May 26, 1982

THE U.N. AND DISARMAMENT:
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION

INTRODUCTION

From June 7 to July 9, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly will convene in New York for a Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-II). The successor to the First Special Session on Disarmament held in 1978, largely at the initiative of the so-called non-aligned majority in the General Assembly, SSOD-II will find the U.S. and its allies facing a paradox. On the one hand, it will afford the Reagan Administration an opportunity to explain before the community of nations its approach to arms control, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) proposals that are expected to be fully articulated before the Session begins. Conversely, SSOD-II also will provide another chance for Third World countries to "internationalize" nuclear reduction efforts and for some Soviet-inspired "peace groups" to further their attempts at harassing and discrediting the U.S and the West.

SSOD-II, like the U.N. itself, is drawing organizations and individuals to New York like a magnet. Massive demonstrations are being planned to coincide with the Session with the predictable veteran radical groups churning out their usual anti-military diatribes.

It is ironic that the non-aligned bloc should be so boisterous in its demand for a worldwide hearing on disarmament. While the question of conventional arms is scheduled to be discussed at SSOD-II, attention will undoubtedly focus on the nuclear states, and primarily the West. And as serious as the threat of nuclear warfare may be, statistics, viewed in perspective, indicate that the real arms race is being run chiefly in the Third World. While developed nations increased their military expenditures by about 3.1 percent over 1978, to a total of about $402.7 billion during 1979, the developing countries increased their military
spending in the same period to some $118.7 billion, up 8 percent from 1978.

Furthermore, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union remains the principal supplier of armaments to the developing countries. From 1977 to 1980, for instance, Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World totaled some $27.5 billion, compared to U.S. deliveries of $17.3 billion during the same period. In virtually every category of weaponry, Soviet supplies to the Third World vastly outnumber those from the West.\(^1\)

Such fundamental realities are barely recognized by the U.N. Instead, the overwhelming need to arrive at a consensus and the fear of alienating members states dilute all U.N. products to "agreements" at the "lowest common denominator" in order to be as inoffensive as possible to all concerned. The U.N., therefore, is unable inherently to deal with substantive issues on a pragmatic, non-theoretical basis.

Against this background, it is not surprising that most American officials charged with preparing for the SSOD-II do not see much of significance emerging from it. Indeed, one State Department planner said privately that "the First Session was a disappointment because expectations were high. For this one, there are much lower expectations from the outset." SSOD-II is seen largely as an exercise in rhetoric and polemics, a rehash of existing positions that at best could serve to crystallize world opinion. At worst, for the U.S., it will be an effort at "damage limitation" unless the U.S. takes the offensive and aggressively argues its history of arms control initiatives and the merits of its current proposals. Otherwise, SSOD-II will accomplish little.

Nevertheless, SSOD-II appears to be a serious matter to the U.N.'s 157 member states. Led by President Reagan, the Western delegation is tentatively scheduled to include the heads of governments from Britain, Denmark, Egypt, Israel, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and others.

U.S. preparations are being handled by two inter-agency committees drawing on representatives from the Department of State's International Organizations Bureau, Political-Military Affairs, and other branches, as well as officials from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Pentagon, White House, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency.

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THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION

The six-week SSOD-I was, in the words of one British writer, "notable for two opposite and distinct reasons: on the one hand, it did precious little to bring the major war-blocs closer together; on the other, it provided a common platform for the small and middle powers...to consolidate a programme of what is called nowadays 'detente'...."²

Vice President Walter Mondale made the principal policy speech for the U.S. He discussed measures designed to stabilize regional arms control efforts, including American assistance to countries that desired help in bolstering their verification procedures. Mondale also called for a U.N. peace-keeping force to be held in reserve for deployment as the Security Council saw fit. Finally, he announced that President Jimmy Carter would ask Congress to aid those countries with peaceful nuclear programs provided they agreed to support non-proliferation measures.³

Other American efforts at SSOD-I centered around a three-tiered approach: first, to develop support for Carter Administration arms control initiatives; second, to develop realistic new proposals consistent with American security needs; and third, to ensure that resolutions passed at SSOD-I were feasible, pragmatic and in accord with the strategic needs of the U.S.⁴

Yet, by most accounts, SSOD-I produced little of substance. Talks dragged on to the early hours, producing only a commitment to talk more. "Thus, the major success of the year's deliberations appeared to be a clear path to more deliberations," as one report put it.⁵ A delegate from Brazil most likely spoke for many others when he complained about the pressure to come up with even a modicum of compromise. "In spite of the year and a half of preparations, we were called upon to approve a document...which contains a number of formulations on which we had in fact been unable to agree...our delegation is compelled to state its reservations about the procedures that have been employed...hastily to

put together certain fundamental sections of the final document," he complained.\(^6\)

That final document was adopted by consensus\(^7\) and contained a declaration, a program of action, and an appraisal of the means to improve the machinery dealing with disarmament, primarily through the U.N.'s Centre for Disarmament in New York. The issues that will come up before SSOD-II are largely the result of that document and subsequent work done in Geneva by the Committee on Disarmament\(^8\) and SSOD-II's preparatory committee.

