The Limits of Dynamic Equivalence in Bible Translation

D. A. Carson

Printed with permission

In this article the author welcomes the careful use of dynamic equivalent principles in Bible translation but warns against the abuses of applying the principle beyond the limits of linguistic priorities and of absolutizing the dichotomy between meaning and message. Readers' response to these issues is welcomed. (Editor)

Generally speaking, a newly minted expression no sooner triumphs, capturing a revered place in an ever widening circle of users, than it is debased. Its very triumph almost ensures its defeat, especially if it is a clever, catchy, quasi-technical term, for its very popularity will prompt many to use it even though they do not possess any deep understanding of the setting which called it into being or of the limitations of its original context.

The Triumph of Dynamic Equivalence Translations

So it is with 'dynamic equivalence.' As far as those who struggle with biblical translation are concerned, dynamic equivalence has won the day—and rightly so. Its victory is hailed by many signs of the times. There is widespread recognition of the dismal inadequacy of merely formal equivalence in translation, buttressed by thousands and thousands of examples. Undergirding such recognition is the belated understanding that terms such as 'literal translation' and 'paraphrase' are steeped in ambiguity, and in any case belong, not in mutually exclusive categories, but on the same spectrum: a 'too-literal' translation can be as bad as a 'too-paraphrastic' translation, if for different reasons. Few translators of any competence would today deny such fundamental sets of priorities as the following:

1. Contextual consistency has priority over verbal consistency (or word-for-word concordance),
2. Dynamic equivalence has priority over formal correspondence,
3. The aural (heard) form of language has priority over the written form,
4. Forms that are used by and acceptable to the audience for

which a translation is intended have priority over forms that may be traditionally more prestigious. Dynamic equivalence displays its triumph in the publishing houses, in the continuing parade of multiplying helps, front rank research, manuals of problems, reflective textbooks, assorted popularizations and sane assessments of recent translations. Missiologists are now comfortable with classifications of languages based not on their roots (e.g. Indo-European, Semitic) as on their use (or non-use) in literature and education (primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary), and they have become sensitive to the differences between translating the Bible in an 'overlap language' (one in which the colloquial and the literary forms of the language overlap significantly, e.g. English) and translating the Bible almost exclusively at a literary level (e.g. Arabic). As they have been sensitized to the kinds of readers, so they sympathize with the very different linguistic needs of diverse readers within any particular language or dialect. There is a new appreciation for the work of the receptor-language stylist in the translation process, and in the best seminaries, lecturers in Greek and Hebrew


3. We may think, for instance, of the growing list of handbooks/commentaries for translators, published by UBS.
4. It is risky to single out individual items for special praise. However, representing quite different contributions, one may think of recent developments in discourse analysis; of sophisticated and creative individual essays like that of Kenneth L. Pike, Agreement Types Dispersed into a Nine-Cell Spectrum,' along with other contributions to On Language, Culture and Religion, ed. Matthew Black and William A. Smalley (The Hague: Mouton, 1974) 275–286; of developments in computer software that are promising new and sophisticated lexical, grammatical and syntactical concordances.
6. E. Nida/Taber, Theory and Practice; William L. Wonderly, Bible Translations for Popular Use (London: UBS, 1968); and many others.
7. The list is so long that it cannot be registered here. Many articles in The Bible Translator fit into this category.
10. Nida, ibid. 136–137, goes so far as to recommend that Bible translation teams consider adopting the procedure of United Nations and European Common Market translation departments, whose first drafts are produced by stylists of the receptor language, the specialists checking their work as a second step (instead of the inverse order).
take extra pains to convey a literary feel for the biblical languages, no less than the rudiments of their grammar. Even unreconstructed grammarians such as myself, thoroughly convinced that a profound and growing knowledge of the donor languages is a great desideratum in Bible translation, are no less concerned to expose their students to the elements of modern linguistic theory and practice. At least in part, all of this has come about because dynamic equivalence, rightly understood, is essential for good translation. Only the linguistically incompetent would today argue that the translator needs facility in the languages with which he or she is working, but not understanding of the content of the text. At its best, dynamic equivalence, far from jeopardizing good translation, is essential for fidelity in translation. Fidelity in conveying meaning, tone, emotional impact, naturalness, awkwardness and much more.

