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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE:)	
GUANTANAMO BAY)	Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)
DETAINEE LITIGATION)	Civil Action No.
)	05-CV-1429 (RMU)
)	
)	
)	

AMENDED FACTUAL RETURN

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Respondents hereby submit, as explained herein, an amended factual return pertaining to the petitioner identified as the subject of the attached Narrative. This amended return is intended to supersede the material contained in any previously filed return, except for the fact that petitioner was previously determined by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to be an enemy combatant.

This amended return sets forth factual bases¹ supporting petitioner's lawful, ongoing detention pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and the President's power as Commander in Chief.

Dated: September 29, 2008

Respectfully submitted,


GREGORY G. KATSAS
Assistant Attorney General

JOHN C. O'QUINN
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

¹ Respondents reserve the right to seek leave to further supplement the record with additional factual bases supporting petitioner's detention, as necessary.

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DECLARATION OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID THOMAS

Declaration of Rear Admiral David M. Thomas, Jr.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, David M. Thomas, Jr., hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the following is true, accurate, and correct:

I am a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy, with 31 years of active duty service. I currently serve as Commander, Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. I have held this position since 27 May 2008. As such, I am directly responsible for the successful execution of the JTF-GTMO mission to conduct detention and interrogation operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, coordinate and implement detainee screening operations, and support law enforcement and war crimes investigations.

The attached narrative and supporting materials from files of the Department of Defense or other government agencies contain information used by the Department of Defense to establish the status of the individual who is the subject of the narrative as an enemy combatant and to substantiate their detention as an enemy combatant at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Dated:



DAVID M. THOMAS, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAID MUHAMMED SALIH
HATIM

Petitioner

v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, *et al.*
Respondents.

Civil Action No. 05-CV-1429
(RMU)

**NARRATIVE FOR PETITIONER SAID MOHAMMED SALIH
HATIM (ISN 255)**

Introduction

1. Said Muhammed Salih Hatim (hereinafter, Hatim) is a **b(1)** national, who has admitted in interviews his travel in year 2001 to Afghanistan. Hatim admits to traveling over routes consistently used by al-Qaida recruits to Karachi, Pakistan, and has admitted to staying in hotels and guesthouses commonly used by al-Qaida recruits. Hatim trained at the al-Farouq training camp, and admits to supplying Taliban fighters with food while serving at the Said Central Station near the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan. Hatim admits to fleeing U.S. and allied forces after the bombing campaign began after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 **[REDACTED]**

[REDACTED] Hatim's admissions closely parallel that of other young Yemeni men who were recruited by al-Qaida to wage "jihad." **[REDACTED]**

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[REDACTED] Consequently, for reasons including those described further below, the petitioner is lawfully subject to detention pursuant to, among other things, the President's powers as Commander in Chief and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force.

2. In assessing whether a detainee is an enemy combatant, the intelligence community relies upon interviews with the detainee and others conducted by law enforcement and intelligence personnel, as well as information derived from other sources and methods. Information received from these sources is commonly reproduced in reports created by the collecting officer. Such information is also commonly analyzed by intelligence or law enforcement personnel and used to produce other intelligence products. These reports and intelligence products are routinely relied upon by military or intelligence personnel in making decisions to act upon threats to our national security.

Declaration of ^{D3}[REDACTED] Declaration of Robert H. Holmes.

3. As with all detained enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Hatim has been assigned an Internment Serial Number or ISN. The ISN is an administrative code assigned to detainees. Hatim's full ISN is ^{b(2)}[REDACTED]-00255^{b(2)} in which the number 255 is Hatim's unique identifier and the ^{b(2)} designation indicates that he is a national of

^{b(1)}[REDACTED] Source documents attached as Exhibits to this Narrative may refer to Hatim by name, full ISN, or various short forms, such as "^{b(2)}[REDACTED]00255" or "ISN 255."

4. The following narrative and attached materials set forth the factual bases supporting petitioner's lawful detention. This narrative is not intended to be a complete explication of the information in support of petitioner's detention in those documents.

