Feeling
Photography
Contents

Acknowledgments / vii
Introduction / 1
ELSPETH H. BROWN AND THY PHU

PART I. Touchy-Feely

1 Photography between Desire and Grief: Roland Barthes and F. Holland Day / 29
SHAWN MICHELLE SMITH

2 Making Sexuality Sensible: Tammy Rae Carland’s and Catherine Opie’s Queer Aesthetic Forms / 47
DANA SEITLER

3 Sepia Mutiny: Colonial Photography and Its Others in India / 71
CHRISTOPHER PINNEY

4 Skin, Flesh, and the Affective Wrinkles of Civil Rights Photography / 93
ELIZABETH ABEL

PART II. Intimacy and Sentiment

5 Looking Pleasant, Feeling White: The Social Politics of the Photographic Smile / 127
TANYA SHEEHAN
PART III. Affective Archives

9 Trauma in the Archive / 239
DIANA TAYLOR

10 School Photos and Their Afterlives / 252
MARIANNE HIRSCH AND LEO SPIZTER

11 Photographing Objects as Queer Archival Practice / 273
ANN CVETKOVIČ

12 Topographies of Feeling: On Catherine Opie’s American Football Landscapes / 297
LISA CARTWRIGHT

13 The Feeling of Photography, the Feeling of Kinship / 325
DAVID L. ENG

Epilogue / 349
THY PHU AND ELSPETH H. BROWN

Bibliography / 357
Contributors / 385
Index / 389
When we first began this project, we were not exactly sure how we felt about feeling photography, only that the questions we were framing were worth asking. We explored these questions over the course of lunches and dinners in spirited conversations with members of the Toronto Photography Seminar, who patiently guided us through the emotional spectrum from puzzlement to excitement, and who helped us realize that feeling was a powerful analytic for thinking about photography. Our deepest thanks go to our dear friends and colleagues, members of this research collective, who have been such an inspiring force behind this project: Sarah Bassnett, Marta Braun, Matthew Brower, Deepali Dewan, Sophie Hackett, Laura Levin, Sarah Parsons, Sharon Sliwinski, Linda Steer, Dot Tuer, Kelly Wood, and Carol Zemel. We’re especially grateful to Sarah Parsons, whose graciousness and generosity nourished us through theoretical impasses, rhetorical fisticuffs, and conceptual breakthroughs. Many thanks as well to research assistants David Sworn, Jonathan Fardy, Shyama Talukdar, and especially Daniel Guadagnolo for their tireless work in research and manuscript preparation.

We’d like to acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada, the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at Western University, and the Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of Toronto for their extensive research support. We’re also grateful to Ken Wissoker and Jade Brooks for their guidance and encouragement. Our anonymous readers at Duke made brilliant, clairvoyant suggestions that have helped make this project become itself more fully: many thanks for your care, attention, and collegiality.

Finally, we thank our families—Art, Asa, and Michael—you know who you are, what you mean to us, and, of course, how we feel about you.
Chapter 4 is reprinted from *Qui Parle* with permission from the University of Nebraska Press. Elizabeth Abel, “Skin, Flesh, and the Affective Wrinkles of Civil Rights Photography,” *Qui Parle* 20.2 (2012): 35–69.


Jacob Riis, *Street Arabs* in “Sleeping Quarters,” 1890.
Image courtesy of Library of Congress.
Introduction

ELSPETH H. BROWN AND THY PHU

My phenomenology agreed to compromise with a power, affect; affect was what I didn’t want to reduce; being irreducible, it was thereby what I wanted, what I ought to reduce the Photograph to; but could I retain an affective intentionality, a view of the object that was immediately steeped in desire, repulsion, nostalgia, euphoria?

ROLAND BARTHES, Camera Lucida

Since its publication in 1979 and English translation in 1981, Camera Lucida has become one of the most widely cited works on photography. Writing after Barthes, many photo critics have grappled with the implications of a phenomenology, ontology, and ideology of photography—while skirts in sometimes telling ways the “affective intentionality” that, for Barthes, lies at the heart of photography. But as this epigraph shows, Barthes keenly grasped the complexities of feeling photography. When it comes to photography, Barthes confessed, “I have determined to be guided by the consciousness of my feelings.” As Shawn Michelle Smith notes in chapter 1 of this volume, Barthes “felt photography.” He did so, however, in ways that were so subtle that it has taken a long time to recognize fully the nuances of his insight, captured in this elegant passage, on the links between feeling and photography.

That we feel photography can hardly be doubted. Photography excites a spectrum of feelings: faced with a violent image, you may respond with both horror and pity. The portrait you carry in your wallet may be of your beloved, whom you cherish. The photograph on your desk reminds you of one you’ve lost and may always mourn. Yet despite the myriad ways of feeling
photography, surprisingly little has been said, beyond acknowledging that this is the case, about the affinity between feeling and photography so poignantly noted by Barthes. What might it mean to feel photography? Feeling Photography takes up this important question.

Doing so requires understanding why photo criticism has largely been, with a few notable exceptions that we acknowledge below, reluctant to account for feeling when it comes to photography. (By contrast, affect theory has been influenced by photography in intriguing ways that we briefly outline later.) Although Camera Lucida reveals how profoundly we feel photography, at around the same time that this book was published another influential line of inquiry established a different approach. Insisting upon the necessity of “thinking” photography, critics established the dominance of a rubric of thinking—largely by disavowing feeling.

