Synthesis Report on Findings from Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda

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The Integration of Education and Peacebuilding

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The Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding
The Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding

Between July 2014 and December 2015 the Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding, a partnership between UNICEF and the University of Amsterdam, the University of Sussex, Ulster University and in-country partners, addressed one of the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) key objectives, ‘contributing to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming related to education, conflict and peacebuilding’.

Consortium teams carried out research in four countries over the course of the project: Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa, and Uganda. Each team will produce a specific country report which, alongside thematic Literature Reviews, which formed the basis for three synthesis reports addressing the following specific thematic areas:

- the integration of education into peacebuilding processes at global and country levels;
- the role of teachers in peacebuilding;
- the role of formal and non-formal peacebuilding education programmes focusing on youth.

In addition, throughout the research project and as a cross cutting theme in all three areas, the research project aims to understand the dynamics and impact of various forms of direct and indirect violence in relation to education systems and educational actors in situations of conflict. Each thematic focus will also include a gender analysis.

The research seeks to generate evidence that can inform policy and practice aimed at the global and national peacebuilding community, and the global and national education and international development communities.

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The authors are responsible for the choice and presentation of views contained within this report and for opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of UNICEF and do not commit the organisation.

A complete set of Literature Reviews and individual Country Reports can be accessed through the Research Consortium for Education and Peacebuilding Web Portal at the UNICEF Learning for Peace Website - http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/partners/research-consortium

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Cover Photograph: Children playing at the Child Friendly Space (CFS) in Ayillo 2 refugee settlement in Pakelle sub- County Adjumani district, Uganda. © UNICEF/Wandera
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A Note on Referencing

In each Consortium Synthesis Report some specific references are sourced to individual Consortium Country Reports. The final Country Reports have been produced as complementary documents to each of the Synthesis Reports and therefore provide a first point of reference within this publication.

Each country report can be accessed in full at:  
http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/partners/research-consortium/research-outputs/
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ASIGSA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa</td>
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<td>DBE</td>
<td>Department of Basic Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAG</td>
<td>Ethnic Armed Groups</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>ESP</td>
<td>Education Sector Plan</td>
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<td>ESIP</td>
<td>Education Strategic Investment Plan</td>
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<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Strategic Sector Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FSI</td>
<td>Fragile State Index</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy</td>
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<td>GoU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>LiEP</td>
<td>Language in Education Policy</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Macro National Development Framework</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoESTS</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Sports</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPI</td>
<td>Multi-dimensional Poverty Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<td>NCDC</td>
<td>National Curriculum Development Centre</td>
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<td>NEP</td>
<td>National Education Plan</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NFE</td>
<td>Non-formal Education</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBEA</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy</td>
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<td>PEAP</td>
<td>Poverty Eradication Action Plan</td>
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<td>PRDP</td>
<td>Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Primary Teaching Colleges</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Research Area</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNPBF</td>
<td>United Nations Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>UPE</td>
<td>Universal Primary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCF</td>
<td>United Nations Strategic Cooperation Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>USE</td>
<td>Universal Secondary Education</td>
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The Integration of Education and Peacebuilding Synthesis Report

Photograph: Girls walk across a wooden suspension bridge in the village of Bhogar Mang in Mansehra District in North Western Frontier Province, Pakistan.

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Executive Summary
Executive Summary

The purpose of this synthesis report is twofold. First, it examines how education is included in peacebuilding and development frameworks in four distinct conflict-affected environments (Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda). Second, it compares, summarises and critically reflects how education policies and governance contribute to the peacebuilding process. In doing so, we pay close attention to aspects of redistribution, representation, recognition and reconciliation (see: Novelli et al. 2015). Throughout the report we deliberately distinguish between explicit and implicit forms of peacebuilding through education. The former refers to activities such as peace education, peacebuilding training for teachers, programmes and initiatives purposely put in place for a conflict-affected society to come to terms with the legacies of a conflict. The latter, refers to policies, activities and programmes that may not be intentionally designed to build peace but indirectly impact processes of social transformation and change, necessary for sustainable peace and development.

Analytical Framework and Methodology

Our research methods are outlined from pages 18-21, highlighting the consortium’s theoretical framework alongside a short overview on how we define and approach key concepts and terms. The methodology for this report builds on:

- The consortium’s 4Rs theoretical framework: the role of key processes of redistribution (equity in the distribution of resources - economic), representation (participation in decision making - political), recognition (affirming the diversity of identities) and reconciliation (healing across divides) within peacebuilding and education sector planning and policy;
- The report is informed by an initial literature review on the integration of education in to peacebuilding (Smith & Ellison 2016) and a desk review of policy documents and mapping analysis. Our review of relevant peacebuilding, development and education-related policies included: National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, National and International Peacebuilding Plans (if existent), UNDAF and any other relevant UNCT plans, Education Sector Plans and Reforms, Curricula, any other documents relevant for the specific case study (e.g. policies about decentralisation of education sector)
- This was followed by semi-structured interviews (individual and small group) with various actors at country level, including: government officials, UNICEF and any other UNCT staff, representatives of international donors and INGOs, academics, civil society organisations, schools officials and any other country- and context-specific actors.

Four Country Case Studies: Pakistan, Myanmar, South Africa and Uganda.

An overview of the four case-study countries is provided from pages 22-28. The four country case studies (Pakistan, Myanmar, South Africa and Uganda) represent a variety of contexts relating to the relationship between education and peacebuilding,
in terms of geographical diversity, the nature and temporality of the conflict and the drivers and root causes that underpin them. South Africa, emerged out of the struggle against apartheid, a conflict rooted in racism and social exclusion, whose legacies and inequalities remain more than two decades after conflict. South Africa provides us with a rich resource to reflect more historically on the challenges and possibilities for the education system to contribute to promoting sustainable peacebuilding. Uganda, another country in Africa, remains divided between a peaceful South and Central Region and a Northern region that has suffered a series of punctuated armed conflicts for almost three decades. Pakistan, located in South Asia, is a large country that has suffered from a series of conflicts in recent years, linked to instability in Afghanistan, the global ‘war on terror’, regional tensions with its neighbour India, internal political and civil unrest and terrorism. Finally, Myanmar, presents us with a case study from South East Asia, of a country on the brink of entering a post-conflict period after decades of authoritarian military rule, challenged by a range of armed and non-armed ethnic and political movements. The rich diversity of research sites emphasises the need for conflict sensitive, contextually coherent approaches to enhancing the role and potential of education in peacebuilding processes in each context, while serving to enrich globally relevant insights and reflections on the differing challenges, possibilities and potentials of education, as a key social sector, in the promotion of sustainable peace-promoting societies.

