March 26, 1979

THE FRONT-LINE STATES:
THE REALITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

The Front Line States (FLS) are five subsaharan African nations adjacent to Rhodesia: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. All are relatively new nations, all are former white-ruled colonies now ruled by black Africans, and all have played and continue to play an important role in the struggle against existing white-ruled states in Africa (Rhodesia and South Africa).

The FLS share other characteristics as well. With one exception, all are one-party states where Western ideas and institutions of political and personal liberties do not apply. Some have established special relationships with the Soviet Union and its satellites. In all of them the economy is at least underdeveloped and at worst in a state of crisis. Finally these five states are among the most important African states due to their size and geographical location. Their policies play an important role in determining the future of southern Africa and indeed of the whole Third World.

The significance of the FLS in U.S. foreign policy reflects their common characteristics. Their relationship with Rhodesia and South Africa is crucial for the future stability of the region and the American relationship with southern Africa. It is through the FLS that the U.S. has sought to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, but these efforts have so far been a failure.1 Their natural resources make their economic development and accessibility important to the U.S. and West European economies, as do their international financial status. Their geopolitical position, dominating

1. See Samuel T. Francis, "Rhodesia in Transition," Heritage Foundation Back-
grounder #62.

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
the peninsula of southern Africa and facing both the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, gives them special strategic importance for the U.S. and its access to Mideastern oil.

In the recent past U.S. relations with these states have not been friendly. Their anti-Western ideologies and policies have tended to view the U.S. as an imperialist state allied with white oligarchies in South Africa and Rhodesia (and previously with Portugal), and the influence of the Soviets has encouraged this perception. In reassessing U.S. policy, some legislators advocate a more active and sympathetic relationship with the FLS. Thus, it is urged that economic assistance should be given to them to develop a friendlier relationship and to promote their stabilization. Since the conflicts in southern Africa have led to massive refugee problems for these states, aid specifically oriented toward refugee assistance is urged. Also, some advocate international credit to assist the FLS with their balance of payments deficit with the West and promote economic linkages with Western states.

Clearly this involves a massive amount of aid. In 1975, for example, the Carter Administration sought congressional approval for $5 million for refugee assistance in Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia. A further $500,000 was proposed to finance education and training in Mozambique. From 1962 to 1977, total U.S. assistance to these five states was as follows:

TOTAL U.S. AID, 1962-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$200,000 (all in 1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>$45.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$17.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>$195.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>$14.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Foreign Operations Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee

In addition, the World Bank and International Monetary Development Association, as of June 30, 1978, had lent the following amounts to the FLS:

APPROVED WORLD BANK & IDA CUMULATIVE LENDING OPERATIONS TO FRONTLINE STATES, JUNE 30, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S. $ Amount</th>
<th>Number of Loans &amp; Credits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>$108,050,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>$604,900,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>$552,750,000</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,265,700,000</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank
The U.S., it should be noted, contributes over 28 percent of the total World Bank subscription.

These figures contrast with economic aid and loans to Rhodesia. From 1946 to 1975, the U.S. gave only $7 million in aid and loans to Rhodesia (and none since 1966), of which all but $800,000 has been repaid. The World Bank has lent about $87 million to Rhodesia through 1978 in five loans, less than to any single FLS borrower and less than 10 percent of the total loans to all the FLS. The principal reasons for the lack of U.S. and international assistance to Rhodesia have been the non-democratic and allegedly oppressive nature of the government and the alleged unstable political situation. The FLS, however, share many of the failings attributed to Rhodesia, though this has not deterred economic aid to them.

Despite the humanitarian intentions of much of this aid, some legislators feel that its usefulness has not been demonstrated. The success of such programs depends on the nature of the governments that receive it. The inefficiencies, corruption, instability, and outright tyranny in several of the FLS raise questions of how these governments would use increased assistance. A survey of the internal politics, economic developments, and international relations of the Front Line States is necessary to assess the usefulness of continued or increased U.S. aid to their governments.

ANGOLA

**Internal Politics:** Portugal granted independence to Angola in 1975. Prior to as well as after independence, three liberation movements contested for control of Angola. These were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) founded in 1956 and active in armed struggle since 1961, led by Dr. Agostinho Neto, a Marxist poet who was a member of the Portuguese Communist Party and an associate of guerrilla leader Amilcar Cabral; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which in 1962 established a Revolutionary Government in Exile in Zaire, led by Holden Roberto, a Baptist and reportedly the son-in-law of Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Soko; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), founded in 1966 and led by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, formerly associated with the FNLA. Neto's MPLA was closely associated with the Soviet Union, which gave it assistance, while the movements of Roberto and Savimbi were associated with Communist China, which in 1974 provided considerable assistance to their groups.

Angola became independent on November 11, 1975, and a bitter struggle erupted among the three groups. Neto and the MPLA received substantial assistance from the USSR and about 18,000 Cuban troops assisted them to become dominant. The FNLA and UNITA formed a
common government, the People's Democratic Republic of Angola, in January 1976, with Dr. Savimbi as President. Despite the dominance of Neto's faction, these rivals appear still to threaten the MPLA government and to control considerable parts of the country. Another resistance movement, the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave (FLEC), long associated with the FNLA, is a separatist movement in the oil-rich Cabinda province. More recently, the Movement for the Socialist Union of Angola (MUSA) has been founded by Moises Andre. Andre was trained by the Soviets in Moscow and was a member of the FNLA and MPLA, though he now claims to be anti-Marxist and nationalist. The source of funds for the MUSA is not known.

