Temporariness in Canada: Establishing a research agenda

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Introduction

Permanence in a territory continues to be the basis for rights, including entitlements to work, residency, and pathways to citizenship. Migration and refugee laws set the limits for who is included in the territorial state and the nation as an imagined community. Canada, much like other immigrant-receiving liberal democratic states, designs and adapts its immigration and refugee systems to reflect its own interests and the right to sovereign rule of its territory. In the aftermath of the events of 9/11, perceived threats to national identity mixed with national security concerns have meant that migration laws in tandem with citizenship laws are now associated with the essence of the nation (Aiken, 2001). In such a context, migration and refugee laws have been transformed into the “last bastion of sovereignty” (Dauvergne, 2008: 1).

The “White” settler colonies emerging out of Europe in the nineteenth century, which became the United States, Canada, and Australia, epitomized the concept of the bordered, territorial, culturally homogenized nation-state. Discriminatory measures that were used to classify people according to their perceived eligibility to enter or remain in a particular territory constructed a “global apartheid” (Richmond, 1994). Historically, membership in the Canadian state was premised on territorial presence and permanent status; however, temporary migration has always been a significant component of Canadian policy and economy.

Since 2008, the number of temporary foreign workers entering Canada annually overtook the number of permanent residents admitted annually, a trend that has continued ever since (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Now, temporary migration is becoming a pathway to gaining permanent residence status in Canadian society for selected migrants (Rajkumar et al., 2012). Temporariness in Canada implies limited rights based on temporality (often limiting period of stay) and conditionality (i.e., rights conditional upon their behavior, e.g., they must satisfy a specific employer to remain in the country). These temporal and conditional limitations determine access to citizenship. The growing temporary migrant population in Canada is diverse, demonstrating the multitude forms of contemporary temporariness. The temporary-permanent divide creates a “permeable paper border for the transnational elite […] it is less permeable for the growing numbers who enter with temporary status” (Rajkumar et al., 2012: 505).

Rajkumar et al. (2012) argue that Canada offers privileged forms of temporariness and inclusive membership to the “highly skilled” and restrictive and restricting forms of
temporariness for the “low skilled”. The authors go as far as to distinguish between those who are temporarily temporary (e.g., highly skilled temporary foreign workers who are eligible for expedited permanent residency through the Canadian Experience Class), permanently temporary (e.g., seasonal agricultural workers) and temporarily permanent (e.g., foreign-born permanent residents who could be deported upon violation of immigration and security laws). Restrictions placed on entitlements to substantive citizenship rights and access to citizenship for newcomers in Canada continues to be strategically used to unjustly authorize the exclusion of a racialized, gendered and classed “other.”

Canada in the twenty-first century is an ethnoculturally diverse state with a large foreign-born population; however, membership in this diverse state is still tied to notions of nationhood, colonialism, neo-colonialism, “race,” and gender. When Canada selects migrants and refugees on economic, family reunification, or humanitarian and compassionate grounds, the state conveys the values of the nation and expresses its absolute power over territory. Dauvergne (2008) notes that ironically the term “economic migrant” is used both as a basis of exclusion for supposedly “bogus refugees” and to describe the highly sought-after migrants in the current global race for talent (Shachar, 2006). The competition for the world’s best and brightest plays into economic calculations that permit international students and highly skilled temporary foreign workers to gain expedited residency but jeopardizes the basic liberties and entitlements of others, such as persons designated as “irregular arrivals” who are often detained without review. The increased control over movements of people across Canada’s borders is in fact beginning to threaten civil liberties and violate elements of human rights and protection provided under international law (Dauvergne, 2008).

The growing moral panic about illegal migration is the rationale driving the “crackdown” measures introduced in Canada over the past decade to curb unsanctioned entries. Exclusions within refugee law have become a vital instrument in denying protection to refugees. The number of refugee claimants has been dropping steadily in the last decade. Canada’s refugee acceptance rates for 2010 and 2011 are at historical lows (38% as compared to the average rates in the previous decade of 40-45%). Furthermore, the number of referrals made to the Immigration and Refugee Board is steadily declining as the number of abandoned and withdrawn applications is on the rise. As the acceptance rate falls, some claimants risk living illegally rather
than be deported, contributing to a vicious cycle further instigating moral panic and security fears (Human Rights Research and Education Centre Refugee Forum, 2012).

This paper provides a critical review of the literature concerning the multiple forms of temporariness in contemporary Canada and examines the diverse groups that are entitled to different combinations of substantive citizenship rights (if any) and pathways to citizenship. The review of academic and policy materials reveals three broad groups who hold temporary status in Canada: asylum seekers, temporary foreign workers, and international students. The paper is divided into six sections.

The first section provides a brief description of the methodology used to identify the materials included in the review. In the second section, the paper examines the history of Canada’s exclusionary immigration and refugee policies, establishing immigration as inseparable from Canadian nationhood. In the third section, the paper reviews the influential discourses of illegality and securitization that are uncritically employed by policy makers to rationalize the current violations of human rights of the growing number of persons who are denied access to permanent residence and/or citizenship. The following three sections provide a thematic review of the existing academic literature on the three broad groups holding temporary status in Canada: refugee claimants/asylum seekers, temporary foreign workers and international students, respectively. In the concluding section, the authors identify the gaps in existing research in order to establish a research agenda with the objective of increasing the availability of evidence-based research on the increasingly diverse groups that fall within the parameters of temporariness in Canada.

Methodology

The academic and policy literature selected for this review include academic journal articles, book chapters and books, various documents prepared by different government branches (e.g., policy briefs), advocacy and interest groups, government media releases and relevant media articles. The initial selection was made using key word searches on selected portals including Google Scholar, Proquest, and EBSCO. Examples of key words include “temporary resident”, “non-status”, “refugee claimants”, and “citizenship”, among others. Government publications and summary tables of numbers of various temporary resident categories were retrieved mainly from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Statistics Canada. The materials
have been produced primarily between 1990 and 2012. The paper also draws extensively from excellent reviews prepared by leading scholars.

The academic literature is roughly divided by the three broad groups holding temporary status, which inform three sections of the paper. Within each section, the literature was coded by themes that appear most frequently or were most discussed by academics, policy makers, and advocacy groups. Some works by key scholars, however, applied to all three groups who experience temporariness. A key theme that emerged from these works was that discourses of illegality and securitization are strategically used to rationalize draconian legislative changes. For this reason, these citations were discussed in a separate section appearing before the detailed discussion of the conditions of temporariness for the three groups in Canada.