Synthesis of Findings and Implications for Future Policy and Research

The Role of Education in Peacebuilding and Development Frameworks

No matter the degree of state fragility, within macro-peacebuilding and/or development plans and frameworks, education is in the main equated with aspects of redistribution (for example, mainly identified as an economic driver), thereby disregarding the transformative potentials of representation, recognition and reconciliation within and through education.

“No matter the degree of state fragility, within macro-peacebuilding and/or development plans and frameworks, education is in the main equated with aspects of redistribution (for example, mainly identified as an economic driver), thereby disregarding the transformative potentials of representation, recognition and reconciliation within and through education.”

“Our synthesis revealed that also national macro-education policies and reforms prioritise aspects of redistribution over representation, recognition and reconciliation – with South Africa (at least rhetorically) placing a much greater emphasis on the transformative role of education than all other countries.”

The Role of Peacebuilding within Education Sector Plans and Macro-Reforms

Our synthesis revealed that also national macro-education policies and reforms prioritise aspects of redistribution over representation, recognition and reconciliation – with South Africa (at least rhetorically) placing a much greater emphasis on the transformative role of education than all other countries. Education sector plans place either a strong weight on access to free education (in particular Myanmar and Uganda) or portray education as a key ingredient towards economic growth (Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda). Such strategies clearly favour a rigid peacebuilding and development through ‘modernization’ approach as opposed to regarding education as a tool of and for social transformation.
Financing for Education

Three of the countries (Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda) seem to follow the pattern in other conflict affected contexts whereby the percentage of GDP and allocation of government spending to education falls below recommended levels. This means that even if peacebuilding were prioritised, it would struggle to compete with other demands on education budgets – a vicious circle where countries most in need of peacebuilding efforts are also those with the least resources to implement peacebuilding policies. Even where there is a higher percentage of GDP and allocation of government spending on education (as in South Africa), this does not necessarily mean that transformation is achieved and deeper structural challenges in terms of segregation and inequality persist. Financing therefore is only part of the solution and there may be additional political economy factors that make it more difficult to effect change.

Education Governance

A more transformative approach to peacebuilding through education needs to be both implicit and explicit by addressing change at individual, institutional and systemic levels. However, the lack of political will, poor implementation practice or coherence as well as the overall political economy context of a country frequently impedes systemic and institutional change and therefore long-term transformation nourished through education (this point is also corroborated by Novelli et al. 2015).

In contexts where education policies are developed at the national macro level to support peacebuilding through equity, social cohesion or reconciliation, one has to acknowledge that these are unlikely to be successful when they are undermined by a political economy that is resistant to transformation and change. This may be further complicated by political domination by elites and flawed decentralisation processes in education.

In regard to growing privatisation trends in education, questions about what kind of new forms of education governance will emerge can no longer be avoided. There is a pressing need to further examine what aspects of governance make education policies more effective or ineffective in contributing to sustainable peace.

Lastly, there is a striking absence of donor and multi-lateral policy strategies addressing the weaknesses of conflict-affected governments to coherently implement education policies that foster implicit and explicit peacebuilding in the longer term.

Equity

The distinction between equality and equity is often poorly understood, but of crucial importance for peacebuilding since it determines whether education policies (for example, to address access, resources or outcomes) are applied equally to all regions and populations (thereby replicating existing inequalities), or are applied in an equitable way (that is in a differential and targeted way, to redress historical inequalities).

It is also important that inequalities are monitored in terms of access (enrolments
and retention), resources (pupil/teacher ratio and infrastructure) and outcomes (completion, attainment and employment). However, there are two main shortcomings within current approaches that are vital for the link between equity and peacebuilding. One is that rarely is education data collected and disaggregated by religious, cultural or ethnic background (yet it is these identities that are often mobilised around conflict). The reason for not collecting this data is often cited as concerns about causing intergroup tension and sometimes districts or regions are used as proxies for these identities. A second shortcoming is that education policies do not currently monitor links between education inequalities and levels of violence at sub-national levels, for example, through cross referencing with other national datasets such as crime statistics and social surveys. On both these fronts, it is difficult to see how the linkages between education inequalities and education policies that support peacebuilding can be evaluated.

Poor quality education and segregation based on social class or wealth thwarts equal opportunity and social transformation in all four case studies. Structural violence pervades the educational system in several ways thereby affecting social cohesion and reconciliation processes.

The long-term consequences of how unequal access to high quality education impacts social transformation in conflict-affected societies remains by and large unexplored. The interplay of gender, education and peacebuilding requires approaches that go far beyond providing equal access to educational services. In this regard, educational institutions and programmes have to be regarded as unique platforms that develop and re-negotiate identities and reflect upon deeply seated cultural norms. In other words, schools are an essential entry point to enable boys and girls to contribute equally and positively to peacebuilding and social transformation.

There is a need to thoroughly interlink aspects of inequality in education with social cohesion and not to analyse or assess them in isolation from one another. In the scope of this study we hardly encountered research or empirical data acknowledging how both social cohesion and inequality in education are closely intertwined. In part this can be explained by the fact that it is much easier to measure indicators of inequality than social cohesion.

**Social Cohesion**

More knowledge and generation of evidence is necessary to better understand the importance of institutional and systemic change. There is a need to move away from a sole preventative ‘peace-education’ approach towards exploring implicit forms of peacebuilding that encompasses a society and its respective institutions at large.

While all countries under our examination do have their own context-specific and socio-historical causes of segregation in education, we found that they share two broad commonalities that impact processes of “vertical” and “horizontal” social cohesion through education in several ways. These are: Segregation based on socio-economic status and national unity versus cultural diversity.
Segregation based on socio economic status largely reflects what has been already discussed in our section under ‘equality’, namely that the political context of a society determines equal opportunities in education. Restricted access to high quality education widens social segregation based on wealth and the creation of a two-tiered society in all of our case studies. Perhaps even more important, it showcases how inequality and the lack of social cohesion within and through education are closely intertwined. Not surprisingly, this also affects remote and/or rural areas as well as specific urban regions (for example, townships in South Africa).