Since taking power Neto has stayed close to the Soviets and their allies and has sought to construct a "socialist" state on Marxist lines. The government is that of a single party with no constitution. The news media and much private property including private medical care have been nationalized. The World Survey of Freedom, published by Freedom House, in both 1978 and 1979 included Angola in the "least free" category in both political and civil liberties (along with North Korea and Cambodia). On a rating of 1-7 (seven being "least free" and 1 being "most free") Angola is rated seven in both categories. In contrast, Rhodesia had a higher rating of 6 and 5 respectively in civil and political rights in 1978 and this was upgraded to 5 and 4 in 1979.

Neto, who is a medical doctor with literary ambitions, appears to be well versed in and dedicated to Marxism-Leninism. He refuses to allow any opposition or coalition with other liberation movements. Despite his advocacy of and assistance to "liberation" in Rhodesia, Neto himself is a mulatto, married to a white Portuguese. He speaks no African languages and few Africans hold position in the Angolan leadership. He frequently sends his family to Portugal, where the families of his Defense, Finance, and other high ranking Ministers live. The MPLA is made up largely of mulattoes, who represent only 5 percent of the population of Angola (about the same percentage as whites in Rhodesia).

Neto's regime was effectively overthrown on May 27, 1977 by black dissident members of the MPLA led by former Interior minister Nito Aves Batista, but this revolt was suppressed by Cuban troops on behalf of Neto's government.

Economy: The two most important events for Angola's economy since independence have been the Marxist orientation of the government and the exodus of the vast majority of white settlers following independence. Prior to decolonization, approximately 500,000 whites lived in Angola. Almost entirely Portuguese, they were largely settlers who provided the bulk of the technical and managerial infrastructure of the province. In the first six months of independence, over 200,000 whites left Angola, and at the present time, 400,000
whites have left. Not only did the mass emigration mean the withdrawal of most of the trained personnel, but also the Europeans left behind a vast amount of property and plant equipment. All of this property was taken over by the new government and some was redistributed to the indigenous Angolans. In addition, Neto has made no secret of his commitment to socialist ideology in economic policy, his hostility to the private sector and the free market, and his general economic plans. Addressing a trade union conference, Neto has stated:

The long period of transition from a colonial society to a socialist society will call for a multi-sided form of economic organization. The progress of our economic transformation towards socialism will be expressed by a steady growth of both the State sector and the cooperative sector in the rural areas, and by a steady reduction of the mixed sector, of the private capital sector....But we do not want to deceive anyone by concealing the fact that we intend to follow the road to socializing our means of production, of finances, of trade, of services, and of everything that can be socialized; and that we intend to do this as rapidly as possible. (African Freedom Annual, 1978, p. 24)

As of 1977, the government had implemented Neto's policies to the extent of nationalizing 100 percent of the production of coffee and cotton, sugar, oil, ship repairs, beer breweries, banks, and the media of communication. One hundred percent of oil distribution and 61 percent of diamond production had also been nationalized. The Gulf Oil facilities in Cabinda province, however, remain privately owned and provide 122,000 barrels per day in exports to the U.S. The taxes and revenues from these facilities account for 60-80 percent of the operating revenues of the Angolan government. As of the beginning of 1978, the diamond production of Angola had fallen by 80 percent; the country imported over 50 percent of its food; and the coffee crop, once one of the largest in the world, was down by 50 percent. One reason for the decline in coffee production was that the coffee workers, members of the Bakongo tribe, were active in the support of the FNLA. The civil war and repressive treatment of opponents led to Neto’s use of forced labor. The De Beers Diamond Company has been asked by the government to return in order to increase diamond production.
International Posture: Angola is a member of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. However, the U.S. vetoed its entrance to the U.N. on June 23, 1976 on the grounds that a large Cuban military presence precluded Angolan membership. On November 19, 1976 the U.S. reversed its veto and Angola was admitted. The OAU admitted Angola to membership on February 11, 1976. Since independence, Angola has aligned itself closely with the Soviet Union and received substantial military and technical aid from the U.S.S.R., East Germany, and Cuba. Other Eastern bloc states that have agreements with Angola include Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Neto has visited Moscow and Havana several times since taking power, and Soviet and Cuban leaders have visited Luanda. Soon after independence, Senator Dick Clark of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that, "If the MPLA wins, the Soviets will be lucky if they can hang on a year or two." Since this statement, the U.S.S.R. and its surrogates have become more and more entrenched in Angola. The Soviets contributed $170 million to Angola to put Neto in power and in July 1976 Angola became the first African state to join the Soviet-controlled Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA). In October 1976, Neto concluded a 20 year Friendship Treaty with the Soviets. In June 1977 Angola signed a fishing agreement with the USSR by which the latter may fish in Angolan waters, and Angola receives 12 percent of the catch. This agreement in 1977 brought 20,000 tons of fish for Angola, though in 1974, under Portuguese rule, Angola's fishing catch was half a million tons. As of April 1978, over 100 Soviets were stationed in Luanda to train secret police, intelligence, and army officers. The Soviets have supplied tanks, MIG-21's, air defense equipment, and naval vessels. However, Neto has not yet allowed the Soviets to establish bases in Angola. Cuba, as of the spring of 1978, had 23-25,000 troops in Angola and literally placed Neto in power after the abortive coup of May 1977. Cuban troops have also been crucial supports of Neto's regime in the continuing war against UNITA. However, the Cubans, Soviets, and East Germans are unpopular with Angolans who regard them as racists. According to Father Gottfried de Kinderen, who recently toured Angola:

Their Cuba's occupation policy is similar to that of the Soviets in East Europe after the "liberation." They are dismantling useable industrial installations and transporting them to Cuba. (Freedom at Issue, March/April 1978, p. 15)

In 1977, according to Fr. de Kinderen, Angola had to use its entire coffee and sugar harvest to pay for Cuban and Soviet arms. In 1978, an armed force invaded Zaire's province of Shaba (Katanga) and seized the mining town of Kolwezi. President Carter publicly
accused the Cubans in Angola of training and supporting the invasion forces, though considerable controversy developed when the President was unable to offer persuasive evidence of their support. However, Newsweek's senior editor, Arnaud de Borchgrave, interviewed prisoners of war in Shaba province who admitted that Cubans and Portuguese communists had trained and supported them. Shaba province produces about 60 percent of the world's cobalt, a necessary metal for the production of high grade steel, and contains 36 percent of known free world reserves. Prior to the invasion of Shaba province, the Soviet government had been purchasing massive quantities of cobalt at unusually high prices. Cobalt production was temporarily halted during and after the invasion. In May 1978, Angola supported another invasion of Shaba province.

