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When a person’s immune system doesn’t work at full capacity, their body has a difficult time fighting harmful bacteria and they run a higher risk of getting a food-borne illness or developing serious complications from food poisoning. If you are planning to pursue food safety courses, or you have already started your program, read on to learn how individuals with weak immune systems can avoid consuming potentially harmful bacteria.
Experts with food quality assurance and quality control training know that canned foods are typically prepared in clean and safe conditions. On the other hand, raw and unprocessed foods (or processed foods like jams and mayonnaise) that have been opened should always be stored at safe temperatures. Safely handling food is an important part of keeping potentially harmful bacteria from causing food poisoning. People with a weakened immune system should wash their hands in warm soapy water before and after they handle food.
Food safety pros know that fruits and vegetables should be thoroughly rinsed under cool running water before consumption. Additionally, people with a weakened immune system should use a meat thermometer to ensure that meats are heated to 74 °C (165 °F). Unfortunately, even with safe food handling and good storing habits, there are still some foods that should not be consumed by individuals with weak immune systems.
For instance, unpasteurized milk and juices have not undergone the procedures maintained by professionals with food safety training to eliminate harmful bacteria.
In addition, people with weakened immune systems should also avoid food from potlucks, salad bars, and buffets, since they are more likely to have been left at unsafe temperatures that can promote bacteria growth. Unless you're in a particularly remote area, you can't go far in most develoA­ped countries without finding a fast-food restaurant.
The fast food phenomenon evolved from drive-in restaurants built in southern California in the early 1940s. A­Their old drive-in had already made them rich, but the new restaurant - which became McDonald's - made the brothers famous. Before the McDonald brothers invented their fast-food production system, some restaurants did make food pretty quickly. Instead of being designed to facilitate the preparation of a variety of food relatively quickly, the kitchen's purpose was to make a very large amount of a very few items. When you visit different restaurants belonging to the same fast-food chain, the menu and food are pretty much the same.
Copies of the Speedee Service System spread throughout California and the rest of the United States as restaurateurs adapted the techniques for their own restaurants.
Government and industry have been investigating foodborne illness and outbreaks for decades. The complexity of the investigations and the multiple players involved invariably lead to coordination challenges. Investigators need to quickly identify the vehicle (contaminated food) and alert the public to minimize further cases of illness and at the same time they need to be right.
Being wrong can cause serious economic harm to industry, reduce public and industry confidence in government and undermine support and trust for future investigations and findings.
Although many people only hear about foodborne disease illness when it is linked to a nationally distributed food, that view is a very limited one. Approximately 1 – 5 percent of all reported sporadic cases of foodborne illness agents are ever linked to an outbreak.
The CDC’s PulseNet laboratory-based surveillance system has been successful in identifying many diffuse outbreaks since its inception in 1995. These outbreak investigations have often resulted in greater public awareness of the food contamination due to public alerts and recalls. As a result, there are approximately 3,000 state and local agencies with some regulatory responsibility for food safety in the U.S. When it comes to foodborne disease surveillance, detection, investigation and response, there often is a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities and decision-making authority. Staffs who conduct these investigations usually have many responsibilities in addition to foodborne disease.
Federal or state epidemiologists may need a follow-up interview on a sporadic case of illness that is a PFGE match to other sporadic cases around the country. Some of the smaller agencies that do not conduct many foodborne disease outbreak investigations suddenly find themselves thrust into a situation they are inadequately staffed or prepared for.
Nevertheless, staffs at all levels of government are invariably dedicated to public service and public health. Experienced staff is leaving for retirement before benefits are lost or to take better paying jobs elsewhere.
All parties involved in outbreak investigations are prohibited from sharing patient identifiers, regulatory agencies are sometimes prohibited from sharing commercial confidential or proprietary information (processing methods, customer lists) as well as investigational findings that might be used in any future enforcement actions. Similarly, the food industry is looking for information about what is going on to help them inform government investigations, focus and speed up recalls and to rapidly put in place interventions to prevent future outbreaks. Further, initial laboratory and environmental information may not be sufficient to help identify the vehicle. The skills to perform these tasks are most likely gained with a graduate degree in epidemiology and yet many epidemiology offices have few if any staff trained at this level.
This loss of disease surveillance capacity could pose a longer-term dilemma along with the obvious loss of immediate outbreak detection capacity.
So-called stealth or hidden ingredients as vehicles are being identified more often in foodborne disease outbreaks. Two of the best-known examples of stealth ingredient outbreaks have already been mentioned.
The 2008 multi-state Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak was first associated with tomatoes and later shown to be linked to Jalapeno peppers. These examples and more recent ones involving ground pepper used as a spice in restaurants (Salmonella Rissen) and on processed meats (Salmonella Montevideo) point to how nuanced it can be to identify vehicles from epidemiological studies. Investigators are looking for additional tools such as product testing and ingredient tracebacks to identify vehicles that case control or cohort epidemiological studies alone cannot tease out.
Similar problems have been vexing investigators in outbreaks where multiple ingredient foods like tomatoes and lettuce are served in the same dish (salad, sandwich).
Laboratory surveillance enables the identification of sporadic case clusters that can lead to identifying otherwise unrecognized outbreaks. Laboratories can be left out of efforts to analyze the data that they have generated and from planning to develop new surveillance systems. In a somewhat ironic development, newly available rapid test methods for foodborne pathogens being used in the clinical setting have meant that fewer bacterial cultures are being forwarded to public health laboratories for further characterization, such as serotyping and PFGE testing. Regulatory actions might include food seizures, citations for violations of regulations, recalls of food, public alerts and even closure of a firm. Firm operators are expected to cooperate with the regulatory investigations in the face of allegations that they have made customers ill, that they likely will face bad publicity, loss of money, possible government and or private legal action and loss of reputation. These investigations are intended to identify the contributing factors, what went wrong like inadequate cooking or cross contamination, that lead to the outbreak and the environmental antecedents (root causes) that lead to the contributing factors happening. Environmental assessments mean a very different kind of investigation needs to be conducted and a very different relationship needs to exist between an operator and investigator. In an environmental assessment investigators are not there to find violations of regulations, they are looking at what happened, regardless of the regulation. A regulatory investigation understandably can be a cat and mouse game, as an operator is in damage-control mode. The Food Safety Modernization Act directs FDA to put more emphasis on implementation of preventive controls, which are developed from an understanding of conditions and practices that can lead to contamination and subsequent foodborne illness. The question facing us all is what do we want out of investigations of foodborne disease outbreaks and what are we willing to give up to get us there? Historical investigations limit themselves to violations at one or more settings, not to root causes for the outbreak.