**Historical arrivals of refugees and temporary foreign workers in Canada**

Historically, immigration played a strategic and pivotal role in Canada’s project of nation building. In its first national policy following Confederation in 1867, Canada identified immigration as a cornerstone for nation building. During the influxes of immigrants between 1869 and 1914, the Canadian state limited the citizenship rights of Asian, South Asian, and African-American migrants who arrived through contract labour schemes (Taylor, 1991; Wayland, 1997; Liston & Carens, 2008). Immigration declined considerably with the onset of World War I, at the same time that the Canadian state incarcerated close to 9,000 individuals of “enemy alien birth”, mainly persons of German and Ukrainian origin. Canada also strengthened deportation provisions in 1919 and Asian immigrants were entirely excluded under the 1921 Exclusion Act. A highly restrictive immigration policy was in effect during the Great Depression, reducing immigration to record low levels until the mid-1940s. Immigrants with less than five years residence were also subject to deportation in order to decrease pressure on public relief (Liston & Carens, 2008). The Canadian government gave preference to farmers from the UK, US, and Western Europe to settle the western provinces and contribute to the resource-based economy (Abu-Laban, 1998).

Hostility towards immigration also continued in the period leading up to World War II. Despite the desperate plight of Jewish refugees in the 1930s, Canada admitted very few. The intention of Canadian authorities was made clear in the infamous statement made by an
unidentified immigration official who, when asked how many refugees would be too many for Canada to accommodate, replied, “None is too many” (Abella & Troper, 1983). In keeping with the precedent set in World War I, during World War II immigrants of “enemy alien birth”, particularly Italian, German, and Japanese, were incarcerated and persecuted. Another dark chapter in Canada’s immigration history was written when the government confiscated the property of Japanese Canadians and forcibly relocated them to camps and attempted to deport them back to Japan (Liston & Carens, 2008).

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Canada accepted a significant number of displaced persons from Western Europe, admitting “desirable” refugees while limiting immigration from Asia and the Caribbean. Canada also accepted refugees from Hungary in the 1950s and from Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. It was also around this time when the international legal instruments and basic structures of legal protection of refugees were put in place. International refugee law was codified in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 in Geneva, Switzerland. The geographic (Europe) and temporal (persons displaced before 1951) constraints in the Geneva Convention definition of refugees were lifted in the UN Protocol in 1967, which was adopted as a universal instrument, applying to refugees worldwide (Martin, 2011). Since the 1967 Protocol was put in place, the Canadian state also began to receive refugee flows from outside the traditional European states.

From the mid-1960s to early 1970s, Canada permitted the entry of American refugees who moved to avoid the draft during the Vietnam War. In the 1970s, Canada also admitted thousands of Asians expelled from Kenya and Uganda during Idi Amin’s dictatorship, whom Britain did not accept even though they held British passports. Also, in the 1970s and 1980s, Canada accepted a number of refugees from Southeast Asia. During this time, Canada projected the image of a refugee haven. The number of asylum claimants increased dramatically in the late 1980s and early 1990s, from a few thousand a year to over 30,000. In response, the Canadian state imposed visa restrictions and carrier sanctions and managed to reduce and stabilize refugee claimant flows at around 20,000 a year on average during the 1990s, still a high level compared to previous decades (Liston & Carens, 2008).

The economic recovery of traditional source countries in Northwestern Europe dramatically reduced immigrant flows to Canada from these regions. Meanwhile, the onset of a sustained economic boom, ending in the 1960s, pushed the Canadian federal government to look
elsewhere to meet the growing demand for foreign workers (Green & Green, 1995), contributing to the emergence of temporary worker programs as an effective strategy to prevent rising wages and slowdowns in economic growth. Several scholars have compared the historical and sociopolitical motivations for such programs across Western Europe, the United States, and Canada (Hahamovtich, 2003; Castles, 2006; Illias et al., 2008); however, the common element at the core of all such programs is the rotation principle. Historical temporary worker programs, with the most famous case being that of the German Gastarbeiter or “guestworker” programs during the 1950s and 1960s, allowed governments to address labour market shortages while avoiding permanent immigration, (Martin, 2006; Djajic & Michael, 2009), that is without adding “aliens” as permanent residents to the population.

Some of these programs were largely abandoned or drastically changed over time, paving the way for a new wave of guestworker programs that emerged during the 1990s. Castles (2006) argues that the current temporary foreign worker programs do not indicate a return to pre-1974 policies. The majority of guestworker policies from 1945-1974 were designed specifically to import low-skilled workers (Khoo et al., 2008); however, current temporary foreign worker programs are characterized by a strong international competition for qualified and experienced highly skilled migrants. Another significant difference from earlier programs of its kind: a shift towards more authority for employers (Castles, 2006; Martin, 2006). As part of the current neoliberal strategy, the Canadian state is giving more authority to employers who play a critical role in who is selected for the privilege of permanence. The role of employers was cemented by the highly controversial and hotly debated government announcement that Canadian employers may pay foreign workers up to 15% less than the prevailing wage rate (Omidvar & Lopes, 2012).

**Illegality, securitization, and the right to stay: Implications within the Canadian context**

In the past two decades, the phenomenon of “securitization” has emerged as a key policy and security issue in Canada (Faist, 2003). Migration controls, including refugee determination policies, are a part of the securitization agenda. Intertwined objectives of counterterrorism and strengthening national borders have led to a web of restrictive legal and policy measures that have increased the labeling of non-citizens who enter outside legally sanctioned migration and pre-selected refugee streams as “illegals” and “bogus refugees”, subjecting them to
criminalization and detention with little juridical oversight, thereby eroding migrants’ rights at all stages of migration and settlement (Crépeau & Nakache, 2006).

There is a growing body of work concerning the historical, sociopolitical and legal production of migrant “illegality” and the conjunctures of migrant “illegality”, nativism, and racialization (for a useful review see DeGenova, 2002). Defining who is a non-status migrant or “illegal” is a surprisingly complex question (Nyers, 2010). “Liminal legality” (Menjivar, 2006), “precarious status” (Bernhard et al., 2007; Goldring & Landolt, 2012), and “permanent temporariness” (Bailey et al., 2002) emphasize that a person’s legal position in the host country and hence their entitlement to rights and access to services cannot be expressed in either/or terms. Non-status persons are legally and socially in-between (Menjivar, 2006) and they move in and out of status and also between different legal statuses. Non-status migrants are predominantly portrayed in a negative light and as incapable of autonomy, self-representation, and claim making. Scholars continue to use the language of abjection and exclusion when describing the lives of non-status persons (Balibar, 2000; Coutin, 2000; Panagia, 2006; Nyers, 2010).

