

## Annual Review - Summary Sheet

|   |                                 |                   |              |
|---|---------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| <b>PROGRAMME TITLE: CSSF Syria Security Strand</b>  |                                 |                   |              |
| <b>Country/Region:</b>  | Syria                           |                   |              |
| <b>HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)</b>  | Foreign and Commonwealth Office |                   |              |
| <b>Total Budget (FY 16/17):</b>   | ODA: £7.55m                     | Non-ODA: £20.65m  |              |
| <b>Start Date: 01 April 2016</b>  | <b>End Date: 31 March 2017</b>  |                   |              |
| <b>Outputs</b>  |                                 |                   | <b>Score</b> |
| Technical assistance and equipment provided to Moderate Armed Opposition  |                                 |                   | A            |
| Technical support provided to moderate security and justice structures  |                                 |                   | B            |
| <b>Outcomes:</b>  |                                 |                   |              |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Basic governance and services are quickly restored in areas taken from extremists and regime (to avoid the creation of power vacuums and support stability)</li> <li>• Moderate Armed Opposition are able to hold territory from extremists and regime</li> <li>• Basic security and justice is provided to communities</li> </ul> |                                 |                   |              |
| <b>Outcome Score: N/A</b>   |                                 | <b>Risk: High</b> |              |

### Summary of Programme Performance

| Year            | 2015/16 | 2016/17 |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----------------|---------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Programme Score | A       | A       |  |  |  |  |  |
| Risk Rating     | High    | High    |  |  |  |  |  |

### What support is the UK providing?

The programme aims to (1) restore and improve governance and basic service delivery in moderate opposition-controlled areas; (2) empower the Moderate Armed Opposition (MAO) in southern Syria to manage better the territory they control; and (3) support the provision of human rights-compliant basic security and justice services in key local communities. Contextual changes over the last year have shifted the strand's mandate in the north increasingly towards countering violent extremism (CVE). These projects aim to confront and challenge extremist groups and foster moderate institutions. The projects work in target areas to: improve the capacity of moderate actors to: hold and manage territory; provide stabilisation responses to local community needs quickly; and provide basic security and justice services at the local level, at the expense of extremists.

### Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last review

There have been significant changes in the context since the last review, particularly in northern Syria. The MAO experienced a significant loss of territory in northern Syria, primarily due to the fall of Aleppo City to the regime, and the expansion of extremist groups and the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield campaign. This led to a marked decrease in the geographical space in which security strand projects could operate in the north.

In the south, the area along the Jordanian border under opposition control has not changed much, and MAO groups continue to hold significant territory. However, the continued presence of Daesh has led to heightened security measures, which has limited movement across the Jordanian border. Despite the significant challenges posed by a volatile and high-risk context, the projects under the security strand have, overall, made good progress over the period. Most of the recommendations made in last year's reviews of the projects in the security strand have been addressed. However, a number remain relevant, particularly around maintaining up-to-date and relevant results frameworks at both project and strand level. The projects in the strand were not designed as complementary parts of a coherent, unified programme. But while they are individually relevant to the UK's policy objectives, their aggregate contribution to higher-level outcomes is unclear, and remains difficult to assess. Research and analysis has been central to the projects in the strand - and over the last year, important steps were taken towards strengthening the collection and use of data. However, the increased availability of data has not yet been integrated into monitoring and evaluation processes.

### Summary of recommendations for the next year

Reflect the need for differentiated approaches in northern and southern Syria, and security strand projects should be re-calibrated accordingly.

Expand the strand's remit into the justice sector. The provision of justice services is central to extremist groups' legitimacy and authority in the north - enhancing moderate courts' capacity would provide a challenge to extremists on a crucial front. In the south, improving the justice services provided by moderate courts will enhance the legitimacy of the MAO, and strengthen their resilience against possible future expansion of extremists in the south. Careful consideration should be given to whether the additional level of risk associated with expanding into the justice sector is within the UK's current risk appetite.

Revise the security strand's results framework to capture the most relevant aggregate, gender-disaggregated results of the strand's different projects, and to articulate more clearly the linkages between outputs and outcomes.

Use project's increasing body of research and access to survey data to measure higher level political outcomes of strand projects and test project assumptions. The projects have demonstrated that accessing and using data is possible even in highly volatile and high-risk contexts. The next step is to use that data to inform monitoring and evaluation processes.