Federal agencies depend on timely and complete state and local epidemiology, laboratory and environmental data to inform their investigations going forward. One problem that every environmental investigation faces is the time that has passed between the contamination of the food and the beginning of the investigation into how that contamination occurred. In outbreaks involving fresh produce, the field where the produce was grown may be plowed and fallow, or another crop may be growing there. Very few outbreak investigations that identify a vehicle also report contributing factors and even fewer report environmental antecedents. Government agencies at all levels recognize these problems and are working to address them. Partnerships are being developed among government agencies, with universities and with industry organizations.
FDA has created its new foodborne disease response team CORE (Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation) to help improve internal management of foodborne outbreak surveillance and response, as well as improve coordination with other government agencies.
FDA is also funding several Rapid Response Teams made up of members from state food safety regulatory agencies, public health agencies and the associated laboratories, along with area FDA District Office members. In cooperation with state and local agencies, FDA has also developed retail food and manufactured food model regulatory program standards, and works with state and local food safety regulatory agencies to assist them in implementing these standards.
CDC has been promoting and funding improved public health laboratory and epidemiology capacity in state and local public health agencies for decades. The Public Health Accreditation Board has developed a set of standards that state, local and tribal public health departments need to meet of they wish to be accredited. The Food safety Modernization Act contains a number of provisions that direct FDA and CDC to improve foodborne disease surveillance and response. There are many ongoing efforts working towards these improvements, but we will continue to be frustrated by the consequences of the many challenges we face. Jack – Excellent summary of the challenges we are facing in public health and food safety! Great overview of the challenges associated with outbreak investigations and environmental assessments (vs. On February 14, 2000, a 44-year-old male and a 30-year-old female, both career fire fighters, died in a restaurant fire. On February 14, 2000, two fire fighters died while performing an interior fire attack at a restaurant fire.
Meetings and interviews were conducted with the Chief, Assistant Chiefs, District Chiefs, Safety Officers, fire fighters who were at the scene, the department's training officer, a representative from the District Attorney's Office, a representative from the City Special Crimes and Arson Unit, representatives of the City Fire and Arson Bureau, the county Fire Marshal, and representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters.
On March 22, 2000, two Safety and Occupational Health Specialists conducted additional interviews. The career fire department involved in this incident is comprised of 3,800 total employees, of whom 3,400 are uniformed fire fighters. The building involved in this incident served as a restaurant, measuring 110 feet by 39 feet.
Additional companies responded to this incident; however, only those directly involved are included in this report.
Upon a request from NIOSH, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) completed a fire model of this incident. On February 14, 2000, at 0430 hours, Central Dispatch received a call reporting that a restaurant was on fire. At 0438 hours, Medic 73 was the first to arrive on the scene and reported to dispatch that they had visible fire emitting through the roof (approximately 6-foot flames). The IC directed one of the fire fighters from Ladder 76 to set up a positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fan outside the west side door to help clear the smoke from the building. After stretching approximately 20 feet of additional hoseline to the victims, the Captain from Engine 76 reentered to find his crew.
The Captain from Engine 76 had exited the structure and relayed that they could not find the fire. At 0446 hours, District 10 (District Chief) arrived on the scene and after completing a walk-around size-up, he assumed command. Other fire fighters in the vicinity and the Captain and a fire fighter from Engine 73, who were using a thermal imaging camera, later stated that the heat had intensified and became more noticeable.
The IC ordered the Captain and a fire fighter from Ladder 75 to act as the rapid intervention team (RIT) and enter and search for the victims.
The fire fighter from Engine 73, who was on an interior hoseline prior to the evacuation tone, heard the IC sending fire fighters inside and decided to reenter to search.
The Captain and a fire fighter from Ladder 76 pulled a 2½-inch line off Engine 76 and applied water from the exterior through one of the drive-through windows to hold back the fire in the kitchen area.
At 0510 hours, Engine 82 arrived on the scene and attempted to shut off the gas (a second time).
At 0517 hours, the Captain from Ladder 75, who had put the ladder up to the roof line, stated that he heard a PASS device going off in the kitchen area. At 0528 hours, Ladder 68, which arrived on the scene shortly after Engine 68, forcibly opened the rear (north) steel door (see Photo 10).
At approximately 0600 hours, the Chief radioed dispatch and requested a crane to the location to remove the large HVAC unit. The medical examiner listed the cause of death for both victims as asphyxia due to smoke inhalation.
Department SOPs state that a Tactical Evaluation and Assessment Plan should be established to gather information on buildings within the fire department's jurisdiction. As a part of the prefire plan or inspection, fire departments can visit buildings in their jurisdiction that are under construction and make notes of the interior building components. Discussion: Accountability on the fire ground is paramount and may be accomplished by several methods. Discussion: One of the most important size-up duties of the first-in officers is locating the fire and determining its severity.
Departments should ensure that the first officer or fire fighter inside evaluates interior conditions and reports them immediately to the Incident Commander.
Discussion: Ventilation is necessary to improve the fire environment in order for fire fighters to approach a fire with a hoseline for extinguishment. Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use extreme caution when operating on or under a lightweight truss roof and should develop standard operating procedures for buildings constructed with lightweight roof trusses. Discussion: The lightweight, wood truss incorporates wooden members which can be as small as 2- by 4-inch timber connected with metal gusset plates.
The above-referenced document also states that fire fighters should be extra careful when responding to a fire in a fast-food restaurant at night. Develop standard operating procedures for buildings constructed with lightweight roof trusses. Standard operating procedures should be developed and implemented for buildings constructed with lightweight roof trusses. Discussion: There is no specific time limit on how long fire fighters should operate under or on truss roofs that are exposed to fire. Fire fighters may have difficulty in finding the exact location of fire in a building, even though heavy smoke makes it clear that fire is present. Recommendation #9: Fire departments should ensure that, whenever there is a change in personnel, all personnel are briefed and understand the procedures and operations required for that shift, station, or duty.
Discussion: If a change in personnel is made, such as adding a new officer or fire fighter, a briefing process should take place.
Discussion: When fire fighters are in a building, the building is now occupied and all exits should be available, even if the doors must be torn down.
Discussion: Communication on the fireground between fire fighters and Incident Command is paramount.
Discussion: Fire departments should ensure that SCBAs are serviced, perform properly, and are reliable. The following recommendations apply to building owners, utility providers, and municipalities.
Recommendation #14: Utility suppliers should ensure that all exterior building utilities are accessible and in working condition. Discussion: Utility providers should ensure that the building's exterior utilities can be turned on or shut off if necessary. Discussion: Information regarding the building's construction is very valuable to fire fighters if a fire would occur. Discussion: There are currently building codes and standards which are used as guidelines for new building design and construction. The self-contained breathing apparatus maintenance program was evaluated by Tim Merinar, Engineer, and Thomas McDowell, Physical Scientist, Division of Respiratory Disease Studies, Respirator Branch.
