037723	23 May 42	DNB
Novinski, John Mrs. Stella Olinski (Mother) 62 Blackman St., Wilkes-Barre, Penna.	33021240	30 Jul 42	DNB
Odom, David Mrs. W. A. Rouse (Sister) Rt. No. 2, Goldsboro, N.C.	14039147	9 Sept 45	RMC
O'Hern, Ted H. Mr. Terrance B. O'Hern (Father) 129 Monte Cresta Ave., Oakland, Calif.	19052729	7 Sept 44	KIA
Padilla, Jose F. Mr. Filipe Padilla (Father) Quemado, New Mexico	19054787	1 Jul 42	DNB
Penny, Bruce H. Mrs. Lou M. Penny (Mother) c/o Mrs. J.E. Strawbridge, 2601 Englewood Ave., Durham, N.C.	14039411	22 Nov 42	DNB
Peter, Albert L. Mrs. Cecile A. Peter (Mother) 465 Edwards St., Crockett, Calif.	19052705	18 Sept 42	DNB
Pilcher, Herbert H. Mr. Lewis R. Pilcher (Brother) R.F.D., Buena Vista, Georgia	34083086	4 Sept 45	EUS
Potts, Boyd C. Mrs. Allie A. Potts (Mother) Peggs Rt., Tahlequah, Oklahoma	19052724	25 Jul 42	DNB
Pressley, Clyde E. Mrs. Flossie M. Honeycutt (Mother) c/o Lester Helms, Rural No. 2, Monroe, N.C.	14049045	28 Apr 42	DNB
Pryer, Robert C. Mrs. Wallace Simelsen (Mother) Bradwood, Oregon	19021231	29 May 42	DNB
Rasmussen, Russell A. Mr. Antonne Rasmussen (Father) Box 354, Arlee, Montana	19021221	21 Jun 42	DNB
Reed, Albert E. Mrs. Ada Reed (Mother) 625 Jefferson St., Brownsville, Texas	38028193	17 Jan 44	DNB
Rogers, Albert Bessie Serpas (Aunt) Highlands, N.C.	14037881	8 Feb 43	DNB
Schwartz, Morton Mrs. Mollie Rothman (Mother) 2462 N. Dover St., Philadelphia, Penna.	33027524	5 May 42	DNB
Shelton, Ford Mrs. Floyd Warrick (Sister) Sioux, N.C.	14043804	20 Aug 45	RMC & EUS
Smith, Jeff Mr. George W. Smith (Father) Rt. No. 1, McCrory, Arkansas	19002802	11 Feb 45	EUS
Spinelli, Ralph Mr. Dominick A. Spinelli (Father) 846 Crescent Ave., Box 207, Sewickley, Penna.	19056982	NS	EUS
Thomas, Charles E. Mrs. Mary M. Ramey (Mother) 764 Ontario Blvd., Ontario, Calif.	19039160	5 Jul 42	DNB
Thompson, Marion R. Mrs. Anna W. Thompson (Mother) c/o L. M. Harris, Rt. No. 1, Lancaster, S.C.	14037985	16 Jun 42	DNB
Tiernan, John V. Mr. Patrick Tiernan (Father) 519 Lincoln Place, Brooklyn, N.Y.	32092937	3 Jan 43	DNB
Weatherwax, George F. Mrs. Elizabeth Eichler (Sister) R.F.D. No. 2, Gansevoort, N.Y.	32044055	28 Jul 42	DNB
Withrow, Lewis W. Mrs. Jessie D. Withrow (Wife) 1016 Albany St., Brunswick, Ga.	34083064	1 Oct 45	EUS
Wilson, Clifford Mr. Vesta Wilson (Father) Rt. No. 2, Fairmont, Georgia	34083065	20 Mar 42	KIA

SPXPC-G 704.1
(14 Mar 46)

1st Ind

HMC/erb

Hq ASF, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 10 April 1946

TO: CG, Walter Reed General Hospital, Washington, D. C.

1. The records of the personnel listed have been checked and the inclosed reports give the name, rank or grade, Army serial number and type of casualty together with the names and addresses of the emergency addressees.

2. The following explanation is given of the abbreviations used on these reports:

EUS - Evacuated to the United States
RMC - Returned to Military Control
DNB - Died, non-battle
DIE - Died
KIA - Killed in action
DED - Determined dead
NS - Not shown
EA - Emergency Addressee

3. From the information furnished this office has been unable to identify the records of "Joyner."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LUTES:

Adjutant General

ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
WALTER REED GENERAL HOSPITAL
DETACHMENT OF PATIENTS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1946

SUBJECT: Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation)

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, 25, D. C.
Attn: Casualty Branch

1. There follows below a reconstructed roster of the Seventh Chemical Company Service (Aviation). This organization was formed in the Philippine Islands in December 1941 from detachments of the former organizations; Decontamination Detachment, Second Chemical Company (Aviation); Decontamination Detachment, Third Chemical Company (Aviation); and Decontamination Detachment, Fifth Chemical Company (Aviation). This roster has been made up from memory and notes of former members thereof who were prisoners of war in Japan in 1945. It is requested that the roster be checked and that any data available which will indicate the present military status or home address of each individual be furnished as soon as practicable. There has been entered along side of each name the last information as to the status of the individual concerned. The code used is as follows:

D = Dead
OD = Camp O'Donnell
C = Cabanatuan
J = Some P.W. Camp in Japan
DAV = Davao, Mindanao
Camp
No. 17 = Prison Camp at Fukuoka, Island of
Kyoshu, Japan
M = Mukden

Roster of 7th Chemical Company Service (Avn.)

2nd Lt. Small, G

First Sergeant:

Lloyd, J

T/Sergeant:

Broach, W. E.

Dagon, J. T.

Gorham, S. H.

McCallum, R.E., 1403757

Moore, M. L.

Torrissi, A. F.

Trawinski, C.

Williams, R.

Taylor, R.

D OD
D C
Shot by Japs on detail
D C 7/11/42
D OD 5/42

Killed in action 5/8/42
D C
D OD

Sergeants:

Adjucyck, E.

Becher, W. L.

Clem, Hubert

Destefan, F.

Green, M.

Harrill, T. E.

Hanell, J. A.

Johnson, P.

Kerekesh, G.

D OD

D C 9/29/42

D C

Sergeants (Cont'd.)

Knopick, B. C.	. Shot by Japs on detail
Krick, J.	
Litch, T. M.	
Mainer, Robert	D J
Powell	
Quesenberry, W.	D C 6/11/42 Dysentery
Rabon, Henry	D C
Rhoades, H., 19056429	D C 6/42 Malaria
Sachwald, L.	
Schmidt, John	D
Squires, E. J.	D OD
Williamson, H	Killed in action on Corregidor
Wilson, Claude	D OD
Zubic, V.	
Knight, D. H.	Killed in action on Corregidor

Corporals:

Barlosky, L. J.	D C 7/27/42
Barnett, W., 19021228	D C 6/23/42
Bruce, R	
Bruer, J.	
Bucholtz, D.	D OD
Carteretteg, E.	Killed in Hospital by bomb in Bataan
Cohan, E.	D J
De Jong	D J Jan. 43, Honshu
Demaray, R., 36 152 247	D C 7/4/42 Malaria
Gow, D. L.	D 9/8/44
Haley, A. A.	
Hall, J.	
Horton, L., 19 013 676	D C 7/31/42
Horton, R. M.	D C
Johnson, T.	
Laird, J. C.	
Lawrence, A. J.	D C 42
Macarovich, W.	
Meuller, C	D OD
Mason, W. J.	
Moreno	
Polikoff, W.	
Querback, A.	D OD 42
Wood, H.	D
Zynda, R.	

Pfc:

Albertia, D. C.	
Beach, T.	
Becker, H.	D OD
Bidwill, G	D C 7/30/42
Bock, G.	
Boyer, F. 37 053 244	D C 7/12/42
Clark, F. G.	D C 9/19/42
Dondich, A., 19 056 925	D C 7/5/42
Dykes, H. J.	D J
Ganz, H.	Killed in action on Corregidor
Grant, J. C.	
Gray,	
Ignazewski, L. L.	D
Jones, A. M.	D C 8/9/42
Kokitas, B.	

Pfc: (Cont'd.)

Laster, R.	
Lawrence, J.	
Lovelace, G.	D
Leckron, Cecil B.	D C 7/20/42
Macormick, Ora A	D C 7/19/42
Majors, F.	
Mason, Jesse .	D C
Matz, R.	
Mc Carty	D
Mc Coy	D
Mc Graw, B.	D
Mc Ham, R.	
Nealy, Leon	
O'Donoghue, A.	D
Parker, J.	
Reichart, P.	
Sasek, L.	
Schlappich, E.	D C 9/24/42
Scronce	
Thurman, M.	D C 7/28/42
Vassey, R.	D OD

Privates:

Abernathy, D.	D
Anderson, J.	D C
Armond, J.	
Bales, E.	D OD 5/28/42
Bass	
Barker	
Baskett,	D
Baty, J. (Beatty?)	D
Becker, J., 19 056 963	D C 7/11/42 Dysentery
Brend, W.	D C 10/3/42
Blair, A	
Bordeau	D OD
Bovee, G.	D
Boyett, C., 19 017 627	D C
Brown, J.	
Bruer, J. (Cpl.)	
Caplan, H.	
Carmicheal, C. L.	
Cheholtz, H.	D
Cobb,	D OD 5/42
Costello	D
Cutelo, N.	
Darby, James, 18 029 921	D on detail 7/5/42
Dishman	
Dixon, W.	
Drake,	
Duckworth, E. H.	
Early	D
Eldridge, D.	
Eadorchack, M.	
Fitzgerald, E.	
Fulgham, J.	Shot by Japs on detail
Gladewitz, C	
Gregory, R. C.	
Harris, J.	
Hart	
Hattenbach, D.	D

Privates: (Cont'd.)

Hinson, C.	D C 7/28/42
Jenkins, W. J.	
Jones, T. O.	D C 6/42
Joyner	
King, H.	
Kiro, G.	
Knighton, B.	
Lane, E.	
Langford, C.	
Lanning,	
Larkin	
Loveless, D.	Killed in action
Mock	
Machineshok, W.	D OD
Marfuta, V.	
Matlock	
Mc Cann, G., 32 092 865	D C 7/8/42
McCrary	D C
McConnell	D OD
Mc Duffey, W. D.	
Merritt, Carl E.	D C 7/28/42
Minaugh, L.	
Moore, J. D.	
Nichols, C.	D OD
Nichols, W.	D OD
Norman, L.	D C
Novinski, J.	D C 7/30/42
Odom, D	
O'Hearn, T.	
Padilla, Jose, 19 054 787	D C 7/12/42
Penny, B.	D C
Petee, Albert L	D C 9/18/42
Pilcher	
Potts, Boyd C.	D C 7/25/42
Pressley	D OD 4/42
Pryer, R.	D
Rassmussen, E.	D OD
Reed	
Rogers, A	
Schwartz	D
Shelton	Killed in action
Smith, J.	
Spinelli	
Thomas, C. F., 19 039 160	D C 7/5/42
Thompson, M.	D C Camp No. 3 6/14/42
Tiernan	
Tucker, C	
Weatherway, G. F.	D C 7/28/42
Withrow, L.	
Wilson, C.	D in Hospital, Bataan 2/42

On December 8, 1941 this company had an approximate strength of 4 officers and between 185 and 200 enlisted men. On February 1, 1942, this company, less one officer and about 10 enlisted men (Lt. Winn; Sgts. Knight, Sachwald, Torrisi; Cpls. Bruer, Bruce, DeJong, Haley, and Gow; Pvts. Ganz and Ignasweski--who were on D.S. at Headquarters, USAFFE) were attached to the 31st Infantry (American) for duty as Infantry. Previous to February 1, 1942, this company did military police and guard duty on the Mariveles-Bagac Road.

STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, CWS

20 December 1945

SUBJECT: Combat Infantryman Badge for CWS Personnel serving as Infantrymen with the 31st Infantry (American) on Bataan, P. I., 1 Feb to 9 Apr 1942.

TO: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

1. Pursuant to verbal instructions from the Chief of Staff (then Major General R. K. Sutherland) US Army Forces Far East in January 1942, the 4th Separate Chemical Company, Service (Weapons) and the 7th Separate Chemical Company, Service (Avn) were attached to the 31st Infantry (American) for duty as infantrymen effective 1 February 1942. These units reported as directed and the individual officers and men thereof were assigned to separate companies within the 31st Infantry (American). They fought, bled and died as members of this infantry regiment during February, March and up until the surrender of Bataan, 9 April 1942.

2. The approximate strength of each of these units when turned over to the 31st Infantry (American) 1 February 1942 was:

- 4th Separate Chemical Company, Service (Weapons) - Two (2) Officers and Sixty (60) enlisted men.
- 7th Separate Chemical Company, Service (Avn) - Three (3) Officers and One Hundred-Eighty-five (185) enlisted men.

3. The undersigned has no authentic record as to how many members of these two units survived the Philippine campaign and the subsequent three years and four months in Japanese prison camps. Present information indicates three (3) officers and possibly eighty (80) enlisted men have been returned to the United States.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

4. That the War Department authorize the award of the Combat Infantryman Badge to those officers and enlisted men of the 4th Separate Chemical Company, Service (Weapons) and the 7th Separate Chemical Company, Service (Avn) who participated in combat with the enemy on Bataan, P. I. while serving as infantrymen with the 31st Infantry (American) between 1 February and 9 April 1942.



/s/ Stuart A. Hamilton
STUART A. HAMILTON
Colonel, CWS

N.B.

26 September 1946.

The above recommendation was forwarded as an inclosure to a personal letter addressed to Brig. General L. C. Beebe, G.S., Chief of Staff, Fourth Army, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, by the undersigned some time during the spring of 1946, with the request that same be presented for approval of General Jonathan M. Wainwright.

SAH



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
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Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 2

Folder Title : 98-USF1-20: Hq/USAFFE - Historical
Report - Headquarters Engineer School (July
1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



1604

2

HEADQUARTERS ENGINEER SCHOOL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

APO 74
5 August 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Historical Report

TO: Commanding General
Army Forces Western Pacific
APO 707

ATTN: S-2 Section

1 July 1945 - 31 July 1945 incl
Period Covered

I
AUTHORITY

USASOS Regulations No. 1-15, Headquarters, USASOS, APO 501, dated 23 March 1944, sub: Compilation of the Military History of USASOS.

USASOS Letter, sub: Military History, dated 2 April 1944. Hq USASOS, Office of the CG, APO 501.

II
COMMENT

On 2 July 1945, this Headquarters received Special Order No. 160, Headquarters, 5th Replacement Depot, dated 26 June, assigning four EM to the Engineer School, AFMESPAC. These were the first personnel assigned to the School. Subject personnel arrived by plane at Oro Bay from Manila on 4 July 1945.

The next day General Order No. 19, Headquarters, NUGSEC, dated 25 June 1945, was received. This General Order awarded the 59th Engineer Service Company the Meritorious Service Unit Plaque for superior attainment in the performance of exceptionally difficult assignments and the achievement of a high standard of morale and discipline between 1 August 1944 and 28 February 1945. The movement of the School began on 7 July 1945. One Officer and four enlisted men left for Manila by plane. Six officers, 13 enlisted men and 23% of equipment departed on the Navy ship A KA 9; two officers on the A KA 71.

The next movement serial was assigned to the A KA 12. Loading of equipment was begun on 7 July. Five officers and 73 enlisted men and 65% of equipment departed Oro Bay on 10 July.

- 1 -

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG/SW

RESECTED

BASIC: Unit Historical Report, Engr Sch, AFWESPAC, APO 74 dtd 5 Aug 45,
file 314.7, to CG AFWESPAC APO 707, Attn: S-2 Section.

One officer and 31 enlisted men and remaining equipment comprise rear echelon, which was expected to sail on an LST on or about 17 July 1945.

All troops except the rear echelon had arrived in Manila by 17 July and reported uneventful voyages, good food, and excellent morale.


Since 18 July, troops and equipment have been moved up continuously from Manila to the Engineer School area at Mababacat, - Papango, Luzon. A temporary housekeeping set-up has been made pending completion of the permanent section of the school. The Area Engineer, Clark Field Area, and the 1913th Engineer Aviation Battalion are assisting in the first phase of construction.

Now that the project is actually underway, there is a spirit to build the school and morale is excellent.

For the Commandant:

ALFRED W. DAY
Major, C.E.
Executive Officer

98-7551-20
Historical Report - 10g. Ingt School
10g. USNFFE
given 1994



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

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USAFFE (Oct 1941 - Mar 1942)

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98-USF1-21

U. S. Payrolls (List), USAFFE

Hq, USAFFE

Oct 1941-Mar 1942

1604
3

Philippine Payrolls

Heading of payroll	Station	Date
Air Corps		
Air Corps Det. Weather Philippines	Nichols Field	Nov.
Tow Target Det. AC	Clark Field	Nov.
5 Interceptor Command Combat Unit #1	Not shown	March
Sig. Co. AW 5 Interceptor Command	Fort Mills	Jan.
Hq.Hq. Sq. Far East Air Service Command	Bataan	Feb. March
Hq.Hq. Sq. 5 Air Base Group	Not shown	Oct.Nov.
Hq.Hq. Sq. 12 Air Base Group	Nichols Field	Oct.
Hq.Hq. Sq. 20 Air Base Group	Nichols Field	Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.Feb.March.
Hq.Hq. Sq. 27 Bombardment Group	Bataan	Nov. Dec. Feb.March
Hq.Hq. Sq. 4 Composite Group	Clark Field	Nov.
Hq.Hq. Sq. 19 Bombardment Group	Clark Field	Nov. Feb.March
Hq.Hq. Sq. 24 Pursuit Group	Bataan	Nov. Dec. Feb.March
19 Air Base Sq. 20 Air Base Group	Nichols Field	Nov. Dec.Jan. Feb.March
20 Air Base Sq. 20 Air Base Group	Nichols Field	Nov.
14 Bombardment Squadron	Clark Field	Nov.
16 Bombardment Squadron	Bataan	Nov. Dec.Jan. March
17 Bombardment Squadron 27 Bomb. Grp.	Bataan	Nov. Dec. March
28 Bombardment Squadron	Clark Field	Nov.
30 Bombardment Squadron	Clark Field	Nov.
91st Bombardment Squadron 27 Bomb Grp.	Bataan	Nov. Feb. March
93 Bombardment Squadron	Clark Field	Nov. Jan.Feb. March
7 Materiel Squadron 4 AB Group	Bataan	Nov. Jan.Feb. March
27 Materiel Squadron 20 AB Group	Nichols Field	Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.Feb. March
28 Materiel Squadron 20 AB Group	Clark Field	Nov.Dec. Jan.Feb. March
48 Materiel Squadron	Fort McKinley	Nov.Dec.
2 Observation Squadron	Nichols Field	July.Oct. Nov.Dec. Jan.Feb. March
3 Pursuit Squadron	Zamboles	Nov.
17 Pursuit Squadron	Bataan	Oct. Nov.Dec. March
20 Pursuit Squadron	Bataan	Nov.Dec. Feb. March
21 Pursuit Squadron	Nichols Field	Nov. Feb. March
31 Pursuit Squadron	Nichols Field	Nov.

98-4851-21

US Payroll
HQ USAFFE
1002 41-10-42

Philippine Payrolls

Heading of payroll	Station	Date
Chemical Warfare		
CW Det. 2nd Chemical Co. Serv.	Ft. McKinley	November 1941
4 Sep. Chemical Co.	Ft. McKinley	November 1941
Decon, Det. 5 Chemical Co. Serv.	Nichols Field	October November 1941
7 Chemical Co.	Bataan	Feb.
Coast Artillery		
		1941 1942
Hq. Btry 59 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Hq. Btry. 1st Bn. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Hq. Btry 2nd Bn. 59 CA	Ft. Drum	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan.
Hq. Btry 3rd Bn. 59 CA	Ft. Hughes	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry A. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry B. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry C. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry D. 59 CA	Ft. Drum	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb.
Btry E. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry F. 59 CA	Ft. Hughes	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry G. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry H. 59 CA	Ft. Hughes	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry I. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry K. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Band 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Philippine Army Det. 59 CA	Ft. Mills	Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb.
Hqs. Btry 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb.
Hq. Btry 1st Bn. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb.
Hq. Btry 2nd Bn. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Hq. Btry 3rd Bn. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry A. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry B. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry C. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry D. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry E. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry F. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry G. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry H. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry I. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry K. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry L. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Btry M. 60 Coast Artillery	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov. Jan. Feb. Mar.

Heading of payroll	Station	Date	
		1941	1942
Coast Artillery			
Btry A 16 CA	Ft. Mills	Dec.	March
Hq. Btry 200 CA	Bataan	Nov.Dec	Jan. March
Hq. Btry 1st Bn. 200 CA	Bataan	Nov.Dec.	Jan. March
Hq. Btry 2nd Bn. 200 CA	Bataan	Nov.Dec.	Jan. March
Btry A 200 CA	Bataan	Nov.	Jan. March
Btry B 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Btry C 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Btry D 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Btry E 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Btry F 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Btry G 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Btry H 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Band 200 CA	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan. March
Med. Det. 200 CA	Stotsenburg	Nov. Dec.	March
Hq. Btry 515 CA	Not shown	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Hq. Btry 1st Bn. 515 CA	Not shown		Jan.Feb. March
Hq. Btry 2nd Bn. 515 CA	Not shown		Jan.Feb. March
Btry A 515 CA	Not shown	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Btry B 515 CA	Bataan	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Btry C 515 CA	Not shown	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Btry D 515 CA	Not shown		Jan.Feb. March
Btry F 515 CA	Not shown		Jan.Feb. March
Btry G 515 CA	Not shown	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Btry H 515 CA	Not shown	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Med. Det. 515 CA	Not shown	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
<u>ENGINEERS</u>			
Hq. Co. 803 Engr. Bn.	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Co. A. 803 Engr. Bn.	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Co. B. 803 Engr. Bn.	Bataan	Nov. Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Co. C. 803 Engr. Bn.	Bataan	Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
809 Engr. Co. Avn.	Nichols Field	Oct. Nov.	

Heading of payroll	Station	Date	
		1941	1942
<u>INFANTRY</u>			
Hq. Co. 31 Inf. Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb. March
Serv. Co. 31 Inf. Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Hq.Hq. Det. 1st Bn. 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Hq.Hq. Det. 2nd Bn. 31 Inf. Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Hq.Hq. Det. 3rd Bn. 31 Inf. Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. A 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. B 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. C 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb. March
Co. D 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. E 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	
Co. F 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	March
Co. G 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. H 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. I 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. K 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb. March
Co. L 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Co. M 31 Inf.Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
AT Co. 31 Inf. Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb. March
Band 31 Inf. Regt.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	March
Det. Med. Dept. 31 Inf.	Manila	Nov.	March
<u>MEDICAL</u>			
Det. Med. Dept. (RA)	Ft.Stotsenburg	Nov.	
Det Med. Dept. (Amer) Sternberg Gen. Hosp	Manila.	Nov.Dec.	
Det. Med. Dept.	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb.March
Det. of Patients Sternberg Gen.Hosp.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	
Det. Med. Dept	Ft. Wm. McKinley	Nov.	
Det. Med. Dept	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov.	
Det. Med. Dept. Gen. Hosp. #1	Bataan		March
Dep. Med. Dept. (Amer)	Bataan		Jan.Feb.
<u>MILITARY POLICE</u>			
808 Military Police Co.	Manila	Oct.Dec.	Jan.Feb.March
Prov. Hqs. & MP Co. (Amer)	Bataan		Feb.
Amer. Plat 12 MP Co.	Ft. Stotsenburg	Nov.	
<u>ORDNANCE</u>			
12 Ord. Co.	Ft.Stotsenburg	Nov.Dec.	
17 Ord. Co.	Bataan	Oct.Nov.	Feb.March
75 Ord. Co.	not shown	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Jan. Feb. March
440 Ord. Co.(Bomb)	Clark Field	Nov.	

Heading of payroll	Station	Date	
		1941	1942
<u>ORDNANCE</u>			
454 Ord. Co.	Bataan	Nov.Dec.	Feb. March
4 Plat. 454 Ord.Co.	Bataan		Feb.
680 Ord. Co.	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Feb.
693 Ord. Co.	Bataan	Jan.	Feb. March
2nd Plat. 693 Ord.Co.	Nichols Field	Nov.Dec.	
3rd Plat. 693 Ord.Co.	Bataan	Nov.	Feb.
698 Ord. Co.	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov.Dec. Jan.	Feb.
701 Ord. Co. (Avn.)	Clark Field	Nov.	
724 Ord. Co. (Avn.)	Bataan	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
745 Ord. Co. (Avn.)	Clark Field	Nov.Dec.	
Det. Ord. Dept.	Fort Mills	Oct.Nov.	
Det. Ord. Dept.	Fort Wm.McKinley	Nov.	
Hq.Hq. Co. 12 QM Bn.	Not shown	Jan.	Feb.
19 QM Co.	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov.	Jan. March
30 QM Co.	Bataan	Oct.Nov.	Jan. Feb. March
<u>QUARTERMASTER</u>			
Co. C. 33 QM Regt.	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Jan. Feb.
Det. QM Corps (Amer)	Ft. Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Feb. March
Det. QM Corps			
Det. QM Corps	Bataan	Dec. Jan.	Feb. March
Det. QM Corps	Nichols Field	Nov.	
Det. QM Corps	Ft. Stotsenburg	Nov.	
Det. QM Corps	Ft. McKinley	Nov.	
Det. QM Corps	Manila	Nov.	
2nd Plat. Co. C 89 QM Bn.	Nichols Field	Nov.	
Det. 1st Plat. Co. A 91 QM Bn.	Ft. McKinley	Nov.	
<u>SIGNAL</u>			
2 Signal Service Co.	not shown		Feb.
228 Sig. Opn. Co.	Manila	Oct.Nov.	Feb.April
330 Sig. Co.(Avn)	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov.	
409 Signal Co.	Little Baguio	Dec.	March
54 Signal Maint.Co.(Avn)	Nichols Field	Nov.	
17 Signal Platoon	Nichols Field	Oct.Nov. Dec.	
3rd Det. Signal Co. AW	Corregidor		March
2nd Det. Signal Co. AW	Bataan		March
Signal Co. AW Phil. Dept.	Bataan		Feb.
429 Signal Maint. Co.	Bataan		Feb.
<u>TANK CORPS</u>			
Hq. Co. 192 Tank Bn.	Ft. Stotsenburg	Oct.Nov.	
Co. A 192 Tank Bn	Ft. Stotsenburg	Oct.Nov.	
Co. B 192 Tank Bn	Ft. Stotsenburg	Oct.Nov.	
Co. C 192 Tank Bn	Ft. Stotsenburg	Oct. Nov.	
Co. D 192 Tank Bn.	Ft. Stotsenburg	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Jan.
Med. Det. 192 Tank Bn.	Ft. Stotsenburg	Oct.Nov.	

Heading of payroll	Station	Date	
		1941	1942
<u>TANK CORPS</u>			
Hqs. Co. 194 Tank Bn.	not shown	Nov.	Jan.Feb.
Co. A 194 Tank Bn.	not shown	Nov.Dec.	Jan. March
Co. C 194 Tank Bn.	Bataan	Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb.
Co. D 194 Tank Bn.	Bataan		Feb. March
Med. Det. 194 Tank Bn.	Ft.Stotsenburg	Nov.Dec.	Jan.
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>			
Det. Fin. Dept.	Bataan		Feb.
Fin. Dept.	Ft.McKinley	Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Det. Fin. Dept. Fin. Office	Manila	Nov.	Jan.
Det. Fin. Dept.	Ft.Mills	Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb.
Det. Fin. Dept.	Ft. Stotsenburg	Nov.	
Hq.Hq. Btry HD of Manila and Subic Bays	Ft.Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb. March
Hqs. Det.Phil. Dept.	Bataan April	Dec.	Feb
Hqs. Ce. Phil. Div.	Fort McKinley	Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb.
Enl. Det. Phil. Engr. Depot	Bataan	Oct.Nov.	Feb.
Sig. Co. AW Phil Dept.	Bataan	Nov.	March
Hqs. Co. Luzon Force	not shown	Oct.Nov.Dec.	
Engr. Hqs. Avn. Phil Dept.	Bataan		Jan.Feb.
Det. CIC Corps (DEML)	not shown		Jan.
Hq.Hq. Det. I Phil Corps	not shown		March
Hqs.Hqs. Det. II Phil Corps	not shown	Nov.	
Hqs. Spec. Trps. Phil Div.	Fort McKinley	Oct. Dec.	
Det. Corps of Intell. Police (DEML)	Ft. Santiago		Jan. March
Phil Motor Transport Depot	Bataan		Feb.
School for Bakers and Cooks	Bataan		
School for Bakers and Cooks	Ft. McKinley	Nov.	
Hqs. Graves Reg. Serv. Co.	Bataan		March
<u>MINE PLANTERS</u>			
Det. USAMP "Col. Geor. FE Harrison	Fort Mills	Oct.Nov.Dec.	Jan.Feb.
<u>ARMY TRANSPORT</u>			
Det. USAT "Don Esteban"	Bataan		Jan.



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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 4

Folder Title : 98-USF1-23: "We Return to the Philippines"
(1942 - 44)

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"We Return to the Philippines"

1942-44

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WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINE INFORMATION TRAINING PROGRAM PART ONE FROM PORT MORESBY TO MOROTAI

OUTLINE AND REFERENCE MATERIAL
PREPARED BY INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION, HQ. USAFFE

Suggestions to Unit Commanders and Instruction Officers on Presentation of Philippine Information Training Program

I. PREPARATION FOR TRAINING PERIOD:

1. Careful and thorough preparation on each of the eight topics in the program is essential to successful presentation of the subject material and to the conduct of an interesting and stimulating group discussion which should be a part of each presentation.

2. For each topic to be presented it is important that the training officer be thoroughly familiar with:

(a) The narrative outline: This narrative topical outline, which is supplied for each topic of the program, will be considered as a complete guide to the material to be presented. It is not intended to restrict the initiative or resourcefulness of the training officer. (See pp. 2 to 3.)

(b) Reference materials and source reading: These materials follow, in a general manner, the narrative outline and consist of selected extracts from reliable sources. From them the training officer can select such material as he desires to properly expand the narrative outline to whatever length or type of presentation is most practical and effective, in his opinion, to the requirements of his audience. (See pp. 4 to 8.)

(c) General technique of group discussion: Each presentation should be divided into two parts:

(1) Presentation of the topic by the instructor.

(2) Group discussion and answering of questions.

The success of the discussion period will depend largely upon the ability of the group discussion leader. He must guide the discussion along lines which are interesting, pertinent and challenging. Irrelevant and trivial questions and discussion should be diplomatically sidetracked. Proper allotment of time must be observed to insure adequate coverage of all questions. Stop discussion before interest bogs down. Encourage as many individuals to participate as possible. Restrict more vocal and articulate individuals to their just share of time. Included in the training materials is a pamphlet "Guide for Discussion Leaders." Training officers should read it carefully. Reference is also suggested to "Explanation-Directed Discussion," paragraphs 37-41, TM 21-250, Army Instruction.

II. GENERAL PRESENTATION SUGGESTIONS.

(a) The specific method of presentation will naturally vary with the background and experience of the training officer, personnel of the unit, available training aids, and physical conditions. The outline and reference materials supplied lend themselves to great flexibility in presentation methods.

(b) In many units officers and men with Philippine experience will be found. Such personnel should be utilized in the presentation if they are qualified and articulate. Use of enlisted personnel as discussion leaders is suggested and encouraged.

(c) Every effort should be made to localize the presentation of each topic to the interests of the particular unit. For example, in connection with "Part One—From Moresby to Morotai," the review of tactical operations in SWPA, the training officer should amplify the general presentation with review of the operations of his particular unit, division, group, command or base.

(d) The fact that a particular unit is not immediately destined for service in the Philippines does not minimize the importance of proper presentation of the program. On the contrary, it is vitally important that every unit realize its part in the operation and fully realize the significance of the contribution of his unit to its success.

(e) As far as possible the reading of material to the group in training should be avoided. Few instructors can hold the attention and interest of students by reading a lecture. Occasional short extracts of material may be effectively read. Use of notes and reference material is encouraged, however.

III. DISTRIBUTION OF PHILIPPINE HANDBOOK:

1. This handbook has been prepared to recapitulate the essential facts of the material presented in the eight training periods, and quantities will be supplied to provide distribution of one copy to every officer and enlisted man.

2. The handbook should not be distributed until the end of the training program.

This outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines. There will be eight topics:—

Part 1—From Moresby to Morotai.
Part 2—History of the Philippines.
Part 3—These are the Philippines.
Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5—Under the heel of Japan.
Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
Part 7—A few Do's and Don'ts for GIs.
Part 8—Looking Ahead.

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Outline: "From Port Moresby to Morotai"

THE following text is presented in narrative topical outline. It is intended as a guide for the proper presentation of this subject. Unless absolutely necessary it should NOT be read to troops—but rather used as a foundation.

1. You are about to take part in one of the greatest operations of this war—the recapture of the Philippines.

2. Ever since General MacArthur came out of Corregidor—from the first day that the Southwest Pacific was activated, this command has had one major objective—to return and recapture the Philippines.

3. Every officer and man in this theatre has an important role to play—whether his assignment is loading supplies at a base or as part of a combat team. Upon the efficiency and enthusiasm with which you do your job depends the success of this coming operation—the lives of hundreds of thousands of men—the future of 18,000,000 Filipino allies.

4. It is important that you know something about the Philippines—why they are important strategically, economically, politically—it is even more important that you know about the Filipino people—their history, customs, ideals—because we will fight and live side by side during the months ahead. You will be honored guests in their country, helping them to regain their homes, their families, their independence.

5. That kind of preparation paid off in the great Allied landings in Europe. Now the eyes of the world are on another invasion—our operation to the Philippines. The same thorough understanding of the problems involved—the same careful preparation—will pay off the same dividends in success here.

6. During the next few weeks you will be given in regular sessions these important facts:

- (a) History of the Philippines from their discovery and settlement by Spain to their invasion by Japan.
- (b) The Philippines—their economic, strategic and geographical highspots.
- (c) The Filipino people, their customs, ideals, love of freedom

and democracy.

(d) The effect on the Philippines of Japanese occupation.

(e) How the Filipinos met the Jap invasion—a story of loyalty and all-out resistance.

(f) The importance of your relationships with the Filipinos—some simple do's and don'ts.

(g) The future of the Philippines—and some of the problems after invasion.

7. When you go to the Philippines, it is important for you to remember that you represent the United States and everything it stands for, to every Filipino you meet. He will judge the United States by you and your conduct.

8. Everything that has gone before in this theater has been in preparation for the invasion of the Philippines. All the island campaigns, the maneuvering for airstrips, for bases, the building up of reserves of supplies, the training of a hard hitting team of ground troops, air, and navy—all designed to get into striking position for this operation.

9. So that we may thoroughly understand the ground work that has been laid, and like all good planners review our progress to date, let us review the tactical operations in SWPA to date. Through this review and a study of the strategy which General MacArthur and his staff have employed, we will understand better how our Philippine campaign will probably be conducted.

10. Let's look at how we got where we are.

11. The coming campaign for liberation of the Philippines has been the main purpose of the Southwest Pacific command ever since it was created on 18 April, 1942.

12. A review of what has gone before will help us know what to expect.

13. In the beginning the Allies were on the defensive.

The full reference text which follows the outline can be drawn upon to amplify this outline. Thus flexibility of time and type of presentation to meet the requirements of individual units is provided.

(a) America had not recovered from Pearl Harbor.

(b) Australia had no air force; its best troops were in Europe or in Asia fighting the Germans.

(c) The Japs were strong and greedy.

(1) They were taking bases in New Guinea, New Britain, the Solomons from which they could organize for a possible thrust into Australia and from which their warships could cut our supply lines.

14. The Japs' drive on Port Moresby.

(a) They move over the Owen Stanleys from Salamaua and Lae, are bogged down by rain in Markham Valley.

(b) They try an attack in convoy to Port Moresby's rear, are dispersed in the Battle of the Coral Sea, 4-8 May, 1942.

(c) They try a drive against the right flank by landing at Milne Bay, are defeated in battle from 26 August—7 September, 1942.

(d) They drive across the Kokoda Trail, march within 32 air miles from Port Moresby, outrun their supply carriers, come to a halt on 18 September, 1942.

15. The Allies begin an all-out offensive on 25 September, 1942.

(a) The Aussies chase the Japs back over the Kokoda Trail.

(b) One battalion of American troops parallels the Australian advance to serve as left guard.

(c) Air-borne Americans drive up Papuan coast from Oro Bay.

(d) Gona taken 9 December, 1942; Buna Village 15 December, 1942; Buna Mission 2 January, 1943; Sanananda Point 22 January, 1943.

16. From lessons learned at Buna came a new strategy.

(a) We recognize the futility, tremendous expense of a frontal

attack, therefore seek to encircle the enemy by striking from flanks and rear.

(b) Almost invariably since Buna enemy strongholds have been by-passed, supply lines cut to ribbons by air and sea assault.

(c) Strategy depends on air supremacy, immediate goal of every operation has been to gain new air bases to extend reach of our air arm.

17. Battle of Bismarck Sea, 1-4 March, 1943.

(a) Japs lost three light cruisers, seven destroyers, 12 merchant ships, 15,000 troops, about 90,000 tons of shipping

(b) Victory destroyed another threat to Port Moresby and Australia.

18. The Salamaua-Lae Campaign was the new strategy applied successfully.

(a) Australian brigade from Wau, American regiment from Buna feinted toward Salamaua.

(b) Enemy sucked in, moved all his strength to Salamaua.

(c) Allied amphibious force dashed across Huon Gulf, landed at Hopoi, 20 miles from Lae.

(d) At same time Paratroopers landed at Nadzab, on enemy's flank and rear

(e) Australians and Americans converged, took Salamaua on 11 September, 1943; Australian 9th and 7th Divisions took Lae 14 September, 1943; Finschhafen captured on 2 October, 1943.

(f) Strategic gains:—

(1) Gave Allies way into Ramu Valley.

(2) Put us in position to envelop enemy on Huon Peninsula.

(3) Additional forward airfields at Gusap and Finschhafen.

19. Progress also being made in South Pacific Area.

(a) Munda taken 5 August, 1943; all New Georgia before the month's end.

(b) Landing at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville on 1 November, 1943.

(1) Japanese garrison of 20,000 either killed or neutralized.

(2) We got an airfield from which our bombers could direct attacks against Jap positions to the north.

20. Neutralization of the Bismarck Archipelago.

(a) Air attacks begin in strength against Rabaul on 12 October,

1943; by May, 1944, reconnaissance shows 85 per cent. Rabaul installations destroyed.

(b) We land at Arawe on 15 December, 1943; Cape Gloucester on 26 December, 1943; at Saidor on 2 January, 1944.

(1) Japs on Huon Peninsula now trapped between Australians pushing north from Finschhafen and Americans pushing south from Saidor.

(a) Forces join at Yagomai, 15 miles southeast of Saidor on 10 February, 1944.

(2) These landings secured Allied control of Vitiaz Strait, the channel between New Guinea and New Britain, thus cut one enemy supply route.

(c) Admiralty Island Campaign.

(1) Cavalrymen land on Los Negros 29 February, 1944, seize Momote airstrip.

(2) Second force of Cavalrymen land at Lugos Mission, west of main Japanese garrison at Lorengau.

(3) The same effective strategy; Japs again encircled.

(d) Marine force seizes Emirau Island, 195 miles to northeast on 20 March, 1944.

(e) Holding Admiralties and Emirau to north, and strategic bases on New Britain and New Guinea to east, Allies now enforce blockade on enemy shipping to Bismarcks; Rabaul knocked out from air; garrisons rendered militarily impotent.

21. The Hollandia-Altape operation was a classic maneuver of surprise and encirclement.

(a) On 22 April, 1944, Allies land at Altape; Homboldt Bay, 115 miles to west; Tanahmerah Bay, 25 miles farther west.

(b) Japs completely surprised.

(1) Our daily air bombardments had deceived them into expecting us to attack either at Wewak or Madang.

(a) About 3000 crack Marines had been transferred from Hollandia to Wewak shortly before we landed.

(c) Meeting but token resistance, we seize Tadjil airstrip at Altape, three dromes at Hollandia.

(d) Some 60,000 Japs estimated to have been trapped in 500 miles between Saidor and Hollandia.

22. The same strategy has been

used in every operation since.

(a) Wakde Island invaded on 17 May, 1944.

(b) We leap-frog 210 miles farther west to Blak Island on 27 May, 1944.

(c) We land on Noemfoor, 100 miles to the west of Blak, on 6 July, 1944.

(d) From Noemfoor on 30 July, 1944, we jumped to Sansapor, by-passing enemy's main defense garrison at Manokwari.

(e) Results of these landings.

(1) Enemy's 18th Army trapped at Wewak virtually annihilated (his savage counterattacks were repulsed, cost him almost 10,000 dead).

(2) Japanese 2nd Army in Dutch New Guinea disorganized, flees to south coast in hope of evacuation.

23. Allied Air Forces break up enemy's Halmahera-Philippines defense line into separate links, attain air supremacy over southern Philippines.

24. We land at Morotai, northernmost island of the Halmahera group, on 15 September, 1944.

25. To get where we are today we had to beat another enemy, at times tougher than the Jap—the jungle; we had to deliver supplies over distances and terrain that no textbook prepared us for.

(a) We have had to build docks, warehouses, air dromes, roads, etc., out of wilderness

(b) Our supply lines stretch from America to Australia through New Guinea, fan out to scores of island bases; boats and planes, rather than trains and trucks, are our principal carriers.

(c) Yet our supply forces have met every challenge of island warfare.

26. From what has gone before we may know a little of what to expect when we land on the Philippines.

(a) Wherever we land will be where the Japs least expect us and are least prepared.

(b) We will land in sufficient force to take what we want and hold it; with sufficient supplies to carry on.

(c) The campaign for liberation of the Philippines will be won at a rock-bottom price in human life, just as we've won everything since Buna.

Text Reference: "From Port Moresby to Morotai"

THE following full narrative reference text will be valuable to the unit commander or training officer in amplifying his presentation on this topic.

Someday soon—perhaps sooner than you think—we are going to land on the Philippine Islands.

That we are going to do this is no military secret and never has been. General MacArthur himself first put it on the record more than two years ago, when, leaving Bataan at President Roosevelt's orders, he vowed to return, drive the Japs out, and restore the islands to the freedom-loving Filipinos to whom they belong.

The fulfillment of this promise has been the dominant purpose of the Southwest Pacific command ever since it was formally created on 18 April, 1942. Every battle we've won—from Buna to Morotai—has been in preparation for this coming operation.

The history that has led us to the threshold of the Philippines is a proud one—and a brilliant one. In jungle fighting we have beat the Jap at his own game. We have beat the jungle, too, an achievement almost as important. We have used air power in a way heretofore thought impossible. We have outthought the Jap in strategy and outfought him in battle. Our victories haven't always come easily, but they have always been victories. It is wise to review them now so that we may know how we got where we are and what we learned on the way:

The Beginning: Defense

General MacArthur arrived in Australia hoping to organize and lead an army to the immediate relief of the Philippines. But this was impossible. Our Navy as yet had not recovered from the blow at Pearl Harbor; we had neither the ships nor the strength. And Australia was inadequately armed even for its own defense; its air force was almost non-existent and its best troops were on other continents fighting an earlier enemy.

Furthermore, the Japs were as strong as we were weak. In the islands to the north they were stretching out like a hungry octopus, sucking in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Solomons. Here they were building bases for this possible thrust into Australia and from which their warships could halt or impede the flow of U.S. convoys to the far east. They knew only too well that if they could cut the sea lanes linking Australia with America the United Nations would lose the key base for any future offensive against Japan.

In March of 1942 it was imperative that Japan not be allowed to cut these sea lanes. General MacArthur's promise to return to the Philippines had to be postponed. The number one job was to stop the Japs.

The key objective in the early New Guinea campaign was Port Moresby, the last harbor north of Australia still controlled by the Allies. The Japs realized that none of their holdings in New Guinea could be considered secure until they had driven the Allies from this foothold. In their hands, Port Moresby would give them an invasion base only 340 miles from Australia's Cape York Peninsula.

General MacArthur recognized Port Moresby as a foothold, too, and he intended to keep it. He had been faced with a choice between two grim alternatives—that of fighting a holding war on the Australian mainland or taking the initiative to New Guinea. He chose New Guinea—and in 1942 this meant Port Moresby.

Wanted: Port Moresby

The enemy started four drives against Port Moresby. Two were by land, both across the Owen Stanley mountains, and the second along the famous Kokoda trail. A third try was by sea, ending in the Battle of the

Coral Sea. The fourth was by a flank movement whose success would depend on the occupation of Milne Bay. He failed in all four and, after his crushing defeat at Buna and Sanananda, never had the chance to try again.

From their bases at Salamaua and Lae, in the early spring of 1942, the Japs started moving across the treacherous slopes of the Owen Stanleys. By May they had reached the Markham Valley. Then the rains came, flooding the mountain gaps, making any further advance impossible. They returned to their bases and sent out scouts to explore the south-east coast for a shorter and more practicable route.

Battle of the Coral Sea

Their first overland attempt having failed, the Japs now planned an attack in large convoy force from Moresby's rear, to be carried out in conjunction with another landing to the east, possibly at New Caledonia or in the New Hebrides. In early May, American carrier-based planes spotted a large task force moving in two groups to the south. They followed both groups. One entered the Louisiade Archipelago off New Guinea's south-east tip to refuel and set up air bases. The other anchored an occupation fleet in Tulagi Harbor in the Solomons and sent a striking force steaming on farther south.

Apparently the Japs did not expect serious opposition. But on 4 May American planes appeared over Tulagi Harbor and in 20 minutes destroyed 12 of the 15 ships at anchor. Then ensued the four-day Battle of the Coral Sea. It was a unique engagement, since it was fought entirely by carrier-based planes. The surface ships never came within gun range of each other and the only broadsides fired were at attacking aircraft. When it was over, on 8 May, the Japs had lost 37 warships sunk or damaged. We lost only the carrier Lexington, one destroyer, and a tanker. Not only had Port

Moresby been saved from invasion. It was the U.S. Navy's first complete victory of the war, and with the second victory at Midway Island a month later, may be cited correctly as the turning point in the Pacific war at sea.

The Kokoda Trail

Meanwhile the enemy's scouts had discovered a better and shorter road to Port Moresby. About 140 miles south-east of Salamaua there was a narrow jungle path that led from a native village and a peacetime government mission called Buna. So on 21 and 22 July the Japs made fresh landings at Gona, a tiny mission center, hiked eight miles east to Buna, and started forth.

Opposing them were no more than a few score Australian troops and natives of the Papuan Infantry Battalion. The defenders fought gallantly. In ambushes, sometimes in desperate stands, they actually killed more Japs than the Japs killed of them. But outnumbered, fighting a close jungle war for which they had not been trained, constantly threatened with encirclement, the Aussies retreated. By mid-September the Japs had marched to Ioribaiwa Ridge, only 32 air miles from Port Moresby.

But here they stopped. The Japs had made their first serious mistake. They had pushed ahead too fast and had outrun their supply carriers. Forced to eat spoiled rations, unwholesome fruits and herbs, so many died of food poisoning they had good cause to fear a cholera epidemic. Others were suffering from malaria and dysentery. What's more, the miraculous work of General Kenney's then pitifully small Fifth Air Force was denying them any effective air support and wrecking their supply trails faster than they could repair them. Before the drive on Port Moresby could be completed, they had to pause and collect their forces.

Battle of Milne Bay

While they waited, the Allies were mustering their strength to strike back. And the first thing on the new program was the occupation of Milne Bay. It was a necessary move in order to protect our right flank for the coming direct offensive against Buna.

A mixed Australian force and elements of the American 43rd Engineers landed at Milne Bay in August shortly after a couple of Kittyhawk

squadrons. Exactly one week later, on 26 August, the Japanese Kure No. 5 Landing Force arrived. The Japs wanted Milne Bay as a base for an overland drive against Moresby's right flank. They didn't get it. By 7 September the 700 invaders had been annihilated, and the Allies had scored their first notable victory in New Guinea.

Gona—Buna—Sanananda

The all-out offensive began on 25 September. With General Sir Thomas Blamey, commander of Allied Ground Forces in New Guinea, General MacArthur had decided on a strategy which in its essence was the modern application of the classic maneuver of envelopment. The Aussies were to drive the Japs back down the Kokoda Trail; one battalion of Americans was to parallel the advance along the left flank, at an appropriate point pivot and cut through the enemy's extended supply lines. At the same time another group of Americans, airborne to secret bases near Oro Bay, was to start a drive up the eastern Papuan coast to Buna. The battle lines thus would form a triangle. Buna was the apex; the dual advance over the Owen Stanleys one leg; the American advance from Oro Bay the second. Japanese forces were to be cut in two—one half would be caught on the mountain ridges, and the other trapped at Buna and Gona.

In reality the campaign followed this strategic plan with one exception. The Japs withdrew from the mountain ridges too fast to be encircled. The Papuan campaign ended in a savage, head-on, fight-to-the-finish on the Buna beaches. The Japs had entrenched themselves in interlocking pillboxes made of palmetto logs with walls as much as seven feet thick and bristling with machine guns. They had to be taken in hand-to-hand combat and often at great cost. Small arms and mortars were of no use. Thirteen-ton tanks had to be brought in before many of them fell. But all were taken. The Aussies entered Gona on 9 December. Buna Village fell to the 32nd Division on 15 December, and Buna Mission on 2 January. The Papuan campaign was over when men of the 41st Division and the Australian Seventh captured Sanananda Point on 22 January. In all, about 15,000 Japs had been killed.

Lessons from Buna

Buna was not a cheap victory. Of some 13,000 men who had entered the combat zone, more than 70,000 were casualties. About 670 were killed. The rest were either wounded or sick in action. Scarcely a man survived who had not suffered malaria at least once. Most had had it several times. The swamp and thick scrub of the jungle had presented almost insurmountable problems of supply. Sometimes food was so short men received only one-sixth of a "C" ration per day. And it had been a long campaign. We had tried to fight it in the style of trench warfare that was used to be fought in, and it took us five months to win it.

But Buna was a testing ground. Through the invention of new tactics—such as the use of the parachute bomb—we had learned how to use aircraft as a weapon in the jungle, a place where many experts had predicted aircraft would be worthless. We had caught onto the Jap's favorite tricks. Before the campaign was over we could match him in camouflage, concealment, and silent movement. Since the mountains and swamps stopped us from supplying our troops by land, we had resorted to the air. Ammunition and equipment were flown in on specially prepared landing strips or dropped by parachutes over predetermined targets. We had learned how to keep radio sets from corroding in the hot moist air, how to wrap food so that it wouldn't spoil in the rains, and how to protect rifles from jungle rust. We had learned how to handle malaria, too. Fifty-one GIs volunteered as guinea pigs so that the medics could discover the best preventive. From their findings we developed a system of malaria control which in the 15 months that followed reduced the rate of malaria among our troops by 95 per cent.

Moreover, from the lessons of Buna evolved a new strategic plan. A look at the map will show just how successful this plan has been in practice. With the capture of Buna we had advanced our forward lines 108 miles from Port Moresby. In a comparable six-month period this year, we have jumped from Hollandia clear off the map of New Guinea to Morotai—a distance of 935 miles. We have done it through a system that has come to be known as leap-frogging. It means just that.

Basically ours is a strategy that

recognizes the futility and the tremendous expense of a frontal attack and therefore seeks to encircle the enemy by striking from the flanks and rear. We have become masters in the use of surprise. In every operation the enemy has been deceived as to our objectives and our methods. We have struck first on one flank, then on the other. Or we have applied pressure from the center, and engaging in a combined maneuver, attacked from several directions at once. Almost invariably enemy strongholds have been by-passed, and their supply lines cut to ribbons by constant sea and air assault.

This strategy has a personal significance for every man in the theater. For where it has paid off most has been in the saving of American lives. The ratio of Jap dead to U.S. dead for New Guinea operations since Salamaua and Lae, for instance, is about 37 to 1. During this time about 25,000 Japs have been killed and 2,855 taken prisoner. On the other hand American and Australian casualties combined totalled only 662 dead and 63 missing.

The successful application of this strategy has depended mainly on Allied air supremacy. Our air forces first must knock out any enemy resistance from the air, neutralize adjacent bases from which he might draw reinforcements, soften up his defenses before the invasion, and then proceed methodically to destroy his supply channels. And herein is another consistent pattern of Allied movement. Every time we have made a landing the immediate goal has been to gain air bases. From them heavy and medium bombers and fighters start reaching forward again, pounding bases and slashing at the enemy's supply lines, weakening his whole defensive position. Then the cycle starts all over again, ending in another landing and another advance. As General Whitehead of the Fifth Air Force has explained it, our strategy has been "to kill more Japs to get more bases to kill more Japs to get more bases . . ."

Battle of the Bismarck Sea

Our toehold on New Guinea wasn't sure, however, until after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, in which land-based planes almost completely destroyed a big enemy convoy bearing reinforcements to the Japanese garri-

son at Lae. The convoy was first sighted on 1 March off Ubili, one-third of the way down the New Britain coast, and was then steaming south to New Guinea. A total of 136 Allied planes, representing virtually the combined strength of our air forces, attacked for three days running. The Japs lost three light cruisers, seven destroyers, twelve merchant ships, 15,000 troops and about 90,000 tons of shipping. It was here that Mitchells, mounting enough firepower and armor to enable them to fight it out with ack-ack batteries, raised mast-height bombing to the dignity of a science. Because in this single action 18 specialized jobs were assigned to different airplane types, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea is now remembered as an aviation classic. The tactics proven here have since meant certain death for any Japanese convoy so careless as to allow itself to be sighted by our air patrols.

Lae—Salamaua—Finschhafen

Our next objective in New Guinea was to be Lae. In winning it we feinted toward Salamaua and thus demonstrated one of the cardinal lessons from Buna.

In mid-summer an Australian brigade started out from Wau, an air base some 40 miles inland and halfway between Buna and Salamaua, and began to cut its way through the jungle. At the same time the 162nd U.S. regiment began an advance from Buna up the coast to Morobe Bay.

Anticipating a frontal assault, the Jap moved all his resources to Salamaua. In doing so he dropped his guard. We were quick to take advantage. An amphibious force dashed across the enemy waters to Huon Gulf to land at Hopol, about 20 miles east of Lae. About the same time paratroops landed at Nadzab, on the enemy's flank and rear, less than 10 miles northwest of Lae. The Aussies and Yanks then converged to take Salamaua on 11 September, and the 9th and 7th Australian Divisions closed in on Lae four days later. Before the Japs had time to catch their breath another amphibious force landed north of Finschhafen, and seized the township on 2 October.

With the capture of Lae and Salamaua, the Allies now had a way into the Ramu Valley and were in a position to envelop enemy troops on the Huon Peninsula. It also gave us addi-

tional forward airfields, particularly at Gusap and Finschhafen, and a springboard for a new advance.

The South Pacific

In parallel operations, the same sort of tactics was being exploited by American forces in the South Pacific. After the Marines' Guadalcanal victory, Infantry forces moved onto New Georgia. There was some particularly tough fighting at Munda. But it fell on 5 August, 1943, and the whole group was cleared before the end of summer.

We now faced the Japs in the Buin-Faisi area on Bougainville Island, then, next to Rabaul, the most heavily garrisoned enemy position in the area. To avoid a costly frontal attack on 1 November strong U.S. forces landed at Empress Augusta Bay. We established a perimeter, maintained it against repeated counterattacks, and within it built an airdrome from which our bombers could direct attacks against Jap position to the north. With the neutralization of Bougainville that came later with the achievement of full air and sea supremacy, the 20,000 Japs were made militarily impotent. Some 14,000 are estimated to be there still.

On 29 June, 1943, the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific areas had been united for operational purposes under General MacArthur's single command. To further bridge the gap, and to provide fighter cover for bombers in that sector, in the same month we had seized the Trobriand and Woodlark Islands. Now with the conquest of Bougainville geographic and strategic unity between the two areas was complete.

Neutralization of the Bismarcks

Our campaign to neutralize the enemy's bases in the Bismarck Archipelago is a nearly perfect example of the flank maneuver which Southwest Pacific strategy has so well exploited.

From the newly-gained bases in the Solomons and New Guinea, on 12 October the Air Forces launched a full-scale, unrelenting attack against Rabaul. Then, while air raids were continuing at their peak, the Allies landed on New Britain's western tip. Arawe, the little peninsula on the southwest coast, was hit first. A diversionary force of Cavalrymen and Infantrymen landed there on 15 De-

cember (exactly one year after the fall of Buna Village). But the chief prize we wanted was Cape Gloucester, which with its two airfields would place us within 250 miles of Rabaul. Marines struck there in force on 26 December, and in two weeks' time had overcome the stout enemy resistance. Beaten, the Japs started scampering northeastward into the Gazelle Peninsula, where they hoped to prepare for a last-ditch stand at Rabaul.

Eight days after Marines hit Cape Gloucester we invaded the New Guinea coast at Saldor. This landing was the beginning of the end for Japs on the Huon Peninsula, who found themselves caught between the Aussies pushing north from Finschhafen and the Yanks pressing south from Saldor. On 10 February the forces joined at Yagomal, a point about 15 miles southeast of Saldor.

We then set forth on foot for Bogadjim, terminus for an important Japanese supply road about 50 miles up the coast. Aussies took off inland across the Finisterres, in pursuit of the enemy, whilst elements of the American 32nd Division advanced along the Rai Coast.

Victory at the Huon Peninsula clinched our control of Vitiaz Strait—the waters separating the New Guinea mainland from New Britain—and secured our lines of communication with the beachheads at Gloucester and Arawe from any potential flank attack. The Strait was made doubly secure by our occupation of Rooke Island in mid-February. This supply channel thus was denied the enemy.

Everything was set up now for a conquest of Rabaul. The New Britain beachheads were secure and the sustained air raids were growing more intense. What's more, the oft-used strategy of the offensive triangle was now established with Bougainville and the tail of New Guinea as the base and Rabaul as the apex. War correspondents were rather confidently predicting it and certainly the Japs were expecting it. But again we capitalized on the element of surprise. Instead of hitting Rabaul, General MacArthur decided to take the Admiralty Islands, about 450 miles to the northwest.

The strongest Jap fortification on the Admiralties was at Lorengau on Manus Island, the larger of the two principal islands in the group. But, as always, the Allies intended to strike at the enemy's most vulnerable point. A heavy reconnaissance force composed of elements of the 1st Cavalry

Division recognized this most vulnerable point as Momote airstrip at Los Negros, the small island to the east of Manus. What started as a reconnaissance in force developed into a full-scale invasion. On 29 February, the reconnaissance troops landed at Momote and seized the airstrip. Bitter fighting developed but the Cavalrymen stood their ground and chased the Japs inland. The strong garrison at Manus, meanwhile, was expecting the Allies to press the attack from Los Negros, and instead of sending reinforcements to their weaker forces there, prepared for a defensive stand at Lorengau. Again they were surprised. A second force of Cavalrymen landed at Lugos Mission, to the west of Lorengau, and within three days had captured the Lorengau airstrip and stormed their way into the township.

While Cavalrymen were mopping up in the Admiralties, on March 20, Marines seized Emirau Island, in the St. Matthias Islands, about 195 miles to the northeast. The Seabees followed close behind and set about building an airstrip which, among other important enemy bases, would bring Truk, 580 miles to the north—within easy bombing range.

With the capture of the Admiralties and of Emirau, the Allies now were in a position to enforce the tight blockade of the 50,000 Japanese in New Britain, New Ireland, and elsewhere in the Bismarck Archipelago. From our strategic bases our air and sea patrols now proceeded to operate day and night to see that no supplies got into the beleaguered garrisons. By May, constant bombing of Rabaul and its nearby bases had destroyed 85 per cent. of the area installations. Rabaul had been knocked out without the necessity of landing.

Hollandia—Aitape

The direction of the Allied advance now shifted from north to west, and General MacArthur turned his attention back to New Guinea. While ground troops took a breather, Allied air power forced a steady withdrawal of Japanese aircraft into western New Guinea. Repeated air bombardment of Madang and Alexishafen caused the Japs to build up Wewak. Then sustained attacks on Wewak grounded the planes there and kept the three airfields in a constant state of repair. To replace Wewak, the Japs developed a big base at Aitape and a bigger one

at Hollandia. Our bombers went after them with the same systematic, relentless spirit. Three brilliantly executed surprise attacks on Hollandia destroyed or irreparably damaged all 288 planes concentrated there.

Then General MacArthur made the boldest move of the Southwest Pacific war. On Saturday, April 22, an assault force, stronger than any ever before assembled in this theater, invaded the New Guinea coast at three points. One force struck at Aitape, another at Humboldt Bay, 115 miles to the west, and a third at Tanahmerah Bay, 25 miles further west. At all three places Japanese garrisons took to the hills, leaving little more than token forces to offer resistance. So quickly that it surprised the Allies almost as much as it did the Japs, we occupied the Tadjil airstrip at Aitape and seized the three big airdromes at Hollandia.

Again the Japs had been outmaneuvered. Because of the heavy bombings, they had expected us to strike either at Wewak or Madang. Confident of this prediction, they had transferred about 3000 combat marines to Wewak, leaving Hollandia with service troops, most of whom had had no more than basic training. In this triple operation, the Allies simply hurdled the 500 miles between Saldor and Hollandia. Trapped in between were some 60,000 enemy troops.

Meanwhile, having reached Bogadjim, the Australians raced forward along the coast to Madang, then to Alexishafen, then on to Hansa Bay. The Japs were too busy fleeing to Wewak to stop and fight.

Again and Again

Since then it has been a case of more of the same. On 17 May we jumped 115 miles west of Hollandia to land on Wakde Island. Ten days later we leapfrogged 210 miles farther west to land on Blak Island, and scarcely two months after that we hopped onto Noemfoor, 100 more miles to the west. From there we skirted the enemy's big defense center at Manokwari, where he was expecting us, and on 30 July landed almost unopposed at Sansapor, 200 miles west of Noemfoor.

Each of these operations is worthy of a separate history in itself. Wakde and Blak particularly were notable for the fanaticism with which the Japs resisted. But they all are alike in illustrating the basic nature of our strategy.

tegic plan. In each the enemy was surprised and thrown off balance. In each large forces were left trapped and starving in the by-passed areas.

With the landing on Sansapor we had occupied all strategic centers in New Guinea. There remained only to mop-up enemy remnants and consolidate our positions. Below Alitape, the Japanese 18th Army tried to break out of its trap, attacking our defenses time and again. Each attack was repulsed and the force was completely demoralized after we had encircled the forward elements and cut off their supply from the rear. Today, harassed daily from the air and sea, the 18th Army is virtually disintegrated.

Similarly the 2nd Japanese Army, by-passed at Manokwari, has been disorganized. Its troops are now reported to be evacuating Dutch New Guinea as best they can—on foot or by coastal barge—in hopes that on the southern shore of the Vogelkop peninsula they might be picked up by rescue craft.

From Sansapor, Noemfoor, Biak, and other forward bases, our air power began to pound at the enemy's chain of defenses through the Molucca Islands. These are the islands to the west of New Guinea which the enemy had developed into strong bases to protect the approaches to the Philippines to the north and his holdings in the Netherlands East Indies to the west. In mid-August General MacArthur announced that as a result of

our air strikes this chain had been broken up into separate links. A little later, as a result of heavy blows on Mindanao, he announced that we had achieved air supremacy over the southern Philippines.

The next move was the landing on Morotai. And that's where we are today—only 300 miles below the Philippines and the payoff on a promise.

We Licked the Jungle Too!

Although in looking back we tend to emphasize combat operations, it is well to remember that in winning the battle of supply we faced a natural enemy that in places has been tougher than the Jap—the jungle.

In New Guinea and the other islands near it we have found no highways, no ready-made public utilities, few docks, no public buildings waiting to be converted into headquarters or hotels waiting to be turned into billets. We have had to build from scratch—sometimes actually shoving the earth out to meet the big boats at anchor, and everywhere building docks and piers and jetties. We have had to cut roads through swamp, hack airstrips out of wilderness, and somehow keep them from washing away. We have had to set-up our own electric dynamos and establish our own water-purification system. And if we've wanted a roof over our heads

we've had to build it ourselves—from canvas, grass, or coconut logs. Whenever we've approached the enemy on the march we've had to set up our own supply dumps on the way, and, to prevent an epidemic of dysentery, set up elaborate latrine systems as we advanced.

The distances involved have been staggering. Our supply lines stretch from San Francisco to Australia through New Guinea, and fan out to scores of island bases. When we move anything we must carry it either by boat or by plane. Any extensive overland supply is too expensive and impracticable.

Yet we have met every challenge the jungle has offered. No matter what the distance or how it had to be reached, somehow we've delivered the goods on time.

What to Expect

It would be foolish to try to predict where or when we'll make this coming Philippines landing. But from what has gone before we may safely assume these facts:—Wherever we land will be where the Japs least expect us and are least prepared. We will land in sufficient force to take what we want and hold it, and with enough supplies to carry on. We may be assured that, as has been true of every operation since Buna, the campaign for the liberation of the Philippines will be won at a rock-bottom price in human life.

Additional Material on the following topics may be found in NEWSMAP and MAPTALK:

Attack, Moresby to Finschhafen ... NEWSMAP, Vol. 1, No. 1.
Coral Sea, Battle of, MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 12, P. 12
Air Forces in SWPA, Growth of ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 6, P. 91
Bismarck Sea Battle, MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 9
Vol. 2, No. 6, P. 94
South Pacific, Warfare in ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 9, P. 138
Rabaul Neutralized NEWSMAP, Vol. 1, No. 12
Admiralty Islands ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 1, P. 4
Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 9
Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 1
Emirau Island ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 5, P. 1
Hollandia ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 9, P. 8
Vol. 1, No. 8, P. 1

Altape, Invasion at, Counter attacks at MAPTALK, Vol. 1, Nos. 9, 10, 11, P. 1
MAPTALK, Vol. 2, Nos. 3, 4, 6, PP. 33, 49, 81
Wakde Island Invasion ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 14, P. 1
Biak Is. Campaign MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 15, P. 1
Vol. 1, No. 16, P. 4
Vol. 1, No. 17, P. 1
Vol. 1, No. 18, P. 3
Noemfoor Invaded, MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 2, P. 17
Sansapor ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 5, P. 65
Moluccas Defenses Disintegrating ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 8, P. 113

NOTE: For additional background information, see indices to Vols. 1 of MAPTALK and NEWSMAP appearing in MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 19, and Vol. 2, No. 1.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informal training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:

- Part 1—From Port Moresby to Morotai.
- Part 2—History of the Philippines.
- Part 3—These are the Philippines.
- Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.
- Part 5—Under the heel of Japan.
- Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
- Part 7—A few Do's and Dont's for GIs.
- Part 8—Looking Ahead.

POINTS TO EMPHASIZE

Some knowledge of the history of the Philippines will be useful in understanding the Filipino people.

The Philippine culture—its ways of living and thinking—was unique in its fusion of Malay, Chinese, and other cultures, before the influence of Spanish rule.

The Spanish regime introduced Western civilization to an Oriental country and brought to it the far-reaching benefits of the Christian religion. The Philippines is now the only Christian country in the Far East.

The United States introduced a new colonial policy in the history of the world, which encouraged the growth of local self-government looking toward independence. It emphasized educational opportunities, promoted economic and industrial development, and greatly improved public health.

Rapid progress was made by the Commonwealth Government toward independence of the Philippines in the years immediately preceding Japanese invasion. The United States has advanced the date for Philippine independence to the time when the Japanese are driven from the country and democratic processes are re-established.

In the battle for the Philippines, Filipinos made a heroic fight against the Japanese and continue to resist Japanese aggression.

The Philippine Government-in-Exile continues the fight against Japan and plans for the freedom and independence of the Philippines.

(A suggestion to the leader: Brief comments by any members of the group who can contribute information on Philippine history should be encouraged).

Philippines Information Training Program Part 2

History of the Philippines

Outline and Reference Material Prepared by:
Information & Education Section, HQ USAFFE

OUTLINE:

HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. Our trade and relations with the Philippines developed early in our national life.
 - a. Our sailors learned the Filipino commercial products in the China trade between New England and Canton.
 - (1) Manila hemp (abaca) for rope making became a trade staple in New England.
 - (2) Crude sugar secured for American consumption and export to Great Britain.
 - b. Three American export and import houses in Manila in 1858.
 - c. American men of science charted, explored, and studied the region.
2. Before the Spanish rule the Philippines received contributions from Malay, Chinese, and other cultures.
 - a. Between 12th and 15th centuries, the influence of Hindu-Malay state at Sumatra reached Philippine archipelago.
 - b. Chinese trade reached Philippines long before Magellan.
 - (1) Captain of Chinese junk entering Manila gave white umbrellas as tribute to local chieftains.
 - (2) Delegation from Luzon exchanged gifts with Chinese Emperor as early as 1372.
 - (3) Spanish found Chinese traders essential to their existence.
 - c. Some evidence that commissioners of Chinese Emperor exerted some form of rule over some islands.
 - d. Strong Mohammedan movement spread eastward from

tegic plan. In each the enemy was surprised and thrown off balance. In each large forces were left trapped and starving in the by-passed areas.

With the landing on Sansapor we had occupied all strategic centers in New Guinea. There remained only to mop-up enemy remnants and consolidate our positions. Below Aitape, the Japanese 18th Army tried to break out of its trap, attacking our defenses time and again. Each attack was repulsed and the force was completely demoralized after we had encircled the forward elements and cut off their supply from the rear. Today, harassed daily from the air and sea, the 18th Army is virtually disintegrated.

Similarly the 2nd Japanese Army, by-passed at Manokwari, has been disorganized. Its troops are now reported to be evacuating Dutch New Guinea as best they can—on foot or by coastal barge—in hopes that on the southern shore of the Vogelkop peninsula they might be picked up by rescue craft.

From Sansapor, Noemfoor, Blak, and other forward bases, our air power began to pound at the enemy's chain of defenses through the Molucca Islands. These are the islands to the west of New Guinea which the enemy had developed into strong bases to protect the approaches to the Philippines to the north and his holdings in the Netherlands East Indies to the west. In mid-August General MacArthur announced that as a result of

our air strikes this chain had been broken up into separate links. A little later, as a result of heavy blows on Mindanao, he announced that we had achieved air supremacy over the southern Philippines.

The next move was the landing on Morotai. And that's where we are today—only 300 miles below the Philippines and the payoff on a promise.

We Licked the Jungle Too!

Although in looking back we tend to emphasize combat operations, it is well to remember that in winning the battle of supply we faced a natural enemy that in places has been tougher than the Jap—the jungle.

In New Guinea and the other islands near it we have found no highways, no ready-made public utilities, few docks, no public buildings waiting to be converted into headquarters or hotels waiting to be turned into billets. We have had to build from scratch—sometimes actually shoving the earth out to meet the big boats at anchor, and everywhere building docks and piers and jetties. We have had to cut roads through swamp, hack airstrips out of wilderness, and somehow keep them from washing away. We have had to set-up our own electric dynamos and establish our own water-purification system. And if we've wanted a roof over our heads

we've had to build it ourselves—from canvas, grass, or coconut logs. Whenever we've approached the enemy on the march we've had to set up our own supply dumps on the way, and, to prevent an epidemic of dysentery, set up elaborate latrine systems as we advanced.

The distances involved have been staggering. Our supply lines stretch from San Francisco to Australia through New Guinea, and fan out to scores of island bases. When we move anything we must carry it either by boat or by plane. Any extensive overland supply is too expensive and impracticable.

Yet we have met every challenge the jungle has offered. No matter what the distance or how it had to be reached, somehow we've delivered the goods on time.

What to Expect

It would be foolish to try to predict where or when we'll make this coming Philippines landing. But from what has gone before we may safely assume these facts:—Wherever we land will be where the Japs least expect us and are least prepared. We will land in sufficient force to take what we want and hold it, and with enough supplies to carry on. We may be assured that, as has been true of every operation since Buna, the campaign for the liberation of the Philippines will be won at a rock-bottom price in human life.

SUPPLEMENT

PART TWO: HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Errata:

Page 2 -- The following item was omitted from the outline (column 2):

5c. Filipinos considered Revolution against the United States as a war for independence.

Page 3 -- Column 3, Early American Contacts:

"Later ... exports decreased ..." should read:

"Later ... exports increased ..."

Page 14 -- At head of column 3, the following heading was omitted:

7. RECENT ACTIONS PROMOTING INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PHILIPPINES

Additional Material on the following topics may be found in NEWSMAP and MAPTALK:

Attack, Moresby
to Finschhafen ... NEWSMAP, Vol. 1, No. 1.
Coral Sea, Battle of, MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 12, P. 12
Air Forces in SWPA,
Growth of ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 6, P. 91
Bismarck Sea Battle, MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 9
Vol. 2, No. 6, P. 94
South Pacific,
Warfare in ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 9, P. 138
Rabaul Neutralized NEWSMAP, Vol. 1, No. 12
Admiralty Islands ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 1, P. 4
Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 9
Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 1
Emirau Island ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 5, P. 1
Hollandia ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 9, P. 8
Vol. 1, No. 8, P. 1

Vol. 1, No. 10, P. 1
Vol. 1, No. 11, P. 1
Aitape, Invasion at,
Counter attacks at MAPTALK, Vol. 1, Nos. 9, 10,
11, P. 1
MAPTALK, Vol. 2, Nos. 3, 4, 6,
PP. 33, 49, 81
Wakde Island
Invasion ... MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 14, P. 1
Blak Is. Campaign MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 15, P. 1
Vol. 1, No. 16, P. 4
Vol. 1, No. 17, P. 1
Vol. 1, No. 18, P. 3
Noemfoor Invaded, MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 2, P. 17
Sansapor ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 5, P. 65
Moluccas Defenses
Disintegrating ... MAPTALK, Vol. 2, No. 8, P. 113

NOTE: For additional background information, see indices to Vols. 1 of MAPTALK and NEWSMAP appearing in MAPTALK, Vol. 1, No. 19, and Vol. 2, No. 1.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Philippines Information Training Program Part 2

History of the Philippines

Outline and Reference Material Prepared by:
Information & Education Section, HQ USAFFE

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informal training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:

- Part 1—From Port Moresby to Morotai.
- Part 2—History of the Philippines.
- Part 3—These are the Philippines.
- Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.
- Part 5—Under the heel of Japan.
- Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
- Part 7—A few Do's and Dont's for GIs.
- Part 8—Looking Ahead.

POINTS TO EMPHASIZE

Some knowledge of the history of the Philippines will be useful in understanding the Filipino people.

The Philippine culture—its ways of living and thinking—was unique in its fusion of Malay, Chinese, and other cultures, before the influence of Spanish rule.

The Spanish regime introduced Western civilization to an Oriental country and brought to it the far-reaching benefits of the Christian religion. The Philippines is now the only Christian country in the Far East.

The United States introduced a new colonial policy in the history of the world, which encouraged the growth of local self-government looking toward independence. It emphasized educational opportunities, promoted economic and industrial development, and greatly improved public health.

Rapid progress was made by the Commonwealth Government toward independence of the Philippines in the years immediately preceding Japanese invasion. The United States has advanced the date for Philippine independence to the time when the Japanese are driven from the country and democratic processes are re-established.

In the battle for the Philippines, Filipinos made a heroic fight against the Japanese and continue to resist Japanese aggression.

The Philippine Government-in-Exile continues the fight against Japan and plans for the freedom and independence of the Philippines.

(A suggestion to the leader: Brief comments by any members of the group who can contribute information on Philippine history should be encouraged).

OUTLINE:

HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. Our trade and relations with the Philippines developed early in our national life.
 - a. Our sailors learned the Filipino commercial products in the China trade between New England and Canton.
 - (1) Manila hemp (abaca) for rope making became a trade staple in New England.
 - (2) Crude sugar secured for American consumption and export to Great Britain.
 - b. Three American export and import houses in Manila in 1858.
 - c. American men of science chartered, explored, and studied the region.
2. Before the Spanish rule the Philippines received contributions from Malay, Chinese, and other cultures.
 - a. Between 12th and 15th centuries, the influence of Hindu-Malay state at Sumatra reached Philippine archipelago.
 - b. Chinese trade reached Philippines long before Magellan.
 - (1) Captain of Chinese junk entering Manila gave white umbrellas as tribute to local chieftains.
 - (2) Delegation from Luzon exchanged gifts with Chinese Emperor as early as 1372.
 - (3) Spanish found Chinese traders essential to their existence.
 - c. Some evidence that commissioners of Chinese Emperor exerted some form of rule over some Islands.
 - d. Strong Mohammedan movement spread eastward from

- Arabia and engulfed many of the peoples of Sulu archipelago and Mindanao.
- c. Japanese planned to attack and rule Philippines late in the 16th century after Spain was established there.
 - (1) Plan fell through on account of illness of Japanese leaders.
 - f. Before Spanish occupation, Japanese ships came yearly to Manila to trade products.
3. For more than three centuries Spanish rule dominated the Philippines and greatly affected all government and cultural development.
 - a. Discovery by Magellan in 1521 marked the beginning of modern Philippine history.
 - b. First permanent Spanish colony established in Cebu by Miguel Lopez de Legaspi in 1565.
 - c. Until 1821 Spain governed Philippines through Viceroy of Mexico.
 - d. Spanish rule brought Western civilization to the Islands.
 - (1) Some main roads constructed.
 - (2) A centralized government established.
 - (3) Spanish forms of local government introduced.
 - (4) Spanish ideas and customs took root slowly among the masses of the people.
 - e. Introduction and promotion of Christian religion was the outstanding and most far-reaching contribution.
 4. The Filipino Rebellion revealed failure of Spanish rule.
 - a. Spanish rule developed some unity but little affection for Spain among the masses.
 - b. In 1896 the Filipinos rebelled and conditions were still unsettled when Spanish-American War opened.
 - c. Execution of Jose Rizal by Spanish gave Filipinos a national hero.
 5. A new era for the Philippines started with the Spanish-American war.
 - a. American fleet under Admiral Dewey won decisive victory

over Spanish naval forces at Manila Bay in 1898.

- b. Filipino insurgents and American forces co-operated to defeat common enemy.
 - c. Entire country passed under control of United States by terms of the Treaty of Paris, December, 1898.
 - d. The Filipinos demanded immediate and complete independence.
 - f. Philippine Revolution developed and crystallized a high level of national feeling, unity, and consciousness.
 - g. Filipinos were defeated by superior arms and equipment.
 - (1) In 1901 the Filipino leader Aguinaldo was captured and persuaded to take the oath of allegiance.
 - h. An enlightened form of civil government was established and developed under American control beginning in 1901.
6. The Attitudes and Policy of the United States promoted great progress in the Philippines.
 - a. McKinley's decision on the Philippines was to take the Islands, educate the Filipinos, and help them attain a higher level of civilization.
 - b. U.S. Senate Resolution, February 1899, stated that it was not the intention of the United States "to permanently annex said Islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States" and that the aim was "to prepare them for local self-government."
 - c. In 1908 Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, reported to President Theodore Roosevelt: "The national policy is to govern the Philippine Islands for the benefit and welfare and uplifting of the people of the Islands and gradually to extend to them, as soon as they shall show themselves fit to exercise it, a greater and greater measure of popular self-government."
 - d. Educational progress, an outstanding achievement of U.S. policy and Filipino co-operation.

- (1) Early instruction given by American soldiers.
 - (2) More than 1,000 American teachers appointed in 1901.
 - (3) Remarkable growth in educational opportunities and educational level of Filipinos during 40 years.
 - (4) Schools have developed a strong consciousness of Philippine nationality and a sense of civic responsibility.
- e. A general economic development without parallel in colonial administration was achieved under the guidance of the United States.
 - (1) Foreign trade has expanded rapidly.
 - (2) Free trade with United States established in 1913.
 - (3) Favorable trade balance established.
 - (4) Increased cultivation of land attained.
 - (5) Much progress achieved in industrial development.
 - (6) Benefits from wealth created include:
 - (a) Higher standards of diet, clothing, and housing.
 - (b) Building of highways, railroads, and bridges.
 - (c) Better public health service, wider education, and advancing social standards.
 - f. Significant improvement made in public health.
 - (1) Many hospitals established.
 - (2) Infant mortality greatly decreased.
 - (3) Founding of Medical School and Nurses' Training School.
 - (4) Development of a program of sanitation to check disease and to insure a pure water supply.
 - (5) Between the 1930 census and that of 1939, the population more than doubled.
 - g. Idea of Filipino development toward freedom constantly encouraged.
 - (1) Early policy declared that our control and possession of Islands would be but temporary.

- (2) Passage of Cooper Law by U.S. Congress in 1902 giving the Filipinos an elective National Assembly.
 - (3) Jones Law in 1916 contained a promise of independence as soon as a stable government was established.
 - (4) Tydings-McDuffie Law in 1934 provided for Commonwealth form of government and fixed date of independence at 4 July 1946.
- h. In development of local self-government Filipinos assumed increasing share and responsibility.
 - (1) Under American regime a rapid extension of political power was given the Filipinos, first in the municipalities, then in the provinces, and finally in the insular or national government.
 - (a) From the outset more than 99 percent of municipal officials were Filipinos.
 - (2) Consciousness of loyalty to national state increased steadily during last forty years.
 - (3) Growth of national feeling especially rapid under Commonwealth government.
7. In recent years several steps have been taken to promote independence for Philippines.
 - a. Commonwealth Government established by Independence Law in 1934.
 - (1) Adoption of the Philippine Constitution.
 - (2) Executive power vested in President of the Commonwealth.
 - (3) Legislative power now vested in a national legislature consisting of two houses.
 - (a) Senate of 24 members.
 - (b) House of Representatives of not more than 120 members.
 - (4) Judicial power vested in Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Court of First Instance.
 - (5) High Commissioner to the Philippines appointed by the President of the United States with consent of the Senate.

- (2) Resident Commissioner, appointed by President of Philippines, has seat in U.S. House of Representatives with right to speak but not to vote.
- b. The Commonwealth Government is highly centralized.
- c. A Commonwealth Government-in-Exile is maintained during Japanese occupation.
- d. Senate Joint Resolution 93, 29 June 1944, advanced date of Philippine Independence to time when Japanese are driven from country and democratic processes are re-established.
- e. Senate Joint Resolution 94, 29 June, established joint Filipino-American Rehabilitation Commission for reconstruction of Philippines after the war.

8. The invasion by Japan is the last dark chapter of Filipino history.

- a. Pre-war Japanese activities were meaningful.
 - (1) A peaceful penetration achieved by economic and cultural activities.
 - (2) 18,000 of the 29,000 Japanese in the Commonwealth lived in Davao on Mindanao.
 - (3) Japanese controlled deep-sea fishing industry.
 - (4) Much foreign trade moved in Japanese ships.
- b. International situation stimulated preparation for defense of Philippines.
 - (1) General MacArthur called to Philippines in 1935 to organize and train Philippine army.
 - (2) The Philippine Army and the United States Army were united under command of General MacArthur 26 July, 1941.
 - (3) Additional air fields were being established.
 - (4) Invasion by Japanese came before defense plans were completed.
- c. Historic and tragic battle for the Philippines immortalized the valor and loyalty of Filipino troops.
 - (1) Overwhelming numbers of Japanese and superior equipment were resisted gallantly.

- (2) Heroic defense of Bataan Peninsula ended 9 April 1942.
- (3) The fighting spirit of defenders held Corregidor until 6 May 1942.
- (4) Active resistance to Japanese continues throughout Islands by American and Filipino soldiers and patriots.
- (5) The Commonwealth Government-in-Exile continues to fight Japanese aggression and to plan intelligently and effectively for the free Philippines of the future.

TEXT REFERENCE

1. OUR EARLY INTEREST IN THE PHILIPPINES

Early American Contacts

American interest in the Philippine Islands has varied greatly from year to year. During the early period of our nation's existence, the China trade between New England and Canton served to familiarize our sailors and shipping interests with the commercial products of the Islands. After 1814 when general permission had been given by the Philippine colonial government to foreigners to establish trading posts in Manila, the American flag became conspicuous among the vessels anchored in the waters of Manila Bay. Manila hemp (abaca) for rope making became a trade staple in great demand by the New England ropewalks and shipyards. Crude sugar in earthenware jars was also purchased in part for home consumption and in part for re-export to Great Britain. In 1858 there were three American export and import establishments in Manila. Later . . . exports decreased. . . . We received leaf tobacco, dyewood, rope fiber, tortoise shell, and mother-of-pearl.

Krieger, Herbert W. *Peoples of the Philippines*. Smithsonian Institution, 1942. (War Background Studies Number Four). p. 7-9.

A Brief History of the Filipino People

The emphasis . . . given to the United States and its interests in the Philippines springs from the quite natural concern of Americans with that side of the picture. Of much greater importance is the need to understand, as far as may be possible,

the people who have been fighting side by side with Americans on the Far Eastern battlefields. A sketch of their past history, necessarily brief, provides part of the basis for that understanding.

The typical Filipino now emerging in the Islands is considered by Professor Keesing to be "somewhere between the early Negritos and Indonesians and the mestizos (Filipinos with recognizable Chinese or white racial characteristics) of Manila." Early Indonesian immigrants from southern Asia, coming to the islands thousands of years ago, mingled with the pygmy aboriginals, now fast disappearing, who showed both Negroid and Mongoloid affinities. Later arrivals (now commonly known as Malays), showing strong Mongoloid affinities, in turn mingled with the Indonesians. According to Professor H. Otley Beyer, "Among Philippine Malays, every gradation can be found from an almost pure Indonesian to a pure Mongoloid type. Pure blends constitute a minority everywhere . . . the Luzon Christians are predominately Mongoloid, while both the Christian and Mohammedan (Moro) groups to the south of Luzon are predominantly Indonesian."

Between the 12th and 15 centuries, the influence of the Hindu-Malay state at Sumatra, which had extended to the Philippine archipelago through its adventurous colonizers, had been swept away by a Buddhist-Javanese empire. This in turn was followed by a strong Mohammedan movement eastward from Arabia, which engulfed the peoples of the Sulu archipelago and of Mindanao and was progressing rapidly toward the northern islands when it met the new influence of Spain. The Spanish conquerors, visiting the islands first in 1521, established themselves there after the middle of the century. They were able to Christianize the larger part of the lowland dwellers in the northern and central islands, but the mountain peoples of both north and south remain largely non-Christian, and the peoples of Mindanao and Sulu are predominantly Mohammedan (Moro) to this day.

Spaniards and Mexicans from New Spain, and in later years Americans and other Occidentals, united with

the island peoples and introduced new blood strains. There had been an infiltration of Chinese blood even before the days of the Spaniard. Many prominent Filipinos today, officials, businessmen and cultural leaders, are mestizos, a term which carries no derogatory connotation and which sets no group apart.

The early influences of the Asiatic continent, of Arabia and India; three centuries of Spanish domination; and the last forty years of American rule have produced in the Philippines a unique social and cultural pattern. An Oriental people, geographically and racially close to the great cultures of the East, has become westernized to a large degree through its familiarity with western language, law, custom and religion.

During the three centuries of Spanish rule in the islands, the colony was developed almost solely with a view to the enrichment of the mother country and her colonial agents in the Philippines, and to the propagation of the Catholic faith. In spite of numerous decrees with regard to public instruction, it was not until the latter years of the Spanish regime that anything approaching popular education was introduced. Excellent schools and colleges were founded, however, early in the 17th century, and some of them still exist.

Spain brought together under her control the peoples of a country completely lacking national unity. (The only peoples who remained outside her control were the Moros (Mohammedans), who are still strongly entrenched in the southern islands of Mindanao and Jolo, and the pagan peoples who are still to be found principally in the mountains of Luzon and in Mindanao). She accomplished this not alone by political means but also largely through the activities of Roman Catholic missionaries. She brought Christianity to an Oriental country, where it survived through years of revolt against the power of Spain and even against the power of the Church itself. When the last census was taken (1939), 91% of the 16 million Filipinos were classified as Christian, 79% as Catholic—a sturdy monument to the influence of Spain in the islands. About 10% were Aglipayans, members of the Independent

Filipino Church which developed under Father Aglipay at the time of the country's uprising against Spain. Although the Aglipayan Church retained some of the forms of the Roman Catholic Church, it was primarily a national institution.

It is the custom to belittle and condemn the record of Spain in its Far Eastern colony. Yet the unifying and civilizing effect of Spanish rule must not be underrated. Spain introduced into the Philippines Roman civil law, the religion and culture and, to some extent, the language of one of the most advanced nations of Europe. Through intermarriage she left in the Philippines a mestizo class of Spanish-Filipinos numbering between two and three hundred thousand, many of them prominent in the political, social, intellectual and business life of the community. Spanish ways of life and thought inevitably permeated to all classes of people.

The United States introduced into the country an entirely new colonial policy, new not only to the Philippines but in the history of the world. It established a government designed, so it was stated, "for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands." It initiated a system of free primary education, encouraged the management of their own local affairs by Filipinos, and prepared them gradually for self-government and an independent statehood. American legal and constitutional ideas were introduced and to a large measure adopted. Through an effective public health control, cholera was wiped out, the occurrence of smallpox was greatly reduced, and the country was brought well to the top of Oriental nations in health standards. Infant mortality was reduced, although it was still high even by Oriental standards. Hospital facilities were gradually made available all over the islands.

The public school system had been organized immediately after the Americans took Manila. American soldiers became the first instructors in the public schools and they were soon supplemented by hundreds of American teachers who came out from the States to go to every part of the islands. Schools were provided to give general and specialized instruc-

tion to thousands of Filipinos. Roads, railroads and bridges were built, opening up the islands to a remarkable extent. Excellent waterworks, sewage systems, electric power and lighting, and telephonic communication were introduced. Many people were earning better wages and living under better conditions than some of their most favored countrymen had known under the Spanish regime.

The Spanish language, still used in official and social circles, never became the language of the people, nor did English so become, although it was taught in the schools all during those forty years and was the official language after 1906.

The 1939 census revealed that, in a population of 16 million, about 27% of the people were able to speak English; 3% Spanish. Even those who can use these languages fall back into their native dialect in ordinary family and communal intercourse. Of the four dozen native languages, two predominate: Bisayan, used by about 45% of the people, and Tagalog, now adopted as the national language, used by about 25%.

In spite of the introduction of a public school system under the American regime, many factors operated against its complete success. After centuries of living under a feudal system, with its sharp division between the wealthy landlord (cacique) class and the tenant and laborer, the workers and tenants who made up the bulk of the population were still too poor to send their children to school for long. Communications were largely lacking forty years ago, and the country districts to-day still need good roads. It was difficult to secure enough American teachers to undertake spade work; the task of training Filipinos to assist the first comers and to carry on the work was enormous. Unfortunately space is lacking to give full recognition to the work of American and Filipino teachers, not only in schools but in their communities.

These things should all be taken into account when we see that, according to the 1939 census, nearly two-thirds of the persons over 20 years of age had received no schooling; that only two-fifths of those who had attended school had completed the

fourth grade; that less than half the population was able to read and write in any language or dialect.

The handicaps may not be obvious, but they must not be overlooked. Most of the children in public schools came from homes where native dialects were still spoken. Their parents, able to go to school only a few years if at all, acquired only a smattering of English which in many cases they promptly forgot. The children suddenly had to learn the new arts of reading, writing and arithmetic in a completely new medium. If they were able to attend school only a few years, as was too often the case, they did not make the progress in their other work that would have been possible if they had been working in a familiar tongue; nor did they make enough progress in English to ensure the continuance of its use once they left their class rooms behind. For this reason, the introduction of Tagalog into the public school system in 1940 had much to commend it.

A much broader criticism of the whole educational system is that it was not conceived in terms of the country where it was being applied. It was, in the first instance, an attempt to adapt the American system to an Oriental setting. Textbooks, curricula, general school activities were not so planned as to make the child aware of the relationship of what he was trying to learn in school to his life outside the schoolroom.

Recognition of these facts is not meant to disparage the genuine—though sometimes misdirected—effort made by Americans, which met with the whole-hearted co-operation of the Filipino people. Viewed against the record at the beginning of the century, it is a remarkable achievement, and one for which much credit is due not only American officials and teachers, but the Filipinos themselves.

Neither is this brief summary intended to magnify the problems which the Commonwealth has been facing. People who know the Philippines well believe that there is far greater unity among the people than their racial, lingual and religious diversities would seem to suggest. This sense of unity came about as a natural result of the years of silent resentment against

Spain, which finally burst into open rebellion at the end of the 19th century. It survived and strengthened with the coming of the Commonwealth. The non-Christian peoples of the mountains of Luzon and Mindanao, the Moros in the south, were a small minority problem which Commonwealth officials had already been meeting with some small success. The unification of the people received a new impetus when Filipinos, Christian, Mohammedan and pagan alike, were called to arms to meet the Japanese invasion of their country.

Porter, Catherine. Crisis in the Philippines. Issued under the auspices of The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942. p. 35-42.

2. CONTRIBUTION OF MALAY, CHINESE, AND OTHER CULTURES TO PHILIPPINES BEFORE SPANISH RULE

Chinese Traders in the Philippines

The Spanish found the presence of Chinese traders in Manila an absolute essential to their existence. The scarcity of local food supplies not only attests to the sparse native population of the Philippine Islands at the time of the first Spanish settlements, but made the importation of rice and other foodstuffs from China necessary. In the galleon trade with New Spain (Mexico) which later developed, the Spanish found that a cargo of goods imported originally from China to Manila where it was transhipped to the official cargo of the galleon produced greater profits than did the export of such things as could be obtained locally in the Philippines. On the other hand, the Chinese were eager to trade with the Spanish in order to obtain the Mexican pesos and Spanish gold.

Luzon was known to the Chinese long before the Spanish conquest. The native Indonesian name "Luzong" appeared in Chinese texts as "Lu-Sung." Like the Japanese, the Chinese applied this term to the entire archipelago although the Chinese meant the City of Manila in most instances when reference was made to the name

Lu-Sung. This term appears in "Ming Shih," the Chinese Annals of the Ming dynasty, along with many other references to the Philippines generally. According to these Annals, a delegation from Luzon actually arrived in China with gifts as early as the year 1372. The Chinese emperor exchanged gifts with the embassy in the form of silk and cloth of gold. There is no evidence that the Chinese had settlements or colonies in the Philippine Islands previous to the Spanish conquest. Nevertheless, trading vessels came to the Islands with the fall monsoon. The products of the country are described as yellow beeswax, cotton, pearls, shells, areca nuts, abaca, and pina cloth. The Chinese exported porcelain, objects of lead and iron, including iron cooking pans and needles, and glass beads in variegated colors.

Another reference to the Philippines taken from the Annals of the Ming Shih is to the Pangasinan people who originally occupied much of the area of the valley of central Luzon and of the northwest coast of Luzon. The Pangasinan must have been an energetic and enterprising people for this reference in the Ming Shih speaks of an embassy from them to China in 1406 as presenting some horses to the Chinese emperor, Yung Lo. It is generally understood that the Filipinos, particularly in Jolo and in Mindanao, did have horses before the arrival of the Spaniard. The emperor very graciously gave the Pangasinan delegation paper money in return, as well as bolts of silk. The Chinese emperor, Yung-Lo, appears to have sent an officer to Luzon during the previous year, namely in 1405, who was to remain as the governor of that island. This interesting detail in the narrative of the Annals of the Ming Dynasty indicates that the first protectorate over the Philippines was Chinese.

The first contact between the Spaniards and Chinese was in 1571 in Mindoro. The Chinese, however, had been established in Luzon before that time in considerable numbers. It is mentioned in the Ming Shih, that "Formerly the people of Fukien lived there because the place was conveniently near." The many conflicts with the Chinese colonies established in

Manila from time to time and their bloody extinction by the Spanish and Filipinos form a part of narrative history and do not in themselves contribute to a study of the cultural development of the people of the Philippines.

Krieger, Herbert W. *Peoples of the Philippines*. Smithsonian Institution, 1942. (War Background Studies Number Four). p. 26-28.

(For comment on the Mohammedan movement see excerpt from Catherine Porter's *Crisis in the Philippines*, quoted in Section 1.)

3. EFFECTS OF MORE THAN THREE CENTURIES OF SPANISH OCCUPATION

The Spanish Experiment in Global Geography

Ferdinand Magellan first reached the eastern Philippine island of Samar, March 16, 1521. We have the narrative of his voyage of discovery from Antonio Pigafetta who accompanied the expedition to the Philippines and was fortunate enough to be aboard the one ship, the Victoria, that returned out of the five that had departed from Seville. Pigafetta refers to the inter-island trade in existence between the Malays of Brunei in Borneo, Cagayan in western Mindanao, and the Visayan island of Leyte. He observed and tells about the native cultivation of rice, and refers to the presence of coconuts, oranges, bananas, breadfruit, and ginger.

Magellan, anxious to obtain adequate food supplies for his crew, extended his explorations. Passing the island of Bohol he arrived at Cebu, at that time a native town of several thousand inhabitants. Here further evidence of inter-island trade was noted in the presence of a Siamese junk.

The ability of the Filipino as a trader in 1521 is evidenced by the observation of Pigafetta that Cebu merchants were in possession of balance scales, weights and measures, and that they had a good knowledge of the relative value of commodities.

It might be noted that the desire

to Christianize the populations of newly discovered lands fired the enthusiasm of the Spanish explorer as much as it does our own great missionary societies. The extent to which Magellan succeeded during his brief stay on the island of Cebu in "Christianizing" the native population is difficult to understand. However, Pigafetta refers to the dato of Cebu as having become a Christian. The observance of mass by the Spaniards must have made a strong emotional appeal. Eight hundred Filipinos, including Humabon, their chief or dato, were baptized. Magellan was killed soon afterward while assisting the "Christianized" Cebuanos in a fight with the natives of the nearby island of Mactan.

It was decided to send one ship, the Victoria, to Spain under the command of Juan Sebastian Elcano by way of the Cape of Good Hope following the established Portuguese route. The other remaining ship out of the original five was to return to the Spanish colonies in America. This latter ship was never heard from again, while the Victoria sailed first to Timor, and then through the Indian Ocean, around the southern end of Africa, finally reaching the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands where Elcano anchored, hoping to obtain supplies, thinking that the Portuguese would not suspect them so far away from the Moluccas. The Portuguese governor, however, gave orders for the seizure of the Victoria and Elcano raised sail, arriving at San Lucar, Spain, September 6, 1522, with 18 men left out of the original company of 234. Spain welcomed the return of the expedition.

The voyage, designed to appropriate for the Spanish the trade with the East Indies already established by the Portuguese, actually led to the discovery of the Philippine Islands to the western world. It incidentally brought about the first circumnavigation of the globe and set in motion the cultural forces that have operated from that time on to isolate the peoples of the Philippines from earlier cultural affiliations and from physically related populations in Indonesia. At the same time it magnified the importance of Manila as the commercial center of the Far East, and the en-

trepreneur through which the kingdoms of eastern Asia exchanged their wares.

Each year a fleet of 30 to 40 Chinese junks sailed with the new moon in March. The voyage across the China Sea, rough with the monsoons, occupied 15 or 20 days, and the fleet returned at the end of May or the beginning of June. Between October and March there came each year Japanese ships from Nagasaki which brought wheat, silks, objects of art, and weapons, and took away from Manila the raw silk of China, gold, deer horns, woods, honey, wax, palm wine and wine of Castile.

From Malacca and India came fleets of the Portuguese subjects of Spain, with spices, slaves, Negroes, and Kafir, and the rich productions of Bengal, India, Persia, and Turkey. From Borneo, too, came the smaller craft of the Malays, who from their boats sold the fine palm mats, the best of which still came from Cagayan Sulu and Borneo, slaves, sago, water pots, and glazed earthenware, black and fine. From Siam and Cambodia also, but less often, there came trading ships. Manila had become a great emporium for all the countries of the East.

The commerce between the Philippines, and Mexico and Spain, though it was of vast importance, was soon limited by action of the crown. It was a commerce which apparently admitted of infinite expansion, but the shortsighted merchants and manufacturers of the Peninsula clamored against its development, and it was subjected to the severest limitations. Four galleons were at first maintained for this trade, which were dispatched two at a time in successive years from Manila to the port of Acapulco, Mexico. These galleons were great ships of 600 and 800 tons apiece. They went "very strong with soldiers," and they carried the annual mail, reinforcements, and supplies of Mexican silver for trade with China, which has remained the commercial currency of the East almost to the present day. Later the number of galleons was reduced to one.

The solitary galleon was freighted with the pick of all the rich stores that came to Manila. The profits were enormous—600 and 800 percent.

Biscaino wrote that with 200 ducats invested in Spanish wares and some Flemish commodities, he made 1,400 ducats; but, he added, in 1588 he lost a ship—robbed and burned by Englishmen.

A few years before Mexico gained her independence from Spain the galleon trade was discontinued.

Krieger, Herbert W. *Peoples of the Philippines*. Smithsonian Institution, 1942. (War Background Studies Number Four). p. 23-26.

Spanish Occupation

The discovery of the Philippines by Magellan in 1521 marked the beginning of modern Philippine history. After 1521 several ill-fated Spanish expeditions were dispatched from Mexico, but it was not until 1565 that a permanent Spanish colony was established in Cebu under the leadership of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi. Later the Spanish extended their rule throughout the Visayas and northward to Luzon. In 1571 Manila was taken, and the construction of the Spanish walled city began.

For over 3 centuries, from 1565 to 1898, the Spanish ruled the Islands. There were occasional unsuccessful rebellions of the Filipinos and attempts by the Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, Dutch and English to obtain a foothold in the archipelago. During most of this period, the Philippines were governed through the Viceroy of Mexico. In 1821, when the Mexican war of independence began, however, Madrid assumed direct supervision of the Spanish captain-general in Manila, who was not only the chief military officer, but was also the head of the civil government.

During the period of Spanish control, steps were taken to introduce Occidental culture in the Islands. Main roads were constructed in Luzon, a common religion was introduced and a centralized government was established. These developments helped to foster a spirit of unity among the Filipino people but did not increase their affection for Spain. The foreign trade also increased, particularly after the port of Manila was opened to ships of all nations in 1837.

In 1896, after 20 years of increasing

disaffection, the Filipinos rebelled, seeking their freedom from Spain. The execution of Jose Rizal, a liberal Filipino leader and now their national hero, gave them a further incentive. A temporary peace was concluded in 1898, but conditions were still unsettled when the Spanish-American War opened another chapter in Philippine history.

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section III, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 42.

Spain's Contribution to Filipino Culture

"Such accomplishment was principally the diffusion of the gospel, and it is due to this mission that the souls of our forefathers were unfolding to the light of the dogmas and teachings of the Christian religion, which has been transmitted to us, their descendants, as a sacred legacy and a dynamic tradition.

"Likewise, we owe to Spain the principles of occidental education which she implanted in these Islands, according to the modes and standards found in Latin countries.

"These two civilizations, the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon, which the fortunes of war have brought to us to make the soil of our land more fruitful, have moulded our national character in a manner so different from that of neighboring nations that in addition to the results of our own efforts, it may be said in truth that to both civilizations we owe in large measure our aptitude and fitness to assume the responsibilities of the present government. . . ."

President Manuel L. Quezon, January 11, 1936.

4. FILIPINO REBELLION GROWING OUT OF FAILURE OF SPANISH RULE

Decline of Spanish Rule

Although the Spaniards brought many benefits to the Islands during their centuries of rule, they failed essentially to win the loyalties and co-operation of the people. Too often

Spanish rule tended to be harsh and arbitrary, taking little account of the individual Filipino. The masses were heavily taxed, while the ruling classes despoiled the country for their own advantage. After years of unrest and turmoil the Filipinos finally rebelled in 1896. Under the great moral leadership of Jose Rizal, now the Filipino national hero, they attacked Spanish garrisons throughout the islands, and intermittent warfare was waged between Filipino and Spanish units.

At a time when the Filipino-Spanish struggle was deadlocked, the United States declared war on Spain. Under the blows of the United States Navy Manila surrendered and Spanish rule soon collapsed throughout the Islands.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (except Mindanao) (JANIS 154, Chapter X), People and Government, July 1944. p. 1.

The Beginning of the End of Spanish Rule

Although the Spanish priests did good work in educating and civilizing the Filipinos in the early years of their rule, by the end of the nineteenth century their church had become very corrupt. Spanish officials likewise were busy feathering their own nests. Discontent stirred in the Philippines. But an attempt at revolution, under the slogan "Long live the Philippine Republic," ended in failure.

Some of the rebels, however, continued to hold certain districts even after Admiral Dewey had destroyed the Spanish fleet stationed in Manila Bay, and Spain had given up her title to the Philippines by the Treaty of Paris in 1898. It was not until 1901 that the rebel leader Aguinaldo was captured and persuaded to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. In 1935 he was a candidate for the first presidency of the Philippine Commonwealth, but was defeated by Manuel Quezon, the present president.

Reid, Charles. *Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts*. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 39.

5. A NEW ERA FOR THE PHILIPPINES FOLLOWING THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

The American Era

For 2 years following the termination of Spanish rule in the Islands, American forces were compelled to engage disaffected Filipino elements who refused to recognize America's new position in the Philippines. This resistance gradually ended and military government gave way to civil government.

From the outset American civil administrators proceeded on the assumption that American rule was to be for the benefit of the Filipino people. As a result self-government was consistently extended to the Filipinos through the years. By 1916, when the Jones Act was passed, the Filipinos had made notable strides in self-government and this trend was further accelerated during the following years. Finally, in 1935, proceeding on a mandate of the American Congress the Filipinos established the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which provided independence, with final independence to come in 1946.

This development of an independent Filipino state was interrupted in 1941 by the Japanese invasion of the Islands. Since that time normal constitutional processes have been suspended. The Japanese have set up a puppet government under Jose P. Laurel, but this government is believed to be largely ineffectual and mainly a "front" for the Japanese military. Steps have been taken in the American Congress to reaffirm the pledge of independence to the Philippines and to guarantee them our co-operation and assistance in developing economic stability and military security in the post-war period.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (except Mindanao) (JANIS 154, Chapter X), People and Government, July, 1944. p. 1.

Civil Government under the Americans

Civil government was established in 1901. Political autonomy was gradually and progressively extended to the Filipinos, the tendency prevailing throughout the American regime being towards self-government and

eventual independence.

Beginning with the Treaty of Paris in 1898 clearly defined steps in that direction have been taken, such as President McKinley's instructions to the Commission (1900), the Philippine Bill (1902), the Philippine Autonomy Act or otherwise known as the Jones Law (1916), which promises eventual independence, and culminates with the Tydings-McDuffie Law (1934), which in turn provides that ten years after the Constitution of the Philippines has been approved by the Filipino people and the President of the United States, the Commonwealth Government organized, and the President and other officials have been installed, the Filipinos will enjoy complete political liberty. The Commonwealth Government was established on November 15, 1935.

In accordance with the provisions of the Independence Act, the Commonwealth Government was inaugurated with Hon. Manuel L. Quezon and Hon. Sergio Osmena as first President and Vice-President respectively.

Facts and Figures About the Philippines. Commonwealth of the Philippines, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, 1939. p. 34.

6. PROGRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES RESULTING FROM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

American Policy in Philippines

The basic principles of American policy in the Philippines during the first period of Republican control, and to a considerable extent during the whole of the American-Philippine relationship, were set forth in President McKinley's instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900. This great state paper expressed the dual purpose of the United States with reference to the government of the Islands; to see that they were well governed and at the same time prepared for democratic self-government. This quality of purpose was reflected in the instructions to the Commission concerning the organization and administration of the government which it was

to set up. The government was to be established for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippines and made to conform to their customs, their habits and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the maintenance of justice and efficiency and the preservation of the great principles of liberty and law which are at the basis of the American political system. As in the United States, in the distribution of political power, the presumption was always to be in favor of the smaller unit and the central government was to have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern and only such supervision and control over local government as might be necessary to enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers. Natives of the Philippines were to be placed in public office in preference to any others if they could be found competent and willing to perform the duties thereof.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippine Policy of the United States*. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1939. Chapter II, p. 5.

Statement of Policy by U.S. Senate

Statement of our policy included in a resolution by the United States Senate February 14, 1899, after the ratification of the peace treaty with Spain:

RESOLVED: That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said Islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States; but it is the intention of the United States to establish on said Islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said Islands, to prepare them for local self-government and in due time to make such disposition of said Islands as will best promote the interests of citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said Islands.

Krieger, Herbert W. *Peoples of the Philippines*. Smithsonian Institution, 1942. (War Background Studies Number Four), p. 10-11.

Secretary of War Taft's Statement of American Policy

No clearer authoritative statement of the American policy of the period is to be found than that made in 1908 by Secretary of War William Howard Taft in a report to President Roosevelt. Secretary Taft declared:

Shortly stated, the national policy is to govern the Philippine Islands for the benefit and welfare and uplifting of the people of the Islands and gradually to extend to them, as soon as they shall show themselves fit to exercise it, a greater and greater measure of popular self-government. . . . What should be emphasized in the statement of our national policy is that we wish to prepare the Filipinos for popular self-government. This is plain from Mr. McKinley's letter of instructions and all of his utterances. It was not at all within his purpose or that of the Congress which made his letter a part of the law of the land that we were merely to await the organization of a Philippine Oligarchy or aristocracy competent to administer the government and then turn the Islands over to it. . . . Another logical deduction from the main proposition is that when the Filipino people as a whole show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self-government, maintaining law and order and offering equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence of the United States, they shall be given it.

(1) Special Reports of William Howard Taft, Secretary of War, to the President of the United States. Washington, 1908, p. 7-8.

The Filipino leaders subscribed to every principle expressed in Mr. Taft's utterance. They declared, however, that they had already met the conditions laid down and should at once be granted independence. This being unattainable, they frankly utilized the wide political powers which they already possessed to wring the last degree of self-government out of the existing situation, to secure greater autonomy as rapidly as possible, and to press for early independence.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippine Policy of the United States*. Interna-

tional Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1939, p. 6-7. American Occupation

Almost immediately thereafter President McKinley announced that the Philippine Islands were not to be exploited for the aggrandizement of the American people. "The Philippines," he said, "are ours not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path which we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us."

The American occupation of the Philippines may be divided into four periods, namely, the military, transitional, constructive, and Filipinization periods.

During the first, or military period, from August 13, 1898, to July 4, 1901, the Islands were under a military governor, and the insurrection against the United States, headed by General Emilio Aguinaldo, was suppressed. United States troops went to the Philippines in large numbers to subdue the insurrectionists and to restore public order. In spite of the continuance of military operations, substantial beginnings were made in the organization and maintenance of a civil government, particularly in establishing respect for the authority of the United States; in the opening of schools in which the first teachers were noncommissioned officers of the Army; in the establishment of the judiciary; and in matters pertaining to public works and health services.

The second period was from 1901 to 1907, during which time the military government gradually was replaced by a civil government. With the inauguration of a civil governor on July 4, 1901, the military governor relinquished a portion of his executive authority. A year later he gave up all civil power, except as to the Moro provinces which he exercised continually until September, 1914. During this period of transition from a military to a civil government, the sole legislative body was the Philippine Commission, appointed by the President of the United States. In addition to the establishment of a working civil government, several projects were undertaken. A public school system was organized. About

5,000 schools were opened with 7,671 teachers and an enrollment of 400,000 children, or about one-fifth of the children of school age in the Philippine Islands. A judicial system was organized and procedure adopted. A new currency system was established and a census was taken. Public works were started on a systematic basis, and the health service was reorganized and made more effective.

During the third period, from 1907 to 1915, participation in legislation was granted to a lower house known as the Philippine Assembly, which was elected by the Filipinos. The commission became the upper house, or senate. In this period of construction, the government laid down and carried out a broad and practical program for the building of roads, bridges, port installations, irrigation works, schoolhouses, markets and other public buildings. Artesian wells also were driven. Practical and effective negotiations were made for the financing and construction of railroads and for developing inter-island transportation. Steamship subsidies were established and a large number of lighthouses were built. A comprehensive cadastral survey of the Islands was undertaken. In this period also, the University of the Philippines and many professional schools were founded as part of the government's educational program. Throughout these first three periods the policy was followed of utilizing Filipinos in minor government positions, carefully training them for promotion, and advancing them as rapidly as their efficiency and training justified. At the end of the third period, the proportion of Filipinos in the service was 72 percent, as against 28 percent Americans.

The fourth, or Filipinization period, was from 1915 to 1935. The first step taken by the Wilson administration in Washington in regard to the Philippines was to give the Filipinos a majority of the Commission or Upper House. The second was the passage of the Jones Bill in 1916. This act abolished the Philippine Commission and created the Philippine Senate in its stead, thus placing the legislative function entirely in the hands of elected representatives of the Filipino people. Under the Jones Law, the Christian provinces were permitted

to elect a Senate and a House of Representatives, and the Governor-General was authorized to appoint delegates and senators to represent the non-Christian sections of the Islands. The Legislature was given legislative control over the whole archipelago, subject to veto by the Governor-General. A law could be repassed over the Governor-General's veto, but in this event the law had to be approved by the President of the United States. During this period, public and private education expanded; and students, teachers and school buildings increased in number. Public buildings and hospitals were built, more artesian wells were bored, and roads were laid. Taxation and expenditures were both greatly increased. With the resulting expansion in governmental services there was a corresponding increase in the number of government employees. However, at the same time, and in the early part of this period, Governor-General F. B. Harrison adopted the policy of replacing most of the Americans in the service with Filipinos. Although the Governor-General remained the chief executive officer of the insular government, as early as 1921 the Americans in the service constituted only 4 percent. The form of government provided for in the Jones Law continued in effect until November 15, 1935, when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was inaugurated under the authority of the Independence Act passed by Congress in the previous year.

Results of American occupation and direct American control

As is indicated above, during those four periods there was a progressive enlargement of the autonomy granted to the Philippines, with complete political independence as the ultimate objective. In contrast to this development in the political sphere, the economic ties with the United States, based on trade preference, steadily became stronger.

During the period from 1898 to 1902 war and rebellion led to decreased crop production and dislocation of economic life. With the establishment of complete peace and the organization of American civil rule, however, both production and foreign

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trade began to increase by slow degrees.

When free trade came under the tariff acts of 1909 and 1913, the cultivation of export crops began to boom. These crops, principally sugar, coconuts, abaca and tobacco, depended almost entirely on the American market where, as a result of tariff protection, they were able to command as much as double the world market price. From 1909 to 1935 sugar production increased eight-fold, coconuts four times, production of rope about doubled and tobacco production more than doubled. Rice production also increased at a rate somewhat faster than the growth of population.

The periods prior to the establishment of the Commonwealth saw a rise in the standard of living, due largely to increased production resulting from preferential access to American markets. This rise was reflected in the clothing and to some extent in the food of the people, and in the introduction of modern conveniences among the upper classes.

Survey of the Philippines Islands, Volume I, Section III. Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943, p. 42-44.

Filipino Development

At least two of the aims expressed by McKinley soon came to appear smug and provided further proof of how little we really knew about the Philippines when we took the Islands over. For the Filipinos were undoubtedly civilized—the early American teachers found, to their amazement, that the Philippines boasted of universities older than any in the United States—and they were certainly Christianized, with the exception of a small minority of Mohammedans and pagans.

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, p. 90.

Step-Children

The islands which thus became a part of the American republic had from the beginning a curious status. They did not form a State, or a Territory, or a colony, or a naval base.

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The best definition that officials could invent for them was a "non-incorporated territory." The people of the islands were not citizens of the United States, although they had practically all the rights and privileges of American citizens. They did not, however, have to pay Federal income or other taxes.

Most of the American governors-general in the Philippines, appointed by the President of the United States, carried out pretty faithfully President McKinley's idea that they should serve as advisers and not as dictators. A legislature in which Filipinos were in the majority was created in 1907. In 1916 Congress extended Filipino self-government by the Jones Act, the preamble of which stated that " . . . it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands . . . as soon as a stable government can be established therein."

Except when curbs were needed to insure health and sound finance, the Filipinos steadily progressed toward this end. They had their own currency and postage stamps, and they made their own laws, although these were subject to the veto of the President of the United States. Unless an American law specifically stated that it applied to the Philippines, it was the local law which was in effect. Thus the Filipinos did not have votes for women until they had decided the issue for themselves, and they were never blessed (or plagued) with Prohibition.

Reid, Charles. *Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts*. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942, p. 40.

Progress Under American Guidance

My father was a fair-minded man. He realized that cases of torture by soldiers in the Philippines were revealed by Congressional investigation to be isolated cases of individual sadism and not condoned by the American government. He realized that the Americans were bringing American teachers instead of military authority into our country. Men like General Arthur MacArthur, my present chief's father, won him with their fair dealing as government heads.

The elder MacArthur was the first to institute in the Philippines the writ of habeas corpus, which is one of the cornerstones of the Bill of Rights. It was a courageous thing for a military governor to institute in a country still at war.

The first move of the Spaniards upon taking the Philippines had been to build churches. The Americans built schools. American teachers taught us through the life stories of Washington, Lincoln, and other leaders, of America's birth to freedom. This was what America gave us—the impulse for individual freedom.

And that reminds me, the first thing the Japanese did when they entered Manila was to establish two large red-light districts in the heart of the city.

Romulo, Carlos P. (Colonel). *I saw the Fall of the Philippines*. Harrap, 1943, Sydney, p. 47.

Philippine Education

If with their simple and sincere faith in the principles by which they had won their own independence and founded their governments, the American people failed to realize fully the nature and difficulty of the mission they were undertaking, they understood clearly that for its successful practice and permanent enjoyment, democratic government required an educated and informed citizenry. This understanding and conviction were as strong as they had been one hundred years earlier, when the framers of the great Ordinance of 1787 enacted for the government of the so-called northwest territory, stated that "religion, morality, and knowledge being essential to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."

In similar vein, President McKinley directed that the Commission 'should regard as of first importance the extension of a system of primary education which shall be free to all, and which shall tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship and for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community.' In its first proclamation to the people of the Philippines in 1899 the First Philippine Commission de-

clared the establishment of elementary schools and appropriate facilities for higher education to be of cardinal importance in the American program for the Islands.

No people ever accepted the blessings of education with more enthusiasm than the Filipinos. Like the Americans, they saw that the road to self-government lies through the schoolhouse. The United States Army began the establishment of modern schools in 1898, and within a year more than 4,500 primary pupils were enrolled in Manila alone. The foundations for the permanent educational system of the country were laid by the Philippine Commission in January, 1901. One of its first acts provided for the appointment of more than 1,000 American teachers. Some of the members of this original group of educational pioneers are still in the Philippines. The splendid and devoted work of these and thousands of others who followed them has been a credit to their country and of immeasurable value to the Filipino people.

Although a system of primary public schools was provided for by Royal Spanish decree in 1863, few Filipino children were being educated at public expense at the end of the Spanish regime. Today about two-thirds of all Filipino children of primary school age (seven to ten) are enrolled in the first four grades of the public schools. Total public school enrollment in March, 1935, was 1,204,485 pupils. They are taught in 7,680 schools, staffed by 27,120 teachers and administrators. In 1934 total expenditure for public education amounted to nearly twenty-three million pesos. This included more than 20 percent of the total expenditure of the central government for all purposes.

No agency of the state has been more effective than the public schools in the creation of a strong consciousness of Philippine nationality and the development of a sense of civic responsibility. The English language is now spoken in every barrio in the Archipelago by people of all ranks of life. The schools have been an important factor and effective instrument in the improvement of the health of the people. The offices of

the Government and of private business have been almost completely staffed with competent Filipinos trained in the public schools. The standards of efficiency in agriculture, commerce and industry have been raised and the wealth of the country increased by the efforts of vocationally trained citizens. Professional and technical education has been placed upon a high plane and our own institutions of higher learning are now supplying the country with specially trained men capable of meeting its technical and scientific needs. The Bureau of Science, the University of the Philippines and some of the older institutions, besides providing opportunities for general and specialized higher education, are making distinguished contributions to the common fund of human knowledge. Through the National Research Council, founded and supported as an agency of the State, the direct aid of the Government has been placed behind scientific research.

Murphy, Frank (Governor-General), to the Tenth Philippine Legislature, November 14, 1935.

A Problem in Education

One of the biggest problems encountered by the early American teachers was instilling in the people a respect for the dignity of labor. Taught by the Spaniard that the object of education was to avoid manual labor, the average Filipino student didn't want to soil his hands. It was quite customary, until the early teachers stopped it, for the wealthier students to have their houseboys carry their books to school for them. On more than one occasion, when school gardens were laid out or vocational courses in woodworking were started, the richer pupils wanted their servants to do their work for them. But once the idea was impressed upon them that there was nothing shameful about manual labour, they dug into their work with that enthusiasm which is one of their national traits.

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, p. 38-39.

GENERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Economic Progress

Economic progress in the Philippines has justified the hopes of those who set out 35 years ago to train a people for nationhood in the principles enunciated by the far-seeing revolutionaries of 1776. Building on a foundation of enlightened altruism, America has consummated an achievement without parallel in the annals of colonial administration.

The early American Government found the Philippines with a meager and inadequate economy. The total of foreign trade was less than 100,000,000 pesos a year. Imports exceeded exports and the balance of trade, both visible and invisible, was seriously against the Islands. Internal trade was seriously restricted and Philippine economy was essentially that of the village. The country was almost wholly agricultural. Industrial development and improvement were negligible. Even in the field of agriculture, the necessity of importing a considerable fraction of the principal item of diet, consisting of rice, attested the inadequacy of the national economy. It is estimated that probably less than 5 percent of the land area was under any form of cultivation.

By successive steps the Government proceeded to build a larger and surer economy and obtain a wider distribution of the growing wealth. In 1902 a discount of 25 percent from the regular United States tariff rates was granted. In 1909 free trade was set up with mild restrictions. In 1913 unlimited free trade was established. In the years that followed, American import duties on foreign goods competing with Philippine goods were successively raised.

To-day at the end of thirty-five years of economic growth, the foreign trade of the Philippines is running approximately 400,000,000 pesos annually—more than fourfold as compared with trade in 1901. Even the invisible items of trade have turned in favor of the Islands. Trade with America has acquired so favorable a position that it has offset for many years with a favorable balance the

negative balance with all oriental and most European countries with which the Philippines trade.

The population has more than doubled. Land under cultivation has increased nearly threefold. The rice problem has been solved and during the past few years the Islands have been all but self-sufficient in cereal requirements. Should necessity arise the cattle raising industry has made it possible to supply all of our meat. The production of abaca and tobacco has more than doubled. Corn has increased fourfold, rice fivefold, lumber and forest products sixfold, sugar sixfold. Copra production has increased ninefold, and mineral production has risen from a negligible position to one that is commanding the respect of the world.

Formerly all our products left our shores in raw state, or as nearly so as conditions of transport allowed. To-day nearly half our copra is converted into oil; practically all our sugar is carried to 96 degrees or more; our tobacco goes forth as cigars; and a respectable fraction of our abaca leaves as rope. The sound first steps of industrial development have been taken in the form of maximum elaboration of our agricultural products.

The public benefits that have accrued from the wealth created during the last thirty-five years are too numerous to catalog fully. A few may be sketched:

1. Higher standards of diet, clothing, and housing have lifted the Filipino laborer far above the level on which he formerly lived.
2. State funds have been provided out of which railroads, highways, bridges, and ports have been brought into useful being.
3. State payrolls make possible the highest average salary for Government employees and the largest number per capita to be found in the Orient or Tropics.
4. Private capital is available for investment in sugar mills, oil mills, store and offices, land and houses; capital that has been used to modernize old industries and create new ones.
5. Less tangible but equally important,

ant, are the acquirement of better health, wider education, and higher scientific and artistic culture, and all the chain of advancing social standards, which come with an expanding and diffused economy.

Murphy, Frank (Governor-General), to the Tenth Philippine Legislature, November 14, 1935.

Independence of the Philippines

The United States of America did not secure possession of the Philippine Islands by deliberate design. Our sovereignty here was a consequence of armed hostility, the cause of which was 10,000 miles distant from the city of Manila. At the conclusion of that conflict, through a series of unforeseen events, the Philippine Islands became a part of the territory of the United States.

However, at the very start of our sovereignty, a national policy was declared that our control and possession of the Islands would be but temporary; that eventually, after law and order and a stable self-government were established over a period of years, we would relinquish all rights, and sovereignty over the Filipino people. This national policy, uttered over 30 years ago, has been reiterated by every President of the United States since the administration of President McKinley.

Local Self-Government

In 1916 the Congress of the United States formally proclaimed it through the enactment of the Jones Law.

This year upon the open, direct, and specific request of the Filipino people, who sent representatives to Washington to obtain it, the Government of the United States, in spite of the great difficulties attendant upon it, enacted a law which provides for complete and absolute independence for the people of the Philippine Islands within a definite and short period of time.

I repeat that this action upon the part of the American Congress was in line with continuously declared American policy of 34 years standing; but, more particularly, action was taken at this time upon the insistent request of the authorized representatives of the Filipino people who were sent to Washington to obtain the enactment of the Independence law.

Following the passage of that law, commonly known as the "Tydings-McDuffie Act" its provisions were considered and discussed by the Filipino Legislature, which body accepted it for and on behalf of the Filipino people on May 1, 1934.

Tydings, Millard E. *Independence of the Philippines*. Address delivered by the Honorable Millard E. Tydings from the State of Maryland before the Philippine Constitutional Convention, December 22, 1934, 74th Congress, 1st Session. Senate Document No. 119, p. 1-2.

Filipino self-government began in the barangays, the local political units of the pre-Spanish Philippines. During more than three centuries of Spanish rule a small number of Filipinos played an indispensable although narrowly controlled part in the government of the municipalities with which the Western conquerors replaced the barangays. The rapid extension of political power to the people of the Philippines which has marked the American regime in the Islands occurred first in the municipalities, then in the provinces, and finally in the insular, or, as it is now called, the national government. Local government, therefore, meaning government in the municipalities and provinces, has deep roots in the Philippines. These units, especially the municipalities, are the most natural, the most nearly native areas of political action in the Archipelago.

Until recently at any rate, the instinctive interest of nine-tenths of the Filipinos has centered in the government nearest at hand and most intimately affecting their personal interests, for better or for worse—the government of their respective municipalities. The province came next, the nation last. During the past forty years, and especially since the organization of the Commonwealth, consciousness of and loyalty to the national state has been steadily increasing among the provincial masses. But the municipality and the province still bulk larger in the thoughts of the majority of the people than the cities, counties or states of the United States do in the minds of most Americans. The barrios, municipalities and provinces are the arenas in which leaders and families fight for

power; and almost every voter is a partisan of one faction or the other. National political figures are local heroes and the champions of their towns and provinces in Manila. For the common man political favors or oppression come most often from the mayor, the chief of police, the justice of the peace or the local boss. In time of typhoon or flood, the provincial and municipal officials are the immediate dispensers of relief, although they may be aided by national funds and supervised by agents of the national government. Local government, of major importance in every country, is of primary interest to most of the citizens of the Philippines. The municipality is the government unit in which the Filipino expresses most completely his distinctive political personality.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942, p. 261-262.

Success of Self-Government

Considering the political history of the Filipino people, the ignorance of the masses, and the fact that their country was prostrated, disorganized, and demoralized by five years of revolution which was ending in guerilla warfare, the surprising thing is that their first attempts to operate the American-Filipino system of local government turned out as well as they did. The masses of the people, the electorate, and provincial and municipal officials in many cases failed in precisely the ways in which all of the circumstances seemed to make it inevitable that they should fail. The outstanding, dominant fact, however, is that the system as a whole succeeded. Under it and through it was accomplished the remarkable program of material, social and political development which reached every Christian part of the Islands, and of which Americans and Filipinos are so justly proud. And despite the stabilizing, vitalizing, and guiding influence of the Americans in the provincial governments and in Manila, the municipalities were practically placed in the hands of the Filipinos themselves in 1901. From the outset more than 99 percent of the municipal officials were members of the native race.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942. p. 267-268.

The Philippine Legislature (1907-1935)

Dr. Hayden points out certain differences between the Philippine Legislature from 1907 to 1935 and the State and national legislatures of the United States:

These differences are important. They affect the character of government in the Philippines. In weighing their significance, however, at least three considerations should be borne in mind. First, many of them are differences of degree and not of kind. For example, the House of Representatives in Washington is controlled by a handful of people, and its detailed work in the preparation of legislation is performed by a small proportion of its members. Second, these differences spring from the peculiar conditions under which the Philippine Legislature existed and functioned during the period in question; of these, the colonial status of the Philippines, the personal characteristics and group background of the individual legislators and their constituents, and the fact that the Filipinos were attempting to effect a synthesis of two radically different cultures were probably the most important. Third, during these three decades the Philippines sought, with surprising success, to traverse a road from something akin to mediaevalism to modernity. Within a generation the country sped from Magna Charta to the New Deal. During the same period it proceeded from a state of subjection to the threshold of independence. The almost incredible rapidity of this progression must in itself have affected profoundly, but in ways which the techniques of the social scientist cannot as yet fully determine, the character of the legislature and of every other Philippine institution.

The very fact that the Philippines is in rapid transition lends both fascination and significance to a study of its government. This condition, however increases the difficulties surrounding the evaluation of Philippine political institutions and policies. It seems to state, however, that in no modern colony comparable to the

Philippines has the legislature been so completely under native control, exercised such broad powers, or played so vital a part in government in the broadest sense of the term as did the Philippine Legislature during the twenty-eight years between the establishment of the Philippine Assembly and the inauguration of the Commonwealth.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942. p. 197-198.

Political Parties

General: The history of political parties in the Philippines is one of fusions, mergers, and the repeated absorption of minorities into the Nationalist Party which has been dominant since 1907. The only serious external threat to its control came between 1922 and 1926 from the Democrata Party under the leadership of Juan Sumulong. The Nacionalista Party was split, on two occasions, into groups under the leadership of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena. The first split occurred in 1922 and the second in 1933. In 1935, prior to the organization of the Commonwealth, the two factions—the "Pros" under Osmena and the "Antis" under Quezon—formed a coalition, thus eliminating the last serious threat to the party's unity. This coalition led to the organization in 1937 of a new Nacionalista Party which controlled the Government through 1941.

Nacionalista Party: Since 1935, the Nacionalista Party has placed its candidates in practically every national, provincial, and municipal position in the Philippines. The vote against the Nacionalista candidates, however, was considerable. Nevertheless, because the Nacionalista Party always advanced the popular slogan of independence, because it had a virtual monopoly on political and administrative talents, and because it was able to point to a record of political achievement, it remained in control.

Survey of the Philippine Island,

Volume I, Section IV. Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943, p. 79.

The Commonwealth Government

The only democracy in the Far East embarked, in November 1935, on the path toward complete independence under a form of government which could not help but reflect the influence of American thought and institutions in the Islands. As Judge Malcolm has said: "For a score and a half of years, the American conception of good government has been modified to meet Philippine conditions; American laws have been bodily or partially transplanted to the Philippines; American educational methods have been applied, and American thought has been predominant. Accordingly, there could be no other result than that democratic institutions, as fostered under the Constitution of the United States, should become known in the Philippines, and should there meet, and to a great extent overcome, the more conservative notions of Spanish times."

The Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth is republican in form, as required by the mandatory provisions of the Independence Act. The preamble to the Constitution describes the desired regime as one of "justice, liberty and democracy." The Declaration of Principles (Article II, Section I) states: "The Philippines is a republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Bill of Rights (Article III), also required by provisions of the Independence Act, guaranteed to the people, among other things, freedom of religious worship, freedom of speech and of the press.

Porter, Catherine. *Crisis in the Philippines*. Issued under the auspices of The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. Knopf, 1942. p. 45-47.

The Philippine "Declaration of Independence"

The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 created a so-called Commonwealth Government of the Philippines to rule semi-autonomously until July 4, 1946, the date for the granting of full independence. The office of Governor-General gave way to that of the High Commissioner, who is the representative of the President of the United States in the Philippines. In the

United States the Philippine government has a Resident Commissioner, who has a seat in Congress without voting rights.

As the Act of 1934 prepared the way for withdrawing American control, so it also prepared the way for withdrawing American economic support. Free trade between the United States and the Philippines was to continue for five years, but from then until Independence Day there was to be an export tax (stepped up each year) on all goods shipped to the United States. This tax was to go into a fund to help settle the Islands' public debt. After 1946, Philippine products coming into the United States were to be subject to full duties.

Reid, Charles F. *Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts*. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 40-41.

Philippine Government

General: The form of government in the Philippines at the outbreak of war was highly centralized with practically all powers centered in the national government departments at Manila. The President of the Philippines had all-embracing authority over all government functions, by law and in fact, even though there were legal divisions into executive, legislative and judicial powers. President Manuel Quezon and Vice-President Sergio Osmena, with the consent of public opinion, were for many years practically in control of the Government. Occasional attempts have been made to defeat their administration in the national elections, but without result. Their party, the Nacionalista, has always won the election with large majorities.

A few days before the Japanese occupied Manila on January 2, 1942, President Quezon and other high officials went to Corregidor. Later they went to the United States and set up the "Free Philippines" government-in-exile. Meanwhile, the Japanese established a civil administration in Manila under Jorge Vargas and a council composed of prominent Filipinos.

The extent of American executive control over the Philippines was laid down in the act of 1934, establishing the Philippine Commonwealth, under

which the Islands were to be given complete independence in 1946. American control operated partly through the High Commissioner of the Philippines, appointed by the President of the United States; partly through the Department of the Interior; and partly through the Department of the State. The High Commissioner's office was ordinarily in Manila.

Status of the Philippine Commonwealth.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 (Independence Act), the Filipinos were given autonomy in most internal matters, but the United States reserved to itself many important powers. Before the establishment of the Commonwealth, the constitutional status of the Philippines was that of an "unincorporated" territory of the United States. As such its legal and political position and the civil and political rights of its citizens in the American system were determined by the Congress of the United States.

The Independence Act, the Philippine Constitution, and certain American statutes set forth the powers vested in the Commonwealth Government. The Commonwealth possesses all of the powers of government not withheld from it by the Independence Act and other United States statutes, or prohibited to it by the Constitution of the Philippines. Broad powers of intervention are reserved to the President of the United States. These presidential powers guarantee that the Government of the Philippines shall be conducted in such a way as to protect legitimate American interest.

Constitutional Government

Constitutional government of the Philippines is in abeyance during the military occupation by the Japanese. However, the Constitution is operative in so far as is possible through the representatives of the Commonwealth Government in Washington. As provided for in the Constitution, the Government of the Philippines was republican in form and based on the principle of the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. The executive power was vested in a President of the Philippines, the legislative power in a bicameral national assembly, and the judicial

power in a supreme court and courts of inferior jurisdiction. The electorate was composed of all literate citizens (male and female), of the Philippines who had reached 21 years of age.

Executive: The President exercised an all-embracing power over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, including provincial and municipal governments. In case the President died, resigned or was removed or was unable to serve, his powers devolved upon the Vice-President. The President held his office for 4 years. He was eligible for re-election, with the proviso that no person could serve as President for more than 8 consecutive years. Under the terms of the Constitution, President Quezon is eligible to hold his office until December 31, 1943. Secretaries of the executive departments were appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.

Legislative: The Legislature established in 1935 was a unicameral National Assembly with a maximum of 120 members elected for 3 years from single-member districts. However, amendments to the Constitution adopted in 1940 authorized a bicameral Congress consisting of a Senate of 24 members, who were elected at large, and a House of Representatives (equivalent to the National Assembly) of not more than 120 members. The members of the House were to be apportioned among the various provinces, according to the population, and elected from single-member districts. The members of the House were to be apportioned among the various provinces, according to the population, and elected from single-member districts. The members of this Congress were elected in November, 1941, but so far as is known, were not sworn in.

Judicial: The judicial power was vested in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, justice of the peace courts, and the municipal courts of chartered cities. All justices and judges of these courts were appointed by the President subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The members of the higher court held office during good behavior.

Resident Commissioner: In Washington, the Commonwealth of the Philippines is officially represented by a Resident Commissioner. The Resident Commissioner is appointed by the Philippine President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. He has a seat in the United States House of Representatives with the right to speak but not to vote. He also is entitled to official recognition as the representative of the Government of the Commonwealth by all departments of the United States Government.

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section IV, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 72, 73-74.

The Philippine Constitution

The Philippine Constitution was drafted under the authority of an Act of the Congress of the United States, and its character was determined in part by a number of mandatory provisions contained in the American statute. Only three of these provisions, however, affected the legal form and character of the Commonwealth Government, and these three laid down requirements which the Filipinos would have met even in the absence of any mandate from the United States. These requirements were: that the Constitution should be republican in form, contain a bill of rights, and secure absolute toleration of religious sentiment. The other mandatory provisions of the Independence law were intended to protect American interests or maintain certain American policies during the life of the Commonwealth, insure the stability of the Commonwealth Government and provide for the maintenance of a minimum amount of American authority during the Commonwealth period; and to protect certain American interests upon the attainment of Philippine independence.

Thus in all essential matters the Filipinos were legally free to determine the form of their government and to express their political ideals in a fundamental law of their own devising.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development.* Macmillan, 1942. p. 39.

The Commonwealth Government: The Presidency

The chief executive was endowed with great powers: general and special veto powers with regard to appropriation, revenue and tariff bills; wide control of the budget; and general supervision over all local governments. Article VI, Section 16, provides: "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period, and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It was these emergency powers which were delegated to President Quezon in 1940 and 1941 which aroused much criticism in anti-Quezon circles both at home and in Washington.

President Quezon never used those emergency powers.

In November 1941, therefore, the Philippines held national elections for president, vice-president, senators and assemblymen. The outcome of the presidential election was never in doubt, for in August the Nacionalista party nominated Quezon to head the ticket, with Vice-President Osmena as his running mate. The unanimity of the nomination left no question as to the popularity and power of the incumbents.

Porter, Catherine. *Crisis in the Philippines.* Issued under the Auspices of The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. Knopf, 1942. p. 47-50.

Progress of the Commonwealth Government

The first year of the Commonwealth of the Philippines was marked with the continuation of progress attained in previous years. The financial condition of the Government was sound and stable. At the end of the year there was a considerable unencumbered surplus, despite the fact that the organization of the new Government with the new activities that were commenced entailed a larger expenditure than that of 1935. The foreign trade of the Islands had increased, being 477,109,506 pesos as compared with 359,539,059 pesos in 1935, excluding gold bullion or ores. There was a large favorable balance

of trade in visible items. Peace and order reigned and no untoward event of any importance happened or marred the first year of the Commonwealth. The people as a whole did not suffer too severely from the effects of the economic depression, and unemployment was not as noticeable as in other countries. The excellent condition of the public health was maintained, there being an absence of epidemic diseases. The largest enrollment in the history of public education in the Philippines was registered this year, being 1,250,000.

Quezon, Manuel L. *President. First Annual Report of the President of the Philippines to the President and the Congress of the United States,* November 15, 1935, to December 31, 1936.

Philippine Independence

The birth of the Philippine nation that is about to emerge in the Western Pacific is essentially one of peace. In an unprecedented gesture of international goodwill, the United States has agreed with our people that on July 4, 1946, the Philippines will be free and independent. We had tried under Spain to achieve the same objective in a series of bloody and costly revolutions, but it was destined that the great American nation would be the first to nurse and nurture us in self-government and that we would win our freedom not in war, but in peace. The frustrations that we had suffered in war, due doubtless to our deficiency in military training and preparation, have taught us the bitter lesson that we are now determinedly applying to our final preparations for nationhood. We are resolved, firmly and unyieldingly, to protect and preserve the freedom that we are about to achieve in peace, by being ready to defend it in war.

With statesmanship and vision, the Chief Magistrate of our Government took steps even before his assumption of office to prepare a program for the defense of the country. He consulted the highest military authorities in the United States as to the feasibility of creating a military establishment in the Philippines that would be adequate for the defense of the country. General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff of the United States

Army, gave it as his opinion that a national defense program, which would be within our means and would give reasonable assurance of security, could be formulated and executed. In this opinion, the distinguished soldier, who later became military adviser of our Government, took the same position as his illustrious father, Lieutenant General MacArthur, when, in a public address in the United States at the beginning of this century, the latter cast a prophetic eye toward the future and said:

"I do not hesitate to say that I firmly believe that if we, as a nation, should demonstrate that we are worthy of our opportunity and know how to comply with our obligations, we shall ultimately be witnesses to the establishment in the Philippines of a republic with an independent existence, supported by a people who, attached to its institutions, are capable of protecting it against any domestic disturbance or external aggression."

Osmena, Sergio. *National Defense and Philippine Democracy.* Address delivered at commencement exercises of Philippine Military Academy, Baguio, March 15, 1940.

8. INVASION BY JAPAN

Enter Japan

With the launching of the Japanese offensive on December 7, 1941, discussion of future political and economic relations between the United States and the Philippines became academic. The issue of whether Japan or the United States would be the major economic force in the Islands was to be settled by force of arms. And yet most informed people agreed that, had Japan waited for the Philippines to become independent, she would have fallen heir to American influence there without firing a shot.

For the Japanese had been engaged in peaceful economic penetration of the Islands over a number of years. According to the 1939 census, there were more than 29,000 Japanese in the Commonwealth, of whom the majority (about 18,000) lived in the province of Davao, on Mindanao. Actually there were far more Chinese immigrants (117,000), but they intermarried more freely with the Filipinos than the Japanese did. Although indi-

vidual Filipinos sometimes resented the prosperity of Chinese merchants, the fact that many of their own leaders had Chinese blood, and sympathized with China in her fight against aggression, forged strong ties between the two groups. The Japanese settlers, however, were a different story.

Had the Japanese government not harped on military expansion with the loud pedal down, there could scarcely have been any objection to the presence of these immigrants. But their control of much of the deep-sea fishing in Philippine waters, the many retail shops which they set up to handle wares made in Japan (after the Chinese shopkeepers began boycotting these goods in 1931), their stakes in iron, manganese, and copper mines, and, finally, their flourishing colony in Davao gave them all kinds of opportunity to work for the Japanese militarists, if they chose. There was wide suspicion that many were doing just that.

Reld, Charles F. *Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts.* The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 47-50.

Pre-War Japanese Influence

Prior to the outbreak of the war there had been for some years a continuous growth of Japanese effort in the Philippines, chiefly in the Davao district and in the shipping and deep sea fishing industries.

Japanese land settlement was practically confined to the Province of Davao, although there was a belated and limited effort to push westward from the Davao area toward the upper valley of the Rio Grande de Cotabato and southwest into the Sarangani Bay district. The Japanese sought unoccupied areas and were careful not to encroach on the thickly populated coastal and central plains of Luzon and the Visayan Islands. Widespread malarial infection prevented settlement by Filipinos, Japanese, or others on the large island of Mindoro lying just south of the entrance to Manila Bay.

In respect to Davao, the Japanese were confronted during most of the period of settlement by the Philippine land and natural resources laws. These laws forbade purchase of the

public domain in parcels of more than 250 acres or leasing in parcels exceeding 2,500 acres. No purchase or lease of public land was permitted by persons other than citizens of the Philippines or of the United States (the latter until Philippine independence).

The same was true of partnerships and companies controlled by other nationals.

Japanese control of abaca (Manila hemp) lands of Davao had been acquired largely before 1920 and almost wholly before 1930 by a lease and contract system. Under this system the typical procedure was as follows: A Filipino (in several instances government officials) or an American would lawfully obtain a 25-year lease from the Government on not to exceed 2,500 acres of the public domain adjacent to or near the central establishment of a Japanese development company (mainly Ohta Development Co. or Furukawa Plantation Co.) and thereafter execute a contract with the Japanese company, whereby the company guaranteed to clear, plant, and manage crop production on the area, pay all taxes and other land costs, and return to the lessee from the Government a fixed percentage, generally 15 percent, of the gross revenue from operation of the leasehold. The laws forbade subleasing, but the interested parties held that the agreements were "managerial contracts" and not subleases. There is no available record of a court decision on the point.

After execution of the contract the Japanese company would clear the land, divide it into 25 to 100-acre lots, build access roads, and assign each lot to a Japanese farmer—usually one of Okinawa blood. More frequently than not, the cost of clearing, subdividing, and road construction was more than covered by the value of the logs, lumber, and other products of the overburden. The Japanese development companies thus came to control a "private" road system within land under their control, exceeding in kilometerage even the public highway system. Gates were set up along these private roads, but public use was allowed generally. Japanese assignees of lots were represented by the companies by the Gov-

ernment and outsiders as overseers or foremen, but they were led to believe that the assignment was land granted in perpetuity which they should hold against all comers. As emigration to the Philippines was selective and closely controlled by the Japanese government and as this government through indirect means retained a large measure of control over emigrants, the companies with the aid of the consul at Davao experienced no difficulty in selection of competent assignees nor in exerting a comprehensive social and economic discipline over them. The assignees usually employed one or two male Japanese relatives, in training to become future assignees, and under these assistants were a number of Filipino laborers, none of whom was ever advanced to the position of assignee of company lots.

Through the system described, through acquirement of land by marriage to natives (generally of Okinawas to pagan Bagobo hill women under recognized but loose tribal customary laws), and through direct purchase in lawful instances, the Japanese, at a minimum of capital investment, came into control of more than 150,000 acres out of some 360,000 devoted to agriculture in the Province of Davao.

The Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands to the President and Congress of the United States Covering the Fiscal year July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1942. Washington, D.C., October 20, 1942. p. 105-107.

Commercial Activities of the Japanese

In the Philippines, the presence of the foreigner was in evidence in other roles than that of laborers. Thus, Americans were interested in commercial activities, namely in import-export, finance and mining. Spaniards concerned themselves with the tobacco, sugar and rope-making industries, and with inter-island shipping. The British and French concentrated upon import and export firms and banks, while German and Italians entered the field of domestic trade.

The Japanese had various economic stakes in the Islands. Those interests included retail trade, building construction, miscellaneous commercial

undertakings, various manufacturing plants and more than 300 retail stores. Prior to the war, more of the foreign-trade tonnage moved under the Japanese flag than that of any other nation. That nationality also controlled 80 percent of the deep-sea fishing activities.

Before the outbreak of war, the largest Japanese enterprises were the Manila hemp plantations in Davao, on the southern coast of Mindanao. By 1941 those plantations processed most of the high-grade hemp exported from the Islands.

Civil Affairs Handbook: Philippine Islands. Section 9: Labor Army Service Forces Manual M 365-9. p. 7.

PREPARATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Problem of Defending the Philippines

Only a superhuman army could defend all the 7,100 Philippine Islands, which have a coastline many times that of the forty-eight States. Yet many places in the archipelago are natural fortresses which with suitable manpower and equipment are amazingly strong. The rugged Bataan Peninsula, as we all know, was held by a small and determined army hidden in its "fox-holes" for four long months against a superior foe.

But the United States did not establish any major army or naval bases in the Philippines. We did not expect to stay permanently there. Furthermore, the Philippines were on the other side of the world from us (Manila is 7,186 statute miles from San Francisco), and the United States could have defended them only at great cost. In the early years of American administration an attack on them was not considered likely, anyway. And between 1922 and 1936, as we have seen, the Washington Naval Treaty bound us not to construct any new fortifications, or remodel existing ones, west of Hawaii.

By the time the shadow of Japan's militarist expansion was lengthening over southeast Asia, Congress had already passed the Act which set a date for Philippine independence and provided that all U.S. army reservations in the Islands would be handed over to the Philippine government on

July 4, 1946. (The question of whether or not the United States would retain any naval stations in the Philippines was to be discussed between 1946 and 1948.) Consequently, Congress hesitated to sink too many millions of dollars in permanent defense installations which we might have to give up in a few years' time. As the Japanese menace grew, however, it did provide for the strengthening of mobile defenses, and after September, 1939, these were rapidly expanded. When Japan struck on December 7, 1941, there were nine army airfields scattered throughout the islands.

Other defense facilities in the archipelago had also been established. At Cavite, on Manila Bay, one of the finest harbors in the world, we had a naval station with fuel and ammunition depots. The small United States Asiatic fleet, consisting of a few cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, but no battleships, was based there. Its vessels were able to use a naval repair station at Olongapo, sixty miles to the north. A number of army forts were also maintained, among them Fort Wint at the entrance to Subic Bay protecting Olongapo, and the fortress of Corregidor and three other island forts guarding Manila Bay. Troops stationed inland co-operated with the native Philippine army being trained under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, and also received support from some 6,000 Philippine Scouts, who were incorporated in the U.S. army.

As we know, these defenses were inadequate to meet the Japanese surprise onslaught. In less than four weeks the invaders had conquered Manila and the greater part of Luzon Island. By May, 1942, the fortress of Corregidor had fallen, and resistance on most of the other islands had been overcome.

Reld, Charles. Overseas America: Plans for a Philippine Army

Our Territorial Outposts. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 35-37.

This was the emergency Quezon and MacArthur had foreseen.

Six years before Quezon had conceived the idea of a great army to defend the Philippines. He had asked MacArthur to organize it. They had

been attacked and criticized, assailed and traduced by men who misunderstood their motives. One section of the press charged that President Quezon was using MacArthur to help him set up a dictatorship.

Quezon's farsightedness had been upheld by President Roosevelt on July 26, 1941, when the Philippine Army had been inducted into the American Army and MacArthur had been made general in command of all the United States Armed Forces in the Far East. "I feel like an old dog in a new uniform," said MacArthur. Romulo, Carlos P. (Colonel). *I saw the Fall of the Philippines.* Harrah, Sydney, 1943. p. 40-41.

THE BATTLE FOR THE PHILIPPINES

Commonwealth Government-in-Exile Continues the Fight

In December, 1941, while our soldiers were fighting by the side of the American comrades-in-arms in an unequal battle against the enemy, the President of the United States sent a message to the Filipino people, recognizing their loyalty and heroism, and assuring them that their independence would not only be established but protected. This message, containing as it did a new promise to the Philippines, was received with the deepest satisfaction and gratitude, and without doubt, contributed strongly to the maintenance of the morale of our fighting men during those terrible days on Bataan. On August 13, 1943, President Roosevelt renewed his promise of 1941, in a broadcast commemorating that date, and a month later he sent a message to Congress recommending the enactment of legislation which would authorize the advancement of Philippine independence to a date prior to July 4, 1946, and provide for the security of both the Philippines and the United States, and for the rehabilitation of our country. The legislation recommended was first introduced in the Senate, and afterwards in the House of Representatives. In neither body was this legislation considered a party measure, and therefore when the vote was taken, Republican and Democratic senators and representatives voted together, and as a matter of fact,

passed it unanimously.

One result of this legislation was the creation of the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, composed of nine Americans and nine Filipinos. The commission is studying all aspects of the problem of rehabilitating the Philippines in an effort to secure the most ample help and assistance from the United States, which I am sure, will be given us by Congress.

Since the Commonwealth government was established in Washington, it has not only been discharging the ordinary functions of government, but also studying the manifold problems which we have to face after the expulsion of the enemy from the Islands. The Commonwealth government has also attended to matters of an international character, by taking part in international organizations and conferences. Our position in this respect has been greatly facilitated and strengthened by the liberal attitude of the President and of the United States, who has considered us as possessing the attributes of an independent government. Consequently, we are now one of the United Nations, we have a seat in the Pacific War Council, and we will undoubtedly have a place at the peace conference. Moreover, our presence in Washington has served as a constant reminder to the world that there exists in the Far East, a Christian and democratic people who cherish their liberty, and have shown themselves ready and able to fight and die for it.

Our heroic stand in this war has produced results of transcendental importance to the Philippines. Because of it, our ability to establish and maintain free and democratic government has been universally recognized. It has also won for us the lasting gratitude of the American people. This is the reason why President Roosevelt's message recommending the advancement of Philippine independence was received in Congress with spontaneous and general approval. Senate Joint Resolution 93 authorizes the President of the United States to advance the date of independence as originally set by the Tydings-McDuffie Law, and to assure permanence of that independence. We already have the assur-

ances of the President of the United States that this authority will be exercised, after consultation with our government, as soon as the enemy is expelled from the land and constitutional processes are restored. The President has also assured us that all forces and material resources available will be used as soon as possible to effect the expulsion of the enemy from our soil, and to restore normal conditions and constitutional government in the Philippines. For, as he stated, we Filipinos, by our courage and sacrifices and by our loyalty to the cause of free and independent government, have more than earned every effort America can put forth to usher in the day of our liberation.

From an Address by President Osmena in Washington on his 66th birthday, 9th September, 1944.

There was one other great gain for this nation in the suffering on Bataan, less tangible perhaps than the heavy blows struck the enemy and less important to the United States than the positive and convincing proof that American soldiers were still able to hold their own in any part of the world.

That was the heroic example of the Filipino troops, who not only established the right of the Philippines to a place in the concert of free nations but who also vindicated once and for all the basic soundness of the policy of the United States toward the Philippines. For forty years foreigners had declared that the United States was entirely wrong in its avowed intention of preparing the Filipino people to govern themselves. And when the Philippine independence date was set for July 4, 1946, every colonial power in the world firmly believed that the Americans were utterly insane.

Yet when it came to war—the ultimate test in international relations—our Philippine policy of fair dealing proved to be eminently sound. Three out of every four soldiers on Bataan were Filipinos, and we have General MacArthur's word for it that "No army has ever done so much with so little."

Marquardt, Frederic S. Before Bataan and After. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 260-261.

Defense of the Philippines

Organized resistance to Japan's invasion forces in the Philippine Islands collapsed with the surrender of the United States and Filipino armed forces in Bataan Peninsula on April 9, 1942, and on Corregidor Island on May 6, 1942. The fall of Corregidor and three other island fortifications at the entrance of Manila Bay was followed by the surrender on May 10th of American-Filipino forces in Mindanao and the Visayan Islands. However, armed resistance did not cease altogether with the capture of the principal United States forces. Reports from various sources, including the enemy, reveal that bands of American and Filipino soldiers in

various parts of the islands continue to harass the Japanese forces of occupation. President Quezon, in a letter to the Secretary of State in Washington on June 10, 1942, stated that the people of the Philippines would continue to fight Japanese aggression.

The United States Army and the Army of the Philippine Commonwealth were united and organized under a single command on July 26, 1941, when President Roosevelt ordered the induction of all the Commonwealth's military forces into the armed forces of the United States. (The provisions of Section II (A) (12) of the Tydings-McDuffie Act made the organized armed forces and military

History of the Philippines

equipment of the Philippine Commonwealth available to the United States Army in time of emergency.) General Douglas MacArthur, former chief of staff of the United States Army, who was then serving as military adviser to the Government of the Commonwealth, was recalled to active service with the United States Army and placed in command of the United States Army Forces of the Far East.

Survey of the Philippine Islands.

Volume I, Section VI. Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 123.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

POINTS TO EMPHASIZE

Realization of the important geographical characteristics of the Philippines—their size, population, climate, and natural wealth—will contribute to a better understanding of the Islands. The Philippines possess the basic requirements for an important nation.

The more than 7,000 islands of the Philippines may be grouped into four main divisions. Eleven of the largest islands constitute more than 94 percent of the total area.

Mindanao, second largest of the Islands, is the home of the Moros. It is rich in natural resources. Here, in Davao province, many Japanese were engaged in agricultural and trading activities before the invasion.

Our economic relations with the Philippines were growing before the Japanese invasion. The United States was the chief market for their raw materials, and the Philippines was an important market for American products.

Philippine commercial and industrial life showed promising development. The Islands' agricultural exports were of great value; their mines produced rich deposits; their forest products were rich, and capable of great development.

Although many languages and dialects are spoken in the Philippines, English had become the most important language before the invasion. Spanish was still spoken by an influential group of people. Tagalog, understood by most Filipinos, had been adopted as the national language.

The Philippines, situated in the center of the Far Eastern theater of war, have great strategic importance. Recapture of the Philippines will deprive the enemy of the natural wealth of the Islands, and will be a major step toward the ultimate defeat of Japan.

Philippine Information Training Program Part Three THESE ARE THE PHILIPPINES

Outline and Reference Material Prepared by
Information & Education Section, Hq USAFFE

Outline: The Philippines

1. Some knowledge of the natural and geographical characteristics will be helpful to you.
 - (a) General description should show location, size, extent, and other helpful information.
 - (1) 7,100 islands with few large and many small and unnamed.
 - (2) Islands extend 1,152 miles north and south; 688 miles east and west.
 - (3) Combined land area is 115,000 square miles.
 - (a) Area greater than combined areas of New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
 - (b) Estimated population in 1944 about 18,000,000.
 - (1) Sufficient population for important nation.
 - (c) Climate is distinctly tropical.
 - (1) Average yearly rainfall is 93 inches.
 - (2) The rainy season though generally covering the period from the middle of June to late October affects only the Western part of Luzon and Western Visayas, coinciding with the Southwest Monsoon of the Indian Ocean through the China Sea. The Eastern Coast of Luzon and eastern Visayas are affected by the Northeast Monsoon which extends from October to March.
 - (3) Typhoons are common in area north of Mindanao from July through November.
 - (4) Climatic differences based mainly on amounts of rainfall, altitude, and location.
 - (5) Necessity for usual health precautions in a tropical region such as New Guinea.
 - (d) Natural wealth is abundant.
 - (1) Extensive forest resources include tropical hardwoods, bamboo, dyes and tanning materials, resin, gums, spices, and palm nuts.
 - (2) Mining resources include gold, silver, copper, iron ore, manganese, and chrome ore.
 - (3) Much fertile land for variety of agricultural crops.
 - (a) Philippines provide one of the richest land areas for size in the world.

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:—
Part 1—From Port Moresby to Morotai.
Part 2—History of the Philippines.
Part 3—These are the Philippines.
Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.
Part 5—Under the heel of Japan.
Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
Part 7—A few Do's and Don'ts for GIs.
Part 8—Looking Ahead.

- (b) Practically any tropical crop and some crops of temperate zone can be grown any time of the year.
- (e) Vegetation is luxuriant and sustaining to civilized life.
 - (1) 65 percent of the area is in forest.
 - (2) 20 percent of land is in grass.
 - (3) 15 percent of the land is under cultivation.
- (f) Water supply is ample but precautions necessary.
 - (1) Water supply obtained from rainfall, surface wells, and artesian wells.
 - (2) Much of the water, even running stream water, may be polluted and dangerous for drinking purposes.

2. You will want to know the main territorial and topographical divisions.

- (a) Four main divisions in the more than 7,000 islands.
 - (1) Luzon and adjacent islands in the north.
 - (2) Central group known as the Visayas.
 - (3) Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago to the south.
 - (4) Palawan with small adjacent islands.
- (b) Eleven largest islands constitute 94 percent of total land area: Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Negros, Palawan, Panay, Mindoro, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, and Masbate.
- (c) Topographical divisions include a great variety of mountainous areas and river valleys.

3. An intelligent understanding of the Philippine government calls for some information regarding the political and administrative divisions.

- (a) Philippines divided into 49 provinces.
 - (1) Variations in area of provinces.
 - (2) Three provinces have sub-provinces.
- (b) Divisions of provinces include 925 municipalities, 245 municipal districts and 9 chartered cities.
- (c) Barrios constitute smallest political division.
 - (1) Rural or semi-rural areas somewhat similar to township in United States.
 - (2) 16,939 barrios are reported.
- (d) Mindanao is important, interesting, and somewhat different from remainder of Philippines.
- (e) Second largest of Islands, including 31 percent of land area of Philippines.
- (f) Includes approximately 10 percent of inhabitants of Philippines.
- (g) Vast regions in interior sparsely populated.
- (h) In general, a rugged, mountainous terrain with many parts little known.
- (i) Moros constitute about one-third of population.
- (j) Natural resources include forests, gold and iron mines, chrome deposits, and potential water power.
- (k) Region ideal for growing rubber, coconut and quinine trees, pine-apples, coffee, and abaca.
- (l) Many Japanese settled in Davao province and developed and dominated agriculture and trade.

5. Our economic relations with the Philippines have become increasingly important.

- (a) Steady growth of trade with United States since Spanish-American War.
- (b) Great stimulus provided by reciprocal free trade in 1913.
- (c) United States as predominant market for most Philippine export products.
- (d) Important products imported by United States include sugar, abaca (manila hemp), coconut products, tobacco, embroideries, gold bullion, and base minerals in ore form.
- (e) Philippines important as a market for American products.

(1) Average imports of American products by Philippines during ten years 1929-1938 amounted to 65,500,000 dollars annually.