Designating “illegality” much like “citizenship” assigns an individual a juridical status, a political identity, and a specific social relation to the state (DeGenova, 2002). Citizenship or placing a person on a path to citizenship plays a decisive role in shaping their access to rights and services, which in turn contribute to people’s health, social inclusion, and sense of belonging (Calavita, 1998; Bosniak, 2000; Basok, 2002; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2005; Sharma, 2006; Simich et al., 2007). Non-status persons, however, are invariably engaged in everyday social relations in intimate proximity to citizens and persons with legal status. Their involvement in everyday social relations and mundane activities can be transformed into illicit acts through legal codes, government policies, and bureaucratic apparatus: anthropologist Susan Coutin (2000) calls this the “temporalization of presence.” This process further restricts the mobility of non-status persons (already noted by Hagan, 1994; Mahler, 1995; Heyman, 1998) and sustains their vulnerability.

Migrant “illegality” is gaining prominence as a “problem” in policy debates (Harris, 1995; Sassen, 1999). The “illegalization” and “criminalization” of some migrations is intricately connected to a perceived “loss of control” by government. In Canada, becoming non-status is a complex process that Magalhaes et al. (2010) argue is “interwoven by a flawed immigration
system and reinforced by gender, racial stratification, and discrimination” (p. 133). Sovereign power permits states to restrict entry to their territories, and persons “made illegal” are stripped of their legitimacy and excluded from national belonging but more importantly from the legal system, rendering them vulnerable and with precarious access to health care, education, social services, and legal rights (Dauvergne, 2008). Persons lacking legal status, including visa overstayers and failed refugee claimants, face several barriers to receiving adequate medical attention, including limited entitlement to public health insurance, lack of knowledge about available services and lack of financial resources to pay hospital fees or doctors’ visits (Simich et al., 2007; Magalhaes et al., 2010).

States continue to view illegal migration as an affront to national sovereignty because it is evidence that a nation is not in control of its borders. Alison Mountz (2010) argues that in the 1990s, Canada became a desirable destination for human smugglers but the transnational nature of smuggling inhibits the ability of nation-states to confront the issue effectively. Van Liempt and Sersli (2012) demonstrate that human smugglers have become the literal embodiment of a failing border regime as they facilitate the arrival of migrants that the state classifies as “unwanted” and “illegal”. Smugglers represent the “dark side” or the “underbelly” of globalization (Moises, 2005). Hyndman and Mountz (2008) argue that the conflation of public discourses about terrorists, refugees, economic migrants, human smuggling, and other persons crossing national borders strips people of their identities as individuals and re-subjectifies them as groups of “illegals.”

Van Liempt and Sersli (2012), in their attempt to provide a reality check concerning state responses to and migrant experiences with human smuggling, show that it no longer matters if an individual is escaping a despotic regime; the inquiry at the border is focused on how a person crossed the border, with whom, and, increasingly, whether they have their papers. The authors identify four recurring elements that are cited as a rationale for penalizing human smuggling and for recent and proposed legislative changes: unexpected boat arrivals, high smuggling fees, labeling refugee claimants as “bogus refugees,” and the organized crime rhetoric. Boat arrivals in Canada are too few to be statistically significant but nonetheless garner disproportionate political attention, often resulting in subsequent policy changes (Macklin, 2001). The accusations that persons arriving on boats were “economic migrants” disguised as “bogus refugees” is often associated with the assumption that people who can afford to pay large amounts for the journey
are not eligible for refugee protection – that is, wealthy refugees are not real refugees (Van Liempt & Sersli, 2012).

Dauvergne (2008) argues that the face of the imaginary illegal is poor, brown, and destitute. It is becoming increasingly difficult to discern whether illegal migration is on the rise but what is certain is that concern about illegal migration is increasing. Asylum seekers and illegal migrants occupy the same space in our collective imagination and the crackdown on illegal migration is translating into a crackdown on refugee claimants as well (Kaushal & Dauvergne, 2011). Despite having no evidentiary basis, global terrorism is being linked with refugees. When people are identified as “illegal” it is hard to argue for their membership claims on the basis of their contributions to the economy or their long-term residence. Some scholars have suggested that libeling people as “illegal aliens” creates and sustains a vulnerable, relatively tractable, and “cheap” reserve of labour (Castles & Miller, 1993; Delgado, 1993; Sassen, 1998; Calavita, 1998). Migrants’ legal status is a fundamental dimension of labour market stratification that can have a lasting impact on the quality of jobs throughout a person’s working life.

Non-status persons are increasingly key protagonists in global political struggles for freedom of movement, social recognition, worker protections, and the right to seek asylum (Nyers, 2010). Their challenges deconstruct established norms of citizenship, belonging, and political community. These campaigns for official adjustment of status, variously called “legalizations”, “regularizations”, or “amnesty”, are pitched largely on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Political scientist Joseph Carens (2010) argues that states are morally obliged to grant legal residency status, “amnesty”, to “irregular migrants” who have a moral claim to stay based on age upon arrival, the presence of immediate family members, and length of stay. These arguments regarding moral claims reveal a complex political reality that renders “regularization” a site of transformative politics (Hobbs, 1994, Joppke, 2007; Isin, 2008).
The contemporary state of asylum seekers/refugee claimants in Canada

Canada’s regressive refugee determination policy: the Singh decision to MV Sun Sea

Canada accepts refugees in two ways: the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program and the In-Canada Asylum Program. For the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program, the Canadian government relies on referrals from the UNHCR (who then become Government-Assisted Refugees or GARs) and private sponsoring groups (who then become Privately-Sponsored Refugees or PSRs) to identify and refer refugees for selection. The PSR Program allows Canadian citizens and permanent residents to help an asylum seeker make a claim. There are three avenues available to sponsor refugees privately: organizations that have signed sponsorship agreements with the Government of Canada; a group of five of Canadian citizens or permanent residents over the age of 18; or community sponsors. Persons sponsored privately must still qualify under IRPA and sponsors must commit to providing financial assistance for up to one year. The In-Canada Asylum Program allows people to make refugee claims at a port of entry or at a Citizenship and Immigration Canada office. Once claimants are deemed eligible, their claim is sent to the Immigration and Refugee Board for a decision on their refugee status (CIC, 2012).

The dominant refugee discourse in Canada is responding to two related security threats perpetuated by globalizing forces: the suspected growth in human smuggling and the conflation of terrorism with “undesirable or “unsanctioned” entries. Canada employs a variety of measures to intercept potential asylum seekers who are not selected for settlement before they arrive in Canada. This process of “externalizing” the crisis includes strategies such as detention and removal, diplomacy, prosecution (especially increased punitive measures against smugglers), transnational enforcement practices, and harmonization (e.g., the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement, part of the Canadian Federal Government’s Perimeter Strategy) (Aiken, 2001). The Canadian federal government increasingly detains migrants and controls flows of information to carefully construct its public image by pitching differential entitlements of tax-paying citizens against supposedly “bogus refugees” (Dauvergne, 2008).