The development of the fire model for this incident was by Dan Madrzykowski, Engineer, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Technical review and assistance in completing this report was provided by Brad Newbraugh, Physical Science Technician, and Richard Current, Engineer, Protective Technology Branch, Division of Safety Research. Expert review was provided by Vince Dunn, retired Deputy Chief, New York City Fire Department, and Francis L.
While for some this may be a result of an organ or bone marrow transplant, others may have weak immune systems due to a chronic illness like HIV or AIDS.
As a result, people with a weakened immune system need to be very careful about what they eat, how they handle their food, and how they store that food.
They are also processed in a way that enables them to be stored safely on grocery store shelves and in pantries without refrigeration. Refrigerator temperatures should never exceed 4 degrees Celsius, and any meat that will not be consumed between two and four days after its purchase should be frozen. Carefully washing any knives, cutting boards or other surfaces that may have come into contact with raw meat is especially important. This is mainly because unwashed produce can be contaminated with bacteria and can lead to food-borne illness. Therefore these should always be avoided by people with a weakened immune system, since they are much more likely to be contaminated. Restaurateurs wanted to take advantage of the rising popularity of cars, so they designed restaurants that let people order and eat without leaving their vehicles. Restaurateurs traveled from all over the country to copy their system of fast food preparation, which they called the Speedee Service System.
These restaurants employed short-order cooks, who specialized in making food that didn't require a lot of preparation time. For example, when Ray Kroc, who founded the McDonald's corporation, visited the restaurant for the first time in 1954, he was selling milkshake machines that could make five shakes at once. Many of the chains that copied the McDonald brothers' ideas still exist - they serve everything from tacos to chicken. These investigations occur at multiple organizational levels and they involve multiple components of organizations. In government alone you can have local, state, federal and international organizations involved and at each level you can have epidemiologists, clinical laboratories, food laboratories and regulatory agencies all with overlapping roles and responsibilities.
These issues are further complicated by a growing public and political distrust of government and science in general. Media and political demands for information can distract agencies struggling to complete their investigations.
Most reported foodborne illness cases are so-called sporadic cases where no specific risk factor for illness is determined.
The victims themselves self-identify and report most foodborne disease outbreaks to state or local agencies.
Epidemiologists are conducting surveillance for many diseases and often have multiple investigations they are juggling at the same time, nurses who interview illness cases may also be providing immunization clinics and visiting homebound patients. Local nurses may have to juggle that request with their need to visit patients and conduct clinics.
In multi-state foodborne outbreak investigations, government agencies at multiple levels are trying to work in a coordinated way with people they will never meet and over multiple time zones. Federal food safety agencies depend on under-funded state and local agencies to identify and investigate outbreaks linked to products that they regulate. These laws, regulations and policies can slow down investigations and lead to friction between investigation and response organizations over access to information. Consumer groups and the public want actionable information quickly to protect themselves and their families.
The investigations move as quickly as possible to identify the food and thereafter prevent additional exposures and illnesses.
Most epidemiologist’s, and public health laboratory staff, who conduct foodborne disease surveillance at the state and local level are funded by CDC grants, not the state or local agency they work for. The impact of the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act on food safety will not be measurable if state and local agencies do not have the capacity to detect any changes in disease incidence and prevalence resulting from implementation of the act.
The 1996 Cyclospora outbreak first linked to strawberries and later to raspberries hinged on whether the chef who baked wedding cakes topped them with one type of berry or another and that in turn depended on price and availability of berries. That initial vehicle identification hinged on what questions were asked of early victims of the outbreak. Mexican-style foods have been involved in several outbreaks in which tomatoes, lettuce, cheese and ground meat were served together in tacos and other similar dishes.
Public health labs can have a very hard time keeping up with new technologies as they lack the resources to conduct proof of principle studies to demonstrate the value of moving to those technologies. Under the best of circumstances, they are not always going to be able to recover an agent from a sample even if it is there. Investigators are expected to get all of this done quickly and because they are regulators to do so following the appropriate procedures and legal restrictions on how they conduct their activities. Environmental antecedents are findings such as inadequate equipment, inadequate employee training and supervision, lack of a food safety culture, lack of a HACCP system. In such a setting, it is much less likely that the contributing factors and environmental antecedents will be found. An emphasis on the legal aspects of an outbreak may not lead to a true systems analysis of what went wrong.
They also do not look at the wider food safety system in industry and government and how all of those aspects need to improve if future outbreaks are to be prevented.
Incomplete, inaccurate, and untimely information has slowed federal investigations and yet the state and local agencies federal agencies depend on often have inadequate levels of staff.


At best it can be a few days, but in some occasions months have passed before the investigation gets to this location. Foodborne outbreak investigations can not be considered successful if investigators have not been able to identify the contributing factors that caused the outbreak and the environmental antecedents that lead to the contributing factors. This lack of information seriously limits everyone’s ability to identify future preventive controls. Agencies are accomplishing this through development of new and enhancing existing partnerships, providing training including cross training with partners, setting and implementing program standards, piloting new approaches and developing protocols to improve the system from surveillance through response. One example of the partnerships is the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR). Standard number five for both of these sets of standards sets out recommended practices for foodborne disease surveillance and response programs. This model emergency response plan is focused on intentional contamination of the food supply, but since many of the same players are also involved in unintentional contamination the document can be useful for agencies preparing for those events as well.
Those standards include many provisions that directly or indirectly impact the effectiveness of foodborne disease surveillance, detection, response and prevention. Both agencies are to improve capacity at state and local agencies and CDC is required to establish Centers of Excellence. Guzewich (Jack) retired from the FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition in August of 2011.
Our corporation is ever so slowly turning to look at this opportunity for providing service and support.
It is very disheartening though to see the myriad of agencies at the federal and local levels hampered so by the increasing lack of resources. Nice summation of the laboratory and environmental health challenges present in outbreak investigations. At 0430 hours, Central Dispatch received a call from a civilian who reported that fire was emitting through the roof of the restaurant. Both victims were using a 1¾-inch hoseline inside the building when the roof collapsed. Fire Administration notified the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident.