**SSOD-II: WHAT TO EXPECT**

The issues expected to be on the agenda at SSOD-II include:

**Assessment of the Post-SSOD-I Developments**

According to one ACDA official, the U.S. can expect to get "beaten around the head on this one." While such pessimism may prove unjustified, this aspect of SSOD-II nevertheless will be largely an exercise in damage limitation for the American delegation.

Between January 1979 and April 1982, the Committee on Disarmament met numerous times in Geneva to deal with a variety of far-reaching and perhaps unrealistically grandiose schemes. These included a nuclear test ban treaty that would go beyond the limited one already in place; a "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"; "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear states against the use of the threat of nuclear weapons"; chemical weapons; and "new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons."\(^9\) The "progress" of these discussions, though inconclusive, will be forwarded by the Committee to the SSOD-II.

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\(^6\) Ibid., p. 13.

\(^7\) In other words, without taking a vote. In the U.N., a consensus document generally refers to one to which no delegation has objected strenuously enough to demand a vote.

\(^8\) Final Document of Assembly Session on Disarmament, 23 May-1 July, 1978 (New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, June 1980, U.N. Document #DP1/618). One result of the Final Document of the SSOD-I was to increase the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to 40 members (21 non-aligned, 10 Western, 9 Soviet bloc), rename it simply the "Committee on Disarmament (CD), and establish its function as primarily a negotiating forum. (Final Document paragraph 120) The CD has, since the 1960s, steadily grown in number of members, largely at the insistence of Third World countries.

\(^9\) Committee on Disarmament, Draft Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (U.N. Working Paper No. 58/ rev. 2; April 20, 1982).
Such utopian goals are not easily reached in a world bedeviled with suspicion and uncertainty. In late 1980, for instance, the trilateral test ban negotiations between the U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. broke down over the recurring obstacle of verification and compliance, a bottleneck typical of those that have thwarted productive negotiations in the past.

The post-SSOD-I period has seen the proposal of other disarmament and arms control measures, some of which could improve the U.S. position at the SSOD-II. After the 1979 Vienna Summit between President Carter and Soviet Chief Leonid Brezhnev, for example, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly proposed a ban on radiological weapons of the type that spread radioactive materials without a nuclear explosion.

The year before, then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced in Washington, on June 12, 1978, while the SSOD-I was in session in New York, a policy of "negative security" assurances, meaning "the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any comparable international binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices." Vance added, "It is the President's view that this formulation preserves our security commitments and advances our collective security as well as enhances the prospect for more effective arms control and disarmament."10

This pledge, says a high ranking National Security Council specialist, is now "floating in the realm of ambiguity." Nevertheless, it puts the U.S. on record as having taken the lead in this issue, and it could give the U.S. a more advantageous position at the SSOD-II if American delegates forcefully remind the General Assembly that it is not the U.S. that is blocking implementation of these assurances on a multilateral scale. It should be emphasized further to the General Assembly that the U.S. has taken the lead on many disarmament issues -- from the Baruch Plan, to the embargo on advanced weapons sales in Latin America, to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the open skies proposals, to the foundering negotiations to limit conventional arms. Most recently, moreover, it is the U.S. which has called for a real reduction in nuclear arsenals through President Reagan's START proposals.