The Potential for Abuse

Unfortunately, now that ‘dynamic equivalence’ is so popular, it is not infrequently abused. I hasten to add that the most careful scholars in the field do not err in this way. What is still one of the finest books in the area, The Theory and Practice of Translation, by Nida and Taber, abounds in wise and sensitive caveats. For example, the translator is carefully warned against trying to get behind the biblical writer, or ahead of him; and he is cautioned not to confuse linguistic translation with ‘cultural translation,’ transforming the Pharisees and Sadducees, for instance, into present-day religious parties. In other words, the historical particularity of the text is to be respected.

But sadly, similar care is not shown by all. The caveats and restrictions which make dynamic equivalence so useful a way of thinking about translation are sometimes overlooked or abandoned; and this route has become progressively easier to follow as professionals have come to think of contextualization in highly diverse ways, and as such theoretical developments as the new hermeneutic and what might be called philosophical structuralism have made their own impact on the translator and his art. Such developments are so complex I dare not broach them here, except tangentially. But it may be useful to offer a number of reflections on dynamic equivalence and related concepts, reflections which may help translators avoid the pitfalls inherent in some of these developments. It is worth insisting one more time, at the outset, that the best practitioners of dynamic equivalence have always observed the contents of this list, even if they might not phrase their positions this way. In other words, I am not surreptitiously advocating the overthrow of the principles of dynamic equivalence, but rather encouraging clarity of thought and the adoption of necessary caveats.

Limits to Equivalence of Response

The most common descriptions of ‘dynamic equivalence,’ as insightful as they are, must be guarded against as having considerable potential for abuse. In a work now considered a classic, Nida describes ‘dynamic equivalence translation’ as the ‘closest natural equivalent to the source-language message’ and insists it is ‘directed primarily toward equivalence of response rather than equivalence of form.’ Again:

Dynamic equivalence is therefore to be defined in terms of the degree to which the receptors of the message in the receptor language respond to it in substantially the same manner as the receptors in the source language. This response can never be identical, for the cultural and historical settings are too different, but there should be a high degree of equivalence of response, or the translation will have failed to accomplish its purpose.

Or, as Munday remarks, ‘In the final analysis, a translation is good or bad, right or wrong, in terms of how the reader understands and reacts.’

I have no quarrel with these quotations, all three of which stress equivalence of response, as long as they are referring to linguistic priorities alone. Clearly, a translation is poor if by preserving formal equivalence in word order or syntactical construction or the like it

---

12. As in n.2, supra.
13. Ibid. 8.
15. See, for instance, the discussions by David Hesselgrave (along with the responses, and his rejoinder), The Contextualization Continuum: Gospel in Context 2/1 (July, 1979) 4-26; and James O. Buswell, III, ‘Contextualization: Theory, Tradition and Method,’ Theology and Mission: Papers Given at Trinity Consultation No. 7 ed. David J. Hesselgrave (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1978) 87-111.
16. Bibliography in these areas is extensive. The most significant contributions are listed in D. A. Carson, ‘Hermeneutics: A brief assessment of some recent trends,’ Thematios 5/2 (January 1980) 12-20; to which must be added the excellent work by A. G. Thielson, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980).
obsures the meaning of the original text, or transmutes it into something quite different, or remains completely opaque to those whose tongue is the receptor language. Moreover, selecting appropriate linguistic priorities requires a sensitive knowledge of the receptor culture, since there may be cultural associations between linguistically constructed and cultural values such that an entirely false impression is conveyed—false, that is to say, as measured by what was originally conveyed. 'Blessed is the man who does not stand in the way of sinners' (Psa. 1:1, NIV) is a shockingly poor rendering of the Hebrew, because 'to stand in someone's way' in English means 'to hinder someone,' whereas the thought in Hebrew is 'to walk in someone's footsteps,' 'to walk in someone's moccasins' or, less metaphorically, 'to adopt someone else's lifestyle and values and habits.' There are far more difficult cases discussed in the standard texts; and, as pursued by a linguistics expert such as Nida, 'dynamic equivalence' is surely in these cases an eminently worthwhile goal which no one competent in two or more languages would wish to gainsay.