Moreover, there is a general tension in all countries to promote notions of national unity through education alongside the need to also cherish diversity with regards to ethnic background or religious views (for example, differences in Islamic thought and practice in Pakistan). Besides, language of instruction policies weaken processes of social cohesion across all cases, yet national policies and context-specific challenges vary tremendously between each country. Whereas in Uganda and South Africa religion does not appear to be a major conflicting impediment towards social cohesion within and through education, in Myanmar and Pakistan religion can be a basis of exclusion. Also the marginalisation of ethnic minorities varies from country to country.

Across all countries the following challenges towards integration of refugees through education persist: a) different educational backgrounds, in some instances even language barriers, disadvantage refugee children in their educational progress; b) advocacy work for special treatment of refugees in providing them better access to education is challenged by the fact that many nationals frequently struggle with poverty or low socio-economic status as well; c) there is a scarcity of resources for urgently needed psychological support in schools; d) with the exception of Uganda, tensions with local host communities affect social integration of IDPs and refugees (also through education).

Lastly, we found that non-formal education (NFE) programmes can have a greater potential to address societal transformation (in reference to redistribution, representation, recognition and reconciliation) and social cohesion more explicitly than nationwide formal education initiatives (e.g. Uganda). However, their success largely depends on the country context, history of conflict and political as well as religious motivations by its implementers/designers. More research is necessary on whether and how NFE programmes address societal transformation and peacebuilding more explicitly than nationwide formal education initiatives at regional and country level. More importantly, the implications for formal education sector planning in post-conflict environments need to be further explored. This includes discussions on the limitations of appropriating a Western-style educational model to non-Western contexts, conflicts and everyday realities.

Reconciliation

Notably, in the case of Pakistan the term reconciliation is not used at the official level. In such circumstances we opted to apply the term reconciliation (in alignment with our theoretical framework) to specific issues, such as the role of education in nurturing
relationships of trust or how history is taught and reflected school textbooks – to name but a few examples.

With the exception of South Africa, whose TRC made explicit mention of the role of education towards social transformation; all three other cases share one commonality: School curricula fail to thoroughly address the historical and contemporary injustices linked to conflict and structural forms of violence. In a broader sense, educational systems and programming do not embrace peacebuilding as a process that comes to terms with past and present grievances and conflicts. This may change in the course of the peace process in Myanmar, and equally needs more time and investment in Pakistan and Uganda, where social injustices, past and current grievances are still to a large extent silenced in schools.

The way in which the root causes of past and/or present grievances and conflicts are subject to (public) debate could potentially generate new tensions if not revive former divisions. This is not to imply, however, that there is not space for educational approaches to co-create a ‘social truth’ that acknowledges multiple experiences, narratives, perspectives and interpretations of past and present conflicts and grievances. In fact, there is a pressing need to move away from a sheer preventative ‘peace education’ approach, and instead use education as a mechanism to also come to terms with the root causes and dynamics of conflicts.

“There is a pressing need to move away from a sheer preventative ‘peace education’ approach, and instead use education as a mechanism to also come to terms with the root causes and dynamics of conflicts.”

Young girls participate in a drawing competition during a school enrollment campaign in Killa Kanci, Quetta City, Balochistan Province, Pakistan ©UNICEF/Zaidi
Introduction
Introduction

This synthesis report is one of the main outcomes of the Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding, co-led by the Universities of Amsterdam, Sussex and Ulster, and supported by UNICEF’s Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme. This two-year partnership with UNICEF seeks to build knowledge on the relationship between education and peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts. The consortium has carried out extensive fieldwork between September 2014 and July 2016 in four countries: Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda. The research was conducted in collaboration with local colleagues in each of the participating countries and sought to contribute both to theory and practice in the field of education and peacebuilding, developing multiple theoretically informed, policy relevant outputs.1

The purpose of this report is to compare, summarise and critically analyse the findings from the first of these research themes. In general, education has been treated as an area of development programming which is separate from (post-) conflict stabilisation. This trend has been accompanied by priority setting among peacebuilding actors towards security-related issues, particularly in the early to medium post conflict phase (c.f.: Denney 2011; Novelli & Smith 2011). Gradually, scholars and practitioners have been pointing to the transformative potential of education in conflict-affected environments and its potential to foster social justice and build sustainable peace (Bush & Saltarelli 2000; McCandless & Smith 2011; Smith & Vaux 2003; Bird et al. 2011; Bird & Higgins 2009; Williams & Cummings 2015; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, et al. 2015; Lopes Cardozo et al. 2016). Notwithstanding the growing recognition that education plays an important role in the context of a fragile state, the majority of education and peacebuilding interventions remain explicitly and implicitly framed in terms of service delivery and formal, or conventional, educational infrastructures. The same applies to the more development-oriented frameworks EFA (Education for All) or the previous MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). Both predominantly focus on universal primary enrolment thereby lessening attention towards other crucial areas, such as education quality or adjusting educational systems to local contexts and the socio-economic needs of a society2. To some extent, the post-2015 framework for international development has listened to that critique and now places more emphasis on education as a life-long and not purely formalized process3.

1. All reports and further background to the research consortium are available at http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/partners/research-consortium/about-the-research-consortium/

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is increasingly concentrated in fragile states (New Deal 2013). In 2013, one third of the world’s poor lived in fragile environments, and it is estimated that this proportion could rise to one half in 2018 and to nearly two thirds in 2030 (UNICEF 2014b). Clearly, such trends imply the need for new educational approaches and responses adjusted to the everyday realities (c.f. de Certeau 1984) and challenges of populations in conflict-affected areas. Educational interventions, it is repeatedly argued, have to operate much more across (and not only within) education service delivery embracing processes of social change. In so doing, they succeed or fail not only on the basis of their technical quality but also because of a range of political, historical, cultural and economic factors (Novelli 2011). Hence, educational programming in fragile environments ideally takes into account the root causes history of conflict as well as the cultural, historical, socio-economic and political context of a country or region. In practice, however, educational structures are frequently challenged by two main dynamics. First, education is not only affected by but can also perpetuate indirect, repressive or structural forms of violence (Novelli & Lopes Cardozo 2008; Salmi 2000; Bush & Saltarelli 2000). Second, fragile environments decrease access to education leaving a significant amount of children and youth out of school. Latest data suggests that the proportion of out of school children living in fragile environments, increased from 30% in 1999 to 36% in 2012 (UNESCO 2015). In 2009, Save the Children reported that out of 77 million out-of-school children globally, 41 million lived in conflict affected environments (Dryden-Peterson 2009).

