The “Turn” Away from the Transcendental–Phenomenological Positioning of *Being and Time* to the Thinking of Being as *Physis* and *Aletheia*

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*Philosophy is never “of” or “about” something—always only for—for Being.*

Heidegger, *Black Notebooks*, 1931

Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks* have already generated a cottage industry of commentary, too much of which has been no more than “reaction”—and overreaction—to a handful of entries among hundreds and hundreds in the four thick volumes published thus far. Even if one agrees that a considered vetting of some of the more callous and inflammatory entries is necessary and appropriate, still, there is much more to these notebooks that deserve attention, and particularly his properly philosophical notes that are helpful in elucidating his principal ideas and terms and in clarifying the development of his thinking. It will take time and patience to sort out the philosophical import of all these reflections, and it would do well for us to keep this in mind as the remaining notebooks from the 1950s and later years are brought to publication. In the long run, however, these notebooks will be chiefly of interest to Heidegger scholars and not essential reading for an understanding of Heidegger’s central ideas and themes. What is more, no matter how strenuous the effort by some recently, the distinction between Heidegger the man and his times and Heidegger the thinker cannot be collapsed. As I have remarked elsewhere, the work of every great philosopher, poet, artist, composer—the creative work of any person—can never be reduced to biography.

1. The “Leap” to the Thinking of Being Itself (GA 94)

To maintain a sharp focus for the present essay, let us consider a small selection of entries from the first volume (GA 94) and the fourth volume (GA 97) of the notebooks that have been published thus far.¹ These particular entries offer

¹ Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* or *Black Notebooks* have thus far been collected in four volumes in his *Complete Works* (Gesamtausgabe, henceforth, GA), ed. by Peter Trawny, Frankfurt am Main 2015: *Überlegungen II–VI: “Schwarze Hefte” 1931–1938* (GA 94), 2014; *Überlegungen VII–XI: “Schwarze Hefte” 1938/39* (GA 95), 2014; *Überlegungen XII–XV: “Schwarze Hefte”*
us additional guidance on Heidegger’s “turn” (die Kehre) after Being and Time and on his later thinking of Being as physis and aletheia. In GA 94, which covers the years 1931–1938, there are two remarkably revealing entries (Überlegungen, “considerations”). The first brings into view in an especially striking manner his transition from Being and Time:

*Being and Time* is not a “philosophy about time,” and even less so a teaching on the “temporality” (Zeitlichkeit) of the human being, but rather clearly and surely a path to the grounding of the truth of Being; of *Being itself*, and not of beings, and also not of beings as beings. Leading the way is the leap into “Temporality” (Temporalität), into that wherein primordial time with primordial space essence together as unfoldings of the essencing of truth, of its [truth’s] transporting-transfixing clearing (Lichtung) and concealing. Of course, [therefore], the first, insufficient version of the third section of the first part of *Being and Time* had to be destroyed.²

One may say that the entirety of the “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking is crystallized in this single entry. Reading GA 94, one is struck at how dissatisfied Heidegger had become not only with the reception and appraisal of *Being and Time* by contemporary readers, but also with his own approach. In an indirect manner, he appears to admit that his thinking in *Being and Time* was still too colored by a transcendental approach and its terminology. In a related entry, he allows that his seeking after the “understanding of Being” (Seinsverständnis) in *Being and Time* posed the core matter in an insufficient way, for it presented the “danger” of construing *Being and Time* as proffering only another “idealism.”³ Although he is insistent throughout that this is a misreading of the posing and unfolding of the Being-question in *Being and Time*, he is nonetheless aware of the difficulties and limitations of his own Daseinsanalytik. Thus, in the full entry cited above, he makes it clear that in *Being and Time* he was not principally concerned with proceeding in a transcendental manner in uncovering the “temporality of the human being.” Rather, all along, and in *Being and Time* in particular, his aim was to attain to a thinking of the “temporality” of “Being itself.” Yet this is precisely what the transcendental positioning in *Being and Time* prevented him from achieving, and we hear his frustration and even exasperation as he reports, rather dramatically, that his effort to finish *Being and Time* had to be “destroyed.” The task for thinking that he had proposed simply could not be accomplished by continuing within the Neo-Kantian and Husserlian transcendental framework.