In June 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced that the U.S. would seek to improve relations with Angola. He omitted references to the President's earlier accusations of Cuban involvement in the Shaba invasion, and Donald F. McHenry of the U.S. delegation to the UN, was dispatched as a special envoy to Angola. The apparent motivations of this new policy were to seek a reduction in Eastern Bloc aid to Angola, to stabilize relations between Angola and its neighbors, and to protect oil production on the Angolan coast. Neto was said to be eager to develop closer ties to the West to avoid dependence on the Soviets. He began exploring new relationships with Portugal, France, and other Western states. The U.S. has significant business ties to Angola through the Gulf Oil Corporation, the Boeing Corporation (which has sold commercial jets and air traffic control systems), Mobil Oil, Texaco, Cities Service, and National Cash Register. Morgan Guaranty Trust has explored the financing of Angolan international economic transactions. The Cabinda facilities of Gulf Oil, threatened by the FLEC insurgency, are guarded by Cuban troops.

Despite its own internal instability, Angola has interfered in the affairs of Zaire (e.g., the Shaba invasion), South Africa (open support for SWAPO in Namibia, though Neto has recently acted as a restraint on SWAPO forces due to his desire to stop South African and Zairian aid to UNITA and FNLA), and Rhodesia (the Patriotic Front maintains training camps in Angola, from which its terrorists and guerrillas are moved to Zambia for deployment against the Rhodesian population). 3


In July 1978, Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge was interviewed by a French news service. In response to the question, "So 'majority rule' does not mean much to you?" Jorge responded:

It is revolutionary movements which we regard as important. We support any movement in any country and consider that its main aim is to seize power. Once we recognized that the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe, SWAPO in Namibia and the National Council in South Africa were the true representatives of their respective peoples, the only problem was how these revolutionary organizations could seize power -- that is all. This view is held by all the "frontline" states. (FBIS, July 12, 1978, p. 4)

BOTSWANA

Political Background: Botswana, formerly the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland, became independent as a republic in 1966. Unlike the other four frontline states -- and almost unlike any other government in Africa -- Botswana has been a multi-party democracy since independence. The majority party is the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), led by Oxford-educated Sir Seretse Khama. The BDP won 80 percent of the popular vote in the first elections in 1965 and took 28 of 31 seats in the National Assembly. Opposition parties are the Botswana People's Party (BPP) and the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) espousing social democratic platforms, and the Botswana National Front (BNF), a Marxist party that is the major opposition force. Freedom House places Botswana in the second category for political rights and the third category for civil liberties. The media of communications are government owned but there is no censorship.

The political capability of Botswana has been disturbed by the continuing war in neighboring Rhodesia, by the presence of Cuban troops in other adjacent states, and by the general leftward drift of African politics since the Soviet-Cuban intervention. The Botswana government denies that it provides bases for guerrillas operating in Rhodesia, but guerrilla forces undoubtedly use Botswanan territory as sanctuaries. This has led to occasional Rhodesian raids in Botswana on reprisal missions against the guerrillas. Although Botswana has maintained good relations with its small white minority of about 5,000, President Khama in 1975 admitted the rise of anti-white sentiment. In March 1978, Botswanan troops murdered three whites in the northern part of the country. The arrest of one of those implicated in the murder led to student demonstrations and clashes with the police in the capital of Gaborone in September.
The BNF has sought to develop links with Cuba and other Communist states, and in June the government revoked the passports of 17 BNF members who were planning to attend a youth conference in Cuba. The government charged that they planned to receive military training in Cuba for the subversion of the country. The increase of political tensions in the area has led Botswana to create an army for the first time since independence. It consists of 12-15,000 men and cost the government $20 million, though a U.N. survey predicted increased costs of $60 million in the near future.

**Economy:** Although Botswana is the smallest of the five FLS and has the lowest Gross Domestic Product, its per capita income in 1974 was higher than those of Mozambique and Tanzania (that of Mozambique is from pre-independence days and has undoubtedly declined since). Much of Botswana is composed of the Kalahari desert in the west and the Okavango swamps in the north. The per capita arable land is 2.1 acres, though this compares favorably with other FLS and with Rhodesia. The major industry is meat exports, but U.S. and South African development of diamond mines at Arapa and other minerals including copper and manganese have provided $130 million investment. The Botswanan economy has been closely linked to that of South Africa, and labor migration is permitted. The government has not pressed for nationalization and controls only 15 percent of the diamond, copper-nickel production.

**International Posture:** Botswana is land-locked between Rhodesia and South Africa, and thus its foreign policy, like its economy, has been largely dependent on these two white-ruled states. Rhodesia accuses Botswana of harboring guerrilla forces, but other African states have accused her of not doing enough to promote the "liberation struggle" in Rhodesia.