Comprehensive Plan for Disarmament (CPD)

Paragraph 13 of the SSOD-I's Final Document reads in part:

Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through

10 GAO Report, op. cit., p. 17.
the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.\textsuperscript{11}

Yet, because of a number of factors -- including the failure of the SALT II Treaty to address adequately U.S. security needs, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet-backed military crack-down in Poland, and persistent reports of chemical warfare in Asia by Soviet and Soviet-supplied forces -- American diplomats believe that is highly unlikely that the SSOD-II will arrive at any acceptable formula for a Comprehensive Plan for Disarmament (CPD). Nevertheless, the Session plans to tackle the subject and the U.S. delegation is preparing responses to a variety of potential proposals.\textsuperscript{12}

Central to these responses is the American rejection of binding agreements that fail to recognize political realities and the continuing refusal of the Soviet Union to agree to verification procedures sufficient to ensure CPD compliance. Secondly, basic questions as to the designation of a transnational body to police any CPD have yet to be answered.\textsuperscript{13} Given the generally acknowledged bias of the U.N. toward non-aligned countries, the U.S. would be unlikely to relinquish even partially its prerogative in maintaining and defining its security needs to another body.

**World Disarmament Campaign (WDC)**

Resolution 35/152 of the General Assembly, passed December 12, 1980, repeated the SSOD-I's call for a World Disarmament Campaign. According to a U.N. prepared summary of that resolution, the WDC would be aimed at "mobilizing public opinion...so that it may exert a positive influence...[and] involve as many segments of the world's population as possible...and outline the catalytic part that the U.N. could play...."\textsuperscript{14}

After the SSOD-I, a "group of experts" was authorized by the U.N. Secretary-General to study the practical implications of a

\textsuperscript{11} SSOD-I Final Document, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{12} Based on private interviews conducted in May 1982.
\textsuperscript{13} For an excellent analysis of the lack of serious thought given to the question of who would actually administer or police any CPD and its practical effects on arms expenditures, see Theodore Caplow, "The Contradiction Between World Order and Disarmament," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 2, Summer 1979.
\textsuperscript{14} See U.N. Document #A/36/458, September 17, 1981, "Review of the Implementation of the Recommendation and Decisions by the General Assembly at its 10th Special Session" (note: SSOD-I was the U.N.'s 10th Special Session, but the first on disarmament).
WDC. That group came up with a long list of proposed strategies, including informational campaigns geared toward journalists, teachers, and various non-governmental organizations.

While the WDC seems laudable in theory, in practice it would serve only as a one-sided effort, given the fundamental dichotomy between the open societies of the West and the closed environment of Soviet bloc countries.

U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman, observed that "the proposals...are anything but concrete, realistic and practical. They exemplify instead a well-meaning but fundamentally flawed approach to disarmament that has made real progress in this crucial area more rather than less difficult."

Adelman stressed the impact on closed societies: "Public access to information is strictly controlled by the government; the public is told only what the government wishes it to be told, and only when and in what context the government may wish."

"...[T]he consequences of a United Nations campaign to mobilize world opinion on behalf of disarmament are not hard to predict. Despite the intentions of the campaign's sponsors -- and we do not for a moment question their sincerity -- the campaign would inevitably come to focus only on public opinion in the free societies of the world. Its effect on public opinion in closed societies would be zero."15

In other words, such a WDC would find the U.N. -- largely funded by the U.S. and its allies -- using mostly Western funds to propagandize mostly Western societies. Such a move is clearly not in the interests of the West, and American delegates to the SSOD-II are expected to reiterate Adelman's position.

Those who doubt the lack of impact a WDC would have on Soviet bloc countries need only reconsider recent press reports of police reprisals against those few individuals who have dared to protest Soviet military policies behind the Iron Curtain.16 If the Eastern European governments will not tolerate an indigenous and spontaneous cry against excessive militarism at home, how can they be expected to allow the U.N. to coordinate an internal campaign against arms buildups?

**Strengthening the Centre for Disarmament**

Another subject expected on the SSOD-II agenda will be proposals to strengthen the U.N.'s machinery for disarmament, primarily the Centre for Disarmament in New York.

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The Centre has been headed since 1979 by Swedish diplomat, Jan Martenson, a suave and articulate veteran in international affairs. In the past, he has helped run the U.N.'s 1972 Conference on Human Environment and was Deputy Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), founded in the 1960s by the Swedish government and still financed by it. He has also been an aide to the Swedish monarch and head of the Information Department at the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

Martenson sees the role of the Centre as a "tool for peace. Like all tools, it has to be used to be effective." He laments the fact that the Centre's budget is about $3.25 million a year, "the same as about five minutes of the arms race."¹⁷

The Centre's work currently is confined largely to research and dissemination of information on the arms buildup and coordination of U.N. efforts at disarmament.

Martenson says "to be realistic, each country has a right to security. Unilateral disarmament is not realistic." At the same time, however, "the arms race is spiralling upward. We need to halt it, especially the nuclear race, and bring it down on a mutual, verifiable basis." Carefully noncommittal, Martenson would not point the finger of blame at any individual country.