Nevertheless, there are several ways in which the expression 'dynamic equivalence' can easily be abused. Perhaps it is best to provide illustrations of several kinds of abuse; and, to focus discussion, I shall draw them from the writings of Charles Kraft. First, it is increasingly common so to focus on the 'response' aspect of dynamic equivalence that several weighty matters are overlooked. At the extreme, the resulting 'versions' may be called 'transculturations' (to use the language of Kraft).20

Kraft acknowledges, 'In a translation it is inappropriate to give the impression that Jesus walked the streets of Berkeley or London or Nairobi. But a transculturation, in order to reach its target audience effectively, may do exactly that.'21 These transculturations 'dare to be specific to their audiences and free to be true to God's imperative to communicate rather than simply to impress. In this they demonstrate the deep concern of their authors for the total communicational situation, not simply for one or another aspect of it.'22 Kraft then goes on to suggest (as he does elsewhere) that those who disagree with his diagnosis and react negatively against 'proper transculturation' are the modern equivalents of the 'orthodox' retainers of the old cultural forms' against whom Jesus 'waged a running battle for culturally relevant transculturation,' or of the 'orthodox' Judaizers of Acts 15.23

These assessments raise a host of issues. A glimpse of them may be afforded by a series of questions: Did Jesus primarily or even marginally set himself against the Jewish religious leaders of his day out of concern for the transculturation of an agreed message, or out of a fundamental break with his opponents' understanding of Scripture? How much of his disagreement stemmed from their failure to perceive the new developments on the salvation-historical plane, his claims to fulfill Old Testament expectations concerning the coming of the Messiah? How valid, logically speaking, is the constant disjuncture Kraft raises between his own approach to 'dynamic-equivalence transculturation' and a kind of incompetent fixation upon mere content devoid of desire and/or ability to communicate? Is the disjunction essentially fair, or does it approach caricature?

When we say we aim to generate the same response in the readers of the receptor language as in the readers of the donor language, what do we mean? Suppose the readers of the original New Testament document were largely alienated by the truth of what Paul wrote: should we aim to reproduce similar alienation today, in order to preserve 'equivalence of response'? Can we expect exactly the same response among the urban, secularized, twentieth century readers of Leviticus or of Romans as their respective first readers? Is it not better, if we are going to define 'dynamic equivalence' in terms of equivalent response, to understand such equivalence in linguistic categories, i.e. in terms of the removal of as many as possible of the false linguistic barriers (along with the associations each linguistic category carries) which actually impede the communication of truth?

Each of these questions could easily generate its own paper; and one or two of them will re-emerge in subsequent points. I think it is clear, however, that the hidden fallacy against which many of these questions are directed is the unwitting assumption that 'response' is the ultimate category in translation. Strictly speaking, that is not true; theologically speaking, it is unwise; evangelistically speaking, it is uncontrollable, not to say dangerous. I hasten to add that I am not surreptitiously supporting obscurity in translation or obscuring scholarship. The concerns Kraft is feeling are real ones, and need addressing. My criticism is more fundamental: his solution, the

---

22. Ibid. 286 (emphasis is Kraft's).
23. Ibid. 287.
elevation of response above truth, fails precisely in the areas where it claims to be strong, for the response is not rendered equivalent by such means as he advances. The aim of a good translation is to convey the total content—informational, emotional, connotational etc. — of the original message to the reader (or 'hearer,' where the translation is read publicly) in the secondary language.

Limits of Equivalence of Theologizing

We read in contemporary literature on missiology of 'dynamic-equivalence theologizing' and 'dynamic-equivalence churches.' Once again, the concerns behind these labels are real. For example, biblically faulty and/or culturally myopic ecclesiastical structures may be imposed on a church in which the entire blue-print were handed down from heaven, complete with robes for the choir and Roberts' Rules of Order. Nevertheless, all such evils are better addressed without talking of 'dynamic-equivalence churches,' because: (a) As the expression is used by its inventor, social custom becomes so controlling a feature that the Scriptures are not permitted to reform society. Kraft appeals to the Kru of Liberia who state that 'You cannot trust a man with only one wife,' concluding that Kru church leadership need not be monogamous, despite Paul's strictures on this point. Kraft thinks that eventually polygamy would likely die out among the Kru, 'just as, through God's interaction with the Hebrews, polygamy died out in Hebrew culture—over the course of a few thousand years.' Until then, polygamy should be tolerated. There seems to be, from Kraft's examples, few things which the Bible seems clearly to demand of church structure, which could not be jettisoned in favor of 'dynamic-equivalence churches.' (b) More important, the extension of the expression 'dynamic equivalence' into areas far removed not only from linguistic priorities but also from translation itself reflects back on problems of translation and muddies otherwise clear distinctions. In the name of an ill-defined and infinitely plastic 'dynamic equivalence,' almost any translational aberration may be justified.