With that said, we hope that this report will not only contribute to but also inform policy, practice and research concerned with peacebuilding processes and education planning – at global and national levels. In short, the objective is to build a bridge between what is currently known as SDG 4 (quality education) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions).”

“We hope that this report will not only contribute to but also inform policy, practice and research concerned with peacebuilding processes and education planning – at global and national levels. In short, the objective is to build a bridge between what is currently known as SDG 4 (quality education) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions).”

RQ1: How and to what extent is education integrated into broader peacebuilding policies and practices?

RQ2: How and to what extent is peacebuilding integrated into education programmes and policies?

In examining these questions, we pay particular attention to policies related to the following areas: equity, social cohesion, reconciliation and governance in education. While we discuss each of them in a separate section, our final analysis suggests that all of them are in fact interrelated when it comes to assessing the role of education in sustainable peacebuilding. Accordingly, we start with a brief overview of our research methods and then briefly outline the theoretical and analytical framework we apply throughout the report. The way in which we use key definitions and concepts is also clarified. This will be followed by a brief overview and rationale of our case study selection. The subsequent section then synthesizes data on equity, social cohesion, reconciliation and governance in education from our case studies. In summarizing our main findings in the last section, we also discuss future avenues and ways forward to foster processes of social transformation through education in policy and practice. Potential gaps in research and policy practice are also identified.
Research Methods
This synthesis report is based on 4 in-depth country case studies which are available on the PBEA research consortium website. For the purpose of this report, we compiled a matrix which served us as an analytical tool to synthesize data and compare findings from each case study. The data shown in the matrix was taken from four individual country reports from research teams in Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda. All reports are informed by the following research methods and in-country data collection:

**Desk Review:** A review of existing literature on peacebuilding and education policies was carried out in each of the country case-studies, with a particular focus on their relationship to equity, social cohesion and reconciliation. Available government and donor policy and strategy documents, reports, academic literature, and education statistics were examined. This included also a review of relevant education-related policies such as: National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy papers, National and International Peacebuilding Plans / Agreements, UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) and any other relevant UNCT (United Nations Country Team) Plans, GPE (Global Partnership for Education) Plans (only if different to National Education Sector Plans), Education Sector Plans and Reforms, Curricula and any other document that has been relevant for the specific case study (e.g. policies about decentralisation of the education sector, teacher policies, national plans and strategies for youth).

**In-Country Data Collection:** The field research adopted a qualitative approach, drawing on a range of data sources including one-to-one interviews with diverse education and peacebuilding stakeholders in each country, focus groups, paper-based questionnaires (for student-teachers), lesson observations (teacher education institutions), analysis of existing statistical datasets, and policy documents. This approach enabled the inclusion of multiple and comparative perspectives, so that student-teachers, policy makers, facilitators/teachers/principals participated in the study across the four countries.

**Data Analysis:** The vast majority of the data were audio-recorded with the consent of the participants and transcribed fully. Where languages other than English were used they were translated into English. Researchers analysed qualitative data, including interview transcripts and notes, and coded them. Reflections emerging from the data in each country were discussed in cross-country Consortium meetings, which enabled a refinement of the emerging findings. The findings have been reviewed in a series of validation events with stakeholders in each country.

**Stakeholder Engagement:** Throughout the research process, from conception to completion we have engaged with a wide range of national and international stakeholders: International agencies, national government officials, INGOs, NGOs, teachers, academics, youth and students. We have held inception and validation events in each of the countries, presented interim findings at national and international conferences and will continue to disseminate the work widely through a broad and strategic dissemination process. This is central to our approach and seeks to provide theoretically informed but policy relevant research that will hopefully contribute to the better application and promotion of education as a contribution to sustainable peacebuilding.

The overall research approach draws on a theoretical framework developed for the consortium (Novelli et al. 2015), which gives a distinctive focus on the role of education in peacebuilding from a “4Rs perspective”, linking the analytical dimensions of redistribution, recognition, representation and reconciliation.

The 4Rs: Redistribution, Recognition, Representation and Reconciliation

The 4Rs Analytical Framework provides the overarching framework for all the research themes addressed by this study. This framework combines social justice and transitional justice thinking to develop a normative framework for the study of education and peacebuilding, which recognises the multiple dimensions of inequality and injustice that often underpin contemporary conflicts and the need to address the legacies of these conflicts in and through education. The framework is in line with broader and well-established peacebuilding thinking (Galtung 1976; Lederach 1995; Lederach 1997) of the need to address both negative peace (the cessation of violence) and positive peace (the underlying structural and symbolic violence that often underpins the outbreak of conflict – sometimes referred to as the ‘drivers of conflict’). It also recognises the importance of addressing and redressing the ‘legacies of conflict’ in tandem with addressing the ‘drivers of conflict’.

Within conflict studies, there has been a long and heated debate on the relationship between inequality, injustice and conflict. The debate is often framed in terms of “greed versus grievance” explanations, with the former suggesting that wars are driven less by justified “grievances” and more by personal and collective “greed” (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). Humans are viewed as engaged in conflict as “economic agents” making cost-benefit calculations and trying to maximize returns on engagement in violent conflict. For these thinkers, the route to peace and security is not through addressing injustice, inequality and structural exclusion, but through increasing the cost of access to resources for violent actors. A strong critique of this work argues that horizontal inequalities (between groups) are important indicators for conflict outbreak (Stewart 2008; Langer et al. 2011), arguments supported by strong econometric evidence (Cederman et al. 2011). Horizontal inequalities, which often relate to ethnicity, tribe, or religion, involve a range of dimensions: economic (access to land, income, and employment), political (access to political power and representation), social (access to public services), and cultural (respect for difference and identity, language rights, etc.). In armed conflicts, real or perceived horizontal inequalities can provide a catalyst for group mobilisation and uprisings. There is limited research on the relationship between education and inequality in the outbreak of armed conflict. However, recent quantitative research drawing on two international education inequality and conflict datasets (FHI 360 2015a) demonstrates a robust and consistent statistical relationship, across five decades, between higher levels of inequality in educational attainment between ethnic and religious groups, and the likelihood that a country will experience violent conflict. However, this research is less able to identify causal mechanisms, or explain the complexities of understanding those. Therefore, as the authors note in their conclusions, there is a need to explore the multiple dimensions of inequality beyond just educational outcomes, as well as the different ways in which the education system might contribute to or alleviate conflict.
The 4Rs framework builds on this thinking, developing a normative approach that seeks to capture the multiple economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions of inequality in education and the ways in which these might relate to conflict and peace (see Novelli et al. 2015). The framework combines dimensions of recognition, redistribution, representation, and reconciliation, linking Fraser’s (2005; 1995) work on social justice with the peacebuilding and reconciliation work of Galtung (1976), Lederach (1995; 1997), and others, to explore what sustainable peacebuilding might look like in post-conflict environments. The examination of inequalities within the education system seeks to capture the interconnected dimensions of the “4Rs”:

