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Maintaining secrecy, particularly during wartime, is vital to the national security of every country.
Philip Johnston was the initiator of the Marine Corps' program to enlist and train the Navajos as messengers. After detailing the nature of the demonstration and its success, Vogel outlined in his letter the advantages, as he saw them, to Johnston's proposal. Although Vogel's letter was firm in its support, it nevertheless contained allusions to some of the problems that would trouble the project as it progressed. While these concerns were not to manifest themselves for some time, others found more immediate reasons to object. Despite these objections, the initial recruitment of code talkers was approved, with the stipulation that the Navajo meet the normally required qualifications for enlistment, undergo the same seven-week training as any other recruit, and meet strict linguistic qualifications in English and Navajo, qualifications not easily attained. It was at Camp Elliott that the initial recruits, along with communications personnel, designed the first Navajo code. The Navajo soon demonstrated their ability to memorize the code and to send messages under adverse conditions similar to military action, successfully transmitting the code from planes, tanks, or fast-moving positions.
By April of 1943, the additional 200 recruits had almost completed their training, while the initial recruits were attached to Marine divisions in the South Pacific and performing communication and general Marine duties. With the recruitment and training program for the code talkers facing curtailment on the homefront, the Navajo code talkers assigned to the South Pacific experienced their own varying degrees of success. Despite the development of unique military terms for the Navajo code, the lack of military terminology in the original Navajo vocabulary remained an obstacle, another limitation that became apparent in the Battle of Iwo Jima. Even with these limitations, however, overall assessments from Iwo Jima and other battles showed that there was an interest to continue the development of Navajos as code talkers. If you would like to make an offer, click Enquire Here and follow the prompts on the displayed page to submit a bid or Buy It Now.
If your offer is accepted by both parties or you have completed the Buy It Now process, you will receive a notification advising you of the next steps. Accomplishing this on the homefront during World War II was one objective of the Office of War Information.
Although Johnston was not a Navajo, he grew up on a Navajo reservation as the son of a missionary and became familiar with the people and their language. Johnston's report concluded by recommending the Navajo, Sioux, Chippewa, and Pima-Papago as tribes that were available for recruitment based on the size of their population. Prior to the demonstration, General Vogel had installed a telephone connection between two offices and wrote out six messages that were typical of those sent during combat.
One colonel stated that the supposed primary advantage of the code talkers over the encrypted system -- speed -- was actually of little benefit because in field action situations, when speed was of the essence, messages were usually sent verbatim without code because the enemy would not have time to intercept them and respond. On May 5, 1942, the first 29 Navajos arrived at the Recruit Depot in San Diego, California, for basic training, where they trained in the standard procedures of the military and in weapons use. This code consisted of 211 words, most of which were Navajo terms that had been imbued with new, distinctly military meanings in order to compensate for the lack of military terminology in the Navajo vocabulary. The program was deemed so successful that an additional two hundred Navajos were recommended for recruitment as messengers on July 20, 1942. A cryptographer who monitored the code talkers' transmissions concluded that the code might be broken because using the alphabet to spell out words not in the Navajos' vocabulary produced too many repetitions. The Marine Corps by this time had compiled recommendations of Marine Divisions in the field and had determined that the program should be continued and expanded further.