6. The last few decades have provided a promising development of industrial, commercial, and general economic life.

- (a) Economic system of Philippines is essentially agricultural.
- (b) Important agricultural products include:
 - (1) Sugar, coconuts, abaca, and tobacco produced primarily for exports.
 - (a) One-third of world's copra produced.
 - (b) Practically a monopoly on production of high grade Manila hemp.
 - (2) Most important crop for domestic consumption is rice.
 - (a) Production not yet sufficient to meet requirements of Philippines.
 - (b) Rice is principal food for Filipinos.
 - (3) Other food crops include corn, cassava, mandarins, bananas, mangoes, avocados, and pineapples.
 - (4) Animal and meat products include cattle for beef, carabaos for draft animals, goats and sheep, hogs, and poultry for eggs and meat.
- (c) Sea products important for food and commerce.
 - (1) Fish next to rice as principal food of Filipino people.
 - (2) Commercial fishing engaged approximately 265,000 people.
 - (3) Japanese controlled off-shore fishing.
- (d) Mining has developed into an important industry.

(1) Gold and silver exports greatly increased in period just prior to war.

(2) Gold in this region ranks sixth in world production.

(3) Chromite was most important base metal exported to the United States.

(a) Largest chromite deposit in the world in Zambales Province.

(4) Largest iron ore deposit in Far East in Surigao Province.

(5) Japan was principal market for iron, copper, and manganese.

(6) Japanese now have access to all valuable minerals.

(e) Forest products rich and relatively undeveloped.

(1) Forests typically tropical with fine hardwood and "Philippine Mahogany."

(a) Timber especially suitable for cabinet work.

(2) Philippine forests could sustain many times the present cut without being depleted.

(f) Manufacturing primarily for local consumption and for processing export products.

(1) Much manufacturing carried on in cottage industries.

(2) Manufactured products from raw materials for export include sugar, cigars, cigarettes, cordage, pearl buttons, and hats.

(3) Factories include sugar mills, cordage plants, and coconut oil factory.

(a) Factories located almost entirely in Manila.

(b) Sugar mills located in Luzon and Visayas.

7. Interesting language differences found in the Philippines.

(a) Approximately 87 languages and dialects are used, of which eight languages are spoken by the several lowland Christian groups totaling about 92 percent of the population.

(1) Communication between native language groups is frequently difficult except in English.

(2) Three most important native languages are Tagalog, Visaya, and Ilocano.

(b) Under the Commonwealth Government, Tagalog was developed and officially recognized as the national language.

(1) Tagalog is spoken by more than one-fourth of the population and understood by most Filipinos.

(c) During the American regime the 2 "official" languages were English and Spanish.

(1) About 27 percent of the Filipinos speak English.

(2) About 3 percent of the Filipinos speak Spanish.

(d) Japanese declared Japanese and Tagalog to be "official languages."

(1) Japanese teachers have taught "Nippongo."

(2) Japanese have found it necessary to print propaganda, newspapers, and many documents in English.

(3) Tagalog is taught in public schools under Japanese rule.

(e) Spanish language declining in importance.

(1) Fewer than 500,000 people, mainly from the higher social groups, still speak Spanish.

(2) Spanish language still important because of use by influential class.

(f) English language of greater importance.

(1) Reflects American schools and influence in Islands.

(2) Widespread use of English will enable American soldier to communicate with Filipinos.

8. The Philippines have great strategic importance.

(a) Location provides center for Far Eastern theater of war.

(b) Geographic location across important trade routes of Japan, China,

the East Indies, and routes leading to Australia, India, and Europe.

(1) The Philippines constitute the keystone of the Far East.

(c) In wartime Japan must be deprived of the great natural resources of the Philippines.

(d) United States must drive the Japanese from the Philippines.

(1) To fulfil its promise to make the Philippines an independent nation.

(2) To maintain its position as a world power and its prestige in the Orient.

(3) To provide access to the natural resources of the Philippines.

(4) To make the hope of the Filipinos and the promise of General MacArthur—"I shall return . . ."—come true.

Text References: These are the Philippines

1. Important Geographical Characteristics.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. Volume I, Section I, p. 1; Volume II, Section II, p. 4-5.

Descriptive location—*a*. The Philippine Islands occupy the most northerly part of Malaysia, the geographical grand division comprising the Eastern Archipelago in Eastern Asia. Lying to the Southeast of the great continent of Asia and occupying much the same position as the West Indies to North America, the Philippines extend . . . roughly . . . 680 miles east and west by 1,150 miles north and south. The islands are within easy range of Southern Asia, Japan, and the East Indies.

b. The Philippine Islands are bounded on the south by the Celebes Sea and on the west by the China Sea.

c. Closest neighboring land areas to the Philippines are:

(1) *Formosa*, a Japanese insular possession, the distance from its most southerly point to the Island of Y'Ami, the northern extremity of the Philippines Archipelago, being only 65 miles.

(2) *Pelew Islands*, a Japanese group, 510 miles east of Mindanao.

(3) *Palmas Island*, a Dutch insular possession lying 48 miles south-south-eastward from Cape San Agustin, Davao, Mindanao.

(4) *Borneo*, the northern tip of which is but 60 miles from Balabac Island, the south-west end of the archipelago. The easternmost tip of British North Borneo is 35 miles from the southwest extremity of the Sulu Archipelago, the most southerly islands of the Philippines.

(5) *China*, at the nearest point, Hong Kong, is 405 miles from the northern tip of the Island of Luzon.

(6) *Indo-China*, due west of Luzon and 515 miles west of Palawan.

d. The Philippine Islands, as a group, comprise some 7,100 islands and islets, of which Luzon and Mindanao are the largest. Most of the Islands are mountainous. More than three-fourths of the surface of the islands has a slope greater than 10 degrees.

e. The Philippines is divided into three main groups, occupying respectively a northerly, central, and southerly position in the archipelago. They are:

(1) *Luzon* and adjacent islands, Marinduque, Mindoro, Catanduanes and several smaller islands.

(2) *Visayas*, comprising Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Cebu, Negros, Panay, Masbate and many small islands.

(3) *Mindanao and Sulu*, embracing Mindanao and Basilan, Palawan and adjacent islands, and the islands of the Sulu Archipelago which latter included Jolo, Tawitawi, and lesser islands, all extending southwest in a chain from Basilan to Borneo.

AREA

The Philippines extend for 1,152 miles north and south, and 688 miles east and west. Their total land area is 115,600 square miles, but of the entire group, only 462 islands are larger than one square mile. Only 11 of the Philippine Islands have an area of more than 1,000 square miles. The area of the entire group is almost three times that of the State of Ohio, and is greater than the combined areas of New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland.

POPULATION

The population of the Philippines was 16,000,303 in 1939. The population is unevenly distributed among the islands. Luzon has nearly half of the total population, and Mindanao, the second largest island, has nearly one-eighth. Only three others, Panay, Negros and Cebu, have more than one million inhabitants.

CLIMATE AND WEATHER

The climate of the Philippines is hot and moist. Average temperatures are in the neighborhood of 80° F., and the words "summer" and "winter" have little meaning. The difference between the highest and lowest monthly averages at coastal stations is usually only a few degrees, and is seldom as great as ten degrees. Inland stations, at a higher elevation, are much cooler than those on the coast, and have a smaller annual range. The seasonal distinctions in the Philippines depend on precipitation rather than

on temperature, and separate the year into a dry season and a wet season, with the difference between the two periods decreasing toward the south and east. Seasonal wind shifts or monsoons (northeast in winter and southwest in summer) cause the wet and dry seasons to occur at different times on the east and west coasts. The east coasts have their rainfall maxima in winter (October to January) and a relatively poorly defined dry season in early summer. West coast stations have a pronounced wet period in summer and a dry period in winter. In the extreme south (Davao, Mindanao), there is a double maxima of rainfall, May or June, and October. Typhoons occur most frequently between July and November, and often do great damage because of their force and the torrents of rain which may accompany them.

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS AND FIGURES

Facts and Figures About the Philippines. Commonwealth of the Philippines, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, 1939. p. 5-6.

The Philippines lie a few hundred miles to the southwest of the great continent of Asia. Only 2,441 of the islands have names. The total land area of the country is about 115,000 square miles. This is larger than the combined area of the States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. It is about two-thirds the size of Spain; around 7,000 square miles smaller than the British Isles; 5,000 square miles larger than Italy; and more than twice as large as either Java or Cuba. The Island of Luzon alone is as large as Denmark, Belgium, and Holland combined; and Mindanao is about the size of Portugal.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SIZE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942. p. 5-6.

The Philippines is qualified for nationhood by the size of its territory as well as by the number of its inhabitants. The Philippine Archipelago has a land area (approximately 115,600 square miles) nearly as great as that of Great Britain and Ireland. New York and New England combined are a little smaller than the Philippines, as is the combined area of Illinois and Iowa.

POPULATION STATISTICS

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands. Section 1: Geographical and Social Background. Army Service Forces Manual M 365-1, 25 April 1944. p. 29-31.

The Census of January 1, 1939, reported the population of the Philippines as 16,000,303. Since then it has been vari-

ously estimated at from approximately 17,000,000 to 18,000,000. The latest available official estimate of the Commonwealth Government placed the total at 16,971,100 as of July 1, 1941.

Municipalities: Philippine municipalities and municipal districts are analogous to counties in the United States. As noted earlier there were 1,170 municipal units in the Islands on January 1, 1939, three of which have since been made chartered cities. Of the 1,167 remaining, only nine have as many as 50,000 inhabitants according to the Census returns. Five of the nine are in the Visayan Islands, which contain the most densely populated areas in the Philippines.

Poblacions: The Census does not list poblacions individually except under the separate reports for each province. As the latter fill four volumes it is impracticable to determine which poblacions are the most populous. The 1939 Census reported only 26 as having over 10,000 inhabitants, while 358 were listed as under 1,000 in size. Ninety-six had from 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, and by far the greatest number—697—were in the 1,000 to 5,000 group.

SOME COMPARISONS OF POPULATIONS

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942. p. 3-4.

The national stature of the Philippines is more evident when the population of the Commonwealth is compared with that of other countries. In Europe only the "great powers" (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Spain) and Poland have more inhabitants. The Philippines is more than twice as populous as Sweden, Belgium, The Netherlands, or Greece. More people live in Spain's former Asiatic colony than in any country in the Western Hemisphere, except the United States, Brazil and Mexico: more than three times as many as reside in any Latin-American state, save the two mentioned and the Argentine Republic. The Commonwealth is more populous than any State of the Union; New York with some 13,000,000 inhabitants the most nearly approaching it.

Turning to the Filipinos' neighbors, China's population is about twenty-six times, and Japan's nearly five times, as great. Korea outnumbers the Philippines by somewhat less, and French Indo-China somewhat more, than one-third. Formosa is less than one-third as large; Thailand is a little smaller; crowded Java has nearly three times as many inhabitants. The combined population of the British Com-

monwealths in the south Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, is only slightly greater than one-half that of the Philippines.

POPULATION ANALYSED

Facts and Figures About The Philippines. Commonwealth of the Philippines, Department of Agriculture and Commerce, 1939. p. 7-9.

On the basis of (1935) figures, the average density of population per square mile was 67 in 1903, 90 in 1918, and 132 in 1935. The population, however, is unevenly distributed throughout the provinces and ranges (1935) from a density of 628 per square mile in Cebu and 576 in Iloilo to 15 in the Province of Agusan, Mindanao, and 13.5 in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Luzon. The Provinces of Pampanga and Pangasinan in the central plain of Luzon have a population density of 361 compared with 34 for the entire island of Mindanao. The Filipinos as a people have settled chiefly in areas along the sea coast rather than in the fertile valleys of the interior.

According to 1935 estimates the foreign population of the country are as follows: Chinese, 100,000; Japanese, 18,000; Americans, 8,000; and Europeans, 6,000. The Europeans are largely Spanish and English.

Three general racial types—pygmy, Indonesian, and Malay—inhabit the Philippines. The pygmies are probably the aboriginals, but at present that are comparatively only a few of them—perhaps about 60,000—and they are living in rather inaccessible places throughout the Islands. The Indonesians are settled principally in the islands of Luzon and Mindanao and number approximately 200,000. The Indonesians are also a pagan, tribal people, though less primitive than the pygmies.

The major portion of the population in the Philippines consists of Malaysians. On the basis of their religious belief, the Filipinos of Malay stock may be divided into three groups—Pagans, Mohammedans, and Christians. Several pagan tribes of semi-civilized Malays, numbering about 200,000, inhabit the mountainous regions of northern Luzon. The Moros, or Malays who are adherents of the Mohammedan religion, are concentrated chiefly in Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago. They are estimated to number around 500,000.

The Filipinos of Malay extraction who are adherents of the Christian religion constitute over 93 percent of the total population. They are the dominant people in the Philippines, and from their number are derived most of the agricultural and industrial laborers, the business and professional men, the educators, and the social and political leaders of the country.

Manila: Largest City in the Philippines

IMPORTANCE

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (except Mindanao) Cities and Towns. JANIS 154. Chapter VIII, July 1944. p. 2.

(a) **Strategic:** Manila, the capital and largest city of the Philippines, is a major commercial center and one of the leading cities of the Far East. It is located on the largest of the islands, faces the China coast and possesses the best harbor facilities in the Archipelago. All the permanent defenses of Luzon and most of those of the islands as a whole were located in or near the Manila area.

(b) **Commercial:** Manila is a key point in local, insular, and international commerce. It was a regular stop for ocean vessels, a base for interisland traffic, and the railway and highway center of Luzon.

(c) **Industrial:** Ninety percent of all Philippine manufacturing industries is located in or near Manila, including coconut oil mills, tobacco, hemp, and furniture factories, hat concerns, breweries and distilleries, lumber mills, foundries and machine shops, vulcanizing plants, shoe factories, soap-making establishments, and ice plants.

(d) **Political and Cultural:** Manila held cultural and political leadership in the Philippines, as the seat of government and residence of the High Commissioner and the site of many churches and church schools, including the University of the Philippines, the University of Santo Tomas, the University of Manila, the Philippine Women's University, many smaller universities and colleges, and numerous trade schools, institutes, and academies.

Climate; Natural Wealth; Vegetation; Water Supply TOPOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume 1, Appendix P. Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 225-226.

The Philippine Islands have a varied topography, ranging from low-lying coastal areas to mountains and plateaus. In some portions of the islands, the change is quite abrupt, the mountainous area extending directly to the sea coast. River systems are present on most of the important islands. Approximately 35 percent of the surface of the Philippines is suitable for farming and the soil is rich, but only about 40 percent of this area is actually under cultivation. The principal crops are rice, hemp, copra, sugar cane, corn, tobacco and maguey. About 64 percent of the area of the Philippines is in forest and 20 percent in grasslands.

The climate is distinctly tropical, the mean annual temperature being 80° Fahrenheit, with extremes of 45° and 105°, which are rarely reached. The warm season extends from April to October, while January or February is the coldest month. Considerable differences in climate exist in various parts of the Islands which are due largely to the presence of dry seasons of variable duration. Three distinct types are recognized. In Western Luzon, Mindoro, Negros, Palawan and Western Panay, there are two pronounced seasons, a dry season in winter and spring and less than two inches of rainfall, and a wet summer and autumn season. In the eastern part of the archipelago, there is no pronounced dry season, and the maximum rainfall is during the winter months. The central and southern areas have a short dry period of one to three months, with no pronounced rainy season. The average annual rainfall for the entire area is 93 inches. Droughts and typhoons are common.

In the provinces, Filipino houses are usually of simple frame construction, covered with thatch. They are well ventilated and are placed on stilts to avoid floods and high water.

In general, health conditions in the Philippines are superior to other Far Eastern and Asiatic countries, though there is considerable room for improvement. The greatest strides in sanitation have been made in Manila, where an excellent water supply was finally made available, with the added advantage of a water-borne sewage system. Elsewhere in the islands, the Bureau of Health had succeeded in installing suitable types of sanitary latrines in numerous areas to replace the more primitive methods of sewage disposal. According to Major General Basilio J. Valdes, Secretary of National Defense, and Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, the artesian well water which supplies the provinces is considered potable without treatment, though the high incidence of enteric diseases would not bear this out. On the whole, the Philippines remain remarkably free of most of the tropical scourges, with the exception of leprosy, malaria and enteric infections, while the ordinary diseases of temperate climates, especially tuberculosis, are present in abundance. Up to the time of the Japanese occupation, the Bureau of Health had amply demonstrated its efficiency in recognizing public health problems, and had shown every indication of continued progress in their solutions. The present hostilities may have an unfavorable influence on the general health of the islands.

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

Krieger, Herbert W. *Peoples of the Philippines*. Smithsonian Institution, 1942. (War Background Studies Number Four). p. 19-20.

To the Filipino peoples, long inured to the constant heat and humidity found throughout the entire archipelago, climatic conditions within the area occupied are perhaps normal. Whether the intense humidity and heat, which at times become almost unbearable to the individual reared in a temperate environment, have in the long run and independent of other contributory factors retarded the development of the Filipino is a purely hypothetical problem. To him, this climate is normal and not extreme. With the exception of a few favored areas, however, namely, the uplands of north-central Luzon where the summer capital, Baguio, was early established by the American insular government, and the great upland plateau of northern Mindanao in the vicinity of Lake Lanao, now occupied by large cattle ranches, the climate of the Philippines is definitely obnoxious to many occupational classes of the temperate zone. The Philippine Islands constitute no favorable exception to tropical climate generally.

There are, nevertheless, two definitely distinct types of climate in the Philippines roughly localized in the eastern and western portions of the archipelago, on the opposite sides of the main mountain axis. The entire area east of the main cordillera, particularly from central Luzon southward, has no dry season and rainfall is continuous throughout the year, whereas in the extreme western portion of the archipelago, particularly in the Visayan Islands and in Luzon, the winter is definitely a dry season. This variation in rainfall, of course, is due to seasonal variation in prevailing winds. From November to June the northeast trade wind prevails, and consequently the east coasts have a heavy rainfall, while most of the rest of the archipelago, being protected by the east coast ranges, is comparatively dry. During the remaining four months the southwest summer monsoon prevails producing a rainy season over most of the archipelago, while the east coasts are comparatively dry.

A RESIDENT'S DESCRIPTION OF THE CLIMATE

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 51-52.

Air conditioning was at best only a partial solution to the most objectionable single feature of life in the Philippines, namely persistent, consistent, all-inclusive and non-escapable heat. From November through January, the temperature was not too bad. After a few years' residence,

when your blood had thinned to the approximate consistency of water, you slept under a light blanket during this so-called cool season.

In February the sun began to beat down more intensely every day. April and May were the hottest and driest months, and those who were lucky enough to be able to get away went up into the mountains . . . Finally the rainy season would start, never later than July 4 . . . The rains lasted until November 1, with August usually the wettest month.

TYPHOONS

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section II, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 9.

The typhoons of the Philippines are similar to the hurricanes of the West Indies. About 20 typhoons are recorded a year in the Islands, but few of these are destructive. The zone of destruction of any one typhoon is usually very limited. The storms are most prevalent from September to December and least probable in February. They form in any month, however. September has one-fifth of all the typhoons affecting the Philippines . . . The southern islands (south of 9° latitude) are seldom if ever subject to typhoons, the central islands have them occasionally, and the northern islands have them most often. A typhoon is a vast whirlwind revolving around a space of relative calm called a vortex. In the northern hemisphere the rotation of the whirlwind is counter-clockwise. The typhoons of the Philippines start to the south and southeast of the Marianas and Caroline Islands, and pass westward or westnorthwestward through the islands at an average rate of 12 miles per hour, although the speed of individual storms often varies widely from the average. Within the storm, the maximum hourly wind velocity is 54 miles, but gusts of over 120 miles per hour, have been recorded. Typhoons vary in size from 40 to 400 miles in diameter, the vortex having a diameter of from 11 to 16 miles. They may last as much as 10 to 12 hours at any one place, but generally are of shorter duration. Heavy rainstorms always accompany typhoons, and low dense clouds combine to reduce visibility to a few yards. Lightning and thunder generally mark the approach and departure of a typhoon. An unexpected typhoon may cause considerable damage to military installations. High winds, torrents of rain, abrupt and violent floods, disruption of traffic, etc., may result in a serious upset of plans of operations unless adequate warning is given of the approach of such

a storm. During peacetime typhoon warnings are given by a network of meteorological stations and ships in the region of the typhoon's origin. During wartime, however, this warning system may not be in operation, and it is important to recognize meteorological signs which precede typhoons. When possible cautious estimates should be made from available weather reports, of the path of the vortex of a typhoon. If this cannot be done special precautions must be taken against wind damage from any quadrant.

NATURAL WEALTH

Hayden, Joseph R. The Philippines, A Study in National Development. Macmillan, 1942. p. 6.

In natural wealth as well as size, the Philippine Archipelago furnishes a substantial base for a Filipino state. The rapid increase in population, accompanied by a rising standard of living, which has occurred during the past forty years has been achieved almost entirely by the development of the agricultural and forest resources of the Islands and by the sale of the bulk of their products in a duty-free American market. Because Philippine economy has been geared almost exclusively to this bonanza market, an abrupt termination of preferential American-Philippine trade (and termination at the end of the period provided by the Tydings-McDuffie act would be abrupt) would probably spell disaster for an independent Philippines. Nevertheless, the Islands have within their borders the natural resources upon which under favorable political conditions a new and more independent economy could in time be developed.

THE RICHES OF THE ISLANDS

Reid, Charles F. Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 42-43.

The land these people occupy is one of the richest for its size in the world. Almost any tropical crop you care to name can be grown in the coastal regions and—except in those parts which have a dry season—you can grow or plant at any time of the year. In certain upland regions, also, Europeans and Americans can find carrots, cabbages, and other homely vegetables to their hearts' content. Vast forests stocked with valuable tropical hardwoods, bamboo, dyes and tanning materials, resin, gums, spices, and palm nuts cover Mindanao, Palawan, Samar, and eastern Luzon. There are rich mineral resources—gold, silver, copper, iron ore, manganese, and chrome ore.

Despite their tropic location, the climate of most of the islands is not unpleasant, cool nights following the warm days.

There is one real drawback, however. Typhoons strike periodically, not only levelling buildings and crops, but also washing out the soil on the slopes with torrential rains, especially if they follow a dry season. Earthquakes are common.

Not all the islands have the same resources, of course, or the same economic importance. Some are little more than outcroppings of rock lashed by surf. The eleven largest (Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Negros, Palawan, Panay, Mindoro, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, and Masbate) are responsible for the economic support of the archipelago as a whole. Even here, however, are still wild and undeveloped sections, isolated by lack of transportation facilities. The subsistence farmers who live in these parts often have a hard time raising their meagre food supply, especially in times of drought or flood, or where the forest constantly encroaches on their small plots.

NATURAL VEGETATION

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section II, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 10-11.

General: About 64 percent of the area of the Philippine Islands is in forest, 20 percent in grass, and 15 percent in cultivation. The remaining 1 percent of the area is swamp and lake country.

Forest: Four distinct types of forest vegetation are found within the forest zone of the Philippines; tropical forests, pine forests, mossy forests and mangrove. Forest vegetation is found on the mountainous areas of all islands, but is often interrupted by cultivated land or grass on the lower hills or flat land.

The tropical forests are composed of a great variety of trees. In virgin forests, these trees are widely spaced and seldom less than one foot in diameter. More commonly they are at least three feet thick. High spreading branches support a canopy of foliage and vines which shades the ground, keeping the air beneath moist and comparatively cool. The forest floor itself is often surprisingly clean and open, a thin carpet of dead leaves and occasional dead limbs being the only debris. Barbed vines and creepers, suspended from the trees and herbs, shrubs and giant ferns are the main obstacles to travel, but these can be easily cut with a bolo. Wherever sunlight can reach the ground, a dense jungle springs up rapidly. Such tangles are very difficult to penetrate. The edges of the tropical forests provide excellent concealment for troops and equipment because of the almost complete canopy. Except on steep slopes, the open floor under the canopy and the

wide spacing of the tree trunks permit fairly rapid movement of forces on foot. Philippine Government mineral exploration parties with trained cargadores (native carriers) average 5 miles per 10-hour day in the rainy season through unexplored heavily forested mountainous country where it is necessary to climb and cut trail. In heavily forested lowland country, a speed of 15 miles a day is maintained. The cargadores carry a standard load of 50 pounds. During the heat of the day it is better to travel in forested areas than in open country because of the shade. Travel across forested mountain ranges is more rapid along stream routes. Tropical forests occur on low, level land and on mountain slopes below 3,500 to 4,000 feet.

Pine forests occur on the higher mountain slopes, particularly in northern Luzon. The pines often grow in nearly pure stands, but sometimes are mixed with oak and other temperate species.

The mossy forests are found in high altitudes and consist of a large variety of small trees and shrubs. The trunks and branches of the trees, as well as the ground are covered with moss.

Mangrove thickets occur as a narrow band on tidal flats near the mouths of streams and along the muddy shores of protected bays. These swamps are difficult to traverse because of the intertwining of tough branches and projecting root systems. Mangrove forests along shores will retard landings except at stream mouths where they are usually channelled by passages. Landings can be made by passing through these channels, and disembarking behind the swamp.

Grasslands: Grasslands, called "cogonolas", make up a large part of the land area of the Philippines. Agricultural practices and other factors* have resulted in the felling of trees in many areas. The grass in such areas is usually 3 to 8 feet tall, and is very thick cover. Trees may be scattered through these clearings. Cogon grass furnishes good concealment but is difficult to penetrate. It is often more difficult to move troops through Cogonolas than through many parts of the tropical forest. Tanks can operate in the grasslands and planes can make crash landings on them, but, unless the grass is unusually short the planes cannot take off without considerable clearing. Vehicle tracks through the grasslands are easily detected by aerial reconnaissance.

*The practice of the natives in clearing land is to drop and then burn part of the forest. They then plant their crops in the cleared space. Inevitably however, the cleared spaces are invaded by cogon and talahib grass, which cover ground rapidly, growing up to heights of 8 feet and against which fire and the native

implements of the Filipinos have been rather ineffective. The natives have found it easier to clear more forest than to attempt to destroy the cogon grass that has grown on the land that has been cleared. To guard against surprise by hostile natives many tribespeople in the mountains of Mindanao frequently drop the forest for radii of several hundred feet around their isolated dwellings so as to create a protective barrier of fallen trees and cogon grass. Unless camouflaged passageways are located, it is almost impossible to pass these barriers. Since tribespeople move frequently these barrier clearings are numerous. When viewed from a distance they appear to afford easy passage. They should be avoided.

WATER

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Appendix P, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 226.

Water supplies in the Philippines are obtained from three principal sources, artesian wells, surface wells, and rainfall. Water from streams and rivers is employed principally for bathing, laundry, and sewage and waste removal. Consequently it is rarely a source of drinking water. Most of the potable water in the provinces is supplied by artesian wells. These wells are deep and ordinarily require no pumping. The water obtained from them is believed by the Bureau of Health to be quite satisfactory for general use without treatment. Such wells, if properly capped and controlled, will last indefinitely, but if they once run dry, they can seldom be reclaimed. Surface wells are used to some extent throughout the Islands to supplement the artesian supply. They are shallow, usually placed too close to privies or other waste disposal areas, and are universally contaminated. As a rule, the wells are not curbed or covered and heavy rainfall may wash surface soil into the well. They are apt to be community property, thus increasing the opportunities for contamination of water and dissemination of disease. In a few areas located near suitable natural watersheds, rain water is used as a main source of supply. Since watershed areas are sparsely populated, opportunities for contamination are slight, but such water is generally chlorinated before use.

2. Territorial and Topographical Divisions

Civil Affairs Handbook: Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background. Army Service Forces Manual M 365-1, 25 April 1944. p. 6-11.

Natural Divisions: The 7,090 known islands which constitute the Philippines fall naturally into four main divisions, i.e., Luzon and adjacent islands in the North; the smaller, central group known as the Visayas; Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago to the South; and Palawan, with small adjacent islands, lying West of the main configuration. More than 6,800 islands are less than one square mile in

size, while only 11 account for 94 percent of the total land area of 297,410 square kilometers (114,830 square miles). These 11 islands are:—

	Area of Eleven Largest Islands	
	Square Kilometers	Square Miles
Luzon . . .	104,688	40,420
Mindanao . . .	94,630	36,527
Samar . . .	13,080	5,049
Negros . . .	12,705	4,904
Palawan . . .	11,785	4,549
Panay . . .	11,515	4,445
Mindoro . . .	9,734	3,757
Leyte . . .	7,214	2,785
Cebu . . .	4,410	1,702
Bohol . . .	3,865	1,492
Masbate . . .	3,269	1,262
All others . . .	20,615	7,938
Philippines . . .	297,410	114,830

Topographical Divisions: On the 11 largest islands massive mountains, plateaus, low marshlands, many rivers and extensive valleys and coastal plains afford an impressive variety of topography. Elevations range from a foot or two above sea level to mountain summits nearly 10,000 feet high. About half the archipelago is tropical forest land, but fertile coastal plains are well distributed throughout, and there are four large river valleys. The most extensive mountainous areas, as well as the largest valleys, are on the island of Luzon.

Northern Luzon consists of a valley—running north and south for over 120 miles and with an average width of 40 miles—bounded on the east coast by the Sierra Madre Mountains, while to the west lie mountains of the Cordillera Central, separating the valley from the China Sea. Flowing north through this region the Cagayan River, with its tributaries, drains an area of approximately 10,000 square miles. **Central Luzon** is composed of a plain extending north from Manila Bay to the China Sea and the Caraballo Mountains, which separate the plain from the Cagayan Valley. The Zambales Mountains lie west of the plain and an extension of the Sierra Madre lies to the east. Central Luzon is drained by the Pampanga River, flowing south into Manila Bay, and the Agno which flows north into Lingayen Gulf off the Western Coast, and scene of the early Japanese invasions. The area of the plain is approximately 4,000 square miles, although a considerably greater area is drained by the two rivers and their tributaries. **Southern Luzon** consists of the southwest volcanic region directly south of Manila—in part plain and in part mountainous—and of the southeast volcanic district, composed of the Bondoc

and Bicol Peninsulas. Mount Mayon, a typical volcanic cone, is in this section near the town of Legaspi, Albay Province.

Mindoro, the island directly south of Luzon, has not been entirely explored. It is high and mountainous, but with a fairly extensive coastal plain in the east and a much smaller one of the southwest.

The central, or **Visayan group**, is generally mountainous, with coastal plains of varied importance. Panay has the greatest area of level and rolling country in this group, and Cebu the least. A relatively large central plain runs north and south on Panay between a high mountain range on the west coast and much smaller mountains in the east. Negros has high central mountains, with most of its level land to the west and northwest. Masbate, Samar, Bohol, and Cebu are in general characterized by rolling hills, plateaus, and low mountains, while Leyte consists of a low mountain range running north and south with small parallel valleys to the east and west in the northern part of the island. There are no large rivers in the Visayas.

Mindanao, the large southern island, includes the mainland and the Zamboanga Peninsula extending southwest toward Borneo, with which it is connected by a submarine plateau supporting the numerous small islands forming the Sulu Archipelago. The Diuata Mountains lie along the east coast of Mindanao and to the west are two large river valleys, the Agusan and the Cotabato.

The valley of the Agusan is approximately 93 miles long, with an average width of about 17 miles. A considerable proportion, however, consists of marshlands, particularly near the center where four streams join to form the Agusan River, flowing north into Butuan Bay. To the west of Agusan valley lies the Lanao-Bukidnon upland separated by extinct volcanoes from the rich Cotabato valley to the south. This broad valley contains approximately 18,000 square miles, exclusive of marshlands, and averages 30 miles in width. Drained by the Rio Grande de Mindanao, which rises in the Lanao-Bukidnon upland and empties into Illana Bay on the west, it is the largest and most important of the undeveloped agricultural regions in the Philippines.

The Zamboanga district of Mindanao consists of a long, narrow mountainous peninsula, with high ranges to the northeast. Valleys are well dispersed in the peninsula, and a small coastal plain skirts its southern extremity. Separated from the tip of the peninsula by a narrow strait is the island of Basilan, site of the

principal Philippine rubber plantations. The Sulu Archipelago is composed of a number of small islands lying to the southwest as far as Borneo. Jolo and Tawi Tawi are the largest and most important.

The island of **Palawan** appears to be the crest of a submerged mountain range and coastal plains are little developed, although extensive coral growth are evident on all sides. There are few rivers and little level land apart from several short valleys which cross the island from east to west.

3. Political and Administrative Divisions

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background. Army Service Forces Manual, M 365-1, 25 April 1944. p. 25-28.

Provinces: The Philippines are divided into 49 provinces, 24 of which are in the island of Luzon, 10 in the Visayan Islands, and 9 in Mindanao. Six groups of smaller islands constitute the remaining six provinces of Batanes—north of Luzon—and Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, Palawan, and Sulu. In the case of coastal provinces, numerous outlying and adjacent islands are included within the provincial areas. The Polillo Islands in Loman Bay, for example, are part of Tayabas Province which is strung along the eastern coast of Luzon, and Catanduanes Island is a subprovince of Albay, in the southern peninsular area of Luzon. Similarly, Dinagat Island and the Siargao and Bucas Islands are part of Surigao Province on the northeastern coast of Mindanao. Many other examples could be cited.

The provinces vary greatly in area from Batanes, with 74 square miles, to Cotabato, with 9,620, and range in population from Batanes, where some 9,500 people dwell on the rocky, wind-swept islands between Luzon and Taiwan, to Cebu with more than a million inhabitants.

Subdivisions: Three provinces have subprovinces. The extensive Mountain Province in northern Luzon is divided into Apayao, Genguet, Bontoc, Ifugao, and Kalinga subprovinces, and the islands of Catanduanes and SuQUIJOR are subprovinces of Albay and Negros Oriental, respectively.

For purposes of local government provinces and subprovinces are divided into municipalities, municipal districts, and chartered cities, the aggregate area of which comprises the total area of the Philippines. On January 1, 1939, there were 925 municipalities, 245 municipal districts, and 9 chartered cities.

Municipalities and municipal districts are divided into **barrios**—16,939 in all—which are rural or semi-rural areas somewhat like townships in the United States. Many barrios have a center, or centers of population, in physical respects somewhat similar to American villages. In most municipalities the rural population greatly outnumbers the urban, but each unit includes a principal urban, or quasi-urban area, known as the **poblacion**, in which is located the **presidencia**, or "city hall."

Manila and Baguio have always been **chartered cities**, each governed under a separate law, and for many years prior to 1936 a number of the larger municipalities, most of which were also provincial capitals, sought to attain the status of cities. Under the Commonwealth seven of them—Bacolod (in Negros Occidental), Cebu, Davao, Iloilo, Quezon City, Zamboanga, and Tagaytay (in Batangas)—were granted special charters by the National Assembly before taking of the 1939 Census. Since that date three more cities have been created, San Pablo in Laguna Province, Cavite, Cavite Province, and Dansalan, Lanao Province.

4. Mindanao: Its Especial Importance

"BIG, RICH, LARGELY UNEXPLORED."

Like a big steppingstone on a watery path from New Guinea to Tokyo lies big, rich, largely unexplored Mindanao, southernmost island of the Philippine group.

Its gold mines and vast primeval forests, its cattle ranges and as yet unharnessed waterfalls, make it resemble the empty but rich California of ninety-odd years ago.

Long ago, from a Moro proa offshore, I saw the half-naked tinted hills of Surigao peninsula, now known by geologists to be one of Asia's greatest iron ore deposits.

Though still little known, pioneer planters have already proved this tropic region ideal for growing rubber, coconut and quinine trees, and juicy pineapple crops.

Slightly larger than Indiana, Mindanao is second in size only to Luzon.

Among its colorful tribes are some 400,000 Moslem Moros, the only big Mohammedan colony ever under the American flag. With these fanatics the Spaniards had struggled for 300 years, till Admiral Dewey took Manila in 1898. Then American soldiers, with native scouts and constabulary they trained, for years

carried on the Moro campaign. Finally, leaving them to their own customs and life under the Koran, we almost pacified the Moros. Emphasize almost!

Negritos and other wild tribes still prowl the hills and jungles. Some hunt with spears, fight with poisoned arrows, eat bats, and take fish by throwing intoxicating weeds into their pools. Here, too, are man-eating crocodiles, eagles that kill monkeys, lizards that fly, and battles between vicious wild boars and big pythons.

SCORPIONS IN YOUR SHOES

Simpich, Frederick. Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo. From an article for The National Geographic Magazine (not yet published).

White men who dig gold, saw lumber, or farm in Mindanao face some strange and unexpected odds.

American exiles I've talked with say they never yet have got used to crocodiles killing their workers, or to crazed Moros who shave their heads and run amok with a wavy-bladed kris, sworn to die killing Christians and thus get a ride up to heaven on a white horse, to dwell with Allah.

"You get used to snakes," one old-timer said, "even to deadly little green tree vipers. You calmly smack any big centipede that scoots about your shower, and you habitually shake your shoes, before you dress, to stampede any lurking scorpion."

"If lizards want to fly, or if wild men want to eat bats and pythons, that's O.K., and you soon learn to sleep in camp despite red deer that bark all night, like dogs."

"But as for these mimetic insects, as science calls them, they're always a surprise. We've got a walking stick on Mindanao that may grow to 18 inches including its legs, and it looks exactly like an old stick of wood. Others are shaped and colored so much like leaves of the tree they live on that you can't tell 'em from those leaves until they start crawling. But the crocs—they're man-eating devils."

In the Rio Grande River about Cotabato crocodiles are so dangerous that women and children, to wash clothes and bathe, must do so behind paling fences built in the water's edge; so plentiful are they here that a cotabato dealer, in 1939, shipped 3,000 salted hides to New York.

Known scientifically as *Crocodylus porosus*, this reptile lives in sluggish streams; it crawls along the coast, from one river mouth to another, and often appears to lie in ambush at some point frequented by humans.

Crocs lurk near river villages in Mindanao and kill people just as tigers at

night devour natives who venture outside their villages in parts of India. During 1941 thirty Mindanao employees of the National Development Company were killed or badly wounded by crocodiles.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINDANAO

Hayden, Joseph R. The Philippine Policy of the United States. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1939. p. 108.

Among the multifarious problems which have pressed upon the Philippine Commonwealth for solution, few are of greater importance than that of the settlement and development of the Island of Mindanao. In many respects Mindanao is to the Philippines what the "Great West" was to the United States for the generation after 1850. While the island, which is about the size of the state of Indiana, comprises 31 percent of the land area of the archipelago, its population, estimated at 1,580,700 in 1938, includes less than 10 percent of the inhabitants of the Philippines. Furthermore, the Christian-Filipino and more advanced Moro inhabitants of the island are for the most part concentrated along certain well developed portions of the narrow coastal plain, near the mouths of a few rivers, and in scattered settlements along the river banks. Two of the provinces on the northern coast, for example, have a population of nearly 300 per square mile, while over vast regions in the interior one may fly for hours without seeing any sign of human occupancy save occasional clearings made by primitive pagans. Yet on a small rolling plateau around Lake Lanao dwell more than 100,000 industrious Moro farmers, illustrating the capacity of many parts of the interior to support a dense population. The leading Filipino authority on the subject has estimated that Mindanao as a whole can maintain a population of approximately 14,000,000.

Few large undeveloped regions in the world contain more valuable natural resources than Mindanao. In addition to the basic tropical and sub-tropical food crops, it has been proven that the island is capable of producing commercially citrous fruits, coffee, pineapples, coconuts, derris root, Irish potatoes, Bermuda onions, peanuts, ramie kapoc, cinchona, pill nuts and abaca.

MINING IN MINDANAO

Dr. George Kemmer, long with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, walked, climbed, and paddled through hundreds of Mindanao jungle miles; both as prospector and as operator of coal mines for the Philippine Government, he came to know much of this island's geology.

"We know now," says Dr. Kemmer, "That Mindanao has enormous iron and gold resources. When the great Philippine gold boom started in 1935 and these islands became one of the world's leading producers, prospectors flocked to Mindanao. Gold seekers came from the United States, from Canada, Japan, Australia, and some are now dead, interned, or in hiding. By 1941 excitement was intense. It was like Klondike days. When the Japs came, the gold district in northeast Surigao was producing around \$700,000 a month, though the island as a whole had not even been superficially prospected."

"A gold mine map of the Western Pacific would show producing mines working here and there from Luzon south to New Guinea and Australia."

"My own work, and that of others, showed that gold lode and placer mining here dates back centuries. In fact, most of the modern mines are simply old or 'relic' mines, first worked long ago."

"Some abandoned underground workings we found show that the early Chinese miners used methods, such as stope and fill, which we occidentals regard to-day as being fairly modern!"

"To get drinking water, these pioneer Chinese planted rattans about their mines; these they simply cut, and sucked good water out of the vines. It's a curious fact that modern prospectors, looking in the hills for old mine workings, often find them by first locating such patches of transplanted rattans."

JAPS HAD STRONG HOLD ON PRE-WAR MINDANAO

Simpich, Frederick. Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo. From an article for The National Geographic Magazine (not yet published).

Hemp is Mindanao's most valuable crop. Japanese grow most of it, in Davao Province, which is a "little Tokyo" of Jap speech and ways of life. Here 20,000 or more were colonized.

Davao hemp growing was first begun on a big scale by American ex-soldiers, who remained in the islands after the Insurrection of 1899 was quelled.

After 1918, when Jap migration set in, most Americans sold their lands to the Nipponese or hired them as farm managers; so, when Jap invaders came, they found 20,000 of their countrymen already settled, familiar with Mindanao roads, resources, and whereabouts of Americans then on the island. Long-range planning by the crafty Japs!

Davao city, in the southern Province of that name, is the island metropolis, with more than 100,000 people. It looks,

sounds, and smells like what it is—a Japanese place.

The Imperial Japanese Consulate General at Davao is the island's most sumptuous edifice. When the war came, 90 percent of all goods being sold here were of Jap origin; even the registered mail clerk in the Philippine Government's Post Office was a Japanese subject.

5. Our Economic Interests in the Philippines

AMERICAN INTEREST IN PHILIPPINE TRADE

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 8: Industry and Commerce. Army Service Forces Manual M 365-8, 8 February 1944. p. 55.

Trends and Nature of Foreign Trade: Even before American occupation of the Philippines, American business men showed their interest in the Islands' trade. About 1830 when Manila was opened by the Spaniards to foreign merchants, New England's Clipper ships engaged in trade with China made Manila a port of call, and two American firms established business connections there which lasted until after the Civil War. A hundred years later "Clipper" ships of a vastly different era also made Manila a port of call.

PHILIPPINE EXPORTS

Reid, Charles F. Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 44-45.

For many years the Philippines' chief exports have been sugar, coconut products, manila hemp (abaca), tobacco, and embroideries. The bulk of these have come to the United States. Until 1941 sugar alone accounted for half the value of all Philippine exports, and 99 percent of it entered the American market. Coconut production got a boost during the First World War, when glycerine, extracted from coconut oil, was in great demand for explosives. After the Armistice, however, it slumped. Other products obtained from copra (dried coconut meat) are soap, margarine, cooking fats, cattle food, fertilizer. Manila hemp went to Japan for its paper industry, and also to the United States and European countries for marine and other heavy duty rope. Before the war much of the Philippine tobacco export went in the leaf to Spain, Japan, China, France, and Belgium, the bulk of the rest in the form of filler and cigars to the United States.

Lumbering in the Philippines is carried on in forests leased from the government, but so far only about 20 percent

of the cut has been exported, chiefly to Japan and the United States. Vast stands of timber are still untouched, even unexplored.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section V, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 114-115.

Preferential treatment for Philippine exports Production for export to the United States was greatly encouraged by the reciprocal free-trade arrangement which has existed between the Philippines and the United States since 1909. This production enabled the Philippines to pay for imports of manufactured articles for consumption. Under the Commonwealth Act providing for independence in 1946, this free-trade arrangement was to be gradually abolished, until by the end of the Commonwealth period all products of either country would be subject to full tariff duties.

Principal Exports: Sugar, gold, coconut products, abaca, tobacco and embroideries have been the leading exports constituting 90 percent of total exports.

Sugar, mostly raw, was exported to the value of around \$50,000,000 annually. Almost all went to the United States. By law, duty-free sugar exports to the United States were limited to 850,000 long tons. Beginning in 1941, sugar was to pay a 5 percent export tax, proceeds to go to the Philippine Government and be applied to reduction of Philippine Government debts held in the United States. Cost of production in the Islands has been so high that Philippine sugar has not been able to compete with that from Java and other countries in the world market.

Exports of coconut products varied from year to year, constituting from 20 percent to 30 percent of total exports, and were valued at from \$25,000,000 to \$30,000,000 annually. Almost all the oil and the desiccated coconut went to the United States, as well as more than two-thirds of the copra. Duty-free exports of coconut oil to the United States were limited to 200,000 tons a year. In addition an excise tax of three cents a pound was levied, the proceeds going to the Philippine Government. Philippine copra sold below the prices on the world market, since it was smoke-dried instead of sun dried, and in general received less care in preparation.

Abaca exports, valued at \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000 annually amounted to something over 10 percent of average exports, the price fluctuating considerably

during recent years. The amount of cordage exported rose till 1935, when the amount to enter the United States was limited by law to 6,000,000 pounds. Value of cordage exports was about \$1,500,000 annually.

Beginning in 1941 duty-free quotas, exempt from export tax, were also put on cigars and on scrap and filler tobacco. These tobacco products were sold almost entirely to the United States. Leaf tobacco went to Europe. Tobacco products constituted about 5 percent of Philippine exports.

Embroideries to the value of \$4,000,000 went entirely to the United States. Exports of base minerals (in ore form) have increased in importance in later years; their totals in dollar terms have been small. Exports of gold to the United States have increased greatly since 1934.

Imports: Foodstuffs, mostly of a sort not produced in the Islands, such as wheat flour, canned fish, and other canned and preserved foods, were leading imports. Second in importance among imports were iron and steel and their manufactures. Third in importance were cotton textiles. Occasionally, crop shortages led to imports of rice.

The Japanese trade in cotton goods assumed such importance in recent years that an agreement had to be made between the United States and Japan limiting Japanese exports to the Philippines. Australia was an important factor in the wheat flour trade. Otherwise, most of the principal imports came from the United States.

BALANCE OF TRADE

Hayden, Joseph R. The Philippine Policy of the United States. International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1939. p. 79-80.

After the American occupation of the Philippines in 1898, Philippine trade developed rapidly, particularly with the United States. Of the total value of the combined import and export trade of the Philippines, the United States accounted for 11 percent in 1900, 41 percent in 1910, 65 percent in 1920, and 71 percent in 1937.

During the decade ending with 1937 the Philippines shipped to the United States between 75 and 87 percent of its total annual exports, and obtained from the United States between 59 and 65 percent of its total annual imports. During the past several years, the United States has declined in relative importance, but has increased in absolute importance, both as a supplier of Philippine imports and, more especially, as a market for Philippine exports.

6. Promising Development of Industrial and Commercial Life

URBAN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (Except Mindanao) Cities and Towns. JANIS 154, Chapter VIII, July 1944. p. 1.

The economy of the Filipino is essentially rural, based on agriculture with great dependency on fishing. Most settlement has, therefore, taken place in plain areas and coastal lowlands. Many Philippine farmers neither own nor live on their farmland. Throughout the farming districts, both mountain and lowland, it is common for the workers of the farms to live in villages or towns not far from the land they cultivate. The Chinese element of the population is concentrated in the cities and towns of the islands and tends to dominate commercial life. In the past, most Japanese settlers were found along the moist eastern coast in the regions of abaca production. In recent years, however, the Japanese seem to have spread throughout all parts of the islands. The strategically, politically and commercially important cities of Manila and Baguio, in the rich gold-mining district of northern Luzon, contain most of the American population.

The cities and towns of the northern Philippines conform to a general pattern of settlement on rivers or streams or along the coasts. All the communities are as nearly rectangular in street pattern as the terrain will permit. There are generally two or three principal streets and one main street which is the commercial core of the community. Few towns have large open spaces except the central plaza. A conspicuous landmark in every town and city is the Spanish stone church, with an elaborate bell tower which either forms part of the building itself or is a separate structure. A convent or monastery affiliated with the church is often located nearby. The municipal buildings are generally constructed of coral stone or concrete. Bodegas, or storerooms constructed of wood and stone, are numerous. The residential sections are composed of nipa shacks and suali huts. Shopkeepers commonly live over their shops in the commercial section of the town. The typical Filipino house, a highly inflammable structure, is made of bamboo with nipa palm side sheathings and a cogon grass thatched roof. Houses are generally raised on piling to provide shelter for animals under the house. The practice of constructing houses, barracks, bodegas and warehouses,

of galvanized iron or wood is also popular with the Filipinos.

RICE: PRIMARILY FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION

Rice is the most important crop in area planted, employment offered and value of production, having apparently exceeded sugar in value in 1937 and 1939, when production of sugar and by-products was valued at \$65,700,000 and \$78,000,000 respectively. Value of rice production is not so easy to determine, as it is largely a subsistence-crop and production estimates vary considerably.

It is estimated that there are 10,030,000 people in the Philippines with whom rice is the principal food. Their average consumption is believed to be 2.35 cavans (5 bushels) of clean rice a year, or a total of 23,500,000 cavans of cleaned rice, or 47,000,000 cavans of palay.

FRUIT

The value of domestic fruit production is estimated at over \$9,000,000, of which about \$1,100,000 was exported in 1938.

Apples, grapes and pears are not raised in the Islands. It is possible that they could be raised in the Mountain Provinces but probably not in any large way.

Area devoted to oranges has increased from 3,750 acres in 1929 to 4,250 in 1938, but production has declined from 12,685,000 fruit to 10,040,000. Production of mandarins, grown on some 5,000 acres of land, has increased from 21,833,000 fruit in 1929 to 25,757,000 in 1938. Pummelo, a sort of grapefruit, occupies about the same area as oranges and production totaled 8,538,000 fruit in 1938. It should not be difficult to expand production sufficiently to replace imported oranges and grapefruit. No information is available as to production of limes but they could easily be grown in sufficient quantity to replace imported lemons.

Bananas grow easily throughout the Islands and an export market for them might be found. Area devoted to them is estimated at 225,000 acres and production in 1938 was reported as 47,857,000 bunches, valued at \$5,155,000.

Mangoes are grown on some 37,000 acres of land, with a production of 103,000,000 fruit, valued at \$1,116,000, reported for 1938. There is a small export market, with 809 tons, valued at \$51,000, exported to Hong Kong and China in 1938. With improved methods of refrigeration, the export market might be broadened.

Avocados have been grown for only a short time but appear to do very well and it may be possible to produce them for export.

Area devoted to pineapples is given by the *Bulletin of Philippine Statistics* as 11,500 acres and 1938 production as 18,222,000 fruits. These statistics apparently omit one American-operated plantation in Bukidnon, with an area believed to be close to 20,000 acres. Exports of canned pineapples from that property totalled 8,911 tons in 1938, valued at \$1,065,000, and will probably be nearly twice as great in 1939.

CASSAVA

Cassava is now grown on an area of about 40,000 acres, with a consistent annual production of about 75,000 tons. There are said to be 50,000 people more or less dependent on the industry. Most of the production is consumed locally, the tubers being cooked and eaten as a vegetable, ground into flour or made into starch in the farmer's kitchen. Several hundred small hand mills probably produce as much as 1,500,000 pounds of starch a year, for local use. There is also some commercial production of starch, with sixteen starch factories in the Islands, having an investment estimated at \$79,000 and an aggregate production of perhaps 3,500,000 pounds.

CATTLE

Cattle are, for the most part, raised for beef. Some are used as draft animals but the carabao is preferred. Very few are milked. The principal cattle provinces are Masbate, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga, Bukidnon, Bohol and Negros, in the southern Islands, and Batangas and Ilocos Provinces, on Luzon. Cattle are brought to Manila alive and slaughtered in Manila abattoirs, due to municipal regulations which require slaughtering for the Manila market in approved abattoirs. This has a deterrent effect on the growth of the cattle industry, since the shipper in the south cannot afford to keep his cattle indefinitely at Manila, awaiting a favorable offer, and is consequently at the mercy of the buyers.

CARABAOS

Carabaos are the principal draft animals and are found throughout the Islands, though the most populous provinces are Pangasinan, Iloilo, Leyte, Cagayan and Nueva Ecija. They are also used for milk, though not to the extent that they might be. When their working days are over, they are slaughtered for local consumption or sent to Manila for slaughtering.

HOGS

Hogs are widely distributed throughout the Islands, the average family having a

sow and a few pigs. Greatest concentration is in the Provinces of Cebu, Pangasinan, Leyte, Iloilo, Cagayan, Bohol, and, rather strangely, the city of Manila. They are an important food item, *lechon*, or roast suckling pig, being a favorite Filipino delicacy. There are two or three small companies producing hams and bacon but this enterprise is not yet of very considerable importance.

CHICKENS

Jacobs, Joseph E. and Richards, J. Bartlett. *The Economy and Trade of the Philippines*, Volume I, Parts I-IV, 1940. p. 135-136, 138-140, 148-150.

Chickens are widely distributed, a typical household having one or two fighting cocks and a few hens, for eggs and meat. No information is available regarding the number killed annually but it is probably at least a third of the total chicken population, or say 13,500,000, with an average dressed weight of perhaps a kilo each.

FISHERIES

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section V, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 89.

Fish is the primary animal food of the people. Most of it is consumed by those living near the sea. The shore Filipino may have several times as much fish in his diet as the farmer in the interior, who uses pickled or dried fish merely as a flavoring.

The 1939 census gives 265,000 persons engaged in commercial fishing, most of them lone fishermen or groups of two or three. Their output was reported as 200,000,000 pounds. About twenty million pounds of canned sardines and salmon were imported annually in peace times and consumed mostly in the towns. Most of the fish consumed comes from catches in shore areas. Two main methods of fishing are used, the dragnet and stationary fish traps made of bamboo. Since they used power trawlers and other modern methods, the Japanese controlled the off-shore fishing, making up about 20 percent of commercial production. The Philippine Government in recent years made unusual efforts to encourage Filipinos to engage in off-shore fishing, but without much result.

Mining

Jacobs, Joseph E. and Richards, J. Bartlett. *The Economy and Trade of the Philippines*, Volume I, Parts I-IV, 1940. p. 110-112.

IMPORTANCE OF MINING

Such minerals as gold, coal and iron have been produced in the Philippines for a great many years, in a very small way. It is only in the past few years, however, that mining has become an

important industry. Commercial production of gold was started as early as 1913 and increased notably in 1929, when a second substantial mine came into production, but it is only since 1933 that gold has ranked among the major exports. Production of base metal ores is even newer, having been negligible prior to 1935.

Philippine customs figures show fairly substantial exports of gold and silver during the first decade of this century, but this was in the form of re-exports of currency. The same is true of the more moderate exports during the next three years. From 1913 through 1918 gold and silver from Philippine mines made up a substantial part of the exports. From 1919 to the present (1940), exports have been almost entirely the product of Philippine mines.

The small exports of base metals and minerals during the first thirty-five years of this century also appear to have been made up largely of re-exports. It is only in 1935 that production of base metal ores for export was started.

The expansion in exports in the past six years is particularly significant. Gold and silver exports increased from \$4,851,000 in 1933, or 4 percent of total exports, to \$32,369,000 in 1938, or 22 percent of total exports. Exports of other metals and minerals increased from \$73,000 in 1934 to \$4,437,000 in 1938, with nothing to the United States in the former year and \$1,094,000 in the latter. Chromite is the principal base metal export to the United States, while iron, manganese and copper ore go mainly to Japan.

MINING LANDS

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-1, 25 April 1944. p. 14.

Mineral deposits are widely scattered. Gold mining claims, for example, have been filed in practically every province, although Mountain Province in northern Luzon is by far the most important gold-producing section, as well as the chief mining area in the Philippines. Iron mining is concentrated mainly in the province of Camarines Norte, and extensive iron reserves exist in Surigao Province, northeastern Mindanao. The principal copper mining district is in the subprovince of Bontoc, Mountain Province, and Zambales Province, on the western coast of Luzon, is the chief chromite center, with reserves in this location believed to be the largest in the world. Manganese, although widely scattered, is mined mainly on Siquijor Island, south of Cebu, on Busuanga Island in Palawan Province, in

Camarines Sur Province, and in Ilocos Norte Province, northwestern Luzon. Coal is mined chiefly on the island of Cebu and on Batan Island, Albay Province in southeastern Luzon, while reserves are held at Malangas in Zamboanga Province, Mindanao.

MINERALS ARE STRATEGIC

Reid, Charles F. *Overseas America: Our Territorial Outposts*. The Foreign Policy Association, 1942. p. 45.

The mining industry is . . . in its infancy. Nevertheless, despite the fact that exports of minerals have been only a small fraction of the Philippines' total foreign trade, they are important because of their value in making war. Gold has headed the list for some years past, and silver and copper have been mined chiefly as by-products of gold mining. Actually, however, the precious metals are less significant today than the base metals. Until mid-1941, when United States restrictions on the export of strategic materials were extended to cover Philippine exports, the half a million to a million tons of iron ore mined each year had gone to Japan. Japan also bought most of the copper ore and manganese before September 1939, when the United States became the big buyer of manganese and began importing some copper. Since the Philippines started exporting chromite in 1936, the United States has taken the bulk of it.

Ironically enough, while the Philippines are exporting minerals which enable other countries to make war, they lack the two power-producing elements which are necessary to build large-scale industry for themselves. For only a fraction of their coal is mined at home, and no oil deposits of any significance have been discovered in the islands. Up to the outbreak of war, the Philippines imported most of their coal from Australia and Japan.

Forest Products

THE LUMBER INDUSTRY

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 6: Natural Resources, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-6, 29 March 1944. p. 24, 27.

Resources, Facilities and Production: Philippine forests are typically tropical and include about 3,000 species of trees yielding a considerable proportion of commercial hardwood timber, especially suited to cabinet work. The total volume of commercial timber was estimated in 1939 at 1,096,080,000 cubic meters, or about 464,740,000 board feet, with an approximate value of \$4,000,000,000.

The lauan family constitutes about 75 percent of the total stands, and over 90 percent of the volume. Lauan stands are

relatively heavy and admirably suited to lumbering exploitation. Because of their grain, color and texture, as well as durability, red and white lauans are known as "Philippine mahogany" in the American market.

Principal Forest Areas: Leading provinces in which timber was cut in 1940, in order of their importance in the industry, were Negros Occidental, Negros Island; Zamboanga and Lanao, Mindanao; the Camarines and Mountain Province, Luzon; and Misamis Oriental and Davao, Mindanao. Philippine forests, it is officially stated, could sustain three or four times the present cut without being depleted. The country is thus considered in an excellent position to furnish a steady supply of export timber.

The lumber industry was ranked by the Philippine Government in 1939 as fifth in capital invested, fourth in value of production, third in monthly wages, and second in number of laborers employed.

Markets: Only about 15 percent of lumber produced by Philippine mills, representing the best grades, was normally exported, the domestic market being by far the chief outlet. A large proportion of timber produced was sold in the form of logs, most of which also was consumed locally, especially by the mining industry. The United States, Great Britain, British Africa, and Hong Kong were the chief export markets for sawn lumber, while Philippine logs and timber went mainly to Japan and China. Immediately prior to the outbreak of war in the Philippines shipments of logs to Japan were declining, because of Japanese Government restrictions on imports.

Manufacturing

IMPORTANCE OF MANUFACTURING

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-1, 25 April 1944. p. 17.

There is little manufacturing in the Philippines. Aside from the conversion of certain raw materials into finished products for export—namely refined sugar, cigars and cigarettes, cordage, pearl buttons, and hats—manufacturing is primarily to meet the comparatively small needs of local consumers, and much of this production is carried on in native cottage industries. Factories are located almost entirely in Manila and environs, the business and commercial center of the country.

Noteworthy exceptions to this rule include one sugar refinery located near a sugar center in Occidental Negros, a branch in Cebu of a Manila coconut oil

factory, and a paper plant in Oriental Negros. The government fish cannery and factory for manufacturing tin cans are located in Pampanga Province in the vicinity of fish ponds, while another fish cannery is in Zamboanga Province. The government cement factory is located at Naga, Cebu, and a pineapple canning plant was operated before the war by a subsidiary of the California Packing Corporation in Misamis Oriental Province, Mindanao, where the company's fruit was grown. All other manufacturing plants of any size or consequence are situated in Manila or vicinity.

THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*, Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 130-131.

The Philippine sugar industry was an illegitimate child of the First World War. The sugar famine of those days, which boosted prices to unprecedented heights, encouraged the investment of fairly substantial amounts of capital in the Philippine sugar industry, a goodly proportion of it being lent by the Philippine Government in the days when Harrison, Quezon and Osmena were taking that government into business with a vengeance.

Low labor costs in the Philippines, as compared with Hawaii and Cuba, and free entry of Philippine sugar into the United States made the industry a profitable one, and by 1920 or 1929 most of the mills, or "centrals", as we called them, were in a very strong financial position. When the depression caught the United States and forced every branch of business to pull in its horns, the Philippine sugar industry was set to expand although the price of sugar was at an all-time low. Expansion was a simple matter. There was plenty of good farm land near most of the centrals, and it took only a year to produce a crop of sugar cane, which was promptly milled and the raw sugar then shipped to the United States.

In 1928 the Philippines sent 589,000 short tons of raw sugar to the United States. In 1930 it sent 814,000 tons. In 1932 it sent 1,124,000 tons, and in 1934 it sent 1,275,000 tons.

Thus, in six years, the shipment of Philippine sugar to the United States had more than doubled, and had come to account for a substantial part of the approximately six million tons of sugar consumed in this country yearly. Domestic sugar producers, both cane and beet, were afraid that the Philippines would continue to expand the sugar industry until it monopolized the American market. The Cuban sugar interests were equally disturbed, as their own exports to the United States fell in almost the same

proportion that Philippine exports grew. Hawaii, which had reached the limits of its sugar-producing potentialities, eyed the Philippines with mixed feelings. On one hand the Hawaiian sugar people knew the Philippines could produce more cheaply than they could. On the other hand they were afraid that any discriminatory legislation against the Philippines might provide a precedent for similar discrimination against Hawaii.

7. Languages

LEADING LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-1, 25 April 1944. p. 78-82.

Official Languages: There are two official languages in the Philippines, English and Spanish, with the law of the Commonwealth stipulating that in case of doubt in official documents the English text shall determine what is meant. The use of Spanish, while still prevalent in Manila and certain provincial areas, is restricted mainly to the older generation. The Census of 1939 reported only 417,375 persons speaking Spanish, or but 2.6 percent of the total population, in contrast to 4,259,550 or 26.6 percent speaking English.

During American occupation English was taught in all the schools, and most of the younger generation are able—with varying degrees of fluency and accent—to read, write and speak it, in addition to at least one native dialect. The Census reported 55 percent of Manila's population as able to speak English, while the ability to do so in the provinces ranges from around 10 percent of the population of Cotabato, Lanao and Sulu to about 40 percent in Camarines Norte and Rizal Provinces. In most of central Luzon English is spoken by from 30 to 35 percent of the people. Twice as many publications in the Islands were printed in English before the war as in all native dialects combined.

Diversity of Languages: There are said to be more sharply distinct languages and dialects than diversion of peoples in the Philippines, the lack of a common language being one of the chief handicaps to the development of homogeneity in the nation's life. Although all the languages belong to one Malayan stock and possess certain fundamental similarities of grammar, the many differentiations of dialect and vocabulary within the several language groups make communication difficult between Filipinos from different areas.

With this problem in mind, framers of the Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth stated in that document that "the National Assembly shall take steps toward development and adoption of a common language based on one of the existing native languages." Commonwealth Act No. 184, therefore, established an Institute of National Languages, which after a study of numerous dialects, recommended Tagalog. Late in 1937 it was officially proclaimed as the basis for a national language, and when war came to the Islands preparations were under way for teaching Tagalog in the public schools.

Native Languages and Dialects: The Bisayan dialect is the language of the densely populated central, or Visayan Islands, and the language spoken by much the largest group of Filipinos. One of its two main subdivisions, Sebuano, is spoken chiefly in the islands to the west (Leyte, Bohol and Cebu) and the other, Panay-Hiligaynon, in Panay, Negros and adjacent smaller islands. Bisayan-Cebuano is the principal dialect of Christian Filipinos in Mindanao—chiefly in Misamis, Surigao, Agusan, Davao and Zamboanga Provinces—while Lanao, Bukidnon, Magindanaw, and Sulu-Moro are spoken in the Moro provinces of Lanao, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Sulu.

Tagalog is the main language spoken in Manila and nine provinces in the central Luzon district, in most of which it is the native dialect and practically the entire population. The principal Tagalog provinces include Batangas, Bulacan, Tayabas, Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Bataan, Nueva Ecija, and Camarines Norte. Ninety percent or more of the population of the islands of Marinduque and Mindoro also speak Tagalog.

In Northern Luzon, the Ibanag dialect is spoken in the Cagayan valley on the eastern side of the Cordillera mountains, and Iloko is the chief native tongue in the provinces west of the mountain range as well as in the Christian communities in Mountain Province. Igorot, Ifugaw, and Kalinga are the main dialects of the hill tribes of Mountain Province. In Southern Luzon ninety-nine percent of the inhabitants of Albay, Camarines Sur and Sorsogon, speak Bikol, as do also seventy percent of the population of Camarines Norte. Masbate, too, is an important center of use of the Bikol dialect.

Foreign Languages: Chinese is spoken by the approximately 120,000 Chinese in the Philippines, chiefly in Manila. The main provinces in which use of the Chinese language is found are Sebu, Rizal,

Tayabas, Zamboanga, Iloilo, Leyte, and Davao, although its use is scattered very generally throughout the archipelago.

The Census of 1939 reported Japanese spoken by 28,900 persons, over 17,000 of whom were in the Japanese settlement in Davao. Aside from 4,660 Japanese in Manila, and somewhat over 1,000 in Mountain Province, the balance were widely scattered in small groups.

Sixty-five languages and dialects are separately listed in the Census. Those reported as spoken by more than 100,000 persons are shown:

Leading Languages and Dialects in the Philippines (Census of 1939)

Language or Dialect	Number Speaking	Percent of Population
Bisaya . . .	7,099,580	44.37
English . . .	4,259,550	26.62
Tagalog . . .	4,068,560	25.43
Iloko . . .	2,553,320	14.71
Bikol . . .	1,289,420	8.06
Pampangan . .	621,455	3.88
Pangasinan . .	573,750	3.59
Spanish . . .	417,370	2.61
Sulu . . .	245,260	1.54
Ibanag . . .	193,160	1.21
Lanao, Rranao or Ilanun . .	170,550	1.07
Magindanaw . .	159,680	1.00
Igorot . . .	139,000	0.87
Samal and Samal-Moro	125,350	0.78
Chinese . . .	120,099	0.76

Japanese Attitude Toward Language:

Soon after their arrival in the Philippines, the Japanese undertook to introduce their language, they and their puppet officials stressing the desirability of Japanese as the common medium of expression among peoples of East Asia. Japanese and Tagalog were soon declared "official languages" and Japanese teachers reportedly were brought in to teach "Nippongo," a simplified Japanese.

Both Nippongo and Tagalog "weeks" have been featured, and from information available it appears that the Japanese are as zealously trying to propagate Tagalog as Japanese. Emphasis is placed on the former as a national language and a symbol of Filipino culture, versus American. The new constitution of the Philippine "Republic" declared Tagalog to be the official language, and beginning in December 1943 it was, reportedly, to be taught in all public and private schools, both primary and secondary.

DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGES

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section III, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 55-56.

General: The diversity of languages in the Philippines is not so great as is commonly believed in the United States, although it is true that approximately 87 different native languages and dialects are spoken. More than 90 percent of the inhabitants, however, fall within eight or nine principal language groups. These people comprise almost the entire Christian population of the archipelago, those who have the Malayan-Spanish-American culture which is distinctively "Filipino." The remaining languages and their subdivisions are roughly those of the half-million Mohammedan Moros of the southern islands and a somewhat larger number of the semi-civilized pagans, who are scattered through jungle and mountain areas throughout the archipelago.

Native languages: The most widely spoken Filipino dialects are Visayan, Tagalog, Ilocano and Bicolano. Each of the other dialects is spoken by only a small percentage of the total population.

Visayan, composed of four dialects, is spoken by 7 million persons, or about 45 percent of the entire population. It is the predominant language in the Visayan Islands and is the leading language in 16 provinces. Cebuano, the most important Visayan dialect, is spoken by the majority of the people in each of 14 provinces. Panay or Hiligaynon, Samar-Leyte, and Aklanon are the other important dialects of the Visayan language.

Tagalog is spoken by 4,200,000 persons, or about one-fourth of the entire population. Most of the Tagalog-speaking persons live in Luzon. However, Tagalog also is spoken in many other parts of the Philippines. It is the native language of practically the entire Filipino population in Manila and the Provinces of Batangas, Rizal, Tayabas, Bulacan, Laguna, Cavite, Mindoro, Bataan and Marinduque.

Ilocano is spoken by about 2,300,000 persons, or 14.7 percent of the population. It is the leading dialect in 10 provinces of northern Luzon, namely: Abra, Cagayan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Nueve Scija and Zambales.

Bicolano is the language of 1,300,000 Filipinos, 95 percent of whom live in the Province of Masbate and the Bicol Provinces of Albay, Sorsogon, Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte.

English: English is by far the most important language of foreign origin spoken in the Philippines. More than

five times as many people are able to speak English as are able to speak Spanish. Before the Japanese occupation, all education was carried on in English. Although the 1939 census stated that nearly 4 million persons in the Philippines had completed at least the third grade and thus should be able to speak English, it is probably true that in the provinces not more than one person out of 5 can converse extensively in that language. The native languages are universally spoken in the homes. English is the primary, and Spanish the secondary language of government, commerce and social assembly.

Spanish: Spanish is still one of the official languages and is the second leading language of foreign origin, although it is rapidly decreasing in importance. In 1939, the census reported only 417,375 persons who were able to speak Spanish and 80 percent of this number were over 20 years of age. However, the percentage of those able to converse reasonably well in Spanish is probably higher than the official figures indicate. Most members of the high social order still speak Spanish, as well as English and their own particular dialect. Manila and five provinces—Zamboanga, Rizal, Iloilo, Negros Occidental and Davao—contain more than one-half of all the Spanish-speaking population.

Recent Developments: Since the occupation, the Japanese radio has reported both from Tokyo and Manila that Japanese and Tagalog have been made the "official" languages of the Philippines. However, the same announcements stated that English may still be used "temporarily as a subject of derision". One broadcast stated that the Japanese commander in Luzon had recommended the gradual elimination of English from the schools since its eventual abolition would "eliminate the blind dependence upon Anglo-American culture and civilization and further the Filipinos' consciousness that he is an Oriental." Japanese-language classes are reported as being organized for students in the primary grades. Few practical results can be expected from such instruction in less than five years.

TEACHING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Marquardt, Frederic S. Before Bataan and After, Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 26-28.

It was a long jump from administering the "watercure" to insurgents to teaching English to their children, but American soldiers made the jump in a hundred towns and barrios, the tiny hamlets in which a large part of the Filipinos live. The soldiers were specially chosen for the

job—at the specific request of William Howard Taft, who had become convinced that the best way to "pacify" the Filipino was to offer him the tool by which he could govern himself, namely education.

Thirty years later, Manuel L. Roxas of Capriz, delivering a plea for Philippine independence in one of the houses of Congress, told gratefully how he had learned his first English on the knees of an American soldier, George Shoens. And when war came with Japan, Roxas became a colonel on General MacArthur's staff and fought through the Bataan campaign. Although he could have come to this country with President Quezon's party before Bataan fell, he decided to stay on in the Philippines to the end.

But the soldier-teachers were at best a temporary expedient. The real groundwork for the Philippine education system was laid by the civilian teachers. They came from every state in the Union, and they may have felt like adventurers but I doubt if they felt like heroes. "The student will scan the pages of history long," said a commission, headed by Dr. Paul Monroe of Columbia University, which made a survey of the Philippine educational system in 1925, "before he will read of an adventure in human enlightenment more bold than that which has been undertaken in this Oriental setting."

Most of the early American teachers, I believe, thought for a while at least that they would be able to make the Filipinos over in their own image. On that score their educational efforts must be marked down as a failure. But when they realized that their task was not to make the Filipino into an American, but to give him a belief in his own dignity and in the advantages of democracy, they undoubtedly succeeded.

USE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Marquardt, Frederic S. Before Bataan and After, Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 37-38.

One of the first and most far-reaching decisions made by American educational authorities in the Philippines was to give all instruction in the English language. Critics of the public-school system have asserted that the classes should have been conducted in Spanish, with which the Filipinos had a bowing acquaintance for three centuries, or in the native dialects which they spoke in their homes.

As a matter of fact, only the socially prominent Filipinos ever mastered Spanish. Its use in the Public schools would have increased the barriers between classes, when one of the major educational aims was to destroy those barriers. And the

use of dialects would have emphasized the regional or tribal differences throughout the islands, increasing the cleavage between Tagalogs and Visayans, Ilocanos and Bicolanos.

But the basic reason for using English was that in teaching a people democracy it was wise to use the language to which most great democratic principles were native. The Spaniards had always been accused of refusing to teach the Filipinos Spanish because they wanted to keep a distinct line between the governors and the governed. The Americans, desiring to erase any such lines, wisely decided to give the Filipinos instruction in the language of the "rulers."

English as spoken by a Philippine public-school product, especially in the later years when more than ninety-nine percent of the teachers were Filipinos, may not have sounded much like English as spoken either in the United States or the British Isles. But a Filipino from Iloilo could carry on a conversation in English with a Filipino from Vigan when they couldn't talk to each other in their own dialects. The use of English as a medium of instruction was probably the greatest single factor of unification during the American regime, and the fact that the child of a laborer could learn the language of the courts and of the government in the public schools carried the Filipino another long step forward on the road toward the self-respect which had been denied them for years.

8. Strategic Importance of the Philippines

SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS LOCATION

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section I, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 2.

a. **Geographic:** (1) The Philippine Islands lie in the geographic heart of the Far Eastern theater of war. They are centrally located with respect to the vital areas of Japan, China, Burma, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, and constitute a pivotal point for their control. The Philippines, the most northerly segment of Malaysia, is closer to the vital areas of Japan proper and to the Chinese-held coastal area of Asia than any other part of Malaysia. It is roughly 700 miles from the closest Chinese position near Canton, behind which extends a combination highway and rail network which trends northwest through China and connects with the Russian railway at Novosibirsk—a line of overland transport to and from Europe.

(2) The Philippines is about 4,900 miles west of the closest American naval base at Hawaii. Strategically dispersed in this portion of the Pacific Ocean, between the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines, are numerous Japanese naval and air bases located on the Marianas, Caroline, Marshall, and Bonin Island groups which comprise some 2,000 islands.

(3) The Philippines is 2,000 and 4,000 miles north of the Australian naval bases at Darwin and Sydney, respectively.

(4) The Philippines, as a part of Malaysia, constitutes an insular, as distinct from a continental, theater of action. The tactical possibilities afforded for land and sea operations are much greater than in continental areas, likewise logistic problems are more difficult.

b. **Political Importance:** The Philippines, a possession of the United States, has been conquered by Japan. Consequently, for the sake of its prestige as a world power and the maintenance of its position in the Orient, the United States is obliged to regain control of the Islands as an incident of the present war. Also, the United States has given its promise as the sovereign power to make the Philippines an independent nation, and it is duty bound to redeem this pledge.

c. **Economic Importance:** (1) The Philippines is rich in natural resources—both mineral and agricultural. The population is small in comparison to the unoccupied land available and the untouched resources.

(2) The Philippines is one of the chief gold-producing centers of the Far East

and ranked sixth in world production (\$38,000,000) during 1940.

(3) The largest chromite deposit (10,000,000 tons) in the world and the largest high-grade iron ore deposit (1,150,000,000 tons) in the Far East are in the Philippines. Large tonnages of this iron ore contain one percent nickel which is economically recoverable by processes which have been recently developed. During the year 1940, 1,235,000 tons of iron ore, 190,000 tons of chromite ore, 57,000 tons of manganese ore, 30,000 tons of copper ore and 8,000 tons of copper concentrates were produced in the Philippines. A recent government petroleum survey of the Islands was sufficiently encouraging to have initiated drilling operations on Panay and Cebu Islands just before the outbreak of war in the Pacific. It has been reported that a flowing oil well (400 barrels a day) was brought in during the first week of December, 1941, and that it was ordered destroyed several months later.

(4) Agriculturally, hemp, sugar, copra, coconut oil, timber and tobacco have been the principal exports. Virgin hardwood forests cover the greater portion of the foothills and mountains and constitute one of the most valuable natural resources. Rice, the principal food, usually is raised only in sufficient quantities to meet domestic demands. Occasionally, rice is imported to make up harvest deficiencies. However, the rice crops could be more than doubled by intensive agricultural expansion. Large areas in Mindanao are suitable for rubber plantations.

(5) The Philippines lies directly across the important trade routes of the Far East, leading to Japan, the East Indies, Australia, India, China and the Americas.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Hunt, Frazier, MacArthur's Promise: "I Shall Return!" This Week, 13 August 1944.

There are hard and practical reasons that make the Philippines the key to swift and certain victory over Japan. When MacArthur returns to the Islands, we shall be materially helped there by 17,000,000 native Filipinos. They fought bravely and tenaciously in the mountain jungles of Bataan, and they will fight again. They ask only that Douglas MacArthur be their leader. To them he is the symbol of American loyalty and integrity.

Once troops, with the help of the Filipinos, have established strong ground, sea and air bases in the islands, MacArthur can strike the Japanese where they least expect him. They are spread so wide and so thin that they cannot have strong bases everywhere. By-passing their main bases and hitting them where they are weak, MacArthur pushes steadily ahead to the main islands of Japan. He controls the sea around the by-passed bases and the sky overhead. The once invincible Sons of Heaven can neither get out or in. They are prisoners of their own folly and greed.

Japan is now on the defensive—both her army and her navy—and she will never again be on the offensive. With the Philippines in our hands, her doom will be sealed.

SUPPLEMENT

PART THREE: THESE ARE THE PHILIPPINES

Errata:

The following references were omitted from the text:

p. 8 -- "Big, Rich, Largely Unexplored"
Simpich, Frederick. Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo. From an article for The National Geographic Magazine (Not yet published).

p. 9 -- Mining in Mindanao
Simpich, Frederick. Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo. From an article for The National Geographic Magazine (Not yet published).

p.11 -- Rice: Primarily for Domestic Consumption
Fruit
Cassava
Cattle
Carabaos
Hogs
Jacobs, Joseph E. and Richards, J. Bartlett. The Economy and Trade of the Philippines. Volume I, Parts I-IV, 1940. p. 135-136, 138-140, 148-150.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINE INFORMATION TRAINING PROGRAM PART FOUR MEET THE FILIPINOS

OUTLINE AND REFERENCE MATERIAL
PREPARED BY INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION, HQ. USAFFE

Points to Emphasize

Good relationships between Americans and Filipinos will depend on an understanding of the Filipino's main qualities and habits—his generally friendly nature, his feeling of pride and self-respect, his loyalty to his family group, and his love of sports and of the arts.

Despite the various racial and cultural groups that have contributed to the make-up of the Filipino people, notable progress has been made toward developing a national unity. In blood and ancestry the Filipinos are as unified as the inhabitants of the United States, Great Britain, and other great powers.

Filipino women hold a high place in the social scheme—higher than the women of any other part of the Orient. They are considered the social equals of men, and many have attained responsible positions in the professions.

The Philippines constitute the only Christian country in the Far East. The Christian religion has strongly influenced the ideals and habits of the Filipinos since its introduction to the Islands under Spanish rule.

The Moros are a small but important group.

Their way of life has been shaped mainly by their Mohammedan beliefs, which have in the past led to clashes with established authority.

Remarkable advances in public health were made under American administration. The Philippines led all Oriental countries in providing pure water systems, in bringing diseases under control, and in educating people to observe public health measures.

The extension of educational opportunities through public education did much to prepare Filipinos for the responsibilities of citizenship. The school system, staffed almost entirely by Filipino teachers, became an important function of the Commonwealth Government.

The Filipinos' love of freedom and democracy has made them willing to work and fight for their independence.

Foundations of Philippine self-government were laid by the co-operation of Filipinos and Americans in governmental affairs. The Filipinos gave convincing evidence of their loyalty to the United States in their fight against the Japanese on Bataan.

This outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines. There will be eight topics:—

Part 1—From Moresby to Morotai.
Part 2—History of the Philippines.
Part 3—These are the Philippines.
Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5—Under the heel of Japan.
Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
Part 7—A few Do's and Don't's for GIs.
Part 8—Looking Ahead.

Outline: "Meet the Filipinos"

1. An understanding of some interesting qualities and habits of Filipinos generally will help you.

(a) In general, modest, affable, hospitable, and courteous.

(1) The Filipino likes to be your friend.

(b) Possesses pride, dignity, and self-respect.

(c) By nature orderly and law-abiding.

(d) Respects authority and makes an excellent soldier.

(e) Like the G.I. in cartoons, the Filipino is not much interested in work for work's sake.

(f) Exceptionally deft in trades requiring manual skill.

(g) Greatest loyalty to kinship group known as *parientes*, including blood and marriage relations.

(1) Obedience to parents is characteristic.

(h) In temperament usually gay and friendly.

(i) Very sensitive and may resent slightest discourtesy.

(1) Insult or ridicule may drive him to deep resentment.

(2) Laugh with him but never at him.

(j) Tends to worry little about the future and to enjoy himself from day to day.

(k) Fond of music, literature, and art.

(1) Filipino literature is at its best in the political field.

(a) Literature has helped to fight way to national independence.

(b) Language expression tends to be poetical; poetry of good quality.

(c) Creative native literature usually romantic and emotional.

(d) Carlos Romulo, Filipino editor, won Pulitzer Prize.

(2) Remarkable growth in performance and appreciation of

music during last two decades.

(a) Development of Manila Symphony Society since 1932.

(b) Increasing presentation of good music in various forms.

(c) Planting, harvesting, and threshing of crops frequently accompanied with music.

(3) Some development toward a distinctly Philippine architecture.

(a) Many Manila buildings, a combination of native with Spanish and other foreign styles.

(4) Modern artists and architects, such as Guillermo Tolentino and Juan Nakpil, have done much to beautify Manila.

(5) Filipino painters have won wide recognition.

(a) Juan Luna and Felix Resurreccion Hidalgo won the Prix de Rome.

(b) Fernando Amorsolo, the leading contemporary painter.

(l) Active in social life, sports, and entertainment.

(1) Fond of social gatherings, dances, and music.

(2) Philippine civic and fraternal organizations patterned after parent or world organizations.

(3) Baseball, boxing, tennis, soccer, basketball, and other sports have developed extensively.

(4) One chief source of entertainment is cockfighting.

(5) Filipinos are born gamblers.

2. Filipino culture has received contributions from several important racial and cultural groups.

(a) Several racial groups recognized.

(1) Predominant racial group is Malay.

(2) About 80,000 forest and mountain dwellers of Negrito, negroid, or undetermined blood.

(3) Presence of Chinese and Spanish blood is apparent in group known as *mestizos*.

(4) Fundamental differences between Filipinos are more cultural than racial.

(b) Religious groups have greatly affected history.

(1) Christians constitute over 90 per cent. of total population.

(a) About 78 per cent. of people are Roman Catholic.

(b) About 10 per cent. are Aglipayan.

1. Similar to Catholic Church in ritual, but independent of Rome and national in origin.

(c) About 3 per cent. are Protestants.

(2) Mohammedans (Moros) live chiefly in Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago.

(a) Adhere to principles of Koran.

(b) Oppose bitterly any encroachment on religion.

(3) Pagans include about 40 relatively small groups.

(a) Igorots comprise largest pagan group.

(b) About 40 per cent. of pagans live in mountain section of Northern Luzon.

(c) Social and economic groups easily recognized.

(1) About 5 per cent.—the upper class—control the political, economic, and social life.

(a) Preponderance of both Chinese and Spanish *mestizos* in upper class.

(b) Standard of living in this group relatively as high as that of well-to-do Americans.

- (2) A small but growing middle class is found.
- (3) At the lower end of the social and economic scale are the masses or peasants.
 - (a) A large majority engaged in agriculture.
 - (b) Living conditions lack many things to which we are accustomed.
 1. Governmental measures had been developed in recent years to help the masses.
- (d) Progress toward development of national unity.
 - (1) Increasing tendency to think of themselves first as Filipinos.
 - (2) National consciousness developed as English became a common language.
 - (a) Ability to use only local language retarded development of national feeling.
 - (3) Actually in blood and ancestry the Filipinos are as unified as the inhabitants of Great Britain, France, Spain, or the United States.
3. The Filipinos give women a high place in their social organization and pay great respect to them.
 - (a) In no other part of Orient, and perhaps even in the world, have women so much freedom and control of family, social, and business affairs.
 - (b) In all respects considered social equals of men.
 - (c) Women exert great influence in the family unit.
 - (d) Suffrage granted Filipino women in 1937.
 - (e) Women occupy established place in most of the professions.
 - (f) Some women have exercised leadership in national affairs.
 - (g) American soldiers must understand Filipino respect for women and observe local customs.
4. The introduction and development of the Christian religion had a far-reaching influence on Filipino development.
 - (a) Philippines constitute only Christian country in Far East.
 - (b) Ideals and habits greatly influenced by Christian religion.
 - (c) Under Spanish rule the Roman Catholic Church was the only one permitted in Philippines.
 - (1) Introduced new crops, printed books in various dialects, and started schools.
 - (2) Influence extended deeply into lives of people.
 - (d) Under American administration, separation of church and state was brought about.
 - (1) Freedom of worship guaranteed.
 - (e) Aglipayan Church founded by late Bishop Gregorio Aglipay during early days of Filipino Rebellion against Spain.
 - (1) A manifestation of religious and political nationalism.
 - (2) Membership has diminished somewhat since peak days.
 - (f) Protestant churches originally American in origin, affiliation, and spirit.
 - (1) Tendency now toward Filipino autonomy.
5. An understanding of the Moros as a small but important group is essential.
 - (a) Most important cultural influence is Mohammedan religion.
 - (b) Attachment to religion far greater than attachment to government.
 - (c) Religious beliefs frequently led to clashes with Spanish, American, and Filipino authority.
 - (1) Individual Moro sometimes runs amok, or "goes jura-mentado," killing as many Christians or personal enemies as possible.
 - (2) Religious warfare has diminished under American administration.
 - (d) Three social classes exist in Moro society, but not officially recognized by Philippine Government.
 - (1) Datu or noble class.
 - (2) Privileged class.
 - (3) Subjects of the datu.
 - (e) Occupations of Moros include:—
 - (1) Sea-faring trades at which they are usually most at home.
 - (a) Notorious pirates in years past.
 - (2) In the interior, Moros are farmers.
 - (3) Expert handwork includes weaving; work in iron, brass, silver and gold; making bolos, barongs, spears, and krisses.
6. The status of public health has been developed and improved greatly.
 - (a) Under Spanish rule, San Jose Medical College was established as part of the University of Santo Tomas.
 - (b) During Spanish occupation the medical profession and the government exercised but little effective control over hygiene and sanitation of people.
 - (c) Under American administration, Philippines led all Oriental countries in progress in public health.
 - (1) Epidemics of smallpox, cholera, and plague brought under control and practically eliminated.
 - (2) Provisions for pure water reduced water-borne diseases.
 - (a) Modern filtration plant constructed near Manila.
 - (b) Many public and private artesian wells have contributed to pure water supply.
 - (3) Philippine Public Health Service contributed much to public health measures.
 - (4) Medical schools and hospitals established.
 - (5) People educated to observe public health measures.
 - (d) Commonwealth government continued progress in health policies and agencies.
 - (1) Administration of public health kept out of "politics."

- (2) Highly trained permanent personnel selected for public health service.
7. The Filipinos have a firm belief in the values of education and remarkable progress has been achieved.
 - (a) Under American regime public education prepared Filipinos for responsibilities of citizenship.
 - (b) In 1940 some 12,000 public schools had an enrollment of more than 1,900,000.
 - (1) More than 43,000 teachers and school administrators.
 - (2) Schools staffed almost entirely by Filipino teachers.
 - (3) University of the Philippines in Manila had enrollment of about 8,000.
 - (4) Total of 8 universities and more than 425 private schools.
 - (c) In 1939, of the 11,000,000 people 10 years of age and over, about half were able to read and write.
8. The love of freedom and democracy is an outstanding characteristic of Filipinos.
 - (a) Sacrifices of heroes of Revolution of 1896 against Spain showed willingness to pay price for freedom.
 - (b) Later resistance of the people to Americans showed keen desire for complete independence immediately.
 - (c) Under American guidance, younger Filipinos accepted avidly the ideals of freedom and democracy.
 - (d) Filipinos eager to accept responsibility for Philippine independence.
9. It is important to remember that the Filipinos have a friendly attitude towards the United States.
 - (a) Co-operation of Filipinos and Americans fostered in building foundation for self-government.
 - (b) Filipinos have absorbed essential principles of American democracy.
 - (c) Most convincing evidence of Filipino loyalty and attitude was given in fighting the Japanese as a common enemy.
 - (1) Bataan proved forever Filipino loyalty.
 - (d) Presidents Quezon and Osmena have stated that friendly Filipino-American co-operation and understanding will continue after independence.
 - (e) Every American soldier landing in the Philippines has the opportunity and responsibility to maintain and promote Filipino-American understanding and friendship.

Text References: "Meet the Filipinos"

1. General Qualities and Habits of Filipinos.

Outstanding Qualities and Habits

Filipinos in general are affable, hospitable, and courteous. They possess dignity and self-respect and are by nature orderly and law-abiding; but—as usual in lands where nature provides bountifully—are not much interested in work for work's sake, nor in putting something aside for a rainy day. They love life and are fond of the arts, and many are exceptionally deft in trades requiring manual dexterity.

Accordingly, Filipinos have never shown any special adaptability for commerce or industry, being content on the whole to leave these enterprises to the Chinese or to Europeans and Americans. There is, however, a genuine desire for education, and many Filipinos who have held important judicial, executive and educational positions would be a credit to the inhabitants of any country. Among the masses, on the other hand, ignorance and superstition persist to a large degree. The Census of 1939 reported literacy for the country as a whole at 48.8 per cent., on the basis of 10,903,880 persons of 10 years and over.

Most employers, particularly on large plantations, regard Filipinos as reasonably good workmen, although physically they are less able than labourers in colder climates. They are readily led by those who understand them, but lack initiative and sound judgment. Except when hardly oppressed and aroused by the mob instinct, they show great respect for constituted authority. Even before the recent tragic crisis they had demonstrated that they make good soldiers.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section I: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual M: 65-1, 25 April, 1944, p. 68.

Filipino Characteristics

While certain character traits are common among the Filipino people, they are by no means universal, and many individual exceptions occur.

The Filipino's greatest loyalty is to his kinship group, which includes not only his immediate family but a varying number of persons related to him by blood or marriage and known collectively as the *parientes*. The ties between parent and child are very strong, and filial obedience is considered a virtue. An attitude of respectful obedience and dependence is also maintained towards other forms of authority, the kinship group, the church, and the government.

Sense of Personal Dignity

The Filipino's point of greatest vulnerability is his pride or sense of personal dignity. Many Filipinos resent the slightest discourtesy or ridicule, and are so sensitive that they often suspect an insult in a joke or chance remark. On such occasions some Filipinos are quick to use a weapon, and during an outburst of temper will often commit rash or fatal acts. This trait also shows itself in the Filipino's apparent lack of good sportsmanship and his inability to take defeat in good spirit. Failure to win, whether in school, sports, or politics, is felt to be a disgrace.

Courtesy, modesty, and hospitality are outstanding characteristics of the Filipino. He is gay and friendly and has an excellent sense of humour, although it differs somewhat from that of the American. Extreme poverty and misfortune are endured with great fortitude; at the same time, the hardships of others often arouse little concern or sympathy. The Filipino likes and respects Americans and identifies himself with them rather than with other Asians.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (Except Mindanao) People and Government, JANIS 154, July, 1944, p. 12.

The Filipino Temperament

The Filipino . . . is quick to smile and has a good sense of humor. He is ordinarily talkative and delights in oratory. The *tao* or common man, however, usually will retreat into reserve when among outsiders. For this reason, newcomers and travellers should make themselves and their business known to the people of a locality in order to allay suspicion.

The Filipino, like all peoples wherever life is easy and the necessities simply obtained, is not thrifty. As a rule, the women are much more thrifty than the men since they rear the children and must look to the future. The Filipino has much respect for his wife's judgment and consults her before making important decisions. In the Philippines, especially among Christians, the woman has a high social standing. While the man performs all the heavy tasks, she does most of the light tasks.

The Filipino loves the companionship of others, especially those in his barrio. Friendships are highly valued. He is everwilling to lend a helping hand to neighbor or stranger. He is liberal with gifts and is highly hospitable. He is fond of social gatherings, dances and music, and has a lively interest in politics.

Being a hospitable person he does not like to be discriminated against socially. When the Filipino extends an invitation, it should not be ignored. If possible it should be accepted even though inconvenient. If necessity prevents acceptance, an understandable and permissible reason for declining should be given.

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section III, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943, p. 56-57.

Philippine Literature

Filipino literature reflects the personality and history of the Filipino people. It reveals native talent and creative impulse of a high order; shows the effects of suppression and frustration; is colored by romantic emotionalism. It is at its best, per-

haps, in the political field, where the Filipinos have successfully employed literature as a sword with which to fight their way to national independence. Yet, although Philippine literature of native production, especially the poetry, is of higher quality than is generally realized by foreigners, it fails to bring to the Filipinos that vast stock of knowledge and beauty which is the common possession of the modern civilized world. Furthermore, most of the native literature which has come down from the past does not interest the Filipinos of to-day sufficiently to cause it to be widely read even by those who are literate. Reading in the native literature is very largely of currently or recently produced writing.

In the problems of Philippine languages and literacy the consumption of literature is, perhaps, as important a factor as is its production. Among the masses of the people the consumption is slight. Fifteen or twenty years ago one might have said with reasonable accuracy that as there was little truly national literature, so also was there virtually no national reading public in the Islands. Filipinos do not read to any extent in the public places where reading is the order of the day in many other countries. In Japan, for example, the street cars, trains, railway stations and boats are often filled with men and women engrossed in newspapers, magazines or books. No contrast between the two peoples is more striking to the visitor than this one.

Interest in the Arts

There is, of course, a close relationship between the development of language and literature and of the other arts in the modern Philippines. In Philippine architecture, sculpture, painting, music and drama are reflected the diverse elements in the culture of the country. The most distinctive buildings in Manila are of the Spanish colonial type. Some of them are architectural gems. The new Bureau of Posts and Legislative Buildings, the work of Juan M. Arellano, are in the classical style. The former structure has received the praise of some of the world's great architects. Business buildings in the medium of re-enforced concrete vary from "mediocre to poor, even sordid" American types to the modernistic structures which have been erected during the past few years. Creative

work in adapting the native architectural motifs to the uses of modern public buildings was done by Arellano when he was the consulting architect of the Bureau of Public Works. There is a fruitful field in the development of a distinctive Philippine architecture by the use of this interesting native material and of the Spanish Colonial style, which may be regarded as a part of the country's artistic heritage. Although the work of Spanish ecclesiastical architects, many of the older churches were given a distinctive character by Filipino collaborators in decoration, sculpture and wrought iron work. Modern sculptors, such as Guillermo Tolentino and Juan Nakpil, are beautifying Manila with examples of their art.

Painters

The works of the older Filipino painters, such as Rocha, Malantac, Luna and Hidalgo, reveal the capacity of the race for self-expression in this form of art. Among present-day artists Fernando Amorsolo and Juan M. Arellano have achieved technical excellence and transferred to their canvases the spirit of certain phases of Philippine life. Possibly younger artists, such as Eduardo Salgado, who was working and exhibiting in the United States in 1941, may develop a more distinctively Filipino school of painting.

Music

During the past two decades there has been a remarkable growth in the production and appreciation of good music in the Philippines. Since 1932 the Manila Symphony Society, an offshoot of the *Asociacion Musical de Filipinas*, has developed a symphony orchestra which gives annually a series of three regular and three popular concerts which would be creditable in any country. Capacity houses of sixteen hundred are the rule. A decade ago an audience of one hundred or so was all that could be drummed together. The cosmopolitan character of the Philippine capital is reflected in the personalities who have been at the center of the Manila Symphony Society: Mrs. Benito F. Legarda, a member of a distinguished Philippine family, its president since 1932; Mr. A. V. H. Hartendorp, the American editor of *The Philippine Magazine*, the secretary of the organization; and the late Dr. Alexander Lippay, a gifted and zealous

German musician who, as director, built up the orchestra. Paralleling the establishment of the Manila Symphony Orchestra has been an increase in the presentation of good music in other forms.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942, p. 609-610, 617-618.

Civic and Fraternal Organizations

Philippine civic and fraternal organizations are patterned largely after the parent or world organization, exercising similar functions and influence. Chief of such groups are the Rotary Clubs, the Knights of Columbus, and the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the Philippines. Masonry is very strong in the Islands, many of the country's most prominent leaders being ranking masons. President Quezon himself was a mason before he became a communicant of the Roman Catholic Church. Many liberal Catholics, moreover, are masons, including several members of the Philippine Supreme Court, a number of other leading government officials, and many university professors.

A National Federation of Women's Clubs has affiliated organizations throughout the country, with emphasis on civic rather than social activities, and there are in Manila a number of fraternal groups among scientific, professional and educational men and women. Such organizations include the Philippine Scientific Society and the Medico-Pharmaceutical Association, the Philippine Bar Association, and the Engineers', Nurses', and Teachers' Associations. While all have headquarters in the nation's capital, many of their members live in the provinces.

Sports and Entertainments

Many of the amusements and sports of both Spain and the United States are popular throughout the Philippines, but the chief source of entertainment is cock-fighting. Love of the sport, so closely allied with the Filipino's inveterate gambling instinct, has become what might be called "the national vice." It has been said that a majority of the natives in Manila breed game cocks. The Government demands that the spectacles take place in public cockpits on feast days, and a portion of the admission fee goes to the federal treasury.

Baseball, tennis and other forms of outdoor recreation were introduced by American teachers and became a permanent policy of the Philippine Bureau of Education. To a certain extent athletics have successfully competed with the cock-fight. Filipinos have participated in the Far Eastern and World Olympic Games, while polo and golf are played by the well-to-do and movies are popular.

Gambling

Authorities agree that Filipinos are born gamblers. Even the poorest will borrow money on almost any terms, if necessary, in order to gamble. Often naive about his ability to repay debts thus incurred, the hapless *tao* falls into the power of *cacique* money lenders, with little hope thereafter of escape from debt servitude.

Gambling is not limited to Filipino men; women indulge at cards and men add to the hazards of cards and dice those of the cockpits and sweepstakes. A national lottery for securing government revenue was a feature of public finance under the Spanish regime, and the sweepstakes represent a modern revival of the scheme.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual, M 365-1, 25 April, 1944, p. 59, 65.

2. Important Racial and Cultural Groups.

Racial and Religious Groups

Native Filipinos are of the Malay race, with the exception of a comparatively few mountain dwellers of Negrito origin. Notwithstanding some infusion of Indonesian and Mongoloid blood in almost every group among the masses, and the presence of Spanish and Chinese blood in the leading people of every Christian area, the racial integrity of the Malays has been maintained to a remarkable degree. There are, therefore, no sharp divisions of territory by races, and fundamental differences between Filipinos are more religious than racial.

The government of the Philippines during American occupation recognized three major groups of natives: Christians, Mohammedans (or Moros),

and Pagans. Christianity—legacy of Spain—is professed mainly by adherents to the Roman Catholic faith, although there are 1,570,000 members of the Philippine Independent Church and 378,000 Protestants. Broadly speaking, Christians and Moros inhabit the lowlands throughout the archipelago and Pagans the mountains and forests.

Christian Filipinos account for 60 per cent. or more of the population of all provinces, except the predominantly Moro provinces in Mindanao, and constitute 91 per cent. of the total population of the Philippines. They fall into eight groups differing in habitat, language, and to a certain extent culture. Three of these groups are by far the most numerous and important. Visayans are the chief inhabitants of the Visayan or central islands and of much of the coastal region in Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental and Occidental, Bukidnon, and Davao. Though less numerous than the Visayans, the Tagalogs (pronounced *Ta-ga'-log*) have come to be regarded as the dominating Filipino type. Living mainly in central and southern Luzon and in the islands of Mindoro and Marinduque, they are more assertive than the comparatively docile Visayans. The last in numerical importance of the three main groups are the Ilocanos, found in north-western Luzon. They have a reputation for exceptional orderliness and industry.

The smaller ethnological groups of Christian Filipinos—whose habitats are indicated by their names—are the Bicolans, living in the Bicol provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon in southern Luzon; the Pangasinans, Pampangans, and Zambalans, found mainly in Pangasinan, Pampanga and Zambales Provinces in central Luzon; and finally, the Cagayans, whose principal habitat is the Cagayan valley in northern Luzon.

Non-Christians

Chief of the non-Christians are the Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, who are the Mohammedans of the Philippines. The more populous provinces in Mindanao—Cotabato, Lanao, and Sulu—constitute the strongholds of the Moros. They are present in lesser numbers in Zamboanga and Davao, while some are also found in Palawan.

... Pagan... tribes... include Igorots,

Ifugaos, and Kalingas—all of Malay origin—about 40 per cent. of whom inhabit Mountain Province in northern Luzon. Smaller groups are scattered throughout the Islands, especially in Mindanao. These "wild men," among whom greater ethnic diversity exists than among Christian Malays, have been found to be very intelligent people and excellent fighters, Igorots especially having distinguished themselves during the Japanese invasion. The Negritos are believed to be remnants of Philippine aborigines who, dispossessed by invading Malays of the littoral and principal river valleys, survive only as remote hill tribes of northern Luzon and the mountainous interiors of Mindanao, Palawan, Negros, Panay, and Tablas Islands.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual, M 365-1, 25 April, 1944, p. 22-24.

Cultural and Racial Diversity

At first sight cultural and racial diversity do seem to be very great among the people of the Philippines. The leading authority on Philippine ethnology has recognized no less than forty-three distinct ethnographic groups, speaking eighty-seven languages and dialects, as existing in the Archipelago. Yet, with the exception of a small number (possibly 80,000) of forest and mountain dwellers of Negrito, negroid, or undetermined blood a very large majority of the people of the Philippines belong to one great racial group, the Malays. Among the 16,000,000 Christians and Mohammedans who dwell in the lowlands, the type is fairly uniform, although in almost every group the Malay stock has been blended with Indonesian and Mongoloid elements, and the presence of Chinese and Spanish blood is apparent in the leading people of every Christian area. Among the half million or more Pagan mountaineers and forest peoples, greater ethnic diversity exists. Indonesian types and Malay blends in which the Indonesian and Mongoloid elements are predominant are common.

A Unified Group

From the ethnological standpoint, however, the outstanding fact about the Filipino people is not diversity, but homogeneity. In blood and ancestry they are at least as unified as are the inhabitants of Great Britain, France, Spain, or the United

States. When the Government of the Philippines seeks to arouse among all of the native inhabitants of the Archipelago a consciousness of Philippine citizenship and devotion to a Philippine state, it is appealing to a people already united by one of the most fundamental of ties, that of blood relationship.

Hayden, Joseph R., The Philippines, A Study in National Development. Macmillan, 1942, p. 11-12.

Mestizos

Over a long period of time, native Filipinos have been mingling together and inter-marrying among themselves. In like manner, Spanish and Chinese inhabitants have been mixing with them. As a result, many Filipinos are partly Spanish or Chinese. They are known as mestizos.

Since Spaniards in the Philippines were always influential in the government and other positions of importance before 1900, the Spanish mestizos are prominent to-day in Philippine life. For a long time, Chinese have been influential in business and trade, and like the Spanish Filipinos, the Chinese Filipinos are very important members of the population.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines, p. 23.

Social and Economic Groups

Social Classes

Upper Class.—A relatively small percentage of the Filipino people controls a very large proportion of the wealth and political power. The upper stratum of society, or so-called "ruling class," is generally estimated at not over 5 per cent. of the total population, or about 800,000 people.

Numbered in this group are Spanish families of inherited wealth and marked prestige and influence, including the tobacco and sugar barons, and business magnates. Mr. Josquin Elizalde, resident Philippine Commissioner in Washington and member of the Cabinet of the Philippine Government in exile, is of such a family. Spanish mestizos (mixed Malay and Spanish blood)—of which President Quezon is the most illustrious example—also hold positions of wealth and influence, as do likewise many of the Chinese mestizos. Vice-President (now President) Osmena belongs to the latter class. The large group of Filipinos in whom there is some admixture of Chinese blood, although not

by any means all of the upper class, is regarded as among the most capable and prosperous elements of the Filipino people. The preponderance of both Chinese and Spanish mestizos in the upper class is striking; for practically all of the social, business and political leaders are of either Spanish-Malay or Chinese-Malay blood.

Standards of living in the upper strata of Filipino society, whether metropolitan or provincial, are approximately as high as those of well-to-do Americans, though not entirely comparable. Many of this class, especially the large land-owning families are genuine aristocrats. Independent economically, competent socially, imaginative, ambitious and politically adept, they dominate the social, business and political life of the country. Their children, usually educated in the more exclusive private schools, are then sent to one of the universities in the Philippines or—before the war—to institutions of higher learning in the United States or Europe.

Lower Class.—At the other extremity of the social-economic scale are the masses of Filipinos, of whom the vast majority till the soil as small landed proprietors, tenants, or laborers on large estates. Frequently burdened with debt, many of them are the easy prey of usurers, who are notoriously active despite legislation designed to suppress them. In the words of President Quezon, addressing the National Assembly in 1938:

"As he (the *tao*) works from sunrise to sundown, his employer gets richer while he remains poor... He has to drink the same polluted water his ancestors drank for ages. Malaria, dysentery, and tuberculosis still threaten him and his family at every turn. His children cannot all go to school, or if they do, they cannot finish the whole primary instruction..."

For years Philippine authorities have wrestled with the problem of helping the Filipino peasant to improve his economic and social position. Measures so far taken, however, such as the establishment of farm loan associations and an anti-usury board, have been largely ineffectual. As will be shown in the section following on quasi-public and private organizations, peasant unrest has expressed itself in uprisings against the government and the upper class, but as Philippine society has evolved over a long period of years the potentiality for progress and advancement may be said to rest

almost solely with the upper and—to a much less extent—the middle classes.

Middle Class.—In the main, however, the Philippines are without a middle class. Before the war an economically independent middle-class group was gradually developing with the expansion in educational facilities and commercial opportunities, but in number and influence the Filipinos who may be so classified are few and ineffectual compared with the lower class on the one hand or with the upper class on the other. They are largely the "white collar" employees of Government, the clerks and minor shop owners, or small-type professional men—a much less numerous group than would be found in a more diversified society.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background, Army Service Forces Manual, M 365-1, 25 April, 1944, p. 50-53.

The Social Structure

The Philippines are theoretically organized as a political democracy, having a liberal constitution and no legally privileged classes. In actual practice, however, political democracy has not coincided with economic and social democracy. A great chasm continues to separate the lower and upper classes. A small middle class is only slowly developing.

The upper stratum of Philippine society is dominated by the wealthy land-holding class. This class has increasingly entrenched itself in the life of the nation and has exerted great pressure on political developments taking place in the country. Its children are well-educated and its family life is not unlike that of well-to-do Americans.

At the other end of the socio-economic scale are the masses of the people, most of whom are small farmers, tenants, or simple *taos* working the great sugar, tobacco, hemp or rice estates. The majority of them lack education and money beyond bare requirements for food and clothing. A faulty agricultural credit system has for years exposed the masses to usurers; borrowing money at high interest, the poor farmer has often found it almost impossible to pay his way out of debt and has been forced to become little more than a bonded servant.

In recent years education has been spreading among these people and they have been learning something of the rights as well as the duties of citizens in a democracy. They have con-

sequently become more articulate and some political organization on their behalf has developed. Radical political movements sprang up in several of the provinces before the war; such leaders as Pedro Abad Santos of the Socialists grew more powerful. The Sakdals who in 1935 led an uprising against the government, were in part composed of discontented, landless farmers.

The foreign populations in the Philippines, particularly those of Western countries, have usually been considered part of the upper classes. Engaged in governmental, commercial, and educational pursuits, they have constituted a class apart. The *mestizo* descendants of the Spanish also represent a powerful class group in the Islands and have achieved a dominant role in much of the business and political life of the country.

The Chinese and Japanese have belonged to both the upper and lower classes although their sympathies and interests are confined to their own groups.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (except Mindanao) People and Government, JANIS 154, Chapter X, July, 1944. p. 2.

Development of National Unity

Development of Nationalism

Probably most members of the dominant classes to-day think of themselves first as Filipinos and only afterwards as Tagalogs, Ilocanos or Bicolos. . . . How far this is true of the masses of the people is open to question. The author recalls many instances in which the spontaneous expression of popular feeling in this matter would indicate the contrary. Typical is an interchange overheard between two chauffeurs at a Manila curb. "Is he a Filipino?" one of them inquired. "No. He is an Ilocano," the other replied. The possession of a common language by the upper and middle classes has contributed greatly to the development of a national consciousness and to a diminution of provincialism among the Filipino people. Only a relatively small proportion of the masses use effectively any language save the local one, however, and it may be doubted whether the increased mastery of a foreign medium of communication by the classes has advanced the cause of democracy as effectively as that of nationalism.

Thinking Filipinos have always objected to the unofficial American designation of the several groups among the Christian inhabitants of the Islands as "tribes." They are acutely conscious of the usual connotation of the word ("group of barbarous clans under recognized chiefs," Concise Oxford Dictionary), resent being classed with more or less primitive peoples, and feel that the term unjustly exaggerates their political disunity. Even the title "Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes," long officially used to designate the bureau charged with administrative responsibility for the non-Christian peoples, was always resented upon the ground that it was misleading to the outside world and insulting to those "Filipino brothers." It was discarded early in the Commonwealth period.

National Unity

The effect which the infusion of foreign blood may have upon the development of the Philippine nation is difficult to appraise. In view of the shifts of population now occurring in various parts of the world and the problems of race and nationality which undoubtedly will have to be dealt with at the conclusion of the present conflict the subject is one of general interest. There is scarcely room for doubt that the infusion has improved the quality of the native stock. This conclusion is no reflection upon the Filipino people or upon the Malayan race, of which the Filipinos are a branch. Even the "pure" Malays are of mixed blood. No existing nation is racially "pure." The peoples which throughout history have made the greatest contributions to civilization have been of mixed race. The blood and culture of many nations and races have combined to make the Twentieth Century American.

No one who knows the Philippines can fail to be impressed by the happy results produced by the admixture of the Chinese or the Spanish with the Filipino racial stock. The mingling of these races tends to reproduce in combination a preponderance of the good qualities of the three peoples. The admixture of American blood has produced many individuals of high type. This group, however, is not sufficiently numerous to affect the character of the population as a whole. There is, of course, no way of knowing what the descendants of the early Malaysians who peopled the Philippines would have become had they not

mingled their blood with that of other races and been subject to foreign domination. Nevertheless, there would seem to be little doubt that the infusion of foreign blood has strengthened the Filipinos as a race. There has, however, been a certain amount of feeling, even among Filipinos, that the creation of a strong unified Philippine state would be made more difficult by the overweighting of the upper class by Filipinos who are differentiated from the great body of the people by noticeably foreign characteristics. This problem is a political and social one and for this reason the position occupied in Philippine society by the two great classes of Filipinos with foreign blood deserves consideration.

In the first generation, Chinese coming to live in the Philippines are not usually assimilated. But in most instances the children of Chinese fathers and Filipino mothers become Filipinos. Few of them return to China, regard it as the homeland, or feel that they belong to a foreign community in the Philippines. They think of themselves as Filipinos, and a Filipino with a considerable proportion of Chinese blood in his veins may have sprung from families whose members have been Filipinos for generations and played distinguished parts in Philippine history. Such a person is a Filipino as wholly as the descendants of the European immigrants of a century ago are Americans. Nevertheless, by many of his fellow citizens of darker color and humbler circumstances (Filipinos of heart and face, they call themselves), he is apt to be thought of as belonging to a minority possessed of more than its proportionate share of wealth and authority.

So is the Filipino of Spanish extraction. Furthermore, he is definitely allied by blood to the race which only recently exercised a domination over the Filipinos as a people and as individuals. Probably this is one reason why few politicians wish to be too definitely identified as Spanish in blood or affiliation; and why Spanish connections are weighed when political appointments are to be made. On the other hand, there are not nearly so many Filipinos with a Spanish as with a Chinese racial background. Citizens of Spanish extraction are not allied by blood with any group of aliens who are competing in occupations which are open to the less prosperous elements of the population. More important, Philippine culture is in large part Spanish, and since

Spain's political domination has ceased, virtually all Filipinos look with pride and satisfaction upon the strong ties between the two countries. Finally, it is improbable that the Spanish element in the nation will materially increase.

Many facts can be cited which indicate that the divisive force of the situation which has been described has been exaggerated. Countless Filipinos of Spanish or Chinese extraction have been chosen to municipal, provincial and national offices by an electorate of more nearly pure Filipino blood. Rizal and other national heroes were of mixed lineage. No political party, religious denomination, or other important national organization rests upon a racial basis. Most telling fact of all, the predominance in the upper class of citizens with Chinese or Spanish racial affiliation has not prevented the Christian Filipino people of all categories from uniting in the national cause of independence.

Hayden, Joseph R., *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*. Macmillan, 1942. p. 19-20, 26-29.

3. High Place of Women in the Social Organisation

Place of Women in the Community

Philippine community life is strongly reliant on the family and village system typical of most agricultural areas in the East, particularly among Malay races. Family bonds are closely drawn and family ties frequently unite all blood relationships, the complete family unit taking on the proportions of a clan.

Parental authority is thoroughly grounded in the social customs of the people, extending even to late in life. A man of 50 years treats his aged parents with marked respect and deference. The father, as head of the family, commands obedience from the children but is not despotic. The mother, although subject to the father's rule, is not suppressed. Filipino women, on the other hand, exert great influence in the family unit, which, in fact, is a combination of patriarchal and matriarchal forms of family organization.

Patriarchal influences of Oriental

neighbours—notably the Chinese—are noted in the individual Filipino's respect for family authority and the subordination of interests to those of the elders. The matriarchal form, however, was highly developed in large tribal groups in Luzon in the pre-Spanish era, and the position and power of women to-day—especially among the Tagalogs—is traced chiefly to this culture, although the attitude toward women doubtless has been influenced also by the introduction of Catholicism at the beginning of the Spanish era. In no other part of the Orient have women relatively so much freedom, or so large a part in control of the family or in social and business affairs. In all respects they are the social equals of men, and in both the privileged and lower classes, are generally regarded as much more enterprising than Filipino men. Pampanga women especially are reputedly clever in business, and rarely does a Pampanga husband complete an important business transaction without the concurrence of his wife. Frequently the woman is manager of the household, supervising the expenditure of all cash earned by any member of the family.

Suffrage was granted Filipino women in 1937, and a number have since exercised important leadership in national affairs, while many others are similarly influential in provincial and municipal matters.

Age of Majority.—Filipino men 21 years or over who are able to read and write any dialect or a foreign language, or who possess taxable property valued at 500 pesos (\$250) or more, are permitted to vote. Women also must be 21, literate, and residents for at least one year in the Philippines and at least six months in the voting precinct.

Monogamy.—When the Filipinos accepted Christianity they also accepted monogamy as the basis for family organization. The Bontoc and Lepanto Igorots also are monogamous, but the Moros, or Mohammedans, are polygamous. Among other non-Christian peoples polygamy may or may not be permitted, but its practice is often determined by economic rather than religious considerations.

Divorce.—In keeping with the laws of the Catholic Church, Filipino Catholics are not granted divorce by the Church. The law of the Commonwealth allowed divorce only in case of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband. Philippine courts did

not recognize divorces obtained in foreign countries. Among non-Christians, divorce was permitted but is rare.

In March, 1943, Mr. Jorge Vargas, then Chairman of the Executive Commission, and titular head of the Philippine government, issued Executive Order No. 141, providing a new divorce law. Eleven grounds for divorce were recognized by the order, which, according to broadcasts from Manila, was received by leading Filipinos with varying degrees of approbation—some purportedly referring to the new law as Japanese-inspired, and expressing the hope that the people "would not take advantage of the situation."

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background. Army Service Forces Manual, M 365-1, 25 April, 1944. p. 39-41.

Women in Public Life

In the opinion of the author, there is no country in the world in which woman suffrage is more desirable than in the Philippines. In intellect the Filipino woman is on a level with her menfolk. In responsibility, sensitivity to the social needs of her community, and in practical common sense, she is, on the average, above them. Women's organizations, a number of them national in scope, have initiated and secured popular support for important social reforms and significant movements for intellectual and artistic progress. The National Federation of Women's Clubs has been an especially powerful instrumentality for good. A number of women, of whom Mrs. Sofia Reyes de Veyra and Mrs. Pilar Hidalgo Lim are examples, exercise a powerful leadership in national affairs. Through club affiliations many women exercise a corresponding influence in provincial and municipal affairs. Within the last few years an increasing number of women have been elected to public office, to the great advantage of the public. Women occupy an established place in most of the professions. Although in her present position as the wife of the President of the Philippines, Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon is above the arena of social and political struggle, Mrs. Quezon's personality and her understanding solicitude for the welfare of the people have strengthened the influence of all women in the affairs of the nation. The Philippine woman voter will be a powerful stabilizing force and her political influence will be used to forward sound efforts to ameliorate

human suffering and lessen the handicaps under which the less prosperous elements of the Filipino people now live.

Hayden, Joseph R., *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*, Macmillan, 1942. p. 203-204.

4. The Christian Religion in the Philippines

Christian Influence in the Philippines

General.—The Philippines is the only Christian country in the Far East. Under Spanish sovereignty, the Catholic Church was the only one permitted in the Philippines, but the subsequent change to American sovereignty brought with it a separation of church and state, and freedom of worship.

Christian Influence.—The Catholic Church in the Philippines is Spanish in background and international in its affiliations. The Philippine Independent Church, whose founder was the late Bishop Gregorio Aglipay and whose members are called Aglipayanos, is completely and aggressively Filipino. The Protestant Churches, despite the fact that their membership is almost entirely Filipino, are definitely American in origin, affiliation and spirit. The contribution of the organized churches in the Philippines is important, both historically and culturally. The Roman Catholic Church was the only part of Spanish-organized influence which extended deeply into the lives of the people of the provinces. It had a tremendous influence on the modernization of the Philippine Islands. Through it important new crops were introduced, books were printed in various dialects, and schools were started. Even after the separation of Church and State, the Catholic Church has remained a powerful force of law, order and stability. The Protestant churches and the Philippine Independent Church likewise have made increasingly important contributions to the national life.

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section III, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 64.

Principal Christian Groups

(1) Principal faiths.

RELIGIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS BASED ON THE CENSUS OF 1939

Religion	Number	Per cent. of Population
Christians— ...	14,555,334	91.0
(Roman Catholics) ..	(12,603,365)	(78.8)
(Aglipayans) (1,573,608)	(9.8)	
(Protestant) .	(378,361)	(2.4)
Mohammedans	677,903	4.2
Pagans	626,008	3.9
All others	141,058	.9

(2) Christianity.

(a) General. Christianity was introduced into the Philippines by the Spaniards late in the sixteenth century. A complete ecclesiastical system was established, and the Islands were apportioned among the several orders of the Roman Catholic Church. At the same time, the Spanish set up the encomienda system, by which the land and the people were divided among certain Spaniards whose duty it was to protect and govern and to provide opportunity for the practice of the Catholic religion. A close union of church and state was thus one of the characteristics of Spanish rule. There were many bitter struggles between church and state, but at the end of the Spanish regime the Church still dominated the political situation.

The American policy of religious freedom has been continued by the Commonwealth of the Philippines. All peoples are granted freedom of religious practice, provided that the laws of the land or of the United States are not violated.

(b) Catholicism. About 80 per cent. of the population of the Philippines is Roman Catholic. The people are very devout, and community life centers around the church. The majority of the priests are Filipinos, but there are also American, Belgian, Dutch, German, Irish, Italian, and Spanish priests. There are many Catholic schools throughout the islands.

(c) Aglipayan Church. The Philippine Independent Church is popularly called the Aglipayan Church after its founder, Bishop Gregorio Aglipay. It was established in 1902, in part as a

manifestation of the political nationalism of the period and as a revolt against Rome after the Filipino priesthood failed to secure recognition. The hierarchy is identical with that of the Catholic Church, except for its separation from the Vatican. Most of the rituals and impressive ceremonies of the Catholic Church have been retained, but the theology more closely resembles that of Protestantism.

(d) Protestantism. American Protestantism entered the Philippines in 1898. Protestant chaplains and Y.M.C.A. secretaries came with the Army, and civilian missionaries followed. In 1901 the Protestant missionaries formed the Evangelical Union and apportioned the islands among the various Protestant sects. Each mission was assigned a number of provinces; Manila remained open to all.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (Except Mindanao) People and Government. JANIS 154, Chapter X, July, 1944. p. 16.

5. The Moros

Fighting Men

It is important that you understand the Moros. They derive their religious beliefs from the Koran. They are devoted to their own religion, and have no great love for Christians.

As a fighting man, the Moro has long been famous. His traditional weapon is the kris, a wicked sword with sharp wavy edges. Moro warriors prefer hand-to-hand combat, using the kris, and fight to the death once engaged.

The Moros were never completely conquered by Spain. Against United States troops, Moros carried on organized resistance until the battle of Bud Bagsak on Jolo Island, in 1913.

For many years, American soldiers saw plenty of action in Mindanao and the Sulu Islands. General (then Captain) Pershing, among others, became famous for his exploits against the fierce Moros. Pettit Barracks, in Zamboanga, was a famous American Army outpost in south-western Mindanao.

After 1913, a fair treaty was negotiated with the Moro Sultan. Americans and Moros came to know and respect each other.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines, p. 20-21.

Moro Groups

Although the different Moro groups are far from united politically and lack any real consciousness as a national group, they do have numerous close cultural bonds stemming mainly from their attachment to the Mohammedan religion. The general cultural and social outlines of these Moro groups—the Lanaos (Maranaos), Magindanaos, the Samals, the Sanggils, the Sulus, and the Yakans—follows:—

(a) Dress.—Most of the Moros dress in gaudy, brilliant colors. The men generally dress in very tightly fitting jackets of cotton or silk with wide, skirt-like sarongs caught up at the waist by a belt, or bright trousers, loose at the waist, held up by a kind of kummerbund. On their heads are worn red fezzes or bright-coloured, twisted turbans. The women wear similar loose trousers and cover the upper part of the body with tightly fitting jackets.

(b) Religious Influence.—The most important cultural influence in the life of the Moro is his religion. This attachment to his religion is far greater than any attachment to the government. The actual methods of religious worship and degree of attachment to the various tenets of the religion vary from the Cotabato Moros to the Sulu Moros. But in all these Moro areas three officials commonly play important roles in the religious life of their communities. These are the datu, who enjoys not only temporal power over many hundreds of people in a given area . . . but also wide religious powers by virtue of his noble inheritance; the iman, who collects fines for religious defalcations; and the hadjis, who occupy special roles in the religious life of their communities because they have made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Moro has established a reputation for fanaticism through the years. This fanaticism has to a great extent sprung from his religion. The Moro has especially resented any efforts to interfere with, suppress, or even modify his religion. The Spanish were years in warring with the Moros of North Africa and carried this feud over to the Malay Moros of the Philippines. For years the Spanish and Moros of the Philippines carried on intermittent warfare. When pitched battles or ambushes were not occurring, individual Moros were running amok or going juramentado. Going juramentado had a special religious

significance with a Moro taking a solemn vow to kill as many Christians as possible and then running wild with his kris in the closest settlement or street. Under American administration the religious warfare died out but occasional cases of juramentado continued to flare up even as late as 1941.

(c) Social Classes.—The Moro community usually consists of 4 classes. These are the datu or noble class, the privileged class or free citizens, the subjects of the datu, and the slave class. These classes are recognized by Moro law, which also differentiates between crimes committed against one class or another. Much has been done to eliminate the conditions of slavery, but it still exists, particularly in Sulu.

(d) Occupations.—The Moros are usually said to be most at home near the water though there are numerous exceptions to this. The Sulus, Samals, and Badjans ("sea gypsies" who are mixed pagan-Moro . . .) of the Sulu Archipelago are the most sea-faring of the Moros. The Samals in years past were notorious as pirates plundering the coasts of the northern Philippines, Borneo, and other adjacent lands.

The interior Moros of Lanao and Cotabato are farmers as are most of the Moros on Jolo Island in the Sulu group (these Moros known as Joloanos). Corn, rice, sugar cane, coconuts, hemp, cocoa, ubi, peanuts, and sweet potatoes are raised.

The Moros also do excellent weaving and do expert work in iron, brass, silver, and gold, making bolos, barongs, spears, and krisses . . .

(e) Language.—Three main languages exist among the Moros. These are Sulu-Samal, Lanao, and Magindanao. Like all Philippine languages, they are grammatically related to each other as well as to the languages spoken in Borneo, Celebes, and elsewhere in Indonesia. It is possible thus for the different Moro groups to understand each other in general terms though any detailed conversation would be impossible.

Through the school systems many of the Moros also have some knowledge of either Spanish or English.

(f) Education.—Spain made little effort to educate the Sulu Moros. Such efforts as were made were actively resisted. American administration, on the other hand, has made every effort to bring the Moros into active co-operation with the educational

program for the Islands. In the more thickly populated areas the response to this educational program has been slight. Many of the Moros refuse to see the need for attending school on a regular basis, and many complain that not enough Moro teachers are employed in the school system. These handicaps were beginning to be met satisfactorily, however, and signs pointed to increasing Moro receptiveness to the educational program. The school system has taught hundreds of Moros to speak a little English.

Political and Social Groups.—Despite their close attachment to the Mohammedan religion there is no close sense of political consciousness among the Moros. Dr. J. R. Hayden states that "the three great Moro groups, the Maranaos (Lanaos), the Magindanaos, and the inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago, are as separate from each other as are Germany, France and Spain—they have never achieved either the consciousness or the machinery of national unity." Thus, the idea that the Moro represents a fundamentally united political unit is utterly false.

Even among the great divisions of the Moros, there are many splits. Each datu considers himself independent of the other, though some have risen to positions of recognized general leadership by virtue of superior talents or wealth. For the most part, however, great jealousy and distrust exists among the *datu*s and each is intent on preserving his own power.

It is altogether unlikely that the Moros in any great numbers have submitted to the Japanese. The Japanese have claimed successes among them, but nothing like the successes they claim to have achieved among the people of the Visayas and Luzon. Moro raiding parties have undoubtedly struck at Japanese communication lines and Japanese scouting parties with effect. But this resistance presumably is largely unorganized and on a hit-and-run basis.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Celebes Area, People and Government. JANIS 155, Chapter X, May, 1944. p. 17-19, 21-22.

Moro Uprisings

Sporadic Moro uprising marked the entire American regime in the Philippines, and when the story of the Japanese occupation is finally told I am sure it will reveal that many a Jap sentry who grew momentarily careless had his head lopped off

by the swift, silent stroke of a Moro kris. Every American governor-general spoke of the Moro problem and most of them tried to do something about it, but the American who lived permanently in the Philippines felt that it was a problem which nothing but time could solve. With the economic development of Mindanao and the gradual spreading of the benefits of enlightened government to the Moro people, their warlike propensities will gradually melt away.

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1945. p. 122-123.

6. Improvement of Public Health

Under Spanish Rule

In 1871 a new period in the medical progress of the Islands was inaugurated with the establishment of the San Jose Medical College as the medical department of the Santo Tomas University. From then on Filipinos became doctors in increasing numbers. The medical profession offered opportunities for political advancement and social prominence. Such physicians as Pardo de Tavera, Bautista, Luna, Manuel Gomez, and the immortal Rizal played great roles as statesmen or soldiers in the national development of their people. Of them all, Rizal approached most nearly to the modern ideal in scientific attitude and in his feeling of professional responsibility for the health and social welfare of the people. While an exile on the remote coast of Mindanao he constructed upon his own initiative and with private funds a water works system which protected the health of the ordinary people of Dapitan. When the Filipino political leaders of to-day are pondering how far the government should go in expending public money for furthering a national program of public health and welfare they may well recall the deep feeling of their national hero upon this subject.

But although the medical profession of pre-American days was conducted upon a high ethical plane and many of its members occupied positions of distinction in the Philippine community, its scientific qualifications were not high, when judged by modern standards. Neither the profession nor the government exercised

any effective control over the hygiene and sanitation of the people. During the years immediately preceding the American occupation some 40,000 people annually were dying of smallpox. Periodic epidemics of cholera took hundreds of thousands of lives. The bubonic plague visited the Islands at not infrequent intervals. Tuberculosis, malaria, dysentery, beri beri, intestinal infestations and malnutrition kept a large proportion of the population in a condition of partial debility. A terrific infant mortality, estimated in 1896 to have been 421.69 per 1,000 births in the City of Manila, and a high general death rate had held the population stationary for a quarter of a century.

Public Health Development during the American Regime

In no important matter were greater changes wrought in the Philippines after the American occupation in 1898 than in the field of public health. The new masters of the Islands differed from their predecessors in feeling that the government should actively promote the health of the people and in possessing the scientific knowledge and physical energy required for the effective prosecution of this task. Better health was one of the "blessings of civilization" which the United States was going to bring to its new Oriental wards.

The first period of the American regime, from 1898 to 1914, was one of rapid development. Great advances were being made in public health throughout the Western world, especially in the fields of environmental sanitation and the control of epidemics. The public health officer was coming into his own as a recognized specialist who, in a sense, was physician to the whole community or nation and who required for his particular function a specialized training beyond that of the private practitioner. The conquest of yellow fever and the mass control of other diseases that were incidental to the Spanish-American War and the construction of the Panama Canal gave Americans the leadership in this new aspect of medical science. Under American control the people of the Philippines shared in these world-wide advances. Remarkable progress was made in sanitation. The terrible epidemics of smallpox, cholera and plague were gradually brought under control and, at the end of the period,

practically eliminated from the Philippines. Dysentery was checked and a beginning was made in the eradication of beri beri and leprosy. The dietary habits of many of the people were improved and the general level of their physical vigour somewhat raised. The measurable results of the new health regime are roughly indicated by a striking reduction of the infant mortality rate in the city of Manila between 1904 and 1914; of the Manila death rate from 49.01 per 1,000 in 1904 to 23.82 for the calendar year 1913; and by the rapid increase of the population. At the end of the period the Philippines had become one of the most healthful of the tropical countries having populations comparable in number. The detailed story of these great achievements has been well told, and need not be repeated here.

Early Progress under the Americans

Notice should be taken, however, of the progress that was made during the first fifteen years of the American regime, as well as during the later periods, towards equipping the Philippines with the instrumentalities which modern experience indicates are indispensable for maintaining national health at a reasonably high level. . . . Through increased and modernized facilities in medical education the number of physicians was rapidly augmented between 1898 and 1914 and the quality of medical service vastly improved. The government took the lead in this activity through the establishment of the Philippine Medical School in 1905 and the development of this institution as the College of Medicine of the University of the Philippines after 1910. Similar advances were made in the fields of nursing, pharmacy, and midwifery. Large numbers of sanitary inspectors and dispensary attendants were given sub-professional training. Hospital facilities were improved and increased both by the government and by private agencies, especially the Roman Catholic Church and the Philippine missions of a number of Protestant denominations.

The Bureau of Science

Of outstanding importance to public health was the establishment in 1905 of the Bureau of Science. This institution became the central agency of the government for fundamental scientific research and for the per-

formance of the routine laboratory work which places modern sciences at the disposal of the medical and other professions. Working in close collaboration with the Bureau of Science and the Philippine General Hospital, the University of the Philippines became an active center for scientific instruction and research. In the initiation and early development of many of these activities the United States Army played an indispensable role, and by the brilliant work of its medical officers made valuable contributions to the development of a modern system of medicine and public health in the Philippines.

Philippine Public Health Service

Long before 1914, the Philippine Public Health Service was an organization, effective within the limitation of its financial resources, that reached into every part of the Archipelago. Simultaneously with the development of public health administration the Philippines were given a modern body of laws and regulations for the protection of the health of the people, a sanitary code, pure food and drug legislation, laws and regulations governing the teaching and practice of medicine, nursing, dentistry and pharmacy.

While the laws, administrative organization, and other public and private instrumentalities prerequisite to the better protection of health were being developed, the Filipino people were being gradually educated as to the necessity of public health measures and the benefits of modern medicine. So far as the masses of the people were concerned, progress was slow and sometimes painful. Fear, suspicion and occasional resistance were eventually replaced however, by acquiescence in the ministrations of the Public Health Service, and by partial co-operation with it. The public schools played a major part in effecting this change. Public health, however, is vitally affected by the intimate personal habits and the traditional beliefs and attitudes of the people. To indoctrinate millions of ignorant, indifferent, suspicious Filipinos scattered through a thousand

tropical islands with the essentially scientific concepts upon which a modern health program rests was not to be accomplished in a decade, or in a generation.

Young Filipino Scientists

But if fundamental and permanent changes were only gradually effected in the health habits of the people as a whole, better progress was made among their scientific, educational and, in lesser degree, their political leaders. During the early years of the Filipino-American association an understanding of the scientific method was gained by a considerable group of young Filipinos who were soon to be placed in responsible charge of scientific work in their country. Trained in Philippine, American and European educational institutions these young men served under Dr. Paul C. Freer, Dr. Richard Strong, Dr. Victor G. Heiser, Major Frank S. Bourns, Col. L. M. Maus, Dean C. Worcester, and other Americans whose names stand high in the annals of medical science and public health administration. They were subordinate, but essential participants in a thrilling struggle to elevate the lives of a whole people. They caught something of the scientific and humanitarian spirit of their American leaders. In the field of public health, it was one of the great achievements of the period that within the Philippine government an essentially scientific attitude should have been substituted for the unscientific ways of Spanish days, and that a small group of young Filipino officials should have been imbued with the scientific spirit.

Between 1914 and the advent of Governor-General Wood's administration in 1921, the Government laid the foundations for a public welfare program, and as a part of this activity encouraged and supported the efforts of private organizations to combat tuberculosis and protect the health of women and children.

Aid from the Rockefeller Foundation

With the beginning of the administration of Governor-General Leonard Wood in October, 1921, the Philippine Government rapidly regained its former effectiveness in safeguarding public health. A physician, a driving administrator, a sanitarian of world

renown, and a great humanitarian, Leonard Wood proceeded to recondition and extend the public health structure. Under such conditions it was possible to secure important aid from the Rockefeller Foundation in dealing with the health problems of the Philippines. Prior to 1922 the sole Philippine activity of the Foundation had been the subsidization of a hospital ship which provided an itinerant medical service for the Moro and other scattered inhabitants of the Sulu Archipelago and the isolated coastal towns of Mindanao. Now, upon the invitation of the Philippine Government, the Foundation launched a broader program planned by Dr. Victor G. Heiser, then at the head of the Far Eastern Division of the International Health Board. In order to increase the competence of the Filipinos in the fields of medicine and public health, the Foundation aided in strengthening the College of Medicine of the University of the Philippines, participated in the establishment of a school of public health nurses and helped to organize and elevate the nursing profession in the Islands, aided in the reorganization of the biological laboratory of the Bureau of Science, provided over a period of years more than thirty fellowships which enabled Filipino doctors to take complete graduate courses in medicine and public health in the United States, financed shorter observation trips by many other health officials, and was largely instrumental in establishing and developing a graduate School of Public Health and Hygiene in the University of the Philippines.

Each of these activities made valuable contributions, but none was of greater permanent value than the founding of the School of Public Health and Hygiene . . .

In addition to aiding in the improvement of medical and public health education, the Rockefeller Foundation co-operated with the Philippine Government in the scientific study and actual control of malaria, hook worm and other intestinal infestations, typhoid fever, and malnutrition. It assisted in the development of a balanced diet for the people, in the planning and administration of local health programs, and in organizing an improved system of soil sanitation. Although this phase of the Foundation's work had a direct application to local conditions, it also contributed to world knowledge of the diseases and problems studied.

The Commonwealth's Policy Toward Public Health

Only those who in past years have participated in the long pull to establish public health and welfare work in the Philippines so soundly that it would survive any political changes which might occur in the Islands can appreciate fully the significance of the Commonwealth's initial record in this field. Since being placed upon their own responsibility, the Filipinos have continued the general health and welfare policies and agencies which had been developed during the period when final control lay in American hands. They have adhered to and carried forward the modern, long-time inclusive program initiated during the last years of the American regime. They have kept public health and welfare administration out of "politics" and in the hands of the highly trained permanent personnel which the advanced civil service policy of the government has made it possible to develop through a long period of years. During the first two years when expenditures had to be met by taxation the National Assembly continued the sharply increased health and welfare appropriations of the two previous years, and when extraordinary "windfall" revenues became available they appropriated a generous proportion of them for sound health and welfare purposes.

Hayden, Joseph R. *The Philippines, A Study in National Development*, Macmillan, 1942. p. 639-645, 673.

Philippine Public Health and Welfare

The Philippines has led during the American occupation all other oriental countries in progress made in health and welfare. Epidemics are controlled; pandemics are definitely of the past; commerce is no longer impeded by quarantine and other restrictions necessary to prevent the spread of disease; new measures have been inaugurated by the Government to improve the living conditions of the poor and to protect those economically distressed from the ravages of disease.

As a typical example, I refer particularly to the construction during the past two years of a modern water filtration plant for the City of Manila. It is significant of the progress which has been made that Manila, a tropical city, is thus provided with a water supply which is not excelled in purity

by that of any other city in the world. The prevalence of water-borne diseases in the City of Manila has already been reduced and there is no doubt that the pure water now available for the inhabitants of Manila will be an important factor in the continued improvement in the public health of the city.

Governor-General Frank Murphy, to the Tenth Philippine Legislature, November 14, 1935.

7. Progress in Education

Development of Public Education

United States Educational Policy.—Until 1940, there was no law providing for compulsory school attendance in the Philippines. However, from the time the United States entered the Philippines a vigorous program of public and private education was developed. A bold attempt was made to inculcate in the Filipinos the Occidental way of life. Teaching began in the English language exclusively, and continued so. American, as well as Filipino school teachers, stressed instruction in and discussion of civic rights and duties and in the purpose and aims of government. They tried to indoctrinate a generation with American humanitarian idealism. That the Filipinos have realized the value of education is witnessed by the fact that in recent years about 30 per cent. of the Philippine Commonwealth's budget has been allocated to education. Private schools, maintained in part by Filipinos, supplemented the public educational system by providing facilities which the Government had not the funds to supply.

Schools and Enrollment: Public Education.—During the school year 1939-40 there was an enrollment of 1,904,729 in 12,057 public schools, under a staff of 43,763 teachers, principals, supervisors and superintendents. About 80 per cent. of the public schools were primary schools.

The University of the Philippines was an integral part of the public school system occupying in it a place similar to that of state universities in most states in America. It was American in its organization, curricula, methods of instruction, and equipment. The various colleges and branches supplied training in every

field. In recent years the university received from 80 to 85 per cent. of its income from legislative appropriations.

Private Education.—Private schools, colleges and universities were an important part in the educational system of the Philippines. They made an important contribution to the intellectual life of the nation, while relieving the Government of an appreciable proportion of the financial burden of education.

Results of Educational Program: Literacy.—In 1939, of the 11 million persons over 10 years old, 5,300,000 or 48 per cent were reported as being able to read and write. Of the 7 million who were 21 years old and over, 3,080,000, or 44 per cent., were reported literate. The proportion of Filipinos 21 years old and over who were reported as literate, varied from 78.9 per cent. for Manila to 15.4 per cent. for Sulu.

Persons with Advanced Education.—Of the total population of school age in 1939, 45 per cent. attended school, and of this number only 5 per cent. had progressed beyond the intermediate grades. About 175,000 were high school graduates and about 100,000 were college, normal school or university graduates. Results are considerably under those in the United States, grade for grade. Government officials, distinguished from the rank and file of government employees, were usually university graduates and many had studied in the United States and elsewhere.

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume I, Section III, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943. p. 63-64.

Extension of Educational Opportunities

"The extension of opportunities for public education to all children of school age continues to be one of the major problems of the Government. Despite the opening of 3,600 extension classes and the construction of new buildings, there are still many children of school age out of school. The difficulty of the problem lies not so much in the shortage of funds as in the insufficiency of professionally-trained teachers. I have appointed a Joint Educational Survey Committee for the purpose of studying and recommending a solution for the recurring school crisis.

"Greater importance is being given to character and civic education and the fostering of patriotism among

the children and the youth. For this purpose, a code of citizenship and ethics has been promulgated and courses of study on character and civic education are being revised.

"There is a growing popular response to the work of the office of Adult Education as shown by the fact that there are now over 4,000 schools for adult citizens."

President Manuel L. Quezon, January 22, 1940.

Training of Citizens

It became . . . the duty of our teachers to help in the training of citizens—physically vigorous, self-supporting, civic spirited—who would know their duties as well as their rights and who would understand the service that a democratic state demands as well as the blessings that it offers.

In the early days, one of the most difficult problems confronted by the Government was the choice of the language to be used as a medium of instruction in the public schools. There were those who urged the use of the Spanish language. There were others who advocated the use of the different native dialects. It was finally decided, however, to use the English language so that it would serve as a unifying medium and enable us to become familiar not only with intellectual currents abroad but, also, with the democratic ideology and experience with which Anglo-Saxon literature is so richly endowed. To implement that policy, two practical steps were taken: first, the bringing over of a large number of American teachers to the Philippines who would help to organize the new school system and to teach the different subjects required in a modern curriculum in English, and, second, the selection, beginning with 1903, of young Filipinos as pensionados to the United States who, upon their return, could serve as teachers in the public schools or in other capacities in the Government. In addition to these two steps, it was necessary also to establish teacher-training institutions so that the country could have, within the shortest practicable period, a sufficient number of qualified Filipino teachers. This task—the training of a large body of men and women with the necessary academic and professional preparation for teaching in a language other than their own—was one of tremendous magnitude. What has been accomplished within the

comparatively short period of forty years can be truly considered a notable achievement.

The coming of a thousand American teachers in 1901 to teach their own language and to spread their culture and the spirit of their democratic institutions, is unique in the history of the relations between peoples. It is fitting on this occasion that we pay tribute to the service rendered by this group of American pioneer teachers who laid down the foundations of our present public school system. If the English language is not the language of every Filipino, it was not because of their lack of enthusiasm and energy or the inability of the Filipinos to learn a foreign language. But the English language, by their painstaking work, has become the common language of a goodly portion of Filipinos throughout the country. In this sense, we can say that these teachers have greatly aided in the unification of the people by overcoming the barriers of language. By the example of their democratic attitudes and practices, they also fostered the democratic way of life and firmly established in our country the principle of equality of educational opportunities for all.

The Filipino Teacher: His Contribution to Philippine Democracy and Nationalism, Speech Delivered by Sergio Osmena at Commencement Exercises of National Teachers College, Manila, March 25, 1940.

Education in Mindanao

Children in the United States have it so easy, they can't ever imagine the adventures of getting an education in Mindanao.

Of course in big towns like Zamboanga and Davao the schools are, or were, fairly modern. But contrast these with the one-room country schools of Cotabato Province, often built only of poles and palm leaves hacked from the jungle with a bolo.

Much of Cotabato, Mindanao's largest Province, is a Congo-like jungle of marshes and fields of cogon grass crossed only by sluggish streams. Here are only three smallish towns, Cotabato, Midsayap, and Dulawan. Outside these towns are a few lonely, scattered one-room schoolhouses, built to take care of "wild" children, and those of "Christian" settlers.

To reach school many pupils walk, ride ponies, or paddle in dugouts. Always they must watch for snakes, leeches, and man-eating crocodiles.

By 1941 some pagan chiefs had come to realize the importance of schools. In other cases, if a schoolhouse was built near a tribal village, the whole town would pack up and move!

At the town of Upi is an agricultural high school, first built by missionaries for use of children of the timid Tirurai tribe. But so eager were all other Cotabato people for education that, when the Japanese came, pupils in the Episcopal Upi School included Ilocanos, Visayans, Moros, Manobos, Bilaans, Subanos, Tagabalis, and others.

Though their parents, members of rival tribes, may have hated and fought each other, their children in school worked peacefully together.

The Manobos, in particular, though a half-wild tribe, wanted their children educated. Some built their own schoolhouse, on condition that teachers be sent. Parent Manobos, dressed in their best tribal finery, came on "Child Health Day" and listened closely when the English program was translated to them.

An odd fact about this Upi school is that the American teacher, a Mr. Mackenzie, was once captured by the Moros. They were about to kill him when they learned, somehow, that he could cook. They tried his cooking, enjoyed it, and that saved his neck!

The lonely jungle teacher's job is hard enough, says D. R. Famador, a Filipino writing in the Mindanao "Recorder" of Davao, "but life of a school inspector is even worse."

Schools he must visit may lie three or four days' jungle travel apart. No roads, no boats; so some inspectors ride on pack bulls, carrying gun, bolo, mosquito net, blankets, and cooking utensils.

Along wild-pig trails the only sound the inspector hears is the clank-clank of his coffee-pot and skillet knocking together on the pack saddle, or the cries of birds and snorts of wild hogs. When it rains he must build a shelter of banana leaves and keep a smoky fire going under this shelter to scare away pythons and crocodiles.

Primitive and scattered as they are, says Vice-President Osmena, these schools have been a prime force in tempering the hostility and taming the wild ways of the pagan tribes.

Simpich, Frederick. Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo. From an article for The National Geographic Magazine (Not yet published).

8. Filipinos' Love of Freedom

A Democratic Generation

Foreign missionaries, officials and businessmen who have had unusual opportunities of knowing the more obscure Filipino farmer and laborer pay tribute to his sturdy qualities, his individual worth. They understand that his much-publicized "laziness" often is due to ill health, or to a fatalistic acceptance of his sorry lot in life. An opportunity for education, for a better standard of living, would overcome many of these handicaps. This opportunity many Filipinos have been given during the present century.

Among Filipinos to-day there are many keen and able statesmen, as well as run-of-the-mill politicians; there are well-trained jurists and lawyers, a growing circle of men and women of letters, excellent doctors and nurses, hard-headed business-men; and there is a growing reservoir of young people filled with pride and ambition. Not all of these people came from the wealthy landed class; there are many Horatio Alger stories in the islands. Girls and boys overcame poverty and tradition to secure an education and make a place for themselves in the new world opening up to them. They began to understand what, in its highest sense, democracy means.

"The Philippines Are a Young Man's Country"

No better proof of this can be offered than the words of a young Filipino writer, Salvador Lopez, whose name is well known in his own country. His essay: "A Young Man's Country," merits careful reading:

The Philippines are a young man's country. They are a young man's country in a rather special sense. For the Filipinos who are in their twenties to-day are a generation separated from their fathers—in ideals, in behavior and in temper—by what would be the equivalent of at least a hundred years. More truly than the many

hundred miles of paved highways and the thousands of modern public schools and hospitals, they are the fair first-fruits of the American regime. Brought up on American books and magazines, taught by American teachers in public schools patterned after those of the United States, and cured by American medicine, they are a generation uprooted and transplanted into the hothouse of American civilization. In this fact lies their promise as well as their danger.

The outside world little suspects the extensive changes that have been wrought in the Philippines by the American occupation. The statistics tell clearly enough the story of how epidemics have been conquered, how illiteracy has been reduced, and how industry has developed. What they do not tell is the story of how a new generation has grown up amidst an environment wholly different from any hitherto existing, how it has cut loose from the past and now faces the future with confidence.

It is a generation reared in the shadow of American democracy. Of the Spanish misrule of the country and oppression of the people, those that compose it have no personal experience. When they were old enough to understand, the great principles of individual freedom, constitutional rights and democratic government had become household words. The doctrine of the practical life had been established in place of the old ineffectual pieties. The mass political struggle for definite worldly ends had replaced the practice of personal salvation through spiritual exercises.

Yet what oppression they were born too late to undergo, the youth of the Philippines came to know in the histories they read in school. They know well what their fathers suffered in many a prison and battlefield. The sacrifices of the heroes of the Revolution of 1896 have taught them the one lesson they most need to learn—that freedom is a privilege to be fought for and achieved. They understand that, if the United States once upon a time presided like a Fairy Godmother over their infancy and gave them the strange new toys of liberty and equality, they must now face the task of preserving these gifts as a grave and significant enterprise. . . .

Porter, Catherine. *Crisis in the Philippines*, Issued under the Auspices of The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., Knopf, 1942. p. 42-44.

9. The Filipinos' Friendly Attitude Toward the United States

Filipino Co-operation in Self-Government

The United States Government, from the very beginning, repeatedly declared that America came to the Philippines not for purposes of conquest or national aggrandizement but to help the Filipinos along the path of self-government. It realized that the aim could be achieved only with the active co-operation of the Filipinos. As Woodrow Wilson said in one of his works, self-government is not a thing which is given but a form of character which is acquired and developed through practice and experience. So, in carrying out America's Philippine policy, the consent and active collaboration of the Filipinos were essential. . . .

Success in Filipino-American Collaboration

It should be a source of the greatest gratification to both peoples that, in the past five years of the Commonwealth administration, this collaboration has been complete and effective. The United States has given and is giving us abundant proof of her desire to aid in assuring the success of this joint experiment. The selection for the position of High Commissioner of eminent men possessing a sympathetic understanding of our problems and a keen desire to help us solve them; the services of numerous experts from the United States placed at the disposal of our Government, the approval of the amendments to the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which granted relief to a number of our important industries; the assistance given to us in preparing our national defense, including the appointment of a Military Mission, headed by no less a personage than the former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, one of America's outstanding soldiers, General Douglas MacArthur; these are but a few of the many instances of helpful collaboration extended to us by

the United States during the last five years.

On our side, it can be said that this policy of collaboration is the principle we have followed in exercising the increased powers granted to us in the Independence Act. The Commonwealth Government has not sought to destroy the governmental set-up at the time of its establishment or to make unnecessary changes in the fundamental policies of government followed in the preceding decades. In the sphere of education, health, public works, justice, and the maintenance of peace and order, its objective has been one of further growth and development. In the extensive social-justice program, the primary purpose has been to re-vitalize our democratic institutions by amply protecting the underprivileged. The governmental measures taken along all these lines were in response to the needs and wishes of the people; but, in strengthening the foundations of the Government, the Commonwealth eliminated any concern the United States might have felt over our domestic affairs, thus leaving her free to devote her entire attention to her other numerous responsibilities.

After Independence

I believe in Filipino-American collaboration after independence. This collaboration, if undertaken, will express itself in various fields. There is the economic field where the exchange of products between the two countries may be maintained on a basis that should be mutually beneficial. There is ample room for friendly economic collaboration in view of the fact that the products of an agricultural tropical country such as the Philippines could be made to supplement the products of a country situated in the temperate zones such as the United States. While the past years are gone with their problems and issues, we cannot overlook the fact that questions arising in the future are conditioned by circumstances in the past, and therefore it is pertinent to recall that during the progress of this joint Filipino-American enterprise, and as a result of the policies adopted by the United States Congress, the Philippines came within the American economic orbit and this development has given rise to one of the most difficult problems facing the country—that of economic readjustment to make Philippine economy less dependent on special or fortuitously favorable conditions abroad. It is also well to bear in mind that Fili-

pino-American trade has conferred benefits on both the United States and the Philippines and that, with the quota restrictions and export taxes imposed on some Philippine products entering the United States, the interests of specific American industries are amply protected. . . .

A Common Way of Life

In the cultural field, co-operation between the two countries has a logical foundation in the fact that for over three centuries Filipino culture has been based on Western ideas, and since the opening of this century Filipino political thought has been absorbing the essential principles of Anglo-Saxon democracy. Throughout the long period of Spanish rule, the Philippines was intimately bound to Spain by political, cultural, and spiritual ties; and during a portion of this long association, which has left such a deep imprint on the Filipino soul, the commercial intercourse and spiritual communion between the mother country and the colony were carried on by way of Mexico through the proud and rich galleons plying the Manila-Acapulco trade, thus bringing Spain, Mexico, and the Philippines into close and intimate relations. When Destiny brought about the eclipse of Spain as a world power, her colonies in the Americas, Mexico among them, became independent States and the Philippines, strangely enough, continued to be linked to the New World through her political association with the United States. Thus it is that Filipino culture is eclectic; to the original Malayan foundation there has been added Asiatic, Latin, and Anglo-Saxon elements. To-day, the Filipino way of life is the Occidental, the Christian, the democratic way of life. Is it not natural to assume then that the United States and the Philippines would wish to collaborate in standing for this way of life, in extending its sway in the Orient, and in defending it throughout the vicissitudes of a highly uncertain future?

Osmena, Sergio. *Philippine-American Collaboration Past, Present, and Future*. Speech Delivered at Radio Program of Voice of Commonwealth, Fifth Anniversary of Commonwealth, November 15, 1940.

Gratitude to the United States

Two weeks before Japan attacked America, Quezon had addressed a mass gathering of all university students at Manila. The boys who heard him that day were those who would fight

to the last foot of shore line on Bataan.

I was there, and I never saw him more in earnest or more impassioned. There was a quaver in his voice betraying his deep emotion when he said:

"I pray God"—and he paused and looked at his vast audience as if he knew he was making his farewell speech to the Filipino youth that had always idolized him—"that the Philippines will be spared from the horrors of war. But if He should will it that we should be participants in the struggle, let me tell you it will be a good thing for us for two reasons: First, it will give us an opportunity, before we finally sever the ties that bind us with the United States in 1946, to show the American people that our gratitude to the American flag for all the manifold blessings it has brought us is so deep-seated we are willing and ready to lay down our fortunes and our lives in its defence; and second, because it will teach our youth—that, reared in the ease and comfort of an American-protected market, has whiled away its time in luxury and frivolity—how to suffer and how to die. For no nation is worth anything unless it has learned how to suffer and how to die."

Romulo, Carlos P. (Colonel). *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines*. Harrop, Sydney, 1943. p. 56-57.

"To America we owe a special debt of gratitude. To her altruism and generosity, we shall be indebted for our national independence. She has made us heir to her ideals of liberty and democracy and the beneficiaries of her civilization and culture. It should be our constant endeavour to preserve undiminished this invaluable inheritance as well as our friendly and cultural relations with her after we shall have become independent."

President Manuel L. Quezon, Commencement Exercises of the University of the Philippines, U. P. Campus, April 4, 1939.

Pledge of Co-operation

"Our fate . . . is linked with that of the United States. We are placed in that position not only by the nature of our political relationship with that great nation, but by our common faith in democracy and by every noble impulse that animates our people.

"To this end, I have assured the Government of the United States, on behalf of the Commonwealth, that the entire Philippines—its manpower and material resources—are at the disposal of the United States in the present emergency."

President Manuel L. Quezon, Message to Second National Assembly, January 31, 1941.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

POINTS TO EMPHASIZE

Long before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and invaded the Philippines, they had been employing preparatory "softening-up" techniques. Espionage, fifth column activities, low-pressure propaganda were used to further their aims of Far East domination.

With the fall of the Philippines, Japanese propaganda turned to showing Filipinos their place in the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The Japanese have sought to drive a wedge between the Filipino people and the United States, and under the guise of "cooperation" have looted the Islands for their military needs.

After almost two years of provisional military government, the Japanese set up a "puppet republic" in October, 1943. Though it has the outward appearance of a republic, with constitution, president, and assembly, it is clearly under the domination of the Japanese, and has been recognized only by the Axis nations and their satellites.

Under the puppet republic only one political party exists—the Kalibapi Association—the purpose of which is to line up the Filipino people in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. This "collaborationist" organization has been an important link between Tokyo and local agencies in the Islands.

Japanese propaganda has distorted Philippine cultural agencies. Freedom of the press has disappeared. Religious bodies and schools have been impressed into supporting the "New Order." Radio and motion pictures have been put to work in an attempt to achieve "Japanese-Filipino collaboration."

Philippine commercial and industrial life has been reshaped to help meet Japanese military needs. A progressively lower standard of living for Filipinos has resulted. Many Filipinos have been impressed as laborers; others have fled to the mountains to carry on active resistance to Japanese domination.

Philippine Information Training Program Part Five UNDER THE HEEL OF JAPAN

Outline and Reference Material Prepared by
Information & Education Section, Hq USAFFE

Outline:

1. In imposing their rule on the Philippines the Japanese have used fifth column activities; propaganda techniques; inhuman harshness; slogans such as "cooperation," "universal brotherhood," "Asia for Asiatics," and "independence"; and the concept of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."
 - a. Before invasion, the Japanese carried on espionage and fifth column activities.
 - (1) Espionage was carried on by Japanese diplomats, merchants, fishermen, tourists, saloon keepers, and monks.
 - (2) Japanese Vice Consul at Manila gave lavish presents and delightful parties to government officials and newspapermen.
 - (3) Balintawak brewery in Manila was known as a Japanese arsenal.
 - (4) Japanese huts near Manila were found housing enough dynamite to blow up the city.
 - (5) Japanese fishermen controlled deep sea activities.
 - (6) Propaganda activities encouraged Filipino unrest and aspirations for immediate independence.
 - b. Early Japanese attitude of inhuman harshness and superiority toward Filipinos after invasion was changed to "universal brotherhood."
 - (1) Japanese learned that Filipinos could not be enslaved by brutality and terror.
 - (2) Japanese promulgated the slogan "Asia for Asiatics," and encouraged Filipinos to drive out "Western Imperialism."
 - (3) By the device of granting "independence" the Japanese attempted to win over the Filipinos.
 - c. Japanese propaganda techniques have capitalized Oriental psychology.
 - (1) Observed the importance of "face."
 - (2) Placed emphasis on family ties, social pride, adherence to tradition, and dignity of spirit.
 - (3) Cited the achievements of Oriental scholars, scientists, poets, and philosophers.

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informal training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:

- Part 1—From Port Moresby to Morotai.
- Part 2—History of the Philippines.
- Part 3—These are the Philippines.
- Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.
- Part 5—UNDER THE HEEL OF JAPAN.
- Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
- Part 7—A Few Do's and Don'ts for GIs.
- Part 8—Looking Ahead.

d. Filipinos were told the mythical advantages of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

- (1) The semblance of self-government, always under strict supervision of Japanese civilians and military officials.
- (2) Japanese gestures in turning over to the native "government" some enemy property, such as, English and American hotels, clubs, radio stations, mission houses, motor car plants, and packing plants.

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- (3) A steady stream of Japanese educators, medical men, scientists, agriculturists, industrialists, and various cultural experts to the Philippines.
- (4) Actually "cooperation" and "co-prosperity" served as a cover for the systematic looting of the Philippines.
- (5) Under the guise of "cooperation" the Japanese are exploiting the rich resources of the Islands.
- e. The granting of "independence" fitted the Japanese aims and facilitated plundering.
 - (1) Aimed to win over the Filipinos to "cooperation."
 - (2) Tried to drive out the "evil concepts of Americanism" and replace them with the "spiritual" values of Japan.
 - (3) Placed all the economic resources at the service of the Japanese.
 - (4) Aimed to use the vast manpower of Japan's Greater East Asia for carrying on her Imperialistic war.
 - (5) Marionette governments maintained embassies in Tokyo and other capitals of "Co-Prosperity Sphere."
 - (6) Real master in each occupied territory was commanding officer of Japanese military forces.
 - (7) Japanese military strength was implemented by calling the war "a holy war for all the peoples of East Asia."
2. Under Japanese rule the first provisional military government was followed by a "Puppet Republic."
 - a. Governmental machinery of the Philippine Commonwealth was brought to a halt with the fall of Manila, 2 January 1942.
 - b. Provisional military government was set up by the Japanese.
 - (1) Much of the old administrative machinery resumed its functioning.
 - (2) But the Commonwealth Constitution was dead.
 - (3) Philippines Executive Commission was established by the Japanese High Command.
 - c. Puppet republic was established 14 October 1943.
 - (1) Premier Tojo had promised the Philippines its "independence" 16 June 1943.
 - (2) New Constitution was adopted under close supervision of Japanese, through a Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence.
 - (3) Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee, was "elected" to the office of President of the Republic.
 - (4) A new National Assembly was established, and members were selected.
 - (a) Half the membership consisted of provincial governors and city mayors.
 - (b) The other half, supposedly elected, were handpicked by the Kalibapi (the sole political party).
 - d. The puppet republic has been recognized only by the Axis nations and their satellites.
 - (1) Japanese have attempted through this government to drive a wedge between the U.S. Government and the Filipino people.
 - (2) The U.S. Government has, of course, reaffirmed its recognition of the Commonwealth Government-in-Exile, and denounced the puppet republic as a fraud.
 3. Social and political organizations have been changed and developed to promote the purposes of Japanese conquest.
 - a. The Kalibapi Association is the leading and most dangerous collaborationist organization in the Philippines.
 - (1) Its purpose is to line up Filipinos in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
 - (2) It constitutes the only political party of the puppet republic.
 - (3) It has a youth organization, the Junior Kalibapi, and a Women's Auxiliary.
 - (4) Neighborhood Associations, which had been used mainly in distributing food, were incorporated into the Kalibapi as local adjuncts.
 - b. The press was suppressed or confiscated under the Japanese, and a Japanese-controlled publishing company was established in Manila.
 - (1) The press is relied upon heavily for propaganda purposes.
 - (2) Competition has disappeared.
 - c. Japanese intelligence depends largely on Filipino civilians for its information.
 - (1) Fishermen have sometimes been employed for gathering and transmitting information.
 - (2) Even children, 10 to 15 years of age, have been employed as spies, helping to point out members of the guerrilla forces to the Japanese.
 4. Cultural activities have been warped and directed toward the "New Order."
 - a. Even religion under the Japanese must serve for propaganda purposes.
 - (1) Religious organizations have been utilized for propaganda purposes.
 - (2) At first, efforts were made to win cooperation of Filipino religious groups.
 - (3) Later the Japanese began to exercise a more complete control over the Philippine clergy in order to bring religious activities in line with the "New Order."
 - b. Schools have been reorganized to eliminate American influence.
 - (1) Thorough revision of Philippine school books was started in 1942.
 - (2) English was to be gradually eliminated from the schools.
 - c. Radio was limited and the programs prescribed.
 - (1) All owners of radio receiving sets were required to have them "reconditioned" to prevent their listening to "Anglo-American propaganda."
 - (2) Japanese have put radio stations into operation primarily for propaganda.
 - (5) One activity of the Kalibapi was to try to induce Filipino "guerrillas" in the hills to surrender.