- **Redistribution** concerns equity and non-discrimination in education access, resources, and outcomes for different groups in society, particularly marginalised and disadvantaged groups.
- **Recognition** concerns respect for and affirmation of diversity and identities in education structures, processes, and content, in terms of gender, language, politics, religion, ethnicity, culture, and ability.
- **Representation** concerns participation, at all levels of the education system, in governance and decision-making related to the allocation, use, and distribution of human and material resources.
- **Reconciliation** involves dealing with past events, injustices, the material and psychosocial effects of conflict, as well as developing new relationships of trust.

As outlined in Table 1, the 4R framework will be used as a tool to analyse the extent to which education can support cross-sectorial programming for conflict transformation in terms of redistribution, recognition, representation, and reconciliation.

**Table 1: Analysing Education Systems Using the 4Rs: Potential ‘indicators’**

| Redistribuition (addressing inequalities) | • Vertical and horizontal inequalities in education inputs, resources, and outcomes (quantitative data)  
|                                          | • Redistribution in macro education reforms or policies (e.g. impact of decentralisation and privatisation on different groups and conflict dynamics) |
| Recognition (respecting difference)      | • Policies on language of instruction  
|                                          | • Recognition of cultural diversity and religious identity in curriculum  
|                                          | • Citizenship and civic education as a means of state-building |
| Representation (encouraging participation) | • Participation (local, national, global) in education policy and reforms  
|                                          | • Political control and representation through education administration  
|                                          | • School-based management and decision-making (teachers, parents, students)  
|                                          | • Support for fundamental freedoms in the education system |
| Reconciliation (dealing with injustices and the legacies of conflict) | • Addressing historical and contemporary injustices linked to conflict  
|                                          | • Integration and segregation in education systems (e.g. common institutions)  
|                                          | • Teaching about the past and its relevance to the present and future  
|                                          | • Vertical trust in schools and education system, and horizontal trust between identity-based groups |
We deliberately refrain from a too deterministic and descriptive application of the 4R framework in order to ensure also awareness of a wide range of context-specific factors or socio-historical dynamics. Instead, we will use the framework as an explanatory tool in highlighting how the 4Rs broadly interrelate and are reflected within the chosen case study to discuss the wider implications for peacebuilding and education sector interventions. In doing so, we opted to break down our analysis across four different areas, namely: education governance, inequality/equity, social cohesion and reconciliation. The arrows in the figure below indicate that we perceive all these areas as interrelated and closely intertwined. The framework of the 4Rs will be applied to help us understand and scrutinize patterns of conflict or peacebuilding within the education sector at large. Lastly, attention will be also given to crosscutting peacebuilding challenges such as direct and indirect forms of violence in education or gender inequalities.

Figure 1: Structure and Analytical Angel of the Report by using the 4Rs.
Key Concepts and Definitions

Peacebuilding
While we recognise that there are multiple interpretations of the term “peacebuilding,” our framework draws on a conceptualisation that focuses on the need for core transformations in order for post-conflict societies to move towards sustainable peace. Key post-conflict transformations necessary to produce sustainable peace, or positive peace, as Galtung (1976) calls it, requires going beyond the mere cessation of violence (negative peace) in order to address the root causes of violent conflict. This involves addressing both underlying causes and legacies of conflict and the promotion of both social justice and cohesion, by addressing injustices and bringing people and communities together. This is in line with a range of contemporary theories of war and conflict (see for instance Stewart 2008; Cramer 2006), which see horizontal and vertical inequalities as drivers of conflict. Addressing these inequalities, in their different economic, cultural and political dimensions, supports the promotion of social cohesion, whereby trust, solidarity, and a sense of collectivity and common purpose are strengthened.

Peacebuilding and Education Nexus
We deliberately distinguish between explicit and implicit forms of peacebuilding through education (c.f. Datzberger et al. 2015, p. 24). The former refers to activities such as peace education, peace huts, clubs or programmes and initiatives purposely put in place with the explicit purpose of promoting peace in conflict-affected societies. Such approaches may have an implied ‘theory of change’ (e.g. that teaching conflict resolution skills to children will make them less likely to resort to violence during disputes) and explicit approaches often prioritize working with children and young people to achieve change at the level of individual values, attitudes and behaviour.

Implicit forms of peacebuilding through education, on the other hand, refers to activities and programmes that may not be intentionally designed to build peace but indirectly impact processes of social transformation and change, necessary for sustainable peace and development, that is aspects of education governance, institutional change and reforms that may affect structural features of the education system such as equity, representation and participation in decision-making, finance and control. Table 2 below is indicative of implicit and explicit forms of peacebuilding and education activities and/or initiatives – with the risk to exclude many more.

Table 2: Peacebuilding and Education Nexus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explicit (examples)</th>
<th>Implicit (examples)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Peace Education which can different forms and emphases such as conflict resolution skills, values education, inter-group contact</td>
<td>• Equity in education (in terms of access, quality, redistribution of resources, learning outcomes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peace Initiatives in schools (e.g.: huts, clubs)</td>
<td>• Equal representation in decision-making processes affecting the education sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peacebuilding training for teachers and personnel</td>
<td>• Education system fosters processes of integration and not social, cultural or religious segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Addressing the legacy of past and present conflicts in school curricula, textbooks and/or non-formal education programmes</td>
<td>• Inclusive decentralisation within and through education systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rebuilding schools and educational infrastructures in conflict-affected regions</td>
<td>• Improve service delivery of education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“While we recognise that there are multiple interpretations of the term “peacebuilding,” our framework draws on a conceptualisation that focuses on the need for core transformations in order for post-conflict societies to move towards sustainable peace.”
Peace Education

The term peace education is understood in this report as a mechanism to acquire the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes to live in harmony with oneself, others and the given environment. We regard peace education as an important mechanism towards conflict prevention. By contrast, when we refer to education as a wider tool towards peacebuilding and reconciliation, we further understand education as a mechanism that goes beyond conflict prevention. In short, formal or non-formal education initiatives are seen as safe spaces to encourage the development of a ‘social truth’, meaning multiple narratives and perspectives (e.g.: McCully 2012) of past and present conflicts. From this angle, education plays a role in addressing and critically reflecting upon the evolution of historical and contemporary injustices that are linked to present and past conflicts (see also our definition of reconciliation and education below, pp. 20-21).