**MOZAMBIQUE**

**Political Background:** Mozambique, like Angola, was settled by the Portuguese in the 16th century and became a formal colony in 1584. In 1952 it was incorporated fully into the Portuguese state. In 1967 the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was founded in Dar es Salaam by Eduardo Mondlane. After Mondlane's death in 1969, leadership fell to Samora Machel, who became head of state in 1974. FRELIMO engaged in acts of terrorism and guerrilla warfare prior to establishing an independent state on the voluntary withdrawal of Portugal. Many white Portuguese settlers objected to the decolonization and some resisted through their own short-lived effort at
establishing a separate state. However, Machel's movement soon became dominant. From its early days, FRELIMO was close to the Soviet Union, and Machel has shown himself to be a full-fledged Marxist since taking power. He has denied that his Marxism is peculiarly adapted to African conditions -- "Afrocommunism" -- and insists that it is pure "scientific socialism" (i.e., Marxism-Leninism). FRELIMO, he has declared, is a "democratic revolutionary dictatorship" which will be the vanguard of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It should be noted, however, that Machel is a former hospital orderly and far less educated or knowledgeable of Marxism than his Angolan counterpart, Agostinho Neto.

Unlike Angola, Mozambique has not until recently had major problems with resistance movements, though some opposition existed from the first. The main reason for the lack of opposition appears to be that Machel has massively suppressed potential opposition. In the first six months of his rule, Machel crushed a revolt of about 400 rebels from FRELIMO. He established his secret police, the People's National Security Service (SNASP), which makes use of some Portuguese fascists and Nazi sympathizers. He created "dynamisation committees" for psychiatric reconditioning of the "colonial mentality." These committees are frequently purged of corrupt elements through the use of government informants who are then promoted to replace those expelled. Machel also sought to end prostitution, but any woman who lived alone was liable to be classed as a prostitute and subjected to "re-education." According to the New York Times, FRELIMO theorists say, "The first step...is to eliminate all other centers of power in Mozambique" (July 2, 1975, p. 4) in order to control the country and transform the society. One U.S. visitor, J. Douglas White, was imprisoned without charge and forbidden to contact U.S. diplomats or friends in Mozambique. He found in prison that most of the other prisoners had been arrested and tortured so that the government could seize their property and find out if they had more wealth. Most of the prisoners were blacks and only a handful were Portuguese or Asians. Some had been in prison for 21 months (Washington Post, August 14, 1977, p. B2). Machel has established FRELIMO as the only legal party. All candidates must be nominated by FRELIMO. Elections were held in 1977 under tight FRELIMO control. Broadcasting is also government controlled. Machel stated in September 1977 that the press should be "an instrument of the broad masses of the people and as their vanguard, an offensive instrument." It should seek to "liquidate liberalism, individualism" and enforce Party supremacy. Independent trade unions are being destroyed by state controlled ones; private lawyers are forbidden; and religions (especially the Jehovah's Witnesses) are persecuted systematically. There is forced re-settlement, and emigration is restricted. About 100,000 persons are estimated to be prisoners in concentration camps. SNASP, directly under Machel's control, has incarcerated more political prisoners than there were under the Portuguese. Freedom House places Mozambique in the "least free" category, seventh in both political and civil liberties for both 1978 and 1979.
In late 1978 a serious armed resistance movement against FRELIMO began. This movement, organized as the National Mozambican Resistance (RNM), is composed of FRELIMO defectors. According to 21 year-old Lacerda Ceatano, a former commanding officer in the FRELIMO army and now a member of the RNM, Mozambique is training Rhodesians, Malawians, Swazis, Kenyans, and other Africans for guerrilla warfare in their own countries.

There they receive military training and communist indoctrination and are later sent back to their countries to foment uprisings against their governments....Machel's ambition is to turn the African continent into a continent of communist states against the will of the peoples of those countries. (To The Point, January 19, 1979, p. 37)

Economy: Like Angola, Mozambique's economic problems derive from it Marxist ideology and the emigration of 260,000 of the 270,000 whites who had lived in this country prior to 1975. The black elite also fled the country. Virtually all major industries have been completely nationalized without compensation. According to a UN report of July 1978, Mozambique will need to import at least 192,000 tons of foodstuffs in 1978 and 386,000 tons in 1979. Prior to independence, Mozambique had been an agricultural exporter. It will be virtually impossible for the country to import this amount without major international assistance. In 1978, the government had an estimated accumulated debt of $171.3 million and a balance of payments deficit of $185 million in 1977. The response of Machel to his country's economic problems has been to blame them on floods and Rhodesian incursions. Floods, however, caused little damage under Portuguese rule, and the GNP expanded from an annual 4.2 percent in 1967 to 9.5 percent in 1971. Mozambique lacks the natural resources that enrich some other south African countries, but still has great agricultural potential. The country is reportedly considering joining the World Bank and other Western international financial groups. Despite Mozambique's official policy of opposing apartheid, its foreign exchange has been largely derived from South Africa itself through the wages earned in South Africa by 100,000 Mozambicans. The closure of its borders with Rhodesia in 1976 cost Mozambique about $200 million per year. In 1928, the Portuguese government concluded an agreement with South Africa whereby 60 percent of the wages earned by migrant workers in South Africa would be paid in gold. The Mozambique government then bought the gold from them with its own currency. This arrangement still continues today, though the Mozambican currency received by the workers for their gold, is now worthless. (See To The Point, October 13, 1978, p. 45) Machel receives $115 million per year through this arrangement.
One example of the disastrous economic policies of Machel's government is the ruin of the Sena Sugar Estates, which was British-owned and provided most of Mozambique's exports of sugar, its third largest currency earning export. After independence, the workers on the Estates demanded and received higher wages, and absenteeism became a serious problem. Crime rates in the surrounding areas rose dramatically and forced an exodus of skilled white personnel. According to FRELIMO itself, one plantation recently showed a rate of wilted sugar cane of 70 percent and the ruin of the soil. In 1974, the last year of Portuguese rule, SSE profits were close to $5 million. At the present time, SSE has a debt of $50 million. The response of the government to SSE's problems has been to accuse the two British managers of SSE with "premeditated economic sabotage," a crime punishable by solitary confinement in an East German-run prison.