The 1976 Immigration Act established the first refugee determination process of inland claims. Refugee claimants made their application on paper and until the Supreme Court’s critical 1985 Singh Decision, had no right to an oral hearing. This decision was overshadowed by two
pieces of legislation that threatened the civil liberties of all potential refugees. The first piece of legislation was a response to the perceived security threat raised by an “irregular” boat arrival: Sikhs seeking refuge on the shore of Nova Scotia in 1987. Then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney issued an emergency recall of Parliament to table Bill C-84, the *Refugee Deterrents and Detention Bill*. Bill C-84 gave new powers to immigration officers to turn back ships in international waters if they were suspected of carrying claimants and made provisions for new fines to be imposed on carriers and new powers of search, seizure, and detention (Creese, 1992). It took a full year for Prime Minister Mulroney’s bill to be passed and implemented. In the same year, Canada ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Bill C-55, which went into effect in January 1, 1989, was intended to streamline the refugee determination process. Bill C-86 that was introduced in the House of Commons on June 16, 1992, transferred the Adjudication Branch from Citizenship and Immigration Canada to the Immigration and Refugee Board and established a third division, the Adjudication Division, to conduct inquiries and detention reviews. Bill-C-86 added “terrorism” to the list of security-related exclusions for claimants Medical examiners were also given more power to screen applicants who were deemed to be medically inadmissible (Aiken, 2001). Bill C-86 also contained a provision that required Convention refugees to produce “satisfactory” identity documents to be granted permanent residence status (Aiken, 2001). Canadian law continues to focus on proof of identity, increasing the risk of asylum seekers being detained, particularly those without adequate identification (Crépeau & Nakache, 2006; Lacroix, 2006).

On June 28, 2002, the Canadian government implemented the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), a bill that recognized refugees in its title. IRPA expanded the power of immigration officers to examine non-citizens and non-permanent residents not only when entering Canada but also at any time while they were living in Canada. Since its implementation, IRPA has raised three issues of particular concern to refugee advocates. First, the law was implemented without providing for an appeal process: the Refugee Appeal Division was never implemented. Secondly, only one member of the Immigration and Refugee Board now hears claims. Thirdly, IRPA introduced a number of immigration categories that are precarious and dependent on third parties, meaning the affected migrants could at any time be refused the right
to stay in Canada (Lacroix, 2006). IRPA also raised the maximum fines and prison terms for those convicted of human smuggling to unprecedented levels (Van Liempt & Sersli, 2012).

In December 2004, the Safe Third Country Agreement between the United States and Canada came into effect, allowing claimants who arrived in Canada through the United States to be returned there in order to make their claims. In her critical examination of this legislation, Audrey Macklin (2004) argues that it will produce illegality rather than reduce it, driving asylum seekers deeper into the hands of smugglers. Canada, by diverting asylum seekers, violates asylum seekers’ fundamental right to security. Refugees will simply be known by another name: illegals (Macklin, 2004).

Bill C-49, brought to Parliament in October 2010, called for increased smuggler penalties. The bill was re-tabled in June 2011 as Bill C-4, Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act. Both bills dealt with those designated as “irregular arrivals” who may suffer mandatory detention without independent review for twelve months. They were not permitted any access to the Refugee Appeal Division, theoretically established under IRPA 2002, and are not eligible to apply on humanitarian and compassionate grounds if refused refugee status. Accepted refugees would not be able to gain permanent residency or family reunification for five years or be allowed refugee travel documents.

The most recent and controversial omnibus refugee legislation, Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, carries over modifications from Bill C-4, Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act and Bill C-11, Designated Countries of Origin. Intended to deal with the so-called “refugee crisis”, this bill is criticized across the board by human rights advocates and scholars for gross violations of human rights (CCCR, 2012; Cleveland et al., 2012; Van Liempt & Sersli, 2012). Protecting Canada’s Immigration Act imposes multiple penalties on claimants and refugees who are designated as part of an “irregular” arrival. Although the purpose is to deter smugglers, refugee advocates argue that it in fact punishes refugees who use smugglers, particularly those who arrive by boat (Van Liempt & Sersli, 2012). Other concerns with Bill C-31 include the expedited timelines for refugee determination, which risk returning refugees to persecution. The designation as “irregular arrivals” results in family separation, detention, precarious permanent residence, and barriers to successful long-term settlement, since the Minister may revoke an individual refugee’s
permanent residence status at any time up until they get citizenship (CCR. 2012; Cleveland et al., 2012).

**What do we know about refugees in Canada?**

Academic research about refugees and asylum seekers in Canada can be roughly divided into three broad and interrelated streams: the construction of refugee claimant subjectivity; Canadian refugee policy and practices; and individual and family experiences with the refugee determination process and integration into the host society. Each of these themes will be addressed in turn to identify directions for further research.

The first research theme includes macro-level studies on the construction of refugee claimant subjectivity that draw on the international definitions and legal protection regimes that developed out of specific historical, social, political, and economic circumstances of the “Western” world (Macklin, 2001; Hyndman & Giles, 2011). The second theme of research on refugees identifies the policies and practices of various nation states, in particular the restrictive administrative measures preventing refugee claimants/asylum seekers from full participation in the host society (Mountz, 2010; Renaud et al., 2003; Macklin, 2004; Anderson, 2010). There is a growing recognition that liberal democracies like Canada are making it harder to seek refuge. Governments find it difficult to legislate procedures that protect genuine/bona fide asylum seekers and at the same time identify and discourage “other” migrants (Hollifield, 1999; Crépeau et al., 2007; Anderson, 2010). Canada continues to struggle with striking a balance between security and asylum.

Historical research on refugee flows in Canada demonstrates how the admission of refugees constructs a racial, gendered, and classed boundary of who is considered a “desirable” or “deserving” refugee (Abella & Troper, 1983; Liston & Carens, 2008). There is now a consensus among Canadian scholars that refugee claimants bear the brunt of restrictive measures and an increasingly hostile discourse (Aiken, 2001; Macklin, 2001; Dauvergne, 2008; Mountz, 2010; Martin, 2011). Many bona fide displaced persons, identified as so-called “economic migrants,” are being denied protection by using a strict and narrow interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention criteria for refugee status.