- (3) Educational role of radio is stressed, as in teaching Japanese language.
- d. Motion pictures are used to present Japanese propaganda.
 - (1) All films and American-owned theatres were seized by the Japanese.
 - (2) Japanese now concentrate on newsreels and propaganda films showing "Japanese-Filipino collaboration."
- e. Japanese attitude toward entertainment has relaxed somewhat.
 - (1) Early stress was laid on avoiding so-called frivolities.
 - (2) Later, many prohibitive measures were lifted; former Filipino sports are still popular.
- f. A new list of legal holidays was proclaimed under the military government—a combination of Japanese, Christian, and Filipino.
5. Commercial and industrial life has been pointed toward military goals, with a great reduction in the standard of living for the Filipinos.
 - a. Local manufacturing facilities have been converted to production of Japanese military supplies.
 - b. Philippines has been required to provide not only for native requirements, but to contribute to needs of other occupied areas.
- c. Mines (particularly iron and chrome ore) have been utilized to supply Japanese military needs.
- d. Revival of the lumber industry has been greatly restricted.
 - (1) Acute shortage of lumber in Manila.
 - (2) Guerrilla activities are retarding Japanese attempts to revive lumber industry.
 - (3) Inadequate transportation facilities.
- e. Fishing operations are strictly regulated by the Japanese.
- f. Foreign trade has been restored for shipment of certain Philippine raw materials to Japan.
 - (1) Japanese have attempted to make the Philippines self-sufficient in production of foodstuffs.
 - (2) They have probably been taking rice out of the country to Japan.
 - (3) A scarcity of drugs and medicinal supplies apparently exists.
 - (4) Living standards and purchasing power of all classes of Filipinos have been materially reduced.
6. In general Japanese occupation has ravaged the Islands, destroyed property, lowered the standard of living, and driven many Filipinos to active resistance to Japanese oppression.
 - a. Filipinos pay for occupation by the Japanese policy of:
 - (1) Ravaging the Islands of their food resources.
 - (2) Denuding them of their minerals and metal production.
 - b. Standard of living has been lowered.
 - (1) In addition to troops garrisoned in the Islands, the Japanese have brought in thousands of civilians.
 - (2) Japanese occupy almost all of the educational institutions, many of the hospitals, and more than half the religious institutions.
 - (3) Food costs have soared until the Filipinos will soon be living on weeds and roots like the Chinese peasant in time of famine.
 - c. Japs destroyed property.
 - (1) Tramways and mills in Mindanao—for mining and lumbering.
 - (2) Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company's "Pathfinder" plantation near Zamboanga.
 - d. Relation between Japanese and local population is antagonistic.
 - (1) Many are forced to get along with the Japanese in order to get work and food.
 - (2) Many are impressed as laborers while others work for the Japanese because there is no other way to make a living.
 - (3) Many have fled to the mountains rather than live under Japanese domination.

Text References: Under the Heel of Japan

1. How The Japanese Have Imposed Their Rule On The Philippines

INTRODUCTION

FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE INVASION

There is considerable evidence that the Japanese had a Fifth Column in the Philippines prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific. There also is evidence that the Japanese intend to leave well-selected collaborationists behind when they are forced to yield territory in the Philippines.

The enemy employed his usual espionage network as a basis for his Fifth

Column. Japanese diplomats, merchants, fishermen, tourists, saloon keepers, and monks were used to gain military information about the islands, and they had the aid of dissident Filipinos.

DIPLOMATIC

Jitaro Kihara, who was the Japanese vice consul in Manila prior to Pearl Harbor, typifies the Japanese diplomat. He made his appearance in Manila in 1921 as an insignificant employee of the Japanese consulate, but unusual for a consulate employee, he had a lot of money. He was modest, had a winning personality, and had a charming wife. He gave

lavish presents and delightful parties to government officials and newspapermen. When he left Manila he did not forget his Filipino friends. Presents kept coming from him from the various other cities of the world in which he served.

Suddenly Kihara reappeared in Manila as Vice Consul. Then four weeks before Pearl Harbor, he left for Japan.

"No man," says Col. Carlos P. Romulo, the former Manila newspaper publisher now in the U.S. Army, "was better acquainted with Philippine defenses and conditions. As the most popular Japanese in the Philippines he was welcome everywhere. I can visualize Kihara with the High Council of

Japan giving them all information preparatory to an attack on the Philippines."

Soon after the occupation, Kihara was back in Manila.

BUSINESS FIRM

The Balintawak brewery in Manila was known for years before the Japanese attack as a Japanese arsenal. Its tower was a guide for Japanese bombers. All incriminating evidence, however, had been destroyed by Japanese agents before the war gave the Filipino government an excuse to investigate the brewery.

FISHERMEN

Japanese fishermen were others who served as spies. For 30 years prior to the war the Japanese had increasingly engaged in commercial shipping throughout the Philippines, the industry numbering by 1941 some 3,000 men and controlling 80 percent of the deep sea activities.

A number of Japanese fishing vessels were registered under Filipino dummy names; this evasion was open and public.

MINDANAO JAPANESE

Of the 30,000 Japanese in the islands in 1941, 20,000 were engaged in the Davao abaca (Manila hemp) area on the island of Mindanao. Nearly 5,000 of these were engaged in retail trade.

This influx of Japanese began as early as 1907 when one, K. Ohta, went to Davao and saw commercial opportunities in the production of abaca in the then undeveloped area. His success attracted other ambitious Japanese. They developed plantations, built their own roads, bought through their own stores, and by 1918 had made the area a Japanese community which included schools and a hospital.

By 1941, the Japanese plantations produced and processed most of the high grade hemp exported from the islands. More foreign trade shipping was moved under the Japanese flag than that of any other nation.

There were few indications of actual Japanese government subsidized colonization efforts. Subsidies were not necessary because profits could be easily made. Undoubtedly, the fact that under the Commonwealth Act, American sovereignty was to continue only until 1946 deterred strenuous efforts on the part of the Japanese government to establish direct connections with these business interests.

After 1946 the islands were to be swallowed up gently and easily. That appeared to be the original plan.

SALOONS, ETC.

Japanese huts around Camp Murphy near Manila, investigated before the war, were found housing enough dynamite to blow up the city. The Japanese owners explained they used the dynamite for fishing. They were given three months' imprisonment and a small fine for illegal possession of explosives.

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda activities were promoted by the Japanese, such as political missions and student tours for Filipinos to Japan and Japanese to the Philippines. Newspapers in Japan were not backward in expressing sympathy with Filipino aspirations for independence.

Japanese in the islands were on friendly terms with the Filipinos, but generally lived to themselves in their own communities. The local Japanese frequented their own clubs, operated private schools for their children, published Japanese language newspapers and established their own Shintoist Church.

MONKS AND TEACHERS

Since the arrival of the Japanese in the Philippines, delegations of Buddhist monks have been brought to the islands. The Japanese also are using school teachers to advantage, as they have in other occupied countries in GEA. These Nippongo teachers travel from province to province, stimulating the study of Tagalog and Japanese. The teaching of English has been barred in Philippine schools. In Japan proper school teachers are government servants and are regarded as the most ardent jingoists in the country.

FROM BACK-STAB TO "CO-PROSPERITY"

After Bataan the Japanese at first treated the Filipinos with inhuman harshness. They made it clear that Japanese were superior to Filipinos. They did not hesitate to shoot, stab and slug Filipinos who refused to cooperate. But as time went by and the Japs saw that the Filipinos could not be enslaved by brutality and terror, they changed their tune a bit. The slogan of world domination, "Hakko Ichiu", was turned into a slogan of "universal brotherhood." Premier Tojo promised independence, without setting a date at first, and finally established a "Philippine Republic" in Manila in 1943. Instead of boasting of owning and taking away the riches of the Philippines, the Japanese spoke only of establishing economic self-sufficiency for the Filipinos. Filipino culture was now praised

and encouraged. Filipinos were told they belonged to the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." However, they looted the islands of everything they wanted. For example, practically all the sugar mills have been taken away or destroyed. Even household goods of any value were stolen. This is the Japanese brand of "prosperity."

"ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS"

Another Japanese slogan was "Asia for the Asiatics." They told Filipinos that they should cooperate with all Oriental peoples in a campaign to drive out every sign of "Western imperialism" in the Far East. Ceaselessly, they harped on the political "domination," economic "exploitation," and race "discrimination" by Western peoples of the Far East. The Japanese described themselves as "liberators." Half-truths, lies and rosy promises were poured on Filipinos in a steady flow. . . .

The Japanese made sensational racial propaganda of such happenings as the Detroit race riot and the Los Angeles zoot suit riot. They have been spreading the lie that thousands of Filipinos who died on Bataan were sent needlessly to their death on the front lines while American soldiers supposedly stayed safely behind.

Pocket Guide to The Philippines

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

The more positive side of Japanese propaganda is illustrated by the fanfare which accompanied the granting of "independence" to the Burmese and Filipinos. The establishment of the Philippines Republic last October (1943) was ushered in with solemn ceremonies, including the lowering of the flag of the Rising Sun "with appropriate respect and veneration" and the hoisting of the Philippine flag (as altered by the Japanese military) by "Veterans of the Philippines Revolution." A Declaration of Independence was read, followed by one minute of silent meditation and prayer "in honour of the heroes and martyrs of Philippines freedom and for the success of the new Republic."

Of course, all this was well rehearsed and enacted under the persuasion of Japanese guns. I know the Filipinos too well to believe that any more than an inconsequential fraction were taken in by this mockery. Nevertheless, the Japanese broadcasts of these ceremonies are bound to have a marked effect upon Orientals who do not know the Filipinos. Inevitably millions of them listened and

said, "See, Japan has done in two years for the Filipinos what America did not do in forty years."

The Japanese have a decided advantage in their instinctive understanding of and sympathy with Oriental psychology, something Western nations seemed either incapable of understanding or unwilling fully to appreciate. Japs know the importance of "face" to the Oriental, recognize the subtleties of Oriental courtesy, and they encourage and turn to their own ends the Oriental's emphasis on spiritual contentment, family ties, racial pride, adherence to tradition, sacredness of feelings, dignity of spirit.

Japanese propaganda cites the achievements of Oriental scientists, poets, philosophers, scholars, and reminds readers and listeners of Japanese victories over white forces, even harking back to Japan's victory over Russia years ago. Woven through these outpourings are repeated plugs for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the sweet-sounding name of Nippon's new empire.

EXPLOITATION THROUGH "COOPERATION"

Unfortunately, what the Japanese are doing in the lands they occupy is more important than what they are saying. Obviously, they are developing every possible resource of these lands; that's why they conquered them. But they are doing it in such a manner, and supported by such smooth propaganda that most of the natives actually think they themselves—and not the Japs—are doing the developing.

This is accomplished through the establishment of puppet governments. The puppets are natives who willingly play along with the Japs for the easy living and dubious honors they gain thereby. Nevertheless, there is a semblance of self-government—always under the strict supervision of Japanese civilians and military. But the native masses have not yet awakened to that fact, such is their elation over being rid of their white masters and their resurgence of national pride under the sure guidance of Japan's propaganda.

Meanwhile, the Japs pour into native ears the soothing syrup of "the Orient for the Orientals." "All Asia is now marching arm in arm except traitor Chungking," they say. They refer to the Chinese leaders of Chungking as "fratricidal," and remind the people that but for the Japanese they would "forever be the horses and cows of the Americans and English."

One of the most effective gestures Japan has made in the occupied territories is the turning over to the native "government" of numerous parcels of enemy property. The properties include English and American hotels, swank clubs, radio stations, mission houses, motorcar plants, packing plants, printing establishments, and other valuable items of real estate. The turnovers are accompanied by appropriate ceremonies for broadcast to all the Orient.

There is a steady stream of Japanese educators, medical professors, scientists, agriculturists, industrialists, and various cultural experts following between Japan and the occupied lands. These representatives lecture before native schools, attend scientific congresses, arrange for the exchange of Japanese and native literatures, compose songs—dedicated to the "independence" of the lands conquered, spread the gospel of Greater East Asia, and generally ingratiate themselves with the natives.

Particularly significant for the immediate future are the Japanese-organized, equipped and trained native armies in the captured countries, except the Philippines. The people are urged to support their national armies so as to defend themselves against the Americans and English. The Japs, of course, are thinking of the imminent Allied invasion of these lands.

Romulo, Carlos P. (Colonel) *How We Can Win but Still Lose in the Orient.* Liberty Magazine, April 29, 1944.

GRANTING THE FILIPINOS "INDEPENDENCE"

By giving them so-called "independence," Japan seeks to prove to Filipinos that her aims are purely altruistic.

"We are doing our utmost to drive out American thought," said one Jap military man, on the air from Manila. In other intercepted broadcasts frequent reference is made to "the need to stamp out evil concepts of Americanism" and to replace them with the "spiritual" values of Japan.

Streets, signboards, ships, etc., have been rechristened with Japanese names.

All American tunes are forbidden; people are not even allowed to play records of American music.

To arouse hostility against us, the Japs harp on our past "ruthless exploitation," or insist we have a racial prejudice against all orientals. In one broadcast from Manila a speaker said, "Filipinos must learn the Jap language and gain more knowledge of Japanese art, science, and social breeding."

In Mindanao native dialects are permitted, of necessity, but looked on as secondary tongues.

From Japan has come a set of 22 text books, published for use in southern occupied areas. Jap teachers are sent to spread the Nipponese tongue, the history and literature of Japan.

Filipino youth organizations are being shaped to Japanese pattern. Filipino lads have been sent to Japan for training. Among these were sons of puppet leaders like Jorge B. Vargas and Jose P. Laurel, the puppet president.

These words from the islands have also been picked out of the air: "Priests and ministers of all religious orders must help in Jap pacification." Later, the puppet government directed all priests to explain to their flocks, in every sermon and by every means in their power, the merits of Japan's plan for the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Simpich, Frederick. *Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo.* From an article for *The National Geographic Magazine* (not yet published).

JAPANESE POLICY OF FLIRTATION AND APPEASEMENT

The Japanese have long ceased to be able to hold the territories they have overrun in East Asia and the Southwest Pacific with sheer armed force.

Therefore the Japanese had to think up something new quickly. They decided to create political support within the seized territories. They announced what they called a "new policy." Actually this new policy had the same old purpose—to strengthen the Japanese position in the occupied countries, place all the overrun peoples' economic resources at the service of the Japanese, and to use the vast manpower of the so-called Japan's Greater East Asia for carrying on her imperialistic war.

Naturally the Japanese put into effect a policy of winning over the overrun peoples. The policy of flirtation and appeasement was pushed into the forefront. We admit that she had made the most of the legitimate aspirations of the colonial peoples for autonomy or independence.

Following this policy of flirtation and appeasement, the Japanese announced the "independence" of Burma and established the so-called "Independent" totalitarian republic of the Philippines. The Japanese announced their renunciation of extra-territorial rights in China and the return of Shanghai concessions to the puppet government under Wang Chinn-wei. With each of the Japanese-established puppet republics of Burma,

the Philippines and occupied China, Japan has entered a much-advertised treaty of alliance, which among other things establishes Japanese right to use the resources and manpower of the ostensibly independent country.

"MARIONETTE GOVERNMENTS"

Of course the independence proffered by the Japanese to the occupied countries is empty and spurious. The marionette governments, as one Russian writer aptly describes these Japanese-established entities or rather nonentities, maintain embassies in Tokyo and in other capitals of the misnamed Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese are smart enough to allow these puppet governments to display the outward attributes of free and equal governments, in order that when any of them takes any action it appears as if it is the will of the people under that government.

But of course, as the people of the Philippines know quite well, the real power in these ostensibly independent governments lies in the hands of the Japanese, particularly the occupying forces. The real master in each occupied territory is the commanding officer of those forces. The puppet governments can not take a step without the knowledge, approval or prodding of the Japanese military administration.

Japan keeps a close tab of the occupied territories, especially the so-called independent countries, through her military, political, economic, financial and other advisers which she keeps with her diplomatic representatives and military administrators.

IMPLEMENTING HER DWINDLING MILITARY STRENGTH

Japan's flirtation and appeasement policy in occupied areas, including the stirring slogan "Asia for the Asiatics," implements her dwindling military strength. The Japanese figure that by calling their own imperialistic war "a holy war for all the peoples of East Asia," they can arouse the peoples they have overrun and violated, into spontaneous comradeship in arms with the oppressors. Where her military power no longer makes any considerable impression, Japan expects to win support with her insidious propaganda.

But the Japanese, as usual, have the tendency to underestimate the intelligence of the oppressed peoples and to overestimate their gullibility. In the Philippines, for instance, the Japanese have failed miserably in their attempt to alien-

ate the people from the course which they must follow as worthy aspirants for a free, democratic and independent existence. There is no doubt that when the proper time comes, the Filipino people will show what they really think of the Japanese and their efforts in the Philippines.

From a commentary by James L. Wingo on *The Philippine Hour*, broadcast by the U.S. Office of War Information, 27 September 1944.

2. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE JAPANESE

JAPANESE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

The fall of the capital city of Manila to Japanese forces on 2 January, 1942, brought the regular governmental machinery of the Philippine Commonwealth to an abrupt halt pending the decision of the Japanese military authorities as to the exact type of administrative organization to be allowed the country. Acting then on the basis of carefully prepared plans, apparently long in process of development, and on the basis of current intelligence, the Japanese High Command announced that the existing departments and bureaus were to resume functioning until otherwise notified. This decision was a practical one for the Japanese, for it saved them much time and prevented confusion at a period when such factors were of the greatest importance to the success of Japanese arms.

While much of the old administrative machinery was allowed to resume its functioning, the Japanese made it clear that the Commonwealth Constitution, with its provisions for the three great branches of government, was now dead, and that government would be carried on largely through administrative agencies under the supervision of the Japanese Military Administration.

PHILIPPINES EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

As the medium for carrying out its decision to use the old administrative machinery, the Japanese High Command established a Philippines Executive Commission, headed by Jorge B. Vargas, Quezon's former Secretary who had been left in Manila to arrange the best possible terms with the Japanese. Vargas was specifically instructed in Order No. 1 issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief "to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs in the Philippines, and to the execution of the administration under the commands and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces." . . .

FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION

In cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration, the Executive Commission not only attempted to carry on the more normal functions of government but also attempted to solve the many pressing problems stemming solely from the war. Among the most important of these problems were:

1. Providing food and relief for many thousands of hungry or destitute Filipinos.
2. Reconstructing railways, roads, bridges, utilities, and docks.
3. Inducing Filipino and American "guerrillas" to surrender.

For almost two years, from 23 January, 1942, to 14 October, 1943, the Executive Commission carried on the work of government in the Philippines directly under the supervision of the Japanese. During this time the work of the Commission was of immense value to the Japanese. Japanese propaganda exploited its activities to the full and used it as the means by which to prepare Japan's own special brand of "independence" for the Philippines.

PUPPET REPUBLIC

The "Benevolence" of the New Order
—From the very beginning of her occupation of the Philippines Japan has sought to persuade the Filipino people that her mission in the Philippines was that of a protector and liberator. Japanese brutality and misconduct in the Islands have scarcely been hidden, but on the propaganda front the Filipino people have been told only of the alleged misdeeds and machinations of the Americans. Japanese propaganda likewise has made many promises to the Filipinos of better things to come.

Premier Tojo Promises Independence.
—In the course of two of his addresses to the Japanese Diet Premier Tojo took up the matter of Philippine independence. In the second of these two addresses, given on 16 June, 1943, Tojo "categorically promised" the Philippines its "independence." The making of this pledge was the occasion for a barrage of Japanese propaganda reciting at length the sincerity and generosity of Japanese promises of independence and deploring the failure of the United States to have accorded a similar "independence" to the Philippines. With the firing of these propaganda salvos the program for the granting of Philippine "independence" was on its way.

"Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence."—In a Manila broadcast of 18 June, 1943, it was announced that "the High Command of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines has issued orders to the Kalibapi for the immediate formation of the preparatory committee for Philippine independence." The Kalibapi then selected the twenty-man commission . . .

The Committee Reports Out the New Constitution.—After having allegedly spent many days in study, consultation, and discussion of various constitutional proposals, the Preparatory Committee reported out a draft of a proposed Constitution for the new republic late in August. This proposed Constitution was signed by all the members of the Committee on 4 September.

The Constitution Is Ratified.—Three days after the Constitution was reported to have been signed by the Committee members, a Kalibapi convention summarily ratified the new document. The failure to submit the Constitution to the people for ratification through national plebiscite was said to have been due to the need for urgent haste. The new Constitution setting up a puppet Republic under the Japanese was thus adopted without recourse to the people.

Selling the New "Independence" to the Country.—Following the "ratification" of the Constitution the Kalibapi assumed the leadership in a vast propaganda campaign to sell the new Constitution and the forthcoming republic to the Filipino people. Committee members and Kalibapi leaders toured the available provincial areas delivering speeches extolling the merits of the new Constitution and asking the support of the people for the new Republic. Japanese propaganda itself worked overtime to convince both the people of the Philippines and the world that an independent new republic was being set up in the Philippines.

The New Republic Is Proclaimed, 14 October, 1943.—Finally on 14 October, 1943, amidst ceremonies stressing Philippine indebtedness to Japan, the new Republic was inaugurated. Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, assumed the office of President of the Republic, and the new government was proclaimed to be operating under the recently promulgated Constitution.

CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW REPUBLIC

The constitutional document drawn up by the Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence, approved by the Japanese and Kalibapi, and finally promulgated, might appear to be more or less identical with the pre-war Constitution of the Commonwealth. The same general grouping of powers is provided for among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the old legal titles such as National Assembly and Supreme Court are retained, and many of the provisions seem almost to have been directly lifted from the Commonwealth Constitution.

These similarities, however, are largely superficial. Actually, great and sweeping changes have been made in the fundamental law of the land. This constitution is not a democratic constitution nor is it an independent constitution. Throughout its framing the influence of the Japanese was constant . . .

THE PUPPET ASSEMBLY

The outward forms of the old National Assembly have been retained in the puppet constitution; but analysis of the constitutional provisions for the new National Assembly shows that the present body is only a weak imitation of its predecessors. Under the new Constitution the legislature is distinctly subordinated to the President and unable to claim any real degree of independence.

Selection of Members.—One half the membership of the Assembly was, of course, secured by virtue of the provincial governors and city mayors serving in ex-officio capacities. The other half of the membership the supposedly elective portion of the Assembly, was handpicked in various Kalibapi conventions held throughout the Islands in September, 1943.

The Election law decreed by the Executive Commission in September provided that only officers and members of duly-organized provincial municipal, municipal district, and federal district committees of the Kalibapi should have the right to vote. Election Boards were set up by the provincial and municipal Kalibapi units and presided over by the provincial governors and mayors as local heads of the Kalibapi. Only candidates acceptable by Kalibapi standards could be proposed.

Japanese propaganda attempted to picture the elections as being participated in by "thousands," and made numerous unfavorable comparisons between the American period, when elections were

said to have been conducted in a carnival spirit, and the present period when "elections" were said to have been conducted in a very efficient way. Manila, however, was apologetic for the elections in other broadcasts. On 13 September, 1943, the Manila radio admitted, for example, that "while the method of electing the delegates . . . does not provide for popular expression . . . at any rate through the Kalibapi the people speak and thus the voice of an Assembly elected by vote of Kalibapi members will specifically reflect the popular will."

ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY

The central fact about the administrative machinery under the puppet republic is its rigid control by the President. The Constitution, as has been pointed out, vests in the President almost dictatorial powers over the whole structure of the puppet government, and this naturally extends to control of the administrative organization of the government. One of the chief controls over administration exercised by the President is his almost unlimited power of appointment; through this power he can virtually decide who shall or shall not be employed in government service. In practice, however, this power of appointment has been shared with the Kalibapi. And back of both the President and the Kalibapi at all times has stood Lieut. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda and the Japanese Forces in the Islands. But, aside from such restraints as the Japanese may care to interpose, the President has a relatively free hand in directing the course of administration.

JAPANESE CONTROL OVER LOCAL AREAS

Japanese and puppet government control over the provincial and local governments has been conditioned by the success of the Japanese army in imposing its will throughout the Philippines. The exact extent to which the Japanese army has occupied the territorial areas of the Philippines is not known; nor is it clear to what extent the Japanese forces have been able to maintain a successful occupation of already invaded areas. The most successful occupation of the Philippines has undoubtedly taken place in the Manila area in such provinces as Cavite, Rizal, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, and Zambales. What successes have been attained in the Visayas and Mindanao is uncertain. "Guerrilla" resistance continues widespread throughout the Islands, rendering many of the Japanese

conquests tenuous. In selecting representatives for the National Assembly, Manila broadcasts speak of representatives coming from forty-six provinces and chartered cities; actually, of course, the so-called representatives of these provinces and cities may be refugees from their own home areas. . . .

Puppet control over the outlying provincial areas continues to be claimed. The Ministry of Home Affairs in the Laurel Cabinet is responsible for the supervision and control of the province and cities. Closely linked with this power of supervision is the Philippine Constabulary, which is also located in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

General International Status.—The new puppet republic . . . stands in the position of being recognized only by the Axis nations and their satellites. It has failed to get recognition from Spain, the Vatican, and the United States with which its sentimental ties are closest, and has also failed to get any recognition from other nations outside the Axis camp. Its position in the international community is, therefore, at best artificial and extremely weak.

The Puppet Government and the United States.—Japanese propaganda has consistently and unrelentingly attempted to drive a wedge between the American Government and the Filipino people. There is no reason to believe, however, that it has attained any measurable success.

Both President Laurel and Foreign Minister Recto were reported to have made pleas for American recognition of their new government and to have expressed disappointment when that recognition was not forthcoming. Both must have had their tongues in their cheeks when making this request.

The appeals of some puppet leaders for American recognition have either been ignored or flatly rejected. President Roosevelt in a statement of 22 October, 1943, set forth the official American position vis-a-vis the Laurel government when he castigated the new government as a fraud and delusion created solely by the Japanese as a means to control the Philippines.

The American official attitude towards the Philippines continues to be based upon the recognition of the Philippine Commonwealth Government-in-Exile as the legal government and representative of the Filipino people. The puppet government is regarded only as a war-time

expedient of the enemy to be abolished with the return of American forces to the islands.

The Government of the New Philippines. (A Study of the Present Puppet Government in the Philippines) Washington, D.C., Office of Strategic Services, Report No. 1752. Revised by G-1, G.H.Q., SWPA, 25 September 1944. p. 1-3, 8-11, 21-22, 38, 54-54, 69-70.

3. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE ON THE KALIBAPI:

The leading and most dangerous collaborationist organization in the Philippines is the Kalibapi Association. It was formed in December, 1942, for the purpose of lining up the Filipinos in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Its objectives, according to Japanese broadcasts, are to expand and strengthen the Kalibapi organ, to co-operate with the policies of the government, to spread the Tagalog language, to cultivate the East Asia Spirit, and to materialize the GEA declaration.

The Kalibapi movement appears to have branched from a cultural and social organization into a political party. On March 28, 1944, the Japanese-controlled Manila radio announced that it is now the sole officially recognized political party of the Philippines and that its membership had passed the 1,000,000 mark.

The Kalibapi has a youth organization, the Junior Kalibapi, and a women's auxiliary. Twelve training centers for junior members are maintained in Manila and great efforts have been made by the Japanese to enroll all Filipino students in the movement. Tagalog is taught in these centers, and, in an effort to propagate the language, teaching of the Tagalog in homes by the Bureau of Public Welfare has been encouraged.

Campaigns to secure members for the Kalibapi have been numerous. In one province the following program was put into effect: 1. Town meetings of all local chapters to enlighten the people about the aims and ideals of the Kalibapi. 2. The auxiliary service. 3. The organization of home classes in various municipalities. 4. Lectures by Kalibapi leaders in schools and public buildings. 5. Assignment of graduates of the Kalibapi Leaders' Institute to their respective provincial and city chapters upon their graduation in Manila. 6. Recognition of the special functions of Kalibapi leaders, who will work under the direct supervision of provincial governors and city mayors as heads of their respective chapters and

whose salaries will be drawn out of the 5,000 pesos (annual) subsidy given by the National Government for the work.

The Kalibapi has an insignia. It is a white circle set in a red diamond.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE KALIBAPI.

The Neighborhood Associations.—The Neighborhood Associations, which had been organized in September, 1942, primarily to be used in the distribution of rice and other commodities, were . . . incorporated into the framework of the Kalibapi as local and district adjuncts of the organization. Membership in the Kalibapi and the Neighborhood Associations continued to be on a separate basis. Many of the functions of the Neighborhood Associations were entirely independent of the Kalibapi.

Neighborhood Associations were based on family or household units, with the head of the family directly responsible to the leader of the Neighborhood Association. The Associations included in their membership all of the household units in their particular neighborhood . . . The Neighborhood Associations were given partial responsibility for patrolling and policing their own areas. They were required to report the presence of any suspicious characters (e.g. guerrillas) within their area. Wilful failure to report such information on the part of any member of the neighborhood provided legal grounds for imposing penalties on the heads of the families and the leaders of the Neighborhood Associations.

In addition to these policing functions, the Neighborhood Associations were extensively used in the distribution of prime commodities, the compiling and keeping up to date the census records for the community, in carrying out the functions of the Civilian Protection Service within the local community, and in many other semi-governmental emergency activities.

Other Activities of the Kalibapi.—With the approval of the Japanese the Kalibapi and its leaders soon assumed the role of spokesman for the Filipino people. Kalibapi training institutes were set up in various parts of the islands, and selected leaders and "graduates" were sent about the country to inform the people of their role in the Greater East Asia sphere.

Perhaps the most difficult problem assigned the Kalibapi was the task of trying to induce some of the thousands of Filipino "guerrillas" still in the hills to surrender. In co-operation with the provincial governors systematic campaigns

were carried out to bring some of the dissenters down from the hills. This was an unpleasant assignment, and one in which the Japanese were glad to have the Kalibapi acting as their propaganda front. But even the ruse of employing the Kalibapi as the spearhead of the pacification drive seemed to bring no conspicuous successes against the "guerrillas".

Kalibapi as a Political Party.—More and more the Kalibapi entered into the political activities of the country, and as the Japanese preparations for granting "independence" to the Philippines got under way it was the Kalibapi which took the lead in attempting to sell the new "independence" to the people. Once the puppet republic had been proclaimed on 14 October, 1943, President Laurel made it clear that the Kalibapi would enjoy a monopoly of the political life of the nation. The puppet President declared that "political parties have divided us in the past and we must avoid a recurrence of our sad experience." Therefore, he pledged, "I shall stand for no political party while I hold the rudder of the ship of state. We must have only one party—the people's party (Kalibapi), a party that stands for peace, reconstruction, sound national economy, social reform, and the creation of a new world order."

A Foreign Importation.—The Kalibapi is a foreign importation and not an original creation of the Filipino people. Increasingly the Kalibapi has shown a close kinship to the Japanese Imperial Rule Association. Both are called "National Service Associations", have similar organizing techniques, and are notable for their efforts to develop an over-all control of the governmental machine. Because of its Japanese Associations and compulsory features the Kalibapi may be regarded at best as only a transitory political organ which the Filipino people may be expected to discard when the opportunity presents itself.

The Government of the New Philippines. (A Study of the Present Puppet Government in the Philippines) Washington, D.C., Office of Strategic Services, Report No. 1752. Revised by G-1, G.H.Q., SWPA, 25 September 1944. p. 4-7.

THE PRESS UNDER THE JAPANESE

Confiscation of the Press.—At the beginning of Japanese occupation all the Philippine press was suppressed or confiscated, and a subsidiary of the Mainichi Publishing Company of Osaka established in Manila. Publication of the three TVT dailies was resumed in English, Spanish and Tagalog, as formerly, the Tribune

appearing almost immediately after the fall of Manila. As time passed editorials in the TVT papers became notably pro-Japanese in tone . . .

The press apparently is relied upon heavily for propaganda purposes, particularly for spreading the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics", and extolling the role of the Philippine "Republic" in the "Co-Prosperity Sphere". Official spokesmen claim that freedom of the press in the Islands "compares favorably" with that of other countries involved in the war. All publications appear to be known as "Philippine Publications", and since the press is no longer privately owned, it is said, "competition has disappeared", and the surviving newspapers and periodicals have "considerably swelled their circulation". A Board of Information now "coordinates" the work of the press, helping in the selection of information which the public "must" know for better relations between the government and people. The selection of other news items is said to be left to the direction of the editors.

Much attention is given by publishers to greater use of Tagalog. A Tagalog Writers' Federation has been organized in Siland, Cavite, and publishers are allegedly working overtime in putting out Tagalog translations of English and Spanish works by Filipino writers, as well as original works in Tagalog. Tagalog translations of the Spanish writings of Jose Rizal, Filipino national hero, are especially popular with the younger generation according to Tokyo's claim.

Civil Affairs Handbook. Philippine Islands, Section XII, Communications. Army Service Forces Manual M 365-12, September 1944. p. 138-140.

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE METHODS

Obtaining Information.—In Panay the Japanese are forced to depend largely on Filipino civilians for information. They have used various types and classes of people as spies. Filipino fishermen have been frequently employed because they could use their boats for gathering information and communicating information. In some instances wealthy Filipino merchants have served as spies, carrying information to Manila on their sail-boats. It is rumored that some spies are paid 150 pesos a month to work for the Japanese. They have also secured the services of women spies by treating them well and promising them money and gifts. On several occasions the guerrillas have captured children from 13 to 15 years old working as spies for the Japanese. It is reported that Governor Tomas Confesor

has complete information on spies captured and executed by the guerrilla army and that each person signs a confession before he is executed. Jesus Perlas, former chief of police in Iloilo City, was shot on order of Confesor for serving as a Japanese spy.

Kempei.—The Kempei has an efficient spy system in Iloilo City and Pototan through the use of Filipinos. They also have a counter-intelligence system designed to capture guerrilla fighters. They send Filipino spies out to capture guerrilla fighters. They send Filipino spies out to the hills to locate guerrilla forces and outposts. Most of these Filipinos are paid for their services. Sometimes the guerrilla forces kill a Filipino and another member of his family becomes a spy for the Japanese for revenge. Japanese soldiers fear the Kempei as they have much power.

Civil Government of Occupied Territories.—In the areas controlled by the Japanese in Panay the Japanese military is the supreme authority. Civil control is in the hands of puppet officials appointed and maintained by the Japanese. Bureau of Constabulary personnel assist the military in maintaining control over the puppet officials. There are reports of as many as five spies paid by the Japanese to keep watch over one puppet mayor.

Intelligence Units and Methods.—The Kempeis attached to Col. Yamaguchi's unit in Bacolod were engaged in counter-intelligence activities. In the evening they would dress in civilian clothes and congregate in the municipalities or barrios seeking saboteurs and those engaged in subversive activities. Also they would apprehend former Filipino soldiers.

Civilians.—Senit Candido, escaped prisoner, was seen by many people who knew him well, acting as guide for Japanese troops who raided Malabugas, Canbule and Camaya-an, Negros in May, 1944. Senit was condemned to death for murder but his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. A younger brother of Lt. Locsin, guerrilla forces in Negros, testified at the trial of Senit. At the time Senit swore to get revenge with the Locsins. During this raid by Japanese, Locsin's mother and two sisters were bayoneted to death, while one sister, although captured by the Japanese, were unharmed.

Intelligence Units and Methods.—The Japanese are known to employ young children of both sexes between the ages of 10 and 15 as spies. These children circulate around the market places and

point out members of the guerrilla forces to the Japanese. These spies also report those among the civilian population who are pro-American.

Many Japanese soldiers, wearing civilian clothes, are designated to certain towns for the purpose of detecting civilians exhibiting their loyalty to the United States. Other Japanese soldiers are sent out on carabaos to capture members of the guerrilla forces. These soldiers dress as ordinary farmers and have bags containing rifles and tools hanging over the side to give the appearance of a native farmer. In this manner they have been successful in penetrating advance Command Posts of the guerrilla forces and capturing some prisoners. These Japanese soldiers on carabaos are also assigned to bringing in civilians who are not pro-Japanese.

Within the last few months (first part of 1944) the Japanese in Negros have formed another organization known as the Hihos. They consist of volunteers of the civilian population who are pro-Japanese. The Hihos seem to be trusted by the Japanese more than the JC's were. They are also employed to spy on the Constabulary. Hihos guide Japanese troops on patrols, and raids on sugar centrals and against guerrilla forces.

4. CULTURAL ACTIVITIES RELIGION UNDER THE JAPANESE

The Japanese arrived in the Philippines with a well-prepared plan to utilize Filipino religious organizations for propaganda purposes. During 1942, the primary aim was conciliation, and religious affairs were directed by the Religious Section of the Japanese army, which consisted of a specially trained group of Japanese, including "Catholic" priests, "Protestant" clergymen, "Y.M.C.A." secretaries, "Catholic" sisters, and "Catholic" laywomen who served as language instructors. From the beginning of 1943, the Japanese military administration has been in command, and its policy has been one of coercion.

During the first year, the Japanese made a series of gestures calculated to win the cooperation of Filipino religious groups. The Japanese Army attended Catholic services en masse and was ostentatious in showing its respect for Philippine religious beliefs. A group of Japanese "Christians" made a pilgrimage to Manila to worship (with appropriate publicity) at the grave of an early Christian Japanese who had fled from Japan to seek refuge in the Philippines. Emphasis

was placed on the "Christian ties that bind Japan to the Philippines," and the Japanese went to great lengths to display religious tolerance. Restraint was placed on only a few individuals among the clergy, and the "magnanimous treatment of enemy alien missionaries" was well advertised.

CONTROL OVER THE CLERGY

Early in 1943, the Japanese began to exercise a more complete control over the Philippine clergy. "Enemy alien" missionaries were forbidden to engage in any religious activity. A divorce law was passed, which aroused the disfavor of both Catholics and Protestants. Religious education was placed in the hands of Japanese "Catholics." Some of the Catholic properties were expropriated. Strict rules were imposed on the clergy, requiring them to submit outlines of all of their sermons, to preach only on topics suitable to the "New Order," and to conduct their religious activities in accordance with Japanese plans.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Philippines (Except Mindanao) (JANIS 154) People and Government, July 1944, p. 11.

SCHOOLS

The Japanese radio reported on February 19, 1942, that a thorough revision of the Philippine school books had been started and that a gradual elimination of English from the schools had been recommended. On February 27, 1942, the Japanese reported a meeting in Manila at which reforms in text books and the educational system were discussed. On June 1, 1942, the Japanese radio reported from Manila "that elementary schools which have been closed for about a half year since the outbreak of war were reopened to train the younger generation who will shoulder the responsibility in the Philippines of tomorrow." Undoubtedly, the Japanese will try to reopen as many schools as possible. A radio announcement from Tokyo in September, 1942, declared that 267 schools in and around Manila had been opened.

Survey of the Philippine Islands, Volume 1, Section III, Prepared under Direction of Chief of Staff by the Military Intelligence Service, War Department General Staff, February 15, 1943, p. 63-64.

RADIO

Radio Reception.—The Japanese military government required all owners of radio receiving sets to have them "reconditioned," in order to "protect" the Filipinos from Anglo-American propaganda. Since August 1, 1942, it has been illegal to have a radio that is

not duly registered and "reconditioned." It is reliably stated, however, that at the stations for reconditioning, Filipino technicians surreptitiously offer to "undo" the repairs, and there are said to be devices on the black market by which short wave reception can be managed. Moreover, there are believed to be a considerable number of receiving sets not registered before the war and now clandestinely operated for shortwave reception. The Japanese effort to overhaul all radios has been started in other cities than Manila, but has not been extended throughout the countryside, it appears.

Broadcasting.—Station KZRH, characterized as "The Voice of the New Philippines," was put in service by the Japanese immediately after the fall of Manila. In October, 1943, when "independence" was established, the station was given the call letters PIRN and its use, reportedly, confined to broadcasting to North America. At the same time station PIAN was inaugurated primarily for broadcasting within the Philippines.

Programs.—The Japanese use the radio primarily for propaganda, both in the presentation of news and in featured programs. They have repeatedly announced their purpose to "protect" the Filipinos from "false" Anglo-American propaganda and to train them in their "important role as members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere under the guidance of their leader Japan." The Japanese language is taught over the air and oratorical contests, emphasizing the responsibilities of the "New Philippines" are sponsored by the broadcasting station.

Increasing emphasis is laid on the educational role of the radio in things Filipino. In June, 1944, it was announced that the "Voice of the Philippines" would give lessons in Tagalog and talks on Philippine geography, history, literature and folklore. A regular broadcast, "What Is Your Province," is, reportedly, to present detailed data on each province in the country.

Government-sponsored programs include the "Philippine Republic Hour," the "Kalibapi Hour," the "Neighborhood Association Hour," and a weekly program featuring "Youth on the March." Through these programs, the Japanese announce, the public is to be given "more vital and interesting presentation of the problems that face the country and how they can be solved through cooperation between the government and people."

MOTION PICTURES

One of the first procedures of the Japanese occupying forces in Manila was to seize all films and all American-owned theaters. Soon thereafter a central film exchange was set up which allocates films to theaters on the usual rental basis. All proceeds are taken by the exchange, which appears to be a civilian undertaking, possibly under Japanese military supervision.

Notwithstanding the purported efforts of the Japanese to wipe out all American influence in the Philippines, the exhibition of American films continued for more than a year. As soon as theatres were reopened after the fall of Manila, however, Japanese newsreels and propaganda films were introduced, and in November, 1942, Tokyo announced the preparation of a dramatic movie of Japanese culture to be exhibited throughout occupied areas. A Japanese film "The Naval Battles of Hawaii and Malaya," shown in Manila early in 1943, reportedly "went far to impress Filipinos with Japanese naval strength." In April, 1943, came the announcement that a four-reel film, "What Do You Think?" was soon to be released throughout the Islands, presenting pictorial proof of the "achievements of Japanese-Filipino collaboration." "The Dawn of Freedom," a story of the Bataan campaign featuring Filipino screen personalities playing opposite an all-star Japanese cast, reportedly was shown in Manila in March, 1944. The film, produced jointly by Sampaguita Pictures, Manila, and the Toho Motion Picture Company of Tokyo, when shown in Japan was entitled "Tear Down the Stars and Stripes."

JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD ENTERTAINMENT

In the early part of Japanese occupation much stress was laid by the invaders on the importance of eschewing all so-called frivolities. A curfew was imposed and licenses were not given to reopen places of amusement, such as race tracks, cockpits, cabarets, and the Jai alai auditorium. Motion picture houses on the other hand—supplied with Japanese news reels and propaganda films—were permitted to reopen at lowered entrance prices.

By late 1942, however, many prohibitive measures were rescinded. Night clubs and dance halls reopened and the ban on horse racing, boxing and cockfighting was lifted. In September, 1943, the curfew was extended to 2 a.m. with a warning to residents that the revision

was not to encourage "strolling around late at night," and a reminder that stores and amusement centers were still to close at 11 p.m. except on Sundays and holidays.

In the realm of sports, jujitsu has been introduced by the Japanese, but the former sports are still popular. If statements from Tokyo claiming widespread participation by the Filipino populace in baseball, basketball, football, bowling, tennis, track, golf and swimming, are correct. In the so-called "Government Employees' Training Institute" in Manila, the trainees are said to participate in physical drills "similar to those which the Japanese army found best for its soldiers."

To promote cultural relations between Japan and the Philippines, the Watashi Kai, or "Spiritual Bridging Society between Filipinos and Japanese," was formed in April, 1943, and, according to radio announcements, a Japan Cultural Institute was opened in the Heacock Building, Manila, in July of that year. Early in 1944 a Bureau of Oriental Culture reportedly was created under the Philippine Ministry of Education to intensify research into old Filipino customs. The aim, it was stated, was not "entirely to eschew Western influence, but to put greater emphasis on the Philippines and things Oriental."

OBSERVATION OF HOLIDAYS

In February, 1942, the observance of all legal holidays except Sunday was suspended until further notice by Executive Order No. 7. The following month, Jorge B. Vargas, then Chairman of the Executive Commission, proclaimed in Executive Order No. 20 dates which were to be observed as legal holidays as shown below:

January 1.—New Year's Day.
February 11.—Empire or Foundation Day.
Easter.—Holy Thursday and Good Friday.
April 29.—Emperor's Birthday.
November 3.—Meiji-setu.
November 30.—National Heroes Day.
December 25.—Christmas.
December 30.—Rizal Day.
Sundays.

From time to time other special holidays are announced by the Japanese authorities in Manila, such as May 18, 1942, when, by Executive Order No. 37, officials, employees, laborers and other elements of the community were given the opportunity to join the parades and

celebrations commemorating the "return to normalcy of the country after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor." December 8 has been celebrated as "Greater East Asia Day," and Philippine "independence" was marked by a four-day holiday beginning October 14, 1943.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 1: Geographical and Social Background. Army Service Forces Manual M 365-1. 25 April 1944. p. 66-68, 127-129, 146-147.

5. EFFECTS ON COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LIFE

EFFECTS OF WAR ON PHILIPPINE INDUSTRY

Prior to the war there were no munitions factories in the Philippines, and so far as is known none has been established by the Japanese, nor have extensive war industries been inaugurated. As far as possible, however local manufacturing facilities appear to have been converted to the production of supplies for Japanese military forces and for at least a minimum of essential civilian requirements. It has been noted that several of the larger sugar mills and the two refineries, together with distilleries in the Manila district, are engaged in the production of alcohol for industrial and military needs, while coconut oil factories appear to be operating primarily for the export of oil to Japan or for the manufacture of glycerine within the Islands. Information from reliable sources indicates that facilities of foundries and ship repair yards are utilized to the fullest possible extent by the Japanese for purposes allied to their war effort.

Early in 1942 the Japanese military administration stated that production in the Philippines should:

- (1) supply all requirements of the military forces there,
- (2) provide for native requirements within specified limits, and
- (3) contribute to the needs of other occupied areas where surpluses might exist.

While doubtless the first requirement continues a "must," the repeated emphasis placed by the Japanese on the need for self-sufficiency in all prime necessities suggests that the second and third requirements have not, as yet, been met.

Even before early 1942, it was reported the Japanese had converted a Japanese bicycle factory to production of shells for their military rifle, and had taken the

machinery at Cavite and Ft. Santiago, repaired it and used it at ordnance repair shops.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 8: Industry and Commerce, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-8, 8 February, 1944, p. 39-40.

MINING

Japan should obtain from the Islands substantial quantities of iron, all the gold, chrome and manganese she may need, and a small amount of copper. Beyond this, the Philippines are lacking in coal and petroleum, coal having been formerly imported chiefly from Japan and petroleum from the United States and the Netherlands Indies.

Japan's problems are largely those of shipping, transport within the Islands, and a repair or replacement of equipment and loading facilities, believed in many instances to have been demolished by military forces. Insufficient blast furnace and rolling mill capacity in Japan also may prevent full utilization of Philippine iron deposits.

Serious labor difficulties do not seem likely. Highly skilled labor is not necessary in the Philippine mining industry, and the Japanese are in a position to control possible recalcitrants through force, or through their supervision over the food supply.

Information relative to the production status of the mines is conflicting and incomplete, but broadcasts by the Japanese have emphasized that copper and manganese mines were restored by the end of 1942 and are now ready for "large-scale operation." It is reported that two iron mines are being successfully operated and that appreciable quantities of chrome ore have been obtained by the Japanese from the Islands.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 6: Natural Resources, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-6, 29 March 1944, p. 21-22.

LUMBER INDUSTRY

In August, 1943, the Director of the Bureau of Forestry and Fishery . . . stated that 15 sawmills on Luzon were in operation and that within the first 6 months after resumption of activities had produced 8,500,000 board feet of cut timber, totalling over 97,000 cubic meters. The Lumber Producers Association, it was claimed, had succeeded in increasing output and reducing market costs.

Reports from Chungking in June, 1943, indicated that the Japanese are training experts in tropical forests in order to develop the rich forest reserves of the southern regions. There has been

some reference to the possibility of rafting timber from the Philippines to Japan, but as this would involve a long voyage across the open sea, it does not seem likely that it would meet with success. Moreover, reports from other than Japanese sources indicate that logging and lumbering operations have been resumed only on a restricted scale. There is known to be an acute shortage of lumber in Manila and prices are very high. It is to be expected that inadequate transportation facilities, both by land and water, have presented major difficulties, while guerrilla activities in many lumbering districts and a shortage of mechanical equipment are further retarding factors in the Japanese effort to revive the lumber industry.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 6: Natural Resources, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-6, 29 March 1944, p. 27-28.

FISHING INDUSTRY

Fishing operations in Manila Bay were suspended for a very long period after the outbreak of war owing to military activities in that area. Even after the fall of Corregidor, fishing was prohibited by the Japanese, ostensibly because of the danger of floating mines, but possibly because the Japanese feared sabotage or spying by Filipino fishermen.

Fishing operations apparently are strictly regulated by the Japanese who forbid the construction or maintenance of fishing devices without a license from the Director of Forestry and Fisheries. Weekly permits for pond fishing, however, may be issued by the governors of certain provinces, if approved by the Japanese military forces. The increased manufacture of fishing nets in two of Manila's cordage factories is expected to supply not only the Philippine demands, but the entire "Greater East Asia Sphere," according to an announcement from Davao late in June, 1943. The same broadcast referred to large catches of bonito and tunny off the coasts of Davao and Zamboanga Provinces, and stated that Japanese fishing guilds would encourage the preparation of dried bonito, which has a large market in Japan and other Eastern areas.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 6: Natural Resources, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-6, 29 March 1944, p. 40-41.

FOREIGN TRADE

Detailed information in regard to Philippine foreign trade under Japanese broadcasts, however, have indicated that former shipments to Japan of certain

Philippine raw materials have been re-established, while from time to time references are noted to plans for the interchange of commodities between the Philippines and Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The exchange of Philippine copra, and iron ore for cotton textiles and cigarette paper and cigarette machinery has been mentioned, and it is stated that transactions will include cash payments as well as barter. Tokyo also is reported to have promised cotton textiles to those occupied areas which will furnish Japan with foodstuffs.

Food Situation.—Japanese authorities in the Philippines have laid great emphasis on the importance of making the country self-sufficient in the production of foodstuffs. Allegedly, the 1942 rice crop fell but three percent below domestic needs, and with increased plantings, rice was expected to reach the self-sufficiency mark in 1943. A five-year rice production program has been inaugurated, and authorities reportedly have proposed the payment of 750,000 pesos (\$375,000) to farmers, mainly rice and corn producers in central Luzon, to increase the production of foodstuffs.

In order to conserve the domestic supply of meat—and also to protect work animals—the military authorities are taking measures to conserve animal husbandry. Greater attention also is paid to the nutritive value of the coconut. Early in 1942 reports were received in the United States that coconut milk, known as "Nacoco," was being marketed in Manila at the same price as fresh carabao milk and considerably cheaper than cows' milk. Demand for the raw nuts themselves has increased to such an extent that control over price and distribution in Manila is deemed necessary.

Every effort apparently is made by the Japanese to popularize farm life as a career and home gardening—even in vacant lots—for the production of quick-growing vegetables. Government officials promote the campaign by frequent visits to many parts of the country, constantly preaching Philippine self-sufficiency, especially in foodstuffs. Every province in the Islands is said to now have a Foodstuffs Production Increase Council, functioning under the provincial governments and the "Kalibapi," or New Philippine Reconstruction Service Corps. A reorganization of the systems of irrigation to permit the growing of double crops yearly has been proposed, and municipal mayors are authorized to confiscate "abandoned" land and hand it over to anyone who is willing to work it.

The extreme measures taken by the Japanese to increase the food supply in a country that is primarily agricultural and formerly not dependent upon imported foods for the bulk of native demand, suggest that there may be some truth in rumors that the Japanese are confiscating considerable quantities of food for the use of military forces within the Islands, and taking rice out of the country to Japan, and/or other occupied areas.

Availability of Medical Supplies under the Japanese: In October, 1942, the Japanese broadcast extensive plans for increasing Philippine production of quinine to 2,800 kilograms (6,170 pounds) through the cultivation of about 1,700,000 cinchona trees in Mindanao, and in September, 1943, Tokyo announced that "a future supply of quinine is being insured by the planting of cinchona trees on a large scale in Mindanao." Meanwhile, the Islands have reportedly received "good will" gifts of quinine from Japan, one ton at the time of the visit to Manila of Premier Tojo in May, 1943, and three tons on the occasion of the attainment of "independence" in October, 1943. Both supplies purportedly were turned over to health authorities to be used in an anti-malaria campaign throughout the country. Dispensaries and new hospitals are reportedly being established in the provinces, with quinine and other medical supplies distributed free to the poor, as well as information on preventative measures. It also has been claimed that the Japanese have brought in large quantities of high-grade serums and vaccines to wipe out malaria, diphtheria, and smallpox.

Notwithstanding the rather elaborate plans and claims of the Japanese, an Executive Order of November 3, 1943, indicates a general scarcity of drugs and medical supplies. The order was issued to "control prices of medicines, drugs, surgical and laboratory supplies," and specifically prohibits "profiteering, hoarding, manipulations to corner the market, or any other clandestine activities in transactions connected with medicines and medical supplies."

Lower Living Standards May Reduce Import Demands.—Indications are not lacking that, under the Japanese, living

1. Officials of the Philippine Government-in-Exile in Washington have expressed concern over the Japanese announcement that lack of quinine in the Islands had caused over 50,000 deaths since the outbreak of war, in contrast to less than 9,000 deaths from malaria in 1940. (Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, New York, July 23, 1943.)

standards and purchasing power of all classes are materially reduced, through loss of export markets, widespread unemployment, reduced wages and increased taxation. It may be expected, therefore, that during Japanese occupation Philippine import trade will be reduced to minimum proportions. The Japanese are laying great emphasis on self-sufficiency in all directions, and in large measure substitute local materials and domestic production, including the output of cottage industries, doubtless will be utilized as the Islands revert to the more primitive economy of pre-American days.

Export Trade, on the other hand, probably will be more active during Japanese occupation, consisting mainly of raw materials, in which Japan is primarily interested. Aside from direct shipments to Japan, should surpluses remain, there may be limited export trade to other occupied areas, within the restrictions of available shipping facilities.

Japanese Control and Regulation of Foreign Trade.—Control over import and export trade was exercised by the Japanese army prior to inauguration of the Philippine Republic in October, 1943, when presumably nominal control over foreign trade regulations was turned over to the new Government. The right to collect import and export duties was transferred by the Japanese military administration to the Executive Commission of the civil Government on October 1, 1943, and shifted by the latter to the Republic on October 15.

Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, Section 8: Industry and Commerce, Army Service Forces Manual M 365-8, 8 February 1944, p. 77-81.

6. SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION

FILIPINOS PAY FOR JAPANESE OCCUPATION

LOOTING THE ISLANDS

The Philippines are among the richest of the territorial loot which has fallen into Japanese hands and the Japanese are prepared to go all-out in their defense. Meanwhile the to-the-victors-belong-the-spoils maxim characterizes all Japanese operations and Japanese policy. This policy is, first, to ravage the Islands of their food resources and, second, to denude them of their minerals and metal production. First feed, then equip for fighting. Two years have seen the island economy completely disrupted, the largest measure of native economic

security to be found anywhere in Asia almost totally destroyed, the native standard of living lowered and again lowered until today it approaches that of India and is below that of the Dutch Islands, Indo-China or Malaya under the Japanese.

For the Japanese came to the Philippines, saw, conquered—and took. They still take and will go on taking so long as there is anything left. In addition to probably 200,000 soldiers garrisoning the islands the Japanese have brought in thousands of civilians . . . Scores of Japanese families today occupy former homes of well-to-do Americans in the capital. Many Filipino, even "third-party," residences have been bought by Japanese at prices fixed by them. Manila street names have been changed to Japanese except where the name, like "Rizal Avenue," was that of some figure important in native annals.

The Japanese have built enormous barracks in all the open spaces of downtown Manila. With ruthless disregard for native comfort and welfare they have occupied most of the educational institutions, all the Y.M.C.A.'s, many of the hospitals, more than half the religious institutions. In August, 1943, they gave the priests of the Ateneo (large Jesuit educational establishment which generously and without pay quartered many Americans released from internment on account of age or illness) eighteen hours notice to vacate. Earlier in the summer, having set up a new internment camp at Los Banos, sixty miles from Manila, they announced that the entire group of internees at Sto. Tomas, numbering then above 5,000, would be transferred since Sto. Tomas—which the Jesuit organization actually holds in perpetuity from the Philippines Government—was to be taken over for a base hospital. The transfer has been, however, delayed and so far no more than a thousand have gone from Sto. Tomas. But as soon as large-scale fighting commences in the Islands Sto. Tomas is certain to be used by the Japanese for military purposes of some sort and then internees now there may face hardship and perhaps grave danger.

COST OF LIVING

Food prices in Manila were so high in September, 1943, that ordinary kidney beans cost a dollar a pound, coffee (what was left after the Japanese had taken their fill of the native-grown, the imported having disappeared long since) was \$12 a pound, tea \$15, the coarsest kind of water-buffalo meat \$1.50 a

pound and daily going higher, small eggs from native hens 30 cents each, fish (when obtainable, which was rarely since the Japanese took most of it) around \$2 a pound, native chickens, scrawny as crows, 75 cents to \$1 a pound and so on. Ordinary brands of American cigarettes, remaining now in small quantity only, had reached the fantastic figures of \$3.50 for a package of twenty. The smallest size cans of imported evaporated milk were \$3, native-made oleomargarine of the poorest known quality was \$3.75 for a tin containing less than one-third of a pound, peanut butter (much in demand because of the lack of fats) was \$2 a pound. Even matches, locally made and requiring at least five to light one cigarette, reached 40 cents a box.

LOWERED STANDARD OF LIVING

The native of the Philippines can do without oleomargarine and peanut butter and imported cigarettes. But he cannot do without rice. And, whether it is essential to him or not, he has been accustomed to plenty of sugar with which to sweeten the native grown coffee that used to cost 15 cents a pound. Now he has little rice and neither coffee nor sugar. Tomorrow he will have no rice and like the Chinese peasant in time of famine he will be down to weeds and roots. Today he is suffering greatly from ailments traceable to malnutrition. Tomorrow he will be dying in the thousands from them. And scores of our own countrymen and countrywomen, if they are not repatriated before then, will be dying by his side.

From the start the Japanese have pursued and continue to pursue a policy calculated in every way to alienate the Filipino and to discourage anything like the "cooperation" which Japanese propaganda in the islands is forever and with increasing fervor demanding . . .

The native of the Philippines hates the Japanese today more ardently than ever before and his bitterness grows ever more intense. Yet it is bitterness based 75 percent on economic grounds. The Filipino peasant is not concerned with ideologies any more than any other Asiatic peasant. Like the rest he wants enough to eat, some assurance as to the probabilities of eating tomorrow, next week. Also the Filipino has been accustomed by Americans and American ways in the islands to certain amusements, to American movies, American soft drinks, American cigarettes and (among the well-to-do) to American automobiles. Japanese propaganda is forever chiding

him along these lines. The Filipino, according to Japanese propaganda newspapers and radio broadcasts "in his slavish submergence in American materialism has lost sight of the spiritual values which influenced his ancestors."

If, as the Japanese insist, they were "submerged in American materialism" before, they want nothing so much as to be submerged in it again. For it meant to them, as we have seen, much the highest native standard of living in the Orient. It meant to them amusements, diversions such as no other Asiatic, in the mass, knows or ever has known. It meant to them movies, radio entertainment, distraction of many kinds from the monotonous toil of their daily lives as Asiatic peasants. It meant to them, moreover, a degree of economic security unknown to their ancestors—unknown to any other indigenous people in the whole East.

All this has gone, every last vestige of it. It has gone and the Japanese have destroyed it . . . And in place of it he is assailed with arguments about spiritual values, the desirability of sacrifices in order that Asia may become a place for Asiatics only, insistence that he has sold his birthright to the Americans for a mess of pottage composed of entertainment and sufficient to eat and wear.

Greene, Marc T., *Back from the Philippines*, Free World, February, 1944.

JAPS DESTROYED AMERICAN PROPERTY

"By 1941 our islands had become one of the world's greatest gold-producing regions," said J. M. Elizalde, former Philippine High Commissioner at Washington. "On Mindanao my family owned the Davao Gold Mines. First we flew all machinery in, then built an aerial tramway. The Japs destroyed our tramway and mills.

The following reports from a reliable source have been made on living conditions in the Philippines:

The inflationary trend continues with rice now selling for thirteen hundred pesos per cavan in Manila. Although living conditions continue to deteriorate, there are definite indications that widespread knowledge of recent major Japanese defeats and of the American bombings of Davao have served to strengthen the will of the Filipino people to endure the privations imposed upon them by the Japanese. (28 September, 1944)

The Japanese army handed over 3,000

"We also operated sawmills. We had 50 miles of standard gauge American railways, with logging engines and trains. All that the Japanese despoiled. I imagine they also took our locomotives. They stole all the logs and cut lumber in sight, but for some reason did not keep the sawmills going, despite their declared policy of cooperating with native peoples in all occupied areas.

"My family was the largest manufacturer of Manila rope in the islands. We used to buy a lot of Mindanao hemp from the Jap planters. That crop must be much reduced now, because thousands of Japs who worked in those fields went into the ranks when the Jap army came; and a lot of pagans who worked for the Japs fled to the hills when shooting began."

Into Jap hands also fell the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company's "Pathfinder" plantation near Zamboanga, with its machinery for processing latex, smokehouses and coagulator sheds, and company buildings. Its American officials were interned.

From its Dolok-Merangir plantations in Sumatra the Goodyear Company had brought high-yielding, bud-grafted Hevea trees to this Mindanao plantation, some 600,000 of which were producing when the Japs invaded.

Simpich, Frederick. *Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo*. From an article for *The National Geographic Magazine* (not yet published).

TOKYO RULES MANILA

Port Elizabeth, Union of South Africa, Nov. 3 (AP).—As I left Manila on September 26 after 21 months' internment in the Santo Tomas Camp, the Philippines were on the eve of receiving their "independence" from Japan with Jose P. Laurel installed as President of what the Japanese described as a "republic" operating within their sphere of influence.

sacks of rice to the Philippine Government for distribution to the people of Manila and Cavite. The rice, Radio Manila stated, was imported from French Indo-China for this purpose.

To appreciate fully the general dislocation of the Philippine economy since the Japanese occupation, it must be remembered that prior to the war the Philippines were self-sufficient in rice, save for comparatively small imports of French Indo-China rice to Central Luzon. On 22 September, the Philippine Rice Association, a group of land owners, handed over to the government four million bags of rice. (2 October, 1944.)

It is quite evident to all that Japan created the so-called republic to serve her war purposes and aid her in making East Asia safe and self-sufficient for the Japanese.

Just what this independence will mean is, in fact, impossible to say, but I am convinced that it leaves the Japanese military authorities in complete control of the country politically and economically and that the government will dance to music written in Tokyo.

Some observers express the belief that the provisional constitution adopted by the puppet regime last month contains sufficient loopholes to permit the Japanese to compel the drafting of Filipinos for war services in the interest of Japan.

The general health in the Santo Tomas Internment Camp in Manila where I was a prisoner, the largest concentration of civilian prisoners in the Far East, is gradually deteriorating because of lack of essential foods.

A heavy cargo of relief supplies—totalling some 30,000 cases of all kinds of food, medicines and clothing—is go-

ing to Manila aboard the Japanese Repatriation Ship Teia Maru. If it reaches the internees it will stave off the serious situation for at least a few months, but a long-range, sure-fire food and supply program is necessary unless speedy repatriation is planned.

At Santo Tomas Camp, doctors—among them Dr. Earl R. Leach of the Rockefeller Foundation, who organized and managed the camp hospital—say the general diet is now less than 1,800 calories daily as compared with a normal diet of 2,500.

Essential foods are now unavailable in the local markets, because the Japanese not only are living off the country but are removing supplies—especially rice and sugar—to other areas—perhaps to Japan proper and to occupied regions further south.

Cronin, Raymond P. *Tokyo Rules Manila*, The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 4, 1943.

RELATION BETWEEN JAPANESE AND LOCAL POPULATION

The residents of Iloilo City are forced to get along with the Japanese in order

to get work and food. Many are impressed laborers; others work for the Japanese because there is no other way to make a living. Japanese officers visit in the homes of the better families. They seem to like home life and children. A few of these officers have made "emergency marriages" with local Filipinos. Reports from towns where smaller garrisons are stationed indicate that many Japanese soldiers are marrying Filipina girls and that a number of Japanese-Mestizo babies have been born. The Filipino population in general is opposed to these babies.

The majority of the inhabitants of Negros was opposed to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines and refused to co-operate with them wholeheartedly. The Japanese experienced difficulties in getting the civilian population to work for them as many fled to the mountains rather than live under Japanese domination. Those remaining behind and employed by the Japanese, worked only when they were threatened and even then they worked in a haphazard manner.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PART SIX - "FIGHTING FILIPINO ALLIES"

Outline and Reference Material
Prepared by:
Information & Education Section
Hq USAFFE

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:

Part 1 -- From Port Moresby to Morotai.

Part 2 -- History of the Philippines.

Part 3 -- These are the Philippines.

Part 4 -- Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5 -- Under the Heel of Japan.

Part 6 -- Fighting Filipino Allies.

Part 7 -- A Few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.

Part 8 -- Looking Ahead.

When available in complete printed form each of the eight booklets will include specific "Instructions and Suggestions to Instructors" covering each topic.

FIGHTING FILIPINO ALLIES

1. The Filipinos met the Japanese invasion with a heroic, fighting attitude.

a. Loyalty of the Filipinos to the United States has been based on mutual understanding.

- (1) Filipinos understood our policy of preparing the Philippines for independence.
- (2) Our policy has been to treat the Filipinos with respect and consideration.
- (3) After 1935, the Filipinos enjoyed a large degree of political autonomy and were looking forward with pride to independence in 1946.
- (4) The Filipinos realize that they had a higher standard of living than other people in the Orient and they expect to enjoy it again when the Americans return.
- (5) The American policy of treating Filipinos with understanding and justice is now paying big dividends.

b. Of all peoples overrun by the Japanese, the Filipinos were the hardest to conquer.

- (1) Filipinos were fighting by the side of Americans when the Japanese conquered the Islands.
- (2) Green Filipino troops fighting under General MacArthur soon became first-class fighting men.
- (3) Mohammedans and pagans, as well as Christians, showed their loyalty to the United States.
 - (a) When the Japanese landed at Davao, Zamboanga, and Jolo, the handful of Filipino and American troops took to the interior and are continuing their guerrilla resistance effectively.
 - (b) Thousands of Cotabato Moros pledged their loyalty to "fight to the last and die for America and their country".
 1. Lacking firearms, they fight with kris, barong, campilan, tabak, and spear.
 2. They have given valued assistance to American and Filipino troops who continue to fight the Japanese.
- (4) Thirty-two Philippine Army reserve officers were shot by the Japanese because they refused to accept Japanese doctrines.

- (5) Many civilians lost their lives and distinguished themselves in refusing to submit to the Japanese.
 - (a) The Mayor in a town in Ilocos Norte was shot by the Japanese when he refused to pull down the American flag.
 - (b) A Filipino principal of a private school near Vigan in Northern Luzon was shot when he refused to replace the American flag with the Rising Sun.
 - (6) Japanese-controlled radio in Manila was forced to announce that eight persons found "guilty of printing and distributing anti-Japanese booklets" had been executed.
 - (7) Although there have been collaborationists with the Japanese, the Filipino people as a whole have retained their loyalty to the United States.
 - (8) On several occasions since the Islands were overrun, the United States has expressed its faith in the Filipino people.
 - (a) Through the messages of President Roosevelt to the people of the Philippines 28 December 1941 and 13 August 1943.
 - (b) Through the Senate-House Joint Resolution, 29 June 1944, advancing the date for Philippine independence.
2. Bataan and Corregidor demonstrated convincingly the loyalty and courage of the Filipinos.
- a. Filipinos and Americans fought together with mutual respect.
 - b. Filipino field hands adopted guerrilla warfare tactics and fought the Japanese.
 - (1) Japanese military authorities paid them the compliment of confiscating their knives and bolos.
 - c. The courage and heroism of many Filipinos is now a part of the war record.
 - (1) General Vicente Lim with the 41st Filipino Division threw back Japanese offensives time after time until disease, starvation, and sheer exhaustion caused men to drop in their tracks and foxholes.
 - (2) Major Jesus Villamor was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross with the oak leaf cluster for his gallant work in beating off 54 Jap bombers with six pursuit planes.

- (3) Jose Calugas, a Philippine Scout, was the first enlisted man to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in this war.
 - (4) Riding tanks and firing pistols, the Igorots led the attack in one of the bloodiest battles on Bataan, in which the 20th Japanese Infantry Regiment was completely annihilated.
 - d. Worn down by exhaustion, malaria, food shortage, and lack of supplies, the Filipino and American soldiers were compelled to surrender to the overwhelming Japanese force in May 1942.
 - e. Some 3,000 American soldiers and 21,000 Filipino soldiers died in the heroic defense of the Philippines.
3. Continued resistance of the Filipinos to the Japanese has marked the pages of Filipino history since Bataan and Corregidor.
- a. Among the many peoples conquered by the Japanese, the Filipinos alone refuse to be beaten.
 - b. Active resistance to the Japanese continues in many parts of the Islands and many loyal Filipinos have lost their lives.
 - c. Perhaps the best organized underground movement in the Islands to fight Japanese oppression is the secret society known as the "F.F.F.", or "Fighters for Freedom".
 - d. Filipino and American guerrillas continue to attack the Japanese in surprise raids.
 - (1) In Panay, loyal Governor Tomas Confesor and his men have never yielded to Japanese authority.
 - (2) In a July Fourth "celebration" in 1943, a band of Filipino patriots came down out of the hills, marched through the streets of a village waving Filipino and American flags, and later annihilated the Japs who had been sent to break up the demonstration.
 - (3) An underground radio personality, Juan de la Cruz or "John Smith" to the Filipino, has caused continuous embarrassment and difficulty to Japanese authorities, and is still uncaptured.
 - e. Convincing evidence shows that the Filipinos cherish their former liberty and are fighting for it, and that they will be ready to help the Americans drive the Japanese oppressors from their country.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

POINTS TO EMPHASIZE

Fighting alongside American troops the Filipinos made a heroic stand against the Japanese invaders. Their willingness to fight to the end against aggression was an impressive demonstration of their loyalty to the United States.

* * *

Of all the peoples overrun by the Japanese, the Filipinos were the hardest to conquer. Continuing to fight individually or in small groups with whatever weapons they could find, Filipino soldiers and civilians in all parts of the Islands have made occupation hard for the Japanese.

* * *

Although some have collaborated with the Japanese, the Filipino people as a whole have remained loyal to the United States.

* * *

Some 21,000 Filipino soldiers died in the defense of the Philippines. Stories of the courage of individual Filipino soldiers on Bataan and Corregidor are among the great annals of American military history.

* * *

Underground movements, working through organizations like the F.F.F. ("Fighters for Freedom"), continue actively to resist the Japanese in many parts of the Islands. Filipino and American guerrillas often attack the Japanese in surprise raids.

* * *

Filipinos have given every evidence that they value their former liberty enough to fight for it. They will be ready to help American troops drive the Japanese from their country, knowing that they will be fighting for their own independence.

Philippine Information Training Program Part Six FIGHTING FILIPINO ALLIES

Outline and Reference Material Prepared by
Information & Education Section, Hq USAFFE

Outline:

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(4) Thirty-two Philippine Army reserve officers were shot by the Japanese because they refused to accept Japanese doctrines.

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(a) The Mayor in a town in Ilocos Norte was shot by the Japanese when he refused to pull down the American flag.

(b) A Filipino principal of a private school near Vigan in Northern Luzon was shot when he refused to replace the American flag with the Rising Sun.

- (6) Japanese-controlled radio in Manila was forced to announce that eight persons found "guilty of printing and distributing anti-Japanese booklets" had been executed.
- (7) Although there have been collaborationists with the Japanese, the Filipino people as a whole have retained their loyalty to the United States.
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 - (e) Convincing evidence shows that the Filipinos cherish their former liberty and are fighting for it, and that they will be ready to help the Americans drive the Japanese oppressors from their country.

Text References: Fighting Filipino Allies

1. Fighting Attitude

Filipinos Were Hard to Conquer

Of all the native peoples overrun by the Japanese, the Filipinos were the hardest to conquer. Six months after the fall of Manila, when there had been ample time to win the people over, the Japanese-controlled radio station was forced to announce that eight persons found "guilty of printing and distributing anti-Japanese booklets" had been executed. Three others were given long prison sentences for "violating military laws".

In March, 1942, according to a Filipino who was on the island of Luzon at the time, thirty-two Philippine Army reserve officers were taken to Manila's La Loma

Cemetery, made to dig their own graves, then shot in cold blood by the Japanese authorities. The architects of the "New Order in Asia" realized that these Filipino officers, who had not been called to active duty because of illness or official duties, would never accept the doctrines brought to Manila by the conquerors from Tokyo.

This same Filipino told me that the books in the library of the University of the Philippines, nursing ground for Philippine nationalism, were burned by the Japanese, while the University buildings were used as a concentration camp for Chinese residents of Manila. In China the Japanese always bombed and destroyed universities. In the Philippines, however,

they showed a utilitarian streak and turned them into prisons.

Early in the Philippine campaign, according to a well-authenticated story which I have checked with several sources, the Filipino principal of a private school near Vigan in Northern Luzon, was ordered to pull down the American flag flying in front of the school building, and replace it with the Rising Sun. The maestro, with the quiet dignity of his kind, refused to follow the commands of the Japanese officer. Given the alternative of obeying the order or being killed, he chose the latter. The mayor of a town in Ilocos Norte was told to pull down the American flag which flew over the Tribunal. When he refused to do so, he

suffered the same fate that had befallen the teacher.

The Japanese did their best to keep news from leaking out of the Philippines, but more than a year after the first bomb fell the Tokyo radio admitted that army and navy forces were in action against "the remnants" of "guerrilla forces".

A FIGHTING TRADITION

American sports fans shouldn't have been surprised at the fight put up by the Filipinos; for back in the roaring twenties an American showman named Frank Churchill proved to the world that the Filipino is a tough little boxer, small, fast and game as they come. He also proved, involuntarily of course, that the Filipino prize fighter has an amazing tendency to die with his boots on.

Churchill promoted Panchito Villa to a world flyweight championship, and at the height of his career, on June 4, 1927, Villa died on the operating table after a fight with Jimmy McLarnin in Oakland, California.

Churchill started Dencio Cabanela on his way to the top, and the plucky little Filipino looked like a cinch for the championship until he dropped dead in the fourteenth round of a fight with Eugene Crique in Australia.

Churchill brought Clever Sencio to this country, and established him in the hearts of ring fans as a boxer who never quit fighting. Sencio died after a fight with Bud Taylor on April 19, 1926.

Many others are to be found in the list of brown-skinned keen-eyed lads with dynamite in their fists and the love of battle in their hearts. There was Celerino Garcia, who came within a whisker of the middleweight championship of the world two or three years ago. There was small Montano, whose claim to the world's feather-weight title was recognized in many states. Pete Sarmiento and Speedy Dado and Elineo Flores and a score of others demonstrated in a thousand rings that the Filipino need tip his hat to no one when it comes to courage, stamina and sheer lust for combat.

In the fearsome forties General Douglas MacArthur did for the Filipino soldier what Frank Churchill had done twenty years earlier for the Filipino boxer. As the bombs began to land on Luzon in December, 1941, and the Japanese started swarming ashore at Legaspi and Aparri, MacArthur threw his Filipino troops into battle and the world realized that a tough breed of fighting men had arisen to defend American interests on the far fringes of the Pacific.

The grizzled American veterans of the fighting Thirty-First welcomed MacArthur's green Filipino troops as brothers-in-arms. But it wasn't until the War Department communiques began to carry the citations from MacArthur's headquarters that the average American realized that the Filipino soldier was a first-class fighting man.

Marquardt, Frederic S., *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 262-265.

Contrast in Filipino Attitudes

But one great difference should never be forgotten. Spain had lost Cavite, Manila and the Philippines because her political structure was rotten all the way through, because she was, in a word, decadent. We lost the Philippines because we had badly misjudged Japanese strength and timing, and because we were the victims of the hope that we should never have to fight again. When Spanish power was destroyed in the Philippines the Filipinos helped destroy it. When our control over the islands came to a temporary end, the Filipinos were fighting at our side against the invader.

We knew our weakness in the Philippines, and in part at least it was due to the main source of our strength—to our policy of preparing the Philippines for independent nationhood. Since 1934, by act of Congress, the Filipinos had been formally promised their independence. They had established an autonomous Commonwealth, with July 4, 1946, set as the date for a formal severing of the political ties and the trade preferences that bound the Philippines to the United States. In these circumstances an isolationist American people could hardly be expected to prepare adequately for the defense of a group of islands on the other side of the world. And by the time that the danger of Japan became so plain it could no longer be ignored, it was too late to do much about it.

There was a significant contrast, too, in the manner in which the commanding generals in Manila reacted to war in 1898 and in 1941. In 1898 Governor General Basilio Agustin Pavila said:

"Between Spain and the United States of North America hostilities have broken out . . .

"The North American people, constituted of all the social extremes, have exhausted our patience and provoked war . . .

"The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of Victories will give us one as brilliant and complete as the righteousness and justice of our cause

demand. Spain, which counts with the sympathies of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers . . .

"A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago . . . pretending to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable . . .

"Vain designs! Ridiculous boasts!

"Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt . . . Prepare for the struggle and, united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will crown our efforts . . ."

In 1941 General Douglas MacArthur's only comment when war came was: "We shall do our best."

Marquardt, Frederic S., *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 22-24.

Why Filipinos and Americans Understand Each Other

Unlike other Eastern people, the Filipino is not concerned with "face saving". Instead he has honor and dignity, a love of life and a reluctance and respect for death. Unlike what was expected of him, the Filipino loves to joke and poke fun at another. He desires to be well thought of and to be liked by others. He is friendly and smiles easily. Quite likely, these characteristics which were unlike other peoples of the East made it easy for the American way of doing things to soon become understandable to the Filipino. Perhaps, circumstances made the two peoples to have enough in common by instinct that in the period of one short generation a great and pleasant understanding could be achieved. Otherwise, the miracle of the East might never have happened.

At first the Filipino distrusted the professions of democracy that proposed to be a substitute for his own. He had a passion for freedom just as strong as any, and had undertaken to set up governmental institutions for the promotion of that purpose. Fortunately and to the amazement of the Filipinos, the American considered his point of view. Quite likely it was a surprise to both people to discover that both had prejudices but both were willing to listen to the other fellow's idea of the thing. Probably neither expected to find the other with determined intentions to maintain what each considered self-respect, but both respected the other for it. And when both did find out about each other, the mutual understanding which resulted explains why the

Filipinos have remained loyal to the Americans in this war, and why they are willing to give their lives to help the Americans to return to finish the program they began.

Romulo, Carlos P. *The East and the West Have Met*. From Red Barrel, house magazine of the Coca-Cola Company, June 1944.

Solid Foundation of Loyalty

Never fear about Filipino loyalty. As I have pointed out, two factors bulwark this loyalty and will continue to. One is the natural preference of the native for the American, who has always treated him like a human being. Our policy in the islands is paying dividends today but they are trifling compared with what they will amount to when the time for fighting cooperation really comes. The other factor, as we have seen, is economic expediency. The Filipino expects his good standard of living again when the Americans come back—maybe a little better one to remunerate him for all he has endured, for all he may have yet to endure.

When, therefore, you combine sentiment and economic expediency you have a pretty solid foundation of loyalty. The Japanese with all their propaganda, with all their insistence upon "cooperation", with all their pressure of whatever kind upon the Filipino, have not shaken this foundation as much as an earth tremor in Los Angeles shakes the capital in Washington. But still and for all that the loyal Filipino needs some encouragement. Said a native boy to me, in a quick whisper, just before I left the East, "Mr. Greene, when are the Americans coming back?" There was a pathetically imploring note in his query; but his emphasized "when" left no suggestion of doubt as to the ultimate coming.

Greene, Marc T. *Back From the Philippines*, Free World, February, 1944.

Moro Loyalty

Although most Filipinos are Christians, the Mohammedans and pagans were just as quick to rise to the defense of their country—and ours—as the Christians were.

When the Japanese made landings at Davao and Zamboanga and Jolo, the handful of American and Filipino troops in those areas took to the interior, and can be counted on to continue their guerrilla tactics almost indefinitely. In three hundred years the Spaniards were unable to conquer the proud Moros of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Japs won't have any better luck in the time at their disposal.

Datu Gumbay Piang, a captain in the Philippine Army, reported to Secretary of War Stimson that he had enlisted twenty thousand Cotabato Moros as holomen

and that they would "fight to the last and die for America and their country".

Sultan Sa Ramin, of Lanao, a Senator in the Philippine Congress, reported that ten thousand of his Moro tribesmen had sworn on the Koran to fight all "enemies of the United States" with "no mercy asked". Because they lack firearms, Sa Ramin told MacArthur that the Lanao Moros would fight with kris, barong, campilan, tabak and spear, all native knives with an edge as famed in the Far East as the Toledo blade is in Europe.

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 272-273.

Filipino Morale

There were many persons in the islands who still remembered the coming of the Americans. At first delighted that they were to be helped in throwing off the yoke of Spain, they soon learned that they were to accept in its place the yoke of the United States. They could not know how different that yoke would be; they could not understand that a new conqueror was subduing them for the avowed purpose of later liberating them. They fought against the new conquerors, and they resented them for many years after the struggle was ended. Not the least cause of their resentment was the fact that many individual Americans did not live by the same fine principles of democracy for which their government stood.

In the later years of American occupation, Filipinos had come to realize that this strange new policy was actually being carried out. They were being prepared to govern themselves and were given opportunities to do so in some respects even while the American Governor General still remained. After 1935, they enjoyed a large degree of political autonomy. They were looking forward to 1946 with some qualms, it is true, but also with much pride and confidence.

Then came the war, into which they were drawn largely by reason of their association with the United States—so a great many of them might argue. Then, seemingly abandoned by the Allies, they had to face the fact that the Japanese had come, with what promises remained to be seen.

The Japanese were quick to seize their opportunity. The Tokyo radio broadcast constantly to the Filipino people during the critical days of December. The favorite theme was that the Japanese intended to liberate the islands. A sorry nation, to have to undergo periodic conquests in order to be liberated! President Quezon belittled the Japanese efforts and declared they had had no effect on the populace.

On December 27, a Manila Associated Press dispatch reported that leaflets addressed to Philippine soldiers had been dropped by Japanese planes. They said: "Dear friends: Our aim is to destroy American force. We have no quarrel with you. Are we not all of the Far East? Drop your guns; return home to your loved ones." With typical Japanese inconsistency, these leaflets were dropped after Manila had been declared an open city and had been subjected to fierce bombardment by enemy planes.

Those Filipinos who knew the story of the Japanese war on China would know how to accept Japanese promises. They might have to suffer Japanese control for some time. The history of Korea, Manchuria, and China suggested that the Japanese would make the same mistakes in the Philippines as they had elsewhere. Little as they had learned from their past errors, the Filipinos had perhaps learned much.

Beyond the regular dispatches from Manila, which continued to praise the morale of the Filipino soldiers and civilians, there were a few scattered reports that were similarly reassuring. On December 29 the leader of one of the pygmy tribes volunteered his services and those of his tribesmen to fight with the United States against the Japanese. A dispatch to the New York Times on December 22 reported that the Moro datu (chief) in Zamboanga had assured the American High Commissioner in Manila that "all Zamboanga Mohammedan elements are with me in the defense of democracy".

Porter, Catherine. *Crisis in the Philippines*. Issued under the auspices of The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., Knopf, 1942. p. 135-137.

Filipino Collaborators

We are not so naive as not to believe that Japan, like Germany, has friends, collaborators or admirers in the countries she has overrun. There is no doubt that she made an impression of invincibility in the early months of the Pacific war when Japanese forces spread widely over the southwest Pacific. Even in the Philippines the Japanese succeeded in winning over a number of temporary collaborators.

Japanese propagandists have been busy strengthening Japan's ties with wavering collaborationists. The Japanese have been telling them that Japan will win. But certainly the Japanese cannot be as convincing as they were in 1942. Every intelligent man now knows that what is happening to Germany will happen to Japan. The Japanese too will be beaten.

We know that the Filipino people as a whole have kept their faith with the United States. We know that many of them have continued to fight and are still fighting the Japanese at the risk of their lives. We know that they have heeded neither the pleas nor threats of the collaborationists to lay down their arms and join the Japanese in their war of aggression.

The Philippine Hour, United States Office of War Information, 6 September, 1944.

Message to People of the Philippines

On December 28, 1941, the President sent a message to the people of the Philippine Islands. It was broadcast by short-wave radio direct to Manila where it was rebroadcast and given to the press. The text of the message follows:

The People of the Philippines:

News of your gallant struggle against the Japanese aggressor has elicited the profound admiration of every American. As President of the United States, I know that I speak for all our people on this solemn occasion.

The resources of the United States, of the British Empire, of the Netherlands East Indies, and of the Chinese Republic have been dedicated by their people to the utter and complete defeat of the Japanese war lords. In this great struggle of the Pacific the loyal Americans of the Philippine Islands are called upon to play a crucial role.

They have played, and they are playing tonight, their part with the greatest gallantry.

As President I wish to express to them my feeling of sincere admiration for the fight they are now making.

The people of the United States will never forget what the people of the Philippine Islands are doing this day and will do in the days to come. I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and in material, of the United States stand behind that pledge.

It is not for me or for the people of this country to tell you where your duty lies. We are engaged in a great and common cause. I count on every Philippine man, woman, and child to do his duty. We will do ours.

Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. Washington, D.C., October 20, 1942. p. 9.

2. Loyalty and Courage of the Filipinos

"The story of American-Filipino cooperation is something that every citizen of the United States ought to know and take pride in."

President Manuel L. Quezon, November 15, 1942.

Defense of Bataan and Corregidor

The gallant defense of Bataan and Corregidor could not last indefinitely without reinforcements of men, ammunition, and supplies, and these it proved impossible to get to Corregidor. Worn down by exhaustion, malaria, food shortage, and lack of supplies, our soldiers were compelled to surrender Bataan to the superior forces of the enemy on April 9. With the fall of Bataan the fate of Corregidor was sealed. Corregidor was compelled to surrender on May 6.

The defense of Bataan and Corregidor will go down in history as one of the great and heroic chapters of human courage and endurance. The story of those who died there will never be forgotten.

Amid tremendous memories that which will outlive them all is of the steadfast loyalty to America of the rank and file of Filipinos, both civilians and soldiers. After 40 years of colonial administration, the acid test came when Japanese troops, sweeping down from the north with superior numbers and equipment, sought to win the Filipinos over and force them to renounce friendship for America. The Filipinos stood firm. Their gallant defense alongside the Americans of Bataan and Corregidor and the unwavering loyalty of the great rank and file of peasants, townspeople, and soldiers are a high tribute to the Filipino people and to the kind of colonial administration which America has tried to give them during the past 40 years.

Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. Washington, D.C., October 20, 1942. p. 12-13.

"Filamerican"

... MacArthur ... [analyzed] a word we had come to use in dispatches to describe the typical soldier on Bataan, where American and Filipino boys were fighting shoulder to shoulder in a common cause:

The distillate of forty years—Filamerican. The word was coined in the thick of battle. Filamerican troops, Filamerican spirit, Filamerican stamina and grit! This perfect union of two races begun early in the century when the weary American soldier resting by the roadside gave a bright-eyed Fili-

pino boy his first apple and his first lesson in English.

The union based on mutual respect was refined and proved as the years passed. But the fire of war brought forth the perfect and pure understanding. The American soldier far from home and his brown brother, defending his home, fighting side by side against a common hated enemy.

Freed from dross and alloy, the bond between Filipino and American stands pure and impervious. Filamerican! It has withstood the attacks of scheming propaganda—the attacks of false promises—the attacks of fire and steel—and it will endure.

Romulo, Carlos P. (Colonel). *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines*. Harrap, Sydney, 1943. p. 194.

Heroes of Bataan

Some 3,000 American soldiers and 21,000 Filipino soldiers died in the defense of the Philippines. After five months of constant fighting, short rations, disease, lack of medicine and sheer physical exhaustion, the survivors were forced to surrender in May, 1942.

To mention only a few of the Filipino names which represent the thousands who fought in the Battle of the Philippines—General Vicente Lim, whose 41st Filipino Division threw back Japanese offensives time after time, until disease, starvation and sheer exhaustion dropped the men in their tracks and foxholes. The troops of this division launched General MacArthur's major attack against the Japanese at Abucay when the enemy was mowed down by the hundreds.

Major Jesus Villamor, then Captain, Philippine Army Air Corps, received the D.S.C. with cluster for his actions in the campaign. During an attack on the airdrome at Batangas by approximately 54 Jap bombers, Villamor took off from that field leading six pursuit planes and engaged the enemy. By such courage in the face of superior odds, Major Villamor typified the courage with which thousands of other Filipinos opposed the Japs.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

From an American Soldier

Let me read to you a part of a letter written by a young American soldier on Bataan to his mother.

I am proud to be a part of the fight that is being made here—he wrote: and I would not, even if it were possible, leave here until it is over, and we have won as we inevitably will. I have seen some horrible things happen, and have had my share of narrow escapes, but I have also seen some wonderful acts of courage, self-sacrifice,

and loyalty. At last I have found what I have searched for all my life—a cause and a job in which I can lose myself completely and to which I can give every ounce of my strength and my mind. And I have mentally and spiritually conquered my fear of death . . .

Should anything happen to me here, it will not be like closing a book in the middle as it would have been had I been killed in the first few days of the war. For in the last two months I have done a lifetime's living, and have been a part of one of the most unselfish, cooperative efforts that has ever been made by any group of individuals.

Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Washington, D. C., October 20, 1942. p. 164.

Stories of Filipino Fighting

JOSE CALUGAS

But it took the Japanese invasion to focus the world's spotlight on the warlike nature of the Filipino. How well the Filipino fought can perhaps best be told by a few individual stories.

There was, for instance, Pedro (Jose) Calugas, thirty-three years old, five feet four inches tall, weighing 116 pounds. He was born in Iloilo, where the easygoing plantation owners live high on the fabulous sugar industry.

Calugas was not an hacendero, with a big home in Manila and another in Iloilo. He didn't travel in Europe, or own a swank limousine. But he had gone to free public schools, the bequest of the early American teachers. He did have the benefit of an excellent public-health system, established by such eminent Americans as Dr. Victor Heiser. He did enjoy the Filipino standard of living, probably the highest in the Orient.

Calugas enlisted in the Philippine Scouts, and by the time war came he had risen to the rank of mess sergeant.

On January 16, 1942, Calugas was serving with his unit, Battery B, 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, on the rugged uplands of Bataan Peninsula. Nearly a quarter of a mile away another Scout battery had been subjected to such a severe shelling and bombing by the oncoming Japanese that all of its cannoners were either killed or wounded.

It was none of Calugas' personal problem. No one expected the mess sergeant to give up his own position of comparative security. But the little Filipino—who after all was as tall as Napoleon—left his own dugout and started across the thousand yards of shell-raked terrain which separated him from the silenced battery.

Somehow he made his way through the enemy fire. From nearby foxholes he recruited a volunteer crew of his fellow country men, and together they put the battery back into action, keeping it going in the face of enemy shelling until the Japanese broke off the engagement and retired to positions of greater safety.

For this exhibition of "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty", President Roosevelt awarded Sergeant Calugas the Congressional Medal of Honor, this country's highest military honor. He was the first enlisted man to receive the award in this war.

JESUS VILLAMOR

Calugas came from what we would consider the "middle class" of Filipinos—an oddity in the Far East, where usually there are only the well-to-do and the coolie classes. But Jesus Villamor came out of the top drawer. His father was a Supreme Court Justice, who had also been the first Filipino president of the University of the Philippines.

Back of Jesus was a great heritage of wealth and culture. He attended one of the old Catholic colleges in Manila, a school which was teaching Latin and Greek before Harvard was established. The last time I saw him he was escorting a beautiful Filipino girl to a society dance at the Manila Hotel.

Jesus could have studied law, gone into the government, perhaps become a distinguished jurist as his father. But he saw the war clouds gathering over the Far East, and he knew there wouldn't be any Philippines to practice law in if someone wasn't ready to fight for them. So he went to General MacArthur and volunteered his services.

MacArthur made him a third lieutenant, then put him in the newly formed Philippine Air Corps. The lad was smart, adaptable and, like all Filipinos, anxious to learn. MacArthur sent him to this country, where he studied aviation at Randolph and Kelly and Chanute Fields. Then young Villamor went back to the Philippines to teach other Filipinos how to fly.

When the first Japanese planes came screeching over Zablan Field last December, Villamor and his squad of brand-new pilots were lolling in their barracks. Most of them had been flying less than a year. But they whipped out of their quarters like veterans, and Villamor got his flight of three planes into the air in time to prevent "appreciable damage to his station". For that "conspicuous example of

courage and leadership" Villamor was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Five days later Villamor's squadron drew the assignment of beating off a Japanese aerial attack one hundred miles south of Manila. Fifty-four enemy bombers were in the attacking force, and Villamor had only six pursuit planes behind him. But the Filipinos drove off the Japs, and Lieutenant Villamor himself accounted for one of the Jap bombers. When the reports came in MacArthur gave Villamor an oak leaf cluster to go with his Distinguished Service Cross.

FIELD HANDS

While the middle class (Pedro Calugas) and the well-to-do (Jesus Villamor) were fighting the good fight, the poor people of the Philippines were doing the best job of all. Most of them field hands, generally referred to without contempt as "common toos", but their love for freedom and their ability with a knife are far from common.

The Filipino field hand became an apparently peaceful farmer by day and a deadly guerrilla at night. He adopted the tactics of warfare by which China has been able to survive. The Jap military authorities in the occupied portions of the Philippines paid him a high tribute by confiscating his knives and bolos, those long keen-edged weapons equally adaptable to working or fighting. The bolo is as necessary to the Filipino farmer as the hoe is to his American counterpart. If he can't use it, his crops will be small and starvation will ravage the land. But if he can use his bolo for work, he can use it also to slit the throat of any Japanese soldier he manages to catch off guard. Between starvation for the Filipino and death for the Japanese, the occupation authorities quickly chose the former and ordered the Filipinos to turn in their bolos.

Marquardt, Frederic S., Before Bataan and After. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 267-271.

"A FILIPINO SOLDIER"

"Sergeant Calugas is a Filipino soldier—one of thousands upon thousands who faced the hated invaders and have not flinched. More than two months of continuous battle have made him a veteran—stern and tough and hard. He knows that between the beginning and the end lie not one thousand yards of bursting bombs and shells, but many steep miles of road and many more days of bitter fighting."

General MacArthur.

The Igorots

Igorots fought gallantly against the Japanese. Here is General MacArthur's account of an incident to remember . . . of these people:

"Bataan has seen many wild mornings, but nothing to equal this. No quarter was asked and none was given. Always above the din of the battle rose the fierce shouts of the Igorots as they rode the tanks and fired their pistols.

"No gun, no thicket, only death itself could stop that mad rush. Of all the bloody spots on the peninsula that proved to be the bloodiest.

"When the attack was over, the remnants of the tanks and of the Igorots were still there but the 20th Japanese infantry regiment was completely annihilated."

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

Spirit of Bataan

We will go back to Manila. The flags of the United States and the Philippines will fly again over Malacanang. I saw the fall of the Philippines, and I will see it rise again to a great and understanding freedom. It was to have had its freedom in 1946. Now that freedom will have been sanctified in American and Filipino blood.

I know we are going back, because in this half year of war I have learned many things.

I have seen man's inhumanity to man in its most hideous aspect, but in the most terrible places I met people who were great and good. I have learned that all men are fundamentally the same and that there is a kinship that race or creed or national ideologies cannot efface.

My memories of the Battle of the Philippines are of men and women who remained civilized and kind in the face of unspeakable horror. The officer who slept on a chilly deck to give me his blanket; the nurse who saved me her ration of bread because I was on night duty in Bataan; the boy who shielded me from a sniper's bullet in the foxhole—to me they are part of the living promise that is democracy.

That we will see the rise of the Philippines is part of that promise.

I heard it made, that morning on the airfield on Iloilo, when an American flyer and a Filipino soldier wept together. From the hearts of men and women waiting entrapped in the tunnel of Corregidor, from the bodies of our dead who lay unburied in the forests of Bataan, it came to us over the Voice of Freedom:

Men fighting under the banner of an unshakable faith are made of something more than flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield

at last, endurance melts away, and the end of the battle must come.

Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand—a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the world—cannot fall.

Romulo, Carlos P. (Colonel). I Saw the Fall of the Philippines. Harrap, Sydney, 1943. p. 287-288.

Meaning of the Fight on Bataan

"I am . . . here to bring to you a message from Bataan. I wish I could say it is from my buddies whom I left behind—the wounded, the crippled for life, the prisoners of war, the dead. If I did, it would merely be a figure of speech, for the soldiers who fought in Bataan are now wrapped in silence. In fact, I know that even if they could talk to us, they would not. Words are an affront to heroes. They had a job to do and they did it. How they did it, you and the world know.

"But Bataan is a message in itself. There American honor was buried. There the American flag was hauled down. There American arms were defeated—for the first time. We read the thrilling reports of the gallantry of General Eisenhower's boys, superbly equipped with the latest weapons American production has turned out, their attack excellently supported by the fire of America's new navy, myriads of American planes furnishing a powerful air cover. I read all that and I think of Bataan—where we had none, where we were starving, where our rifles were of the First World War vintage, the bullets so long our Filipino boys could hardly reach the trigger, where we made hand grenades out of bamboo, dynamite and nails, and we made bombs out of pop bottles.

"But Bataan stood for four months. Filipino loyalty was firm and unshakable. That loyalty is still whole and unimpaired in the Philippines today. Bataan is more than a name. It is more than a symbol. It is a rallying cry to every American. Bataan is where freedom died. A part of America lies dead there, too. Until American honor has been vindicated there, until freedom is restored to the Filipino people, the 3,000 American soldiers and the 21,000 Filipino soldiers who lie in the foxholes of Bataan cannot rest easy—neither can you—or you—or you—or any American worthy of the name."

Romulo, Carlos P., from a speech delivered at the request of the U.S. Treasury Department before the Republican Convention, Chicago, Illinois, 27 June, 1944.

3. Continued Resistance Filipinos Fight Back

Among the many peoples the Japanese have subjugated, the Filipinos alone refuse to be conquered. Resistance continues throughout the archipelago, in the Caga-

yan Valley in Luzon where followers of the late President Quezon continue to resist, in the Visayan Islands, where loyal Governor Tomas Confesor of Panay and his men have never yielded to Japanese authority, and in Mindanao where the Mohammedan Filipinos of Lanao have pledged themselves to fight back against the Japs.

Loyal Filipinos have taken every opportunity to show their contempt for the aggressor, and in many cases have paid with their lives. A secret society known as the "F.F.F." or "Fighters For Freedom" is an active underground movement, perhaps the best organized in the islands.

Individual acts of Filipino heroism are numerous. You may know the story of the village teacher, Buenaventura J. Bello, who was shot for refusing to obey a Japanese officer who had ordered him to haul down the American flag in front of the school building.

Take Nicomedes Suller, the Mayor of San Manuel, Pangasinan. Single-handed, he tried to stop a Jap tank column moving through his town. He boarded the nearest tank and emptied his revolver through an opening in the tank. Needless to say, he was riddled and his lifeless body, left on the roadside, became a symbol of Filipino resistance.

Meet Cuenca, a fighting Filipino driver. The Japanese wanted some one familiar with the roads of Batangas province to drive a truck loaded with 31 Japanese soldiers. Cuenca volunteered for the task. When he came to a sharp curve he deliberately pushed the accelerator to the floor board, plunging the truck and its passengers over a cliff into a gorge. Cuenca and 11 soldiers were killed and the other soldiers were all seriously injured.

A typical story of guerrilla warfare is a July Fourth "celebration" which took place in a Philippine village in 1943. A band of Filipino patriots came down out of the hills and marched through the streets waving American and Filipino flags. They sang patriotic songs. They had musical instruments and played march music. When the Jap authorities heard of this "brazen" demonstration, they sent four truckloads of soldiers to arrest the "musicians". But the guerrillas had taken positions in ambush. They massacred the Japs with grenades and bolos.

GUERRILLAS

Some who were never captured are still fighting as guerrillas. They live in the hills and the Japs have never been able to capture them. They may be out of arms and ammunition, but using the bolo (a knife with a large blade, razor-sharp and deadly in close combat) they have been able to defend themselves against

the Jap and in many instances have attacked the enemy in surprise raids.

Long before Pearl Harbor, General Douglas MacArthur said: "I have commanded Filipino soldiers off and on for thirty-five years and know that they are among the most splendid soldiers in the world. They are naturally well-disciplined, and they have endurance and courage."

Filipino patriots have lived up to this mark. The evidence proves that Filipinos cherish liberty and fight for it.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

Guerrillas in Mindanao

Drama and tragedy swept Mindanao in the early summer of 1942 as Japs sought to mop up the last of the Americans. Gen. William F. Sharp had surrendered on May 11. For General MacArthur, the late President Manuel Quezon, President Sergio Osmena, and other dignitaries, Mindanao was the last jumping-off place for Australia.

From Borneo came a few of our surviving bombers, to rain ruin and death on enemy ships and docks at Davao. Daringly, Lt. John D. Bulkeley's MTB's (Motor Torpedo Boats) harassed Jap war craft off Mindanao's coast or sneaked into Mindanao ports by dark of night, bringing fugitives for rendezvous with Australia-bound planes or submarines. One MTB was actually dismantled, hauled up to Lake Lanao, and rebuilt for use in a last desperate stab at the Japs.

Cruelty to American captives was unspeakable, as in The Dyess Story. In Davao prison camp the Japs concentrated more than 2,000 Americans, and it was from here that the late Lt. Col. William E. Dyess, Lt. Comdr. Melvyn H. McCoy, and others escaped.

Fugitives and prisoners came to Mindanao from northern islands by the thousands. So vast is this wooded island and so largely unexplored that, despite the increase in their garrisons, the Japs have never yet been able to control or even patrol it all, hence, unnumbered American and Filipino guerrillas and fugitives still lurk and move about its wilder areas. One American woman I know, before escaping, spent 8 months in these jungles, and one month aboard an open sailboat off the Mindanao coast.

Now and then, by secret means, these tenacious guerrillas send out news of enemy strength and movements; by other means—easily imagined—they get in food, medicine, arms, and ammunition. Now and then submarines land spies, and pick them up again at isolated points and on certain dates previously agreed upon.

Some of our air crews, forced down here, have later been picked off the

beaches by submarines. Others are still there, camping, tramping, hiding out from the Japs.

Simpich, Frederick. *Mindanao, on the Road to Tokyo*. From an article for *The National Geographic Magazine* (Not yet published).

Juan de la Cruz: Radio Personality

Juan de la Cruz is the people's hero of the Philippines. Juan de la Cruz, or "John Smith" to the Filipino, is the radio personality who has caused more trouble and actual embarrassment to Lieutenant General M. Homma, the "conqueror of the Philippines", and his colleagues than the Filipino-American troops on Bataan and Corregidor.

What's more, Juan Cruz is still uncaptured. He's still ready to radio-blitz any Jap general, corporal or geisha when the hour comes to rouse the Filipino flame of resistance.

But his broadcasts—short and long-wave from a portable set—are made now, as he tells his listeners in English, native Tagalog and Spanish, "just to keep my hand in for the big day".

Juan Cruz has a price of ten thousand pesos on his head, originally offered by the very much worried General Homma at the height of the first series of broadcasts during the Bataan and Corregidor campaigns. To match the offer for his scalp by the bald-headed, Oxford-educated Jap general, Juan Cruz countered next day with "exactly five centavos (two and one-half cents U.S.) for your ivory-plated dome, you ——! No skull is worth more".

Juan Cruz and his assistants understand Japanese psychology. They do everything possible over the air to rile the Japanese command. They even poke fun at His Imperial Japanese Majesty Hirohito, whom they familiarly address as "Charlie"—the name coined for him by foreigners in Japan. Juan pricks the Japs in their soft spot—their inferiority complex—consistently. He is the unseen, but not unheard, Spider.

To be sure, there is a strict military ban—and penalty of death—for possession of short-wave radio sets in the Philippines, but not for long-wave sets. The Jap wants and tries to put out his own long-winded propaganda over local Manila stations. Thus, what's a bit perplexing to the Nip propagandist is to have Juan Cruz suddenly break in on the same programme to announce a time and wave length over which all may hear him.

This anonymous Filipino "John Smith" has the best news sources in the Philippines. Some of his broadcasts, copies of which I have seen, contained information which could have come only from sources

at the elbow of the commanding Jap as well as of Japan's Filipino puppets. His intimate knowledge of what goes on everywhere in the islands shows the scope of the organization behind him.

For instance, he can tell you what is happening inside the concentration camps in the islands where more than 7,000 American, British and Dutch are still sweating and starving out the war. When three British subjects in my camp were shot without trial in February, 1942, Juan Cruz had the whole story, and accurately, the next day.

USE OF FACTS

Juan Cruz has facts and he uses them effectively. His listeners soon found he was telling the truth the greater part of the time, and his reputation grew. It grew, too, because the Filipino loves intrigue, although he's not too good at it. He's a great patriot. He's emotional and, despite anything anyone may tell you, the average Filipino has more guts than most of us.

Don't misjudge him by what you may have read in the early days of the Philippines campaign or through Jap-inspired propaganda. To be sure, there are Filipino traitors just as in every country, but these men and women are marked or will be by the guerrilla groups and Juan Cruz, or his successor, if by chance the Japs catch up with him.

Juan has had some close calls. Obviously he moves his broadcasting unit constantly. One day he escaped the Jap dragnet by the brazen ruse of halting his broadcast in the middle of a sentence, leaving his equipment to be disposed of, I can't tell you how, and walking serenely through the Jap cordon, after showing the Nips "which way I had gone".

On his next broadcast, he upbraided the "stupid so-and-sos" for their thick-headedness. His profanity is profuse, but to the point.

Juan Cruz has become more than a mere "voice". He has become a symbol of the freedom the Filipinos are determined to have. If the Japs get this Juan Cruz, another one will pick up where Juan the First left off, just as soon as a new set can be assembled. He uses two techniques: First, he seeks to rouse his people against the tyranny of the Jap invader. Second, he infuriates the Japs into making open blunders for all to see, through the ever useful means of ridicule. The inferiority-complexed Jap can't stand ridicule. This is effective propaganda with a capital "P" and that "P" stands for patriotism.

Gunnison, Royal Arch. *The Filipinos Fight On*. From an Article in *Collier's Magazine*, 1 July, 1944.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PART SEVEN --- A FEW DO'S AND DON'TS FOR GI'S

Outline and Reference Material
Prepared by:
Information & Education Section,
Hq USAFFE

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:

Part 1 -- From Port Moresby to Morotai.

Part 2 -- History of the Philippines.

Part 3 -- These are the Philippines.

Part 4 -- Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5 -- Under the Heel of Japan.

Part 6 -- Fighting Filipino Allies.

Part 7 -- A Few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.

Part 8 -- Looking Ahead.

When available in complete printed form each of the eight booklets will include specific "Instructions and Suggestions to Instructors" covering each topic.

A FEW DO'S AND DON'TS FOR GI'S

1. Every soldier must understand that strict security measures will be essential in the Philippines.

a. For the first time in this theater troops will run into large masses of people.

(1) Most of these will be of invaluable aid -- they are awaiting liberation.

(2) A certain few are not sympathetic to the U.S. -- against these our soldiers must be on the alert.

b. For the first time troops will come across modern, thickly settled, and thriving cities.

(1) It cannot be denied that during the past few years some of the people of the Philippines were not immune to Japanese propaganda.

(2) Dangers of loose-talk, rumors, espionage, sabotage, enemy mines and booby traps will be increased.

(3) Japanese government has had a successful system of espionage working in the Philippines for several years, and some Filipinos as well as Japanese citizens were involved in it.

(4) For over two years the Filipino people have been subjected to intense and concentrated propaganda campaigns, and many have been threatened and coerced into cooperating with the Japanese.

c. Peoples of the Philippines must be considered as citizens, not "natives."

(1) They are citizens of the Philippines, and nationals of the United States.

(2) They should be treated with respect and consideration.

(3) But we must still guard constantly against those whose sympathies do not lie with our government.

d. It will be necessary to distinguish between the good and the bad among the Filipinos.

(1) We cannot afford to get careless in the presence of any of them.

(2) Some Filipinos who speak English poorly may still understand enough to make them a security risk; they might be in the employ of the enemy just to pick up small bits of important information.

(3) Filipino fishermen, wealthy Filipino merchants, women spies and on several occasions, children from 13 to 15 years of age have been discovered working as spies for the Japanese.

- (4) An escaped convict was seen acting as a guide for Japanese troops who raided a certain city.
 - (5) Soldiers must keep quiet on military matters in the presence of all men, women, and children.
 - e. Soldiers have no monopoly on rumors; the Japanese can be counted upon to start vicious rumors among certain Filipinos, and to see that they spread.
 - (1) Every soldier should recognize the responsibility he has to stop wild and ridiculous rumors wherever he hears them.
 - (2) Passing on such rumors is to be considered directly aiding the Japanese.
 - f. Beware of souvenir hunting.
 - (1) The Japanese have doubtless prepared many lovely souvenirs for Yanks in the form of booby traps.
 - (2) An inconsequential souvenir may lead an unsuspecting GI into a well laid mine field; these souvenirs should be reserved for the Engineers.
 - g. Japanese are anxious to capture American prisoners of war.
 - (1) They realize the importance of obtaining information.
 - (2) Soldiers must be warned strongly against carrying military information of any sort with them into a combat area.
 - (3) Conversely, the more Japanese prisoners Americans can capture, the more valuable information will be available to our intelligence sections through interrogations.
2. Good health depends on strict observance of health measures.
- a. Malaria must be fought constantly.
 - (1) Follow the regular precautionary measures: atabrine, mosquito bar for sleeping, repellent ointment, use of sprays, keeping sleeves rolled down, and wearing leggings.
 - b. Dysentery can be avoided:
 - (1) By not eating uncooked food, green fruits, or raw vegetables.
 - (2) By drinking purified water.
 - (3) By washing hands and mess gear before meals.
 - (4) By keeping flies away.
 - c. Dangers of venereal disease are great.
 - (1) Before the war venereal diseases were the largest single cause for hospitalization of U.S. troops in the Philippines.

- (2) During the Japanese occupation, they have spread more widely.
 - (3) The regular precautions insisted on by the Army must more than ever be carefully followed.
3. Every soldier will profit from some information and practical advice.
- a. Philippine money system is simple, for, like U.S. money, it is based on the decimal system.
 - (1) The Spanish words peso and centavo are the names for coins of currency used in the Philippines.
 - (a) Peso in 1941 was equal to fifty cents in U.S. money.
 - (b) One peso equals 100 centavos.
 - (2) Coins in currency were the peso, one-half peso, peseta (20 centavos), media peseta (10 centavos), all silver coins. The five centavo coin was made of copper and nickel. The one centavo, of bronze.
 - (3) Paper money was issued in the one, two, five, ten, twenty, fifty, one-hundred, two-hundred, and five-hundred peso denominations.
 - b. The metric system of measurements is used by Filipinos as well as the American system.
 - (1) One meter is 39.37 inches, 1,000 meters (1 kilometer) is 5/8 of a mile. (5 miles equal 8 kilometers.)
 - (2) Weight is measured by the kilogram ("kilo" which equals 2.2 pounds).
 - (3) Liquids are measured by the liter which is a little more than one of our quarts.
 - c. Spending sprees should not be indulged in.
 - (1) A scarcity of things to buy will exist in the Philippines; buying up items unnecessarily will work a hardship on Filipinos, and create ill-will.
 - (2) Whenever purchases are not essential, spare money should go for bonds, or be deposited, or sent home.
4. Getting along with the Filipinos is a military responsibility of every soldier.
- a. GI's should be acquainted with their general characteristics in order to understand them.
 - (1) The Filipinos cannot be compared with the fuzzy-wuzzies of New Guinea, for they are civilized.

- (2) The Filipinos' home life is simple.
 - (a) They are fond of dancing and music.
 - (b) Guitars can be found in most Filipino homes, and most everyone can play one.
- (3) Filipinos are hospitable people and will often invite soldiers into their homes.
- (4) Filipinos, being Oriental, eat rice and much fish, but they also like meat, especially pork (except the Moros).
- (5) Their most popular intoxicating beverage is a drink called "tuba" made from the sap of a coconut tree; one can get drunk on it rather easily.
 - (a) It is commonly sold in the small roadside "tiendas."
 - (b) Before the war it was considered a gesture of friendship when an American soldier shared a glass of tuba with the country people.
 - (c) In the better homes, beer and wine and other liquors may be served, but most drinking is reserved for feast days.
 - (d) The average Filipino is not a heavy drinker.
- b. The Filipino woman is treated with the utmost respect by menfolk.
 - (1) She is deeply religious.
 - (2) Her family and church are the most important influences in her life.
 - (3) She expects the consideration due her as a woman.
 - (4) She is sometimes shy, and may not greet a man first, even if she knows him.
 - (5) A Filipino will often fight to avenge a supposed insult to a woman; he might mistake playful wolfishness for something more serious.
- c. A soldier wanting to date a Filipino girl should always respect peoples' local customs and attitudes.
 - (1) When he takes a girl out to a movie or a dance it is a good idea to meet her parents first.
 - (2) Almost always in the provinces, and often in the larger cities, even in Manila, girls of good families are used to being chaperoned when they attend movies or other entertainments.
 - (a) There will be girls, however, particularly in Manila, who are more modern, in the American sense.

- (3) A soldier must simply use common sense and good judgment in his relations with Filipino girls, in order not to give offense.
 - d. In all his relations with Filipinos, the American soldier will get along best if he is soft-spoken and not boisterous.
 - (1) Respect for peoples' customs and feelings will be the best way to show friendliness.
 - (2) Good relations will be helped if it is remembered that the Philippines is the Filipinos' home -- not ours.
 - (3) Any suggestion of condescension or talking down to Filipinos will be deeply resented, particularly by the educated ones.
 - e. Local customs of Filipinos should be observed carefully.
 - (1) Throughout the Islands, sacred places and objects are greatly respected by certain people, and offenses against them may result in serious trouble -- even vengeance by these people.
 - (2) Mohammedan mosques and prayer houses, and Chinese temples and cemeteries must be treated with care.
 - f. Associations with Moros call for particular care.
 - (1) They are independent and aggressive, and prefer to be left alone in their social life and their religion.
 - (2) Moro women are less independent than other Filipino women, and are more closely guarded.
 - (3) Moros have many tabus which must be respected.
 - g. The GI has a responsibility to conduct himself as a good American.
 - (1) The good-will of the Filipinos will often depend on the faith they are able to have in individual American soldiers.
 - (2) Demonstration of our understanding of Philippine cooperation in the war will go far to maintain good relations between our peoples.
5. Present good relations between Filipinos and American soldiers will contribute much to good relations in the future.
- a. American soldiers have an opportunity to add to the already illustrious history of Philippine-American relationships.
 - b. The better knowledge we have of our record in the Philippines the better will be our understanding of the Filipinos' ideals and hopes for an independent nationhood.

- (1) While the United States still had sovereign power over the Philippine Islands, its people were not only helped to attain a better standard of living, but were aided in achieving their own independence.
- c. A recognition of our common democratic ideals has built a strong foundation for cooperation between our two countries.
 - d. In the battle for the Philippines, the friendship of Americans and Filipinos was strengthened.
 - e. In re-establishing contacts between these two peoples, the American soldier must recognize the responsibility he has for continuing these good relationships; every American soldier should consider himself a personal ambassador of good-will for Filipino-American relationships.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINE INFORMATION TRAINING PROGRAM PART SEVEN A FEW DO'S AND DON'TS FOR GI'S

OUTLINE AND REFERENCE MATERIAL
PREPARED BY INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION, HQ. USAFFE

Points to Emphasize

Strict security measures will be essential in the Philippines. For the first time in this theater many American troops will meet large masses of people living in modern, thickly settled cities.

* * * *

Most of the Filipinos will be of invaluable aid to the United States Army, for they are awaiting liberation. A certain few, however, are not sympathetic to the United States. Against these every soldier must be on the alert.

* * * *

Every soldier must guard constantly against careless talk in the presence of any Filipinos. It is not always possible to distinguish between friendly and unfriendly individuals, anywhere.

* * * *

Rumors must be squelched before they are allowed to spread. Part of the Japanese fifth column technique will be the planting of rumors among certain Filipinos. Soldiers passing on such rumors would be actively, though unwittingly, aiding the Japanese.

* * * *

Military efficiency will depend on the good health of troops. Regular army precautions against malaria, dysentery, and venereal diseases must be observed strictly.

* * * *

Filipinos must be considered as citizens of the Philippines, not "natives." They are a civilized people, and are entitled to respectful and considerate treatment.

* * * *

Getting along with and understanding the Filipino people is a military responsibility of every soldier. In their relations with Filipino women, particularly, soldiers must show consideration for the customs and feelings of the Filipinos. They are friendly people, but will deeply resent crude behavior by any soldier.

* * * *

American soldiers have an opportunity to add to the already illustrious history of American-Philippine relationships by considering themselves personal ambassadors of good will. Good relations in the future depend on our proper conduct during and after invasion.

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines. There will be eight topics:

Part 1—From Moresby to Morotai.
Part 2—History of the Philippines.
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Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5—Under the heel of Japan.
Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.
Part 7—A few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.
Part 8—Looking Ahead.

Outline: A Few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.

1. Every soldier must understand that strict security measures will be essential in the Philippines.

(a) For the first time in this theater troops will run into large masses of people.

(1) Most of these will be of invaluable aid—they are awaiting liberation.

(2) A certain few are not sympathetic to the U.S.—against these our soldiers must be on the alert.

(b) For the first time troops will come across modern, thickly settled, and thriving cities.

(1) It cannot be denied that during the past few years some of the people of the Philippines were not immune to Japanese propaganda.

(2) Dangers of loose-talk, rumors, espionage, sabotage, enemy mines and booby traps will be increased.

(3) Japanese government has had a successful system of espionage working in the Philippines for several years, and some Filipinos as well as Japanese citizens were involved in it.

(4) For over two years the Filipino people have been subjected to intense and concentrated propaganda campaigns, and many have been threatened and coerced into co-operating with the Japanese.

(c) Peoples of the Philippines must be considered as citizens, not "natives."

(1) They are citizens of the Philippines, and nationals of the United States.

(2) They should be treated with respect and consideration.

(3) But we must still guard constantly against those whose sympathies do not lie with our government.

(d) It will be necessary to distinguish between the good and the bad among the Filipinos.

(1) We cannot afford to get careless in the presence of any of them.

(2) Some Filipinos who speak English poorly may still understand enough to make them a security risk; they might be in the employ of the enemy just to pick up small bits of important information.

(3) Filipino fishermen, wealthy Filipino merchants, women spies and, on several occasions, children from 13 to 15 years of age have been discovered working as spies for the Japanese.

(4) An escaped convict was seen acting as a guide for Japanese troops who raided a certain city.

(5) Soldiers must keep quiet on military matters in the presence of all men, women, and children.

(e) Soldiers have no monopoly on rumors; the Japanese can be counted upon to start vicious rumors among certain Filipinos, and to see that they spread.

(1) Every soldier should recognize the responsibility he has to stop wild and ridiculous rumors wherever he hears them.

(2) Passing on such rumors is to be considered directly aiding the Japanese.

(f) Beware of souvenir hunting.

(1) The Japanese have prepared many lovely sou-

venirs for Yanks in the form of booby traps.

(2) An inconsequential souvenir may lead an unsuspecting GI into a well laid mine field; these souvenirs should be reserved for the Engineers.

(g) Japanese are anxious to capture American prisoners of war.

(1) They realize the importance of obtaining information.

(2) Soldiers must be warned strongly against carrying military information of any sort with them into a combat area.

(3) Conversely, the more Japanese prisoners Americans can capture, the more valuable information will be available to our intelligence sections through interrogations.

2. Good health depends on strict observance of health measures.

(a) Malaria must be fought constantly.

(1) Follow the regular precautionary measures: atabrine, mosquito bar for sleeping, repellent ointment, use of sprays, keeping sleeves rolled down, and wearing leg-gings.

(b) Dysentery can be avoided:

(1) By not eating uncooked food, green fruits, or raw vegetables.

(2) By drinking purified water.

(3) By washing hands and mess gear before meals.

(4) By keeping flies away.

(c) Dangers of venereal disease are great.

- (1) Before the war venereal diseases were the largest single cause for hospitalization of U.S. troops in the Philippines.
- (2) During the Japanese occupation, they have spread more widely.
- (3) The regular precautions insisted on by the Army must more than ever be carefully followed.

3. Every soldier will profit from some information and practical advice.

- (a) Philippine money system is simple, for, like U.S. money, it is based on the decimal system.

- (1) The Spanish words **peso** and **centavo** are the names for coins of currency used in the Philippines.

- (a) Peso in 1941 was equal to fifty cents in U.S. money.

- (b) One peso equals 100 centavos.

- (2) Coins in currency were the peso, one-half peso, peseta (20 centavos), media peseta (10 centavos), all silver coins. The five centavo coin was made of copper and nickel. The one centavo, of bronze.

- (3) Paper money was issued in the one, two, five, ten, twenty, fifty, one-hundred, two-hundred, and five-hundred peso denominations.

- (b) The metric system of measurements is used by Filipinos as well as the American system.

- (1) One meter is 39.37 inches, 1,000 meters (1 kilometer) is 5/8 of a mile. (5 miles equal 8 kilometers).

- (2) Weight is measured by the kilogram ("kilo" which equals 2.2 pounds).

- (3) Liquids are measured by the liter which is a little more than one of our quarts.

- (c) Spending sprees should not be indulged in.

- (1) A scarcity of things to buy will exist in the Philippines; buying up items unnecessarily will work a hardship on Filipinos, and create ill-will.

- (2) Whenever purchases are not essential, spare money should go for bonds, or be deposited, or sent home.

4. Getting along with the Filipinos is a military responsibility of every soldier.

- (a) GI's should be acquainted with their general characteristics in order to understand them.

- (1) The Filipinos cannot be compared with the fuzzy-wuzzies of New Guinea, for they are civilized.

- (2) The Filipinos' home life is simple.

- (a) They are fond of dancing and music.

- (b) Guitars can be found in most Filipino homes, and most everyone can play one.

- (3) Filipinos are hospitable people and will often invite soldiers into their homes.

- (4) Filipinos, being Oriental, eat rice and much fish, but they also like meat, especially pork (except the Moros).

- (5) Their most popular intoxicating beverage is a drink called "tuba" made from the sap of a coconut tree; one can get drunk on it rather easily.

- (a) It is commonly sold in the small roadside "tiendas."

- (b) Before the war it was considered a gesture of friendship when an American soldier shared a glass of tuba with the country people.

- (c) In the better homes, beer and wine and other liquors may be served, but most drinking is reserved for feast days.

- (d) The average Filipino is not a heavy drinker.

- (b) The Filipino woman is treated with the utmost respect by menfolk.

- (1) She is deeply religious.

- (2) Her family and church are the most important influences in her life.

- (3) She expects the consideration due her as a woman.

- (4) She is sometimes shy, and may not greet a man first, even if she knows him.

- (5) A Filipino will often fight to avenge a supposed insult to a woman; he might mistake playful wolfishness for something more serious.

- (c) A soldier wanting to date a Filipino girl should always respect peoples' local customs and attitudes.

- (1) When he takes a girl out to a movie or a dance it is a good idea to meet her parents first.

- (2) Almost always in the provinces, and often in the larger cities, even in Manila, girls of good families are used to being chaperoned when they attend movies or other entertainments.

- (a) There will be girls, however, particularly in Manila, who are more modern, in the American sense.

- (3) A soldier must simply use common sense and good judgment in his relations with Filipino girls, in order not to give offense.

- (d) In all his relations with Filipinos, the American soldier will get along best if he is

soft-spoken and not boastful.

- (1) Respect for peoples' customs and feelings will be the best way to show friendliness.

- (2) Good relations will be helped if it is remembered that the Philippines is the Filipinos' home—not ours.

- (3) Any suggestion of condescension or talking down to Filipinos will be deeply resented, particularly by the educated ones.

- (e) Local customs of Filipinos should be observed carefully.

- (1) Throughout the Islands, sacred places and objects are greatly respected by certain people, and offenses against them may result in serious trouble—even vengeance by these people.

- (2) Mohammedan mosques and prayer houses, and Chinese temples and cemeteries must be treated with care.

- (f) Associations with Moros call for particular care.

- (1) They are independent and aggressive, and prefer to be left alone in their social life and their religion.

- (2) Moro women are less independent than other Filipino women, and are more closely guarded.

- (3) Moros have many tabus which must be respected.

- (g) The GI has a responsibility to conduct himself as a good American.

- (1) The good-will of the Filipinos will often depend on the faith they are able to have in individual American soldiers.

- (2) Demonstration of our understanding of Philippine co-operation in the war will go far to maintain good relations between our peoples.

5. Present good relations between Filipinos and American soldiers will contribute much to good relations in the future.

- (a) American soldiers have an opportunity to add to the already illustrious history of Philippine-American relationships.

- (b) The better knowledge we have of our record in the Philippines the better will be our understanding of the Filipinos' ideals and hopes for an independent nationhood.

- (1) While the United States still had sovereign power over the Philippine Islands, its people were not only helped to attain a better standard of living, but were aided in achieving their own independence.

- (c) A recognition of our common democratic ideals has built a strong foundation for co-operation between our two countries.

- (d) In the battle for the Philippines, the friendship of Americans and Filipinos was strengthened.

- (e) In re-establishing contacts between these two peoples, the American soldier must recognize the responsibility he has for continuing these good relationships; every American soldier should consider himself a personal ambassador of good-will for Filipino-American relationships.

Text References: A Few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.

1. Security Measures Necessary In the Philippines

Introduction:

The dangers to United States troops, through security lapses, will be of a far greater scope than heretofore, when they enter the Philippine Islands.

It will be the first time that they will run into large masses of people. However, on the whole, these people can, and will, prove themselves to be of invaluable aid. They are citizens of the Philippines and nationals of the United States, and they have been anxiously and patiently awaiting their liberation from the Japanese by their protectorate. But then, there are bound to be a certain few whose sympathies do not lie with the United States, and it is against these few that our soldiers must be on the alert.

Also, for the first time in this theater of operations, United States troops will come across modern, thickly settled, and thriving cities. These cities will bring their own security problems, and it will be advantageous to have troops alerted and aware of these inherent dangers. The dangers of loose-talk, rumors, Japanese espionage and sabotage, enemy mines and booby traps will be far greater than previously experienced and they can wreak havoc upon Allied war efforts. United States troops must be fully aware of the existing danger to themselves when they find their units operating in Mindanao, in Luzon, or in any of the islands which compose the Philippine Island group.

It has been established, that prior to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Japanese government managed, through the medium of countless hundreds of Japanese businessmen, industrial leaders, fishermen, tourists, etc., all Japanese citizens, to receive great amounts of important military, geographical and economic information regarding the Islands. Many of these Japanese citizens were involved directly in the espionage systems of their government. It cannot

be denied that during the past few years the people of the Philippines were not immune to Japanese wiles and propaganda, and as a result, many of these Filipinos will have to be guarded against.

It is quite important that the person instructing and orienting troops on the Philippine Islands, and their dangers, have a thorough knowledge of the subject. Valuable information can be gleaned from material furnished through the Philippine Information Training Program.

It is further recommended that the lecturer incorporate in his talks all phases of security education, for in such areas as those that will be encountered in the Philippine Islands, the dangers resulting from the lack of all forms of security are great.

A Sample Lecture on Security

To-day I'd like to talk to you about the Philippine Islands. You undoubtedly all know where they are located—how many square miles they cover—how we were forced to surrender the Islands to the Japanese and to evacuate—how General MacArthur has pledged his return to the Islands and their liberation from Japanese domination—and how almost every Allied Pacific war effort to date has been directed in the Philippine direction. I'm not going into any great detail on the importance of the Islands, geographically, to the Allies, or into the economic set-up—nor shall I discuss their principal cities, their industries, and so forth, for previous periods of the Philippine Training Program have acquainted you thoroughly with these matters.

A Few Added Dangers

But, I would like to bring to light a few of the added dangers you, as soldiers of the United States Army, will encounter should you be among the troops who re-enter and who recapture the Philippines.

Heretofore, the geography of the countries in which our main victories have been won in the Southwest Pacific offered nothing more than

tangled jungles, extensive, stinking, treacherous swamps. Almost every location we've recaptured had to be built up—roads constructed, airfields built or enlarged and repaired, and our complete installations built up from practically nothing. The so-called pre-war towns in the Islands were nothing more than a few scattered native huts, perhaps a mission building or two, and these were usually wrecked by our air bombings or artillery. Upon occupying these so-called towns, troops encountered a few natives, the population of the area retaken. But, regardless of the absence of large numbers of people, there were many dangers present to the Army in the form of natives co-operating and working for the Japanese. The troops had to be kept continuously on their guard against loose-talk, against the spreading of rumors, and they had to adhere strictly to the regulations of safeguarding military information contained in AR 380-5. All in all, they had to wage another war of security in order to deny important military information to the Japanese. And although in many cases there were instances where the plans and intentions of our Armies were learned by the enemy through some security breach, the battle was quite efficiently carried out.

But now let's consider how great these same dangers of people in occupied areas cooperating with the Japanese will be when Allied troops occupy any of the Islands that make up the Philippine group.

The Philippine Islands cover over 115,600 square miles of land—an area three times as large as the State of Ohio. Latest census figures place the population at about eighteen million people, of which, before the occupation by the enemy, 30,000 were Japanese.

Security Problem in Populated Area

The security problem presented by having so many people in a battle area should be evident to all of you, for you can readily understand how easily enemy agents can be placed in a fair-sized city.

The Japanese have been in possession of the Philippines for over two

years now, and we cannot but admit that they have striven, and in many cases have succeeded, in winning over many of the Filipinos to their cause. The Japanese have subjected the Filipino peoples to intense and concentrated propaganda campaigns; they have threatened and coerced many into co-operating with them. They have used all sorts of tricks to get the Filipino people to work for them in helping to defeat the American aims.

Citizens—Not "Natives"

When we get to the Philippines we must not consider the peoples as "natives." They are citizens of the Philippines and nationals of the United States; and they are our allies. They should be treated with respect and with consideration. Although they are nationals of the United States, we must guard, and guard constantly, against those whose sympathies do not lie with our government.

You might ask how these people, who are citizens of our country, who have been always friendly to us, can be a danger to us. After all, the United States has been the protector of the islands for 40 years, we have promised them their independence in 1946; we have established thriving businesses in their land; we have helped them to prosperity. Why should they be dangerous to us? Logical questions—but let me cite a few examples of what has happened in the past, and perhaps you'll have a better understanding of why we will have to be on our guard. The names and locations concerned have been omitted for reasons I'm sure you will be able to gather, but the facts presented here are the truth.

"In (a certain Philippine city) the Japanese have found it convenient to depend largely on Filipino civilians for information. They have used various types and classes of people as spies. Filipino fishermen have been frequently employed as spies because they could use their boats for gathering and communicating information. In some instances, wealthy Filipino merchants have served as spies, carrying information to (the Japanese) on their sailboats. They have also secured the services of women spies by treating them well and by promising them money and gifts. On several occasions children from 13 to 15 years of age have been discovered working as spies for the Japanese."

"In one province, women peddling Bibles, religious treatises, or food, are known to have been gathering information for the Japanese."

Another example:

"An escaped convict was seen by many peoples who knew him well, acting as guide for the Japanese troops who raided a certain city. He was condemned to death for murder but his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment."

These examples should clearly show to you the wide range of classes of people the Japanese have covered to obtain their spies. Fishermen, wealthy merchants, women, young boys and girls, and convicted prisoners. And it will be correct to presume that many other types have been pressed into service.

Good or Bad?

Perhaps, too, that will help you to understand why we cannot accept all of these people as friends and allies. As a result we must hold all with skepticism, for we are not able to tell the good from the bad at first glance and we cannot afford to get careless in the presence of any of them.

Although all Filipinos cannot speak English well, enough of them can understand the language to make them a security risk—another warning to us to be perpetually on our guard.

The nearer we get to the enemy's home land and main forces, the quicker information concerning our intended actions can reach him, so with the possibility of the Japanese having Filipinos in their employ as spies you men must continually and painstakingly guard against loose-talk.

We know you all like to shoot the breeze, but don't do it in the presence of any Filipinos—for they may have been sent out by the Japs just to stand, look harmless, and to listen, and to report back whatever information they have been able to pick up—which may be the cause of many of you, and your buddies becoming battle casualties.

Rumors—No Monopoly by Soldiers

The presence of so many Filipinos will also add to the dangers of rumor mongering or rumor spreading, for you can count upon the Japanese to use their agents to start vicious rumors.

"Why, rumors are only for soldiers" you might say—"what harm would

come of the Filipino hearing and spreading the rumors he hears the soldiers discussing?" The Filipino is by nature calm in temperament, but once he feels he has been let down or has been "used," he is intense in his hatred. What more could the Japanese wish than to have the hatred of the loyal and friendly Filipino people stirred up against our forces, using vicious rumors as the means? The Japanese will most certainly endeavour to panic the Filipino in recaptured areas with wild and ridiculous stories and if you pass on these stories you will be directly aiding the Japanese, and I know none of you want to be guilty of that. It is important, mighty important, that the sympathies and feelings of all Filipinos are with us.

"Souvenirs"?

In the back of the heads of many of you have been the thoughts of what lovely souvenirs will be found in the Philippine Islands when you get there. True—it would be nice to send the folks something from the Islands—concrete proof that you were with the invading forces, with the forces who helped fulfill the American promise of liberation from the Japanese. But think for a moment—think of all the time the Japanese have had to prepare their lovely "souvenirs" for you men.

To date many of our soldiers have been pretty lucky in that they didn't get themselves seriously hurt in their souvenir hunting. The Japanese haven't been too thorough with their use of booby traps, but that is no indication at all that they won't start to use this form of warfare, and that is what it is, in the Philippines. There will be plenty of houses and shacks to leave enticing looking knick-knacks lying about. They undoubtedly will have prepared elaborate and fancy booby traps, just waiting for souvenir-hunting Yanks.

Mine fields will in all probability be well plotted and laid, and wouldn't some of you feel a bit foolish if you found suddenly that you were starting through a thick mine field, and for nothing more than some small, inconsequential souvenir? True, our Army wants to know where the Japs have laid their mine fields, but they have far better ways of discovering and neutralizing these mine fields than by having some GI take off in the search of souvenirs only to find himself blown

sky high. Leave that business to the Engineers, and leave the souvenirs alone!

Information from Prisoners

Captured enemy documents have shown upon translation that the Japanese are more anxious to capture American prisoners of war. They have come to realize the importance of prisoners from the military information standpoint, so I'd like to warn you men against carrying military information of any sort with you into a combat area.

Here's a bit, extracted from a captured enemy document:

"On 1 April we attacked four Allied soldiers and killed three of them. According to diaries gathered from their bodies, their movements are judged to be as follows:

1. On 27 February left Port Moresby and arrived same day at Yeschan, 20 km west of Kambuntsu.
2. On 2 March left Avatip, 15 km SW of Marui and arrived on the third at Marui.
3. Thereafter they were at a place 10 km north-east of Bukinara and reconnoitered the Wewak region."

The above clearly proves the enemy does search casualties and does value information so obtained. The above soldiers were guilty of a serious security breach, and any bit of written information can be of value to the enemy . . . personal letters which contain your unit's name and APO number, information which will inform the enemy of what forces are opposing him; copies of company orders—anything that is written can be of value to the Japanese. So—realize that all of you are liable to capture by the enemy and guard against carrying anything of value to him with you into a battle area.

The reverse on the importance of prisoners is true also. The Japanese to be found in the Philippine Islands will have been garrisoned there for some time. Many replacements and reinforcements will have just come from Japan, China, or other Japanese occupied countries. Think of the valuable information they will be able to offer our intelligence sections through interrogations. Endeavor to capture as many prisoners as possible and you will be aiding our intelligence sections greatly.

Don't Talk on Military Matters

In closing I would like to say—all the dangers heretofore presented through security breaches, will be presented still when you men enter the Philippine Islands—but they will be added to greatly. I know the pretty damsels to be seen in the Philippines will be most attractive to you all, but don't let your guard down for one minute. Keep quiet on military matters in the presence of all men, women, and children, for as I've pointed out, the Japanese are using them all as their spies.

Follow the security rules and regulations laid down by the Army and you'll find half the battle won—and you'll all be home soon with victory won without the great casualties that security laxness certainly brings.

2. Health Measures in the Islands

Guard Your Health

When you have arrived in the Philippines, you will come fully vaccinated against some diseases, but not against all. You will have to fight "bugs" and diseases peculiar to tropical countries as well as others. If you are not careful, you are more likely to get diseases in the Philippines than in the United States. Here are a few things to do and guard against:—
Fight malaria.

The malaria-bearing mosquito in the Philippines breeds in running water. She likes to come out at night and dine on human flesh. But don't let her get you. Let her bite Japs, but not you.

Follow the rules and the training regulations for fighting this disease. If you do, you can hold off the chills, the fever, and the death which malaria can bring on you. Use your mosquito repellents and take anti-malaria drugs regularly when ordered.

Fight dysentery. Stomach aches and running bowels are the first signs of disease which can wreck your health.

To prevent dysentery, follow all the rules. Don't eat uncooked food, green fruits or raw vegetables. Dirty hands and dirty mess kits make for dysentery. Keep flies away. They carry germs from the latrine.

Don't drink water which has not been boiled or chlorinated. Boiling water for at least five minutes is a sure way to kill the dysentery bug. As a general rule, all stream water in the Philippines is polluted.

Just as you stay "on the ball" with your rifle or other anti-Jap weapon, so also you must constantly use your anti-malaria and anti-dysentery weapons.

Watch out for all the other "bugs" and diseases. Learn as much as you can about their tricks, and the ways to fight them, as you would the enemy.

In the Philippines venereal diseases were the largest single cause for hospitalization of U.S. troops before the war. During the Japanese occupation, venereal diseases have been spread more widely than ever in the Philippines. Don't let the enemy knock you out indirectly by this means.

The best way to prevent venereal disease is not to engage in sexual intercourse. Don't take a chance that may wreck your post-war happiness. The odds are against you. If you do expose yourself, use Army prophylaxis measures immediately after exposure.

As a general rule, be aware of all these other enemies you have to fight in addition to fighting the Japs. The Japs have to fight bugs and diseases, too. With your knowledge of how to stay healthy under the toughest conditions, you can stay fit and fight better.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines. Additional material on measures of sanitation and health may be found on p. 25-26 of We Return to the Philippines, which will be included among the materials for the Philippine Information Training Program.

3. General Information and Practical Advice

To Buy or Not to Buy

After years of Japanese occupation you will find that there is a scarcity of things to buy in the Philippines. If you go around on spending sprees, you will be working hardship on the Filipino people and creating ill-will.

If you must buy things, however, set a fair price in your own mind and pay no more. Filipinos like to bargain as much as anyone else. It makes business more interesting.

When you find yourself wondering whether to buy or not to buy, don't—SAVE. Your money may not mean much to you now, but if you save as much as you can, you will be glad that you did so after the war.

You can save in several different ways.

You can buy War Bonds out of your pay or for cash.

You can put your extra cash into Soldiers' Deposits.

You can make regular Allotments-of-Pay (Class E) to individuals at home, to civilian insurance companies or banks (for savings or checking accounts).

Use the Personal Transfer Account System for sending money home to individuals or banks. No charge for the service.

If you want more details ask your First Sergeant or the nearest Finance Officer.

Money

The Spanish words *peso* and *centavo* are the names for coins of currency used in the Philippines.

The peso in 1941 was equal to fifty cents in United States money.

One peso equals 100 centavos.

Coins in currency were the peso, one-half peso, peseta (20 centavos), media peseta (10 centavos), all silver coins. The five centavo coin was made of copper and nickel. The one centavo, of bronze.

Paper money was issued in one, two, five, ten, twenty, fifty, one-hundred, two-hundred and five-hundred peso denominations.

Measurements

The metric system of measurements is used by Filipinos as well as the American system. Roadmarkers, for example, are usually marked in kilometers from the nearest large town. You should know the more important units of metric measurement:

One meter is 3.37 inches longer than a yard, or 39.37 inches. 1,000 meters (1 kilometer) is 5/8 of a mile (5 miles equal 8 kilometers).

Weight is measured by the kilogram ("kilo") which equals 2.2 pounds in the American system.

Liquids are measured by the liter which is a little more than one of our quarts.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

4. Getting Along with the Filipinos

Habits and Customs of the Filipino People

General Characteristics

It must be remembered that the Filipino population has been under Spanish domination for 300 years and under the Americans for only about forty years. Consequently their habits are a mixture of Spanish, American, and Malayan customs. . . Being originally Malays, they have intermarried with the Chinese and Spaniards for hundreds of years. The American soldier will see both dark and light skinned natives. The girls are very beautiful, especially those who have mixed blood, the *Mestizos*.

Filipinos cannot be compared with the fuzzy wuzzies of New Guinea. They are all civilized except for a few Negritos who live in the wilds. They are a religious people. The predominant religion is Catholic, and one will see churches in every small barrio. The soldier will meet many well-educated Filipinos. Most of the Filipinos he meets will be able to speak at least some English, for that was the language of instruction used in the school system before the war.

Home Life

The people are simple and home-loving. They are very fond of dancing and music. Almost every little hut has a guitar and practically everyone can play it. They all dance foxtrots, and any other dance you want to introduce, including jitterbugging. In the poorer homes everyone sleeps on the floor on mats which are spread at bed time.

Food and Drink

The Filipino being an Oriental eats rice and much fish, but also likes meat, especially pork. During their festivals every home will have "a lechon," or as it is called in English "a barbecued pig." (Moros, however, eat no pork, because of religious scruples).

The natives drink intoxicating beverages, the most popular one being a drink called "tuba." This is made

from the sap of a coconut tree. It is very mild, but one can get drunk on it easily. Every evening about four, the local population will gather about its favourite tubabar and drink tuba and eat fish or roast pork. This side dish is called "suman suman." This is a good way to get acquainted with the local population.

Tuba is commonly sold in the small roadside "tiendas," and is the drink of the country or market-place Filipino. Before the war it was considered a much appreciated gesture of friendship when the American soldier shared a glass with the country people. In the better homes, under normal circumstances, beer or wines, or other liquors may be served. Most drinking among the better class, however, is reserved for feast days or special celebrations. The average Filipino is not a heavy drinker.

Hospitality

Most of the younger generation can speak English, and many of the old-timers speak Spanish. Through the American movies, the younger generation have become very much Americanized, and appreciate our ways of humor. The soldier must be advised that when taking out Filipino girls, he may have to get the parents' consent. This is from the old Spanish custom. You will be invited into their homes and they will offer you the best they have. These people are very hospitable. They also have very sensitive feelings, however, and are quick to avenge an insult with a knife.

Some Filipino Characteristics

The Filipino is generally a peace-loving, God-fearing, home-loving person. He is rather sensitive; his feelings are easily hurt.

When aroused he is a caution. He fought like a wild-cat at Bataan. For the last two years he has fought the Jap from the underground. He can be expected to continue to fight with the fury of a man whose home has been violated.

Unmolested, the Filipino is peaceful. He is courteous. He does not like gruffness. He is hospitable and generous.

He prefers to be gay and smiling rather than sour-faced and sober. He loves pleasant company. He likes a good joke now and then even at his own expense—but he does not like to

be kidded about his wife or his children. His family is the most important thing in his life.

In short, the Filipino is pleasant company as long as he is treated with courtesy and fairness. At work, at play or in a fight, he knows how to take care of himself.

When he works he works hard, so do not think he is lazy if he likes to take a siesta in the afternoons. The heat runs hot and heavy this part of the day, and Filipinos have learned to take it in stride.

How to Oppose Japanese Propaganda

You will have to start off right away showing the Filipinos by your conduct and manner as well as by your fighting ability that you live up to your reputation.

As a soldier of democracy, you must help to restore the faith which they may have lost in American good-will. Some Filipinos may have been convinced by the Jap propaganda that we left the Philippines holding the bag. They may doubt our fighting ability because of our defeat in 1942.

But on Philippine soil, your very presence will prove that America has not forgotten Bataan. Many Filipinos will learn for sure, for the first time, how we have been beating the Japs in the South-west Pacific.

Most Filipinos will look on you as "liberators" in the American sense; not the Japanese sense of the word. Our experience in maintaining harmonious and progressive relations with them in the past; the memory of heroism and suffering shared on Bataan and Corregidor; the unbroken co-operation of the United States Government and the Philippine Commonwealth Government since the war began—such facts are the guides to your conduct in the Philippines.

The Filipino Woman

She is treated with utmost respect by the menfolk of the Philippines. For example, in crowded street cars or busses, Filipino men are very careful to stand up and let women have their seats.

The Filipino woman is deeply religious. Her family and the church are the most important influences in her life. In most cases, she loves nothing better than to find the same piety in men.

Although modern in many ways,

she is innately old-fashioned and modest. No matter how much she may demand equality with men, she still expects all the consideration due to her as a woman. She controls the family's finances and can dispose of her property without her husband's consent, but she still regards her husband as lord and master.

... A country girl (that is, one from the provinces), especially, is apt to be afraid of appearing alone in the presence of men. She is used to being chaperoned by her mother.

If you become acquainted with a Filipino girl respect her unsophistication and her piety. Don't get too playful. Your boldness may be mistaken by Filipino men. . . .

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

Local Customs

In dealing with the local population, it is important to be aware of the most vulnerable points in the people's religious and cultural traditions.

Throughout the Archipelago there are sacred places, burial places, places of worship, sacred objects, and holy heirlooms kept in houses, of varying shape and location, depending on the particular ritual practices of a given pagan tribe. Trespassing on sacred grounds, and touching or handling holy objects may be the cause of vengeance, not necessarily open. The offender or offenders may perish by the "wrath of spirits or gods."

Mohammedan mosques and prayer houses, Chinese temples and cemeteries, holy graves of Mohammedan kings and saints, and burial grounds in general, all belong to the category of places to be treated with care.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Celebes Sea Area (JANIS 155, Chapter X). People and Government. May 1944, p. 2.

Your Associations with Moros

You must be particularly careful in your associations with Moros. They are very independent and aggressive. They prefer to be let alone in their social life and their religion, especially the latter. Moros, for example, regard their women folk differently from how other Filipinos regard their women. Moro women are less independent and more closely guarded. And they have many tabus in regard to other things. As a matter of interest, it is all right to learn their customs, but do not be disrespectful.

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

5. Relations between Filipinos and American Soldiers

The Story of Philippine-American Relationships

The time is historic. And so is the place—this frontier post in the Philippines. I wonder if in all history there has ever been anything quite like the story of Philippine-American relationships. A Nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to human freedom and democracy, grown powerful and great through a century and a quarter, through a strange juxtaposition of circumstances in 1898, acquires sovereignty over some seven and a half million people on the other side of the world struggling for freedom and seeking the same objective which had become American traditions. America must promise them the freedom they demand or compromise her fundamental faith. So she promises freedom. Then for over 40 years she assists the Islands with much of the best she has to give—men, ideas, sacrificial effort, money, material resources. The two peoples, aided by the talents of those from other countries, buckle down to work, shoulder to shoulder together. They set up schools and the standard of literacy is raised from 20.2 per cent. in 1903 to 48.8 per cent. in 1939; they teach a uniform language by which Filipinos of different localities and different race can reach common understanding and achieve the unity of a nation. Americans inspire the building of systems of roadways linking together distant parts of the Islands; they teach sanitation and inaugurate campaigns against disease so that the dread scourges of cholera and smallpox are practically stamped out, reducing the death rate from 47.2 per thousand in 1903 to 16.87 per thousand in 1939. Americans and Filipinos together open up mines, develop new industries, introduce revolutionary changes into old industries, so that the Filipino standard of living is raised to double or more what it was before America came; and, of fundamental importance, America imparts to the Filipino people her own conceptions of human progress, her own political

philosophy, and her own ideals. Within the span of a single generation, a progress is achieved truly phenomenal—achieved, as I need scarcely point out, not by the work of either people alone but by the joint efforts and close co-operation of both peoples working unitedly together. Naturally during this time there have been differences of viewpoint and disagreements aplenty; but these have never prevented the steady progress and the fundamental unity of purpose of the two peoples.

Then in 1934 a program is agreed to for definite independence at the end of a 10-year term and during those 10 years the Filipinos are granted wide domestic autonomy and a High Commissioner is sent by the President of the United States to help them prepare for full-blown independence in 1946. All ideas of ruler and subject people quite forgotten; instead a whole-hearted help to a once-subject people to become absolutely free. It is the most striking example I know of in history of the comradeship of two peoples working together for the kind of ideals that make men free.

Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Washington, D.C. October 20, 1942. P. 132-133.

Common Ideals Have Furthered Understanding

"We are a Christian people, and the faith that we imbibed springs from our contacts with nations of Occidental civilization. We embraced Christianity before the Pilgrim fathers landed at Plymouth. For more than 400 years we have had that faith. We cannot now turn back and be a pagan people.

"For centuries we have been a law-abiding people. We believe in and practice democracy. That is the reason why Section 3, Article 2 of our constitution provides that we renounce war as an instrument of national policy and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of our nation.

"It is repugnant to our Christian traditions and democratic ideals to be satellite of a conquering power or be allied with the master of brute force whether in Asia, Europe or elsewhere. The mutual relationship between the American and Filipino peoples for half a century has revealed to Filipinos the high ideals of the American nation and the good faith that has always animated the United States

in its dealings with us. From this association have arisen mutual understanding and continuous co-operation between the two countries, resulting in great national progress for the Philippines—progress without parallel in history. In the epic of Bataan, where American and Filipino soldiers fought together, the enduring friendship of our two peoples was sealed.

"In this war between the free and the slave world, the Philippines has freely and voluntarily taken side with the defenders of liberty and democracy. In the same manner as the enemy is resorting to every means 'to attain his evil deeds,' the United Nations are exerting their utmost to achieve complete victory. Pledged in this war to the finish, we will continue doing our best to help the war effort. Every commitment made by us in this respect will be fulfilled.

"The Filipino people, with their wisdom in peace and gallantry in war, have established their right to take a place in the family of nations as a full and sovereign power. We cannot renounce this right nor its obligations and responsibilities. We shall, as a free and self-respecting nation, fulfill our duties not only to ourselves but also to the entire freedom-loving world, by participation in the establishment and the preservation of a just peace for the benefit of mankind.

"Our path of duty is clear. It is the path of national honor, dignity and responsibility. It was laid out for us by the great leaders of our race—Rizal, Bonifacio and Quezon. We shall move forward steadily to reach our goal, maintaining our faith in the United States and fully co-operating with her.

"In the fulfillment of my duties as President of the Philippines, I ask in all humility but in all earnestness the co-operation of all my countrymen in the United States, in Hawaii, in the homeland and elsewhere in the world. With their full and unstinted co-operation and support, and God helping me, I shall not fail."

From Address by President Sergio Osmeña, at first meeting of Philippine War Cabinet under his administration, 10 August, 1944. (Philippine Hour, 11 August, 1944, United States Office of War Information).

"Ambassadors of Good-will": Remarks by Two Enlisted Men

I
With the reoccupation of the Philippines by American troops, one of the biggest jobs of the liberating forces

will be to convince the Filipinos that their faith in America and American ideals has not been misplaced.

While the majority of the Filipinos have always loved and respected their American allies, we cannot overlook the fact that the Japanese occupation has had a profound effect upon the Filipino people socially, economically and politically.

As we judge others by their deeds, so will the Filipinos judge American doughboys when they set foot upon Philippine soil. "By their fruits you shall know them" may well be the yardstick of the Filipinos' opinion of the American soldier.

The question which immediately presents itself, therefore, is: "What can we, as American ambassadors do to win the respect and good will of the Filipinos and to demonstrate conclusively and concretely that we are worthy of their trust and faith in us?"

Broadly, one of the most frequently encountered criticisms of the American has been his superior manner and disregard for Filipino sensibilities and culture. In direct contrast to this attitude, the Japanese have played their cards skilfully. With characteristic Oriental humility, they have often gone out of the way to create and foster the Greater East Asia principle of racial equality and the belief of "Hakko Ichiu" (Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof). Care should therefore be taken to avoid offensive or disparaging remarks. The GI who rides the street car or rubs elbows with the Filipino in a bar or hotel should make it a practice to think twice before he speaks. A careless word can do more harm, psychologically, than a truckload of 2,000 lb. bombs.

The danger of ridicule also must be avoided. The American soldier will find many aspects of Filipino life which will undoubtedly seem strange and foreign to his way of thinking. To scoff at them would be fatal. He should remember that what we Americans consider sane and logical may well appear completely ludicrous in the eyes of the Filipino. Nor should he assume the equally arbitrary attitude that the Filipinos are an uncivilized or illiterate people. Some of their statesmen, writers, artists and musicians are among the finest in the world. As a general practice, the American representative should avoid disparaging references to street cars and slow-paced elevators as evidences of an inferior society.

Although indiscriminate spending

is ordinarily considered a bad trait, one cannot completely overlook the fact that American largess has certain definite advantages. The practice of giving cigarettes to a casual street acquaintance or a stick of gum to a kid on the street is a good example. Properly directed, this flair for generosity can be turned into a definite psychological asset.

Another "don't" which would be well to consider is the inevitable tendency of American soldiers to turn a town or city into a "Coney Island" mardi gras. All of us like good times. But does that mean we can excuse our bad manners just because we happen to be at war?

To the embattled, tired, sex-starved GI, the attractions of Manila and other Philippine cities will be difficult to resist. He will want a taste of night life before the last shot is fired, meet the "senoritas," and in general have a rip-roaring good time. Some men can spot a brothel quicker than they can pick off an enemy sniper. In this respect the danger will be twofold, for it will not only concern the health of the individual soldier, but will concern the effectiveness of the Army, as well. Consequently, too much attention cannot be given to the need for restraint and care in avoiding venereal disease. Although it is now so ingrained that it defies correction, the American penchant for whistling at every girl who passes by should be discouraged. Among continental races, it is regarded as uncouth and extremely boorish.

Finally, it should be remembered that the attitude and behavior of the American soldier in the Philippines will be an important factor in determining whether future relations between America and the Philippines will develop into amicable and endur-

ing collaboration or whether the joint venture in democracy will end in a desultory and purely materialistic arrangement in which the seeds of discord and misunderstanding are permitted to take root.

II

As individual emissaries from the United States of America, it is of prime importance that every American soldier who participates in the forthcoming Philippine Island struggle be thoroughly instructed in what is expected of him. The actual fighting commitments do not require briefing by us but the oft-repeated gem of wisdom "the war can be won but the peace may be lost" contains a thought which cannot be over-stressed.

In my opinion there are two main, highly important issues which should be given special emphasis in order to influence a GI's thinking and better prepare him as an ambassadorial representative from America.

To begin with, there is evidence which indicates that in pre-Pearl Harbor days there was a pronounced haughtiness displayed by some Americans in their associations with the Filipino which placed a huge obstacle in the path toward friendliness and co-operation. With the ultimate freedom of the Philippines it is only natural that we assume a big-brother air, considering ourselves as the saviour of all Filipinos. This, coupled with a feeling of superiority over brown and yellow races, is a potential powder keg which needs only a series of thoughtless statements and careless actions on our part to cause a damaging explosion, rendering useless all our efforts for mutual good will.

Everyday associations with Filipinos will be commonplace, and it is in these contacts that the greatest

care should be exercised by Americans. In short, the feeling of "all men are created equal" should be stressed and enlarged upon, an objective more easily reached by illustrating that fundamentally the Filipino is American—in his religion, dress, social life, and numerous other "mental complexes."

A word of caution is given concerning the use of high-sounding words and eloquent phrases. These have been used to such a great extent by dramatic war correspondents and in personal-experience stories that I believe they have reached the stage of impotency and would have the effect of "so much propaganda" if used in literature addressed to our troops. Plain language is advisable. The truth is all that is necessary.

The second point is one which will come to the fore wherever troops of any nation are located and should be strongly dealt with by every possible agency. Many soldiers consider the city of Manila as the "Paris of the Pacific" and after months on SWPA islands intend to use it as such, being given the added support of Filipino open-arm-welcome. Perhaps gaiety and free spending are indicative of Americanism but public actions such as whistling at girls, loud and vulgar conversation, or ridicule of any Filipino phase of life, should be emphatically discouraged.

In conclusion, an important factor to remind the American soldier of is that prior to this war, the Philippines were regarded as a guinea pig of free government and were closely watched by other peoples of this hemisphere. The results of present American leadership and mutual respect may well be the difference between success or failure in the post-war venture for lasting peace.

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PART EIGHT --- LOOKING AHEAD

Outline and Reference Material
Prepared by:
Information & Education Section,
Hq USAFFE

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:

Part 1 -- From Port Moresby to Morotai.

Part 2 -- History of the Philippines.

Part 3 -- These are the Philippines.

Part 4 -- Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5 -- Under the Heel of Japan.

Part 6 -- Fighting Filipino Allies.

Part 7 -- A Few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.

Part 8 -- Looking Ahead.

When available in complete printed form each of the eight booklets will include specific "Instructions and Suggestions to Instructors" covering each topic.

LOOKING AHEAD

1. Plans have been carefully prepared for insuring an immediate restoration of democratic government in the Philippines after the Japanese are driven out.
 - a. The United States has made it clear that none of the events since the invasion of the Islands have in any way altered its promises to give the Filipinos their independence.
 - b. Steps taken by the United States since the fall of the Philippines have reaffirmed principles that had already been established.
 - c. The United States regards Philippine Government-in-Exile as having the same status as the governments of other independent nations.
 - d. The Philippine Government-in-Exile has kept constitutional government alive until it could be reestablished in the Islands.
 - e. The Philippines became one of the United Nations 14 June 1942.
 - (1) Philippine Government is a signatory of the declaration by the United Nations, along with thirty-one other nations.
 - (2) In the name of the Philippines, the late President Quezon signed the Atlantic Charter.
 - (3) President Quezon attends meetings of the Pacific War Council, where plans for war in the Pacific are made.
 - (4) The government has participated fully and equally in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, and a Philippine representative is a member of its Interim Commission.
 - f. The Government-in-Exile and the United States Government have cooperated in planning for rehabilitation in the Philippines.
 - g. The Philippine Government has contributed to the United Nations' effort in manpower, materials, and facilities.
 - (1) Two special Filipino regiments were trained in California.
 - (2) Thousands of individual Filipinos are serving in other branches of the United States Army.
 - (3) This Government has cooperated with our own Government in daily broadcasts to the Filipino people, and has been in constant touch with the underground movement.

2. Complete independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation will be granted by the United States as soon as orderly and free democratic processes of government can be restored.

a. Senate Joint Resolution 93, signed by the President of the United States, 30 June 1944, laid down the policy for the granting of independence.