Limits to the Dichotomy Between Meaning and Message

Whereas the expression 'dynamic equivalence' started out as a category belonging to the realm of translation and set in opposition to various kinds of linguistic formalism, the extension of its use to far broader issues is currently being grounded in a variety of faddish theoretical constructs which do not stand up to rigorous scholarship but which are cited with ill-deserved authority as if the subjects with which they deal were closed—e.g. the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the New Hermeneutic, and some recent communication theory. The first, in its crudest form, makes human beings the determined captives of their language, and their language becomes a guide to their 'social reality.' The second, in its extreme form, calls in question the possibility of objective knowledge as text and interpreter progressively 'interpret' one another, without terminus, lost in profound relativity. The third, conjoined with structuralism, insists that there is a rigid dichotomy between meaning and message. All three of these notions, wittingly or unwittingly, lie not far from the surface of the following lines:

Contemporary understandings contend that a major difference between messages and meanings lie in the fact that messages can be transmitted in linguistic form while meanings exist only in the hearts and minds of people. Contemporary communologists (sic) see communicators with meanings in their minds that they would like to transmit to receptors. Communicators take these meanings and formulate them, usually in linguistic form, into messages which they then transmit to receptors. Receptors then, listen to the messages and construct within their minds sets of meanings that may or may not correspond with the meanings intended by the communicator.

Meanings, therefore, do not pass from me to you, only messages. The meanings exist only within me or within you. . . . The messages, then, serve as stimulators rather than as containers. Receptors, in response to the stimulus of messages construct meanings that may or may not correspond to what the communicator intended.

There is considerable insight here, of course. Each man is finite in his understanding, and the potential for misunderstanding increases when the message is translated. Communicators do not always say exactly what they mean, and the best communicators will try to encourage the

24. This is the title of chapter 15 of Kraft, Christianity in Culture.
26. Ibid. 54.
27. Ibid.
feed back necessary to discover whether their meaning has been absorbed by the receptors. Nevertheless, as stated these lines present their case too disjunctively. Some 'contemporary understandings contend that there is a major difference between messages and meanings', but others, while recognizing that any individual communication may be imperfectly grasped, nevertheless insist that the message/meaning disjunction, taken absolutely, is one form of the intentional fallacy, that human beings cannot entertain complex meanings without propositions, and that therefore meaning and message, though not identical, cannot be divided absolutely, that the commonality of our creaturehood in the image of God makes verbal communication less problematic than some think; that even particip­ant knowledge can be verbalized among those who share common understandings (whether sex or knowing God); that the individual can 'fuse' his 'horizon of understanding' with the 'horizon of understanding' of the communicator in order to assure true understanding of the message, even if it may not be exhaustive understanding; that meanings can and do pass from one person to the other; that messages are neither mere stimulators nor mere communicators, but the very stuff of the meaning, insofar as the two individuals share semantic ranges and the like, and insofar as the communicator says what he means.

Much more needs to be said on this first, difficult point, but this sketch must serve to remind us that adherence to 'dynamic equivalence' as a linguistic principle in translation does not commit one to a considerable conceptual baggage increasingly common in the literature.