Investigators visited the site, and the Engineer and Physical Scientist from NIOSH conducted an evaluation of the department's respirator maintenance program. On September 12-13, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program and an Engineer with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted additional interviews with fire department personnel to assist in the development of a fire dynamics model for this incident (see section titled FIRE MODEL INFORMATION). The department serves a population of approximately 1.8 million in a geographical area of 617 square miles. The origin of the fire was determined to be in the office, which extended into the void space above the suspended ceiling. The fire model demonstrates fire growth and the fire's reaction when different variables are inputted. Note: Based on information obtained from the City Fire and Arson Bureau, the fire started in the office area approximately 25 minutes prior to Medic 73's arrival (see Photo 3). The fire fighter from Ladder 76 retrieved a PPV fan from their ladder truck and placed it approximately 12 feet behind the railing of the west door.
He noticed a small amount of fire in the middle interior section of the restaurant and then walked back to the west side. At 0448 hours, the Captain and a fire fighter from Engine 75 grabbed the 1¾-inch hoseline that the other fire fighter from Engine 73 had stretched to the door, and entered approximately 8 feet inside through the west side door. At this time the following fire fighters were still inside the building: the fire fighter from Engine 75 (on the nozzle of one of the hoselines), the Captain and a fire fighter from Engine 73 (with the thermal imaging camera), Victim #1 and Victim #2 (in the kitchen area and behind the counter with a hoseline), the Captain from Engine 76 and a fire fighter from Engine 73 (on the same hoseline in the dining area). They were given the assignment to enter through the west side door, and follow the victims' hoseline to the nozzle.
Dispatch toned out Engine 39, Engine 82, Engine 60, Engine 68, Engine 69, Ladder 68, Ladder 69, Rescue 11, Rehab 17, and Safety 2 as the second-alarm companies. Assuming that his Captain was behind him, he reentered and followed the line that he had previously taken in, all the way to the nozzle. The fire fighter from Engine 73, who was still inside applying water, stated that he did not feel that he was making any progress and the heat was intensifying. As they attempted to shut off the gas, the Captain from Ladder 75 put a ladder up to the roof line on the west side to look down inside the building. Dispatch toned out Engine 48, Engine 57, Engine 78, Ladder 28, Ladder 78, Ladder 51, District 21, and the communications van as the third-alarm companies.
Assuming that Victim #2 was in the general vicinity where Victim #1 was found, the IC ordered Rescue 11 to enter the rear door and search for her.
Neither of the victims were equipped with a portable radio nor were found with a portable radio near them.
Additionally, fire fighters can record information regarding structures in their jurisdiction that incorporate a truss system. It is the responsibility of every officer to account for every fire fighter assigned to his or her company and relay this information to Incident Command. The smoke conditions can provide the Incident Commander with additional information about the fire.
The roof system should be one of the first things that is determined before fire fighters enter a burning structure. The Incident Commander should ascertain the age of the building when determining strategy or tactics.
Information such as time of incident, time fire was burning before arrival, time fire was burning after arrival, and type of attack, is some of the most important information the Incident Commander could have. Since the IC is staged at the command post (outside), the interior conditions should be communicated as soon as possible to the IC. Additionally, smoke, heat, and gases should be vented above the fire to prohibit conditions necessary for a flashover. It is important that fire fighters are able to identify them and the dangers they may pose. The majority of fast-food restaurants are designed to incorporate large open spaces for dining.
The loads are generally HVAC units, compressors, air ducts, cooling lines, rest room ventilation fans, grease exhaust ducts and exhaust fans, snow, and ice. The lightweight trusses are designed in a series of triangles which create the trusses' structural integrity. Fire or heavy smoke from the roof indicates that the trusses are on or have been exposed to fire.
The SOPs should be provided to all fire fighters and training should take place to identify buildings constructed of lightweight roof trusses (see also Recommendation #5). A time limit is often used by fire departments as a guide for operation under or on truss roofs. Although most officers and fire fighters will complete the same training, procedures and operations can vary by personnel, shift, or station crews.
The doorway should be clear and free of any debris, so fire fighters and any other occupants can exit if needed. Fire fighters will enter buildings as a pair or team, and generally a company officer will accompany them. To monitor and enforce the service and maintenance of SCBAs, fire departments should establish written standard operating procedures, ensure record keeping, and conduct annual evaluations.
Any problems with utilities that the owner may encounter should be reported to the appropriate utility when they are found to be inoperable or in need of repair. Unfortunately, before municipalities adopted or enforced specific codes and standards, many buildings were designed and constructed without incorporating such standards. Metal Gusset Plate Used on Roof System of Restaurant Note: Photo was taken of a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident. HVAC Units and Cooking Vents Positioned on the Roof of the Restaurant Note: Photo was taken of a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident. Fire's Point of Origin Was Determined to Have Occurred in the Office of the Restaurant Note: Photo was taken of an office in a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident. Drive-Through Window of Restaurant, Located Across From the Office Door Note: Photo was taken in a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident.
West Side of Restaurant Note: Photo was taken of a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident.
East Side of Restaurant Note: Photo was taken of a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident. Rear Door Used by Fire Fighters to Gain Access During Search for Victims Note: Photo was taken of a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident.
Location of Victim #1 Note: Photo was taken in a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident.
Location of Victim #2 Note: Photo was taken in a restaurant similar to the one involved in this incident. There are also individuals who are simply born with weak immune systems and will need to form careful habits early on in their lives in order to ensure they do not become prone to dangerous diseases. Drive-ins were busy and successful, but they generally used the same short-order style of food preparation that other restaurants did. They wanted to make food faster, sell it cheaper and spend less time worrying about replacing cooks and car hops.
Because investigating agencies also must ensure the information provided has been vetted and confirmed, this often means the information is not provided as soon as others want it. These outbreaks are often linked to local restaurants, investigated locally and often not reported in the media.
Multiple agencies at local, state and federal levels can see message priorities differently and they can work under different rules for what they can say, all of which creates challenges in developing and providing consistent public information. Therefore, they created a federalist form of government with much authority and responsibility, including public health, residing in the states.
When we talk about organizations that are more successful than others, this often reflects a few key individuals who are really making the difference.
Cuts in training, salary and benefits for new government hires will result in a different workforce in the future. Government agencies are looking for ways to be more transparent, but progress has been slow so far. Much of epidemiologists’ time, therefore, is spent trying to improve the quality of the data they collect and trying to find ways to get more and better data. Would any hoped for reduction in reported sporadic cases of illness and outbreaks mean that food is safer or that surveillance is less robust? All of these ingredients have been identified as food vehicles in the past, so how do outbreak investigators discover which one was contaminated when they are served and eaten together? So many disease clusters are identified by this CDC led system that the epidemiologists and laboratorians have to triage what clusters they have the resources to investigate. Laboratories can be left out of planning for ongoing investigations as well as be left out of planning and implementation of interventions after an investigation. These findings often necessitate working out of the bounds of a historical regulatory inspection. To be fully successful an environmental assessment needs to be a cooperative investigation between an operator and an investigator with full transparency from both parties. Many operators do not see it to be in their best interest to help to identify conditions that could expose them to greater jeopardy and liability.