The third theme in Canadian refugee research concerns the experiences of resettled refugees and asylum seekers with the refugee determination process, work, and family life (LaCroix, 2006; Murdie, 2008). In Canada, waiting for status in conditions of long-term limbo
acts as a major barrier to integration and contributes to claimants’ feelings of insecurity (Hyndman & Giles, 2011). The challenges posed by an already lengthy and complicated refugee determination system in Canada are exacerbated by increased surveillance and screening, decreased community support, and reduced funding for services (Rosseau et al., 2002).

The main topics of research on resettled refugees include access to labour markets, housing, basic amenities, and services, all aspects of their integration and settlement in the host society. Resettled refugees face problems similar to those of all low-income households but they are often more disadvantaged because of their lack of knowledge of the language, customs, and strategies for accessing basic amenities and services (Hyndman, 2011). Resettled refugees often have limited financial resources upon arrival in Canada that contribute to an overwhelming problem of housing affordability. Although resettled refugees often need some form of assistance in accessing good-quality, safe, and affordable housing (Preston et al., 2011), few seek formal sources of housing help and instead rely heavily on informal sources, such as friends and relatives, for housing information and help (Murdie, 2008).

Few studies have compared the integration and settlement outcomes for resettled refugees and refugee claimants; however, there is some consensus that refugee claimants often take longer to find their first job and are less likely to be employed than resettled refugees that are selected abroad (Renaud et al., 2003; Hyndman, 2011; Preston et al., 2011). The research on asylum seekers is focused on their experiences with the refugee determination process (Bailey et al., 2002; Kaushal & Dauvergne, 2011; Van Liempt & Sersli, 2012), implications and effects of detention (Cleveland et al. 2012), and the impacts of policies and practices on family reunification and long-term settlement (LaCroix, 2006).

Two significant observations are made by scholars studying both groups: first that the refugee experience is gendered (Hajdukowski-Ahmed, 2008; Martin 2011) and second, the negative experiences of asylum seekers and challenges to integration and settlement for resettled refugees are more acute for youth and particularly young women (Montgomery, 2002; Khanlou & Crawford, 2006; Dryden-Peterson, 2010). In the last two decades, scholars have begun to recognize that the refugee experience is gendered. They identified the unequal treatment of women in flight, exile, resettlement, and repatriation. Gender often determines where people are displaced, their vulnerability to human rights abuses, and their access to services and economic livelihoods; however, legal frameworks and academic inquiries to address gender in refugee
crises continue to be inadequate (Martin, 2011). Post-migration experiences of resettled refugee youth based on their membership in a particular ethnocultural-group and their migration and racialised status affects their sense of self-worth. Newcomer refugee youth face language barriers, relationship issues, and a lack of friendship networks, which in turn affect their sense of belonging in Canada (Khanlou & Crawford, 2006). Less is known about young refugee claimants; however, it is clear that it is the uncertainty associated with immigration status that increases their vulnerability. Unaccompanied minors are particularly at risk because of their combined status as refugee claimants and minors (Montgomery, 2002).

Despite the breadth and depth of research on resettled refugees and refugee claimants in Canada, there are still gaps in research for both groups. The latter group is of particular concern since they hold non-permanent status in Canada and are increasingly being denied basic civil liberties, the right to family reunification, and entitlements to citizenship. Based on this review, it is possible to identify three overlapping areas for further research. First, there is a need for longitudinal and comparative research to understand how the experiences of state policies affect the long-term settlement of resettled refugees and refugee claimants. Research needs to acknowledge the heterogeneity of refugees and examine how labour market and housing outcomes and access to services are influenced by legal status; i.e., by comparing refugee claimants, government-assisted refugees, and privately sponsored refugees. Secondly, despite scholarly consensus that the refugee experience is gendered, the identification of gender-specific challenges to integration and settlement remains an underdeveloped topic of research in the Canadian context. There is a need for more research concerning the gendered impacts of detention, waiting, and the systematic denial of rights and services, which contribute to the marginalization of women, especially racialized women. Thirdly, scholars have acknowledged that young refugee claimants are a particularly vulnerable group with specific needs; however, evidentiary research concerning the Canadian context remains scant. More research that recognizes young claimants’ particular experiences with refugee determination practices and their educational and settlement experiences is needed to develop policies and programs that will better address the needs of this growing, vulnerable group.
The selectively exclusionary Canadian guestworker programs

Predecessors to Canada’s current temporary foreign worker programs

Historical temporary migration programs in Canada included mainly the recruitment of foreign domestic help and farm labour. The delegation of domestic work to foreign women is a longstanding practice in Canada (Cohen, 1991; Langevin & Belleau, 2001; Moors, 2003; Khan, 2009; Pratt, 2009; Fudge, 2011). The recruitment of foreign domestic workers was closely linked to Canada’s nation-building efforts and designed to ensure women of the “right” national and racial stock and character were permitted entry and entitled to long-term settlement. The most restrictive and coercive policies were reserved for “third-world” women of colour (Bakan & Stasiulis, 1997). Programs specifically targeted to recruit seasonal agricultural workers were initiated in 1966 through bilateral agreements with Mexican and Caribbean governments to provide seasonal employment in agriculture (Binford, 2009; Basok, 2002; Preibisch, 2010). The programs were male dominated and brought farm workers from the Caribbean to reduce seasonal domestic-labour shortages.

Young Western European women were invited to immigrate to meet the need for immediate domestic help and in turn acquired citizenship. British-Canadian families in the 1890s and 1920s hired English and Scottish “girls” as domestic help, who also became a significant source of future wives for the growing population of male settlers (Bakan & Stasiulis, 1997). The first groups of women of colour who entered Canada in 1955 were denied the right to permanent residence. The Canadian state justified its discrimination on the basis of their supposed sexual licentiousness and continued to build its “White” settler state. In response to the growing arrivals of domestic help who did not fit the racial criterion for strategic nation building, the Canadian state ended the Caribbean Domestic Scheme (as it was called then) in 1973. From 1973 to 1981, foreign domestic workers were denied citizenship and their low wages prevented them from applying as independent-class immigrants who would have benefited from the removal of non-discriminatory measures under the 1976 Immigration Act and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Bakan & Stasiulis, 1997).

In place of these diverse programs, the Canadian federal government introduced the umbrella Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) in 1973 whereby
temporary workers (including domestic workers and farm labour) received short-term permits. The worker was the only temporary feature of this rotation system of immigration and employment (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). This system of forced rotation was maintained by the continual renewal of workers bonded to the employer (Boyd et al., 1986; Plewa, 2007). The program was intended to link migrant flows to economic conditions and react in a flexible manner to short-term market interests. An important feature of the NIEAP was that temporary workers were restricted to a specific job and employer. Over half of the validated employment authorizations, in person years, were issued for domestic work and farm labour; moreover, women predominated in the employment authorization program (Boyd et al., 1986).