Fragile State

In this report we frequently refer to the term ‘fragile state’ and make use of the data presented in the Fragile State Index (FSI) as well as in the latest OECD Report “States of Fragility 2015”. The concept of ‘fragile state’ is a highly contested term and not firmly defined academically or across development agencies. Clearly, labelling a specific country as fragile could reflect a political bias. While there is no commonly accepted global list of fragile states, there is at least a consensus on some clear-cut circumstances affecting five dimensions, namely: violence (peaceful societies); access to justice for all; effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, economic foundations; and the capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters (OECD 2015, p. 13). All of these dimensions are directly or indirectly relevant to education. This also implies to understand fragility beyond fragile states in assessing fragility as an issue of universal character that can de-facto affect all countries. In other words, the above noted five dimensions are applicable to all countries worldwide – in varying degrees. By embracing the OECD’s definition and approach, a fragile region or state will be understood as weak in capacity to carry out basic governance functions and therefore lacking the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. A fragile state is vulnerable to internal and external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. By contrast, more resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. OECD suggests that fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum (OECD 2011a).

Equity and Inequalities in Education

For UNICEF, equity is a guiding principle and implies “that all children have an opportunity to survive, develop and reach their full potential without discrimination, bias or favouritism [...] regardless of gender, race, religious beliefs, income, physical attributes, geographical location or other status” (UNICEF 2011).”

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5. Recently, under the PBEA programme, there is a shift to move from peace education towards peacebuilding competencies, with a greater focus on applied practice and skills development.

resources to redress existing inequalities (for example, based on location or group identity). For example, while a version of equity might be achieved through ensuring that all schools receive the same funding (based on pupil numbers), for others this would be seen as inequitable precisely because some schools are located in more socially deprived locations and face more difficult challenges than others and therefore should be prioritized. As Bourdieu (2008, p. 36) notes:

To favour the most favoured and disfavour the most disfavoured, all that is necessary and sufficient is for the school to ignore in the content and teaching it transmits, in the methods and techniques of transmission and the criteria of judgement it deploys, the cultural inequalities that divide children from different social classes. In other words, by treating all students, however much they differ, as equal in rights and duties, the educational system actually gives its sanction to the initial inequality.

In seeking equity in education, the unequal distribution of resources might therefore be necessary to redress historical inequalities. This has been the underlying argument for policy measures such as affirmative action and positive discrimination, which often inflame political tensions. Analysis of equity in education thus needs to be grounded in the contextual analysis of the country, existing socio-economic, cultural, political, gender-related, ethnic/linguistic and religious inequalities, and the resources, policies, and practices aimed at addressing them. While economic dimensions of inequalities, or redistribution, are important, there are also other dimensions of inequality that require attention. Recognition refers to the ways in which culturally related identity-based issues manifest themselves, while representation concerns a sense of isolation from decision-making spheres. These concepts reflect the ways in which different dimensions of inequity and inequality manifest themselves and highlight the need for a holistic strategy to redress them.

Social Cohesion
Social cohesion, like many key development concepts, is contested and open to a variety of interpretations (see Jenson 2010). The Council of Europe defines social cohesion as “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means.” This definition captures two key aspects of many definitions: “inequalities” and “social relations and ties” (Berger-Schmitt 2002, pp. 404-5). The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) similarly captures these two dimensions and defines social cohesion as “the quality of coexistence between the multiple groups that operate within a society […] along the dimensions of mutual respect and trust, shared values and social participation, life satisfaction and happiness as well as structural equity and social justice” (UNICEF 2014a). Social cohesion is a societal rather than individual property, based on the promotion of positive relationships, trust, solidarity, inclusion, collectivity, and common purpose. Social cohesion is also linked to social justice and equity. Higher income inequality has been associated with lower social cohesion, and more equitable societies tend to have greater social and political trust and less violence and crime (Pickett & Wilkinson 2010). Educational equality has been linked with greater social cohesion across a number of measures, with educational inequality positively correlated with violent
crime and political unrest and negatively correlated with political and civil liberties (Green et al. 2006). Improving social cohesion therefore requires addressing structural, inter-personal, and inter-group domains. In this sense, social cohesion can sometimes be used interchangeably with the concept of peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts, as a kind of synonym for the aspirational production of a society with strong social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility (see OECD 2011b). In the UNICEF PBEA programme, social cohesion has been used in several contexts as a proxy for peacebuilding, due to local sensitivities related to peace or peacebuilding language in some of the countries in which the PBEA operates.

Against this backdrop, we differentiate between “vertical” and “horizontal” forms of social cohesion. As outlined, among others, by (Kaplan 2012), we relate vertical social cohesion to substantial differences in economic status (such as income), whereas horizontal social cohesion refers to the social glue (e.g.: ethnic or religious background) that ties people together. The latter is based on the assumption that feelings of togetherness matter for both, the wellbeing of individuals and the long-term health of a society and identity formation.

Reconciliation and Education
As noted earlier under ‘peace education’, in the scope of this report we understand the role of reconciliation in education as a process that addresses historical and contemporary injustices that are linked to past and current conflicts. This may occur in the form of ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ teachings about different narratives of the past, and their relevance to the present and the future. At the same time processes of integration or segregation in education systems (e.g. common institutions) can have an effect on reconciliation through establishing vertical trust in schools and education systems, and horizontal trust between identity-based groups.

More generally, we argue that education may have an important role in longer term post conflict development. Two education policy areas in this regard concern the curriculum, and in particular the way in which history education can contain values that either promote division or encourage peaceful management of diversity, and the extent to which education has a role in contributing towards reconciliation following recommendations from formal Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). It is common in countries that have been affected by conflict to point to a role for education in promoting longer-term reconciliation as a means of preventing recurrence of violent conflict. However, it is often an area that is not prioritised as part of education policy development.