Implementation of environmental assessment will be a significant first step in improving our overall food safety system and food safety culture. Some of those staff have received little or inadequate training and have little experience in conducting foodborne disease outbreak investigations. The system is just too complex, government funding is too tight and the challenges are too numerous for quick fixes.
They will need to clarify roles and responsibilities, improve communications and coordination, share findings more freely and increase capacity.
It is amazing that even programs like PulseNet, which have been estimated to be saving millions of dollars in prevented cases of foodborne illness, are facing resource downfalls. Please consider my somewhat lengthy reply to your comments on epidemiology challenges in your Gmail inbox! I teach food safety to environmental health graduate students, and I wish that FDA would establish model curricula for undergraduate and graduate programs in food safety, along with specialty training programs.
Issues Allergy Alert on Undeclared Treenuts - Pecans In GFS Honey Roasted Peanuts Received From Supplier Trophy Nut Co. Medic 73 was first to arrive on the scene, followed by Engine 76 (Captain, Fire Apparatus Operator (FAO), and two fire fighters (Victim #1 and Victim #2).
When the victims failed to exit upon the IC's interior evacuation call, the IC ordered additional fire fighters to enter the building and search for the victims. On March 6, 2000, three Safety and Occupational Health Specialists from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, as well as an Engineer and a Physical Scientist from the NIOSH Respirator Branch, investigated this incident. Investigators also examined the victims' SCBAs and the turnout gear that they were wearing during the incident.
On September 14-15, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program conducted additional interviews with fire department personnel and met with a representative from the City Code and Enforcement Department. The department requires all new fire fighters to complete 31 weeks of training at the department's fire academy.
Investigators with the City Fire and Arson Bureau had confirmed this to be the point of origin, based on the scene evidence.
Grabbing onto a hoseline he thought the victims were on, he followed the hoseline past the front ordering counter and then turned around a corner wall.
At 0445 hours, Engine 10 arrived on the scene and was ordered by the IC to catch a plug on the east side and assist with the fire attack.
The Captain from Engine 76 then turned and followed the same hoseline to the exit, thinking he would meet his crew. As they opened the nozzle to apply water over the kitchen area they could feel debris falling from above.
He then pointed it back towards the floor and the screen went completely white, indicating uniformly high levels of heat.
There were now approximately 30-foot flames extending from the center section of the building and the IC could see heavy fire in the kitchen area. He then ordered the Captain and two fire fighters from Engine 75 to enter the building through the west side doors with a 1¾-inch hoseline, to hold back the fire as the fire fighters entered. At approximately the same time, one of the fire fighters from Engine 75, who was on the hoseline inside the west door, exited the building. The IC then ordered Engine 69 to enter the east side with a hoseline and hold back fire on that side as crews searched.
At approximately the same time, the IC radioed the Engine 82 crew, which was still inside on the east side, to exit. The fire fighter from Ladder 68, who found Victim #1, reentered with Rescue 11 (Captain and two fire fighters) and showed them where Victim #1 was found. Based on the amount of fire throughout the incident, the time which had elapsed to this point, and the location where they thought Victim #2 to be, the Chief had declared this incident as a recovery.
For example, a Captain with the Phoenix Fire Department put together a photo log which contained information on all buildings with truss systems in their responding territory.
Accountability on the fire ground can be maintained by several methods: by a system using individual tags for every fire fighter and officer responding to an incident, or by a company officer's riding list, stating the names, assigned tools, and duties of each member responding with every fire company. It determines the number of fire fighters and the amount of apparatus and equipment needed to control the blaze, assists in determining the most effective point of fire extinguishment attack, and the most effective method of venting heat and smoke.
For example, if the fire is in the roof and burning roofing materials, the smoke would probably appear to be thick and black.
The type of structure could provide the Incident Commander information such as how the building may hold up under fire conditions, or if the building is generally subject to collapse under fire conditions. The age of the structure can provide the Incident Commander with information to help determine the building's integrity or other vital information such as construction methods or construction materials. The protection of exposures near or connected to a burning building should be included in the strategic plan.
Additional loads, which could be applied after the truss is in place, are antennas, satellite dishes, flags, banners, large air-filled advertisements with air blowers, and improperly stored items. The truss voids in the ceiling may harbor a well-concealed fire that is ready to burst out with almost an unbelievable fury when oxygen is admitted to a void containing heated carbon monoxide. Even though standard fire engineering calculations show that lightweight trusses may be expected to collapse after about 10 minutes in a fully developed fire, it is not recommended to set a time limit. For example, fire-rated suspended-ceiling panels create a space between them and the top chord of the roof truss. Additionally, "Infrared thermal imagers assist fire fighters in quickly getting crucial information about the location of the source (seat) of the fire from the exterior of the structure, so they can plan an effective and rapid response with the entire emergency team. Fire fighters should be aware of the building's exits and be trained how to force open different doors they may encounter in a building. In most fire departments, the company officer or one of the fire fighters will be equipped with a portable radio to keep a line of communication with Incident Command.
Although there were no SCBA problems noted in this investigation, the fire department requested that NIOSH evaluate their SCBA maintenance program (see Attachment 1).
The exterior utility shut-off controls should also be in a position where fire fighters can access them. New or improved codes have been established which can improve the safety of existing structures.
Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) maintenance program evaluation, NIOSH Reference: TN-11399.
Mezzanotte, Mark McFall, Safety and Occupational Health Specialists, Division of Safety Research, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch. The service wasn't speedy, and the food wasn't necessarily hot by the time a car hop delivered it.
The brothers closed the restaurant and redesigned its food-preparation area to work less like a restaurant and more like an automobile assembly line. Without assembly lines, they would not have had a basis for their method of preparing food. Such outbreaks are not always reported to the Centers for Disease Control’s voluntary foodborne illness surveillance system, either. Are our objectives, to prevent more illnesses or to take some kind of regulatory or punitive action against the wrong doer? They are trying to find out what went wrong in the system, not what legal action will result. Modest inputs into many of these programs combined with a strategic national plan for improving food safety would go along way to truly modernizing food safety!
New entrants to the food safety profession need a solid foundation in epidemiology, food microbiology and toxicology (including sample collection), water quality, and pest control, as well as education in food safety practices and systems analysis.
CDCVoluntary Recall for 30 Bakery ProductsAllergen Alert: Kitchen Cravings Strawberry and Mixed Berry Parfaits with trace peanutsStarway Inc.
Upon arrival, dispatch was notified by the two companies that there was visible fire emitting through the roof.