(1) United States policy is to drive the Japanese from the Islands, restore as quickly as possible orderly, free democratic processes of government to the Filipino people, and establish complete independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate self-governing nation.

(2) As soon as conditions warrant, civil government will be set up under constitutional officers, to prepare the Commonwealth to exercise its independence.

(3) The Resolution makes a proclamation of independence possible as soon as practicable after constitutional processes and normal functions of government have been restored in the Philippines.

b. The Resolution also provides for acquisition of air and land bases by the United States, in addition to naval bases and fueling stations, which were provided for under the Independence Act of 1934.

(1) These bases will provide for the mutual protection of the United States and the Philippines.

(2) Commonwealth authorities are to cooperate in establishing and maintaining these bases, both as a restored Commonwealth and as an independent nation.

c. Filipinos have contributed much to ultimate victory in the Pacific. They will contribute much to the winning of the peace.

3. The United States is pledged to assist the Philippines in economic and financial rehabilitation after the Japanese have been driven out.

a. The Philippine Rehabilitation Commission was created by Senate Joint Resolution 94, signed by the President 30 June 1944, to study all aspects of the problem, and to make recommendations to the President and Congress of the United States and to the President and Congress of the Philippines.

(1) The Philippines is the only substantial area under the American flag to suffer lengthy invasion by the enemy.

(2) The United States is determined to give all possible aid and assistance to the Filipino people:

(a) Because the American effort in the Philippines over the last 40 years is at stake.

(b) Because of the loyalty of the Filipino people to the United States in the face of Japanese invasion.

b. The Commission will work on many economic and social readjustments.

(1) Industrial and agricultural enterprises must be reestablished.

(a) Lumber and fishing industries will require much financial assistance.

(b) The sugar industry must be restored, though probably not to its former volume of production for export to the United States.

(2) Probably most gold and copper mines will have been flooded and will require extensive reconstruction.

(3) General import and export relations with the United States must be developed.

(a) Stocks of goods, including foodstuffs, will be depleted or non-existent.

(b) Many new markets may be opened up to meet expanding needs.

(4) New currency measures will be needed, and provisions for reopening of banks closed under the Japanese.

(a) The Commonwealth has funds now on deposit in the United States, including ample reserves upon which to base a new currency system.

(5) To insure law and order, extensive policing of cities, villages, and the countryside may be necessary.

(6) Reconstruction of public works must be started.

(7) Immediate support for schools and health services must be provided.

4. The record of Filipino-American cooperation in the past is a basis for faith that the political, economic, and cultural relations in the future will be attained by friendship, understanding, and collaboration.

a. Cultural relations should be extended and improved, for greater mutual understanding.

- b. Political cooperation will be essential for the solution of many post-war problems in the Pacific.
- c. As a daughter republic of the United States, the Philippines can become an even greater force for democratic government than she has been in the past.
- (1) The Philippines is peculiarly qualified to serve as a link of good will with other peoples of the Far East.
 - (2) The successful American-Philippine partnership will serve as an example for other peoples striving for independence.
- d. "Our character as a nation," President Roosevelt has said, "will be judged for years to come by the human understanding and the physical efficiency with which we help in the immense task of rehabilitating the Philippines."

WE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

POINTS TO EMPHASIZE

Restoration of democratic government in the Philippines will be made as soon as the Japanese have been driven out. Through the Philippine Government-in-Exile in the United States, plans have been carefully prepared for immediate reestablishment of constitutional government in the Islands.

During the Japanese occupation, the Philippine Government-in-Exile has participated actively in the war as one of the United Nations. It has contributed in manpower and materials, and has cooperated in planning for rehabilitation after the war.

As soon as orderly and free democratic processes of government can be restored in the Islands, the United States will grant complete independence to the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation.

Plans have been made for acquiring naval, land, and air bases by the United States for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States. Philippine authorities are to cooperate in establishing and maintaining these bases.

The United States is pledged to assist the Philippines in economic and financial rehabilitation after the Japanese have been driven out. Industrial and agricultural enterprises must be reestablished. Social readjustments will have to be made, particularly in restoring adequate schools and health services.

Philippine-American cooperation in the past has pointed the way toward good political, economic, and cultural relations in the future. The Philippines as an independent democracy will be peculiarly qualified to serve as a link of good will with other peoples of the Far East, and will give valuable assistance in solving post-war problems in the Pacific.

Philippine Information Training Program Part Eight LOOKING AHEAD

Outline and Reference Material Prepared by
Information & Education Section, Hq USAFFE

Outline:

1. Plans have been carefully prepared for insuring an immediate restoration of democratic government in the Philippines after the Japanese are driven out.

(a) The United States has made it clear that none of the events since the invasion of the Islands have in any way altered its promises to give the Filipinos their independence.

(b) Steps taken by the United States since the fall of the Philippines have reaffirmed principles that had already been established.

(c) The United States regards Philippine Government-in-Exile as having the same status as the governments of other independent nations.

(d) The Philippine Government-in-Exile has kept constitutional government alive until it could be reestablished in the Islands.

(e) The Philippines became one of the United Nations 14 June 1942.

(1) Philippine Government is a signatory of the declaration by the United Nations, along with thirty-one other nations.

(2) In the name of the Philippines, the late President Quezon signed the Atlantic Charter.

(3) President Osmena attends meetings of the Pacific War Council, where plans for war in the Pacific are made.

(4) The government has participated fully and equally in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, and a Philippine representative is a member of its Interim Commission.

(f) The Government-in-Exile and the United States Government have cooperated in planning for rehabilitation in the Philippines.

(g) The Philippine Government has contributed to the United Nations' effort in manpower, materials, and facilities.

(1) Two special Filipino regiments were trained in California.

(2) Thousands of individual Filipinos are serving in other branches of the United States Army.

(3) This Government has cooperated with our own Government in daily broadcasts to the Filipino people, and has been in constant touch with the underground movement.

FOREWORD

The following outline and reference material is for the guidance of unit commanders in the planning and presentation of a series of informational training periods on the Philippines.

There will be eight topics:—

Part 1—From Port Moresby to Morotai.

Part 2—History of the Philippines.

Part 3—These are the Philippines.

Part 4—Meet the Filipinos.

Part 5—Under the Heel of Japan.

Part 6—Fighting Filipino Allies.

Part 7—A Few Do's and Don'ts for GI's.

Part 8—Looking Ahead.

2. Complete independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation will be granted by the United States as soon as orderly and free democratic processes of government can be restored.

(a) Senate Joint Resolution 93, signed by the President of the United States, 30 June 1944, laid down the policy for the granting of independence.

(1) United States policy is to drive the Japanese from the Islands, restore as quickly as possible orderly, free democratic processes of government to the Filipino people,

and establish complete independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate self-governing nation.

- (2) As soon as conditions warrant, civil government will be set up under constitutional officers, to prepare the commonwealth to exercise its independence.
- (3) The Resolution makes a proclamation of independence possible as soon as practicable after constitutional processes and normal functions of government have been restored in the Philippines
- (b) The Resolution also provides for acquisition of air and land bases by the United States, in addition to naval bases and fueling stations, which were provided for under the Independence Act of 1934.
 - (1) These bases will provide for the mutual protection of the United States and the Philippines.
 - (2) Commonwealth authorities are to cooperate in establishing and maintaining these bases, both as a restored Commonwealth and as an independent nation.
- (c) Filipinos have contributed much to ultimate victory in the Pacific. They will contribute much to the winning of the peace.
3. The United States is pledged to assist the Philippines in economic and financial rehabilitation after the Japanese have been driven out.
 - (a) The Philippine Rehabilitation Commission was created by Senate Joint Resolution 94, signed by the President 30 June 1944, to study all aspects of the problem, and to make recommendations to the President and Congress of the United States and to the President and Congress of the Philippines.

(1) The Philippines is the only substantial area under the American flag to suffer lengthy invasion by the enemy.

(2) The United States is determined to give all possible aid and assistance to the Filipino people:

- (a) Because the American effort in the Philippines over the last 40 years is at stake.
- (b) Because of the loyalty of the Filipino people to the United States in the face of Japanese invasion.

(b) The Commission will work on many economic and social readjustments.

(1) Industrial and agricultural enterprises must be reestablished.

- (a) Lumber and fishing industries will require much financial assistance.
- (b) The sugar industry must be restored, though probably not to its former volume of production for export to the United States.

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- (b) Many new markets may be opened up to meet expanding needs.

(4) New currency measures will be needed, and provisions for reopening of banks closed under the Japanese.

(a) The Commonwealth has funds now on deposit in the United States, including ample reserves upon which to base a new currency system.

(5) To insure law and order, extensive policing of cities, villages, and the countryside may be necessary.

(6) Reconstruction of public works must be started.

(7) Immediate support for schools and health services must be provided.

4. The record of Filipino-American cooperation in the past is a basis for faith that the political, economic, and cultural relations in the future will be attained by friendship, understanding, and collaboration.

(a) Cultural relations should be extended and improved, for greater mutual understanding.

(b) Political cooperation will be essential for the solution of many post-war problems in the Pacific.

(c) As a daughter republic of the United States, the Philippines can become an even greater force for democratic government than she has been in the past.

(1) The Philippines is peculiarly qualified to serve as a link of good will with other peoples of the Far East.

(2) The successful American-Philippine partnership will serve as an example for other peoples striving for independence.

(d) "Our character as a nation," President Roosevelt has said, "will be judged for years to come by the human understanding and the physical efficiency with which we help in the immense task of rehabilitating the Philippines."

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS' EFFORT

The Philippine Government has contributed to the United Nations' effort in manpower, materials and facilities. Two special Filipino regiments have been trained in California, and thousands of individual Filipinos are serving other branches of the United States armed forces. This Government in cooperation with our own Government, broadcasts daily to the Filipino people, and is in constant touch with the underground movement.

President Quezon frequently reported to the Filipino people by radio. In his broadcast of February 20, 1943, he told them how their government in exile was working together in conferences with other United Nations; how the Philippines were represented on the Pacific War Council; that, in the name of the Philippines he had signed the Atlantic Charter.

"We are one of the United Nations, and whether the war is over before or after July 4, 1946, the date fixed for the establishment of the Philippine Republic, I am certain that we shall have our own representation on the Peace Conference." Thus President Quezon reassured his countrymen, helping them to have faith and hope in the future.

PLEDGE OF INDEPENDENCE

More recently, by the magic of radio, the Filipinos were informed about the joint resolution passed by the U.S. Congress on June 29, 1944, whereby Philippine independence is pledged by the American people—this independence, pending military operations, to come to pass even before the date (July 4, 1946) set by a previous law of Congress. By this resolution also, the United States plans to establish military, naval and air bases in the Philippines after the war as part of the world-wide plan to prevent future wars. By another resolution signed the same day, economic rehabilitation of the Philippines is to be considered also. With these developments, the Philippine government is in full accord.

The Filipino people in the Philippines are thus represented in Washington. Through their government, thousands of miles away in Washington, they learn the facts. They are able to keep informed of the latest events in the outside world.

After his oath of office had been administered, President Sergio Osmena said:

"I am conscious of the tremendous responsibility that is mine as I assume the Presidency of the Philippines. I pledge all that is in me to serve the best interests of the Filipino people. My first

objective is to cooperate with the American Government, sparing nothing, for the achievement of victory which means the complete liberation of the Philippines. Philippine relief and rehabilitation is one of our pressing problems.

"I have faith in America and in the American people, and as in the past, I know the United States will keep faith with us. The freedom of the Filipino people is my goal and the permanence of that independence once achieved I will strive to secure."

Pocket Guide to the Philippines.

PLEDGE OF PROTECTION

As Manila was about to die, President Roosevelt broadcast a speech to the Philippines in which he said, "I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources in men and materials of the United States stand behind that pledge." Other presidents had promised that the Philippines would eventually be given their independence, but never before had a responsible American official gone so far as to promise that independence would be "protected".

Marquardt, Frederic S. Before Bataan and After. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 212-213.

2. Complete Independence for the Philippines

PLEDGE OF INDEPENDENCE REAFFIRMED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

"On December 28, 1941, three weeks after the armies of the Japanese launched their attack on Philippine soil, I sent a proclamation to you, the gallant people of the Philippines. I said then:

"I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources in men and materials of the United States stand behind that pledge."

"We shall keep this promise just as we have kept every promise which America has made to the Filipino people.

"The story of the fighting on Bataan and Corregidor—and indeed everywhere in the Philippines—will be remembered so long as men continue to respect bravery, and devotion, and determination. When the Filipino people resisted the Japanese invaders with their very lives, they gave final proof that here was a nation fit to be respected as the equal to any on earth, not in size or wealth, but in the stout heart and national dignity which are the true measures of a people.

"That is why the United States, in practice, regards your lawful government as having the same status as the governments of other independent nations. That is why I have looked upon President Quezon and Vice President Osmena, not only as old friends, but also as trusted collaborators in our united task of destroying our common enemies in the east as well as in the west.

"The Philippine Government is a signatory of the declaration by the United Nations, along with thirty-one other nations. President Quezon and Vice President Osmena attend the meetings of the Pacific War Council, where the war in the Pacific is charted and planned. Your government has participated fully and equally in the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, and a Philippine representative is a member of the Interim Commission created by that Conference. And, of course, the Philippine Government will have its rightful place in the conferences which will follow the defeat of Japan.

NATIONHOOD A FACT, NOT A PROMISE

"These are the attributes of complete and respected nationhood for the Philippines, not a promise but a fact.

"As President Quezon himself has told you, 'The only thing lacking is the formal establishment of the Philippine Republic.' These words of your President were uttered to you with my prior knowledge and approval. I now repeat them to you myself. I give the Filipino people my word that the Republic of the Philippines will be established the moment the power of our Japanese enemies is destroyed. The Congress of the United States has acted to set up the independence of the Philippines. The time will come quickly when that goes into full effect. You will soon be redeemed from the Japanese yoke, and you will be assisted in the full repair of the ravages caused by the war.

"We shall fight with ever-increasing strength and vigor until that end is achieved. Already Japan is tasting defeat in the islands of the southwest Pacific. But that is only the beginning.

"I call upon you, the heroic people of the Philippines, to stand firm in your faith—to stand firm against the false promises of the Japanese, just as your fighting men and our fighting men stood firm together against their barbaric attacks.

"The great day of your liberation will come, as surely as there is a God in heaven.

"The United States and the Philippines have learned the principles of hon-

Text References: Looking Ahead

1. Plans for Restoring Democratic Government

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

The Commonwealth of the Philippines has a form of government similar to that of the United States. The leader of this government, in exile in the United States, was President Manuel Quezon, until his

untimely death, August 1, 1944, after a long illness. Sergio Osmena, the Vice President, succeeded automatically to the Philippine Presidency. Both men have been popular leaders in the Philippines for many years. On November 11, 1941, both were elected to office by overwhelming majority votes. At the last session of the Philippine Congress, held on December 15, 1941, under a rain of bombs in

Manila, full emergency powers were voted to the President.

The top leaders of this government arrived in Washington, D. C. on May 13, 1942, after a hazardous escape from Manila. A month later, on June 14, the Philippines became one of the United Nations. Since that time, it has been represented in important conferences of the United Nations.

est cooperation, of mutual respect, in peace and in war.

"For those principles we have fought—and by those principles we shall live."

Text of Address by President Roosevelt, broadcast to the Philippines by short wave radio, August 13, 1943.

Text on Joint Resolution on Independence

(PUBLIC LAW 380—78th CONGRESS)

(Chapter 322—2d Session)

(S. J. Res. 93)

JOINT RESOLUTION

Declaring the policy of the Congress with respect to the independence of the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes.

Whereas, on December 7, 1941, while the people of the Philippine Islands were peacefully engaged in achieving for themselves their complete political independence in the manner mutually agreed upon by the Government of the United States and the people of the Philippine Islands, which independence was to become fully effective July 4, 1946, the Japanese in a wholly unprovoked, wantonly treacherous, and surprise attack on the people of the Philippines and of the United States, did by military invasion interrupt these orderly and mutually agreeable processes for complete independence of the Philippines; and

Whereas the American and Filipino troops made a valiant and courageous defense to the aggression of the Japanese invader and were overwhelmed only by the surprise and superior numbers and equipment of the enemy; and

Whereas the Japanese are now in possession and control of the land, peoples, business, communication, and institutions of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and because of these circumstances the Filipino people are denied the free use and employment of the processes and political institutions jointly established by the Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines for the transaction of private and public business and for the maintenance of liberty, law and order, and justice in the Philippine Islands; and

Whereas by this possession and invasion the Japanese have attempted to frustrate the free process to independence in the Philippines by substituting therefor their own puppet government which was conceived in intrigue, born in coercion, and reared primarily for the purpose of Japanese selfishness and aggrandizement and not to achieve the independence and freedom of the Filipino people; and

Whereas the Government of the United States has solemnly guaranteed to the people of the Philippine Islands the right to be completely free and independent and to select by a free ballot, without any kind of inducement or coercion whatsoever, those who shall hold the elective offices in such government and exercise the power and authority thereof, which solemn guarantees have been temporarily made impossible of fulfillment due to the wantonly treacherous and surprise attack on the free people of the Philippine Islands; and

Whereas, because of the valiant resistance by the Philippine people, which is even now continuing while the invader occupies parts of the Philippines, and because of the long and unbroken record of loyalty of the Filipino people, both to the cause of complete independence for themselves and to the sovereignty of the United States while they have been under our flag, and because they have abundantly demonstrated their will to independence through the processes mutually agreed upon by the people of the Philippines and the Government of the United States, and their will to resist all outside invasion and encroachment, which seek to destroy or set aside their march to independence, and because they have abundantly proved their capacity to govern themselves in an enlightened, progressive, and democratic manner:

Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress that the United States shall drive the treacherous, invading Japanese from the Philippine Islands, restore as quickly as possible the orderly and free democratic processes of government to the Filipino people, and thereupon establish the complete independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate and self-governing nation.

Sec. 2. After negotiation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the Filipino Republic, the President of the United States is hereby authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934, as he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States.

Sec. 3. In order speedily to effectuate the policy declared in section 1, the Presi-

dent of the United States is hereby authorized, after proclaiming that constitutional processes and normal functions of government have been restored in the Philippine Islands and after consultation with the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, to advance the date of the independence of the Philippine Islands by proclaiming their independence as a separate and self-governing nation prior to July 4, 1946.

Sec. 4. Meanwhile the resources of the United States, both of men and materials, are pledged for continued use to redeem the Philippines from the invader and to speed the day of ultimate and complete independence for the people of the Philippine Islands.

Approved June 29, 1944.

3. Rehabilitation

TASK OF REHABILITATION AFTER THE WAR

The Philippines will be faced with difficult problems of rehabilitation when the islands are reoccupied. It is not possible to anticipate in detail the situation which will be found at that time, but it may be confidently concluded that deterioration particularly of economic conditions will be extreme and that it will be necessary to turn every energy toward the reestablishment of normal social, economic, and financial conditions.

The chief effect of the war upon the agricultural output of the Philippines will presumably be the sharp reduction of the sugar crop, which will in all probability have been reduced to approximately local requirements. Inasmuch as sugar was the industry most reliant upon artificial protection in the American market and the one which recent Federal legislation has particularly sought to adjust to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States, it may be found undesirable to reestablish in full the former volume of production for export to the United States. In all probability most gold and copper mines will have been flooded and their reconstruction will require financing in amounts which cannot be covered by treasury reserves of many of the companies. Lumber and logging concessions and the offshore fisheries presumably will be found practically abandoned. For the fisheries, it will be necessary to supply vessels and train personnel in order rapidly to bring the catch to normal market requirements. General import and export connections with the United States will have been disorganized or dissolved. Stocks of goods, including foodstuffs, will be sadly depleted or non-existent.

OTHER PROBLEMS OF REOCCUPATION

At the time of reoccupation serious and difficult questions must also be faced with regard to banks and to the local currency situation. Fortunately, however, the Commonwealth Treasury will have a relatively large amount of funds which are now on deposit in the United States, including ample reserves upon which to base a new currency system.

Conditions of law and order may be found to demand extensive policing of cities, villages, and the countryside. There may be serious social unrest and aggravation of criminal activities. The apprehension of criminals and the quieting of disorders will be costly.

Whatever the outcome of the independence program, a considerable volume of legislation either by the United States, by the Commonwealth Government, or by both, will have to be framed and enacted. This will presumably include such measures as a new currency law; an act prescribing the conditions under which banks operating prior to Japanese occupation are to reopen; a war damage assessment and compensation law; a measure to provide public loans for reestablishment of industrial and agricultural enterprises; an act for a Treasury operation loan; an act for a public-works reconstruction loan; and a special act for the immediate support of schools and health services.

The rehabilitation of the Philippines will not be an easy task. In meeting it the American people will want to give in the most constructive form possible their aid and assistance to the Filipino people, because of the fact that American effort in the Philippines for the past 40 years is at stake, because of the brave loyalty of the Filipino people to America in the present crisis, and because of the international importance of building for future stability in the Pacific.

Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, Washington, D.C., October 20, 1942, p. 13-14.

Text of Joint Resolution on Rehabilitation

(PUBLIC LAW 381—78th CONGRESS)

(Chapter 323—2d Session)

(S. J. Res. 94)

JOINT RESOLUTION

To amend section 13 of Philippine Independence Act, as amended, establishing the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, defining its powers and duties, and for other purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 13 of the Act of March 24, 1934,

as amended, is hereby further amended by striking out the proviso and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

There shall promptly be held a conference of representatives of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, such representatives on the part of the Government of the United States to consist of three United States Senators appointed by the President of the Senate, three Members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, and three persons appointed by the President of the United States, and on the part of the Philippines to consist of nine representatives to be appointed by the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; each appointee shall serve at the pleasure of his appropriate appointing authority; the said Commission to be known as the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission, subject to the following conditions and with the following powers and duties:

(a) The members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than fifteen days after the passage of this Act. Within ten days thereafter the ranking member of the Senate appointees and the ranking member of the Filipino appointees shall jointly call a meeting of the Commission to be held in the Capitol of the United States for the purpose of organization. In case of death or resignation of a member, such vacancy shall be filled by the original appointing power.

(b) The Commission shall investigate all matters affecting post-war economy, trade, finance, economic stability, and rehabilitation of the Philippine Islands, including the matter of damages to public and private property and to persons occasioned by enemy attack and occupation.

(c) To formulate recommendations based upon such investigations and for future trade relations between the United States and the independent Philippine Republic when established and to consider the extension of the present or heretofore agreed upon trade relations or otherwise for a period of years to make adjustments for the period of occupancy by the Japanese in order to reestablish trade relations as provided for in the original Independence Act.

(d) The Commission is authorized to employ expert legal and clerical assistance, to establish offices in the Philippine Islands and in the United States, and to make rules and regulations for the transaction of its business pertinent to the provisions of this Act.

(e) The Commission shall make annual reports to the President of the United

States and to the Congress, and to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, and more frequently if so desired, and make such recommendations from time to time as it deems necessary to carry out the purposes and intents of this Act.

(f) The Commission is authorized to fix the salary of all necessary expert and clerical assistance, to provide for travel and other expenses incident to its labor, and to do all other things pertinent to this Act. The annual compensation of the United States members of this Commission, other than those holding official positions under the United States Government, shall be on a per diem basis at the rate of \$10,000 per annum. The compensation of the Philippine members of the Commission shall be determined by the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth. The United States, as herein provided, shall compensate the members of the Commission who represent it, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the Filipino Republic, as the case may be, shall compensate the members of the Commission appointed by it or them. Otherwise, the expenses of the Commission shall be equally borne by the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the Filipino Republic, as the case may be.

Sec. 2. For the purpose of carrying on its duties, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary.

Approved June 29, 1944.

4. Basis for Good Relations

President's Statement on Signing Joint Resolutions POLICY FOR GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE

"I have signed today two joint resolutions of Congress respecting the Philippines. The first of these resolutions lays down a policy for the granting of independence, and for the acquisition of bases adequate to provide for the mutual protection of the United States and the Philippine Islands.

"In that resolution it is declared to be the policy of the Congress that the United States shall drive the treacherous, invading Japanese from the Philippine Islands, restore as quickly as possible the orderly, free democratic processes of government to the Filipino people, and thereupon establish the complete independence of the Philippine Islands as a separate

self-governing nation. The measure makes it possible to proclaim independence as soon as practicable after constitutional processes and normal functions of government have been restored in the Philippines.

"It is contemplated that as soon as conditions warrant, civil government will be set up under constitutional officers. It will be their duty forthwith to take emergency measures to alleviate the physical and economic hardships of the Philippine people, and to prepare the Commonwealth to receive and exercise the independence which we have promised them. The latter includes two tasks of great importance: those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country; and the democratic form of government guaranteed in the constitution of the Philippines must be restored for the benefit of the people of the islands.

PROVIDES FOR MORE BASES

"On the problem of bases, the present organic act permitted acquisition only of naval bases and fueling stations, a situation wholly inadequate to meet the conditions of modern warfare. The measure approved today will permit the acquisition of air and land bases in addition to naval bases and fueling stations. I have been informed that this action is most welcome to Commonwealth authorities, and that they will gladly cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of bases both as a restored Commonwealth and as an independent nation. By this we shall have an outstanding example of cooperation designed to prevent a recurrence of armed aggression and to assure the peaceful use of a great ocean by those in pursuit of peaceful ends.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REHABILITATION

"The second joint resolution signed today brings into effect the joint economic commission first ordained in the present organic act, and enlarges its scope to include consideration of proposals for the economic and financial rehabilitation of the Philippines.

"We are ever mindful of the heroic role of the Philippines and their people in the present conflict. There is the only substantial area and theirs the only substantial population under the American flag to suffer lengthy invasion by the enemy. History will attest the heroic resistance of the combined armies of the United States and the Philippines in Luzon, Cebu, Iloilo, and other islands of the archipelago. Our character as a nation will be judged for years to come by the

human understanding and the physical efficiency with which we help in the immense task of rehabilitating the Philippines. The resolution creates the Philippine Rehabilitation Commission whose functions shall be to study all aspects of the problem, and after due investigation report as recommendations to the President of the United States and the Congress, and to the President and the Congress of the Philippines."

New York Herald Tribune, July 1, 1944.

Pattern for Other Small Nations and Peoples

Mixing truth with hyperbole, Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president of the First Philippine Commission, said in 1899:

"The destiny of the Philippine Islands is not to be a state or territory of the United States of America, but a daughter republic to ours—a new birth of liberty on the other side of the Pacific, which shall animate and energize those lovely islands of the tropical seas, and rearing its head aloft, stand as a monument of progress and a beacon to all the oppressed and benighted millions of the Asiatic continent."

The Philippines has already, to some extent at least, filled that destiny. After the war the monument must be rebuilt, the beacon light rekindled and its flame carried to the other peoples of southeastern Asia and the South Pacific.

That responsible American statesmen are thinking along these lines was evidenced on the seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, when President Roosevelt and President Quezon took part in anniversary ceremonies held in Washington.

In a radio address on that occasion President Roosevelt said, "I like to think that the history of the Philippine Islands in the last forty years provides in a very real sense a pattern for the future of other small nations and peoples of the world . . .

"But we must remember that such a pattern is based on two important factors. The first is that there be a period of preparation, through the dissemination of education and the recognition and fulfillment of physical and social and economic needs. The second is that there be a period of training for ultimate independent sovereignty through the practice of more and more self-government, beginning with the local government and passing on through the various steps to complete statehood.

"Such training for independence is essential to the stability of independence in almost every part of the world. Some

peoples need more intensive training and longer years; others require far less training and a shorter period of time."

In other words, what we have done in the Philippines we shall now have to do on a much broader scale throughout most of the territory overrun by the Japanese. We shall have to do it with the aid of the British and the Dutch and the French, but it will be primarily our job.

OUR FUTURE ROLE IN THE PACIFIC

Great educational systems will have to be set up. The standard of living throughout that part of the world will have to be raised. The native peoples will have to be convinced that complete and absolute independence—if they desire it—will be theirs as a result of their active cooperation. An intelligent program will have to be instituted to teach the working principles of democracy to peoples who do not even have the word in their language.

The outcome of such a great program will not result in the creation of a lot of new governments molded exactly on the Anglo-American pattern of democracy. As happened in the Philippines, these former colonies will adapt democratic principles to their own national and racial characteristics. But the ultimate result will be the rebirth of the belief in the dignity of man, and millions upon millions of people will be given a stake in their own country which they will consider worth fighting for.

The job can be done. We have proved that in the Philippines. And it will pay, as was shown on Bataan. If we can help the subject peoples of this vast area, as we helped the Filipinos, to become hardy, self-reliant nations, then perhaps there will be some hope that the Pacific can live up to its name for generations to come.

Marquardt, Frederic S. *Before Bataan and After*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. p. 299-301.

Place of the Philippines in Winning the Peace

One of the most reassuring signs on the international horizon was the fact that two great leaders of the democratic nations, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, had for some time been thinking in terms not only of how to win the war but also how to win the peace. In August, 1941, they had drawn up the Eight-Point Atlantic Charter, which suggested a hopeful basis for the reorganization that must follow the end of the war.

They gave their assurance that their countries desired to see no territorial

changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; that they respected the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live; that they desired to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security; that the peace they envisaged would afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries.

These basic terms meant much, not only for the countries then under the heel of the Axis but for all of those threatened by the octopus tentacles of the "new orders". They had significance for the Filipinos, and for their Malay brothers in southeast Asia.

Of greater significance perhaps was the pledge given by President Roosevelt on December 28, when he said in a broadcast message to Manila:

"I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and in material, of the United States stand behind that pledge."

RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS

In the dark days through which the Philippines has passed, and in the darker days that may lie ahead, [This was written in 1942.] that pledge will mean more to the Filipinos than anything that Japan could possibly promise. The United States has kept its word given many years ago; it will keep it again. The leader of the Filipino people had already weighed the question and given the answer. In his speech of August 16, 1941, accepting the presidential nomination, President Quezon had said: "If the outcome of the war means triumph for the democracies and the upholding of the rights of small nations in their own existence, then the Philippines will be independent forever."

So it would seem that the threadbare question of Philippine independence might be forever laid away. There will still be a Philippine problem, but it will be part of a wider world problem that will demand the best thought and the fullest cooperation of people everywhere in the world. To the ultimate triumph of the democracies in the war of the Pacific, the Filipinos have contributed much. They will contribute to the winning of the peace.

In laying the foundations for a new order, a new world, the United States has an important part to play. In the light of its present commitments, it can hardly shirk the responsibility. One prominent

place where it can contribute to the new pattern is in the Philippines, by fulfilling its promise there under such conditions as will reasonably ensure, without great sacrifice to the United States, the orderly development of a progressive nation, side by side with its neighbors, Malay, Chinese and Japanese.

Porter, Catherine. *Crisis in the Philippines*. (Issued under the auspices of The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.) Knopf, 1942. p. 143-145.

President Osmena on Philippine-American Collaboration

AMERICA HAS PROMISED AID IN REBUILDING

Whatever program of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction is finally decided upon—and the items I have discussed are only a part of it—we are already assured of America's help and collaboration. Responding to the recommendations of the President of the United States, the Senate has approved a joint resolution which provides for the organization of a commission of Americans and Filipinos, charged with the study of the relief and rehabilitation problems of the Philippines. To this commission is also entrusted the task of surveying the economic situation in the islands with a view to their economic stabilization and the formulation of a plan for future trade relations between the United States and the Philippines.

As will be remembered, provision was made for the ten-year transition period of the Commonwealth in order, among other things, to enable the Philippines to stabilize her economy with an eye to her future independent existence. This preparation was already at an advanced stage when war broke out and everything built up was destroyed. It will be within the province of the joint commission, when organized, to study how to make up for the lost years and to recommend measures for the reestablishment of such commercial relations with the United States and other countries as will assure us a reasonable level of public and private prosperity.

The policy of free exchange of commodities prescribed by Congress has brought material benefits to the Philippines and economic advantages and profits to American labor, exporters, and businessmen. This economic tie has so affected Philippine economy that the major export industries of the Philippines have become dependent upon the American market, necessitating a reasonable period of readjustment. This record of economic collaboration will serve as a basis upon which to formulate a post-war commercial relationship which will redound to the lasting benefit of both countries.

DEFENSE PLANS WILL BE COMPLETED

The defense plans of the Commonwealth, formulated with the advice of the American Military Mission headed by General MacArthur, were in the process of execution when Japan struck. With the re-conquest of the islands, we shall resume this work, making such adjustments as new circumstances and experience will require. American technical assistance will continue to be needed. Moreover, our program should be worked out with full consideration not only of our own defense needs but also of the future military necessities of the United States.

This brings us to the question whether, after independence, mutual collaboration in defense measures will be advantageous both to the United States and to the Philippines. It can truly be said that during the last four decades there has been American-Philippine collaboration for defense. The United States Navy maintained its principal base for the Asiatic Fleet at Cavite, and the United States Army had camps and airfields at several points. The Army relied very largely on Filipino soldiery—Scouts, and later the Philippine Army—to fill its ranks. That the inadequacy of these forces rendered ineffective their defense against a vastly superior power, does not argue against the intrinsic value of military collaboration. It only emphasizes the need for strengthening the military establishment.

The maintenance of adequate naval and air bases across the Pacific, anchored in the Philippines and supported there by Filipino troops, will assure the mutual protection of both the United States and the Philippines, and preserve the Pacific Ocean for the peaceful purposes of all nations. To the Philippines such plans are vital to its security, liberty and growth. To the United States such plans should aid greatly in the defense of the sea and air approaches to your Western shores. In a joint resolution, already passed by the Senate and now pending in the House, the President of the United States is authorized to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Philippines for the selection of suitable bases in the islands. I have reasons to believe that the United States may confidently expect from us full cooperation in this regard.

CULTURAL INTERCHANGE SHOULD CONTINUE

In the cultural field, cooperation between the two countries has a logical foundation in the fact that for over three centuries Filipino culture has been based on Western ideas. Throughout the long period of Spanish rule, the Philippines

imbibed Christianity and much of the Greco-Roman culture and philosophy of Mediterranean Europe. During a part of this long association, the commercial intercourse and spiritual communion between the mother country and the colony were carried on by way of Mexico through the proud and rich galleons plying in the Manila-Acapulco trade, thus bringing Mexico and the Philippines into close and intimate relations. Mexican soldiers settled in some numbers in Luzon, and several of our most important vegetable and fruit crops were direct introductions from Mexico. The architecture of some of our churches shows the influence of Aztec ornamentation.

With the eclipse of Spain as a world power, Mexico, along with most of her other American possessions, became an independent state, and for the ensuing 75 years Spain dealt directly with the Philippines. Subsequent to the liberalization of the Spanish trade policy and the opening of the Suez Canal, the people of the Philippines came into profitable commercial and literary contact with the whole of southern and western Europe and Great Britain.

When, as a consequence of the Spanish-American War, the United States replaced Spain as the principal contact of the Philippines with Western influence, Filipino political thought absorbed the essential principles of Anglo-Saxon democracy; the English language became the common tongue; the American systems of public schools and public health were adopted; and American methods in commerce and finance were practiced.

MANY ELEMENTS IN FILIPINO CULTURE

For centuries the Philippines has been linked with the peoples not only of the East but also of the West, both old and new. Thus Filipino culture is eclectic; to the original Indo-Malayan foundation there have been added Asiatic, Latin, Mexican, and Anglo-Saxon elements. Today the Filipino way of life is the Occidental, the Christian, the democratic way of life. It is, therefore, natural that intimate cultural relations will continue between the Philippines and the United States; and that these relations will extend and improve.

In the political field, cooperation between the United States and the Philippines is most logical. After having worked together for the building of the Philippine Nation, the United States and the Philippines can in the years to come devote their joint efforts to the solution of the manifold post-war problems. As a daughter republic of the United States and as a new birth of liberty in the far East, the Philippines can serve as a vanguard of democracy and as a beacon of hope in that part of the globe. If, through the Philippines, the influence of American democracy can reach less fortunate peoples of Asia, then the cause of world peace will be greatly served. Moreover, the Philippines is peculiarly qualified to serve as America's bridge of good will to the peoples of Asia.

ISLANDS EXAMPLE OF TRUSTEESHIP

As the veritable token of America's handiwork, the Philippines stands also as a vivid example of the success of the policy of trusteeship—the policy which the nations of the West can and must

follow for all dependent peoples everywhere. To these dependent peoples, a free and independent Philippines symbolizes the goal that can be attained not by distrust, bloodshed, and violence, but by friendship, understanding and collaboration. Thus by remaining close political allies, the United States and the Philippines will make great contribution toward the building of a new world of peace, justice, democracy and freedom.

The day of our liberation is not far off. The forces of freedom are on the march in the Pacific as in other war fronts. The final triumph of American arms in the Philippines is inevitable and so is Philippine independence. Philippine independence—the crowning event of Filipino-American partnership in the task of nation-building—will not essentially change American-Philippine relationship. The ties of friendship and the spirit of collaboration will endure.

In a free Philippines, America will continue to find a loyal partner in the defense and the furtherance of the ideals and policies which the two countries hold in common.

America may rest assured that the Philippine Republic, born out of the sufferings of Rizal and of other Filipino heroes and martyrs, including those who fought on Bataan and others who are fighting still, will know how to cherish and defend its freedom, and that the Filipino people, whom she has so unselfishly helped in attaining self-government and independence, will always remain a friendly and a grateful people.

Osmena, Sergio. *Philippine-American Collaboration*. Address delivered at Filipino Community Rizal Day banquet, Chicago, 2 January, 1944. *Bataan Magazine*, January 1944.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 5

Folder Title : 98-USF1-23: "Maptalk" (26 Oct 1944 - 20 Jan
1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-23

"MAP TALK"

26 Oct 44 - 20 Jan 45

1604

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USAFFE -

Maptalk

EXTRA

Published by Information & Education Section, USAFFE

26 Oct., 1944

RESTRICTED

Philippines Invaded at Leyte

D-day was Friday, 20 October, and the point of landing was Leyte Island, in the central Philippines. Immediate objective was two air-dromes whose capture would bring land-based bombers within reach of every Japanese strongpoint on the archipelago. The battlecry was "Remember Bataan."

In their essence these were the facts about America's comeback in the Philippines that got under way last week. But more important than the facts was their symbol—a promise to the Filipino peoples was being kept; America's greatest military defeat was about to be avenged. We had returned.

AIRFIELDS OURS. Capture of the two airfields was officially verified in General MacArthur's communique of 22 October. Evidently they had been taken on Saturday, the day before. One is a 6,000-foot strip near Tacloban, Leyte's capital city on the east coast which commands the straits leading to the inland seas, and the other is at Dulag, 20 miles to the south. Engineers, going to work immediately, promised to have them ready for fighters in a few days.

To take the two dromes American forces infiltrated through strong Japanese concrete pillboxes and artillery positions, forcing the enemy to withdraw. It was a repeat performance of the same sort of

tactics that Southwest Pacific troops have used to such advantage so often before. A direct assault was avoided and casualties were light. According to an unconfirmed report, less than a dozen men were killed in the seizure of Tacloban.

The same communique reported that, meeting no serious resistance, U.S. troops had pressed on from the four original beachheads to an average depth of four miles. In the Tacloban sector units were thrusting out toward the small town of San Pablo in Leyte Valley.

THE LANDINGS. Under the personal command of General MacArthur, Friday's landings were made at several spots in four separate sectors on Leyte's east coast. One beachhead was established at San Ricardo, three miles south of Tacloban; another farther south between San Jose and Dulag; and two more on Panaon Island in the extreme south.

Hundreds of warships and planes covered the troops as they went ashore. Battleships were on hand for the preliminary bombardment as early as Thursday, and the Australia cruisers Australia and Shropshire with the U.S. cruisers Phoenix and Boise pounded enemy positions throughout Friday afternoon. Also on hand, spitting out 14-inch and 16-inch shells with a vengeance, were the battleships California and Pennsylvania, which had been "destroyed" at Pearl Harbor.

As the amphibians moved in to discharge their cargoes, salvos from the big guns

SUPPLY PROBLEM

The War Department recently released the following figures to show what was necessary to supply an invasion force of 150,000 men. If you nearly double these figures you'll have a rough idea as to what is required to supply the estimated 250,000 men in the Philippines liberation force:

For the landing: 1,500,000 tons of equipment, including 235,000 tons of combat vehicles, 200,000 tons of ammunition, 200,000 tons of medical supplies.

Thereafter: 332,000 tons of equipment must arrive every 30 days, requiring monthly trips by 30 to 35 Liberty ships and 15 tankers.

increased into a continuous barrage, their thunder counter-pointed by the rocket fire from landing craft close inshore. When the naval fire lifted, carrier planes took over. Throughout the entire operation Hellcats and Avengers patrolled the skies high overhead.

OPPOSITION. Japanese resistance apparently varied from beachhead to beachhead. One landing party in the north moved inland as far as 500 yards before meeting any fire. One other, however, had a tough time getting ashore. Japanese mortar and machine gun fire opened up at 500 yards, damaging a few landing craft. Another report, perhaps of the same beachhead, said that the initial assault south of Tacloban had been held up temporarily by accurate fire from enemy gun emplacements. The advance proceeded after the guns had been knocked out by shellfire from cruisers and destroyers.

Only one enemy plane appeared to oppose the landing. It dropped one bomb into the sea, was promptly shot down by naval ack-ack. That night, though, the Japs managed two raids against units of the convoy, causing some damage to one vessel with an aerial torpedo. Jap aircraft also was reported

to have raided in light formations over Saturday and Sunday.

FEW CASUALTIES. But, the Japs, caught unawares, did not offer the sort of resistance they might have mustered had the forces gone ashore at Mindanao, where the enemy had expected us to invade. General MacArthur on Saturday reported that ground casualties in the initial phases had been exceedingly light, and that the operation was proceeding on clock-like schedule.

Moving inland on a 20-mile front, ground troops on Saturday captured a road junction at Dulag and set about storming the defense of Tacloban. Troops then went into Tacloban harassed only by an occasional sniper, for rather than contest the city the Japs had retired into the hills. The two airfields fell shortly thereafter.

Filipino citizens, of whom Tacloban has some 30,000, cheered General MacArthur when he appeared. Hungry and clothed in bits of fabric, they reported that Japanese occupation troops had given them no clothing and kept them half-starved. They were immediately fed with American field rations.

THE CONVOY. More than 600 transports, landing craft and warships were in the convoy that assembled at Dutch New Guinea bases on the afternoon of 13 October. They shoyed off for a 1,300-mile trip, the most far-reaching amphibious operation of all time, plowing northwest under a strict blackout and in radio silence. A typhoon with winds up to 75 miles an hour at first threatened the invasion's success, but when H-hour arrived the skies were cloudless and the weather calm.

Reinforcements and equipment, including medium tanks and artillery pieces, followed the first wave onto the beaches in a constant stream. By nightfall Friday more men were reported to have landed than the Allies put ashore in Normandy on Europe's D-day. All told, some 250,000 troops are estimated to be in the invasion force.

ISLETS SEIZED. Three days before the Leyte landings combat teams had

occupied the northern tip of Dinagat Island and the southern part of Homonhon Island, both so located to the east of Leyte as to command the entrance to Leyte Gulf. A Japanese radio report that Suluan Island also had been occupied has not been confirmed. Monitors of the Federal Communication Commission who picked up and relayed the report admit that they may have heard wrong.

Minesweepers also were in the area several days before the main landings to clear the area for the convoy's passage.

THE ENEMY. Friday's special communique disclosed that the enemy force in the area is the Fourteenth Army Group, which embraces about 25,000 men under the command of Field Marshal Count Terauchi. In an informal conversation with newsmen aboard the cruiser Nashville shortly before the landing, General MacArthur further identified the enemy as the 15th Division.

"I am particularly anxious to get at the division which is on Leyte," General MacArthur said. "It's the 15th, the outfit that did the dirty work on Bataan. They've been living off the fat of the land for more than two years and I believe they'll be a little softer now. But soft or not, we'll get them." Splashing ashore

sometime later he told a radio commentator that this time he had come to "stay for the duration."

Among General MacArthur's forces was every able bodied man who escaped from Corregidor in Manila Bay prior to its surrender on 6 May, 1942. In his personal party were President Sergio Osmena, of the Philippines Commonwealth, and Brig. Gen. Carlos Romulo, resident commissioner, both of whom predicted a major uprising soon among tens of thousands of Filipino patriots in the Japanese rear.

STRATEGIC GAINS. In seizing Leyte's east coast American forces were following a tried and true policy among SWPA campaigns—to hit at the enemy's soft spot. Believed to be much more lightly garrisoned than other enemy holdings in the Philippines, Leyte also is the center of guerrilla resistance.

So far gained at comparatively low cost, Leyte evenly divides the Japanese forces on the Philippines between Luzon to the north and Mindanao to the south. As GHQ's communique pointed out, for all practical purposes the landing isolates at least 20,000 Japs on Mindanao and nearly a half million farther south in the Netherlands East Indies.

THE FIRST COMMUNIQUE

20 October, 1944

In a major amphibious operation we have seized the eastern coast of Leyte Island, in the Philippines, 600 miles north of Morotai (Halmaheras) and 2,500 miles from Milne Bay, whence our offensive started nearly 16 months ago.

This point of entry in the Visayas is midway between Luzon and Mindanao and, at one stroke, splits in two the Japanese forces in the Philippines.

The enemy's anticipation of an attack in Mindanao caused him to be caught unawares in Leyte and beachheads in the Tacloban area were secured with small casualties.

The landing was preceded by heavy naval and air bombardments, which were devastating in effect.

Our ground troops are rapidly extending their positions and supplies and heavy equipment are already flowing ashore in great volume.

The troops comprise elements of the Sixth U.S. Army, to which are attached units from the Central Pacific, with supporting elements.

THE NAVAL FORCES consist of the Seventh U.S. Fleet, the Australian squadron and supporting elements of the Third U.S. Fleet.

Air support was given by navy carrier forces, the Far East Air Force, and the R.A.A.F.

The commander-in-chief is in personal command of the operation.

The enemy's forces of an estimated 225,000 include the 14th Army Group, under command of Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, of which seven divisions have

already been identified—the 16th, 26th, 30th, 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th. The strategic result of capturing the Philippines will be decisive.

The enemy's so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be cut in two. His conquered Empire to the south, comprising the Dutch East Indies and the British possessions of Borneo, Malaya and Burma, will be severed from Japan proper.

The great flow of transportation and supply, upon which Japan's vital war industry depends, will be cut, as will be the counter supply of his forces to the south.

A half million men will be cut off without hope of support and with ultimate destruction at the leisure of the Allies a certainty.

In broad strategical conception, the defensive line of the Japanese, which extends along the coast of Asia from the Japan Islands through Formosa, the Philippines, the East Indies to Singapore and Burma, will be pierced in the centre, permitting an envelopment to the south and to the north.

Either flank will be vulnerable and can be rolled up at will.



“...Rise and Strike!”

Shortly after the beachheads were established on Leyte, the voice of General MacArthur went out over the airwaves urging Filipino citizens to join in the fight for liberation. Text of his historic message follows in full:

“People of the Philippines—

“I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We

have come, dedicated and committed, to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people.

“At my side is your President, Sergio Osmena, worthy successor of that great patriot, Manuel Quezon, with members of his cabinet. The seat of your government is now therefore firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

“The hour of your redemption is here. Your patriots have demonstrated an unswerving and resolute devotion to the principles of freedom that challenges the best that is written on the pages of human history. I now call upon your supreme effort that the enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people within that he has a force there to contend with no less violent than is the force committed from without.

“Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike! Strike at every favorable opportunity. For your homes and hearths, strike! For future generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of your sacred dead, strike! Let no heart be faint. Let every arm be steered. The guidance of Divine God points the way. Follow in His Name to the Holy Grail of righteous victory.”

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Tanks, Artillery Have Room For Maneuver on Leyte

With the landings on Leyte Island last week, SWPA forces left behind them the primeval conditions of the New Guinea jungles and the close in-fighting they required, and for the first time entered an area of open terrain where highways and buildings already exist and where tanks and artillery may be employed to full advantage.

The eighth largest island in the Philippines and the main island of the Visayan (Central) group, Leyte lies 20 miles north-east of Cebu and less than a half mile southwest of Samar. It therefore may be considered as one of the pylons of the land bridge linking northeastern Mindanao to southeastern Luzon. Its capital, Tacloban, which may have fallen to U.S. forces by the time you read this, is only 275 miles from Davao (Mindanao), and but 340 miles from Manila (Luzon).

NOT SO WIDE. In shape Leyte is hard to classify. Ending in two peninsulas in the south and one in the north, it suggests at best a bit of broken bric-a-brac or unfinished sculpture. The island is about 120 miles long, has a maximum width of 60 miles in the north and a minimum of 15 miles in the center. In total land area it's somewhere close to 2,785 square miles, or about half again as large as Delaware.

Panaon Island, in the south, site of one of last Friday's four landing beaches, is separated from Leyte by a strait which at one point is only 90 yards wide. Panaon is said to be an extension of Leyte's major mountain chain, just as the island of Biliran, which lies only 120 yards offshore, is an extension of the same chain in the north.

CORDILLERA. Most but not the best of Leyte is mountainous. From northwest to southeast—from Carigara Bay in the north to Cabalian Bay in the south—the island is traversed by a belt of mountains, the Central Cordillera, which extends onto both southern peninsulas east and west of Sogod Bay (see the

accompanying special issue of NEWS-MAP). The Cordillera consists almost entirely of volcanoes, all extinct. Best known among them are Mount Majunag, 4,426 feet (and the island's highest) in the central Leyte; Mount Cabilian, 3,100 feet at the end of the southeastern peninsula; and Mount Nelangapan, 2,356 feet at the southern end of Panaon Island.

Having no pronounced saddles, these mountains have been little explored, especially in the southern half. The only road crossing the range at the island's narrowest point (Abuyog, on the east coast, and Baybay on the west), winds through rugged, precipitous terrain. It is safe understatement to describe the Cordillera as a marked barrier between the coastal lowlands.

THE PLAIN. North and east of this range is a broad, agriculturally rich plain occupying 250 square miles known as Leyte Valley, which forms a wide corridor between the Central Cordillera and some more hills to the east. In the north it opens toward Carigara Bay; in the south it slopes into the lowland coast between Tacloban and Abuyog. It may be defined generally within a line southeast from Barugo on Carigara Bay, to Palo on San Fernando Bay, south to a point on the east coast five miles south of Dulag, northwest to the town of Carigara on Carigara Bay, and along the coast to Barugo. At its narrowest point it is five miles wide. Protected from the full force of the monsoons, the Valley produces most of the food for Leyte's 972,000 inhabitants.

It is at the eastern edge of (in reality an extension of) this Valley that our men are currently engaged in some of their

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toughest fighting. The objective: Tacloban township, its airfields and its port facilities.

CAPITAL CITY. Tacloban lies at the south end of San Juanico Strait on the island's east coast, some 1,875 statute miles from Tokyo, 1,350 miles from Guam, 1,425 miles from Saipan. It is Leyte's only sizeable port, its harbor being large and deep enough to accommodate 12 to 15 vessels with a draught of 15 to 20 feet. Larger vessels normally anchor in nearby San Pedro Bay. In peacetime, and perhaps even under Japanese occupation, ships up to 2,000 tons used to sail from Tacloban twice a week for Manila. It is reported to be the second most important shipping port for hemp in the Philippines.

Boasting most modern conveniences and a population of 31,230 people, Tacloban is divided into four districts—Panalaron, the northern section including the wharf area; Kapangian, the western section; Sawan, the central; and San Fernando, in the south. Among other things, the town has an up-to-date business district, three lumber mills, and three large general hospitals. In 1938 it had only one asphalt-surfaced road—President Wilson street. Other streets, averaging 20 feet in width, were of firm gravel.

Communications from and to Tacloban, however, are among the best in the Philippines. The normally level terrain is enhanced by a good network of highways. Before the Japanese invasion Samar was easily accessible by the Guintiguian-La Paz auto ferry, and the Leyte Land Transportation Company bus service operated on nearly every route on the island passable to motor vehicles. Two important routes connected the east and west coasts and, although there was no telephone system, telegraph facilities were available in the larger coastal towns.

AIRDROMES. One of several air-strip clusters is located less than six miles southeast of Tacloban across a small bay on Cataisan Point. It was originally built by American-Filipino enterprise as a commercial airport. In December, 1941, shortly before the Japs invaded Luzon, USAFFE forces, including more than 20,000 Filipino soldiers, built another drome at Ormoc, the port town at the neck of the hammerhead-shaped peninsula on the west. Both these dromes are known to have been improved and extended by the Japs.

In addition, the Japs have constructed a number of strips a few miles south of Tacloban along a road in Leyte Valley leading from Dulag on the east coast five miles inland to Burauen. At least one more is located in the vicinity of Valancia. As this is written, U.S. troops are reported to be closing in the strips at Tacloban and Dulag.

OTHER VITAL AREAS. Besides Tacloban, Leyte has several other towns that may crop into the news before the fighting's done. Ormoc, mentioned earlier, a municipality of 77,349, is center of the island's sugar industry. Cane processed at nearby Ipil is shipped from here to the Manila refineries. Palompon, also on the west coast, has good wharf facilities, is a shipping point for hemp, copra, and corn. More piers are farther south at Sogod, at the head of Sogod Bay. Some of the hinterland in this area probably is suitable for military development.

Palo, less than eight miles south of Tacloban, is an important road junction, being the meeting point of the Leyte Valley inland and east shore road systems. With a population of about 25,000, it also is noteworthy as the center of the local ropemaking industry. Only two municipalities on Panaon Island worth



remembering are Liloan and Pontuyan. There is a small pier at Liloan, and the bay there is credited with providing good shelter from both monsoons.

RESOURCES. Leyte's number one export is hemp, the island running second only to the Davao area in the production of abaca. Copra and other derivatives from the coconut also are shipped in some abundance.

Mainly, though, Leyte is essentially farm country, growing enough to be self-sufficient in rice, corn, camote. There are plenty of pigs, chicken, fish, and carabao, and, in the vicinity of Baybay, even some cattle. Milk and butter are practically non-existent. Coconut oil is the main source of cooking, and wood the main fuel.

PIRATE RULE. History of the white man on Leyte dates back to 1543, when the chief of the province of Tangdaya (Leyte) received the armada of the Spanish explorer Villalobos "with special consideration and appreciation." Apparently the white man had not come to stay, because Leyte's subsequent history is devoted almost exclusively to native affairs.

Long a deterrent to Leyte's population growth was the notorious piracy of the Moros, who either drove or scared away all newcomers. From 1735 to 1798 not one new person took up residence on Leyte, the number of inhabitants remaining a constant 37,433. Then, as the rate of piracy began to decline, the rate of settlers began to rise. From 1798 to 1818 the population added about 3,000, and in the next 37 years it more than doubled itself. The last census taken before the Japanese invasion listed 915,853 people on the island.

DIVERSE TONGUES. About 20 per cent of Leyte's population can speak English, about one per cent Spanish. Tagalog, the official language, is spoken by 14,000. The rest speak two dialects of the Bisayan tongue, one more like the dialect of Cebu to the south, the other more like that of Samar to the northeast. Largest non-Filipino stock, according to the 1939 census, is Chinese.

TOKYO DOUBLE-TALK

"The Philippines have become the ground for decisive battles between America and Japan."
—Yomiuri, the Tokyo newspaper.

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KEEP 'EM OPEN. Leyte has a tropical climate with no dry season (rain-fall averages from 11 to 20 inches monthly. Heaviest rains come during November, December, January) and it has almost all the diseases that sort of climate can produce. Although cholera is rare, the Japs reported cases of it in 1943. In general, anybody in the area better do everything the medics recommend to guard against this and the more common bowel diseases such as dysentery and diarrhoea.

DINAGAT AND HOMONHON. The two islands east of Leyte which our men occupied shortly before the main landings in order to clear the sea lanes of mines are otherwise pretty unimportant. Dinagat is 46 miles long, 12 miles at its widest, has no airfields, and only the crudest of roads. It is rugged and sparsely populated. Its inhabitants depend chiefly on fishing for a livelihood, although before the war there was some prospecting for chromite.

Located nine miles southwest of Samar, Homonhon is crescent-shaped, fringed with reefs, heavily wooded. It has no good anchorages, although vessels may make landfall in fair weather. From the south, Homonhon sometimes appears as two islands, for in the middle it is less than a mile wide. In 1939 it had a population of 1,825, most of whom lived in the village of Homonhon, at the head of Casogoran Bay, in the island's northeast.

Messages from the President

In Washington on the day of the Philippines landing, President Roosevelt issued a special statement which referred to Leyte as "only a wayside station on the road to Japan. From our new base we shall quicken the assault." He then released for publication his messages:

To General MacArthur—

"The whole American nation today exults at the news that the gallant men under your command have landed on Philippines soil.

"I know well what this means to you. I know what it cost you to obey my order to leave Corregidor in February, 1942, and proceed to Australia.

"Since then you have planned, worked, and fought for the day when you would return to the Philippines with powerful forces. That day has come.

"You have the nation's gratitude and prayers for success as you and your men fight your way back to Bataan."

To Admirals Nimitz and Halsey—

"Your fine cooperation with General MacArthur furnishes another example of teamwork and the effective, intelligent use of all weapons."

To the Filipinos—

"We promised to return. We have returned. We have landed in the Philippines to redeem the pledge we made over two years ago when the last American troops surrendered at Corregidor against overwhelming enemy strength.

"Nowhere has the desire to avenge their comrades been stronger than among the forces in the Southwest Pacific. Leyte is another rung in a long ladder to which MacArthur's men have been clinging for two years.

"Our attacks in the last week have been destructive and decisive, but now we shall strike even more devastating blows to teach Japan her lesson.

"We learned our lesson about Japan. We trusted her, and treated her with the decency due to a civilized neighbor. We were foully betrayed. The price of the lesson was high.

"We have the will and power to teach her the cost of her treachery and deceit, the cost of stealing from neighbors.

"With our steadfast Allies we shall teach the lesson so that Japan never will forget it. We shall free the enslaved peoples, and restore the stolen lands and looted wealth to their rightful owners.

"We shall strangle Black Dragon Japanese militarism forever."

Maptalk

Vol 2, No. 17

Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE

28 OCT. 1944

RESTRICTED

Japs Suffer War's Worst Defeat In Big Philippines Sea Battle

At least a dozen Filipino communities had been freed on Leyte and the first beachhead had been established on nearby Samar. But important as it was, ground action on the Philippines was momentarily overshadowed by a blunt announcement from General MacArthur's headquarters: "The Japanese have suffered their most crushing defeat in the whole of the war in the biggest sea and air battle now raging east of the Philippines."

The special communique disclosed that of the three separate Japanese fleets that had gone into battle one had been either entirely sunk or badly damaged.

JAP LOSSES. Earlier reports from Admiral Nimitz' Pacific Fleet headquarters said that the crucial battle, which began on Monday, 23 October, and was still raging at the time this is written, had cost the Japs 150 aircraft shot down; one aircraft carrier sunk, two damaged; and five or six battleships, two cruisers, and a number of destroyers damaged. Only American loss reported is that of the 10,000-ton aircraft carrier, Princeton, most of whose crew was saved.

Described as a "critical moment in our history" by naval authorities in Hawaii, the battle began on Monday when planes of the U.S. Third Fleet sighted two enemy forces headed eastwards through the Sibuyan and Sulu Seas, moving in the direction of Leyte. The first force, comprising three or four battleships, ten cruisers, and 13 destroyers, was picked up south of Mindoro; the second, of two battleships, one cruiser, and destroyers, southwest of Negros. Later Monday a third force was spotted approaching from southeast of Formosa. Carrier planes immediately attacked, following the enemy ships as they steamed through the archipelago. The fight increased in intensity throughout Tuesday, surface forces apparently meeting somewhere east of Leyte.

In the absence of further details anything more would be sheer conjecture. In Washington, however, Admiral King, sorting through the incomplete reports reaching him, commented that the whole of the Japanese Navy seemed to be engaged.

SAMAR BEACHHEAD. Nor as yet were there any details on the landing at Samar, the mountainous, triangular-shaped island separated from north-east Leyte by the half-mile stretch of San Juanico strait. The first dispatch mentioned only that the beachhead had been established by Marines, news which, considering the reputation of the Leathernecks, might be enough said.

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The twelve Leyte communities liberated as of Wednesday, 25 October, included Tacloban (the capital of 30,000 people lying on the east coast and commanding the straits leading to the inland seas), San Fernandos, Sovaohan,

Most of the place names mentioned in dispatches from the Philippines may be located on the detailed map of the Leyte-Samar area which appears as the reverse feature of this week's NEWSMAP.

San Jose, Morasdras, Dulag, Palo, Pawing, Dureneatuman, Darombamal, Parayan, and San Pablo.

SAN PABLO. Last of these to fall to American ground troops was San Pablo. It was overrun with its strategic airfield on Tuesday. To take it infantrymen moved in sweltering heat and through sucking mud for 12 hours, averaging a mile an hour from the coastal village of Palo.

Palo, which lies two and a half miles inland six miles south of Tacloban and just north of the center of the 20-mile front, had been seized the day before by men of the 24th Division of the X Corps. Palo was the last Japanese stronghold on the east coast and the Japs fought bitterly to hold it. This area had been heavily fortified—tank traps, pillboxes, heavy and light machine gun emplacements, artillery and mortar positions. Occupation of the town was held up by particularly strong resistance in the northwest.

In counterattacking at Palo the Japs pulled a variation on one of their old tricks. On Tuesday night 75 men carrying bundles walked into the town crying "don't shoot, we are Filipinos." Then they unwrapped their bundles, pulled out machine guns, and started shooting. Retaliating with tommy guns and grenades, U.S. infantrymen killed 50. The rest fled. Other counterattacks, most of them more orthodox, continued all through the night.

FIRST SUCCESSES. Two airdromes, the capture of which brings Allied land-

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based bombers within reach of every Japanese stronghold on the archipelago, were the first objectives of the invasion forces. They fell on D-Day plus One. A 6000-foot strip near Tacloban was seized by elements of the First Cavalry Division operating in the X Corps sector; another strip at Dulag, 20 miles to the south, was taken by troops of the XXIV Corps. Engineers, going to work immediately with bulldozers, promised to have them ready for fighters in a few days.

In winning the two dromes American forces adopted tactics which had been used to such advantage often before in SWPA campaigns and which were to set the model for future action on Leyte. Artillery and divebombers first knocked out pillboxes and gun emplacements. Then infantrymen and tanks infiltrated Jap positions, forcing the enemy to withdraw, leaving flame throwers to incinerate Japs who remained in the field. A direct assault was avoided and casualties were light.

From Tacloban, which the Japs had evacuated except for snipers, infantrymen began to push on to San Juanico Strait, thus securing the point from which Marines later were to launch their invasion of Samar. In the XXIV Corps sector to the south American armor rolled on westward, spearheading the drive that took San Pablo. Progress was not easy. Halftracks were bogging down in rain and mud, and men were having to wade waist-deep through rice paddies.

THE LANDINGS. Under the personal supervision of General MacArthur, last Friday's landings had been made at four separate sectors on Leyte's east coast. One beachhead was established at San Ricardo, three miles south of Tacloban; another farther south between San Jose and Dulag; and two more by combat teams on Panaon Island in the extreme south.

Three days before the actual landing mine sweepers were in the area to clear an approach passage through San Pedro Bay. During the same period, warships cruised up and down Leyte's east coast, gave Jap installations a taste

of greater bombardments to come. Among them, spitting out 14-inch and 16-inch shells with a vengeance, were the smartly refitted battleships California, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, all of them once "destroyed" on a well-remembered Sunday at Pearl Harbor.

Concentrated bombardment began early in the morning of D-Day (20 October). As the amphibians moved in to discharge their cargoes, salvoes from the big guns increased into a continuous barrage, their thunder counterpointed by the rocket fire from landing craft close inshore. When the naval fire lifted, carrier planes took over, spot-bombing the enemy's gun emplacements on shoreline hills. Throughout the entire operation Hellicats, Avengers and other carrier planes patrolled the skies high overhead.

OPPOSITION. Japanese resistance apparently varied from beachhead to beachhead. One landing party in the north moved inland as far as 500 yards before meeting any fire. Another one, however, heading for the southern end of the San Ricardo beachhead near the township of Palo, had a tough time getting ashore. Japanese mortar and machine gun fire opened up at 500 yards and badly damaged a few landing craft.

Only one enemy plane appeared to oppose the landing. It dropped one bomb into the sea, was promptly shot down by naval ack-ack. That night the Japs managed two raids against units of the convoy, causing some damage to one vessel with an aerial torpedo. Jap aircraft also was reported to have raided in light formations over Saturday and Sunday.

FEW CASUALTIES. But the Japs, caught unawares, did not offer the sort of initial resistance they might have mustered had the forces gone ashore at Mindanao, where the enemy had expected us to invade. General MacArthur, on Saturday reported that ground casualties in the initial phases had been exceedingly light, and that

the operation was proceeding on clock-like schedule.

As of Tuesday, 3000 Japanese dead had been counted—a ratio of 10 to 1 to American dead. Most American casualties have been caused by the enemy's persistent mortar fire.

THE CONVOY. More than 600 transports, landing craft, and warships were in the convoy that assembled at Dutch New Guinea bases on the afternoon of 13 October. They shored off for a 1300-mile trip, the most far-reaching amphibious operation of all time, plowing northwest under a strict blackout and in radio silence. A typhoon with winds up to 75 miles an hour at first threatened the invasion's success, but when H-hour arrived the skies were cloudless and the weather calm.

Reinforcements and equipment, including medium tanks and artillery pieces, followed the first wave onto the beaches in a constant stream. By nightfall Friday more men were reported to have landed than the Allies put ashore in Normandy on Europe's D-Day. Estimates on the size of the invasion force have varied from 100,000 to 250,000.

ISLETS SEIZED. Three days before the Leyte landings combat teams had occupied the northern tip of Dinagat Island and the southern part of Homonhon Island, both so located to the east of Leyte as to command the entrance to Leyte Gulf. A later communique disclosed that a third and smaller island to the east of Homonhon, named Suluan, also had been occupied, a fact that Radio Tokyo had

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announced excitedly as early as last Wednesday.

THE ENEMY. Friday's special communique disclosed that the enemy force in the area is the Fourteenth Army Group, which embraces about 225,000 men under the command of Field Marshal Count Terauchi. General MacArthur, wearing his familiar braided cap and smoking a large corn-cob pipe, more specifically identified the enemy in an informal conversation with newsmen aboard the cruiser Nashville shortly before the landing.

"I am particularly anxious to get at the division which is on Leyte," General MacArthur said. "It's the 15th, the outfit that did the dirty work on Bataan. They've been living off the fat of the land for more than two years and I believe they'll be a little softer now. But soft or not, we'll get them."

Sometime later, while small arms fire and mortars were directed against nipa huts and isolated Jap positions scarcely more than 100 yards inland, the General walked up the busy beach to the radio truck where he told the world that this time he had come to "stay for the duration."

COMMONWEALTH IN CONTROL. Among General MacArthur's forces was every able bodied man who escaped from Corregidor in Manila Bay prior to its surrender on 6 May, 1942. In his personal party were President Sergio Osmena, of the Philippines Commonwealth, with Brig. Gen. Carlos Romulo, resident commissioner, both of whom predicted a major uprising soon among tens of thousands of Filipino patriots in the Japanese rear.

At Tacloban on Monday was created the first free government of the Philippines in 30 months. In a dramatic ceremony with President Osmena, General MacArthur declared Japanese laws void and promised prompt extension of Commonwealth authority to other areas.

Filipinos have been trickling steadily into the American lines ever since headquarters were first set up. They

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come for orders and, receiving them, go out again, armed with captured Jap weapons, bolos, and ancient rifles, to gather information on enemy troop dispositions. Some evidence of their activity during the last year was given by 55-year-old Colonel Ruperto Kangelon, veteran of the Filipino constabulary and army for 28 years, who has been the leader of some 4000 guerrilla fighters. He reported that, though often badly outnumbered, in 304 forays his men had killed 3800 Japs.

Seizure Of Ulithi, Ngulu Straightens Pacific Battle Line

Last week a Pacific Fleet communique placed on the record an American conquest dating back to 20-21 September: seizure by U.S. forces of Ulithi Island, 100 miles west of Yap, and one of the best anchorages in the Carolines.

Reason why capture of the island remained unannounced for so long was apparently a very reasonable suspicion that Tokyo had remained unaware of the landings until some time after they were executed.

A later communique announced the capture of Ngulu atoll, another Carolines atoll, 80 miles south of Yap, where American invading forces completed their occupation of the island chain on 15 October.

STRAIGHT-LINE FRONT. With the consolidation of these gains in the Carolines, the U.S. had succeeded in forging a chain of bases stretching in a straight line from Morotai in the Halmaheras to Saipan in the Marianas. On 8 and 10 October Garakayo and Bairakaseru, islets in the Palau group, fell by default to landing parties.

TRUK BYPASSED. Careful study of aerial photographs of Truk, once the most feared Jap base in the Pacific, has

shown the island to be 75 per cent neutralized by raids of the Seventh Air Force. Since February, when carrier force planes first struck and sank 35 ships, Truk has been raided almost continuously, for a long while by elements of the 13th Air Force from SWPA. The Japs had planned to use Truk as a great base for Pacific offensives and had made pretentious instal-

lations of hangars, storage tanks, and warehouses. Survivors of the Jap garrison there, once estimated at 35,000 are now living in caves. Their barracks have been bombed to bits.

With the seizure of Ulithi and Ngulu, Truk's strategic isolation becomes complete, while Yap, once a powerful enemy supply base and staging area is for all practical purposes neutralized.

The First Communique

20 October, 1944.

In a major amphibious operation we have seized the eastern coast of Leyte Island, in the Philippines, 600 miles north of Morotai (Halmaheras), and 2500 miles from Milne Bay, whence our offensive started nearly 16 months ago.

This point of entry in the Visayas is midway between Luzon and Mindanao and, at one stroke, splits in two the Japanese forces in the Philippines.

The enemy's anticipation of an attack in Mindanao caused him to be caught unawares in Leyte and beach-heads in the Tacloban area were secured with small casualties.

The landing was preceded by heavy naval and air bombardments which were devastating in effect.

Our ground troops are rapidly extending their positions and supplies and heavy equipment are already flowing ashore in great volume.

The troops comprise elements of the Sixth U.S. Army, to which are attached units from the Central Pacific, with supporting elements.

THE NAVAL FORCES consist of the Seventh U.S. Fleet, the Australian squadron and supporting elements of the Third U.S. Fleet.

Air support was given by navy carrier forces, the Far East Air Force and the R.A.A.F.

The commander-in-chief is in personal command of the operation.

The enemy's forces of an estimated 225,000 include the 14th Army Group, under command of Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, of which seven divisions have already been identified—the 16th, 26th, 30th, 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th.

The strategic result of capturing the Philippines will be decisive.

The enemy's so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be cut in two.

His conquered Empire to the south, comprising the Dutch East Indies and the British possessions of Borneo, Malaya and Burma, will be severed from Japan proper.

The great flow of transportation and supply, upon which Japan's vital war industry depends, will be cut, as will be the counter supply of his forces to the south.

A half million men will be cut off without hope of support and with ultimate destruction at the leisure of the Allies a certainty.

In broad strategical conception, the defensive line of the Japanese, which extends along the coast of Asia from the Japan Islands through Formosa, the Philippines, the East Indies to Singapore and Burma, will be pierced in the centre, permitting an envelopment to the south and to the north.

Either flank will be vulnerable and can be rolled up at will.

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Tanks, Artillery Have Room For Maneuver On Leyte

With the landings on Leyte Island last week, SWPA forces left behind them the primeval conditions of the New Guinea jungles and the close in-fighting they required, and for the first time entered an area of open terrain where highways and buildings already exist and where tanks and artillery may be employed to full advantage.

The eighth largest island in the Philippines and the main island of the Visayan (Central) group, Leyte lies 20 miles northeast of Cebu and less than half a mile southwest of Samar. It therefore may be considered as one of the pylons on the land bridge linking northeastern Mindanao to southeastern Luzon. Its capital, Tacloban, which may have fallen to U.S. forces by the time you read this, is only 275 miles from Davao (Mindanao), and but 340 miles from Manila (Luzon).

NOT SO WIDE. In shape Leyte is hard to classify. Ending in two peninsulas in the south and one in the north, it suggests at best a bit of broken bric-a-brac or unfinished sculpture. The island is about 120 miles long, has a maximum width of 50 miles in the north and a minimum of 15 miles in the center. In total land area it's somewhere close to 2,785 square miles, or about half again as large as Delaware.

Panaon Island in the south, site of one of last Friday's four landing beaches, is separated from Leyte by a strait which at one point is only 90 yards wide. Panaon is said to be an extension of Leyte's major mountain chain, just as the island of Biliran, which lies only 120 yards offshore, is an extension of the same chain in the north.

CORDILLERA. Most but not the best of Leyte is mountainous. From northwest to northeast—from Carigara Bay in the north to Caballan Bay in the south—the island is traversed by a belt of mountains, the

Central Cordillera, which extends onto both southern peninsulas east and west of Sogod Bay (see the accompanying issue of NEWSMAP). The Cordillera consists almost entirely of volcanoes, all extinct. Best known among them are Mount Majunag, 4,426 feet (and the island's highest) in central Leyte; Mount Caballan, 3,100 feet at the end of the southeastern peninsula; and Mount Nelangapan, 2,356 feet at the southern end of Panaon Island.

Having no pronounced saddles, these mountains have been little explored, especially in the southern half. The only road crossing the range at the island's narrowest point (Abuyog on the east coast and Baybay on the west) winds through rugged, precipitous terrain. It is safe understatement to describe the Cordillera as a marked barrier between the coastal lowlands.

THE PLAIN. North and east of this range is a broad, agriculturally rich plain occupying 250 square miles known as Leyte Valley, which forms a wide corridor between the Central Cordillera and some more hills to the east. In the north it opens toward Carigara Bay; in the south it slopes into the lowland coast between Tacloban and Abuyog. It may be defined generally within a line southeast from Barugo on Carigara Bay, to Palo on San Fernando Bay, south to a point on the east coast five miles south of Dulag, northwest to the town of Carigara on Carigara Bay and along the coast to Barugo. At its narrowest point it is five miles wide. Protected from

the full force of the monsoons, the Valley produces most of the food for Leyte's 900,000 inhabitants.

It was at the eastern edge of (in reality an extension of) this Valley that our men landed last week. Their objective: Tacloban township, its airfields and its port facilities.

CAPITAL CITY. Tacloban lies at the south end of San Juanico Strait on the island's east coast, some 1,875 statute miles from Tokyo, 1,350 miles from Guam, 1,425 miles from Saipan. It is Leyte's only sizable port, its harbor being large and deep enough to accommodate 12 to 15 vessels with a draught of 15 to 20 feet. Larger vessels anchor in nearby San Pedro Bay. In peacetime, and perhaps even under Japanese occupation, ships up to 2,000 tons used to sail from Tacloban twice a week for Manila. It is reported to be the second most important shipping port for hemp in the Philippines.

Boasting most modern conveniences and a population of 31,230 people, Tacloban is divided into four districts—Panalaron, the northern section including the wharf area; Kapangian, the western section; Sawan, the central; and San Fernando, in the south. Among other things, the town has an up-to-date business district, three lumber mills and three large general hospitals. In 1938 it had only one asphalt-surfaced road—President Wilson street. Other streets, averaging 20 feet in width, were of firm gravel.

Communications from and to Tacloban, however, are among the best in the Philippines. The generally level terrain is enhanced by a good network of highways. Before the Japanese invasion the nearby island of Samar

was easily accessible by the Guin-tigulan-La Paz auto ferry, and the Leyte Land Transportation Company bus service operated on nearly every route on the island passable to motor vehicles. Two important routes connected the east and west coasts and although there was no telephone system, telegraph facilities were available in the larger coastal towns.

AIRDROMES. One of several airstrip clusters is located less than six miles southeast of Tacloban across a small bay on Cataisan Point. It was originally built by American-Filipino enterprise as a commercial airport. In December, 1941, shortly before the Japs invaded Luzon, USAFFE forces, including more than 20,000 Filipino soldiers, built another drome at Ormoc, the port town at the neck of the hammer-head-shaped peninsula on the west. Both these dromes are known to have been improved and extended by the Japs.

In addition, the Japs have constructed a number of strips a few miles south of Tacloban along a road in Leyte Valley leading from Dulag on the east coast five miles inland to Burauen. At least one more is located in the vicinity of Valancia.

OTHER VITAL AREAS. Besides Tacloban, Leyte has several other towns that may crop into the news before the fighting's done. Ormoc, mentioned earlier, a municipality of 77,349, is center of the island's sugar industry. Cane processed at nearby Ipi is shipped from here to the Manila refineries. Palompon, also on the west coast, has good wharf facilities, is a shipping point for hemp, copra, and corn. More piers are farther south at Sogod at the head of Sogod Bay. Some of the hinterland in this area



probably is suitable for military development.

Palo, less than eight miles south of Tacloban, is an important road junction, being the meeting point of the Leyte Valley inland and east shore road systems. With a population of about 25,000, it also is noteworthy as the center of the local ropemaking industry. Only two municipalities on Panaon Island worth remembering are Liloan and Pontuyan. There is a small pier at Liloan and the bay there is credited with providing good shelter from both monsoons.

RESOURCES. Leyte's number one export is hemp, the island running second only to the Davao area in the production of abaca. Copra and other derivatives from the coconut also are shipped in some abundance.

Leyte is essentially farm country, growing enough to be self-sufficient in rice, corn, camote. There are plenty of pigs, chicken, fish, and carabao, and, in the vicinity of Baybay, even some cattle. Milk and butter are practically non-existent. Coconut oil is the main source of cooking and wood the main fuel.

PIRATE RULE. History of the white man on Leyte dates back to 1543, when the chief of the province of Tangdaya (Leyte) received the armada of the Spanish explorer Villalobas "with special consideration and appreciation." Apparently the white man had not come to stay, because Leyte's subsequent history is devoted almost exclusively to native affairs.

Long a deterrent to Leyte's population growth was the notorious piracy of the Moros who either drove or scared away all newcomers. From 1735 to 1798 not one new person took up residence on Leyte, the number of inhabitants remaining a constant 37,433. Then, as the rate of piracy began to decline, the rate of settlers began to rise. From 1798 to 1818 the population added about 3,000, and in the next 37 years it more than doubled itself. The

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last census taken before the Japanese invasion listed 915,853 people on the island.

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KEEP 'EM OPEN. Leyte has a tropical climate with no dry season (rainfall averages from 11 to 20 inches monthly. Heaviest rains come during November, December, January) and it has almost all the diseases that sort of climate can produce. Although cholera is rare, the Japs reported cases of it in 1943. In general, anybody in the area better do everything the medics recommend to guard against this and the more common bowel diseases such as dysentery and diarrhoea.

DINAGAT AND HOMONHON. The two islands east of Leyte which our men occupied shortly before the main landings in order to secure the approaches are otherwise pretty unimportant. Dinagat is 46 miles long, 12 miles at its widest, has no airfields and only the crudest of roads. It is rugged and sparsely populated. Its inhabitants depend chiefly on fishing for a livelihood, although before the war there was some prospecting for chromite.

Located nine miles southwest of Samar, Homonhon is crescent-shaped, fringed with reefs, heavily wooded. It has no good anchorages, although vessels may make landfall in fair weather. From the south, Homonhon sometimes appears as two islands, for in the middle it is less than a mile wide. In 1939 it had a population of 1,825, most of whom lived in the village of Homonhon at the head of Casogoran Bay in the northeast.

ARMY TALK The Philippines' Place On the Road Back Home

Note to Information and Education Officers: The discussion text which follows is designed to use the Philippines as a focal point for considering our current progress and future problems in closing in upon Japan. Among the points particularly desirable to stress in the discussion are: 1. We are only beginning to face a major portion of the Japanese army; 2. After victory over Germany, much of our fighting strength must be remanned against Japan; 3. If cutting Japanese supply lines is so important, our own supply system must be even more vital.

WE HAVE COME a long, hard way on the road that leads back home. Casablanca and Henderson Field, Naples and Noemfoor, Metz and Morotai are among the milestones which we have passed on that road. It is no longer necessary to look ahead to see that the road home goes through the Philippines.

There is no point in our discussing the tactics which we are using to retake the Philippine Islands. That decision and its details is the operations plan, which is naturally a well-guarded secret.

The real question is the significance of the Philippines in our overall strategy to defeat Japan and restore peace to the Pacific. (Suggestion: Put the above into your own words as an introduction to the discussion. Then start group participation by asking a few individuals the question: "What do you think of these days when you think of the Philippine Islands?")


As Bases for Operations

When we retake the Philippines and again fly our flag over Manila and Bataan and Corregidor, we will have many assets. They fall into four groups: 1. Bases for operations against the mainland of China and against Japan; 2. A huge gap in the outer defenses of Japan; 3. A barrier between Japan and its supplies in the Netherlands East Indies; 4. What Orientals term "face." (Question: How might we use the Philippines as bases of operations?)

In the Philippines, our Navy will have many fine anchorages. Our ships—if necessary—can disperse widely, hug the shores and be protected by our AA and planes from numerous airfields, includ-

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ing many which the Japanese have built since their conquest of the islands



The Philippines provide an excellent base for our bombers to reach China, Formosa, French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. Manila is about 700 miles from the nearest coast of China, about 1000 miles from the NEI and 600 miles from Formosa. (Geographical relationships can be illustrated by a simplified type of chart like the one on the left. It is suggested that you put this on a black-board or wall chart at this stage of the discussion rather than prepare it in advance. This would be in addition to a large map of the area, which should be on hand if possible.)

Barrier To The Indies

When we recapture the Philippines, we obviously cut off the enemy's homeland from those islands. At the same time we will be able to cut the sea lanes between Japan and the incomparable riches of the Netherlands East Indies, Thailand, French Indo-China and the Malay States. The whole Japanese offensive in 1941-42 was aimed at securing these prizes. (Suggestion: Ask what raw materials vital to Japan are plentiful in those areas.)

Among the significant raw materials Japan wanted from those areas are:

High grade iron ore found in the surface mines of Malaya and the Philippines.

Tokyo claims the Japanese have put back to work 70 per cent. of the rich oil wells in the Netherlands East Indies. Fuel oil from here is needed by the Japanese navy.

In the Philippines, Japan is operating the Lepanto copper mine and smelter at full capacity.

Cotton growing has been promoted all through her conquered territory.

In Burma, Thailand, and French Indo-China, the Japanese obtained the source of 95 per cent. of the world's export rice and raw rubber.

From high grade bauxite deposits in the Netherlands East

Indies and Malaya, Japan gets ore for aluminum mills in Formosa, Manchuria and Japan.

Java is the source of 90 per cent. of the world's quinine.

Two-thirds of the world's pre-war tin was mined in Malaya, Thailand and NEI.

The Philippines produce 90 per cent. of the world's best and strongest hemp.

All of these materials are found outside of Japan itself and many miles from its home factories. When we take or neutralize the Philippines we keep these materials from Japan. (Suggested question: "Will we get materials from the Philippines which we need badly?")

For our own immediate needs, there are few important raw materials within the Philippines themselves, except for the hemp which makes excellent rope.

Independence For The Philippines

We do not intend to keep the Philippines after the war. The United States is committed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 to the policy of affording the Filipinos their full independence by 1946. The President has said: "I like to think that the history of the Philippine Islands in the last 40 years provided in a very real sense a pattern for the future of other small nations and peoples of the world." In the Philippines we will have the first positive opportunity to apply the spirit of the Atlantic Charter to the Far Eastern Area. (Suggestion: Ask the group about the status of Philippine independence.)

We are not going back into the Philippines for selfish nor profit-making reasons. We are going in for definite military aims of securing a fine base of operations against the enemy, cutting that enemy off from a rich empire seized by conquest, and at the same time driving the largest in a series of wedges into Japan's outer fortifications.

Wiping The Slate Clean

These are tangible things to be gained. (If it has not already come up in the discussion, ask whether there is another motive which makes recapture of the islands meaningful to us.) An intangible but important reason to go back is the necessity of wiping the slate clean.

It is more than two years (Bataan 9 April '42, Corregidor 6 May '42) since organized American resistance officially ceased in the Philippines. We have not forgotten our fighting men who died there. With our landings on Leyte we are keeping faith with the



"...Rise and Strike!"

After the beachheads had been established on Leyte, the voice of General MacArthur went out over the airwaves urging Filipino citizens to join in the fight for liberation. Text of his historic message follows in full:

"People of the Philippines—

I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed, to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring, upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people.

"At my side is your President, Sergio Osmena, a worthy successor of that great patriot, Manuel Quezon, with members of his cabinet. The seat of your government is now therefore firmly reestablished on Philippine soil.

"The hour of your redemption is here. Your patriots have demonstrated an unswerving and resolute devotion to the principles of freedom that challenges the best that is written on the pages of human history. I now call upon your supreme effort that the enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people within that he has a force there to contend with no less violent than is the force committed from without.

"Rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike! Strike at every favorable opportunity. For your homes and hearths, strike! For future generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of your sacred dead, strike! Let no heart be faint. Let every arm be steered. The guidance of Divine God points the way. Follow in His Name to the Holy Grail of righteous victory."

victims of our worst military defeat (1086 killed; 1694 wounded; 12,892 prisoners; 15,613 missing).

They paid in suffering and blood for the precious months during which we rallied our forces to slow down and finally stop the Japanese. An Oriental would think of it in terms of "face." We think of it as self-respect and honor. (Question: How far did the Japanese thrust before we stopped them?)

The Japanese recognized the fact that their sneak attack on Pearl Harbor only temporarily crippled American seapower in the

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western Pacific. For Japan to succeed, the Philippines had to be neutralized before the United Nations could mobilize their strength. The magnificent stand made by the Filipinos and Americans in the Philippines slowed up the Japanese timetable, but in other areas the planned Japanese offensive moved forward with incredible speed.

Within three months the Japanese militarists, using previously conquered French Indo-China as a springboard, held a new empire. Driving across the Malay Peninsula from Thailand, the Japanese quickly occupied the greater part of Burma and captured Singapore.

Even as we fought for time on Bataan, the Japanese moved on the Netherlands East Indies to the south. Manila had hardly fallen before the Japanese also held Borneo, Celebes and New Britain. Singapore's fall sealed the doom of Sumatra and Java. The Japanese had an empire which was protected from the east by a ring of defenses developed throughout the Japanese-mandated islands years before. This island ring of defenses had been augmented by the capture of Guam, Wake, Makin, Tarawa, and similar islands into which they poured steel and concrete. (Question: How have the Japanese used their conquests in addition to fortifying strategic places?)

How Japan Used This Empire

The Japanese attempted to push further. They stabbed in the direction of Australia and India, but the United Nations had built up enough strength to stop them. It is true that Japan was able to seize Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians but this effort was largely nullified by our clear cut naval victories in the Coral Sea and Midway Island engagements.

There followed for Japan a two-fold program. She developed military defenses of the kind we ran into at Tarawa. Behind this outer wall, Japan swiftly began to ship to her industries and stockpiles at home raw materials she so desperately needed to continue a long military conflict. From the Netherlands East Indies, the Malay States, Thailand, Burma, and French Indo-China the Japanese took as much rubber, oil and rice as they could seize and ship. They were rushing against time, as they tried to build up sufficient reserve for a long war.

Ever since Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, she has rushed development of that area. Farm lands, factories and mines have been whipped into intensive production. The same thing has been done throughout most of the remaining huge area taken from China, as well as in Japan itself. Thus, the whole area north of

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the Yellow River has been turned into a Japanese production center. Into this inner zone have been poured the products of stolen lands which are so far away that they can be cut off. For more than two years, storehouses of the inner zone have been filled.

As a result, Japan will be able to keep fighting us for a considerable time after we cut her off from the South. It is essential that we do cut her off, but we must not expect to see immediate evidence of the action.

Our Counter-Offensive

The farthest point in Japan's drive south was the Solomon Islands, and it was there that they suffered their first land defeat in this war. Just prior to our successful landings on Guadalcanal in August, 1942, our fleet had handed the Japanese a severe defeat at Midway and had repulsed their thrust at Dutch Harbor.

Since Guadalcanal, our forces in the Pacific have progressed steadily forward. The going in the Pacific has been tough; it took from January 1943 to July 1943 to move 120 miles from Guadalcanal to Munda, but we have an unbroken series of victories.

We pointed even more sharply toward Japan last August when the South Pacific Theater was consolidated with the Central Pacific Area under the command of Lt. General Robert C. Richardson, Jr. General Richardson's command is known as "the Pacific Ocean Areas." General MacArthur, of course, continues to command the Southwest Pacific Area.

Despite our successes and gradual northward and westward progress we must remember that as yet we have beaten only out-post garrisons of the Japanese army. The main body of the Japanese army has not yet faced a major American attack. We may encounter it soon on the Philippines, and when we do we will know how to fight against it as a result of battle lessons we have learned in our series of smaller-scale meetings.

What Was Accomplished?

In addition to killing fanatic Japanese soldiers and destroying their materiel piecemeal by our island-hopping, we accomplished several definite things. We have gnawed into their outer defenses by capturing islands or cutting their supply lines. We captured important bases for our own operations and shortened our water routes to our advanced units. We continued to hammer at Japanese shipping reducing their tonnage at a faster rate than they can build.

As we moved across the South and Central Pacific, we not only removed the Japanese threat to Australia, New Caledonia and New

CLOSING IN ON TOKYO

				Taken by Japs	Retaken by Allies
Guam	..	..	..	Dec. '41	Aug. '44
Hongkong	..	..	..	Dec. '41	
Makin	..	..	..	Dec. '41	Nov. '43
Tarawa	..	..	..	Dec. '41	Nov. '43
Ellice Islands	..	..	..	Dec. '41	Apr. '43
Manila	..	..	..	Jan. '42	
Borneo	..	..	..	Jan. '42	
Rabaul	..	..	..	Jan. '42	
New Ireland	..	..	..	Jan. '42	
Singapore	..	..	..	Feb. '42	
Java	..	..	..	Feb. '42	
Lae	..	..	..	Feb. '42	Sept. '43
Salamaua	..	..	..	Feb. '42	Sept. '43
Flinschhafen	..	..	..	Feb. '42	Oct. '43
Bataan	..	..	..	Apr. '42	
Woodlark	..	..	..	Apr. '42	June '43
Rendova	..	..	..	Apr. '42	July '43
Treasury Isl.	..	..	..	Apr. '42	Nov. '43
Russell Isl.	..	..	..	Apr. '42	June '43
Bougainville	..	..	..	Apr. '42	Nov. '43
New Georgia	..	..	..	Apr. '42	Aug. '43
Kolombangara	..	..	..	Apr. '42	Oct. '43
Guadalcanal	..	..	..	Apr. '42	Jan. '43
Corregidor	..	..	..	May '42	
Burma	..	..	..	May '42	
Attu	..	..	..	June '42	June '43
Kiska	..	..	..	June '42	Aug. '43
Hollandia	..	..	..	May '42	Apr. '44
Buna	..	..	..	July '42	Jan. '43

Zealand, but we also shortened our own supply lines to our far advanced outposts.

It is no longer necessary, since we captured Tarawa and Eniwetok, for our cargo planes to make a dog leg from Hawaii toward Christmas Island or the Samoa group. We save many miles by cutting across the ocean to the Gilberts and Marshalls.

Along with this cleansing of the Central and South Pacific, of course, came the development of the Pacific Wing of the Air Transport Command, flying supplies to our forces and speeding evacuation of wounded.

Jap Shipping Losses

And while our forces have been recapturing our island bases, the Navy has carried on the primary task of sinking Japan's ships. As an island nation which must import many necessities, Japan's shipping is her life line. We have reduced the Japanese merchant fleet to two-thirds the size it was on December 7, 1941. We have sunk well over 2,000,000 tons of her cargo tonnage. The shipping problem has become so desperate for the Japanese that recently they have been forced to use their inter-island coastal transports to carry supplies to their Pacific bases.

Losses like those have certainly weakened the Japanese position. Their army cannot fight for long without its supply lines, any more than we could win without our supply services.

The very fact that we are now at long blessed last on the Philippines indicates how far we have come. Japan's ouster of Tojo and other cabinet changes reveal the enemy's worry. We have set the stage for victory over Japan during the last two years, even while our main effort was directed against our European enemy.

The Japanese army, with its stolen stockpiles massed behind it, knows we will hit Japan with all our power after we win in Europe. The more strength we can concentrate in the Pacific, the sooner we will be home. Such strength will be available after Germany surrenders, according to plan. Our leaders have never lost sight of this plan; Winston Churchill expressed the same idea in March, 1943:

"Speaking under every reserve and not attempting to prophesy, I can imagine that some time next year—but it may well be the year after—we might beat Hitler . . . then we shall immediately proceed to transport all the necessary additional forces and apparatus to the other side of the world to punish the greedy, cruel empire of Japan . . . that must be our first supreme task and nothing must lure us from it."

This is the present picture of the Pacific and the place the Philippines fit into the pattern of our ultimate march to complete victory and the road home.

(A.G. 353 (16 Jan '44).)

By Order of the Secretary of War:

Official:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

Orientation Branch, Morale Services Division, Army Service Forces,
War Department, Washington, D.C.

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Answering GIs: These Facts About Philippines May Help

WHETHER they are with troops actually in the islands or units looking forward to getting there, SWPA officers and non-coms these days can count on being asked all kinds of questions about the Philippines. Preparing for the job of answering these questions will not be easy even with the material that has been made available, because it is obviously impossible to anticipate even very many of these questions, to say nothing of trying to foresee all of them.

You can't out-guess the active GI mind. It never operates more devastatingly than when it is firing inquisitorial salvoes at company officers and NCO's. The only workable solution is to get together the basic facts found in the standard sources and add to them a substantial collection of odds and ends of information. And if the answers to some of the questions are still obscure, there is always the old reliable "I don't know but I will find out for you." MAPTALK will help.

HEALTH. Soldiers who have experienced jungle conditions are going to wonder what they will find in the Philippines to compare with the sort of conditions they found in New Guinea, Bismarck and the Solomons. Just keeping fit in New Guinea, for example, means a constant battle with all kinds of disease from deadly malaria to maddening skin diseases. Men will want to know how many of the precautions they have become used to can be relaxed when they reach the Philippines. Unfortunately the answer is none.

MALARIA. Progress made toward reducing malaria in the Philippines has largely been lost through the war and Jap occupation. Malaria will be prevalent everywhere and all routine precautions will have to be kept up as vigilantly as ever. In fact, the malaria mosquito in the Philippines adds a few more tricks to the anopheline repertory, outshining her country cousins in New Guinea by successfully breed-

ing in running water, so that even if stagnant pools are drained or sprayed, the anopheles species can perpetuate itself.

DYSENTERY. Often referred to in less dignified terms, dysentery is another menace that will have to be constantly guarded against by troops campaigning in the Philippines. Stomach aches and running bowels are only the first symptoms of a disease which can ruin a man's health permanently. Here again no precautions can be relaxed. Men must be warned against eating uncooked food, green fruits or raw vegetables. Dirty hands and dirty mess kits are conditions which help dysentery take hold. Insect control also enters the picture since flies carry disease germs from latrines.

Besides taking precautions in regard to food, troops must also be warned about water supply. It is safe to assume that all the streams in the Philippines will be polluted even though they may flow crystal clear. Boiling water for at least five minutes is one sure way of killing dysentery organisms. Standard Army chlorination, of course, also safeguards water supply.

THINGS TO BUY. Troops are going to be curious about ways to spend their money when they get to the Philippines. Many of them are probably looking forward to being able to buy souvenirs and to do a certain amount of shopping in Philippine towns.

Troops entering Tacloban found most Filipino shops closed and shuttered.

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SUPPLY PROBLEM

The War Department recently released the following figures to show what was necessary to supply an invasion force of 150,000 men. They should give you a rough idea as to what is required to supply the Philippines liberation force:

For the landing: 1,500,000 tons of equipment, including 235,000 tons of combat vehicles, 200,000 tons of ammunition, 200,000 tons of medical supplies.

Thereafter: 332,000 tons of equipment must arrive every 30 days, requiring monthly trips by 30 to 35 Liberty ships and 15 tankers.

and those few which had remained open under Jap occupation had very limited stocks. You can count on this being more or less the rule in the Philippines. There is going to be a scarcity of things to buy.

There is another angle to this "buying" business. If American troops go on wild spending sprees to purchase what few Filipino stocks remain, it will work a real hardship on Filipinos in the liberated areas, most of whom have been prohibited from buying much more than the bare necessities of life because of the high inflationary prices that prevailed under Jap occupation.

MONEY. Some of these questions are going to deal with the coinage system which men can expect to find in the islands. By this time most American soldiers have been used to dealing with foreign currency, many having gone through the shillings, pounds and pence routine on the mainland of Australia, others having become acquainted with Dutch guilders.

In the Philippines they will find a system based on pesos and centavos. The standard value of the peso (pre-war value that is) was 50 cents in

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United States money. A centavo was the 1/100th part of a peso, therefore, being equal to 1 cent. Coins in currency in 1941 were the peso, 1 peso, the pesata (20 centavos), Media pesata (10 centavos). All of these were silver coins. The 5 centavo coin was made of copper and nickel. The one centavo was made of bronze. Folding money consisted of notes issued in one, two, five, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and 500 peso denominations.

U.S. Gets 2500 New Fighting Citizens

United States citizenship rights have been granted to approximately 2500 members of the armed forces fighting in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, Dr. Henry B. Hazard, representative of the U.S. immigration and naturalization service, states in a report to General MacArthur.

In the Pacific since early 1944, Dr. Hazard has worked on the Australian mainland, at various commands in New Guinea, the Admiralty Group, New Britain, the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides. Of the 2500 who have pledged allegiance to the Stars and Stripes before him, 2000 represent the SWPA.

FROM ALL OVER. These new citizens come from 79 different countries, ranging from Australia to Albania, from Canada to Czechoslovakia and from Estonia to Egypt. Practically every race and culture is represented. It is significant that in the group, the largest number, 728, are from the Philippines, some of whom fought heroically before Bataan fell to the Japanese. Second place is held by Canada with 447, followed by Mexico with 307, Germany with 159 and Italy with 139.

The next ten countries are Poland with 77, Scotland 56, Irish Free State 44, England 42, Russia 36, Greece 24, China and Sweden 23 each, Czechoslovakia 22, and Norway 22.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

First Army Takes Aachen; Canadians On New Offensive

Principal developments up and down the long front in western Europe last week were the taking of Aachen by the Americans, the launching of a new offensive by the First Canadian Army, and an increased tendency by the Luftwaffe to seek combat.

Aachen, an industrial city and the hub of a communication network spreading far into the Reich, fell to troops of the First United States Army. Isolated patches of resistance were still being mopped up as the week closed, but for all practical purposes the place had changed hands. It was won after bombardment by artillery and fighter bombers and gruelling infantry operations that culminated in a period of bitter house-to-house fighting.

Despite the doggedness of the defense, however, the attackers' casualties were not heavy for a battle of the bloody kind they were compelled to wage. Aachen (known to the French as Aix-La-Chapelle) was the first large German community to fall to the Allies and was completely encircled before the decision was gained.

SCHELDE OFFENSIVE. The First Canadian Army's offensive got under way about 14 miles northeast of Antwerp and, according to early reports, appeared to involve two separate forces operating along slightly divergent directions of attack. It was aimed approximately at the mid-point of the German line extending east from the

neighborhood of the Schelde Estuary's head to the base of the Semend, the British army's salient into Holland.

Its whereabouts suggested that purposes of the attacks might include the easing of enemy pressure at the landward end of the isthmus leading to German-held territory on the north shore of the Schelde Estuary. The Canadians now controlling the entrance to the isthmus had been subjected to frequent counterattacks, and toward week's end came reports of new enemy forces massing just north of the area.

Use of the big Belgian port of Antwerp, which would be a major addition to the Allies' supply system, hinges upon control of the Schelde Estuary. At present the Germans not only occupy the north shore but retain a large pocket on the south shore at the seaward end of the waterway. A continuous front has now been drawn around the pocket and its only communications are water borne across the estuary.

The enemy-held area is being steadily compressed, demolition explosions have been heard within it, and since the operation began about 3200 prisoners have been taken. The last report of an advance told of a new bridgehead being thrown northward across the Albert Canal about five miles northwest of Bruges. Farther east the canal was crossed early in the attack. At about the same time troops were landed on the Estuary shore east of Breskens, one of its ferry ports.

RENEWED PUGNACITY. The Luftwaffe's increased tendency to show fight developed late in the week and was noted all the way from the Ruhr district south to Colmar. Between 150 and 200 enemy fighters were sighted Friday, 20 October. They tended to operate in formations of about 30 and attacked wherever they encountered Allied planes. The encounters were all with Ninth USAAF fighters and fighter bombers and the score for the day was 26 enemy aircraft shot down

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and 18 of the Ninth's ships lost. It had been a number of weeks since the Luftwaffe showed so much inclination to fight. On the last occasion it offered battle the region was that of the British salient's extremity in Holland.

Allied air operations were directed largely against enemy rail communications and battle positions. Railway targets were hit by fighter bombers from the Ruhr area down through much of the Rhineland, and Eighth Air Force heavies operating in strong force made a series of strikes at Cologne. Stuttgart was another and more distant railroad center attacked. It underwent two raids in one night.

Eastern Front Not So Long Now; Nazis Fight On Own Soil

The tremendous length of the Russo - German battlefield, which stretches from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean, has always posed a major communications problem to both Soviets and Germans. The entire line can never be manned with necessary strength at one time and consequently action never occurs along the full length of the front.

Soviet tactics have been to build up a strong reserve along one segment of the front, then strike in a strong offensive until limited objectives have been reached. To counteract the Soviet tactics the Germans have been forced to move troops to threatened points, or points which they might reasonably expect to be attacked, in time to contain the Red Army drives.

October's third week saw the problem somewhat simplified for both nations as the line continued to diminish in length. While some fighting continued in northern Finland that nation was

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officially out of the war, releasing Soviet forces for operations to the south. Except for a portion of Latvia, the Baltic nations had been cleared of the Germans, and to the south the situation was the same. Bulgaria and Rumania were out of the war, while Greece and Albania had been invaded and the Nazi garrisons were fleeing north.

CENTRAL FRONT NOW. The northern and southern flanks of the German defensive line had collapsed and attention was centered on the main battle area, which included East Prussia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. The Red Army could now concentrate its manpower in more strength, while by the same token the Wehrmacht could thicken its defensive perimeter in the threatened areas.

The major operational areas on the eastern front are four in number. The northernmost extends in an eastward curving line from Memel to Warsaw and encompasses East Prussia and north central Poland. The next sector runs south from Warsaw to the Carpathian mountains. The third area includes the Carpathian mountain passes, screening Slovakia and a portion of Central Hungary, while the fourth operational front lies in Yugoslavia, where the Partisan fighters of Marshal Tito are battling alongside their Soviet allies.

After a week's silence about the East Prussian front Moscow confirmed the Berlin report of a great Soviet offensive in this area. In an order of the day Stalin announced that strong Red Army tank columns had smashed a 90-mile gap in the Nazi defenses and driven 20 miles inside East Prussia to within 15 miles of the Insterburg rail hub. This city is on the main trunk line to Koenigsberg, the east Prussian capital. Launched from the Suwalki triangle, the new offensive brought the capture of about 900 places, more than 400 of them on German soil. Among them were Eydkau, Schirwindt, Goldap, and Stalluponen (or Ebenrode). German sources also claimed

the Nazis had repulsed Soviet attacks against the Nieman river bridgehead north of Tilsit.

BELGRADE FREED. There were no reports of major action in southern Poland, the area lying just east of Germany's industrial Silesia, but action flared in Slovakia and Hungary as well as Yugoslavia. In the latter nation, where active resistance has continued throughout the period of German domination, Yugoslav and Soviet troops took Nish, an important rail center, and advanced to Belgrade, whose capture was announced in another order of the day in Moscow. The capture of the Yugoslav capital cuts the Athens-Belgrade railway, the major escape route for Nazi troops retreating north from Greece.

The week's most intense fighting appeared to be in Slovakia and Hungary. Red Army soldiers smashed south through seven mountain passes in the wild Carpathians to enter Slovakia, on a 170-mile front, then battle across the country to link with other Soviet forces in Hungarian-annexed Transylvania. Paced by elements of the Fourth Ukrainian Army, the Soviets liberated Slovakia's southern tip driving forward along important communication lines.

DESTINATION BUDAPEST. Major objective of Soviet forces operating in Hungary was the Danube river and the Hungarian capital of Budapest, which was threatened from the east and south. To the east of the capital the Soviets took Debrecens and Nyiregyhaza, both east of the Tisza river. To the south, where the Tisza had been crossed at several points, Red Army men reached the Danube at Baja, 84 miles south of Budapest. This drive, carried out by the Second Ukrainian Army, was reported to have pinned numerous Germans back against the great river in a 100-mile long pocket with a depth of 30 miles in some places.

In their fast advance into East Prussia, Russian forces are following

an east-west highway that leads eventually to Koenigsberg, the capital, and a railway that starts at Leninograd, crosses into East Prussia at Kaunas (Kovno), capital of Lithuania, and leads to Berlin.

The highway runs from a border town of 5,000 people called Eydkau which the Red Army grabbed on the first day of last week's renewed offensive. Seven miles west, the highway and rail line converge on the town of Ebenrode. Until a few years ago called Stalluponen, Ebenrode is remembered as the neighborhood in which 30 years ago the Russians encountered the Germans along a 35-mile battlefield and were subsequently defeated. Ebenrode is a highway center of eight roads and had a population before the war of 6,500.

BROAD AND FLAT. This portion of East Prussia forms a broad, flat corridor dotted with windmills, farm houses and villages, lying between wooded swampy areas to the north and the lake-dotted region of Masuria to the south. At Gumbinnen, a modern little city of about 22,000 people, 22 miles west of the Lithuanian border, the Rominte and Rossbach join to form the Pissa River. Capture of this town would put the Russians within 15 miles of the vital railway junction of Insterburg.

SUWALKI TRIANGLE. The eastward bulge which long remained in Russia's advancing battle line opposite East Prussia resulted from one of the wildest virgin forests of Europe, made up of almost impenetrable thickets, lakes and marshlands. This is the region of the so-called Suwalki Triangle which Hitler took from Poland in 1939 and tacked on to the eastern tip of East Prussia.

The region is so formidable that in the Middle Ages it stopped the Teutonic Knights after they had conquered most of the lands along the sea. The forest is 20 miles wide and extends 30 miles north, beyond the city of Suwalki. The road to Suwalki is a causeway lined by intricate chains of lakes.

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Allies Restoring Southern Italy

A report from the Allied Control Commission in Italy last week emphasized the effort being made to restore the southern section of the semi-liberated nation to a sound economic and administrative level even as Allied fighting men inched ahead in the northern Apennines.

Accomplishments listed included formation of an administrative government including leaders of parties both in Rome and from the south as well as the purging of provincial and metropolitan administrations and establishment of local democratic government. The railway system south of the battlefields was restored to working condition in August and progress has been made in the restoration of roads, bridges, and public works.

HOLD-UP AT BOLOGNA. To the north the bitter struggle for the entrance to the Po Valley continued. Fifth Army troops engaged in frontal assaults against Apennine foothill positions before Bologna were reported within nine miles of that city, but German artillery fire and tanks made the going difficult. American and South African forces in this area were facing a force around Bologna which some observers said numbered ten divisions.

Eighth Army forces were entering the eastern section of the Po Valley in two directions driving up the Adriatic coast and northwest along the Rimini-Bologna highway.

The coastal push saw the capture of Cesenatico, 18 miles below Ravenna. Along the highway leading to the primary Allied objective of Bologna the town of Cesena fell and the Savio river was reached along a four-mile

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front north of the occupied city. Cesena, entered by British troops coming up from the south, was the scene of some bitter street fighting.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Japs Seeking New Land Supply Route

The need for a Jap overland supply route from Manchuria to Indo-China, Thailand and the Dutch Indies became more acute this week as American units landed in the Philippines.

Recent enemy drives to satisfy this need have brought the Jap north and south pincers in China within 62 miles of each other in the neighborhood of Pinglo and Pingnam, about 175 miles northwest of Canton. One Jap army has in the past few months plunged south 350 miles from the Tungling lake area in the China rice bowl, while the other column has advanced north and west from Canton seeking juncture with the southbound troops.

Enemy control of this north-south China route would not necessarily mean the Japs would have a well functioning channel of communications. Chinese guerrilla activity would no doubt constantly harass the invaders. But if Jap reverses in the Philippines area continue and the South China Sea route comes under control of Allied forces, the only possible hope the Japs will have for supply of the stolen Southeastern Asia empire will be by land through China.

SAND IN THE GEARS. Chinese counterattacks during the week were so much sand thrown into the machinery of the well oiled Japanese invasion. Particularly around Kweiping and Pingnam did the Chinese throw back the enemy and temporarily

stall the Jap drive on Liuchow, 90 miles southwest of Kweilin and 78 miles northwest of Kweiping. Liuchow is site of an important air field and operates as a rail base for China supply. The situation around Kweilin, where the Japs were last reported 23 miles northeast and north of the town, was unchanged. There the Chinese have dug in to make a Stalin-grad defense, for Kweilin is the terminus of the first railroad built by China at war in 1938 and the fourth largest city in Free China.

This railway line was to reach from Hengyang, which is on the Canton-Hankow railroad, through Kweilin to French Indo-China. Work was being done on both the northeast and southwestern ends of the line simultaneously, but the Jap invasion threat forced destruction of the southern section. The National Geographic Society estimates some 330 miles of railway in the north were actually completed from Hengyang through Kweilin to Liuchow. One of the few modern railway coaches in China operates on this line, and the Chinese intend to keep it. It has become a symbol of the good life they expect from the democracy they're fighting to build.

Burma-Ledo Road Junction Foreseen

Ever since the Burma Road was closed, China's war effort and the sustenance of the 14th Air Force has been maintained by flying supplies over "The Hump" across the Himalayas from India to China.

Actually supplies have gone over the Hump in greater quantity than the Burma Road was ever able to funnel into China. In one month, for example, the Air Transport Command flew in more than 46 million pounds of military cargo, including aviation gasoline, munitions, trucks, jeeps, and

SCORE: 482 TO 1

A three-month bombing record, just released by the War Department, reveals that the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force based in China, sank or probably sank 482 tons of Jap shipping for every ton of bombs dropped during the months of June, July, August.

A large part of this total was accounted for by B-24s in sea sweeps against Jap shipping in Formosa Straits and along the Southeast and South China Coasts. In sea sweeps during August, the Fourteenth's Liberators sank 39,500 tons of enemy shipping, representing 800 to 900 tons of shipping sunk for every B-24 sortie.

other war material. But there has never been any doubt that reopening the road would transport heavy tools of war through to China in great and appreciable volume.

One big purpose of General Stilwell's drives has been to reopen this road by joining its northern part with the Ledo Road now under construction in north Burma. Last week's reports from the Burma front indicated that great strides were being taken toward realizing that purpose.

TIDDIM CAPTURED. Troops of the Fifth Indian Division captured the Jap Tiddim base after pushing the retreating enemy 162 miles southward along the road from their attempted invasion of India at Imphal. Tiddim was the scene of the first determined Jap stand along the retreat route from India, and its defenders had been aided in their hold-out by conditions of terrain and monsoon weather.

General Stilwell's units have occupied Mohnyin, 75 miles southwest of Myittha on the railroad to Mandalay, while British 14th Army troops have seized Haka in the southern Chin hills.

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- Q. What is Japan's mainstay in Manchuria?
- A. Japan is leaning heavily on Manchuria's steel industry to ease the burden of her dwindling ship tonnage.
- Q. How does the Japanese reckoning of a child's age differ from our own?
- A. The Japanese reckon a child's age as one year at birth. Thus, when Domei broadcasts Japan's conscription age as 17, it means that it is now 16.
- Q. What immediate problem faces the Navy as the war in Europe draws to a close?
- A. The huge transportation problem of moving men and materiel from Pacific ports. Pacific coast ports will not have sufficient capacity for all the traffic and it will be necessary to use Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico ports as well.
- Q. What are the three principal types of planes used by a Navy carrier force?
- A. Fighter, bomber, and torpedo. All are single-engined.
- Q. The Japanese fighter pilot is popularly supposed to belong to the Suicide Club. Is this true?
- A. Cases of Japanese fighter and bomber pilots deliberately crashing their aircraft on to a target are very rare. Experience has shown that the Japanese fighter pilot has quite a high regard for his own skin. Perhaps his most outstanding quality is his ability to carry out very long escort flights and yet fight efficiently after several hours in the air at a great height.

- Q. What does "Luzon" mean?
- A. Luzon comes from a word meaning "a wooden bowl" and describing the appearance of a promontory.
- Q. Where was the largest of any force of Japs active against the United Nations massed?
- A. Hengyang. The Japs had at least seven well armed, well clad, well supplied divisions there to encircle the Chinese and U.S. troops.
- Q. In what country would you expect to find the Peloponnesus?
- A. In Greece. The Peloponnesus is the popular name given to the southern peninsula of Greece. In actual size, the Peloponnesus makes up about one-fourth of the Greek mainland.
- Q. A Jato, a Puddle Jumper and a Praying Mantid are all nicknames for different Allied war planes. Can you identify each of these planes?
- A. A Jato is an American plane with a jet-power unit attached to its wings so that it can take off quicker and with heavier loads. The U.S. Navy is using these units on its fighter planes for quicker take-offs from carrier decks and on its big PBVs so they can take off successfully with heavier loads. The name Jato is taken from the first letters of its official name—Jet Assisted Take Off. Puddle Jumper is a nickname for any small, light observation plane. And a Praying Mantid is a British Spitfire rigged up with folding wings to give carrier-based aircraft of the British Royal Navy a big increase in fighter strength.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2. No. 18

Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE

4 NOV., 1944

RESTRICTED

All Important Areas On Leyte, Samar Occupied

American forces in the Philippines this week controlled two-thirds of Leyte and virtually all of Samar Islands, had freed more than a million and a half Filipinos, and had killed or wounded an estimated 24,000 Japanese troops.

These statistics were released from General MacArthur's headquarters after infantrymen had cracked what appeared to be the last organized resistance in Leyte Valley and dismounted cavalrymen had raced up the Samar coast to a point within 15 miles of Luzon. By 30 October it could be officially announced that 1800 square miles of Leyte (including 212 miles of shoreline from Carigara Bay in the north to Panaon Island in the south) was in U.S. control, and that the remaining enemy garrisons on both Leyte and Samar were isolated and ready for destruction "at will."

DESTINATION CARIGARA. The Japs offered their stoutest resistance in Leyte Valley at Dagami, a road junction some 8 miles inland from the eastern shore, where men of the Seventh Division ran into a heavily-defended area of bunkers, pillboxes, and land-mines. A full 24 hours was

required to smash their way through the obstacles, and once inside the township they faced 1500 Japs barricaded for a last-ditch stand in the northern suburbs. After 8-inch howitzers had been brought in to supplement flame-throwers and grenades, all opposition was finally overcome late Monday afternoon.

At the same time troops of the 24th Division operating farther north captured another road junction at Cavite, then moved on a few miles westward to drive Japanese rearguards out of Jaro, the last important highway point below Carigara Bay. In a parallel advance, men of the First Cavalry Division, who had been working westward of Tacloban along the northern coast, moved in on Carigara Bay to take the two villages of Balud and Darugo.

At last report the 24th Division was thrusting north from Jaro in a move to join First Cavalry units at Carigara Bay. When this junction is effected the enemy's principal line of retreat to the west coast will be closed and his only effective point for reinforcement of Leyte Valley will be bottled up.

TO MAKE STAND. Carigara also is important as the anchor point to a possible Japanese defense line which has its southern terminus at Ormoc Bay. Reversing their early evacuation attempt, the Japs recently have shown evidence of intending to fight it out at Ormoc. Under cover of darkness and aided by a typhoon whose 75-miles-per-hour winds handicapped PT boats in their attempts to intercede,

reinforcements have been successfully ferried from the island of Cebu to Ormoc. On one occasion, Allied planes and light naval units sunk or damaged 20 barges and two luggers in the vicinity, all apparently seeking to land replacements.

Earlier in the week troops from the X and XXIV Corps had linked up at Tanauan, between Tacloban in the north and Dulag in the south, to establish a strong 40-mile front on the east coast and thus extend the Leyte beachhead from San Juanico Strait to Dulag. In both corps sectors our forces now hold all lateral roads and internal communications.

Moreover, the combined operations of guerrilla forces and the 21st Infantry Regiment, which landed at Sogod Bay on the south coast on 20 October, have resulted in the conquest of the lower third of Leyte, south and west of Abuyog. All of Panaon, where combat teams went ashore on D-Day, is also in Allied control.

SAMAR LANDING. Initial reports to the contrary, the invasion of Samar was handled by elements of the First Dismounted Cavalry Division, who made a 17-mile amphibious drive up Leyte's eastern coast and crossed the narrow San Juanico Strait to land at La Paz. There they routed some 100-odd Japanese defenders, tightened their grip on the beachhead after repulsing several small counterattacks, then moved on up the main west coast highway to Santa Rita.

Catbalogan, Samar's capital city, fell soon thereafter. Cavalrymen then proceeded to seize all the key areas that would give them domination of the entire island. Advancing 66 miles to the north, they were last reported to have reached San Bernardino Strait, which separates Samar from Luzon, and there stood at the last water barrier before Manila, 250 miles to the northwest.

CASUALTIES. Of the 24,000 enemy casualties estimated during the first

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ten days of the Philippines operation, more than 6,800 have been counted dead. Enemy losses at Dagami and Jaro probably would raise both these figures even higher. American losses during the same period number 3221—706 killed, 270 missing, and 2245 wounded.

In his first field order issued since the beginning of the operation, General MacArthur on Tuesday, 31 October, said that this was a relatively low casualty rate "which was unsurpassed in the history of war." For this achievement he credited the skill with which American troops had maneuvered the assault.

"Now that the initial phases have been successfully accomplished," he said, "I wish to express my admiration and gratitude to all commanders and ranks for the determination, fortitude, and courage they displayed under a very difficult, dangerous and complex situation."

The Japanese 16th Division—the torturers of Bataan—have been "completely defeated" on Leyte and are now pinned back against the central mountain range. The two main enemy groups who once garrisoned the island are retiring either to Carigara Bay in the north or to Ormoc Bay in the west.

AIR BATTLE. Japanese air raids have continued regularly against the American beachhead, but have been reduced somewhat in intensity since the first land-based fighter planes arrived on Friday, 27 October. Before then the enemy strikes came sometimes as many as 17 in a single day.

Carrier-based planes from the Seventh Fleet have borne the burden of Allied air defence. On one day they shot down 53 enemy planes appearing over Tacloban. During the first ten days over Leyte they destroyed more than 250, in addition to sinking or damaging more than 38 ships and causing widespread devastation to enemy ground installations.

Jap Fleet Reduced To Half In Battle Of Philippine Sea

The Japanese navy asked for it. How badly it got it was disclosed in an official communique released from Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. Summarizing enemy losses in the three-day naval battle in waters off the Philippines last week, it showed:

SUNK: Two battleships, four carriers, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, three small cruisers, six destroyers.

PROBABLY SUNK: One battleship, three heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, seven destroyers.

BADLY DAMAGED: Six battleships, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 10 destroyers.

Total sunk or damaged: 58—a figure that prompted Admiral King in Washington to declare that the Imperial Japanese fleet had been reduced "to no more than half its maximum strength."

For this overwhelming victory American naval forces paid six vessels—the aircraft carrier Princeton, two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort—plus a few lesser craft.

MORE STILL. Scarcely had clarifying details been released on last week's action when word came of other heavy blows to Japanese sea strength. In renewed raids on Luzon over Saturday and Sunday, 28 and 29 October, carrier planes from the Third Fleet sank one heavy cruiser, damaged two other cruisers and an oil tanker, and destroyed 90 planes. Sometime earlier the 14th USAF caught one force fleeing from the Philippines in the South China Sea and scored hits on a transport, a freighter and a tanker.

About the same time the Navy Department made one of its irregular announcements about the doings of sub-

marines in Pacific and Far East waters. During an unspecified period the underwater ships have sunk one destroyer, one large transport, three medium transports, 11 cargo vessels, one medium tanker, and one small auxiliary vessel.

OFFICIAL STORY. Communiques termed "the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea . . . one of the major sea battles of the World War." Exuberant navy officials, speaking for a less conservative record, termed it one of the greatest in military history.

The action engaged virtually the entire Japanese fleet. It was fought in three sectors, each separated by several hundred miles of ocean, ranging from the South China Sea across the Central Pacific, off Leyte, and to the northwest between Luzon and Formosa. It involved land-based aircraft, carrier-based aircraft, and the guns of capital ships. If it weren't the biggest in naval history, it was certainly unique in naval history. No sea force of the past ever mustered so much fire power or deployed its ships over so wide an area.


"Two movements of major Japanese Fleet units north from the Singapore area were detected on 21-22 October," reported the Pacific Fleet communique. "Submarine scouts sighted the enemy force and sank two Atago-class heavy cruisers and severely damaged a third."

"Ships of the Third Fleet moved into position east of the Philippines, off Surigao Strait (12 miles wide, separating Mindanao and Leyte), San Bernardino Strait (15 miles wide and 80 miles north of Leyte, separating Samar and the main island of Luzon), and Polillo Island."

"Carrier searchers on 23 October discovered two strong enemy naval forces moving east, one through Sibuyan Sea, the other through Sulu Sea."

TWO FORCES. "Photographs by carrier aircraft showed that the force moving east through Sibuyan Sea included five battleships thought to be the Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo, and Harana, and eight cruisers and 13

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destroyers. The force moving east through Sulu Sea consisted of two battleships of the Yamashiro class, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and seven or eight destroyers.

"As soon as the presence of the two enemy fleet forces in the Philippines was discovered on 23 October, Hellcats and Avenger torpedo planes and Hell-diver divebombers from the Third Fleet (commanded by Vice-Admiral Mark Mitscher of the carrier force) were launched to attack both forces.

"One battleship and one cruiser in the Sibuyan Sea were severely damaged

and set on fire, and may have sunk. Three other battleships and three heavy cruisers received bombs and torpedoes; one light cruiser was torpedoed, capsized and sank.

"Bomb hits were made on both battleships in the Sulu Sea. Cruisers and destroyers were strafed with rockets and machine-guns.

"Meanwhile, east of the Philippines enemy shore-based aircraft attacked our carriers. In the ensuing air battle we shot down over 150 enemy aircraft. Our losses, on which exact figures are not yet available, were light."

PRINCETON LOST. It was during this aggressive action that a Japanese divebomber at 2000 feet hit the 10,000-ton Princeton. Smashing through the hangar deck, a 1000-pounder exploded on the third deck and blew up the Princeton's magazine. Thirty minutes later the order to "abandon ship" was given and nine hours later American guns and torpedoes sent her to the bottom.

"Also on the afternoon of 23 October," the communique continued, "a land-based Navy search plane discovered the presence of an enemy carrier force approximately 200 miles off Cape Engano, Northern Luzon, heading south.

"This force consisted of 17 warships, including two battleships, with flight decks aft, a heavy cruiser, a light cruiser, three other cruisers, and six destroyers.

"To meet this serious threat, the Third Fleet commander concentrated several of his carrier task groups and started north at high speed for a dawn attack.

"These Third Fleet units steamed at full speed through the night and caught the enemy so completely by surprise on the morning of 24 October that there was no effective air opposition.

TOO LATE. "Later, in the forenoon, enemy carrier aircraft which had been refueled ashore in the Philippines flew out to join their ships, which already had met disaster. The enemy planes arrived too late to get into the fight. We shot down 21.

"The following destruction was inflicted on the enemy in this action:

Sunk: One carrier of the Zuihaku class, one light cruiser of the Zuiho class, two light carriers of the Chitose class, one light-cruiser or large destroyer, one destroyer, one cruiser.

Damaged: Two battleships, three cruisers, four destroyers.

"None of the Third Fleet ships engaged with the enemy carrier force was damaged. We lost 10 planes, eight pilots, 10 aircrew men—all shot down by flak—in this phase of the action."

LEYTE GULF BATTLE. Before all the damaged enemy ships could be tracked down, planes from the Third Fleet were suddenly diverted to the south. For now the Japs were trying their most audacious stroke of all.

Apparently the original Japanese objective had been for the northern and southern forces to converge in darkness upon the American units in Leyte Gulf. On the chance of success they were willing to gamble most of their fleet. They failed because they miscalculated in their timing and underestimated American naval strength. Instead of fighting a duel engagement, the two forces were separated and dissipated singly. Carrier-based raids of the Third Fleet threw the northern force off balance so that it arrived in daylight sometime after surface ships of Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet had routed the southern force during the night.

SOUTHERN FORCE. PT boats first sighted enemy warships steaming through Surigao Strait shortly after midnight on Wednesday morning, 25 October. They immediately roared in for a brave but unsuccessful attack. Destroyers of the Seventh Fleet then followed with a closely-pressed torpedo attack and sent Jap battleships reeling under the impact of direct hits. Then battleships opened up. Shortly thereafter one Jap battleship was stalled in the water and another was burning and steaming slowly back toward the Sulu Sea. What was left of the enemy fleet broke off the action and retreated through Surigao Strait, pursued by Avenger torpedo bombers.

"All units of this force were sunk or decisively defeated," said Admiral Nimitz' communique. Admiral Kinkaid was more specific. He told a press conference that of the 14 ships in the original southern force, only one cruiser and five destroyers survived.

OUTNUMBERED. While broadsides were still being exchanged in the south, the northern force—now reduced to four battleships, seven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 12 destroyers—sortied through San Bernadino Strait.

Off the eastern coast of Samar it met a force of baby carriers and pressed home the attack. What happened thereafter probably will rank as one of the most heroic actions of the war.

To cover the retreat of the vulnerable babytops, one destroyer escort and two destroyers, representing all the resistance that could be summoned at the moment, straddled the path of the oncoming Japanese fleet. One destroyer laid a smoke screen, then darted into it to deliver a torpedo blow at close range. The two destroyers followed up the attack.

In the interim the babytops, blessed with a southeast wind, had time to launch their planes, and more planes from the Third Fleet came up. Now under their combined attacks, one enemy heavy cruiser and one destroyer were sunk, and three battleships or cruisers and a destroyer were severely damaged. Three other heavy fleet units probably were sunk. But American losses were heavier than any other

engagement of the three-day battle: two escort carriers, two destroyers, one destroyer escort, "considerable . . . casualties."

In this and other actions the baby carriers (MAPTALK, 30 September) behaved like adults. One of them waged a bitter battle for more than five hours against Japanese cruisers and destroyers. In one day of hectic fighting their Wildcats and Avengers downed 49 Japanese twin-engined bombers out of a force of 107 for a loss of two planes and one pilot. They were so successful that no more than eight or nine enemy planes got through to Leyte Gulf.

By dawn on Thursday the position of American forces on Leyte had been made definitely secure. And in the words of Admiral Halsey, Japan had been reduced to a "naval runt," no longer capable of offering any serious opposition to the forthcoming American offensive toward the China coast.

Jap Navy Was Outbuilt Too

The battle off Leyte and Samar was actually the climax of a battle which the Japanese lost long ago—a battle that began when the first Nip plane peeled off for the first run over Oahu. A battle that was fought in the shipyards of California and New England, as well as in the waters off Guadalcanal and the Coral Sea.

HERE'S HOW. Cold statistics help tell the story. The U.S. Navy now has more than 1,155 combat ships; 45,207 landing craft; 5,000 small vessels; 34,071 aircraft. New powerful units include two huge super-battleships, the MISSOURI and the IOWA—45,000-ton giants packing a main battery of nine 16-inch guns, as well as subsidiary guns of various other calibres totalling 157.

These gigantic warships cleave the water at speeds greater than 30 knots.

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In the same powerful class are the two new U.S. Navy cruisers ALASKA and GUAM, 27,000-ton vessels 750 feet long, carrying nine 12-inch guns.

And the shipyards of the United States have added unprecedented power to the naval air arm with fleets of flattops, ranging from 14 Essex class carriers (27,000 tons) to swarms of the 4,000-ton Casablanca type, and including nine formidable 10,000-ton carriers of the Independence class.

VERSUS. What has the Imperial Japanese Navy to match against this strength? Any answer available for publication is necessarily guesswork, but it might be guesswork helped along by carefully compiled statistics. Associated Press, for example, an old hand at this sort of thing, sets Japan's remaining sea power at 175 warships in fighting condition. The AP estimate places Jap battleship strength at somewhere between six and eight, with from seven to nine carriers, 25 to 30 cruisers, and a submarine fleet that totalled 78 at the beginning of the war.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

East Prussia Drive Preparing Way For Push Thru Poland

The eastern approaches to Berlin lie in the Polish Plains area, a natural corridor connecting the USSR with the Reich. Soviet forces last summer drove west along these approaches, but halted at the Vistula River line and Warsaw, ceasing to press the attack which might have carried them across the borders of the central Reich.

The developing action marking October's last days gave some indication of the reason for the Soviet halt at the entrance to the Polish capital. It was necessary only to remember the early days of World War I when Russian armies in a position similar to that occupied by the Red Army of today met a crushing defeat at the hands of German General von Hindenburg. Soviet generals this time were obviously going to avoid a German trap.

LESSON FROM HISTORY. In 1914 Russian soldiers were caught in a German nutcracker which closed on their exposed flanks from both north and south. The battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes gave full proof of the folly of attempting a push across Poland while the enemy still held strong flanking positions. Therefore in 1944 the Soviet strategy was to clear these flanks before attempting the great overland drive.

While troops in the north and center of the line halted and built up their supply lines, Soviet soldiers struck first in the south to break the German right flank in the Balkans. As this action continued, the German left flank

was taken under attack in the Baltic area. With the conquest of the Baltic provinces practically assured, East Prussia remained as the one great threat on the northern flank.

As the Soviets struck to clear this flank, German soil felt the tramp of Soviet feet crossing the East Prussian border in the first invasion of Germany from the east since the mammoth German offensive opened against the USSR on 22 June, 1941.

LAND OF FEUDALISM. Lying east of the Reich proper, East Prussia is separated from its parent nation by the Polish Corridor and is bounded by Lithuania, Poland, and the disputed Danzig and Memel territories. Once inhabited by Slavs, East Prussia was conquered hundreds of years ago by the Teutonic knights and has long been famed as the stronghold of Prussian militarism. The territory is the most feudal in all Germany, the titled junker class holding vast estates now worked by Soviet and Polish prisoners.

Twice the size of New Jersey, East Prussia is separated into two dissimilar terrain areas. To the north where the province borders the Baltic Sea the land falls in a series of rolling plains toward the Pregel River, which flows west toward the chief city of Königsberg. The southern part is wild and rugged plateau country, dotted with the Masurian Lakes, swamps, forests, and high hills; an area excellently adapted for defensive fighting.

Following a two-month halt at the East Prussian border, massed Soviet troops smashed across the frontier in a drive, the first phase of which saw a 19-mile penetration along an 87-mile front. As the campaign developed news was scarce, but Soviet forces appeared to be driving along the main trunk railway leading to Insterburg and Königsberg. Other attacks were reported from the south while to the northwest Soviet units cleared most of the Memel territory, leaving unoccupied only the port of that name.

TO ENCIRCLE WARSAW. South of the East Prussian battle another static

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front flared into action. The First White Russian Army and the First Polish Army attacked to clear the Germans from the triangular bridgehead between the Narew and Vistula Rivers, presumably driving toward country northwest of Warsaw from which the Vistula could be crossed. Other Soviet elements hold bridgeheads south of the Polish capital and a successful joining of the northern and southern armies would encircle Warsaw and cut its communications from the west.

Above the Arctic Circle Soviet fighting men, forging ahead in the teeth of a northern blizzard, crossed the Norwegian border to capture Kirkenes, a Nazi-held submarine base and iron ore center. Long used by the Nazis as a station for U-boats preying on Allied convoys to Murmansk, Kirkenes is the first major place in Norway to fall to United Nations soldiers since the abortive British attempt to enter that nation following the German conquest. Soviet forces pushing west from captured Kirkenes marked the advance of troops which less than two weeks ago had taken the Finnish base at Petsamo.

GAINS IN BALKANS. To the south Marshal Tito's partisan forces reported the capture of Spalato, important Yugoslav port on the Adriatic. North of war-torn Yugoslavia Soviet units pressing up from Transylvania joined others which had blasted their way through the Carpathian passes into Czechoslovakia. The occupation of Ruthenia—annexed by Hungary in 1939—was almost complete, and the invasion of Slovakia had begun.

Still farther south more Russian soldiers smashed through German defenses between the rivers Danube and Tisa and, driving swiftly forward on a 100-mile front, approached within 45 miles of Budapest. With a firm hold on two good highways and a railway running from Kecskemet, 50 miles southeast of Budapest, they were in an advantageous position to outflank the Hungarian capital. Between Kecskemet and Budapest is little more than German tanks and a flat plain.

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British, Canadians Bid To Trap Nazis In South Holland

Last week on the Western Front saw the development of a 21st Army Group offensive which suggests another pocketing of German forces.

The action is taking place in southwestern Holland. The German forces under attack are in the areas south of the rivers Waal and Maas, and between the sea and the long British-held salient which thrusts north in the Nijmegen region.

While the First Canadian Army pushed north against the enemy, the Second British Army pushed out of its salient in a generally westerly direction, and bridges across streams in the enemy rear were subjected to steady air attacks to hinder a possible German retreat.

PINCERS. Hertogenbosch, a communications center, was the first point of focus for the British attack. After a few days of fighting the town fell before two spearheads, one from the east and one from the southeast, both following main highways.

Following the British occupation of Hertogenbosch, Allied troops rolled on to take Tilburg, about a dozen miles southeast of Hertogenbosch. As the week ended Breda was under attack. The last large enemy stronghold south of the Maas river, Breda is somewhat less than 20 miles due west of Tilburg. The city is not only threatened by British forces to the east but by Polish, British, and Canadian forces driving up from the south.

First Canadian Army troops took Bergen op Zoom, which lies north of the peninsula constituting the northern shore of the Schelde Estuary. The Canadian Army controls the landward

end of the peninsula known as Zuid Beveland and has made progress westward along it. British forces in an amphibious operation landed and established a beachhead on Zuid Beveland last week and Canadian troops driving west approached to within three miles of the expanding British positions.

BRESKENS OCCUPIED. Other Canadian Army units continued to squeeze small the so-called Schelde pocket which the Germans hold on the Estuary's south shore. Breskens, a ferry port, was taken. Troops who had bypassed Breskens earlier moved to the west to seize Fort Frederick Henry, whose large guns had been hammering at them as they forced their way west. The fighting in this vicinity was over waterlogged ground.

On the east side of the great British Second Army salient German troops counterattacked to take Meijel in their only gain. In this general area American units were driving on Amerika.

Estimates place the German force under attack south of the Maas and the Waal at about 40,000, and elements of eight divisions have been identified there. Another 11,000 Germans are believed to hold the peninsula and island territory north of the estuary, while the force in the pocket south of it is calculated to be about 5,500.

NO CHANGE On the Twelfth and Sixth Army group fronts there were no major developments, though hard local fighting occurred. Japanese-American troops have manned a sector on the Seventh United States Army front toward the south of the line, and on the extreme southern flank a large FFI force is in action with the First French Army.

Battlefront reports indicated the Germans were employing a new grenadier division and the 390th Cossack regiment. The Volks grenadier unit

is apparently a part of the People's Army, whose formation was announced when the war flowed into Germany. The Cossack regiment was reported to be composed of about 60 per cent Soviet political exiles and the remainder Germans.

Indicative of the lull which exists, the First United States Army experienced its quietest 24 hours since D-Day last 6 June. Only 32 prisoners were taken in that period, which ended at midnight 24 October. A stiffening of resistance was noted in the French-held sector.

Though bad weather frequently held air operations to a relatively small scale there were a number of attacks on Reich railroad and industrial targets by forces of approximately 1,000 heavy bombers under strong fighter escort. Fighter bombers also made strikes at rail targets and flew missions in close support of ground forces.

Although the Allies have occupied the Belgian city of Antwerp since early September they have been denied use of its port facilities because of continued German control of the Schelde Estuary. It is for control of this Estuary that British and Canadian forces are now fighting.

Antwerp's port facilities are worth fighting for. Located on the right bank of the Schelde river some 50 miles inland from the North Sea, they make up the only seaport in Belgium large enough to berth big army transports. Here a naturally well developed harbor has been further improved by a series of locks and canals. "The Antwerp owes the Schelde to God," runs an old Belgian proverb, "and all else to the Schelde."

In prewar days Antwerp's commerce was as great as that of any port on the European continent. Its 18 miles of stone wharves and quays hummed with night and day activity, for it

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was then the distributing point for Belgium, Alsace, Lorraine, Switzerland, and some of the German provinces.

Antwerp—whose founding probably goes back to the 8th century—has experienced troublesome days in the course of its history. By the middle of the 16th century it was, next to Paris, the largest city in the world and held the purse strings of the European continent. In 1576 it was burned and pillaged by the Spanish when the Antwerpers revolted against Spanish rule.

Napoleon helped restore its commercial importance, but it suffered another decline after 1830, when, as a result of Belgium's separation from the Netherlands, the city lost control of the mouth of the Schelde. For 30-odd years Antwerpers were required to pay heavy tolls on all incoming and departing vessels. They finally put a stop to this in 1863 by paying the Netherlands government something like \$3,000,000 for recognition of their rights to the river.

News Scant, But War In Italy Is Rugged

Stretching across the Italian peninsula from the Liguria to the Adriatic Sea is the "forgotten front," an area where for the past month or so there has been little change in the tactical situation and therefore little news. But even so, official communiques and war correspondents both have indicated that Italian fighting is perhaps as bitter as that on any front in the world-wide war.

The combination of rain and mud has constantly disrupted communications and forced continuous reconstruction of roads along which Allied supply vehicles crawl hub-and-fender-deep in mire. German resistance has been unrelenting, while mortar and artillery fire has continued accurate and heavy. There has been no indication the Germans plan to evacuate

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Bologna without a savage struggle, and official sources have announced that the enemy is working feverishly to complete trenches and fortifications "to defend the city . . . at all costs."

As October ended rain and gales had brought the Italian fighting to a virtual standstill. Allied forces were moving on Bologna from two directions: Fifth Army forces fighting through heights south of the city in a frontal assault, and Eighth Army units driving northwest along the Rimini-Bologna railway.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

General Stilwell Gets New Mission

From Washington last week came word that General Joseph W. Stilwell had been relieved from his command and duties in the far east and recalled to the United States for assignment to a new and important, but at present undisclosed, mission.

The White House announcement said: "General Stilwell has been relieved as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, as deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, commander of the Southeast Asia Command, and as United States Commander of the China-Burma-India theatre, and has been recalled to Washington."

United States forces in the China theatre will be under Major General A. O. Wedemeyer, who also has been appointed by the Generalissimo as chief of staff in the China theatre. Major General Wedemeyer, who has had long experience with the Army general staff and is thoroughly trained in war planning, is now deputy chief of staff to Admiral Mountbatten.

United States forces in the India-Burma theatre will be commanded by Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, at present deputy commander in the CBI theatre.

In the battlefields of Burma the Fifth Indian Division, driving along the twisted mountain roads of that country's northwestern corner, was pursuing retreating Japanese troops along the Tiddim-Fort White road. Allied aircraft including heavy bombers hit railway targets on the Lashio-Mandalay line and struck dumps at Taungup. The Allied North Burma forces occupied Mohnyin, 75 miles southwest of Myitkyina on the rail line to Mandalay.

Three USAAF Bases In China Threatened

Japanese forces in China are driving on three important USAAF bases at Nanning, Kweilin, and Liuchow, but an Air Force spokesman in Washington said even if these drives were successful they would by no means neutralize the attacking power of the 14th USAAF.

To check any complacency his comment might have caused, the spokesman hastily added that undoubtedly loss of any one of the three dromes would seriously limit the 14th's operations.

Kweilin, one of the bases mentioned, was seriously menaced last week, despite the Chinese promise to make a "Stalingrad defense." Nipponese ground forces, last reported halted about 20 miles from that city, renewed their offensive with twin drives directly down the Hunan-Kwangsi railway to reach the city's outskirts. One Japanese column struck 14 to 18 miles east of the city, while another swung southwest from Kwangyang to join the attack.

In another new thrust Nipponese troops struck from their west river

THE ENEMY'S VIEW

IT IS REVEALED that the Overseas Japanese Central Association here will sponsor a series of "meetings to . . . (expose) American bestiality" in the principal cities throughout Japan, with the first being scheduled for Hibiya public hall on the evening of 7 October. In the course of these meetings a series of 40 slides will be shown demonstrating lynching and mass atrocities perpetrated by bloodthirsty Yankees. Domet, 3 October, 1944.

base at Pingnam, 115 miles south of Kweilin to carry 18 miles west of Pingnam. Pingnam, along with Kweiping, is one of the two main bases for the drive on Liuchow, 95 miles southwest of Kweilin.

On China's east coast Japanese forces were fighting 50 miles west of recently seized Foochow, heart of a region reportedly being converted for use as a base against possible American landings on the China coast.

B-29s Smash Plane Factory On Kyushu

Striking again at the roots of Japanese airpower in a highly successful mission, USAAF B-29 bombers last week hit one of the most important aircraft assembly plants on the Japanese home island of Kyushu.

The attack was a continuation of the Superfortress campaign against supply and repair facilities of the Japanese Air Force, a campaign which started with heavy strikes at Japan and followed later with hits at Formosa's Okayama air depot prior to the Philippines invasion.

This latest strike hit assembly units of the Omura aircraft plant on Omura Bay's east coast, 12 miles northeast of Nagasaki. A 20th Air Force communique said the plant was built during the present war as one of the keystones of Japanese airpower.

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Samar Is Large, Mountainous, And Yet To Be Fully Explored

Samar is the largest of the Visayan Islands and the third largest of the Philippines. Yet it is one of the least known islands in the archipelago. In 1939 there were only two Americans in residence and their visitors were few and far between. But rarely penetrated, the interior has never been surveyed.

The mere geography of Samar is largely to blame for this. The island lies right in the center of a typhoon track and for at least four months of the year—October, November, December, and January—shipping conditions are pretty unpredictable. Added to this hazard is the fact that the coastline, irregular though it is, provides only one first-rate anchorage, that at Catbalogan, the island capital. Except for the coastal flats, most of the island is a maze of heavily-forested hills and mountains. As yet neither cartographers nor historians have found anything about Samar worth extensive study.

STRATEGIC LOCATION. But it is another fact of Samar's geography which makes it of strategic importance today. Samar is the land mass that bridges the gap between Leyte and Luzon. Leyte lies less than a half mile to the southeast across San Juanico Strait; Luzon less than 11 miles to the northwest across San Bernardino Strait.

Easternmost of the central Philippines, Samar has a land area of some 5,050 square miles, is 145 miles long, has its greatest width (50 miles) in the north. In outline it is quite irregular, forming numerous bays and headlands. Only one of these bays, however, is of any size. That's Maqueda Bay in the center of the western coast, and even it is too shoal to serve as a good harbor.

Samar is distinctive too because of its odd terrain. Despite its large size it has no high mountain range and no extensive plain. Rather it is an area of hills, mountains and narrow valleys.

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None of its mountains compares in height with those on Leyte. The highest peak, Mount Caputian, is scarcely 2,792 feet high. Because in general the island rises steeply from the coast and then preserves a relatively even elevation in the interior, viewed at a distance Samar looks like a plateau that is slightly domed in the center.

HISTORY. As was true of Leyte (MAPTALK, 28 October), Samar's early history was most concerned with the activities or the counter-activities of the Moro pirates, who for a long while held undisputed rule over the area and scared away all newcomers. The natives are said to have finally driven the pirates away by fortifying the tiny islands along Samar's east coast, and from there waging a long, bloody war.

Centuries ago Samar and Leyte were a single island known as Ibabao. During the 16th century the name was changed to Tangdaya and sometime later it was changed again to conform to the name of the new provincial capital, Cebu, the long thin island to the southwest. In 1798 Leyte and Samar were separated and Samar became a distinct province all its own. Since then its growth has been steady. In 1818, with 27 recognized towns and villages, it had a taxable population of 57,922. By 1939 the population had increased to 575,000.

RESOURCES. Most of Samar's population live on the narrow coastal belt fringing the island where both the farming and fishing are good. Farming isn't as good as it might be,

mainly because severe damage is too often caused by the northeast monsoon. Copra is the largest agricultural export, followed by fish, rice, abaca, corn and other garden produce. Largest single enterprise on the island before the war was the Samar Iron Mining Concession at the village of Pambuhan Sur on the east coast at Matarinao Bay. Considerable good timber probably grows in the inland areas, but poor roads and general inaccessibility prevent its full exploitation.

THE CAPITAL. Catbalogan, which Cavaymen occupied shortly after last week's landing, is the capital of the Province of Samar and the principal distributing center for the island. Until war came to disrupt everything, motor vessels ran almost daily from Catbalogan to Cebu, and steamers stopped at least once a week on their way to Manila. Here the fish and copra from provincial islands were collected and transhipped to the larger islands.

Catbalogan township is situated at the head of a small bay at the mouth of the Catbalogan river on Samar's west central coast. Often described as "a town in a teacup," it is built on the low swamp ground of a small plain and is surrounded by high, steep hills. A crescent of partially cultivated hills, 500 feet high, curves around the town on the north, east, and south. A muddy beach fronts it on the west.

As anyone who entered the city last week probably knows by now, Catbalogan consists of about 15 or 20 square blocks of homes, shops, and public buildings. The church, the capital building, the provincial high school, and a few homes are of stone, but most of the structures are of nipa palm.

Catbalogan has no industries of any importance. Maqueda Bay on which it is situated is considered one of the best anchovy fishing areas in the Philippines, but it remains a native industry yet to be commercialized. Population in 1939 was 26,654.

OTHER VILLAGES. There are a number of other "barrios" (native settlements) worth remembering. Basey, located on Samar's southern coast at the end of San Pedro Bay, is the largest town in the area (population 28,296) and under the Commonwealth was the municipal seat of government. It is noted for its Ticug Mat (or Benig Mat) production, most of which was sold each year in large quantities at Tacloban. Spread on the floor at night and rolled up during the day, these mats are used by the natives in lieu of beds.

Best port on the east coast is at Borongan, which lies near the mouth of the Loom river just off a bay. From the bay the town is almost entirely hidden by a coconut plantation which is planted right down to the beach. Principal landmark is the steeple to an old Spanish church of stone and concrete.

On the west coast is another one of Samar's important copra shipping ports, the town of Calbayog. It would be even more important if it had any docking facilities or a sheltered harbor. On the extreme southeast tip is Gulan, whose main claim to distinction is a telegraph office that connects with other towns on the east coast. Gulan has a small concrete wharf and does a thriving business in the export of copra. Here is one of the rare places on all Samar suitable for extensive development as an air base.

COMMUNICATIONS. One problem in any future development of Samar is that presented by transportation. Although there are several large rivers navigable by launches for varying distances inland, all are obstructed by sand bars which restrict entrance to high tide of any boats larger than the smaller native craft. Considerable progress had been made in highway construction before the war, but most of the roads were made of dirt or with a veneer of some surfacing metal and, unless the Japs have taken proper precautions in their maintenance, many

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may have washed away from rains.

Only one secondary road penetrates the interior. Running across the center of the island from barrio Taft on the east coast to barrio Wright on the west coast, it was scarcely completed when the islands were occupied. Moreover, the small coastal plains over which travel should be easy, are frequently interrupted by mangrove-rimmed estuaries and hill spurs.

Four airfields were constructed on

Samar before the war, but only two have been used extensively. One is at Catarman, principal town on the north coast and one-time headquarters for a Pilamerican army cadre; the other, consisting of one strip 2,300-feet long, is at Borongan on the east coast. Except for the exigencies of wartime, Samar probably wouldn't be considered very suitable for airfields, for the typhoon season, which has just begun, keeps planes grounded too much of the time.

Jap Soldier: Some Opinions From Men Who Fought Him

(From the Intelligence Bulletin—War Department, September, 1944.)

IN AN INFORMAL discussion a number of U.S. soldiers, who had been fighting the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific, recently offered some interesting and useful comments on enemy combat methods and on the individual Japanese soldier as an opponent in battle. During the discussion this question was asked: "Did you notice any particular action or behavior on the part of the Japanese that would serve as a basis for predicting their next move, or that would foreshadow any action to follow, whether offensive or defensive?" In reply to this, the men added a number of related comments.

"WHEN WE PUT heavy artillery fire on the Japs, they crawled up close to our lines to keep from getting hit. Moreover, while they were up there, they put light mortar fire on us during our own barrage. When our barrage stopped, they slipped back. The Japs vary their tactics a good deal, attacking one way one time and then another way another time. They don't let their tactics get into a groove; instead, they always try for surprise."

"THE JAPS LOVE mortars of every kind. They also use their grenade dischargers extensively. These are the weapons that were incorrectly called 'knee mortars' at first, because of the shape of the base plate. They're really used on logs and fallen trees, on the ground, and against upright trees.

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"Some of the enemy soldiers looked about 14 or 15 years old, but don't ever let anyone tell you that all Japs are small. Some of the men from Kyushu are really big guys, and I saw an Imperial Marine from Formosa who was at least 6 feet 2 inches tall. They yell 'Banzai!' 'Blood for the Emperor!' and so on as they come running toward us. As a rule, the heavier the action is going to be, the louder they yell."

"SOMETIMES JAPS buried their equipment. We discovered whole piles of it covered with dirt. They had the stuff well oiled and greased, and plenty of ammunition ready for use. Then at night they crept in, dug up the equipment, and used it on us."

"THEY ARE exceptionally good at night infiltration; they do a lot of it.

"For some reason the Japs are very likely to travel in pairs. Whether they're afraid to operate independently, I don't know, but there it is—where there's one, there's invariably another."

"The grenade discharger, which is widely used, has a concussion effect, mostly. Very little fragmentation. The Japs always use a lot of mortar fire before they move in. They use most of their heavy fire from the rear, so that it goes over their own troops. Their aim is pretty good."

"Another thing they like to do is to wait until they see us advancing in a horseshoe formation, and then close in on our flanks. You may be going up a hill and think you're advancing, when all of a sudden you see a Jap coming around your rear with a machine gun."

"When they're on the defensive, they're forever digging in, like natural-born ground hogs."

"THE JAPS capitalize on the failure of some men to hold hand grenades for the right count before throwing them. Often the Japs have snatched up the grenades and thrown them back at us."

"They drop parachute mines along beaches where they expect us to make landings."

"THE BAYONETS on Japanese rifles aren't camouflaged. The enemy would attack with the damn things glittering in the sun."

"THE JAP 25mm sounds like the Browning automatic rifle. It's useful to know this, especially in the jungle."

"The Japs had some sort of skin disease on their hands, perhaps from a jungle fungus, and some of us found ourselves getting the same thing. You know, the Japs don't make as much of an effort as we do to maintain sanitation in the field. They're filthy. It's startling to capture their field hospitals and find them so dirty. I don't see how they can stand it. The Japs usually are pretty careful about their dead, but leave the sick and wounded behind if they are in a hurry. Inci-

dentally, if the sick and wounded are still capable of pressing a trigger, they're mighty likely to do just that."

"NO SOONER was our radio communication system set up on Kwajalein than the Japs began to intercept our messages. Many of them spoke good English over the radio."

"A favorite enemy trick was to fire mortars over our artillery barrage some 100 to 200 yards into our advancing infantry troops. As we ceased firing our 105-mm shells, the Japs would stop firing their mortars also. The enemy intention was to deceive our infantrymen into thinking that our own field artillery was placing fire on them out of sheer carelessness."

"A trick I saw the Japanese employ on Kwajalein was to send a lone soldier out of a pillbox with hands raised as if in surrender. As five of our men went after him, the Japs in the pillbox shot three of them. I saw them use this same ruse on several other occasions also."

"If a Jap sniper picks off a buddy and you rush to his side immediately, the Jap will have a bead on you, too. I repeatedly saw men go to a pal's rescue, only to be shot themselves."

"Whenever we killed a Japanese officer, his men seemed to have a hard time thinking for themselves and often went to pieces."

"In the daytime we had to dig the Japs out, and at night they always counterattacked."

"Jap marksmanship is definitely inferior to ours. True, their snipers are likely to be good, but, even so, I've had the experience of having their snipers fire all around me and of not being hit by a single bullet."

"Although Jap riflemen are hard to detect in the jungle, the movement of bushes and leaves made by the traveling bullet can be a help in locating the enemy. Also, muzzle flashes from their 75-mm guns help to reveal enemy positions in the jungle."

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Q. What class carrier was the Princeton, which was lost in the first days of the Philippines naval battle?

A. The Princeton was of the 10,000-ton Independence class, originally designed as a cruiser and refitted with a flight deck while under construction.

Q. What and where is Dumbarton Oaks?

A. It is an estate situated in the outskirts of Washington, D.C., and site of the recent international conference on postwar security. Dumbarton Oaks takes its name from the Rock of Dumbarton on the Clyde in Scotland. By royal grant the estate was given to Ninian Beall in 1702. Last owner to live in it was Robert W. Bliss, former Minister to Sweden and Ambassador to the Argentine Republic, who gave it to Harvard University in 1940.

Q. Can you explain why our throat mikes have not fared so well with the English?

A. The Army Signal Corps recently made the disclosure that since most Englishmen form their tones in the roofs of their mouths, their words are unintelligible over the throat mike.

Q. What does "Manila" mean?

A. Manila is a combination of Ma and Nila. Nila is the name of the indigo tree of the East Indies and Ma means abundance. The word aniline is a derivative of Nila.

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Q. Ryukyu Island, Balikpapan, and Babelthup (Palau) each have something in common. What is it?

A. Each is 500 miles from the Philippines. Ryukyu is to the northeast, Balikpapan southwest, and Babelthup east.

Q. The British in Greece took over Corinth last week. For what is this city popularly known?

A. Architecture. The Corinthian column is the most decorated and detailed of three Greek designs, the other two being the Doric and Ionic.

Q. The intellectual source of the Japanese mind is said to be found in Zen. What is Zen?

A. A Buddhist sect without scriptures, doctrines, ceremonies, or worship. After the thirteenth century Zen (which came originally from China) was developed in Japan into a specific Japanese form of spiritual training and self-mastery by meditation. It prospered especially among the warrior class, although it also influenced artists and men of letters.

Q. What is RDX?

A. It is an explosive whose prime ingredient is hexamine, an unstable chemical combination of ammonia and formaldehyde. Too sensitive to be used alone, hexamine is mixed with TNT to make RDX. The U.S. produces it in quantity, uses it as a major weapon. The Germans, who apparently are yet to learn the secret of its mass production, use it sparingly.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 19 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 11 NOV., 1944

RESTRICTED

Leyte Campaign Reaches Climax In Battle for Ormoc Corridor

On Leyte this week American and Japanese forces were maneuvering for the showdown. Freshly reinforced, the Japs pushed north from Ormoc Bay; to meet them U.S. troops moved south down the narrow, winding highway from Pinamopoan. The fighting was heavy, growing heavier, and the Battle of Ormoc Corridor loomed as the decisive action of the campaign.

What had prepared the way for this final contest was a classic movement of double envelopment. With most Japanese resistance cracked in Leyte Valley, men of the First Cavalry Division and the 24th Division had converged swiftly on Carigara Bay to seal the enemy's last point of reinforcement on the northwest coast. Meanwhile farther south Seventh Division troops had advanced westward across the island's narrow waist to Baybay.

Thus the Japs were compressed into an area north and west of Ormoc Bay. They had to fight there or not at all. For some reason known but to the Japs, they decided to fight—perhaps for the same mixed reasons of "face" and vengeance that two years ago caused them to muster for a last suicidal stand at Guadalcanal.

Last week the people of the United States re-elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to an unprecedented fourth term in office, as Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel in the far corners of the earth followed the election returns by means of shortwave radio. In the Southwest Pacific news was broadcast by Armed Forces Radio stations and in many cases compiled by unit daily newspapers. Off Leyte the now famous radio ship APACHE stood by with powerful receivers to pick up and relay news to troops on the island.

CARIGARA SEIZED. Carigara township fell on Thursday, 2 November, after warships had shelled the shoreline and American troops, with Filipino guerrillas, had fought in the streets to knock out the last enemy resistance. From there Allied units fanned out in pursuit of the disorganized Jap garrison, some to the south, others to the west.

Seizure of Carigara really marked the end of the battle for Leyte Valley, but in the central sector around Dagami there was still some fighting to be done. This was a job for men of the 96th Division, who in the earlier scrap for the village had killed between 1500 and 2000 Japs.

Now as the troops pressed through waist-high congo grass into the hill

THE TOLL

The Navy has announced that carrier planes of the Third and Seventh Fleets destroyed 2,584 Japanese planes and probably destroyed or damaged 252, from August 30 to October 31. American losses were 300.

country to the west, they ran into stiffening Japanese resistance. Desperate enemy counterattacks came on successive nights; on the first night the Japs lost 165 dead, on the second 500. Obviously the Japs intended to hold the mountain heights guarding the eastern approach to Ormoc whatever the cost.

The Americans used flame throwers, tanks, and all the standard weapons of infantry. Finally from 96th Division headquarters came the report: the last enemy mass resistance in central Leyte was broken and the Japanese, "groaning, growling, and squealing" were dragging back their wounded.

SHOWDOWN BEGINS. The Battle for Ormoc Corridor started on Saturday, 4 November, with a land and over-water assault on Pinamopoan, a village seven miles west of Carigara which guards the entrance to Ormoc Valley.

From the moment Pinamopoan was secured 155 mm. "Long Toms" were brought into position. In the days that followed, moving forward with the ground advance, they proceeded to pour 499 rounds of 100-pounders into Ormoc township, to maintain a steady barrage against Japanese supply columns on the highway. Shelling was so incessant the Japs were forced to confine their traffic to night.

From Pinamopoan to Ormoc, a distance of some 23 miles, a single highway twists its way through a dangerously narrow defile, flanked all the way by steep, forested hills. Down this road, going after the enemy's last strong-point, moved advance elements of the 24th Division. Dug-in in those hills, skillfully camouflaged, were Japs.

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The forward troops got to a point beyond Limon, four miles from Pinamopoan, before the Japs struck. Joined by reinforcements coming up from Ormoc, they encircled the Americans, cut off their supply road, subjected them to a hail of enfilading fire. Some supply trucks balked, others managed to back up, none got through. The momentarily trapped units fought their way out, but not without heavy casualties.

SITUATION GRIM. Here in the northern section of the Ormoc road and on the adjoining series of ridges occurred some of the most savage warfare of all time. The Japs counter-attacked three times Monday night, were hurled back each time with heavy losses. When their frontal assaults failed, they tried infiltration and forced the withdrawal of a few small units.

But whatever ground had been lost during the night was regained in daylight Tuesday. By Wednesday the 24th's troops had broken through the advanced Japanese defenses and were in a position to accelerate their drive on to the main perimeter at Ormoc.

JAP STRENGTH. With night landings at Ormoc Bay the enemy had managed to send considerable reinforcements for the badly beaten men of the 16th Division who made up the original garrison. Most of the reinforcements apparently came from Cebu, 50 miles west of Leyte. "Let them come," was General Krueger's attitude. "The more Japs they put there the fewer we'll have to kill later."

Leyte-based fighters and carrier-based torpedo bombers did much to reduce the quantity of troops and equipment landed. Divebombers sank two of four transports in Ormoc Bay one night, then swept up the highway at minimum level to smash a column of troops, destroy 30 trucks and two tanks. Next night 20 enemy barges off Ormoc were sunk or damaged by carrier planes and two large luggers were sunk by PT boats.

Elements of at least three enemy divisions landed as reinforcements.

Identified so far, in addition to remnants of the 16th, are the First, 30th, and 102nd. Once arrived at Ormoc they moved quickly forward to establish a main defensive perimeter in the hills overlooking the plains to the north. With them went tanks, artillery, and full mechanized equipment.

Americans were on the move too, and not only from Carigara Bay. To the south of Ormoc, in the XXIV Corps sector, the underjaw of the Allied pincers was closing. Having reached Baybay, units of the U.S. Seventh Division paused for breath, then turned north and advanced 14 miles up a coastal highway. At last report they were less than 15 miles southeast of Ormoc.

BATTLE OF THE AIR. In the air the action was every bit as vicious as on the ground. In the week's beginning, using their vast network of airfields on Luzon, Cebu, Mindanao, and Mindoro, the Japs were sending in sometimes as many as a hundred planes at a time in an effort to smash through the Allied umbrella over Leyte. Rarely, however, did more than a dozen get through to bomb the immediate area of U.S. forces, and those that did usually suffered flak wounds. From A-Day on 20 October through 7 November ack-ack defenses on Leyte shot down 144 out of action, either totally destroyed or probably so.