As for the outcome of the SSOD-II, Martenson insists that he is "not as pessimistic as before. President Reagan's decision to attend has been a big help. Now, everything depends on the political will of the members. Delegates should come prepared to negotiate. There is a growing concern all over the world, and our task is to inform in an objective and neutral way."

Yet, just how neutral the Centre really is remains in doubt. While Martenson professes non-partisanship in his office, American observers point with dismay to the fact that he answers to U.N. Undersecretary-General V. Ustinov, the latest in a succession of Soviets to occupy that post. Such access gives Moscow an opportunity to manipulate the Centre's work and stifle potentially damaging disclosures.

In fact, in September 1981, Ustinov allegedly used his position to block a study by the Centre on Soviet-supplied chemical weapons used in Cambodia in apparent violation of a number of multilateral treaties that the U.S.S.R. has signed.

A number of proposals are expected at the SSOD-II by non-aligned countries to make the Centre more independent of the Secretary-General's office. Senior American planners, however, appear to have differing views on how to respond to these initiatives.

¹⁷ Based on an interview conducted in May 1982.
Some believe that to reduce Soviet manipulation of the Centre, the U.S. should back proposals to disengage it from the General Assembly. Others stress the need to keep the non-aligned bloc from "internationalizing" what essentially should remain an area of bilateral or limited multilateral negotiations. These officials, therefore, want the Centre to retain its present form, even with the inherent danger of clandestine Soviet influence.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT SSOD-II

Various "non-governmental organizations" (NGOs) are officially recognized by the U.N. as spokesmen for citizens on a host of issues, and are accorded accreditation to take part in sessions and meetings.

At the SSOD-I, twenty-five NGOs and six "peace and research institutes" were given the opportunity to speak before the Assembly. For the upcoming SSOD-II, some fifty-six NGOs and seventeen research groups, including The Heritage Foundation, have been given permission by the Session's Preparatory Committee to take part in the deliberations, no doubt reflecting what one NGO spokesman called "the realization on the part of the U.N. that there has been a considerable surge in public interest in disarmament" since 1978.

While most of the groups are legitimate associations representing the full spectrum of political ideology, no fewer than eleven of them have been identified by the State Department as "fronts" for the Soviet Union. At least three others are closely associated with front groups.

The NGOs in New York are formally but loosely organized through the NGO Committee on Disarmament, currently headed by Dr. Homer A. Jack, Secretary-General of the World Conference on Religion and Peace and a prolific author on arms control. Another unofficial NGO disarmament committee, based in Geneva, is headed by famed Irish radical and Lenin Peace Prize winner Sean McBride. Jack's Ad Hoc Liaison Group recommended, from about 150 that applied, a list of NGOs and other groups to be allowed to participate at SSOD-II.

A Unitarian minister originally from Evanston, Illinois, Jack describes himself as a "Norman Thomasite Democratic Socialist" and "truly non-aligned." But an analysis of Jack's previous statements reveals that he apparently favors U.S. unilateral disarmament measures. At a State Department conference in late April, Jack said that he hoped "President Reagan could admit that 'we [the U.S.] have unilaterally escalated some aspects of the arms race and we are now prepared to take national initiatives to reduce the arms race, in the hope that the adversary might reciprocate.' Arms limitations negotiations and agreements can be bilateral or multilateral. They can also be unilateral. This term, unilateralism, need not be a 13-letter swear word. There
are times when a great nation, such as ours, out of strength and not weakness, can assert that 'enough is enough.' Generosity can induce reciprocation, even from the Soviet Union."

Jack also urged "a moratorium suspending all research, production, and deployment of all nuclear weapons (of any size) and their carriers...the U.S. should be sufficiently secure psychologically not to want to be the first in everything...."18 Notably absent from his statements was any recognition that reliable verification remains the core for any genuine disarmament.

Jack, meanwhile, says that the role of the NGOs is to "interpret the work of the U.N." While he concedes that some are Soviet fronts, Jack insists that the "U.N. long ago accepted the fact that many of these groups are not pristine as we see it in the West."

The participating NGOs and research groups that have been identified as Soviet fronts are: Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (Cairo); Christian Peace Conference (Prague); International Association of Democratic Lawyers (Brussels); International Organization of Journalists (Prague); International Union of Students (Prague); Women's International Democratic Federation (East Berlin); World Federation of Democratic Youth (Budapest); World Federation of Scientific Workers (Lyon); World Federation of Trade Unions (Prague); International Institute for Peace (Vienna); and the World Peace Council (Helsinki).