International Posture: FRELIMO was originally sponsored by Communist China, but has abandoned the PRC in favor of the Soviet Union and her satellites. At present, there are estimated to be 1,000 Cuban military personnel in Mozambique, up from 500 in June 1978. Machel has concluded several treaties with the states of the Soviet bloc. These treaties include (a) a fishing agreement with the U.S.S.R., by which the Soviets keep 75 percent of the catch and Mozambique keeps only 25 percent, and the U.S.S.R. pays no royalties for its fishing rights, unlike most other nations; (b) agreements with other Eastern Bloc states by which Mozambique receives machinery and vehicles in return for agricultural produce (Much of this machinery is unsuited to the tropical climate of the country and breaks down soon after it is put in use. Much of the military equipment received is obsolete.); (c) a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, signed in March 1977, when President Podgorny of the Soviet Union and other high ranking Soviets toured Africa, which resembles similar treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Angola. It provides for expansion of economic, technological, scientific, and cultural contacts between the U.S.S.R. and Mozambique, for the "development of national cadres" (i.e., ideological training), for the joint adherence of FRELIMO and the CPSU to "proletarian internationalism" (i.e., that aspect of Soviet Marxism-Leninism that asserts that the defense of the U.S.S.R. is to be given priority for other Communist Parties), and to Marxism-Leninism. The treaty also forbids any alliance by either state that is aimed at the other partner, provides for future military cooperation, and for consultations in the event of situations that threaten or break the peace, and for mutual cooperation with other "peaceful states" in the struggle for "freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress" (i.e., for cooperation in the international direction of the subversion of other states).
Mozambique's relations with the U.S. have been confined largely to economic contacts. Machel met with President Carter in New York in October 1977, and with U.S. businessmen to encourage investments and trade, but this led to little new U.S. economic involvement. The U.S. has given Mozambique about $20 million in foreign assistance since independence; this is largely confined to food assistance, and the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 specifically forbids funds appropriated under the Act being expended for direct assistance to Mozambique or Angola. However, the same Act provides $45 million for refugee assistance in southern Africa. The Carter Administration contends that the language of the Act permits U.S. assistance to Mozambique for refugee assistance.

Mozambique has been one of the principal sponsors of the guerrilla war against Rhodesia. It provides sanctuaries and training bases for the Zimbabwe African National Union of Robert Mugabe, a self-proclaimed Marxist, and the more radical section of the Patriotic Front. Rhodesia has conducted punitive incursions and air attacks against ZANU forces and bases in Mozambique. ZANU receives arms and training from Cuban advisers in Mozambique.

TANZANIA

Political Background: Tanzania consists of Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and the island of Pemba. The former was a German colony until World War I and was occupied by the British as a League of Nations mandate thereafter. Zanzibar and Pemba -- islands in the Indian Ocean -- were placed under British protection by the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1890. Zanzibar became independent in 1963, as did Tanganyika in 1961. In 1964 they combined as the United Republic of Tanzania.

Julius K. Nyerere of the Tanganyika National Union (TANU) became President of Tanganyika in 1962 and remains so today. In Zanzibar, African nationalists overthrew the Arab-dominated sultanate little over a month after independence. The Africans established a People's Republic under the leadership of Abeid A. Karume of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). Nyerere appealed to Zanzibar to unify with Tanganyika and the unification took place in October 1964. A popular election led to an overwhelming victory for Nyerere as President of both countries. Karume was assassinated in 1972, and in 1977, the ASP and TANU merged to form the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM).

The CCM is the official party in an officially one-party state. Only individuals nominated by the CCM may contest elections, in which it is forbidden to discuss issues in the campaign. The media are owned by the government and strikes are illegal. Forced relocation of the population of the cities has been an important aspect of the government's policy of economic development. According to
Freedom in The World there were 2-3000 political prisoners in 1977, and "torture and killing by the security services appeared to be common, although there has been an attempt to control the excesses of the security forces." In 1977 and 1978 Freedom House placed Tanzania in the sixth category for political rights and civil liberties -- the "not free" category -- slightly higher than Angola and Mozambique but lower than Botswana and Rhodesia in civil liberties. According to the U.S. State Department, "In contrast to its stance on violations of human rights in other countries, Tanzania tends to ignore, or at best to justify in the interests of state security, most domestic violations of human rights."

Economy: The economic policy of Tanzania has flowed almost entirely from Nyerere's paper, Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism. Ujamaa is a Swahili word which means roughly harmony or "a condition like that of the family." In Nyerere's thought this state is characteristic of African society and is a non-Marxist version of socialism. Unlike Marxism, it emphasizes consensus and community rather than struggle and class conflict. In accordance with this ideology, Nyerere has departed from most socialist doctrine by trying to develop rural collective settlements rather than urban development. Moreover, he has been particularly concerned with inequality -- between rural and urban, but also between different strata of urban society and between the Third World and the industrialized world. Consequently, he has sought to redistribute wealth and economic rewards within Tanzanian society.

The results of these ideological experiments have been disastrous for the Tanzanian economy and Nyerere has himself engaged in protracted self-criticism. When Tanzania achieved independence, Nyerere promised that the country would achieve more in the next ten years than in the past 40 years of colonial rule. About 13 million peasants are now said to live in communal villages, though in 1973 the government claimed only 2 million lived in them. The 11 million who have moved were forced to do so, though Nyerere has denied this. Agricultural productivity fell during the transition period while the population increased, and agriculture absorbed more resources than ever before; at £ 30 million in 1976 compared to £ 3.1 million in 1967.