Macklin (1994) argued that NIEAP transformed domestic workers into disposable migrant labourers, not so different from European guestworkers. The harsh reality of the working and living conditions of domestic workers was brought to the attention of the federal government in the early 1990s leading to the Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures in 1991. The report resulted in the Foreign Domestic Movement (FDM) in the same year, allowing foreign domestic workers to apply for permanent residence after completing two-years of live-in domestic service in a private household. FDM was reformulated in 1992 as the Live-in-Caregiver program; however, many scholars have demonstrated that the primary exploitative features remained in place, that is, the live-in requirement and dependence on a single employer (Bakan & Stasiulis, 1997; Khan, 2009).

The Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program emerged in 1974 as a government-to-government program of managed migration between Canada and Mexico. Workers enter into an Agreement of the Employment in Canada of Seasonal Agricultural Workers from Mexico, a four-party agreement between the worker, employer, the Government of Mexico, and the Government of Canada. The day-to-day administration of the program is carried out by a non-profit, private-sector organization, Foreign Agricultural Resource Management Services (FARMS), federally incorporated in 1988. The work visa is valid for a specific job, employer, and time period. Workers live in employer-provided housing and employers are required to cover certain costs including transportation and health insurance (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010).

The Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP) and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) are the two flagship programs that defined Canada’s guestworker programs in the post-war period. The programs, intended to fill critical labour shortages, created a vulnerable labour
force that is segmented by gender, “race,” and citizenship status, thereby legally constituting the subordinate status of specific groups within the larger society (Baines & Sharma, 2002). The majority of persons arriving under these programs worked in low-wage, unprotected jobs without access to a range of substantive citizenship rights including labour market protection and entitlements to permanent status and long-term settlement.

**Temporary workers are on the rise, but who remains temporary?**

The numbers arriving under the two remaining flagship programs of this earlier model of the temporary worker program, the Live-in Caregiver Program and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program, have remained relatively stable. The contemporary Temporary Foreign Worker Program has “undergone seismic changes in its purpose, size, and target populations” (Nakache, 2010: 1). The number of temporary foreign workers rose by 148 percent between 2002 and 2008.

The NIEAP evolved into a bifurcated program with two general streams: one targeted at highly skilled workers and the other targeted at low-skilled workers (Nakache, 2010). As a result, a hallmark of the contemporary Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) is the formalized distinction between highly skilled and low-skilled work in accordance with the National Occupational Classification (NOC). The administration of the TFWP is both complex and confusing. The *1867 Constitution Act* specifies that immigration is a matter of shared federal-provincial jurisdiction. The federal government has jurisdiction over the entry and stay of temporary foreign workers; however protection of workplace rights is a provincial responsibility, with the exception of the provision of Employment Insurance (Nakache, 2010).

There has been a significant shift in source countries of migrant workers over the last twenty-five years. The United States is the largest source country for male temporary foreign workers, while a plurality of female temporary workers comes from the Philippines. Over the last five years, approximately one-third of permits are issued for special programs with seasonal agricultural workers accounting for the greatest number issued, followed by live-in caregivers (Nakache, 2010). While the numbers of temporary foreign workers from Asia and the Pacific are on the rise, the numbers from Europe and the US have dropped considerably. An interesting geographic pattern emerges when the source countries of temporary foreign workers are compared to their skill levels at time of entry into Canada.
In 2005, more than two thirds of the temporary foreign workers admitted under managerial, professional, and skilled categories originated from Europe and the US. By contrast, 59 percent of workers from Asia and the Pacific and 85 percent from the Americas outside the United States were recruited for low-skilled positions (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). The increase in low-skilled temporary foreign workers has led to a significant demographic shift in the temporary workforce entering Canada, with increasing numbers from the Global South, especially from Mexico and the Philippines.

Mexico is the third leading source country for temporary foreign workers to Canada (Nakache & Kinoshita, 2010). Mexican immigration to Canada has been quietly increasing (Mueller, 2005). The number of permanent and temporary residents from Mexico almost doubled from 1991 to 2001; however, Mueller (2005) argues that it is the changing composition and timing of Mexican flows that is most interesting. The growth of Mexican temporary workers has increased across all entry types, but the largest numerical increase was in workers who are employed in agriculture through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program. There is overwhelming evidence that the availability of migrant labour negatively affects wage levels and working conditions in agriculture (Castles, 2006; Griffith, 2006; Basok, 2002; Plewa, 2007).

A predominant trait of Canada’s Live-in Caregiver Program is the significant number of Filipinas entering Canada through the program. Since the 1980s, Canadian employers and recruitment agencies demonstrated a strong preference for the Philippines for sourcing live-in caregivers (Khan, 2009). The long-standing stereotype of Filipino women shapes their experiences in Canada, contributing to social exclusion and segmentation in the national labour market. Women from the Philippines exhibit the highest degree of occupational segmentation of any group of women in Canada (Pratt, 2009; McKay et al., 2002).

There is growing evidence of an increasing reliance on migrant workers to meet short-term labour market shortages (Sharma, 2006; Nakache, 2010; Trumper & Wong, 2010). The current Conservative government is increasing the recruitment of temporary foreign workers, who are usually denied entitlement to permanent residence, let alone citizenship. The employer-specific nature of contemporary temporary worker programs exposes migrant workers to exploitative and abusive working and living conditions. Pathways to permanent status are more limited for some temporary workers than for others (Texeira, Li, & Kobayashi 2012). Research on temporary foreign workers in Canada is specific to each program; however, there is some
consensus among scholars that at its core, the contemporary Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) has racist intentions as it imports workers, not people, and keeps racialized men and women from the Global South out of the nation’s territorial space and imagined community.

The construction of temporary foreign workers as a disposable workforce exposes them to “super-exploitation” in the Canadian labour market (Sharma, 2006; Walia, 2010; Marsden, 2011). Many scholars have documented the “super-exploitation” and varying entitlements of different temporary foreign worker groups and reveal the construction of this hierarchy by comparing the working and living conditions and entitlements to permanent status of the various temporary worker groups, namely:

- seasonal agricultural workers (Mueller, 2005; Binford, 2009; Preibisch, 2010);
- live-in caregivers (Cohen, 1991; Macklin, 1994; Pratt, 2009; Moors, 2003; McKay et al., 2002; Khan, 2009; Fudge, 2011);
- low-skilled pilot program workers (Fudge & MacPhail, 2009; Walia, 2010); and
- highly skilled temporary foreign workers (McLaughlan & Salt, 2002; Shachar, 2006; Khoo et al., 2008; Marsden, 2011).