Governance in Education
Governance refers to the sum of all concurrent forms of collective regulation of social issues: from the institutionalised self-regulation of civil society, through the diverse forms of cooperation among state and private actors, to the action of sovereign state agents (Mayntz 2009). Aragon & Vegas (2009) highlight two distinctive aspects of definitions of governance. The first concerns political control of a system and the context this creates, with governance defined in terms of the policy-making process (e.g. how the rules of a political regime provide the context for policy-making). The second aspect refers more to technical capacity and the ability to implement policies (Smith 2010). This research concerns both of these aspects: the politics and the
process of education sector governance at the national and macro level. There is also a third aspect of governance, which is more analytical and considers “governance” as a concept of our time, reflecting a shift from government to governance, and for some towards “global governance” (Rosenau & Czemiel 1992). This involves a shift from the idea of the government as the unitary source of educational governance (that funds, provides, regulates, and owns the education system) towards a more “coordinating” and facilitating role involving a range of actors operating at multiple geographical scales. This can be traced to the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal political economy approaches that have dominated international development debates since the 1980s (Robertson et al., 2006). Dale (2005) sees this as the scalar and functional division of education governance, which necessitates exploration of the supra-national or international, national, and sub-national levels. It also requires exploration of governance activities: funding, provision, regulation, and ownership, and the actors and institutions (state, market, community, household) responsible for carrying them out. Analysis of educational governance reflects on who is doing what, where, with what outcomes, and for whom. This requires sensitivity towards the multi-scalar and functional division of these processes in contemporary contexts.

Policy
In broad terms policies are generally understood to be visions, set of ideas, statements of intent, or issues that have been officially deliberated and agreed upon by a particular group of actors (e.g.: government, international peacebuilding and development partners, donor agencies, civil society representatives or any other stakeholder). In a narrower sense, it is essential to acknowledge that a policy is not only limited to statements written on a piece of paper, but should also lead to courses of action and implementation (e.g. specific programmes, projects or reforms). Ultimately policies ought to achieve specific outputs and outcomes that have an impact in the short, medium or long term. In other words, policies are not only designed and made to summarize a commonly established vision and idea, but are also closely tied to specific actions and results. For the purpose of this study, we therefore suggest that the concept of policy is defined as:

* A set of coherent decisions and ideas made and agreed by a group of actors, who are committed to courses of action serving a common (long-term) vision and purpose.

Consistent with the analysis by Rizvi & Lingard (2009) we suggest that any research focusing on policy should not just embrace a normative notion (written document), but also pay attention to why a policy emerges (process) and how a policy is put into practice (implementation). With that said, our main interest in the policy process revolves around the political-economy context that embeds policy shaping, making and implementation. In short, we focus on who is driving a certain policy, who benefits most and least and why certain policies that might support peacebuilding are advocated or resisted and by whom. Our interest lies in the difference between policy text and implementation with the aim to highlight inconsistencies between the two (policy implementation gaps or unintended outcomes).
Political Economy Context
There is increasing recognition that blockages for effective reform at the sectoral level (including for delivery, planning and procurement) can be political and that technical solutions alone may not be enough. In other words, the governance of a sector, and the way in which politics and institutions interact within that sector, will in practice have a critical impact on sector policies and services (Joint Donor Workshop, DFID, EC, UNDP, World Bank, 2009). With that said, in this report we understand the Political Economy Context of a country as the interaction of political and economic processes in society, such as the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time (Dahl-Østergaard et al. 2005). Such an approach needs to take into account structural factors, institutional factors, actor interests and motivations. Levels of analysis can involve: country level analysis (macro level), sector level analysis, or problem driven analysis.

Violence in the Context of Education
As elaborated by Novelli & Lopes Cardozo (2008, p. 480), we distinguish between direct, indirect, repressive and alienating violence in the context of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Forms of Violence in the Context of Education – Typology according to (Salmi 2000)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct violence</strong> (“deliberate injury to the integrity of human life”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect violence</strong> (“indirect violation of the right to survival”, structural violence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Repressive violence</strong> (“deprivation of fundamental political rights”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alienating violence</strong> (“deprivation of higher rights”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Four Case Studies (Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa, Uganda)

In this section we briefly introduce the particular conflict and peacebuilding background of all four case studies to better contextualise the findings that are presented in this report. Each country exhibits different perspectives and experiences on explicit and implicit forms of peacebuilding through education, which are influenced and shaped by context-specific dynamics and dimensions. However, subsequent sections also elaborate on commonalities and shared experiences in addressing causes of conflict through education policies and/or policy-making.

The four country case studies provide a high degree of contrast relating to the relationship between education and peacebuilding, in terms of geographical diversity, the nature and temporality of the conflict contexts and the root causes that underpin them. They also offer a rich and nuanced understanding of the capacity and commitment of different states to effect durable peace and social cohesion in and through education. South Africa, emerged out of the struggle against apartheid, a conflict rooted in racism and social exclusion, whose legacies and inequalities remain more than two decades after the cessation of armed conflict. South Africa provides us with a rich resource to reflect more historically on the challenges and possibilities for the education system to contribute to promoting sustainable peacebuilding. Uganda, another country in Africa, provides a contrast between the relatively peaceful South and Central Region and a Northern region that has suffered a series of punctuated armed conflicts for almost three decades. Pakistan, in South Asia, is a country that has suffered from a series of conflicts in recent years, linked to instability in Afghanistan, the global “war on terror”, regional tensions with its neighbour India and internal political unrest. Finally, Myanmar, presents us with a case study of a country from South East Asia, on the brink of entering a post-conflict period after decades of authoritarian military rule, challenged by a range of armed and non-armed ethnic and political movements. The rich diversity of research sites emphasises the need for conflict sensitive, contextually coherent approaches to enhancing the role and potential of education in peacebuilding processes in each context, while providing relevant insights and reflections on the differing challenges, possibilities and potentials of education, as a key social sector, in the promotion of sustainable peace-promoting societies.
Myanmar

Myanmar is known officially as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (also known as Burma), and is located in Southeast Asia bordered by Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand. The root causes of the ethnic strife that characterise on-going conflict in Myanmar may be traced back prior to the Anglo-Burmese wars of the mid-19th century and British colonial rule thereafter. Myanmar became an independent nation in 1948, initially as a democratic nation and then, following a coup d’état in 1962, as a military dictatorship. Conflict currently largely falls into three movements: the struggle of armed ethnic groups for greater self-determination; the pro-democracy movements resisting oppressive practices by the military-dominated State; and the more recent resurfacing of inter-religious tensions. These dimensions are highly interdependent and contribute to the historic and current climate of conflict, mistrust and grievances in Myanmar. After the election in 2010, there have been tensions around and only partial successes with regard to the government’s quest for a nationwide ceasefire agreement. Since 2011, the government initiated multiple reform processes, including an education sector review. However, actual transformations towards a more sustainable peace remain volatile given weak state institutions and the (positive and negative) impact of international aid on building confidence in the peace process. Finally, although slowly increasing, the government spends relatively little on the education sector in comparison to, for instance, the defence budget.