What, then, was needed for (his) thinking? The entry tells us: a “leap” out of the transcendental approach. But a “leap” out of transcendental-phenomenol-

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ogy to—what kind of thinking? We could say that this is precisely what Heidegger attempted to answer for himself over the remaining nearly fifty years of his lifetime of thinking and writing. Even so, what he does make evident here, if we read carefully enough, is that with this “leap,” the transcendental framing of *Being and Time* had to be abandoned and left for ruins. The Being-question survives, but little else. Indeed, there should be no surprise or puzzlement among commentators that so many of the thematic elements of *Being and Time*—such as the tool analysis—vanish in the later Heidegger’s thinking. The “leap” left these transcendental micro-analyses behind once and for all.

Yet, again, a leap whereunto? He offers a sketch of where (his) thinking must go, and we recognize in the dense sentence of the entry several of the key features of his later thought. Thus thinking must make a “leap” over the transcendental analysis of Dasein’s *Zeitlichkeit* in *Being and Time* to the *Temporalität* of Being itself. To think the “temporality” of Being itself means bringing to language “primordial time” and “primordial space” as they “essence” or unfold together. In the later thinking this is the leitmotif of the “time-(play)-space” (the *Zeit-Raum* and *Zeit-Spiel-Raum*) of Being itself. It was the “time-space” of Being that was sought after in *Being and Time* but which could never be attained by remaining within the transcendental paradigm. Only with a “leap” in thinking can we arrive at the fundamental temporalizing-spatializing of Being itself, which is the (groundless) ground of the human being’s own temporal-spatial existence.

There are other prefigurings as well. We also hear the later theme of Being itself unfolding as “truth.” “Truth” does not in the first place belong to the human being, but rather to the “essencing” or “unfolding” (self-showing, emerging, shining-forth) of Being itself. Furthermore, the “truth” of Being itself is named here by Heidegger as the “clearing” (*Lichtung*) that reveals-conceals, and this brings into view his key later position that “the clearing itself is Being,” as he put it so emphatically in “Letter on Humanism” (1946).

In this one entry, then, we learn where the “leap” in thinking must go: (1) to the “temporality” and “time-space” of Being itself (and not simply of the human being); (2) to the “truth” of Being itself (and not simply “truth” as the disclosive activity of the human being); and (3) to the clearing itself as Being itself (and not simply as the clearing activity of the human being). This one entry captures Heidegger’s deep dissatisfaction and struggle with his own Daseinsanalytik in *Being and Time*—and how he set for himself the task of making a “leap” beyond it in order to fulfill the promise of the *Seinsfrage*. The second “consideration” from GA 94 is related to the first and is also especially instructive:

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The fundamental experience of my thinking: The predominancy of Beyng before all beings [...] Beyng, however, not as object of thinking and representing, and the predominancy [of Beyng] not as the a priori in the sense of the condition of objectifying; all of this is only the foreground and distant consequence of the primal inceptualizing—but again rapidly receding—Beyng. The predominancy of Beyng [as] unfolding in the primordial truth—from out of which [primordial truth], and in which therefrom, every being arises in the first place.5

This entry reveals Heidegger’s need to affirm that no matter the confusions in his own earlier work and especially in Being and Time, and no matter the confusions in the critical responses to Being and Time, one thing was certain: the fundamental experience of his thinking from the outset was the “predominancy of Beyng before all beings.” It is apparent that he did not have this clarity about his project when he composed Being and Time, and for this reason Being and Time could not and did not work out the primacy of Being in a direct and decisive manner. The Daseinsanalytik fell short of the professed aim of the Seinsfrage.