Work permits issued to temporary foreign workers (TFWs) tie each worker to a single employer; however, the agency approving their contract (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada) has no regulatory authority to monitor employer compliance (Fudge & MacPhail 2009). At a provincial level, TFWs are not entitled to social assistance anywhere in Canada and provincial employment standards branches rely exclusively on employees to initiate complaints in order to enforce basic labour standards (Nakache, 2010). Moreover, when a TFW chooses to contest a contractual violation through legal proceedings, the time constraints on a work visa present a practical barrier to successful litigation. The threat of deportation or repatriation alone is an effective measure of control for employers (Hanley & Shragge, 2009). The bonded nature of the employment severely limits labour mobility and impedes workers’ ability to change their employer. Competition between sending countries fuels the practice of “country surging”, whereby employers switch supply countries if they are dissatisfied with the performance of workers, a particular government agency, or sending country policies (Preibisch, 2010). Migrant workers also continue to be used to discipline collective organizing. Few studies
have compared and contrasted across groups: the few exceptions include Fudge and MacPhail (2009), Nakache (2010), Nakache and Kinoshita (2010) and Rajkumar et al. (2012).

Delphine Nakache (2010) claims that the unjust paradox lies in the fact that low-skilled workers lack a pathway to settle permanently, even though employers use them to fill long-term and even permanent vacancies. Skilled TFWs are granted expedited permanent status within Canada by applying under the Canadian Experience Class. Programs targeted at highly skilled TFWs have fewer requirements for both employer and employee. There is no regulatory bar in Canada to having family members accompany TFWs; however the closed work permits granted to accompanying spouses of “low-skilled” workers entrench racial and gendered labour-market segregation (Preibisch, 2010; Rajkumar et al., 2012). The hierarchies of belonging establish the right of the Canadian state to discriminate against particular foreigners and reserve the entitlement to make claims against the state exclusively to citizens. The experiences of diverse groups of temporary foreign workers reveal a “remaking of citizenship,” reserving permanence of presence for a privileged and supposedly “deserving” few: the “highly skilled” contingent.

Does access to permanent residency for “highly skilled” TFWs translate into improved socio-economic outcomes? Canadian social scientists have noted a long-standing and substantial income gap (when controlling for educational attainments to earnings) between highly skilled immigrants and the native born (Li, 2000; Frenette & Morisette, 2005). Factors contributing to skilled immigrants’ diminished social and economic status in Canadian society include the non-recognition of education and work experience acquired outside Canada, limited social networks, perceived linguistic abilities, and racial and gender prejudices. The racialised nature of the diminished social and economic status is evident in labour market analyses that control for differences in education, occupation, and other measures of human capital. White immigrants fare better than immigrants of colour (Pendakur & Pendakur, 2004; Tran, 2004).

The numbers of temporary foreign workers that are granted permanent status is growing, from 11.7% in 2001 to 32.1% in 2010 of all persons (CIC, 2011). Although highly skilled temporary foreign workers with Canadian education and/or work experience may circumvent the labour market disadvantages reported for foreign-born skilled professionals, little is known about how temporary foreign workers fare after gaining permanent status and citizenship in Canada. As part of this contemporary nation-building project, where the recruitment and retention of highly skilled temporary foreign workers play a pivotal role, Canada is now opening its borders to
another group of temporary residents: international students, who are discussed in the next section.

**International students: Exporting education and importing future citizens**

International student mobility has changed the global higher education landscape in the last ten to fifteen years and is fundamentally changing how countries in the Global North invest in educational attainment and human capital (Verbik & Lasanowski, 2007). The global international student population grew from some 600,000 to 1.2 million between 1975 and 1990. By 2000, the total was 1.9 million and in 2006, this number rose to 2.9 million (Douglass & Edelstein, 2009). The demand for international education globally has engendered a new wave of international students from diverse demographic and national backgrounds. The direction of student migration is almost exclusively from the global “east” to the global “west” in search of accumulating social and cultural capital to reproduce social advantage in their home countries and/or the host society (Brooks & Waters, 2009; Skeldon, 2009; Findlay, 2011; Findlay et al., 2012). From the perspective of Western governments and educational institutions, international education plays a key part in their efforts to “neoliberalize” whilst mitigating some of the loss of state control brought on by globalizing forces. International students are generally viewed as a “cash-cow”, offsetting limited public investment in education (Waters, 2006).

Canada’s international student population has grown steadily with a significant increase in female international students. Asian students consistently account for the largest share of international students. The importance of this group to Canada is evident in universities’ efforts to recruit and retain international students. Imagine Education in/au Canada is the Canadian government’s recent attempt at a nationally coordinated marketing and branding campaign that also provides new scholarships to attract international students. The government has eased employment restrictions through the Post-Graduation Employment permit program and introduced the Canadian Experience Class program that expedites permanent residency applications in order to encourage current foreign postgraduate students to remain in Canada after completing their studies. Universities are becoming a strategic vehicle in the global competition for foreign talent (Gertler & Vinodrai, 2005; Mueller, 2009).
The international student-migrant experience: What more do we need to know?

The available literature on international students predominantly draws on the experiences of Asian students in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, and to a much lesser extent in Canada. Most of what we know about international students globally is based on case studies of specific source countries. Few studies have compared student experiences across various home countries. A few exceptions include Yang et al. (2006) and Popadiuk (2010). Also, little is known about international students’ experiences across different host societies (with the exception of Chirkov et al., 2008, and Fritz et al., 2008). The literature can also be divided into three broad themes: first, profiling students based on their decisions to study abroad, secondly, international students’ cross-cultural adaptation, integration, and psychological well-being in the host society, and thirdly, “student-switching” and the transition from student to permanent resident and, over time, citizen. The third theme, although relatively undeveloped in the Canadian context, is of particular significance to this paper.

The more autonomous international students felt in making the decision to study abroad, the more likely they are to succeed in the host society and choose to stay (Chirkov et al., 2008). International students intending to enter secondary schools in Canada are a potentially vulnerable segment of the total international student population and require knowledgeable, skilled, and culturally sensitive counseling and training to facilitate adaptation in the host society (Popadiuk, 2010). Students entering university stress their difficulties in adapting to a new culture, language barriers, growing financial burden, loneliness, lack of attachment in family, romantic and social relationships (DiTomaso et al., 2005; Sherry et al., 2010). Scholars remain divided on whether cultural and gender specificities are critical to understanding the experiences of international student populations (Yang et al., 2006 contradict the “cultural fit” hypothesis that finds support from DiTomasso et al., 2005, Sherry et al., 2010 and Zhang et al., 2011). Few scholars examine international students’ experiences of racial and cultural discrimination especially from “established residents” in host countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Collins, 2008).