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General Background of the War on Terror

5. Al-Qaida (“the Base”) was founded by Usama bin Laden (UBL) and others in or about 1989 for the purpose of opposing certain governments and officials with force and violence. See The 9/11 Commission Report 56 (2004). Usama bin Laden is recognized as the emir (prince or leader) of al-Qaida. See Id.
6. A purpose or goal of al-Qaida, as stated by Usama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders, is to support violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of the United States and other countries. See Id., at 59-61.
7. Between 1989 and 2001, al-Qaida established training camps, guest houses, and business operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries for the purpose of training and supporting violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of the United States and other countries. See Id. at 64-67.
8. In 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a public “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans.” This declaration called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian peninsula. See Id. at 48.
9. In February 1998, Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri (bin Laden’s deputy) issued a fatwa (purported religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans - whether civilian or military - anywhere in the world. See Id. at 47.
10. Since 1989, members and associates of al-Qaida, known and unknown, have carried out numerous terrorist attacks, including, but not limited to: the attacks against the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which killed approximately 250 people, see Id. at 68-70, the attack against the USS Cole in October 2000, which killed 17 United States Navy sailors (see Id. at 190-93), and the attacks on

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the United States on September 11, 2001, which killed approximately 3,000 people. See Id. passim.

11. The Taliban (students of Islamic knowledge) is an Islamic fundamentalist group that was formed in Afghanistan in 1994. See The Taliban in Afghanistan, at www.cfr.org/publication/10551. After two years of violent conflict that included the capture of Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan's national government in 1996. See The 9/11 Commission Report 65 (2004). Although it was never formally recognized by the United States, see Id. at 124, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national government from 1996 until the United States-led military campaign ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. See Id. at 337-38. During the period in which the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national government, it provided safe harbor and support to al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden. See Id. at 64-67.

12. On September 18, 2001, following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Congress adopted the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. See 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Recognizing that the attacks of September 11, 2001 "render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens at home and abroad," Congress authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Within weeks, United States military forces were deployed in Afghanistan. See The 9/11 Commission Report 337 (2004).

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13. The United States led the initial aerial bombing campaign of Afghanistan, with ground forces composed of United States forces and Afghanistan militia opposed to the Taliban, including the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance is an association of Afghan groups opposed to the Taliban. The Northern Alliance has assisted the United States in its military campaign in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida and the Taliban. See Id. at 330-34; 336-38.

14. In December 2001, the United States-led military campaign removed the Taliban from control of Afghanistan's national government. See Id. at 337-38. Taliban and al-Qaida forces, however, have continued to operate in Afghanistan and attack coalition forces. Currently, two major military operations are underway in Afghanistan. First, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a multinational coalition military operation, led by the United States, initiated in October 2001 to counter terrorism and bring security to Afghanistan in collaboration with Afghan forces. See www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60083.htm. OEF operations led to the collapse of the Taliban government and helped bring security and stability to Afghanistan. Id. OEF involves troops from over 20 nations, including about 19,000 United States forces and about 3,000 non-United States troops. Id. Second, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a United Nations-mandated international coalition operating under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See ww.nato.int/isaf/index.html. ISAF was established in 2002 with the goal of creating conditions for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan. ISAF is comprised of approximately 50,000 troops from 40 countries. Id.

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Hatim's Account of his Travel to and Activities in Afghanistan

Travel to Afghanistan

15. [REDACTED] from the region of Ibb, and stated he studied traditional Islamic Law at the [REDACTED] in 1998 and stopped after two years. ISN 255 FD-302 (June 13, 2002). Hatim stated that he [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in 1994-1995. Id. In 1995-1998, Hatim attempted to get enrolled into a University but was unsuccessful, and advised that he did not do much else between 1995-1998. Id. Hatim stated that he became interested in Russia's war in Chechnya because he witnessed the oppression on the television. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 5, 2002). Hatim was "outraged" by what the Russians were doing to the Chechens, and decided to go to fight "jihad" alongside his Muslim brothers. Id. Hatim wanted to go to Chechnya for "liberation." Id. Hatim stated that he was motivated by his religion and "the call," so he began preparing for the trip. Id. Hatim [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ISN 255 [REDACTED] Hatim [REDACTED] Id.