Toward the week's end Japanese raiders were fewer and more irregular. The simple reason was that carrier-based strikes on Manila and land-based attacks on every other important airfield in the archipelago were destroying Japanese aircraft in the Philippines faster than they could be replaced.

In a sweep over the three main airbases on Negros, Lightnings destroyed 57 grounded planes, probably ten more, shot down three of six interceptors.

Sometime later they swarmed into a formation of enemy planes shepherding a convoy into Ormoc Bay, shot down 27. Unescorted Liberators hit hard in an early morning attack on

Cebu fields, cratered runways with 86 tons, shot down two and damaged four Zeros. Over Alicante airdrome on Negros Mitchells shot down four fighters and destroyed three more on the ground.

In addition to strikes against airfields, Allied airmen also took their usual toll in Japanese shipping. Among others, they damaged a 3000-ton freighter transport off Masbate, and an 8000-ton transport off Mindanao, and sank a 1000-ton freighter and eight barges northwest of Halmahera.

Filipinos Revive Two Symbols of the Free

Battle-torn Leyte Island last week saw two simple ceremonies that, in their own way, were more impressive than the formal establishment of the Philippines Commonwealth Government that took place shortly after A-Day.

The ceremonies were impressive because they symbolized two things: the return of liberated Filipinos to the free way of life, and the link between the Philippines and United States. The first ceremony was the reopening of the Leyte schools, the second the reopening of airmail service between the Philippines and the U.S.

For the first occasion President Sergio Osmeña delivered a simple address heard by an assembly of several hundred school children in which he told them "Providence has decreed that as a people we should be the most occidental among the oriental, and the most oriental among the occidental. . . ." Then President Osmeña went on to say that the Filipino mission therefore was "to build good will between the peoples of the Occident . . . and the Orient. . . ." For their part in the proceedings, the Filipino school children sang a fervent "Star Spangled Banner," bringing the simple function to a close.

Reestablishment of the long-broken airmail service was a ceremony similar

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In its simplicity, as President Osmena rededicated the Tacloban Post Office, and dispatched to President Roosevelt the first airmail letter containing a number of crisp, new Commonwealth Victory issue postage stamps for the presidential collection.

Third Fleet Planes Hit Hard at Manila

A Pearl Harbor communique last week told of a two-day carrier strike in the southern Luzon area of the Philippines in which airfields, shipping and ground installations around Manila Harbor were heavily attacked.

A total of 440 Japanese planes were destroyed during the two day assault, and 30 ships sunk or damaged, among which were one heavy cruiser left burning and in a sinking condition from several bomb and torpedo hits; one light cruiser damaged; one submarine chaser sunk off Lubang Island. In addition, three oil storage

areas, shops and hangars at Clark Field were set afire, and ground installations at Batangas Field, Legaspi Field, Lipa Field, and Lubang Field were heavily damaged.

SURPRISE. The carrier-based raiders swooped in over Manila Harbor Friday, 3 November in the opening operations of the strike, apparently catching Japanese defense forces by surprise. The enemy quickly recovered, however, putting swarms of interceptors into the air; and the Navy planes faced determined air opposition during both days of the strike. Of the 440 Jap planes destroyed, 113 were shot down, 327 wrecked on the ground.

Following the heavy assault on Friday and Saturday, shipping in Manila Harbor came in for another severe raid Sunday in which three cargo vessels, an oil tanker, a junk, and a destroyer were probably sunk, and two destroyers, two destroyer escorts, a trawler, and several cargo ships damaged.

SOME TIPS FROM THE MEDICS

For taking care of yourself in the Philippines the Medics have a few special rules, a few more reminders. Here are some of them:

1. Don't trust water to be safe simply because it comes out of a pipe. The old rule on bivouac still holds: don't drink water unless you know it to be chlorinated.
2. Don't bathe, wade, or wash your clothes in ponds or irrigation ditches, or for that matter any streams unless the medical officers says they're safe. In parts of the Philippines the water contains invisible parasites which bore through the skin and set up plenty of serious trouble.
3. Bathe as frequently as you can in salt water or in fast running streams.

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And dry quickly. Get the ear canals as dry as possible, likewise between and under the toes. It's here that infection starts most readily from moisture.

4. Pickled crabs and crayfish are a native delicacy, but they're not for you. They carry a rare but serious parasitic disease.
5. Sleep off the ground, whenever possible.
6. All the rules for malaria prevention are to be respected, if possible, more conscientiously than ever. In the Philippines the anopheles breeds in running water, is doubly hard to kill.
7. Don't eat melons or uncooked vegetables from local gardens. Sometimes "night soil" is used to fertilize them. Fruits off trees are okay, but for safety's sake peel them yourself.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Allies Clear Germans From Schelde; First Army In New Thrust

Last week added up to a steady, though sometimes slow, retreat for the Nazis. They lost their last foothold in Belgium and saw their control of the Schelde Estuary doomed. In western Holland they were pushed back south of the Maas and Waal river lines.

At the eastern base of the big salient that thrusts north toward the Arnhem neighborhood they tried a counterattack but gained nothing. And all along the front in Germany and France they were faced with relentless offensive pressure from Americans.

The Schelde pocket, south of the Estuary, was the last patch of Belgium to be held by the enemy. It was eliminated after an action which began 7 October with the crossing of the Leopold Canal by Canadian First Army troops. About 12,000 prisoners were taken.

BATTLE OF WALCHEREN. North of the Estuary, as the pocket was wiped out, Germans were rapidly losing their grip on Walcheren Island. They were under attack by seaborne forces who had made two landings and by Canadian First Army troops who had come west along the Beveland peninsula and fought their way across the 1000-yard connecting causeway to gain a foothold on the island's east side. For practical communications purposes the peninsula had been cut since 12

October. The westward advance had begun on 25 October.

In the same period the enemy was being forced north away from the entrance to the peninsula. With the fall of Walcheren and its gun batteries imminent, the great port of Antwerp appeared about to become a major addition to the Allies' supply system. (MAPTALK, 4 November, p. 289).

DRIVE COMING. From a point north of Bergen op Zoom, a town immediately north of the peninsula now in Allied hands, the battle line now bends north to the bank of the Maas river and then south again to the base of the big salient. Three bridgeheads have been established on the north bank of the Mark river, a lesser waterway in the path of the advance to the Maas.

Toward week's end Allied troops were lining the Maas in strength, cleaning up the German rearguards on the southern side of the Estuary, and preparing to resume their attacks against the Arnhem bridgehead. Ground lost earlier to a Nazi counter-attack had been retrieved.

DEEPEST YET. Fourteen miles southeast of Aachen the First Army got a new offensive of its own underway, driving a salient 16 miles into Germany to mark the deepest penetration of Reich territory to date. Deprived of air support by foul weather but aided by strong artillery support, the men fought their way through the forest of Huertgen to take the towns of Germeten, Vossenack, and Schmidt.

On Saturday, 4 November, the Germans counterattacked fiercely three times and succeeded in regaining Schmidt. Stepping back, U.S. infantrymen called up divebombers that proceeded to shatter the village with 500-pounders. It seemed only a matter of time until Schmidt would be recaptured and American forces would move forward for an even greater battle.

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The Third Army also went ahead with a local offensive 14 miles southeast of Nancy, seizing Abaucourt and Letricourt. Nature of the opposition was indicated by the report that the village of Berg, 22 miles southeast of Metz, had changed hands three times before U.S. troops finally occupied it.

In the Belfort sector the Seventh Army went forward to take Burdille, Hablainville, and Agerailles, and came within three miles of Baccarat. The area of the action was about 14 miles southeast of Luneville.

REVIVED LUFTWAFFE. One observation demonstrated conclusively last week was that as the war edges deeper into Germany and German forces are steadily driven from territory they have defended outside the Reich's borders, Luftwaffe fighter squadrons may be expected to become increasingly combative.

After a period in which the enemy's air arm took a relatively negligible part in the fighting, big formations are beginning to come up to meet the Allied bombers pounding at German targets. Scale of the interception efforts is indicated by the bag of enemy planes downed by Eighth Air Force fighters on 2 November alone. Striking at oil plants in central Germany, the Eighth shot down 208 German aircraft for a loss of 69.

In this same battle the Germans brought out jet-propelled planes for their second major engagement. As on the previous occasion they were driven off.

THE REASONS. An explanation of why the Luftwaffe is returning to battle in such strength can only be an estimate of the true enemy situation at best.

It may be simply a matter of the number of aircraft available and the area to be defended. Now that the Luftwaffe has a great deal less territory to defend than it did even a few months ago, it can concentrate its once widely-scattered squadrons. Per-

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haps fuel for the planes is another consideration. Defending the interior of the shortened German perimeter calls for comparatively short-range operations, thus simplifies the problem of distributing whatever gasoline the enemy may have for Luftwaffe purposes.

Reds Near Budapest, Slow Up in Prussia, Win Petsamo Area

Red Army men in the first week of November were driving on Budapest, capital of Hungary and one of the last remaining strong points in Hitler's collapsing Balkan empire.

One of the great Balkan communication centers, Budapest controls the rail, highway, and water routes leading from the south to Vienna and on into Bavaria, the southern section of the Reich. The former Austrian capital of Vienna is only 140 miles northwest of Budapest and a drive through this city would flank the Bavarian Alps and lead into the Vienna-Salzburg corridor and Germany itself.

Pushing across the Hungarian plain, Soviet troops reached a major defense line based on the Budapest-Szolnok railroad and highway. Captured were Szolnok, 49 miles southeast of the Hungarian capital, as well as Abony and Cegled along the communications lines. At the closest point to their objective Soviet forces took Felsopakony, six miles from Budapest.

German reports from the front indicated Budapest was being evacuated rapidly, and that with complete control of the air, Soviet fighters and bombers were strafing retreating German columns. The proud city on the Danube seemed doomed.

EAST PRUSSIA. To the north there were only sparse reports from the

East Prussian battlefield, where the Red Army had broken through to fight on German soil. Indications from that area were that the Germans were counterattacking fiercely and had almost halted the Soviet advance which reportedly had come up against a strong defense line punctuated with earthworks and pillboxes. Along with the bitter resistance Soviet fighting men were running into the start of the Baltic winter which would further complicate their supply problems.

SALVO FOR PETSAMO. Meanwhile the familiar salute of 20 salvos by 224 victory guns boomed through Moscow streets to celebrate another northern gain as Premier Joseph Stalin announced the final clearing of Germans from the nickel-rich Petsamo area of Finland. The three-week operation was carried out by the

Karelian army (from the Soviet republic adjoining Finland) aided by the Russian northern fleet and was opposed by the Second German Army.

Budapest has been one of Germany's principal distributing centers, the junction of fourteen main railways, and the hub of a system of arterial highways leading toward Germany, Slovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Croatia.

The city is located on the Danube and comprises the towns of Buda on the right bank and Pest on the left. Traffic across the river here has always been congested, since virtually every important rail line in Central Europe must cross its six bridges. The Nazis added to the already strained facilities when early in the war they double-tracked routes to the southeast.

"WE MUST MAKE WAR IMPOSSIBLE"

Fascist propagandists have had as their primary aim furtherance of the policy of "divide and conquer," and have long focused such a campaign against the United Nations. This week Marshal Stalin "hammered to smithereens" fascist propaganda efforts in that direction in a series of cogent statements delivered at the celebration of the 27th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Republics.

At the same time he struck a few telling blows on behalf of those nations of the world desiring to live in peace and security. Not only did the Soviet Republics go on record as determined to work in unity with other peace-loving nations on banishing future wars, but Japan was clearly branded as Russia's enemy.

TO OUTLAW WAR. Russia's post-war stand regarding Germany and Japan or any other fascist coalition

was enunciated thus: "... the United Nations will win the war, whose last stage has been reached, but we must not only win the war; we must also make war in the future impossible, if not forever, then for a long time ... Special measures must be instituted against aggression.

"The only way is to create a special organization of United Nations to preserve peace and security, and give it armed forces and responsibility to apply them immediately to avert or suppress aggression."

Such an organization Stalin declared will be effective only "if the great powers which bore the brunt of the war continue to work unanimously and in accord—and only so." His faith in that unanimity was firm—"When you read reports of divergencies of views ... about postwar organization, remember that such differences always exist, even in the same party, and will obviously exist between different countries. Surprise should be expressed not that such differences exist, but that they are so few."

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Standstill In Italy; Greece Liberated

Besides the miseries of the Italian weather Allied forces last week were facing the stiffest kind of resistance from German units who, after being reinforced with parachute troops, were counterattacking savagely.

Fifth Army troops holed up in the cold dampness of the mountains carried out patrol actions, waiting for sunshine before continuing the frontal assault on Bologna. Eighth Army forces were edging through mud and mire toward the city from the east. The lack of geographical change in the positions of the Allied forces led some observers to report Italy was a quiet front, but it was a quiet in which men died.

COST AND PROFIT. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of Allied ground troops in the Mediterranean area, stated 194,000 German troops had been killed, captured, or wounded during the last six months in Italy. Allied casualties since the opening of the offensive on 6 May were listed as 116,150. Allied advances pushing 500 miles up the rugged mountainous peninsula for the past 14 months have liberated 51,000 square miles from Nazi domination.

German materiel losses in Italy include 790 planes, 340 tanks, 360 assault guns, 333 locomotives, and more than 3800 railway cars seized or destroyed.

General Alexander gave Field Marshal Albert Kesselring full credit for being an able and clever general. "He is especially good in regaining control of his forces after he has made a blunder," General Alexander said. "That is why it is so difficult to trap them in large numbers."

GREECE FREED. To the east the entire mainland of Greece was freed

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from German domination after a 40-day Allied campaign. The German garrisons are now fleeing northward through the Vardar valley in an effort to reach dubious safety at the Yugoslav highway center of Skopje, 75 miles north of the border.

Allied patrols in the north of Greece reported that only small scattered groups of Germans remained in that area. British troops landed near the partisan-held port of Salonika and prepared to enter the city.

Western Greece was invaded in October, 1940, by the Italians, but the Greeks threw them back into Albania in a savage counteroffensive. Coming to the aid of their Allies the Germans invaded Greece on 6 April, 1941, and won Athens 21 days later.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Burma Gains Offset By China Reverses

The if, when, and where of future Japanese resistance in Burma lately has become conjecture in the minds of many observers.

Allied communiques tell of rapid advances in north Burma and of Japanese retreats in the Fort White-Tiddim west Burma sector. Having apparently accepted Allied air superiority over Burma, the Japanese are now experiencing an attrition by land.

The British 36th Division has pushed southward along the rail line from Mogaung and is now at Mawlu, 35 miles southwest of Katha, railhead and port on the Irrawaddy River 100 miles southwest of Myitkyina. On a front parallel to the British, 70 miles to the east, Chinese forces have pushed almost southward from Myitkyina, which was taken 4 August, and have

cleared almost one-third of the distance to Mandalay. In facing these twin Allied drives, the Japs have shown little inclination to fight, even at points of favorable terrain where they could throw up stiff defenses.

MORE SUCCESSES. The British forces which drove the attempted Japanese invasion of India at Imphal back into Burma have advanced along the Chindwin river some 200 miles southwest of Katha, and Indian troops in that same area are fighting around a "vital corner" southeast of Tiddim. To the east on the China border other Chinese units fighting in the Yunnan and Salween areas have taken a heavy toll of Japs.

The successful Allied land campaign and accompanying air war has killed an estimated 50,000 Japs in the Tiddim area and a slightly smaller total in General Stilwell's campaign to clear the Ledo Road to Myitkyina. This resulting Japanese reverse and near-exodus from Burma may be explained by either Japanese fear of sea strikes at Rangoon by the British eastern fleet, a possible Japanese plan of withdrawal from south Burma altogether, or Japanese hopes of re-establishing a defense line more compatible to the length of their strained supply lines in south Burma.

B-29s OVER RANGOON. Meanwhile, as ground troops pushed the Japs southward, the Allied command dispatched Superfortresses with record breaking bomb loads against the Malagon railroad yards in the Rangoon area in co-ordination for the first time with smaller bombers from the Eastern Air Command. The Rangoon rail yards handle Jap cargoes in transshipment from sea to rail. The mission was termed successful and no B-29s were lost to enemy action.

NEW COMMAND. Announcement has been made of organization of the Eleventh Army Group which will operate in Southeast Asia and include

some American troops formerly led by General Stilwell. This group will be under command of Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver W. H. Leese, who was commander of the British Eighth Army in Italy. General Leese and his group, which will include the British Fourteenth Army as well as the Stilwell Chinese and American troops, will serve under Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia theater.

ANOTHER LOST DROME. In China American air force crews lit fuses to 218 tons of bombs buried in the runways at Yangtang airfield outside Kweilin this week and started southward to escape the Japanese, who are now reported fighting inside the eastern, northern, and western suburbs of Kweilin. Weeks ago other 14th airfields around Kweilin, the capital of Kwangsi province and a former important rail center, were mined and destroyed in this manner, leaving only the Yangtang field for up to the last-minute strafing and bombing missions against the Japanese troops and supplies.

As fighting took place inside Kweilin, other Japanese units bypassed the capital and struck toward Luichow to the southwest, rail center and air base for Free China. Two of the major cities protecting Luichow have been captured and the Japanese are storming a third. One column of the Jap offensive has pushed 35 miles south along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway to Yungfu. A second enemy force farther east has reached Lipu, 60 miles east of Luichow. A third unit has Mosun, 45 miles southeast of Luichow, under attack.

Only the Chinese occupation of the Burma Road town of Lungling on the Yunnan front and the recapture of strong points northwest of Tungan in Hunan province brightened the Allied outlook. It was a week in which the Japanese advanced 90 miles along the Hunan-Kwangsi rail route and 110 miles in the drive to Lipu.

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Crisis For Japan? Koiso Calls It "Life and Death Struggle"

Trying to force greater production from the Japanese home front is not a new story in Japan, either to the people or the ruling clique. Ever since the nation embarked on its disastrous course of world conquest, the home front has been implored to work harder for quicker victory. But now something new has been added—the propaganda of fear.

The "fear" motif has been no better enunciated than by Premier Koiso himself. In urging greater production effort at a recent warworkers rally in Osaka, Koiso refreshed the Japanese memory on the events of the war, from Pearl Harbor to the present. After pointing out the preliminary successes in the war's early stages, he added that the "Guadalcanal withdrawal had created a critical situation." Ever since then, he told his audience, "... the situation has become regrettably unfavorable for Japan."

LIFE OR DEATH. Koiso gave impetus to the fear propaganda by telling the nation that "failure to achieve a decisive victory in the battles to come will mean the outright loss of Japan's unique national policy and the total obliteration of her national existence." He called it "a life and death struggle," and warned that not a single minute could be lost.

Even more significant was Koiso's bald declaration that there was no hope of a compromise peace. For foreign consumption this may have been intended as an effort to test the receptiveness of the idea of peace before the war builds towards its conclusive stage. But for domestic consumption that statement was aimed to dispel from Japanese minds any immediate hope of an early peace. Koiso implied that Japan could win its victory and preserve its present hegemony only by waging such a determined fight that Allied public opinion, wearied by a long war, would demand peace of a compromise nature.

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MORE SUBTLY. Koiso's speech is perhaps the first forthright, articulate expression of fear as a fillip to greater effort on the home front. But the fear theme has crept subtly into many another story told the people. It was evident even in the manner with which the Imperial press reported the Philippines landings.

When the Third Fleet preceded the Leyte invasion with its widespread attacks on Formosa and nearby islands, Japanese propagandists fashioned a "glorious" victory. They went so far as to say that the impending invasion of the Philippines had been set back by "two months," an opinion that must have choked them when less than a week later our ground forces struck for the invasion.

It was impossible to keep all news of the landing from the people, so Japanese spokesmen continued to beat the victory drums. The Imperial Fleet's engagements in waters off the Philippines were glorified as a great victory and subordinate news bulletins were released claiming annihilation of the landing forces. For a moment the Japanese people must have believed enthusiastically that after two years the Rising Sun was again in ascendancy.

But, knowing that subsequent events would soon destroy that fallacious belief, Koiso grew cagey. The navy had scored huge successes at Formosa and the Philippines, he reiterated. Then he injected a note of doubt and fear: These victories had not been won

easily. "We shouldn't forget that we lost several warships, and in addition, many have not returned to their bases."

MORE, MORE, MORE. The Koiso regime—or any that may follow—has need to increase production. Being almost perfect fascist subjects, the people probably won't revolt against the state. But they can tire from their intensive effort to produce at the rate demanded by the state.

The state's problem is to prevent this industrial fatigue. From the labor standpoint, this seems to be through the introduction of fear propaganda. From the standpoint of production material, the state faces a graver problem—it now must find ways and means of producing much of its war needs from ersatz materials. For treasures of the Indies and other conquered territories are slipping from Japan's grasp; even where they are still obtainable, Allied attacks on supply lines are seriously reducing their rate of delivery to homeland manufacturing centers.

To procure more metal, collections from the public, stopped in 1942 when the conquered territories began to produce for Japan, have been revived. At the moment the main emphasis is on platinum, but the intention is to include iron, steel, aluminum, copper, silver and other kinds of metals "sleeping in the house."

RUE-A-DUE-DUE. Japan is seeking to overcome in part the rapid loss of vitally needed shipping with the stepped-up construction of wooden ships, a good indication of her poverty of metals. "Experts" from Tokyo have been dispatched to all wooden shipbuilding centers in the nation to boost production to meet "increased demands." Regional councillors have been in conference with the Home Ministry on the problem, too. Production of wooden propellers

for Zekes, Zeros and other Japanese aircraft also has been stepped-up by "experts."

Under the Tojo regime use of women in industry was not viewed favorably. Now, however, women are conscripted and are hard at work. Japanese casualties have begun to mount at such a rate that even the army, which once accepted only trained personnel, now conscripts inexperienced women as nurses.

CONSCRIPTS ALL. All civilians are placed at work on a conscript basis. Recently more coal was needed to fulfill the increased production demands. The power plants lagged behind the needs of the factories despite a "do not waste power" campaign. So to boost the production of coal for power plant use, thousands of Tokyo factory workers got 20 days training and, were summarily shifted to coal mines.



TEA NOT TOO BITTER.

The Japanese diet has not yet reached the critical stage. Each person is allowed enough food to maintain his health.

But recently Japanese scientists began exploring possible food sources. So far they have reported favorably on bamboo sprouts, acanthus, and ferns for use in case of an "emergency." This month a sugar substitute, "perillatin," is being rationed to the public on an experimental basis. Derived from beefsteak plants it is claimed to be 100 times sweeter than sugar.

This latest use of an ersatz food might seem inconsistent in view of the sugar surpluses extant in the Philippines and Java. Apparently Japan already is preparing for the loss of those sources. One thing the Japs can't do, however, is to produce a sweetening ersatz that will take away the bitter taste of defeat.

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Dumbarton Oaks: The Big Four Offer A Plan For World Peace

"These proposals have been made public to permit a full discussion by the people of this country prior to convening a wider conference," President Roosevelt said when details of the Dumbarton Oaks conference were released to the press. Confident that GIs, as citizens overseas, will want to participate in this discussion, MAPTALK herewith presents some of the necessary background.

Two World Wars in a single generation have brought common acknowledgment to what once was only a philosopher's prophecy—at some date the war process has to stop or civilization itself will stop.

It was on this sober premise that representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Republic assembled last August at the palatial estate called Dumbarton Oaks, near Washington, to open a conference on world security.

"I wish I could burn this into your minds and memories for the next 50 years at least," Secretary of State Cordell Hull told the delegates. "And that is, the human race, this hour, this day, this week, this year, is confronted by the gravest crisis in all its experience, and that we who are here on this scene of action at this critical time have the responsibility of saying what way the world is going for 50 years to come."

SECRET SESSION. The delegates apparently accepted that responsibility. After the first formal exchange of diplomatic courtesies, they withdrew behind closed doors and proceeded in secret. The press was given the line-up of representatives and that was about all: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., chairman of the American delegation; the Earl of Halifax, chairman of the British delegation; and Andrei A.

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Gromyko, chairman of the Soviet delegation.

In an air of quiet suspense the conference, originally set for three weeks, stretched on to six. There were rumors of disagreement, of a Russian disinclination to cooperate, of some general disunity with regard to voting. Then the State Department made an announcement and the rumors stopped: the delegates had "reached a large measure of agreement;" recommendations were being submitted to their respective governments for approval.

CHINA IN: With the first phase of the conference out of the way, Mr. Gromyko retired and Dr. Wellington Koo, representing China, took his place. Again the doors closed.

Scarcely two weeks later the doors opened again, this time to admit the free people of the world. On 11 October publication of the "unanimously agreed recommendations" occurred simultaneously in Washington, Moscow, London, and Chungking. With simple clarity the announcement disclosed a plan for an international organization empowered to use armed force for the preservation of world peace and security.

THE BLUEPRINT: Called simply the United Nations, the proposed organization would be based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states. Core of the plan is the solidarity of the great powers who admittedly must bear the major respon-

sibility for keeping the peace and suppressing aggression.

The United Nations would have a General Assembly open to all "peace-loving" nations, a Security Council, an international court of justice and a permanent secretariat. Its most powerful organ would be the Security Council, composed of representatives of the Big Four as permanent members and representatives of six other nations elected in rotation every two years by the General Assembly.

The Security Council, a far more streamlined body than anything in the old League of Nations, would be entrusted with the preservation of peace and would have at its disposal armed forces from the United Nations as a whole. The Council would be given broad powers to intervene in any situation which might lead to a breach of the peace and to employ any means, diplomatic, economic, or armed force at its discretion.

STILL SOME KINKS. The United Nations is still only a blueprint. It contains several unresolved problems which the State Department indicated would have to be ironed out by the chiefs of the four states themselves or by their foreign ministers with full power to act. After final agreement, a more detailed draft would have to be drawn up for submission to a conference of all the United Nations and then approved by the parliaments of each nation. In the case of the United States, the draft would be in the form of a treaty and would have to be approved by a two-thirds vote in the Senate.

Among the questions left undecided in the Dumbarton Oaks draft is the voting procedure in the Security Council. At issue is the question of whether a nation involved in a potential breach of the peace should be allowed to vote on that particular question. Another question still up in the air is whether the Little Six on the council should be able to outvote the Big Four. The Big Four, according

to the Dumbarton Oaks draft, would "in due course" become the Big Five with the admission of France as a permanent member.

The Little Six on the council would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with three nations retiring every year. They would not be immediately eligible for re-election, although presumably a nation could get back after a two-year lapse.

COUNCIL'S JOB. To insure prompt and effective action, the United Nations would confer on the Council primary responsibility for keeping the peace. The Council could thus take action without consulting any states not represented in the Council. All members of the United Nations would be obligated to accept the Council's decisions.

The Security Council would be empowered to exercise any diplomatic, economic or other measures short of war against a potential aggressor and call upon all members of the United Nations to carry them out. Such measures would include interruption of rail, sea and air service, postal, telegraphic and radio communication and the severance of diplomatic or economic relations.

If the council decides on force, "it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security," the draft states. "Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the organization."

THE MIGHT. The armed forces would be provided by all members of the United Nations, each presumably chipping in according to its means. Each nation would hold a certain number of troops "available" for use by the Security Council. They would not be brought together, however, into a unified international army, and their numbers and types would be determined by special agreements between the nations involved. The chiefs of

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THE ENEMY'S VIEW

Mainichi Shimbun levelled a bitter editorial criticism against the enemy's published plan for a "League of United Nations," branding it as the "most amusing blueprint" that has ever been conceived by enemy war leaders. The whole published thing is interesting only in that it amply reflects Anglo-America's inordinate design for world domination, while it is obviously intended for propaganda purposes, to suit the needs of Washington and London.—Domei. 12 October, 1944.

staffs of the Big Four (or in due course, Big Five) would form a military staff committee to advise the Council on the requirements or tactical employment of the troops.

The importance of air power in the plan is indicated by a separate paragraph, which is more specific and far more forceful in language: "In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the organization there should be held immediately available by the members of the organization national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in special agreement or agreements."

FREE ASSEMBLY. The General Assembly of the United Nations would contain representatives of all the United Nations. The assembly would be the policy-making body and would have far less actual power than the

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Security Council. It would consider general principles concerning international cooperation, make recommendations on matters before the Security Council, and initiate studies in political, social and economic fields.

It is empowered to admit new members, but only upon recommendation of the Security Council—presumably after passing on the "peace-loving" qualification which is the requisite of membership. This phrase excludes Japan and Germany for some time.

One of the Assembly's few real powers is that it elects the six non-permanent members of the Security Council. The political complexion and diplomatic alignments of these six, who would wield a potent bloc of votes, would do much in influencing decisions of the Council.

JUDICIAL POWER. The International Court of Justice would be the principal judicial organ of international society. Conferees at Dumbarton Oaks were undecided as to whether the present World Court (permanent Court of International Justice) would be taken over and modified or whether a whole new judicial organ should be set up.

The Dumbarton Oaks draft also proposed an Economic and Social Council to carry out recommendations in economic and social fields by the assembly and also to make studies in those fields for the use of the assembly and member nations.

Presiding officer of the United Nations would be a secretary-general, who would preside over meetings of the Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council and would make an annual report to the assembly on the work of the organization. He would be the chief administrative officer of the body.

NO UPSET TO MINORS. A separate section of the draft states categorically that the organization's charter should not interfere in any way with "regional arrangements or agencies"

already in existence, providing their purposes did not run counter to those of the United Nations. This presumably leaves the Pan American Union free to deal with hemispheric problems. An "authorized source" in the State Department was further quoted by the New York Herald Tribune as saying that the Monroe Doctrine would not be affected in any way.

Besides the question of voting procedure, several other important points remained to be cleared up. One of these was what to do with the present League of Nations—whether it should be scrapped entirely or parts of it incorporated into the United Nations. The whole system of League mandates was likewise left up in the air.

NOT LIKE LEAGUE. Probably the League will merely suffer a quiet death, honored as the first noble, however impracticable, experiment in collective security. With creation of the United Nations the League would almost automatically be outdated. Ill-defined though it may be, machinery for the proposed organization already differs basically from that of the League.

Unlike the League, the new organization would be kept distinct from the terms of the final peace treaties. This would separate the problem of handling future aggressors from the settlement of the current war. The United Nations also would be kept free of disputes concerning boundaries, one of the more important issues which bogged down the old League before it was even under way.

Another major difference is that the new plan does not provide for automatic sanctions to be used against aggressors. Each case would be handled individually. Whereas the League was forced to wait until the overt act occurred before the sanction machinery was put into operation, the United Nations could take action before the act of aggression is committed.

Although it stresses the equality of rights of all sovereign nations, the new organization recognizes the fact that the power at the disposal of various nations is unequal. The unanimity rule of the League, which many observers felt hamstrung effective action, is modified to the extent that majority rule will prevail and that the four or five major powers who would bear the burden of enforcing the peace would have the indirect right of vetoing any proposed action.

WHAT NOW? When disputed points are cleared up by the Big Four, and a complete draft presented, a conference of all the United Nations will be called to draw up the charter. Then the charter will be submitted to the respective governments for approval. The State Department has disclosed that the over-all document charter of the United Nations would comprise one treaty and the numbers and composition of United States troops and air forces to be held available for use by the international body would be drawn into a separate treaty.

AGREED. Although details are lacking, the vision is clearer than men of good will have ever seen it. The four Allied nations bearing the weight of war against the Axis emerged from Dumbarton Oaks not only unanimous on the principle of collective security and determined to stop man's destruction of man, but agreed to an encouragingly high degree on the system through which the ideal will be achieved.

"This time we have been determined first to defeat the enemy," said President Roosevelt, voicing the official attitude, "to assure that he will never again be in a position to plunge the world into war, and then to so organize peace-loving nations that they may through unity of desire, unity of will, and unity of strength, be in a position to assure that no other would-be aggressor or conqueror shall even get started."

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ARMY TALK **Enemy Changes His Tune As Our Battles Pay Off**

Note to I&E Officers: Properly developed in discussion, this article will serve to remind us: (1) that the enemy made a long-term blunder when he sneered at our fighting qualities and the military abilities of our leaders; (2) that the so-called "decadent democracies" have in three years overtaken and surpassed the efforts of a whole generation of Germans and Japanese. Every effort should be made to develop through discussion by the men the satisfying fact that, in every major operation we have undertaken, our top leaders have paid off on strategy better than that of our capable enemies.

WHEN JAPAN ATTACKED us at Pearl Harbor and Italy and Germany followed up with declarations of war against us, our enemies had a low opinion of us. They didn't think much of our nation, our people, the manhood of our soldiers or the efficiency of our generals.

(Question: What did the Germans think of our fighting potentialities before the war?)

Hitler had said: "The American is no soldier. The inferiority and decadence of the allegedly new world is evident in its military inefficiency." He thought Americans lacked the manhood necessary to make good soldiers; our system of free, democratic institutions was impotent; and our military, from top to bottom, was outclassed.

The Japanese Admiral (now deceased), Yamamoto, looked forward to dictating a peace in the White House. Shortly after the attack, the Tokyo radio spoke happily of the "utter incapability of U.S. officers" and described them as "having no practical knowledge of strategy." The Japanese soldier was told: "The U.S. soldiers are at the beginning like lions, but at the end are gentle like virgins."

In the beginning, the enemy had some reason to be confident in belittling us.

(Question: Why was the enemy so confident that we would be defeated? What did he have that we didn't have?)

The Enemy Had All Four

Both the German and Japanese enemies, on 7 December, 1941, had four things: (1) seasoned armies; (2) modern weapons and equipment; (3) carefully evolved plans for conquest; and (4) war-

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minded, indoctrinated home populations. They had already tried them out in the Spanish Civil War and in China.

(Question: What new weapons and methods had the Germans used in their early conquests?)

By the summer of 1941, the Germans were in control of France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, some by military, some by political conquest. The world trembled at a new word: the "blitzkrieg," which had overwhelmed seven nations. This "lightning war" involved a great and powerful air force, co-operating closely with mechanized and armored fire power, and followed up by highly trained, mobile infantry. In combination with these, they had airborne troops, efficient combat engineer teams, and a masterly supply system.

They had an army and air force of 8,000,000 men. Being the aggressors, the efficient German General Staff had carefully conceived plans for military action. They were backed by a people long obedient to Germany's supposed "destiny" to rule the world, who had gloried in victory upon victory.

(Question: Ask the men for suggestions as to Japanese items of military strength.)

When they attacked us, the Japanese army and air force numbered 3,217,500 men. They had been on a war footing even before 1931, when they grabbed Manchuria. Their attacks were aided by years of espionage, as was soon shown during their operations through "impossible terrain" in Malaya. Their armies had been tested on the Chinese. Their air force had efficient planes, notably the Zero fighter. Their foot soldiers were tough, trained to endure extreme hardship, indoctrinated in aggressive fighting. Their people, worshippers of their Emperor, gave up all comforts to make the military effort.

(Question: What was the strength of our army when we were attacked? What weapons did we have?)

We Had Only Plans Ready

Compared with the four major assets of our enemies, we had only plans ready. Our General Staff had faithfully laid plans for modern organization of our forces, including the acquisition of planes and other weapons fit for this new kind of warfare that was beginning, but until the fall of France neither Congress nor the people of the United States was at all willing to incur the expenses of any such preparations.

When the attack came, we had a green army of 1,600,000 men, built up by peacetime conscription in a year from an original force

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of only 265,000 regular army officers and men and a somewhat smaller National Guard. We were short on small arms, on planes, on armor. We had been forced to maneuver with broomsticks for machine guns, trucks marked "tank," and old observation planes to simulate bombers. Our weapons were mostly on order.

Many of our people, far from being war-minded, hoped and believed all along that we would not have to engage in war. This was demonstrated in Congress which, two months before Pearl Harbor, mustered only a one-vote margin in the House of Representatives for extension of the selective service law.

(Question: Ask the men what they would have done, on 7 December, 1941, had they been in charge of the defense of our nation.)

We Took It

With the Pearl Harbor blow, the Japanese reversed the balance of naval power in the Pacific. Premier Tojo (now resigned) declared that the American and British fleets, in the first three months, had vanished. "They have ventured into a hopeless war and are now approaching a complete collapse," he said.

We were beaten in the Pacific: in the Philippines, at Guam and at Wake, while the British were being whipped at Hong Kong, in Malaya, and at Singapore. The Japanese were poised to attack Australia when they were finally checked at high cost to us by naval and air power which had been built up during the time we were defending the Philippines. We couldn't keep them out of the Aleutians.

We took a beating in the Atlantic, where the U-boats sank 582 ships serving the Allies. The German radio boasted "The shipping situation has become so bad that the U.S. is not expected to be able to send any troops overseas in the future." That was on 27 December, 1942. (For the year 1943, our losses in the Atlantic were cut to 90 ships.)

We rushed the training of the new army, the people at home strained to fill the production quotas for weapons. We maintained our long supply route to Australia, and we rushed garrisons to

WHO SAID THAT?

BEFORE.—17 February, 1943.—"Everybody realizes that Eisenhower is not much of a general and that the average abilities of his officers are not too high."—German broadcast.

AFTER.—5 September, 1944.—"We definitely admit that the operative achievements, particularly of the Americans, were on a considerable level both as regards the planning and the carrying out of their campaign in France."—German broadcast.

protect the continental area of the United States and its immediate approaches.

We covered. We had our guard up. But that was all.

(Question: Ask the men what their strategy would have been, once we had assembled the men, and weapons, and ships to strike a blow at our enemy.)

Our Offensive Begins

Early in 1942, our leaders determined on the grand strategy: knock out the European end of the Axis first.

We sent only enough strength to the Pacific to stop the Japanese short of Australia. The tide was turned in the naval battles of Midway and the Coral Sea. Gradually by long-range bombing missions against the new Japanese bases, by efficient use of airborne troops, foot soldiers, and some armor, we maneuvered our way to the places necessary for the mounting of an all-out offensive after the fall of Germany. And by B-29 raids, we even carried the war to Japan proper.

Even though our Pacific resources were limited by the global plan, our battle leaders made the most of them. Like a master player on a chessboard, we bewildered the Japanese generals by assaults which bypassed and cut off strong Japanese forces. In the closest coordination with naval strength, we repeatedly jumped such strong points all along New Guinea, New Britain and the island groups.

(Question: What did we achieve by going into North Africa?)

Late in 1942, the German enemy knew we were going to attack somewhere. He didn't know where. Hitler, in exasperation, referred to our generals as "military idiots," capable of embarking on "the maddest enterprise."

We landed in North Africa, achieving surprise as we hammered at the supply life-line of the Afrika Korps. In the six months to follow, we showed that we and the British could coordinate our actions, and a new French Army came into being. Our air forces found that their fighters and bombers were masters of the air. Our tanks and our bazooka, our jeeps and our ducks proved up to our proud expectations. Our tactics justified themselves both in the air and on the ground. Our soldiers were no longer green; they had stood the test of battle. Our generals showed they could out-think the enemy's best, as demonstrated in the final push when our II Corps and units of the British Eighth Army in Tunisia moved secretly 200 miles to the North to join the British First Army for the overwhelming assault on the surprised Germans at Bizerte.

HOW MANY OF THESE ALLIED

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

For the United States:

Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff
Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations
Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commander Army Air Forces
Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President

For Great Britain:

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lieutenant General G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh

U.S. ARMY:

Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commander of Army Air Force
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commander Army Service Forces
Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, Commander Army Ground Forces

W.D. GENERAL STAFF:

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Chief of Operations

U.S. DEFENSE COMMANDS:

Lt. Gen. George Gruentert, Commanding General Eastern Defense Command
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, Commander of Western Defense Command

ALASKA:

Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, Commanding General

Brig. Gen. Frank L. Whittaker, Deputy Commander

Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnston, Commander 11th Air Force
Colonel E. D. Post, Chief of Staff

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA:

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander
Lt. Gen. Richard Sutherland, Chief of Staff

Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander Allied Ground Forces

Lt. Gen. Geo. C. Kenney, Commander Far East Air Forces

Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, Commander Fifth Air Force

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, Commander 13th Air Force

Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Commander U.S. Sixth Army

Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, Commander XIV Corps

Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Commander Naval Forces

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS:

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Commander Pacific Fleet

Vice Admiral John H. Towers, Deputy Commander

Lt. Gen. R. C. Richardson, Commander U. S. Army Forces

Rear Admiral C. A. Pownall, Commander Air Forces, Pacific Fleet

Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Commander Army Air Forces

Maj. Gen. W. H. Hale, Commander Shore-Based Air Forces, Forward Area

Brig. Gen. R. W. Douglas, Acting Commander, 7th Air Force

COMMANDERS DO YOU KNOW?

Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, Commander Service Force

Admiral Raymond Spruance, Fifth Fleet

Admiral William F. Halsey, Third Fleet

EUROPEAN-AFRICAN THEATER:

Western:

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander

Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander & Allied Air Commander

Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff

Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commander of U.S. Strategic Air Force in Europe

Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander of Allied Ground Forces

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Commander Twelfth Army Group

Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Commander Sixth Army Group

Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Commander Allied Expeditionary Air Forces

Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Deputy Commander Allied Expeditionary Air Forces

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Commander U.S. Eighth Air Force

Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Naval Commander-in-Chief

Lt. Gen. George Patton, Third Army

Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, Seventh Army

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, First Army

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, First Allied Airborne Army

Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, Ninth Army

Mediterranean:

Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commander-in-Chief

Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, Allied Commander in Italy

Lt. Gen. Sir Richard McCreery, Commander British Eighth Army

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Allied Air Commander

Air Vice Marshal John Henry d'Albanc, Deputy Commander Allied Tactical Air Force

Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander Fifth Army

Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Chief of Staff, Fifth Army

Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commander 12th Air Force

Maj. Gen. Nathan Twining, Commander 15th Air Force

SOUTHEAST ASIA:

Lord Louis Mountbatten, Commander-in-Chief

Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander, U.S. Armies in China

Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, Commander Eleventh Army Group

Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, Commander U.S. Armies in Burma and India

Maj. Gen. George C. Stratmeyer, Commander of Theater Air Forces

Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, Commander 14th Air Force

Brig. Gen. Howard Davidson, Commander 10th Air Force (India)

What did we achieve? We shortened the supply route to India by 3,221 miles by gaining control of the Mediterranean. We showed that we could whip a tough, seasoned German Army, and shattered the myth of Nazi invincibility. We gained a vast continental base for future assaults on Hitler's "Fortress Europe."

(Question: Ask the men where they would have struck the next blow after the African victory.)

Africa conquered, the long-decided plan to attack Sicily and Italy was put into operation. With notable achievements by airborne and armored troops, we ripped through Sicily in 39 days and

knocked Italy out of the war. By subsequent operations in Italy, we tied up as many as 27 German divisions in the Italian areas. We secured our flank for the later attack on Southern France. We had cracked the "Fortress Europe."

(Question: Why didn't we open the "second front" sooner?)

WAR OF CERTAINTY.

For almost a year, no new major operation was launched. Impatient demands for invasion were heard. Our leaders kept their counsel and went on with their plans. They had demonstrated their policy of expending materiel in preference to lives.

They softened the enemy. By night and day our great air forces pounded the enemy's factories, his transportation centers, and his oil depots, gradually but surely weakening his war machinery against the day when our men would wade ashore.

They massed great stockpiles of weapons, vehicles, and supplies of all kinds. In May, 1944, the Army Service Forces moved a record of almost 4,000,000 measurement tons overseas, almost twice the amount moved in May of 1943. (A measurement ton: a unit of volume for cargo freight, usually reckoned at 40 cubic feet.)

When this tremendous weight of air power, supplies, and ground troops was pressed against the enemy, Germans soon complained bitterly about our "inhuman war of certainty."

The operations of France are recent history. Though the enemy knew we were coming, we achieved "tactical surprise." After we landed, the enemy was in a dilemma. He publicly confessed that he would crush the beach head if he dared move enough troops from other sectors of the coast. But he didn't dare, because he could not discover whether the Normandy thrust was or was not the "main effort." Our leaders confused him further by sending air and sea feints to the North toward Denmark and toward Southern France. He hesitated and tried to concentrate on holding in Normandy. We massed our strength and broke through. And now our troops are inside Germany.

AXIS SURPASSED BY DEMOCRACIES.

The German radio said "The German units in Southern France, after passing Lyon, are headed up the Rhone. They constantly approach their objective, the great German defense front."

Only three years ago, the spokesmen of Germany and Japan were contemptuous of us. They ridiculed our production plans.

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Tokyo Double-Talk

BEFORE.—March, 1942.—"Japan has already won her victory. The unfinished task is on the U.S. proper and the British Isles proper, and Japan is figuring how to wipe them out. Should there be further war, it will no longer be a great war. It will be the battle of Washington and the Battle of London."—Japanese broadcast.

AFTER.—September, 1944.—Premier Koiso (Tojo has resigned) told the Japanese to expect intensified air attacks on their homeland and not to overlook the "possibility of a landing on our home soil. The counteroffensive of the enemy is becoming increasingly fierce and the war situation is finally becoming more intense. The general war situation cannot be regarded as satisfactory."

They held our soldiers in low regard. They spoke condescendingly of our generals.

Now, after almost three years of united effort, successful planning, and courageous fighting, we have overtaken them. The Germans are fighting on their own soil for the first time in this war. And the Japanese speak feelingly of the intensified tempo of the Pacific war. Both the Germans and Japanese have shuffled a whole succession of generals as each of their leaders was "out-foxed."

On 26 April, 1942, Hitler said "The great generals of England and the United States inspire neither fear nor horror to me."

On 3 September, 1944, Hitler's promised speech was cancelled. A.G. 353 (16 Jan 44.)

By Order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Prepared by Army Orientation Branch, ASF, War Department, Washington, D.C.

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Q. Where are Garakayo and Bahrakaseru Islands?

A. In the southern Palau group. They were recently occupied to further secure our control of Peleliu and Angaur.

Q. Loochoo, Ojiza, Nasei Shoto, Okinawa, Uruma, and Nanto Shoto all refer to the same thing. What?

A. To the long archipelago which stretches for 600 miles between Kyushu (southernmost island in Japan Proper) and Formosa. Ryukyu, which was hit so heavily in the extensive carrier sweep prior to the Philippines invasion, comprises the three southern island clusters in the group.

Q. What is the most important oil port in the Far East?

A. Balikpapan, Borneo.

Q. Is it legal to mail home small Jap pistols that you manage to capture?

A. No! A special War Department announcement says that no explosive items of any sort may be mailed back to the United States. That goes for small firearms that can be concealed on the person, too. The War Department also warns that international law forbids taking items from prisoners. What's more, if you bring home any war souvenirs yourself, you've got to get a certificate signed by your commanding officer showing that it's okay for you to bring home your war trophies.

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Q. In 1922 Japan's naval development was restricted to the 5:5:3 ratio (Britain and the U.S. represented the 5:5) established by the Washington treaty of naval limitation. How long did she respect this limitation?

A. Ostensibly until 1936 when, after Great Britain and America had rejected her demand for naval parity, she denounced the Washington treaty and resumed complete freedom of naval action.

Q. "Banzai" is the Japanese national cheer. What does it mean?

A. It means "Ten thousand years, forever."

Q. Recently Lord Mountbatten sent a squadron of his powerful fleet to bomb Car Nicobar. Where is Car Nicobar?

A. It is one of a shielding group of islands off the Malayan coast, and 100 miles off the mouth of the Malacca Strait.

Q. Admiral Nimitz referred to last week's naval action as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea. When and where was the First Battle of the Philippine Sea fought?

A. The First Battle of the Philippine Sea was fought on Monday, 19 June, 1944, when Task Force 58 pursued a Japanese carrier force seeking to interfere with the invasion of the Marianas at Saipan. (MAPTALK, 30 June, 1944).

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 20. Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 18 NOV., 1944

RESTRICTED

Weather, Japs, Terrain Slowing Ormoc Advance

The battle for Leyte this week was being fought in terrain as torturous as the razor-backed mountains of New Guinea and against an enemy whose resistance was as stubborn as it had been on Guadalcanal or Tarawa.

Closing in on the last Japanese stronghold at Ormoc from three directions along a twisting 46-mile front, American ground troops measured their gains in yards. They fought through a raging tropical hurricane, crept and crawled through mud and slime, clawed their way up perpendicular heights to meet the enemy in a close, primeval sort of combat. By Tuesday, 14 November, through such painful advances, they had won control of several ridges dominating the Ormoc highway and were in a position to pinch off a reinforced Japanese regiment in the northern end of the Ormoc corridor.

CRISIS FOR ENEMY. Fully conscious of the threat to his supply lines to the Netherlands East Indies and to Malaya, the enemy apparently had decided to make Leyte one of the decisive battles of the Philippines. From the nearby islands of Cebu and Mindanao he kept pouring reinforcements into Ormoc Bay; at the last estimate he had

committed more than 70,000 troops for the defense of Leyte, including his original garrison of 35,000 already killed, wounded or otherwise made ineffective.

Further evidence of the seriousness with which the Japanese high command viewed the situation was the sudden withdrawal of Field Marshal Count Juichi Terauchi as commander of the Leyte forces and his replacement by a "soldier's soldier," General Tomoyuki Yamashita, conqueror of Malaya and Singapore. Yamashita's mission probably is similar to that of an earlier Japanese general on Guadalcanal—to throw in reinforcements again and again; to buy at a reckless cost in blood the time required to fortify elsewhere.

General MacArthur's headquarters has indicated that Yamashita is going all out to build a prepared line of defense in the Ormoc corridor. "It is evident that his (the enemy's) purpose is to assemble sufficient forces to attempt to break out from this Yamashita line, which is now enveloped by our troops on all ground fronts," General MacArthur said. "He has chosen western Leyte as a main battle ground for his first supreme effort to crush our liberating forces."

BEATEN TO DRAW. But whatever plans he may have had to seize the initiative on Leyte went awry when General Krueger ordered offensive action on all Sixth Army fronts. "The enemy's general preparations for counterattack have been dislocated by our current offensive drive that has penetrated his potential assembly areas," General MacArthur continued, "compelling him to premature and

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piecemeal commitment of his forces for the defense of the main bastions of the Yamashita line."

Neither the presence of some 35,000 Japs in western Leyte nor the prospect of more arriving is regarded as alarming by GHQ. U.S. troops still hold better than a two to one numerical superiority over the enemy; Japanese airpower in the central Philippines has been badly crippled; and Allied supply lines are now secure while those of the Japs are hazardous.

THREE-PRONGED. Japanese troops bottled up in the Ormoc corridor are being pressed from three different sectors. In the north on a wide front below Carigara Bay (see NEWSMAP, 10 November) elements of the 24th Division and the First Cavalry Division are pushing south; to the southeast in the central sector, the 96th Division is moving west from Dagami; still farther south, at Leyte's narrow waist at Baybay, the Seventh Division is advancing north up the coastal highway.

Heaviest fighting has occurred at the northern end of the corridor. Moving forward on the right flank, units of the 24th Division on Thursday, 9 November, captured the dominating height known as Hill 1525 and another near Minoro, both to the east of Ormoc road, and held them despite three strong Jap counterattacks. Three days later, closely supported by artillery fire, they drove three miles south to seize Mount Catabaran (2349 feet high), one mile east of Highway Two and less than 16 miles north of Ormoc. Spearheaded by tanks, other 24th Division troops smashed through strong Japanese defenses on the highway to further the frontal assault.

ENTER CAVALRY. Meanwhile men of the First Cavalry Division, operating on the left flank and starting from Carigara township, had knifed their way through ridge and forest country to a depth of five miles. Some of them joined the 24th in the battle for Mount Catabaran while others pushed two miles to the southwest to take Mount Cabungangan. Still others moved three

miles to the southeast to contest the Japs for control of the Mt. Pina saddle.

Until the Cavalrymen blazed it, much of this country was untraveled. Troops waded waist-deep through streams, pulled themselves up almost vertical heights by vines and roots, and hacked out paths through dense clinging rain forest. Behind them came Filipino porters carrying 35-pound ration boxes six and seven miles up back-breaking hills.

Added to the challenge of geography was the constant threat of the enemy. Although in the main enemy opposition was light, scattered Japs had to be flanked and dug out of deep holes. In addition, in that kind of terrain it was impossible to check all infiltration, and U.S. forces frequently were delayed by small enemy parties who had sneaked behind their lines.

ENVELOPMENT. To the northwest, around Limon, an entire Japanese regiment reinforced was being threatened with encirclement by other elements of the First Cavalry and 24th Divisions.

Here in an area known as Breakneck Ridge American infantrymen had been fighting continuously for 23 days, throwing back repeated counterblows. But by Wednesday the several thousand Japanese troops appeared to have been eliminated as combat effectives. Strong elements of the First Cavalry had swung southwest to cut the Ormoc road at Paribo, thus isolating the forward enemy units and denying them supplies or reinforcements.

In the other sectors on Leyte progress was similarly slow and steady. At Gamulaaan, 14 miles south of Ormoc, units of the Seventh Division repulsed a small enemy force attempting to land from barges, then resumed their advance up the coastal road. In central Leyte the 96th Division column broke enemy resistance north of Dagami and proceeded to move across a mountain trail from Jaro to Alto Peak, a height 13 miles from Ormoc.

SOME DROWNED. That all the troops intended to reinforce the Japanese garrison have failed to arrive is due to the constant vigilance of carrier and land-based planes and PT boats operating over and on Ormoc Bay. Striking at two separate convoys last week, together they sank a total of 13 destroyers and eight transports.

First of the two big convoys appeared Thursday afternoon, 9 November, and consisted of four large cargo ships and 15 destroyers. General Kenney's planes sank six of the destroyers and three of the 5000-ton transports. A PT boat sent a seventh destroyer to the bottom. In the air attack that continued through Thursday afternoon and Friday morning, U.S. planes shot down 16 Jap fighters, probably five more for a loss of four bombers and four fighters.

The score was cleaner for the second convoy bout, which occurred early Saturday morning and involved carrier planes from Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet. This time an entire force of six Jap destroyers and four large transports, together with an estimated 8,000 enemy troops, were sunk.

OTHER AIR ACTIVITY. Leyte-based fighters and rear-based Liberators kept up a constant bombardment of Japanese installations at Ormoc. Liberators struck regularly with an average bombardment of 62 tons, causing extensive damage to waterfront facilities. Spreading out to other islands in the Visayas, they unleashed 66 tons on the Alicate and Fabrica airdromes on Negros, where they destroyed six planes on the ground. Jap interception was fierce, but the Liberators shot their way out by downing three Zeros.

A summary of Allied air strikes over the central Philippines through 15 November shows that 764 Japanese aircraft have been destroyed either in combat or on the ground. The figure does not include those planes shot down by the Third Fleet, although it

does embrace "kills" by Navy flyers while operating with the Fifth Air Force.

In retaliation the Japs have continued their harassing attacks against Allied shipping and supply installations on Leyte, causing some damage.

Pacific Gets More And More Carriers

Returning from a recent inspection through the Pacific, Rear Admiral George D. Murray, Commander of Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, told newsmen that the Pacific carrier force soon will have twice the strength it had just before the opening of the Marianas campaign last spring.

The Admiral spoke of the greatly increased number of carriers and the greater facilities for repairing damaged craft now available. He revealed that American air patrol wings operating from Leyte in the Philippines have brought the entire China Sea under Allied air cover. American air losses, the Admiral said, have been exceedingly light in making the ocean jumps some 4000 miles west of Pearl Harbor. Enemy pilots have been shot down at heavy ratios to American pilots and of the Americans shot down more than 50 per cent have been rescued almost immediately.

The British high command also released some statistics about operations in the Pacific. In recent weeks, the Admiralty, announced, British submarines operating in far eastern waters have sunk 45 Japanese vessels. The toll included one large and one medium size supply ship, a sub chaser, and three landing craft.

Bypassed Japs Hit

Isolated enemy garrisons and installations on New Britain, New Ireland, Bougainville and Choiseul received their heaviest bombing in recent weeks on 11, 12, and 13 November when Allied planes dropped 157 tons of bombs on targets throughout the Bismarck-Solomons sector.

Samar Filipinos Stayed Free

When democracy is firmly resolved in the minds of people no fascist force, however great and determined, can crush the government of the people, by the people, for the people. That has been proved conclusively by 6,000 Filipinos, residents of Basey, on the island of Samar.

When Japan overran the Philippines in 1942, Samar was not occupied. The island was not vitally important agriculturally and the enslavement of the population was not considered "necessary" either for the security or expansion of Japan's new empire.

GAMBLE. By 1943 the picture had changed rapidly. The Japanese gamble for world conquest had begun to prove a bad investment. Like a speculator operating on margin, Japan had to "contribute" more to try to maintain control of its gamble.

So Basey, a quiet community that had not been touched vitally by the Japanese, awoke on the morning of 24 October, 1943, to learn the invader was crossing the San Juanico Straits in overwhelming numbers. Hurriedly the residents of Basey and of the 24 surrounding barrios packed their belongings and slipped into the rugged Samar mountain ranges.

The Japanese conquered a ghost town. They stayed to occupy the island. But the occupation was not peaceful. In the mountains, as Basey's government began to function, the people elected a Major Abia, veteran of 24 years' service with the Filipino Scouts, as their leader and vested in him all powers of civil government.

FREEDOM FIGHTS. The Major organized 3,000 Filipino men and boys

into a cohesive guerrilla army to fight the Japanese occupation forces. At the beginning they had firearms, some stolen from the enemy. When they ran out of ammunition they fought with knives. Later they managed to signal SWPA and to receive additional supplies by submarine. As a result of their activities, the Japs were forced to maintain a large garrison on Samar.

To the community flocked Filipinos from other sections until the population reached approximately 36,000 evacuees. The county records had been trundled into the mountains. The people printed their own currency and operated their own corn exchange.

But life in the jungle country was difficult. One doctor served the 36,000. Food was hard to come by, and from dawn to dark women dug and grubbed in the ground for roots and other edible foods. The diet was uncertain at best, and consisted mainly of roots, camotes (sweet potatoes), and wild fruit. Some of the evacuees became insane from privation. Sickness and malnutrition took a heavy toll too.

LIBERATION. Their deliverance came with the landing of SWPA forces on Samar and the quick drive against the Japanese garrison. Word of our arrival spread quickly. The evacuees began to straggle back to the lowlands, back to Basey. Many of the women, now without clothing, waited until they had been brought something to wear before returning to their barrios.

Basey resumed its function as the county seat on 1 November. Major Abia, his military task accomplished, vacated his office. Government of the people, by the people, for the people, surrendered during the period of military emergency, had been returned to the people.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Third Army Moves To Encircle Metz; Nazi Lines Probed

In a week that marked the anniversary of the armistice of World War I, three Allied army groups were deployed along the Reich's western borders, probing for weak spots in the steel circle the Wehrmacht had woven to protect the fatherland.

To the north the 21st Army Group rested and regrouped after clearing the Schelde Estuary and driving the Germans back to the Meuse river. In the line's center, strong offensive action occurred at both flanks of the Twelfth Army Group front. The southernmost sector saw elements of the Sixth Army Group continuing their patient probing of enemy defenses screening the upper valley of the Rhine.

SOLID FRONT NOW. The British Second and Canadian First Armies have made great gains in the northern fighting, perhaps the most important of which is the transformation of the Nijmegen salient into a solid battle front with its eastern flank anchored on waterways leading to the North Sea.

In the past this Allied-held area had been a true salient, a long finger of land punched into enemy territory and open to enemy attack on three sides, with the further disadvantage of a single supply line running through Eindhoven and Nijmegen. To-day the front is broad and securely based on the road network running through Breda, Tilburg, and Hertogenbosch.

In a new push in this sector, which may well develop into a major offen-


sive to outflank the Siegfried Line at its thinnest northern point, the British Second has begun hacking away at the bulge in the corridor to Nijmegen around Venlo.

Preceded and covered by a steady barrage from 400 artillery pieces, the Second threw two bridgeheads across the Noord and Wessen canals, captured the lock gates at the canals' junction point of Pankiel, and consolidated the gains in the boggy terrain. There were indications the Nazis were withdrawing from their positions west of the Maas farther north, positions which would soon become untenable under the pressure of the British drive.

The greatest single advantage from the northern successes will probably be the opening of the Belgian port of Antwerp, the second largest port on the European continent, being exceeded in size only by Rotterdam. The port fell into Allied hands with its facilities almost intact, and the docks and cranes which used to handle 10,000 ships per year will do much to facilitate Allied supply to the western front. Cargo unloaded at Antwerp could reach the lower Meuse in a few hours and the Aachen sector within a day.

NO EASY JOB. There is little doubt, however, that the changeover from French supply ports now in use to Antwerp will not be accomplished overnight. Such a change is an operation of great magnitude and demands revision of plans and material installations on both sides of the channel. The distance from Flushing to Antwerp is 60 water-miles, and it seems highly probable the Germans have thoroughly mined this seaway. Minesweeping can clear the channel of these hidden dangers, but it will be a time-consuming operation.

South of the Netherlands, American First Army units continued their bitter battle of the Huertgen forest, fighting through its gloomy glades in an effort to win the edge of the Cologne plain. With Cologne, the Ruhr



Industrial city, in American hands, Allied troops would be on the edge of gently rolling country through which one of Hitler's superhighways winds its way toward Chemnitz and Dresden.

PINCERS ON METZ. But the week's great offensive was that launched by

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the American Third Army. Eight divisions participated in what appeared to be a concentrated effort to encircle the fortress city of Metz. The early days of the offensive saw Allied drives above and below the city, and some of its major communications already severed.

Metz is a fortress city, the center of 13 roads and a defensive bastion which has not fallen to frontal assault since the days of Attila the Hun. Guarding the main fortifications are a ring of smaller forts, such as Fort Driant, which was unsuccessfully attacked by numerically small American units earlier in the autumn.

If Metz falls or is isolated, the American Third Army will presumably gain freedom of maneuver to the east and can reach the great fortified belt protecting the Reich. This area, to which the Germans will undoubtedly fall back, is made up of the Maginot Line, the Siegfried Line, the Rhine river, and any new fortifications the Germans may have installed in the past six weeks during which the Third was stalled at the Metz approaches.

LONG FRONT. Preceded by a shattering artillery barrage, the eight divisions advanced along a 75-mile front, one division driving north of Metz across the Moselle, while seven pushed ahead south of the fortress city toward the Saar basin. Advances up to eight miles in depth were scored and the pincers drawing together beyond the city were less than fifteen miles apart at the week's end.

American divisions taking part in the battle were the Fourth and Sixth Armored, along with the 26th, 35th, 80th, Fifth, 90th, and 95th. Opposing them were elements of two German divisions so far identified—the 11th Panzer Division and the 17th S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division. Both German units have seen action in Normandy at Caen, Caumont, and Carentan.

South of the Third Army front the American Seventh continued to push forward toward the Belfort Gap

leading to the valley of the upper Rhine. If this defensive strongpoint could be reached and breached there would be the possibility of the Third and Seventh armies joining forces in the Rhine valley and taking over south-western Germany in the area just north of Switzerland.

Like Alsace and Lorraine, the city of Metz has been the focal point of differences between Germany and France for almost a century.

Although thousands of loyal Frenchmen left the city in protest when Germany took over in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian war, rapid industrial and commercial development quickly replaced the loss in population. The city grew so fast that at one time it was necessary for the Germans to destroy the old ramparts to make room for additional rows of houses. When

the city needed still more room, they built 14 bridges across the Moselle river and spread onto the river's islands. The Metz continued to grow after the city had reverted to France at Versailles. By the time of World War II it had 85,000 inhabitants.

During the time of German possession Metz was developed into one of the most heavily fortified cities of Europe. The minette iron field, which extends from a little south of Nancy to the Belgian border, and coal from the Vosges deposits and the extension of the Saar field into Lorraine, have favored the development of an iron and steel industry. As an antithesis to its military development, Germany introduced the making of strawberry and plum preserves which is still one of Metz's principal industries.

Metz lies near the Luxembourg corner, only 25 miles southwest of the German border.

NAZI HOME FRONT GETS A PEP TALK

Adolf Hitler addressed the German people last week for the first time since 21 July when, soon after the abortive attempt on his life, he rushed to a microphone to assure his followers of his safety. But this time he spoke through proxy, and his words served only to increase the rumors, doubt and suspicion already widespread over the reason for his long absence.

In a manifesto read Sunday, 12 November, by Heinrich Himmler, the home front director, and broadcast by German radio in connection with the swearing in of "millions" of newly-drafted members of his new People's Storm Army, Hitler explained his weeks of silence by saying that he was preparing and executing "measures necessary for a final victorious carrying out of this war."

There was no hint of a bid for peace in Hitler's speech unless his assertion that the Allies were fighting to destroy Germany was an implied invi-

tation to offer generous terms. He praised Japan as "our greatest Ally which has considered the struggle since the beginning as a decisive battle for existence and has since been fighting with bravery of real nation of heroes."

Promising victory under his leadership as "First German," he girded the Germans for a finish fight and promised to crush without mercy any enemies inside Germany. "If single elements of parties or classes which have been overcome are still of the opinion that the time has now possibly arrived for their resurrection, they will witness only the moment of their complete destruction," he said.

Himmler has assumed de facto control of all Reich affairs during the present disability of the Fuehrer, according to reports from Switzerland. Neutral sources also maintain that Hitler's disability resulted from a recent operation for the removal of a dangerous throat tumor.

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Soviets Seize Rail Lines to Budapest; Lull In East Prussia

The eastern front was quieter last week than it had been for months. Red Army troops were continuing their drive on the Hungarian capital of Budapest, but to the north in East Prussia and along the Vistula river the action was limited to artillery fire.

After a brief halt south of Budapest, Soviet forces wheeled to the east and launched a drive between the Tisza and Danube rivers. Moving north from captured Szekesfehervar, other Red Army men gained ground, while farther to the northeast the drive on Miskolc was pressed in an apparent attempt to capture the city, which is the fifth largest in the nation and the terminal point for the Budapest-Miskolc railway.

At week's end General Malinovsky had almost completed the job of cutting all the main railways to Budapest east of the Danube. His army had control of the four main lines to the capital's south, southeast, east-southeast, and northeast. Fresh German forces made repeated attempts to break the Russian grip on the Miskolc railway. They not only were repulsed but were forced to release two more stations.

ALL QUIET. The lull in fighting in East Prussia and between that province and Warsaw was called "the quiet before the storm" by a German commentator. Strength of the artillery barrage being laid down in those areas by Red Army gunners was proof in point.

Although in his speech last week (MAPTALK, 11 November) Premier Josef Stalin promised that the Red Army soon would collaborate with its Allies in "finishing off the Fascist beast

in his own lair," he remained suspiciously silent as to the immediate future, making predictions in only the vaguest of terms. But if the past history of the Red Army can be used to predict future operations, major action may begin at any time, as Soviet fighting men in the crucial areas and below Warsaw have had a long period to regroup and be resupplied.

Marshal Stalin cited the record of his but recently-ended offensive as indication of what the Germans might expect from the forthcoming one. During the summer drive the Red Army killed or captured 790,000 Germans and smashed 120 divisions of German soldiers or of their satellites.

Eighth Takes Forli

As snows of increasing severity blanketed the trans-peninsular Italian battle line, British Eighth Army forces captured Forli, an eastern Po valley town on the Rimini-Bologna highway and long a Fascist stronghold.

Attempting to push forward from the fallen city, the Allied troops met stiff resistance just outside Forli along the Ravaldino canal, where concentrations of German tanks and infantry were found in considerable strength.

Germans Introduce New Secret Weapon

Last week Germany introduced her long-touted secret weapon, V-2, directing it not only against Britain, but against Belgium and France as well.

Roughly similar to the better known V-1 robot bomb, the new terror weapon was given official recognition by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister declared "there is no need, however, to exaggerate the danger. The scale and effort of these attacks have not hitherto been significant."

The V-2 is evidently a rocket-powered weapon, shaped like a torpedo and about 40 feet long. It has

tall fins and leaves a trail of flame in its wake. Radio controlled, it carries a warhead in its nose and its range has been reported at from 200 to 300 miles.

On speed and altitude, the figures vary widely, but Prime Minister Churchill announced it could reach altitudes of 70 miles. Its speed has been variously reported at from 700 to more than 3000 miles per hour. Mr. Churchill said the rocket traveled at speeds faster than sound, which would be more than 700 miles per hour at ground level.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Chinese Outflank Burma Road Block

Chinese forces have crossed two rivers to outflank Bhamo, important north Burma base blocking the reopening of the Burma Road land route to China.

One force early this week crossed the Irrawaddy river and took Shwegu, halfway between Bhamo and Katha, to outflank the city from the west, while another column bridged the Taying river in the Myittha area and occupied Momauk, eight miles east. Situated at the confluence of the Irrawaddy and Taying rivers, Bhamo is significant as a communications center. A mountain road stretches from Bhamo to Lungling, in China, which was recently recaptured by Chinese, and a road and river connect it in the north with Myitkyina and Katha, which are now both in Allied hands.

Elsewhere in Burma British troops fighting along the Myitkyina-Mandalay rail route have made advances six miles south of Mawlu, while parallel progress by three British units driving along the Tiddim-Kalemyo road in the Kachin and Chinlwin valley of eastern Burma is reported.

Japs Claim Capture Of Liuchow, Kweilin, But Chinese Say No

For two consecutive days the Japanese have claimed capture of Liuchow and Kweilin, two Kwangsi province cities that have figured prominently in the defense of China, but China's communiques admit only that street fighting is heavy in Kweilin and that Liuchow has "remained unscathed."

The Chinese High Command has estimated that 350,000 Japanese have been tossed into the battle for the two cities and has indicated that a threat to Yungming was developing in the form of a Jap drive westward south of Liuchow. If the Japs were to take Yungming they would have only a 105-mile gap separating them from other Jap forces in Indo-China and would be in a position to establish their inland supply route from Manchuria to Singapore.

Whether the supply route from Manchuria to Hong Kong in the area of the West river has been unified has not been reported. Tips of the two pincers nipping off East China from the rest of the country were near this objective weeks ago.

Although badly handicapped through loss of air bases in southeastern China, the 14th Air Force has delivered a continuing series of stinging blows to the enemy forces in the Kwangsi area.

Less than 50 miles west of Liuchow the Japs have advanced to a point within six miles of Ishan, an important station on the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway. Direction and force of this drive indicate that the Japanese intention to invade Kweichow might be given priority over any plan to link with forces in Indo-China.

B-29s Raid Kyushu, Nanking, Shanghai

The systematic destruction of the Japanese' capacity to fight has begun in earnest. B-29 Superforts are now making regular raids against the Japanese homeland and strategic Jap-held ports and cities on the Chinese mainland and in Southeast Asia.

The heavy bombers, which carry a reported bombload six times that of the Fortress—possibly eighteen tons—this week again hit the Omura aircraft factory on Kyushu in Japan. Operating from China bases and flying through a sudden hurricane, the Superforts also dropped their bomb-

loads through clouds on the extensive dock and loading facilities at Nanking, seat of the Jap-controlled puppet government in China, and on the enemy military storage and transshipment facilities at the large port of Shanghai.

A 20th Air Force communique revealed for the first time that the Superforts are equipped with instruments which allow bombing through clouds. Such instruments have been in use in the European air war for a long while.

Fighter opposition against the B-29s was weak and anti-aircraft fire slight. One airplane failed to return from the raids, which were flown against "targets of vital importance to the Japanese war machine."

"PEACE MUST EMBRACE THE EARTH"

In his best-selling book "One World," in his campaign speeches, often in casual conversation, the late Wendell Willkie said a number of things that should be remembered. Some of his comments are reproduced here as a statement of what one American citizen thought we ought to be fighting for:

"When I say that peace must be planned on a world basis I mean quite literally that it must embrace the earth. Continents and oceans are plainly only parts of a whole, seen, as I have seen them from the air. England and America are parts. Russia and China, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, Iraq and Iran are also parts. And it is inescapable that there can be no peace for any part of the world unless the foundations of peace are made secure throughout all parts of the world."

"Our way of living together in America is a strong but delicate

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fabric. It is made up of many threads. It has been woven over many centuries by the patience and sacrifice of countless liberty-loving men and women. It serves as a cloak for the protection of poor and rich, of black and white, of Jew and gentile, of foreign and native born.

"Let us not tear it asunder. For no man knows, once it is destroyed, where or when man will find its protective warmth again."

"It has always impressed me, that quite apart from any reasons of humanitarianism or justice or any sentiment regarding the protection of the weak by the strong, it is only common sense to safeguard zealously the rights of minorities. For minorities are rich assets of a democracy, assets which no totalitarian government can afford. Dictatorships must, of necessity, fear and suppress them. But within the tolerance of a democracy minorities are the constant spring of new ideas, stimulating new thought... the constant source of new vigor."

Fall Guy: A Prisoner of War Sizes Up The Japanese GI

NOTE: This story, which first appeared in Counter-Intelligence Bulletin No. 42, was written by an American sergeant who, while a prisoner of war, served as a truck driver for the Japanese Army for 15 months. In order to preserve its honest realism, editing has occurred only where the limitations of space have required it. The views expressed are those of the writer, and are not necessarily those of the CIC or of MAPTALK.

Most of the Jap GIs are from the farms, and as a consequence have about a fourth grade education. They all can read and write. They are subject to conscription at the age of 21, but this can be deferred until 25 if they are attending school.

The training they undergo for the Army is probably the most brutal in any Army. This is to toughen them, so they claim. The Japs told me that many commit the honorable hara kiri during the training period because they can no longer stand the brutal punishment being meted out to them.

STUDY IN SADISM. Corporal punishment is practiced to the fullest extent. The soldier must stand at attention while he is being slapped or kicked by his superior. If he falls as a result of a blow, he must get up and resume the position of attention, and receive more punishment. I have personally seen these Japs beaten unconscious, and had to be carried to their quarters. On one occasion I watched a Jap captain kick a Jap GI in the testicles. (It did my heart good). Any man who outranks another has the right to administer this punishment, at any time, if he just thinks the other has done something not according to his fancy.

The lowest ranking Jap is a one star private, which means second class soldier. His life is the worst. He must

wash the other soldiers' clothes, cook their food, make their beds and their packs, plus any other dirty job that comes along. He is the constant butt of all jokes and the fall guy when anything goes wrong. After six months' service in the field he is automatically promoted to the rank of two star private, or first class soldier. His life is made a little more pleasant by the fact that he has now the right to beat on one star privates, which he proceeds to do so with gusto. But if there are no one star privates around he is still the sucker.

THE HUMAN FRAILTIES. The Jap GI is just like our own soldiers when it comes to bitching about chow and work. They have goldbricks and the usual run of boot lickers. The only difference is that they are very careful that their superiors do not hear the complaints.

The chow is no problem. The main dish being rice, which they get plenty of, plus perhaps a little meat or vegetable or fish. They are taught to live off the country they occupy as much as possible. When the troops are out on campaign they steal everything eatable. The dumbest soldier is always placed in the kitchen to do the cooking, so you can imagine the quality of the cuisine. No sanitary rules are observed, no self-respecting pig would be seen in a Jap GI kitchen. The food is then dished into cans or mess kits.

In garrisons the soldiers eat in their dormitory and the food is

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brought to them by the one and two star privates. They eat like pigs and throw everything on the floor. Incidentally, they eat on the floor also. In the field they cook their chow in their mess kits, and you can always spot one of their bivouac by the many fires they have going. The usual sucker is called to do this work also.

ORGANIZED BRAWLS. They are given cigarettes and beer and sake rations every month when available. They are also allowed to purchase these articles if they wish to have more. Every now and then the company will have a party for all the men and officers. They will all sit in a big circle and proceed to get plastered to the gills. The party usually ends up in a battle between some of the men, but it is quickly stopped. These parties are also held just before going into battle to pep the boys up. I have never seen any use of narcotics by the Jap GIs. If it is used, it is being done behind the scenes, and perhaps then only by the officers.

The Jap soldiers are taught that to die for their Emperor is the most glorious thing that can happen to them. They earn a place in the Yasuki Shrine, and are promoted one rank, but if the battle is big enough, he jumps two ranks (providing he is dead). The country yokels believe this line of crap, but the well educated city boys don't go for it. Many have told me they are looking strictly for "little Willie." But they all believe that if



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they surrender or are captured, they can never return to Japan. If they do, the people will kill them. Even the most highly educated ones believe this doctrine. This belief makes them the toughest soldier of all our enemies, because we must kill all of them.

The fear of corporal punishment is also one of the greatest factors in their performance in battle. Personally, I rate the Jap as a third class soldier as far as brains and ability to think for himself goes. I have met a few Japs that would be good soldiers in any man's army, but there are damn few.

Their clothes are made out of the cheapest cotton materials. It tears very easily. It is not an uncommon sight to see the Japs in uniforms so patched up that you can no longer recognize the original garment. They will wear any kind of clothes they find. Only on inspections must they wear the regular uniform.

JOY OF DYING. When a soldier dies in battle and they have time to get him back for cremation, they have quite a ceremony. No doubt to impress the others how wonderful it is to be dead (?) They will dig a large hole, about three feet by eight feet and fill it with wood. Then they will lay the body on top of this pile and place more wood and douse the whole mess with gasoline.

The whole company lines up dressed in their Sunday uniforms, and the commander makes a speech, but he talks to the stiff as if he were still alive. He tells what a great guy he was and what a wonderful thing he has done by getting himself killed, and then he promotes him (what a break). He then bows and the company comes to port arms with fixed bayonets. He throws a torch on the pyre. Each soldier files by the fire, bows, places ashes from one cup to another which sets on a little table in front of the pit.

After the fire has died out, they rake the ashes for any pieces of bone

that has not been consumed by the fire. This is placed into a little wooden box. It is handled very reverently. The box is bound up in a pure white cloth and one soldier carries it to the nearest headquarters. Everyone must salute the box from the General on down. The box is then sent home to the parents who are supposed to become mad with joy because they can place their son's ashes in the Yasuki Shrine.

ONLY SO FAR. Now to get back to the rest of the ashes. They are raked into a hole and buried. A nice mound is built over the grave and a wooden four by four pillar is placed over the grave like a tombstone with the soldier's name, rank and serial number and how he died. They fix the grave up very nicely, a little table is placed in front of the grave.

Every meal time food is placed on this table. Cakes, beer, fruits, and even cigarettes are also provided (the lucky stiff). But by nightfall only the rice and water remain. The other GIs don't mind the grave looking at the nice things they set on the table, but they aren't that too dumb to leave the stuff rot. They make sure nothing stays too long on the table.

Every morning and evening time the soldiers line up, face to the Emperor's palace, bow, say a prayer, and bow again. Most of the Japs are not religious, but they all carry a small pouch with religious matter tied to their belts. This is GI issue and they are all supposed to carry it. Outside of this pouch I have never seen or heard of any religious services being conducted by the Army, except at funerals.

The soldiers also sing songs when marching to battle. In garrison towns they will march around the streets in the evening singing army songs. This is probably done to impress the civilians. They also have exercises in the morning and evenings followed by a run of about a mile. Each soldier must know how to lead these exercises

and every day the leader is changed so they all get a chance at it.

ROTATION. The Jap GI is told that after he serves five years in the Army he will be allowed to return to Japan. I have seen groups of Japs leaving for home after their five years' service is up; they are happy and are tickled to death to get out of the war, (at least 80% of the Japs now think that this war is a pain and want to quit, but the only thing that holds them together is their policy of no surrender). The Jap GIs I have met during 1943 are definitely fed up with the war. They hate the tropics and long for their homeland. One told me that all the world leaders including Tojo should be put in a big cage, armed with clubs, and then fight it out while all the soldiers of the world watch.

The Japs are also taught that Americans will kill them if they try to surrender, but it seems to me that this is not the reason why they will not surrender, but the reasons mentioned before. The city Japs are pro-American because of our American films. They all have their favorite movie stars, Clark Gable and Deanna Durbin being most frequently mentioned. They were amazed when I would tell them of the things you could buy in America. Of course the country yokels wouldn't believe it, but the boys from the city were all ears.

The first bunch of Japs were sure they were going to America, but before they left in November, 1942, for SWPA they were talking of a 100-year war, and believing it.

JIG IS UP. The last bunch of Japs I was with had their doubts about winning the war. Several Jap civilians told me that the jig was up for Japan. They were worried about their own lives because if the Jap Army pulls out and leaves them behind the civilians in the occupied areas will massacre them.

The Jap GI is brutal because it is beat into him to be that way. The Japs are poor marksmen, and rely mostly on their automatic rifle and

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small grenade thrower for success. They have the guts to run into fire, but I have witnessed several charges where the men were a little reluctant about following the officers. One time in particular, the officer, after yelling for a charge, advanced a couple of hundred yards only to find himself alone. He went back and after working his boys over, they charged. (There were only three of the enemy shooting at them). This officer has since been promoted. (That is, the hard way, in a Jap shrine).

They are trained and trained in bayonet fighting. They only have one stroke and that is the thrust. They have bayonet practice on bags in the same manner as we do, but also they are taught to yell bloody murder, to frighten the enemy. If they don't yell, they are in for a swing session, and how.

They also match two soldiers up with wooden guns the same length as a rifle with fixed bayonets. The soldiers are protected by a head and face mask and pads over their chests. The object of this exercise is to learn the art of parrying and thrust. When you touch your opponent, you must also yell like hell. I guess if the bayonet wound don't kill him the yell will scare the enemy to death (or is supposed to). Wrestling is also taught, but most of the Japs aren't very good at this sport. They also have kendo. This is the game where they beat one another with bamboo clubs. They have Jap moving pictures, propaganda showing their early victories, also old American movies. The Japs go wild when they see a good American musical comedy with singing and dancing in it.

HABITS ON LEAVE. In garrison towns they are allowed to go into the town about once a week on pass. They have army clubs for them, where they can buy chow or hear music. There are plenty of native girls there to wait on them and talk to them. The Jap army have their own prostitute houses, which are inspected by them,

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but they are generally inadequate to handle the rush of business.

The soldiers pick up the usual run of street walkers and get the usual run of the clap and syph and other venereal diseases. But when a Jap GI turns in with a venereal ailment he gets a good beating and loses what few privileges are allowed to him. As a consequence of this they try to doctor themselves or go to civilian doctors and drug stores. Many of them are infected. Short arm inspection is held only on rare occasions, in fact, I only heard of one such inspection in all my stay with them.

MALARIA PROBLEM. Each company has a first aid man who takes care of most of their malaria and other ailments. When a soldier is really bad he may get a break and get into a hospital. Malaria is taking a heavy toll of their personnel because of their method of sleeping from four to six men under one mosquito net. The nets come in various sizes, but only the officers get individual nets. They have sufficient quantities of quinine, but the soldiers don't follow the instructions on how to take it. Most of them throw it away. Many of them complained to me about their method of sleeping so many under one mosquito net. They were smart enough to realize the main factor of such a high rate of malaria.

They are definitely home loving boys and are very proud of their mother country. The ambition of every Jap is to conquer the world so they can be the master race. The Jap soldiers told me they would take on Russia after they beat us and then they would tackle Germany.

IN ALL SIZES. The average height of a Jap is about 5 feet 4 inches. But I have seen plenty of big Japs over six foot. Some are black as the ace of spades, and I have seen some that looked as white as we are. They have plenty of breeds in there, that is, half Jap, half German, or mixed with Russian or other European blood.

The first group of Jap soldiers I came in contact with were veterans of

from three to five years service in the China Incident. They fought in north China. A great majority of their officers could speak English.

The GI has nothing but praise for the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldiers. What impressed the Japs most was the way the Chinese many times would charge at the Japs with nothing but long swords. The Japs complained that no matter where they bivouaced the Chinese somehow managed to make their life unbearable.

The only non-Jap soldiers I have ever seen are some Formosans, who wore the regular Jap's uniform but were considered as work troops. I have never once seen or heard of a Korean soldier with them. In fact they consider it an insult to be called a Korean (I found this out the hard way). They have some Chinese soldiers with them, but they were born and raised in Japan and are considered as Japanese as the rest of the soldiers.

The Jap officers fare not much better than the enlisted men, that is, the low ranking officers. Their food is the same, only they will fix it fancy for the officers' mess, but it is the same crap that the others eat with a ribbon on. The high ranking officers eat and live like kings. You can always tell a Jap officer in the field by his saber. Non-commissioned officers also may carry sabers, but when in field most of the NCOs carry rifles.

The favorite Jap tactics are night surprise attacks. They are taught to move silently at night and not to shoot back when fired on at night during a surprise attack until the order is given. This is done perhaps to make the guards who shot to think they made a mistake.

INTER-ARMY FRICTION. The Japs have no love for each other.

They call other regiments cowards and old women and all claim that they are the best in the whole Jap Army, and the rest are a bunch of saps. One truck company won't help the other unless forced to do so by a ranking officer. They will lie about not having parts for the trucks. They steal and sell to the civilians anything that they can sell and make money. Their wage scale is probably the lowest of any army in the world. The lowest soldier gets three yen a month in Japan; in the field he gets the equivalent of about five dollars a month. But he can't buy much in the occupied areas because prices have increased on most things about two thousand per cent.

In conclusion, I would say that the Jap GI is definitely behind the eight ball, but definitely.

P.S. We have all heard so much about the cleanliness of the Japs, so I believe it would be interesting to relate how the Japs in garrison life bathe themselves.

They will get a couple of empty gasoline drums and cut the tops out, then they fill them both with water. Under one they will build a fire to heat the water. They really love to bathe in hot water. The other drum is filled with cold water. They place a wooden platform next to the drums so you won't get your feet muddy. When the hot water is at the right temperature, the highest ranking officer is informed and he will proceed to take a bath. He finishes the bath by soaking for a few minutes in the hot water, and then rinses off with cold water. By the time the Jap sack gets to take a bath the water is slightly soiled to say the least. About 30 to 40 men will take a bath in the same hot water. And the lower the rank the longer he waits.



ARMY TALK In Global War Lend-Lease Is a Potent Weapon

Note to I & E Officers: This week's Army Talk deals with one of our most successful weapons—Lend-Lease. The three big points to make are: 1. Lend-Lease kills Fascists by putting the necessary weapons and supplies at the proper place at the proper time; 2. Lend-Lease works two ways. By "reverse" Lend-Lease Great Britain, for example, is giving us almost as great a per cent of her war budget as we give her; other United Nations are doing the same; 3. Lend-Lease decisions are guided by our chiefs of staff. War materials are sent to other countries so that our allies can deliver the goods for us to their final destinations—Germany and Japan.

A YOUNG FRENCHMAN fires an American-made rifle and there's one less Fascist to kill a Yank. That's Lend-Lease.

A soldier sits down in New Guinea and helps himself to some pretty good tasting Australian beef. That's Lend-Lease, too. We call that phase of it "reverse" Lend-Lease.

A Red Air Force Ace flies his P-39 along the deck, strafes a Nazi convoy and there are five enemy trucks the AAF doesn't have to worry about. That's Lend-Lease.

An American merchant ship, torpedoed on its latest run across the Atlantic, lies in Liverpool while it is repaired by British workers. That's Lend-Lease.

Yes, that's Lend-Lease, a giant system of pooling United Nation resources with only one objective in mind—defeating the enemy as soon as possible. And it works. It works so successfully that when the act was extended this year by Congress to run until July 1, 1945, there was only one dissenting vote in the Senate and 21 in the House of Representatives.

Neighbor's House Aflame

On December 17, 1940, almost one year before Pearl Harbor, the President posed a question to the reporters attending his press conference:

"Suppose," he said, "my neighbor's house catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out the fire. Now what do I do? I don't say to him before that operation, 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me fifteen dollars; you have to pay me fifteen dollars for it.'"

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No, when such an emergency arises neighbors don't haggle over the price of equipment—they get the hose to work immediately.

(Question: What has all this business of a neighbor's house on fire and a hose got to do with Lend-Lease?)

It was comparing a small neighborhood fire to the world conflagration which had started in Manchuria in 1931 and had swept down the avenue of nations because each neighbor failed to help the next. It was comparing the neighbor's hose with American production which our neighbors needed if they were to stop the fire threatening not only their homes and their way of life, but also our homes and our American way of life.

That was the first public announcement of the Lend-Lease concept. On March 11, 1941, Lend-Lease became law as "An Act To Promote The Defense of the United States."

(Question: What help had we been giving the Allies before Lend-Lease? Why wasn't that enough?)

When Hitler's Panzers smashed through Poland in 1939, France and Great Britain declared war on Germany. Immediately we proclaimed the neutrality of the United States and placed an embargo on all shipments of arms to any of the belligerent nations. The Neutrality Act required such action; many of us in America had not yet realized the threat to us.

Cash-And-Carry Came Next

Then Congress met in special session to reconsider the arms embargo. Out of that meeting, on November 4, 1939, came "cash-and-carry"—a system by which warring nations could buy our goods and carry them to Europe so long as they could furnish their own ships.

The British and French established purchasing commissions here and the signing of multi-million dollar contracts with American manufacturers not only helped support their forces, but initiated our present production program. Three times as many orders

FOR THE BENEFIT OF U.S.

The law commonly called the Lend-Lease Act is officially titled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States." The words "Lend-Lease" are used in the text of the Act where it authorizes the President, "in the interest of national defense . . . to sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of" defense articles to the government of any country whose defense he deems "vital to the defense of the United States."

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were placed for planes by the French and British in the first half of 1940 as in all of 1939.

Dunkirk came, and we aided the saved but weaponless British army not only by our immediate production but by selling them part of our Army and Navy stocks of World War I rifles and equipment.

In September of 1940, we swapped 50 of our old four-stack destroyers for 99-year leases on naval and air bases stretching from Newfoundland to British Guiana. The exchange was mutually advantageous. The destroyers were just what the British needed to fight the U-boats and the bases were an important addition to our line of defenses.

Britain's War Chest Gone

By producing these goods and making these agreements we were not only supplying the Allies with war materials but "most important of all was the promise implicit in these shipments—that America saw in Britain's imminent danger the imminence of danger to herself," according to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., first Lend-Lease Administrator and now Under-Secretary of State.

When in December, 1940, Britain's war chest of dollars was almost exhausted, Cash-and-Carry no longer worked. If Britain fell, we realized that our country was wide open to possible attack. It was time for Lend-Lease.

(Question: How did Lend-Lease face the fact that those resisting aggression no longer had enough money?)

Lend-Lease would eliminate the dollar sign from the problem of getting war supplies to nations whose continued resistance shielded us from possible attack.

How Lend-Lease Works

In 1941 our factories were turning out munitions and planes and guns, some of which were bought by our Army and Navy, and some by the nations defying Hitler. The way things looked then, it was evident that they would soon be unable to buy any more supplies. Their funds were too low.

Once Lend-Lease was passed, the United States government placed contracts for practically all war materials manufactured here and we began to pay for all of them ourselves.

Since then, when they come off the production line, our military chiefs have decided where the materials can be used best for our purposes—here at home or fighting on the front of a country whose existence is deemed necessary for the defense of the United States. If for military reasons it is decided that the supplies will do us the

most good in the hands of one of our fighting Allies, we send them there. We became the great arsenal of democracy.

(Question: How much Lend-Lease have we furnished?)

From the time it began until the most recent Lend-Lease report was published on June 30 of this year, Lend-Lease aid amounted to \$28,270,000,000. The United States has put into Lend-Lease about fifteen cents out of every dollar's worth of our war expenditure.

At first the flow of Lend-Lease material from this country was merely a trickle in comparison to the needs of total war. But where it did pay off in a hurry was in supplying food needed so badly in order to keep fighting.

For example, during peace-time Britain had to import two pounds of food for each one it produced. Under war conditions, the food situation became a bitter problem. Between April 16 and December 25, 1941 our Lend-Lease food shipments to Britain meant their having enough to eat so that production and combat efficiency could be maintained.

We have sent all kinds of munitions as well as raw materials and tools for the production of more munitions. We have sent medical supplies, tanks, fire-fighting equipment, planes, tractors and supply trucks. Forty-three per cent of all the Lend-Lease material we have exported has gone to the United Kingdom.

Joint-Operations

British and American planning, troops, and supplies pooled together in a common operation have paid off in the Middle East, in Africa, and in France.

When our 700-ship invasion fleet approached French North Africa on October 24, 1942, it was made up of men, equipment, and ships of the two great nations. One entire United States division was equipped with British 25-pounders instead of American artillery, and several American fighter squadrons flew British Spitfires.

General Eisenhower said of Lend-Lease, "I've found that it works."

(Question: How about Russia, does she get Lend-Lease?)

Even with its own desperate shortages, Britain stripped herself even further by giving weapons to the Soviet Union after Germany pointed its blitzkrieg toward Moscow. Like us, Britain saw that her precious tanks would kill more Nazi enemies at that time in Red Army hands. It was common sense.

The U.S.S.R., China and 45 other nations receive Lend-Lease materials from us. U.S.S.R. receives 28 per cent. of all our Lend-Lease materials. In fact the event which had the greatest effect

upon the planning of the administration of the Lend-Lease program was the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union.

On October 30, 1941, when the Battle for Moscow was at its height, the President cabled Premier Stalin, "I have ordered that as far as possible the delivery of raw materials be expedited. In an effort to obviate any financial difficulties immediate arrangements are to be made so that supplies up to one billion dollars in value may be effected under the Lend-Lease Act."

And things were expedited. One day in 1941, when Russia cabled desperately for 4,000 tons of heavy barbed wire, we could find only 700 tons. With production records set by our workers, we loaded the 4,000 tons aboard a convoy which sailed only 10 days later. Experts shook their heads in amazement.

Since 1941, and in increasing quantities, the Red Air Force has delivered our bombs on Nazi concentrations; the Red Army has killed Nazis with our tanks; engineered our locomotives; and increased its production of weapons by using machine tools we sent to the Soviet Interior. When our experts agreed that it would be more efficient to send Russia a complete tire factory instead of having the Soviet's ship synthetic rubber here and have us send the tires back, we dismantled and sent the Russians one of the Ford plants.

Reverse Lend-Lease

America's vast production machine, through Lend-Lease, has contributed mightily to our combined efforts to destroy the military strength of the Axis. But Lend-Lease is not one way traffic.


(Question: What have we been given through reverse Lend-Lease?)

In dollars and cents our allies have not contributed to Lend-Lease nearly so much as we have. While we have devoted more than 28 billion dollars to the plan, they have given us some 3 billion dollars of Reverse Lend-Lease supplies and services.

Under the Lend-Lease concept there is nothing wrong with that difference, for while we were giving our production goods in order to

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DISTRIBUTION OF LEND-LEASE EXPORTS BY AREA OF DESTINATION MARCH 1941-JUNE 1944



win the war, our Allies were sacrificing in the form of wounded and dead, and land laid waste.

Such contributions cannot be measured in dollars. On the other hand, our allied United Nations have given what they had in rough proportion to our Lend-Lease help. They simply did not have so much as we did.

The greatest part of the cost of maintaining and training the American Army in Australia and in Britain was provided by those countries. Food, medicine, airplanes, airfields, barracks, hospitals, rest centers, PX supplies, ammunition dumps, and repair depots are but a few of the items given to us.

During the final few weeks before the invasion of Europe, entire sections of British industry were devoted to nothing else but the vital job of water proofing American wading tanks as well as trucks and other mechanized equipment so they would reach the invasion beaches in fighting condition.

When we needed anti-aircraft guns after Pearl Harbor to prevent any possible attack on our homeland, the British sent us factory machinery to make them, just as we have sent them machines and machine tools. So wide is the scope of the Reverse Lend-Lease that one United States Naval base in England operated a full year without making a single cash payment.

Over 90 per cent of all the food consumed by the American forces in the South and Southwest Pacific is provided by Australia and New Zealand without cost to us.

(Question: Have Russia and China been able to give us any Reverse Lend-Lease?)

Even Russia and China, which have suffered such tremendous battle losses, have been able to supply us with reverse Lend-Lease equipment in addition to their immeasurable contributions on the battlefield. We have obtained supplies and repairs for our merchant ships in Soviet ports. Bases, equipment, and services needed for our shuttle-bombers were made available by the Russians. China has provided tremendous airfields from which our B-29 Superfortresses take off to raid Japan and gave us its own P-40s, when our Fourteenth Air Force took the place of the Flying Tigers.

We must remember, too, that the Russians have given us more dead or captured Fascists than all of the other United Nations put together. They have destroyed or captured 90,000 Nazi cannons, 70,000 tanks, and 60,000 aircraft. These men and materials will never kill Americans, will never threaten American homes.

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Lend-Lease Secret Ideas

Long before Pearl Harbor, Britain gave the United States the results of her engineering and research in new weapons. Much of this information consisted of closely guarded secrets. For example, rockets based on British design are now being used by American forces against the Japanese; a British-developed radio set is built into American tanks made for Britain and Russia, and much of the development of our radar equipment is based on British experiments.

Only the other day, when the British lifted the secrecy from their new Spitfire model, which is capable of fighting at 40,000 feet, it was also announced that details of the design were given to the United States authorities under Reverse Lend-Lease. Watch for this plane as activity in the Pacific and China becomes intensified.

(Question: What will be the post-war results of Lend-Lease?)

It is obvious that Lend-Lease was a big factor in preventing the possibility of our losing the war, and it undoubtedly will hasten our victory by many, many days. What this means to each of us is indicated by the fact that on the last day of the war in 1918 there were 2,311 American casualties.

As a weapon of war, Lend-Lease has proved itself. Any advantages we secure after the war as a result of Lend-Lease will be sheer gravy.

We attached no strings to the fighting material which we sent to the fronts on which our Allies were killing our enemies. No definite repayment fees were established except that any intact materials we want will be returned, and the broad provision of Section 3b: "...the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory."

Additional Benefits

Certain benefits seem probable. Among them is a spirit of good will toward the United States which will be beyond price in the difficult years ahead as a desolated world rebuilds. While we were helping ourselves, we also helped the freedom-loving nations of the globe in their hour of greatest need.

Even more tangible is the method by which this mutual aid in mutual self-interest was conducted. Through actual usage under stress, we and the nations "vital to the defense of the United States" have learned how efficiently international machinery can be worked for the good of all. This demonstrated unity of purpose and action can pay large dividends when we sit down at conference

TOWARD FOUR FREEDOMS

The Master Agreements signed by Lend-Lease nations provide that we and they "...are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations."

Article 7 of the Master Agreements provides that settlements will "...promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and (name of country), open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration (Atlantic Charter) made on August 12, 1941..."

tables to shape the international structures designed to stand against a future possibility of war.

Most of us have come to realize that so dreary a term as "international trade" is something that has a real and personal meaning to each of us in terms of jobs and pay-checks and bank accounts. As a result of Lend-Lease, it is probable that better trade agreements between us and other nations may be facilitated, resulting in better living for each of us. As a by-product of Lend-Lease, although not one of its purposes, people of all climes and color have learned what America's products can do. Their demand for such products is life-blood to our economic structure, and maintenance of such demand is a big step toward realizing the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter.

These are extra benefits which can be expected. Even if we should gain none of them, we would still have full value from Lend-Lease as one of our most successful weapons against the Axis.



Q. Is Poland one of the Balkan nations?

A. No. The Balkan nations are Greece, Albania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

Q. The following men were important in Philippine history: (a) Manuel Quezon, (b) William Howard Taft, (c) George Dewey, (d) Emilio Aguinaldo. Who were they?

A. (a) Ex-President of the Philippines, who died recently in the United States; (b) first Governor General of the Philippines; (c) Admiral of the U.S. fleet that fought the Spanish in the Philippines in 1898; (d) Filipino revolutionary who fought against the Spanish and Americans in the Eighteen Nineties and early Nineteen Hundreds.

Q. When did a Russian army last invade Hungary?

A. In 1848. Hungary had revolted against the Austrian crown and Russian troops invaded the country to help suppress the revolution.

Q. What is the bombload carried by a B-29?

A. About 18 tons. The War Department recently revealed that the Superfort carried a bombload six times that of a B-17, whose standard load is three tons.

Q. In what town did the Germans recently make the first formal surrender of German arms on German soil to foreign invaders since the Napoleonic Wars?

A. Aachen.

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Q. List the following great sea battles in the chronological order in which they happened. The Battle of Trafalgar, the Battle of Midway, Battle of the Nile, and the Battle of Manila.

A. 1. Battle of the Nile (1798); 2. Battle of Trafalgar (1805); 3. Battle of Manila (1898); 4. Battle of Midway (4 June to 6 June, 1942).

Q. How many of the following cities are not seaports? Berlin, Marseilles, Sevastopol, Madrid, Brussels, and Bombay.

A. Three. Brussels, Berlin, and Madrid are not seaports. They are all located inland. Only seaports in the above list are Marseilles, on the Mediterranean in southern France, Sevastopol, the famous Russian naval base on the Black Sea, and Bombay, India, located on the Arabian Sea.

Q. How many Japanese have been bypassed by Southwest Pacific operations?

A. Some quarter of a million Japanese troops in New Guinea, New Britain, Solomons, New Ireland, and the lesser islands of the Dutch East Indies are believed to have been bypassed as a result of operations through Morotai. In his first communique announcing the Leyte invasion, released to the press on 20 October, General MacArthur indicated a half million more would be bypassed as the Philippines campaign progressed.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2. No. 21 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 25 NOV., 1944

RESTRICTED

Japs Have Lost Nearly 50,000 Men On Leyte

General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the "Tiger of Malaya," recently appointed Supreme Commander of Japanese Army Forces in the Philippines, last week directed an order of the day to his troops defending the Ormoc Corridor on Leyte Island.

"The Japanese forces on this island are shouldering the destiny of the Japanese Empire," he stated. "The opportunity to strike has arrived and victory must be ours wherever we advance. Without victory on land there will be no victory on sea or in the air. We will not return alive without recapturing the enemy or launch death defying attacks."

FATE OF THE WORLD. Despite its confused sequel, Yamashita's order was clear enough. The situation for Japan was serious. It was imperative that she retain control of the Philippines. In the battle of Leyte, on the outcome of which Domei said depended "the fate of the world," there would be no retreat and no surrender. True to the Samurai tradition, Japanese soldiers would be expected to win or die.

Last week Japanese soldiers were dying. General MacArthur's head-

quarters, reviewing casualties for the first month of the Leyte operation, reported they were dying at the rate of at least 1000 a day.

TEN TO ONE. From 20 October to 20 November the Japs are conservatively estimated to have lost 45,000 troops on Leyte, 10,000 of whom were wiped out in the last ten days of that period. This does not include the 8,000 who drowned in Ormoc Bay after the convoy sinking on 10 November, nor perhaps thousands of victims of other Allied air and sea bombardment.

These figures mean simply that Yamashita has lost not only the 35,000 troops of the 16th Division who made up the original Leyte garrison, but almost one-third of their replacements. Number of the remaining defenders in the Ormoc pocket therefore would be about 25,000.

GHQ further revealed that American casualties during the month were scarcely one-tenth those of the enemy: 1,138 killed, 126 missing, 4,432 wounded, total 5,691. For this gratifyingly satisfactory ratio General MacArthur credited the Long Tom (range 14½ miles) artillery pieces which have brought the entire Yamashita line under fire without the possibility of retaliation, and the success of infantrymen in bypassing and enveloping enemy strongpoints.

"Tactically the enemy has been completely surprised by these methods," according to the communique, "which have resulted not only in success, but in the minimum possible loss of life."

COMPRESSION. Against those 25,000 remaining Japanese troops (of

the 1st and 26th Divisions) five American divisions last week were engaged in a maneuver of double envelopment. The fighting was as mean as a combination of typhoons, mountains, and "death-defying" Japs could make it, but not once did American troops lose the initiative.

In the vicinity of Limon township, some four and a half miles south of Carigara Bay, and in the rain-drenched ridges flanking Highway Two to Ormoc, elements of the First Japanese Division continued to hold out fiercely. Closing in on them, however, were units of the 24th Division from the north; other units of the 24th with men of the 1st Cavalry Division from the east; and fresh troops of the 32nd Division from the west.

TRAPPED. Fate of the Japanese defenders was sure by week's end. In a shore-to-shore movement units of the 24th skipped to a point west of Pinamopan and began to inch their way down the west side of the highway in a flanking drive. At the village of Tolibaw, 18 miles north of Ormoc and two and a half miles southeast of Limon, they wheeled, cut across the highway, set up a road block.

Two miles southeast of Tolibaw men of the First Cavalry moved down the slopes of Mount Catabaran and pressed westward toward a junction with the 24th. Probing to the east and north, other Cavalrymen knifed their way through rugged, roadless wilderness to seize Mount Mamban and two other dominating peaks.

Entry of the 32nd Division into the action was disclosed Saturday, 18 November, with the announcement that a deep wedge had been driven into isolated Japanese positions north of Limon. The 32nd, which two years ago at Buna was the first U.S. outfit in the Southwest Pacific to beat the Japs at their own jungle game, passed through lines held by the 24th in order to make the assault.

NOOSE TIGHTENS. The Japs also felt the pressure from two other

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sectors. In Central Leyte, west of Dagami, 96th Division troops were spreading out like a giant fan, moving west and southwest from Jaro toward Ormoc. Farther south forward elements of the Seventh Division, advancing along a coastal highway from Baybay, reached the village of Balogo, ten miles below Ormoc, a position they held in the face of constant counterattacks.

Thus from these four pressure points—north, west, east, and south—American forces were slowly tightening the tourniquet around the Ormoc Corridor, heartstream feeding the Yamashita Line.

NATURE FAVORS DEFENSE. There was no minimizing the character of Japanese resistance. The Japs were fighting a smart war and they were well supported.

Battle lines were fluid. In attacks and counterattacks through the hills near the northern salient, sometimes small formations of both Japanese and Americans would be cut off. The difference was that American troops, supplied by parachute, always managed to fight their way out.

Rushing urgent supplies to their trapped forward troops, the Japs kept pounding at the road block with artillery and light tanks, were thrown back each time. Other relief columns were repulsed in bitter fighting west of the highway. To help their ground troops on Monday, they sent over 20 dive-bombers with fighter escort.

Nature was as much an enemy as the Japs. A roaring typhoon brought torrential rains, flooded waterways, disrupted communications, washed away bridges. "The rugged terrain of the mountain pass," pointed out General MacArthur's communique, "ideally suited to defense, compels time in consuming piecemeal the destruction of enemy pillboxes, entrenchments and pockets of resistance in order to minimize our losses."

Sizing up the situation, a spokesman for the 32nd Division was reminded of some stout Japanese defenses met in

earlier campaigns. The only way to reduce the Limon strongpoint, he said, was for the infantry to get into close quarters and root out the enemy. And the 32nd meant to do it.

AIR WAR. Throughout the week, whenever the weather lifted, Leyte-based bombers and fighters swept over the Japanese positions. Thunderbolts on Tuesday, 14 November, blew up dozens of trucks in a motor pool at Valencia, next day knocked out 30 barges on a four-mile coastal stretch from Ormoc to Ipil. Liberators went after Palompon, the port town on Leyte's west coast which the Japs have been using as an auxiliary loading point for supplies to Ormoc. Bridges, supply dumps, two luggers were listed among the demolition.

Japanese airdromes in the central and southern Philippines—the Bacolod drome on Negros and the Lahug and Opon fields at Cebu in particular—were hit regularly, getting an average bombload of some 60-odd tons.

South and west of the Philippines General Kenney's bombers maintained their persistent raids on Celebes and Borneo. Flying 800 miles to the enemy's naval base at Brunel Bay on Borneo, the heavyweights scored five direct hits on a battleship and four on a heavy cruiser. Sometime later over Tarakan and Sandakan they sank two freighters of 1000 and 3000 tons.

NAVY HITS A LICK. While land-based planes took care of points south, carrier planes from the Third Fleet were active against Japanese installations in the Manila Bay area of Luzon.

Striking in successive waves throughout Monday, 13 November, carrier groups under command of Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman badly damaged one enemy light cruiser, wrecked two destroyers, sank or set afire an estimated eleven cargo ships and tankers. Considerable damage also was inflicted upon docks in Manila Bay and Cavite navy yards.

In addition, 18 of 20 enemy fighters seeking interception were destroyed

over Luzon, and another ten were brought down near the launching area. Between 130 and 140 single and twin-engined Jap aircraft were strafed on Legaspi, Manila and Clark airfields.

In a later mass attack on Saturday carrier aircraft wiped out at least 100 more Jap planes and destroyed three cargo ships. This time there was lighter fighter opposition. Ten Jap planes were shot down in combat and an additional eight were destroyed near the carriers.

According to an official Pearl Harbor dispatch, such raids over the Manila area during the past six weeks have destroyed 845 Japanese planes and sunk or damaged 134 ships.

Navy pilots returning from Saturday's raid said that Manila Bay had become a veritable graveyard for Jap shipping. Out of 81 ships in Manila Bay only three large and one medium were fully surfaced or on an even keel, and the breakwater at Manila and Cavite contained only submerged and settled ships.

No More Listening

American forces landed on two pinpoint island groups north of Dutch New Guinea last week in a protective move aimed at eliminating Japanese coast watchers and warning stations.

First island taken was Pegan in the Mapia group, 145 miles northwest of Biak. Going ashore after two days' preliminary air bombardment, assault troops won an almost bloodless battle. Thirteen Japs committed suicide with hand grenades on their approach; the rest fled to nearby Bras Island, where they were subsequently wiped out by Allied troops in pursuit. To extend control of the group, the Americans then seized a third Mapia island called Fanildo.

Almost simultaneous with the landing on Pegan other U.S. forces occupied the Asia Islands to the west, some 130 miles north of Sorong.

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Navy Says Japs Still Don't Know What Hit Them in Sea Battle

Probably not until the war itself is over will the complete story of the Second Battle of the Philippines Sea be told, but last week the Navy Department released a 2300-word recapitulation that was as thorough as the interests of military security would permit.

Pointing out that it "may turn out to be among the decisive battles of modern time," the communique disclosed that the action took place over 1000 square miles of ocean during four days between 22 and 27 October; that the U.S. victory not only guaranteed the continued flow of men and munitions to SWPA forces on Leyte but "its magnitude can be said to have greatly reduced future casualties in both men and waterborne equipment . . . The Japanese are still wondering what hit them."

NO NEW ASSESSMENT. Reviewing the three engagements which made up the battle (MAPTALK, 4 November), the communique made no attempt to assess enemy losses beyond the 58 warships sunk or damaged as originally reported. Names of the five American ships lost with the 10,000-ton carrier Princeton were revealed for the first time, however. These were the 4000-ton escort carriers Gambler and Saint Lo, the destroyers Johnson and Hoel, and the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts. Loss of several lesser and unidentified craft also was acknowledged.

The engagement didn't just happen, the report emphasized. "It was preceded by a series of other actions which fell into a definite strategic pattern."

WHAT WENT BEFORE. "The preliminaries to the showdown battle

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opened with landings on Peleliu and Morotai islands on 15 September which in turn were preceded by a fortnight's feints and thrusts by Admiral Mitscher's Third Fleet carrier task force, which kept the Japanese forces off balance and at the same time whittled down their aerial strength by some 900 planes.

"These successes indicated the feasibility of advancing the date of the invasion of the Philippines; and therefore 20 October was set by General MacArthur in consultation with Admiral Nimitz and with the approval of the High Command."

THE GAIN. From the Navy's official statement emerged certain well-defined strategic gains for the Allies in the Pacific and a clue to the nature of the next move against Japan.

With such a crippling blow handed out to the Japanese navy, the United States fleet now can roam virtually at will in the South China Sea. Success of the Philippines ground campaign will assure the complete separation of Japan's southern empire from the homeland. Allied sea and air power thus may soon deny Japan the use of Singapore as base for part of her fleet; without protection, her merchant ships will no longer be able to ply between Japan and Indo-China, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies.

Great Allied pincers are now closing in on Japan's southern empire, with the British forces that struck Nicobar Islands last month forming the western jaw. In time both jaws will close on Malaya and the Indies, clamping down not only on Japanese garrisons but on these valuable sources of rubber, tin, and oil that were lost early in 1942.

Quasi-official Washington last week was looking to a new landing soon, either on the China coast where Admiral Nimitz has so often said he would land, or on Formosa—or on both.

On the other end of the pincers, recent air and naval bombardment of Singapore and Sumatra pointed to a forthcoming drive against Malaya.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Allies Launch Push That May Be Final Bout For Germany

The Germans, who like to let their opponents develop an attack until they can make out exactly what is in the wind and then crush it with deftly handled reserves, were confronted with a baffling multiplicity of actions this week.

Allied offensive operations materialized from Holland down to the neighborhood of the Swiss frontier. Just how they were inter-related and which represented the most immediate and gravest peril did not become apparent. The vigor of the action and its scope, however, left no doubt that the Allies had raised the curtain on another very big show.

Most dramatic of the week's events was an attack by the United States Ninth Army that came simultaneously with the revelation that it had taken its place in the line. On 16 November the Ninth drove out of the frozen marshes of southeastern Holland and across the German frontier to assume a sector of operations between the British Second Army and the United States First Army. It was last reported to have been in the vicinity of Brest. By Tuesday, 21 November, the Ninth had penetrated the Siegfried Line to a depth of more than four miles, advancing to the Wurm area northeast of Gellenkirchen, captured earlier in the drive, and converging in three columns on Julich, strongpoint in the Roer River Line.

FIRST PUSHES OUT. An hour and a quarter before the Ninth threw its

surprise punch, the First also launched a new attack in the region east of Aachen. Its sector is to the south of the Ninth's on the latter's right. As the Ninth threatened Julich, the First drove forward, penetrating into Eschweiler.

Preceding these assaults some 5000 Allied aircraft, including 1200 Liberators and Fortresses, loosed a bombardment upon enemy strongpoints. A feature of this phase of the action was the demarcation of targets. Bombardiers obtained their guidance from such variegated devices as ground panels, smoke shells, barrage balloons, and colored flak.

Massed artillery also hammered at enemy positions, with some batteries smothering enemy antiaircraft guns well to the German rear.

ALL ALONG LINE. Meanwhile the United States Third Army's assault on Metz continued with great intensity, and not long before the Ninth and First Army offensives were begun the British Second Army and French First Army started to press forward.

The Third either took or bypassed a number of forts that ring Metz and proceeded to envelop it. By Sunday, 19 November, streams of tanks and infantrymen had poured across the Moselle river into Metz from the north and southwest, and a considerable part of the city was reported cleared. Fierce resistance still came from a ragged band of German people's army troops, most of them dressed in what once had been mufti, who fought from behind street barricades and stone buildings. Eleven Allied divisions were engaged in mopping up Metz and pursuing the Germans in retreat to the northeast. On Monday all organized resistance in Metz was crushed.

Meanwhile, the Third maintained its blistering pressure east, northeast, and southeast of Metz, advancing into the Saar basin within a mile of the Saar River, entering reversed Maginot Line fortifications at Faulquemont, 21 miles east of Metz, and Pontpierre, 2 miles farther east, and battering to

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within 12 miles of the Reich border city of Saarbrücken.

Further north the Third harassed the Germans with a second operation. Its Moselle river bridgehead in the Thionville area was expanded to a breadth of about 14 miles, and American armor had been passed over the Trean and put into action east of it.

BELFORT NEARER. On the extreme southern flank of the line the French First Army completed a spectacular 28-mile advance, bypassing Belfort, and reaching the Rhine, and Allied troops poured through the Belfort Gap exploiting the breakthrough. The French First Army Tuesday was trading artillery blows with the Nazis across the Rhine from a ten-mile stretch of the west bank just north of the Swiss border. The fortress of Belfort had been captured in mopping-up operations to the rear.

Just to the north of the French the U.S. Seventh Army, moving ahead through the Vosges, found villages in its path abandoned by the enemy and set aflame, as the Nazis sought to escape from the entrapment maneuver of the U.S. troops on the French left flank. The Seventh surged ahead to capture Lourquin and Heming, within five miles of Saverne, and crushed the Nazi line in front of the Saverne Gap in the Vosges, besides seizing a score of towns in advances to the Schirmeck, Sainte Marie and Bonhomme passes.

BRITISH CLEAR MAAS. Near the northern extremity of the eastward-facing front the British Second Army came within a mile of the Maas river city of Roermond in Holland. By their advance the British cleared the entire area west of the Maas that is bounded by the Wessem and Zig canals.

Enemy resistance varied. In places it consisted principally of thickly strewn mines and booby traps. In others there was furious fighting. Early in its offensive the Ninth Army was met by a counter-attack, but repulsed it. In general the Metz battle was dogged in the extreme, but some of the

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city's surrounding forts quit without putting up the defense of which they were assumed to be capable.

How is it that many of the same German troops who folded before Allied armored and aerial might and fled the entire width of France now resist with such determination our entry into the Rhineland?

Perhaps part of the answer may be found in the words of a century-old German battle song:

"....To the Rhine, to the Rhine, to the German Rhine! Who will be the stream's defender?....The German, upright, honest, strong, protects the holy landmark. As long as a drop of blood still flows, a fist still draws a dagger, an arm still aims a gun, no foe shall cross your shores....the watch on the Rhine holds fast and true."

It is toward this mighty river valley and against the sentiment of this song that American, British, French and Allied forces were driving last week.

WATERWAY. The Rhine is Germany's lifeline, navigable for 550 miles of its 850-mile length. In no place between Cologne and the North Sea is it less than nine or ten feet deep. With its connecting canals, railroads and bridges, it furnishes an outlet for Belgium, Holland and France as well as for Germany. And the Ludwig canal gives the upper Rhine access to the Danube basin.

Because the Rhine forms the boundary between Germany and France and also separates German territory from Switzerland, the Siegfried Line was built in 1938 to run the length of the German Rhine from Kleve, opposite the Dutch frontier 70 miles east of Rotterdam, to the Swiss border below Strassbourg. But centuries before the concrete tank-traps of the Siegfried Line were thought of, mighty fortresses dotted this river's banks. It has been Germany's traditional purpose to protect the Fatherland by preventing any enemy from getting across.

Reds Put Pressure On Hungary Line

The Soviet Second Ukrainian Army last week continued pressure along the Hungarian-German defense line which runs 80 miles northeast from Budapest to Miskolc, Hungary's fifth largest city.

After three days of savage fighting, the communications center of Jászberény fell to the Soviets, who then plunged ahead to slash the Budapest-Miskolc highway in three places. Advance units were less than five miles from Miskolc as the week ended.

The arc around Budapest was steadily closing as Red Army men took Valko, 14 miles northeast of the Hungarian capital. To the south the Soviets continued to enlarge their bridgeheads across the Danube river.

As the greater portion of the Russo-German front remained static, the war of nerves was beginning to tell on Berlin. Knowing the time is ripe for a winter offensive, and knowing well the power of the Soviet advance across snow-covered ground in the past, German leaders were feverishly predicting Red Army attacks through East Prussia and toward Silesia. Meanwhile the Soviets were silent.

New Nazi Defenses

Battling through snow in the mountains before the Po Valley plain, Polish troops of the Allied Eighth Army took Gofara, a small mountain village about one mile east of Monte Fortino.

Rome, however, reported the Allied units operating in eastern Italy had run up against a new German delaying line. The line follows the Montone river southwest from Ravenna across highway nine, between Forlì and Faenza, and into the hilly country in the Monte Fortino area. Faenza, which sits on the Rimini-Bologna highway, appears to be the next Allied objective.

Rome also announced that British troops of the Adriatic Land Forces had invaded Montenegro and Hercegovina in Yugoslavia.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Japanese Strategy Shifting to Land; New China Gains

Major General A. C. Wedemeyer's statement that Japan has switched from an oceanic to a continental strategy and is bolstering her land forces in China with reinforcements is well pointed up by his communications.

Last week these communiqués told of Jap units advancing beyond the former American air base of Liuchow, capturing Ishan and moving into positions along the Lung river west of the town near Kweichow province. The particular Jap column that has made these advances originally came from the Canton area and has covered more than 250 miles into Kwangsi province.

The objectives of this Jap drive are not as yet clear. General Wedemeyer says possible enemy moves might be (1) a push from Liuchow south to link with Jap forces in French Indo-China; (2) a westward drive through the Liuchow corridor to Kweichow, capital of Kweichow province; (3) or a drive on Chengtu and Chungking, China's wartime capital in Szechuan province.

TO BLOCK BURMA ROAD. The current westward Jap drive appears to be designed at occupying the Burma Road town of Kweichow which would nullify Allied efforts of the past few months at reopening the Burma end of the road at Myitkyna and more recently at Bhamo. Another possible Jap design in pushing west might be the elimination of the B-29 bases in inland China which are launching the strategic bombardment against the

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Japanese ability to produce war materials. Such Jap intentions would at least make the 14th Air Force's support to Chinese troops even more ineffective by pushing it back farther inland.

The big bulk of the Japanese army is thought to be garrisoned in China-Burma and, according to General Wedemeyer, most of it is fairly well intact, well trained, and equipped. Some observers have placed the strength of General Shunroku Hata's South China army at from 250,000 to 350,000 troops.

MARK TIME. The Japanese drive west has temporarily been stalled along the Lung river where enemy attempts at crossing were repelled by Chinese artillery. Chinese reports indicate the Japs who captured Kweilin have started toward Lungsheng, 40 miles to the northwest, while other Jap units are trying to secure the right flank with Liuchow—an objective they seemed certain to achieve before week's end.

Despite the loss of air bases, American planes have provided effective strafing and bombing for the Chinese against Jap supply lines and troop concentrations. The airmen also have been active over the Salween river front in Yunnan province and over the South China Sea and French-Indo China.

General Wedemeyer says he has recommended to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek means of meeting the Japanese invasion in China. The General regards the Jap position in Burma as "deteriorating," and with the prospective opening of the Burma-Ledo road, heavy guns and other equipment which cannot be moved by air may be supplied.

General Wedemeyer told reporters he thought it would take another year after Germany falls to defeat Japan and that the best way to aid China for this objective was to "bring all available resources to bear on the object—and that's killing Japanese."



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Chinese 100 Miles From Burma Road

The two-year-old goal of reopening the Burma Road may be realized in the next few weeks if Chinese troops maintain the pace of their recent drive across north Burma.

In a month of post-monsoon conditions, the Chinese have covered 122 miles along all weather highways against little Japanese opposition. Before getting back on the old Burma Road and into China, they must clear another 100 miles—60 miles southeast to Namkham and 40 miles back north-east.

Bhamo, situated at the confluence of the Irrawaddy and Taying rivers and considered the key to reopening the Burma Road, was sealed off this week. Front dispatches indicate the Chinese are preparing for a final drive on Bhamo and a push south to open the land route to China. There is a growing belief that the Japs may abandon all of Burma north of Mandalay.

WEDGE. The Chinese have driven a wedge into Jap positions on the road leading from Bhamo to Namkham and control all the road below Bhamo to Nansi, 13 miles southeast, except for a short portion.

On the west Burma front around Tiddim Fifth Indian Division troops advancing eastward toward Kalemmyo from Tiddim have met East African forces who battled down from the north. Both columns have united for an assault on Kalemmyo and are clearing road blocks at a point near the Jap-held town. British along the Myittha-Mandalay railway have reported slight gains against strong natural enemy defense positions.

NEW PIPELINE. Announcement was made last week of the longest military operational pipeline in the world which ultimately will reach from Calcutta to China across Burma. Upon completion it will have at least double the capacity of the Ledo Road.

Rising from sea level to mountain passes 4000 feet high, the pipeline crosses three rivers and generally follows railroads, highways, and streams from Calcutta into northeast India where it swings over into Burma and China. The exact course of the line after leaving Assam, initial point of the Ledo Road, has not been disclosed. A variety of fuel can be carried over the line which was built despite drenching monsoon rains, scorching heat, and the ravages of jungle disease.

B29 Has Proved Itself In Combat

In 1940 the B-29 Superfortress looked so good on paper hundreds were ordered before the first model was completed.

To-day, five months after its introduction last June with the raid on the Yawata steelworks, the bomber has more than justified that confidence.

HIT THE HEARTLAND. So far Superfort targets have included two industrial centers in Japan proper and nine strategic areas in the adjacent empire. Yawata, center of Japanese iron and steel production in Kyushu, has had three raids, two of them at night. During the sustained carrier strikes that preceded the Philippines invasion, airdromes and harbor installations on Formosa got three raids within 72 hours.

Other targets: Oil refineries at Palembang and Medan in Sumatra; the naval base at Singapore; marshalling yards at Bangkok (Siam) and Rangoon (India); port facilities at Darien (Manchuria) and Taku (China); aircraft factories at Nagasaki (Japan); and staging areas at Loyang (China).

Based somewhere in the vicinity of Chengtu in western China, the B-29s flew their longest mission (3700 miles) to hit Palembang, their heaviest to blast Rangoon. Costliest was the daylight raid against Yawata when four went down to ack-ack or interception.

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Kamikaze: Japanese Airmen Are Urged To "Join It and Die"

Japan's official propaganda agency, Domei, has been occupying much of its recent time boasting about Nippon's crude and macabre attempt to improve on the directionally inaccurate German robot bomb. Domei claims the Japanese "improvement" is the Kamikaze (Divine Wind) Corps, a "volunteer" group of Japanese airmen committed to the "bodily crash tactic."

The Kamikaze mission, to quote a Domei quote of one of the airmen, is "...to act as carriers of bombs...to stick with our eyeless bombs until the very moment they strike their targets."

Another Domei war correspondent stressed an obvious fact by saying: "This bodily crash tactic is not, of course, advantageous for our wild eagles..." But this same Domei writer, Sirya Hata, claimed it was the robot bomb jockey's own idea. "...they will never be given orders to crash bodily, but for the fulfillment of their duties they are adopting this all-time great tactic."

OH YEAH? Official military viewpoint gives lie to this statement. Rear Admiral Kunishige Taketomei of the Imperial Japanese Navy put it bluntly: "These young pilots must go out

NAVY TO DATE

Speaking in Minneapolis at a mass demonstration marking the opening of the Six War Loan drive, Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal last week disclosed that since 1 July, 1940, U.S. naval vessels have convoyed 61,000 ships in the Atlantic and Pacific; landed 1,200,000 troops on enemy beaches; sank 1400 enemy ships totalling 50,000 tons; destroyed 10,000 planes; and cleared the Japanese from an area of 8,170,000 square miles. Total personnel in the Navy as of 18 November: 3,300,000.

on their one-way trips, colliding with the enemy, whether they like it or not." The robot bomb jockeys take their orders from the Japanese Army and Navy.

Latest report of the exploits of the bomb jockeys was given by Domei on 1 November in crediting them with the sinking of "three aircraft carriers, one transport, one cruiser, and heavily damaging six other carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, one transport, and three warcraft of unidentified category." The results were supposedly achieved "in less than a week since it (Kamikaze) launched its activities over Philippines waters."

Publicizing such weird and extravagant claims to the Japanese homefront is supposed to have brought about what Domei calls "a new wave of spirit in all munitions factories... throughout the nation." Domei reflects the home front feeling thus: "...workers declaring if serving men are so willing in giving their lives for their country, the home front is not going to be outdone."

THAT OLDTIME SPIRIT. This robot bomb jockey "spirit" is nothing new in Japan, Domei explains, for the "spirit runs in the very blood of the Nippon people, nurtured and fostered in the mother's womb, inculcated in the schoolrooms, matured in the shelter of the family and mellowed in the vicissitudes of social living."

"His (any member of the Kamikaze) behavior transcends death,"

Domei continues. "It is something qualitatively divorced from calculation and rationalization of a prosaic world. In the Occidental sense it may be said he sacrificed his life for his country. However, in Japanese terms, he made not even a sacrifice, for death is a mere coincidental factor. The all powerful rule—consciousness of what he must do as a Japanese—is paramount, exceeding the question of life and death."

Domei claims this spiritual force fires all Japanese and is "an inexhaustible and inexplicable subjective force—pride and faith in the Yamato race." For this reason the Kamikaze Corps will "prove beyond all doubt that spiritual strength can triumph over material power."

DEAD END. Japanese militarists, however, do not seem to be above thinking materially — and about material power, for not only are the Kamikaze airmen expected to go out on "one-way trips...whether they like it or not," but before they go they must donate their "pocket money toward the aircraft construction fund." When that shakedown ceremony is completed, the airmen are given a few dollops of "farewell" sake before taking to the air.

The robot bomb jockeys not chosen as yet for missions are declared by Domei to be doing a "lot of worrying over the fact whether there will be any enemy ships left for them to crash into when their turn comes." Since U.S. task forces continue to operate closer to Japan with each passing day, the robot bomb jockeys seem to be worrying unnecessarily.

The "volunteer" Kamikaze Corps seems to boil down to the fact that it's a desperate Japanese military makeshift which the High Command hopes may succeed where the Imperial Fleet and the armies and air forces in the South, Southwest and Central Pacific areas failed in stopping the

AMENDMENT

For one reason or another certain changes have occurred recently within the Allied high command which necessarily amend the list of leaders published on pages 340 and 341 of MAPTALK for 11 November.

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney is now Deputy Supreme Commander and Commanding General of United States Forces in the Mediterranean theater. His post as Deputy Chief of the War Department General Staff has been filled by Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy. New Chief of Operations for the War Department is Maj. Gen. John E. Hull.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory has been missing since 14 November, when the plane in which he was travelling to Ceylon was reported lost. His position as Commander of Allied Expeditionary Air Forces in Europe, which he was leaving, as well as the office of Air Commander-in-Chief in Southeast Asia, to which he was being transferred, are now vacant.

Lt. General Raymond A. Wheeler, who was commanding general of the CBI theater before October, 1943, has been named to succeed General Stilwell as deputy commander to Lord Louis Mountbatten in Southeast Asia. As commander of the U.S. Army section and senior American officer in command, he also is in charge of all lend-lease to Allies in that theater.

Allied penetration of Japan's inner defense lines. It's unlikely that the robot bomb jockeys will do much more than prove conclusively that Domei reporter Hata was right in saying: "This bodily crash tactic is not, of course, advantageous for our wild eagles."

Amphib Engineers Land Troops, Then Supply and Support Them

Amphibious is from a Greek word meaning to lead a double life, but if an Amphibian Engineer is accused of that usually shocking allegation, he would probably be a little grieved, because he lives considerably more than just a double life. In fact, when you speak of the Amphibs you are including life in the Army, the Navy, and the Marines, in all their varied phases.

It's not the easy happy-go-lucky life that the word implies, but it is one that furnishes all the action a vigorous stalwart young man can use. For instance, one amphibian organization, the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, has participated in 20 landing operations in the Southwest Pacific alone.

One of the most versatile units in the Army, an Engineer Special Brigade runs the gamut of land and sea combat duties in the course of its hard working Army career. Composed of three Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments, attached troops and boat maintenance crews, Brigades take part in so-called shore-to-shore movements, ship-to-shore movements, or combinations of the two.

BIG AND FORMIDABLE. Generally they are formed into task groups or forces of which no two are identical. But one that is typical consists of landing craft with dozers, trucks, jeeps, gasoline trucks, cranes, anti-aircraft guns, prime movers, a support battery equipped with landing craft and LVTs toting barrage rockets, automatic weapons and a heavy type flame thrower—a formidable craft for sure. Approximately 2000 officers and soldiers make up a Boat and Shore Regiment. Their task is the transportation and landing of personnel, equipment and supplies from ship-to-shore or from shore-to-far-shore.

After the landing, whether resistance is bitter or light, the engineers help organize and defend the beach, control traffic, build roads and dumps, install

beach communications, employ support batteries and remain in support of the task force after the Navy withdraws. With the assistance of troops attached from the task force for this purpose, they unload all landing craft of the Army and Navy. They also bring in supplies from following waves of supply ships, resupply units advancing parallel to the coast, furnish reconnaissance and combat patrols, and usually defend a part of the perimeter.

SECOND FIRST. First Amphibian Engineer unit to arrive in the SWPA was the Second Engineer Special Brigade which landed in Australia in February 1943. They had had intense training with two infantry divisions in the States in all kinds of waters and were eager to get into action over here. But they were doomed to great disappointment when they disembarked, but only for the time being. They found no landing craft available and the big assembly plant at Cairns, where hundreds of boats were supposed to have been ready for them, was still in the blueprint stage.

But with their usual energy and enthusiasm, the Base Shop Battalion pitched in and, working 24 hours a day, soon had a boat assembly plant despite a battle for priorities. Finally on 7 April 1943 the first LCVP was turned out and the Brigade got back to their well-loved craft which turned out to be an entirely different type than they had trained on in the States. However, they learned with the Aussies the art of amphibian warfare and one of the regiments was attached to the

Australian Ninth Division. After proving themselves in action, they were adopted as the Ninth's "navy" in now historical operations in New Guinea.

In June the outfit embarked from Australia on its first combat mission with deckloaded LCVPs to Milne Bay and then to Oro Bay. The engineers had one incomplete rehearsal at Morobe with a task force from the 41st Division and took off for a landing at Nassau Bay behind the Jap lines who were holding the 41st north of Morobe.

NO LOSSES. During the landing operation the boats encountered a severe storm with a 10 to 12-foot surf which was too much for the landing craft to beach. Only a few were able to withdraw from the beach without being swamped, although all troops were landed without loss of a man. The amphibians, after unloading equipment which was not lost in the storm, were assigned to a position on the southern flank of the beach where there were plenty of Japs in the neighborhood.

These Japanese soon learned of the small force holding this flank and counter-attacked. They also learned that the boatmen knew how to use bayonets and knives, and after an all night struggle the rest fled. The infantry commander said that the whole position would have been lost if the Engineers had not repelled the attack. The land route was virtually impassable because of steep mountains, jungles and streams, and the amphibians carried troops, artillery, ammunition, bulldozers and a hundred other items in their boats for the Salamaua landing. Boats even reconnoitered along the coast to draw Jap fire and to locate Japanese batteries. For the last 40 days the engineers supported the fighting at Salamaua before it fell.

LAE NEXT. Meantime detailed plans were worked out for the important landing on 4 September at Lae, some 73 miles away. They were lightly opposed, but for ten days a steady rain made the country a quag-

mire, every road had to be corduroyed, and one night a sudden storm swept six of the LCMs onto the shore. The enemy line of resistance was established just east of Lae on the line of the Buni River. The Australians swam the river in the face of intense fire, but lost many weapons and were without ammunition. Amphibians ran their boats into the river and for 48 hours and under continuous fire ferried arms, ammunition and reinforcements to the Aussies. This action sealed the fate of the Japanese at Lae which fell 16 September.

Just six days later the enemy was caught off guard at Finschhafen by the Australian Ninth Division with the Boat and Shore Regiment of the Second Engineer Special Brigade. They met tough resistance and severe bombings while the boats rode out high waves off shore. The Ninth advanced south and the engineers again furnished perimeter defense both landward and seaward. Again the engineers virtually saved the operation. They furnished the beach and inland perimeter at Scarlet Beach, defended the line of the Song River to the north, and repulsed an attempted counter landing by Jap barges. It was here that Sgt. Junior N. Van Noy won the Congressional Medal of Honor which was awarded posthumously.

ROCKETS INTRODUCED. There followed other landings in quick succession at the Tami Islands, 12 miles off Finsch. Then Sattelburg—where the Engineer Rocket Support Battery used the new American rocket for the first time in the SWPA. The enemy



retaliated but, not knowing where the rocket fire came from, only gave away their gun positions. When the Aussie infantry rushed into the shelled area, no Japs were found alive. The rockets, with this successful beginning, later were to prove one of the Allies' most effective weapons of attack.

The invasion of New Britain at Arawe on 15 December marked the first amphib participation with American troops. Reefs were bad and only "alligators" and "buffaloes" comprised the first four waves. Here rockets were used for the first time in a combat landing. Here also was their first "naval" engagement with the enemy. Contact was made with Jap barges in waters too shallow for PT boats, and rocket DUKWs sank eight of the barges. The next encounter was not so lucky as the enemy caught a reconnaissance patrol in 2 LCVs, closing in from the front and rear. The engineer commander directed his crews to a near shore which turned out to be a mangrove swamp. Five men were wounded but all survived and were rescued.

Next operations were at Cape Gloucester and Long Island on the same day. The Sixth Army followed up with a landing at Saldor to cut off Japanese retreating from Huon Peninsula on New Year's Day. In rapid succession successful operations followed at Talasea, on New Britain, the Admiralties, Aitape, Hollandia, Tanamerah Bay, Toem, Wakde, Biak, Noemfoor and finally Leyte. Another example of their versatility was shown at Hollandia where the amphib provided an inland navy to cut in on Japs on Lake Sentani shore. Buffaloes were brought up to the mountain lake to successfully outflank the Jap defenses guarding the airstrips.

CITED. During the assault landing at Wakde Island, the LCVs carrying infantry encountered a hail of machine gun fire from concealed machine guns mounted in turrets on the beach. The infantry, crouched behind the armored bulwarks, suffered no loss, but

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the amphibian boatmen sustained severe casualties. The boat company concerned was awarded a Presidential Citation.

The Second Brigade performed some of the most remarkable feats of the Southwest Pacific war during the Biak operation, where, due to reefs, landing craft could not beach. Figures show they unloaded 66 LSTs and 51 cargo vessels, discharging a total of 108,746 tons. They made 32,039 sorties covering a distance of 174,485 miles; carried 190,781 personnel and 175,040 tons of supplies. These figures include attached craft, LVTs, DUKWs, and LCTs.

Statistics do not tell of the heroism displayed throughout the bitter fighting for the island. When elements of an infantry unit were cut off past Paral jetty, 14 LVTs were dispatched to resupply them. The boats were commandeered by an infantry officer to evacuate wounded under heavy Japanese fire. The boatmen were unsuccessful in first attempts but an hour later got ashore and brought out the wounded. Early in the afternoon all available LVTs, LCVs, LCMs, LCTs and DUKWs were ordered to the jetty for evacuation of the infantrymen. LVTs and DUKWs had to plow their way over reefs to pick them up and take them to the other boats waiting at the edge of the reef. All personal and even heavy machinery were evacuated from Paral jetty. For this gallant action the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade Support Battery was cited by the Division Commander.

HOLDING FORCE. Meanwhile a company of the amphib acted as a holding force covering the withdrawal of the infantry. About 100 men with light arms went to the top of a ridge for several hours, then formed a rear guard for the infantry until it passed a road junction and, assisted by two tanks, executed a four-mile withdrawal to a new perimeter.

During the Noemfoor landing the support battery was instrumental in

the capture of the Kamiri airdrome, overrunning the strip, killing 55 Japs and blasting others out of caves and strong points while the Flak LCMs supported the advance of the ground troops along the coast.

Addition of another Engineer Special Brigade was made in December 1943, when the Third ESE landed in New Guinea from the States. The new outfit teamed with the Second from whom they had access to valuable combat experiences. The Third was initiated to combat in March 1944 in a frontal assault by the First Marines at Talasea on New Britain. Like the Second, landings came fast and often and from March to 30 July the Brigade took part in eight operations of utmost importance to the swift advance of General MacArthur's forces toward the Philippines. These included Yalau Plantation north of Saldor, Aitape, Madang, Alexishafen, Toem-Wakde, Noemfoor, and Sansapor.

ACTION AT MAFFIN BAY. A combat experience, one of many the Third has had which reveals the stuff that Amphibs are made of, was at Maffin Bay when the Japanese infiltrated through the jungle to surprise a group of infantrymen. The enemy captured several AA and machine guns which were turned on the infantrymen. Amphibian engineers nearby swiftly leaped to the rescue and after 14 hours of desperate fighting, drove the Japanese off and secured the beach.

The record of the Amphibian Engineers is one in which they can and do take pride. There have been more callouses than medals, though they have won their share of both. What counts most with them is that they started 100 miles from Buna and today stand only 300 miles from Bataan. With their destination Tokyo, the Engineer Special Brigades look forward with confidence to the still larger tasks that lie ahead. They have already travelled over half way.

INSTITUTE OPENS "B" BRANCH

To speed up enrollment procedure and the distribution of study materials, a "B" Branch of the U.S. Armed Forces Institute in SWPA has been established at APO 503.

The new branch, which was officially authorized with publication of USAFFE Circular No. 97 on 8 November 1944, has been designed especially to handle all applications for enrollment and requests for text-books from troops stationed outside continental Australia.

The SWPA Branch at APO 927 will continue to handle most other correspondence, however. Once enrolled, students will send all lessons to the Commandant, SWPA Branch, U. S. Armed Forces Institute, APO 927, where they will be corrected and graded by instructors of an Australian college or by Institute personnel. Soldiers located on the Australian mainland, of course, will continue to direct all correspondence to APO 927.

Further information about institute services may be obtained upon request from Information and Education offices or from the Commandant of one of the two branches.

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ARMY TALK Germany Has Been Fascist For A Long, Long Time

Note to I & E Officer: Perhaps no more serious task ever faced mankind than that which will be presented the United Nations after the military defeat of Germany—that of eradicating for all time the complex system of economic, political, and social forces which led to the rise of the Nazi party. If in the future world community these forces are to be controlled, it is important that the American soldier-citizen understand the past and present of German fascism. The discussion text which follows is designed to contribute to that understanding.

The Nazi Movement of 1890

AT THE END of the last century a group of college professors, teachers, over-aged government officials and other patriotic citizens founded the "German Colonial Association." They said: "We haven't enough space. We want colonies. We want a place in the sun." The Association was headed by Herr Kusserow, brother-in-law of Herr Hansemann, director of a big German banking concern.

In 1898 another group, motivated by the same ideas, founded the German "Navy League." The speech that launched the organization on its perilous way was delivered by a shipbuilder, Herr Woermann, who declared, "Germany's flag must be carried across the seven seas." His jingoism soon raised League membership to more than a million.

The Association and the League together became the first organized mass movement in any country to prepare public opinion in favor of annexations, military adventures, and —wars. This movement taught a man named Adolf Hitler a number of things—how to make a scapegoat of the Jews, how to appeal to prejudice, how to tell lies and get away with them; but one of the more important lessons it taught him was the fallacy of overseas empire.

Largely as a result of agitation from the League and the Association, Germany got her colonies in Africa. But she lost so heavily on the deal that after World War I she was glad to get rid of them. Some time later Hitler, writing in *Mein Kampf*, gave the direction for the new imperialism: "For Germany . . . the only possibility for carrying out a healthy territorial policy lay in the acquisition of new land in Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose."

The League and its satellites were backed by the same group of men who 20-odd years later were to finance Hitler. Head of the

League was Baron Zu Wied, later made famous by his short possession of Albania's crown and throne, now one of the biggest land owners in Westphalia. Its general secretary was Herr Schweinburg. He suddenly became owner of a large and well-known newspaper whose editorial themes alternated between the denunciation of minorities and a demand for punitive action against Great Britain. Behind both these men was the fabulous Krupps family, owners of a whole industrial complex in western Germany and the Saar district, producers of the "Big Bertha" of World War I, and chief armament producers for World War II.

Backed by the "angry demands" of a million naive upper middle class members, the campaign initiated by these men was successful: in 1900 the German parliament voted for a huge naval and fleet program. Thereafter, each year until 1914, the Krupps of Essen made five million marks alone on the armament plating of warships, while other branches of the family made equally big killings through the production of 57 warships and 171 U-boats.

Father of the Nazi Party

The most vicious group, the "All German League," was founded shortly before 1914. The "League" was the actual father of the Nazi party, and Hitler became its heir. This group expanded its propaganda more and more into the racial field and, among other things, called for the annexation of all territory in which Germans happened to live.

Founder and President of the "All German League" was shaky old Herr Class, who was later made a member of Parliament by the Hitler party. Class not only listed Krupp as financial backer of the "League," but also Kirdorf (iron), Stinnes (coal), Borsig (locomotives), and Hugenberg (press and movies), later leader of the Nationalist Conservative Party. In his memoirs Class revealed: "The connection with Kirdorf had a good effect on our cause. His contributions came in very handy for the sake of our racial brothers in southern and southeastern Europe. The money enabled me to found German papers in Hungaria and Bosnia, but I managed also to support the German Bund in Bohemia."

The above quotation covers the time before the first World War. If we read "Henlein's Sudeten Party" instead of "Bund" and "Fifth Columnists" instead of "Racial Brothers," we won't find much difference between Goebbels' technique and that of Class'.

The Ground Was Fertile

It pays well to study the pages of early German propaganda volumes, because it will help us to understand why Hitler had such

an easy time. A famous pan-German professor, Klaus Wagner, wrote as far back at 1906:

"Great enforced migrations of the inferior peoples must be organized! Posterity will be grateful to us for doing so. The colonization of the earth by the most perfect race is the wisdom of war . . . To the conquered rivals who encumber our road we must assign a restricted territory, into which we shall drive them to make room for the German expansion: we must set a term to their increase, which is dangerous to us, by circumscribing their country . . . The Nation above all! The nation above humanity! The Germans know only 'Germany above all in the world.' And it is because such a watchword was an obligation upon our ancestors that we are German."

Emperor William II (The Kaiser), addressing the troops he was sending to crush the Boxer Rebellion in China, said, in 1900:



"I shall take vengeance, the like of which the history of the world has never recorded. I shall not stop until the German flags fly victoriously over the walls of Peking and we dictate peace to the Chinese . . . I command you not to give quarter, not to take prisoners and to kill every enemy who is overpowered. Following the example of Attila and his Huns, I shall spread terror in east Asia that will be remembered even after a thousand years."

The Hun Kaiser, not at all as effective as Hitler, had nevertheless broken a lot of fertile ground for the "leaders" after him. Less plagued with intuition and not quite taking the place of God, he too, knew how to threaten, and how to promise a history that should last a thousand years. In 1914, now fully prepared to attack the Western Powers, he declared:

"I am the instrument of the Most High. I am His sword, His representative.

"Woe and death to all those who resist my will! Woe and death to those who do not believe in my mission! Woe and death to the cowards! Let them perish,—all the enemies of the German people! God demands their destruction.—God, who through my mouth, commands you to execute His will."

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Still, the Kaiser was not the man to satisfy the demands of German heavy industry. He promised the iron ore districts of Briey and Longwy, the coal mines of Pas de Calais (France), a corridor to the Atlantic across northern France, and the total colonization of Belgium. History decided against him. Instead of new conquests, Germany lost the iron ore of Alsace-Lorraine and upper Silesia.

But defeat meant nothing. Krupp didn't shed any tears when William went into exile, for the old order would persist, he knew, as long as the German generals remained within the "fatherland." Only now a new man was needed, a new organization, bigger and more effective than any of the primitive pan-German Leagues that had gone before.

After defeat in 1918, German industry placed heavy bets on Adolf Hitler, and laid 500 million marks on the line to finance the "Free Corps," other private armies of the officers caste, and the "Anti-Bolshevist" league. Other millions went for the purchase of newspaper chains and a movie industry.

Hugenberg, owner of the "Ufa" Film Company, the same man who was once described as the "most reactionary German" by the Nazi Storm Troopers, became boss of all pan-German supernationalistic propaganda. In his "National German Party" the princes met the small shop owners, and in his military organization, "Steel Helmet," the colonels drank beer with the less fortunate veterans of the World War.

Democratic Germany?

It is interesting to take a look at German public opinion as it expressed itself in January 1919 during the election of the first National Assembly. The election was an emphatic repudiation of militarism. Of all votes cast, the Nationalist Parties (Hugenberg) received 14.7 per cent; the non-socialist republican parties 39.1 per cent; the moderate Socialist Party 37.9 per cent.

In this democratic aggregation, the center of gravity lay toward the side of labor (37.9 per cent). But only moderately so. There was nothing revolutionary about the vote. The left-wing Socialists were heavily outnumbered.

(Question: How conservative was the "Right" and how liberal was the "Left" in German political parties before Hitler?

Answer: In the old German Parliament the conservatives sat on the "Right" of the House, the centrist in the "Center" and the Socialists and Communists on the "Left." There never existed a great Republican or Democratic Party in our sense. The German Democratic Party (which formed the "Center" together with the

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Centrist Party) was very small, timid and non-violent. At its height in 1919 the Democratic Party received 5½ million votes, but lost from election to election. In 1930 only a little more than one million people voted for the Democrats. In other words, during the time of the German Republic no great and powerful Democratic movement was apparent. Furthermore, no attempts had been made to educate the youngsters in a Democratic way. The school books of the Kaiser were good enough for the Republic.)

But within a very short time the new democratic government, backed by the will of the people, gave up its power to govern Germany, and the propaganda machine of the pan-Germans, the Junkers, the Krupps and the Generals began to influence public opinion again. Although they had a larger circulation than the papers of the government parties, Hugenberg's papers, however, were unable to create a mass-movement backed by all classes. With no social appeal, they still talked mainly to the naive upper crust of the middle class which slowly lost its economic power through inflation.

In the meantime the democratic government surrendered to the Army (Reichswehr) which soon became the autonomous power within the state. The function of maintaining order was left to officers of the imperial army who entertained their own private armies. They were not dissolved, despite their open hostility towards the republic, because the imperial judiciary was allowed to continue in control of the courts. Other important administrative functions of the state were left with the old bureaucracy.

Leit Motiv: Sympathy

After the Treaty of Versailles, the German Nationalists patterned their propaganda along the lines of a sympathy campaign. The Prussian Junker and First Foreign Minister of the German republic, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, says in his book "Documents and Thoughts on Versailles":

"From now on Germany must not cease in her efforts to acquire the ally whom shortsightedly she scorned during the Wilhelminian era: the public opinion of the world."

The effect of this campaign was soon felt in the United States. Everywhere little groups were organized who spoke of "British Imperialism" and "French revenge policy." Although we had just won the war, we opened our doors to the advance agents of Hitler. Count Luckner reports in his book "Seadevil Conquers America":

"Without any effort, all doors, even of the most exclusive circles, were thrown open to me. The most fashionable clubs entertained in my honor. I lectured in about 300 clubs; 36 of them

made me an honorary member. My many lectures at universities were attended by thousands and thousands of students who, in a few years, as men, will influence the opinions and policies of their country . . ."

Count Luckner became honorary citizen of San Francisco. His racket was successful beyond all expectations. He boasted that in the United States "the possibility offered itself to an unforeseen extent, to obtain results for Germany that are greater, more important and far-reaching, than any we could have obtained by sailing around the globe."

This was exactly what Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had in mind when he wrote to the people's representative, Scheidemann: "One of the most important jobs that has to be undertaken at once is the stabilization and consolidation of our credit . . . It will be possible then to buttress the financial situation of our private business with large foreign loans, to vitalize it, and to give it confidence in itself; and the financial situation of our private business will have to rely primarily on American help."

Luckner was followed by Nazi Hanfstaengl, Captain Wiedeman and the Free-Corps leader Killinger (former consul of San Francisco, now governor of Rumania). The propaganda was directed by a member of the illegal German General Staff, Dr. Alfred von Wegerer, who distributed millions of pamphlets against the "war guilt lie" and for "sympathy" throughout the world.

"Business Ueber Alles"

The foreign policy of the Republic followed the instructions prepared by the Junkers precisely. America began to pump millions of dollars into Germany. Krupp ceased to produce such laughable items as plates for artificial teeth, cash registers and faked table silver. Big industry stood on its feet again, and armament production began.

The German trusts outsold all competition on the world market—at a loss, for the German government was ready to help out with cash. According to Swiss figures approximately 1,600,000,000 marks yearly went from the Government Treasury to the "suffering" trusts and concerns. Each ton of armor plating, for instance, was sold for 800 marks less to the United States than to the German Navy.

The new "strong man," Hitler, looked more promising than the rest of the racists and supernationalists, so years before the rise of Hitler the masters of the trusts began to finance the Nazi Party. Industrialist Kirdorf was the first one to become a member. Thyssen and the Krupps followed. Even the bankers—whose lives were

demanding in many revolutionary songs of the Storm Troopers and middle-class Party members—hurried to get on the bandwagon. Despite deep differences between heavy industry, the banks, and the big estate holders, all three had only one aim: Hitler must be put in power. The "socialistic" program of the Nazi Party didn't scare them.

(Question: During the 1920's, were these men considered by most of the German people to be "extremists" and "crack pots" or were they looked upon as "good solid citizens?"

Answer: Krupp, Thyssen and other industrialists were always considered good citizens and highly respected even in republican circles, while Hitler and his friends were being taken as "extremists." The general attitude was that the National Socialist Party could always be defeated by parliamentary means, and in case of a revolution, by the republican police, or, if necessary, by a general strike.)

The "revolutionary" advertiser and organizer, Hitler, promised more fruitful dividends than the small fry of the pan-German groups. In "Mein Kampf" he said: "Theoretically speaking, all the pan-German's thoughts were correct, but since it lacked the force and astuteness to transmit this theoretical knowledge to the masses—that is, to put it in a form suited to the receptivity of the broad masses, which is and remains exceedingly limited—all this knowledge was visionary wisdom, and could never become practical reality."

Last Step Toward Total War

Hitler simply took over, developed, and exploited a system of deceit already established. With the strongest powers in Germany backing him, he unfolded the biggest propaganda campaign in history, while his Storm-Troopers spread terror across the country. No republican judge was willing to prosecute brown swastika murderers, for Guertner, the Chief Justice, was Hitler's old friend.

Hitler's party grew from election to election. He never quite managed to gain the majority of the votes, but it didn't matter. The Republican Parties who received 39.1 percent in the election of 1919 (without the Socialists) received only 25 percent in 1924 and less than 15 percent in 1932.

To recapitulate the major trend of German public opinion and sentiment from 1919 to 1933 (Hitler's rise to power) we get the following picture:

1. In the first election, before Versailles and before the failures of the Weimar Republic, the German people strongly repudiated

militarism and aggressive nationalism, and showed their overwhelming preference for a liberal or progressive democratic republic.

2. By May, 1924, after Versailles and the inflation, and after irretrievable errors by the early Weimar Governments, the German people had made a violent swing toward the militaristic and reactionary Right.

3. By March, 1928, after four years of slow reconstruction and economic recovery, they had reversed the previous trend and made unmistakable progress back toward the democratic and non-militaristic line-up of 1919.

4. In July, 1932, under the impact of the depression and mass unemployment, 37.3 percent of the German voters supported the Nazis. This was the high point of Nazi strength before Hitler became Chancellor.

5. In the first election after Hitler acquired control of the machinery of state, 53.0 percent voted for the major parties of the extreme Right, all of them definitely militaristic. However, even at this time Hitler's party did not obtain a majority.

(Question: What has happened to the "Democratic" groups within Germany?

Answer: All groups "Right" of the "Center" were absorbed by the Nazis before Hitler's rise to power. Only a small portion of the other groups were able to keep together and work underground.)

Quick as a Goose Step

The step from the first pan-German group to the Nazi movement was short. The step from the republic to dictatorship was even shorter.

How big a step it will be from the defeat of the Nazi army and Nazi industry to a peaceful, non-aggressive Germany, is largely up to the men who will have to lay down the law at the peace conference. Some of the most interesting sessions will obviously be those which are concerned with the question of what should be done with German heavy industry.

In 1918 the Krupps, Thyssens and Kirdorfs were as much left alone by the Allies as were the Junkers and the Generals. The feudal, militaristic, monopolistic elements in Germany were never deprived of their power for aggression. In the name of justice, in the name of the victims of two World Wars, for the sake of world peace, outcome of World War II. will have to be different.





Q. What does the term "Plan Sud" mean?

A. This was the late Marshal Rommel's scheme for securing an African-Middle Eastern German Empire. In command of the Afrika Korps he tied up much of Britain's military strength and leaders for nearly two years.

Q. Whose headquarters is at Kandy in Ceylon?

A. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Commander-in-Chief of the Southeast Asia Command.

Q. What is de Gaulle's position in France?

A. Official recognition of the French Provisional Government headed by General Charles de Gaulle was made by the United States 23 October 1944, coinciding with similar action by Soviet Russia, the United Kingdom and Canada. At the same time the de Gaulle administration assumed authority in the French Interior Zone as agreed upon with Allied Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower.

Q. How many men are we still inducting into the Service?

A. This September another 81,154 men were inducted into the armed forces, one-fourth going to the Navy and three-fourths to the Army. The breakdown: Army, 60,257; Navy 20,897.

Q. Where are Japan's biggest steel plants?

A. At Yawata, center of Japanese iron and steel production in Kyushu; and Yoes, the country's second largest steel plant at Anshan (Manchuria).

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Q. What South American troops are fighting overseas?

A. A contingent of Brazilian troops landed 16 July '44 in Italy and were assigned to the Fifth Army. Included were Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Air Force, MP's, Medical and Quartermaster.

Q. How many pounds of supplies must be sent overseas daily for every overseas soldier?

A. For every soldier we send overseas, we make an initial shipment of five to ten tons of equipment. To maintain each soldier 30 days, another ton of cargo must be shipped. This means that every day we must ship about 64 pounds of material to maintain each soldier overseas.

Q. What separates East Prussia from Germany proper?

A. The Polish Corridor which stretches to the port of Danzig on the Baltic sea.

Q. If a battleship were to fire a broadside of all nine of its 16-inch guns, about how much would it cost?

A. \$13,500.

Q. What's the difference between the Service Ceiling and the Absolute Ceiling of an airplane?

A. The Service Ceiling is the highest altitude at which a plane can climb at the rate of one-hundred feet per minute. But the Absolute Ceiling is the very highest altitude the plane can reach.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 22 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 2 DEC., 1944

RESTRICTED

Limon Cleared; Yamashita Line To Be Rolled Up

As the Battle for Ormoc Corridor moved into its fourth week, the whole Yamashita Line was in danger of being rolled up. The Japs had lost some 17,000 troops in four desperate efforts to reinforce it, had lost virtually all of one division in the defense of its northern anchor. For the fact that they still managed to hold a line at all, they could thank continued torrential rains.

Japanese forces defending Limon in the Corridor's north, their supply lines cut and encircled on all sides, were wiped out last week by 32nd Division troops who pushed out from a wedge driven into forward enemy units to plunge into and beyond the township. The Japs had held out at Limon for almost 20 days; their First Division was practically destroyed in its defense.

FORCED BACK. "The enemy attempted to mount a large scale offensive and failed," reported General MacArthur's communique in a strategic summary. "... He has been thrown on the defensive, has lost critical defensive terrain in the mountain area, and has been forced back on the rolling plain before Ormoc. The whole

Yamashita Line is in danger of being rolled up."

Momentum of their drive through Limon carried elements of the 32nd southward to that rolling plain. At a point beyond the Leyte river they ran into the Japanese 26th Division, now fully committed in the area southwest of Limon, and repulsed several counter-attacks. On the east flank, meanwhile, other troops of the 32nd drove enemy defenders from the mountain mass known as Hill 1525, and proceeded to reduce other strongpoints in the vicinity one by one.

Then the rains, which has been incessant all week, increased in ferocity, and ground action was reduced to patrolling. For a decisive struggle on Ormoc plain, both forces awaited a Rising Sun.

MOP-UP AND THROW BACK. In other sectors on Leyte during the week ground action was unspectacular. Around Carigara Bay south of Capocan troops of the 24th Division were systematically engaged in mopping-up Japanese infiltrating parties. In the XXIV Corps sector on Saturday, 25 November, a night attack on elements of the U.S. Seventh Division was thrown back at Palanas, 11 miles south of Ormoc.

COME AND THEY GO. Apparently having elected to make his main stand in defense of the Corridor, the enemy drew heavily on his immediate reserves at Cebu, tried time and again to land reinforcements at Ormoc Bay. By Sunday, 26 November, four such efforts had cost him 65,000 tons of shipping, at least 17,000 men. Ships sunk

7

included 16 transports and 14 escorting warships.

Biggest blow to Japanese ferrying attempts since the sinking of the 8000-man convoy on 10 November came on Friday, 24 November. Kittyhawks and Thunderbolts caught a convoy off Masbate, about 20 miles northwest of Leyte, steaming toward Leyte's west coast. Attacking at mast-height, they sank one destroyer escort, two transports (one of 11,000 tons, the other 2000); left a third transport (6000 tons) beached and blazing. In all some 4500 Japs are believed to have drowned.

Off the northern tip of Cebu on Saturday another convoy was spotted, this one of four unescorted transports. Kittyhawks and Thunderbolts sank three of the transports and left the fourth blazing. About 2000 more troops went to the bottom. At dusk on Saturday in the same area three 1000-ton vessels were sunk.

Japanese losses were raised considerably by random strikes on inter-island and coastwise shipping. In a single day, for instance, four small freighters, four luggers, and 14 barges, most of them laden with men and supplies, were destroyed or damaged by air patrols or PT boats. On another day more than 40 barges were destroyed by strafing fire on beaches directly below Ormoc.

AIR WAR. General Kenney's bombers continued to tear into the enemy's network of airdromes throughout the central Philippines. On Wednesday, 22 November, unloading 146 tons, Liberators and Mitchells left the Bacolod field on Negros a shambles. Next day Lightnings and Thunderbolts swept over the area, found only two enemy planes to shoot down.

But on Friday Japanese interceptors returned with a vengeance. Some 30 of them swarmed up to seek combat with Liberators over the Alicante drome on Negros. A Thunderbolt cover shot down eight of the Jap fighters and probably another, clearing the way for the heavyweights to dump 195 tons on the Alicante runways. On the same day Liberators hit airdromes, bivouacs

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and supply areas at Masbate, and demolished buildings at Puerto Princesa on the east coast of Palawan.

In their campaign to neutralize the Negros and Cebu fields, U.S. airmen before the week's end had raised the total bombload dropped on the area since A-day to more than 1200 tons.