The entry also speaks to his clarity regarding the limitation of the transcendental approach to Being. He alludes to the fact that in all transcendental approaches, Being is reduced to either (1) the object of thinking and representing or (2) the sum total of the cognitive conditions of the possibility for any object (of thinking and representing) coming before us. He rejects both reductions as inadequate, as mere “foreground” and “distant” from the fundamental matter. The transcendental-phenomenological “a priori” can never attain to the ontological priority of “Beyng before all beings.” What is needed, therefore, is a more fundamental thinking that makes manifest how the human being and its noetic activity—no matter how deconstructed and broadly understood—is ontologically “grounded” or “founded” in the first place. Consequently, certain leading themes of all his later work thereby take shape in this entry: Being as “primal inceptualizing” (Being as Ereignis and as Es gibt) and Being as “primordial truth” (physis and aletheia) as the temporal-spatial unfolding/emerging/opening/clearing of all beings, including the human being.

Thus, patiently considered, these two entries in GA 94 give us a clearer and fuller picture of Heidegger’s abandonment of the transcendental-phenomenological positioning that still marked Being and Time and of his decisive “turn” to the thinking of Being itself.

5 Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II–VI (GA 94), 362.
2. Being Itself as *Physis* and *Aletheia* (GA 97)

Let us move our attention to GA 97, the fourth published volume of the notebooks covering the years 1942–1948, because here we find the “later” Heidegger fully underway. These “observations” (*Anmerkungen*) parallel, in part, his brilliantly creative readings of Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander of the 1940s, in which he unfolded his understanding of Being as *physis*, *aletheia*, and the primordial *Logos*. There can be no understanding of the later Heidegger’s thinking of Being without an understanding of his readings of the earliest Greek thinkers, so it is important to consider how these readings are reflected in the notebooks. In particular, his understanding of Being as “primordial truth” is now fully developed in these notebooks from the 1940s.

One of Heidegger’s most original and distinctive positions is that Being “is” “primordial truth” or “*aletheia*.” Yet it is precisely this position that appears to generate the most resistance in some recent readings of his work. Why? Principally because it refuses the modern transcendental and analytic position that the human being is the sole “locus” of truth. Heidegger struggled to find his own voice on the matter of “truth” throughout the 1920s, and this is evident in the ambiguous accounts of truth in those early years. Yet in the later work his position emerges with more clarity and firmness: the earliest Greeks experienced Being as “primordial truth” as *aletheia* as emergence/self-showing/shining-forth. In other words, for Heidegger, the principal “locus” of “truth” is Being itself, and not the human being. In the narrative that he unfolded, it is Plato in particular who subtly shifted attention to the human knower in the matter of truth, and Aristotle followed in kind with the notion that truth is properly to be found in the “judgment.” Even so, Heidegger appreciated the complexity of the work of both Greek thinkers, and he often found evidence of the earlier Greek experience of Being as “truth itself” in their thinking. Nevertheless, the subtle shift to the human “knower” in both Plato and Aristotle was discernible—and decisive in shaping all subsequent metaphysical thinking about “truth.” In other words, the “alethic” character of Being was already to some degree “forgotten” prior to Descartes.

Yet, to be sure, this “forgottenness” became more acute in Descartes’s thinking, which rendered things as static objects for a foundational human “subject,” and it culminated in the thinking of the modern philosophy of consciousness in which things took on the character of mere mental objects or representations. The human “subject” or “mind” was thereby installed not only as the principal “locus” of truth, but also as the sole “source” of being and truth. It was in this Cartesian/Kantian/Husserlian philosophical climate of thinking that Heidegger sought to raise anew “the Being-question.” Yet, as we observed earlier, it required of Heidegger many years of thinking—and *Holzwege*—in order to find a way out of the modern transcendental framework.
But he did. Heidegger ultimately found his way to his original and distinctive position: Being is “truth” in the first place as dynamic emergence and self-showing, that is, as physis and aletheia. This is the leading theme of his masterpiece Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) and of his brilliant commentaries on Plato and Aristotle and on the sayings of the earliest Greek thinkers Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander from the late 1930s into the 1940s. In GA 97, we find numerous entries that state and restate this breakthrough position. For example, we read this “observation” (Anmerkung) from 1946–47: Aletheia is not a name for veritas, but rather for esse.6