Out of a population of 15 million, only 500,000 persons not on the collective farms are in paid employment. In 1975, Tanzania had an urban unemployment rate of 17 percent. The movement for forced egalitarianism has had the effect of punitive taxation for professionals and the prohibition of civil servants from engaging in any form of business. Nyerere has also engaged in massive nationalization. The government now controls virtually all the major means of production. Tanzania in 1974 (the last year for which figures are available) had the lowest per capita income of all the FIS and Rhodesia, the lowest life expectancy at birth, the second lowest ratio of

population per hospital bed, and the third lowest literacy rate. Since this ranking predates the civil war in Angola, the disruptive insurgency in Rhodesia, and the Marxist regime in Mozambique, they may no longer be valid. But it should be recalled that Nyerere's regime has not been oppressive or corrupt on the same scale that Angola and Mozambique have been, nor has it had the experience of civil war and insurgency movements as Angola and Rhodesia have. The above ranking came after 13 years of independence and are in comparison to the colonial regimes in Angola and Mozambique. In short, Tanzania's economic crises cannot be blamed on tyranny, internal violence, corruption, international discrimination, or the colonial legacy. They are the result only of the ideological persuasions of its leadership.

**International Relations:** Nyerere has been one of the strongest critics of both the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa as well as of the dictatorial regime of Idi Amin in Uganda. Tanzania has also had strained relations with Malawi because of border and territorial disputes. Tanzania is an influential member of the U.N., the OAU, and, until its dissolution in 1977, the East African Community with Kenya and Uganda. In October 1978, war broke out between Tanzania and Uganda when the latter country invaded Tanzania and occupied an area of 700 square miles in the Kagera district in northern Tanzania. Uganda had an army of 20,000 men with 35 Soviet tanks and over 30 Soviet MIGs. Tanzania, having relied on the PRC until recently, had an army of 17,000 with 33 Chinese MIGs, but had also reportedly received in 1978 24 Soviet MIGs and an unknown number of SAM missiles. Neither the Soviet Union, which has ties to both countries, nor the OAU, which condemns all border changes in Africa, condemned the Ugandan invasion. The war hurt the Tanzanian economy and reduced its hard currency holdings to $50-60 million. It has severely undermined Tanzania's ability to pay for imports, which was already weak. Nyerere has stated that the war was costing his country $1 million per day. However, Ugandan reverses in the war appeared to be destroying the rule of Idi Amin at the most recent report.

As the first African President to visit President Carter, Nyerere was considered one of the President's strongest supporters in Africa. However, in June 1978, Nyerere denounced Western intervention in Africa and criticized Carter specifically for listening to "hysterical voices" protesting the Cuban presence in Africa. Nyerere also defended the Soviet and Cuban role in Africa. He accused Carter of caring only "about confrontation with the Soviet Union and defense of capitalism in Africa." (Washington Post, June 9, 1978, p. 1) In a recent interview in the Washington Post (February 25, 1979, p. B2), Nyerere reaffirmed his support for Soviet and Cuban intervention:
for those Africans who feel they need to enlarge their areas of freedom, their problem is not the Soviet Union. Their problem is Western Europe.

These remarks show a move away from support for the U.S. and toward the Soviets and their supporters in southern Africa. Although Communist China has provided considerable aid to Tanzania, including the building of the Tanzam Railway that linked Zambian copper mines to the port of Dar es Salaam 1200 miles away, Nyerere has abandoned China for the Soviet orbit. In 1977 Tanzania had 1,000 Chinese economic technicians and only 365 Cuban and Soviet ones, and recently it appears to have received arms from Libya, formerly a close supporter of Amin, who has received arms from Iraq. Nyerere's defense of the Soviet involvement in Africa and his acceptance of arms from the Soviet Union indicates a closer reapprochement with the Soviets at the expense of China, notwithstanding Chinese economic aid.

ZAMBIA

Political Background: Zambia is the former British colony of Northern Rhodesia and became independent in 1964. Kenneth D. Kaunda became President in 1964 as leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda won elections as President in 1964 and 1968, but in 1972 issued a law declaring Zambia a "one-party participatory democracy" with UNIP as the sole legal party. A new constitution later in the year confirmed this. In 1973 Kaunda was again easily re-elected for a five year term, though the new constitution stipulates that only the president of UNIP is eligible for the Presidency and only 39 percent of the eligible electorate voted. The President has an absolute veto over all legislation passed by the National Assembly (all of whose members must be members of UNIP). The President also appoints the Secretary-General of UNIP (the second highest ranking official in the country), the Prime Minister, all Cabinet officials, and all judges.

The official transition to a one-party state was precipitated by the rise of political opposition to Kaunda in 1971. In that year a new party, the United Progressive Party, was formed, and a Cabinet minister, Simon Kapwepwe, resigned to lead it. In late 1971 and early 1972, however, Kaunda's secret police arrested over 200 members of the UPP, including Kapwepwe. Amnesty International has reported that these prisoners were subjected to torture in the form of beatings, strippings, and electro-shock, and leaders of the UPP showed signs of having been severely beaten. The torture occurred due to interrogation on the membership and nature of the UPP. While these prisoners were interned, Kaunda proceeded to the suppression of opposition and the creation of the one-party state. In 1978, Kaunda was again re-elected for a five year term, though again he was the only candidate. Certain changes were introduced in the legal requirements for candidacy that brought the Presidency even more under the control of UNIP. The reason for these reforms was to undercut any possible challenge to Kaunda from Kapwepwe, who
had been released after adoption of the new constitution in 1973. In 1976 Kaunda allowed Kapwepwe and four other opponents to join UNIP, thus making them technically eligible for the Presidency in 1978. However, at the Mulungushi party conference in October, the rules were changed to forbid his candidacy. It is now required that an aspirant candidate have the support of 20 delegates from each province of the country and that he has been a dues-paying member of UNIP for three years (thus automatically excluding Kapwepwe and his colleagues).