Allied flyers also were on the lookout over Mindanao. Liberators made a 40-ton raid on the Matina drome at Davao and Beaufighters made their entry into the southern Philippines with a successful barge hunt throughout Davao Gulf.

ENEMY HITS BACK. The Japs were still able to show some aggressive spirit in the air. Three Bettys attacked a Leyte-bound convoy east of Mindanao on Monday, 20 November. They caused no damage, however, and one was shot down by deck guns.

Taking advantage of a momentary break in the weather on Friday, between 40 and 50 raiders appeared to bomb Allied ships in Leyte Gulf. At least three-fourths were destroyed. From this and other raids on the same day, some 42 kills were claimed over Leyte—33 by Lightnings, seven by ack-ack, one by a Navy fighter, and another by a search plane.

The Japs tried again on Monday, 27 November, singling out a U.S. battleship in Leyte Gulf for attack. Of the 25 fighters, torpedo and dive bombers in the raiding force, 15 were shot down—13 by ship gun crews, two by Leyte-based Lightnings. "Some casualties and damage" resulted.

POINTS SOUTH. Japanese strong-points in the Netherlands Indies suffered their usual attacks. Twenty-three Jap fighters and three bombers were destroyed in a surprise raid on Macassar in Celebes on Wednesday, 22 November. All 26 planes were caught on the ground at the Mandal drome. In Macassar harbor a 6000-ton freighter was sunk; a gunboat and nine freighters were damaged.

Bomber patrols found exceptionally lucrative targets at the Japanese naval

base in Brunei Bay, Borneo. In repeated strikes during the week they damaged three freighter transports of 10,000, 7500, and 6000 tons; sank a destroyer escort. In less than two weeks over this harbor Allied planes have left crippled a battleship, a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, a destroyer, a destroyer escort, three transports.

Battle For Japan

Is Joined; B-29s

Twice Raid Tokyo

For the first time since the Doolittle raid in April 1942, American planes have bombed Tokyo, capital of the Japanese empire and the world's third largest city. This time it was no hit-and-run affair.

Industrial targets in Tokyo were hit twice in four days by a fleet of giant B-29 Superfortresses based at the recently-won Marianas Island of Saipan, 1505 miles to the south of the Japanese homeland. The first mission was carried out Friday, 24 November, the second on Monday, and both were described as "highly profitable."

Brig. Gen. Haywood Hansell, Jr., base commander of the 21st Bomber Command—designation of the newly-formed Saipan group—said Friday's raid did not come up to expectations so far as results were concerned. Weather was not entirely satisfactory and enemy resistance was sometimes severe. But Tokyo was under bombardment for more than two hours, and huge fires were still burning the day after the raid.

One of the Superforts was downed when a Japanese fighter pilot crash dove into the tail. Another went down in water 140 miles north of Saipan, but the crew were rescued by a Navy

destroyer. These were the only two aircraft lost on the raid.

HARVEST TIME. Tokyo's citizenry was celebrating the start of a two-day harvest festival when the bombers roared in over the city from two directions. The Japs were taken by surprise and heavy industrial targets were plastered with bombs. Principal among these was the Nakajima branch of the Musashina airplane company.

Few enemy fighters reached early waves of the 29s and antiaircraft fire was described as "spotty and inaccurate." Heaviest fire during the two-hour raid was drawn by the last plane in the formation, which was attacked by more than 100 fighters, most of them of a new type—twin engined and extremely fast.

THE SECOND. Monday's mass raid was directed chiefly at Tokyo's industrial waterfront and was accomplished without loss of a plane. Heavy cloud cover prevented observation of results. Surprising fact was that the bombers met practically no interception or anti-aircraft fire.

About the same time the War Department disclosed that B-29s based somewhere in India had attacked Bangkok in Siam. This assault likewise was achieved without combat loss, although airmen flew through cloudless skies, to bomb visually Japanese railroad marshalling yards and repair facilities.

THREE-DAY RECCO. Early in November a Superfort flew over Tokyo on reconnaissance on three different days, photographing vital targets around the capital. Prime among these targets was the airplane factory which produces a good portion of the Japanese air power. Bombing of this target is a continuation of the announced objective of defeating enemy air power either in the air or on the ground.

Contrary to popular belief, Tokyo is not completely a "tinder box," for after the 1923 earthquake and fire, which destroyed nearly half the city, construction was accomplished with

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materials and architectural styles that would withstand future ravages—including bombings. Before a recent Jap move to decentralize its industry, there were some 40,000 factories of all sizes in Tokyo, including textile mills, chemical and woodworking plants, and factories turning out metal products.

MORALE. Much of the population of more than six million is housed in matchbox dwellings in areas near concrete business buildings and apartment houses and fires started by the B-29s were undoubtedly among these residences. The Office of War Information, however, has said that, judging on the basis of civilian reaction to bombings in England and Germany, this type of destruction was likely to stiffen Jap resistance rather than demoralize the population.

Because of the access of the Saipan base to supply as contrasted to the China-based B-29s proximity, the volume of bombs dropped on Japan in the future will be tremendous. "One plane can strike Japan two and a half times from the Marianas in the time required for one 8000-mile target mission from our Orient bases, counting the distance from staging areas in India, from which planes must transport all supplies to the take-off areas in China," George Horne, a correspondent with the 20th Bomber Command points out.

General Arnold in a report to the President on the raid said: "This operation is in no sense a hit-and-run raid. It is a calculated extension of our air power. No part of the Japanese Empire is out of our range, no war factory too remote to feel our bombs. The battle for Japan has been joined."

General Arnold's confidence was shared by Rear Admiral John Cassidy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, who predicted that soon carriers would launch 1500 to 2000-plane raids against Japan. "Just as the Superfortress attacks are only beginning," he said, "likewise the full punch of our carrier aircraft is yet to be felt by the Japs."

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THE WAR IN EUROPE

Allies Push Ahead All Along Length Of Western Front

Tremendous Allied pressure along the entire western front from the Netherlands to Switzerland marked November's third week. The Germans were resisting fiercely everywhere; in some sectors they were counter-attacking.

The battle areas split into two great divisions, separated by the tiny Duchy of Luxembourg. The greater progress was being made along the southern front, where the Nazis appeared to be falling back to the natural defenses of the mountainous black forest and the Rhine river. While less ground was gained in the north, the tactical advantage of every yard of land taken was great. The Allies were fighting on the approaches to Germany's third city, Cologne, and the flatland beyond which leads to Berlin.

THE FORCES. Committed to battle in the northern sector were the British Second Army operating in the Netherlands and the American First and Ninth Armies attacking on German soil north and south of Aachen.

Opposition to this Allied force apparently consisted of a Panzer Army of several armored divisions, the old Seventh Army of Normandy, and, near the sea, the Fifteenth Army. Civilian correspondents referred to this German cordon as "Army Group B" and reported it commanded by Field Marshal General Walther von Model.

In the southern sector below Luxembourg the American Third and Seventh

Armies were engaged along with the French First Army. The Third was locked with the Enemy in the Moselle river area north of Metz and also east and south of that city. The other two armies were battling in a perimeter which almost completely surrounded the Vosges mountains.

GROUP G. Unofficial reports indicated the Allies in the south were being opposed by German "Army Group G," made up of the First and Nineteenth German Armies, formerly under Field Marshal General Johannes Blaskowitz, who was relieved recently.

Apparently General Eisenhower is holding a considerable force in reserve, as neither the First Canadian Army, which mopped up the stubbornly defended coastal areas, nor the First Allied Airborne Army were reported in action.

The British Second Army captured the village of Amerika and fanned out in a drive towards the Maas river at Grubbenvorst, four miles north of Venlo, while that city was also under attack. Farther south below other British Second Army elements fought their way into Hoven, but later withdrew.

TOWNS TAKEN. American forces in the northern sector took the German towns of Gellenkrohen, Eschweiler, Stolberg, and Roetgen, and U.S. First Army elements were reported to have occupied half of Weisweiler, German industrial city eight miles north-east of Aachen. Other First Army units, according to frontline reports, had broken through the Huertgen forest to gain the edges of the Cologne plain.

The ten-day battle through the dense and gloomy Huertgen forest was described as a "battle of horrors." Thousands of men fell on each side in the engagement, which resembled the famed action of World War I at Belleau Wood and the Argonne forest. Brightening weather enabled Allied dive bombers to come to the aid of American fighting men in this area,

while in retaliation the Germans sent robot bombs into front line positions.

GATEWAY TO RUHR. North of the Huertgen forest the U.S. Ninth Army sent forces to battle in Kosiär, to capture Bourheim and retake Puetzlohn. As German broadcasts asserted, "the defensive battle east of Aachen is approaching its climax," it became apparent the Americans were driving to envelop Juelich and Duren, thus posing a major threat to Cologne and the entire Ruhr industrial area. Cologne, highway hub and rail center with four great bridges crossing the Rhine, is considered the gateway to the Ruhr (MAPTALK, 16 September).

The Eifel mountains flatten out before reaching as far north as Cologne, and the only natural barriers now between the Allies and their objective are several rivers—perhaps the most important being the 200-foot Roer—and some low hills. Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions were thrown into the defense of the Cologne plain and Allied advances were measured in yards. Nevertheless, the northern offensive was of prime strategic importance, for if Cologne could be gained a great portion of German industry would be endangered and the broad path to Berlin would be open.

HEADED FOR SAAR. The upper portion of the southern sector saw elements of the U.S. Third Army capture the fortress-ringed city of Metz, known for ages in the history of Europe's wars as an insurmountable obstacle for invading armies. Third Army units gained a Saar valley front 20 miles in width and punched to within five miles of Sarreguinites, German escape route. Lieutenant General Patton's forces were two miles across the Saar river in the Postroff area, 18 miles south of Sarreguinites, while to the north the Tenth Armored Division took Butzdorf, three miles inside Germany and 14 miles southeast of the city of Luxembourg.

The Third Army was headed for the Saar, a great industrial and coal pro-

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ducting center, second only to the Ruhr in Germany's economy, and its spearheads were within 12 miles of Saarbrücken, capital of that region. The Third also seemed likely to become the extreme left flank of the American Seventh and French First Armies after joining forces with the Seventh in Saverne Gap.

SOUTHERN ADVANCES. The southern sector, where the American Seventh and French First Armies were working together, saw the most impressive gains of the week as to ground taken. The cities of Belfort, Mulhouse, and Strasbourg were captured, while an encircling force, closing on the Vosges mountains, threatened a force of from 40 to 50 thousand Germans.

The enemy pocket was approximately 4000-square miles in area, and was surrounded on three sides by Allied forces, while the Nazis had their backs to the Rhine. Aerial destruction of the Rhine bridges would pose a grave problem to the Germans in this sector, and while they still might escape, such an offensive blow would presumably force them to abandon much of their heavy equipment.

TO FREE ALSACE. Frenchmen, with the patriotic objective of freeing Alsace-Lorraine from German rule, pushed through the Belfort Gap to reach the Rhine, then drove down its left bank east of the Vosges mountains. Simultaneously the American Seventh Army pushed through Sarrebourg and the Saverne Pass to reach Strasbourg, capital of Alsace. As the week ended the French troops driving up from the south were pushing toward Colmar and had reached positions approximately 12 miles from the city.

Meanwhile, German troops, including a newly outfitted Panzer Division, were driving in the direction of Sarrebourg in an attempt to smash across the Saverne Gap through which the American Seventh Army advanced in the past week. The German attempt to split Allied forces was paced by Tiger and Panther tanks, and the

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Nazis retook the towns of Durstel, Drulinger, Veckersviller, and Eschwiller.

Fortresses and Liberators of the Eighth USAAF twice struck at the L'una synthetic oil plant at Merseburg, Germany, in large scale attacks. The factory has been one of Germany's main sources of fuel since the fields in Rumania and the Ukraine were recaptured.

Soviets Mark Time In East Prussia

Another week went by without any announcement of major action on the long-dormant Vistula river and East Prussian fronts. Again Red Army action was confined to the extreme north and south.

Troops of the Leningrad army joined with units of the Baltic fleet in an amphibious assault on the 1000-square mile island of Oesel, which guards the entrance into the Gulf of Riga. The German garrison was liquidated and Estonia completely liberated. Berlin reported a renewed offensive of Soviet forces attempting to clear some 200,000 Germans from the Courland peninsula of western Latvia.

Far to the south the Hungarian drive continued. The Red Army took Hatvan, but again the news was German in origin and not confirmed by Moscow. Hatvan is an important rail and road junction 22 miles north-east of Budapest, and also controls enemy communications between Budapest and Czechoslovakia, 36 miles to the north.

Soviet troops did announce the capture of Kerekharaszt, some two miles west of Hatvan. This cut the rail and highway lines between Budapest and Hatvan, and thus interrupted any transport between the Hungarian capital and Czechoslovakia. In the latter country the fourth Ukrainian army drove to points four miles east of the communications center of Michalovec.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Japs May Advance On Kweiyang From Three Directions

Indications are developing that the Japanese may drive on Kweiyang, capital of Kwelchow province on the Burma Road, from three directions.

In recent weeks the enemy has swept westward from Canton past Liuchow and Ishan to the Lung river, and with a possible objective Chungking, is now threatening the very center of the Chinese inland government. Japanese patrolling has been reported 185 miles southeast of Kweiyang and other Japanese activity has been reported 40 miles northwest of Kweilin, where some observers feel the blow at Kweiyang might be launched. The third possibility of a Jap drive might come from Paojing, west of Hengyang in Hunan province and 290 miles northeast of Kweiyang.

NO LOSS BUT A SETBACK. The loss of Kweiyang would not isolate Chungking, which is 200 miles north of Kweiyang, because there are two routes to the capital. Japanese control of Kweiyang, however, would threaten air bases inland from which the 14th has been operating, as well as the B-29 Superfortresses.

Major General Wedemeyer, American Army Chief in China and Chiang Kai Shek's chief of staff, says he believes a ground campaign will be necessary in China to defeat the Japanese. Pointing out Admiral Nimitz' recently expressed opinion that we would have to engage the Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland, General Wedemeyer said: "We'll need a continental force to close with them and for employment of our air forces." The General revealed

that his plan for employment of forces in China against the Japanese has been accepted by Chiang Kai Shek and that the plan is now being put into operation.

INDO-CHINA. General Wedemeyer said Jap troops in Indo-China below Kunming do not constitute an immediate threat, because the route of the Burma Road passes north of those forces. The replacement of Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, Jap commander in chief in China since 1941, does not indicate a weakening of the Jap command in China either, General Wedemeyer said, because Hata's successor, General Yasuji Okamura, is a "wise and adept mountain fighter."

B-24 Liberators of the 14th Air Force bombed the Hankow waterfront area and Samah Bay installations on Hainan Island, while other planes raided the Hengyang and Paojing airfields during the week. Mustang fighter bombers have struck at Japanese troops pushing northwest from Ishan.

Enemy Losing His Hold On Mandalay

Japanese holdings north of Mandalay are considerably less secure because of Allied progress in Burma during the last six weeks.

British, Chinese, and American forces are driving into the heart of Burma from three main directions. On a 70-mile front in the middle Chindwin valley between Sittaung in the north to around Kalewa in the south, British and Indian divisions are moving on Jap strongholds. South from Mogaung in north Burma British and Chinese units are advancing along the Burma railway from Mogaung to Mandalay, and are fighting in the sector of Katha and Indaw. A third Chinese force is pushing down the Bhamo road from Myitkyina, seeking juncture with the main body of Chinese battling from

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Yunnan province south along the old Burma Road.

As yet these thrusts have made no lateral east-west contacts, but a situation is developing in which such links may be possible and a continuous front may be formed across Burma.

RACE FOR BHAMO. The fighting around Bhamo probably assumes the most immediate importance, for it is a race against the Japanese driving west from Canton and Liuchow toward Kweiyang in China to reopen the Burma Road and supply Chinese troops. The attacking Chinese have completely surrounded Bhamo, isolating the Jap garrison estimated at 1000.

Bypassing Bhamo, a Chinese force has pushed south on the main road from Bhamo to Muse, north of Lashio, and is seeking contact with the Yunnan Chinese. Mountain passes leading to the Chefang valley in western China, over which the Burma Road passes, have been cleared by the west-bound Chinese in Yunnan. Two columns are descending on Chefang

SOLDIERS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Filipinos who have continued their resistance to the Japanese after General Wainwright's capitulation on 6 May, 1942, are now recognized soldiers in the Philippine Army, according to President Osmena's Executive Order No. 21 (28 October).

Stating that their action "has written in blood an epic of courage, devotion and loyalty to the Government and people of the Philippines" and acknowledging their contribution to the Allied military effort and to the liberation of the Filipino people, President Osmena declared that all those who had served with "a recognized military force" were considered to be on active service in the Philippine Army.

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PROMOTIONS

The Italian front saw a change in the high command last week as General Sir Harold Alexander was made a Field Marshal and appointed to succeed Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre.

General Maitland-Wilson was appointed to succeed the late Field Marshal Sir John Dill as chief of the British joint staff mission in Washington. Lieutenant General Mark Clark of the U.S. Army has been made Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Fifteenth Army Group in Italy.

itself with support of American dive bombers.

Japanese determination to prevent the reopening of the Burma Road seems to be stiffening. Hill defense positions east of the Shweli river may enable the enemy to throw up a stubborn resistance.

"A recognized military force" was defined as any force under a commander who had been appointed, designated, or recognized by General MacArthur. The order confirmed all temporary grades and ranks of men and officers.

SAME PAY. In Executive Order No. 22 of the same day President Osmena fixed the salaries and allowances for officers and enlisted men.

Basic pay for both corresponds to that of soldiers in the U.S. army, ranging from 50 dollars a month for privates to 8000 dollars per annum for major generals (the Philippines' highest). Filipinos, however, get no increase because of foreign service, nor for length of service, nor for duty requiring regular and frequent aerial flights.

The Enemy's Way - I.

JAPAN'S BLACK DRAGON

INTRODUCTION

Curious analogies continue to be drawn between the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler and the Imperial Government of Japan; inescapable analogies based on the fact that each regime exists under a system whereby force replaces reason and fanaticism logic. The Nazi ersatz religion that pictures Adolf Hitler as a modern demigod destined by divine authority to lead Germany to preeminence in the world is a Teutonic carbon copy of Japanese Shinto, which adores the Emperor of Japan, descendant of the Sun-goddess, divinely ordained ruler of men.

To Americans, who are accustomed to applying to all questions the simple democratic yardstick of majority rule, both Nazi Germany and feudal Japan are almost beyond understanding. Yet both must be studied carefully and understood thoroughly, because in their way of life lies a menace to America far beyond even the military aggression which is now being put down by the force of the arms of free men.

This menace to our way of life is the threat inherent in the use of force in government, unscrupulously wielded by men mad with the lust for power. America has already known such men and such methods. America has had its Aaron Burrs and its John Browns and its Huey Longs, its carpet-baggers, its Klu-Kluxers, and its gangsters. But they all have been stopped by a people who have shown, in this more than in any other single thing, the true measure of their greatness. On the other hand Japan and Germany are hideous living examples of what can happen when people are less alert, or less jealous of their birthright as human beings.

MAPTALK, in this and future articles, will analyze the institutions

of Germany and Japan, not only as an aid to understanding the forces that seek our destruction from without, but also as an index to corollary evils that would destroy us from within.

Germany has its brutal Gestapo, Japan its thought-control police. But overshadowing all organizations in either country in sheer fanaticism is the notorious Black Dragon Society which has been part and parcel of the entire Japanese program of violent aggression in the Far East.

Up until recently the doings of this mysterious league were shrouded in an impenetrable veil of secrecy. Oblique mention was made of Black Dragon activities, but actual compiled knowledge rested only with the Society's own supreme council. Even its origin was obscure, and great Tokyo daily newspapers indicated the name of the Society's leader only with asterisks. All Japan feared the Black Dragon. Its operatives honeycombed the Far East. Men died violently because the Black Dragons willed it.

But wars have a way of bringing light to many a hitherto dark subject, and this war toward which the Black Dragon Society had long worked has revealed many of its secrets. For the first time the tremendous power wielded by this organization has actually become known. Through the whole fantastic story one name keeps emerging, the name so dread that Japanese newspapers dared not print it—the name of Mitsuru Toyama.

Mitsuru Toyama, mastermind of the Black Dragons, died a few weeks ago in Japan at an advanced old age. Died peacefully in bed. Mitsuru Toyama, who sent assassins on their way to mur-

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der Japanese statesmen, who "permitted" his men to commit hara-kiri when they failed in a mission, who directly or indirectly caused death by violence to come to millions—died peacefully in bed, a venerable figure of a man with a wispy white beard.

ORIGIN. Beginnings of the Black Dragon Society go back to the restoration of the Emperors in 1867. In that year the Emperor Meiji abolished the rule of the shoguns who had operated a tight military dictatorship over Japan since the beginning of the thirteenth century. During this dictatorship of the shoguns the Emperors had lived in seclusion at Kyoto, divorced from authority, and carrying out religious rituals as high priests of the Sun-goddess.

The Emperor Meiji changed all that, once again taking into the hands of the Imperial house the ruling of the island empire. In 1877, however, a powerful court faction headed by the Lords of Satsuma began to fear that Japan was becoming too western in her ideas, and rebelled, hoping to keep Japan to her ancient religion, Shinto, the Way of the Gods. With this group

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Meiji compromised, thus solidifying his hold. By the terms of the compromise Shinto was to become not only the national religion of Japan, but also the mainspring of national policy. (See Maptalk, Vol. 1, No. 3, 10 March: Shinto)

ENTER TOYAMA. In 1890 Mitsuru Toyama, then a young Samurai, conceived an idea of setting up a secret society to watch developments and to make sure that this compromise was carried out, and especially to make sure that the national policy of Nippon remained faithful to the Shinto plan of world conquest.

Around him he gathered a group of young officers, mostly of the Satsuma clan; and these young fanatics bound themselves together by solemn oath as follows:

"We swear to sleep only four hours each night as a sign of our vigilance. We swear to eat sparingly in token of our determination not to take life easily until our mission is completed. We swear not to use any product of the outer world as a sign that we must impose on the entire world our civilization. We swear to commit hara-kiri if commanded to do so by our leader. We swear to carry out any order in any country to which we may be commissioned . . ."

From the very beginning the course of the society was clear. It was to be an organization that would stop at nothing to gain world conquest for Japan. It was to have religious trappings that would strengthen its fanatic spirit. The original 150 members held weekly meetings, clad in black kimonos with a round white disk on the back, and with the top of the kimono lengthened to form a cape that covered all of the face except the eyes.

TO WAR. The society was not long in getting started on its sworn mission of pressuring the Japanese into wars of conquest. In 1894 the young fanatics forced Japan into a war with China over Korea. And with this accomplished, they began to plot the

war against Russia in minute detail. Plan of the society was to drive the Russians back beyond the Amur River that borders Manchuria on the north; and it was from this circumstance that the society took its name, since the Japanese interpretation of the characters spelling the name of the Amur River (Kokuryuke) signify "Black Dragon."

The campaign of the Black Dragon Society to force Japan to war with Russia was eminently successful. Its members inflamed public opinion with cleverly circulated propaganda, and ceaselessly hammered away at public officials until the tension became impossible to sustain. Japan went to war with a sneak attack that became a precedent for Pearl Harbor.

Japan gained her aims in the Russo-Japanese war, and the Black Dragon Society rocketed to a position of tremendous power and influence.

AND NOW THE WORLD. There followed years of plotting and planning by Mitsuru Toyama and his Black Dragons, all designed for one end—supreme rule of Japan over the civilized world. With these dreams for a strictly third-string nation, Toyama was shooting very high, but with the weirdly religious aspect of his appeal, the curious, twisted notion of setting the world to Shinto, the way of the gods, his fanatical group continued to gain new and powerful recruits.

Of course there was reaction to the extreme policies of the Black Dragon Society. There were even several attempts to have the organization outlawed and disbanded. But they all failed, and it is believed that this failure to halt the work of this super gang was largely due to the fact that the Emperors themselves have been closely associated with it. In addition Mitsuru Toyama was shrewd enough to secure the firmest kind of financial backing from prominent Japanese financial organizations.

BIGWIG DRAGONS. Besides Toyama and his mysterious connec-

tions in high Japanese circles, the names of many other powerful figures are associated with the ascendancy of the Society. Chief among these is Kingoro Hashimoto, a career man in the Imperial Japanese Army, who was prominent in the Panay incident, when the U.S. gunboat was destroyed by attacking Japanese planes long before Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of open warfare.

Hashimoto started off his Black Dragon career by organizing the Japanese Youth Party, believed to be a junior branch of the Society itself.

"I am looking," said Hashimoto, "far and wide for pure hearted youths to work for the cause of the Imperial Nation, whose policy is to write in letters of fire its own message in the eight corners of the universe." And while Hashimoto was finding his "pure-hearted youths" another young recruit to the Black Dragon Society was furthering its aims by connivance with the Axis powers. Selgo Nakano, a Japanese politician, member of the Diet, hastened to Europe almost immediately after he joined the Society, his mission to interview both Hitler and Mussolini. He was the man who in 1941 said "time is running short . . ." and that "Japan must blast her way to Singapore and the Persian Gulf . . ."

DRAGON MURDERS. With all of this power concentrated in his hands Mitsuru Toyama hesitated at nothing. In 1921 President Harding, reflecting the American dream of world peace, invited the great powers to assemble at Washington to consider mutual reduction of armament. Representing Japan at this conference was Premier Hara, who signed the famous 5-5-3 treaty setting the ratio between British, American, and Japanese naval power. In so signing he penned his name to his own death warrant.

When Hara returned to Tokyo he was given a banquet to celebrate his mission. But at the banquet he was handed an order signed by the Black Dragon, an order to repudiate publicly his agreement to the naval limitation.

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Hara apparently had forgotten the power of the Black Dragons, or else he was a man of unusual principle. A second note was handed to him, signed also by the Black Dragon, and then a third. All of these Hara ignored, and the banquet proceeded without disturbance.

But when Hara left the banquet hall the assassins of the Black Dragon Society were upon him. One knifed him in the back, while another cut his throat. The whole gathering was thrown into an uproar, and by the time bystanders reached the assassins they had committed hara-kiri.

What effect did this have on the government of Japan? The murder of Hara served as a very effective warning, apparently, because very shortly after the assassination it was publicly announced that attempts would be made to modify the agreement made at Washington. And at the same time a special guard was placed over every member of the Japanese cabinet. Every entrance to the Diet was closely guarded. The Black Dragon had shown its claws, and Japan's officialdom was cowering.

SPECIAL MEETING. Next incident to focus attention on Mitsuru Toyama's fanatics came about consistently as part of the Black Dragon Society's plan for conquest. In January of 1932 a special meeting of the Black Dragon Council was summoned. The Army and the Navy had been demanding large sums of money to finance further conquest, and the money was not being made available to them as rapidly as the Shinto spirit would insist. Shutoku Tori and all the council members were present. Clearly something "big" was to be considered.

Two weeks later Finance Minister Inouye was presented with the demand for more money for the Army and Navy. He refused point blank. While he was speaking in the Diet a paper was handed to him, bearing the ominous sign of the Black Dragon. Inouye turned a ghastly white, cut his

speech off short and left the Diet. Next morning he was found with a knife in his throat—a knife emblazoned with the sign that Japan knew so well.

The Diet was hastily convened, and the largest appropriations ever voted prior to the present war were rushed through for Japan's army and navy. The Imperial fighting forces began their sudden growth that paved the way for Pearl Harbor.

DISSENTERS. Men in public life for the most part either concurred in Black Dragon aims, or through fear remained silent and acquiescent. But a few stoutly resisted. Premier Tsuyoshe Inukai was one such man; and the memory of the death of Inouye was still fresh in the public mind when he rose and denounced the Society, declaring it to be a menace to Japan. That way lay death, and Inukai probably knew it.

When the young men of the Black Dragon entered his house one night, the old man knew exactly what was in store. Nevertheless he spoke to them: "This evening is young and you have plenty of time to hear me and consider what I have to say. You claim to be devoting your lives to the good of our country . . . So do I . . . But I choose other methods, and better . . . I do not fear you . . ."


While the larger body of Black Dragon assassins was listening to the Premier, two who had been selected to do the actual killing moved in close behind him and stabbed him to death.

This murder, following so closely on the other terror killings, forced the government to act, to bring the guilty to trial. There were those who secretly hoped that Mitsuru Toyama and the Black Dragons had overstepped themselves. But there were others who had come to believe as fantastically as the Dragons themselves in the ultimate destiny of Japan's rule over the world.

The Black Dragon was not forced to sheath its claws.

(Part Two of this series will deal with the trial of the assassins of Premier Inukai.)

Key to Newsmap Philippine Is. Series



ARMY TALK What Must We Do With Germany After The War?

Note to I & E Officer: This discussion text is suggested as a logical follow-up to the Army Talk of last week on pan-Germanism. It does not intend to lay down any final conclusions, but rather purports (1) to suggest the principal aims we would like to achieve through our treatment of defeated Germany; (2) and to study the various means proposed for their achievement.

WHAT DID THE Allied Governments do, or leave undone, in 1918 which made it possible for Germany to start another war within 20 years?

One view is that the terms imposed on the Germans were too hard. There were, it is said, five features of the peace treaty of 1919 which were certain to be bitterly resented by the Germans, and therefore to make them wish to reverse the decision by another war as soon as they could get ready for it. These features were:

1. **Reparations.** The treaty required Germany to pay very large sums as "reparations" for the physical damage to other countries by the German armies.

2. **Military occupation.** Some parts of Germany—mainly the Rhineland—were, according to the treaty, to be occupied by small Allied forces for 15 years, to ensure Germany's fulfillment of the provisions of the treaty. The costs of this occupation were to be paid by Germany.

3. **Disarmament.** Germany was pledged by the treaty to limit the size of her army to a hundred thousand men, with no heavy artillery—enough men to keep order at home but not enough to be a danger to any other country. At the same time the Allies promised to cut down their own armaments extensively. These promises, the Germans claimed, were not kept.

4. **"War guilt."** The German delegates who signed the treaty were required to admit that the war had been "caused" by the aggression of Germany and her allies. Most Germans rejected and violently resented this forced confession.

5. **Loss of territories.** Certain territories previously under German rule were awarded by the peace treaty to other countries. The most important of these were: a strip across East Prussia (the "Corridor") awarded to Poland to give that landlocked country access to the sea; the port of Danzig, at the end of the Corridor, which was made a Free City under the League of Nations; Upper Silesia, claimed by Poland, of which the smaller but industrially more im-

portant part was finally assigned to that country; Alsace and Lorraine, which had been taken by Germany from France in 1871 and were now restored to France; and the German colonies in Africa and the Pacific.

Those who take this first view say that if these five points had been left out of the peace treaty of 1919, the Germans would have accepted their defeat quietly, would have settled down peaceably to their own affairs, and would have had no wish to go to war again.

Another view is that, though some mistakes were probably made in the peace treaty, the things that happened in Germany between 1919 and 1939 and resulted in another war were not mainly caused by these features of the peace settlement, but that those happenings could have been prevented by other measures which the Allies might have taken, but did not take. Those who hold this opinion point out that most of the provisions of the peace treaty to which the Germans objected were never enforced, or were very soon repealed.

1. **Reparations.** Germany never paid a cent of reparations, except out of loans made to her by Allied governments or their citizens; and she paid back in this way only about one-third of the loans.

2. **Military occupation.** Some Allied forces began to evacuate the Rhineland seven years sooner than the treaty required, and within nine years the last foreign soldier had left German soil.

3. **Disarmament.** The requirement of German disarmament was never enforced. It is now known that almost on the day after the Armistice in 1918 the military leaders of Germany began to plan to build up gradually a great new army. They did so at first secretly, but within a few years it became increasingly apparent that rearmament was going on. And the governments of the other countries made no serious effort to prevent it. What were called "control commissions" were appointed, it is true, to report as to whether Germany was keeping to the disarmament requirements of the treaty, but by 1926 (after the commissions' investigations had shown that she was not doing so) even this slight attempt at control was given up. In 1935, in open violation of the treaty, universal compulsory military service was reintroduced.

4. **"War guilt."** The forced admission of "war guilt" by Germany had no practical meaning except as a basis for claims to reparations—which were never paid; and this admission was officially repudiated by President von Hindenburg in 1927 without protest from the Allies.

Thus, among the points in the peace treaty which the Germans resented most, two were never carried out and two others ceased to have any practical effect within ten years. But it was

another ten years after these alleged grievances had been removed that Germany started the present war. It was not, therefore, a desire of the Germans to get these features of the peace treaty changed that caused the war.

5. **Loss of territories.** The territories taken from Germany in 1919 were, of course, not restored to her. But it is held by those who take the second view that the claims of other countries to these territories were better than those of Germany.

Whether or not those claims were better in every case, the aggressive behavior of the Germans after 1933 under Nazi leadership cannot be explained on the basis of desire to recover lost territories. The Nazi's first demand was for annexation to the German Reich of all lands occupied by people supposed to be of German "race," even though those lands had never been a part of the Reich. Hitler's first steps were to annex Austria in 1938 and parts of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39. Neither of these countries had ever been a part of the German Empire, and most of the people in the regions of Czechoslovakia taken over by Germany were not German either in "race" or speech.

What Could Have Been Done?

If this war was not caused by what the Allies did to Germany in the peace treaty of 1919 and afterward, was it, on the contrary, due to what the Allies failed to do?

A good many students of the subject answer, Yes. What was necessary to prevent Germany from going to war again, they say, was to make it impossible for her to do so with any hope of success. And this was precisely what was not done. If the disarmament of Germany, required by the treaty, had really been enforced, and if the Allied countries had not allowed their own forces, especially their mechanized infantry and their air forces, to fall below Germany's, no German government would have dared to disturb the peace of the world. For no government starts a war which it knows it is practically certain to lose. But since Germany had been allowed to build up the strongest military force in the world, a quick and easy German victory looked, to Hitler and his generals, like a sure thing.

The Allied governments, it is argued, could not in 1919 foresee, and could not do much to control, the ideas and feelings that the Germans would have after the war. But they could have made it clear to the Germans that their real interest lay in peace and in cooperation with other nations in the establishment of an orderly and law-abiding world community. This could have been done only by resisting every aggressive move on Germany's part and by making it certain in advance that another resort to war would be disastrous to

Germany. Instead, after 1924 they increasingly tried to "appease" Germany, and when Hitler came to power they helped to build up his prestige among his countrymen by repeatedly yielding to him—even allowing him to annex territories and whole countries under the threat of war, in violation of his own treaties and promises. The effect of this was not to pacify Hitler but to increase his demands, to encourage the spirit of aggression among Germans, and to make them feel that no country could resist them.

What Should Be Done?

Most Americans would probably agree that there are six things that we should chiefly wish to accomplish after our victory in this war:

1. To prevent Germany from starting another war.
2. To render justice to the countries in Europe that Germany has invaded, looted, and devastated.
3. To bring about the economic recovery of Europe as rapidly as possible—that is, the renewal of the production of useful goods and of international trade, upon which the prosperity of all countries and the full employment of labor largely depend.
4. To punish Germans responsible for Germany's aggression and for illegal or inhumane acts against civilians or members of the military forces of the United Nations.
5. To assist Germany to become a country that is free and democratic—that is, one in which freedom of speech, of political action, and of worship are guaranteed, and in which the majority of the people have power to choose their lawmakers and other officials in free elections.
6. To convert Germany into a peaceful, law-abiding, and co-operative member of the community of nations.

Preventing Future Aggression

These things, which everybody desires, would be achieved if either one of two things happened: (1) Germany was made incapable of starting another war, (2) the minds of Germans were so changed that they would not wish to start another and would not permit their government to lead them into one. Neither of these things, as we have seen, happened after the last war. If our aim is to prevent what did happen the last time from happening again, upon which of these preventives shall we rely?

Some people think that we must rely chiefly upon what has been called "moral disarmament"—a change in the state of mind of a sufficient number of Germans so that no future ruler or government will be able to lead the country into another war of aggression. It is pointed out that, in the last free election in Germany,

the Nazis and the parties with a similar program had a bare majority; and it is argued that, after the Nazis have brought Germany to a ruinous defeat, most of those who had been infected with Nazi ideas will revolt violently against them (as some have already begun to do) and will realize that militarism and aggression are the road to disaster.

There will thus, it is said, be a great majority of Germans who will want only peace and a quiet life and a fair opportunity to rebuild their industry and trade. But this will happen only if the victors do not impose upon the Germans requirements that will keep them in poverty or deeply humiliate their national pride. If such requirements are avoided, it is said by those who take this hopeful view, Germany after this war will not be a menace to the peace of the world.

But there are many students of German history and politics who think that Germany will almost certainly "try it again" if she is able to do so. Millions of young Germans, they point out, have from childhood been indoctrinated in the spirit and the ideas of Nazism and have never known any others. Defeat will only make them more bitter than ever against the enemies of their creed. Few Germans will be willing to admit to themselves that their soldiers have fought and died in an evil cause; they will inevitably

feel intense resentment against the victors. And this resentment will be increased by measures which the United Nations will be bound to take in simple justice to Germany's victims in the war—the restoration of territories claimed and conquered by Germany, payment for at least a part of the immense amount of private property destroyed or looted in occupied countries, punishment of war criminals. And the conditions of life for Germans for some years after the war—apart from anything the United Nations may then do—will certainly be desperately hard, with the principal industrial plants ruined by bombings, their production brought to a minimum, their foreign trade lost, many of their great cities largely destroyed. The Germans will not blame themselves for all this. They will not blame the war which they started. They will blame their enemies. It is therefore to be expected that the Germans will again attempt a war of revenge—if or when they see any chance of success in such a war.

Some other students of the subject take a middle view. The truth is, they say, that nobody can be certain what the state of mind of the majority of Germans will be after the war. It is possible that they will be completely fed up with Nazism and militarism

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and eager to return to the ways of peace and to regain the good will of their neighbors. But though this is a possibility, it is not a safe bet. The United States and other countries cannot afford to risk their own future peace and security on the chance, which is probably a slim chance, that a defeated Germany will be a peaceably disposed and friendly Germany. The only prudent course for the United Nations is to assume that she will not be, and therefore to do whatever is necessary to make it impossible for her to disturb the peace of the world again.

Here's How

Three ways of making this impossible have been proposed.

1. The first has already been mentioned: the complete disarmament of Germany. That this cannot be brought about merely by getting the Germans to promise to remain disarmed is shown by what happened between 1919 and 1939. If there is to be disarmament, it must be enforced. To enforce it, it would be necessary to prohibit the manufacture or purchase by Germany of any military aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery, warships, and the training of land forces, except a small militia for keeping order at home. To prevent secret violations of these prohibitions, it would be necessary to keep control commissions in Germany with power to visit and search all German plants, storehouses, and militia headquarters. To back up the control commissions, it would be necessary to keep contingents of Allied troops on German soil, though these contingents need not be very large. If these things were done, disarmament could probably be effectively enforced, so long as the Allied governments were determined to enforce it.

But it is certain that these measures would arouse intensely bitter feeling among the Germans against the United Nations. So long as there is enforced military disarmament, "moral disarmament" cannot be expected. And it is improbable that enforcement could be continued indefinitely. An industrial nation of 70 million people can hardly be kept permanently under this sort of foreign control and occupation. There would sooner or later be opposition to it among the United Nations themselves, as there was before; some of them would want to bring their occupying troops back home, or to be able to sell to Germany goods that could be used for military purposes. Disarmament would therefore probably have to be for a limited period, say 20 or 30 years.

2. But before the end of this period a different way might be adopted for making it impossible for Germany to attempt future aggressions with any hope of success—namely, by making it impossible for any country to do so. This would mean the establishment of a system of "collective security," or collective enforcement

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of the peace, with prompt suppression of acts of aggression. Under such a system, it is argued, the special danger of future aggression by Germany would disappear, and the bad effects of prolonged enforced disarmament upon the German mind would be avoided; for, so far as the ability to make war upon other nations is concerned, Germany would be in the same position as every other country.

3. A third way proposed for making Germany impotent to start a war is dismemberment, that is, breaking up the Reich into a number of small, independent countries. Before the German Empire was formed in 1871, the word "Germany" was simply a name for a collection of separate states, each with its own government and army (except that one group of them had already formed a partial federation). If Germany were again divided up in this way, it is argued, she would cease to be a menace to other nations, for she could not act as a unit, and little countries are never dangerous to other and larger countries.

Those who oppose this plan do so mainly for two reasons. They point out, first, that there is nothing that would embitter Germans more than to be forcibly kept divided when they intensely desired to be "Germans." It would be dangerous to have a people of 70 millions in the center of Europe who would be in a state of permanent smoldering rage over what they would regard as an intolerable interference with their freedom to choose their own system of government. And it is pointed out, secondly, that it is in the long run very difficult, if not impossible, to keep people divided who want to unite. The separate states could hardly be prevented from making secret or open agreements to act together—and to go to war together to achieve the political union for which they were eager. In 1870-71 the then separate German states did act as a unit in the war against France—and they won the war and formed themselves into a single united empire.

The Promoters of War

Many who agree that in some way Germany must, for a long time, be made incapable of going to war again, also think that something can be done to decrease the likelihood that she will be inclined to do so. To accomplish this they propose the elimination of the groups chiefly responsible for this war. These would, of course, include the Nazi leaders; but Hitler was at first the tool of two small but powerful groups—the Junkers and the industrial royalists—who were the real originators and planners of the war; and it was they who made his success possible. If the power of these groups is not destroyed in Germany, the elimination of the Nazi party, it is said, will accomplish little; they, or others of the

same type, will again secretly plan for another war, and will find new tools when they are ready to use them.

Since it was in these groups that the war spirit had its chief source, one thing that must be done after this war—it is argued—is to destroy that source. The great landed estates must be taken away from the Junkers, be broken up into small farms, and given to the peasants. The concentration of the control of industry in a few hands, with the political power that goes with that control, must be ended, at first by placing the management of the big plants under a commission of the United Nations, and later—if or when a democratic government is set up in Germany—by letting the German people decide for themselves what the future ownership and management of their great industries shall be.

Justice to Germany's Victims

No one, outside of the Axis countries, has any doubt that Germany started the war in Europe and is responsible for the resulting sufferings and damages. But over and above the devastation caused by military operations in various invaded and occupied countries, the Germans have killed civilians to a total of millions, deported millions of others from their homes, reduced those who remained to starvation or near-starvation, systematically stolen all the more valuable private property they could take away, and, in some regions, destroyed what they could not remove.

Much of this loss can never be made good; dead men, women, and children cannot be brought back to life, nor ruined health restored. But the immense physical damage done to the occupied countries will have to be repaired by someone before the people of those countries can get back to normal, or even tolerable, conditions of life. Who shall pay the bill for this huge work of restoring Europe? Justice would plainly require that it be paid, so far as possible, by those who deliberately caused the damage—by Germany and not by her victims. This could be done, to some extent, by compelling Germany to return stolen goods not already used up or destroyed, to provide German laborers to rebuild devastated regions, and to pay in money or in goods for the other costs of rebuilding them.

But it is necessary to bear in mind that there are limits to the possibility of this. Germany herself will for some time be too poor to pay anything like the whole bill. Many of the other coun-



tries will be unwilling to receive German goods—even free goods—in great quantity, for they will feel that this would hamper the recovery of their own industries and decrease the opportunities of employment for their own people. For these and other reasons the attempt, after the last war, to make Germany pay was unsuccessful.

Economic Recovery of Europe

The more quickly the industries of Europe as a whole are restored to full production and the sooner normal trade between countries is resumed, the sooner will prosperity return to Europe and to all parts of the world. Germany has the greatest productive capacity of any European country except, probably, Russia. For a time this capacity will be much reduced as a result of the war. Many think it desirable, in the interest of the general renewal of industry and trade, that Germany be permitted and assisted to recover her power of production as much and as fast as possible. Even her ability to pay reparations will depend upon this. A poor and unproductive Germany means that other countries will be poorer, too; for the other countries need manufactured goods and raw materials that Germany can supply, and need the German market for their own products.

On the other hand, it is felt by some people that a rapid and complete recovery of German industry will be dangerous to the security of other countries. One of the surest ways, they say, of making it impossible for her to start another war, is to prevent her from rebuilding her industries on any large scale; for military power depends on industrial power. If she again becomes the foremost country on the European continent in the number, size, equipment, and output of her plants, she will also surpass all her neighbors in the means of waging war.

There is here a seeming conflict between two purposes, both of which we should, if possible, wish to accomplish—economic recovery and military security. But it may be possible to accomplish both of them, if we can prevent Germany from manufacturing instruments of war while leaving her free to develop all her other industries to the limit of her ability—and if we make sure that the armed forces which would quickly be brought into action against her, if she should attempt any future aggression, will always be overwhelmingly more powerful than any forces which she could muster.

Can Germany Practice Democracy?

Nearly all Americans would agree that it is immensely to be desired that Germany should become a free and democratic country. There are, as has been said above, some who think that it will come

about of itself—that the Germans, after ten years' experience of what despotism is like and what it leads to, will have learned to detest that system and will themselves set up free and democratic political institutions. It is to be hoped that this prediction will prove true. But it must be remembered that the Germans had a republican form of government for 13 years after the last war, that it did not work at all well, and that in the end they rejected it, or at least permitted it to be overthrown practically without resistance. There were large democratic groups, especially among the workers, but they lacked able and vigorous leadership, and the anti-democratic forces proved to be the stronger. It may turn out so again.

The question is, what, if anything, can the United Nations do to help those Germans who want to establish and maintain freedom and democracy? Something could be done during the period of Allied military control by placing local government—of towns, cities, and finally of larger regions—in the hands of the former opponents of Nazism (most of whom will be found in jails and concentration camps), if there are enough of these who are capable of performing administrative duties. During the same period, also, the United Nations can forbid Nazi propaganda, remove Nazi teachers from the schools, and put in their places teachers loyal to democratic principles and ideals.

There are some people who think that the only way to make Germany democratic is for the United Nations to take control of German education until a whole new generation has been taught to understand and believe in the ideas of democracy. But there are at least two difficulties about this proposal. The first is that education imposed or directed by foreigners—and by former enemies—is almost certain to arouse intense mental resistance; it would probably produce just the opposite effect to the one that it seeks to produce. The other difficulty is that Allied military government of Germany cannot be continued indefinitely. Sooner or later, control of their own affairs, their own politics and education, must be turned back to the Germans. After that is done, the choice will be up to them, and no one can be absolutely sure what their choice will be. If there is a strong and determined majority who want individual liberty and a government of the people by the people and for the people, it will be in their power to get it. If they don't want it, or if they get it (as they did in 1920) but are not sufficiently determined to keep it, no one else can give it to them. You can't force freedom on a people; they must win it and guard it for themselves.



- Q. How far is it from Manila to Tokyo?
A. Approximately 2000 miles.
- Q. SWPA forces have penetrated Japan's defense perimeter to a point considerably west of Tokyo. How far west?
A. Our forces on Leyte are now fighting on land 850 miles west of Tokyo. Actually we've been operating west of the Japanese capital since the Hollandia landing last April.
- Q. Who is Petko Stainov?
A. Foreign Minister of Bulgaria. Last month, representing his country before an Allied Commission, he signed an armistice with Russia, Britain, and the United States.
- Q. How much of total army cargo going overseas comes to the Pacific?
A. In his annual report Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, CG of the Army Service Forces, said that of all army cargo shipped overseas during the fiscal year ending June 30 about 40 per cent went across the Pacific, 60 per cent across the Atlantic. He also disclosed that 70 per cent of all soldiers were transported to Atlantic theaters, 30 per cent to Pacific.
- Q. Who commands the XXIV Corps on Leyte? The X Corps?
A. Major General John R. Hodge commands the XXIV Corps; Major General Franklin Sibert the X Corps.

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- Q. Has any portion of Norway been freed?
A. Yes. Russian forces, chasing Germans fleeing from Finland, have crossed the border far north in the arctic to take over Kirkenes, an iron-ore port, once used by the Nazis as an air and submarine base.
- Q. Where is the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional)?
A. In France. Recently formed to operate on the western front, it marks the first time in this war that American and French fliers have been banded together in a single air force. Its commander is Major General Ralph Royce, who is best remembered as the leader of the last raid on Japanese positions in the Philippines, before the fall of Corregidor.
- Q. How much oil is being supplied Japan by the Netherlands Indies?
A. Japan is believed to be dependent upon the East Indies for at least 80 per cent of her oil supply.
- Q. The old reliable Long Tom artillery rifle has a range of about 14 1/2 miles. What is the range of the new Super Tom, which has been recently introduced on the western front?
A. 20 miles. Its shell weighs 200 pounds as compared to the 95-pounder fired by the Long Tom.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 23 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 9 DEC., 1944

RESTRICTED

The Japs Keep Coming, Dying; 25,000 Drowned

Japanese efforts to reinforce the defenders of Leyte last week had cost them 25,000 men, 29 transports of an aggregate tonnage of 103,750 tons, and 18 escort vessels.

This was the toll announced by General MacArthur's headquarters after Allied planes, in a two-day pursuit, had smashed the seventh enemy convoy seeking to debark troops and supplies at Ormoc Bay. It represents one of the most extravagant judgments in military history. Apparently trying to overcome American superiority in equipment and firepower with superiority in numbers, General Yamashita already has sacrificed about 75,000 men (nearly 50,000 on land, MAPTALK, 25 November).

FOUR DOWN. The latest convoy to go down was sighted Wednesday afternoon, 29 November, off Kasbate, a staging port on the island of Cebu to Leyte's west. Fighters struck at mast-height throughout the afternoon and renewed the battle over Ormoc Thursday morning. One 9000-ton troop transport and three smaller freighter transports were sunk, while a 6000-ton freighter and a destroyer were set afire

without being able to unload. Some 6000 Japanese troops were drowned.

This sinking was really an encore to the attack against the sixth convoy over Tuesday and Wednesday when Thunderbolts and Kittyhawks, aided by a small force of Mitchells and Lightnings, chased Japanese shipping all over the Camotes sea and north of Cebu. The enemy's losses: three large transports, ranging from 5000 to 8000 tons; four troop transports of 1000 to 2000 tons; three troop transports of 750 tons; three escort destroyers, four thousand men.

HIT 'EM AGAIN. Ormoc, which is the southern anchor to the enemy's Yamashita Line, was being hit hard and often all during the week. On Monday night, 27 November, destroyers moved into the bay with a force of PTs and, besides causing extensive damage to harbor facilities, sank an enemy submarine.

A bigger and more costly naval battle ensued on Saturday, 2 December. An Allied naval force sweeping into the bay was challenged by enemy naval units, shore fire, and a fleet of Japanese fighters. The enemy lost one destroyer, probably a second, and six planes, but the Allied force also lost a destroyer, probably from a collision with a land mine.

Operating within a few miles of the enemy coastline, Catalina flying boats worked until late Sunday picking up survivors from the water. One Cat, whose normal crew is eight, rescued 56 men and, although it took three miles to leave the water, managed to

JAPS ARE LOSING

General MacArthur's communique has announced that in mopping-up operations apart from the Philippines, Allied forces between 7 October and the end of November killed 1821 more Japanese, took 180 prisoners, liberated 713 friendly nationals.

Nearly half the Jap casualties were inflicted on Biak, the rest at Morotal, Bougainville, New Guinea,

take off successfully. Most of the Allied destroyer crew was saved.

GROUND ACTION. Incessant rain last week reduced land activity to local but significant gains. The rain was unusual, even for the Philippines. Before the month was out Leyte had received almost 25 inches, almost double the normal November registration. It so disrupted communications that some forward American units had to be supplied by air. It turned the highways into quagmire, melted the earth into mud the color of oyster stew.

Despite the rains Sherman tanks pushed south of Limon across the Leyte river to destroy a number of Japanese artillery emplacements and an ammunition dump. The 32nd Division began a double drive south of the river, pushing down the Ormoc road and southeast of Hill 1525 toward the Ormoc corridor villages of Tolibaw and Bonbongon. Other U.S. units were engaged in wiping out Jap mountain strongpoints southwest of Dagami which had been by-passed earlier in the advance.

Otherwise American troops were busy throwing back enemy counterattacks. Near Palanas, 11 miles south of Ormoc, 7th Division elements forming the underjaw to the Allied pincers contained desperate banzai charges on Tuesday and Wednesday nights. On Saturday night, 2 December, trying to break through the road block south of Limon, Japs threw tanks in as spearheads. They were repulsed after a sharp foray in which bazookas were used.

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In the drive down Highway Two to Ormoc, 32nd Division troops have penetrated to a point 2500 yards south of the Leyte river bridge, some four miles south of Carigara Bay. Until the weather clears to permit freer use of supply routes, U.S. fighting men expect progress to continue at the same slow pace.

SAMAR TOWN FREED. Action was reported on Samar last week for the first time since 1st Cavalry troops made the lightning sweep up the west coast in late October. This time the participants were barefoot Filipino guerrillas. Wiping out a numerically superior Japanese garrison in a two-day pitched battle, they liberated the town of Taft, which is midway up Samar's east coast and the eastern terminus of the highway bisecting the island. Among the captured booty was enough unmilled rice and foodstuffs to last for several weeks.

Allied air attacks again were directed against Japanese airdromes and supply areas throughout the Philippine archipelago. On Leyte General Kenney's land-based planes struck regularly at Palompon, Valencia, and Ormoc, the three enemy concentrations on the west coast.

RETURN TO MANILA. Liberators also cruised north to Luzon to dump 27 tons on the Legaspi airdrome, and over the weekend struck Manila. It was the first time since early 1942 that SWPA-based bombers had been over the Philippines capital. They bagged a destroyer southwest of Bataan.

Continuing their neutralization raids against Jap airpower in the Visayas, American planes blasted dromes on Negros and Cebu, sometimes tangling with interceptors. Heaviest raid of the week, however, was directed against Puerto Princesa, the big enemy naval base on the east coast of Palawan, 300 miles west of Leyte. Liberators unloaded 135 tons over the waterfront and airdrome, destroyed four grounded planes, damaged three others, cratered runways.

To the far south other Liberators maintained the pressure against the

by-passed bases in the Moluccas and Borneo. In North Borneo Liberators on patrol sank five freighters and probably four others, ranging from 1000 to 3000-tonners. One Liberator survived a 75-minute running fight with 10 Jap fighters over Balikpapan.

The enemy retaliated with repeated raids on the Leyte airstrips and with a surprise strike at U.S. positions around Carigara. Jap bombers also appeared over Morotal, causing some damage.

B-29s Give Tokyo Its Fourth Pasting. Hit Plane Factory

B-29 Superforts based on Saipan continued their campaign to destroy Japan's industrial productive capacity by striking at Tokyo for the fourth time in little more than a week.

This blow on 3 December was the third daylight raid and, like the first one, had as its primary objective the big, sprawling Musashina Aircraft Works in the northwest section of the city. Crews radioed headquarters that they were attacking in clear weather and dropping their bombs with pinpoint precision. Twelve of a fleet of attacking Japanese fighter planes were destroyed or seriously damaged.

SUPPLY THE FACTOR. Access of supply to the Saipan-based bombers has enabled the 21st Bomber Command to bomb more heavily and frequently than the 20th based in the orient. An estimate has been made that one tank ship can move as much aviation fuel to Saipan as a fleet of tanker planes can carry to China in 1000 hours of dangerous flying.

Besides these considerations of logistics there is the factor of safety which the Saipan base provides over the orient bases. A minimum of

ground fire can be brought to bear on the Saipan raiders as they approach Japan, for little Jap-controlled territory is crossed. The hazard of clouds lined with granite mountains is absent too for the Saipan crews, for air and sea cooperation in carrying out the missions can be utilized, particularly in plotting courses and rescuing crews from disabled planes.

Official statements have indicated that more Superfortress bases are under construction in the Marianas area, permitting the stepping-up of aerial warfare against Japan.

WHAT RESULTS? Exact damage inflicted on Tokyo by these first four raids either has not been gauged or else not announced. Bombing on two of the missions had to be accomplished through clouds, and though fires and explosions were observed at considerable altitudes above the city, specific results were not published. Japanese ground fire has been weak against the raiders and fighter interception has been almost totally ineffective. Only two Superforts have been downed, both by fighter interceptors. One of them was a casualty of midair crash with a Japanese Kamikaze flyer.

Three times within 24 hours on 3 December Japanese aircraft raided the 29 base at Saipan, pointing up Jap concern over the Superfort attacks on their homeland's industrial war effort.

These Jap fighters and small bombers presumably are based in the Volcano and Bonin Islands to the north. Neutralizing raids have been in progress against these bases for several months and have been stepped-up in the last five days. While the Superforts roar off toward Japan smaller bombers carry out secondary and supporting raids on these enemy bases, some of which are 700 miles to the north of Saipan. So far no enemy sorties have been in strength, but the process of liquidating threats of future Jap attacks is being continued by Seventh Air Force and Marine Corps bombers.

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THE WAR IN EUROPE

Western Advance Meeting Fierce Nazi Resistance

The possibilities of a quick Allied breakthrough along the Western Front appeared remote last week. The winter offensive ground slowly ahead against the stiffest kind of opposition.

Allied forces from the Waal estuary to Switzerland were engaged in a massive frontal assault on the Reich and were coming up against the major permanent defenses which guard the Fatherland. Both sides were using artillery on a gigantic scale, as sloppy winter weather limited tactical air support. On good flying days front-line positions were blasted by the planes of the Allied Air Forces, while production centers deep within the German border felt the power of strategic bombers.

TARGET OIL. Heavy planes of the Eighth USAAF and the RAF were smashing day after day at the German war potential, and their primary targets still appeared to be oil centers and refineries for the manufacture of synthetic fuel. In a single two-day period an estimated 11,000 bombers attacked 12 major oil centers, several of them in the Leipzig area. Although German fighter opposition was light, antiaircraft fire was so intense that one section of the sky was described by an American flier as "40-square miles of dense flak." The flak took a high toll of American bombers.

Also under attack were traffic points used by the Nazis in supplying the Western Front. Typical of such places were Coblenz and Bingen, the

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sites of rail yards in the northern sector.

RETURN IN EARNEST. The German Luftwaffe, which at one point just after the invasion seemed almost nonexistent, is making its hoarded strength tell as the battle lines around the Reich contract. German fighter planes may have been carefully preserved to use as the danger to Germany itself increased, and, despite the Allied aerial action against aircraft manufacturing centers, there has probably been a certain amount of continuing plane production in dispersed and underground factories.

Figures for November tell the story. On the second day of that month a large American bomber formation was intercepted by 900 German fighters, one of the greatest fighter forces ever to oppose a bomber formation. On 27 November 500 fighters of the USAAF were opposed by 600 to 800 German fighters. In November American fighters over Germany destroyed 641 fighters in the air—proof enough that the Luftwaffe is still opposing our strategic bombers and fighters in no mean strength.

Recent stories from correspondents have mentioned two new fighters introduced by the Germans. One is rocket propelled and is known as the Messerschmitt 163-B. It has unofficially been credited with speeds of 500 to 600 miles per hour. The other aircraft is the Messerschmitt 262, a jet-propelled ship supposedly capable of travelling up to 500 miles per hour. British military authorities have indicated the flight endurance of these speedy ships is limited to a few minutes.

THE GROUND WAR. Despite the increase in aerial activity the main focus of world attention was on the battle of attrition being waged in the mud of the Reich and the mountains of southern France. Three Allied army groups garrisoned the long front, the 21st in the north, the 12th in the center, and the Sixth in the south.

Action varied in intensity along these sectors, but the pressure was being applied all along the line.

Allied forces were meeting heavy resistance as they drove toward Germany's two great western industrial areas: the Ruhr and the Saar. The battle of the Cologne Plain was the northernmost of these twin offensives, and a reported 12 German divisions were unofficially announced as opposing forces.

KEYPOINT COLOGNE. Covered by a network of roads, the Cologne Plain may well be one key to the Ruhr, for if that flat land can be negotiated and the city of Cologne reached, Allied forces may proceed down the Rhine valley to the concentration of mines, foundries and mills which at one time represented 85 percent of German heavy industry. The battle for the plain was described by the German radio as "the most terrible and most ferocious in the history of all wars." Battlefield reports indicated the German comment was not far from wrong, as fighting of the greatest severity raged up and down the 40-mile front.

The U.S. Ninth Army, counting its gains in yards, hammered ahead to reach the Roer River, one of several streams crossing the Cologne Plain. To the south the U.S. First Army broke out of the Huertgen Forest, scene of one of the bitterest battles of the western front. American forces appeared to be headed for Duren and Julich, two fair-sized German cities lying on the approaches to Cologne and controlling communications to the capital of the Ruhr.

BORDER CROSSED. The U.S. Third Army, companion force to the First and Ninth in the 12th Army Group, was engaged just south of Luxembourg and had crossed the borders of the Reich in the northern sector of its zone of operations.

This force was moving on the Saar, a river valley area somewhat similar to the Ruhr. A great portion of Ger-

many's coal is dug from Saar mines and the region houses many munition works. As in the north, this industrial section was strongly defended, and Third Army forces were met with a series of German counter-attacks as they pushed ahead.

The left flank of the American force, operating on German soil, had scored the deepest advances. The center and right flank were being swung up in a great arc toward the German frontier. Ninth Army forces, paced by bombers of the Ninth USAAF, entered the battered and burning city of Saarlautern, west of the Saar river and northwest of a main objective, the city of Saarbrücken.

The U.S. Third Army had reached the Siegfried Line at some points and would soon test the strength of that fortified area, probably wider in extent to the Third's present operating area than anywhere else. Already elements of the Third had tasted fierce opposition in the zone of the Westwall, the Germans launching large scale tank counterattacks at the advancing men. As on the Cologne Plain, the Germans appeared determined to fight to the end to protect their industrial belts.

ACTION IN ALSACE. The Western Front's extreme southern sector saw the Sixth Army Group, composed of the U.S. Seventh and French First Armies, engaged in operations more mobile than those of the north.

Elements of the American Seventh were driving north and south from fallen Strasbourg in Alsace. Southern units of the American forces were driving for a junction with French troops still clearing the enemy from the Vosges mountains and advancing down the upper Rhine.

To the extreme north the 21st Army Group—First Canadian and Second British armies—was exerting pressure along the top of the enemy's fortified zone in the sector from Nijmegen to Venlo, but there were no reports of major action from that front.

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New Soviet Drive In Hungary Nears Austrian Border

Red Army troops opened a new surprise offensive at the start of December, breaking out from bridgehead positions across the Danube river south of Budapest.

In a push moving roughly parallel to the Yugoslav border, the Soviet forces appeared to be headed either for Austria or for northern Yugoslavia. The Third Ukrainian Army made the advance along a long front, taking the city of Pecs in its stride. Red Army elements were rolling toward Lake Balaton, 50 miles long and five miles wide, a natural barrier on the path leading to Austria. Operating on a 66-mile front, the Soviets reached points within 72 miles of the Austrian border, and in 48 hours had seized more than 300 places.

ANCHOR RAISED. A new crossing of the Danube was made 48 miles south of Budapest and north of the main drive. The city of Paks, which the Germans called the northern anchor of the defense line, before Lake Balaton, fell to Red Army men whose recent operations in this sector had been limited to probing patrol actions.

Also in Soviet hands as a result of the new drive was Kapsovar, 75 miles from Austria, and a bastion on the defense line on the highway between Lake Balaton and the Drava river. Only 27 miles separates the Soviet spearheads and the long narrow lake, and Berlin reported German and Hungarian forces were falling back on the lake, a battle for which might decide the fate of Vienna.

Northeast of Budapest the fresh offensive brought the capture first of Eger, strategic railway center, and then of bitterly-defended Miskolc, Hungary's third largest city, about 85 miles from the capital.

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Liberated Greece Turns to Civil War

In Greece last week the United Nations were being acutely embarrassed by a violent upsurge of politics, and British troops were shooting and being shot at in an effort to maintain order in Athens.

Tension between right and left wing elements among the Greeks (which previously had led to isolated instances of armed clash), finally erupted into what the British were trying desperately to keep from becoming a full-dress civil war.

Trigger-happy rightists and leftists, apparently unwilling to wait until Greece had been organized sufficiently to allow a real election by the Greek people, were indulging in a spate of name-calling and exchanges of gunfire all over the capital city of Greece. Disturbances were serious enough to have called for the use of tanks, which fired into a house held by a group of left-wing partisans during a melee in which the partisans tried to seize a prison in which suspected collaborationists were being held.

Midweek the situation was still tense and awkward, as Winston Churchill explained to the House of Commons: "Sometimes it is necessary to use force to prevent greater bloodshed. The main burden falls on us. The responsibility falls within our Allied military sphere...."

Slow Going

There were few major changes along the Allied Fifth Army front in Italy, where snow, rain, and mud have limited operations to a great extent. Allied troops took positions north and south of Faenza, and German forces were reported withdrawing through the mountains toward the Po Plain in the face of threats to their eastern flank.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Chinese Seek to Forestall Threat To Burma Road

Chinese troops, making a desperate effort to reopen the Burma Road before Japanese troops in Central China can capture Kweiyang and cut the Kunming-Chungking highway, pressed forward on both ends of a 100-mile strip of the road in eastern Burma last week.

Chefang, the last Jap stronghold in Yunnan Province except for the Burma border town of Wanting, was captured against "scant resistance" from retreating Japanese who are setting fire to villages and bridges in order to delay their withdrawal south. The capture of Chefang made possibilities of an early reopening of the Burma-Ledo road to India more certain. Fall of the town came after a 12-day, 25-mile push from Mangahih, and now opens the Burma road about 575 miles from Kunming, its Chinese terminus.

BHAMO ISOLATED. Exact positions of Chinese troops fighting south of Bhamo in north Burma is not clear, but dispatches place these units only 15 miles from the Chinese border and 50 to 60 air miles from the Chinese pushing west from Chefang. Bhamo and its 1000 Jap defenders has been surrounded and by-passed and assumes only minor importance in Allied military goals.

Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, Allied commander in the Burma theater, said "We want Bhamo and will take it—but not in any great cost in lives lost."

West of Bhamo British 36th Division troops occupied Pinwe without firing a shot. Pinwe is near Indaw on the Mogaung-Mandalay railway which runs on down to Rangoon on the Bay of Bengal. Patrols are pushing southward seeking contact with the enemy retreat.

The British threat to the Japanese from western Burma became stronger with the capture of Kalewa on the Chindwin river, 140 miles northwest of Mandalay on 3 December. The Chindwin river valley is the natural avenue of approach to Mandalay, key to Japanese supply. Meanwhile eastern air command planes strafed roads clogged with Japanese troops and vehicles in carrying on air war against the Japs in Burma.

Japs Within 110 Miles of Kweiyang

The Japanese tide rolled on in south China, threatening Kweiyang, capital of Kweichow Province, and Kunming, eastern terminus of the Burma Road supply route from India.

The Chinese admitted advance Jap patrols had entered Liming Pass, 110 miles southeast of Kweiyang, which itself is now being evacuated. This was the first Chinese admission of the Jap breach of the Kweichow Province border.

Chinese troops are reported to be retiring in small numbers to the hills in anticipation of the Jap thrust on Kweiyang.

Kweiyang is situated in a mountain area and once was regarded as impregnable. Apparently the enemy is massing his troops for the all-out drive west to capture Kweiyang and menace Chungking, which lies some 235 air line miles beyond. Allied air activity included blows by Liberators against the southern tip of Hainan Island and by Mitchells on Tanchang and Hochin, both on the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway.

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Inside Germany: Herr Schmidt Is Unhappy, But He Can't Quit

The German citizen is nervous, hungry, and disillusioned. He has lost faith in the Wehrmacht, faith in Nazism, faith in himself. And yet he does not intend to give up. While he is searching for a new faith, he means to fight and work harder than ever before. His leaders have given him no alternative.

That Herr Schmidt is physically and spiritually tired may be attributed to the protracted nature of Hitler's war—the critical shortages of food and clothing and their inadequate substitutes; long hours in the factory; the serious reverses on the battlefronts; the day-in, day-out bombing raids. But to understand the source of his continued acceptance of the Nazi regime and the motive behind his fanatical resistance requires an insight into the nature of Nazi controls and the peculiar frame of the German mind. Some of that needed insight is now provided in recent dispatches from war correspondents in nearby neutral countries, and in the decrees, announcements, and protestations of the official government press.

NO OUT. The truth in Germany seems to be simply that the top Nazi leaders—Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels—have so successfully concentrated power into their own hands that it would be impossible for any group to organize in sufficient strength to revolt, or even to stage a demonstrative protest.

Partly because the Nazis planned it that way and partly because the war itself made it inevitable, a nearly complete dislocation of the stable elements in German society has occurred. This dislocation has been so severe that the old vested interests, the close knit cultural groups, have lost all unity of purpose and all virility of action. The only loyalty left them is to Hitler.

The great German middle class, which in the early days provided the margin of support that put Hitler into power, has now lost its identity.

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Whether they liked it or not, more than three million merchants and office workers have had to close shop, put on coveralls and go to work in factories. As yet they have refused to regard themselves as workers, a class for whom they have had traditional contempt. At the moment, in attitude and interest, they are somewhere in between, their pride compelling them to hang on to the last vestments of the bourgeoisie, the very routine of their lives forcing them into the proletariat.

THE MERGER. This big shift actually started in May of 1943 with enforcement of Total Mobilization Number One shortly after the debacle at Stalingrad. All men from 16 to 65 and all women from 17 to 45 who were not already working 48 hours a week were required to register and accept whatever position a government bureau might assign them. By the same decree all businesses and firms not considered indispensable to the war were shut down. In one typical town nine out of 11 tobacconists went out of business. In another the group leader of the Nazi Party was the only one of four carpenters permitted to operate.

Since then every able-bodied man, woman, and child in Nazi Germany has been working a standard 10-hour day in a war factory and spending his spare hours in training for home defense. The tight restrictions imposed after Stalingrad have grown tighter and tighter. Goebbels passed Total Mobilization Number Two shortly after D-Day and launched Number Three on 18 October.

YOUNG AND OLD. As a result of these latest homefront measures, all

youths and men between the ages of 16 and 60 capable of carrying arms are now serving in one of the armed forces. Latest to be formed is the Volksturm, or home guard, which, in view of earlier total conscriptions, must mainly consist of boys 16 or 17 and men in their late fifties, all virtually untrained. Organized into companies and battalions and equipped with light arms, members of the Volksturm are having to fight in their civilian clothes, but are furnished "with an armband" to identify them as soldiers "according to international agreements."

Women similarly have felt the pressure. To-day all women between 14 and 50 years (who have no children under six years of age) are registered and working at the government's orders. The Labour Maidens who volunteered for six months' duty are now committed for the duration. Women are taking the place of men even in the handling of ack-ack guns, searchlight, and anti-tank guns. In most of the bigger cities four of the five men who used to form an ack-ack crew have been replaced by women.

CLASSLESS. The working class, which never bowed to Hitler and in which many Allied leaders have hoped to see the start of revolt, is now denied its unions and guilds, no longer is allowed to assemble collectively. Its underground elements are still active but their achievements are unknown to the outside world. Almost all the leading Communists in Germany were executed long ago.

Even the German upper class (MAPTALK, 25 November), which historically has never been known to allow the cause of Fatherland to interfere with the cause of Big Business, has lost its position of eminence. The big munitions plants have been taken over by the government. What once was the sprawling Krupp empire is now scattered in hills and caves all over Germany.

Unlike in previous wars, the industrial royalists have not been immune from attack. Their property has been the

number one target for Allied bombers for more than three years and they know that after victory the Allies will not replace it. The war has made them realize that their destiny is that of Germany's. They can expect no compromise from Britain and America, some of whose leaders propose the complete dismantling of German heavy industry, and certainly no co-operation from a Soviet that does not believe in profit. Although fundamentally they no doubt yearn for an economic system free of totalitarian controls, they figure that their only salvation is with the survival of Nazism. They may well be right.

THE COMMONER. Added to the separate problems of these various groups are the common hardships of a losing war. As long ago as summer, 1943, the average German citizen was getting only five pounds of bread, nine ounces of meat, seven ounces of fat, eight ounces of sugar, and nine pounds of potatoes each week. Today, of course, the shortage is even more acute and the quality worse. Bread is made of ersatz flour, beer of some sort of essence and water.

The German is finding it a tough problem keeping warm. He is allowed two pounds of textile a year, but if he should want to buy a coat, a suit, or a pair of shoes, he needs not only points but a special permit. To heat his home this winter—that is, if he still has a home (some 8,000,000 are estimated to have been bombed out)—he is getting about one ton of coal, slightly less than he received last year.

He is allowed little recreation other than the movies. It is almost impossible to get books published in pre-Hitler days. Historical novels and a species of ideological blood and thunder stories make up almost all the few new titles being released. Only soldiers or heavy workers are allowed these. As "relaxation" the Labor Front's Strength-through-Joy Movement recently despatched 1700 workers at a time to the Bayreuth Wagner Festival

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where they could hear the whole Ring cycle of operas in one 13-hour session. Because of the lack of communal recreation, many women are reported to have adopted a certain air of nonchalance in their reaction to air raids. Real coffee, a rare thing indeed, is issued after bombings, and the shelters offer a cozy place for chitchat.

EXTERMINATION. Before the attempted assassination of Hitler on 20 July at least three opposition groups were known to be active against Hitler. One was the Berlin Center, whose ranks included persecuted Catholics, oldtime trade unionists of Socialist and Social Democratic backgrounds, and a strong underground unit of Communists. A second was a Rightist group with headquarters in Leipzig who sought a monarchist restoration and claimed backing from the individually weak industrialists. The third, originally known as the Union of German Officers in Moscow, started in 1943 among German generals and officers captured by the Russians, since then has penetrated into the higher circles of the Wehrmacht and been reorganized under Russian sponsorship as the National Committee for a Free Germany.

These opposition groups, however, have either been dissolved, crippled, or driven further underground. When Himmler seized upon the assassination attempt to consolidate Nazi power and purge its internal enemies, thousands were arrested and hundreds shot.

WHAT THEY'RE TOLD. Goebbels' propaganda continues to be a stronger force in Germany than Allied peoples probably recognize. Germans hear or read only what the Propaganda Ministry serves them. Some of it they may doubt. Some of it they must believe for lack of anything else.

When the invasion was first announced the German people interpreted it as an invasion, not of Europe, but of England. "At last," they said, jubilantly. When the truth was made clear to them they were still jubilant, be-

lieving that the Wehrmacht would beat back the invaders within nine days. Later they put their faith in V-1, then V-2,—and now V-3.

In order to whip up the fighting spirit of the German masses, every speech, every news session from Berlin contains references to alleged Allied plans for the enslavement or actual annihilation of the German people. Goebbels recently wrote in *Das Reich*: "It does not matter that the Anglo-Saxons want to destroy the Reich according to one plan and the Bolsheviks according to another. They might differ in their methods, although even that is doubtful. Their aims are the same; they intend to reduce the German nation by 30 or 40 million, the one group by economic strangulation, the other by bloody terror and mass deportation."

LITTLE MAN, WHAT NOW? The average German may be disillusioned with Nazism. He may even want to capitulate immediately. After Allied victory he may want only to be allowed to live his life as humbly and as constructively as possible, somehow to refashion from memory a culture that his leaders and his own spiritual impotence have destroyed for him.

But not so the Nazis. At key points throughout the country they are said to have built vast fortifications, equipped with enough firepower and food to resist, they hope, for years. They are planning new weapons frantically and whipping up a campaign of hatred and terror that in intensity surpasses anything in their frenetic past.

Hitler has made his position clear. "Let no one think that after this war the young soldier will return and change the National Socialist system," he has said. "I am more fanatical than ever."

It was Goebbels, however, who gave what is perhaps the true Nazi intent when he announced: "If we are forced to quit the stage of history, we will smash the door behind us so that the entire world will be amazed."

The Enemy's Way—II.

SPAWN OF THE DRAGON

The Black Dragon was on trial. The youthful assassins of Premier Tsuyoshe Inukai were being tried in a Japanese court of justice, and everyone knew that greater things were at stake than the lives of the culprits. Perhaps no one knew this better than Mitsuru Toyama—else why would he have permitted members of the Black Dragon Society to stand trial rather than carry out the ritual death by *hara-kiri* that followed earlier assassinations?

Clearly Toyama and the supreme council of the Black Dragons were confident that public opinion would bear them out in their expansionist super-patriotic program. Clearly they felt sure of being able to extend their domination beyond politics and politicians to the Japanese courts and the judiciary.

Events justified their confidence. For two years the trials themselves were postponed time and again while the Black Dragon Society utilized this circumstance as a rallying point for the ambitious millions of inhibited Japan who saw in the working of Toyama a means of gaining a new and greater Japanese Empire. Toyama was still shooting very high, but more and more of Japan's crowded, scrimping, impoverished masses were seeing themselves as *have-nots* who by divine right ought to be *haves*.

A SHINTO WORLD. Toyama, sleeker than ever, played deliberately on this national feeling of frustration as only one of the instruments with which he planned to fashion a new world order. This cold-blooded fanatic was not interested in Japan's people as human beings, but as divinely appointed tools which Samurai hands would wield in shaping an imperfect world to Shinto specifications.

A contemporary writer describes Toyama as he appeared at the height of his power:

"His small seamed face has the color of ivory yellowed with age; his eyes are

hard as agates; his thin, sensitive lips look as if any moment they would snag on the sharp and gleaming canines that show when he smiles or when he utters a characteristic snarl that lasts but an instant. His short and silky-looking white beard used to be black and curling. He sleeps only four hours out of 24, eats as sparingly as a saint in religious ecstasy, and spends half his waking hours before a small gold shrine in his little wooden house outside Tokyo . . ."

Eighteen hours of wakefulness each day, and each hour Toyama used well, with an implacable singleness of purpose that may well be unique in history. Now in 1934 that singleness of purpose led him to the high point in his strange career: with the assassins of Premier Inukai on trial he could now demonstrate to the entire Japanese nation, and also to the world, the real hold which Black Dragon doctrines had not only on Japanese officialdom, but also on the great mass of the Japanese people.

HONORABLE MEN. Toyama had guessed the mood of the Japanese people well. Great men came forward to speak for the assassins. Said General Sadao Araki, Japanese Minister of War: ". . . These young men were moved by honorable motives and passionate devotion to their country . . ." The General went on to argue for leniency in dealing with the killers.

Most significant of all was the roaring response of the Japanese people.

More than a million Japanese citizens of standing signed a petition requesting the judges to exercise leniency. And of the million, 5,000 signed the petition in blood. Nine frenzied citizens sent nine identical silk wrapped boxes to the judges, each containing a finger that had been cut off a human hand, and each bearing the same message: "I send you a part of myself in protest against criminal charges made against honorable youths. Convict them and I will send the rest of my body in protest."

The "honorable youths" themselves had nothing to say. Whatever talking was being done in their behalf was uttered by skilled defense attorneys paid by the Black Dragon Society. They knew their security, knew that Mitsuru Toyama stood behind them.

GUILTY BUT — The whole fantastic farce finally came to a conclusion which saved face for the institutions of justice in Japan, but which also demonstrated, as Toyama intended it to demonstrate, the hold that the Black Dragon Society had gained on the nation. Of the guilt of the assassins there was never any doubt. The courts could not acquit them outright. But the courts could, and did, pass a sentence on the killers which would indicate tacit approval of their deed. The young men were sentenced to two years in prison.

Mitsuru Toyama was well pleased. Each of the learned defense attorneys was presented with a gold dragon 10 inches high, covered with black enamel, the eyes made of agate and the wings tipped with rubies and emeralds.

And now the master meditated at the shrine of the black dragon in his little wooden house at the outskirts of Tokyo. Or maybe he had a new message from the Sun Goddess relayed to him by Shutoko Tori, abbot of the largest Shinto body in Japan, the man believed to be the intermediary between the Black Dragon Society and the throne. At any rate Toyama now felt ready to put new and greater schemes into effect.

FAILURE OF A MISSION. Toyama conceived the idea of talking directly to

the Japanese people; and to do this planned a characteristically involved and spectacular method. A Black Dragon emissary was sent to the director of one of the largest department stores in Tokyo to obtain special funds for the printing of millions of leaflets bearing Toyama's mystic message. Simultaneously another Black Dragon was sent to interview Commander Yamaguchi at the Yokosuka naval base, to arrange for planes to distribute the leaflets over Tokyo. Everything was planned out to the last detail, including the flamboyant device of having the navy planes drop sound bombs over the city to attract attention before dropping leaflets.

Somewhere along the line the scheme fell through. Both the Tokyo businessman and Commander Yamaguchi one day appeared at the little wooden house outside Tokyo with the unpleasant task of explaining to Toyama the reasons why neither of them could follow through according to instructions.

Toyama heard them patiently, then retired to meditate before the dragon shrine. Reappearing again shortly before the distraught visitors, he announced his will: they were to be "permitted" to commit hara-kiri. Both men disembowelled themselves outside the little wooden house, gruesome testimony to the strange state of madness in which Toyama held his followers.

TO REACH THE PEOPLE. The plan for bombarding Japan with Black Dragon leaflets was never resurrected. Different methods apparently were in order—methods that may or may not have had their inspiration in the fact that Kingoro Hashimoto was beginning to have a larger voice in the Supreme Council of the Dragon. For Kingoro Hashimoto was an army man.

At any rate the Black Dragon Society chose steps even more drastic than ever. In February of 1936 the stage was carefully set for the demonstration that convinced Japan how completely the expansionists were in control—the seizure of Tokyo by force.

The coup was carried out with typical Black Dragon ruthlessness. Some 3000 troops led by Captain Norraha of the

Black Dragon Society were marching to the railway station, ostensibly to entrain for the first leg of their journey to Manchuria. When they arrived at the station the group was divided into squads of 60 men each, and written orders were handed to the leaders of each unit. In perfect order the groups marched away from the railway station. Their orders called for the seizure of the capital city.

In quick succession the marching men took over the key points of Tokyo. The police stations, telephone exchanges, radio stations, lighting and power plants, important city intersections—all were speedily occupied and controlled. And directing the activities of the whole operation was Mitsuru Toyama, calm and unruffled in his little suburban house.

THE PRESSURE METHOD. Newspapers of the western world called it a revolt, because there was nothing else in the vocabulary of journalism to describe such activities of violence directed against the government in power. But actually it was no revolt. Peculiarly Japanese, the three-day reign of terror in Tokyo was merely another demonstration, another application of pressure by Mitsuru Toyama.

Although it was no revolt, no uprising, there was bloodshed aplenty. One group of soldiers surrounded the house of the Premier, Admiral Okada, calling on him to come out and be killed, to "die for the sake of his country." The admiral very prudently ignored these startling requests, whereupon they grew louder. "Your country needs your death," shrieked the mob.

Finally the door of the house opened, and a man dressed in the uniform of an admiral appeared. The soldiers fired. The body dropped into the fish pond of the typically quaint Japanese garden. The cry went up: "The traitor who was Premier is now dead!" And the band of soldiers went off, their mission apparently accomplished.

Actually another strange oriental twist was given the story by Denso

Matsui, the Admiral's brother-in-law. Listening to the cries of the mob, Matsui apparently felt it was time to join his ancestors. He dressed in a uniform of the Premier's and went out to his death, thereby saving the admiral's life.

And to carry the cloak-and-dagger drama to further fantastic lengths, the admiral waited until the coffin arrived for "his" body, whitened his face, climbed into it, and was borne to safety in his own "funeral" procession.

MURDER INC. Meanwhile, however, other murders were being carried out more adroitly. Admiral Saito and General Watanabe, both cabinet members, were killed without difficulty. But at the house of Finance Minister Takahashi the Dragon's emissaries had a battle on their hands.

Takahashi had been a soldier, and was the descendant of Samurai. Years in Japanese political life had taken nothing from his tough and dauntless spirit. When he heard of the disturbances in the city he knew well what was in store, and so set about preparing himself. From a wall he took down some of the ancient armor his ancestors had worn in the day of the Samurai. Into his belt he stuck two loaded pistols, and, to complete the picture, he seized a heavy sword.

When the mob approached his door he needed no urging to come out and die. He came out slashing, with an ancient battlecry on his lips. The old man emptied both pistols and hacked in all directions with his keen edged sword. He couldn't win, but he had no intention of dying meekly like a sheep brought to slaughter. Finally he fell, breathing his last in his own garden.

THREE-DAY REIGN. For three days Tokyo was completely in the hands of the Black Dragon Society. Never was there any intention of the Society's actually setting up a government: its real power lay in behind-the-scenes activity, in pressures exerted at the proper moment upon the

proper people to accomplish its long range plans.

The three-day demonstration had purged a few more of the conservatives from power, and had impressed upon those remaining the utter futility of opposing this shadowy organization. Toyama had shown once again, and ever more emphatically that the old Meiji compromise, whereby Shinto expansionism was recognized as the official national policy, was still very much in force. Japan was being committed to a war of conquest that was not to end even if it took centuries to accomplish its purpose. The Black Dragon Society, as a matter of fact, had long since considered the war as actually under way.

Following the Tokyo uprising, Toyama called off his dragons and perplexed Japanese "justice" once again was up against the problem of saving face while at the same time not offending the Black Dragon Society. A routine "trial" was ordered for a few of the leaders of the demonstration. This was carried out with farcical attention to detail. A couple of the Black Dragons were convicted and sentenced, but shortly afterwards were allowed to escape.

TO WAR. Japan settled down to prepare for the war which was clearly inevitable. The conservative element in Japanese life was now at such a low ebb of influence that they exercised no further restraint on the war-makers, while on the other hand Toyama's Black Dragon Society had shown such ruthless determination that many who before were lukewarm began to be four-square super-patriots, screaming for Japan's right to rule the world.

Toyama's rule over the Society meanwhile began to show a subtle change. More than ever he was the mystic, the mainspring of the organization. But more and more the planning began to show the work of other minds.

Kingoro Hashimoto, of the Imperial Japanese Army (who is believed to have succeeded to the leadership of the

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Society following the recent death of Toyama) was one of the new master-minds plotting Japanese conquest. Chief among his associates were (and are) Professor Genchi Kato, of the Tokyo Imperial University, Toyosaburo Kikuchi, of the Department of Education, and Kamekichi Takahashi, of the Department of Economic Research.

THE BRAIN TRUST. While losing none of its fanatical fervor, the Black Dragon Society was gradually adding scientific minds, organizing minds, commercial minds, and above all minds skilled in the arts of war. With the consolidation of power at home carried out simultaneously with limited expansionist activities abroad, the Black Dragon Society was now preparing for greater things.

Kingoro Hashimoto sounded the keynote: "Britain, the United States and France are sinking suns at dusk. National Socialism and Fascism are the crescent moon against the evening sky. The Soviets are a bright star of early night, but quite inadequate to do more than illumine a corner of the sky. Civilization can revive only in the morning sunlight of Japan. And the only hope of Asia and the world is in that sunlight."

Propaganda activities of the Black Dragon Society were intensified throughout Asia in an effort to "sell" the millions of Asiatics on the establishment of a Greater East Asia under the paternal guidance of Japan. With flawless planning, the entire program was based on race and religion. "Asia for the Asiatics" became the key phrase, and restless millions were relentlessly goaded by every possible means the Black Dragons could muster. Shinto priests preached one Asiatic religion for all of Asia. Japanese commercial interests acted as thinly disguised agents of the Black Dragon, spreading virulent hatred of the white race at every opportunity.

Meanwhile the propaganda brains of the Black Dragon Society synthesized a spurious "culture" that pictured the brotherhood—not of man—but of

Asiatics, a brotherhood in which Japan was set up as the "honorable elder brother" and therefore the leader in all things. Professor Genchi Kato, of the Tokyo Imperial University, provides a good example of this in his book on Asiatic Races:

"Many thousands of years ago, there existed in Asia and throughout the adjacent islands of the Pacific a culture of a very high order. It was a common culture in the sense that it was uniform. There were no differences between the many peoples then. They all used a common language which unfortunately was lost. Its words are still to be seen in those words common to all those peoples today.

"When the disintegration set in, the scholars of that ancient culture retired to the islands of Japan and there, by constant association, maintained and preserved that culture. This is the secret power that has enabled Japan to preserve her integrity while other parts of Asia have fallen under the domination of the white man's culture.

"The mission of Japan is to restore that ancient culture to Asia, and thus save its people from decline. But it must be remembered that this culture belongs to all of the peoples of Asia, as it was theirs countless ages ago, before the rise of the whites."

This sort of distortion provided a slender entering wedge into the minds of oriental peoples, and that many of them gave way to it cannot be doubted.

UNDERCOVER. While propaganda was one important mission of the Black Dragon Society, espionage and the organization of fifth column nests was still another.

All over the world—and particularly all over the Pacific islands and our own west coast—there appeared smiling Japanese: Japanese "fishermen" aboard slick, steel-hulled, diesel-powered "fishing-boats"; Japanese "tourists" with 35 mm. cameras slung jauntily from their shiny leather straps; Japanese "diplomats" attached to vastly overstuffed consulates and embassies; and Japanese "journalists" working for

Domei and the great Japanese newspapers.

ALL READY. There is evidence that the Black Dragon Society considered that everything was ready for the main show in August, 1941. The Chinese government has published a report by a Chinese agent named Chuang Kung Ming, who operated as a Japanese intelligence officer before the war, having successfully passed himself off on the Japanese as a supporter of the late Wang Ching-wel, puppet ruler of occupied China. This report includes a document issued by Seishi Uchida, a major in the Japanese Army and a Black Dragon member, addressed to Chuang Kung Ming. In part the document says:

"The Supreme Council has decided to attack during the last days of August, but certain developments caused a postponement . . . Negotiations for peace must not be taken as having any serious meaning. Behind these we shall strike. Immediately this reaches you, a meeting of our men must be summoned . . . you will meet Tadaashi Maeda, who will have special information to give. Pass this notice on to Chujiro Araki and Kazaki Katsujiro. If you can reach Kengo Sugano, you must inform him, as his services will be most valuable . . ."

Whether the document is genuine is probably open to question. But the names mentioned are those of Japanese known to have been engaged in various activities in the Pacific. Kengo Sugano, is a well known Japanese scientist, and Kazaki Katsujiro was the manager of Japanese commercial interests in the Dutch East Indies.

At any rate on December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier force struck without warning at Pearl Harbor, duplicating almost exactly a mock strike executed years before by an American carrier force during peacetime maneuvers. The blow was delivered while peace negotiations were going on in Washington.

THE SPOILS. For a time the Black Dragon gorged in victory, and Mitsuru

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Toyama must have felt that his long task was nearing final success. The hordes of Nippon poured down through the islands, surged through Malaya, overwhelmed Singapore. Everywhere the Black Dragon had done its work well, and its operatives were on hand to greet the forces of the Emperor. Far from resting on their gains, the emissaries of the Black Dragon now had a further task to perform: that of solidifying the native populations of the conquered territories, of welding them into citizens of Greater East Asia.

Various "religious" organizations were speedily set up in the conquered territories, the purpose of each to incorporate the prevailing local religion—including Christianity—with some of the dogmas of Shinto. This was the main theme of the campaign: to provide Greater East Asia with a synthetic religion, and to build the Pacific conflict into a "holy war" with Japan as the champion of Asiatics against the encroaching whites.

IF NOT TODAY. When the tide began to turn the Black Dragon Society merely intensified its efforts among the peoples of Asia. To these fanatics there was no such thing as peace with the outside world: if the struggle went against Japan in this reign, the overall plan must be flexible enough to assist future Samurai in setting some future Emperor on the throne of the world.

Kingoro Hashimoto, Black Dragon chieftain, gave some hint of this long range planning recently: "We have never regarded our bases in the Pacific as essential to our larger purpose, at this stage. If we are compelled to retire from them, it will be but for a time, as our immediate task is to consolidate our positions in East Asia. We shall hold these and from them we shall, at some later period, regain what we have lost elsewhere."

At the same time the tempo of military activity in China was stepped up with new and powerful Japanese offensives. And almost simultaneously Kamekichi Takahashi, another bigwig

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Dragon, whined greasily from the powerful Saigon, Indo-China, radio station: "Why should America want to disturb the progressive era upon which the peoples of East Asia have now entered? Why should Britain have any such intention? It may be that when they have finished the war in Europe they will realize that much is to be gained by co-operating with Japan in building up this new order which is offering such benefits to the peoples of East Asia. Why should they exhaust themselves in such a manner when they could contribute considerably to the future progress of East Asia?"

THE NEW LINE? Is this, then, the latest devious device of the Black Dragon Society to insure that they will have gained something from this war which they plotted to bring about? For the Black Dragons this war is not one which has been going on for three years; it is a war that began when Mitsuru Toyama first gathered about him the young men of the Satsuma clan and they swore a blood oath to follow the way of the gods.

In fighting the Black Dragon all of these things must be kept in mind. Perhaps President Roosevelt summed it up best in his message to the Filipino people upon our landings in the Philippines:

"... We learned our lesson about Japan. We trusted her, and treated her with the decency due to a civilized neighbor. We were foully betrayed. The price of the lesson was high.

"We have the will and power to teach her the cost of her treachery and deceit, the cost of stealing from neighbors.

"With our steadfast Allies we shall teach the lesson so that Japan never will forget it. We shall free the enslaved peoples, and restore the stolen lands and looted wealth to their rightful owners.

"We shall strangle Black Dragon Japanese militarism forever."

(This is the last of two articles on the Black Dragon Society)

ARMY TALK What The Enemy Would Have Us Believe

Note to I & E Officers: This week's "Army Talk" forms the basis for a discussion of enemy propaganda—what it is and what it tries to do. Among the points especially desirable to stress are: (1) Germany and Japan make shrewd use of their propaganda machines; (2) the principal purpose of their propaganda is to create disunity among the United Nations and disunity between us and our people on the home front; (3) currently, enemy propaganda is trying to make us quit by preparing our minds to accept a "negotiated" peace.

IF A GERMAN or a Japanese asked you to do something that would cost American lives, would you do it? There's no need to answer a question like that. Neither would you deliberately spread a story that you knew was invented by our enemies as part of their attack on us. Therefore, Germany and Japan know they must use subtle means—that's where propaganda comes in.

We all think that we are too smart to fall for propaganda, that only dopes are fooled by it. In this idea much of our danger lies, for the wisest man in the world can be influenced by propaganda if it is clever enough.

Curiously enough, one of the things that makes us Americans unusually vulnerable to enemy propaganda is our sense of humor. As a nation, we have a great liking for a good story that has an odd twist. So unusual yarns are retold for their own sake, without realizing what harm they may be doing. The Germans and Japanese take full advantage of this sense of humor of ours, and devise innocent-sounding stories which are loaded with danger for us.

Obvious propaganda is like an enemy infantry attack against which we can defend ourselves if we are prepared. It takes a lot more training to avoid injury from an enemy booby trap, and that's what sly and subtle propaganda is like. It works on us individually, trying to break us down in little ways which add up to serious trouble.

Distorting The Big Facts

In some ways, enemy propaganda is like advertising. It's always trying to sell us something. In order to sell it to us, our enemies usually take a little bit of fact which we recognize as truth. Then they add their lies, hoping we will swallow them along with the crumb of fact. A simple example is a statement made by Hitler in January, 1942: "It was not Russia that forced us to defense, but only 38 and 42 and sometimes 45 degrees below zero that did it."

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Here he told the truth about the weather. It was true that the Russian winter helped to slow down the German attack. But Hitler twisted the important fact. He tried to make us believe that the Red Army was no match for the Wehrmacht. Such a statement looks absurd and harmless today after what the Russians have done, but at the time it was effective propaganda. Every person who swallowed it helped Hitler, for it made the Germans feared even more. If enough people swallowed propaganda like that, the Nazis would succeed in conquering the world.

Defeat For Sale

(Suggestion: Ask the men what catchy advertising slogans they connect with various products such as: Coca-Cola—"The pause that refreshes"; Ivory Soap—"99 and 44/100 per cent pure"; and Old Gold Cigarettes—"Not a cough in a carload." Then ask why we know such slogans.) We remember advertising slogans because of the many times we've seen them and heard them. Enemy propaganda tries the same method—repeat and repeat and repeat until finally some people fall for it. Even we in this country are familiar with such Axis slogans as "Heil Hitler"—"Asia for the Asiatics"—"The Superrace of Aryans"—"The Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Enemy propaganda seeks to sell us defeat. It's a weapon of total warfare which, like the bayonet, the tank and the dive bomber, has proved dangerous and deadly. Sometimes propaganda tries to make us afraid, sometimes tries to make us overconfident and thus off our guard, and sometimes tries only to confuse us and thus make us less efficient. (Question: As the Axis suffers more and more military reverses, is enemy propaganda decreasing?) As we drive back the Germans and the Japanese, they find their war machines being smashed. The Axis prepared many weapons; now their Zeros and Tiger Tanks and booby traps are falling them. Their weapon of propaganda is one of their last remaining hopes.

The propaganda machines of the enemy are running in high. Every day hundreds of radio broadcasts and thousands of printed words are poured out of Berlin and Tokyo. Our enemies have long been aware of the power of propaganda. Early in his career Hitler stated: "The place of artillery . . . in trench warfare will in the future be taken by revolutionary propaganda . . . The enemy people must be demoralized and ready to capitulate . . . before military action can even be thought of." (Suggestion: This quotation might be put on a blackboard or chart to be uncovered at this point. Then ask: What are some propaganda ideas you know the Axis are trying to sell us?)

A review of enemy propaganda shows that it is divided into two

classifications: (1) permanent themes used all the time (examples: Aryan superiority of the German master race, unjust peace terms of World War I, Bolshevik menace); and (2) transitory themes used to meet special situations (examples: invincibility of German arms, unity of Axis partners, impregnability of coastal defenses of Europe.)

(Question: What does the enemy hope to accomplish with the vast amount of money and time expended in propagandizing us?)

Our enemies' main objective has been to spread disunity among our own people and among the United Nations by the "divide and conquer" method. The enemy is clever and energetic in his attempts to cause distrust and suspicion; it is not unusual for him to contradict his own stories as the occasion demands. As recently as last month enemy propaganda to England was on the theme of American imperialism at the expense of Great Britain. The United States, on the other hand, was being told that Britain was encroaching upon American interests. (Question: How does the enemy spread his propaganda?)

Leaflets In Battle Zone

Some propaganda, such as that directed at us in combat zones, is spread by simple and direct methods. One of the most widely-used propaganda mediums in theaters of operation is the leaflet—a printed job that often looks innocent. But don't let yourself be fooled! There's no such thing as "innocent" enemy propaganda. Some of these pamphlets are dropped to the troops from low-flying enemy airplanes, while others are shot over the lines in big shells from enemy mortars or howitzers. Night patrols are also used to distribute leaflets, scattering them on the ground and tacking them on trees and buildings. Very often foxholes which have been evacuated by the enemy will contain propaganda pamphlets.

Some of the leaflets are based on the same propaganda trick of building a bit of fact into a mass of lies. For example, let's consider some of the German pamphlets dropped to British soldiers fighting on the Anzio beachhead. One of these Hitler specials started out like this:

"British soldiers! What about getting the true facts?

"A few days ago over 1,000 American soldiers were made prisoners at one blow near Cisterna."

Using this fact as a basis, the leaflet went on to distort the truth. The first phoney was about some units of a British infantry division that also had surrendered because "they were facing certain destruction." After casting some aspersions at American troops in general, the leaflet to the British concluded: "Certainly, the Yanks have played you a nasty turn . . . In their arrogance the

Americans underestimated the German strength." (Question: What did this leaflet try to do? If possible, put its contents on a large card for your men to see.) This was sowing distrust of allies, as well as hammering again at the Nazi invincibility theme.

Another leaflet dropped at Anzio featured the surrender of some British units and announced: "You are facing German soldiers with the most up-to-date and heaviest arms. Behind you lies the sea. Lay down your arms if you want to see your country and your families again. The near future will convince you that the odds are against you." (Question: What did this leaflet try to do?) This was sowing fear and uncertainty. Many of the same soldiers who had read these pamphlets at Anzio chuckled about them when they helped capture Rome. But under the strain of battle, men are vulnerable to do things which might not otherwise affect them.

Some Leaflets Hit Home

Other propaganda leaflets do not bother with any truth. They play on our emotions. The enemy knows that if he chooses a subject that is close to our hearts, we'll be interested in anything about it. It's natural for us to give a lot of thought to home—and our families, and friends. So the enemy showers us with pamphlet after pamphlet about high pay and loose-living at home, everybody on strike, people starving to death throughout the nation and similar unsettling stories. The same kind of stories are aimed at British soldiers and other United Nations fighters about their own people. The enemy doesn't even expect to make any of us except the most gullible believe these things, but he does try to create a feeling of uneasiness about those left at home, and a soldier who is bothered about such things can't do his best fighting. This propaganda aims at taking our eye off the ball; it tries to knock us a little off balance, to make us uncertain and confused.

Japanese efforts in the propaganda leaflet field are not so clever. By comparison with Nazi leaflets they are crude and smutty. A typical Japanese leaflet shows a scantily-clad glamour girl who, we are assured by the propagandists, will be waiting to greet us either to show us "a good time when we surrender," or ready to welcome us back home when we give up fighting the Japanese.

Bedroom Voices On The Air

Many American outfits have radio receivers, and sometimes a combat soldier will have a small portable radio along with him. So it follows that radio broadcasts to troops in combat zones are another outlet for enemy propaganda. Taking advantage of the natural desire of troops to hear music that recalls home and friends, the enemy opens most of his combat broadcasts with sentimental love songs. On these programs it's common to hear popular tunes

stroyed their ability to think for themselves, these captured soldiers are convinced that their particular system of one-man rule is the only one that will be successful. By extremely subtle means, they attempt to convert to their way of thinking all those with whom they come in contact.

Divide And Conquer

In every neutral capital of the world, the Axis maintains diplomatic representatives who try to spread their doctrine through Government officials, the press, and the radio. They make little or no secret of their intentions. On the other hand, there are actual agents and Nazi sympathizers in our country whose value lies in their identity remaining unknown. They spread propaganda stories under Axis orders.

Berlin and Tokyo propaganda on a large and cunning scale is directed to the United States. Principal outlets include enemy-controlled news agencies such as DNB, the official German news agency; Domei, the official Japanese news agency, and NPD, German foreign office press service for their diplomats abroad. Much of the material coming from these agencies is picked up from other sources (neutral newspapers, enemy broadcasts) by radio stations and newspapers in America. The source of this news, when known, is always given.

So far we've discussed enemy propaganda that is aimed at us. Let's consider next what Berlin and Tokyo tell other countries about us. They further strive to hinder our war efforts by attempting to stir up distrust among the United Nations. America is pictured as a greedy power, ever trying to grab more territory. Strikes and racial difficulties are exaggerated and blamed on a weak and decadent democratic form of government. Generally, material sent to Great Britain, China and Russia follows the familiar pattern of America favoring her own interests at their expense.

What To Do About It

Against most of the weapons of the Axis, the Army has given us ways to protect ourselves and beat them. We have masks against gas, tank destroyers against Axis armor, and antiaircraft artillery. But against propaganda, there is no mechanical protection. Each of us must fight alone, with our good sense and knowledge of enemy aims as our protections.

Next time you hear or see a story that concerns the war, ask yourself two questions. First, "Who said it?" Of course, if you hear Sally or Rose broadcast it, you know instantly that the Axis said it. But keep in mind that all stories originating in Berlin and Tokyo aren't so labelled.

played by Benny Goodman or Sammy Kaye or some other American "name bands." The enemy makes transcriptions of this music when it's played over stations in the United States, then replays them during his propaganda broadcasts. Between songs, the propaganda grinds. More music follows, then more propaganda. (Question: Who has heard Sally of Berlin or Tokyo Rose? If your unit includes a man who has actually heard one of these broadcasts, let him tell about them.)

Two of the more popular propaganda broadcasts beamed by the enemy are "Sally of Berlin" and "Tokyo Rose." Both of these programs feature American-sounding girls with bedroom voices who combine good music with the usual enemy line. Tokyo Rose sounds like a friendly girl who might be from Massachusetts. She says: "Hello, boys; this is Radio Tokyo about to broadcast the Zero hour in honor of the forgotten American soldiers, sailors and marines out here in the Pacific. Here's a tune you'll like: Harry James playing, 'I'll Be Seeing You'."

After playing the transcription, Rose's voice comes back to purr: "But that girl back home isn't waiting to see you. She's out drinking and dancing with some 4F who's rolling in easy money. Maybe they'll have supper too. Mm-m-m, wouldn't a nice thick steak taste good right now, in some air-conditioned cafe. But you won't get any of that for a long time out here. Anyhow, here's another song. . . ."

It all sounds innocent, and we laugh at it. But it makes some men homesick for the familiar things they have left, and thus cuts down their working and fighting efficiency.

During a German high-pressure radio campaign in which "Sally" urged American troops at Anzio to surrender, pamphlets were dropped on our beachhead. On the reverse side of this leaflet appeared an elaborate "complimentary return ticket" from "Europe to America via Germany" aboard the "S.S. Lucky Bird." The date of sailing was a bit indefinite, however: "As soon as the American people will demand it." Here again, the Germans do not expect a lot of us to run over and surrender. It is designed to get us confused.

This confusion, and sometimes the ideas themselves, get back to the United States by letters and returning soldiers. Often, the origins of the stories are forgotten; when that happens they are even more deadly. But there are many other ways of disseminating propaganda to the American people.

German and Japanese prisoners of war, both abroad and those taken to the United States, help spread enemy doctrine. Having been fed on a constant stream of Fascist ideas that has all but de-

THESE ARE ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS

Here's a dozen items which enemy propaganda is trying to peddle. When you hear or see stories along these lines—watch out! Germany and Japan tell us:

1. Our families in the United States are starving to death;
2. All Europe hates us because of the bombings;
3. War workers at home are getting rich and running around with soldiers' wives;
4. Our officers don't know what they are doing;
5. Britain and Russia are in the war solely for their own greedy purposes;
6. America will fight the Communists as soon as we have won this war;
7. Germans and Japanese treat Americans well in their prison camps;
8. If Germany is defeated, there will be a terrible post-war depression in America.
9. World War III is a certainty if the Axis loses this one;
10. The "Jew" are already preparing World War III to make more profit for themselves;
11. The agreement between the United States and Britain will freeze out all nations who want to retain their independence;
12. We should be fighting the "anti-Christian Soviets" instead of the "Christian Germans who have so much in common with Americans."

Next, ask yourself, "Why was it said—will it help the United Nations or the enemy if I repeat it?" Berlin and Tokyo will go to any extent to create disunity and fear. The enemy knows us well; knows the American faculty of laughing at tough problems; knows our love for the startling and sensational. Suspect immediately any stories concerned with favorite enemy themes. They are probably made in Germany or made in Japan.

Unless you're reasonably sure of the source of a story—and that it will help our side if you repeat it—don't repeat it. The fact that it was told to you by a buddy doesn't make it true; he may have heard it from a friend, too. You still need to know who said it and why.

Remember this—German and Japanese propaganda has won more territory than their armies ever won by force. We're winning the war on the fighting front—the enemy is trying to delay our victory with more and more propaganda. Delay means dead Americans.



Q. What is the size of the Japanese army?

A. Approximately four million men, about two and a half million of whom are located in Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and China, and one and a half million in the outer empire. Japan has about two million more reservists.

Q. What is Antwerp's strategic value to the Western Front offensive?

A. Use of Antwerp as a supply depot has made the time-consuming 500-mile haul from Normandy unnecessary. Its resources include a 26-mile dock frontage, 600 hoisting devices, and vast storage facilities, which are now available within 60 miles of the British Second Army and within 80 miles of the U.S. First.

Q. How much in men and money is the European War calculated to cost the world?

A. Before Hitler is defeated it is estimated that Allied and Axis powers together will have spent close to one trillion dollars and have sacrificed the lives of more than six million men.

Q. Who made the second non-stop flight from the U.S. to Paris?

A. General George C. Marshall. His trans-Atlantic flight in October was the first since Lindbergh's famous hop in 1927.

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Q. What is a Staghound?

A. A new high-speed armored car. Manned by a crew of five, it is 17½ feet long, 14 tons in weight, mounts a cannon and a machine gun in the turret, another machine gun in the bow, carries a supply of smoke mortars and hand grenades, was recently introduced to combat in Italy.

Q. How does the electoral vote polled by President Roosevelt in the November elections compare with the vote polled by him in the three previous elections?

A. It was his narrowest electoral victory. President Roosevelt polled 432 electoral to Mr. Dewey's 99. In 1932 he received 472 to President Hoover's 59; in 1936, 523 to Mr. Landon's 8; in 1940, 449 to Mr. Willkie's 82.

Q. Adolf Hitler has a bank account in America being kept for him by the United States government. How did he earn this money?

A. The money comes from royalties from his book, Mein Kampf, and at the present time it amounts to more than \$18,000. What happens to this bank account after the war is up to congress.

Q. What recent B-29 target is known as the Liverpool of the East?

A. Singapore.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 24

Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE

16 DEC., 1944

RESTRICTED

Ormoc Captured; Southern End Of Yamashita Line Wiped Out

As General Krueger explained it, a way through to the Ormoc Valley had to be found, whether it was possible or not. The Japs had pushed in substantial reinforcements, and now was no time to go on the defensive. Nor was there any use waiting for the weather to clear.

So on Thursday, 7 December—the third anniversary of the beginning of the Pacific war—the U.S. 77th Division landed near Ipil, three miles south of Ormoc, and thus cut the enemy's forces in two, isolating those in the valley to the north from those along the coast to the south. In both sectors and from all directions American columns then began to press steadily forward. By Monday, with the occupation of Ormoc and the junction of the 77th and Seventh Divisions, the southern segment of the Yamashita Line had been eliminated. For the northern segment to suffer the same fate seemed only a matter of time.

THE LANDING. To make the sneak landing on Ormoc Bay the convoy crept through Surigao Strait between Mindanao and southern Leyte and up the hazardous west coast under cover of Black Widow night fighters and Marine Hellcats. Before the first light of

Thursday morning destroyers stood off-shore and pounded the beach for 20 minutes. When they retired LCIs moved close in to blast the shore line with rocket fire. The first wave moved in at 0650.

The operation called for speed and precision. Ships had to make record discharge time and get clear of the beaches before enemy air forces could react. They succeeded. Two and a half hours after H-hour Major General Andrew D. Bruce, commanding the 77th Division, took over from Rear Admiral Struble, commanding the amphibious force.

With his reserves already committed to meet the converging attacks from the north, east, and south, the enemy was caught unawares. Initial ground resistance was negligible and the 77th sustained virtually no losses.

JUNCTION. Racing up the narrow coastal plain northward to Ormoc, infantrymen—many of them veterans of the battle for Guam—plowed through swampy cane fields and waded through flooded streams to reach Camp Downes, a point within one mile of their objective, on Friday. Final onslaught which brought capture of the township on Sunday was described by General MacArthur's communique as "desperate." The Japs had dug in under houses and buildings. They had to be routed out

NOW THEY KNOW

Apparently the Japs believed General Arnold when he called the B-29 raids on Tokyo only a warm-up. According to Berlin radio, one contingent of 20,000 non-essential workers has already been evacuated from the city. Others plan to follow immediately.

by grenades and often in hand to hand combat.

Meanwhile elements of the Seventh Division had launched an offensive to coincide with the landing that aimed at linking up with the beachhead at Ipil. From Palanas, six miles south of the beachhead, they fought their way first to Balogo, then to Albuera, thus compressing the Japanese below Ormoc into a stretch of five miles between the two divisions. Still another column pushed westward from Burauen across the central mountain range to take a pass at Mahonag, only six miles inland from Albuera. On Monday the Seventh smashed the last enemy resistance in the south and joined the 77th at Deposto, a village three and a half miles south of Ormoc.

To the commanders of the Sixth Army, the Seventh Fleet, and the Far East Air Forces, General MacArthur sent the following message: "Please extend to your command my hearty commendation on the success of the Ormoc operation. It was executed with the cool courage, resolute determination, and indomitable will for victory which has so characterized our forces in all campaigns."

THE NORTH. From what had happened to their comrades in the south the Japanese defenders of Ormoc Valley could anticipate the pattern of their own destruction. Last week they were being pressed on all sides—from the north and west by elements of the 32nd and First Cavalry Divisions and from the east by the 96th. Most pro-

gress was recorded by units of the 32nd who, pressing south of the Leyte river, moved beyond the villages of Katagbakan and Bonbongan.

Earlier in the week the 32nd repulsed a second daylight tank attack against the road block it had thrown across the highway some 2500 yards south of the river. Of the eight tanks used, two were destroyed.

THE ENEMY PRAYS. The Japs did not disguise their concern over the battle for Leyte. Sometime before the 77th's landing Radio Tokyo complained that supply from the sea "did not progress as our men wished" and acknowledged that Ormoc, once the center of Leyte's sugar industry with a population of 77,000, had been reduced to ashes by air and artillery attacks. Of the overall campaign, Tokyo said: "It is the decisive battle in which we cannot withdraw even a single step. . . It is a great decisive battle on which the life of the Greater East Asia war depends, for it decides whether we lose our sea routes to our southern regions." The same opinion was voiced later by Premier Koiso when he visited a Shinto shrine to deliver a special prayer for victory.

As for the supply of Japanese garrison by sea, Radio Tokyo was right. Last week the Japs tried twice to land reinforcements and failed both times, bringing to nine the total number of convoys destroyed in the attempt.

MELEE. The annihilation of the eighth convoy took place on the same day of the U.S. landing below Ormoc. "Immediately after our own landing," the communique reported, "an enemy reinforcement convoy of 13 vessels, consisting of four large transports of from 7000 to 8500 tons each, two freighter transports of 2500 tons each, and seven destroyers and destroyer escorts, was discovered approaching from the north with strong air cover."

"Our air force immediately attacked, and our own convoy in turn was set upon by the enemy's air force. A desperate melee resulted, in which all of 13 vessels in the enemy's convoy

were sunk without landing. The transports were heavily packed with troops, and 4000 were estimated as lost.

"We had one destroyer and one small torpedo hard hit by aerial torpedoes, and, after having transferred the crews, abandoned the ships and sank them. Fifty-two enemy planes were shot down by our fighters and ten by Navy anti-aircraft fire. We lost five planes but rescued the pilots."

NEXT. The ninth convoy went down in a two-day battle over Monday and Tuesday, 11 and 12 December. The force, which consisted of six transports and five destroyers, was first sighted between southern Luzon and Mindoro heading south. Attacking at dawn on Monday, Marine and Army pilots ran into an aggressive enemy fighter cover of more than 30 planes. It was noon before the Allied fighters broke through the screen of interceptors to strike the convoy. It was then off northwest Leyte. They pursued it until dusk when some of the ships still afloat continued south and others pulled into Palompon under cover of darkness.

The enemy is believed to have gotten some supplies ashore during the night, but it cost him almost all his freight bearers. Another raid early Tuesday morning wiped out the last of the ships. Total enemy losses included four transports (totalling 24,000 tons) and one destroyer sunk; two medium sized transports and one destroyer badly damaged. In addition 50 Jap planes were destroyed or seriously damaged in air combat. U.S. losses included eight fighters and some damage to a convoy unloading supplies at Ormoc.

About 200 Japanese paratroops landed near San Pablo in Leyte Valley last week. They were quickly mopped up. The enemy also tried another air bombardment of Allied shipping in Leyte Gulf. He suffered 80 per cent losses. Of ten attackers six were shot down by fighters and two by ack-ack.

ALLIED AIR. General Kenney's bombers kept up their neutralization raids against enemy airfields in the central Philippines, and patrol craft racked up another impressive score in random attacks on Jap shipping

throughout the archipelago. Of the targets to the south, Borneo was the most lucrative. In a raid on Tuesday, 5 December, Liberators concentrated on the north coast, where they blew up oil tanks, destroyed one locomotive and damaged three others, also damaged a ferryboat and three bridges.

Iwo Gets Heaviest Raid Of Pacific War

Liberators and B-29 Superfortresses teamed with U.S. warships and carrier-based planes to deliver a five-hour bombardment to the Jap island fortress of Iwo Jima in the Volcanoes on 7 December, marking the completion of three years of war against Japan.

Iwo lies about halfway to Tokyo and from its bases Japanese aircraft have raided the Saipan Superfort fields to the south. Approximately 900 tons of aerial bombs, an excellent percentage of which landed in the target area, were dropped on the Jap base in this assault, which was carried out by the largest number of bombers ever assembled in the Pacific for a joint operation.

The assault opened in the morning when 28 P-38s flew the 720 miles to Iwo from Saipan in the longest unbroken escort mission on record. Warships laid down a barrage on the island for one hour, while their fire was directed by Naval observers flying in Seventh Air Force Liberators. Large fires and smoke rising to more than a thousand feet were reported.

Then B-29s began a one hour and 45-minute procession over the target, dropping capacity loads from their bomb bays. As the last flight of Superforts headed for Saipan, the largest number of B-24s ever assembled in the Pacific struck at the targets. These Liberators had been operating against Iwo eight times in seven days just prior to the combined assault. Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, commander of the Army Air Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas, said the Iwo Jima attack was just a curtain raiser.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Snow Covers Front As Allies Push On Into Saar District

Winter has come in earnest to the Western Front, where Allied armies are locked in combat with the enemy along a battle-line stretching more than 300 miles from the Netherlands to Alsace Lorraine.

On a battlefield covered in snow northern forces comprising the Canadian First and British Second Armies last week had reached the line of the Meuse river, while below these units elements of the U.S. Ninth Army were deployed along the west bank of the Roer river. Just south of these American troops, elements of the U.S. First Army were still driving toward the Roer barrier. The next major sector lay just below Luxembourg, where troops of the U.S. Third Army had crossed the Saar river in some sectors and were approaching it in others. On the right flank of the Third, soldiers of the U.S. Seventh and French First Armies were still clearing the Vosges mountain area and driving the Nazis from the long-disputed provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

GOOD PROGRESS. On the six months' anniversary of Allied landings in Normandy the forces of the United Nations could report substantial progress. The enemy had been driven from more than 275,000 square miles of western Europe and some 1700 square miles of Germany itself. German casualties in men and material had been high, and such devices as the formation of the People's Army indicated enemy leaders were prepared to

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commit all available manpower to the defense of the Fatherland. (MAP-TALK, 9 December.)

Nevertheless the Allied forces had paid a high price for their gains, and as they reached the outer defenses of the Reich their progress had slowed. No large German forces have yet been trapped, nor has that nation committed all of its reserves in a last-ditch battle. Neither has the German policy been that of passive defense—Nazi units have launched strong counterattacks in many sectors. The enemy is fighting at the end of short supply lines, and inclement weather has limited the use of Allied aircraft to hammer at enemy communications.

In several sectors, notably in the south, the Germans can fall back on such natural defenses as the Rhine river and the Black Forest, as well as ranges of wooded hills and mountains. Interspersed with these are the powerful structures of the Westwall, a flexible defense in depth taking full advantage of modern knowledge of fortifications. Territory dominated by pillboxes, blockhouses, and emplaced heavy guns, and girdled by minefields and tank barriers will not be won lightly. Although definite progress is being made by the Allies, there is as yet no cause for overoptimism.

BATTLE FOR SAAR. The focus of attention in December's first week was the battle for the Saar valley, the area which, with the Ruhr and Silesia, makes up the industrial potential of the Reich.

Lying between hills and mountains, the Saar district is a natural corridor on the approaches to the middle sections of the Rhine as well as one of the largest coal mining and industrial areas of Europe. Chief city of the area is Saarbrücken, 36 miles from captured Metz and less than 50 miles southwest of Mainz, the nearest Rhine river city. Five railway lines and five main highways converge at Saarbrücken, which last week loomed as a major objective for troops of the U.S. Third Army.

ALL-OUT. Along a short front curving around the Saar valley nine

American divisions of the Third Army were on the offensive, and several crossings of the river had been made. The left flank of the Third was hammering home a frontal assault, while the center and right flanks, pivoting to the left, were engaged in a circling movement aimed at an envelopment of the industrial region from the south and east.

U.S. troops of the Third were battling in the streets of Saarlautern and Dillingen at the northern end of the Saar sector. To the southeast the Saareguemines area was the scene of heavy fighting, as U.S. forces poured across the river at that city and pushed north into Neunkirch. Saarbrücken was only eight miles from the spearheads of these American forces. The 26th Infantry Division which broke local German defenses near Aschen, seven miles southeast of Saareguemines, advanced to meet the 35th Infantry which was expanding three crossings on the Saar's east bank.

GAINS IN SOUTH. Immediately southeast of the U.S. Third the American Seventh Army was active, units of that force taking Bining, ten miles southeast of Saareguemines. Other Seventh Army forces northwest of Haguenau cleared the Germans from Niederbronn and reached points within four miles of the German palatinate border a few miles southeast of Haguenau. Allied troops entered Bischwiller, a classic German village located north of Strasbourg and four and a half miles from the Rhine.

Units of the French First Army approaching Colmar were within four miles of their objective as the Germans fought stiff rearguard actions to protect the Nazi withdrawal across the Rhine east of the city. Ten miles northwest of Mulhouse the French cleared most of the city of Thann.

Heavy snow blanketed the U.S. First and Ninth Army fronts and limited action in that major battle area. Elements of the Ninth attacked two German pockets at Julich, and First Army

units edged closer to the Roer, 18 miles south of the city at Bergstein.

Saarbrücken is a key industrial and communications center in an oft-disputed district of southwest Germany. Just inside the border across from the French Lorraine region, and about 30 miles east of the Luxembourg frontier, it is a junction point for five railway lines and five main highways lying within the defense area known as the Nazi Westwall or Siegfried Line.

VOTE TO RETURN. Saarbrücken, with a prewar population of slightly more than 135,000, is the leading city of the Saar District, whose coal wealth and buffer location between France and Germany have made it one of the storm centres of Europe. Under League of Nations control for 15 years following World War I, this 738-square-mile area was returned to Germany in 1935 by an overwhelming vote of the inhabitants.

The Saar district has a population of well over 1000 per square mile, more than the most densely populated state in America. From the Saar the Wehrmacht has drawn steel, coal, gas, machinery, and glass. The Saar has been a coal mining area since the middle ages and in peacetime inhabitants made use of nearly deposits of Lorraine iron ore to fashion the ploughshares which the Nazis have beaten into guns. From Lorraine also has come large deposits of phosphorous, valuable in the production of both munitions and fertilizers.

Situated on both sides of the Saar River that flows northwestward to join the Mosel, Saarbrücken is surrounded by low, wooded hills. Near the city on the east and southeast, heights rise to more than 600 feet. The Saar basin, as a whole, offers a natural route from France into Germany, leading between higher hill and mountain ranges on the northwest and southeast.

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Two Russian Armies Encircle Budapest, Race Toward Austria

While other fronts remained silent on the Eastern Soviet-German battle line, a major battle for the possession of western Hungary was raging.

Objectives of this latest Soviet offensive appeared to be two: (1) capture of Budapest, and (2) penetration of Austria. Committed to these actions were at least two great forces, the Second and Third Ukrainian Armies.

The Third Ukrainian force was driving north and west and had reached points approximately 40 miles from Austria, as other elements of the same force drove due north to join with Second Ukrainian elements engaged in drawing a circle of steel around the great Hungarian capital on the river. Thus Budapest, which controls one of the most strategic reaches of the Danube just south of the great "knee" where the river swings west to flow toward Vienna, was endangered on three sides.

SIEGE ARC. Newest threat to Budapest came as Red Army men attacked north of the city, taking the town of Vacs and reaching the Danube. Capture of Vacs cut two main rail lines, one leading to Vienna, and the other to Slovakia.

Red Army soldiers now have a siege ring around more than two thirds of the Hungarian capital, and Moscow reported the Hungarian government was fleeing to Vienna on Hitler's orders. The siege arc runs 60 miles from Vacs, 15 miles to the north to Gardony on Lake Velence, 24 miles southwest of Budapest. To the south the Soviets are only five miles from the threatened city.

The western drive toward Austria has made a salient roughly semi-circular in shape, the perimeter of which is more than 150 miles in length. One por-

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tion of the salient lies along the 50-mile southern shore of Lake Balaton.

At each end of Lake Balaton are fairly smooth gaps in the rough terrain of the region, both about 30 miles wide. One gap opens the way east to the Danube, the other southeast to the Drave river valley. Soviet fighting men were pouring through both gaps in early December.

Beyond the northern shore of the lake lie the low Bakony mountains, and behind them the Hungarian plane runs to the Austrian frontier, broken by the foothills of the Alps. There was as yet no indication of a planned German defense line beyond Lake Balaton, but unless the High Command is willing to sacrifice western Hungary, one of eastern Europe's most strategic areas, the fleeing Nazis may turn and stand in the Bakony mountain area.

Adriatic Stronghold Falls To Canadians

Ravenna, German coastal stronghold on the Adriatic sea, was captured last week in an encircling movement by Canadian troops of the British Eighth Army.

The fallen bastion lies 41 miles east of Bologna and 130 miles southwest of Venice. Engineers immediately went to work to clear the harbor on the Adriatic, which is connected with Ravenna by the six-mile Corsini canal, and Indian troops cleared a stretch of highway to the west.

Meanwhile another German stronghold was threatened as Eighth Army infantry took San Prospero, one mile southwest of Faenza, on the Rimini-Bologna highway.

Gales and a steady downpour of rain along the Fifth Army front limited activity, but British and Polish troops of that force, now under Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, forced the Lamone river in the sector around Quartolo to establish a bridgehead on the river's north bank.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Chinese Defenders Launch Counterblow To Japs in Kweichow

Reinforced Chinese troops conducted a counterattack last week and in seven days ousted the invading Japanese from Kweichow Province and chased them back over the Kwangsi border.

Temporarily, at least, the enemy advance, which had threatened to engulf the whole of southwest China, has been stemmed. The Chinese High Command has announced that not only have the two enemy columns, one of which had penetrated to less than 70 miles from Kweiyang, been turned back, but the resurgent Chinese forces have recaptured Liuchow just over the Kwangsi border. Enemy remnants around Lipo, 90 miles southeast of Kweiyang, have been mopped up to fully clear Kweichow.

COMPENSATION. In seven months the Japanese have driven southward from the area of Changsha and carved out a corridor through centers of China's relocated industry at Hengyang, Kweilin, and Liuchow. Most observers believed that the Japs were trying to establish an overland supply route to compensate for loss of the sea lanes which had been sustaining their garrisons in Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, and the Dutch Indies.

This land corridor generally follows the path of the Peiping-Canton railroad—a 1200-mile stretch of railroad which branches in two directions at Hengyang, one section going to Canton on the coast and the other turning

southwest through Kweilin and Liuchow into Indo-China.

4000-MILE FUNNEL. From Liuchow to Langson, which is just over the frontier of Indo-China, is a gap of about 300 miles in the railroad, a gap which the British Information Service says has a railroad bed and requires only the actual laying of rails to become useful. Assuming the Peiping-Hengyang length of the rail route were operating effectively and the gap from Liuchow to Langson completed, the Japanese would have a land supply channel of approximately 4000 miles, which would enable them to load trains at the Korean port of Fusan, 100 miles from the coast of Japan, and travel to Singapore off the tip of the Malay peninsula.

The welding of this huge land link has apparently been the major Jap objective in China. But the possibility that this land route ever would operate efficiently for the Japs is unlikely because of Chinese guerilla activity in the north and the opportunity it would afford American 14th Air Force planes to strafe and bomb train movements.

NINE OUT OF 14. Other prime enemy concerns in China seem to be the denial to the Chinese of a supply source and the neutralization of 14th Air Force and 20th Bomber Command bases. Already seven of the 14th's airfields have been overrun, two have been bypassed, and two more now are threatened by Japs who also imperil the B-29 bases further inland.

Whatever increased supplies the Chinese might glean from reopening the Burma Road, which may occur shortly, would be negated if the current Jap offensives were to capture the Chinese eastern terminus of the road at either Kweiyang or Kunming. The Chinese have counted heavily on the Burma Road as a route for the eventual supply of bulky equipment which must of necessity come overland.

The Japanese capture of Tushan, only 75 miles southeast of Kweiyang, capital of Kweichow Province, was

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the high mark of the enemy incursion westward.

TIDE TURNED. Well-trained and equipped Chinese troops commanded by General Tang En-Po launched the offensive that has turned the tide for the moment. These units recaptured the Limingwan mountain pass on the Kweichow-Kwangsi border, 110 miles southwest of Kwelyang, and retook Shangssu, a rail town 30 miles south of Tuhshan, then pursued the Japs through Liming Pass across the Kwangsi border.

The retreating enemy is now being pursued in the area of Liming Pass northeast of the Kwangsi border town of Liushai after being routed from Tuhshan, their point of furthest penetration.

The Chinese war minister says six Jap divisions and one brigade are deployed along the Kwangsi-Kweichow border but only 9,000 of the enemy troops entered Kweichow, 6,000 who struck for Tuhshan, and 3,000 who were pushing toward Pachai.

Progress In Burma Slight But Definite

Slight advances on all fronts were registered by Allied forces in Burma during the week.

In northern Burma Allied artillery began blasting Japanese bunkers and emplacements around Bhamo, as Chinese 38th Division units held their grip on the besieged and bypassed Jap-held Burma Road city. To the west slightly in the Myitkyina-Mandalay railway area British 36th Division patrols, after occupying the Naba railway station, pushed southwest and southeast of the town in flanking movements 12 miles from the Irawaddy river city of Katha and 145 miles north of Mandalay.

East African troops moving from Kalewa, in west Burma along the Dalewa-Yeu road have made contact

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with the Japs east of Shwegu, five miles southeast of Kalewa. Eastern Air Command aircraft bombed the Japs near Kalewa and east of the Chindwin river, while other planes ranged over enemy targets in Central Burma and along the Mandalay-Lashio railroad.

WANTING WANTED. Meanwhile Chinese troops who moved into the Burma sector from China gained in their offensive toward Wanting, Burma Road border town on the Yunnan Province front, against increasingly difficult Japanese resistance. A mountain south of Tiger Tail mountain and northwest of Manpeng—12 miles from Wanting—has been occupied by these forces while other Chinese units are involved in a flanking action east of Wanting.

Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill, who was leader of the "Merrill's Marauders" has been named deputy commander of U.S. forces in the India-Burma theater, Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan's headquarters has announced.

British in Pacific

The British Admiralty has announced the formation of a powerful new fleet to operate in the Pacific as the first major step in a program to implement Mr. Churchill's promise of naval support in the war against Japan.

The new fleet will be based initially in Australia and will be commanded by Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, formerly in command of the Home Fleet, who will operate under the command of Admiral Nimitz or under General MacArthur as the strategic situation may demand. Chief responsibility in the Pacific will remain that of the United States. Creation of the new fleet affects the large British forces in southeast Asia in name only. What heretofore has been known as the Eastern Fleet now is called the East Indies Fleet.

Civil War in Greece: A Grim Foretaste of Peace Problems

Today, only a few months after the liberation of their country, Greeks are killing Greeks in a violent war among themselves. Worse than that, British troops, tanks and planes are also killing Greeks—a situation that is causing cold shudders to ripple the backs of architects of the post-war world.

And as if civil war in Greece were not enough to upset the planners of the peace, everywhere their eyes turned they saw similar riptides of dissension.

In Italy the Allies were being accused of upholding a reactionary government and of preventing fascist-haters from taking a full part in governing the country. In Belgium, similar charges were being levelled. In Yugoslavia Marshal Tito was being given grudging recognition after the dumping of Draja Mihailovitch; and between Partisan and Chetnik there existed a hatred as bitter as either had ever held for the Nazis. In Poland interfactionary rivalry had reduced the Polish political situation into a fantastic muddle. Away over on the other side of the world China was divided—physically by the recent Japanese offensive, ideologically by the differences in political philosophy espoused by the Central Kuomintang Government and the Chinese communists in the north.

DRASTIC PLUS. Superficially, all this weal and woe appeared to be a refutation of United Nations policies. Actually almost all of it was rooted in a deep restlessness not of individuals but of whole peoples—a restlessness that was a drastic "plus" balancing the violent "minus" of years of war and oppression.

To meet this restlessness the United States, at least, had a ready formula. This formula, old as democracy, was simple; the liberated peoples were to be granted the opportunity of choosing

their own form of government. This formula, of course, was a basic principle upon which all the United Nations had long been in complete agreement. Where the difficulty arose was in carrying out the mechanics envisioned by the formula. In all of the liberated countries the heady wine of freedom had produced an acute impatience, an unwillingness to wait while the machinery of free election was made ready.

SPHERES. Complicating the situation were the national characteristics of Allied countries which dominated "spheres of influence" in Europe. In Yugoslavia, for example, a Soviet sphere, Russian-backed Marshal Tito was gaining slow ascendancy over the so-called rightists, marking the gradual decline of the British-supported Royalists. In Greece, a British sphere of influence was recognized by the Russians, and this eventually led to the unhappy situation in which Britain found herself when outright civil war finally flamed between extreme leftist and rightist governmental factions, with only the power of the British army and the Royal Air Force to restore order. It goes without saying that the present state of affairs in Greece is tragic to everybody but the Axis. Certainly it is especially woeful to the British, whose close ties with Greece, both historical and sentimental, have long been traditional.

How did all this come about? Part of the answer lies in that overwhelming restlessness of people; in that "plus" balancing the "minus" of brutal

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Nazi oppression. And most of the remainder can be found in tangled national politics and political sentiments.

THREE GOVERNMENTS. During the German occupation of Greece there actually existed three separate governments, each claiming the right to rule, and each actually ruling in certain well defined spheres. First, in Athens there was the quisling government set up by the Nazis to rule occupied Greece at the behest of the conqueror. Then there was the Royal government-in-exile, headed by King George II of Greece, and recognized by the United Nations as the legitimate government of the country. The third government was that of the EAM (Ethnikon Apeleutherikon Metopon—the National Liberation Front) which held out in the hills and conducted a guerrilla war against the Nazis with its own army the ELAS (Ethnikon Laikos Apeleutherikos Stratos—the National Popular Liberator Army).

In addition to the ELAS, which was strictly a leftist partisan organization, there was another Greek guerrilla faction of rightist tendencies which did not recognize the authority of the EAM. This second army group, the EDES (Ethnikos Demokratikos Eleutherikos Stratos—the Peoples Democratic Liberation Army) also fought valiantly against the Nazis.

LIBERATION. Then at last came the liberating Allied armies, and Greece was free again. In Moscow Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill conferred and agreed that Greece was to be a British sphere of influence. Mr. Churchill lost no time in proclaiming to the British Parliament and to the world: "... When normal conditions of tranquillity have been restored ... the Greek people shall make, in perfect freedom, their own decision as to the form of government under which they desire to live. Pending such a decision, we naturally preserve our relations with the Greek Royal

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House and the existing constitutional government. ..."

This, of course, was in strict keeping with United Nations policy. The Greeks themselves, however, were in an extremely nervous frame of mind politically. Even during the celebration of liberation in Athens there had been violent street fighting between rightists of the EDES and leftists of the ELAS.

With the liberating British troops appeared Greek Premier George Papandreou, who headed up the royalist government of George II. Papandreou brought with him a number of concessions which he was willing to offer the leftist EAM, pending the promised election. From the 28 cabinet offices available, Papandreou gave five to the EAM, meanwhile hinting that the time had come for the gradual disarmament of the ELAS. The rightist force, the EDES, meanwhile was in control of the Pindus area. The conditions were perfect for powerplay politics, with both rightist and leftist jockeying in none too subtle a fashion for position to seize power.

MOVE TO DISASTER. Next move toward a precipitation of the climax was the Greek government's order for the disbanding and disarming of the guerrilla units. Both the EDES and the ELAS looked suspiciously on this order, and were in no hurry to obey. Neither the armed guerrillas of the rightist EDES, nor those of the leftist ELAS, felt like being the first to lay down their arms; and besides that, the government had made no mention of what was to happen to regular Greek units formed and trained in Egypt by the government-in-exile.

In less tense circumstances the affair might have been handled without more than a violent protest on the part of the guerrilla fighters. But when the order was issued that no demonstration against the disarmament edict was to be permitted, the handful of EAM ministers in Papandreou's cabinet resigned abruptly. The situation grew worse.

Open fighting broke out between EDES and ELAS forces, and since the British were committed to a course of upholding the existing government of Greece which had ordered the disarming of the guerrillas, the local British commander had no choice but to intervene by force of arms to restore order.

THE STORM BREAKS. Immediately upon the firing of the first shot by British troops in Athens there broke a storm of controversy which was seized on eagerly by the Axis for propaganda purposes. The British policy, however, was clear. Again Prime Minister Churchill spoke the official mind in the House of Commons:

"... When countries are liberated it does not follow that those who have received our weapons should use them to engross to themselves by murder and bloodshed the powers and traditions that many countries have slowly developed and to which a majority of their people have become firmly attached.

"I repulse the claim that men who went into the hills armed with rifles and machine guns by the British Government can, by fee simple, claim the right to govern complex communities.

"They have done good service, but it is for the state to judge what reward they shall receive. ..."

From this Mr. Churchill went on to state that the ELAS had prepared an organized plan for seizing Athens by armed force under the pretext of purging collaborationists. He expressed firm support of Premier Papandreou, whom he described as a man who "has restored order to the Greek Government, which is the constitutional government of Greece, and which can only be replaced by a free vote of the people."

Mr. Churchill spared the insurgent Greeks nothing in his Commons speech, referring to them at one point as "gangsters, heavily armed, descending from the mountains to install themselves in power." And the Prime Minister also hinted that a "number

of Germans left behind are fighting in ELAS ranks."

Concluding his address, Mr. Churchill stood firmly on his policy, and in requesting a vote of confidence concluded: "If I am to blame for this I gladly accept the dismissal of the Commons. If I am not dismissed, make no mistake about it, we shall persist in our policy of clearing the rebels from Athens."

WIN IN COMMONS. Parliament approved the Churchill policy by a vote of 279 to 30. But rebuttal to the Prime Minister's speech came in a flood from all directions. The austere London Times sounded a warning note: "If M. Papandreou is maintained in power by a ban of a foreign government on any alternative his moral authority can hardly survive, and British troops will be used and British lives sacrificed in fighting against Greeks on behalf of a government which exists only in virtue of military force. ..."

In Athens a spokesman for the EAM made a blanket denial of Prime Minister Churchill's charge that the EAM and its military force, the ELAS, sought to seize power in Greece. He stubbornly insisted that the present fighting would go on until Premier Papandreou's government resigned. If the ELAS desired to take over Greece by force, said this spokesman to Associated Press, it could have done so immediately after the liberation of Athens, when there were no Allied troops or sufficient police forces in the capital to prevent the seizure of power. The only Germans in the ELAS ranks, this spokesman added, were a few dozen anti-Fascists who had joined the ELAS and were used in making propaganda leaflets inviting other Germans to desert or cease fighting.

PROTEST. A Greek-American delegation calling on the State Department in Washington worded an even stronger protest, calling upon London to "cease its bloody attempt to shackle the Greek people once more with dic-

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tatorship." The group, headed by Stelos Pistolakis, a former member of the Greek Parliament and now president of the Greek-American Committee for National Unity, expressed its full support of Secretary of State Stettinius' statement issued last week backing the principle of non-intervention of internal politics in liberated countries. The delegation accused Britain roundly of bolstering the Greek King, George II, whom it described as a fascist who is hated and despised by the people.

These were hot words, and typical of the heated sentiments which the unfortunate Greek situation had aroused. And while the fighting still raged around Athens in increasing intensity, there was hope that an eventual way out of the morass might be found. The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, and the British Resident Minister in the Central Mediterranean, Mr. Harold MacMillan, had arrived in Athens to lend every effort to reach a solution. An EAM emissary attended a meeting with the British and received peace terms, although these terms amounted merely to a restating of the government's insistence that the rebels lay down their arms.

TRAGIC DEBUT. The United Nations were getting a tragic introduction to the problems of peace: an

SULUAN GUARDS SURIGAO STRAIT

Suluan, which American forces occupied shortly before the Leyte landing on 20 October, is a small but significant island guarding the entrance to Surigao Strait, one of the two main passages leading from the Pacific into the interior waters of the Philippines.

STEPPING STONE: Shaped roughly like a flour sack, Suluan is only about two and a third miles long and a little over a mile wide. Its chief village is called Granadas, on the west-central coast, and its only available landing

object lesson in a primary conclusion that thinking men long ago had reached—that it is as necessary to wage peace with as full a mustering of minds and resources as is devoted to the waging of war.

Herbert L. Matthews, in an article in the New York Times written before the outbreak of the Greek Civil War, expressed the bright hope for the future that lies in this kind of thinking. He was dealing with the Allied handling of the Italian political tangle, but his words apply almost as aptly to the present situation in Greece:

"The results are disappointing—and one would almost be tempted to say terribly disappointing if there were not great and healthy forces at work today that make one realize that today's frustration cannot last . . ."

Today's frustration certainly cannot last. Those forces are the forces of freedom, and peoples who have suffered through the agonies of war have learned to value freedom as they have never valued it before. Everyone regrets, but no one should be surprised that the intensity of their desire for freedom should lead to confusion, and even to bloodshed. There is still no disagreement anywhere on the main point, that peoples of liberated countries will have the right to choose their own government. The problem is one of "when" and "how" and solving it will in no case be easy.

spot, according to pre-war mariners' guides, is on that side, within a partly sheltered anchorage near the village. The northeast and eastern shores of Suluan, however, are free of dangerous hazards in rocks and reefs and are suitable for use by modern landing craft.

Highest point of the island is the 410-foot coral ridge in the east. A couple of hills rise on the northwest, one more than 200 feet. In the southwest, the island spreads out in a low, open plain, dotted with coconut trees.

Borneo's Famous Wild Man Is Its Least Important Feature

Always of recognized military importance for its central location in the Indies archipelago and for its vast resources of oil and minerals, the island of Borneo has assumed added importance during the last two months as a regular target for FEAF bombers.

The third largest island in the world (Greenland is the largest, New Guinea second largest), Borneo is approximately one-tenth the size of the continental United States, or, specifically, slightly less than 300,000 square miles in area. Its greatest length is 830 miles, or as far as from New York City to Florida; it is some 600 miles at its widest point, or as far as from Indianapolis to the Atlantic. Just to get you thoroughly oriented, it is about 1250 miles west of Sansapor and 300 miles north of Java.

TERRAIN. In shape Borneo is rather like a well-worn felt hat. A flat brim borders the sea on all sides and the interior is high and creased with valleys. Vegetation along the coast is mainly mangrove which grows first in a dense fringe and then thins out along the tidal streams running inland. Beyond the mangroves the country is covered with luxuriant evergreen, about 82 per cent of the total land area being forested. Largely because it is non-volcanic, Borneo is not as fertile as Java or Sumatra, but parts of both plain and hill areas carry many acres of cultivated crops.

One of the more unpleasant things about Borneo is the weather. The climate is hot and moist, with no distinct dry and rainy seasons. It rains all the year round and usually every day. Transportation is seriously limited. For instance, in British North Borneo, an area the size of Maine, there are only 135 miles of rail lines. Bridle paths connect the headquarters of various districts, cut through jungles, lead up the river valleys, and

wind across the hills. But they provide access to only a small part of Borneo's developed regions. Consequently most travel is necessarily by way of the inland navigable streams.

POLITICS. All of Borneo was once under the absolute rule of two native sultans: the Sultan of Brunei who ruled the western half, and the Sultan of Sulu who ruled the eastern half. Dutch and British conquest have reduced these two states into small provinces on the northern part of the island, Brunei and Sarawak, both of which are still administered by Sultans under British patronage. Since the early 19th century the State of Brunei has remained little more than a curiously shaped enclave in Sarawak.

Prior to the war Borneo was divided politically between the British and Dutch Empire. The Dutch territory, which comprised about two-thirds of the island, was valuable principally for the oil resources at Balikpapan. The British part was on the north and northwest sides and was generally considered the better developed. Dividing line between the two was the Kapuas mountain range which splits near the central part of the island and extends down to the southeast coast as a much smaller chain.

DUTCH BORNEO. For purposes of administration the Dutch had divided their area into two divisions: (1) the west; and (2) the south and east. Capital of the west division was Pontianak, a southwest port in the delta of the Kaponeas river accessible to small ocean-going ships. This river is



navigable for small launches for more than 300 miles, for canoes still another hundred miles, and thus permits easy access to the native gardens. The Japs recently have expressed hope of a great future for this area, expecting "increased production of foodstuffs."

Nearest port to Pontianak is Bandjermasin, 550 miles to the east, capital of the south and east division and the most important port in Dutch Borneo. The Barito river, navigable for

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launches for 200 to 300 miles, used to bring a fair volume of trade to the town, which, under Dutch control boasted of a military garrison, good hotels and the usual civilized conveniences. Bandjermasin was never very attractive to Europeans. It lies in a delta, is encircled by swamps, and is generally unhealthy.

BALIKPAPAN. But more important than Pontianak Bandjermasin combined is Balikpapan, the fairly new

development on the east coast which received such heavy raids from Allied aircraft just before the Leyte landing. Unlike other Borneo ports, Balikpapan is not on a river, although the Koetal river (Kutai on some maps) is not far to the north. Because there is no river Balikpapan Bay has no sandbar, and the harbor therefore may be used by the largest ships.

Balikpapan (the "k" is not pronounced) is the most important oil port in the far east and the nearest to Japan proper. Its production of crude oil was 997,000 metric tons in 1939, a slight decline from the production rate in 1938. The Dutch operated a completely modern refinery with a daily crude output of 35,000 barrels and a daily cracking capacity of 7400 barrels. Cracking is the process by which the crude oil is converted into gasoline. Capacity of the general tanks was about 100,000 tons of gasoline, crude oil, and fuel oil.

Most of the oil was, and presumably still is, piped into Balikpapan from the hills in the interior. In addition to the pipe line there was a fleet of river tank steamers carrying 400 tons of oil each. The oil here is found at two levels; the upper level (about 600 feet down) produces a heavy oil of the asphalt type; the second level (about 1200 feet down) produces a lighter oil suitable for refining into gasoline and fuel oil. Since the raw oil can be burnt in ordinary ships' burners without refining, it is of special value for military purposes.

Just what improvements the Japs have made at Balikpapan, and how much of the facilities are still operable after such terrific Allied bombardments, has not been entirely disclosed. Apparently the Japs have increased the number of storage tanks. Shortly before the first of the Allied raids in October the storage capacity was estimated at three million barrels. The vast cracking plant, which supplied a considerable share of Japan's aviation fuel, was reported knocked out of

action after the big attack on 17 October.

BRITISH BORNEO. Oil also is found in northern Borneo, though not so extensively as in the Dutch region. On the whole, until the Japanese occupation, northern Borneo's wealth in resources was largely potential. Rubber was cultivated (a total of 50,000,000 tons in 1941) and petroleum extracted, but neither in the large quantities possible.

Japan is known to have undertaken a large program of development. Whereas the British seldom exceeded an annual production of 7,000,000 barrels of oil, the Japs are known to have obtained as much as 20,000,000 barrels in 1943. The Japs also have exploited coal deposits in an effort to make up for existing shortages in the homeland.

British Borneo consists of three political subdivisions—British North Borneo, Brunel, and Sarawak, which together cover an area of 81,728 square miles, or about the size of Kansas. Total population of the regions is about 840,000, consisting primarily of aboriginal tribes.

Vital area here is a strip of coastal land about 200 miles long extending southwestward from Jesselton in British North Borneo. This includes Brunel's coast and a small part of Sarawak. In this area are the important oil fields, with a refinery at Lutong, and rubber plantations.

SARAWAK. Originally a part of Brunel, Sarawak today is a strip of territory more than 400 miles long on Borneo's northwest coast. It and its 600,000 inhabitants came to the British through the Sultan, who successively ceded large territories—first to Sir Charles Johnson Brooke and later to his successors—in return for a fixed annual payment. Brooke became a native ruler under the title of Rajah, and until the arrival of the Japanese the sovereignty of the Brooke family was acknowledged officially by the British Government. Sarawak was the

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only state in the East Indies where the "native" ruler was a white man.

There's very little of military importance—either actual or potential—about Sarawak. It used to handle a reasonable amount of trade in coconuts, rubber, sago, and other foodstuffs. Its capital, Kuching, at the south end, is located about 20 miles up a river and is accessible only to medium or smaller ships.

BRUNEL In Brunel Bay, however, shipping of virtually any tonnage may be accommodated. It is here that Allied patrol bombers have recently found such good hunting.

Center of enemy activity here is Labuan Island, which partly encloses the bay on the north and is situated about five miles from the mainland. Thirty square miles in area, Labuan—then uninhabited—was occupied in 1943 by the British because of its fine harbor. At one time it was expected to rival Singapore. Although it never did, several good piers were built which the Japs probably have extended.

The province of Brunel has a coast line of 80 miles, which forms the base of a triangular tract set into Sarawak. In an area of 1700 square miles (about twice as big as Rhode Island), there are 38,000 people. The capital, also named Brunel, is located on a river a few miles from the sea. The Sultan, who ruled only on native matters and took his orders from the British Resident, had his headquarters here.

BRITISH NORTH BORNEO. The best developed part of the island is British North Borneo, which covers about 31,000 square miles and has a population of more than 300,000. It was ruled by the British North Borneo Company, a commercial organization, believed to be the last instance of private rule over colonial territories.

Of the five residencies in the district, the most important was Sandakan. Its harbor is considered one of the finest in the Far East, being five miles wide and 17 miles long. Until the Japanese came, the port had only a restricted trade and no developments of a military nature except a barracks for Military Police.

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In all British Borneo there was no organized military aviation. Only one airfield and two emergency strips existed in the entire area. An alighting area was available at Sandakan, but it was never recognized as an established seaplane anchorage.

THE PEOPLE. Although six times as large as Java, Borneo has only about one fifteenth its population. Any figures are by guess, since a census has been taken only in limited areas, but a reliable guess sets the total number of inhabitants at 3,100,000.

Most of the pagan natives in Borneo are commonly known as Dyaks, although in reality there are many varieties of tribes and many native tongues. Preponderantly peasants in occupation and psychology, they live midst primitive conditions. Education is very backward and school facilities woefully inadequate.

Natives in British Borneo are said to be much more pleasant and subdued than the Dyaks in Dutch Borneo. In the Dutch territory headhunting is reported to be still in practice, but in the British region the fabulous wild men are things of the past. British managers often recruited Dyaks for labor in the oil fields, and preferred them as carriers on many expeditions into the interior of the Malay archipelago.

In Dutch Borneo, however, the Dyak villages were constantly at war with each other until fairly recently. Cause of the wars was a pagan religious rite which required so many human heads for its observance. The Dutch did much to eradicate this custom, but the religious factor often was so strong that removal of the heads, in addition to punishing proven head hunters, acted only as an incentive for the natives to lay in a new supply.

The Dyaks vary in their attitude toward work. Among some of the more superstitious ones, or perhaps the lazier ones—the Dutch have never decided which—the sight of a snake or a butterfly before noon is cause for a holiday.

ARMY TALK Who Is Getting What Medals and Decorations?

Note to the I & E Officer: This week's discussion is intended to clarify the current awards of various medals. Points desirable to stress include: (1) What our top medals are and the basis for awarding them; (2) American soldiers of every type of background are among those giving the extra contribution to their duty which qualifies for awards; (3) Because of their type of duty or other circumstances, many soldiers doing vital jobs well are not decorated, but this does not mean that their assignment is any less important. If any men in your unit have received medals by all means use them as examples. For basic reference, see AR 600-45 including change No. 3, and AR 600-90.

THE AXIS DUBBED us a nation of "Hollywood soldiers" too weakened by jazz, movies and hot dogs to withstand the hardships of total war. But now that the German and Japanese war machines are running in reverse, we can make our own appraisal of the quality of our Army.

By all Axis "master race" doctrines—and, incidentally, Germany and Japan are becoming less vocal on that subject as their military defeats pile up—many of us were sneered at because of foreign parentage, "wrong" religion or "wrong" color.

Since our Army was a melting pot of many races and nationalities, the Axis held us in contempt for lacking the pure strains to which they pretended. To-day, the success of our "melting pot" Army is not only obvious by the military situation, but also by the type of men who have been signally honored for exceptional achievements.

Symbols of Extra Service

(Question: Do we all agree that our Army has demonstrated its fighting quality? In what way do awards of our highest medals reflect our strength?)

By Army regulations decorations are awarded "in recognition of and as a reward for extraordinary, unusual or outstanding acts or services. They are the visible evidence of such acts or services and are cherished accordingly by the recipients." On the basis of this regulation thousands of our men have earned decorations. Every race, color and creed comprising America are represented many times over.

We distinguish among men meriting a mark of honor by different grades and types of decorations. A corporal singlehandedly wipes out three enemy machine gun nests in Italy; a sergeant

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devises a method for speeding up supplies through Iran; a waist gunner knocks down a whole row of Zeros. All three men, doing their jobs, have made outstanding contributions to the war effort. The difference in their types of duty is reflected by the type of decoration which they are awarded.

(At this point inform your group that you will read them the actions of six men. Each time you present one of the case histories, ask the group which decoration, if any, the man merits. It is suggested that definitions of each decoration be reproduced on a blackboard or by some other means.)

Knocks Out Machine Guns

Corporal James Slaton of Gulfport, Mississippi, is 32 years old and has four sons. He tried to enlist in the Army but was turned down for being underweight at 118 pounds. Slaton, a taxi driver, built himself up to 133 pounds, was inducted 8 June, 1942, and began his basic infantry training at Camp Wheeler, Georgia. He was then transferred to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and later went overseas, where he joined the 45th Infantry Division.

In September of 1943, while fighting in Italy, Cpl. Slaton was a lead scout of an infantry squad with the mission of knocking out enemy resistance that had succeeded in pinning two attacking platoons to the ground. Working ahead of his squad, Cpl. Slaton crept upon an enemy machine gun nest, and assaulting it with his

THE SCORE ON MEDALS SO FAR

Since Pearl Harbor, the number of each of our Army's nine major decorations recorded by the War Department up to 21 Oct. 44 is as follows:

		Oak Leaf Clusters*
Medal of Honor	68	—
DSC	2,066	91
DSM	288	32
Legion of Merit	3,908	149
Silver Star	15,638	730
DFC	31,696	5,547
Soldier's Medal	4,242	26
Bronze Star	12,454	184
Air Medal	134,828	240,941

*In place of duplicate decorations, for additional acts justifying awards.

bayonet, succeeded in killing the gunner. When his bayonet stuck, he detached it from the rifle and killed another gunner with rifle fire. At that time he was fired upon by a machine gun to his immediate left.

Cpl. Slaton then moved over open ground under constant fire to within grenade-throwing distance, and on his second try scored a direct hit on the second enemy machine gun nest, killing two enemy gunners. At that time, a third machine gun fired on him 100 yards to his front, and Cpl. Slaton killed both of these enemy gunners with rifle fire.

(Question: Cpl. Slaton received a decoration. Which one?)

He was first awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, but when his case was reviewed by the War Department, this was changed to the Congressional Medal of Honor. He also holds the British Military Medal and is the first American soldier to win the Russian Order of Patriotic War, Second Class—highest Russian award for enlisted personnel.

Speeds Red Army Tools

Sgt. Floyd Edinger who was inducted into the Army from a job as supervisor of a dairy plant at Scranton, Pennsylvania, was assigned in July of 1942 to training at Camp Croft, South Carolina. Later he joined the 378th Port Battalion of the Transportation Corps and went overseas with that unit to Iran, under the Persian Gulf Command.

There was no combat action going on there, but the Middle East was, as it is now, vitally important as a supply route. Stalingrad had been relieved, and the Red Army's attack needed material to keep going. Sgt. Edinger's services as yard foreman of transit storage throughout all of last year are evaluated as follows:

"Through his unflinching energy, tireless devotion to duty, and exceptional ability as a leader he contributed in an outstanding measure to the successful accomplishment of the mission of this Command. He has spurned hundreds of hours of his allotted 'time off' in order to devote his energy to improvement of clerical and operational procedures. He devised and instituted a completely simplified form of inventory and accounting which has materially speeded delivery of thousands of tons of Russian war aid cargo through this port. He was instrumental in devising a system of storage which in the spring of 1943 brought order from the chaos which had prevailed."

(Question: Sgt. Edinger received a decoration. Which one?)

Sgt. Edinger was awarded the Legion of Merit. The Distinguished Service Medal is the only higher award he could have been

given, for most of the others are by definition limited to participation in combat. But the "extra" that he put into an important Army job merited some special recognition.

Saves Many Lives

Pfc. Sydney Rosenberg was born in 1919 in Lipon, Poland, immigrated to the United States and worked as a counterman in Detroit. He was in the Army 10 Dec. 41, undergoing basic training with the 17th Armored Replacement Battalion at Fort Knox, Kentucky. On 2 Dec. 42, he was transferred to a medical detachment in the 2nd Armored Division, and nine days later went overseas with his outfit.

Fourteen days after D-Day in France, Rosenberg's outfit was about 10 miles in from the Normandy beachhead, snatching some rest in foxholes near its half track ambulances. A German bomber dropped two one-thousand pound bombs which killed several men and wounded many others.

Rosenberg, who wore the Purple Heart for previous wounds, was hit again, but remained on duty two hours in the darkness administering to the wounded. Although scarcely able to walk and unable to stand erect, he refused treatment until he could assist in treating and hospitalizing all the other wounded. His prompt and efficient response to the wounded men's calls for "Medics, Medics," is credited with having saved many of their lives.

(Question: Pfc. Rosenberg received a decoration. Which one?)

For "meritorious service in Normandy in connection with military operations against the enemy," he was awarded the Bronze Star. The Bronze Star Medal was authorized to give ground troops, including the Air Corps ground crews, recognition similar to that of the Air Medal for air crews.

Through Fire And Water

Pvt. Woodall Marsh, 31-year-old Negro soldier from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after undergoing Quartermaster training at Camp Pickett, Virginia, was shipped overseas and assigned to a truck-driving job manning the Fifth Army's supply system in Italy. Here are his actions during one day last November while in the fighting zone:

Pvt. Marsh carried 12 wounded paratroopers from the front lines to safety in his truck, after officers said it was impossible. He drove his truck through water up to the hubs of the wheels, under terrific fire from the enemy, to reach the paratroopers. He had to build his own road as he went along, making the trip long and tiresome. On his return trip, Pvt. Marsh had to select an alternate route, which proved as hazardous as the journey forward. He was forced to dig his truck out of the muck and mire many times. For

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30 minutes during the trip, he was subjected to heavy mortar and artillery fire.

(Question: Pvt. Marsh received a decoration. Which one?)

For this action Pvt. Marsh was awarded the Silver Star. A whole Negro Quartermaster truck company, along with a Negro Antiaircraft balloon battalion, won special commendation from General Eisenhower for outstanding performance in France.

Three Sure, Two Probable

Sgt. Marino Galluzzo, 23, was born in Italy. He came to the United States, worked as a mason, and entered the Army from Uniontown, Pennsylvania, in April, 1942. After receiving Air Corps training at Keesler Field, Mississippi, he was sent to the 10th Air Force in CBI, where he served as an engineer-gunner on a medium bomber.

During his service in China, he carried out his duties with distinction above and beyond that normally expected. On 26 July 43, during an attack on Hankow, China, he shot down two pursuit ships and probably a third one out of a formation of 50 planes which intercepted the small flight. On 26 Aug. 43 he was credited with a probable during an attack on Tien Ho at Canton, China. A third enemy pursuit was destroyed by his accurate firing when the Lai Chi Kok tank farm and fuel depot at Hong Kong was bombed on 2 Sep. 43.

(Question: Sgt. Galluzzo received a decoration. Which one?)

The citation notes: "Sgt. Galluzzo has always displayed a keen offensive spirit in combat and his achievements have always been in accordance with the finest traditions of the Army Air Forces." He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Tenacity Of Purpose

Pvt. Odell Baker, of Johnson City, Tennessee, had been a farmer before he came into the Army. In January, 1942, he was assigned to an infantry training battalion at Camp Wheeler, Georgia, and last January went overseas with the 8th Infantry Regiment. One day after D-Day in France his company was held up, sustaining heavy casualties from enemy machine guns concealed in an orchard ahead of them. In this situation Pvt. Baker volunteered for a job.

Fearlessly and under the direct fire of these weapons, and in plain sight of the enemy, Pvt. Baker twice entered the orchard and moved from position to position, crossing many yards of fire-swept terrain. Disregarding the intense enemy fire directed at him, and although seriously wounded, he continued in his mission until he

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had reduced several of the enemy positions and had rescued three American paratroopers who had been captured by the enemy.

(Question: Pvt. Baker received a decoration. Which one?)

For "valor and courageous tenacity of purpose" Pvt. Baker was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

How You Get Them

(Question: How do we determine who qualifies for decorations?)

The men whose cases we have just cited are only half a dozen of thousands who have earned one or more awards. Since Pearl Harbor the nine major decorations have been bestowed approximately 500,000 times.