Victim #1 was located, removed from the building, and transported to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead. The training consists of 640 hours toward fire fighter Level I and II certification, weight training, a physical fitness test, and 240 hours of emergency medical technician (EMT) courses.
The roof system was formed using lightweight wood trusses, consisting of 2- by 4-inch and 2- by 6-inch lumber connected with metal gusset plates (see Photo 1).
Additionally, it was reported that one of the suspects broke out the first drive-through window (closet to the north side wall), which provided a direct path of air flow to the office (see Photo 4) All companies that responded to the incident stated that it was very foggy and hard to see, which caused a delay in their response. Note: Based on the NIST fire model it was concluded that the PPV fan was not a significant factor to the fire's growth. He met up with a male fire fighter whom he thought was Victim #1, but he was actually the fire fighter from Engine 73 who had stretched a line in by himself. At the same time the Captain from Engine 76, who was following the hoseline taken in by the fire fighter from Engine 73, crawled past the ordering counter to the corner when he felt debris fall from above, almost knocking him completely to the floor. It is believed that the roof had already collapsed in the kitchen area during this time, however, no fire fighters can recall seeing or hearing the collapse take place (see Photo 9).
Based on this observation of the fire conditions, at 0452 hours the IC decided to evacuate fire fighters from the interior and order a defensive attack. Instead, they followed the hoseline taken into the building by the fire fighter from Engine 73. As the Engine 75 crew advanced the line into the building, the Captain and fire fighter from Ladder 75 (RIT) exited. The IC walked around to the east side and ordered the Captain and two fire fighters from Engine 10 to enter through the east side doors with a 2½-inch hoseline and search for the victims. As he attempted to exit, his SCBA air cylinder became entangled in fallen wires and debris. The Captain from Engine 73 noticed that his fire fighter, who had entered through the west door, had never come out and the Captain became concerned. The IC immediately ordered Engine 82 and Engine 68 to enter the east side to search for the victims.
The Captain and two fire fighters from Engine 69 entered through the east side window with a 1¾-inch hoseline. The Captain radioed the IC stating that he felt they were close to the victims because they could hear a PASS device in the area. As they waited for the crane to arrive, the Chief and fire fighters discussed how they would remove the HVAC unit when the crane arrived. To obtain a copy of the safety notice contact Scott or your Authorized Scott Service Center. Prefire plans or inspections provide a wealth of information to fire fighters when responding to an incident. The log consisted of pictures, addresses, occupancy of buildings, operating hours, roof systems (truss, bowstring, etc.), flammable materials, and additional notes.


One copy of the list should be posted in the fire apparatus and one copy carried by the company officer. A proper size-up begins from the moment the alarm is received, and it continues until the fire is under control. It is generally formed by 2- by 4-inch or 2- by 6-inch lumber, attached together with metal gusset plates.
For example, if heavy smoke is emitting from the exterior roof system, but fire fighters cannot find any fire in the interior, it is a good possibility that the fire is above them in the roof system. All the materials may act differently under fire conditions, but all are subject to failure. Training to identify trussed buildings should be a part of the fire department's prefire fire planning or inspections. The trusses are designed to distribute the loads throughout the roof system and can span large openings without interior load-bearing walls. Even if firestops are placed in the voids, openings for duct work, appliance lines, electrical lines, conduit, or additional utility installations create a path for fire to spread. The reaction can range from a deflagration to a detonation, from a backdraft or flashover to an explosion capable of blowing a building apart.
The void creates a path for rapid fire spread and can shield the fire from the fire fighter's sight. Knowing the location of the most dangerous and hottest part of the fire helps fire fighters determine a safe approach and avoid structural damage in a building that might have otherwise have been undetectable. To ensure crew integrity, briefing sessions should take place to ensure that all officers and fire fighters understand their positions and what is expected of each other.
All the other fire fighters who enter a hazardous condition should also be equipped with a portable radio so, if the officer or fire fighter with the portable radio becomes separated from his partner or crew, voice contact can still be maintained. In this incident, the fire fighters made several attempts to shut off the building's gas supply. Additionally, the information would provide fire fighters with important information that they might not otherwise have access to.
New York, NY: WNYF, Official training publication of the New York City Fire Department, 1st issue.
Instead of using a skilled cook to make food quickly, it used lots of unskilled workers, each of whom did one small, specific step in the food-preparation process. But as you pointed out, declining budgets have resulted in cutbacks in government job positions, salaries, and benefits. All fire fighters are required to complete the State EMT and fire certification examination. The total span of the trusses over the majority of the structure was 47 feet 6½ inches. Approximately 1 minute later, Engine 76 arrived on the east side of the scene and reported the same size-up to dispatch as Medic 73. As the PPV fan was being set up, the other fire fighter from Ladder 76 vented the other drive-through window, closest to the west side door (see Diagram 1 and Photo 7).
The IC then ordered them to set up their deck-gun on the east side and wait for further assignment. The Captain proceeded on the line and met up with the fire fighter from Engine 73 who had the nozzle open and was hitting a fire towards the rear of the kitchen area.
He radioed dispatch and asked them to sound an evacuation tone and ordered the FAOs to blow their apparatus air horns to send an additional evacuation tone. The Captain and fire fighter reached the nozzle but were unable to locate either of the victims.
During their exit, the Captain and fire fighter became separated as the fire fighter followed the line out to the west side.
The Captain and two fire fighters entered the building and were unable to maneuver the 2½-inch line around the fallen debris.
He informed the IC that he had a fire fighter missing and he was going to go around to the east side to look for him. The Captain and two fire fighters from Engine 82 and the Captain and two fire fighters from Engine 68 entered the east side window to search for the victims. Rescue 11 (Captain and two fire fighters), District 69, Safety 2, Engine 60 (Captain and two fire fighters), and the Chief entered the rear door to determine how they would hook the HVAC unit to the crane. When fire fighters respond to an incident, the prefire plan information could alert them to any hazards or possible unsafe conditions that they could be exposed to. When the Captain and his crew respond to an incident, the Captain can refer to the log and predetermine if the structure incorporates a truss system.
The list posted in the apparatus is used if the company officer or the entire company is reported missing. It is important for the Incident Commander to immediately obtain this type of information to help make the proper decisions.
Fire fighters should be provided with training to identify the different types of truss systems and their potential hazards in a fire. Since the trusses are tied together and are designed to distribute the load, if one of the trusses fails it places an additional load on the others, which could cause a chain reaction of failure leading up to a collapse. Any ceiling below a truss void should be pulled and examined by disciplined fire fighters under control, standing near a doorway for rapid escape. When it is determined that the building's trusses have been exposed to fire, any fire fighters operating under or above them should be immediately evacuated. Ceilings and floors that have become dangerously weakened by fire damage and threatened to collapse can be spotted with a thermal imaging camera.