Most notably, Victor Burgin challenged photography theorists nearly three decades ago to break from a previous generation of art historians, who relied on “personal thoughts and feelings” to explain photographic meaning. Though Burgin does not elaborate on why feelings are unsettling, the brevity of his dismissal is telling in the context of late twentieth-century photography criticism. Far from enabling the materialist analysis that Thinking Photography sought to provoke, feelings seemed to cloud the critic’s thoughts, making him vulnerable to the ideology of the (art) market. Framed thus, this initial provocation to think photography can also be seen as an implicit rejection of feeling photography: emotions were unthinking, problematic interlopers in the materialist project of “thinking” photography “in relation to society as a whole,” rather than simply the art salesroom. Instead of serving as an analytic approach for understanding photography, feeling (on the few occasions that it explicitly surfaces in photo theory) has instead been perceived as a hindrance to this critical task. Although Burgin, following Louis Althusser, was interested in photography’s role as representation, shaping ideologies that act on men and women “by a process that escapes them,” feeling appeared to play no role in the viewer’s construction of photographic meaning—despite Burgin’s explicit efforts to rescue the role of the viewer in charting a future course for photography theory. Feeling was an epistemological problem for the late twentieth-century criticism that saw the photograph as fundamentally a “material product of a material apparatus” whose history can be understood only in reference to the specific institutional frameworks in which the image is produced and circulated. Writing in the wake of the English translation of Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida in 1981, materialist photo critics such as John Tagg, who tell-
ingly considered “real effects” more important than affect in the construction of meaning in photography, sought to distance the emerging work of neo-Marxist and structuralist photo criticism from the unexpected re-introduction of feeling as an ontological requisite for photography in Barthes’s last work.

Yet Barthes’s insights on feeling were not lost upon the astute critics committed to the thinking approach. Curiously, in the same year that Thinking Photography was published, Burgin wrote a compelling review of Camera Lucida, which demonstrated his awareness of the book’s engagement with feeling. The “significance for theory” of Barthes’s book, Burgin observes, “is the emphasis . . . placed on the active participation of the viewer in producing the meaning/affect of the photograph.”6 Although he acknowledged the relationship between affect and meaning, Burgin and others committed to the thinking approach nevertheless continued to explore the discursive production of meaning instead of feeling.7 As Tagg’s emphasis on “real effects” suggests, the task of thinking cast suspicion on feeling. For a new vein of scholarship still in its infancy, 1970s and 1980s photographic criticism needed to police its fragile boundaries rigorously. Feeling became the collateral damage in the disciplinary war against the often depoliticized incorporation of photographic images into the art historical and museological canon.8 Moreover, the task of thinking produced what could be described as a “straight” photo criticism, which, while shrewd in its materialist and historicist politics, had, in marginalizing feeling, effectively marginalized photography’s shadow subjects, most notably, women, racialized minorities, and queer sexualities.

Yet by drawing attention to some of the limitations of the thinking approach, we do not mean to dismiss the rubric altogether. After all, we owe the interdisciplinary field of photography studies to exceptional scholars such as Allan Sekula, John Tagg, and others working with materialist theoretical frameworks, who continue to produce important work today—including work that approaches feeling as an analytic.9 As Edward Welch and J. J. Long have written, the “very fact that we can now talk comfortably in terms of photography as a field of study suggests that the work of academic and intellectual legitimation to which Thinking Photography was intended to contribute has paid off.”10 Indeed, the rift between feeling and thinking is by no means rigid—at times, it was even bridged by the latter approach’s perhaps most vocal proponent, Burgin, whose own photographic practice emphasizes desire, loss, and other (Freudian) affects. Under the rubric of “thinking,” photography theory nevertheless largely overlooked both affect
and feeling and drew instead upon the critical tools of neo-Marxist histori-
cal materialism, discourse analysis, and psychoanalytic theory to establish a
still influential account of the camera as a technology of surveillance, a dis-
cursive site, and an ideological apparatus where meanings are constructed
through the circulation of photography. The expansive embrace of new criti-
cal models and historiographies that has since emerged has yet to engage
fully with the theoretical seismic shift that Patricia Ticineto Clough has
called the “affective turn.”

Given the marginalization of feminist, queer, and racialized perspec-
tives within the 1970s and 1980s “thinking” rubric, it is perhaps no sur-
prise that an alternative approach attentive to the affinity between feeling
and photography is offered by feminist critic Susan Sontag, whose land-
mark book emerged at the same time that materialist approaches to pho-
tography studies first gained traction. Sontag wrote eloquently about mel-
ancholia, among other feelings, in On Photography (a book that Barthes
significantly acknowledges as an influence), and continued to explore the
relationship between moral feeling and ethical response in her last book,
Regarding the Pain of Others. While feeling permeated Sontag’s writings
about photography, she unexpectedly shared with the thinking approach
a palpable suspicion about feeling, which for her is a problem not because
of its unimportance in the construction of photographic meaning. Rather,
in overdetermining meaning, insofar as we may feel too much, feeling is
worrisome for Sontag because it may paralyze ethical action. The signifi-
cance of the relationship between moral feeling and ethical action remains,
however, an abiding concern in photo criticism, especially among scholars
such as Ariella Azoulay, who are concerned with establishing an ethics of
spectatorship that “shed terms such as ‘empathy,’ ‘shame,’ ‘pity,’ or ‘compas-
sion’ as organizers of . . . [the civic] gaze,” and more recently Sharon Sli-
winski, who likewise contends that feeling binds spectators into an ethical
community. The rejection of these terms in analyses of atrocity images
in particular speaks not to a rejection of feeling altogether but rather to a
desire to provoke more politically useful feelings.

Just as importantly, the straightness of the thinking approach is all the
more striking when contrasted against Barthes’s decidedly queer account
of feeling photography. As Kris Cohen and Carol Mavor perceptively put it,
feeling for Barthes was intensely queer. Reading Barthes’s moving reflec-
tions on photography attuned to the sensuous dimensions of his phenome-
nology helps disclose with jarring literalism the sexually loaded charge of
the punctum, as a “prick” that arouses desire in photography, as the penetrating hole made possible by the camera, as an exquisite wound that writing cannot fully heal. To describe Camera Lucida as a coming-out narrative would be a vulgar simplification of the coy tone that the book adopts (even though at one point in the English translation this is precisely the phrase that is used). But the text’s perverse story about photography’s feelings broaches the subject of queerness not just through these tropes, but also by means of the affiliations it claims with marginalized subjects.

As a number of sensitive readers have noted, Barthes’s affective affinities with black and feminine figures especially (aunt, mother, slave, and Van Der Zee’s bourgeois family play particularly prominent roles17) are ways of invoking queerness. And yet they are troubling precisely because of the ahistorical nature of the analogies he implicitly draws between gender, race, and sexuality under the sign of a queer sensibility. What we are left with in these reflections on photography’s manifold feelings is a defining feature of the queer sensibility to which these feelings are ultimately fused. Barthes’s queer sensibility is remarkable, in the end, for its teasing refusal to name or picture itself, except by reference to and identification with all that gets left out in photography’s still unfolding story, at least as it is told in the versions that emerged at the time, as well as after, he was writing. As it turns out, these are the very subjects that at best only find admission in the “thinking” rubric in apologetic afterthoughts that admit to, but fail to make up for, their omission.