This is one simple line that speaks to a whole history of philosophical thinking. I have examined the matter in some detail in Heidegger’s Way of Being,7 but, in brief, it was the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas in particular who consolidated the position that for Aristotle “truth” (in Latin, veritas) properly resides only in the intellect, whether human or divine. Aquinas thereby rejected the position, suggested by Augustine and other earlier writers, that “truth” belongs in the first place to “being” (esse). For Heidegger, Aquinas’s reading of Aristotle was clear evidence of the intensification of the “forgottenness” of the aletheic character of Being during the medieval period. His entry in the notebook thus states his novel position in a succinct and elegant manner: The ancient Greek Ur-word aletheia is not a name for “truth” understood in the metaphysical manner as proper to the intellect (veritas), but rather it is, in the first place, the name for being (esse). Being is “primordial truth” as the emerging of what is emergent. Being is/as Aletheia.

In the same section of GA 97, he furthers this theme in another entry:

To think Being aletheically means to experience that and how Aletheia is as the revealing of the beginning of the unfolding of Seyn [crossed out] = the unfolding of physis.8

Again, the task is to think Being aletheically, and this is precisely what the earliest Greek thinkers gave us to think, but which was lost from view in the refocusing of our attention on the human knower with Plato and Aristotle. Furthermore, to think Being as Aletheia (and in this period Heidegger often capitalized the Ur-Greek words as names for Being) is to think “the unfolding of physis.” In other words, Being as aletheia as “primordial truth” refers first and foremost to the temporal arising and emergence and showing-forth of all things—and this is also physis, as he had so clearly shown in Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) and in the 1943 lecture course on Heraclitus. I have brought his position in these texts into high relief in chapters 4 and 5 of Heidegger’s Way

6 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 257.
8 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 261.
of *Being*, but there is also helpful supplementary material to be found in Heidegger’s gloss on his *Introduction to Metaphysics* in GA 73.1, which was only recently published. There, for instance, in the section titled “The Being-question and the Dismounting of *physis,*” he observes that “to *physis* belongs unconcealedness,” and he emphasizes that “Being unfolds as true-(being). Being is the truth as such.” He continues that what we no longer see as clearly as the earliest Greeks is the fullness and simplicity of this *truthing of physis itself [aletheuein der physis selbst].*  

The “dismounting” of *aletheia* as *physis* (and *physis* as *aletheia*) largely begins, he states, with the shift in thinking in Aristotle to the “psyche” of the human being as the proper site of “truth” and thus “the later object-subject relation is here [with Aristotle] already prepared”.  

These entries in GA 97, then, only restate and amplify the central position that he had worked out and laid out for at least a decade prior. In another entry, he sets the record straight once more about the proper aim of *Being and Time*:  

The meditation on the essence of truth in *Being and Time* and in the subsequent writings and lecture courses since then is by no means prompted by the question concerning the truth of cognition, and also not by a discussion of the truth of beings, but rather singularly by a thinking of the truth of Being.  

And to this he adds the crucial point: to think “the truth of Being” is to think that “*physis* is Being in the sense of emergence. But emergence is in essence revealing, [that is], *Aletheia*.  

There are a number of other entries in the volume that speak to this same fundamental theme of his later work, and there is no need to examine all of them in detail. Yet one especially instructive entry from 1948 tells us how far Heidegger believed he had come from Husserl’s transcendental approach to the matter of Being. The great shortcoming of Husserl’s transcendental idealism was that it could never fulfill the promise of getting to “the things themselves”; his was a philosophical method that entirely missed “the experience of *Aletheia.*” In fact, Heidegger writes that Husserl “closed himself” to just such an experience:

‘That something shows itself forth from it itself’ – is not only another formulation of the principle of proper description. In that phrase there speaks already the turning of thinking into *Aletheia* as the essential feature of Being itself in the sense of presencing. About

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10 Martin Heidegger, “Die Entmachtung der Φύσις”, in: *Zum Ereignis-Denken*(GA 73.1), 133.