Limits to the Equivalence of Biblical History

Dynamic equivalence must not be permitted to override the historical particularity of the Bible. There is a sense in which any text is historically conditioned. Even in the case of proverbs and aphorisms, those most timeless of literary forms, some examples will prove more easily adaptable than others. 'Do you see a man wise in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him' (Proverbs 26:12) is likely to be coherent in most languages; 'Better to live on a corner of the roof than share a house with a quarrelsome wife' (Proverbs 25:24) presupposes flat roofs frequented by humans, not snow-shedding sloped roofs never visited except to replace a gutter or a TV aerial. The problem becomes much more difficult when we leave aphorism and come to narrative. The problems of equivalence can be grouped under the headings (1) ecology, (2) material culture, (3) social culture, (4) religious culture, and (5) linguistic culture. There is no simple way to categorize the possible solutions; and the problems are very diverse. An Eskimo tribe reads a Bible that speaks of desert and lions; a Mexican tribe in Yucatan has never experienced the four seasons typical of temperate zones (cf. Mark 13:28). If we follow TEV's 'police' or NEB's 'constable' in Matthew 5:25, are we not unwittingly fostering images of a gun-toting officer or an English bobby? Perhaps these cases don't matter; perhaps 'police' is acceptable. But many cases have stings in the tail. If for instance we replace 'recline at food' or 'recline at table' with 'sit down to eat', we are going to have a tough job imagining how John managed to get his head on Jesus' breast. Preservation of descriptions of what is to us an alien custom, reclining at tables, makes it possible to understand a later action, John placing his head on Jesus' breast.

I am not now dealing with such obvious distortions as 'this is the essence of all true religion' (Matthew 7:12, Phillips) for 'this sums up the Law and the Prophets' (NIV), or 'then a diabolical plan came into the mind of Judas' (Luke 22:3, Phillips) for 'Then Satan entered Judas' (NIV). Rather, what interests me at this juncture is that God has revealed himself to men in time-space history—to particular men and women, spatially and temporally and linguistically located. If we are not very cautious about the way we treat the historical particulars, we may introduce such substantive anachronisms that the story becomes intrinsically unbelievable—especially as the receptor group grows in understanding and historical awareness. There are ways of overcoming the obscurity intrinsic in references to customs and experiences unknown on receptor soil—for instance, Scripture notes and teachers (further discussed below), and meanwhile, we must ask how much we are losing when we remove too many indicators of historical and cultural 'distance.' How such problems are resolved may depend to some extent on the literary stage of development of the receptor group, but even if the group is coming across the printed page for the first time, and enjoys virtually no comprehension of cultures other than their own, it must be remembered that this receptor group will likely use this new translation of the Bible for decades to come, maybe a century or two. During all of that time, an increasing number of this receptor people will be exposed to new cultures and education. How well will the Bible translation serve then? Christianity is a religion
whose roots are deeply imbedded in the particularities of history, and
our translations must not obscure that fact.

Limits to the Equivalence of Salvation History

Dynamic equivalence must not be permitted to mask the development of
and internal relations within salvation history. Suppose, for
instance, a tribe has a long tradition of sacrificing pigs, but has never
so much as heard of sheep. Is it in that case justifiable to render John
1:29, 'Look, the swine of God, who takes away the sin of the world!'? I
would argue strongly in the negative, not only because of the
importance of historical particularity, defended in the last point, but
because of the plethora of rich allusions preserved in Scripture across
the sweep of salvation history. In what sense does Jesus 'fulfill' the Old
Testament sacrificial system if that system sacrificed lambs on the Day
of Atonement and at Passover, whereas Jesus is portrayed as a swine?
How then will John 1:29 relate to Isa 52:13–53:12, the fourth servant
song, or to images of the warrior lamb in the Apocalypse (e.g.
Revelation 5:6)? Shall we change all such references to 'pigs'? 'All we
like swine have gone astray...'. And if so, do we then make the
biblical pig-references clean, and designate some other animal
unclean? No; it is surely simpler to preserve 'Iam, In

There is a second way in which appeal to dynamic equivalence
must not be permitted to mask the development and internal relations
of salvation history. We have witnessed a negative example in Kraft's
appeal to polygamy under the old covenant. What Kraft never
struggles with is the nature of the continuity/discontinuity pattern
when moving from old covenant to new. One can no more make
legitimate appeal to the Old Testament to support polygamy among
Christian leaders than one can appeal to the OT to defend continued
Christian maintenance of all dietary laws. The fact that Christians
disagree over certain details on the continuity/discontinuity pattern is
no justification for the failure to wrestle with the issue when dealing
with something as sensitive in parts of Africa as is polygamy.32

32. For a detailed attempt to wrestle with problems of continuity and discontinuity,
with substantial implications for the topic at hand, see D. A. Carson, ed., From Sabbath
to Lord's Day: A Biblical, Historical and Theological Investigation (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1982).