Recommendations for a decoration must initiate with an officer, who must forward someone's eyewitness report of a man's distinguishing service through channels to the War Department or a designated commander who cannot be of lower rank than a general officer. The higher authority then decides if the service rendered warrants recognition in the form of a decoration.

(Question: What are some of our other medals in addition to the ranking nine?)

Other Decorations

Two new medals, the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Air Medal, were created in special recognition of the exploits of our air crews. While the bulk of our decorations have gone to Air Force fliers, it must be remembered that our Air Force was fighting long before our first land offensives began in Guadalcanal 7 Aug., 42, and in North Africa on 8 Nov., 42. During the preceding months the Air Force had been constantly engaged in missions over the Pacific, the Atlantic and Europe, usually against superior odds, with insufficient fighter cover, and opposed by enemies who had more combat experience.

As our land activity caught up with our air activity, new decorations for ground troops were authorized. The Bronze Star, for outstanding achievement not involving aerial flight, and the Legion of Merit, for exceptional service rendered, were created. And last year, in recognition of the important role being played by our foot soldiers, we created the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the Expert Infantryman's Badge.

The Distinguished Unit Badge is given to members of an outfit with the record of outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy. This blue ribbon is the only one worn over the

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right breast. Other ribbons are worn on the left side, with the highest-ranking one on the upper right of a group.

Included in the complete total of decorations now bestowed are the Purple Heart, for wounds incurred as a result of enemy action, and the Good Conduct Medal, for exemplary behavior, efficiency and fidelity.

Our operations in fighting a global war have been so vast that many men who deserve awards have not received them. Many of us, especially those who are toiling laboriously at maintenance or supply jobs, rarely get the opportunity to qualify.

No one has ever maintained that our decorated men are winning the war for us. They are merely reflections of the quality of our entire Army, a "melting-pot" Army that is pounding the guts out of the German and Japanese "master races."

Millions of men maintaining a high standard of performance in their assigned jobs may never get the chance to earn an award, but for most of us winning the war will be reward enough.

HOW THEY RANK, HOW EARNED

The nine highest decorations awarded by the War Department, in order of precedence with qualifications required:

1—Medal of Honor: for conspicuous gallantry at the risk of life and beyond the call of duty in actual combat. Awarded in the name of Congress to any officer or enlisted man. (Additional pay \$2 monthly, EM only.)

2—Distinguished Service Cross: for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy. To any person serving with the Army in any capacity. (Additional pay \$2 monthly, EM only.)

3—Distinguished Service Medal: for exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility. To any person serving with the Army in any capacity. (Additional pay \$2 monthly, EM only.)

4—Legion of Merit: for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services. To members of the U.S. and Philippine armed forces, with special grades for members of allied armed forces.

5—Silver Star: for gallantry in action not warranting a Medal of Honor or Distinguished Service Cross. To any person serving with the Army in any capacity.

6—Distinguished Flying Cross: for heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight. To members of military, naval, and air forces serving with the Army Air Forces in any capacity. (Additional pay \$2 monthly, EM only.)

7—Soldier's Medal: for heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy. To members of the armed forces serving with the Army in any capacity. (Additional pay \$2 monthly, EM only.)

8—Bronze Star Medal: for heroic or meritorious achievement or service not involving participation in aerial flight, in connection with military operations against the enemy, on or after 7 December, 1941. To any person serving with the Army in any capacity.

9—Air Medal: for meritorious achievement while participating in an aerial flight. To any person serving with the Army in any capacity.

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Q. By the recognition of what nation did the Big Four recently become the Big Five?

A. France.

Q. If a Moro asked you to play biola would he be inviting you to a game?

A. No. He would be wanting to hear music. A biola is a native violin.

Q. Among Mohammedan people the Sultan is the highest religious and political authority. Can you identify these other Mohammedan ranks: Wazir; Datu; Panglima; Maharajah; Imam?

A. A Wazir is equivalent to Prime Minister; Datu, principal adviser or tribal leader, or war chief; Panglima, judge; Maharajah, various grades of military rank—Colonel, Major, etc; Imam, secondary priest. Man you're most likely to deal with in the Philippines is the Datu.

Q. Six armies are fighting on the Western Front, near Arnhem, north of Aachen, before Cologne, near Metz and near Belfort Gap. Which are they?

A. British Second, near Arnhem; American First, before Cologne; American Ninth, north of Aachen; American Third, near Metz; American Seventh and French First, near Belfort Gap.

Q. Budapest is known as the "twin city." Why?

A. Budapest was originally two cities—Buda and Pest, on the right and left, respectively, of the Danube river. They were merged into one city in 1873.

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Q. For the first time during the war Allied ground forces coming from east and west joined in combat. Where did this take place?

A. Norwegian forces, numbering 500 men, trained in England, were sent to the north of Norway, where they joined with Russian troops which had come from Finland.

Q. Where is Breakneck Ridge? Bloody Nose Ridge?

A. Breakneck Ridge is in the northern sector of Ormoc Corridor. Bloody Nose Ridge was one of the last Japanese strongholds in the northern tip of Peleliu.

Q. If United States forces were to invade their next Pacific goal from Leyte, which would be closer territory—the Dutch East Indies or the China Coast?

A. The Dutch East Indies.

Q. What two (and only two) advantages does Germany have on the Western Front?

A. (1) Their system of fixed defense, including the massive forts of the Westwall; and (2) short lines of communication.

Q. How much damage did the Germans do during their four years in Greece?

A. It is estimated that in Athens alone, 15,000 Greek citizens were executed and 200,000 died of starvation during German occupation. Approximately 1500 villages have been destroyed; while nearly one-third of the nation's resources such as factories and railroads and shipping are a total loss.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2. No. 25 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 23 DEC., 1944

RESTRICTED

Jap Philippine Holdings Cut In Two With Mindoro Landing

Mindoro Island, 288 miles northwest of Leyte, was invaded last week in an operation that brought Sixth Army troops within 150 miles of Manila, drove a corridor from east to west through the Philippines, and provided bases from which Allied planes may command sea and air routes to the China coast.

Five days after D-day the most remarkable thing about this latest assault appeared to be the almost complete absence of enemy resistance. The invasion convoy travelled 600 miles through the enemy-infested waters of Surigao Strait and the Sulu Sea and landed on an island which Tokyo Radio acknowledged as the key to "control of to-morrow's military situation." Yet so far the entire operation has met with only minor interference from the air and virtually none on the ground.

AIRFIELD TAKEN. Wading ashore during the early hours of Friday morning, 15 December, troops under command of Brig. Gen. William C. Dunkel quickly established strong beachheads at three separate points on Mindoro's southern plain. They ran into no organized shore resistance and

quick seizure of high ground secured the positions against any possible local counterattacks. When no counterattacks came, infantrymen fanned out toward the foothills, while tanks, bulldozers, and the thousands of supply items followed onto the beaches.

San Jose village and its nearby airfield were occupied less than 24 hours later after troops had pushed five miles up the Bugsanga river. U.S. Engineers and RAAF construction crews immediately went to work converting the small strip to Allied use. Ground troops meanwhile proceeded to extend the perimeter 11 miles inland from the beachhead.

AIR SUPPORT. Prior to the invasion, land-based planes gave a terrific bombardment to enemy dromes in the southern Philippines, and carrier-based Hellcats smothered every one of Luzon's almost 100 fields to the north.

Over Wednesday and Thursday, 13 and 14 December, planes from Vice-Admiral John McCain's carrier force over Manila Bay and its environs knocked out 224 enemy aircraft, besides shooting up four trains, setting fire to two destroyers in Subic Bay, damaging a large cargo vessel, destroying one tanker and firing another. During the same period and through Friday, FEAF bombers destroyed 122 grounded aircraft on Negros and Cebu

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and eight on Mindanao strips; Navy planes from baby flattops accounted for six more; and the convoy's air cover and ack-ack brought down 24 raiders.

As the neutralization raids continued, the enemy's losses grew higher every day. The toll after seven days—from Wednesday through Tuesday—was 742 Jap planes destroyed or seriously damaged. Of these, 461 were credited to the naval air arm during three days of sustained strikes, and 23 were shot down while attempting to raid the Mindoro beachhead. A spokesman from Admiral McCain's flagship said that about half the Jap planes on Luzon had been destroyed as a result of the Third Fleet attacks.

Japanese shipping suffered as badly as their aircraft. During the week cited at least 28 Jap ships were sunk and 61 more were damaged, among them several destroyers and other warships.

WHAT IT MEANS. With the seizure of Mindoro's southwest coast, the left leg of the classic offensive triangle has been secured. The base now runs east to the right leg at Leyte-Samar, and the apex is formed at Manila, the prime objective. This has been the pattern of SWPA campaigns ever since Buna and its success is now a matter for history.

There were two pre-war airfields with limited runways in southern Mindoro—one at San Jose, the other at Waterous. Both were used by American Kittyhawks during the battle of the Philippines in late 1941 and early 1942. In addition the terrain is suitable for considerable further development as an air base.

That the Japs are yet to join battle for Mindoro should not imply that they won't. It is entirely likely that they may attempt to pour troops into the island from Luzon, crossing Verde Island Passage in the north. If they do, Allied aircraft is prepared to hand out the same sort of treatment it gave the ill-fated reinforcement convoys to Ormoc on Leyte.

Should the enemy succeed in landing some troops, one distinct geographical

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factor would be in U.S. favor. Between the American perimeter and the Passage is a central mountain range rising as high as 8000 feet, a formidable natural barrier against any enemy counterattack in strength from the east or north coasts.

Battle For Leyte Is Almost Over; Valencia Seized

On Sunday Lt. Gen. Homma, former Japanese commander in the Philippines, went before a microphone to explain the situation to the Japanese people. "The enemy was forced to make the Mindoro landings," he said, "due to the terrific pressure exerted by our victorious forces on Leyte Island. The enemy was just squeezed out of Leyte."

Here's how the "squeezed-out" Americans were doing on Leyte last week:

At the southern end of the Yamashita Line troops of the Seventh Division completed the annihilation of the Japanese 26th Division. In the north the First Cavalry and 32nd Divisions pressed other Japs into an ever-constricting area. And in between, the 77th Division moved nine miles north from Ormoc in a flanking drive to capture the 35th Army headquarters at Valencia.

The "victorious" Japs of Leyte thus were caught in two traps—one along a six-mile stretch of road north of Valencia, the other in a four-mile pocket between Ormoc and Valencia in the south. The only serviceable port left them was Palompon, on the west coast, and its value as a supply depot was dubious. The only means of reaching their forces in Ormoc Cor-

ridor was over a rough, often impassable, mountain road.

FALL OF VALENCIA. Most significant of last week's gains on Leyte was the occupation of Valencia on Monday, 18 December. To take it, elements of the 77th, having seized the enemy's main supply dumps one mile north of Ormoc, bypassed strong Jap defenses on the highway with a wide envelopment movement to the west. Two miles south of the township they swung back onto the road and then plunged forward for a bold, final onslaught. Captured intact, the Valencia airdrome was being used by U.S. spotter planes by Tuesday.

At the same time the First Cavalry Division in the northern sector thrust forward in a two-mile advance to cut the Yamashita Line between Mount Catabaran and Valencia, from there to infiltrate mountains to the west and seize Lonoy. At last reports Cavalrymen were less than 6 miles north of the 77th's spearhead pressing out from Valencia.

Their progress handicapped by the necessity of having to dig out Japs from prepared defenses on the way, 32d Division troops meanwhile moved down Ormoc Corridor beyond the villages of Tolibaw and Bonbongan. Among the booty they captured were light tanks, 75 mm. and 105 mm. artillery pieces, mortars, heavy and light machine guns.

JAP CASUALTIES. For their fanatic resistance the Japs have paid extravagantly. General MacArthur's communique for 15 December reported that in 55 days they had suffered 82,554 casualties in fighting on Leyte and Samar. Abandoned dead numbered 33,801; estimated drowned or killed in attacks on reinforcement convoys, excluding ship crews, 30,000; estimated additional casualties (dead still to be collected, dead buried by enemy within his own lines), 18,500; prisoners of war, 263.

These figures represent a casualty rate of 1500 men a day since the campaign opened on 20 December. In the same period Allied casualties were 2176 killed, 7967 wounded, and 257 missing, a total of 10,400. For every one U.S. casualty, eight Japs have died.

AIR WAR. The ratio of Jap plane losses to American was equally impressive—33 to 1. The ratio was announced by General Kermey and it was strictly the score by land-based bombers in air combat over the Philippines, including in the tally neither the rate of kills by the Navy nor enemy planes destroyed on the ground.

In addition to blasting regularly at Japanese dromes in the Visayas, FEAF bombers continued their raids against Borneo, concentrating particularly last week on the waterfront area at Sandakan. In three enemy attacks against Allied shipping off Leyte 13 Zeros were shot down.

Mindoro Was Cue For Guerrillas

The Mindoro landings were preceded and accompanied by an aggressive guerrilla offensive ranging throughout the entire Philippines Archipelago.

Japanese lines of communication were seriously disrupted, heavy casualties were inflicted upon defending garrisons and the free movement of enemy reserves was checked.

Summarizing recent gains, General MacArthur's communique reported that on Mindanao, under command of Colonel Wendell W. Fertig (Engineers), guerrilla units have invested enemy-held airfields and strategic coastal points, and have liberated the entire provinces of Lanao and Misamis.

ON PANAY, under the command of Colonel M. Peralla (Junior Infantry), they have captured the towns of Zaraga, Painsongon, San Miguel and En-

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SUNK BY SUBS

In latest Pacific prowls U.S. submarine have sunk an additional 33 Japanese ships, including a light cruiser, three destroyers, and six escort vessels. The new sinkings brought to 907 the number of enemy ships sunk by submarines since the war's start. Ninety-four of these were warships and included 13 enemy cruisers and 43 destroyers.

tancia, seized several vital enemy airfields, and are now maintaining heavy pressure on the remaining scattered enemy positions on the island.

ON NEGROS, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Salvador Abcede (Infantry), in a general offensive movement against enemy-occupied areas, they have cleared the southern half of the island with the exception of the Dumaguete area, where the enemy has been driven into a pocket

STEPPING STONE TO MANILA

With the landing on Mindoro the SWPA spearhead now has reached close to Manila, capital city of the Philippines. From the southernmost part of Mindoro, the distance to Manila is only 175 miles; from the northern towns of Palaun and Calapan only 95 miles. A similar distance separates Mindoro from Bataan.

Mindoro itself is a small, mountainous island, roughly 100 miles long and 60 miles in width, some areas of which are yet to be explored. There is a fairly extensive coastal plain along the eastern fringe of the island and a much smaller one in the southwest where we landed. Rainfall here is much lighter than on Leyte.

Mindoro lies northwest of Leyte with the nearest town on the east coast, Bongabong, being 240 miles distant. The distance between Palaun on the extreme northwest tip and Ormoc, recently captured Jap stronghold on

and is now under close siege. On the east coast, Sibulan, San Carlos, Bais, Isabella, and Luzriga, together with several airfields, have been captured.

ON CEBU, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Charles Cushing (Engineers), in a series of direct attacks and violent harassing movements, they have cleared the enemy from most of the southern area, leaving him confined for the most part to central Cebu, where his lines of communication are under constant pressure.

IN THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Alejandro Suarez (Infantry), they have pinned down the enemy's forces into small restricted areas.

ON BOHOL, under the command of Major Ishmael Inginiro (Infantry), they have freed the entire island except in the Tagbilaran area, where the enemy's forces are now concentrated.

Colonel Fertig and Lieut. Colonel Cushing are Americans. The other four guerrilla leaders are Filipinos.

Leyte's west coast, is 325 miles. From a navigation standpoint Mindoro is sadly lacking in good harbors. There is only one noteworthy anchorage—Palaun Bay on the northwest coast.

In relative distances up the Philippine ladder, Leyte is approximately one third of the way up the archipelago, while Mindoro is about two thirds of the way. The distance from Mindoro to the northernmost tip of the Philippine Islands is only 350 miles. The direct approach from Leyte to Mindoro lies across the Visayan and Sibuyan seas, and through the narrow Jintotola channel between Masbate and Panay Islands. This Jintotola channel at the narrowest point closes to a width of about 20 miles.

Among the main towns on Mindoro are Sablayan and Magaran on the west coast, Calapan and Fola on the east coast. Calapan, capital of Mindoro, has a population of 17,160.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

First Army Faces Biggest Counterblow Of Western War

American First Army troops last week were battling the Germans' greatest counter assault of the war in the west, a continuing attack involving strong Luftwaffe support, tanks, infantry, and even paratroops.

The offensive by Tuesday, 19 December, had been slowed and in some places stopped, but there was no official word on the extent of the German penetration following a rigid blackout of news dispatches by Army censorship which clamped down tight Monday afternoon.

A front dispatch from Associated Press correspondent William F. Boni, however, was allowed to go through stating that Lt. General Courtney H. Hodges was throwing all available forces into an effort to stem "the most serious setback to American arms on this side of the world since Kasserine Pass in Tunisia."

The German offensive began Sunday, 17 December, when the Nazis drove across the borders of Belgium and Luxembourg at three points along the route of their 1940 conquests, after raking U.S. First Army lines with an inferno of shells and bombs and bringing out the long hidden Luftwaffe. The main blow appeared to be aimed at the Belgian city of Malmedy, 23 miles south of Aachen.

BORDER PUSH. The main German penetrations were placed near Honsfeld, two and a half miles inside the Belgian frontier about 20 miles south of Monschau; another some 32 miles further south below the border

town of Vianden, where the Nazis crossed back into Luxembourg; and south of Echternach, 12 and a half miles southeast of Vianden.

A SHAEF communique acknowledged that some enemy paratroops had been rounded up behind Ninth Army lines Sunday, indicating that the offensive might possibly spread to the north. But the main weight of German Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Runstedt's offensive seemed to have fallen Sunday morning in the Monschau Forest area south of Monschau.

Late Sunday dispatches said that the Germans had gained four miles in one area ten miles east of Malmedy, the Belgian town just north of the Luxembourg border which appeared to be the main immediate objective of the Nazi onslaught. The battle was progressing along an 80-mile front in what was being described as perhaps the last great Nazi offensive of the war.

NEWS BLACKOUT. On Monday afternoon SHAEF inaugurated an ironclad censorship of news dealing with the First Army front; and line officers there made no attempt to minimize the seriousness of the German winter counter-offensive to ~~stop~~ back the Allied drive for the Rhine. The battle was mounting in fury along a front from Duren to the southern area of Luxembourg.

American planes were thrown into direct tactical and strategic support of the embattled First Army troops. A force 1100 strong streaked over the western front to hammer the railheads of Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, which are located so as to bear importantly on supply lines for the Nazi assault.

Meanwhile Berlin said that the Germans had crossed the northern Luxembourg border on a broad front and were nearing the Belgian border. The Berlin account also said that the Nazis had reached the area of Malmedy.

Tuesday brought no real clarification of the situation from official sources. SHAEF reported that heavy fighting was continuing in the sectors between

the Monschau area and the southern part of Luxembourg border. And while the news blackout remained in force, censors permitted transmission of a Ninth USAAF announcement that British Typhoons had attacked 20 German armored vehicles west of the Belgian town of Stavelot. Stavelot is 18 airline miles from the German border, and nearly 22 miles by road.

The First Army was fighting desperately, but with effective air support which destroyed or damaged 112 Nazi tanks and armored vehicles. The Luftwaffe again was up in force, as the German commanders threw in their whole arsenal into their counter-drive.

U.S. PRESSURE. If the great German counter offensive was designed to lessen pressure on the Roer River Front, it was still at this point unsuccessful, since U.S. pressure here continued with the capture of a number of villages by First Army troops. The villages of Reisdorf, Wurm, Mullendorf, and Beek were cleared.

Late Tuesday came reports that the Nazi assault had been slowed and in some places halted as U.S. troops struck back. The situation on the Luxembourg sector of the First Army front remained fluid. No specific countermeasures were described by official sources except the use of some 308 USAAF heavies to rip a 50-mile strip of German rail and road points from Trier north to Gemund.

Allied Headquarters said only that the attack was continuing, and shed no more light on earlier reports that the Germans had rolled back American lines at one point at least 20 miles into Belgium.

BACKING US

Terming it a "magnificent example of homefront solidarity," Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, has announced that the sixth war loan drive was over-subscribed by \$5,000,000,000—five billion dollars. Final sales are expected to exceed 19 billion.

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But in the South Allied Drive Still Grinds Forward

While attention was riveted on the Nazi counter-offensive in the First Army sector, the Seventh Army far to the south was making slow progress inside Germany near the Rhine.

At least nine German towns were in American hands at midweek, as Lt. General Alexander M. Patch's troops were edging forward farther northward into the Siegfried fortress belt along a 21 mile front.

On Saturday, 16 December, the Germans reacted vigorously to the invasion of their fatherland and local counter-attacks were hurled repeatedly at the advancing U.S. troops, the Germans bringing up a fresh panzer division to supplement the firepower of the Siegfried Line's heavy field guns.

PILLBOXES. Troops of the U.S. 45th, 79th and 103rd Infantry Divisions pressed toward the first pillboxes of the Westwall, as American artillery duelled with enemy big guns. The 79th was finding it heavy going after entering the Reich at two points near Lauterbourg, two miles from the Rhine, some 35 miles south of the great German industrial centers of Mannheim and Ludwigshafen. The other penetrations came west of Wissembourg, 11 miles west of Lauterbourg.

By Monday, the slow advance had been pushed relentlessly forward into Siegfried fortifications. One tank outfit penetrated seven rows of "dragon teeth" north of Wissembourg, while other elements were nearing the village of Reisdorf, four miles inside the Reich. Parts of two forts northwest of Bittche on the western edge of the Seventh Army front were taken after bitter fighting. Wissembourg itself was captured.

Meanwhile, farther to the north U.S. Third Army troops fought their way to the Saar Basin town of Gersheim.

Fighting Continues In Greece; British Reject EAM Offer

Inconclusive fighting continues in Greece between British troops and the guerrilla forces of the EAM, with an additional knot added to the tangle by a general strike in Salonika.

The general strike followed closely the rejection by Lt. Colonel Ronald M. Scobie, British commander in Greece, of EAM (National Liberation Front) peace terms on grounds that they failed to provide for immediate cessation of resistance. The EAM peace plan was offered Saturday, and by its terms the guerrillas agreed to cease fighting if suspected collaborationists were brought to trial, and if a new government were formed to deal with the question of the disarmament of resistance forces.

General Scobie, in refusing the offer the same day, pointed out that the ELAS (armed force of the EAM) had not agreed to disarm its troops, and went on to say that if the guerrillas agreed to surrender as well as evacuate Attica he felt that the other terms could be agreed upon. Attica is the area around Athens, the Greek capital, and its evacuation by the ELAS has been one of the sticking points in discussions between British and Greek representatives.

STILL SOME HOPE. Negotiations were not suspended, however. More and more British reinforcements continued to arrive in the Greek capital, and settlement of the strife was still hoped for in the near future. Meanwhile ELAS artillery continued to hammer away spasmodically at British positions in Athens.

In London, strong criticism of the policy of Prime Minister Churchill

continued to be voiced on all sides. The British Labor party voted a resolution calling on the government to take steps to bring about an immediate armistice in Greece. Demands that the party break away from the government policy brought applause, but were defeated when put to a vote after Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labor, told the delegates that Laborite Ministers in the Churchill cabinet accepted full responsibility with the Prime Minister for British policy in Greece. The resolution was voted on by delegates representing more than two and a half million Labor party members.

Palmer Dutt, vice-chairman of England's small but vociferous Communist Party, told a Birmingham audience that Prime Minister Churchill should be cautioned that he had been accepted as a war leader "and never for his private political views and notorious sympathies to reaction." Sir Percy Harris, leader of the Liberal Party, declared that the policy was "sowing the seeds of future wars."

CLARIFICATION WANTED. Other critics of the Churchill policy of intervention, including the conservative London Times, joined in a demand for a full dress conference of Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin, and President Roosevelt to clarify Allied policy toward the liberated nations of Europe.

In Commons Tuesday Mr. Churchill himself refused to make any further statement on the Greek situation, beyond saying that he felt that the situation was greatly improved.

Meanwhile Premier Papandreou, whose government is the storm center, cabled King George II of Greece recommending that Archbishop Damaskinos, who lived in Athens in open defiance of the Nazis during German occupation and who is probably the most respected single figure in Greece because of his almost legendary bearding of bigwig Nazis, be appointed regent to rule Greece in the transitional period until the Greek people can elect their own form of government.

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Russians Still Put Pressure on Nazis' Southern Flank

The continued pressure on Budapest last week indicated the Soviets had not yet decided to risk frontal assault on Reich defenses but were presumably going to concentrate on the threat from the south, one which might materialize through the Danube valley and Vienna or through Slovakia.

The most logical route to Germany still appeared to be across the Polish plains, but Moscow was silent on any operation along the Vistula river front. Although in the north Red Army forces were deployed along the Vistula in the Warsaw sector, the offensive against the Polish capital had died out. Below, between Warsaw and the southern bastion of Cracow, the Vistula had been crossed in the Sandomierz sector, but rough country lay ahead between the forward Soviet positions and German Silesia. A few more weeks should see the Polish plains and perhaps the Vistula freeze over. At this time—the traditional period of great Red Army activity—the world may witness a renewed Soviet winter offensive.

Moscow was releasing little information of the drive on Budapest although that city was reported three-quarters encircled. Meanwhile the Red Army appeared to be shifting the weight of its southern drive to Czechoslovakia.

NO PEACE, NO GOOD WILL

A \$65 fine awaits any GI who says "Merry Christmas" to a German civilian, Lt. Col. Richard C. Croft, Division Military Government Officer, has warned men of the Eighth Infantry Division inside Germany. A delegation of young German women had asked Colonel Croft that strict non-fraternization rules be relaxed Christmas Day, but his reply was that "the same rules will apply Christmas as any other day, and that includes a \$65 fine for talking to enemy civilians."

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MUTUAL AID. On the diplomatic front General Charles de Gaulle and Marshal Josef Stalin concluded a conference during which, according to Moscow Radio, they discussed "the problems of continuing the war, and the organization of the peace, particularly in relation to the German problem."

On Sunday the result of the conference was made known—a 20-year treaty between France and the Soviet Union, the keystone of which was a military alliance clause. By the terms of the new treaty both nations are bound to fight until Germany's complete defeat and to act together against any future German aggression. Neither party will make a separate peace, undertake any alliance, or join any coalition against the other, according to the pact.

Kiwis Take Faenza

The Allied drive to flank the Germans holding Bologna scored new successes last week. New Zealand troops of the British Eighth Army took Faenza on the Rimini-Bologna highway despite the efforts of the German Ninetieth Panzer Grenadier Division which had been rushed into the line in an effort to hold it.

German resistance collapsed after bitter house to house fighting which took place after the town had been entered from across the Lamone river. Allied troops driving from the southwest also took Cella, and the New Zealanders, leaving Faenza behind, advanced to the banks of the Senio river. The only town of any size remaining on the highway to Bologna is Imola.

CHINA-BURMA INDIA

B-29s Hit Nagoya, Bangkok, Rangoon

Both the 20th and 21st Bomber Commands of B-29 Superfortresses carried out long range missions against the Japanese last week.

After a series of light sorties for purposes of weather data and reconnaissance, the Saipan-based 21st group ranged over Nagoya, Japan's third largest city, and centered an attack on the Mitsubishi aircraft plant which produces twin-engine bombers and Jap navy fighters. Returning crews from the more than 3000-mile trip said results were good and that several explosions and fires were observed.

The 20th Bomber Command roared over Thailand and Burma in return visits to Bangkok and Rangoon, Japanese transportation centers. The attack was the third on Bangkok in Thailand and the second on Rangoon in Burma for the India-based B-29s.

A communique described the force as "substantial" and reported good results in hitting Bangkok through a considerable cloud cover. Excellent results also were reported in the bombing at Rangoon.

Saipan-based Supers over Tokyo in light force last week, found all Honshu Island blacked out.

Army and Navy planes continued their assaults against Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands, the Japanese base from which the enemy has launched harrying attacks against Saipan. Last week a combined naval and air blow, including fighters, heavies, Navy ships and planes, and Superforts levelled a five and a half hour barrage at concentrated targets on this island, which is 700 miles north of Saipan.

Japs Pushed Back 40 Miles Inside Kwangsi Province

The Japanese flood of invasion which swept westward across Kwangsi Province into Kweichow Province has been checked by reinforced Chinese units who are now counterattacking and driving the enemy back along the Kweichow-Kwangsi railroad.

Kweichow is now free of Japanese, and fighting is taking place more than 40 miles inside Kwangsi Province, where three Chinese forces have fanned out in preparation for an assault on Hochih, 95 miles from Liuchow. The town has been outflanked on the southeast and the Chinese are within 12, 15 and 18 miles of its limits from three directions.

Major General Chang Tungchen, of the Chinese Army, said the Chinese military situation has become more stabilized in the last week and that no indication of any enemy plan to invade Kweichow is apparent. He added, however, that the Japanese are thought to be keeping a huge reserve of troops in the areas of Changsha, Hengyang, Kweilin, and Liuchow alerted for the possibility of an Allied landing attempt on China's east coast.

KWEIYANG SAFE. Major General Robert McClure, chief of staff to Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. commander in China, told correspondents this week that Chinese successes have removed any immediate threats to Kweiyang, although a potential threat still exists to the strategic air base of Kunming. General McClure said the former American air base at Liuchow might be retaken if the Chinese had sufficient forces, but this action would involve large scale fighting. To increase Chinese military efficiency, American personnel working

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in training and liaison capacities are being shifted to new posts, while American delivery of supplies by air from India is being increased.

Major General Patrick J. Hurley, U.S. ambassador to China, told a press conference that he had participated in talks between the central government and the Chinese communist leaders, which were followed by the transfer of Chinese forces in the northwest to the Kweichow front.

Reviewing a week's air operations, headquarters announced American planes had destroyed 42 enemy aircraft, had probably destroyed ten, and had damaged 22. No American planes were lost in these raids. More than 21,000 tons of Jap shipping also was sunk during the week.

Chinese Clear Japs From North Burma

The last organized enemy resistance in northern Burma ended this week with the capture of Bhamo, Jap stronghold, after a 28-day siege.

Bhamo had a garrison of 1000 men when Chinese 38th division troops surrounded it. Its occupation, which was preceded by heavy concentrations of artillery fire and a steady bombardment by Tenth Air Force planes, allows the reopening of all but a 40 to 50-mile stretch of the Burma Road supply line to China from Nanhkam to the junction of the old Burma Road at the Yunnan-Burma border.

Chinese 30th Division troops who bypassed Bhamo are fighting in the vicinity of Nanhkam after having cleared the India-China route from Ledo to 35 miles south of Bhamo.

VETERANS. A Chinese force that left Kamaing the middle of October is now reported 50 miles in front of the most advanced British and Chinese forces, fighting along the Mogaung-Mandalay railway to the west.

This force is the veteran 22nd Division which has moved southward 210

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miles through Burma to capture Tonkwa village, 120 air miles north-east of Mandalay and 70 miles from Lashio, where the railway from Rangoon connects with the Burma Road.

The Japanese fled in front of the Chinese 22nd for 50 miles without stopping, and then threw up a stand at Shwegu on the Irrawaddy river. After a day's battle the Japs fled another 50 miles, but the pursuing Chinese caught up with them at Tonkwa. This force is now in a position to cut the retreat southward of Japanese falling back before Allied units advancing down the Mandalay railroad, although to accomplish this the Chinese would have to cross some 80 miles of jungle terrain.

ALTERNATIVE. The Chinese at Tonkwa could also swing eastward to cut the Burma Road between Lashio and Muse, or they could possibly storm the Jap Burma Road stronghold of Nanhkam to meet the Yunnan Chinese who are northeast of Wanting and advancing on Nanhkam. Another possibility is that these units might join in the general movement toward Mandalay, which is considered the key Jap supply point for the Burma theater and which would be the keystone for any future Allied efforts to supply the Chinese war effort.

To use Mandalay to their best advantage the Allies would have to occupy Rangoon, enabling them to establish an overland supply system of rail and road facilities from Rangoon to Mandalay and Lashio and thence to Kunming. Indaw and Katha have been taken by British and Chinese units moving south from Mogaung, while East African patrols advancing into Central Burma are a few miles southeast of Kalewa, which was captured recently. Fifteenth Indian Corps troops moved into Buthidaung and have advanced along the coastal strip of the Bay of Bengal, 16 miles south from Maungdaw, while West African troops in the Arakan hill tracts are 13 miles south of Maungdaw.

Yamashita: The Tiger of Malaya May Be Goat of the Philippines

If you believe his press agents, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, supreme commander of Japanese army forces in the Philippines, is the world's greatest military strategist, a hero to his countrymen, and a big brother to his men. On the record, however, he proves to be one of the ruling members of that military hierarchy which General MacArthur has described as weak, corrupt, and a curse to the Japanese people.

When in early November 64-year-old Yamashita was dispatched to Manila to assume the Philippines command, the Japanese press and radio pulled out all the stops. As conqueror of Malaya, Yamashita was the man who had brought Greater East Asia its happiest victory over the white man. What he had done once he could do again. Domei, waxing metaphorical, commented gleefully: "Yamashita, the Tiger of Malaya is pitted in the battle of the Philippines against the choice of the American League, ... MacArthur, in what is truly the final game of the world series."

Confident that Leyte would prove a second Singapore, the official government news agency later gave dramatic play to Yamashita's promise to Jose Laurel, puppet president of the Philippines—a promise which was supposed to have been delivered "sardonically and with a hearty laugh: 'This time I shall show Your Excellency a surrender scene where General MacArthur will replace Lt. General Percival.'"

THE HUMAN ANGLE. The official Japanese press thereafter carried on a well calculated program to humanize the Tiger for the public. Even so, to an American the General might not seem so human. Here is what Domei's Manila correspondent wrote of him:

"The nickname Tiger fits him well. He looks powerful from head to foot. Although a heavy sleeper Yamashita may awake in the middle of the night and give drastic orders after a

minute's deliberation. . . . He does not accept any visitors unless they have official business. He devotes all his time to carefully conferring with his officers on how and when to strike the enemy.

"Ever since his arrival here, General Yamashita holds conferences every morning at 0800 hours with his staff officers in his private office at Field Headquarters. During the meeting, he listens to various front line reports and discusses the war situation, even forgetting to eat his lunch. He indefatigably carries on these daily conferences until around 1700.

"After taking supper he goes to his own room and plumps into his chair, where he falls into deep meditation. When his staff officers enter his room to make a report on the latest developments they think he is asleep, but he immediately opens his piercing eyes and listens to their detailed reports. He has the names of various places in the Philippines so vividly scored in his mind that he does not have to refer to a map. The fearless general is very meticulous. But there is also a human side to him. Whenever he has an opportunity to mix with the orderlies of Field Headquarters, he reminds them to send the best food to the men at the fighting front."

CAREER MAN. Japan's official record shows that in his rise to power Yamashita has followed the career pattern traditional among members of the military caste to which he belongs.

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Born in 1880 in Kochi Prefecture on Shikoku Island (central Japan), he graduated from the Military Academy in Tokyo in 1906. Ten years later he completed the prescribed course at the staff college and entered the service as an aide to the chief of staff.

In his early days Yamashita served abroad as resident officer in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and Hungary and at home as a member of the War Ministry and the Military Affairs Bureau. After a stint as commander of an artillery regiment he was recalled to staff work to serve successively as director of the War Ministry Affairs Bureau and the Military Affairs Investigation Department. His reputa-

tion through the years was one of reckless brilliance.

The general was in China from 1937 to 1939, first as a unit commander and later as chief of staff. He also commanded an army corps in Manchukuo and late in 1939 became Inspector General of Military Aviation. In 1940 he went to Germany where he probably received a few good Prussian tips for fighting the coming Pacific war which he and others like him were cooking. He returned in time to become supreme commander in Malaya, a post which brought him his full generalship in February of 1943 and which he held down to his transfer to the Philippines.

CHURCHILL FAVORS CURZON LINE

With worldwide howls of dismay over his handling of the Greek situation still dinning without letup, Prime Minister Winston Churchill last week dragged out for exhibition another unsightly skeleton in the closet of United Nations diplomacy.

On Friday, 15 December, the Prime Minister placed before the House of Commons what he termed the "bare grim bones" of the Polish problem, and supported as reasonable the demands by Soviet Russia for territory in old Poland which the Polish Government-in-exile has refused to give up.

In a significant pronouncement that amounted to a sharp criticism of the exiled Polish government in London—a government which has been at swordpoints with the USSR almost from the day of its origin—Churchill said flatly that the Poles have no alternative but to meet Russian demands for a western frontier along the old Curzon Line. The Curzon Line, set up as a reasonable boundary at the conclusion of the last war but never put

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into effect because the Poles successfully maneuvered to disrespect it, lies considerably to the east of the old Soviet-Polish border.

COMPENSATION. In return for the loss of territory involved in setting up this frontier between Poland and the USSR, Mr. Churchill went on to explain, Poland would be given other territory "at Germany's expense" including Danzig and all of East Prussia south and west of Koenigsberg. The exchange of territory would involve a mass transfer of population to prevent minority disputes from troubling the future peace, Mr. Churchill added.

The United States was not long in announcing a policy on the Polish question. A statement released in Washington set forth the official stand: the United States would have no objection to the settlement of the Polish-Russian boundary dispute before the end of the war "if mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations directly concerned."

Secretary of State Stettinius also reaffirmed the American stand for "a strong, free, and independent Polish state," and announced that U.S. aid in post-war rehabilitation would be extended to Poland as well as to all other liberated nations.

V-2: Effective Now, Its Main Influence Is for the Future

The little men of England were gathered in the corner pub for their afternoon pot of beer. They sat at the scarred little tables or leaned against the walls or squeezed in close to the bar and spoke with the easy humor of neighbors. News had been good that day and the talk was full of promise for an early end to the war.

Then suddenly there was a terrific roar which the men did not hear. They died, literally, without knowing what hit them. Rescue squads digging through the debris found only one thing alive—the large V-sign that had stood behind the counter. Its red, white, and blue bulbs still glowed.

Since October, when Germany introduced its second vengeance weapon, that incident, with a slight change in scene and symbol, has been repeated time and again. During November V-bombs killed 716 persons in Britain and seriously injured 1511. Although for reasons of military security it hasn't told everything, the British Ministry of Information has disclosed enough other facts to suggest that militarily V-2 is revolutionizing the science of warfare and politically sealing the doom of the German nation.

LONG TOUTED. If they weren't entirely prepared for V-2, at least the British had expected it. German propaganda had exploited it thoroughly in advance, both to boost homefront morale and to reduce Allied morale. For months the Baltic was rife with rumors of German experiments with some sort of rocket projectiles. Then in August Russian troops, advancing into Poland came across what appeared to be a testing area, and the British Army subsequently received an exhaustive report of Soviet findings.

The rockets were first directed against Britain early in October. For almost a month, though, the Allied press and radio was committed to secrecy, and Prime Minister Churchill didn't make his statement before the

House of Commons until 10 November, two days after Berlin radio had jubilantly announced its introduction. To Mr. Churchill's skeleton description of the weapon, British intelligence officers later supplied some of the details.

THE ROCKET. The V-2 rocket and its predecessor, the V-1 flying bomb (introduced 15 July) are alike in that both are pilotless, both carry an even ton of high explosive, and both are jet propelled. Of their basic differences, the most important is that V-1 gets its oxygen, the essential elements in combustion, from the air, while V-2 carries its own oxygen supply and therefore is able to fly in altitudes where there is no oxygen.

Whereas V-1 is about 25 feet long, has wings and in design resembles a miniature airplane, V-2 is from 30 to 60 feet long and is shaped like a torpedo. A sectional view of the rocket would show a warhead behind which are chambers containing some form of instrument for radio steering, about nine tons of alcohol or gasoline for propelling purposes, liquid oxygen, a turbine, a pump unit and jet, and, at the rear, a combustion chamber which leads to the vent between tail fins. Composition of the explosive material in the warhead is claimed by the Germans to be unknown to the Allies. If foreign reports are accurate, the rocket also has a secret chemical propellant besides petrol which burns under terrific pressure and generates a powerful gas that is discharged through a series of jets in the tail.

STREAK OF LIGHTNING. In flight the rocket travels through the strato-

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sphere, reaching heights of 60 to 70 miles. Its speed varies from 1000 to 3000 miles per hour and its range from 300 to 400 miles. The fact that it is faster than sound makes all warning systems unreliable. It is as true of the V-2 as it is of the 88 mm. shell—if you hear it you're safe.

One observer described the rocket as it headed for earth as "a streak of light, with a reddish glow, which seemed to have a ball of fire at its head diving vertically to earth. It turned the whole sky incandescent and seemed to be alight when it hit the ground. On exploding it roared like a falling waterfall." Experts figure that it strikes the ground at a speed of 800 to 1000 miles per hour and that it normally leaves a crater anywhere from 15 to 25 feet deep. Damage is heavy in the immediate area where the rocket explodes, but surface blast generally is negligible since the rocket penetrates fairly deeply before exploding.

DEBIT SIDE. Two serious disadvantages with V-2 are its extravagant use of gasoline and its inaccuracy. Each rocket burns nearly 2500 gallons of gasoline a minute, which means that on a five minute flight from the present launching sites some 12,500 gallons are consumed in the delivery of one ton of explosive. Knowing this, RAF and USAAF bombers recently have thrown their weight against German synthetic oil plants.

The rocket is inaccurate and, despite all the efforts of German scientists, probably will remain so because of the inability to compute variable winds. But this does not mean that the rockets are not aimed or that they always miss their mark. Through use of radar and comparable instruments, the Germans are able to dispatch a sizeable force toward the same objective with reasonable assurance that one or more will hit the target area.

Rockets currently are being produced in German underground factories and are moved to launching areas under

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cover of night. Thus they can be attacked effectively only while in flight or just before launching. They are being fired across the North Sea from bases ranged in an arc on the European mainland and on the fringe of Germany itself. A favorite practice is to fire them from large towns, the Nazis believing the Allies too civilized to retaliate with bombardment where large masses of innocent people might be involved.

THE IF FACTOR. While in their present stage V-1 and V-2 are largely experimental, both are capable of extensive development. Neither strategically nor tactically can they be considered as an adequate substitute for the orthodox air force, but they can and do operate as an effective 24-hour bad weather air force.

Most aviation authorities agree that had Germany been able to use either V-1 or V-2 in force during the 1940 blitz England would have folded; had she been able to use them before June of this year the continental invasion might have been forestalled; and had she had them on D-Day the Allies might have been turned back from the beaches. As it is, the Allies may be thankful that, for one reason or another, Nazi scientists were unable to produce them soon enough and in sufficient quantity.

Matter of fact, there are indications that Hitler planned to have the weapons ready in time to meet our invasion forces. Working probably at Peenemunde in the Baltic, the Germans first began to develop rocket weapons in the fall of 1942. Mass production is believed to have actually begun in the summer of 1943, but fortunately the Allied bomber command's new offensive upset factory schedules. Production also was disrupted by certain early failures in design and assembly. First blueprints called for rockets to weigh 50 tons and to carry 10 tons of explosives; they now weigh 14 tons and carry one ton of explosives. Experiments failed especially in extremely intricate tech-

nical problems such as casting and welding a suitably strong frame.

MORE TO COME. As the war grows tougher and tougher for Germany, Goebbels may be expected to yell more and more of a V-3 and a V-4. Already he is half-promising the German people a miracle robot capable of bombing New York. According to Stockholm sources, V-3 is a rocket modified to carry poison gas which Hitler, after abandoning all hope of a Nazi victory, plans to use as his last bitter curse for the world. The same sources maintain that V-4 is the Aryan version of the Japanese Kamikaze Corps. Several hundred incurable German war invalids are said to have volunteered to pilot the weapons until the moment they crash. V-4 targets already named by Germany include Buckingham Palace, Downing Street, Whitehall, and the London docks.

But Goebbels' threat of bombing New York seems to be entirely scare talk. Before a meeting of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, scientist Alfred Africano declared that a rocket capable of firing from Germany to New York would require an initial weight of 2500 tons to carry just one ton of explosive. To start off the ground it would have to burn about 100,000 pounds of fuel per second, he said, and the damage in Germany from this blast might be 100 times greater than one ton of explosive could inflict on the States.

Two aviation experts on opposite sides of the Atlantic, however, have no illusions about the possibility of rocket weapons in future warfare. "We can expect automatic flying bombs to have great range in the next war," Glenn Martin, the U.S. plane builder, told reporters. "They will be capable of coming from Europe to America and will have a 5000-mile range." In Britain sci-


tist A. M. Low predicted that in the future a girl could sit at a "typewriter keyboard" and bombard a country on the other side of the world.

ASKING FOR IT. While Germany's frantic use of vengeance weapons cannot affect in any way the progress of the war, it may very well affect the nature of the peace. Rocket bombs and their terrifying implications have convinced a great many otherwise tolerant British citizens that Germany must be made to pay—and heavily. The popular opinion is that after the war Germany must be so closely supervised that she will never get the chance to produce any more weapons of a Buck Rogers character.

The British are not sentimentalists. They went through a blitz of their own and are returning it now with good measure. They know that indiscriminate bombing is a misnomer and are prepared to accept the fact that wherever there is total war civilian populations and non-military properties must expect to suffer. It is not as a terror weapon that they object to the V's, but as an effective means of long-range bombardment.

They know that the V-2, if perfected, would transform all existing conception of warfare and international security. It would render out of date international air forces as safeguards against aggression. It would mean that one country could fight another country separated by hundreds, perhaps thousands, of miles without a single sailor, soldier or airman leaving his own territory. They believe, perhaps more intensely than any people in the world, that it is imperative that there be no more wars. For even granting the invention of a counter weapon, the robot rocket as a weapon in mass warfare might mean the total destruction of modern man and his civilization.

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ARMY TALK Progress Report On Three Years of Total War

Note to the I & E Officer: This week's discussion aims at reaffirmation of the fact that steady, hard plugging has brought us a long way toward winning this war. The technique suggested is to recall our status at one-year intervals since this country's entry into the war. To aid the men in remembering the situation at each yearly milestone, some background of a non-military nature has been provided. Individual men should be encouraged to help set the scene. Important points to emphasize include: (1) It has been a long pull to overcome the initial advantages held by our enemies; (2) By continuous plugging and keeping our eyes on the main objective, we and our allies have made great progress; (3) The remainder of the distance must be covered more rapidly if as individuals we avoid letting down either through discouragement or over-optimism. Also see "The War in Outline."

THIS IS A WAR none of us wanted. But the United States was attacked, and we were faced with a man-sized job. This time, we could not afford to be satisfied with achieving a stalemate and then having the whole task to do over again in a few years. We knew we must break the power of the aggressors so that there would be a fair chance of having an orderly world in which to live.

Because our enemies planned for many years for this war, our job has been a tremendous one. There have been many times when all of us have felt discouraged by the whole project. We sat on our bunks or crawled under our shelter halves, thought about the latest world news we'd heard, and felt as though the global war of which we were a part was not even getting to first base.

Often Looked Stalled

Sometimes our progress did seem stalled. It was that way when our troops on Guadalcanal and New Guinea were measuring their daily gains in yards. It was that way in the mountains of Italy. It was that way again while everyone sweated out the invasion of "Fortress Europe." Our victory parade into Tokyo and Berlin appeared to be as far away as the other side of the moon.

That was partly because this war is too big for us to see the gains that have been made on any day-to-day basis. So if we really want to find out the score, and make an estimate of the

future, a better method is the one used by business companies to learn where they stand: looking at the picture at regular intervals of, say, one year.

In the case of our own progress towards winning this war, let's take as milestones "Pearl Harbor Day"—7 December, 1941, and its three anniversaries.

In the course of reviewing past events in that way, we will get a better idea of two very important points:

1. By continuous plugging that sometimes didn't seem much on a daily basis, we and our allies have made great gains in three years' time.

2. The rest of the distance to victory can only be covered by the daily sweat we put into our job.

(Suggestion: Ask several men in your group what they were doing when they heard news of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Then ask about the world military picture at that time as regards our Army, Germany, Britain, Soviet Union, France, Japan.)

One Out of Five

On 7 December, 1941, the United States was on its way towards building the kind of Army and Navy that would make it safe in a world where the war was crowding in upon us more closely every day. But if we went through the whole Army to-day, we would find only about one man in five who had been in service at that time. Many of those soldiers had just completed the largest peacetime maneuvers in our country's history. Shipments had been going out from our southern training camps to the Philippines; to the vital Panama Canal Zone and to bases like Trinidad acquired from Great Britain in the over-age destroyer agreement. Two months earlier Selective Service duty had been extended beyond one year by Congress.

Recruiting stations were accepting volunteers for the various branches, with emphasis upon candidates for the Aviation Cadet training program. The Air Corps numbered 360,000. Only a handful of us had ever heard of a place called Bataan, and not many more had any clear idea of where Corregidor and Pearl Harbor were located. Our Army was organized by separate branches, for the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces were not created until 9 March, 1942.

If you turned on the radio the night before Pearl Harbor, there's a good chance that you heard "You Are My Sunshine" or "Chattanooga Choo-Choo." If you went to the theater, perhaps you saw "Sergeant York" or "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." In the

THE ENEMY'S BEST HOPE

"We know for a fact that our enemies bank heavily on the American people's losing interest in this war. The Japanese, in particular, feel that they will be able to salvage the greater part of their empire simply by prolonging hostilities—working for a draw. And this belief of theirs has a certain deceptive, though actual enough, basis in fact. There is already much evidence that many misguided people here have succumbed to the false idea that the war is over—that we don't need the all-out effort of our people to bring the war to a close . . .

"Let me say here without quibbling or equivocation: Contrary to popular belief, we still have many bitter, bloody battles ahead of us before we finally defeat Germany. The Luftwaffe has been crippled but it is not dead. Our attrition rates are still heavy . . .

"The air war against the Japanese is still in its earliest phases. And there is no need for me to repeat that it's going to take a gigantic combined effort of all our arms to knock those people out.

"Now my message to you: Whatever your job in this war, keep on doing it. Do it right. Do it better than ever before. Don't slow up. A slow-up may cost lives in battle—extra effort on your part may end the war sooner."

—GENERAL ARNOLD, 9 Nov., '44.

newspapers, you might have read that Japan's representatives, Kurusu and Nomura, were still in Washington talking about working out a basis for continued peace between the two nations.

High Tide For Germany

At the same time, the position of the countries which became our allies gave little cause for optimism. Germany had driven the British completely off the continent, both in Western Europe and in the Balkans, and British cities were battered and scarred from Luftwaffe bombings. Hitler's armies approached the gates of Moscow and Leningrad, the two biggest Russian cities, and had pushed close to the rich Caucasus oilfields. To many observers, it looked as though the Soviet Union, largest nation fighting against Germany, was about to receive the knockout punch.

In Africa, the British had managed to drive the Italians out of Ethiopia. They were also in the midst of another of their seesaw offensives in Libya, but were soon to lose all they had

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gained there, and more, in another of Rommel's savage counter-attacks.

In Asia the Japanese, still methodically strangling China, had also moved into French Indo-China and Thailand, and were threateningly poised above British Malaya and the great British naval base at Singapore. They were ready for their bid for world conquest.

That was the world situation at the time that the Japanese attacked us and began their vast offensive throughout the wide reaches of the Pacific. The year that followed was to show the high tide of Axis aggression, and was for the most part a chronicle of defeats for the United States and its allies.

(Suggestion: Check on the situation of your unit and what it was doing on 7 December, 1942. Ask a few individuals what they were doing. Then ask in what ways the United Nations were better or worse off than a year earlier.)

Million Troops Overseas

By 7 December, 1942, our fighting muscles were beginning to harden. We had well over five million men in the Army—more than a million troops were overseas by Christmas—and some were in action against the enemy in the Pacific, in North Africa, and in the sky over Europe. But emphasis was still on training, on equipping, and on maintaining our fabulously-long supply lines to our troops and those of our Allies.

Going up the gangplanks, in the training centers, and along the supply arteries, we sang "Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition" or "I've Got Spurs that Jingle, Jangle, Jingle" that year. Among the movies we saw were "Casablanca" and "Yankee Doodle Dandy." Along with the military news, the newspapers were filled with accounts of amazing industrial expansion and conversion for war. The "swing shift" changed the habits of millions of American workers, who found themselves eating breakfast in the afternoon as part of the production effort which was to astonish the Axis.

In the Pacific we were just starting to hit back at the Japanese, who had overrun a vast ocean, island and land area. They had the Philippines, Guam, and Wake; had landed in force in the Aleutians; held Singapore; and in Burma had cut the famous Road along which vital supplies for China had passed. They had the whole of the rich Dutch East Indies, and had even come close to taking Port Moresby in New Guinea, springboard for an attack on Australia.

We had struck back at them in daring task force raids, and

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we were fighting them yard by yard in the bitter infighting of Guadalcanal. We had won the sea battles of Midway, the Coral Sea, and the Solomons. But we had barely started on the road back, and to the men in the middle of it the end of the war looked like a tiny light at the end of a long dark tunnel. With grim humor they predicted they'd see: "The Golden Gate in '48!"

Bogged Down In Tunisia

The idea of opening the "Second Front" in western Europe was at that time only a plan and a hope. In Africa the British had broken the threat of the Germans against the Suez Canal and were chasing them back westward. American and Allied troops had made landings at many points on the western Mediterranean coastline and had established a battlefield in Tunisia. But our first thrust for Tunis had failed, and we were bogged down in rain and mud.

In the Soviet Union, Stalingrad had held out, and the Red Army had hit back and encircled a German Army there. Soon other Soviet offensives along the great Eastern Front were to begin. It was one of the great turning points of the War, with a major part played by the supplies from America to the Soviet which we sweated up through the Middle East.

Looking back now at 7 December, 1942, it can be seen that, to use the words of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, we had reached "the end of the beginning" of the War.

(Question: How far along the road to victory had we gone by 7 December, 1943?)

One Down, Two To Go

With the arrival of 7 December, 1943, our Army was approaching top strength of 7,700,000; we had hit our stride in production and in battle. American civilians had learned the need for rationing now that the Japanese held the main rubber-producing areas of the world and food, gasoline, and leather were going in increasing quantities to war. By the end of 1943, you probably were tired of hearing "Pistol Packin' Mama," and among the movies were "The More the Merrier" and "Random Harvest." The book, "Here Is Your War," by Ernie Pyle was published, and penicillin began to be widely used.

Leaders of the United Nations had just finished their meeting at Teheran, plotting the strategy for the coming year. And Premier Tojo of Japan, on the Pearl Harbor anniversary day,

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called 1944 "our (Japan's) year to win." That same day the Wisconsin, then the world's largest battleship, was launched.

Actually, the year 1943 had seen the tide turn definitely in our favor. The patient plugging of the United Nations, the training we went through day after day, the great production record of our home front, began to pay off.

By 7 December, 1943, we had not only cleared the enemy completely out of Africa, but had taken all of Sicily, invaded the Continent for the first time with our landings in Italy, and split the Italians away from the German side. The day before this Pearl Harbor anniversary, the first Italian troops fighting for us entered the front lines against the Nazis. We were well above Naples, just encountering the stubborn resistance of Cassino.

Air Forces Hit Hard

The year 1943 was also the time when our air operations in Europe took on the importance of a "separate front." The bomb tonnage dropped by our Eighth Air Force Bomber Command during December alone equalled nearly one-third of the total dropped during all the previous 16 months.

The month before, the Russian winter offensive had taken the key cities of Kiev and Gomel, and despite occasional German counterattacking successes, the Red Army was generally on the move forward. A month after the Pearl Harbor anniversary, Soviet units were to reach the old Polish border.

In the Pacific, we could look back to a notable 1943 victory when Allied bombers sank 22 Japanese vessels and shot down 71

THEY'VE FOUGHT SINCE . . .

It often seems like a long, weary pull for us since 7 December 1941, but many of the United Nations fighting alongside us have been battling the Axis considerably longer. For comparison, here is when some of them went to war:

Australia, 3 September 1939; Canada, 10 September 1939; *China, 7 July 1937; New Zealand, 3 September 1939; United Kingdom, 3 September 1939; USSR, 22 June 1941; Yugoslavia, 6 April 1941.

*An alternate date would be 18 September 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria.

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planes in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea; we lost one bomber and three fighters. We held major ports on the northern coast of New Guinea, and had ended the threat that the enemy would make that island a usable offensive base. Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands had been taken, and we had made further advances in the Solomons. We held all the Aleutians again, for we had dislodged the enemy from Attu after a hard struggle and then forced him to abandon Kiska without a fight.

Progress Can Accelerate

To-day, three years after our entry into the war, our forces and those of our Allies are on the offensive everywhere, while our enemies have the initiative only on the China front. Some progress has been made in Burma. American troops are back in the Philippines, where we suffered such damaging blows in the first year of the war. In connection with this invasion, our Navy holds the upper hand as a result of routing the Japanese fleet on 26 October, 1944. Meanwhile, giant B-29 super-bombers menace the main islands of Japan at an increasing tempo.

In Europe, the invasion of the continent from the west is an accomplished reality, and American and Allied troops are on Germany's own soil. On Hitler's eastern front, the Red Army is in East Prussia, has overrun the Baltic States, and has knocked out Finnish, Rumanian, and Bulgarian support of the Axis. Germany's position in the Balkans is virtually untenable.

Nowadays, even the news of one day frequently shows progress of a sort that used to be the outcome of many months of effort. (Suggestion: Refer to news of the past few days illustrating this point, and compare it to some past phase of our military activities, for example, the period when our troops were battling for Guadalcanal and had erected signs there reading, "3500 miles to Tokyo".) The rate of our progress to-day, though, does not mean that we could have gone that fast in the early days of the war if we had put more effort or more brains into it. It is simply the result of the fact that our hard efforts in the past are beginning to pay off. Progress towards victory has accelerated, and can continue to do so as long as everyone remembers to keep on pushing.

Double Danger Now

(Question: As we complete three years of war against the Axis, what two dangerous attitudes are likely to develop?)

In direct proportion to our success, Axis propaganda has increased its attempt to foster in our people two dangerous atti-

tudes. One of them is the discouragement that comes from sheer weariness with the war. Three years is a long time to keep up sustained effort, and for most of our Allies the fight has been even longer than that.

Germany and Japan are both counting heavily on the possibility that we will become so tired that we will leave the job half-done, settling for a negotiated peace which would give them the opportunity to try again later for world conquest.

The other attitude is what we usually term complacency, including the overconfidence that often grows with success. Here the great danger is that we may let down our efforts as we lose the spur which a sense of urgency gives us. The results are obvious at the front when that happens, for attacks lose their zip. The effect is less obvious but no less deadly in training centers, along the supply and maintenance lines, and all the way back to production centers. The current terrific German counter-offensive on the Western Front, coming after too many "experts" had predicted a quick end to the European war, should make us realize the dangers inherent in over-optimism.

What will we be able to say on 7 December, 1945, in comparison with the other milestones that mark the road to victory? No one can say for sure. But it can be said that the harder we all work at the jobs we have from day to day, the bigger will be the gains and the nearer the war's end that we all hope for.

CHECKING THE HIGH SPOTS

1. Fall of Singapore . 15 Feb. 42	7. American Forces land in Africa . . . 7-8 Nov 42
2. Fall of Corregidor . 6 May 42	8. Invasion of Sicily . 9-10 Jul 43
3. Battle of Midway . 3-6 June 42	9. Surrender of Italy . 3 Sep 43
4. First 300 Waacs (now Wacs) reported for duty 20 July 42	10. Teheran Conference 1 Dec 43
(89,000 total as of 31 Oct., '44; 13,000 overseas)	11. Invasion of Western Europe 6 Jun 44
5. Landing in Guadalcanal 7 Aug 42	12. Millionth ton of bombs dropped by AAF 28 Sep 44
6. Siege of Stalingrad (Surrender of German Sixth Army) . 2 Feb 43	13. Landing on Leyte . 20 Oct 44
	14. Fall of Aachen . 21 Oct 44



Q.—The Kamikaze Corps is Japan's well-touted suicide group which specializes in "body-crashing" into Allied planes or ships. What does Kamikaze mean?

A.—The word "kamikaze," translated literally, means "divine wind." According to Japanese legend it had its origin some 700 years ago when about 200,000 would-be invaders, led by the great Kublai Khan, were routed just off Kyushu by a sudden fierce gale.

Q.—RAF Lancasters last week bombed Germany's largest chemical plant. What is it?

A.—The I. G. Farben chemical works at Ludwigshafen, producer of nitric acid and lubricating oils.

Q.—America now has four Generals of the Army, but only one General of the Armies. Who are they?

A.—Signing legislation creating the new rank last week, President Roosevelt nominated Generals George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Henry H. Arnold to become Generals of the Army. General John J. Pershing remains General of the Armies.

Q.—What are the "lost provinces" of Europe?

A.—Alsace and Lorraine.

Q.—How long was the north Burma city of Bhamo under siege before it fell to Chinese troops last week?

A.—28 days.

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Q.—Where is the East Indies Fleet?

A.—In Southeast Asia. It is the new name for the old Eastern Fleet. The change was made to distinguish between the British naval forces under Lord Mountbatten's command and those recently formed to serve in Pacific under General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.

Q.—What well-known German border town now in Allied hands also is known as Aix-la-Chapelle?

A.—Aachen. The French know it as Aix-la-Chapelle.

Q.—Are Allied troops at Strasbourg nearer to Berlin than Russian troops near Budapest?

A.—Yes. Strasbourg is about 370 miles from Berlin, Budapest 430.

Q.—What is a "Smoke Drake?"

A.—A new smoke generator, consisting of the standard M1 generator mounted on an amphibious duck.

Q.—About how many U.S. fighting men are currently overseas?

A.—About 4,000,000, according to a speech delivered recently before the American Legion by General Marshall. The breakdown: Ground Forces, 60 divisions (about 900,000 men); Air Forces, 1,000,000; Service Forces, 2,155,000.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2. No. 26. Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 30 DEC., 1944

RESTRICTED

Battle for Leyte in Mop-up Stage; Air War Heightens

In the Philippines last week it was both an end and a beginning.

Except for mopping-up operations, the battle for Leyte was over, General Yamashita's forces having sustained what General MacArthur termed "perhaps the greatest defeat in the military annals of the Japanese Army." Consolidation of immediate strategic gains on Mindoro was completed, with the only sign of opposition continuing to come from the air. And, with the grip on both islands secure, U.S. warplanes began an all-out campaign to destroy enemy airpower protecting the main Philippine island of Luzon.

PALOMPON SEIZED. Final collapse of the Japanese on Leyte came with the junction of the 1st Cavalry and 77th Divisions in Ormoc Corridor, and the capture of Palompon, the enemy's last port town, by an amphibious force from the 77th on Christmas Eve. Enemy resistance thus was reduced to isolated, disorganized groups, who either stayed in their last ditches and fought to the death, or were caught fleeing to Leyte's west coast and fought to the death.

On Tuesday, 26 December, General MacArthur's communique, pointing out that "completeness of this destruction has seldom been paralleled in the

history of warfare," released some figures which showed in detail the extent of Japanese losses for the Leyte-Samar campaign. Total enemy casualties for the ten-week battle were 113,221, of whom only 493 were prisoners of war. The breakdown: 54,338 abandoned dead; 18,500 estimated dead not yet collected, and those buried by the enemy; 30,000 estimated drowned at sea from the ten convoys sunk while attempting reinforcement; and 9890 seamen who manned the 41 transports and 27 warships destroyed.

THE RATIO. In trying to stave off the U.S. forces, Jap soldiers died at the rate of 1600 a day, 11,000 a week. The average was even higher toward the campaign's end, for during the seven days before Palompon's fall a total of 12,873 were counted dead, representing an average of 1800 a day. Number of Japanese dead will increase as U.S. patrols ferret out the remnants. Against these enemy losses, General MacArthur announced our own—2623

The Enemy's View

"Japan needn't worry about an island or two. We have lots of them," General Yamashita, Supreme Commander of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, is reported by Radio Tokyo to have said in an interview last week. "We came to the Philippines with the single purpose to fight a direct war to a successful finish. If we can smash 200,000 American troops here it ought to make even America wince."

killed, 8422 wounded, and 172 missing, a total of 11,217. For each American killed in action in Leyte, 43 Japs had died.

THE LINE CRACKS. The southern end of the much-vaunted Yamashita Line was wiped out two weeks ago when elements of the 77th landed at Ipil, then fanned out north to seize Ormoc and south to meet an onrushing column from the Seventh. The northern end crumbled last week under the same sort of pressure.

From Valencia, onetime Jap headquarters which they had seized earlier, men of the 77th punched four miles north up Highway Two to take Libongao, where the road from Palompon feeds into Ormoc Corridor. Shortly thereafter they advanced about two miles farther north to Kananga to join men of the 1st Cavalry Division, who had pushed some three miles south of Lonoy.

Then as artillery laid down a heavy barrage over the town and its highway, troops advanced three miles westward from Libongao toward Palompon. To hasten the conquest, on Sunday, 24 December, other units of the 77th made an amphibious assault on the port. At the same time 24th Division troops, operating in northwest Leyte, cleared Japs from the coast near San Isidro, and units of the First Cavalry and 32nd Divisions proceeded to wipe out enemy pockets along Ormoc Road. Again the Japs had been outmaneuvered and outfought.

AIR OVER MINDORO. Some 280 miles to Leyte's northwest, where other Sixth Army troops had landed on Mindoro to straddle the Japanese line of inter-island communications, U.S. engineers and RAAF construction units worked fast on the completion of airdromes. Within five days after the landing runways were ready and in use by Allied fighters.

Last week the enemy still showed no inclination to join battle on Mindoro. But he did step-up his air attacks. On Wednesday, 20 December, 29 Jap raid-

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ers appeared, to be contested immediately by Thunderbolts and Lightnings. In the ensuing air combat 11 were definitely destroyed and three others probably, for the loss of one Thunderbolt.

Sometime later nine Jap planes were shot down by U.S. fighters, and on Christmas Eve ack-ack gunners brought down one more. PT boats claimed another on Monday morning.

TARGET LUZON. Biggest development in the week's air offensive was the beginning of mass land-based raids against the enemy's network of dromes on Luzon. In the first of these, on Wednesday, 20 December, an attacking force made up of Liberators from undisclosed bases and Leyte-based Thunderbolts destroyed or damaged nearly 100 Japanese aircraft on Clark Field.

Continuing to concentrate on Clark Field, which is 50 miles northwest of Manila and a concentration point for the Jap Philippines air force, raiders struck in quick succession over Sunday and Monday, 24 and 25 December, bagging a two-day toll of 73 definite and nine probables. On both days the Japs managed to send up about 50 interceptors, but Thunderbolts claimed 33 victims on the first day and Lightnings 39 on the next. Six Allied fighters failed to return.

Throughout the Visayans, other strong U.S. formations kept up their neutralization raids against airfields on Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Masbate. One raid, in which more than 100 tons were distributed over the area, brought the destruction of 13 enemy planes and started several large fires. Other air attacks of the week centered over Davao, in Mindanao, and the oilfields of Borneo to the far southwest.

CASUALTIES.

The War Department disclosed recently that United States ground forces in Western Europe suffered 57,775 casualties during November, bringing the overall figure since D-Day to 258,124.

B29s Smash at Industrial Targets

Superfortress targets for the week included two important industrial districts on the Japanese homeland, another in Manchuria, and two more in occupied China.

From China bases B-29s of the Twentieth Bomber Command flew against the aircraft plant at Omura, on the Japanese island of Kyushu. Results of the raid, which occurred on Tuesday, 19 December, were not assessed because of cloud cover, but from attacks on docks and engineering works at Shanghai and Nanking on the same day crews reported "good to excellent results." Five enemy planes and probably three others were destroyed and nine others damaged in air combat.

Two days later another group of Supers, probably as many as 60, struck heavily at a Japanese aircraft factory at Mukden, Manchuria. The Japs sent up moderate to strong opposition, but 15 of their planes were destroyed, seven probably, and eleven damaged. Two B-29s were lost.

COMBINED RAID. Elements from the Twentieth joined with the 14th USAAF and the Chinese-American wing last Monday in a concentrated bombing of Hankow, which Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, U.S. Chief of Staff in China, described as only the beginning of regular and heavy air strikes against the Japanese in China. More than 1000 tons of bombs were spread on shipping installations, railyards, and over the air base at Hankow, perhaps the most important single Jap installation in China.

Superforts of the 21st Bomber Command based on Salpan meanwhile went after the aircraft center at Nagoya. On Friday, 22 December,

bombing this strategic target on Honshu for the third time in nine days, they carried individual bombloads hundreds of pounds heavier than ever before, and kept the sprawling air center under attack for nearly two and a half hours. They returned without loss after probably destroying five Jap planes and damaging four others.

Add Enemy's View

Emperor Hirohito in a message read to the opening session of the Japanese Diet and heard on short-wave radio, acknowledged that "the war situation is becoming more critical" but that "alliances with our friendly nations are being further solidified." He praised Japan's army and navy for "destroying the powerful enemy" and praised the home front for increasing production. Meanwhile General Tomoyuki Yamashita, soundly trounced on Leyte, was being quoted by the same Tokyo Radio with his classic remark that Japan needn't worry "about an island or two—we've got lots of them . . ."

Five Stars

Advanced headquarters on Leyte last week received a message from the War Department which, in the best military style, notified General MacArthur of the insignia he was entitled to wear as one of the four new Generals of the Army: "five silver five-pointed stars, each star three-eighths inches in diameter fastened together in a circle, the inner points touching, the surface of the stars to be plain, raised, and grounded."

On Leyte, however, there was no such insignia as five stars in a circle. So from a miscellaneous collection of Filipino, Australian, and Dutch silver coins, a Filipino silversmith improvised one. Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, wore it for the first time on the day after Christmas.

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New Allied Gains In Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia Command announced last week that British troops on the Arakan Front have occupied Donbalk, clearing Japanese from all but an eight mile strip near the tip of the Maury Peninsula.

Other successes in the fighting in Burma were disclosed last week in a series of SEAC communiques issued from Kandy, Ceylon, where Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten has his headquarters. Forward units of the British Fourteenth Army have advanced ten miles on the road to Yeu.

FIGHTER FORAYS. Meanwhile a Chungking dispatch told of Christmas Eve forays by bomb-carrying P-51's of the U.S. 14th Air Force, which ranged out over Tsinan airdrome in Shantung Province and Hongkong Harbor. The P-51's sank a large tanker and probably sank four other vessels in these raids, while destroying 40 Jap aircraft.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

Could World War II have been prevented had the United Nations, instead of the League of Nations, been the instrument for collective security during the early thirties?

The answer to this question provides a good evaluation of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (MAPTALK, 11 November). And the probable answer is—"yes." Here's what might have happened if the three "incidents" through which the Axis first proved the impotence of the League, had been resisted by the forthcoming organization of the United Nations:

1. When Germany marched into the Rhineland in 1936, Hitler's troops carried secret orders to quit at the first sign of French action. The French, lacking British support, did not act. The United Nations plan, as advanced at Dumbarton Oaks, would have pro-

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Bombs and Shells Blast Iwo Island

The Japanese fortress at Iwo Jima, 750 miles south of Tokyo and source of the recent air attacks against Saipan, last week was well on its way toward being neutralized.

Following up earlier Superfortress blows against the island, Liberators of the newly-formed Pacific Strategic Air Force blasted installations there on Sunday and Monday, 17 and 18 December, returned to add to the damage on Wednesday and Thursday. Then on Saturday warships steamed into position offshore and, as B-29s and Liberators struck at inland targets methodically bombarded shore defenses.

Two weeks ago Iwo, central island in the Volcano group, had received a record 800-ton bombardment from U.S. planes on 7 December in the first of the coordinated sea-air assaults.

vided an international military force. Thus France would not have been left holding the bag.

2. Half-hearted sanctions by League members in 1935 didn't stop Mussolini from seizing Ethiopia. But his campaign bogged down against ill-armed tribesmen. Dumbarton proposes a first class force.

3. In 1931 with the seizure of Manchuria the Japanese launched their war of Greater East Asia. But they were alone as aggressors then, for the Axis was yet to be formed. Combined Chinese, Russian, French, British, and American action probably could have stopped them short. Dumbarton proposes use of forces of these five and all other "peace-loving nations."

Conclusion: No one can say with certainty what would have happened. But, faced with an international force, the aggressor nations might well have quit and accepted arbitration or judicial settlement.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Nazis Hack Deep Salient In Drive To Reach Meuse

American troops were fighting their biggest battle of the war. At least two full German armies, the Fifth Armored, the Seventh Infantry, and possibly the Second Nazi Armored Army had been committed to the great German counteroffensive that burst through U.S. First Army positions south of Aachen. If the Nazis were shooting their bolt with this drive, as some military men claimed, it was by any standards a terrific bolt.

By midweek the Germans held a bulge forty miles deep into Belgium and Luxembourg and the spearhead of their assault was pushing doggedly ahead despite fierce counterattacks by U.S. ground troops and a ceaseless pounding by Allied airpower. An American island in this Nazi-held bulge was the town of Bastogne, where an encircled force of U.S. troops held on grimly, denying the Germans the use of the road and communications net of which the town is a center.

BROAD FACTS. The news blackout imposed by SHAEF headquarters had been relaxed somewhat, but release of partially complete details of the fighting was still lagging 36 to 48 hours behind. A few broad facts, however, had by the middle of the week become clear: The tip of the German penetration had not yet been completely stopped; Allied airpower was making it increasingly difficult for the Nazis

to maintain the fury of their drive; fierce attacks on the flanks of the German salient were meeting with growing success.

The German offensive, in the beginning shaped up like this: One drive rammed toward Echternach, on the Luxembourg border, and struck to within 13 miles of the city of Luxembourg in its initial momentum. A second thrust came at the Belgian city of Saint Vith, just northeast of the Luxembourg-Belgium border. The third spearhead plunged toward Malmédy, northeast of Saint Vith, and one of two German columns in this drive penetrated to Stavelot, some 20 miles inside the Belgian border.

DRIVE TO MEUSE. This surge to Stavelot was the deepest initial penetration, and it placed German armor within 22 miles of Liege, now believed to be one of the main immediate objectives of the offensive, which as it developed appeared to have the aim of setting up a German line along the Meuse River from Liege to Dinant—a line from which further German penetrations could be effected with the object of unhinging the entire Allied position.

The fourth thrust of the German push was directed through the Monschau Forest, and carried the Nazis into Monschau on the Belgian frontier. This last thrust was held, but some of the large numbers of German paratroops used in this operation were successfully eluding capture behind American lines.

Following the first penetration by armored units, German infantry in increasing strength began to back up the assault, while Nazi tanks thrashed ahead under cover of a deluge of flying bombs.

From here on the battle began to develop into see-saw actions all along the front, with repeated attacks and counterattacks by both sides. Stavelot, Saint Vith and Echternach remained in American hands, while counter-

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attacking U.S. troops regained Monschau and several other German villages, narrowing the base of the German salient to 46 miles. Bastogne still held out, its American defenders refusing repeated German demands to surrender.

MOMENTUM. Meanwhile SHAEF gave no indication that the German assault had lost any of its momentum. Reports told of German penetration to the hamlet of Hablemont, 30 miles inside Belgium, 18 miles south of Liege. The Germans also had swung three-quarters of the way across Luxembourg near Vlianden, and had fought their way to points just east of Wiltz and near Clervaux, seven miles north-eastward. At this stage the Nazis had reached to within 48 miles of Sedan, where the 1940 breakthrough unhinged the Maginot Line. Headquarters of the First Army, the army which had borne the brunt of the initial Nazi attack, reported that 20,000 Germans had been taken prisoner up to this phase of the battle. Berlin, not to be outdone, claimed a similar number of American prisoners.

Six days of continuous assault brought the Germans at least 32 miles into American positions, but the drive was beginning to show signs of slowing. Field dispatches began to describe the Nazi spearhead as "blunted"; and attacks on the flanks of the German-held bulge began to have effect.

TEMPORARY HALT. Sunday, 24 December, SHAEF stated that the German counteroffensive had been stopped "at least temporarily" exactly one week after it began, and front dispatches described the bulge positions now held by von Rundstedt's forces as four major prongs along a 65-mile front.

The northernmost bulge in the Monschau sector was limited to a six-mile gain some 20 miles below Aachen. The Nazis failed to get beyond Bullange, but held a line running more than 25 miles due west to Werbomont, two miles west of Stavelot.

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Probably the gravest threat to American First Army forces was caused by a pocket lying south of this salient, and bounded on the underside by von Rundstedt's westernmost penetration to the town of Hottot. This town was still in American hands, but the Germans had cut the road running to the northeast, thus narrowing the American corridor in this area to 12 miles.

Farther south the Germans reached Morhet, six miles southwest of Bastogne. Only in the fourth major prong, which engulfed Luxembourg, did the Americans drive an appreciable dent into territory newly won by the enemy; and here troops presumably of General Patton's Third Army cut into the southern flank of the Nazi salient.

AIR ASSAULT. Sunday saw the greatest Allied air effort since the beginning of the crisis in the west, as the full-weight of Allied airpower was thrown against the German bulge, and against the transport centers supporting the Nazi offensive. Correspondents in London stated that the record 13,000 sorties flown on D-Day may have been exceeded in this gigantic operation.

Some 2000 four-engined bombers and 900 fighters flew to the attack from British bases, while hundreds of fighter-bombers, mediums, and fighters participated from French fields. At least 5,250 tons of bombs were dropped on 12 transport centers and eleven enemy held airfields behind the German lines. One group of planes left a 65-mile path of destruction from Euskirchen south to Trier; another hit German airports above Frankfurt; and a third group struck south of Frankfurt.

Counterattacks at the sensitive flanks of the German bulge continued, and SHAEF told of wide gains registered near Mersch, on the left flank of the enemy penetration, and of slight advances on the Roer River front far to the north. Fierce fighting raged east of Malmedy, where the Germans were

stopped cold, losing at least 200 tanks in five days of futile assault.

BITTER CHRISTMAS. Christmas Day brought no respite. Von Rundstedt lashed his men forward in incessant and powerful tank and infantry patrols. Christmas morning the skies were somewhat obscured by clouds, but as the weather cleared thousands of Allied planes came out to blast at the Nazis, in continuance of the almost unprecedented air assault launched Sunday.

SHAEF reported a German penetration deeper toward the Meuse River, told of Nazi spearhead forces reaching a point between the Belgian towns of Marche and Rochefort, the latter only fourteen and a half miles from the Meuse. At the same time the American attack on the southern flank of the German drive continued to gain ground, as U.S. troops bit deeper into the wedge, clearing the Nazis from the Luxembourg town of Heldenfeld, four miles north of Grosbous.

Counterattacks in the Liege sector resulted in the release of 130 American prisoners which the Germans had captured earlier. These released captives told of how German officers had claimed that they were scheduled to be in Paris by 17 January, according to von Rundstedt's plan, after which they said maybe "your Roosevelt will talk peace terms."

Bastogne was still holding out, being supplied from the air by the biscuit bombing technique which has saved similar situations before. Meanwhile a relief column was pressing toward the beleaguered town, and had succeeded in reaching to within six miles of it, narrowing the base of the German bulge to possibly 27 miles in Belgium and upper Luxembourg.

MORE BAD NEWS. Tuesday, 26 December, brought more bad news, however. Three German panzer columns, resuming the stalled offensive, burst into the Franco-Belgian border region within fourteen miles of the Meuse despite terrible Allied air blows and

the increasingly heavy counterattacks on their flanks. After two days of swaying attack and counterattack at the western tip of the Nazi spearhead, Allied headquarters revealed that the American center had cracked again on Christmas Eve, spilling Nazi tanks through on a thirteen mile front pointed squarely at the Meuse River fortresses of Namur and Dinant.

Official reports also told of the fall of Rochefort, and of how the American wedge near Saint Vith had been squeezed out of existence, merging the German prongs into a single bulge nearly 40 miles deep. The Germans also occupied Libramont, 23 miles from Sedan. The rescue force of U.S. troops pushing toward Bastogne, however, gained slowly in the direction of the town.

CREDIT TO ADOLF. With the German drive thus progressing, two widely different sources were crediting Adolf Hitler, mysteriously missing Fuehrer of the Third Reich, with planning the tremendous assault. The first source was Dr. Paul Josef Goebbels speaking from Berlin. The second was a "qualified military expert" attached to SHAEF headquarters who was quoted by both United Press and Associated Press as saying that Adolf Hitler personally conceived and planned the German counteroffensive during those months when he was thought dead, insane, or a prisoner. The quoted expert went on to say that it might now be asserted that the German plan had gone awry, although it was still in the process of execution and that further enemy gains might be expected.

Underlining this latter statement was the latest picture gleaned from battlefield information at midweek: the Germans had driven to within four miles of the Meuse in the area south of Namur and were being engaged there 50 miles inside Belgium. The Germans held a solid 35-mile assault front across Belgium. At Celles, ten miles northwest of Rochefort, Field Marshal von Rundstedt's forces were only eight miles from the French frontier.

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Churchill, Eden Arrive in Athens; Civil War Goes on

Things were moving rapidly toward a showdown in Greece last week, but what shape that showdown would take was impossible to predict.

On the credit side of the ledger was the fact that Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Minister Anthony Eden suddenly popped up in Athens, invited opposing Greek party leaders to a conference to end the civil war. On the opposite side of the books was continued fighting between ELAS and EDES factions, and between ELAS troops and British forces trying to restore order.

Prior to the arrival of Churchill and Eden, Lt. Gen. Ronald M. Scobie, British commander, who has been faced with the unpleasant task of dealing with the warring factions by force, sent RAF planes aloft with thousands of leaflets warning that an all-out attack with every weapon at his command would be launched against the ELAS forces. The ultimatum period expired with no sign from the ELAS that they intended to listen to this kind of reason; and there followed exactly the kind of all-out drive Gen. Scobie had promised. Rocket-firing planes and British tanks went into action against insurgent concentrations, and British troops began a renewed effort to clear Athens and the nearby port of Piraeus.

ELAS DRIVE. Meanwhile the ELAS launched an offensive of its own against EDES guerrillas under General Napoleon Zervas, rightist commander, and drove a deep wedge into territory in northwest Greece held by the EDES. British Headquarters, in announcing this turn of events,

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charged that the attack was in violation of an agreement signed by the opposing Greek factions before the Allies landed in Greece to oust the Germans.

This was the situation which Churchill and Eden faced when they arrived in the strife-torn Greek capital Tuesday and proposed their conference, the outcome of which has yet to be announced. As a sidelight to their arrival in Greece, a British patrol uncovered an Hellenic Guy Fawkes plot with the discovery of a ton of dynamite planted under streetcar lines opposite the hotel where Greek government officials and Gen. Scobie reside. The patrol said the dynamite was in boxes bearing German markings. It was not stated whether the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden were staying at the same hotel.

WORD WAR. And while the war of shells and bullets continued without let-up, the war of words went on similarly unabating. In Athens the right of the British to intervene was challenged by ELAS leaders, who demanded the establishment of a Greek government of "common confidence" as a prerequisite to laying down their arms, and agreed to cease hostilities only if the followers of other volunteer militia organizations be disarmed.

In a speech in Commons delivered just before his trip to Greece, Mr. Eden proposed a three-way meeting of Foreign Ministers of the U.S., Russia, and Britain as a partial solution to admitted disagreements among the Allies on European policies. Mr. Eden reiterated the British official stand on the Greek situation, saying that British troops had occupied that country only after the U.S. and Russia had approved the move.

Eden also reaffirmed the fact that Britain has no selfish aims in Greece, and would be glad to hand over the responsibility as soon as it can do so consistently with its obligation.

Soviet Troops Storm Budapest

Budapest, Nazi-held bastion guarding the gateway to Austria, last week was under final assault, as the Soviet Army completed encirclement of the city and simultaneously fought a mile and a half through the streets of the Hungarian capital toward its heart. Nine outlying communities around the city were captured by the Soviets in the climax of this phase of the Red Army's southern drive toward the Reich, cutting off what perhaps was the last escape route for thousands of enemy troops trapped in Budapest.

The assault on Budapest followed closely an announcement from Moscow by Marshal Stalin which told of Soviet gains west of the city. Large forces

of Soviet infantry, tanks, artillery and divebombers, the announcement said, had scored a 25 mile breakthrough, capturing the key enemy-held bastion of Skesefehervar (already admitted lost by the Germans) and more than 160 Hungarian towns and villages, more than 3,000 prisoners were taken in the breakthrough.

WINTER DRIVE. While the Budapest assault was reaching a climax, far to the north, according to Berlin, the Red Army lashed out on its winter offensive in Latvia with upwards of 270,000 men in an effort to crush 30 Nazi divisions pinned against the Baltic Sea. There was no detailed verification of this report from Moscow, the Russian official version merely saying that a northern strike was launched at the same time as another south of Budapest.



Q. (1) Joseph Vissarionovich Djughashvili and (2) Josip Broz are great soldiers-statesmen whose adopted names are known to every literate person in the world. Who are they?

A. (1) Marshal Stalin of the USSR; (2) Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.

Q. In what Italian city is the Bridge of Sighs?

A. Venice.

Q. Who is now commander of the Fifth Army in Italy?

A. Lieut. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, who succeeded Lieut. Gen. Mark Clark when Clark was made Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Fifteenth Army Group.

Q. Where are the Nanpo Shoto islands? Nansel Shoto?

A. Nanpo Shoto, or "Southern Islands," is a chain of small volcanic islands running in a long line from almost the outskirts of Tokyo southward toward the Marianas and including at the north Izu islands; in the center, the Bonin Islands (MAPTALK 7 July); and in the south the Volcano Islands. Nansel Shoto, or "Southeastern Islands," is a chain running south from Kyushu to Formosa and comprising the Ryuku or Loochoo Islands.

Q. What island group also is known as the "Islands of Thieves?"

A. The Marianas. Magellan called them that because the natives looted his ships when he made landfall there in 1521.

Q. Manila is the largest city in the Philippines. What is the second largest?

A. Cebu, capital of Cebu island and provinces. Its population is about 145,000; Manila's is 648,000.

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Poland: Her Eastern Frontier Is Cause for Disunited Nations

Of all the problems facing the Allies in the liberated countries of Europe, the Russo-Polish boundary dispute has been the longest foreseen and the most disheartening to proponents of a united United Nations.

On the surface the facts seem clear. Poland wants to return to the pre-war frontier. The USSR is willing to accept the Curzon Line, which was first advanced by the League of Nations in 1919, and Britain agrees that the Line represents the fairest compromise. America simply says that it has no objection to settling the dispute before the end of the war (the Atlantic Charter would reserve all such settlements for the peace table) provided "mutual agreement" is reached by Russia and Poland.

But so far there has been little sign that the quarrel, which is older than the Polish state itself, will end in mutual agreement anytime soon. Last week the only thing that seemed certain was a moral—the unity of military allies in wartime does not remove the ugly political forces of peace.

THREE FRONTIERS. To understand the present dispute between Poland and Russia requires a knowledge of the origin and limits of three eastern frontiers—two of them actually fixed at one time or another during the past 25 years, the third merely proposed as a "reasonable frontier." The first of these is the frontier established in 1921 by Poland from land won from Russia; the second is the one established in 1939 by Russia from land won from Poland; the third is the famous Curzon Line. In their inception all three share a common history of old world intrigue and European power politics.

Until 1918 Poland as an independent republic existed only in the growing spirit of freedom among her people and as a highly articulate demand from her statesmen-in-exile. For more than 300 years the Polish territory had been the pawn between the Central

Powers to the west and Russia to the east. Since 1815, with the third of three historic partitions, it had formed only several disunited provinces in Austria, Prussia, and Hungary. Before frontiers of any kind could be fixed, therefore, Poland first would have to win her political freedom. And during World War I, in the fast disintegration of Europe's oldstyle system of alliances and loyalties, she saw her chance.

MOVE FOR FREEDOM. In Old Poland itself there sprang up any number of political groups. Although for lack of central direction they sometimes worked at cross purposes, each in its own way worked earnestly for independence. Perhaps the most important of these was the militant-minded organization headed by Joseph Pilsudski, arch-revolutionary and Russophobe, whose activities against the controlling authorities first forced him into exile, then returned him as Poland's Man on a White Horse. At the same time other prominent Poles, such as Paderewski in America, were working so tirelessly among the Allies that the desire for a Polish republic became as strong abroad as it was at home. By November, 1918, for example, a great Polish National Department in Chicago had united all the organizations of the four million Poles in America.

Germany recognized this growing spirit of freedom and tried to capitalize on it. In an effort to raise a large Polish army, General Ludendorff, representing Germany and Austro-Hungary, issued a proclamation on 5 November, 1918, which held out a prospect for the restoration of an independent Congress Poland as an hereditary constitutional monarchy

closely attached to the Central Powers. Two months later some steps were taken toward implementing this promise, for on 14 January the Germans set up a Polish Council of State in Warsaw, with a Polish Diet as the principal showpiece.

Playing a shrewd game, Pilsudski proceeded to organize a Polish national army, then at the crucial moment refused to use it against the Allies. Germany-Austria retaliated with the enforcement of severe controls over the Council. Then the Diet resigned and Pilsudski set about turning his army against the Germans until his arrest on 22 July. Thereafter until the armistice Germany-Austria-Hungary ruled through a regent.

EASTERN THREAT GONE. Meanwhile the threat from Russia, which over a period of years had produced among Poles something approaching a national fear complex, was ended with the fall of the Russian dynasty in March, 1917. On 30 March the newly-formed Soviet Union published a statement in which it recognized Poland's right to self-determination and offered assistance in the creation of a new Polish State. Any danger which might still have threatened from the east vanished in July, 1917, with the breakdown of the Kerensky offensive.

The Central Powers remained Poland's only enemy and they, of course, were eliminated when the war closed. Thus by 12 November, 1918, Poland had achieved her freedom. She also had earned freedom's responsibilities, a fact which many of her ardent leaders did not fully accept. One day after armistice Pilsudski emerged from hiding to become Supreme Commander of all Polish troops and, by self-proclamation head of the new National Government. He failed to unite the country, however, and particularly antagonized Poland's propertied classes. Paderewski arrived to take over as premier on 17 January, 1919, while Pilsudski went back to his military duties.

UNSAVORY. Now came the time for the boundaries of the new Polish

state to be fixed. This unhappily is not a particularly noble period in Polish history. For Poland, perhaps modeling her actions after those of the elder nations, seemed to operate thereafter, on the principle that self-determination was a good thing for one's own people, but a bad thing for one's neighbors.

On 28 June, 1919, the Polish delegation signed the Treaty of Versailles, to become an original member of the League of Nations. Terms of the Treaty provided that Poland should receive the larger part of Posen and part of West Prussia. The northern frontier was to be determined after a plebiscite in Masuria and Upper Silesia. The eastern frontier, according to Article 87, was to be drawn by the Allied and Associated Powers.

SOME CHANGES MADE. There were drastic modifications of these terms before the borders were finally fixed. The plebiscite was held in Upper Silesia, all right, but apparently it didn't turn out the way Poland had expected. A total of 717,422 votes were cast, favoring return to Germany; 483,514 wanted to join the new Polish republic. Fearful that, on the basis of the returns, she would receive only two districts, Poland sent in an army to southeastern Upper Silesia. The Council of the League then forgot about the plebiscite and awarded Poland the southeastern districts, including 75 per cent. of the aggregate material wealth of the disputed territory.

In April, 1919, Polish troops also occupied the district of Vilna, and thereby precipitated a state of war with Lithuania which continued for at least ten years.

Establishment of the eastern frontier similarly was affected through use of armed force. In 1918 the German troops of occupation had evacuated the White Russian and Little Russian territory in Chelm and Volhynia in such a way that Soviet troops were able to occupy it before the Poles could. Pilsudski's forces attacked and made immediate headway, largely

because Russian troops were being dissipated in fighting elsewhere. Russia's suggestion of an armistice in the autumn of 1919 was declined.

CURZON LINE. It was now that the League's Commission on Poland, meeting in Paris under the chairmanship of Britain's Foreign Secretary (George Nathaniel Curzon, Lord of Kedleston), proposed the Curzon Line as a reasonable settlement. This line had been drawn with ethnological factors as the foremost consideration, and in the beginning the Polish representatives, who formed a strong lobby before the Commission, were reported to have sanctioned it. But by 8 December, 1919, when it was introduced, the proposed frontier ran much farther west than the actual line then occupied by Polish troops, and the official Polish view was far from enthusiastic.

The Curzon Line, as proposed, would have the frontier start at the Lithuanian-German border, curve slightly westward to the south to the west of Brest-Litovsk, continue south along the Bug river to a point northeast of Lwow, then sweep to the west again toward Rumania. According to the limits thus defined, Vilna would be assigned to Lithuania, another point to which Poland has consistently objected.

REJECTED. Neither Poland nor Russia wanted the Curzon Line in 1919. Poland, somewhat embarrassed by her earlier promise to respect a decision from the Allied powers, simply stalled. But Russia, which had not been invited to the meeting of the Commission and thus had had no influence in the arranging of her frontier, published an indignant reply. Russia demanded "guarantees that Poland will cease to be an instrument of aggression and intrigue against the workers and peasants of Soviet Russia," and condemned the Line, as "elaborated by the Supreme Council, in some parts under the pressure of counter-revolutionary Russian elements."

In the spring of 1920 Poland extended peace overtures to Russia. They

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were rejected. Then on 26 April, having settled her war in Galicia, Pilsudski launched a strong offensive. Growing more confident as the offensive developed, Poland subsequently denied pleas for self-determination from Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine, and a proposal for a plebiscite in East Prussia. By May Pilsudski's forces had driven the Russians back to a line east of Kiev.

But then the Bolsheviks opened a counteroffensive and began to push the Poles back. As its army retreated, Poland screamed to the Allies for help. In reply, the Supreme Council of the League suggested that Poland should retire to the Curzon Line, and that representatives of Poland, Russia, Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia meet in London to arrive at a general peace settlement of eastern Europe.

POLAND WINS.—When Russia, preferring to negotiate directly with Poland, declined this offer, a French mission under General Weygand was dispatched to assist the Polish general staff. It reached Warsaw as Russian forces were actually storming the gates of the city. With the Commission's support Pilsudski was enabled to launch another offensive which by September had succeeded in forcing the Russians back beyond Minsk and Brest-Litovsk.

Poland now was able to reject the harsh peace terms offered by Russia earlier and to exert some stiff bargaining terms of her own. Under League blessing a preliminary treaty was signed in the Conference at Riga on 12 October, 1920; the final treaty was signed at Riga on 18 March, 1921 and ratified by the Polish legislature a month later.

THE 1921 BORDER. At the point of widest difference, the new Polish frontier exceeded the Curzon Line by about 150 miles. It ran southeast from the Latvian frontier, then mainly due south, proceeded some 18 miles west of Minsk, and further south some 70 miles east of Pinsk. In the neighborhood of Ostrov it turned slightly southwest and continued so for some 25

miles; thence it ran due south till it reached the river Zbruca, which it followed until its junction with the Dniester, which separates Poland from Rumania. As its historical precedent, Poland cited the frontier left her after the second partition of 1793, a frontier to which the new border roughly conformed.

This remained Poland's eastern frontier until the onset of World War II in September, 1939, when again the Polish state was erased from the map of Europe. On 29 September, 1939, after conquest of the country was complete, Germany and the USSR, by terms of their non-aggression pact, partitioned the territory between them, Germany, of course, seizing the greater share.

THE 1939 BORDER. The Russian frontier now ran from a point on the Hungarian border near the Slovak frontier, followed the course of the San river north toward a point beyond Jaroslavl, turned eastward to Kristynopol. From there it ran along the Bug to Brest-Litovsk, followed the Bug toward Chichev, thence to Ostrolenko on the Naren. The line then ran along the Pissa to the East Prussian frontier and north of Augustovo to the most southerly part of Lithuania.

Russia's boundary, as established, closely approximated the Curzon Line, exceeding it to the west by only 60 miles. The most important difference was that, except for a small strip in the west and the pocket in the north of the Suwalki district, the Russian area included practically the whole of the province of Bialystok.

Russia relinquished this territory to the advancing Germans in 1941 and did not regain it until the spring of 1944, when the winter offensive carried over into pre-war Poland. The border issue, which prior to that time had been kept submerged in the interest of Allied unity, suddenly reached a boiling point, subsided, and has sizzled ever since.

DEVELOPMENTS: When the Polish Government in exile, with headquarters in London, turned

thumbs down on the Soviet's offer to recognize the Curzon Line, Russia established its own Committee of Polish Liberation, with headquarters in Lublin. Attempts at reconciliation have failed, Russia claiming that as yet there has arisen no Polish Government with the authority to speak for the Polish people. Despite these differences Stalin has maintained that his statement of 4 December, 1941, still goes: the Soviet Government wants a free, independent and powerful Poland.

In advocating the Curzon Line before Commons this month (MAP-TALK, 23 December), Mr. Churchill gave as his reason Russia's "right to reassurance against the possibility of future attacks from the west." Critics of Mr. Churchill, although many of them favor the Curzon Line, deplored his reason on the grounds that it disregarded the people concerned, and in so doing ignored the basic and most important factor.

Mr. Churchill, however, may have merely assumed that the Curzon Line represents the wishes of the people concerned as best as they can be determined without a plebiscite. The London Times, on the basis of 1931 census figures, estimates that in the area of dispute there are hardly more than 2,250,000 to 2,500,000 Poles out of a population of 11,000,000. The others are Ukrainians or White Russians, Lithuanians, Germans and Czechs, the majority of whom have some real affinity with Russia. The Times also points out that most of them are predominantly of the agricultural and labouring classes, and therefore could be readily assimilated into the Soviet culture.

NOVEMBER TOLL

An American air operational summary published last week showed that the 14th USAAF in China killed or wounded more than 17,000 Japanese troops in November and sank more than 30,000 tons of enemy shipping, besides six naval vessels and 274 small craft.

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ARMY TALK What's the Score On Prisoner of War Camps?

Note to the I & E Officer: This week's discussion is aimed at one source of considerable griping among our men—alleged "coddling and pampering" of the Germans and Japanese and Italians whom we have captured. Even troops who have never seen a prisoner of war have heard exaggerated stories about their treatment, especially at POW camps in the United States. Your men may have special irritations about prisoners which you should by all means investigate and use to lead off the discussion. General points especially desirable to make include: (1) Our treatment of prisoners of war is governed by an international agreement, the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention; (2) As a result of our following civilized rules, our enemies are giving better treatment to captured Americans than they otherwise might; (3) The work these men do as prisoners helps meet critical manpower shortages; (4) Certain Italian prisoners have volunteered for service units and as such are in a special status. See FM 27-10, "Rules of Land Warfare."

PLENTY OF people are good and sore these days about prisoners of war. It's bad enough to hear about captured Nazis lolling in the sun behind stockade wire while American troops plod up toward action. A good many of us have heard the old story about Axis prisoners kidding our GIs by yelling that they (the prisoners) were on their way to America. And though we live up to the rules in treatment of Japanese, some of us are not particularly cheerful about it.

But even harder to take are these stories about "The Life of Riley" that prisoners are supposed to enjoy at the POW camps in the United States. We pass on a yarn about how prisoners had butter when our troops had none, forgetting that they get the same basic ration. A slip-up whereby a few brawny suntanned Germans go without their shirts while our men have to wear theirs, becomes a major gripe.

And on top of all the yarns there have been real annoyances, such as the experience of an outfit which cursed as trucks full of prisoners sailed past at about the eleventh mile of a dusty road march. The Germans had leaned out to yell: "Suckers!"

We hear all sorts of things: prisoners go on strike because they don't like the way the camp is run . . . they get lots of beer . . . they can see the CO anytime . . . they make a hit with local girls.

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Tricks To Annoy Us

(Suggestion: The foregoing are stories known to be in circulation. You might start the discussion by telling one or two, and then asking the men if they've heard any other stories of "prisoner coddling." Then ask the question: "Do you think prisoners deliberately try to annoy and provoke us?")

The natural reaction to these stories, whether true or untrue, is that something is snafu. But remember that most of the prisoners are still fighting us. They do everything they can to throw us off stride and demonstrate their superiority. They've all been given instructions in making complaints and demands under international law. A great many of them still think they're going to win the war. They laugh off our reports of victories as "propaganda." They cease laughing only when they actually get to see, in the flesh, the remnants of the captured German armies that fought in France. (They have seen plenty lately.)

The Germans have smart boys, known and officially described as "political soldiers," trained to carry on the war even after they are captured. They've been told, repeatedly, that Americans are soft, that we are easily fooled, that we are suckers for gibes and propaganda. So, once they have got over their fear of being mistreated, they start right in to see how much damage they can do to our spirits. They do things they hope will arouse the resentment of our soldiers, not against them so much, but against our Army or our Government.

For example, if you hear a story about German prisoners smoking big, fat cigars, the chances are pretty good (if there is any truth in it) that they have saved them up to be smoked at the right

BOX SCORE ON PRISONERS

There were 306,817 prisoners of war held at camps in continental United States as of 12 October, 44. They included 254,166 Germans, 51,032 Italians, and 1,619 Japanese.

Prisoners are held at 131 base camps and 297 branch camps throughout the United States. Branch camps are designed to locate prisoners near current work projects.

Of the Italian prisoners in the United States, 33,971 are in volunteer Italian Service Units. In addition, Italian Service Units formed under United States command overseas include 70,000 in NATOUSA and ETO, and 5,000 in the Central Pacific. The British have also organized Italians into service units.

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psychological moment. What is the right psychological moment? Well, any moment when our PX is short of cigars.

The German takes pride in "showing us up" by being smart, obedient, and clean. He delights in keeping vehicles in perfect shape, especially when our men have been too busy to do an equally good job. Thus the German tries to prove that he and his system are superior to Americans. Any sloppiness on our part is meat for him. He likes to lord it over us even in little ways. Sometimes he does it just because he's trained that way; sometimes it is the result of a planned propaganda campaign organized by a leader in the prisoner group. (Living quarters for officers and enlisted personnel are separated.) He thinks he is serving Der Fuehrer. If we fall for it, he is.

Why Take Any Prisoners?

(Question: Since these prisoners are the fliers, machine gunners and supply men who killed thousands of our men, why should we take any of them prisoners?)

We are civilized people and do not murder people in cold blood. When we have taken prisoners, we get military value out of them. They give us important information about the enemy which helps us win battles and save American lives while winning. Things went better after we succeeded in capturing a few Japanese.

And winning the battles is made easier by the fact that the enemy gives up sooner in a tight spot if he feels that he won't be killed or maimed after he has surrendered. It would cost us many more lives if every enemy fought to a finish.

(Question: What are some of the things to remember when you take a prisoner?)

It is as bad to be friendly with prisoners as it is to get hot-headed about killing them all and never taking any. More information is secured if prisoners are questioned while they still suffer from battle shock and uncertainty. Any friendly gestures we make help them recover confidence.

The whole problem of prisoners of war is a difficult one by its very nature. It starts from the moment of capture, when the important things are: 1. Never trust them for an instant; 2. Don't give them food or cigarettes; 3. Turn them over to intelligence as fast as practicable. Like us, they are required to give only their name, rank and serial number. But a lot of them forget and give things away.

As soon as we have all the information we can get out of them, and as soon as facilities permit, prisoners are moved out of combat zones. Many of them are moved to the United States, in order

to take the burden of maintaining them off our overseas organizations.

(Question: If you were running the Army, how would you treat prisoners of war? What kind of chow would you give them?)

Bread And Water Only

All over the world, we and our Allies hold more than a million enemy prisoners. When we are feeling the most hatred against them, maybe we think it would be a good idea to let them starve to death or to give them only bread and water. But we are not that kind of people.

At other times, when we see the misery that the Axis has inflicted on Greeks and Chinese and people in other occupied countries, we feel like giving them some of their own medicine. This would mean limiting them to a thin diet which would gradually weaken them, according to the devilish system which the Germans have used on forced foreign civilian labor. Actually, our whole handling of prisoners of war is conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of an international agreement known as the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929.

We abide by the Geneva rules because we believe in keeping our word. We also have in mind that the enemy holds plenty of our men and it has been demonstrated, even in the case of the Japanese, that our men have received somewhat better treatment as a result of our strict compliance with the rules.

Reports from German prison camps indicate that our men are being treated reasonably well, except in a few bad camps about which stiff protests have been made. True, they may eat sauerkraut and potato soup, but that is what local German troops get.

Japan did not ratify the Geneva Convention agreement on prisoners, although stating that it would observe the rules as far as possible, and early sufferings of our men were intense. We have no recent reports from prisoners in the Philippines, but neutral inspectors from Japanese prison camps elsewhere indicate that conditions have somewhat improved. It is believed that this is partly a result of the Japanese desire to save "face." They lost "face" when their barbarity was revealed in comparison with our civilized treatment of Japanese prisoners. This has an effect, even though they consider that their soldiers who surrender are officially dead. Even if Japan observed the Geneva rules, their soldier diet of rice and fish would be a hardship on our men.

The Swiss represent the Germans in our camps and our men in German camps. According to the agreement, prisoners may complain to the Swiss without witnesses. If we should not live up to

the agreement, the Swiss could report it to the Germans and it would be taken out on our men.

We should remember, therefore, that if we want to get super-tough with the prisoners, it is our own men in enemy hands who would suffer, and not us.

Keep Geneva Agreements

The Geneva agreement, as far as food is concerned, is applied so that prisoners get the same food as our troops get in the vicinity. Within any locality, prisoner food is never better than ours. You can bank on the fact that any indication that it is better in special instances is the result of deliberate hoarding on their part in order to make a big show. To be sure, we let the Italians have spaghetti and macaroni and the Germans get lots of the potatoes they like. They want a starchier diet, and it's easy to furnish. Other items in the ration are reduced in proportion.

Since our own rations vary from place to place, it is easy to understand how prisoner rations also vary. Prisoners in Texas might get avocados when they are plentiful and in season, while our troops in Palau or on the Gothic Line might be on C-rations or less. But that is a common-sense matter of availability and transportation.

(Question: What kind of clothes does the POW get?)

The same general rules operate as to clothing and housing. Under the Geneva Convention, we provide them shelter in buildings similar to those used by our troops. We also furnish them salvaged outer clothing, underwear, and footwear. Officer prisoners are permitted to buy cloth for making new uniforms when old ones wear out. (Officers are allowed a monthly credit of \$20 to \$40, depending upon their rank. This allowance is repaid by the enemy government after the war.) Other prisoners are furnished fatigues and are permitted to wear their own service uniforms only inside their prison compounds. When these wear out, they are not replaced. The fatigues are labelled with the letters PW on the back, "P" on one leg and "W" on the other.

We Make Them Work

(Question: Would you just let these prisoners sit, or would you put them to work?)

Under the Geneva Convention, the detaining power may require prisoners to do work which has no direct relation with war operations. Officers cannot be required to work, but may volunteer. Non-commissioned officers are required to do only supervisory work,

WHAT ARE THE RULES?

Following are some of the more important provisions of the Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war:

"Prisoners of war . . . must at all times be treated with humanity and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity.

"Prisoners of war have the right to have their persons and their honor respected. . . .

"The power detaining prisoners is bound to provide for their maintenance. . . .

"Prisoners of war shall be lodged in buildings or in barracks affording all possible safeguards as to hygiene and healthfulness. . . .

"The food ration of prisoners of war shall be equal in quantity and quality to that of troops at base camps. . . .

"The use of tobacco shall be permitted. Canteens shall be installed in all camps where prisoners may obtain, at the local market price, food products and ordinary articles. . . . Profits obtained by the management of the camps from the operation of the canteens shall be used for the benefit of the prisoners.

"They must be enabled to take physical exercise and enjoy the open air. . . .

"Labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct relation with war operations. It is especially prohibited to use prisoners for manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind or for transporting material intended for combat units."

but may volunteer for labor. For those required to work, the policy is hardboiled and rigid. "No work, no eat!"

Work is laid out under a "task system." An estimate is made of the amount of a given type of work which an unskilled worker should be able to do in eight hours. If the prisoner does not finish the work, he continues to work up to a maximum of 12 hours. If he still has not finished, his work pay is cut proportionately. If he refuses to work at all, he is disciplined by a diet of bread and water.

Under this policy, prisoners have been especially valuable in harvesting perishable crops such as tomatoes, peas, peanuts, and fruits, and then working in the canneries. Any temptation to spoil food was eliminated by the warning that their own meals would be prepared with the food they were handling. Once the Germans

refused to harvest peanuts because they read that peanut oil could be used for explosives. It was explained that the Army interpreted the Geneva Convention to prohibit such labor as munitions loading, but not peanut-harvesting. "No work, no eat" did the rest. The peanuts were duly harvested.

Prisoners have also been used in the north woods for help to meet the pulpwood shortage. They have reconditioned clothing, repaired watches, worked in laundries and done cleaning chores. (Many of them like the laundry detail because they find odd pennies in pockets.)

(Question: What pay do prisoners get for their work?)

Paid 80 Cents A Day

There are a lot of confused stories about how prisoners are paid. The fact is that every prisoner gets an allowance of 10 cents a day in canteen checks for ordinary necessities such as toothpaste, razor blades, etc. For one day's work they are paid 80 cents in canteen checks or credit. They are never allowed cash. Under a system of incentive pay for extra piece-work, a prisoner might earn an overall total of \$1.30 a day. This is exceptional, but is the maximum possible. They are not paid for work done to maintain their camp.

Prisoners are never used on a private job for which there is an adequate supply of labor. For example, if a farmer wanted war prisoners to harvest his crop, they are not furnished without, first, a certificate by the War Foods Administration that there was no available private labor, and, second, a certificate by the War Manpower Commission that there was no work of higher importance. The prisoners so employed are always under guard. The contractor pays the Government for the labor at the prevailing rate of wages for the work; the prisoner is paid 80 cents and the remainder goes to the United States Treasury.

(Question: What Italians are allowed special privileges?)

Italian Service Units

Italian prisoners are divided into two different groups. One group is treated as regular prisoners of war. The others, prisoners of war who have volunteered to assist our war effort. They have been formed into Italian Service Units, organized along the lines of our service units.

The status of these units has often been misunderstood. Stories of freedom given to the members of the units have often been exaggerated. Here are the facts:

These men are strictly volunteers. Before they are assigned to the units, they must state in writing: "I promise that I will work

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in behalf of the United States of America at any place, on any task excepting in actual combat, and that I will assist the United States to the best of my ability in the prosecution of its cause against the common enemy, Germany." They are then examined by our Military Intelligence and are assigned only if approved as trustworthy. If, at any time, they fail to carry out their work, they are immediately returned to the regular POW status.

Though in a special status, the ISU men are still prisoners of war. From the standpoint of the value we receive, the big difference is that they can be used on any task short of combat, whereas regular prisoners of war cannot be used in tasks having direct relation with war operations. Because of their volunteering, in other words, the area in which they are employed and the kinds of useful work to which they can be put are tremendously enlarged.

Despite all stories, their "privileges" are relatively few. They are allowed to go about their work without armed guards. (This is a personnel saving for us.) They are permitted to make visits to PXs, theatres, and chapels on the post, and occasional supervised group trips out of camp. The War Department also permits them to be visited by friends and the relatives many of them have in this country. These privileges can be restricted any time the post commander considers it desirable.

The ISU adds up very simply: we use the work these men do because it helps shorten the war.

As to all prisoners, we abide by the Geneva Convention out of regard for our own men in enemy hands as well as honoring our pledged word.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2. No. 27. Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 6 JAN. 1945

RESTRICTED

Allied Air Arm Now Reaches As Far As Formosa

Major General Ennis C. Whitehead, of the Fifth Air Force, once said that the strategy behind all SWPA campaigns was "to kill more Japs to get more bases to kill more Japs to get more bases..."

Last week General Whitehead could have cited the Allied situation in the Philippines as proof in point. From the newly-won base at Mindoro and from the now secure bases on Leyte, U.S. aircraft was fanning out all over the archipelago, reaching north to Luzon and farther northwest to Formosa—killing more Japs to get more bases.

NORTH TO LUZON. Following through with the concerted campaign to neutralize Japanese airpower on Luzon, heavyweights zoomed over Clark Field last Tuesday, 26 December, and bagged a total of 35 planes, 13 of them in the air. The third strike on consecutive days, it brought the three-day total of enemy planes destroyed to 144.

On Saturday, 30 December, in the deepest mass attack yet made by land-based planes, Bostons, Mitchells, and Kittyhawks ventured north to Lin-

gayen Gulf, 120 miles northwest of Manila, to destroy five merchantmen and three warships. Either sunk or so seriously damaged they probably sank later were three freighter-transports of 8000 tons each, two smaller cargo vessels, two destroyers, and a destroyer escort. The Japs offered no air opposition and all raiders returned to their Mindoro bases unharmed. Next day fighters, sweeping over the southern provinces, hit warehouses, railway installations, power plants, and wharves, while farther north Mitchells sank a 2000-ton merchant vessel in the neighborhood of Laoag.

About the same time Marine Corsairs went off on a spree over southern Luzon, concentrating particularly on railway lines. At tree top level the Marine pilots strafed and damaged 20 locomotives. One ammunition train exploded along its entire length, spewing debris some 100 feet into the air, and sections of three other trains were blown up. On the same day reconnaissance patrols over other parts of the island destroyed five Jap planes.

Other raids against Luzon during the week were lighter but no less lucrative. Over Lingayen Gulf Liberators sank a 6000-ton freighter transport and Mitchells scored several direct hits on a 7000-tonner. Navy Liberators shot down two enemy planes in scattered air combats over the area.

FORMOSA. When assault troops landed on Mindoro, General MacArthur's communique announced that

bases there would enable Allied planes to command sea and air routes to the China coast. On Sunday, 31 December, Liberators gave a dramatic demonstration. They stretched out far to the northwest, and in waters off Formosa, 600 miles north of northernmost Luzon and 700 miles south of the Japanese mainland, shot down four enemy planes and set fire to five coastal vessels.

In the central Philippines, hardest hit were Japanese airdromes on Panay and Negros. Seventy-two tons dumped on Panay's San Jose field destroyed at least six Jap planes on the ground. Two separate sweeps against the Silay drome in northwest Negros accounted for ten more, in addition to causing extensive fires in supply areas. Other attacks in the Negros area sent two freighters, seven luggers, and three coastal vessels to the bottom, damaged a freighter and several more small craft. PTs, extending their patrols to Negros, bagged four luggers off the northern coast on Friday night.

Farther south over Mindanao Mitchells scored hits on warehouses and a 1000-ton freighter at Davao, and in a subsequent raid smashed three fuel tanks, sank or damaged six barges.

ENEMY REACTS. Much of the U.S. Philippines air force last week was being kept busy on the defense against Japanese attempts to bombard our positions on Mindoro.

Earlier the Japs had countered feebly from the air. But on Tuesday, 26 December, 11 days after D-day, they sent in a good-sized naval force. Consisting of one battleship, a heavy cruiser, and six destroyers, the force was first spotted at 1616 by a patrolling Liberator pilot, who shadowed it as it moved eastward to San Jose. The heavyweight landed on Mindoro field to refuel, and at 2015, accompanied by Army Mitchells, took off to join battle.

While the Jap ships were firing wildly at the Mitchells, the Liberator made a four-mile strafing run at the battleship and struck it amidships with two

bombs. After sinking a destroyer, the Mitchells pressed the attack as the enemy ships continued on their course to a point two or three miles off Mindoro's southwest coast. There the fleet began maneuvering in circles, firing star shells, and proceeded to move slowly northward along the shoreline in a sustained bombardment that lasted 30 minutes. Stung by PT boats, the fleet then withdrew rapidly northward, pursued by our bombers. But before it fled into the sanctuary of darkness, two more destroyers were sunk and the cruiser hit.

The enemy's attempt cost him three destroyers sunk, one battleship and one heavy cruiser damaged. GHQ described the shelling as "fruitless and inaccurate" and reported damage to Allied installations as negligible.

FROM THE AIR. Apparently drawing on his plane reserves on Luzon, the enemy kept up a regular air assault against Mindoro. For the good it did him, it was an extravagant business. Of 23 sent over Wednesday, 27 December, eight were shot down by night fighters and ackack; of 32 appearing on Friday, 14 were knocked out, eight by day fighters, three by night fighters, and three by ackack; of 15 on Saturday night, three were brought down by Marine Hellcats and the rest were sent scurrying home; of 32 on Sunday, 18 were lost. The damage to Allied positions was consistently listed as minor.

Except for these efforts from the sea and air, consolidation of the U.S. holdings on Mindoro continued unmolested. There was still no sign that General Yamashita intended to make a Leyte of Mindoro; as yet no U.S. soldiers had died from enemy ground action.

HIGHER AND HIGHER. On Leyte meanwhile Sixth Army troops pressed forward with the tedious business of wiping out enemy remnants. And every day, with every ground report, the total of enemy casualties went higher. One day 827 were found dead; the next day 912; the next 1191; the next 995. As of Saturday, 30

December, the enemy's ground losses had reached 118,983. While many of those counted last week were killed in patrol skirmishes, the majority were caught by artillery fire. Few were taken prisoner.

Among the dead there was one notable absence. He was Lt. Gen. Suzuki, to whom General Yamashita had entrusted the defense of Leyte. GHQ surmised that Suzuki had abandoned his army and fled. Why he had not followed the Samurai tradition and committed hara-kiri was a question for General Suzuki's conscience.

Japs Losing Ships Faster Than They Can Replace Them

Secretary of the Navy Forrestal last week made one of his irregular reports on the activities of U.S. submarines in Far East waters.

The secretary, addressing his press conference, regretted his inability to "tell the full story of our submarine activities, because of the need for withholding information from the enemy." But this much he could say:

During an unspecified period, submarines have sunk one large Japanese aircraft carrier, six additional warships and 20 other vessels. The "warships" included one light cruiser, one destroyer, two escort vessels, two destroyer transports. The "other vessels": two large transports, one small transport, ten medium cargo vessels, three small cargo vessels, two cargo transports, two medium tankers.

One other thing, added the secretary. Japanese vessels sunk by American submarines alone since the war's beginning represent three and one half million tons of enemy shipping destroyed.

TOLL TO SHIPPING. The Washington correspondent of the United Press, examining the official record, also came up with some startling

figures. His, however, were confined strictly to Japanese merchant shipping, at least five million tons of which he estimates to have been sunk by American sea and air power.

According to the UP record, based on "reliable reports from the Pacific," the Japanese have lost 1950 non-combat ships, probably lost 200, and sustained damage to 1420. Sinkings include 174 tankers, 199 transports, 1272 freighters, and 305 miscellaneous vessels.

If correct, these quasi-official figures mean that Japan now faces the most crucial period of the war with a merchant fleet of considerably less than four million tons. Washington puts Japan's minimum war requirements at five million tons and her present yearly capacity to build at one million tons. Japanese shipwrights may be working overtime, but so are the laws of attrition.

Tokyo, Nagoya Again Pounded by Supers

The new year was marked by B-29s with an acceleration of the methodical air war against Japanese sources of air power and supply.

Raids against enemy Asiatic holdings and the Japanese homeland proceeded on an almost daily schedule, most of them levelled against Japanese aircraft production at Tokyo and Nagoya on the mainland. Saipan-based Superforts gave the Japs on Honshu a restless New Year's Eve, raiding Tokyo, Nagoya, Yokohama, and Yokosuka naval station from mid-evening until dawn.

B-29s also paid a return visit to Iwo Jima, enemy-held island in the Volcanos, midway between Saipan and Tokyo, which has been particularly irksome for the Supers crossing it on their way to Japan. Liberators and other planes from the newly-formed Pacific Strategic Air Force joined in the neutralization campaign, and by week's end Iwo Jima had received its 23rd consecutive raid.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Nazi Salient Wilts; von Rundstedt Hurls New Southern Drive

With their Belgian salient crumbling under American pressure, the Germans last week had lost the initiative all along the Belgian-Luxembourg front, and von Rundstedt was hurling his forces into a new assault, this time against Seventh Army positions around Bitche in the Saar sector to the south.

But while this second counter-offensive was definitely a major effort it appeared to lack the tremendous weight of the earlier northern drive. Events on the Western Front aligned themselves into this general pattern:

American forces had driven wedges into the base of the German-held bulge in Belgium, narrowing the neck of the salient to 12 miles, and threatening to cut off the forward Nazi units west of this narrowing neck. In attempts to counter this American flank drive, the Nazis in turn had attacked the flanks of the American wedges, but without notable success. Von Rundstedt's assault in the Bitche area was being launched simultaneously with a rapid withdrawal of Nazi troops from the westernmost penetration of the Belgian bulge. Meanwhile Allied airpower hammered incessantly at German communications to the rear and at tactical targets in the battle sectors.

FLUID. Christmas Day saw the beginning of decisive U.S. counter-measures to end the threat to the Meuse line, as American troops recaptured the town of Celles, four miles east of the Meuse, and drove into the

western tip of the German salient. In bitter fighting that raged all Christmas Day, Celles changed hands repeatedly. At the same time American assault forces struck six miles to the northeast of Ciney, forcing a German withdrawal from that town as well. In this sector 12 of 17 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns were found abandoned with dry gasoline tanks, indicating strongly that von Rundstedt's forward forces were operating short of fuel.

NUTS. Around Bastogne, where an isolated American force was holding out against everything the Germans could throw against them, equally violent fighting raged. Bastogne was a vitally important communications center and the Germans wanted it desperately. Cut off in the first surge of von Rundstedt's offensive, the American force in the area consisted of the 101st Airborne Division and units of the U.S. 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. During the first stages of the assault the isolated units were under the command of Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, one of the youngest U.S. generals. When the Germans sent their ultimatum to surrender or else, Gen. McAuliffe replied with a classic in brevity: "Nuts."

Meanwhile the regular commander of the 101st, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was in Washington. But on being informed of the plight his organization was in, Gen. Taylor dropped everything, climbed aboard a plane. Carried by air within jumping distance of Bastogne, the General proceeded to make a dash through enemy lines to resume command of his embattled organization. On Thursday, 28 December, SHAEF announced that an American relief column had battled northward to Bastogne, breaking the Nazi siege, after having knocked out some 200 Nazi tanks in the course of the drive toward the encircled city.

STOPPED COLD. At this stage front dispatches—24 to 36 hours ahead of SHAEF communiqués—were reporting that the Germans had been stopped cold everywhere, and that the Americans were on the offensive "at many

points." The U.S. thrust into Bastogne had driven a wedge three miles wide and eight miles deep into the southern flank of the German salient, which was now narrowed at the neck to 20 miles.

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army, SHAEF next announced, was the organization that had brought relief to the Bastogne forces; and the communiqué went on to disclose that the Third had cracked into the German left flank for gains of up to 16 miles.

These increasingly effective counter-measures included the wiping out of a large force of Germans which U.S. infantrymen had trapped in the western extremity of the bulge, and the recapture of the road junction of Grandmenil, 14 miles south of Stavelot on the northern flank of the salient.

FATEFUL THROW. From Washington Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, at this point predicted that "this German throw of the dice will have disastrous consequences for him." Developments underscored his words. By Friday, 29 December, the First and Third Armies had driven deep into the northern and southern flanks of the huge German-held bulge, and were less than 15 miles from a juncture in a counter-assault that threatened to turn the Ardennes into a death pocket for tens of thousands of top-quality Nazi troops.

Fighting down from Grandmenil and up from Bastogne, two American spearheads were converging along the Liege-Arlon highway in a bid to lop off the entire western half of the salient and engulf panzer forces that only a few days previous had been threatening to break across the Meuse and split the Allied armies.

Checkmated at the center, and hard hit by these flanking blows, the Germans had lost the initiative everywhere along the 150 mile perimeter of their Ardennes pocket. German advance units were beaten back more than ten miles and chased across the narrow Lesse and Homme rivers into Rochefort, leaving behind an entire panzer regiment of about 3000 to be wiped out east of Celles.

Saturday front reports said that General Patton had hurled over 100,000 troops and hundreds of tanks into the spreading counteroffensive against the southern wall of the Ardennes salient. In their drive Third Army armored units had penetrated halfway across the Nazi pocket to within 12 miles of U.S. First Army spearheads in the north. Pushing six miles north of Bastogne Third Army forces had captured Sibret, Morhet, Margerotte, Remagne and Molrey.

GERMAN REACTION. Von Rundstedt reacted to Gen. Patton's thrust by launching a strong, co-ordinated assault on both sides of the wedge which the Third had driven into the Nazi southern flank. Two German divisions drove suddenly from the west, and another hit from the east at the corridor to Bastogne. The attacks gained some ground, but failed in their purpose.

Meanwhile a bitter battle was raging for the Belgian highway town of Rochefort on the western end of the salient, as American First Army troops stormed across the Homme river in the face of heavy artillery and mortar fire. Sunday, 31 December, saw the Germans driven from the city.

By Tuesday, 2 January, front dispatches said, the Germans were pulling out of the western half of the Ardennes salient at top speed, with American forces advancing eastward against light rearguard resistance. Von Rundstedt turned his attention to the American Seventh Army positions near Bitche, the old Maginot Line fortress city in the French Saar, apparently in an effort to see whether U.S. lines in this sector had been weakened in attacking the Belgian bulge.

Initial German gains were slight, but by midweek von Rundstedt seemed to have been sufficiently encouraged by them to have committed strong assault forces to a development of the attack. German units stormed across the Saar between Saarlutern and Saarbrücken, quickly extended the fighting to a 65-mile front. No fewer than five co-ordinated thrusts came in one sector of this new battleground, one of which resulted in the probable (but uncon-

firmed) capture of Bannstein, east of Bitche.

To the north, however, the Third Army continued to forge ahead in the effort to complete the destruction of von Rundstedt's counter-offensive No. 1, capturing nine more towns by the middle of the week, and drawing the strings tighter on the neck of the Ardennes sack.

Germans Show Some Initiative in Italy

German forces early in December's last week were reported to have taken the offensive against American troops in the Serchio river valley, forcing the Americans from Galliciano and Barga, less than 20 miles above the city of Lucca, just inland from the Ligurian sea.

The attack evidently was in little strength, for the Americans soon were reported as having retaken Barga, while the Germans withdrew without exerting any great pressure on the U.S. frontline positions. On the eastern flank of the Fifth Army front Allied patrols crossed the Senio river south and east of Rivola, where they were driven back by heavy German fire.

Patrol action dominated the British Eighth Army front, both sides sending out small groups on reconnaissance and harassing missions.

FOO FIGHTERS

AMERICAN FIGHTER pilots report that the Nazis have come up with a new secret weapon. From their description it is one of the strangest of Buck Rogers gadgets German science has yet produced, since no one seems to know just what the new weapon is supposed to do.

The fighter pilots call the new gadgets "foo fighters" and describe them as mysterious "balls of fire" which race along beside planes for miles like will o' the wisps. At first the puzzled pilots thought they might explode, but so far no planes have been damaged. Intelligence reports indicate that the "foo fighters" are radio controlled and can keep pace with planes flying 300 miles an hour.

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Nazis Contest Every Yard in Budapest

Savage fighting raged through the streets of Budapest last week with Red Army forces slowly consolidating their gains against the stiffest kind of German resistance.

The twin city of more than one million people was battered and burning, as the Germans made a Stalingrad stand at the great communications center of southeastern Europe. The Soviet advance had long been halted at Pest, on the river's eastern bank, but Red Army men had spread out above and below the city, and crossed the river to enter through Buda on the waterway's western bank. The fighting was of a block by block nature, and reports from the area were confused.

At last reports, however, the Russians had occupied two-thirds of Budapest and were making deep penetrations from the northwest and southwest. All that remained to the Germans was a strip about a mile wide and stretching about six miles along the Danube.

There was no accurate estimate of the size of the German garrison in the city. German forces, many of them Storm Troopers, were evidently present in some strength, as they were reported throwing tanks against the Soviets within the city limits and using their antiaircraft guns for flat trajectory fire.

King Hands Over Greece to Regent; Fighting Continues

Archbishop Damaskinos, the one Greek leader in whom both extreme rightists and leftists seem to have implicit faith, now rules Greece as Regent in place of King George II. This, last week, was the most encouraging factor in the tangled political conflict raging inside the recently liberated Balkan nation.

The appointment of Archbishop Damaskinos followed a long series of conferences between representatives of Britain, the Greek government, and the rival factionists; conferences that almost came to an abrupt end when delegates from three Greek political parties got up to walk out upon a demand from the left wing EAM representation for between 40 and 50 per cent of available cabinet positions in any new government that might be formed.

The difficulty was settled, however, and the conferees finally reached one point upon which they could agree: Greece should have a regency, George II should step down—at least temporarily.

NEWS FROM ATHENS. These tidings were brought straight from Athens to the Greek King by Prime Minister Churchill, according to reports, and George II almost immediately announced the appointment of Archbishop Damaskinos. The proclamation said that the King had "deeply considered the terrible situation" into which Greece had fallen and had resolved not to return to the country "unless summoned by free and fair expression of the national will."

At noon Sunday, 31 December, Archbishop Damaskinos was sworn in as Regent, and Premier Papandreou and his cabinet handed in their resignations in order to give the aged

clergyman a free hand in forming a new government. While fighting still continued in Athens, the Archbishop tirelessly began another series of conferences. It would be several days, said associates of the Regent, before he would complete the selection of a new government.

Provisional Polish Government Created By Lublin Committee

Poland's Committee of National Liberation, which for the past year has claimed the right to speak for the Polish people, strengthened its case last week by first dissolving itself and then reemerging as the Provisional Government of Poland.

The action was taken by unanimous vote of the 105 members of the National Council, executive body of the Committee, in a morning meeting attended by 500 representatives of the four biggest Polish parties, one Soviet delegate, one French delegate, and a group of war correspondents.

Hegemony of the new government, which will have Lublin as its headquarters, is identical with that of the old Committee. Acting President of Poland is Boleslaw Beirut, former president of the Committee; Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is Edward Osobka-Morawski, former chairman of the Committee; War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armies is General Michal Rola-Zymierski, former defense chief of the Committee.

Direction of the new government rests with 17 members—four Communists, five Socialists, five members of the Peasants' Party, two representatives of the Democratic Front, and General Zymierski, who has not identified himself with any party. Beyond this state-

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CAUSE OF IT ALL



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ment of its skeleton machinery, the Lublin group offered no details.

ILLEGALLY ASSUMED. From the exiled government in London came immediate and indignant protests. An official statement read in part: "The Polish Government protests emphatically against this attempt against the sovereign rights of the Polish nation made by the Lublin Committee, who illegally assumed the title of provisional government."

"The civil authorities, the underground Polish republic and the underground army in the area cleared of German occupation, which for more than five years carried on the struggle against the German invader, have been dissolved. Under existing conditions the Polish nation is by no means expressing its will."

"After the clearing of the whole territory of German occupation, after the evacuation of all foreign armed forces from Poland, the Polish people will be able in a free, democratic election to choose their political system and select a government in accordance with their own will."

Until that time, apparently, the London government considers itself the agency of the Polish people. "In spite of a difficult situation," said Prime Minister Arciszewski, "the Polish Government in London will worthily represent the postwar aims of the Poles. . . . We are continuing our endeavors to achieve an understanding with the USSR."

WHAT NOW? But as to the reception such overtures for understanding might have had in Moscow, the Kremlin last week remained judiciously

silent. Since the Lublin Committee had been mothered by the Soviet, however, there seemed little doubt that in time Moscow would extend its official recognition to the newly-founded Provisional Government.

More articulate were America and Britain. Both, through their diplomatic representatives, announced that they would continue relations with the exiled government in London. While this declaration of intent meant no change in policy for either country, it did make Britain's attitude rather anomalous. Until now Britain has maintained formal recognition of the Polish government in London, and yet, by agreeing with Russia on the basic cause of difference—the establishment of Poland's eastern frontier—has expressed tacit sympathy, if not support, for the Lublin Committee. Any forthcoming stand by Russia undoubtedly would bring amplification of the British policy.

The problem of the Polish people and who's to represent them probably was no closer to a solution last week. But the issue of Poland's eastern frontier was fast being joined. The forces favoring the Curzon Line as a "reasonable settlement" (MAPTALK, 30 December) were organizing powerful interests on their side. Russia favored it. Britain favored it. The Provisional Government would certainly favor it. Of the interested parties, only the old Polish government, now broadcasting alternate protests and promises from London, rejected it. It still wanted to return to the prewar frontier as set up after the Treaty of Riga in 1921 (see map).

THE ENEMY'S VIEW

"WE ARE DETERMINED to acquire final victory through our death-defying defense of the Philippines. The enemy's persistent operations are concentrated in the area, which is vital because it is situated in a strategic point for Japan."—Mitsumasa Yonai, Navy Minister, addressing the Japanese Diet.

"AS OUR ESCORT fighters were kept busy by American fighters and our special attack planes didn't come back either, we do not really know what happened."—Radio Tokyo.

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CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Allies in Burma Now Fight a Guerilla War Across a Solid Front

The Allied part of the fighting in Burma, which has been described as "the biggest guerilla war ever known," has taken on an organized pattern across a solid front.

Mandalay seems to be the Allied objective and, since the Japanese have abandoned most of the important sectors of northern Burma in a methodical retreat, dispatches indicate the enemy may not make a major stand north of this point. British Fourth Corps troops, having captured Kanbalu on the Myitkina-Mandalay railroad, 54 miles south of Wuntho, are less than 90 airline miles from the historic rail and road center of Mandalay on the Irrawaddy river.

Other British troops have moved nine miles east toward Ye-U, and the enemy is destroying the railroad from Ye-U south of Monywa. This rail route had been the main artery of Jap supply north and west of Mandalay. The Allied forces are moving south in three parallel columns in the corridor formed by the railroad and Irrawaddy river.

GAINS WEST AND EAST. British and West African troops now hold the west coast of the Mayu peninsula on the Bay of Bengal firmly and are closing in on the enemy base of Rathedaung, 24 miles north of Akyab. On the eastern end of the Burma front, Chinese forces, under Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, have pushed through jungle south of Namhkam after occupying

Loiwing and Paghkam along the Chinese-Burma border.

More details concerning the "Mars" task force fighting in the heart of Burma were revealed this week. This highly specialized unit, which fought 200 miles into battle carrying 50 pound packs, is now in the vicinity of Tonkwa, deep in Burma, and has been engaged in a drive the past few weeks in the general direction of Mandalay. This unit has been moving through country so unexplored that even the latest Army maps are inaccurate, and the terrain is impenetrable to anything on wheels or tracks. Many of the troops are veterans of the Merrill Marauders who marched up the Ledo Road to Myitkyina last summer. More than 500 wear the purple heart.

14th's Planes Fly From North China

Chungking communiques, with reports of raids on Tsinan air-drome in Shangtung Province over 24 and 25 December by formations of P-51s, revealed for the first time that U.S. 14th Air Force planes are operating out of North China bases.

Tsinan is only 800 miles from the Jap mainland and was raided in conjunction with other sweeping operations of the 14th over Central China, South China, Burma, and China during the week. In the Tsinan missions 69 Jap planes were knocked out.

Fourteenth Air Force bombers and fighters smashed at Jap communications and particularly river transport along the Yangtze, the main supply line to central China. In an effort to ward off the 14th's blows, the Japs are said to have strengthened their antiaircraft defenses at many points.

QUIET FRONT. China's ground war was relatively quiet last week. Both Japanese and Chinese troops dug in around Hochin, where the enemy has elected to make a stand after his

withdrawal from Kweichow Province. In western Honan, meanwhile, a Chinese Communist army defeated a Japanese force protecting a bridge and liberated 2000 Chinese forced laborers.

Best news of the week, from both military and political standpoints, came in statements from two Allied leaders. The first was that China's land route to India is "almost cleared now," a fact disclosed in a press conference by Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of the U.S. forces in China, after a three-week tour of the Yunnan border region. General Wede-

meyer added that he saw American road engineers "working their heads off day and night" to push through the vital road link and pipeline.

The second was in the nature of a promise and came from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Constitutional government will be established in China, said the Generalissimo, before the end of 1945, instead of within one year after the end of hostilities as previously announced. His statement said in part: "I do not usually vainly talk much about democracy, but I have not for one single day forgotten the need for . . . democracy."

Both Escort and Raider, Cruiser Is the Navy's Jack-of-all-Trades

In the autumn of 1942 American ground forces in the Southwest Pacific were engaged in the slow and painful process of consolidating their positions in the face of savage and determined enemy resistance.

August had seen the start of the U.S. offensive as Marines poured ashore on the beaches of Guadalcanal in the first step toward conquest of the Jap-held Solomon Islands. The capture of Henderson Field had supplied the Americans with a main base from which patrol action could penetrate enemy lines.

Contributing to Japanese strength—and to American casualties as well—was a Japanese supply train which our forces christened the "Tokyo Express." This was a sea-borne force which nightly ran "the slot," a channel through two groups of islands. "The Express" was the business end of an attenuated supply line which ran from Yokohama to the intermediate bases at Truk and Rabaul, then on to Bougainville in the northern Solomons. From Bougainville, and other northern bases, men and material were loaded on to merchant vessels for the trip to Guadalcanal. At night, under cruiser and destroyer escort, these ships made their run, landing reinforcements at Cape Esper-

ance, on Guadalcanal's northwestern coast.

JOB FOR CRUISERS. The job of cracking this Japanese supply train was the task of the U.S. Navy. At various times, ships of almost every class clashed with the Japanese in these waters. These included everything from carriers to PT boats, but the brunt of the fighting fell upon the cruisers, protected by screens of omnipresent destroyers.

Many of these cruiser engagements were memorable, such as the battle of Cape Esperance, which took place on 11 and 12 October just northwest of Guadalcanal. On the night of 11 October the "Tokyo Express" came down "the slot" as usual—this time consisting of a leading destroyer line, four or five cruisers, and seven or eight transports. But waiting for them in the black night was an American force of concentrated striking power—the heavy cruisers San Francisco and Salt Lake city, the light cruisers Helena and Boise, with their own covering destroyers.

DEATH BLOW. At the command, "Commence Firing!" forty-nine American heavy guns split the night with their fire, and one Japanese heavy cruiser billowed up in flame. Round after round pierced Japanese hulls and bottoms, while the American ships themselves absorbed plenty of enemy steel. The battle was brief but bitter, the Japanese losses including at least three cruisers, four destroyers, and an undetermined number of transports—while American losses totalled only one destroyer.

The light cruiser Boise emerged from this battle with a fantastic record—six Japanese ships sunk or damaged in 27 minutes of battle. In this short span of time the Boise fired more than 1,000 rounds of five- and six-inch shells, blasting and burning two Japanese heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. She suffered heavy damage herself—losing 107 men and taking brutal punishment from the enemy's eight-inch shells. At one point in the engagement, flames enveloped the Boise above the masts, she fell out of the battle line, and her sister ships considered her lost. But under her damage control officer, crew members plugged her holes with mattresses and wooden shores, and down by the head, but on an even keel, the sturdy ship set her course to rejoin the rest of her task force.

VERSATILE. In the words of one military expert, cruisers are "jacks-of-all-trades of the ocean highways." They participate in large-scale fleet action, acting as a screening force for larger ships such as carriers and battleships, and also moving ahead to act as scouts. They also go in on their own, as in the Cape Esperance engagement, although usually protected by a covering screen of destroyers. They act as convoy escorts, and conversely, may operate as raiders attacking enemy shipping.

The secret of the cruiser's versatility lies in its construction—for this naval unit is a compromise between a heavy battleship and a light de-

stroyer. Like battleships, cruisers carry armor belts and thus are able to stand and trade shells with a heavily-gunned opponent. Their own firepower is considerable, the armament running up to eight-inch guns in some cases. But like destroyers, they are lean narrow ships with a high potential of speed and maneuverability.

Cruisers are generally classed as light and heavy on a basis of gun calibers—heavy cruisers carrying eight-inch guns in their main battery, and light cruisers carrying six-inch weapons in the main turrets.

RAKISH. Military security has limited the releasable details of the new cruisers. However, "Jane's Fighting Ships" indicates the average cruiser can run anywhere up to 10,000 tons, is about 600 feet long, and can attain speeds over 30 knots.

Heavy cruisers usually carry two forward turrets and one aft, each containing three eight-inch guns. Light cruisers may have even more turrets for their main six-inch gun batteries. The secondary batteries usually consist of five-inch guns which can be used as antiaircraft. Several seaplanes are carried and can be launched from catapults for reconnaissance. Cruisers are rakish-looking vessels, long and narrow and many times with an extremely shallow draft for ships of their size. Armor plate is carried in varying thicknesses, for heavy plate reduces speed and range.

This combination of firepower, range, speed and protection makes the cruiser one of the most useful ships in the fleet—and cruiser losses to date indicate how much action this class of ships has seen. Bearing the names of American cities, cruisers will continue to see action until the war is won—in every theater—with such mighty organizations as Task Force 58, or with tiny convoys moving down the Aleutian chain. The workhorse of the fleet, the cruiser, is carrying a great share of naval action.

Manila Is Ancient, Modern, and A Strategic Pacific Crossroads

The finest harbor in the Far East, an oasis in the tropics, one of the most healthful cities in the world, the key to the Orient—all this is Manila, capital and largest city of the Philippines.

Ranking high on the list as a military objective, Manila is both a prize and a stepping stone. When Manila is ours, for all strategic purposes the Philippines will be ours. And in the Manila area are the ample water, shore, and air facilities necessary to feed the Allies armies in their quickening strides toward the final objective of Tokyo.

Manila is located on the northwestern edge of a narrow neck of land separating Manila Bay to the west from a large lake, Laguna de Bay, to the southeast. The bay, which has 120 miles of shoreline, is 33 miles across at its widest part and 120 miles in circumference, indents the western coast of Luzon toward the island's southern end. More than any other single feature, it is the cause of Manila's greatness.

PIERS AND BRIDGES. Since water in the bay is often rough, an enclosed harbor has been constructed by building a long breakwater southward from the mouth of the river and dredging the sea to a depth of 30 feet in front of it. Plans for a similar development north of the river were interrupted by the war. Seven large piers are protected by the breakwater and behind them is a waterfront area consisting of wide paved streets lined with large concrete warehouses.

In addition to Manila Bay, an important shipping point also is formed by the Pasig river, which, joining the bay and the lake, bisects the city. Though the river is sluggish, it is deep enough to accommodate ocean-going vessels, and along its northern bank is a long anchorage extending through the heart of Manila. Five bridges span the river, the newest of which, Quezon

Bridge, is patterned after Hell Gate Bridge in New York City.

MILITARY. Manila and its environs are dotted with naval installations, fortifications, and airfields. Ten miles south is Cavite, which used to be the principal U.S. naval base west of Pearl Harbor, and 35 miles to the north is an auxiliary naval base at Olongapo on Subic Bay.

Directly at the entrance to Manila Bay and 27 miles from Manila is the Gibraltar-like rock of Corregidor, containing Fort Mills and a small auxiliary airfield, Kindley Field. Originally fortified by Spain, Corregidor lies two miles from Cochin Point to the south. The channel to the north of the island is called Boca Chica, while that to the south, the entrance to Cavite, is called Boca Grande.

To the south of Corregidor, in Boca Grande, lie the smaller Fort Hughes on Caballo Island, and Fort Drum on El Fraile Island, while to the southwest is Fort Frank, on Carabao Island. All are fortified with coast artillery and ackack emplacements, and all are vulnerable to artillery barrage from Mariveles Mountain to the north. Beyond Manila and south of the Pasig is Fort McKinley, while 50 miles to the northwest is Fort Stotsenberg.

AIRDROMES. The city's largest air installation is Nichols Field, a military airport about three miles to the south. Largest civilian field in peacetime was just to the north; it presumably has been converted to military use by the Japs. About 50 miles to the northwest are Iba and Clark Fields, which were the main initial targets for the air offensive from General Kenney's land-based bombers that got underway shortly before Christmas.

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East and south of the city is an auxiliary landing field and a larger fuel depot, and ringing the city, the bay, and the southern and eastern shores of the lake are a dozen other small fields.

The bay contains three principal seaplane anchorages. First of these is the enclosed water inside the harbor works leading up to the Admiralty landing in the piers district. It was here that the trans-Pacific clippers first landed in the Philippines. About one and a quarter miles south is another, with a transverse breakwater extending out into the bay. The third lies about six miles across an arm of the bay near Cavite Navy Yard and is protected by the small curving peninsula of Sangley Point.

THE CITY. Origin of the name Manila is open to dispute. Some say it comes from a Tagalog phrase meaning "area liable to flooding." Others claim it comes from a combination of the words Ma and Nila, Ma meaning abundance, and Nila meaning an East Indies Indigo Tree. Both could be correct.

Spanish authority was first established in Manila in 1571 by treaty with the Rajah of Maynila. By the turn of the century Spaniards had built a surrounding wall of hewn stone, three miles in circumference, which still stands south of the river as a section of the metropolitan district known as Intramuros, "the walled city," an area of little more than a square mile circled by narrow lanes and jam-packed with overhanging balconies.

Manila was captured by the British in October, 1762, but was returned to the Spanish four months later. From that time it was uninterruptedly in Spanish hands until August, 1898 when, after the Battle of Manila Bay in the Spanish-American War, it was surrendered to the United States.

Manila is remembered by tourists and loved by its citizens as a dream city. Quite old and quite new, it successfully blends the heritage of the Spanish settlers with the most modern innovations from America. Be-

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fore the war it was a city of flowers; of spreading homes with bamboo partitions; of air-conditioned hotels; of wide esplanades and boulevards full of people in ponycarts, taxis, and street cars; of people sipping native fruit juices at soda stands or American cokes and San Miguel beer in restaurants. It was a city where stores displayed the latest styles from the States and the movies showed wild west serials 20 chapters at a time.

Favorite of every tourist was the huge Manila free market, where farmers from the provinces brought produce and native handicraft. Not the least of Manila's fame has been won by its women, whose nimble fingers turn out bamboo mats as smooth as silk and whose fine needlework has made collector's items of the native linens.

SANITARY. In recent years Manila has become known as one of the most healthful cities in the world. It has new and elaborate water works, deriving its water supply from the Angat and Marikina rivers through a complicated system of reservoirs and filters. A comprehensive slum clearance program was started in 1941.

In 1941 the city, with a population of 648,348, boasted of nearly 200 schools, whose colleges alone had an annual enrollment of more than 35,000. Its principal manufactures, in order of importance, were cigars, cigarettes, embroideries, cordage and twine, coconut oil, copra cake and meal, rattan furniture, shoes, buttons, and refined sugar.

Although declared an open city on 26 December 1941, Manila was severely bombed by the Japs until they entered it on 2 January, 1942. Among the important buildings wrecked during that period were the Church of Santo Domingo, the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception, the College of San Juan, San Juan hospital, and the Convents of Santa Rosa and Santa Catalina. Manila was a civilized city, never meant to be ruled by savages. General MacArthur's promise is that it soon will be restored to the civilized.

ARMY TALK News Quiz Will Help You Keep Perspective

Note to the I. & E. Officer: This week's Army Talk is designed as a quiz session. In introducing it, emphasize how important it is to keep up with outstanding events on all fronts so as to get a balanced picture of our global effort. Then you might open the quiz with the questions of special interest to your own group. You might add some questions of your own. It is desirable to have maps at hand to identify geographical points covered. Before beginning the quiz, check all answers against any late news developments. The index published in last week's MAPTALK is an excellent guide to appropriate background material.

EVEN IF WE had all day to study communiqués and news reports, it would be difficult or impossible to keep complete track of this greatest and most complicated war of all time. As it is, many of us are so located that our news sources, despite the best efforts, are limited. But we should try to get a view of the whole picture, for it often happens that some far-away event will have great effect on our local situation.

British fliers sink a battleship in a Norwegian port and Allied forces gain added naval strength in the Far East. Our victories in Pacific Islands spur new Japanese effort in China which may offset Allied gains in Burma. The supplies of infantrymen in Western Germany are affected by the battle for a port in Holland. Our activities in Italy hold down German divisions which would otherwise be thrown into action on the Western or Eastern fronts.

We are fighting one big war, and everybody on our side is on the same team in winning it. So that our whole war will make sense, we need to check from time to time on outstanding news from all fronts. A good way to do this is to get the views and information of your whole group, through a quiz session.

Western Europe

1. What was the importance of the battle for Antwerp?

When our forces swept through France to the borders of Germany, our supply lines became over-extended. Transport planes using improvised airfields, some French railroads and bridges hastily repaired by our Engineers, and the Red Ball Express truckline based on Cherbourg accomplished miracles in the emergency. But to maintain the momentum of a major drive, we needed a port which would give us shorter communication lines. Antwerp was some

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300 miles closer to the front, and the only western port not still in German hands.

In September, British tanks racing through Belgium into the Netherlands had captured Antwerp with its 28 miles of wharves intact. However, the enemy still held both banks of the Schelde (SKEL-duh) Estuary leading to the port, and German guns commanded the 40-mile passage. Canadian units began a drive to clear them out. By 1 November the last obstacle was a garrison of 7,000 Germans making a last-ditch stand on Walcheren (WALL-kuh-run) Island at the entrance to the Estuary. British Commandos landed on the island and helped wipe out these Germans in a battle compared in bloodiness to Dieppe and Tarawa.

Clearance of mines quickly opened the channel to shallow-draft vessels, and dredging began to remove silt which piled up during Germany's four-year control of the port. By the end of November convoys of ocean-going ships were carrying supplies and troops into Antwerp.

2. What fortified city in eastern France was recently taken by assault for the first time in modern war?

Last month Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third Army achieved a brilliant success of historic importance in capturing the citadel of Metz. Western Europe's strongest fortress, Metz had been an impregnable bastion in war for centuries. It had never been conquered by direct assault by a modern army. (Attila the Hun last took it by direct assault in the fifth century.) When the Third Army touched off our new offensive 8 November, Metz stood in its path ringed by 22 forts. After severe fighting, several of the forts fell. On 18 and 19 November, units of the 5th Division's 10th Infantry Regiment and the 95th Division's 377th Infantry Regiment entered the city. All resistance in Metz had collapsed by 22 November.

3. How does the sinking of the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway help the war in the Far East?

From the time of its commissioning in 1941, Germany's great battleship, the 42,000-ton Tirpitz, was a constant threat to supply convoys going through the North Atlantic to Murmansk. Important units of the Royal Air Force and British Fleet were pinned down on patrol duty.

Air and naval raids finally forced the Tirpitz out of her home-ports into Norway, where she sought shelter in the narrow fjords (fyords). Her movements were reported by reconnaissance planes and the Norwegian underground. Several attacks damaged the big ship. Then last month 29 Lancasters of the RAF Bomber Com-

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mand caught the Tirpitz at anchor in Tromso. Direct hits were scored with 12,000-pound bombs. The Tirpitz capsized and sunk, carrying most of her crew down with her. This success removed Germany's last great surface naval threat and released many British ships from convoy duty. Some of these ships can now move to the Far East to join British vessels now fighting the Japanese.

4. What are Germany's V-1 and V-2?

V-1 is a robot bomb; V-2 is a rocket. Both are Germany's revenge weapon (Vergeltungswaffe—Fair-GELT-oongs-vahfa). They are pilotless, jet-propelled, and carry one ton of explosives.

V-1 first appeared over England six days after the launching of our invasion on 6 June 1944. It has the appearance of a small, propellerless plane. When launched from a platform (it can also be released from a plane) it travels through the air at a speed of 350 to 400 miles per hour for a maximum range of about 150 miles and with an average flight ceiling of 2300 feet. It hits the ground at a wide angle, causing a destructive surface blast.

V-2, described as "the flying telegraph pole," made its appearance this fall. Its range is double that of V-1 and its speed is 3,000 miles per hour (faster than sound). V-2 travels about 60 miles high in the air, and, upon striking, penetrates deeply and creates giant craters.

Both are highly inaccurate and erratic in performance. During London's worst 80 days of V-1 terror bombing, the Germans launched 8,000. Of this number, 2,300 penetrated the antiaircraft, balloon and fighter aircraft defenses. They caused more than 5,000 deaths. V-2s have been landing in Western Europe as well as England. Their full effect has not yet been officially revealed.

5. What is France doing to help us in the fight against Germany?

Although France has only partly recovered from German occupation, our forces are already receiving French help in the war on the western front. The First French Army has won victories on the southern end of the front. They recently captured Belfort and drove on to reach the German Rhine.

Besides fighting alongside our troops, the French have begun to contribute supplies under Lend-Lease. French factories are turning out heavy truck tires, steel girders and beams for bridges, tank parts and uniforms. This output is saving us valuable shipping space. In addition, French labor is being used in stevedoring and miscellaneous Army tasks. French aid is expected to mount sharply as soon as transportation, raw material, and fuel problems can be solved.

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War In The Far East

1. Why has Japan been sending strong reinforcements into Southern China?

Our B-29 strikes from China stung the Japanese into launching a new campaign in China's Southeastern provinces, where we had developed important air bases. Then came the invasion of the Philippines and serious naval and air defeats for the Japanese. While fighting fiercely to hang on in the Philippines, Japan is pouring more and more troops into Southern China.

Some objectives of the new Japanese campaign have already been won. Forced abandonment of Liuchow (Lyoo-joh) has cost our 14th Air Force its last major base in the Southeast and pushed our air strength still farther back into western China. Japan has now secured a North-South network of land communications—cutting China in half—relieving the strain on dwindling shipping which had carried critical cargo between Malaya and North China. Further successes will force out air power back still more. There is also danger that the Japanese will cut the Chinese section of the Ledo-Burma Road. This would nullify our successes in Burma which make re-opening of the Burmese section of the Road an early possibility.

Long-range aspects of Japanese strategy include defense against landings by our forces on the China coast. Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, newly appointed commander of American forces in the China Theater, recently said that Japan intends to fight it out on the Asiatic mainland rather than on her own soil.

2. What is the relationship of the new Ledo Road to the Burma Road?

The old Burma Road ran from Lashio to Kunming. Supplies were unloaded at Rangoon and carried by rail to Lashio and from there by truck. The Japanese, in 1942, captured Rangoon, the rail line, and portions of the Road from Lashio north.



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To open a new land route to Burma we began building the Ledo Road originally at the rail-head town of Ledo near the Burma-Indian border. Plans are to link the new Ledo Road with the freed portions of the Burma Road. Our present drive in Burma is aimed at clearing the Japanese

from the area just north of Lashio where the two roads are to join. (Suggestion: Reproduce the sketch as a visual aid to the explanation.)

3. What is going to be done about the Japanese by-passed in the Southwest Pacific?

In our drive north from the Southwest Pacific to the Philippines, we saved many months and the lives of many men by-passing some islands and parts of islands held by the Japanese. In these places the enemy is cut off from supplies and prevented from making any further moves of major importance. An estimated 250,000 Japanese are isolated between Leyte and the Solomons in an area including Bougainville, New Britain and New Guinea. American and Australian forces which have been containing them have been joined by six Australian divisions which landed in New Guinea during November to accelerate mopping-up operations.

4. How big is Japan's Army?

Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson recently said Japan has a bigger and stronger Army than when she struck at Pearl Harbor. There are 4,000,000 men in her Army, a million reservists not yet called up, and another million youths aged 17 to 18 "who have been steeped since babyhood in hatred of Americans, and who have just been made subject to the draft." We are only now coming to grips with the real bulk of this huge Army of fanatics who are still convinced they can win.

The War In Italy

1. Why have the Germans fought so hard in Italy even after becoming hard-pressed in the battle for their own Fatherland?

Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Theater—succeeded 27 November by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark as Allied Commander in Italy—recently gave three reasons for Germany's continued struggle in Italy: (1) For prestige—the soil of her former ally being the last major territory outside Germany still held; (2) for morale—further retreats would add to pessimism on the home front; (3) for supplies—Northern Italy's industry and enforced labor have been needed to supplement output of Germany's hard-hit home factories.

Our progress against the Germans in Italy has been severely handicapped by bad weather. Nor have we had the superiority required for an overwhelming offensive. Supplies and troops were diverted from Italy for the operations in Southern France. However, in Italy, the Germans have lost about 200,000 men in casualties, and we have kept 28 German divisions engaged, making the assault on Germany itself less difficult.

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ARMY "ALPHABETICAL SOUP" QUIZ

How many of your men know what these frequently used alphabetical abbreviations mean?

SHAEP —Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
ETO —European Theater of Operations
USAFI —United States Armed Forces Institute
USAFIE —United States Armed Forces in the Far East
MTOUSA —Mediterranean Theater of Operations of U.S. Army
FFI —French Forces of the Interior
POA —Pacific Ocean Areas
ABSIE —American Broadcasting Service in Europe

The Red Army Front

1. What is the significance of East Prussia in World Wars I and II?

East Prussia is the economic and political stronghold of the Junker (Yoong-ker) Generals who have historically dominated Germany and the German war machine. It is there that they have their great estates, peopled by share croppers, tenants, and peasants. Their lands are the source of their power, which they have exerted for three centuries in pursuit of their theory that the Germans are a "master race" destined to rule the world.

East Prussia is "sacred soil" to the Germans. In World War I, the Imperial Russian Army invaded East Prussia, but in August, 1914, two superior Russian armies were routed by the Germans under Hindenburg, who was called from retirement, and Ludendorff. Ludendorff was later to lend the prestige of his military career to the Hitler movement. Hindenburg, the "Hero of Tannenberg," became the President of Germany and gave Hitler the Chancellorship which soon led to his dictatorship.

After driving the Germans from Russian soil in World War II, the Red Army of the Soviet Union made its first penetration of German soil in East Prussia on 20 October, 1944. Following initial successes, the Red Army drive slowed down against fierce opposition in a rugged terrain ideally suited for defense.

General Questions

1. How does the proposed Dumbarton Oaks plan differ from the old League of Nations in measures designed to preserve peace?

The League of Nations set up after World War I did not provide for advance commitment of armed forces by the members for use against an aggressor. The League merely set up machinery for

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LINEUP ON THE WESTERN FRONT

Here is the Allied battle team on the Western Front as it has been disclosed by General Eisenhower's headquarters:

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY GROUP:
Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery.

Armies: Canadian First, commanded by General H. D. G. Crerar; British Second, commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey, made up of the following:

Divisions: Canadian Second Infantry, Canadian Third Infantry, Canadian Fourth Armored, Polish First Armored, British Guards Armored, British Seventh Armored, British 11th Armored, British Third Infantry, British 15th Infantry, British 43rd Infantry, British 49th Infantry, British 50th Infantry, British 53rd Infantry, British 59th Infantry.

Other Units: Belgian Brigade, Czech Brigade, Dutch Brigade.

TWELFTH ARMY GROUP:
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley.

Armies: United States Ninth, commanded by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson; United States First, commanded by Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges; and United States Third, commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

Ninth Army Units: Second Armored Division, 29th, 30th and 102nd Infantry Divisions, organized in the XIX Corps.
First Army Units: Third and Fifth Armored Divisions and First, Second,

Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, 28th, 38th and 104th Infantry Divisions organized in the V, VII, and VIII Corps.

Third Army Units: Fourth, Sixth and 10th Armored Divisions and Fifth, 26th, 35th, 80th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions organized in the XII and XX Corps.

SIXTH ARMY GROUP:
Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers.

Armies: United States Seventh, commanded by Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, and the French First, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jean de Latre de Tassigny.

Seventh Army Units: Second French Armored Division, and United States Third, 36th, 44th, 45th, 79th, 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions, organized in the VI and XV Corps.

French First Army Units: French First Armored Division, French First Motorized Division, Moroccan Second Infantry Division, Colonial Infantry Division, and Algerian Third Infantry Division.

ALLIED FIRST AIRBORNE ARMY
Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton.

Units: United States 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions; British First and Sixth Airborne Divisions; the Polish Airborne Brigade.

American Divisions announced as in action, but not placed: Seventh Armored Division and the 94th Infantry Division.

arbitration and if that failed, called for a delay of war for three months. Without any armed might to enforce peace, the League was successfully ignored when Japan invaded Manchuria, when Mussolini attacked Ethiopia, and when Hitler began seizing neighboring countries.

"The United Nations" organization proposed this year at Dumbarton Oaks would also use peaceful means to settle disputes. However, it would be empowered to use air, land, or naval forces

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to maintain or restore peace, if measures short of force prove inadequate.

2. What are some medical advances which, according to figures released by Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk, have almost doubled the chances of recovery from wounds since the last war?

Blood Plasma: Plasma mixed with distilled water checks shock, and replaces lost blood. These had been causes of many deaths. Processed plasma can be preserved for five years. Whole blood for transfusion is now being flown to battlefronts.

Sulfa: By swallowing sulfa tablets and dusting sulfa powder into wounds, wounded men can through their own efforts help to counter infection. The lapse of time before full treatment is thus rendered far less dangerous.

Penicillin: Its medicinal value was unknown less than 5 years ago. To-day it is used to treat many wounds and diseases that resist other attempts at healing or cure. Until recently penicillin was so scarce that almost all went to the armed forces or for further research. It is now being produced in quantity.

3. What is the present manpower strength of our armed forces?

Major General Lewis Hershey, Selective Service director, recently reported to Congress that we now have 11,859,000 men and women in uniform. More than 8,000,000 are in the Army, including 89,000 Wacs. During October 79,543 additional inductees were accepted into the armed forces, 22.6 per cent being fathers.