While we are wary of the dangers of conflating queerness with these other subject formations in the ahistorical manner that makes Camera Lucida so troubling, the book’s idiosyncratic treatment of affective intentionality opens up a space for exploring the connections between feeling and queering. Indeed, the concept of the punctum is best understood not only as a way of contrasting the subjective dimensions of an image with the objective dimensions associated with the studium, a now familiar opposition. Rather, the punctum is a powerful concept because it, in fact, introduces a theory of feeling photography. This is a theory of feeling photography that, accordingly, amounts to a queering of photography.

Inspired by Barthes’s insights, this volume sheds light on queerness and feeling in terms of both sexualities and marginal subjectivities—issues sidelined in the “straight” terms established under the rubric of thinking—as an important account of perverse modernities overlooked in the high modernism canonized by this rubric. Taking up the concerns opened up by the
exciting new developments in the fields of affect theory and photo criticism, *Feeling Photography* shifts the critical focus from thinking photography to a broad range of analytic approaches shaped by the affective turn.

**AFFECT AND FEELING**

There is no scholarly consensus concerning the meaning of affect and emotion, although a concern with subject versus object, and with physiology versus psychology, are sometimes the basis for distinguishing between the former and the latter. Much of the current psychoanalytically inflected scholarship on affect, for example, is drawn from Freud’s early work with hysteric’s, complemented by his later outlines on psychoanalysis. For Freud, “affect” is the generalized concept for all those embodied processes that, when they reach the conscious mind, can be understood on the one hand as feelings, or on the other as physiologically charged emotions. So in this analysis, “feelings” are aspects of affect to which we have direct, subjective access; in contrast, emotions signify the underlying, physiological phenomena, worked out in the body (e.g., a quickened heart rate, a giddiness in the solar plexus, a shift in facial muscles) and often expressed facially. Whereas emotions are sometimes the manifestation of affect, affect itself may remain unconscious, become displaced, or even transform into its opposite. This approach to understanding the psychoanalytic aspects of affect has been especially influential in the work concerning trauma and representation, such as the scholarship on Holocaust photography.

Some of the post-Freud work on affect has continued to emphasize the relationship between the somatic and the subjective. Brian Massumi’s work on affect, influenced by Gilles Deleuze, explores the relationship—the gap, really—between the content of an image and its effect on the viewer. Drawing from recent scientific studies on perception, Massumi argues that the event of image reception is “multi-leveled”: it is embodied both in intensity (detected through the surface level of the skin) and in qualification (detected through depth, via pulse and breathing). “Affect” emerges, for Massumi and others, as a means of signaling the complexity of the viewing “event,” where—for a time—perception resists narrative or structured mapping. In this reading, “affect” exists apart from feeling or even the “unclaimed experience” of trauma, both of which can be understood as social and cultural discourses that emerge in relationship to personal or collective history. Others, such as Sara Ahmed, have explored how emotions work to shape the surface of individual and collective bodies and then circulate between individuals in an “affective economy” of emotional currency, a pro-
ductive approach that Marlis Schweitzer takes up in her essay on modernity’s look and feel (chapter 8). Rather than produce an artificial consensus over the varied meanings of affect, emotion, and feeling, our goal is instead to showcase the range of work where scholars have analyzed these keywords in relationship to photographic meaning. While we refer to affect to denote the thriving scholarship in the field of affect studies, we ultimately emphasize feeling in this volume. In large part, this emphasis on feeling is inspired by Barthes’s own marked partiality to the term. As Shawn Michelle Smith astutely points out, Barthes’s description of the punctum aptly applies to feelings that “disturb” and “wound.” The essays collected here similarly reflect the simultaneously affective and tactile dimensions of the phenomenology of photography outlined in Camera Lucida.

Why feeling now? We have shown why feeling was a problem for the materialist criticism that developed at the very time that Barthes insisted upon photography’s “affective intentionality,” and the consciousness of feelings that it inspires. In part asking the question, why feeling now? has meant explaining, as we have done here, why not feeling then? Besides teasing out what was only implicit in previous approaches to photo criticism, we see three pressing reasons for focusing on feeling at this critical juncture. First, taking account of feeling allows us to focus on practices of viewing. A turn to affect and feeling brings a formerly marginalized attention to reception in explorations of the production of photographic meaning. In this sense, we build on rather than jettison the insights of 1980s scholarship, which has, after all, helped establish photo criticism as a lively interdisciplinary field. The affective turn is powerful because it solicits reengagement with the politics of viewing so crucial to the field of photo studies as conceptualized by these exceptional scholars, a politics that they have shown are embedded in the specific historical circumstances of the viewer’s engagement with the image.

Second, emerging in the wake of critical race theory, queer studies, postcolonial theory, and the feminist engagement with the relationship between representation and intimacy, the affective turn frees photography scholars to tie older concerns with political economy and power to marginalized analytic categories that we can no longer ignore, as much as we might wish for a world in which they no longer mattered. In attending to feeling, one of our aims is to account for marginalized subjects such as women, queer subjects, and racialized groups, who are conspicuously excluded in approaches that focus on thinking. The rubric of feeling promises to link the older photographic criticism’s attention to power and historical materialism with new
questions concerning racial formation, colonialism, postindustrial economies, gender, and queer counterpublics.

Third, though this question presupposes that feeling is a new analytic approach, it has long been central to the history and theory of photography, in both the production and viewing of images. Conversely, photography has also inspired affect theorists. Not only are a number of the contributors to this volume influential scholars in affect studies, who turn specifically to analysis of photography here for the first time, but photography has also long played an important role in affect theory. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick memorably acknowledged how a photo so moved her that she was inspired to theorize the connection between touching and feeling. Indeed, as our brief survey of Duchenne and Darwin below shows, photography’s prominence in debates about feeling is evident from the inception of this field of inquiry. Attention to feeling in the long history of photography—a history that intersects provocatively with the history of affect studies—brings new questions to topics long sidelined due to modernism’s antipathy toward emotion (nineteenth-century combination printing, à la Oscar Rejlander, is one such example).