All private newspapers in Zambia have been placed under government control in 1975, and the government also controls the radio and TV networks. Since 1964, a state of emergency has been in effect in Zambia, and some 200 political prisoners are currently incarcerated. Under the state of emergency the President may order detention of individuals, and habeas corpus does not apply to presidential detainees. According to the State Department's Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid (1979)

The President's detention powers have been used in recent years against political opponents, Rhodesian nationalists and dissident Namibians, common criminals, striking university students and professors, and violators of currency control regulations. (p. 201)

Freedom House in 1979 ranked Zambia in the "partly free" category with a rating of five in both political rights and civil liberties.

**Economy:** In 1973 Zambia produced the following percentages of free world minerals: Zinc, 1 percent; Lead, 1 percent; Cobalt, 9 percent; Beryllium, 8.5 percent; and Copper, 12 percent. It contained 18 percent of the free world reserves of cobalt and 8 percent of free world reserves of copper and selenium. The fall in world copper prices in 1975 hurt the Zambian economy and forced adoption of an austerity program. From 1965 to 1969, the Zambian economy advanced with an estimated annual growth rate in gross domestic product of 13 percent. By 1978, however, copper production and exports had declined to their lowest point in ten years. Although Zambia has one of the most arable land surfaces in southern Africa (40 percent), only about 5 percent of its land is agriculturally developed. Most of its agricultural produce is the work of the approximately 300 white farmers who are former colonists. They produce 60 percent of the cattle, 90 percent of the pigs, 65 percent of the fruits and vegetables, and 99 percent of the wheat. From 75,000 whites in Zambia in 1964, the population has declined to 44,000.

Zambia has engaged in massive nationalization. Fifty-one percent of its copper production in the Anglo-American Corporation and
Roan Selection Trust, all privately owned land, and all private newspapers have been taken over by the government, as have banks and insurance companies, transportation, power, and communications industries. Part of Zambia's recent economic difficulties have been caused by the closure of its borders with Rhodesia in 1973, which ended the use of Zambia's railway links with Rhodesia. This railway carries 50 percent of Zambia's copper exports and 66 percent of its imports. Due to the worsening economic conditions, Kaunda reopened this railroad in October 1978.

International Posture: Like Mozambique, Zambia provides assistance and sanctuaries for the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front, specifically for the forces of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) of Joshua Nkomo. Nkomo maintains a guerrilla army of 6-8,000 men with 12 training camps, mainly in Angola, but with forward bases in Zambia with about 75 Cuban advisers. Kaunda has sought to moderate ZAPU attacks on Rhodesia and his reliance on the Cubans for fears of Rhodesian counterattacks, but Nkomo's shooting down of a civilian airliner and the terrorist murder of 10 of its 18 passengers on September 5, 1978 precipitated Rhodesian raids into Zambia against ZAPU bases.

Kaunda wishes to preserve his independence of the Soviet Union and its allies and for that reason wishes to avoid confrontation with Rhodesia that could strengthen ZAPU's forces in Zambia and require him to increase his reliance on the Soviets. The Soviet ambassador in Lusaka, V. Solodovnikov, is considered an important strategist who helped plan both Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa and Cuban intervention in Angola. In October 1978, other African states criticized Kaunda for re-opening the railroad through Rhodesia to South Africa and the Indian Ocean. The immediate reason for this decision was the emergency needs of Zambian agriculture for fertilizer imports before the November rains began and before the election of that month. The decision marked the end of Zambia's closure of its borders with Rhodesia since 1973 and indicated a new division among the FLS in their policy toward Rhodesia.

On October 29, a meeting of the other leaders of the FLS was held in Dar es Salaam at the request of Nyerere to discuss a common policy toward the war in Rhodesia. However, the meeting ended in dismal failure as only the most moderate of the leaders, President Khama, bothered to stay overnight. Neto and Kaunda left the same day and Machel did not come at all. The disputes among these leaders centered on Nkomo's recent talks with Ian Smith, on a response to Rhodesian raids against the states hosting the guerrilla forces, and on Kaunda's re-opening of the railroad. The failure of the FLS to achieve agreements on a common policy indicates their weaknesses and their need to attend to internal problems over the external and ideological matter of Rhodesian affairs.
The economic distress of Zambia and Kaunda's comparatively restraining role on the Soviet influence and terrorist action in Rhodesia led Western leaders in the summer to extend massive economic aid to Zambia. Earlier in the year the International Monetary Fund committed $390 million to Zambia for a three year period and the Carter Administration promised $100 million more. West Germany offered $100 million and Great Britain offered $27 million and large amounts of military equipment for defensive purposes (on condition that they would not be given to anti-Rhodesian forces). In June the World Bank promised $1 billion to Zambia over the next three years. The IMF loans were made on condition that the Zambian economy be placed under its surveillance for that time period.

CONCLUSION

The politico-economic pattern that predominates in the Frontline States is that governments with little support come to power through force or because they represent the only organized political movement in the area. Without adequate training or with preconceived ideological opinions, these governments have embarked on social and economic experiments with grandiose objectives of transforming their societies. The experiments inevitably fail to work and discontent develops. The discontent takes the form of political opposition, usually based on tribal and religious identities, or armed resistance. The government then relies increasingly on force and outside military help in order to stay in power and curtails civil and political liberties. It adopts a foreign policy nominally based on appeals to "African unity" (anti-apartheid, nationalism, or racial appeals) to disguise its own particularist base of support. While the government may seek Cuban and Soviet military aid, its economic needs can be met only by increased aid from the West (the Communist economic relationship with these states has been largely exploitative). Western governments are understandably reluctant to advance economic aid when the Frontline States show no capacity for efficient or honest economic management, but the natural resources, strategic position, and political role of these states require some Western assistance.