11 Martin Heidegger, “Die Entmachtung der Φύσις”, in: *Zum Ereignis-Denken* (GA 73.1), 133.


14 In GA 97, see also esp. 275, 281, 282, 286, 289, 367, 373, 392, 415, 421.
all of this Husserl not only knows nothing, in fact he closes himself to it (er sperrt sich dagegen).  

One might consider this a harsh observation, but we need to keep in mind that Heidegger is, in effect, also being harsh with himself, that is, with his own failure in Being and Time. Husserl, his teacher, had perhaps glimpsed the core matter, but he persisted in the modern manner of measuring out Being from the human being; that is, his focus remained on subjectivity in the “constitution” of the phenomenon. As we have observed, the early Heidegger was tempted along this way, too, but certainly after Being and Time—and as reflected in these notebooks—he clearly came to understand Aletheia as another name for Being itself. The phainomenon is not merely a “constituted” static content for ever more rigorous consideration and description, but rather a vibrant temporal emergence: Being as aletheia—as physis. Husserl, according to Heidegger, missed this altogether and, in fact, for whatever reasons, actively “closed himself” against precisely this exposure to the experience of Being as aletheia—an experience which, as Heidegger also suggests here, would have turned Husserl out of the certainty and security of his transcendental-phenomenological programme.

On the matter of Being as physis as aletheia, the many “observations” in GA 97 do not break new ground, as we have noted, but they do give us further evidence of the central importance of this motif in his thinking in the 1940s. He had found in the Ur-words of the earliest Greek thinkers a way out of the transcendental approach to Being that had ensnared him in Being and Time. His entries in this volume time and again seek to counter the transcendental-phenomenological inflection that it is the human being who is the “source” of Being and truth. Rather, as with the ancient Greeks, it must be recognized that Being, not the human being, is the “source” of unconcealment and concealment, no matter what our own activity of un concealing and concealing. Thus:

Unconcealment unfolding as Being; Being is the whence—whereunto and wherein of the unfolding of revealing-concealing.  

3. Being as Aletheia as Independent of the Relation With Human Beings

One additional entry in GA 97 regarding this core theme of Being as Aletheia stands out because it brings into even sharper relief the radicality of Heidegger’s position in relation to any transcendental or quasi-transcendental perspective. What we have been taking note of is the originality and distinctive-

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15 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 442.
16 Martin Heidegger, Anmerkungen I–V (GA 97), 456.
ness of the later Heidegger’s understanding of Being as “primordial truth” as temporal self-showing and shining-forth. We could point to places in the early work where Heidegger approached this later understanding of Being, but, again, his early work was limited and inhibited by the transcendental framework that he had adopted from Husserl. His early statements—such as in Being and Time where he states that Being is only insofar as there is Dasein or that there is “truth” only insofar as there is Dasein—clearly reflected the extent to which his early thinking was captured by the transcendental positioning. Heidegger recognized this, and his dissatisfaction with his approach in Being and Time is in evidence in the notebooks (GA 94). Admittedly, however, Heidegger in the notebooks is not always forthright about his discontent with his own approach and is rather inclined to blame readers for mistaking Being and Time as an “idealism” of some kind. Nevertheless, we cannot but hear in many of his entries in GA 94 his personal frustration with the framing of the Seinsfrage in Being and Time and his urgent call for a dramatic “leap” in thinking.