Because feeling has been key to the production of photography itself, this volume investigates this concept as modernism’s other. A focus on feeling, in other words, represents a welcome queering of modernism’s normative tendencies. Indeed, by bringing the insights afforded by the affective turn to photography, we hope to inspire a new account of the medium’s discursive history. And while it is beyond the scope of this introduction to provide such an account in full, a brief overview of several important developments in this history—expression of emotions in photography, Pictorialism, and moral reform—demonstrates not only feeling’s profound influence in shaping these developments but also the insights afforded by this approach.

Perhaps nowhere is photography’s concern with feeling more palpable than in the scholarship on expression of emotions. In the 1850s, the collaboration between Guillaume-Benjamin Duchenne de Boulogne and Adrien Tournachon (brother of Félix Nadar) resulted in a series of images that, through the technique of electrical stimulation, captured emotional expressions despite the technological limitations of the camera at the time. Duchenne’s legacy is evident in Charles Darwin’s book *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872), which, drawing from photographs supplied from several important collaborators, most notably photographer
Oscar Rejlander, boldly argued that emotions were universal, inherited instincts and, rather than being unique to humans, were shared with animals. As one of the first scientific books to feature photographs, Expression marks a pivotal moment in the convergence of feeling and photography, in which the latter provides crucial illustration for and evidence of affect theory. Yet implicit in this work is a tendency to define emotions as the visual manifestation of physiological responses (where photographs appear to function as illustrative tools toward this end) and to consider emotions as objects for analysis rather than as an analytical approach.

Massumi’s multileveled distinction between intensity and qualification enables, however, a reconsideration of these photographs as a complex viewing event. For example, though Duchenne sought to document specific emotions for his study, and directed his electrical probes with the aim of stimulating the physiological response he associated with them, he seemed indifferent to the ethical implications of his method and unconcerned with the responses of his inmate-subjects, whose faces appear horrifically contorted. A focus on the affective dimensions of these photographs illuminates the centrality of abject subjects — most notably children, animals, the insane, and racialized others — to affect theory, as bearers of the burden of excess feeling that would otherwise be ungraspable through a framework that attends solely to feelings as object. Moreover, though Darwin’s book seems at first glance to treat emotions as an object of study, as a growing number of critics have pointed out, his combined method of “stimulation and simulation” — Carol Armstrong’s helpful phrase for describing the collaboration of science and art — in some cases produces precisely the emotions that the photographs seem merely to illustrate. As Tanya Sheehan takes up in chapter 5, an exploration of the affinity between feeling and photography reveals the importance of marginal figures in making emotions legible, as well as the camera’s role in normalizing and pathologizing select emotions.

It was photography’s problematic relationship to emotional expression, and to aesthetic feeling more generally, that rendered the photograph a mechanical document rather than a work of art, for nineteenth-century conservative commentators. By the early to mid-twentieth century, the success of Pictorialism’s advocates in rendering photography “art” through a discourse of feeling is precisely the legacy that materialist photo critics of the 1980s sought to evade by distancing photography studies from aesthetics. (A movement often associated, in Britain, with the Brotherhood of the Linked Ring and, in the United States, with the New American School, Pictorialism.
sought to elevate photography as a distinct art by emulating painting.) Three decades later, however, a brief return to Pictorialism’s primary sources suggests a rich terrain for a historical investigation of the relationship between feeling and photography; indeed, the contemporary debates are predicated on the role of feelings in the production of photographic images.

As photographers began making greater aesthetic claims for their images in the mid- to late nineteenth century, conservative critics lambasted these efforts through an argument based upon the camera’s inability to capture the operator/would-be artist’s feelings. Art, the argument developed, is “not due to knowledge, but to feeling,” as the English art critic Phillip Gilbert Hamerton summarized in 1887. To make the viewer “love the work,” Hamerton continued, “an artist must win our sympathy with his feeling.” The sentiment of a picture, concurred American art critic W. J. Stillman in the same period, resides not in the image but in the artist, whose skills “awaken in us, by some association, a certain feeling which underlies the impression made on the sense, and which we call sentiment.”

As those familiar with the history of art photography know, it was the camera’s indiscriminate recording of all detail, the seeming incapacity of the operator to select one detail over another, which rendered the photograph outside the boundaries of art. In this view, the camera’s “slavish imitation of nature” occludes the central role of the artist in making and communicating aesthetic judgments; as a result, to continue with Stillman’s polemic, “a photographic view can have neither sentiment nor expression.” The outlook was no more sanguine for the portrait. Whereas the portrait painter can catch the sitter’s flitting emotion and still retain it in memory in order to reproduce it faithfully, the camera’s inability to capture such fleeting moments in an era of wet-plate photography meant that all photographic portraits were necessarily caricatures of the sitter’s emotional life. As Hamerton argued, “photography is a purely scientific and unfeeling art”—in other words, not art at all.

If art depended on communicating the artist’s feelings, and if the method was an artful selection of materials and detail, then not surprisingly art photography’s advocates focused their defense on the photography student’s relationship to emotions. Edwin Cocking, writing in the British Journal of Photography in 1878, argued that photography students would do well to learn from the artist’s emphasis on feeling. Two years later in the same journal, W. Neilson outlined ten principles of aesthetic composition for photographers, so that they might achieve the “high aim” of all art: “to set forth what will elevate and expand our emotional being.”
It was the British photographer and author Henry Peach Robinson who most tirelessly promoted the idea that photography could be art, and it was the photographer’s relationship to feeling that made this possible. Much of Robinson’s numerous treatises on photography and art were devoted to arguing the shared emotional landscape of the painter and the art photographer, and promoting photographic work that moved away from the “mechanical” to that which privileged “personal artistic feeling.” As he wrote in a chapter on landscape expression, “the student who wants to go beyond mere mechanism must cultivate the emotions; must get closer into touch with nature; must be able to grasp the scene in his mind and feel its beauty, as well as capture it in his camera.”