Three principal points have consistently sustained American support for the Frontline States. However, as indicated below, the recent historical record in Southern Africa does not sustain these contentions:

(1) Economic assistance to the FLS will improve U.S. relations with them and decrease their dependence on the Soviets. The FLS have turned to the Soviets only because the U.S., persisting in its "cold war" mentality and fear of Communism, has refused to support anti-colonial movements.
However, one of the most striking features of recent political developments in Africa has been the exclusion of the PRC from African affairs and the increased role of the Soviet bloc nations. This turnabout occurred despite the fact that the PRC had long been the most generous supporter of African independence movements and had given substantial aid to those states already independent. The following table shows Communist economic credits and grants to the FLS from 1954 to 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Eastern Europe (Soviet Bloc)</th>
<th>PRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$11 million</td>
<td>$12 million</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$3 million</td>
<td>$15 million</td>
<td>$59 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>$40 million</td>
<td>$13 million</td>
<td>$362 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>$6 million</td>
<td>$50 million</td>
<td>$307 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$60 million</td>
<td>$90 million</td>
<td>$371 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, CIA, November 1978, Table 4, p.5)

Only in Angola, then, did the Soviet bloc contribute more aid than the PRC, but the PRC's massive economic aid has been meaningless for political linkages or advantages. In Mozambique, for example, the PRC gave over three times what the Soviet bloc had contributed but Mozambique is now closer to the U.S.S.R. than any other African state except perhaps Ethiopia. In fact, economic aid has little to do with political alignment. The FLS depend on the Soviets and Cubans because they provide the military coercion that maintains these regimes in power and protects them from external support for their dissidents. The famine, illiteracy, and disease of their own populations appear to be less of a concern for the leaders of the FLS than their ability to imprison or destroy any hint of opposition to their power.

(2) The U.S., it is also argued, should give economic aid to the FLS because they contain valuable natural resources necessary to the Western economy.

The mineral resources of Southern Africa could be vitally important to the U.S. and European economies. However, some of the FLS do not have such vast natural resources; Mozambique, for instance, is lacking in them. Curiously, natural resources are also possessed by Rhodesia and South Africa, but moralistic policies based on a
concern for democracy and human rights seem to prevail in the discussion of these two states. While Mozambique receives assistance from the U.S., Rhodesia, much richer in such natural resources as chromium ore, receives nothing, and the U.S. continues to label Rhodesia an illegal regime. Presumably, the same standards and the same balance of realpolitik and moralistic foreign policy should apply to Rhodesia and South Africa as well as to the FLS, but in practice this does not seem to be the case. In any event, it is not certain to what degree U.S. aid to the FLS would improve access to their natural resources. There has been a recent trend in these states to promote U.S. aid and to restore to private corporations their facilities. This has come about because of their economic dependence on such enterprises and not because of economic assistance from the US government.

(3) It is important for the U.S. to develop closer ties to the FLS in order to promote a peaceful and stable transition to democracy in Rhodesia and South Africa.

The Carter Administration has actually sought to do this through Ambassadors Young's and McHenry's mission in southern Africa. However, even after U.S. overtures and offers of economic assistance, the leaders of the FLS refused all compromises on these questions. Even though Ian Smith and his colleagues in the Rhodesian government offered to attend an all-parties conference in October 1978, this was rejected by President Kaunda, Robert Mugabe, and Joshua Nkomo. In October Mozambique reaffirmed its support for sanctions against Rhodesia, "in as much as it has been noted that at present imperialism is launching a campaign to rehabilitate Ian Smith." Nyerere in his recent interview said that, "What has happened is that the Patriotic Front has been fighting and Smith now realizes that he will lose that war." (Washington Post, p. B1). The leadership of the FLS now sees that as long as the U.S. and Great Britain enforce sanctions against Rhodesia, their forces can win through guerrilla war and terrorism. Once again, military power and coercion mean more to them and offer better opportunities for gaining political power than economic assistance of diplomatic conferences.

While the importance of the Frontline States requires some U.S. involvement with them, it is difficult to advocate further financial commitment unless certain guarantees are forthcoming. Among the conditions which U.S. legislators and policymakers might consider are the following:

(1) An indication that the recipient states will undertake policies that would result in economic developments rather than ideological experiments or the satisfaction of particular political groups and sectors.

(2) A commitment that the economic assistance will not be used for terrorist operations against other countries, such as Rhodesia and Namibia for further destabilization of southern Africa.
(3) An agreement to respect existing borders and internal arrangements in other African states.

(4) A serious undertaking by the recipients that they seek to stabilize their relations with internal political movements, improve their records on human rights observations, and control corruption in their governments.

(5) A decrease in their reliance on or cooperation with the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, and other Communist states.

(6) An agreement to permit Western or international supervision of at least those sectors of the economy in which Western investments or loans are involved and a commitment to the security of these investments from nationalization or harmful regulation.

Such conditions, of course, would be resisted by the Frontline States as the continuations of Western "imperialism." However, the FLS leaders should be aware that their countries have serious economic and political crises, and that continuation of their present policies will only worsen their internal problems, drive their Western friends out of Africa, and lead to further reliance on the Soviets. The Frontline States need Western assistance more than the West needs them, regardless of their importance, and the Western states must have some assurance of change before they renew their economic and political commitments to them.

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