Even Jack, who has been willing to work with Communist front groups, felt compelled to write to The New York Times, in a letter published January 30, 1980, that "the World Peace Council has for more than 30 years faithfully transmitted Soviet foreign policy. Its leaders have regularly been awarded the Lenin Peace Prize (never the Nobel Peace Prize)."

The participating groups that the State Department links with various front organizations are: Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (Ulan-Bator, Mongolia); Latin American Students Organization (Havana); and World Federation of Teachers Unions (East Berlin).

These groups differ in their organizational strategies and ostensible functions, but share a similarity of purpose, namely, to promote Soviet policy and actively campaign against the West. According to an internal State Department assessment, "they are largely financed and controlled by Moscow."

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18 Taken from Homer A. Jack, "Nine Sentences President Reagan Might Deliver: Some Suggestions For U.S. Positions at The Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament." As noted, this paper was presented by Jack at the April 28, 1982, meeting convened at the Department of State.
The report continues:

Lenin and Stalin saw trade unions, youth organizations and other such bodies as "transmission belts" for conveying Communist party directives to ordinary people and "educating" them in Communism. The idea was developed internationally during the Popular Front period of the 1930s, when a veteran German Communist working for the Comintern, Willi Munzenberg, spoke of such bodies as his "innocents' club." The USSR launched the current international front organizations in the late 1940s, either in their present form or by securing control of existing movements. Always obedient to the Soviet line, they have nevertheless been able to attract considerable support by advocating such causes as opposition to US "aggression" in Vietnam and support for Arabs against Israel. In NATO countries they have exploited fears of nuclear wars by pressing for disarmament (on Soviet terms). *** they have also stepped up activities within the United Nations framework; many have consultative status with its major bodies and have recently sent delegates to a variety of UN special committees and seminars....

The World Peace Council, although exposed on a number of occasions as a Soviet front, still strongly influences other front groups. Formed in 1948 after a World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace in Wroclaw, Poland, and a 1949 meeting of the World Committee of Partisans in Paris, the World Peace Council emerged in its present form in November 1951. It was originally based in Paris, but was expelled in 1951 by the French government for "fifth column activities." After spells in Prague and then Vienna, where it was banned in 1957, the group settled in Helsinki where it now is based. A sister group, the International Institute for Peace, remains in Austria.

The Council is the supreme authority of various national organizations, including a chapter in the U.S. Total membership is estimated at about 1,600, and the Council claims to have affiliates in more than 135 countries. The current president, Indian Communist Party Central Committee member, Romesh Chandra, has been the Secretary-General of the Council since 1966.

According to the State Department assessment:

The WPC has campaigned vigorously to exploit its association with the UN to increase its authority, particularly among developing nations. However, it only supports those UN activities which do not conflict with Soviet
policies. It has played an increasing part in the NGOs' Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.19

The WPC collaborates with other international groups seeking influence at the U.N. For example, Chandra is chairman of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, of which Sean McBride is a senior official.

The Council's pro-Soviet slant was clearly displayed in June 1975, when Chandra said in Moscow that "the Soviet Union invariably supports the peace movement. The World Peace Council in its turn positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs." Before SSOD-I, the Council issued its so-called "New Stockholm Appeal" and collected what it claimed were 700 million signatures on petitions delivered to the U.N.

At SSOD-I, Chandra said that "public opinion in all parts of the world naturally views with regret and dismay, as well as a sense of shock, the fact that exactly at the same time as the General Assembly at the Special Session is seriously discussing concrete proposals for the ending of the arms race, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has decided on a steady quantitative and qualitative increase in armaments."20 He said not a word about the massive Soviet arms buildup.

Now the Council is gearing up for SSOD-II. It held three meetings in February alone to organize tactics. These conferences were in Aden, South Yemen (February 6-9); East Berlin (February 18-19); and Athens (February 27-28). A newspaper, "Disarmament Forum," was launched as a "service" to all groups working for disarmament. Issue one predicted that "this year, hundreds of thousands are expected to participate in mass action at the time of [SSOD-II] in demonstrations being organised by US peace forces."

Clearly, the World Peace Council will be heard from again.

DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR SSOD-II

As the diplomats and NGOs prepare for the Special Session, so too does a group of demonstration organizers -- a diverse collection of clergy, union leaders, leftists, Soviet-front activists, and political neophytes. This "June 12th Rally Committee" is planning to stage what one leader optimistically predicts will be "one of the largest political protests in American history."