The point of this brief interlude with a small subset of Pictorialism’s primary sources is not to offer a new history of the period, but instead to emphasize the centrality of a discourse of feeling to this movement in photography. Pictorialism’s reliance on painterly techniques as a means of producing aesthetic feeling became the formal and emotional “other” against which modernism in photography, also known as “straight” photography, became defined in the World War I era. Despite an extensive historiography, few scholars of the art photography movement focus on feeling in their research. Of course, research on Pictorialism has languished as a result of both modernism’s disavowal of the constructed photograph (unless part of late twentieth-century postmodernist art photography) and the 1980s critical disavowal of feeling. With Shawn Michelle Smith’s essay, and our brief effort to reclaim feeling in turn-of-the-twentieth-century art photography, we offer an alternative history of Pictorialism and of modernism in general: one that explores the perverse modernities of F. Holland Day’s work in relationship to the straight modernism eventually championed by Day’s contemporary, Alfred Stieglitz, and his protégé Paul Strand.

Our final example of how a turn to affect suggests new accounts of photographic history concerns reform photography. In particular, a revisiting of the seemingly well-traveled terrain of Jacob Riis’s work shows how a focus on affect as a circuit of feeling and response opens up new questions about the relationship between politics, viewership, and social reform in historical perspective. Riis, a Danish immigrant to New York City, began using photography as part of his urban newspaper reporting in 1887; in 1890 his first book, How the Other Half Lives, was an immediate success, placing Riis in the public eye as an expert on urban poverty and its remedies. With amateur photographers Dr. Henry G. Pißhard and Richard Hoe Lawrence, as well as with Dr. John Nagle of the city’s Bureau of Vital Statistics, Riis enacted a
series of nighttime photographic raids of saloons, tenements, police lodging houses, and opium dens; these images, reproduced in lantern slide lectures and line drawings in the late 1880s, helped tie photographic technologies to a discourse of social scientific “fact,” providing visual testimony of the squalid conditions in New York’s Lower East Side slums.35

At the same time, however, as a young crime reporter for the New York Tribune, Riis quickly discovered the centrality of feeling to narrative tension in his reporting. As he wrote in his autobiography, “the fact is that it is all a great human drama . . . grief, suffering, revenge upon somebody, loss or gain. The reporter who is behind the scenes sees the tumult of passions.”36 For Riis, there was no contradiction between feeling and the era’s demand for “facts.” A brief visit with any of Riis’s voluminous writings, including later works such as Children of the Poor (1892), or The Peril and Preservation of the Home (1903), provides ample evidence of narrative strategies designed to produce specific feelings within the implied middle-class reader. Working within an older tradition of sentimental literature that relied on discourses of “sunlight and shadow” to showcase the mysteries and miseries of modern urban life, Riis catered to both sensational and moralistic sensibilities.37 Notably, an iconic photograph included in How the Other Half Lives, titled Street Arabs in “Sleeping Quarters,” tries to capture the dejection of poverty which for him was most keenly felt on the faces of these street urchins—who in turn could effectively arouse pity, necessary to generate support for the cause of reform. What this photograph also discloses is the production of sympathetic feeling, whose facticity is belied by the barely suppressed smiles of the posed children. Humor lies alongside Riis’s picture of sorrow and misery.

Yet despite Riis’s emotion-laden narrative strategies, the secondary literature ignores the affective dimensions of his work in favor of an emphasis on the “social fact”—disregarding the thorough imbrication of these approaches for contemporary social reformers. A turn to “feeling,” however, provokes a new understanding of these texts’ historical meaning. Riis sought not necessarily the simple manifestation of feeling, but also a transformation of broad states of being among his viewers: his goal was an affective transformation in the middle class, one that would lead to improved social conditions for New York’s poor. Following Silvan Tomkins’s work on the contagious nature of some affects, where affect works in a circuit of feeling and response, we might think about Riis’s work as centrally concerned with the production and circulation of feeling designed to produce an activist viewer, one whose disgust at the “dirty stains” of immigrant life become
transformed first into pity, then indignation, and then the drive to change
social conditions. Although reform photography did not draw on Pictori-
alismand’sformalstrategiesofdifferentialfocusandpainterlyprinting tech-
niques, both photographic genres relied upon an active emotional circuit
between the viewer and the photograph; in contrast, modernism’s reliance
on form, pattern, and repetition privileged the machine over the emotional.

FEELING PHOTOGRAPHY OFFERS new insights into thematic concerns asso-
ciated with the affective turn such as intimacy, alterity, and ephemerality.
We have, accordingly, organized these contributions into three thematic
parts: “Touchy-Feely,” “Intimacy and Sentiment,” and “Affective Archives.”
These parts are structured to pick up and extend the prevailing threads of
photo criticism. “Touchy-Feely” explores the convergence of touching and
feeling, precisely because this convergence is one of photography’s unique,
defining, and most provocative features. Although the colloquial title of this
section marks a departure from the volume’s style, we invoke this pecu-
liar term deliberately, to emphasize how deeply unsettling and unbearably
messy feelings can be. We also wish to stress the strangeness—even the
queerness—of feelings that can’t always be captured or contained within
formal, scholarly categories. The second part focuses on intimacy and senti-
ment because, as we showed in our discussion of moral reform, they are key
to the development of photo history. Our contributors take up these terms
in ways that illuminate the impact of this history, and take account of recent
scholarship that theorizes the hegemonic role of intimacy and sentiment in
racializing subjects, and in suturing private feelings with the public sphere.

The final part, “Affective Archives,” simultaneously acknowledges the en-
during influence of discursive production, while offering new ways of ex-
ploring the significance of photographic archives. Rather than functioning
as a repository for the production of knowledge, one of the important ques-
tions that the essays in this part ask, each in different and compelling ways,
is, what desires animate these archives?