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Q. What French fortress city recently taken by the Americans is also known as La Pucelle ("The Virgin")?

A. Metz, so-called because up until its capture by U.S. Third Army it had never been taken by storm.

Q. Identify the following key figures in the Greek civil war: (1) M. Papandreou; (2) Archbishop Damaskinos; (3) General Scobie.

A. (1) The retiring Greek prime minister; (2) the newly-appointed regent; (3) British commander in Greece.

Q. What was the agreement reached between General de Gaulle and Mr. Churchill during their recent meeting in France?

A. According to Reuters, it was agreed that French troops would occupy the Rhineland after Germany's defeat.

Q. President Roosevelt has announced that the 20 January inaugural ceremonies will be held on the south portico of the White House. How many Presidents before him have taken the oath at places other than the Capitol?

A. Six. Rutherford B. Hayes, in the White House's Red Room; John Tyler and Andrew Johnson at Washington hotels; Chester A. Arthur at his New York home; Theodore Roosevelt in Buffalo; and Calvin Coolidge in Vermont.

Q. Where is Finnmark?

A. Finnmark is Norway's northernmost province, now partly liberated by the Russians.

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Q. "The Gopher" is known to every Marine on Peleliu. Who is he?

A. Japanese sniper who had killed 67 Americans before. Marines finally killed him on Bloody Nose Ridge.

Q. What are the mightiest and fastest ships afloat?

A. America's two new super battleships, MISSOURI and IOWA, each of 45,000 tons, each with a speed greater than 30 knots. These new giants are bigger by 5000 tons than Britain's LION, and the only battleship approaching it for speed was Germany's TIRPITZ, which the British recently destroyed in the North Norwegian fjords.

Q. What American armies fighting on the Western Front are commanded by these generals: (1) Lieut. Gen. William H. Simpson; (2) Lieut. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges; (3) Lieut. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.; (4) Lieut. Gen. Alexander M. Patch.

A. (1) Ninth; (2) First; (3) Third; (4) Seventh.

Q. The Wehrmacht's 70th Division, which surrendered to British and Canadian troops at Walcheren Island also is known as the White Bread Division. Why?

A. The right to produce their own bread was a privilege granted the 70th because it was made up exclusively of men with ulcers, indigestion, and other stomach troubles.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 28 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 13 JAN. 1945

U.S. Assault Troops Seize Four Beachheads on Luzon

At four beachheads in northern Luzon, where three years ago the Japs themselves had landed, American forces this week were ready to join decisive battle for the liberation of the Philippines and control of the Southwest Pacific.

The invasion, for which every SWPA operation since Buna has been a necessary preparatory step, was made at Lingayen Gulf, 100 miles northwest of Manila, and took place on Tuesday, 9 January, 82 days after the landing on Leyte.

"The enemy evidently had not prepared for a landing in the Lingayen sector," reported the communique, "and as a result of this strategic surprise our landing forces were insignificant. We are now in his rear. His main reinforcement and supply lines to the Philippines are cut and his ground fight for Luzon will have to be made with such resources as he now possesses. The back door is closed."

SUPPORT. Sixth Army troops under command of General Krueger went ashore at 0930. With them went General MacArthur, who waded to the beach through knee-deep surf about two hours after the first wave. In support, providing a blistering

bombardment that knocked out virtually every enemy shore battery within range, were units of the Seventh Fleet and the Australian Squadron under Admiral Kinkaid, elements of the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey, and FEAF planes under General Kenney.

Beachheads were established at four points on the south and east coastal areas of Lingayen Gulf, the nearest one approximately 120 miles from Manila, capital of Luzon and the number one objective. Once the landings were made, no effective resistance was met. As hundreds of barges proceeded to disgorge immense quantities of stores and equipment, troops fanned out along the shore to free several small villages, and pressed inland against light, scattered resistance. All first-day objectives had been gained by nightfall. Official view was that the whole Lingayen operation was progressing better than could have been expected.

CONVOY ATTACKED. Although ground opposition was negligible, the Japs tried frantically to halt the convoy on its way. For three days preceding the landing, the invasion fleet, which GHQ said comprised at least as many ships as participated in the Leyte operation (600), was under constant attack from the air. As the Luzon coast was approached some naval action ensued.

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A total of 79 Jap planes were shot down by ack ack from deck guns or by the protecting air umbrella. A midget Jap submarine, maneuvering into position to strike, was rammed by a destroyer and sunk. On the night before A-Day U.S. destroyers caught three Japanese destroyers making a dash from Manila Bay, chased them, sank two and forced the third ashore in flames. In other encounters one coastal cargo ship and a number of small harbor craft were destroyed. Some loss and damage to U.S. ships were sustained.

Two days before the landing the invasion beach area was cleared of floating mines and barbed wire. Minesweepers discovered none of the extensive minefields they had expected.

BATAAN REVERSED. When the Japs invaded the Philippines in December, 1941, they landed first at Lingayen Gulf in the north, later near Legaspi in the south, and from both directions closed in rapidly on Manila. Now they find themselves defending the land they once took by storm, facing an enemy whose moves they have consistently been unable to predict.

General MacArthur, returning in a battleship to the island he left in a PT boat, discussed this reversed situation and its probable developments in an informal chat with correspondents. "It is not yet apparent where the Japanese will make their stand," he said. "But there is no doubt that the battle for Manila and for the entire Philippines will be fought and won on the great central plain north of Manila."

WHAT COMES NEXT. If the battle for Luzon follows the pattern of previous campaigns, the Japanese may be expected to launch the sort of counterattacks they call "death-defying." As at Biak and Leyte, faced with the superiority of American artillery, American motorized equipment, and American fighting men, they will no doubt fanatically defy death—and die.

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Aerial Offensive, Amphib Operations Preceded Invasion

The invasion of Luzon was preceded by air attacks concentrated against every nearby island from which the Japs could conceivably draw air support and by several amphibious operations aimed at securing the sea passage.

For six consecutive days General Kenney's planes hammered at the Luzon airfields and at concentrations of enemy shipping. During the first three days of January, a total of 60 ships were sunk or damaged in Subic Bay and Lingayen Gulf. Among them were a large troop transport, two 6000-ton freighters, a seaplane carrier, three naval escort vessels, and 25 merchant ships of a total tonnage of 57,000 tons.

In the same period medium and light bombers ranged south from Legaspi to Batangas, hitting railway installations, reservoirs, barracks and barges. In one attack, Liberators, escorted by Lightnings and Thunderbolts, destroyed 20 Jap planes parked on Clark Field.

On Thursday, 4 January, Liberators were back over Clark Field, this time destroying 30 grounded planes. Another sweep on Friday was directed against the railway marshalling yards at Los Banos, 31 miles below Manila, where one locomotive, 100 freight cars, and three railway bridges were destroyed or damaged. Next day, after night harassing raids, heavyweights struck Clark, Nichols, and Nielson fields near Manila, cratering runways and destroying 18 parked planes. Surprisingly, enemy attempts to intercept were rare, always fatal.

FEAF bombers also carried through an effective campaign to pin down

any Jap planes on Cebu, Negros, Mindanao, and other islands in the Philippine archipelago.

NAVY TOO. Carrier-based planes also contributed to the devastation. At Pearl Harbor Admiral Nimitz disclosed that in attacks which embraced shipping and other shore installations as well, Navy planes destroyed or damaged 41 Jap planes on Luzon airfields on Friday, 5 January. As the rate of attacks increased in tempo, 225 more planes and 35 more ships were wrecked over Saturday and Sunday by a mixed force of carrier and land-based aircraft.

Formosa, which is only 224 miles from Lingayen Gulf and, with 25 airfields, is probably the enemy's strongest outlying Pacific air base, received its share of attention in the pre-invasion bombardment. A two-day strike over Tuesday and Wednesday scored the destruction of 111 Jap planes and destruction or probable destruction of 95 ships. The attack also included Okinawa Jima, an important base between Formosa and the Japanese mainland which has at least three operational airfields, several seaplane harbors, and numerous sheltered anchorages. The assault was a particularly daring one, since the geographical position of the widely-separated targets required planes to be launched near the southeastern boundary of the China Sea, an area zealously guarded by the enemy-held Ryukyu islands, of which Okinawa is the largest.

Total Japanese losses during the eight-day offensive by Naval air and sea forces included 156 ships and 593 aircraft destroyed or damaged.

MARINDUQUE OCCUPIED. To gain control of the Sibuyan Sea and to establish direct contact with Luzon, Sixth Army men on Wednesday, 3 January, seized the small island of Marinduque, which lies 30 miles northeast of Mindoro and less than 100 miles from Manila. In an unopposed landing, seasoned troops went ashore near Buena Vista on the southwest coast.

Another hop-skip-and-jump, this one up Mindoro's north-west coast, brought

the liberation of the township of Paltan, some 30 miles from Luzon's southwest tip and 90 miles southwest of Manila. Entry into Paluan came after an amphibious landing on 2 January, another landing shortly thereafter, and an eight-mile trek overland.

The Japs continued to send over planes to hit Allied installations on Mindoro, five separate attacks coming on Tuesday, 2 January. All such attempts were successfully frustrated by ackack and fighters.

Jap Industry Gets It Again From Supers

The industrial island of Kyushu on the Japanese homeland and the enemy empire outpost of Bangkok, Thailand, were targets for China and India based B-29 Superfortresses of the 20th Bomber Command last week.

The Bangkok raid was carried out by daylight in medium force with "excellent" results against meager antiaircraft and fighter opposition. The Kyushu raid was accomplished against the airplane plant and other targets at Omura, with bombardiers forced to rely on precision instruments because of a heavy cloud cover over the target area. This attack was the 10th against the industrial island and was the 25th made by the 20th Bomber Command since it went into action last June.

Saipan-based Superforts smashed at Nagoya, Japan's third largest city and an important aircraft manufacturing center by daylight, starting large fires that, according to photographs taken during the raid, blotted out one third of the city. Fires were still raging in the city after nightfall of 3 January, the day of the raid. Nagoya has never experienced the thorough devastation from earthquake or fire which caused Tokyo to be rebuilt along modern, fire-proof designs, and its 300,000 highly inflammable buildings present a serious fire hazard.

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Aussies in Action In North Solomons, British New Guinea

Australian forces, whose last major campaign (Ramu Valley) ended early in 1944, were reported back in action last week. In November, General MacArthur announced, they had moved in to replace American troops in the northern Solomons, New Britain, and British New Guinea.

More specifically, the Aussies have taken over at Aitape, Bougainville, the Gazelle Peninsula (New Britain), Emirau, Green, Munda, and Treasury Islands. The move was kept secret until the entire changeover had been accomplished.

FULL SCALE CAMPAIGN. Australian Army officials in Melbourne, amplifying the GHQ statement, said that progress had been appreciable wherever there had been contact with the enemy.

On Bougainville, where some 16,000 Japs remain to be wiped out, an aggressive action had broken through the perimeter defenses, drove the Japs from a prominent feature known as Little George Hill, and held it despite repeated counterattacks.

In the Aitape area fighting has been steady in a sector east of Tong, a native village which lies 15 miles inland across thickly-forested razorbacks. Here the Aussies' job is formidable: to mop up about 23,000 remnants of the Japanese 18th Army who are dispersed in a 100-mile area extending along the coast from the Danmap river east to the Sepik river and 30 miles inland across the Torricelli and Prince Alexander ranges.

On New Britain a series of amphibious movements has brought Australia-

lian outguards to a point within 50 air miles of the onetime citadel at Rabaul. Australian troops began relieving American forces at Cape Hoskins as early as 8 October and a landing in force at Jacquinot Bay on the south coast followed on 4 November. Subsequent operations have been aimed at compressing the estimated 40,000 Japanese troops into a limited area of resistance on the Gazelle Peninsula.

So far Australian troops have killed 372 Japanese, captured 20, and rescued 10 friendly nationals.

PROGRAM FOR 1945. That Diggers would assume the job of exterminating the by-passed Japs had been announced earlier in a New Year's message from Francis Forde, Minister for the Army and Acting Prime Minister of Australia. In the same speech, Mr. Forde disclosed some other significant commitments for 1945:

At the request of the British Government, the Commonwealth would undertake to provide by June 1945 facilities, supplies and services for the British Fleet estimated to cost a minimum of £21,156,000 (\$67,910,760);

Continued supply of similar services to United States forces in SWPA would aggregate £110,000,000 (\$353,100,000) for the complete financial year of 1944-45.

Fais Occupied

Japan, which, according to General Yamashita, has "thousands of them," lost another island last week. Latest to fall to American invasion forces is Fais, one of the 48 clusters forming the Caroline group, which was seized by troops under Admiral Nimitz' command last Tuesday, 2 January.

Strategic significance of the operation was to further isolate the once powerful, and still troublesome, Jap bases at Yap and Truk. Fais is less than 200 miles northeast of Yap and midway between U.S.-held Guam and the Palaus. Truk is about 850 miles farther to the southeast.

LUZON WORTH FIGHTING FOR

A month ago Japanese radio commentators were telling the world that the Leyte-Samar campaign would decide the victor in the war for Greater East Asia.

Last week, broadcasting to China, Tokyo Radio said: "The Leyte and Mindoro campaigns are merely local operations. The decisive struggle will occur at Luzon."

For once, Radio Tokyo may be right. At its northern tip Luzon is just over 200 miles from the most southern point of Formosa and within 500 miles of Hong Kong. U.S. warplanes based there would have strategic domination of all sea traffic from Japan to Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, and Borneo. Curtailment of the flow of rubber, rice, oil, and minerals that would inevitably follow would mean perhaps the biggest reduction in her capacity to wage war that Japan has yet sustained.

Moreover, Japan stands to lose a garrison estimated to number 150,000 men, plus everything she may have invested in the island during three years of occupation. Of equal importance would be the loss in prestige, for with the liberation of 12 million Filipinos, Greater East Asia would be not quite so great, and morale on both home and battle fronts would be put to a severe test. All in all, the loss of Luzon would be a loss that Japan's shattering empire could ill afford.

DIVIDED. Geographically Luzon may be separated into North Luzon, that land area to the north of Manila (MAPTALK, 6 January), and South Luzon, that portion lying to the south and east.

Similar to Mindoro and Leyte in terrain, North Luzon is approximately 300 miles long and 150 miles wide and

is roughly bisected by the fertile valley of the Caguan river. This great plain, which is about 150 miles long and averages 50 miles in breadth, is flanked on the eastern side by the Sierra Madre range, and on the west by the Cordillera Central. The two ranges join at the southern end to form the Caguan watershed.

These mountains are even higher, more rugged, and more abundant than those on Leyte. The Sierra Madre runs down the east coast for its full length; the western coast is fringed by the Ilocos or Malaya Range.

Main centers of population on North Luzon, apart from Manila itself, are Laoag and Vigan, both of which are on the northeast coast. Laoag has a population of 45,000, Vigan 20,000.

SOUTH OF MANILA. South Luzon is for the greater part covered by isolated volcanoes and irregular masses of hills. Highest peak is 7,900-foot Mayon, which is situated at the extreme southeast near Legaspi, a city of 35,000 inhabitants. Land suitable for cultivation is provided by the plain of Bikol.

Legaspi has one of the few good ports in the area, although the South Luzon coastline is irregular and deeply indented with bays and gulfs. Most important of nearby towns is Naga, a town of 13,000 people.

Climate of Luzon is equable, with a mean temperature of 79.5 and a rainfall of 77 inches. Wettest month is July with 21 inches and the driest is February with 5 inches.

At the time of the Japanese occupancy, transportation facilities on Luzon comprised 712 miles of government-owned railway and many hundreds of miles of highways linking Manila with the important towns on the island. In the fight for strategic areas, American superiority in motorized equipment may be a telling factor.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Allies Shift Forces, Seize Initiative On Snow-Covered Front

As winter snow sifted over Western Front battlefields from Monschau in the north to the Strasbourg area in the south, a shift of command was announced by SHAEF from Paris.

Supreme Headquarters disclosed British Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery had commanded all operations on the northern side of the German salient in Belgium since 20 December, while American Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley had directed operations on the salient's southern rim. The announcement said that "when German penetration through the Ardennes created two fronts, one substantially facing north and another south, by instant agreement of all concerned that portion of the front facing south was placed under the command of Field Marshal Montgomery, and that facing north under command of Gen. Bradley."

TEMPORARY SHUFFLE. News of the change in leadership was held up to keep the information from the enemy, but the change appeared extremely logical and was a regular field operation. Official sources stated the switch was temporary and was not to be construed as appointing Marshal Montgomery as deputy commander in chief under General Eisenhower.

Effect of the reshuffling was to split and regroup forces of the 12th Army Group, normally consisting of the U.S. First, Third, and Ninth Armies. The American Ninth and a portion of the First were placed under General Montgomery, who is head of the 21st Army

Group made up of the British Second and the Canadian First Armies. Remaining under General Bradley were the U.S. Third and a portion of the U.S. First Armies. There were unconfirmed reports that one or more units of the U.S. Seventh Army had been sent up from the south to operate with General Bradley's forces. Despite the reshuffling there was no change in the official commands of the generals involved. Montgomery continued as head of the 21st Army Group, Bradley as head of the 12th.

THE MARSHAL EXPLAINS. How the enemy counteroffensive developed and how the Allies moved to meet it was described last week by General Montgomery before a gathering of press correspondents. "I don't know what von Rundstedt was trying to achieve," he said. "His gains . . . will not win the war . . . Rundstedt's attacks on 16 December obtained tactical surprise, splitting the American First Army . . . The Germans were heading for the Meuse, but the whole Allied team rallied to meet the danger. General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole northern front . . . I formed an offensive Army Corps—the Seventh (under American Major Gen. J. Lawton Collins), and where I put it was largely luck."

When the Seventh Corps caught and smashed the Second German Panzer Division in its northward thrust toward Liege, General Montgomery had to change his plans. "I had to reform the Corps for an offensive. The Seventh Corps is now attacking."

Montgomery heaped special praise on the American Second and Seventh Armored Divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, plus the 1st, 2nd, 30th and 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions, adding, "I love the British soldier, but I have formed a great affection for the American soldier who . . . is basically responsible for stopping Rundstedt from what he set out to do."

ICEBOUND. Meanwhile both Allied and Axis fighting men were locked in battle under the worst kind of

weather conditions. Rain, snow, and sleet fell and froze on weapons and uniforms, and icebound slopes denied passage to armored vehicles and tanks which slithered and fell back as their tracks hit the glassy surfaces. From their forward observation posts artillerymen were blinded by falling snow, while low clouds kept reconnaissance and fighting aviation grounded.

The weather, however bad, did little to halt fighting of the greatest intensity.

After regrouping, Allied leaders hurled armor and infantry at the perimeter of the German bulge thrust into Belgium and the northern part of Luxembourg. German forces counter-attacked between Allied thrusts, while in the south a new probing Nazi drive threatened the Saverne Gap, through which supplies pass to Sixth Army Group units in the Alsace area.

Western front fighting swirled around three great battle areas. North of the German salient, units of the command now under General Montgomery pressed forward against Nazis defending the bulge's northern limits. Troops of General Bradley engaged the enemy along the salient's southern flank. Below the pocket which pushed into Allied positions, the Germans were on the offensive in the area bordering the Rhine.

NORTHERN SECTOR. In discussing the battle in the north, General Montgomery stated the enemy drive had been halted and sealed off and that his forces were now in the process of writing off the Germans. The battle action of the past few days indicated the truth of the General's statement when he announced his forces now had the initiative.

Striking south from Stavelot, troops of the U.S. First Army widened the front to 25 miles in the Ardennes area along the north flank of the German salient. The week's action saw a sizeable strip of territory, more than five miles deep in some sectors, recaptured in the area from just below

Malmédy to a point southwest of Grandmenil.

At the nose of the westward pointing salient the Germans had been pushed back from a considerable area, as Allied forces retook Rochefort, more than ten miles to the rear of the enemy's farthest penetration toward the Meuse River. Here the British Second Army was in action as well as elements of the U.S. First to the north. The week's end, however, saw a German counterblow which drove the British from Bure, a small town between St. Hubert and Rochefort.

THIRD THRUSTS FORWARD. Southern edge of the German salient saw bitter fighting as the Germans hurled numerous counterattacks at elements of the U.S. Third Army, which had made gains along the entire length of the line and had expanded their circular position around the communications center of Bastogne. Here in the Bastogne area American troops were pushing up towards Houffalize even as U.S. troops from the north drove down on this city.

Houffalize has been mentioned in the frontline dispatches before as the centre to which German reinforcements were sent from rear areas. The city is in the center of the German bulge and is connected by highway to St. Vith, another communications center leading into the rear areas. Its capture would menace a great portion of the German communications system by cutting off a central distribution depot, and it appeared that Allied troops on both sides of the salient were driving for this objective.

ALSACE THREAT. In the area southeast of Saarbrücken, the Wehrmacht, in what may have been either a diversionary drive or a probing action to try out Allied strength, pushed 15 miles out of the Saar region and into Alsace. The major German attempt appeared to be taking place below Bitche, where a salient was driven into Allied lines in the Lemberg-Winger-Reipertswiller area.

Other German drives were taking place just east of Saareguemines,

south of Wissembourg, and a few miles northeast of Strasbourg, which seemed to be seriously menaced by the German offensive. Continuing German penetration of the U.S. Seventh Army positions would threaten to cut that organization off from the U.S. Third, whose positions extend to points below Saareguemines. January's first week, however, saw a series of American counterattacks which temporarily halted the Nazi advance.

Supreme Allied Headquarters estimated the enemy had already lost 80,000 killed and wounded and 20,000 prisoners since the great offensive began on 10 December—an average of more than 4700 men per day.

Soviet Recognizes Lublin Government

From Moscow last week came a statement that surprised no one: the Soviet Union would recognize the Provisional Government of Poland recently formed in Lublin.

And from London and Washington came a reiteration of a policy already declared: the British and United States Governments, both of which had been notified of Russia's decision in advance, would continue to stand by the Polish Government in exile. The London Poles said merely that they viewed the action with regret.

With the imminence of a great Russian winter offensive to liberate all Poland, apparently Premier Stalin could delay no longer recognition of the Lublin committee. Hardly had newly-appointed ambassador Victor Lebedev established residence in Lublin when reports came of two fresh stabs at the Nazi lines on the Polish front. Red Army troops were massing in the area of the Vistula bridgehead south of Warsaw. With them were one or more Polish armies. Again, with characteristic precision, Russian politics and Russian armies were moving toward a common objective.

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Germans Making Bid In North Hungary To Save Budapest

Two facts emerged from the welter of conflicting reports about the situation in north central Hungary last week—the battle for the city of Budapest had reached the intensity of that for Stalingrad, and north-west of the city German troops were pressing a determined offensive to relieve the Hungarian capital.

Within Budapest the Soviets inched ahead to capture block after block of the sprawling capital built on both banks of the Danube. The street fighting was severe, as Germans under cover of wrecked buildings and piles of rubble blasted at Red Army forces with every available weapon and counterattacked repeatedly to hold the Soviets at bay. The Wehrmacht appeared to be putting everything it had in the area into the battle for the city. If and when the Red Army completes its capture of Budapest it will control one of the great communication centers of the Danube, but its prize will be a battered wreck only faintly reminiscent of its ancient glory.

HIT BACK. Red Army troops had driven some 30 miles beyond Budapest, and along this battle line Nazi fighting men were battling furiously to push back the Soviets and relieve the beleaguered Hungarian capital. Late Sunday night broadcasts from Moscow admitted that the six-day German offensive had carried 19 miles through the Soviet lines and forced Red Army troops to abandon Estergom, which lies on the Danube's south bank north-west of Budapest and whose capture by the Third Ukrainian Army on 26

December completed encirclement of the city.

From the Hungarian high command meanwhile came reports that the Axis blow had retaken a triangular section of land between Komarno, a rail and highway center, and the front lines which ran through the towns of Nagysap, Bajna, Tarjan, and also Galla.

But the German onslaught represented no serious reverse for the Soviets. Moscow said that the counter-offensive had been mounted by the Second Ukrainian Army on the Nazis' left flank along the south bank of the Danube opposite Estergom. Newly-captured towns included Battor, Keay, and Madar, the latter only 11 miles from the German supply base at Komarno.

Aircraft and armor spearheaded the German push, while German paratroopers were reported to have carried out landings behind the Soviet lines.

Japs Out Of Turkey

The Japanese diplomatic corps in Ankara received its walking papers last week. The notice of eviction came by unanimous vote of the Grand Assembly of Turkey. It was terse but quite clear. Effective Saturday, 6 January, be it known, all diplomatic and economic relations between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Republic of Turkey would cease.

Turkey's action was more than a moral victory for the Allies. While within her own empire Japan has most of the war minerals, including chrome, which Turkey might supply her, she has long depended on Turkey's strategic position to provide her with extra-curricular news of Allied movements in Europe and Asia. Already she had enjoyed the use of Ankara as an observation post some five months longer than her Nazi partners had been allowed to. The German embassy was closed by a similar decree last August.

Plastiras Purges Athens, Threatens Liquidation War

Civil war in Greece continued last week, with indications that British troops were gradually gaining a firm hold on important areas of Greece formerly occupied by ELAS guerrillas.

But even as the British announced the capture of Thebes, 60 miles north-west of Athens, they issued a simultaneous statement that ELAS representatives would always be welcome if they came seeking peace.

Nevertheless peace seemed a distant hope. Archbishop Damaskinos, venerable Regent of Greece, chose last Tuesday (which is a date that superstitious Greeks avoid when undertaking anything important because Constantinople fell to the Turks on that day in 1453) to name a new Premier to form a Greek government.

The Archbishop-Regent chose General Nicholas Plastiras, 53-year-old conservative. His first act was to reserve unto himself four important cabinet positions; the ministries of War, the Navy, the Air, and the Merchant Marine. The remainder of cabinet kudos was distributed among a small band holding much the same conservative political views.

ULTIMATUM. No member of the EAM was named in the new cabinet. Instead, General Plastiras issued a stern statement in their direction: "If the rebels persist in their intransigence I will put myself at the head of an army of liquidation, and will assume the cleaning up of the rest of Greece after the purge of Athens."

Unmoved by the storm of protest his action precipitated in the London press, the General then issued warrants for the arrest of 150 leaders of the ELAS and EAM, ordered a purge of the civil service, police and judiciary to eliminate those suspected of having collaborated—not with the Germans—but with the EAM.

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CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Allies Capture Akyab, Near Mandalay, Move To Open Burma Road

It was a bright, optimistic new year that came to Burma last week.

British and Indian forces achieved a long-sought goal by capturing the important Jap-held port of Akyab on the west coast. At the same time other Allied units were closing in on Mandalay from three directions in central Burma, and Chinese troops were fighting to meet each other and reopen the Burma Road in the areas of Wanting and Namhkam in the Yunnan-Burma sector.

The objectives gained or to be gained were concerned primarily with logistics. Effected by a water-borne operation, capture of Akyab gave the Allied cause a new forward base for future operations against the Japanese in lower Burma and presumably made the Jap position untenable in western Burma. Akyab has facilities for seven airfields capable of handling the largest military aircraft and has a fine harbor. The Japanese, who made it the center for their operations since May 1942, evacuated Akyab island shortly before landings by three Allied columns which came ashore the morning of 3 January to occupy Akyab town.

Since Akyab is at the lower end of the Arakan coastal plain on the Bay of Bengal, its possession will enable the British to hold this area with comparatively small forces, and will place the British in a threatening position on the Jap's western flank around Mandalay.

RESISTANCE VARIED. Two of the three columns moving on Mandalay through the Shwebo district have found no enemy troops in their way, while the third unit is encountering some Jap

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rearguard resistance. Fourteenth Army troops have consolidated their bridgehead in the lower Chindwin river district after having captured Ye-U and Kabo, and are assaulting enemy positions in coordination with air attacks. Forward units are reported only 55 miles from the Irrawaddy river stronghold that is the key to Jap resistance in Burma proper. Chinese forces further east are trying to reopen the Ledo-Burma road. Two Chinese units are fighting toward each other, one which came from the area of Bhamo and is now around Namhkam on the road and is only 20 airline miles from the other unit of Yunnan Chinese who are fighting around Wanting.

TO RETAKE WANTING. Chinese forces captured Wanting 3 January, but lost it again. However, Brig. Gen. Marvin E. Gross, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans of U.S. Forces in China, said they are expected to retake it momentarily and open the Ledo-Burma road supply line to China in the near future. The expected recapture of Wanting will bear directly on the reopening of the road, which will ease the load carried by air transports over "The Hump" into China, the General said.

General Gross said stockpiles of heavy war material in India had been accumulated and would be moved over the road possibly within 30 to 35 days after the towns of Wanting and Namhkam are cleared. "That's our objective," the General said, "and we expect to attain it."

The enemy is thought to have garrisoned Namhkam heavily but the town is now within artillery range of advanced Chinese columns moving in from the west. One dispatch indicates the Japanese who have withdrawn southward in Burma may regroup on a line running from Lashio on the Burma Road to the west 60 miles.

Air operations were stepped up last week as British carrier borne planes attacked the oil refinery at Pangkalan Brandan in northeastern Sumatra on 4 January successfully. Direct hits were scored on oil tanks, a power house and other objectives, and seven Jap planes were shot down.

THE HOME FRONT

The President

MESSAGE. Last week President Roosevelt delivered his annual message to Congress on "The State of the Nation" calling for "total mobilization of all our human resources" to smash Nazi Germany in 1945, and to speed the strangulation of Japan's "malignant power." By total mobilization the President said he meant a National Service Act, and "at the earliest possible moment." Once again he called for unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, but this time referred specifically to "the armies of our enemies" in apparent distinction from whole people. Ranging over the whole field of domestic and world problems the President made these points: He reviewed his demands for national military service, said he would later ask for postwar military training. . . . Called for the drafting of nurses for the armed forces. . . . urged an expanded social security program . . . said that taxes should be modified after VE-Day, but that no general revision could be made until total victory . . . Disclosed the Army has developed the most powerfully armed tank yet produced . . . said that we are about to equip the large new French forces for combat against the Nazis. . . .

PRESS NOTES. Presidential press conferences during the week disclosed that the next Big Three meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin would take place after his inauguration 20 January. The President said that the Allies have a good set of principles but the practical problem is how to apply them to every hill and valley, and indicated that not all Allied differences can be reconciled at the forthcoming three-way parley,

but said that "the thing is to do the best you can. . . ." The President said that he has plans for Vice President Wallace, but is not yet ready to divulge them. On Turkey's severance of relations with Japan, the President commented that this was "further evidence of Turkey's desire for a rapid and complete victory by the Allies."

Foreign Relations

COMMITTEEMEN. Republican Senators Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin, and H. Styles Bridges, New Hampshire, won places on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which will have an important role in shaping the peace. They were selected by a Republican Senate conference. Wiley generally had been classed, said UP, as leaning toward a so-called isolationist position on foreign affairs, while Bridges had supported most administration foreign policy. U.S. economic relationship with Switzerland is under consideration for possible revision because of continued Swiss aid to Germany, Secretary of State Stettinius said Wednesday. (Russia denounced Switzerland a few months ago for allegedly aiding the Nazis by exporting war supplies to them, later refused to attend the International Aviation Conference because Switzerland and Spain had been invited.) Montana's Senator Burton K. Wheeler, opponent of the administration's foreign policy, was quoted last week as calling for the American people to demand that the Allies abandon the "brutal and costly slogan of unconditional surrender." Saturday Secretary Stettinius replied to the Wheeler speech, terming it "profoundly regrettable" and pointing out that "whatever the intention of the Wheeler attack upon unconditional surrender, the principle agreed on by the British, Russian, Chinese and our own government, it will be understood in Germany and Japan as meaning that if these countries can resist long enough negotiated peace can be

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secured. The people of Germany and Japan do not know as the people of the U.S. know that Wheeler speaks not for the American people but for a discredited few whose views have been overwhelmingly rejected by their fellow citizens of every party. . . . " The State Department last week announced that American republics "collaborating in the war effort" will hold a conference in mid-February to consider war and postwar problems. The qualifying phrase "collaborating in the war effort" was seen as excluding Argentina. The announcement said that Mexico City is expected to be the scene of the conference. The Protestant Episcopal Church Commission has announced its endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for general organization for world peace. It said "support of these proposals seems to us the first step towards a just and durable peace."

Congress

NEW CONGRESS. The 79th Congress convened Wednesday, but postponed most business until after the President's State of the Nation report. Proposals for the expansion of veterans' benefits dominated the more than 600 bills dropped in the hopper on the first day, UP said. One bill by Rep. Ludlow (D. Ind.) would speed up disability benefits for honorably discharged service personnel. Another by Rep. Lesinski (D. Mich.) would provide that the government match enlisted men's savings dollar for dollar. Rep. Lane (D. Mass.) proposed putting Merchant Marine veterans on the same basis as other services, while Rep. Jonkman (R. Mich.) would cancel to the extent of \$100 the income tax liability of servicemen for the taxable year prior to their entering the service. Surprise of the week was a vote (207-186) to make the Dies Committee on Un-American Activities a permanent investigating committee. (The committee officially passed out of existence with the end of the last Congress.) This proposal was pushed through

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three hours after the opening of the current session by a coalition engineered by Rep. John Rankin (D. Mississippi) and gave the new permanent committee subpoena power. Republicans and southern Democrats joined in passing the measure in the form of an amendment to the resolution on House rules, said UP. Opposition developed as soon as Dies committee opponents caught their breath. Rep. Frank E. Hook (D. Mich.) described the new committee as a "permanent Gestapo" and said that he would introduce a resolution to abolish it. Hook said the Department of Justice and Army and Navy Intelligence were the proper bodies to investigate individuals or corporations. Rep. Louis Ludlow (D. Ind.) introduced a bill to repeal the Smith-Connally anti-strike law, which he described as a "cruel, stinging injustice to organized labor." Rep. Clare Boothe Luce (R. Conn.) and Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas (D. Cal.) shook hands Tuesday night at the Women's Press Club dinner, agreed they wouldn't feud with each other. Saturday Vice President Wallace announced the result of the official count of electoral votes in November's presidential election. To nobody's surprise: Roosevelt and Truman, 432; Dewey and Bricker, 99.

Manpower

SPORTS BAN. No immediate extension to other professional sports of the ban on horse racing and dog racing is contemplated by War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes, but he believes 4-F's in sports could be used more widely in the war effort, and said Congress should draft all 4-F's for either military service or war work. Friday the War Manpower Commission and the U.S. Employment Service disclosed that thousands of 4-F's are applying for war jobs since the proposal to draft them was announced. In Louisville, Ky., 2000 registered for munition plant jobs, making up half the city's shortage in one day.

Another slant on the 4-F athlete situation was suggested by Rep. O'Toole (D. N.Y.) who proposed they be reclassified for military duty as "soldier athletes" and placed on terms which would be sent to military establishments in the U.S. or abroad, where they would do the most good. The U.S. employment service found jobs for 728,000 veterans in the 11 months from January to November last year. Veterans of the present war accounted for 75% of the total.

LABOR DRAFT. A consensus by the N.Y. Times found mixed Congressional reaction to the President's renewed plea for universal service legislation (State of the Nation speech.) Sen. Richard Russell (D. Ga.) said the suggestion was "three years late, but better late than never." Sen. William Fulbright (D. Ark.): "I wish we had had it in the beginning." . . . Rep. Joseph W. Martin (R. Mass.): "(Roosevelt) could have had some such legislation if he really needed it." . . . The White House last week directed Selective Service to press "to the full extent permitted by law" for the drafting of deferred agricultural workers in the 18 through 25 age class. Official standpoint was that in view of existing conditions agriculture could with a few exceptions be carried on like our other war industries by those in older age groups. Reshuffle will affect 364,000 men.

Woman-power

NEED FOR NURSES. U.S. Surgeon General Norman T. Kirk said Thursday night "It looks as if it will be necessary" to draft nurses into the Army. He said that only 760 answers were received from the appeal to 27,000 nurses to volunteer, and of this number 227 were obtained. The nation's lawmakers, quizzed by the N.Y. Times, appeared divided on the President's plan to draft nurses, but all feminine House members indicated approval. Representatives of two National Nurses' Associations also concurred.

Labor

COURT ACTION. Montgomery Ward Co. filed action in the Federal District Court in Chicago Friday seeking to regain control of properties seized by Presidential order when the company refused to obey a War Labor Board directive. In one of 21 affidavits Maurice A. Garrison, assistant manager of the Chicago store, charged that the Army threatened an immediate draft of any employees who refused to cooperate with officers. He said that one officer told him "it's better to work at merchant's pay than at soldier's pay," and that if he failed to cooperate he would be back in the store doing the same job in uniform at soldier's pay. . . . War Mobilization Director Byrnes said in an affidavit Saturday filed in support of the government position that Montgomery Ward & Co.'s conduct "if allowed to continue will seriously interfere with the successful prosecution of the war." Monday the Government asked the Federal Court to restrain Montgomery Ward from alleged interference with Army operation of its properties. . . . Assistant Solicitor General Hugh B. Cox argued that the Labor situation in Montgomery Ward's case "threatens to break down the whole structure set up by Congress and the President to settle wartime labor disputes," asserting that Ward's with a 600 million dollar business and 30 million customers "bears a direct, substantial, and almost crucial importance in the war." Cox asserted that the company took the attitude that "it can ignore settlement machinery and carry on labor disputes as though the country were not at war."

The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Monday Texas legislation requiring paid union organizers to register with the Secretary of State before soliciting members. Justice Rutledge delivered the 5-4 opinion saying that the law trespassed on the right of free speech and free assembly.

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Inter-Allied Bickering Fades In Face of Facts and Figures

Britain embarks—unwillingly but inevitably—on an unpopular course of action in Greece. Britain haggles despairingly over the Polish situation. Von Rundstedt hammers a huge segment of the American First Army into sudden defeat. Field Marshal Montgomery is apparently held in a subordinate and ineffectual position. And all of it blazes forth overnight in heated controversy in the press of England and America, with each side levelling charges at the other while at the same time exhorting everyone to remain calm, saying over and over again that really there is no basic difference of opinion, and that all of this is merely intended to "clear the air" by means of "frank and open discussion."

Apparently the time has come for a summing-up, a reviewing of facts which everyone knows, but about which everyone needs to be reminded. Britain needs a reappraisal of the colossal weight of the American war effort. The United States needs to recall—with that emotion always strange to a proud and powerful people, gratitude—the unbending and seemingly hopeless struggle which Britain fought for our civilization, not because it was our civilization, true, but because our civilization was first of all Britain's way of life.

BRITAIN'S GREATNESS. Let us face the fact that the people of Britain are a great people, one of the few truly great peoples in history. This is only superficially easy, because Americans as a people enjoy a heritage of greatness which is still so new that we are a little self-conscious of it. Ours is the tremendous vigor of a young and powerful nation, ours the symptoms of greatness which Britain was showing when little men in little ships were defeating the thunderous armada of the King of Spain.

Being self-conscious, and a little jealous of our own unparalleled greatness as a people, we have a tendency toward a somewhat grudging recognition of the greatness of our Allies. Russia we can admire more easily because we know Russia less well, and the

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only facts about Russia which impinge on our consciousness are the vast, gleaming generalities; the almost religious devotion of the Russians to their land; the staggering power of the Red Army; the legendary bravery of Soviet guerrillas; the mystic wisdom of an inscrutable Marshal Stalin. With the British, whom we know so much better, it is easier to concentrate on their national shortcomings, after granting cursory lip service to British achievements.

And what do we consider to be Britain's shortcomings? For one thing, British diplomacy has long been associated by many of us with European-style power politics, the precarious aligning of nations so as to hold a balance of power on the continent of Europe; and British statesmen are envisaged as being hopelessly pre-occupied with this tiresome game. Thus when Winston Churchill stands like a rock, holding in power by force of arms a royalist, rightist government in Greece, the cry immediately goes up that England is playing the same old cards in the same old way.

IRRELEVANT TRUTH. Strangely enough, the truth about the situation in Greece, or about the situation in Poland or in Italy, is almost irrelevant in the face of this fact: that the people

of Britain, probably more than any other people in the world, have a stake in the peace which will not be denied them. In five years of war the blitz and the buzz-bomb have taken toll of 57,298 killed, including 7,250 British children, and 23,757 British women. In addition, 78,818 more British civilians have been injured by the Nazi terror.

The British people do not intend that this sort of thing will ever happen again, and if Winston Churchill or anybody else appears to be endangering their chance for a permanent peace, then he will surely be sent packing. For the British people have a long record for that sort of thing. They are the same people who did not hesitate at lopping off the head of Charles I. when he persisted in the notion that as King of England he had a divine right to tax the people without the consent of their parliament.

How great a stake Britons have in the peace, of course, is something that cannot be measured. What the London Observer calls the "arithmetic of blood, the chemistry of sweat, the accounting of tears" can by no combination of the exact sciences be simplified to a workable equation. But statistics can help in reaching at least a comparative evaluation; and recently the British Government released a careful compilation* of them in an official White Paper that told in terse terms the mathematical story of a nation totally mobilized for war.

STARK NUMBERS. The human element of Britain's war effort was conscientiously minimized throughout this White Paper; but the stark figures themselves were probably more revealing of the sacrifices of Britons than many a glowing prose epic which their fortitude has inspired. The report told of how one out of every three houses in Britain had been destroyed or damaged by bombs; that only the most urgent of minor repairs could be made to those homes not completely lost. It compared the hardships of food rationing today with those of 1939, pointed

out that Britons today were eating only one-third as much butter, two-thirds as much meat, less than half as many eggs, less than half as much fresh fruit.

And touching on the extent of war mobilization, the White Paper pointed out that five and one half million out of a male population of 22 million were serving or had served in the armed forces—57 per cent of all men in the age group between 18 and 40. It told of what women were doing in Britain's factories, besides dying in the blast of V-bombs in the wreckage of their homes. Of 16 million women bracketed in the age group of 14 to 59 more than seven million were mobilized for auxiliary war services, civil defense, and war industries.

Grimmest of all statistics released in the White Paper were the casualty figures. In five years of war Britain had lost 176,081 killed, 32,275 missing, 193,788 wounded, 154,968 prisoners of war. The blitz casualty figures bear repeating again and again: 57,298 killed including 7,250 women, 7,250 children; 78,818 injured.

PRODUCTION. What about production? How has Britain met the fantastic requirements of arming her own troops and those of her Allies with her share of the complex materiel demanded by the conditions of modern warfare? Again the answer—or the cold, mathematical part of it—lies in the White Paper's statistical summation. Tanks, of which 2.6 per day were being produced in 1939, were being turned out in their peak year at 25.2 per day, with an average for the entire war of 14 tanks per day off British assembly lines.

Machine guns and sub-machine guns the British manufactured in a quantity of 3,750,000 during the period covered by the report. Heavy bombers, only 41 of which were built in Britain during 1940, the year of the Battle of Britain, were being mass produced at the rate of 5,800 a year in 1944.

Rifles, radio transmitters and receivers, trucks, cars, hundreds of thou-

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ands of tons of barbed wire, shells, cartridges, army clothing, artillery equipment, antiaircraft equipment, all the grim miscellany of war were being poured out of British factories and arsenals in similar volume. And, at the same time, British shipyards were launching major war vessels in 1944 at the rate of one every two days.

The physical limitations of the United Kingdom must be kept in mind to read any kind of meaning into this collection of figures. England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales all lumped together are about the size of New York and Pennsylvania combined; and crowded into this small area are 47,000,000 Britons—a population about a third of that of the U.S.

HUMAN FACTOR. But this calm recital of statistics no more tells the full story of Britain's participation in the war than a recounting of the number of rounds fired describes the immensity of Verdun or Stalingrad. The London Economist, one of the most influential British publications, adds all the numbers up, then fills in a part of the human factor:

"Not only have great things been done, but they have been done in unity and in freedom. There have been no serious quarrels among the British people in these years. Strains and pressures have brought solidarity, not fracture. . . . In this there is a lesson both for others and for ourselves. Other countries should be put on notice that Britain is nobody's poor relation and nobody's valetudinarian cousin. . . . More than any other nation in the world we have what treasure cannot buy: unity of purpose, freedom of spirit and an effective working machine of social collaboration. . . ."

These were the things that lay close to every Briton's mind and heart when the recent angry expression of ill-feeling sprang up between powerful forces in the press of Britain and America. The British are no less proud than we, and continual needling at the hands of American commentators could hardly go without a challenge. But what both sides in the flare-up were

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saying—that there was no basic disagreement between the U.S. and Britain—was certainly evident even to the hottest heads of either side.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this evidence of friction was entirely a latent accumulation of small irritations that merely broke into an angry rash of unofficial press comment on both sides, and that never at any time was there any official indication of misunderstanding. The irritations themselves, however, might warrant examination.

OBVIOUS EXAMPLE. Probably the civil war in Greece provided the most obvious example. With a tendency to over-simplify the situation, American commentators seized on the issue to voice fears that Tory sentiment in the British Foreign Office was determined to brace the tottering throne of King George II. regardless of how much, or how little, the Greek people wanted a king. Going from this, they rattled the bones of the Count Sforza controversy that took place after the liberation of Southern Italy, claiming that Britain's Foreign Office had prevented fascist-hater Sforza from taking cabinet office in the Italian government, while backing the badly fascist-smearred Badoglio.

The British themselves were none too happy about either affair; as a matter of fact even the staid London Times viewed loudly with alarm the official policy in Greece. But the British were the ones on whose doorstep this ugly problem child was squalling. It was all very well to criticize, they felt, so long as you were thousands of miles away from the scene and could survey it with properly academic air. Meanwhile something had to be done about it; and while the affair might not have been handled with the utmost finesse, the quarrelsome Greek politicians certainly did little to improve the situation. And what would YOU have done, anyway?

And so the irritable dispute went on, like off-stage noises, while Greek

fought Greek in Athens, and British soldiers tried to impose law and order.

NEW CRISIS. Then came a new crisis to focus attention away from the seething Balkans: von Rundstedt's breakthrough on the U.S. First Army's front. This was deadly serious business and the opposing commentators lost interest in the political squabbles of Greece while they followed the pattern of the fighting on the western front. Field Marshal Montgomery, one of the United Nations' most able soldiers, was given command of the U.S., British and Canadian troops arrayed against the northern side of the German Ardennes salient, as public opinion loudly acclaimed the move.

MEETING. Meanwhile, among those who had not forgotten the "clearing of the air" and the "frank and open discussion" that raged like a whirlwind in those touchy sections of the British and U.S. press, there was keen interest in a future development that had been officially predicted. Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin were scheduling another conference. Soon.

What they will talk about at this next Big Three meeting can only be guessed, but certainly Allied unity will be among the matters discussed. President Roosevelt, in his annual Report on the State of the Nation delivered gress last week, recognized the stresses and strains that years of war impose on the ties of mutual purpose that bind us to our Allies:

"The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies," the President said, "the more we become conscious of differences among the victors. We must not let these differences blind us to the common and continuing task of winning the war, and building the peace. . . . The wedge that the Germans tried to drive into our lines in western Europe is less dangerous, in

actual terms of winning the war, than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies."

MUTUAL. There is no question but that Axis propaganda has seized eagerly on these differences of which the President spoke in order to drive home those unity-splitting wedges. But for more than three years now we have been Allies on the basis of common dangers, mutual aid, and similar interests. We are united in a manner unknown to the first World War. The British have accepted our generals as supreme commanders in the Southwest Pacific and in Europe. Our lend-lease materials go to help supply the needs of our Allies, while their goods and services are handed over to meet our own needs in lands where our men are stationed. Frequent conferences between our own top leaders and those of Britain assure continued official understanding of our national points of view.

And underneath this wartime cooperation is an historical and cultural communion older than America itself. It was Britain who first defined, fought for, and won the political rights which set men free. Britain was the first modern state to establish the theory, and the practice, of equal justice before the law. Between the British and American peoples is a strong bond of common ideals that exists between no two other nations in the world.

In view of all this, minor disputes on policy appear petty and meaningless. War nerves probably will bring out many more such episodes of bickering, but if both Britons and Americans remember the cold facts and figures of their alliance, these small squabbles will never become the disuniting wedges for which a desperate enemy prays.

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ARMY TALK Axis Uses Terror As a Calculated Weapon of War

Note to the I. & E. Officer: This week's discussion topic concerns war crimes and the Axis strategy of terror. Points to emphasize: (1) Mounting evidence has gradually made plain that war crimes are far more serious than we first thought them; (2) The Japanese and German governments and military leaders are directly involved in these crimes; (3) Terror has been deliberately used to attain specific objectives; (4) The guilty will be brought to justice after the war.

EVER SINCE Germany and Japan set out to conquer the world we have been hearing stories of Axis crimes against civilians and members of the allied armed forces. The scope of the crimes includes violations of practically every law and custom of warfare and civilized conduct.

At first we treated these stories lightly. We thought they were isolated examples of outbreaks by undisciplined troops, were "exaggerated," or even that it was all "just propaganda."

A lot of our skepticism was due to fake "atrocity" stories of the last war. The Germans did commit crimes in World War I, but many stories of mutilated Belgian babies and women turned out to be phoney. So we came to look on horror stories with suspicion.

As this war has progressed, however, so much reliable evidence of German and Japanese crimes has piled up that we can no longer remain doubtful. We have seen admissions by Axis newspapers and official communiques, eye-witness accounts of neutrals and correspondents, confessions by Axis soldiers and officials, and captured documents and films. Some of the crimes have been so sensational that most of us are familiar with them.

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(Question: What are some of the outstanding crimes committed by Japan in this war?)

Some Japanese Crimes

Hong Kong Outrages: When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941 they also attacked the British garrison at Hong Kong in China. The city was in Japanese hands by Christmas. The fate of the survivors was reported by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to the House of Commons on 10 March 1942. His report was based on eye-witness accounts, confirmed by American reports to our State Department.

British soldiers were bound and then bayoneted to death. Asiatic and European women were raped and then murdered, and one entire Chinese district was declared a brothel. War prisoners were herded into camps consisting of wrecked huts without doors, windows, light or sanitation. Drugs and medical facilities were denied the sick and wounded. Permission to bury the dead was refused. General Maltby, General Officer Commanding, asked for an interview with the Japanese commander, but was curtly refused. "This presumably means," said Mr. Eden, "that the Japanese High Command

have connived at the conduct of their forces."

Bataan Death March: Outnumbered Americans and Filipinos who fought the epic battle of Bataan and Corregidor finally surrendered 6 May 1942. The treatment they received was revealed in January, 1944, in a joint Army-Navy report describing the notorious Death March. This report was based on testimony of American officers who escaped.

Physically fit and wounded alike were forced to march in a hot sun, although trucks were available. Many died from thirst, and some were murdered. Those who did reach prison camps were overcrowded into quarters without sanitary facilities or medical supplies. Beatings and shootings were frequent. At one camp prisoners died at the rate of 50 Americans and 500 Filipinos daily. Inspections by high Japanese officers brought no relief.

On 31 January 1944, Secretary of State Cordell Hull (who resigned office last month and has been succeeded by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.), disclosed that 89 protests had been made against mistreatment of prisoners of war and internees between January 1942 and January 1944. Warning was finally given that we would hold responsible and punish the Japanese officers and officials involved.

Tokyo Raiders Murdered: American fliers commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel (now Lieutenant General) James H. Doolittle took off from the aircraft carrier Hornet on 18 April 1942 and bombed five Japanese cities, including Tokyo. They scored hits on a gasoline refinery, factories, docks, and arsenals. Crew members who had to bail out or land in China were taken prisoner by the Japanese.

Radio Tokyo threatened to execute captured airmen for bombing "non-military" targets and "attacks against civilians." Any future raiders were promised a "one way ticket to hell." Months later Tokyo broadcast that some of the fliers had been sentenced to death. Berlin radio called this "the right answer to Anglo-American air warfare." Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek later reported to our Government that Japanese troops killed every man, woman and child in coastal areas where Americans were captured.

Two AAF captains who took part in the raid called the Japanese charge against the condemned Americans "a damned lie." Our State Department promised to punish the responsible officers of the Japanese Government. President Roosevelt said 21 April 1943: "The efforts of the Japanese war lords to intimidate us...will make the American people more determined than ever to blot out the shameful militarism of Japan."

"IDEALS" OF THE AXIS

"Humanitarianism is the expression of stupidity and cowardice."—Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*.

"War is the father of creation and the mother of culture."—Japanese Army pamphlet, "The Principles of National Defense."

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(Question: What are some of the war crimes Germany has committed?)

Some German Crimes

Bombing of Belgrade: By threatening to dismember Yugoslavia, Hitler forced the government headed by regent Prince Paul to collaborate with Germany and sign the Tripartite Pact in March 1941. Shortly afterward the people revolted and enthroned 18-year-old King Peter.

On Palm Sunday, 6 April, Germany invaded Yugoslavia and began bombing the undefended capital, Belgrade, which had been declared an open city. Fires in the center of the city could be seen at the Rumanian border 37 miles away. Dead and dying littered the streets. The U.S. Minister, Arthur Bliss Lane, said, "Later the German Legation estimated the number of deaths at 15,000." The Yugoslavia Government reported both wounded and dead to be nearly 30,000.

Destruction of Lidice (Li-DEE-chey): Reinhard Heydrich (Hie-drik), next in rank to Himmler in the Gestapo, was sent into Czechoslovakia to enforce "cooperation." Following a reign of oppression which earned him the name "Heydrich the Hangman," he was seriously wounded 27 May 1942 by a bomb and gunfire from unknown assailants. Heydrich died on 4 June. His successor, Kurt Daleuge (da-LOOG-uh), began a siege of terror throughout Bohemia-Moravia.

On 10 June, Berlin radio announced that the village of Lidice had been destroyed because the people "gave shelter and assisted the murderers" of Heydrich. All adult males over 17 years of age were shot on the spot. All the women were sent to concentration

camps. Children under 17 were shipped to "education" centers in Germany. Every building in the village was leveled.

Maidanek Murder Factory: When the Red Army swept into Lublin, Poland, on 23 July 1944, retreating Germans did not have time to cover up evidence at their "murder factory" in suburban Maidanek. Left behind were documents and personal possessions indicating that 1,500,000 persons of 22 nationalities were killed there during three years.

The camp covered 670 acres and included more than 200 buildings. Warehouses contained tens of thousands of garments and shoes of men, women and children as young as one year old. There were inventory ledgers and Berlin orders for clothing of the victims. A German officer admitted that he had shipped 18 freight cars of clothing to Germany in a two-month period. Gold teeth and hardware off luggage also went to Germany.

Prisoners were brought to Maidanek in cattle cars from all over Europe. Many died of starvation, exposure, beatings and shootings. Thousands were exterminated in special gas chambers. Bodies were cremated in a battery of furnaces. The ashes were sold to victims' families and used as fertilizer in camp gardens.

Captured German officers admitted that Maidanek was a systemized death camp but defended themselves by saying, "We always acted on orders from Berlin."

Deliberate Strategy

(Question: Who would you say is responsible for these crimes: Axis soldiers? Military leaders? or the Axis governments?)

The evidence plainly shows that these crimes are not just the work of individual enemy soldiers. The Axis governments and high military leaders are also responsible. They have admitted their crimes and even bragged about them. It is clear that Germany and Japan have deliberately used terror as a war weapon.

(Question: Why do so many people believe Japanese crimes but find it hard to accept stories of German brutality?)

We never did trust the Japanese. We considered them "sneaky" and capable of anything. But we used to think Germans were fairly decent people, a civilized nation pretty much like ourselves. Maybe they were—once. But Germans have long been a cocky people who dote on military strength. When Hitler came along he twisted that cockiness into fiendish cruelty.

The Nazis told the Germans that they were a "master race" who should be overlords of everybody else. "Inferior" races must be subdued or wiped out. Any methods were justifiable. A German could do no wrong. Hitler said: "Nature is cruel, therefore, we too may be cruel. If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the spill-

ing of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin." This appealed to most Germans. They have never questioned it. All they blame Hitler for now is losing the war, not for starting it or kicking other people around.

The Japanese also preach superiority. They are a "divine" people with a "divine mission" to rule the world. Being divine, they believe anything they do is right.

Dissenters who didn't go along with these ideas at first were liquidated or terrorized into submission. Between 1930 and Pearl Harbor, Japanese militarists wiped out less aggressive individuals by assassination. In Germany the Nazis crushed opposition by threats, beatings, concentration camps, and murder. Their people thus educated and purged, Japan and Germany went to war in a manner harking back to the Dark Ages. The strategy of fear they had coldly developed was turned on the rest of the world.

(Question: What are some of the ways the Axis has used terror in making war?)

An early use of Axis terror was psychological. After Poland was con-

HOW TERROR IS USED

1. To crush opponents at home.
2. To intimidate governments and prevent defensive alliances.
3. To convince that resistance is useless.
4. To break the morale of troops.
5. To break the morale of civilians.
6. To enforce "cooperation."
7. To remove community leaders.
8. To corrupt institutions such as the church and school.
9. To destroy or weaken entire nations and populations.

quered in 1939, Germany showed films of the wrecking of Warsaw to officials of neutral governments. The implication was that the same fate awaited any country daring to resist or make defensive alliances. While governments hesitated, Germany gobbled their countries one by one.

"Shock lessons" were dealt out to countries which did fight back. We have seen how Belgrade was mercilessly bombed. The Luftwaffe made a similar example of Rotterdam on 14 May, 1940, by bombing the city for two and a half hours after it had surrendered.

Japan has repeatedly loosed terror bombing against the Chinese. Shanghai was heavily raided in 1932 and 1937. Scores of Chinese towns and villages of no military importance have been destroyed by air attacks.

(Question: How does the enemy make use of the "hostage system"?)

The Hostage System

Our conduct in occupied areas is governed by the Rules of Land Warfare (FM 27-10 Par. 343): "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible." Murder of innocent hostages is the Axis method for enforcing "co-operation."

A favorite German practice is to round up advance reserves of hostages. They are usually reported as "Communists" or "saboteurs." Some are minor offenders against such regulations as the curfew. In Norway members of families of men who escaped to Britain were held. Some hostages are just picked at random. Thousands of

these innocent people, including women, have been shot without trial for alleged sabotage or attacks on German "workers" by unknown assailants. The usual number is 50 hostage deaths for one German killed but the proportion runs as high as 200 to one.

The Japanese announced in a Manila newspaper that "we will hold ten influential persons as hostages who live on or about the street or municipality" where acts against Japanese soldiers are committed. The Japanese have not always been so fussy with mathematics. In the Netherlands Indies all the people in two villages were wiped out because in one a newspaperman criticized the Japanese, and in the other because the people refused to give up their rice crop.

(Question: Why do you suppose community leaders are made hostages?)

Hostages often include government officials, educators, and members of the clergy. Axis strategy is to eliminate all possible leaders of organized resistance. A long-range plan is to corrupt or destroy every institution which fosters democracy. When attempts to "reform" schools and churches fail, they are closed and the teachers and priests shot or sent to concentration camps.

Crippling Whole Nations

One of the most appalling aims of Axis terror is the deliberate plan to weaken or reduce entire populations.

"Inferior" people have been murdered wholesale in camps like Maidanek. Systematic starvation has brought disease and death to millions of men, women and children throughout Europe. Germany's refusal to

release French war prisoners was designed to lower the French birthrate. Japan has also used starvation as a weapon, and the Japanese army has employed opium to make weaker drug addicts of large sections of the Chinese population.

(Question: Where and by whom will the Axis war criminals be tried?)

The allied governments are determined that war criminals will be punished. This was emphasized in the Moscow Declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin.

Some war criminals have already been brought to justice. In December 1943 two German officers, a German private, and one civilian were hanged

in Kharkov after confessing in a military court their participation in crimes at Kharkov during German occupation. Trials of quislings and collaborators have recently been held in Italy, France and Belgium.

After the war others will be tried at the scenes of their crimes or by an international court. Evidence is being collected by a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, established 21 October 1943 in London.

But those of us in uniform have a job to do first: to smash the ruthless military power which has put our own men and allies at the mercy of Axis terror and threatened the whole world with its savagery.

THE MOSCOW DECLARATION

(Note: The Declaration on War Criminals made at Moscow 1 November 1943 refers specifically to German crimes. However, other statements by the governments at war with Japan apply the same principles to the Japanese.)

"The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have over-run and from which they are now being steadily expelled. . . .

"Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, these German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished. . . .

"The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies."

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Q. How was the man for whom the German battleship Tirpitz was named a factor in bringing the U.S. into World War I?

A. Admiral Tirpitz instigated the idea of unrestricted submarine warfare. The attack on U.S. vessels by this method of warfare constituted one of the main factors for our entry into World War I. The battleship Tirpitz was sunk by aerial torpedoes and bombs off the coast of Norway recently.

Q. Did 7,500, 24,000, or 36,800 U.S. Army vets apply for additional schooling under the GI Bill of Rights up to 1 November?

A. 24,000.

Q. How many pounds of supplies are needed for one American soldier's maintenance overseas each month?

A. General Brehon Somervell says "one ton per month per man."

Q. One of the most recent capitals to be liberated by the Allied forces is the city of Tirana. Of what country is Tirana the capital?

A. Albania.

Q. What kind of American planes were the first to drop their bombs on Tokyo?

A. B-25 bombers. On April 18, 1942, just four months and ten days after Pearl Harbor, 16 B-25 Mitchell medium bombers under the command of Lt. Col. (now Lieutenant General) James Doolittle, took off from the aircraft carrier Hornet, bombed Tokyo, and then went on to crashland in China.

Q. The Army Service Forces shipped twice as much materiel and supplies overseas in 1944 as in 1943. True or false?

A. True. 1943 shipments totalled 19 million tons; 1944 shipments totalled more than 40 million tons.

Q. Two questions dominated those asked by 79 American officers and enlisted men who had been prisoners in Germany and were recently exchanged for Nazis. What would you think were the two questions?

A. Who won the world series? Who won the election?

Q. How far is Saipan from Tokyo? 900 miles...1100 miles...1500 miles...2100 miles?

A. It's about 1500 air line miles from Saipan to Tokyo.

Q. Identify these men: (1) T. V. Soong; (2) Edelmiro Farrell; (3) Archibald MacLachlan; (4) Wang Ching-Wei.

A. (1) Foreign Minister and Acting President of the Executive Yuan, positions of influence which place him second only to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in the Government of China; (2) President of Argentina; (3) Pulitzer-prize-winning poet, Librarian of Congress, more recently director of public and cultural relations for the Department of State; (4) the late puppet-ruler of Jap-occupied China.

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Maptalk

Vol. 2, No. 29 Published by Information and Education Section USAFFE 20 JAN. 1945

Drive to Luzon Plains Is Swift, Lightly Opposed

Only rank optimists would have dared predict the rapidity of gains made during the first week on Luzon.

The initial 15-mile beachhead was stretched to embrace 44 miles of coastline along Lingayen Gulf; in five days more than 400-square miles of territory were seized; astride three high-ways to Manila armored spearheads were moving as fast as supply carriers could keep pace. As General MacArthur's communique summed it up: "The enemy is as yet either unable or unwilling to seriously challenge our offensive drive into the central plains."

The tempo was set on D-day and is yet to relax. Once the 800-ship armada had delivered assault troops ashore, it proceeded to unload 50,000 tons of materiel, and from the four beachheads Sixth Army men, who, according to General Krueger, behaved like "a tiger who has tasted blood," quickly linked up and began to push out in all directions.

DRIVE INLAND. By D plus 1 the beachhead ran some 20-odd miles, from San Fabian in the east to Lingayen in the west. Two other key coastal towns—Mangaldan and Dagupan—were among the 20 villages freed during that first quick surge. From them and from the beachhead's two anchors,

while engineers set about preparing the Lingayen airstrip for use by artillery spotters, infantrymen followed tanks over coastal swamps and rice paddies in an inland drive aimed toward the great plain north of Manila.

Thereafter troops simply kept on moving. Units of the XIV Corps punched west of Lingayen to occupy Port Sual, while at the beachhead's left flank other troops moved six miles north of San Fabian to seize Rabon.

THREE BARRIERS. Between Lingayen Gulf and Manila are three natural obstacles where strong Japanese resistance could be reasonably expected. They are three connecting rivers, the Agno, Sagupac, and Camiling, and beyond them is the great fertile lowland. The advance to these rivers proceeded cautiously, but by week's end spearheads had crossed the Agno. Organized opposition was met in only one sector.

On the west flank troops brushed ahead of small enemy groups near Umanday and continued southward along Highway 13 beyond Aguilar to seize an important road junction. In the same area strong patrols reached Alaminos on the Bolinebo Peninsula, 10 miles northwest of Port Sual.

AGNO CROSSED. In the center parallel columns passed San Carlos and Malasiqui, went on to take Urbiztondo and Bayambang, which lie eight miles apart on the Agno river 18 to 20 miles from Lingayen Gulf. The river was crossed near Bayambang at its southernmost bend at a point 91 airline miles from Manila. Subsequent moves brought right flank forces to Camiling

in Tarlac Province and troops operating a few miles to their east to Catablan.

Then at three points three columns, which had been following by-roads leading from the coast, reached the main highway to Manila—one at Moncada, the second at Urdaneta, and the third at Binalonan. Deepest penetration was made by troops reaching Moncada, which is 32 miles inland and about 80 miles from Manila. Paralleled by Luzon's main north-south railway line, Highway 3 will provide U.S. forces with a communications network of highly strategic value in the continued push to the south.

Next immediate objective appeared to be Tarlac, a road and rail junction less than 20 miles south of Moncada and another logical place where the Japs might make a stand. It was here that American forces resisted briefly during the Japanese invasion in December 1941.

JAPS FIGHT BACK. Only area where the Japs have displayed any determined will to resist has been in the northeastern sector along the roads to Pozorrubio and Rosario, about 10 miles northeast of San Fabian, which U.S. jungle veterans are travelling after having captured the coastal settlement of Damortis.

Here the Japs are entrenched in cave positions in the Benguet Mountains and are laying down heavy artillery and mortar barrages. American fighting men suffered some casualties from their wide arc of fire and at some points forward infantry patrols were engaged in bitter hand-to-hand combat. In an effort to eliminate this stubborn nest, elements operating east of Damortis sprang a surprise envelopment to the Japanese rear and cut their supply road at a point three miles from Rosario.

This area dominates the pass through the Benguet Mountains to the north and is the lifeline from Jap-controlled west coast ports to the central plain.

The intensity of enemy opposition here last week indicated that the Japs may have withdrawn substantial forces to northern Luzon, having chosen that area of natural defenses in preference to the Manila plain as the scene for the coming decisive battle of the Philippines. The enemy's purpose may also be to preserve a free route for his troops to enter the north and attack the beachhead around San Fabian, thus driving a wedge south in an attempt to isolate the forward elements now driving toward Manila.

This view is supported by guerrilla chieftains who have reported large scale Japanese withdrawals from Manila to the north. Added testimony is proffered by Allied airmen who during the past week have pounded relentlessly at enemy supply convoys moving north.

SWIM-BOMBS. Other Japanese retaliation came from the air and sea. Several Allied ships bringing up XIV Corps replacements were hit at night by enemy raiders. Usually these raids were in light force and caused only negligible damage; in one the Japs lost 20 planes.

The bizarre Japanese mind, however, came up with a new weapon. One day 12 little Nipponese swimmers were discovered paddling into the Lingayen transport area, their hands clutching explosives. Two were picked up when they tried to blow up a small craft with a hand grenade. The others were shot in the water as they resisted capture.

AIR COVER. Land and carrier-based aircraft were overhead constantly during the week, providing direct support for ground troops on Luzon. Nielson, Nichols, and Clark airfields near Manila were hit daily with substantial tonnage. In one sweep Mitchells and Bostons destroyed 26 locomotives, 300 freight cars, and more than 400 road vehicles along the Manila railway line. In another Kittyhawks successfully blocked the road

through Balete Pass, 30 miles east of Pozorrubio, through which the Japs may have hoped to send stronger forces against the eastern flank.

Units of Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet also were on hand, keeping a weather eye open for enemy shipping. In midweek destroyers caught a convoy of reinforcements and supplies moving into San Fernando, 45 miles north of the Lingayen beachhead, and sank or heavily damaged one large freighter-transport and 45 luggers.

The Japanese radio, meanwhile, spluttered forth with several thousand words of exhortation and cheer. The Philippines battle has entered its main stage, said one commentator, "and 300,000 American officers and men are doomed to die." A personal friend to General Yamashita assured the homefront that the General could be "dependent on to turn back the tide of enemy invasion but it won't be as easy as the campaign against the British in Malaya." One news broadcast ecstatically reported the annihilation of American naval forces in Lingayen Gulf, but apologized for lack of details because "Japanese planes have failed to return."

And from Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, onetime commander in the Philippines, the Japanese people got a promise. "Immediate counter-measures are essential," he said, "and the Japanese Navy will now go into action." As he spoke, carrier planes from the U.S. Third Fleet were tearing through the skies over the China Sea, petulantly unwilling to wait for the Japanese Navy to go into action.

Supers Pay Return Visit to Singapore

Singapore, Formosa, and Tokyo were principal B-29 targets last week as the huge Superforts, based in China and the Marianas, continued their methodical reduction of Japanese military might.

Asia-based planes of the 20th Command paid their second visit to Singapore on the Malay peninsula, the first blow having been flown 5 November. Dispatches indicated this bombing may have been carried out to bottle up remnants of the Jap fleet attempting to head off the American invasion on Luzon and to render ship repair facilities unsuitable for Jap ships being crippled in the running sea battle off the Indo-China coast.

Also hit was Georgetown Harbor on Penang Island off the west coast of the peninsula, a base for past Axis submarine activity in the south China Sea and Indian Ocean. A communique from Washington said the Singapore raid was accomplished with good results by a medium force.

On 14 January both the 20th and 21st Bomber Commands ranged out in strength against strategic Japanese targets. Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell's Superforts from the Marianas attacked Jap industrial targets on the island of Honshu by daylight, while 29s of Maj. Gen. Curtis E. Le May's China command attacked the island fortress of Formosa also by daylight.

JAPANESE SANDMAN

Japanese radio listeners are being urged to go to bed early. In a campaign believed aimed at preventing the Jap civilians from listening in on the new American transmitter on Saipan, which takes over Japan's medium airways as soon as the enemy network leaves the air, announcers are reminding workers of the necessity to get a good night's rest. Radio sets will last longer if they too are given a rest, they croon, so "let's turn off the radio as soon as this broadcast is over."

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Carrier Planes Hit Jap Shipping off China, Indo-China

Striking first at convoys off Indo-China, then at four or more ports along the China coast to the north, American carrier planes last week sank a total of 232,000 tons of Japanese shipping.

The attack was carried out over four days by separate naval forces and marked the deepest penetration into enemy waters yet. Its purpose: to stave off any Japanese attempts to reinforce Luzon.

First target was Saigon. There on Thursday, 11 January, Third Fleet carrier planes under command of Vice-Admiral John McCain sank 41 Jap ships totalling about 128,000 tons, destroyed 112 enemy planes, wrecked harbor facilities, and caused extensive damage to storage areas and lines of communication. In addition, 28 other ships, totalling about 70,000 tons, and 50 more planes were damaged.

THE TOLL. Three organized convoys were among the shipping destroyed or damaged. They included six oil tankers, 12 medium cargo ships, one large cargo ship, three small cargo ships, five coastal cargo ships, one light cruiser, and six destroyer escorts. In Camranh Bay the raiders sank one large troop-laden transport, a dismantled cruiser, several freighters.

The attacking force covered 19 adjacent Japanese airfields, effectively pinning down most would-be interceptors. Of the Jap planes destroyed 15 were caught in the air, 77 on the ground, and 20 at seaplane anchorages. American losses were 16 planes.

A total of 104,000 more tons of enemy shipping went to the bottom over Sunday and Monday, as other carrier planes struck heavily at Hong Kong, Canton, Swatow, and other ports along the

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China coast. The action, as reported by Admiral Nimitz' communique:

SUNDAY: Nine ships, totalling 22,000 tons, including one destroyer escort and an oiler, were sunk. Nine ships and nine smaller vessels were damaged. Sixteen enemy aircraft were shot down, 18 destroyed on the ground, and 38 damaged on the ground. Ground installations, warehouses, docks, and seven locomotives were destroyed on Formosa. Buildings and ammunition dumps were destroyed south-east of Hong Kong.

MONDAY: Shipping totalling 82,000 tons, including a 17,000 ton tanker seen listing, and two oilers, were sunk or damaged. Seven aircraft were shot down and one was destroyed on the ground. Seven were damaged on the ground. Ground installations, docks, harbor facilities, and fuel storage plants were destroyed or damaged at Hong Kong and Canton. There was little opposition over any of the targets.

In the midst of announcing these new Japanese losses Admiral Nimitz paused to confirm an old one. The enemy's 45,000-ton super battleship *MABASHI*, he disclosed, had blown up and been sunk during the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea last October.

Loss of three U.S. destroyers also was announced. They went down, however, not to enemy action but to a 135-mile typhoon that lashed Pacific waters shortly before the new year. The destroyers were the *SPENCE*, *HULL*, and *MONAGHAN*, all of which sank within an hour of each other with a toll of 709 known dead or missing.

THE RECORD

In a summary of the accomplishments of Negro troops during 1944, the War Department has disclosed that more than 700,000 Negroes are serving in all arms and branches of the Army, 60 per cent of them overseas.

THE WAR IN EUROPE

Allies Resume The Offensive On West Front

Just before dawn Tuesday—exactly one month after the Germans started on their Ardennes breakthrough—Allied armies resumed the offensive on the Western Front. Troops and tanks of the British Second Army jumped off in a new attack near the German frontier north of Aachen. American troops struck out at 0200 in a powerful infantry and armor thrust north-east of Strasbourg.

The American thrust apparently was a move to smash the German bridgehead west of the Rhine, the hub of which is at Offendorf, about ten and a half miles northeast of Strasbourg. It got under way on the heels of a blistering 300 gun barrage that pounded Nazi positions along the six mile stretch of river. Tanks moved forward over hastily erected bridges which engineers threw across the network of small streams in the area, blasting the Germans from their entrenched positions. Overhead U.S. Thunderbolts provided tactical coordination divebombing and strafing enemy strongpoints.

GOOD START. The British drive came north of Sittard and southeast of Maastricht, between the Maas and Roer rivers in an easterly direction. The British made a good start, advancing through strong German resistance which stiffened as the advance gained ground.

Infantry and tanks dashed through icy fog to launch a surprise attack in

the five mile strip between the German and Belgian frontier.

The tanks moved into position over roads coated with ice, as gunners all night long kept up their usual desultory fire. Then suddenly the British artillery opened up a terrific barrage, pounding German positions for an hour. At 0730 white-clad infantrymen charged across the snowy fields to the assault.

At midweek both Allied offensives were moving ahead with what unofficial sources termed "satisfactory progress."

RETREAT. Meanwhile, in the Ardennes bulge, German forces which on 16 December had thrust a great spearhead into Allied lines in Luxembourg and Belgium were in full retreat.

Frontline dispatches indicated the Nazis were falling back through the center and north of their expanded positions, presumably to take up more static positions in Siegfried Line defenses. The withdrawal of certain forces, however, was no indication that Field Marshal General Karl von Rundstedt was willing to trade ground for manpower. Allied forces driving in from three sides still met stiff resistance around the salient's perimeter. The most reasonable guess appeared to be that although von Rundstedt was attempting to drain off a large portion of his forces, he had not hesitated to commit strong elements to holding positions screening his communication routes.

GOING OR COMING. These communications centered on two important towns—Houffalize and St. Vith. The former town is at the center of the enemy bulge and now near the bulge's western extremity. St. Vith is near the salient's eastern border and is in the north. The main communications system for men and supplies either headed for the front or in retreat runs through these two places, and capture of either town would probably seriously embarrass the enemy, particularly so since heavy weather

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has forced transport to stay on the main roads.

Meanwhile Allied troops were driving from both north and south as well as against the salient's western tip. Engaged at this extremity of the bulge were British forces, while the attack against the northern flank was made up largely of U.S. First Army troops and the drive up from the south was in the hands of the U.S. Third.

MEETING. The Allied northern and southern forces were apparently attempting a junction in the narrow waist of the German-held bulge. Such a meeting presumably would cut off and trap some portion of the German forces, and the threat of this move may have been one factor contributing to von Rundstedt's plans for withdrawal toward the Siegfried Line.

A news blackout from the Allies prevented the public's receiving exact information as to the distance separating Allied troops at the critical point of the German salient. Such a blackout is usually set up to prevent information of value reaching the enemy, and at this stage in the battle it may have indicated that German leaders were uncertain as to the positions of their units facing the bitter Allied attacks.

Frontline dispatches indicated U.S. forces driving south had cut the road connecting Houffalize and St. Vith and were less than a mile from the former highway center. The report came on the heels of an announcement that forces of the U.S. First had opened a general assault in the area between Malmedy and Stavelot. From the south U.S. units were engaged in the Bertogne sector northwest of Bastogne and were reported to have cut a road connecting Houffalize with Bertogne.

CAPTURE. Midweek the Seventh Army announced the capture of General Hans Lingner, 29-year-old commander of the elite 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. He was nabbed by GIs of the Seventh when he, his aides, and his chauffeur took the wrong

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road, drove their staff car right into an American outpost position.

Clearing weather permitted air activity, and both the Eighth and Ninth USAAFs took advantage of the lull in the snow to carry out large-scale missions.

Red Army Launches Winter Offensive; East Front Ablaze

Red Army troops smashing westward during mid-January opened a winter offensive in Poland that, among other initially significant gains, brought the liberation of Warsaw.

Announced in an order of the day by Marshal Josef Stalin, the push which had been awaited by the Allies for some five months awoke the long dormant Vistula River front, beyond which lies the Silesia area of the Reich. Meanwhile Berlin reported virtually the entire 600-mile front was blazing with action and mentioned new offensives in East Prussia and Czechoslovakia.

Capture of Warsaw, which lies on the left bank of the Vistula 400 miles from Berlin, came after a big breakthrough by First White Russian forces under Marshal Zhukov, and a wide envelopment of the city from the north, west, and south. The Polish capital had been under German occupation for more than five years.

The campaign in southern Poland was opened by units of the First Ukrainian Army under Marshal Ivan S. Konev. Breaking out of their bridgehead on the west bank of the Vistula River in the Sandomiers area, some 100 miles south of Warsaw, Soviet troops scored gains of 25 miles along a front 37 miles long. The Nida River, only a natural obstacle between the advancing Red Army men and the gateway to

Silesia, was reached, and forward elements were only 36 miles from Cracow.

Tuesday the German High Command shed additional light on the East Prussian drive, with the announcement that Schlossberg, German stronghold 13 miles inside the border, had fallen to the advancing Red Army forces.

ON TO SILESIA. Less than 64 miles separated the Soviets from southeastern Germany, where coal and iron deposits as well as steel and glass factories make up a district similar in importance to the Ruhr and the Saar. Driving on Silesia, Red Army forces are menacing Germany's third great industrial area as Allied forces continue pressure on the other two along the Western Front.

The northern flank of the Soviet offensive ran through the towns of Lagow and Skrzelczyce. Progress that the Soviets were making in this region was described briefly Tuesday in another Stalin order of the day, which told of the capture of Kielce, a six-way road junction 93 miles southwest of Warsaw, and a vital rail net center on the Warsaw-Cracow-Silesia line. Less than ten miles separated Soviet spearheads from the Warsaw-Cracow section of this line. Below the Kielce drive other Soviet elements took Pasturka, while 17 miles below that place fighting men along the southern flank of the Soviet salient occupied Wislica.

BATTLE FOR BUDAPEST. Despite the new action on the Eastern Front there was no slackening in the battle for Budapest; and that ancient capital appeared doomed as Red Army men seized control of more than 90 percent of the sprawling city.

The battle for the city—similar to that for Stalingrad in several ways—appears to have been a strong German effort to delay the Red Army's potential push toward the Austrian border. The encircled garrison was evidently ordered to fight to the last man.

Nazi units attempted to smash through the 30-mile wide Soviet corridor northwest of the city to relieve their beleaguered comrades. This Wehrmacht push was halted by the

Soviets, who counterattacked to reach points within a few miles of Komarno. These Red Army troops who crossed the Hron river are operating on the northern side of the Danube and are a potential threat to the German troops operating in northern Hungary.

Red Army men in the Komarno area are approximately 50 miles from the Austrian border, and about the same distance from Bratislava, where a flat and natural corridor connects the little Hungarian basin with the Vienna basin and opens the door to Austria.

If the Red Army can successfully push into Austria through the Komarno-Bratislava-Vienna route, and the new offensive in Poland reaches the borders of Silesia, the Soviets will have achieved a great pincers movement by-passing the rough Carpathian mountain terrain of Slovakia on both sides.

Blizzard In Italy

Allied Fifth Army forces in Italy were halted in all but patrol operations as the worst blizzard of the winter blanketed the front from Bologna to the Ligurian coast.

On the Eighth Army front in the eastern Po valley, German troops crossed the Senio river and established outposts on the waterway's east bank in the area of Fusignano, 12 miles west northwest of Ravenna.

From Rome an American correspondent quoting "Allied surveys" said German forces in Italy were well supplied with ammunition, were using extremely heavy artillery, and had been bolstered by a fresh division rushed from Norway as well as several Italian divisions trained in Germany.

Home Again

After training in Britain for three years, Norwegian parachute troops have invaded their homeland. Clad in white parkas as camouflage against the snow, last week they were reported to have destroyed two sections of the railway between Trondheim and Oslo, cutting the Germans' main railway for transport of troops to the Western Front.

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CHINA-BURMA INDIA

Chinese May Take Offensive As Supply Situation Improves

With the imminent reopening of the Burma Road, the military situation in China seemed better than at any time within the past year.

From two American generals last week came significantly encouraging statements. The prediction that the Chinese would take the offensive "in the almost immediate future" was made by Brig. Gen. Mervin E. Gross, U.S. staff officer under Maj. Gen. Wedemeyer. He said that the Chinese were in a position to offer much graver resistance than ever before, for with the steady flow of heavy stocks of military supplies from India, the Chinese war effort may be expected to take on new life.

Maj. Gen. Clare Chennault told pressmen that his 14th Air Force had more strength and punch than ever before, that it had shot up at least a third of Japanese air power in China and has penetrated deeper into enemy territory steadily in concentrating on enemy air bases, shipping, and communications over an area ranging from Thailand to Taiwan in northern China. This increased sphere of operations is now possible, the General said, because airmen are no longer tied down by the task of supporting Chinese ground forces.

ALL-TIME HIGH. Reporting on December air operations, General Chennault said 241 Jap planes had been destroyed in the month, despite the loss of 14 American air bases to the enemy during the fall. This figure represented a "substantial portion of the enemy's strength in China and an all-time record for our operations, and we our-

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selves lost not one plane in aerial combat," General Chennault said.

General Chennault said he disagreed with the theory that the Japs had struck into China to capture the 14th's air bases. In the first place, the General said, supply difficulties limited U.S. air action from eastern China bases, and the Jap high command would "have been extravagant indeed to use great resources to merely stop these operations." Secondly, the Japs, under severe pressure by U.S. forces in the Pacific, were forced to solidify their continental position in China. Thirdly, "it was the existence of our bases which prevented the Japanese from gaining rapid victory that might have ushered real disaster to China."

LITTLE GROUND ACTION. Since the Japs were stopped at Hochih in December, there has been little ground fighting reported in China. But last week surprise movements by Chinese troops brought the recapture of three strategic coastal villages. The towns are Yamhsien and Linchow on the Kwangtung Province coast west of Lulchow peninsula, and the port town of Siapu on the Fukien coast at Formosa Strait. The Japs had held Yamhsien and Linchow since last November and Siapu since 28 December.

Despite these reconquests, the enemy has been consolidating his strongholds on the southeast China coast at Foochow and Amoyon, the Fukien coast, and Swatow, Hong Kong, and Kwang-showwan Bay on the Kwangtung coast. The Japs also have been fortifying Hainan Island and Weichow Island, and have been generally overhauling their forces in anticipation of possible American landings.

A Chinese high command spokesman said that Japanese in south and central China probably numbered as many as 20 divisions, with a strength of more than 300,000 men. As soon as their coastal defenses are strengthened, the Japs probably will launch an offensive intended to remove the Chinese-held gap in the Canton-Hankow railway, he added.

New Landing South Of Akyab; Burma, Ledo Roads Linked

The Allies continued to push their offensive on all fronts in Burma—from below Akyab on the Bay of Bengal, where a beachhead has been established, through to the north central areas of Shwebo and Tonkwa, where a drive is gathering force and speed toward Mandalay.

In order to cut off Japs retreating from Akyab, which was captured on 3 January, Allied forces last week stormed ashore in the face of heavy artillery and machine gun fire to seize positions on Myebon Peninsula in Hunters Bay, 32 miles to Akyab's southeast. About the same time, to the east of these landings, British 14th Army units were meeting success near Gangaw, 70 miles south of Kalembo and 60 miles west of Monya. The coastal road and the Kyatsin and Myebon rivers in between these two actions are the only escape routes now open to the Japs.

TO MANDALAY. Fighting in northern Burma was centered eight miles south of Tonkwa and three miles north of the Shweli river. Last week elements of Lt. Gen. W. J. Slim's jungle fighters had dug in around Shwebo after its capture to prevent flanking movements from the enemy. Other forces, having entered Wetlet, south of

Shwebo on the Myitkyina-Mandalay railway, were approximately 30 miles northwest of Mandalay.

Flat terrain in this area affords excellent opportunities for tank warfare, a development that would speed up the assault on Mandalay, focal point for supply in central Burma and a potential principal feeding station for the Burma Road once it is opened.

OPEN AGAIN. Last week it seemed only a matter of days before the Road would be opened. Moving across a front that formed an arc to the China-Burma border, Chinese First Army troops under Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan cleared the Japs from the last two towns blocking the way. Some troops, aided by 14th Air Force planes which smashed a vicious Jap counterattack on the city's outskirts, took Wanting and held it; others, in a smashing climax to an 18-day campaign, seized the strategic road junction of Namhkam. The Ledo Road, begun more than 18 months ago, is now linked with the old Burma Road.

Meanwhile the first American convoy in two and a half years carrying war supplies overland from India to China arrived at Myitkyina on Sunday, 14 January. The historic convoy, the first ever to cross from Burma to India, thus had covered the first 262 miles of the 1000-mile trip from Ledo, on the Indian border, to Kunming, China. Now that the 25 miles of the old Burma Road, from Namhkam to Wanting, is secure, it is free to proceed, and to several Negro truck drivers will go the honor of being the first American ground troops to enter China.

JAP FLYING BOMBS

Major General Clare Chennault disclosed last week that the Japanese are now using some kind of flying bomb to bolster their air defenses in China. It has not been determined yet whether the bombs were launched from planes or from the ground, but fliers told of seeing objects following or paralleling their planes. In each case the U.S. pilots were able to evade the robots, which so far have had no success.

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THE HOME FRONT

THE PRESIDENT

BUDGET MESSAGE. President Roosevelt told Congress in the annual budget message that the government plans to spend 83 billion dollars in the fiscal year beginning 1 July. The amount is the lowest in three years, nearly 17 billion less than the record spending of the current fiscal year. The President based his figures on estimates that war costs will total 70 billion, with 13 billion going toward ordinary government expenditures, veterans' benefits, interest on the public debt, refunds to taxpayers. Per capita cost of financing the war will be \$602 as compared with this year's figure of \$722. The President asked for \$262,687,000 for the veterans' program, and warned of heavier obligations to come. He emphasized that jobs are the key to national welfare, said all plans for reconversion and demobilization must revolve around the theme of full employment. Said that the nation's wartime economy demonstrated conclusively that high employment and production is possible...pointed out that it is a solemn obligation to keep them high in peace time.

EXECUTIVE WEEK. Last week President Roosevelt awarded Congressional Medals of Honor to five soldiers and two naval officers in a single ceremony, largest of its kind ever. Awards went to a Superfort pilot, three infantrymen, a medic private, a Naval Air Commander, a sub skipper. The Chief Executive received an offer of 10,000 Guatemalan troops to fight against Germany, the offer being made by Jorge Toriello, the civilian member of a three man junta now ruling the Central American country. Toriello, on leaving the White House, announced that the President was

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"very much interested" and is taking the matter into consideration. Also in a busy presidential week: The President ordered military trial of two German spies who landed on the Maine coast from a submarine and were captured in New York last month. Issued a joint statement with Prime Minister Churchill on ship losses to Nazi U-boats. (They increased during December, the long winter nights giving them added time to prow under cover of darkness.) Enjoyed a rare wartime evening out at the annual dinner of radio correspondents, where he drank a toast to American fighting men all around the world, heard comedian Jack Benny tell how he stepped off in Chicago to buy a shirt from "Montgomery, Roosevelt & Ward's store." Decorated Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd with the Legion of Merit for mapping Pacific airfield sites that will shorten future air travel. Sent a message to Premier Nicholas Plastiras of Greece, pledging American aid in rehabilitation "in collaboration with our Allies." Conferred with Congressional leaders and the high commands of the Army and Navy, then started preparing another message to Congress demanding a national service law...

CONGRESS

WORK OR FIGHT. Work-or-fight legislation heads the Congressional agenda, with Army, Navy, War Production Board and Selective Service officials set to testify before the House Military Affairs Committee. Chairman Andrew May (D.Ky.) was quoted by AP as saying that two or three days would be required to dispose of a bill designed to push hundreds of thousands of men into essential work, and that then the committee will tackle a measure for the drafting of nurses. May's bill would require the registration of all qualified nurses between 18 and 45. They would be assigned to medical duty if qualified, but would receive only private's pay if

inducted, unless offered commissions later. Lt. Gen. William S. Knudson, Army Production Director, told the Military Affairs Committee that stiff fines and prison sentences would be more suitable than induction into the armed forces as an enforcement weapon in proposed work-or-fight law. Said it "would be bad if we put recalcitrants into the Army." (The May legislation would set up special Army service units for men 18 to 45 who refuse to get or keep essential war jobs.)

PEACE PLANS. Michigan's two Republican senators called on the administration to initiate immediate Allied agreements to eliminate political strife and lay the groundwork for an effective peace organization. Senator Vandenberg called for the drafting now of an Allied treaty to provide for the demilitarization of Axis nations. Senator Ferguson asked for the formation of a United Nations Council to supervise liberated countries until stable governments are formed. Chairman Tom Connally (D. Tex.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed the creation of an interim World Council to speed the handling of political problems such as those encountered in Greece and Italy. Suggested the Council function until the World Security Council envisioned at Dumbarton Oaks is formed, said he would outline the plan to Secretary of State Stettinius later. Senator Wheeler (D. Mont.) set off a Senate debate Monday, AP reported, by asserting that Europe is falling into Russia's grasp, while the U.S. delays taking a firm stand against power politics. Senator Pepper (D. Fla.) at once centered his counterfire on Wheeler's repeated plea that the Allies abandon the unconditional surrender demand, saying: "In my... opinion if Wheeler persists in urging the abandonment of the purpose of unconditional surrender in this crisis it might cost more American lives than any statement Mr. Morgenthau may have made about destroying German

industry..." Wheeler attacked the Dumbarton Oaks plan as one that would "override the principles of the sovereign equality of all nations."

REPORTS. Secretary of Labor Perkins in her annual report to Congress said that the "days of intense warfare between labor unions and employers have passed and we are on the verge of a period of mutual cooperation." She said that in the fiscal year that ended last 30 June, the Department's conciliators had settled without any work stoppage over 85 per cent of the industrial disputes which came to them. In addition the Department brought about the restitution of more than 18 million dollars in wages illegally withheld from more than 500,000 workers. Undersecretary of War Patterson told Congress that inductions for the armed forces for the first six months of 1945 will total a minimum of 900,000 men, while 700,000 others will be needed for war production and war supporting activities. He cited the figures in placing the War Department on record as favoring work-or-fight legislation for all men between 18 and 34. Missouri's Governor Phil M. Donnelly announced the appointment of State Senator Frank P. Briggs (D.) to the U.S. Senate to fill the two year unexpired term of Vice President-elect Harry S. Truman. Senator Francis T. Maloney (D. Conn.) III since 1 January, died in his sleep of a heart attack at Meriden (Conn.) Hospital.

APPOINTMENTS: Rep. Edward J. Hart (D. N.J.) as chairman of the new House Committee on un-American Activities. Rep. Marc Antonio (American Labor Party, N.Y.) to the Foreign Commerce Committee, over objections of conservative Democrats. Rep. Clayton Powell (D. N.Y.), new negro member, to the Labor Committee. Reps. Helen G. Douglas (D. Calif.) and Emily Taft Douglas (D. Ill.) to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

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LABOR

M. W. & CO. First phase of the legal fight over the government's seizure of Montgomery Ward properties ended last week, but a decision by Judge Philip Sullivan is not expected for another two weeks. The decision is expected to include a declaratory judgment on presidential powers, which was the principal issue. The government asked for a decision upholding the legality of President Roosevelt's seizure order, while the company maintained that he acted in violation of the Constitution. (The Army took over the company's mail order business in seven cities, following Ward's refusal to obey War Labor Board directives for the maintenance of union membership wage increases and related provisions.) ¶ Concluding arguments by Ward counsel asked the Federal judge to condemn Army seizure under presidential order and to "uphold the Constitution of the United States."

... Solicitor General Charles Fahy summed up the government argument, concluding that neither civil liberties nor the Bill of Rights was involved. ¶ Affidavits filed in Chicago Federal Court included one by Major Warren F. Daly in reply to a charge by Ward that the Army was running the firm into bankruptcy. The affidavit stated that the company had anticipated that the war would end by 1 January 1945, and had issued a special mid-winter sales catalog on that assumption. As a result, Major Daly said, business had increased and the Army was having difficulty in filling orders. ¶ Sidney Hillman told the California CIO Council and the state PAC that the immediate job of the National Citizens Political Action Committee must be to organize for the 1946 congressional elections, and for support of elements seeking world cooperation. He said "We are going to remain non-partisan and are not going to capture or be captured by the Democratic Party."

¶ Servicemen released from the Army

to work in tire plants "are under no compulsion" to join the union, Charles Lanning, secretary of the CIO United Rubber Workers of America, said last week. The union has adopted a policy that any soldier may join if he desires, but is not required to do so even in plants where maintenance of union membership is part of the contract.

MANPOWER

UNDERSTRENGTH. War Secretary Stimson last week said that the Army "when measured in terms of effectiveness" is understrengthed. In explaining a call for an accelerated induction rate which threatens to take 200,000 to 250,000 young men from war plants this spring, Col. V. Keesling, Jr., representing the Selective Service system, had earlier told the House Military Committee that the call would be upped from 112,000 men monthly in January and February to reach a goal of 900,000 men by 1 July. Stimson said "There seems no escape from calling into the armed services during the year all physically qualified men below 30 years from factory, farm, and government." ¶ Threat of work-or-fight legislation is driving thousands of workers throughout the U.S. to essential war jobs, a UP survey disclosed. Meanwhile a Chicago draft board revealed that it had inducted four registrants for quitting their war jobs, and another Chicago board ordered all 4-F's to report to the U.S. Employment Service for questioning. ... In Detroit 5000 4-F's applied for war jobs last week, and the War Manpower Commission said the applicants were "highly capable and qualified—just the kind we're after." ... In Milwaukee 11,000 workers applied for war jobs—the highest number since Normandy D-Day. ... Applications in Dallas, Texas, jumped 85 per cent, included a large number formerly associated with horse racing ... Minneapolis and St. Paul, facing a critical manpower shortage, showed increases of 400 and 125 per cent respectively. ... Boston was up to 40

per cent. ¶ Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Selective Service Director, said Tuesday that about half of all agricultural workers under 26 probably will be inducted by 1 July. ...

RATIONING

SMOKES: Cigarettes will be rationed to civilians at the rate of about 15 daily under a voluntary rationing system planned by the National Association of Tobacco Distributors. The Association, which controls distribution to the nation's million and a quarter retail outlets, said a card system of issuing smokes would be inaugurated within two weeks. ¶ All American Army personnel of the Antilles Department, stretching from Cuba to French Guiana, were issued ration cards last week entitling them to one package of cigarettes daily. Maj. Gen. E. F. Harding, the CG, stood in line with the privates Wednesday for his one pack ration. ¶ In Butler, Kentucky, a customer asked store clerk Thomas Blades for a package of cigarettes. Without explanation Blades pulled a gun from beneath the counter and killed himself. ¶ A nationwide "brown-out" that will dim street lights, store windows and theater marquees beginning 1 February was ordered Monday by the War Production Board in a move to save critically short coal and fuel oil.

MISCELLANY

PRODUCTION. American factories delivered 96,300 planes of all types in 1944, bringing production since 1 July 1940 to a total of 253,256, and representing an increase over 1943 production of 11,423 planes, WPB chairman Krug said Wednesday. ... Over 2200 out of 60,000 American fliers who raided Rumania's Ploesti oilfields are reported missing, says the War Department. ... Treasury Secretary Morgenthau announced Thursday night that virtually complete figures for the Sixth War Loan show that the 14 billion dollar goal was exceeded by 7

billion 621 million dollars. New Hampshire led the nation with 221% of its quota and Milwaukee won the V-bond contest among major cities, buying 131% of the country's quota. ... Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, C-in-C of the Atlantic Fleet, said Monday that it was "possible and probable" that New York or Washington will be hit by bomb bombs within the next 30 days, but that effective steps have already been taken. He said the bombs would be launched from surface ships, subs, or longrange planes.

SUPERFORTS. War Production Chief J. A. Krug disclosed last week that two of four U.S. B-29 plants are turning out 135 Superforts monthly, while the overall munitions program for this year has been increased by 14 billion dollars. This addition to the 62 billion dollar munitions program originally scheduled will include production of equipment for the French Army. Krug said Superfort production must be tripled by March.

DIE IS CAST

As a reminder to the German people that Adolf Hitler means what he says, the Nazi press recently republished the following poem, composed by the fuhrer in 1932, one year before his ascent to power:

*I have chosen the struggle,
Have bound myself to it,
Will stay faithful to it
Until earth covers me.
That they may kill my friends
Is possible;
That they should kill me
Is also possible.
That we should capitulate
Never, never, never!*

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Battle of Burma: In 1944 Allies Won a Great Victory on Land

Not so long ago high ranking officers in Southeast Asia took war correspondents to task for having neglected the war in Burma. What the outside world knew about that war, they said, could be summed up in one sentence—it was being fought in a land of wilderness and tigers and monsoons by men who commonly arrived on the battle scene in gilders, and whose main objective seemed to be the construction or reopening of two roads, the Ledo and the Burma. The war in Burma was as important as any being fought on any front in the world, they added, and it was high time something was done to correct this universal confusion.

War correspondents to a man agreed that this confusion was deplorable. But in defense they pointed out the difficulty of reporting a war that wasn't being fought like other wars, of describing a front that had no front-line, of translating the multitude of native place names into terms that would have some meaning to the occidental mind. And besides, with news columns so crowded with events of the western and Pacific fronts, it wasn't easy getting space for news which was so long in the making.

To-day, some three months later, there is perhaps less reason for this general confusion. News since November has been swift in the making, and for the first time in three years it is possible to review events in such a way that they form a cohesive pattern in relation to total war. The picture is clear. The Japs are on the run, a frontline has been established, and the Burma-Ledo Roads have been joined.

POSITION REVERSED. The fight for Burma has centered largely around the control of communication routes. And these routes are almost entirely determined by geography. Burma, which is almost as large as Texas, consists of a wide and fertile valley, through which flows the Irrawaddy river, sandwiched between two mountain ranges only a little less impressive than the American Rockies. All

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natural lines of communications run north and south.

When the Japs invaded the country early in 1942 they entered the southern ends of these corridors and quickly drove the Allies from their sea supplies. In the long fight back, the Allies have done exactly the reverse. Inching in from the east and west at right angles across the mountain ranges, they won access to the northern ends of these corridors. Today British, Chinese, and American forces control the entrances to the central Burma plain and are in a position to accelerate the drive southward toward Mandalay.

LAND DOOR LOCKED. Communication routes not only have dictated the strategy required in Burma but have had a profound importance in still another sense. For whoever controls Burma also controls the land route into China. And this is what the long fight has been all about. For Japan it has been imperative that this land door be kept closed until conquest of China was completed; for the Allies it has been imperative that it be opened so that China could derive the strength to fight on.

For a long while in Burma the Japs appeared to be having their own way. Allied men and equipment were being diverted to more critical areas of war and the few British forces could only

put up a gallant defense. The first offensive action was weak and promptly failed. In April 1943 a few battalions of British and Indian troops edged along the Bay of Bengal over the border into Arakan and down for 60 miles into Burma behind an obligingly-retreating enemy. But near the tip of the Arakan peninsula the Japs turned and fought back in their well-practiced tactics of envelopment from the rear. With no powerful air force then existent to keep the isolated forces supplied, the Allies pulled out.

HOPE. The Arakan setback was a tragedy of insufficient resources, and the spring monsoon, forcing postponement of any plans for retaliation, added to the general depression in the Allied camp. But about this time appeared the germ of a new supply system which was to revolutionize jungle warfare.

Out of Burma after a 300-mile sweep through enemy-held territory came a mixed force of British, Burma, and Gurkha guerrillas under the late Brigadier Orde Wingate. In action they had maintained communications by wireless and supply by air. What they had done other troops, in greater numbers, could do; in a land where land supply lines were non-existent, aerial lines would be established.

That fall the Allies began to get the men and equipment necessary to put that scheme into operation. Lord Louis Mountbatten came to India to create the Southeast Asia Command. The air force grew. Supplies began to flow in and promises of supply were even better. So the high command whipped up a plan. Somewhere along the coastline of Burma and Malaya seaborne landings would slice across the rail and river communications which fed the Japs in northern Burma.

NO GO. But that plan got no farther than the general staff conference. Ships and landing craft meant for it were diverted from the east to drive the beachhead at Anzio. In-

stead, another all-out offensive developed.

In three sectors commanding generals received their orders. The 15th Indian Corps on the Arakan border, the right flank of the British 14th Army, would push southward, drawing upon it as many Jap divisions as it could. The British IV Corps in the central sector, 300 miles to the northeast, was directed to hang on at all costs. General Stilwell, then commanding the First Chinese Army and a group of American engineers, was told to cross the mountains from India into northern Burma and build a road to link up with the old Burma Road.

To aid Stilwell's advance, General Wingate's Chindit forces were to be flown into Burma behind the Japanese lines and there destroy supply channels and dissipate resistance. American airmen under command of Colonel Phil Cochran were to fly in the gilders and transport planes which would drop the Chindits; other air units would parachute supplies to encircled troops, evacuate casualties, and keep up a constant bombardment of Japanese positions.

THE PLAN UNFOLDS. Late in 1943 the advance began along the two ends of the Burma front. General Stilwell's forces, spearheaded by Chinese troops and the famous Marauders, started out from Ledo at the head of the railway that runs parallel to the front northeast from Calcutta. Their job was to join Calcutta, a vast base depot, with China by extending the 600 miles of railway with nearly 200 miles of brand new road stretching across the northern corner of Burma.

At the other end, separated by 700 miles of rivers, mountains, jungle and swamp, the 15th Indian Corps under Lt. Gen. Sir Philip Christison began a three-pronged drive through the coastal plain and valleys of Arakan. There was a diversionary move intended to draw Japanese attention from the northern move. The bait was tempting and the Japs bit. In the vast-

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ness of the Arakan jungle they encircled the 7th Indian Division and threatened to cut the supply link of the 5th Indian Division. With all their jungle cunning they neatly outflanked the 15th Corps.

But for such an event the Allies had planned well; the Japs had not. From bases in India big, lumbering Dakotas took off to drop ammunition, food, medical supplies. Thus sustained, the isolated troops were enabled to fight on indefinitely. The Japs, on the other hand, had no means of aerial supply. As they circled, looking for cracks in the Allied fort, their ten days rations of rice and fish balls ran out. Reduced to starvation diet, they fought on fanatically. Then in February the 25th Indian Division, rushing in to the relief of the 7th, trapped large formations and cut them to pieces.

LEDO ROAD. In the north, Chinese and American forces were working miracles. Across an old refugee trail leading over a 5000-foot range called Patkal Bum and down into the Hukawng Valley, they moved cautiously forward, killing Japs wherever they met them. Behind them trailed a 30-foot wide double-tracked highway, carved out of malarial wilderness, by bulldozers and high explosives. The road grew mile by mile and for every mile there was a battle.

On 5 March 1944 American glider pilots dropped General Wingate's Chindits into a clearing behind the Japanese lines. They were joined later by other Chindits (officially the 3rd Indian Division, a mixed force of British, Gurkha, and West African troops) who came on foot. On 16 March the Japs launched their greatest counterattack. It was the offensive they boasted of as the "march on Delhi." It ended in a march to death. Their 18th Division was virtually annihilated at the hands of General Stilwell's Chinese troops and General Wingate's Chindits.

THROUGH CENTER. The Japs had tried end runs and failed. They now

decided to smash through center. So to the central front manned by the IV Corps, the front of the mile-wide Chindwin River, the Chin and Naga Hills, Imphal, Kohima, and the Tiddim and Manipur roads, they moved three fresh divisions.

The Japs were smart. Across the Chindwin, behind the hills, lay the Bengal-Assam railway running north-east to Ledo and the airstrips which were sending supplies to China over the Himalayan Hump. Once through the jungle and over the border into India, they intended to smash hard, and with one blow demolish both an operative and a potential source of supply to China. They almost succeeded.

Encircling the IV Corps at Imphal, they crossed into India, reached Kohima, and battled forward to within 30 miles of the all-important railway. But, thanks largely to continued air support, the central front held. The Japs pulled out. When they did, the 33rd Indian Corps moved after them, starting the offensive which today has carried them 300 miles into Burma and through a crescendo of killing that waged throughout the bitterest of the October monsoon storms.

LINK-UP. Meanwhile in north Burma Chinese and American forces moved steadily on, and on 3 August, after a 78-day siege, took Myitkyina, the key Japanese rail supply base. For all practical purposes Myitkyina was the end of the Ledo Road, for southward from it is a railway, a road, and the Irrawaddy river, the finest natural line of communications of them all. When Chinese forces took Bhamo, then converged from the east and west to capture Wanting and Namhkam, the last Japanese resistance in north Burma ceased. Convoys waiting at Myitkyina are now free to pass over onto the Burma Road and to reopen the lifeline to China.

In tomorrow's history books the building of the Ledo Road will occupy as much text as the story of the men

who fought in its advance. A stupendous job of engineering, almost at the outset it had to be lifted over a 3000-foot mountain pass. Farther along it had to be pushed through virgin jungle where no road had ever passed before. More than 700 bridges, built of massive jungle hardwood trees, were thrown up between Ledo and Mogaung. For manpower there were some 9000 U.S. Engineers, a regiment of Chinese engineers, and a minimum of 10,000 native laborers recruited from tea plantations. It was built under the worst difficulties of weather. During the monsoon seasons (May and October) more than an inch of rain fell every day and streams rose as much as 15 inches in two hours. These rains, although they continually washed away traffic, were not an entirely bad thing. In the absence of full terrain surveys, Engineers watched the heavy rains and charted the next day's route by the way the water ran.

FRONTLINE NOW. For three years the battle of Burma was fought over thousands of square miles of mountains and jungles, with the Japs and Allies often more than 100 miles behind one another's forward positions. Correspondents were right when they called it the biggest guerrilla war of all time.

In mid-December, however, Burma got its first clearly-defined frontline. The British 36th Division, storming their way to the southwest down the Myitkyina-Mandalay railway corridor, joined the 14th Army troops thrusting east across the Upper Chindwin river. Meeting point was Katha, important village situated along the upper waters of the Irrawaddy river. The frontline, first established with this junction and since expanded, now runs from Ledo south to Myitkyina through Bhamo, east to the Chinese border, and west through the central plain to India.

HAPPY NEW YEAR. By January 1945 the Allies in Burma could look back on a year which had brought

them their greatest land victory in Asia. More than 30,000 of Burma's 200,000 square miles—a land area as large as Ireland and comprising more than 1000 inhabited localities—had been reclaimed. For a loss of 10,000 men, they had killed 50,000 Japs. And aggressive action from British and American flyers, once and for all, had wiped the enemy's Burmese air force from the skies.

With north Burma cleared of the enemy, the Allies now are directing their attention southward, to the big cities of Mandalay and Rangoon. From the west are three British columns, one striking down the Irrawaddy, a second down the Mandalay railway, and a third from across the Chindwin river. To the east, thrusting south from Bhamo, are the new American Mars Task Force (recruited from the remnants of the famous Marauders and volunteers from the other crack U.S. outfits) and their Chinese comrades. And in the Arakan sector, where the Allies once suffered their biggest defeat, British and Indian forces have seized the prize port of Akyab.

So far this year Japanese movements have been marked by a willing tendency to retreat. But Allied leaders in Burma are cautious about predicting any wholesale enemy withdrawal. Instead, they explain, the enemy may be trying to suck our forces southward where his supply lines will be shorter and ours dangerously long. Dwindling though his Burma garrisons may be, he may still use them as he has used his besieged garrisons in the Pacific—first in hopes of successful counterattack, then in a delaying action to gain time to build up reserves elsewhere.

The question of Japanese motives may soon be answered. Mandalay is drawing nearer every day. And once Mandalay is in Allied possession, the next objective probably will be Rangoon, 386 miles to the south (MAP-TALK, 23 December). The Japs will make a stand at Mandalay or at Rangoon, or perhaps at both—or not at all.

ARMY TALK For Total Victory We All Fight on the Same Front

Note to I. & E. Officer: Among the points particularly desirable to stress in this week's discussion on the Home Front are: 1. Our people at home are winning the production war against Germany and Japan; 2. The enemy unceasingly aims to create antagonism between our soldiers and our civilians; 3. In to-day's total war, there can be no real line drawn between "home" front and "fighting" front. Unless your group numbers more than about 75, it is urgently recommended that you create a discussion and thus avoid a lecture. Above all, don't read this material to your unit.

WE HAVE ACTION on many fronts to follow these days, with new operations opening up continually. We are winning battles consistently in this total, global war—winning in so many places that we get dizzy from unfamiliar geography. To-day let's see how we stand on a front where we're also winning, where the geography is familiar, but where all of us are likely to lose sight of how the battle is going. We call it the "home front."

There are lots of other things we call it, too. When we hear about the wildcat transportation strike in Philadelphia, or the strike in the coal fields, or the gasoline black market, we burn up. We figure they are letting us down. We damn selfish chiselers, and usually we are angry enough so that we damn the entire "home front" along with the chiselers.

Let's take a look at how the "home front" has been doing in its share of the war. But first, what do we mean by home front? (Suggestion: Ask one or two individuals what relatives they have on the home front, and what kind of work those relatives are in.

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Try to get ten such relatives or close friends designated, preferably with a variety of occupations.)

Our Own People

Twelve million of us are now in uniform, including all services, and for every one of us there are ten of our people in civilian clothes. Each one of us knows his own people well; the "home front" is made up of those people of ours.

Included are four million men whom their Selective Service boards turned down; there's another million ex-servicemen, many of whom are still doing their part by working in war factories. There's a smaller group of highly trained specialists who cannot be spared from production of vital war commodities like synthetic rubber. Last summer, for example, the Army furnished former tire workers to help meet the critical shortage existing in heavy duty and bus tires.

Facing the task of producing the material needed for victory, these people of ours are America's "120-million Home Front."

When Pearl Harbor hit us, we were short of planes, guns, ships, tanks—

short on the equipment necessary to wage a big-league war against enemies that for years had produced for war. (Question: How many of you went on maneuvers that were conducted with dummy guns and tanks?) Our job was training to fight, the home front's job was production of our fighting tools; until it had produced them, we were powerless to take the offensive.

Those of us in uniform were up against veteran armies of Germany and Japan, and only through blood, sweat, and a bitter toll did we learn to out-fight the enemy. Our home front also faced a challenge from the "total war" preparations by the enemy's home population.

Axis home lands had long been regimented for war. As the war progressed, enemy industrial power was swelled by materials and factories seized from their neighbors and by the importation of conquered peoples as slave labor. This became our American home front's battle; to outproduce in quantity and quality the totalitarian systems of the enemy.

During 1940, our last full year of peace, 37 million people were employed. America's industries were geared for peace. We faced a test of whether our people in a democracy could match the war output of dictator countries through their own efforts, without being whipped into line the way the Axis millions had been.

The Challenge Met

To-day 44 million Americans are at work combating the Axis home fronts, and this increase in our civilian production workers has been accomplished despite the withdrawal of 12 million men and women into the armed ser-

vices. Since Pearl Harbor we have built 15 billion dollars of new war industries, in addition to converting our peace industries to war. (Question: Where did these workers come from? Seven million of them came from the ranks of 1940's eight million unemployed. Where did the other millions come from?)

It has been a tremendous effort, and it too has cost in toll, sweat and casualties. We took into industry old men who postponed retirement or came out of retirement to join the fight. Women left the comfort and security of their homes to become welders, riveters, clerks. Children too young for the armed forces pitched in where they could. Many of these people were going to their first jobs. Many had no financial need to work; they took work so they could back us up. (Question: Have our people accomplished their mission of surpassing enemy production?)

We can be proud of the results America is showing. Our production front has not only caught up with the Axis; right now our people alone are giving us more weapons than the combined output of Germany and Japan. Together with Britain and Russia as United Nations, we outproduced the Axis 2 to 1 in 1942, 3 to 1 in 1943, and in 1944 we pushed our output to an overwhelming four to one edge over the Axis.

This giant production program is not being realized without difficulties. The most sensational of these are strikes. (Question: What is the most recent strike you've heard about? How did you know about it?) It should be noted that nobody has tried to cover

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them up. We read about them in our news sheets and hear about them over the radio. Our people on the production front hear about strikes, too, and some of them get just as angry as we do. It isn't a question of whether the strikers have a just cause or not. Our anger results from our natural fear that any strikes may prolong the war. What is the actual effect strikes have had upon our production?

Tenth of 1%

From shortly after Pearl Harbor until 1 July 1944 (the most recent of available statistics) we had 9,285 strikes or work stoppages. They cost about 23 million man-days of labor. It is obvious that our war effort would be even greater if perfect harmony had prevailed and these stoppages had not occurred.

(Question: How big are 23 million man-days in the whole picture?)

On the other hand, so prodigious and faithful have been the efforts of the great majority of our people that the loss represents less than one-tenth of one percent of the total labor time

available. This bears out the statement by the Secretary of Labor to Congress that the no strike no lockout pledge of labor and management has been "kept at a rate of 99 percent."

(Question: What are labor-management committees?)

Not only has most of organized American labor and management kept faith with their work pledge, but they have even gone further and formed labor-management committees with the sole purpose of increasing war production by cooperative action.

Ideas that improve the efficiency of one plant are forwarded to Washington for distribution to other plants. One worker cut a four-hour job to 15 minutes by the invention of a special wrench, and the entire industry benefited. More than a million such suggestions have been turned in to labor-management committees.

The Black Market?

Our Home Front is being rationed on food, gasoline and some clothing. A determined attempt is being made to keep the whole price structure under

BIGGER JOB FOR A BIGGER WAR

Our farmers are producing 45 percent more food than farmers produced in World War I. Last year, farm production was 26 percent higher than before the war, and this was accomplished with over a million fewer workers.

The armed services in the European Theater of Operations have already received 18 million ship tons of material; the AEF during the entire World War I received less than 9 million tons.

Our annual rate of merchant ship production has been forced up to 22 million tons. This nearly tripled our output during the first year of war, when we launched 8,200,000 tons of merchant shipping. It dwarfs our production during the first year of World War I when we launched 1,600,000 tons.

control and guarantee the supply of our military needs first.

Strict home economy has resulted in profiteering "black markets" with accompanying publicity. It is true that an irresponsible minority is dealing in the black market. There are always a few who refuse to play the game. Our civilians are exactly like us, and we have just about the same proportion of men who slow the Army effort by going AWOL, joining the VD ward, or just plain goldbricking. It should be remembered that the overwhelming majority of our people stand squarely behind the regulations, just as most of us in uniform do. Most of the complaints of our people about the pinch of rationing are like the "griping" we do just to blow off steam.

Bonds Finance the War

In 1942 and '43 we spent a total of 165 billion dollars on our war program; last year we spent another 90 billions. This averages about three-fifths of our entire national income. (Question: Do you think our people have failed to back us up in regard to buying and keeping war bonds?)

Every one of the six war bond drives has been oversubscribed. In these drives alone, 106 billion dollars in bonds were bought, as compared with a total goal of \$1 billion. Figures on total bond sales are confusing because there are so many different kinds of them. However, just as with production, results like those of the bond drives speak for themselves.

As for cashing in bonds, some people have done it for one reason or another. But up to last month, more than 90 percent of the "baby" war savings bonds (34 billions) which our people

have bought were still being held. In addition, all the tens of billions in large-denomination bonds of the types bought by banks and corporations are being held. Such bonds are not redeemable until their maturity date.

Everybody Getting Rich?

Our home front is also carrying a greatly increased tax burden. Before the war, the only nation-wide payroll deduction from a worker's salary was one percent for social security; by the end of last year the average payroll deduction was not only the one percent but also included deductions for income tax and bonds.

(Question: Do you think our people on the production front are a lot better off financially because of war jobs?)

High-living, champagne-drinking workers grab headlines and feature comic strips. By contrast, a Department of Labor study asserts: "the burdens of the war have been borne by nearly all factory workers in the form either of a reduced scale of living or of harder work without material improvement in current living."

There can be no stinting of costs in fighting our enemies. Ours is not a limited-objective war that will leave the enemy with strength to renew the struggle in a few years. Therefore we cannot limit ourselves to a million-dollar war or a billion-dollar war; we must fight an all-out war and produce whatever is necessary to defeat the Axis completely and in the shortest time.

(Question: What other things would you consider of special credit to our people on the home front?)

Many Volunteer Workers

Nearly four and one-half million Americans have given eight million pints of their blood to help save the lives of fighting men. The Surgeon General of the U.S. Army declares: "Blood plasma has saved thousands of lives and is regarded by the Medical department as the foremost life saver of the war."

Eleven million men and women are performing volunteer work in their free time. Through organizations such as the Red Cross, USO and Welfare Leagues, our folks try to make our tough job easier.

Volunteer air raid systems were stoutly maintained as long as they seemed necessary. Old and young and physically handicapped people took over home defense with promptness and efficiency.

Although our Home Front has never directly been subject to the enemy's armed might, we have industrial war dead and injured just as we have military casualty lists. Casualty figures for the Army and Navy reveal that from Pearl Harbor to July 13, 1944, 59,000 men have been killed, 108,000 injured and 100,000 are prisoners of war or missing. In industry, 102,000 have been killed, and 350,000 permanently disabled from Dec. 7, 1941, to April 15, 1944.

Bigger Results Needed

There can be no ceiling on our production as long as we need the materials of war. To-day we still have shortages of 320 vital categories such as trucks, small bombs, radar, heavy artillery, ammunition, and we put the

job of making up those shortages on the shoulders of our production people.

General Somervell, ASF, summed up the Home Front's present task when he stated: "If we are going to keep down the cost in American life, then the cost in labor and effort for everyone back here must continue to rise until it strikes its high point at midnight on the day before the enemy's collapse."

The rate, quantity, and character of production will continue to be determined by the requirements of the fighting fronts. In 1945 some plants which have produced surpluses may be expected to convert to the manufacture of other war goods or return to the production of necessary civilian goods. But for the great majority 1945 will see a tremendous step-up. Already the year's prospectus has been revised to meet existing or contemplated needs. Proposed arms output has been readjusted sharply in view of shortages that recently developed on the Western Front. Production of Superforts, cargo transports, and jet-propelled fighters will cost \$925,000,000 a month instead of the original estimate, \$367,000,000; one Boeing plant has been ordered to increase B-29 output from 35 a month to 200 a month by July. As the United Nations move into what everybody hopes will be the last victorious round, overall production will increase anywhere from 20 to 50 per cent. over that for 1944. We count on our people back home to meet this increase, despite the loss of another million and a half workers to the armed forces.

Germany and Japan realize they cannot match the tremendous output of America and have acknowledged as

much to their people. They have held up the American home effort as an example to their own populations. A German newspaper told its readers this summer: "The German Front more than hitherto must develop all its energies and make the greatest possible efforts to overcome the enemy's material superiority."

(Question: Do you think the Germans and the Japanese want us to feel that our people are backing us up?)

At the same time, the Axis has directed its propaganda machines toward driving a wedge between us and our home people supporting us. Enemy propaganda tries to make us mistrust our home people, and stories of strikes and black markets are exploited as being representative of the

entire home front. It is clever propaganda because we all get angry at anything which might delay necessary supplies from reaching us.

Naturally, our enemy seeks to delay his inevitable defeat by trying to create a split between the fighting American and the producing American. Actually, in this war more than any previous one, there can be no honest distinction between "Home" front and any other front. We're all on the same front. As the President said on July 29, 1943:

"The longer this war goes on the clearer it becomes that no one can draw a blue pencil down the middle of the page and call one side the 'fighting front' and the other side the 'home front'—for the two of them are inexorably tied together."

FRUITS OF LABOR

Here's an example of what the production front has contributed to victory:

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY: From 1 January 1944 to 1 January 1945 plane factories turned out 96,369 planes of all types, representing an increase of 11,423 over the number produced in 1943 and bringing the total number since 1 July 1940 to 253,256. America is now producing war planes at a rate five times greater than Germany, at least eight times greater than Japan.

AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: Since the war began the auto factories have produced 4,700,000 guns; 2,150,000 military vehicles; 3,100,000 power plants for PT boats, landing craft, fighters, bombers, and superbombers.

STEEL INDUSTRY: Total for 1944 was 89,400,000 tons of ingots and castings, some 600,000 tons more than in 1943, and more than ever produced in any previous year in the industry's history.

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: Total value of goods produced in 1944 was \$8,300,000, two and a quarter times more than the value of chemical goods produced in 1939. The industry considers its most outstanding achievement the increase in penicillin—from nine billion units a month in December 1943 to the current rate of 200 billion units a month.

RAILWAY INDUSTRY: Total freight carriage for 1944 was 740 billion ton-miles, an all-time record for American railroads.



- Q. Where is the headquarters for the 21st Bomber Command?
- A. Guam. It was recently transferred from Saipan.
- Q. How many Japanese outfits were decimated on Leyte?
- A. Five, plus the major elements of two more. Destroyed were the 1st, 16th, 26th, and 102nd Divisions and the 68th Brigade and the major elements of the 8th and 30th divisions. The Japanese 35th Army also included many collateral units, likewise wiped out.
- Q. Who is the older, Mr. Churchill or President Roosevelt?
- A. Churchill, who celebrated his 70th birthday on 20 November. Roosevelt will be 63 on 30 January.
- Q. A pact of alliance was signed on 11 December between what two Allied countries?
- A. France and Russia.
- Q. Name the speaker: (1) "By no means do we consider ourselves a master race"; (2) "Nuts."; (3) "In the Pacific we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare."
- A. (1) Josef Goebbels, in announcing that "with regret," the Germans had abandoned plans for a New Order in Europe as being "no longer practicable;" (2) Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McCaulliffe, in replying to a German ultimatum that his forces surrender at Bastogne; (3) President Roosevelt in his speech on the State of the Nation.
- Q. Who is Britain's ambassador to Greece: General Scobie? Harold MacMillan? or Rex Leeper?
- A. Rex Leeper.
- Q. President Roosevelt's personal envoy recently returned to Washington after a tour of the Far East. Who is he?
- A. Donald M. Nelson.
- Q. Will the British Pacific Fleet operate under the direction of Admiral Nimitz or General MacArthur?
- A. It will operate under the direction of either, as the strategic situation might demand.
- Q. What do the following share in common? Ta Kung Pao, Izvestia, Mainichi Shimbun?
- A. They are all influential newspapers in their respective countries—Ta Kung Pao, China; Izvestia, USSR; Mainichi Shimbun, Japan.
- Q. War Minister Forde has disclosed that Australia needs 50,000 men and women to complete its manpower quota. How does this figure compare with American manpower requirements?
- A. According to Under-Secretary of War Patterson, U.S. services will need 900,000 more men, and industry 700,000 more workers during the first six months of 1945.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 6

Folder Title : 98-USF1-27: Hq/USAFFE - Trajectory
Diagram - 90mm, M1, M1A1, M2 and M3 Guns
(Chart A) (22 Sep 1944)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



This folder includes Oversize items
(maps, overlays, charts, etc).
It takes several frames to cover each
item in its entirety.

(NDL)

98-USF1-27

Trajectory Diagram - 90MM, M1, M1A1, M2 and M3 Guns

Hq, USAFFE

22 Sept 1944

1604
6


1604

6

TRAJECTORY DIAGRAM FOR GUNS, 90 MM, M1, M1A1, M2 AND M3


SHELL H.E., M 71
FUZE P.D. M 48


- CHART A
MUZZLE VELOCITY = 2700 F/S



M1A1, M2 AND M3

TD 90-F-1





RANGE IN YARDS AT LEVEL OF GUN

CHART A: THIS CHART IS FOR RANGES OBTAINED WITH
ANGLES OF ELEVATION LESS
THAN 800 MILS

HORIZONTAL SCALE $\frac{1}{25000}$

ALTITUDE SCALE $\frac{1}{1500}$


22 SEPTEMBER 1944

A.P.G.

M.S.E.E. 41

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This trajectory diagram for 90-mm. guns is used to obtain firing data.
2. The diagram is constructed with map range plotted along the horizontal axis. Note that since the vertical scale is magnified, the shape of the projectile.
3. To use this diagram, proceed as follows:
 - a. Ascertain the map or level range to the target from a map or ground survey.
 - b. Ascertain the height of the target above or below gun from a map or ground survey.
 - c. Pick out the trajectory curve that passes through the target.
 - d. The range of this trajectory curve will give the uncorrected range.
4. A check of this diagram against the ground firing tables, using the same data, however, will in most cases be of such small magnitude that they can be neglected.



INSTRUCTIONS

1. This trajectory diagram for 90-mm. guns is used to obtain firing range for targets below or above gun.
2. The diagram is constructed with map range plotted along the horizontal axis, and with height above or below gun plotted along the vertical axis. Note that since the vertical scale is magnified, the shape of the curves does not indicate the shape of the actual trajectory of the projectile.
3. To use this diagram, proceed as follows:
 - a. Ascertain the map or level range to the target from a map or photo.
 - b. Ascertain the height of the target above or below gun from a contoured map, photo, or by estimation.
 - c. Pick out the trajectory curve that passes through the target as determined above, interpolating where necessary.
 - d. The range of this trajectory curve will give the uncorrected range to place the center of impact on the target.
4. A check of this diagram against the ground firing tables, using the mil range relation, will show slight deviations. These deviations, however, will in most cases be of such small magnitude that they can be ignored.

AA-339

Misc Intelligence Items
No 11

TRAJECTORY DIAGRAM
for
GUN, 90-mm., M1, M1A1, M2, and M3

TD 90-F-1

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 15 June 1945

TD 90-F-1, Trajectory Diagram for Gun, 90-mm., M1, M1A1, M2, and M3, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

This diagram is also supplemental to FT 90-C-3 and FT 90-AA-B-3.

[AG 003 (16 Jun 45)]

By ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

AGF (10); ASF (2); Arm & Sv Bd (1); S Div ASF (1);
Dept (10); Tech Sv (2); SvC (10); PC&S except Air Bases
(1); PE (Ord O) (5); Dist O 9 (5); Dist Br O 9 (3); Reg O 9
(3); Establishments 9 (5); Decentralized Sub-O 9 (3); Gen
& Sp Sv Sch (10); USMA (2); A (10); CHQ (10); D (2);
T/O & E 44-15 (2); 44-17 (3); 44-115 (2); 44-117 (3).

Refer to FM 21-6 for explanation of distribution formula.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

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World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 7

Folder Title : 98-USF1-28: (3345) Hq/USAFFE - Report -
Activities - Provost Marshal in the Far East
(23 May 1944)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-28

(3345)

Report - Activities-Provost Marshal in the Far East

Hq. USAFFE

23 May 1944

1604

17

Hqs. USAFEC - GPM
APO 501 a/o P.M.
San Francisco, Calif.
23 May 1944

Col. James V. Walsh, CMP
PMGO
Washington, D. C.

Am sending this as an official communication as that is what it really is. I will try to send you a functional chart later if I can obtain one. As yet I am not sure that I understand the thing myself. The C.G. of this Area, or Theater, has G.H.Q. which seems to be really an operations base. Then he has USAFFE which is under a Deputy Chief of Staff (Stiners). The Chief Provost Marshal, to whose office I am attached, has his office in USAFFE. The same C.G. commands both GHQ and USAFFE. Under USAFFE is USASOS. GHQ has no PM but lets each allied force and our own tank forces handle their own PM problems largely.

The PW of USASOS is directly under the GPM of USAFFE. Under USASOS are numerous bases here on the mainland and in the islands to the north. A new base is started each time a new task force advances far enough so an SOS installation is set up there. This you can readily see makes for constant calls on the limited number of Military Police in the Theater.

Sincerely,

/s/ Leslie L. Connett
Col., O.N.P.

RESTRICTED

26 JUN 1944
3345

1 8614

Hqrs USAFFE - GPM
APO 501 c/o PM, San Francisco
26 May 1944

Memo to Col. J. V. Walsh C.M.P.
Washington, D. C.

RESTRICTED

1. Many of my reports may be in this form. Yesterday WAAOS replaced Australian girl stenographers in the office of the Chief Provost Marshal, USAFFE. One could take shorthand. Today she is on K.P. per duty roster. Tomorrow is Saturday and I am leaving Monday on a three weeks tour "to the North", so I can't wait to get this, and other reports I want to send in before I leave, typed.
2. I shall put in more time here than you planned and less in my next stop as the next stop is shortly to be absorbed by this one, and therefore will not be important. I cannot yet tell what my total time consumption will be.
3. I am meeting many old acquaintances and have talked to every one up as high as Lt. Gen. Sutherland. He had Military Police experience in the south of France at the close of the last war and is conscious of their value. He differs from those who want to put on special white equipment etc. Military Police here are dressed exactly as other soldiers except for the leather belt with shoulder strap and the arm band. He considers that sufficient. There are very few MP's standing around any headquarters here. The Chief of Staff does not believe in it, and says he hasn't enough MP's to go in for that sort of foolishness.
4. There have been cases here where whole battalions of MP's were put to unloading ships. The necessity existed. I add that the MP's unloaded twice as many pounds per day as any other organization.
5. I am having a study prepared showing all 303 MP's here by groups as to age, education, I.Q., height, weight etc. I think you will find it interesting.
6. I am informed that the name of the P.M.C. School should be changed to MP School as we do not, even in the advanced course, teach enough of the duties of the P.M. to justify the name. The P.M., USAOS is writing a complete report on his problems and duties and will illustrate it with copies of all his forms, records, routine reports and similar data. If we can get the same from other theaters we may have something. It will be what I visualized in January 1942 when I asked that reports be obtained from all bases and theaters. A cross section of a number of such reports should make possible an intelligent and efficient revision of the manual on "Military Police Records and Forms".
7. In USAOS accident deaths have exceeded battle deaths. Many such accidents have been caused by traffic. A young officer who is in charge of traffic control in one base section is putting on a special campaign. I inclose four of his posters, being used in all motor pools and other pertinent places. He uses walkie talkies for speed trap operation. That decreases the number of his friends but he is cutting motor accidents. I have asked him to write his campaign very fully. I think it may form the

RESTRICTED

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basis for an excellent MP Bulletin article.

8. When you start receiving reports that I am having written do not be surprised if you think them verbose for I am asking for them to be VERY full. My idea is that we can always boil down to the sugar if we get enough sap, but we can't get sugar by adding water to a little bit of sap. In other words there are problems here that no one can visualize or imagine sitting in a chair in Washington or Fort Ouster.

9. I have inspected one air field MP setup here. They have one company doing the work of 2 1/2 to 3 companies here with part of that one company at an advanced base clear up in New Guinea. Only one officer here. If your butter was spread that thin you would lose ten pounds in the next thirty days. You might pass that on to Trimble. I will furnish more on that later.

10. Pilferage is a greater problem here than I expected. The loss for a time was about 20%, same as Africa. It has been cut by efficient action of Colonel Purdy, CPM of USAFFE but is still heavy. The descendants of convicts have not forgotten their ancestry and Australian courts do not deal out severe penalties. If you can get a conviction for theft of goods to the value of say 100 pounds the fine may be 75 pounds leaving a net profit of 25 pounds to the pilferer. I am not being facetious. Also a conviction is hard to get.

11. Lt. Col. Holland, P.M. of USASOS, suggests that we make a training film covering MP duties in controlling traffic to and from ships in port and also covering the art of searching a ship after it is unloaded, in order to determine what has been left secreted on the ship. I have arranged for a young officer in charge of some docks here to write a report on this which may give you more idea of what this means. I will also go into it more at forward bases when I see how conditions are there.

12. Colonel Purdy, CPM of USAFFE, is preparing a complete report of his office here which I am sure intelligent study will find of value.

13. Dogs could certainly be used here to advantage, particularly on air bases such as I inspected today. No effort has been made to use them and there is no personnel in sight to start the idea. In order to start it two things would be necessary:

a. A demonstration unit of men and dogs to sell the idea.

b. Personnel to start a school for men and dogs. (There are lots of dogs here.)

If the Film Bulletins that I wanted to make on dogs had ever been made they might have fulfilled a., above.

14. There is no use for our CM grenader here. One can not gas rioters in Australia. We may need some in Manila someday though.

15. I would like samples of both web and leather MP club carriers sent over here as soon as possible. They will do much to improve

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

appearance and help efficiency. RESTRICTED

16. This question has been asked. - "Why does T/O & A 19-55 not contain a photographer to handle the photographic equipment?" Can you give me an answer.

17. I recently inspected a stockade here where U.S. Army prisoners awaiting trial are held. It was practically empty for the following reasons:

a. Decrease in number of troops here as the battle front moves away.

b. The provost marshal keeps very close check on causes of delay in trials, confirmation of sentence and other administrative delays.

c. It is not popular as it consists of a man proof fence in which are tents with wooden floors, one very thin mattress and two blankets per man, without bed, or pillow, lights, or chairs and with a floor cut into four sections so it is easily lifted for inspection as to what might be concealed there under. In one corner of the stockade are individual rooms, with solid wooden walls, heavy rabbit proof wire roofs, covered with canvas, for those requiring "special accommodations". The only lighted tent is the recreation tent. It contains some camp type mess tables and a library of excellent books. No novels, detective stories or trashy magazines. No radios, pin-up girls or other decorative items. Three meals per day and an adequate amount of work.

18. There is a rehabilitation center here which is highly thought of. I have not yet had time to see it. What do you think of an article for the Bulletin on it if it is a good one?

19. Negro soldiers have been the cause of considerable trouble in certain places. In areas where there are nurses, they and other females, must go out only in pairs or larger groups and efforts are being made to secure small revolvers for female officers. You might be able to help on this by finding a source of supply. Caliber 25 or 32 preferred, with ammunition.

/s/ Leslie L. Gennett
Col., G.M.P.

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- 3 -

COPY

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PROVOST MARSHAL

A.P.O. 501
27 May 1944

SUBJECT: Prisoner of War Information.

TO : Colonel James B. Walsh, GMP, Chief Military Police Division
PMGO, Washington, D.C.

1. The office of the Chief Provost Marshal USAFFE is greatly interested in the limited amount of information I was able to bring in regard to Prisoners of War.

2. They would like copies of such other mimeographed or printed information on this subject as may be available from the office of the PMGO and from other theatres.

3. In a few weeks I will send you complete copies of all instructions and pamphlets on this subject which are now being used here, and of others that are in process of publication.

4. At present Prisoners of War captured in this theatre are turned over to the Australian government as they have been largely captured on Australian or British territory. It is anticipated that as the advance continues territory will be captured which does not belong to the Australian or British and the American will establish their own Prisoner of War enclosures.

5. If you can arrange to send to the Office of the Chief Provost Marshal, above address, one of the earliest available copies of our training film on handling of Prisoners of War I am sure that it will be appreciated. I believe it could be sent by air express if proper representation were made to the distributing agency.

6. It is believed that as the American forces come in contact with the newer and less trained Japanese forces the number of surrenders will tend to increase and a much larger number of prisoners will have to be handled. This office desires to be ready for such a contingency.

/s/ Leslie L. Connett
LESLIE L. CONNETT
Colonel, GMP

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RESTRICTED HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PROVOST MARSHAL

A.P.O. 501
27 May 1944

SUBJECT: Criminal Investigation.

TO: Colonel James B. Walsh, GMP, Chief Military Police Division
PMGO, Washington, D. C.

1. At the present time the criminal investigation activities in this theatre are considerable handicapped by the lack of the complete technical laboratory for this purpose. As the theatre expands this condition will become more acute. At present use of the territorial criminal investigation laboratory which cooperates to the best of its ability but the Chief Provost Marshal desires to establish his own, if adequate equipment can be obtained on the mainland. There is no officer who is thoroughly familiar with the latest equipment needed and available for the establishment of such a laboratory. It is believed that the theatre may send an officer to Washington to investigate this matter, but it is believed advisable that the Provost Section of the PMGO look into the matter and forward such information as it can.

2. I have agreed with them as to the advisability of sending their representative to Washington but we are not sure yet as to the reaction of GHQ to the idea.

/s/ Leslie L. Connett

LESLIE L. CONNETT
Colonel, GMP

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PROVOST MARSHAL

RESTRICTED

A.P.O. 501
27 May 1944

SUBJECT: Use of Radio by Military Police

TO : Colonel James B. Walsh, GMP, Chief Military Police Division
FMCO, Washington, D. C.

1. Headquarters Third Base Command USA303 is located in a large Australian city and has a heavy problem of town patrolling. They are using six sedans equipped with two way radios and 5 1/2 ton 4x4 trucks equipped with one way radio, all of which are tuned to the city police station radion where the Military Police have an officer and small headquarters staff located.

2. The opinion of the Military Police officers concerned is that the use of these radios has greatly enhanced efficiency and has enabled them to adequately perform the mission which would have been impossible with the limited number of Military Police available, without the use of radio.

3. This memorandum is forwarded for your consideration in such studies of your office and the Board as you may deem advisable.

/s/s Leslie L. Connett

LESLIE L. CONNETT
Colonel, GMP

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

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World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 8

Folder Title : 98-USF1-DT-5: USAFFE - Unit History -
PCAU (No. 1 - 9) - Civil Affairs Detachment
(Nov 1944)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-DT-5

Unit History - PCAU #1-9 - Civil Affairs Detachment

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Nov 1944

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98-USFI-DT-5

Unit History - PCAU #1-9 - Civil Affairs Detachment

USAFPE

Nov 1944

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RECEIVED
NOV 17 1944
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

File
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HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFTE

314.7
014.1 X 322
APO 503
17 November 1944

SUBJECT: Unit History, P.C.A. Units 1 to 8, inclusive.
TO : Commanding Officers, P.C.A. Units 1 to 8, APO 442.

1. Transmitted herewith unit history of your organization, together with copies of the schedule of training conducted by this detachment.
2. It will be necessary that organizational records be maintained, and the unit history submitted as required in AR 345-105.

By order of Lt Col SNYDER:

1-Incl
Unit History, PCAU's 1 to 8.

E. H. Baker
E. H. BAKER,
1st Lt, AUS,
Adjutant

SECRET

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFTE

APO 503
17 November 1944

314.7
014.1 X 322

SUBJECT: Unit History, PCAU's 1 to 8, inclusive.
TO : Commanding Officer, Civil Affairs Detachment, APO 503.

1. Philippine Civil Affairs Units 1 through 8 inclusive, were activated at Oro Bay, New Guinea, pursuant to authority contained in letter, Headquarters, USAFFE, APO 501, file 014.1, Subject: "Establishment of Civil Affairs Staging Area and Organization of Units," dated 16 September 1944.

2. Personnel for each unit consists of 10 Officers and 39 Enlisted Men. Officers were selected on the basis of civilian and military backgrounds which indicated special training and fitness for the type of work required. Enlisted men were obtained by transfer from Filipino Units stationed at Oro Bay.

3. Training was conducted under the direction and supervision of Headquarters, Civil Affairs Staging Area, APO 711, Lt Col M. A. Snyder, F.A., Commanding. Due to the urgent necessity for these eight units at an early date, they were completely trained and equipped in five days. Lecturers included members of the Headquarters staff, officers of the eight units, and guest lecturers qualified in specific fields. The speed with which these organizations were readied for their assigned missions is especially noteworthy when it is realized that plant facilities for training such specialized units were extremely limited. However, the high standards and qualifications of the officers and enlisted men contributed immeasurably to the success of the program.

4. Pursuant to authority contained in letter, Headquarters, USAFFE, file FECC 370.5, Subject: "Attachment of Units," dated 1 October 1944, and in accordance with G.O. 104, Headquarters, USAFFE, APO 501, dated 2 October 1944, Philippine Civil Affairs Units 1 to 8 inclusive, were attached to the Sixth Army effective 3 October 1944. The units embarked this base on 30 September 1944 by direction of OI - 70, GHQ, USAFFE.

Gerald A. Fleet
GERALD A. FLEET,
Captain, SNC,
Historian

SECRET

Col. Snyder

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFTE**

314.7 x 322

APD 503
17 November 1944

SUBJECT: Unit History, PCAU #9.

TO : Commanding Officer, PCAU #9, APO 442.

1. Herewith unit history, your organization, together with copies of the schedule of training conducted by this detachment.

2. It will be necessary that organizational records be maintained and the unit history submitted as required in AR 345-105.

For the Commanding Officer:

**E. H. BAKER,
1st Lt., AUS,
Adjutant.**

1 Incl
Unit History, PCA Unit #9.

Col. L. J. ...

SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFTE**

314.7
014.1 x 322

APD 503
17 November 1944

SUBJECT: Unit History, PCA Unit #9.

TO : Commanding Officer, Civil Affairs Detachment, APO 503.

1. The organization known as Philippine Civil Affairs Unit #9, was activated at Oro Bay, New Guinea on 28 October 1944, in accordance with G. O. #2, Headquarters, Civil Affairs Detachment, USAFTE, APO 503, same date. Authority for activation is contained in G. O. #100, Headquarters, GHQ, USAFTE, dated 28 September 1944, letter, GHQ, SWPA, file AG 014.1, Subject: "Plans and Policies for Procurement, Organization and Training of Philippine Civil Affairs Units for Musketeer III," dated 1 October 1944, and letter, GHQ, USAFTE, file FECC 322, Subject: "Mission and Procedure of the Headquarters, Civil Affairs Detachment," dated 16 October 1944.

2. Personnel consists of 10 officers and 39 enlisted men, commanded by Major Francis L. Nemeck, Cav. Officers were selected on the basis of civilian and military backgrounds which indicated special training and fitness for the type of work required. Enlisted men were obtained by transfer from Filipino units stationed at Oro Bay.

3. Training was conducted under the direction and supervision of Headquarters, Civil Affairs Detachment, during the period 21 October - 30 October 1944. The lecturers included members of the headquarters staff, officers of the unit, and guest officers qualified in specific fields. The course of instruction included all topics listed in Paragraph 4, letter, GHQ, SWPA, file AG 014.1, dated 1 October 1944. In addition, typical hypothetical problems were discussed and instruction was given in care and use of side-arms. This was followed by a period of tactical training conducted by the unit, and included road marches, motor convoys, and problems of defense.

4. The unit embarked this base on 9 November 1944, per VOCIC, Headquarters, GHQ, USAFTE.

Gerald A. Fleet
**GERALD A. FLEET,
Captain, SMC,
Historian.**

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFTE

EHB/rat

CAD-314.7

APD 503
23 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Organization photographs.

TO : Commanding Officer, PCAU #9, % Sixth Army, APO 442.

1. Inclosed herewith two (2) Signal Corps photographs of PCAU #9.
2. Request acknowledgement of receipt by indorsement hereon.

By Order of Lt. Col. SNYDER:

E.H. Baker

E.H. BAKER,
1st Lt., A.U.S.,
Adjutant.

Incls:

2 Sig C photographs of PCAU #9.

1st Indorsement:

1. Received.

Jesse Deitch
JESSE DEITCH, 1st Lt., F.A.
Adjutant



SWPA-SigC-44-14834 Oct. 31, 1944
Group shot of enlisted personnel of the
P.O.A.U. No. 9 with full field packs.
(Oro Bay, New Guinea.)

HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFPL

EHB/rat

CAD-314.7

APD 503
23 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Organization photographs.

TO : Commanding Officer, PCAU #9, % Sixth Army, APO 442.

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2. Request acknowledgement of receipt by indorsement hereon.

By Order of Lt. Col. SNYDER:

E.H. Baker
E.H. BAKER,
1st Lt., A.U.S.,
Adjutant.

Incls:
2 Sig C photographs of PCAU #9.

1st Indorsement:

1. Received.

Jesse Deitch
JESSE DEITCH, 1st Lt., F.A.
Adjutant



SWPA-SigC-44-14834 Oct. 31, 1944
Group shot of enlisted personnel of the
P.C.A.U. No. 9 with full field packs.
(Oro Bay, New Guinea.)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 9

Folder Title : 98-USF1-DT-5.6: USAFFE - General Orders
(No. 3 - 5) - Civil Affairs Detachment (Nov
1944)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



98-USF1-DT-5.6

General Orders #3-5 - Civil Affairs Detachment

USAFPE

Nov 1944

1604

9

Nov 1944

98-USFI-DT-5.6 General Orders - Civil Affairs Detachment - USAFFE
#3-5

1604

11/11 - 11/11

— 2/11

Registered Classification
Received For
Reservatory Order 10001

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFPE

APO 503
20 Nov 44

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 5)

1. PTAC in GO 100 Hq GHQ USAFFE dtd 28 Sept 44 and Ltr GHQ USAFFE
File: FECC 322 dtd 16 Oct 44 the following PCAU are activated this date:

PCAU Number Twenty-three (23)
PCAU Number Twenty-four (24)
PCAU Number Twenty-five (25)
PCAU Number Twenty-six (26)
PCAU Number Twenty-seven (27)
PCAU Number Twenty-eight (28)

2. The following named O are aptd CO of PCAU stated after their
respective names:

<u>Name, gr, and br</u>	<u>PCAU</u>
MAJOR WILLIAM P CURTIS 0323470 CAC	23
MAJOR ALBERT FISH 0504489 ORD	24
LT COL WALTER F WINTERS 0245132 CAC	25
MAJOR EDWARD L GOSS 0300915 AGD	26
LT COL HEINER HOLMSTROM 0291898 AC	27
LT COL JOSEPH M DRISCOLL 0179949 INF	28

By order of Lt Col SNIDER:

OFFICIAL:

E. H. BAKER
1st Lieut., A.U.S.
Adjutant

E. H. Baker
E. H. BAKER
1st Lieut., A.U.S.
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION "A"

3 USAFFE
3 AG Records
2 Ea O concerned

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

(1)

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFPE

APO 503
17 Nov 44

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 4)

1. PTAC in GO 100 Hq GHQ USAFFE dtd 28 Sept 44 and Ltr GHQ USAFFE
File: FECC 322 dtd 16 Oct 44 the following PCAU are activated this date:

PCAU Number Eighteen (18)
PCAU Number Nineteen (19)
PCAU Number Twenty (20)
PCAU Number Twenty-one (21)
PCAU Number Twenty-two (22)

2. The following named O are aptd CO of PCAU stated after their
respective names:

<u>Name, gr, and br</u>	<u>PCAU</u>
MAJOR ROBERT J TRIPP 0335828 FA	18
CAPTAIN THEODORE A SMITH 0285871 CAC	19
LT COL JAMES L LEADER 0444061 ORD	20
MAJOR ROY R MCKINSEY 0266594 INF	21
LT COL JOHN H MELLOAN 0145054 INF	22

By order of Lt Col SNIDER:

OFFICIAL:

E. H. BAKER
1st Lieut., A.U.S.
Adjutant

E. H. Baker
E. H. BAKER
1st Lieut., A.U.S.
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION "A"

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3 AG Records
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R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT
USAFPE

APO 503
14 Nov 44

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 3)

1. PTAC in GO 100 HQ GHQ USAFFE dtd 28 Sept 44 and Ltr GHQ USAFFE
File: FEGC 322 dtd 16 Oct 44 the following PCAU are activated this date:


PCAU Number Ten (10)
PCAU Number Eleven (11)
PCAU Number Twelve (12)
PCAU Number Thirteen (13)
PCAU Number Fourteen (14)
PCAU Number Fifteen (15)
PCAU Number Sixteen (16)
PCAU Number Seventeen (17)

2. The following named O are aptd CO of PCAU stated after their
respective names:

<u>Name, gr. and br</u>	<u>PCAU</u>
LT COL HAROLD G LACEY 0236397 CAV	10
LT COL BURL B BABER 0269536 INF	11
MAJOR JOHN HEROCKIE JR 0277251 INF	12
LT COL NEPHI C CHRISTENSON 0269791 AC	13
MAJOR RAY C SENATE 0316050 CAC	14
MAJOR PETE WILKS SCOTT 0291958 INF	15
MAJOR WILLIAM J GORDON 0271510 FA	16
MAJOR THOMAS F McNEAL 0240050 INF	17

By order of Lt Col SNYDER:

OFFICIAL:



E. H. BAKER
1st Lieut., A.U.S.
Adjutant

E. H. BAKER
1st Lieut., A.U.S.
Adjutant


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3 USAFFE

3 AG Records

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World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 10

Folder Title : 98-USF1-MPCD-1.13: Hq/USAFFE - General
Orders - Military Police Command, Visayan
Zone (1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



1604

10

1945

98-43F1-mpeD-1.13 Gen. Orders - Military Police Command - VISAYAN ZONE - 14g:USAFPE

(60)

10

5/45 - 7/45

MILITARY POLICE COMMAND VISAYAN ZONE - (General Orders) 1945

1 thru 4

Now Missing

Revised Classification
Removal for
Executive Order 10891

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
VISAYAN ZONE
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND AFWESPAC

/tlw

APO 72,
17 June 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO.....1)

Section

Announcement of Redesignation.....I
Assumption of Command.....II

I. ANNOUNCEMENT OF REDESIGNATION. General Orders No. 2, Headquarters Military Police Command AFWESPAC APO 501, 10 June 1945, redesignated the Military Police Command United States Army Forces in the Far East (MPC USAFFE) as MILITARY POLICE COMMAND UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC (MPC AFWESPAC) effective 10 June 1945. Headquarters Visayan Zone Military Police Command United States Army Forces in the Far East (MPC USAFFE) as an installation of Military Police Command United States Army Forces, Western Pacific (MPC AFWESPAC) is redesignated as HEADQUARTERS VISAYAN ZONE MILITARY POLICE COMMAND UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC (HQ VZ MPC AFWESPAC) without change of station.

II. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. Under the provisions of Army Regulations 600-20, the undersigned hereby assumes command of VISAYAN ZONE, MILITARY POLICE COMMAND, AFWESPAC.

Earl E. Major
EARL E. MAJOR
Colonel, Field Artillery

DISTRIBUTION:

CG MP Comd AFWESPAC (2)
CG 8th Army (2)
CO Base K (2)
CO Base S APO 718 (5)
Provincial Prov Mar (2) ea.
File (4)

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HEADQUARTERS
VISAYAN ZONE
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 72,
20 May 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)

NO.....5)

ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF

The following Staff for Headquarters Visayan Zone, Military Police Command, USAFFE, APO 72, is announced:

Zone Signal Officer

CAPT HAROLD A. WILLIAMS
O-365001 Sig C

By order of Colonel MAJOR:

OFFICIAL:

V. BOSTER,
Major, Cav
Adjutant

V. Boster
V. BOSTER,
Major, Cav,
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

MP Comd (2)
8th Army (2)
Base K (5)
Base S (5)
CO (1)
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201 file (1)
File (1)

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R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
VISAYAN ZONE
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 72
21 May 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO..... 4)

ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF

The following Staff for Headquarters Visayan Zone, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is announced:

S-3 Operations & Training	Lt Col JOHN N. HOWELL, 019840, SAC ✓
(Ass't S-3	Maj CLARENCE E. GUSHURST, 022988, SAC ✓
	Maj JOHN B. MORRISSEY, 0323284, SAC
	Capt JOSEPH J. FEUCHTER, 0336187, CMP ✓
S-4	Maj LLOYD F. YEATON, 0209327, QMC ✓
(Ass't) S-4	Maj GERALD C. TEUDT, 0371156, FA 0
(Motors & Transportation)	

By order of Colonel MAJOR:

OFFICIAL:

V. Boster
V. BOSTER,
Maj., Cav.
Adjutant

V. BOSTER,
Maj., Cav.
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - MP Command USAFFE
2 - 8th Army
6 - Base K
6 - Base S

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
VISAYAN ZONE
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 72,
21 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO.....3)

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, the undersigned hereby assumes command of VISAYAN ZONE, MILITARY POLICE COMMAND, USAFFE, APO 72.

Earl E. Major
EARL E. MAJOR
Col., FA.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - MP Command USAFFE
2 - 8th Army
2 - Base K
2 - Base S

R E S T R I C T E D

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
VISAYAN ZONE
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APC 72
3 May 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)
: NO.....2)

ANNOUNCEMENT OF STAFF

The following Staff for Headquarters Visayan Zone, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is announced:

Deputy Zone Provost Marshal	Lt Col FRED M. FUECKER
	0154055 CMP
Operations and Training	Lt Col JOHN J. JAKLE
	020270 Inf
Adjutant	Maj VERN BOSTER
	0383496 Cav

By order of Colonel MUELLER:

V. BOSTER,
Maj., Cav.
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

V. Boster
V. BOSTER,
Maj., Cav,
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - MP Command
2 - 8th Army
3 - Philippine Army
6 - Base K
6 - Base S
10 - Provincial M.P. Commanders
10 - Provincial Governors

RESTRICTED

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HEADQUARTERS
VISAYAN ZONE
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APC 72
3 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
: NO.....1)

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Under the provisions of AR 600-20, the undersigned hereby assumes command of VISAYAN ZONE, MILITARY POLICE COMMAND, USAFFE, APC 72.

John V. Mueller
JOHN V. MUELLER,
Col., CMP

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - MP Command
2 - Base K
2 - 8th Army
2 - Base S
3 - Philippine Army
10 - Provincial M.P. Commanders
10 - Provincial Governors

1st Lt. ... 215A
42d Inf Regt ...
Naval Operating Base ...
Nov, 30, 1945 ...

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
ADMINISTRATION

Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG 407)

World War II Operations Reports
1940-1948

Pacific Theater

Box : 1604

Folder : 11

Folder Title : 98-USF1-MPCD-1.13: Hq/USAFFE - General
Orders - Military Police Command (1945)

Cataloged by The National Diet Library



1604

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11 (end)
1604
Hy MP Command USAFFE

General Orders 1945

1-28

Missing: # 1-9, 12-15, 24-27

DECLASSIFIED
FOR RELEASE, Sept. 27, 1988
BY SP-10 [signature] 1-28-88

98-45F1-MPCD-1.13 Gen. Orders - Military Police Command

Hy. USAFFE

1945

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

.....
: SECRET :
: AUTH: CG MPC :
: INIT: WNC :
: DATE: 2 June 1945 :
:.....

APO 501,
2 June 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 28)

PRISONER OF WAR INSTALLATION

1. Announcement is made of the establishment of a Prisoner of War Camp at Tres Cruces, Cavite, P. I. to be known as:

Tres Cruces Prisoner of War Camp, APO 501

2. The Tres Cruces Prisoner of War Camp will operate directly under this headquarters.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.C.D.,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
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SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 501,
20 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 23)

HEADQUARTERS PANGASINAN PROVINCE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment - Effective 20 May 1945, Headquarters, Pangasinan Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, and will function under Luzon Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.

2. Composition - Headquarters, Pangasinan Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:

- a. Headquarters Pangasinan Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE
- b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
- c. Philippine Army units.

3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.

4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.

5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.C.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 501,
20 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 22)

HEADQUARTERS LAGUNA PROVINCE MPC USAFFE 1

1. Establishment - Effective 20 May 1945, Headquarters, Laguna Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Santa Cruz, Province of Laguna, and will function under Luzon Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.

2. Composition - Headquarters, Laguna Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:

- a. Headquarters Laguna Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE.
- b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
- c. Philippine Army units.

3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.

4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.

5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 501,
20 May 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 21)

HEADQUARTERS NUEVA ECIIJA PROVINCE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment - Effective 20 May 1945, Headquarters, Nueva Ecija Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Cabanatuan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and will function under Luzon Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.

2. Composition - Headquarters, Nueva Ecija Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:

- a. Headquarters Nueva Ecija Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE.
- b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
- c. Philippine Army units.

3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.

4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.

5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 501,
20 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 20)

HEADQUARTERS BATANGAS PROVINCE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment - Effective 20 May 1945, Headquarters, Batangas Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Batangas, Province of Batangas, and will function under Luzon Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.
2. Composition - Headquarters, Batangas Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:
 - a. Headquarters Batangas Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE.
 - b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
 - c. Philippine Army units.
3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.
4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.
5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 501,
20 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 19)

HEADQUARTERS CAVITE PROVINCE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment - Effective 20 May 1945, Headquarters, Cavite Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Cavite, Province of Cavite, and will function under Luzon Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.
2. Composition - Headquarters, Cavite Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:
 - a. Headquarters Cavite Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE.
 - b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
 - c. Philippine Army units.
3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.
4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.
5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO.....18)

APO 501,
20 May 1945.

HEADQUARTERS LEYTE PROVINCE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment. Effective 20 May 1945, Headquarters, Leyte Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Tacloban, Province of Leyte, and will function under Visayan Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.
2. Composition. Headquarters, Leyte Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:
 - a. Headquarters Leyte Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE.
 - b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
 - c. Philippine Army units.
3. Personnel. Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.
4. Equipment. As authorized by this headquarters.
5. Reports. Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO.....17)

APO 501,
20 May 1945.

PROVOST MARSHAL TACLOBAN

1. Establishment - Effective 20 May 1945, the Office of the Provost Marshal Tacloban, an installation of this command functioning directly under this headquarters, is established at Tacloban, Leyte Province.
2. Composition - The Office of Provost Marshal Tacloban will consist of:
 - a. Provost Marshal and Chief of Police Tacloban.
 - b. Attached Units U. S. Army.
 - c. Metropolitan Police Force.
 - d. Philippine Army Units, assigned or attached.
3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel to Office Provost Marshal Tacloban will be by subsequent letters and orders.
4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.
5. Reports - Morning reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

AFO 501,
12 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 16)

HEADQUARTERS TARLAC PROVINCE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment - Effective 15 May 1945, Headquarters, Tarlac Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, and will function under Luzon Zone Headquarters, MPC, USAFFE.

2. Composition - Headquarters, Tarlac Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:

- a. Headquarters Tarlac Province, Military Police Command, USAFFE.
- b. United States Army units, assigned or attached.
- c. Attached Philippine Army units, and personnel.

3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.


4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.

5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 27th Machine Record (Mobile), AFO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By command of Major General LESTER:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:


CHAS. T. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO.....11)

AFC 501,
1 May 1945.

PROVOST MARSHAL MANILA

1. Establishment. The verbal orders Commanding General, Military Police Command, USAFFE, 15 March 1945, establishing the Office of Provost Marshal Manila, an installation of this command functioning directly under this headquarters, are confirmed.

2. Composition. The Office of Provost Marshal Manila will consist of:

- a. Provost Marshal and Chief of Police Manila.
- b. Attached Units U. S. Army.
- c. Metropolitan Police Force.
- d. Philippine Army Units, assigned or attached.

3. Personnel. Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel to Office Provost Marshal Manila will be by subsequent letters and orders.

4. Equipment. As authorized by this headquarters.

5. Reports. Morning reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, AFC 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV AR 345-400 and Section II AR 345-900 respectively.

By order of Colonel PURDY:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Chas W. Clegg
CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY POLICE COMMAND USAFFE

APO 501,
1 May 1945.

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO 10)


HEADQUARTERS LUZON ZONE MPC USAFFE

1. Establishment - Effective this date Headquarters, Luzon Zone Military Police Command, USAFFE, is established with station at San Miguel, Province of Tarlac, and will function directly under this headquarters.
2. Composition - Headquarters, Luzon Zone Military Police Command, USAFFE, will consist of:
 - a. Headquarters Luzon Zone, Military Police Command, USAFFE
 - b. United States Army units, assigned and attached.
 - c. Philippine Army units.
3. Personnel - Allotment of grades and assignment of personnel will be by subsequent letters and orders.
4. Equipment - As authorized by this headquarters.
5. Reports - Morning Reports and initial rosters will, upon assignment of personnel, be prepared and submitted to 1st Machine Records Unit, APO 501, and this headquarters in accordance with Section IV, AR 345-400 and Section II, AR 345-900 respectively.

By order of Colonel PURDY:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:


CHAS. W. CLEGG,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

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