The Necessity for Good Exegetes and Grammarians

In the light of these observations, I am inclined, somewhat hesitantly,
to call in question the judgment of Nida and others, who argue that
good exegetes and grammarians make poor translators.33 Increasingly,
they say that translation projects should begin with stylists who enjoy
some marginal knowledge of Greek and Hebrew but who are
competent in the receptor language and permit the specialists their say
only at the cleaning up stage.

Quite clearly the gifts and training of the stylists are necessary. But I
wonder if grammarians and exegetes are dismissed too rapidly. Most
field translators for such organizations as Wycliffe Bible Translators
and the American Bible Society have one theological degree, perhaps
two—i.e. two or three years (i.e. four to six semester courses) of
Greek, and perhaps half that of Hebrew. Their problem, it may be, is
not that they have too much Greek, but too little. I would go further,
and suggest that even many teachers of Greek and Hebrew in colleges,
seminaries and universities do not enjoy much facility in the language.
These are precisely the kind of people who are least likely to be
sensitive to the demands of 'dynamic equivalence.' How often, for
example, have I taken second year Greek students aside and explained
at length how rarely a Greek participle should be rendered by an
English participle, how many of the Greek connectives must find no
equivalent in an English word but in the flow of English style, and so
forth. And I have learned that it is my best students in advanced
exegesis and advanced grammar courses who learn such flexibility
most thoroughly. To be good translators, they would benefit from
further study in linguistics and in literary style; but at a guess,
advanced competence in the donor languages will not prove a
hindrance but a strength in most cases, provided the teacher is aware
of the linguistic complexities and subtleties that surround translation.

The reason I have suggested this alternative theory—and I admit it is
only theory—is because the drift in many academic circles is toward
so great a flexibility in translation that, as we have seen, 'communication'
becomes an ideal abstracted from the message to be communicated,
and new voices loudly insist there is an impregnable wedge
between the meaning of the donor and the meaning of the receptor. To
provide safeguards against these erroneous positions, we must
encourage translators not only to pursue studies in linguistics and

33. Most recently, Nida argues the point in 'Bible Translation for the Eighties,' 136–137.
think that, by and large, dynamic equivalence should override the distancing that stems both from historical particularism and from the history of redemption, I favor a fairly liberal use of notes explaining cultural, religious, ecological and linguistic points, especially in Bibles designed for groups made up largely of first readers who therefore have very little knowledge of the world outside their own setting. But great pains should be taken to make those notes as 'neutral' and as objective as possible. Theological notes, homiletic comments, notes explaining the flow, homiletic hints—all should be relegated to separate books. The impetus for this judgment is twofold: (a) In this way we are less likely to impose on the new converts the details of a theological framework that may be in some measure faulty, or perhaps with emphases tangential to their perceived world. (b) I grew up in Québec where, at the time, if Roman Catholics would read the Bible at all, it would be with Roman Catholic notes (such as the Léger version of the New Testament). I witnessed firsthand how such notes could brainwash a people. Even when theoretical allowance is made for the distinction between text and note, the constant re-reading of both on the same page in practice blurs this distinction and shapes the theological convictions of the reader. What applies to the Léger version applies mutatis mutandis to the New Scofield Reference Bible, the Ryrie Study Bible and half a dozen others. It would be good to avoid transmitting our mistakes in this area to the mission fields where Bibles are appearing in new languages for the first time. Equally, it would be good to remember that the God of the Bible ordained that there would be evangelists and teachers in his church. Translation of the Scriptures is not the only thing needed for adequate communication of the gospel: God has equally mandated the training and deployment of evangelists and pastor/teachers. Failure to account for this aspect of our task may unwittingly encourage a 'translation' that is to some degree a perceived replacement of human agents.

In observing such qualifications on 'dynamic equivalence' as the ones I have suggested in this article, perhaps we shall retard the debasement of the expression now in progress, and, more important, encourage reliable translation of the Word of God.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{35} Theory and Practice 30.

\textsuperscript{36} After completing this paper, I was loaned (by Dr. David Hesselgrave) the latest book by Eugene A. Nida and William D. Revburn, \textit{Meaning Across Cultures} (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1981). I am delighted to say that they raise somewhat similar warnings and, with far more linguistic competence at their disposal than I have, provide numerous colorful examples.