This “leap” took several forms in the later work. Some commentators have shown how it gave rise to his “Beyng-historical thinking” of the 1930s and especially in Beiträge. Yet my principal concern has been to show how Heidegger leapt ahead to the theme of Being as physis and aletheia beginning in the early 1930s—and continuing to the end of his life. He left behind the transcendental elements of Being and Time by realizing the full implications of his earliest intuition about ancient Greek thinking, namely, that the temporal emergence of all things ontologically precedes and exceeds the “constituting” activity of transcendental subjectivity. Henceforth, after the “turn” we may say, he never ceased emphasizing the priority and primacy of Being in relation to the human being.

This is not to say that Heidegger left behind his concern with the cor-relation of Being and the human being. This concern remained a constant, but what did change was his characterization of the cor-relation. In the later work, he abjured the transcendental understanding of the cor-relation, which is still in evidence in Being and Time, that Being is dependent upon the human being. His awakening (or reawakening) to the priority and primacy of Being in relation to the human being put this transcendental dependence into radical question, and the later Heidegger found different ways to affirm the “independence” (Unabhängigkeit) of Being as physis as aletheia in relation to the human being, even as he continued to speak about Being’s “need” of the human being.17 In the later work especially, “need” is not “dependence.” The unending temporal self-

showing and shining-forth of Being as \textit{physis as aletheia} is not in need of the human being in the strict sense, yet we may say that the human being is “needed” only as a mirror reflecting back in language the inexhaustible resplendence of Being’s manifestation. He had put this very clearly in 1941:

In the scope of the time when Being appropriates primordiality in the open and gives to be known and preserved the nobility of its freedom to itself, and consequently, its independence \textit{[Unabhängigkeit]} as well, Being needs the reflected radiance of a shining-forth of its essence in the truth.\footnote{Martin Heidegger, \textit{Nietzsche II}, hrsg. von Brigitte Schillbach (GA 6.2), Frankfurt am Main 1997, 441.}

It is in this same text that he refers to Being’s “pure needlessness” \textit{(reine Unbedürftigkeit)}. The radicality of Heidegger’s later position on Being as \textit{physis as aletheia} lies, then, in this: Being is not strictly speaking dependent upon the human being as the site or dative, the “to-whom,” of Being’s unending temporal emergence and unconcealedness. Not surprisingly, therefore, in the notebooks in an entry dated from 1948, we find him venturing just this point in a particularly bold and striking manner:

\textit{Aletheia}—unconcealedness; it \textit{[aletheia—unconcealedness]} is shown to be the unfolding region of everything that comes-to-presence, then one immediately seeks a substrate for it and asks: unconcealed “for” whom?—as if the free of the clearing \textit{[Lichtung]} already had to be accommodated as well.\footnote{Martin Heidegger, \textit{Anmerkungen I–V} (GA 97), 458. My thanks to Richard Polt for this reference.}

Of course, this is precisely the kind of statement of the later Heidegger that is so disconcerting to those who are committed to a “transcendental-phenomenological Heidegger.” And yet—we must take these statements (and no doubt many additional ones in the later notebooks that have not yet published) into account if we are to understand the trajectory of his thinking after the 1920s. The notebooks help us understand in yet another way the considerable distance that separates the later Heidegger from the Heidegger of \textit{Being and Time}.

**Concluding Thought**

It would not be surprising that even in a few short years the \textit{Black Notebooks} will be largely set aside in favor of returning to Heidegger’s major writings and lecture courses. Even so, as I have tried to show in this focused essay, these notebooks, including the ones that have not yet been published, will be of some value in shedding more light on his central philosophical themes and on the development of his thinking. Admittedly, as has been already (too) much
discussed, several of the entries in the volumes that have been published thus far do not reflect well on Heidegger the person, but then again—and let us not overlook this—there are also ample entries that remind us of the brilliance of Heidegger the thinker, and the lyricism of Heidegger the poet of the manifestation of Being:

No matter how the unleashed distortion of everything runs riot, there remains to the knowing the mature calm of the mountain, the gathered illumination of the meadows, the silent flight of the falcon, the bright cloud in the expansive sky—that wherein the majestic stillness of the farthest nearness of Beyng has already announced itself.²⁰

²⁰ Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II–VI (GA 94), 304.