16. Hatim stated that he informed his family of his decision to go to Chechnya and they refused to provide financial assistance. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 5, 2002). Hatim then spoke with several friends and members of his mosque, who agreed to help him raise money for the trip. Id. Hatim stated that a friend named [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was a fellow member of the [REDACTED] Mosque in Ibb, Yemen. Id. Hatim stated that [REDACTED] was instrumental in helping raise money for his trip. [REDACTED] made speeches, and talked to others about Hatim's trip and Hatim eventually raised 250 U.S dollars. Id.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~Hatim ^{b(1)} [REDACTED]^{b(1)} [REDACTED]^{b(1)} [REDACTED]ISN 255 ^{b(2)} [REDACTED]

17. Hatim stated he went to Afghanistan to obtain training at the al-Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan before going to Chechnya. ISN 255 FD-302 (June 13, 2002). Hatim did not know what to expect at al-Farouq. Id. Hatim said he wanted to refine his shooting skills at the camp and possibly learn to shoot a rocket propelled grenade. Id. Hatim said he could not recall in what month he began his travel, but believed that it was six or seven months before September 11, 2001. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 5, 2002). Hatim stated that he traveled by [REDACTED] to Karachi, Pakistan with two other individuals he had recently met ([REDACTED] and [REDACTED]), but could not describe the relationship between the three of them. Id. Hatim stayed with his new friends at a hotel in Karachi for about 4-5 days, and then [REDACTED] (who was described as a businessman who specialized in organic medicine) traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan by bus. Id. Hatim and [REDACTED] stayed at the "Taliban House" in Quetta, PK, for about 1-2 days. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 10, 2002). Hatim stated that this was a special place for students, but he received no briefings about Jihad and did not see any weapons at the house. Id. Hatim and [REDACTED] met an individual named [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] at the Taliban House in Quetta, who arranged travel for Hatim and [REDACTED] across the border and into Afghanistan. Id. Hatim stated that he paid [REDACTED] money in Quetta and additional monies in Kandahar, AF, once they completed the trip. Id.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~Hatim's Stay at the Haji Habash Guesthouse in Afghanistan

18. Hatim stated that he, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] crossed into Afghanistan to Buldak, AF by taxi without being confronted by any border control. Id.; ISN FD-302 (June 13, 2002). Hatim said they traveled to Kandahar and stayed at an Arab house near Haji Habash across from the Kandahar Institute for law (the Haja House) for approximately one week. ISN FD-302 (October 10, 2002). See, Declaration of ^{D3} [REDACTED] "Guesthouses," (Sept. 19, 2008), described further herein, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Hatim stated that he used this time to understand what it was they were asking him to do, i.e., fight Jihad. Id. Hatim stated an individual known as [REDACTED] was in charge of the Haja House, and there were about ten to fifteen others there during that week. Hatim did not ask the others why they were staying at the house, but assumed some were there to fight with the Taliban, and others were going elsewhere. Id. Hatim thought it was near the end of summer, five or six months before Ramadan. Id.

19. ISN ^{A2 A6} [REDACTED] stated that Arabs traveling to and from Kandahar used the Haji Habbash (variant of Haja) Guest House. Arabs who stayed in there were mainly Yemenis. ISN ^{A2} [REDACTED] FM 40 (February 15, 2005). The detainee stated that the house was for everyone, new, old, coming to or leaving Afghanistan. Id. ^{C1, 6} [REDACTED]

^{C1} [REDACTED]

^{C1} [REDACTED]

^{C2} [REDACTED]

This detainee explained that this was the guesthouse used by Arab recruits en route to training at al-Farouq. Id. Indeed, the

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detainee described the guesthouse as a "Mudafa," meaning transient house used for billeting. Id. Consistent with Hatim's account, the detainee stated that the guesthouse was operated by a man named [REDACTED] before September 11, 2001. Id. Usama bin Laden reportedly stayed there in May or June 2000. Id.

Hatim's Desire to Train at Al-Farouq

20. Hatim admitted that while in Kandahar he actively sought how to get to the al-Farouq Training Camp. ISN 255 FD-302 (June 13, 2002), although in another interview he claimed that he realized near the end of the course that it was an al-Qaida camp. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 10, 2002). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Declaration of
D3 [REDACTED] "Terrorist Training Camps" (Sept. 19, 2008). A male, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided Hatim with further information about the al-Farouq camp. Id. Hatim stated that after one week he left with two others he had met at the Haja House for the five hour trip to al-Farouq. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 10, 2002). Hatim stated there was no sign at the camp. Id. Hatim carried his luggage over a mountain, walking for approximately 30 minutes to al-Farouq. Id. He checked in at the office and placed his passport and money into an envelope which he gave to a man named [REDACTED]. Id.