International students emerged as an interest group for academic researchers and policymakers alike as they began to play a greater role in the nationhood and citizenship matrix. Findlay et al. (2012) points out that student mobility is not “discrete or discontinuous” from other mobilities. Ziguras and Law (2006) argue that four factors make international students
attractive migrants. First, they have the potential to contribute to the host economy’s pool of highly trained workers, creating a competitive edge in the global market economy. Secondly, the majority of immigrant-receiving countries have ageing populations that can be supported by recruiting young people at the start of their working lives. Thirdly, graduates of the host country’s tertiary institutions are more readily employable than foreign graduates. Fourthly, for countries where education is a major export, offering the prospect of permanent residence to international students is a marketing advantage in recruiting fee-paying international students.

Transnational education is not based on pure individualistic determination; on the contrary, international students hold a pivotal position in the life course and social pathways of their transnational families (Ong & Nonini, 1997). Studying abroad is intended to translate into improved overseas employment opportunities and provide the opportunity to become a permanent resident at a later date (Meyer 2001; Sklair, 2001). The country of study is carefully selected on the basis of desire for employment opportunities and long-term residency (Verbik & Lasanowski, 2007). In Canada, there is growing policy concern over the adaptation of foreign students who become permanent residents; however, as Lu et al. (2009) show, academic research is lacking, particularly in relation to gendered, racial, and classed patterns of international student migration and settlement in Canada.

Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries, such as Australia (Gao, 2009; Robertson, 2011), are making significant policy changes to favour international students as potential skilled migrants and “desirable” future citizens. The review of the literature suggests two directions for further research on this growing group of Canadian temporary residents who are being awarded a pathway to citizenship. First, following up on the observation of Lu et al. (2009), there is a need to better understand motivations to study in Canada and pay particular attention to how international students’ experiences of adaptation and integration are racialized, gendered, and classed. Secondly, we know little about the process of international students’ integration into Canadian society. Migration is perceived as a deliberate career and life strategy for the international students who move to Canada to pursue secondary and/or postsecondary education. Although the percentage of foreign students changing their status to economic migrants in Canada has been relatively steady, averaging around 5.24 percent of the total persons transitioning from temporary to permanent status in Canada (CIC 2011), policy discourses
increasingly favour this group as potential contributors to national skills pools and a driver of the national economy.

Establishing a research agenda

In order to fully appreciate the implications of on-going immigration and refugee reform in Canada’s increasingly market-driven migration regime, there is a critical need for further research to identify who enters under temporary categories and understand what happens to them after they arrive in Canada. In its review of existing literature on temporary residents groups in Canada, namely asylum seekers, temporary foreign workers, and international students, this paper reveals gaps in knowledge within each group; but a key observation is the systematic lack of comparative and longitudinal research across the different categories of temporariness. Moreover, little is known about the experiences of persons who transition from temporary to permanent status and vice versa. Permanence as a category of presence in Canada continues to be privileged; however, it is important to recognize that temporariness is constructing hierarchies of entitlements to membership in the Canadian state that are drawn along racial, gendered, and classed boundaries.

There is a need to compare settlement outcomes of different groups of temporary residents (e.g., temporary foreign workers and refugee claimants) using a number of indicators including (but not limited to) percentage of low-income levels, employment commensurate to skills and experience, housing affordability, access to basic amenities, use of settlement services, and civic participation (e.g., volunteerism), among others. Research could also benefit from comparisons across different pathways to permanence such as labour market outcomes for international students and highly skilled temporary foreign workers who gain permanent status through the Canadian Experience Class and those who arrive as permanent residents under the Federal Skilled Worker Program (a program that is gradually being phased out). Comparisons across different categories are integral to inform policy and design appropriate services for Canadian newcomers. Comparisons across groups are as critical as comparisons over time. Comparative research should be complemented with longitudinal research to fully understand the implications of precarious status and the outcomes of transitions to permanent status.

The dominant methodology used in the studies included in this review are qualitative
methods, particularly, case studies of specific temporary resident groups. Quantitative analyses of systematic large-scale, nationally representative micro-data on demographic traits, and social, political, economic, and immigration experiences of temporary residents and their subgroups are rare. Although the Canadian census does distinguish between landed immigrants and non-permanent residents, it does not differentiate temporary permit types and years of arrival. The Longitudinal Immigrant Database (IMDB) only includes immigrants with permanent status. Scholars have had limited access to the Temporary Resident Data System (TRDS) that provides equivalent information for temporary visa-holders. Large-scale quantitative analysis of temporary residents is therefore limited by the lack of appropriate data. An alternative source of data could include information on clients routinely collected by agencies, after negotiating access and ethical issues. The importance of qualitative studies should not be understated and should continue as a complement to large-scale quantitative analyses. This agenda demonstrates the urgent need for research, especially now, as Canada enters a migration regime that permits the dissolution of humanitarianism.

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CERIS – THE ONTARIO METROPOLIS CENTRE

Creating and sharing knowledge on the lives of immigrants and the policies that affect them

Who we are

Established in 1996, CERIS – The Ontario Metropolis Centre is a research network focusing on the resettlement and integration of immigrants and refugees in Ontario. We engage in comparative research, knowledge transfer, and policy development, and we work in a collaborative partnership that includes universities, community organisations and different levels of government. For our first sixteen years, we were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) and a consortium of 14 federal departments and agencies.

What we do

RESEARCH
CERIS has funded over 120 research projects selected by panels of academic and community researchers and policy makers who evaluate each project’s academic and policy merit. Collaborative and interdisciplinary, our research projects are designed to create new knowledge to inform current immigration policy and practice, train graduate students, support community research, and promote knowledge exchange between researchers and all of our partners.

CAPACITY-BUILDING
CERIS trains a new generation of immigration scholars and researchers. Each year, graduate students receive funding to undertake their own research. We also provide support for students to present their work at annual conferences, local seminars, and graduate student workshops and conferences. We collaborate with our partners in the community and in government providing opportunities for them to participate in research projects and to learn more about research design and methods.

KNOWLEDGE MOBILISATION
CERIS supports making relevant research more widely available to policy-makers, service providers, researchers, and diverse communities. We hold frequent conferences and seminars to share our research. We also publish materials for a wide range of users and reach out to those who can use our research to effect evidence-based change.

Why we do it
Research has shown that immigrants and refugees coming to Ontario face increasing challenges. CERIS affiliates believe that good policy decisions flow from evidence-based research. We also believe that research must translate into action and we work to mobilise knowledge by getting it in the right hands at the right time.

Where we work
Our office is located at York University in Toronto, but our network extends across Ontario. Our research examines immigration issues in large and small cities as well as in rural areas across the province.