TOUCHY-FEELY
As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick reminds us, “a particular intimacy seems to sub-
sist between textures and emotions.” This dual meaning of feeling as the
“tactile plus emotional” is one of the many resonances we hope to mark by
titling our volume Feeling Photography. As numerous practitioners, critics,
and collectors would agree, photography is fundamentally tactile. Touch-

Introduction 13
ing photographs, whether it is the glossy surface of a developed print itself or even the protective frame that might enclose this print, is one of our most compelling engagements with the medium, particularly since this act is often accompanied by the sensation that the subjects pictured on this surface can somehow touch back.39 Not even scholars, who might be tempted to imagine themselves protected by the cloak of critical distance, can always remain unaffected by this confluence of feeling, Carol Mavor observes, for surely this distance is overcome when at last gloved hands touch their object of study.40 Given this concern, it is little wonder that, in addition to ruminating on the ontology of photography, critics concerned with the meanings of photography have also repeatedly reflected upon its phenomenology.41 Not surprisingly, the haptic register of photography — what it might mean to feel photographs and how photographs might, in turn, feel — has, alongside its optic register, long preoccupied photo critics. The chapters in this part contribute to this thread of inquiry by exploring this duality of feeling, touch, and affect. In “Photography between Desire and Grief: Roland Barthes and F. Holland Day,” Shawn Michelle Smith explores the ways that this duality unfolds within the theory of feeling in photography that Barthes introduces in Camera Lucida. Central for Barthes are desire and grief, feelings constitutive of a queer sensibility that in turn permeate the photographs of the Pictorialist F. Holland Day. Juxtaposing these works, Smith reveals how desire and grief help construct perverse modernities.

Emphasis on feeling in photography served many ends, most notably to draw an analogy between the medium and art and to attest to the truth believed to be depicted within images. And yet approaches to the haptic sometimes consider feeling solely in terms of tactility, with little direct concern for its affective connotations. Referring to some of his earliest experiments with photography, Henry Fox Talbot, for instance, introduced the evocative phrase “the pencil of nature” to describe the chemical process by which images are imprinted on paper. In so doing, he underscored the medium’s materiality, its ability to record the referent’s trace, a concept that would later be theorized, following the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, as the index. A theme taken up by generations of critics, indexicality is an influential way of conceptualizing the tactile sense of feeling in photography. Besides this concern with drawing parallels between art and photography, indexicality, as a basis for an irrefutable (though increasingly disputed) connection between the referent and the represented image — so that the former touches the latter — confirms photography’s evidential efficacy.
this regard, some of the central claims of documentary photography and photojournalism toward the irrevocable reality of their works also hinge upon the haptic qualities of feeling.

Even when the materiality of the referent was uncertain and the authenticity of the image dubious, as was the case with the spirit photographs prolifically produced and widely collected in the nineteenth century, this concern with the haptic persisted. The concept of “ectoplasm,” Marina Warner explains, refers to the immaterial realm of spirits that were believed to be “materialized phenomena from the world beyond the senses.”^43 Photographs were the medium for translating or making visible, indeed material, that which would otherwise be invisible. The record of ectoplasmic presence offered by spirit photographs can be understood paradoxically as simultaneously a counter to, and extension of, the realism of other types of photographs—and it does so by drawing upon the very source of claims to an authentic reality, a material index.

Besides imprinting what might not actually be there, the photograph is believed to be a record of what had been present. In their function as memorials of loved ones, remembered, found, and yet irrevocably lost, such photographs bring together ontology and phenomenology. It is also here that we can most clearly discern the affective qualities of feeling, in addition to the haptic qualities underscored through these other approaches. The exchange of these memorials, Geoffrey Batchen points out, takes place within an intimate community in a process remarkable because remembrance of the beloved’s touch is at stake.^44 Even more remarkably, perhaps, this sense of feeling—the material trace of the beloved’s body imprinted on the image—is often retraced creatively and obsessively.

The emphasis on the perverse evident in Day’s Pictorialism counters the high formalism that would subsequently dominate twentieth-century modernist photography, which would disavow both senses of feeling. Notably, the abstract expressionist approach to modernity aspires to an optics by attempting to reject photography’s haptics, its feelings. As Carol Armstrong notes, the work of Edward Weston marks a turn away from the tactile and a sublimation (rather than fervent stimulation) of desire. Whatever is felt in this modernist sensibility is instead displaced onto the female body of his contemporary, the photographer Tina Modotti, so that this female body becomes the material ground for a countermodernism, an insistent as well as resistant “haptics that contravenes” the optics of high modernism.^45 The turn to touch—the tactile—returns feeling in both these senses to the de-
materialized intellectualism of abstract expressionist photography, in a move that risks, Armstrong acknowledges, essentializing the feeling female body as the basis of sexual difference in photography.

While this opposition between a feeling haptics and a detached optics offers a powerful way of explaining the masculine intellectualism of, on the one hand, twentieth-century modernism, and an affectively feminine and/or queer countermodernism on the other hand, many decades later, toward the end of the twentieth century, these divisions seem no longer so stark when it comes to shaping sexuality. As Dana Seitler shows in her consideration of contemporary queer aesthetics, varied styles of representation—including abstract expressionism and even Renaissance portraiture—form the art historical touchstones for the development of what she calls a “queer sensibility.” Her essay, “Making Sexuality Sensible” (chapter 2), provides a sensual exploration of texture in the works of Catherine Opie and Tammy Rae Carland, and argues that the materiality evoked through techniques such as historical citation helps conceptualize within photography a queering of affect.

Attending to the tactile resonances of feeling in photography discloses another valence of the queer. As a challenge to Western modernity, the painted photograph offers a layering of color upon the two-dimensional surface of print to highlight tactility. Christopher Pinney’s essay, “Sepia Mutiny: Colonial Photography and Its Others in India” (chapter 3), reveals how painted photographs in India help to construct a “feeling community,” subtly resistant to the spatial and temporal constraints of a Western modernity.

How effectively can touch unsettle frequently durable divides? Taking up questions that Mavor’s analysis raises by focusing on select civil rights photographs widely circulated within the United States, Elizabeth Abel considers how the surface of photography might alternately evoke the skin and flesh of the subjects that they depict. In “Skin, Flesh, and the Affective Wrinkles of Civil Rights Photography” (chapter 4), Abel reconsiders the affective idealism ascribed to this set of images, revealing that, despite the rhetorical power that this idealism evokes for the civil rights movement, the entanglements evoked within the photographs themselves are far more equivocal than commonly assumed.

