

Annual Review - Summary Sheet

PROGRAMME TITLE: Iraq - Resilience and Stabilisation		
Country/Region:	Iraq	
HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)	Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)	
Total Budget:	ODA: £16.38m	Non-ODA: £0
Start Date: 1 April 2016	End Date: 31 March 2017	
Outputs		Score
Public works & light infrastructure rehabilitation projects undertaken		A+
People, including households & small businesses, in liberated areas served by livelihood enhancement efforts		A
Stabilisation support provided through technical assistance and Government of Iraq (GoI) capacity building		A
Local governorate, security & community dialogue facilitation mechanisms developed		B
Efforts undertaken to reduce the threat of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) including areas cleared and risk mitigation education provided to vulnerable populations		B
Outcome: Daesh influence diminished, increased community cohesion & GoI institutions representative, responsive and accountable.		
Outcome Score: N/A	Risk: Medium	

Summary of Programme Performance

Year	2015/2016	2016/2017						
Programme Score	A	A						
Risk Rating	High	Medium						

What support is the UK providing?

The CSSF Iraq Resilience and Stabilisation Programme has provided targeted programme funding, a variety of tools such as diplomacy and communications, and technical advice and assistance across a range of projects. The aim of the programme was to help build a more stable and secure Iraq by diminishing Daesh influence, increasing community cohesion, and enabling GoI institutions to become more representative, responsive and accountable. The programme has focused on securing the return of the population to newly liberated areas of Iraq and improving income and livelihoods in those locations.

Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last review

Progress has been made against the extensive recommendations from 2015/16 in a challenging operating environment. The team has helpfully developed a tracking tool to monitor progress which highlights those recommendations actioned and those still needing attention.

In summary, multiple recommendations have been actioned. To highlight a few: a Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) adviser has been recruited and will start summer 2017; an evidence plan has been drafted to ensure improved evidence integration; significant effort has been put into reviewing the results framework and updating it with partner reporting; a gender sensitive Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) was completed and will be a useful tool for evidence generation, a rolling analysis is planned to keep the assessments current; the programme remained flexible and adaptive in regards to recognising and filling geographic and thematic gaps especially in relation to uncertainty about the start of Mosul liberation operations and subsequent stabilisation activities.

Areas requiring further attention include: third party monitoring of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) activity (which will be addressed in 2017-18) and UNDP sharing lessons; the Theory of Change (ToC) has been updated, but the sources of evidence for testing assumptions could be strengthened, which means that it remains a challenge to find evidence that shows how the immediate outcomes of activities are impacting the lives of beneficiaries.

Summary of recommendations for the next year

- 1) M&E:** It is recommended that the team create a framework for Monitoring, Evaluation, Research and Learning (MERL) across all pillars of the 2017-18 programme. Establishing a common platform for MERL will create improved efficiencies between the different programmes and

projects data and research outputs. This is a method commonly used in theory-based evaluations and will allow the framework to be used quickly and efficiently in regular updates of the ToC. It will also be a helpful tool for partner coordination and could reduce duplication and highlight opportunities for use across the pillars of the CSSF programme, across humanitarian and stabilisation activities within the UK government, and with other donor and implementing partners.

- 2) Implementing Partners: Danish Refugee Council (DRC)** – closely monitor performance and delivery of results given the slow start. The team should assess the scalability of the DRC model and consider whether DRC efforts are focused in the right locations or whether more value might be added elsewhere. **Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS)** - performance in Mosul should be reviewed given the scale of the effort and the different operating environment to previous locations, consider the third party M&E of FFIS activity and press for more impact data, review FFIS target setting given the over achievements in 2016-17. The UK should remain firm on pushing FFIS to engage productively with local government and Gol while supporting NGO programming and coordinating with other donors to support the development of an inclusive local political settlement. **United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)** – monitor performance in education delivery and issues with the Gol regarding accreditation. Continue to press for more qualitative data on effect of mine clearance activity. Discuss exit strategy with UNMAS and their plans to develop Gol capacity to enable future transition of responsibility.
- 3) Results Framework:** The results framework for 2017-18 needs to be refreshed with a shift towards more qualitative indicators which will help assess impact. Quarterly milestones should be included to assist overall and in-year assessment of performance. Weightings for the different outputs need to be agreed early in the year; we would recommend greater weightings on areas that align with the UK approach to stabilisation, and outputs that are most critical to achieving stated outcomes and impact.
- 4) Stabilisation:** The focus of donor interest in FFIS is infrastructure rehabilitation and livelihoods. The programme team should maximise the UK influence to close the gap between the time-bound reconstruction focus of the UNDP stabilisation programmes and the necessary political work of supporting a local political settlement and consent for government.
- 5) Conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity and human rights:** The overarching programme would have benefited from a clearer overarching statement on conflict sensitivity, which has been remedied in the successor programme. In order to strengthen the Board's oversight of conflict sensitivity, the CSSF team should consider including conflict sensitivity and gender sensitivity as standing agenda items for country board meetings. In addition to the Overseas Security and Justice Assessment (OSJA), human rights issues should more be routinely discussed and reviewed with implementing partners.
- 6) Risks:** Given the operating environment, the Board should strengthen its oversight of top risks, in coordination with DFID governance as required. The CSSF team should consider how a fuller range of risks can be identified, monitored, managed, and escalated.