To ensure that fire fighters are aware of structures that might have a truss roof, the state of New Jersey has passed a law requiring all building owners to place an exterior placard on structures which incorporate a truss roof (see Attachment 2). Similarly, many states have home rule constitutions and other similar provisions such as commonwealth constitutions that call for government services and authority to be provided at the local level.
Approximately 2 minutes later, Ladder 76 (Captain, FAO, and one fire fighter) arrived on the scene and the Captain assumed Incident Command (IC).
Investigators obtained a copy of the department's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), training manual, both victims' training records, autopsy reports, photographs of the incident, video footage of the incident, fire department interview statements, dispatch tapes, a transcription of the dispatch tapes, and blueprints of the building. Fire fighters are then assigned to a station where they are placed on a 12-month probationary period. Engine 76 drove around to the rear of the building (to complete their size-up) and continued to the west side where they parked the apparatus.
The two fire fighters from Ladder 76 then returned to the east side and made forcible entry through the exterior doors and placed lights inside the doors (see Photo 8). The Captain stated that there was still very little heat and no visible fire as he followed the hoseline to the exit and relay the information to the IC, face-to-face. Soon after, Engine 75 arrived on the scene, caught a plug on the south side, and laid a supply line into Engine 76. Once outside, the fire fighter told the IC that they had reached the nozzle and neither victim was near it. After an exhausting struggle to free himself, he saw a light towards the east side and crawled towards it. At 0530 hours, a fire fighter from Ladder 68 entered through the rear door and told his Captain, who was still standing at the rear door, that he could see one of the victims.
Rescue 11 stated that there was a lot of debris and that there was a 2-inch main gas line burning in the area they were searching. If so, fire fighters can be provided with important information before arriving on the scene. Additionally, fire fighters should not work beyond the sight or sound of the supervising officer unless equipped with a portable radio.
The document, Building Construction for the Fire Service, states that "The metal gusset plates can also be weakened or destroyed by fire by acting as a heat collector, delivering the heat to the metal gusset plate teeth, which can pyrolytically destroy the tensioned wood fibers, which had been gripping the metal teeth. If it is not clear that the building's trusses have been exposed to fire, a defensive attack should take place until the conditions can be verified.
It does not provide any fire resistance, but merely meets fire code requirements for rate of flame spread. There is also a strong possibility that sprinklers could reduce fire fighter fatalities, since they contain, and even extinguish, fires prior to the arrival of the fire department.
The food industry will also suffer from the lack of adequately trained food safety professionals. USDAHouse of Smoke Recalls Products Due To Nitrite Levels in Excess of Regulatory LimitKapowsin Meats Inc.
After making forcible entry, the victims entered with a 1¾-inch hoseline as their Captain finished donning his gear. The investigators conducted a site visit at a nearby restaurant which was similar to the one involved in the incident.
The Captain from Engine 76 stated the fire was extending from the middle section of the roof approximately 6 feet in the air, possibly venting from one of the exhaust vents, which gave the appearance of a grease fire (see Photo 5).
One of the fire fighters from Ladder 76 then proceeded back to the rear of the west side and attempted to shut off the gas. After laying the line, the Captain and two fire fighters from Engine 75 proceeded to the west side of the building. Once inside, the Captain and one of the fire fighters took a rope line, which was tied off to the exterior, and searched for the victims as the other fire fighter manned the 1¾-inch hoseline, approximately 10 feet inside the east door.
The light appeared to be from a large window (which self-vented during the fire) which he climbed through and fell into a flower bed. The IC noticed that only one fire fighter from Engine 75 was on the hoseline and ordered the fire fighter from Engine 73, who was standing with him, to enter and back up the Engine 75 fire fighter on the hoseline. The Captain then radioed the IC stating that they had found one of the fire fighters and would need assistance at the rear door. As they exited, Safety 2 and District 69 decided to search the northwest area of the rear door. This could also provide the Incident Commander with the opportunity to develop or make changes to the strategic plan or tactics on the scene. Fire fighters should communicate with the supervising officer by portable radio to ensure accountability and indicate completion of assigned duties. The design of suspended-ceiling panels provides a void to hide the fire and store carbon monoxide. Shortly after, the Captain entered the structure, met up with his crew, and then exited the structure to assist with the advancement of their hoseline. They stated that the roof was self-venting with approximately 25-foot flames emitting from the center of the building.
He asked the fire fighters at the door if they had seen any of his crew (Victim #1 and Victim #2) exit, and he received a negative response. The Engine 75 Captain decided to leave his crew with the hoseline and search for the Captain from Ladder 75. The Captain and fire fighter heard a personal alert safety system (PASS) device alarming in the southwest section of the building. Unable to move due to exhaustion, the fire fighter laid there until the FAOs from Engine 10 and Engine 75 assisted him to Engine 10, where they requested an ambulance to treat him for exhaustion.
Shortly after this, the Captain from Engine 73 found his missing fire fighter, on the east side, receiving medical attention. At approximately the same time, fire fighters from Engine 82 had broken down a section of wall separating them from the office, and were able to get to the victim (see Photos 11 and 12).
At 0556 hours, Rescue 11 noticed a fire fighter's boot near the area where Victim #1 was found. Safety 2 noticed what appeared to be fibers of a SCBA air cylinder and alerted District 69. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) should address accountability, including the location and the duties of the responding fire companies.
This does not suffice in a fire because all the trusses can be exposed to the same fire conditions.
If the suspended ceiling would collapse while fire fighters were under it, the fire fighters could become entangled in the steel supporting grid. Recalls Siluriformes Fish Products Due To Possible Adulteration OTHERHouse of Smoke Recalls Products Due To Nitrite Levels in Excess of Regulatory LimitKapowsin Meats Inc.
Engine 73 (Captain, FAO, and two fire fighters) arrived on the scene and one fire fighter entered the structure with a 1¾-inch hoseline. Once fire fighters graduate from the academy and complete their probationary period they are certified as a basic fire fighter. He then radioed Ladder 76 asking them to make forcible entry when they arrived because the building was secured.
At 0442 hours, Engine 73 arrived on the scene and connected to a plug on the south side across the street from the building. The Captain stated that he located the Captain from Ladder 75, and the two exited the west side doors together.
They followed the tone and found it to be one of the fire fighters on the west side who was searching for the victims.
Note: This was the fire fighter from Engine 73 who had climbed out the east side window and received assistance. The fire fighter from Ladder 68 found the victim, who was identified as Victim #1, with his SCBA facepiece donned, but his regulator not connected. Just as company officers should know the location of all fire fighters assigned to the company, the chief officer in command should know the operating locations of officers and companies assigned on the first-alarm assignment. An additional load not incorporated into the design can shorten the time to failure in a fire.