As the basis for the intertwining of these two senses, tactility and affect, feeling, then, is more than an index of the referent. While the language of indexicality might occasionally echo in the chapters included in this section, the concept itself often turns out to be inextricable from the emotions
that the haptic might elicit. The essays included within the “Touchy-Feely” section offer powerful ways of exploring the materiality of photographs, the subjectivities constituted through a formal attention to textures, the sexualities that might be shaped through an insistence upon base textures, and the empathetic possibilities afforded through the frequently communal ritual of feeling photography.

INTIMACY AND SENTIMENT
The second part of this volume, “Intimacy and Sentiment,” is structured to acknowledge the concepts’ profound influence in shaping approaches to moral reform, a development in the history of photography that, as noted earlier, is important in rethinking the affinity between photography and history. The politicization of feeling perhaps finds most eloquent expression in nineteenth-century American sentimental literature, a genre to which Jacob Riis himself contributed in publications such as Out of Mulberry Street (1898) and Nisby’s Christmas (1893). Derived from eighteenth-century theories of sentiment, these widely circulated and wildly popular American novels were unrestrained in representing spectacles of feeling—replete with stereotypes such as the suffering of innocents, the redemption of sinners, and an overflow of tears—and unabashed in their hopes for, in turn, soliciting feeling among their readers as a necessary first step toward action. Yet while few doubt sentimentalism’s influence on nineteenth-century politics, what remains uncertain is the effectiveness of this approach to politics, which was equivocal and even paradoxical. As Lauren Berlant puts it, sentimental discourse “denigrates the political” at the same time that it “claims superiority to it.” Though the features of sentimental discourse are arguably most legible in the novel, as Laura Wexler and Linda Williams have shown, they are not just evident in literary but also in visual forms. Sentimentalism’s primary concerns with the political efficacy of feeling likewise energized photographers.

Though linked with sentiment, the concept of “intimacy” itself offers a metaphorical fulcrum for the affective turn in bridging older approaches with new ones. Most notably, Ann Laura Stoler reveals the role of intimacy in naturalizing colonial relations. Drawing not from the Foucault of Discipline and Punish, but from Foucault’s later lectures on race, Stoler joins a large community of scholars working in colonial and postcolonial studies who see intimacy as a productive analytic category for tracing how the organization of the domestic and the state together shaped racialized colonial cultures that were at once intensely local and worldly. Though often ex-
cluded from the domestic spheres, these marginalized subjects are nevertheless indispensable in shaping these spheres while continuing to haunt them.

Three essays in this section explore the racialization of affect. In “Looking Pleasant, Feeling White: The Social Politics of the Photographic Smile” (chapter 5), Tanya Sheehan explores the production of feeling, demonstrating through her analysis of commercial portraits produced in the late nineteenth century by the Gallup studio in Poughkeepsie, New York, which depict black subjects’ toothy smiles, that this work provides a pedagogy of white normative emotional expression.

Whereas Sheehan considers the ways that the black body bears the burden of excess feeling, Lily Cho examines the significance of the lack of affect, a requirement for the representation of the Chinese Canadian body in the early twentieth century. Her essay, “Anticipating Citizenship: Chinese Head Tax Photographs” (chapter 6), argues that the photographs, which were taken well before conventions of passport portraiture were confirmed, in fact constitute a proleptic form of resistance, anticipating and thereby symbolically challenging the state-sanctioned detachment of emotion from citizenship. Kimberly Juanita Brown’s essay is also concerned with the relationship between intimacy, affect, and empire. In her reading of Kevin Carter’s Pulitzer Prize–winning photograph of a starving Sudanese girl shadowed by a waiting vulture, Brown emphasizes the role of intimacy and space in producing the affective displacements of more recent colonial relations, one that unfolds in a space that is often all too public.

As these essays reveal, sentimental discourse’s claim to power constituted, in effect, a bridging of private spaces (the intimate preserve of the home where women were traditionally confined) and public spaces (the conventional site of politics). Marlis Schweitzer likewise explores the role of intimacy and sentiment in soliciting feeling, not for the purposes of politics, but rather for the creation of modern celebrity. In her analysis of Ira L. Hill’s photographs of early twentieth-century performer Irene Castle (chapter 8), Schweitzer shows how the widespread circulation of Castle’s images encouraged audiences to associate her with the affective qualities of female modernity.

The essays within this section provide a fuller picture of the ways that sentiment and intimacy are produced by photography, not merely captured by the camera as a strand of expression studies would have it. These essays rather demonstrate the uneven ways that feeling—whether its apparent lack or manifest excess—are attributed to the faces of marginal subjects,
as masks that mark their profound abjection, and as shields to challenge their subjection.

**AFFECTIVE ARCHIVES**

For photo historians working with the insights of Michel Foucault, the archive is a site of knowledge production rather than of knowledge retrieval, in which photography serves a disciplinary function and photographic meanings are discursively constructed through their institutional circulation.\(^5\) Although this approach to the archive is, as we have shown, insistently scientific and self-consciously “objective,” it remains important because it offers a revelatory analysis of power, helping, for example, to explain how normative bodies are shaped through the construction of criminalized others. Though this structuralist analysis of power has been critically enabling, it has generally been less instructive, however, in providing a full account of alterity.\(^51\) While Foucauldian scholars have tended to be unconcerned with the affective qualities of the archive (recent work by Ann Laura Stoler is an exception), current scholarship has explored the relationship between archives, alterity, and affect.\(^52\)

Perhaps the most illuminating contrast to the seemingly dispassionate Foucauldian account of the archive is offered by Jacques Derrida, who, in *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, underscores its affective—its feverish—qualities.\(^53\) The term “fever,” which Derrida uses interchangeably with desire, denotes the archive’s central paradox, as at once the site where knowledge is gathered and legitimated and yet where it is also destroyed. Whereas discursive approaches to the archive have focused on presence and memory, by contrast, affective approaches attend to the nuances of absence and forgetting, precisely those qualities that would appear to scatter irrevocably beyond the archive, but which *Archive Fever* insists is constitutive of it.