21. According to Hatim, after checking in at the office, he went to the mosque and prayed with some 30 others. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 10, 2002). Hatim reported to an area with four or five tents to sleep for the night. Hatim stated the camp was divided into training areas and he was placed in the all Arab group. Although Hatim stated that he

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stayed at the camp for approximately three weeks, the camp was not what he expected. Id. Hatim stated that he was taught the use of a Kalishnikov, RPG, and pistol, and was taught physical training. ISN 255 FD-302 (June 13, 2002). Hatim confirmed in subsequent interviews that he received military training, including small arms training, at al-Farouq. ISN 255 FM 40 (August 14, 2004). Hatim stated that he didn't like anything about the training and wanted to quit the first day. Id. Hatim thought it necessary to feign an illness and tell people he needed to seek medical care so that he could leave the camp early. Id. In another interview, Hatim stated that he actually became tire and sick with fever while at al-Farouq. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 22, 2002).

22. [REDACTED] Hatim's [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Id.

Hatim's Stay at Al-Qaida Guesthouses in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan

23. Hatim said he then packed up his belongings (backpack, passport, and 200 U.S dollars) and left for Kandahar. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 22, 2002). He was driven from al-Farouq by car to Kandahar, with four other Arab males in the truck. Id. Hatim stayed again at the Haji-Habash guesthouse for about two days while in Kandahar. Id. Haji-Habash was guarded and 10 other Arab males were staying there. Id. Hatim described the house as a walled compound with four rooms. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 30, 2002). Hatim stated that once he was feeling better (or no longer was faking an illness) he hired a taxi to drive him to Kabul, Afghanistan. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 22, 2002). Hatim stated that he wanted to see the Taliban capital in person, and he thought

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he would stay and get a job if he liked it there. Id. Hatim stated that there was no fighting in the city of Kabul when he arrived in 2001; the fighting was many miles away. Id. Hatim stated that there nothing waiting for him in Yemen, and he wanted to meet new people and test the waters. Id. Hatim stated that the Taliban behaved well from a religious standpoint. Id. Hatim stated that while in Kabul he thought of getting married and finding a job. Id.

24. Hatim stated that the first Arab house he stayed at in Kabul was called Carte Birwan (also known as Karte Parwan) and was operated by [REDACTED] a 30 to 35 year old Saudi Arabian male. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 30, 2002). Two armed guards protected it. Hatim stayed there about forty days. Id. Hatim said the next Arab house in Kabul he stayed at, recommend by [REDACTED] was called Gholam Batcha. Id. An Afghan male named [REDACTED] operated it. Id. Hatim stayed there for one month.

Id. [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)

[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)

[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)

[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) Id. [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)

[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) Id.

[REDACTED] b(1)

[REDACTED] b(1) Id. see also, Declaration of ^{D3} [REDACTED] "Guesthouses" (September 19,

2008) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Declaration of

D3 [REDACTED] "Guesthouses."

25. [REDACTED] Hatim [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ISN 255 FD-302 (May 6, 2003);

[REDACTED] Hatim [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Hatim [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Hatim [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Id. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Id.

Hatim's Service on the Front at Said Central Station

26. After leaving Kabul, Afghanistan, Hatim stayed in a small village in the rear of the Bagram, Afghanistan line. ISN 255 FD-302 (October 30, 2002). Id. Hatim stated that as a newcomer he was not allowed on the front lines to fight, but needed to be evaluated first. Id. Hatim stated that for his efforts he received 500 to 1000 Afghan