The official Marine Corps records contain very few battle reports related to the Navajo code talkers, citing activity only at Guam, Palau, Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Because Navajos had trained at different times and worked in different locales, the development of certain dialects and modified vocabularies was inevitable.
The primary strengths of the code talkers was the amount of secrecy that they ensured and the versatility with which they could be used. The Navajo code talker program was highly classified throughout the war and remained so until 1968. The office created propaganda posters that alerted American citizens to the presence of enemy spies and saboteurs lurking just below the surface of American society. Johnston was also a World War I veteran and knew about the military's desire to send and receive messages in an unbreakable code. According to Johnston, the day after he read the article, he went to the Naval Office in Los Angeles, California, and told them the story. Because of Johnston's intimate knowledge of the Navajo reservation, its people, and the Navajo language-- and because the Navajo had the largest population of Native American-- he believed that they offered the best possibility for recruitment. In addition, Vogel noted that the Navajo was the only tribe, according to Johnston, that had not yet been infiltrated by Germans posing as students, art dealers, and anthropologists in order to study the various tribal dialects of American Indians. While the demonstration itself was a success, over the next year, the development of a consistent and universally applicable Navajo code for the countless military terms would prove to be a major obstacle. Afterward, they moved to Fleet Marine Force Training Center at Camp Elliott, where they received special courses in the transmission of messages and instruction in radio operation. This prompted Philip Johnston to offer his services as a staff sergeant to aid in the development of the code talker program. To alleviate this problem, the code talker alphabet grew from twenty-six to forty-four terms by creating alternatives for the most frequently repeated letters -- E, T, A, O, I, N, S, H, R, D, L, and U.
According to the new proposal, an additional 303 Navajos were to be recruited at 50 men per month for six months.
Reports from Iwo Jima, typical of those related to code talkers from the front, highlight both the limitations and the strengths of the program. As a consequence, dialects were different among the code talkers and were detrimental to effective communication between units. When compared to other messengers, the Navajos provided a valuable line of communication by radio that was both secure and error-free.
Returning home on buses without parades or fanfare and sworn to secrecy about the existence of the code, the Navajo code talkers are only recently making their way into popular culture and mainstream American history. On the battlefield, maintaining military secrecy went far beyond poster campaigns because it was essential for victory, and breaking enemy codes was necessary to gain the advantage and shorten the war. Johnston thought that the tribe's seclusion made the Navajo a culturally and linguistically autonomous people compared with other native groups.
Interestingly, this point was to become somewhat moot, as the code talkers were never deployed on the European front, the Marine Corps operations being primarily situated in the Pacific Theater. Vogel also stated, on the basis of Johnston's assurances, that one thousand Navajos with necessary qualifications could be found for the project.
On October 2, 1942, Johnston enlisted and began training his first class in November and spent the remainder of the war training additional Navajo recruits. The enlistment of additional Navajos was not a simple task, however, because many new recruits were not qualified.


One of the primary limitations was the aforementioned lack of available qualified Navajos to participate. The ability to send and receive codes without the risk of the enemy deciphering the transmission was the most desirable end result of military secrecy. The article stated that the Army included Native Americans during these maneuvers on the basis of the experiences of the Canadian Army in World War I, when the Native Americans acted as signalmen against the Germans to send secure messages about shortages of supplies or ammunition. The Navajo reservation, which was located largely in Arizona but which comprised portions of New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado, totaled an area of 25,000 square miles of isolated and sparsely populated land that was largely inaccessible due to unimproved roads and trails. Marine Corps commandant recommending the initial recruitment of two hundred Navajos for the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet. But the statement nevertheless revealed the priorities of Vogel and the military on the whole-- to maintain in their communications the utmost secrecy and security.
In addition, those Navajos who volunteered through Selective Service were often sent to other branches of the military. Many offices, regiments, and battalions remained without new recruits, which of course rendered communication in code between these offices and those with the code talkers impossible. This ability, however, often required hours of encrypting and decrypting the code to ensure the highest security of the message. It took Johnston some time to convince Major Jones about the potential for using a Native American code, but after Johnston spoke a few Navajo words to the baffled major, Jones decided to give Johnston's idea a trial run with actual Navajos.
Johnston also believed that many Navajos had been given an education that adequately prepared them for jobs outside their traditional life-styles. The Marine Corps attempted to alleviate this problem by reducing their quota to twenty-five men per month. Within two weeks, Johnston assembled four Navajos in the Los Angeles area and arranged to meet Major Jones back at Camp Elliott on February 27, 1942, with the demonstration to occur the next day. In the years prior to 1942, Navajo children attended government-established schools on the reservation that taught English grammar.
It made arrangements with Selective Service to activate voluntary induction of Navajos, and even tried to transfer Navajos from the Army into the Marine Corps, but its goal still remained unattainable. The limited recruiting successes, however, made following through with these recommendations difficult. The Congressional Silver Medal was presented to the remaining Navajos who later qualified to be code talkers. A large number of them also attended schools outside of the reservation that taught native arts and crafts and offered classes in trades and occupations.
Senator Bingaman's legislation was one attempt to answer the question of how the United States should document and remember the Navajo code talkers.
With proper training, Johnston was sure that Navajos who fit the age and education requirements for military service could be taught to transmit messages in their native language.



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