Diana Taylor and Ann Cvetkovich, two contributors to this section, have elsewhere provided influential theories of the relationship between these two seemingly irreconcilable concepts, the archive (a fixed repository) and the ephemeral (that which cannot, by definition, be fixed), which is perhaps most vulnerable to forgetting.\(^54\) In “Trauma in the Archive” (chapter 9), Taylor reconsiders the challenge to official histories by focusing on performances staged within the archive itself, specifically memorial enactments at a site of atrocity tourism at Villa Grimaldi, a former torture and extermination camp on the outskirts of Santiago de Chile. Marianne Hirsh and Leo Spitzer also consider the ways that personal feelings may powerfully rework institutional framings of history. In “School Photos and Their Afterlives”
(chapter 10), they explore the works of Christian Boltanski and Marcelo Brodsky, both of whom draw upon the conventions of school photographs, particularly their uniformity and seeming affectlessness, in order to challenge pedagogies of national citizenship.

Working from a slightly different theoretical approach, Ann Cvetkovich expands the concept of the archive so that it can take account of feelings. In her essay for this section, “Photographing Objects as Queer Archival Practice” (chapter 11), Cvetkovich turns to a consideration of photography as an archive of queer feeling. In some ways, the chapter can be seen as a collaborative effort, for in addition to considering the works of Zoe Leonard’s engagement with photography as an archiving practice, she focuses on the work of Tammy Rae Carland, whose recent project, Archive of Feelings, was directly inspired by Cvetkovich’s book. Cvetkovich queers the archive in this piece by examining these artists’ documentation of ephemeral, idiosyncratic objects of queer collections of embedded feelings.

Lisa Cartwright’s essay on Catherine Opie’s American football series offers a perverse account of the queer that refuses to dwell on the queer subcultural lives so often associated with Opie’s work (chapter 12). Cartwright sees Opie’s football portraits and landscapes as “American topographies of public feeling” that constitute an affective archive marked by a bland aesthetic, one that signifies the loss of a capacity for irony.

David Eng draws on the concepts of the repertoire and postmemory to consider how affect is transmitted. His essay in this volume, “The Feeling of Photography, the Feeling of Kinship” (chapter 13), explores how historical traumas of grief, loss, and forgetting are passed from one generation to another, represented and reworked through Rea Tajiri’s “documentary of affect.” The essays in this section provide ways of locating feeling within the archive, either by decentering and thus challenging the institutional power that would banish feeling, or by looking elsewhere to seemingly banal sites where feeling and desires repressed within the archive may find vivid and surprising expression.

This volume offers a snapshot of contemporary inquiries regarding the relationship between the photographic image and affect, emotion, and feeling. We hope each of the essays are read with a sense of the thematic coherence that the sections seek to establish, as well as with the understanding that this coherence may be impossible to achieve. That these essays are not easily or neatly contained within these sections, that they sometimes attach in uneven ways to particular photographers, is further sign of the perverse
nature of feelings, which, as one of our readers rightly reminds us, are after all messy.

Taken together, the essays collected in this volume trace a long-standing but largely overlooked concern with the significance of feeling for photography studies, by focusing on the function of photography in representing its visual signs through the expression of emotions, and on the real affects engendered through engagements with photography. A focus on feeling allows photo scholars a rich theoretical terrain to reimagine the complex relationship between images, power, and subjects. A turn to feeling in photography studies also enables new insights on the history of photography, the criticism that has attended this history, as well as the construction of photographic meaning. Photography provides a productive interface—as site where haptic and optic coincide and where a confluence of feelings, not to mention fields of inquiry, collide—for investigating the implications of the convergence of sensation and perception. The volume is by no means the last word on what is an emerging, intensely rich intellectual, political, and ethical scholarly terrain. Our hope is that *Feeling Photography* will spark a wider discussion about the affective dimensions of photographic meaning, not to mention on the visual dimensions of affect theory, providing us with new analytics for thinking—and feeling—photography.

**NOTES**

3. A richer appreciation of the implications of this insight is evident in work that has recently begun to unpack the book’s manifold influences, especially *Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), the collection of essays edited by Geoffrey Batchen.
7. Burgin, “Re-reading *Camera Lucida*.”
8. This aversion to feeling, with its materialist methodological allegiances, can, according to Susie Linfield, be traced even earlier to the scholarly skepticism associated with Weimar-era writers on photography, most notably Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer. See Susie Linfield, *The Cruel Radiance: Photography and Political Violence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).


18. With regard to physiology, see, for example, Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). The work that has emerged within trauma studies has most rigorously approached affect from this perspective. Perhaps the most influential criticism that takes account of photography is Marianne Hirsch, *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).


23. As Edward Welch and J. J. Long have written, the “very fact that we can now talk comfortably in terms of photography as a field of study suggests that the work of academic and intellectual legitimation to which Thinking Photography was intended to contribute has paid off.” Welch and Long, “Introduction,” 1. See also Sekula, Photography against the Grain. For scholarship committed to materialist analyses of photography, see also Krauss, “Photography’s Discursive Spaces”; and Bolton, The Contest of Meaning.


26. It is significant in this regard that the subjects of Duchenne’s work were patients at the infamous Salpêtrière hospital, an insane asylum and site of Charcot’s later study of hysteria.


41. See, for example, Hubert Damisch, “Notes for a Phenomenology of the Photographic Image,” in Trachtenberg, ed., Classic Essays on Photography, 287–290.


46. Though the American sentimental novel was most prominent in the nineteenth century, critics have persuasively shown its influence during the republican period and in captivity narratives. See Julia Stern, The Plight of Feeling: Sympathy and Dis-


54. In The Archive and the Repertoire, Diana Taylor conceptualizes the “repertoire”—fleeting live performances of grief and other emotions, which are only too susceptible to loss and forgettingness—as performed in tension with the archive. This distinction reveals the limitations of histories that are constructed solely through reference to institutional forms of knowledge. See Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). In An Archive of Feelings, Ann Cvetkovich argues that an “archive of feelings” helps to depathologize negative affects and to provide “an exploration of cultural texts as repositories of feelings and emotions . . . [including] the many forms of love, rage, intimacy, grief, shame, and more that are part of the vibrancy of queer cultures” (7).