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19 The WPC, however, has run into recent difficulty with the U.N. During February 1981, the Council was forced to withdraw its application for upgrading its consultative status with the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council after Chandra refused to reveal the source of his organization's funding.

The June 12 demonstration will be held on First Avenue and 42nd Street on Manhattan's East Side, near the U.N. headquarters. It will feature such notables as Coretta Scott King and popular musicians, James Taylor and Jackson Browne, sure to draw crowds. Some expect half a million people to attend. Two days later, on June 14, there are plans for a series of illegal sit-ins and attempts to block the U.N. missions of the five nuclear member states.

It will not be a spontaneous outpouring of concern. Instead, the protests will represent the culmination of months of calculated effort -- in large part initiated by known Soviet sympathizers.

One of the primary forces behind the June 12 Committee, for example, is the so-called Mobilization for Survival group, organized originally for demonstrations at SSOD-I. A co-founder of this organization is Dr. Sidney Peck, a former Communist Party-USA and U.S. Peace Council (affiliated with the World Peace Council) member, and currently Director of International Relations for Sean McBride's Geneva-based NGO group.


Leslie Cagan, a June 12 Committee leader, says the demonstrations "have the potential to change government policy." She is outspoken in her belief that "it would be very exciting if the U.S. took a unilateral step. If the U.S. would dismantle one

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nuclear weapon, it would be encouraging and make a statement and indicate good faith." In her enthusiasm, she betrays her ignorance of nuclear arms history, for the U.S. has dismantled many nuclear weapons and imposed a de facto freeze on its nuclear arsenal for most of the 1970s.

Demonstration leaders apparently have few qualms about working with Soviet-backed groups. Media spokeswoman Nina Streich, says that nuclear weapons "are a worldwide issue. If there is a nuclear attack anywhere in the world, everyone is affected. So we welcome people of all persuasions into the movement."

But others see a more frightening motivation behind the demonstrations. Writing in the May 17, 1982, Barron's, John C. Boland reports, "The goal, according to organizers who speak with more candor among themselves than they do to credulous reporters, is to create in the U.S. something akin to the neutralist movement in Europe...a broader ambition, according to some activists, is to hasten the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance as a military force."

CONCLUSION

In recent years, the U.S. has found itself at a disadvantage at the United Nations. Forced to deal with a set of priorities determined in large measure by the Third World majority, the U.S. has been confronted with what many observers see as a "no-win" situation. With their stranglehold on the General Assembly and its various organizations, the Third World has directed a large share of U.N. energy against western policies and institutions. The majority claims to be seeking a "new international order" but has failed to demonstrate how it promises either a better future or a more stable and prosperous international environment.

The Soviets, meanwhile, have excelled at appeasing the majority, though many of their overtures ring hollow when compared to their actual performance.

The U.S., on the other hand, must not preach one line on the East River and practice another in Washington. The fundamental strengths of American society -- the checks and balances in government and the accountability of political leaders -- mean that American policy at the U.N. must be consistent, honest, and pragmatic. In short, at present the U.S. has locked itself into a propaganda battle that it can not win.

So it is not surprising that the U.S. has not been able to establish the momentum in U.N. deliberations. That was clearly true at SSOD-I and may well be the case at the upcoming SSOD-II. The prospect looms that the Special Session will be little more than grandiose verbiage, aimed not at arriving at workable solutions to the rifts between power blocs, but rather at continued
efforts to create what many see as philosophical nostrums. The presence of outside pressure groups -- both in the halls of the U.N. and on the streets of New York -- will add to the confusion.

But it would be unwise to dismiss the SSOD-II prematurely as useless to the U.S. Its timing, just after President Reagan's trip to Europe in June offers the possibility of broad lobbying efforts to gain points for the American arms reduction initiatives. The Session also should be seen as a chance to begin redirecting world discussion toward the salient issue in the disarmament process: absolute verification and compliance procedures.

The U.S., to be sure, has proved itself to be the leader in meaningful arms control efforts. From the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), Outer Space Treaty (1967), Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970), and other agreements, the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to sign workable and balanced arms control measures. It must emphasize these realities over and over at the SSOD-II.

The onus on American delegates representing their country at the Second Special Session, therefore, will be to take the offensive, to try to gain the momentum, and to move beyond merely "controlling the damage." Otherwise, SSOD-II, like most U.N. deliberation, will accomplish little of value to the West.

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