Additionally, fire fighters could become entangled in wire and other loose debris falling from the suspended ceiling and could be trapped in the building. He stretched the hoseline past the front counter and around a wall in the dining area (see Diagram 2). The second level is intermediate, which requires 4 years of service and 6 semester hours of Fire Science or 96 hours of completed courses at the National Fire Academy. There were a total of five HVAC units located on the roof (three 10-ton units and two 5-ton units). At 0440 hours, Ladder 76 arrived on the scene and the Captain assumed Incident Command (IC). After laying a supply line to Engine 76 the Captain and his two fire fighters from Engine 73 approached the building on the west side. After learning that it was the fire fighter from Engine 73, who had been on the line with him, he informed the IC that Victim #1 and Victim #2 had failed to exit. The Captain and fire fighter then met with the other fire fighter (from Engine 73) on the hoseline and exited the structure, due to low air. The Chief, a Captain and two fire fighters from Rescue 11, and the Captain from Ladder 76, entered the rear door of the building. She was found by a safe, approximately 6 feet to the west side of the rear, steel door (see Photo 13, Photo 14, and Diagram 4). As a fire increases and additional fire companies respond to the fire, a communication assistant with a command board should assist the Incident Commander with accounting for all fire companies at the scene, at the staging area, and at rehabilitation.
The Captain from Engine 76 reentered the structure and followed a hoseline, which he believed the victims were on.
The third level is advanced, requiring fire fighters to have 8 years of service and 6 additional hours of Fire Science or 96 hours of completed courses at the National Fire Academy.
There were a total of four exhaust vents located on the roof above the kitchen area (see Diagram 3 and Photo 2). The IC radioed Engine 73 and ordered them to connect to a plug (fire hydrant) on the south side of the building and lay a supply line to Engine 76 when they arrived. As the Captain from Engine 76 fed additional line to the victims, a fire fighter from Engine 73 pulled another 1¾-inch hoseline off Engine 76 and entered the structure through the west side door to back up the two victims. At 0453 hours, the IC ordered a personal accountability request (PAR) from all companies on the scene.
They walked to the area where Victim #1 was found and located the fire fighter's boot, near a HVAC unit on the floor. She was found entangled in wires and a pair of wire cutters (believed to be hers) were found nearby. One of the most important aids for accountability at a fire scene is an incident management system. After meeting up with a fire fighter on the end of the line, the Captain exited and reentered the structure a second time. The interior ceiling of the building was suspended 1 foot from the trusses, using suspended ceiling panels. Victim #1 and Victim #2, equipped with a 1¾-inch hoseline, entered the structure as their Captain donned his equipment.
The fire fighter from Ladder 68, with the assistance of a fire fighter from Engine 82, freed the victim from the wires and debris and attempted to remove him from the structure. They assumed-based on the location of the boot and on the nearness to the other victim's location'that Victim #2 was under the fallen debris and HVAC unit (see Photo 11).
Investigators could not determine if the victim was wearing her SCBA at the time of her death due to severe fire damage to the SCBA unit.
As he followed the line, debris began to fall and there was visible fire throughout the middle section of the kitchen (see Diagram 1). The FAO and fire fighter from Ladder 76 went to the west side to prepare entry as requested and stated that entry was already made by removing the bottom panel of the glass-sectioned door (see Photo 6 and Photo 7).
Instead, the Captain from Engine 73 ordered the other fire fighter to pull a 1¾-inch hoseline off Engine 76 and meet him at the west side door. Concerned about the burning gas line and fearing another collapse, the Chief then ordered everyone out and requested a PAR for all companies. The department in this incident had in place a personal accountability report (PAR) system at the time of this incident. Soon after, District 10 (District Chief) arrived, completed a size-up, and assumed command.
Victim #1 was listed as a master level fire fighter with 18½ years of fire fighting experience. The Group B-3 code is incorporated in the city's 1972 Building Codes, Chapter 7, Section 701 - Requirements for Group B Occupancies, Division 3.
He was equipped with a thermal imaging camera and was going to enter the structure to conduct an interior size-up with the camera. At 0532 hours, additional fire fighters entered the rear door of the structure and removed Victim #1. The PAR system is set up by the dispatcher sending a message to the IC requesting an accountability report for all crews on the scene.
Due to the heavy fire he observed, he requested all companies convert to a defensive attack and evacuate the structure.
Victim #2 was listed as an intermediate level fire fighter with 5½ years of experience as a fire fighter. Soon after, the Captain from Engine 76 entered the building and stated that it was filled with thick, black smoke which had banked down to the floor. The fire fighter from Engine 73 pulled the 1¾-inch hoseline off Engine 76, and was only able to stretch it to the west side door before dropping it and entering with her Captain. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was administered by fire fighters as the victim was loaded into an ambulance and transported to a nearby hospital. Victim #2 had met all of the certification items at the advanced fire fighter level except for the time in service.
In 1986, the city adopted the nationally recognized Uniform Building Code and this building was reclassified as a Group A building. The two advanced approximately 20 feet inside but never made contact with the other fire fighter, who had stretched his hoseline inside, past the front counter, and around a wall in the dining area (see Diagram 2). Fire fighters were then released from the scene and the department set up debriefing at a nearby fire station. When this message is received, the officer for each crew is responsible for communicating to the sector officer a report of accountability for their crew.
This code is incorporated in the 1986 Uniform Building Code, Section 303 - Requirements for Group A Occupancies, Division 3. It is believed that the majority of the fire was between the suspended ceiling and the roof and could not be seen from the interior. This code reads the same as the 1972 Building Codes, Chapter 7, Section 701 - Requirements for Group B Occupancies, Division 3.
The Captain met up with Victim #2 approximately 10 feet inside, in front of the ordering counter (see Diagram 1). Regardless of which system is used, proper communication and adherence to SOPs are necessary to ensure personnel accountability on the fireground.
It is believed that Victim #1 was on the opposite side of the counter (kitchen area) at this time. This building was not equipped with a sprinkler system and, according to the codes listed above, a sprinkler system was not required. Victim #2 stated that they were having trouble advancing the hoseline and told the Captain they needed someone to feed them the line. The fire fighters located Victim #2 at 0713 hours, and she was pronounced dead at the scene.
Additionally, the City Code and Enforcement Department did not have any previous violations listed for this building. The scene was then turned over to the City Fire and Arson Bureau, which declared the incident to be a crime scene due to arson.



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Comments to «Quick food safety quiz»

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