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rupees in an envelope handed to him by [REDACTED]. The envelope had his name on it and instructions to hand deliver it to him. Id. Hatim stated that he did not know where the money came from. Id. When Hatim was asked how he could be evaluated without any responsibility, and how he could receive payment for doing nothing, Hatim was evasive in response, but finally admitted to being part of Said Central Station, which he described as a group of 15 Arabs positioned on the Kabul line. Id. Hatim stated that Said Central Station was commanded by a man named [REDACTED]. Id. Hatim stated that Said Central Station was located outside Kabul at the rear lines of fighting and was described by Hatim as a place of resupply for the front lines near Bagram. ISN 255 FD-302 (November 1, 2002). Hatim stated that while at Said Central Station he rode horses and played soccer. Id. Hatim also stated that he would check out an AK-47 and take the 30 minute ride to the front and deliver food to the Taliban soldiers on the front line. Id. Hatim stated the Kalashnikov was for his protection and he did not take part in the fighting. Hatim stated that he only took food to the front line Taliban fighters, never weapons, ammunition or clothing. Id. Later on, Hatim claimed that he did not actually distribute the food, but merely accompanied those transporting the food to the front, while he stayed in the car. Unclassified Summary of ISN 255's Unsworn Statement to CSRT, Enclosure 3 (January 16, 2005). Hatim [REDACTED] b(1)

[REDACTED] b(1) ISN 255 [REDACTED] b(2)

Hatim's Work for Al-Wafa

27. Hatim said that after approximately three weeks at Said Central Station, he returned to Kabul. ISN 255 FD-302 (November 1, 2002). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Al-Wafa is an al-Qaida and Taliban affiliated non-governmental organization (NGO) that provided financial and logistical support to Islamic extremists. The organization has been named by the President as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1701. See Exec. Order 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079, 49082 (Sept. 23, 2001), see also 66 Fed. Reg. 54404, 54405 (Oct. 26, 2001). See Declaration of ^{D3} [REDACTED] "Al-Wafa Islamic Humanitarian Organization" (Aug. 29, 2008). ^{D1} [REDACTED]

^{D1} [REDACTED]

^{D1} [REDACTED] Id. ^{D1} [REDACTED]

^{D1} [REDACTED] Id. ^{D1} [REDACTED]

^{D1} [REDACTED]

^{D1} [REDACTED] Id. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Hatim's and Al-Qaida's Retreat from Kabul, Afghanistan to Pakistan

28. With the fall of Kabul to U.S. and allied forces, Hatim stated that he traveled to Jalalabad by taxicab, driven by [REDACTED] cook. ISN 255 FD-302 (November 1, 2002). Hatim stated that [REDACTED] directed him to the home of another Arab in Jalalabad who would take him to Pakistan. Id. Hatim stated that he had left his passport with [REDACTED], but he had an agreement with [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] would be in Pakistan and from there they would get out. ISN 255 FD-302 (May 5, 2003).

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29. According to Hatim, he stayed one day in Jalalabad then took a cab with some Pakistanis to the Pakistan border. ISN 255 FD-302 (November 1, 2002). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The Pakistanis instructed Hatim not to talk to anyone so that no one would think he was an Arab. ISN 255 FD-302 (November 1, 2002). Once at the border town, the Pakistanis left Hatim. Id. Hatim met an Afghani who took Hatim to another town closer to Pakistan where he stayed for one day. Id. Then, Hatim was taken to a Pakistan police station. Id. According to Hatim, the police told Hatim that his paperwork would be worked out so he could return to Yemen., but he was detained. Id. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] **Other Detainees Further Indicate that** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

30. [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) ISN 255 [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)

[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) Said Muhammad Salih Hatim [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2)

[REDACTED] b(2) The author of a Department of Defense Criminal Investigation Task Force (DOD/CITF) memorandum commented in describing [REDACTED] A6 [REDACTED] (ISN [REDACTED] A2 statement with respect to another detainee that his credibility was in question with interrogators. DOD/CITF Memorandum (May 14, 2004). [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)

[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) [REDACTED] b(1), b(5)

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b(1), b(5) [redacted] b(2) [redacted] b(1), b(6) [redacted]

b(1), b(6) [redacted] Hatim b(1), b(6) [redacted]

b(1), b(6) [redacted] Id. see Declaration of

D3 [redacted] "Tora Bora" (Sept. 19, 2008). b(1), b(6) [redacted] Hatim b(1), b(6) [redacted]

b(1), b(6) [redacted] Id. b(1), b(6) [redacted] Hatim b(1), b(6) [redacted]

b(1), b(6) [redacted] Id. b(1), b(6) [redacted]

Hatim b(1), b(6) [redacted] Id.

D1 [redacted]

31. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Declaration of D3 [redacted] "Guesthouses," supra.

32. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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33. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Conclusion

Based on the facts above, Hatim is lawfully detained by the United States.

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