A central issue in the current landscape of Myanmar is the ongoing processes of peace negotiations between the government and multiple ethnic armed groups (EAGs), which are as yet unresolved after six decades of fighting. Education is not an explicit component of the National Ceasefire Agreements (NCA), but is seen as an important aspect of the peace dialogue, as it is recognised that education has and continues to be a key grievance for many of the armed ethnic groups, civil society, and minority groups. Current education reform is deemed as vital to securing peace dividends through improved service delivery and a renewed focus on inclusion and equality of provision. Key education challenges include:

• Access to education: disparities in participation rates in primary and secondary education, most acute amongst populations who are marginalized because of living in remote or border areas, having a lower socio-economic background, are refugees/IDPs, or living under the threat/consequence of conflict and/or natural disaster;
• Funding and underinvestment in education;
• (History) Curriculum: dominance of majority (Bamar) cultural/military history and religious identity;
• Language of Instruction: lack of acknowledgement/support for mother-tongue instruction;
• Costs of education: despite commitments to free primary education, many families are still required to pay fees or purchase texts/uniforms to send their children to school.

Fieldwork was carried out in two regions, including the wider Yangon area and in Mon state. Hence, the data presented reflects a particular period and geographical focus and does not claim to be representative of Myanmar.
Pakistan

Pakistan emerged as a country in 1947 as a result of the partition of British India. It is located in the north-west of the South Asian subcontinent. Pakistan is administratively divided into four provinces, Punjab (largest in population and most developed), Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan (smallest population-wise and least developed). Additionally, it has a capital territory Islamabad, two autonomous territories - Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan - and a group of Federally Administered Tribal Areas. An overwhelming majority (96%) of Pakistan’s estimated 189 million citizens follow the Islamic faith. The small religious minority includes Christians, Hindus, Parsis (Zoroastrians), and the Ahmadi community, who were declared non-Muslims by the state in 1974. Pakistani Muslims are divided into two sects, the majority Sunni and the minority Shi’a. Additionally, both sects are internally differentiated. Ethnicity is another marker of difference, with each ethnic group primarily concentrated in its home province, that is Punjabis (55%) in Punjab, Pakhtuns (15%) in KP, Sindhis (14%) in Sindh, Balochs (4%) in Balochistan, with most Mohajir (8%) residing in urban Sindh. However, Punjabis and Pakhtuns live across Pakistan. Pakistan is a lower-middle income country and is placed in low human development, ranking 146 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index.

Major conflict dynamics in Pakistan include, for instance, violence perpetrated by Islamist terrorist groups, fuelled by the ‘War on Terror’ with its epicentre in KP, ethnic insurgency and sectarian violence in Balochistan and ethnic/political and sectarian violence in Karachi. The entanglement of Islam with Pakistani identity and a history of conflicts with India work to construct idealised gendered roles and masculinised identities for Pakistanis. This restricts the possibilities of female citizens and make them vulnerable to verbal, physical and sexual violence. Additionally, socio-economic inequity, unequal access to resources and power, and a lack of political participation also contribute to conflict. The education system mirrors these inequities, with household income being the strongest determinant of educational opportunities, followed by rural and urban disparities, inequities across the different regions/provinces and gender gaps between females and males. These inequities are reflected by the three systems of education - public, private and the madrassa/religious sector and language of instruction. The two provinces most-affected by conflict - Balochistan and KP - are also the ones with poorer educational indicators. Nevertheless, literature indicates a high proportion of educated youth from the prosperous Punjab province are engaged in conflict but outside their home-province (Fair 2013; Yamin & Malik 2014).
Research was conducted in Urban (Karachi) and interior Sindh, KP (Peshawar) and Islamabad. Sindh province is the major research site, with RA2 focusing on urban and interior Sindh and RA3 focusing on Karachi. RA1 is covered in all research sites. Sindh was selected because significant inequities on the basis of uneven socio-economic development between rural and urban areas exist. The ethnic and language mix is also an issue for social cohesion especially as the large Sindhi speaking population in rural Sindh feels that Sindhi is marginalized due to the positioning of Urdu as a national language. Karachi with its large population has a wide range in the social class, ethnic and religious mix. Importantly, Karachi reflects key conflict-drivers—ethnic/political and sectarian violence and both Karachi and interior Sindh exhibits indirect and structural violence. Peshawar was selected because it is the capital city of KP, the province most-affected by terrorism. Islamabad, being the capital city was included because of the presence of international development community and federal policy-makers.

“Major conflict dynamics in Pakistan include, for instance, violence perpetrated by Islamist terrorist groups, fuelled by the ‘War on Terror’ with its epicentre in KP, ethnic insurgency and sectarian violence in Balochistan and ethnic/political and sectarian violence in Karachi.”
South Africa

South Africa has a population of approximately 54 million (53,675,563) people with a total land area of 1,219,090 square kilometers. It is classified as a middle income country with an emerging market and an abundant mineral resource supply, including manganese, platinum, gold, diamonds, chromite ore and vanadium. The biggest socio-economic and political challenges remain its high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality which are among the highest in the world, at a time when economic growth has increased by as little as 1.5%. Most current South African conflicts are firmly rooted in a history of colonialism and apartheid that not only fractured social identities along the lines of race and ethnicity, but solidified them in unequal relations that continue to separate the population across unequally resourced spatial areas. Dealing with issues of equity, redress, and social cohesion were some of the things that the new government in 1994 committed itself to addressing. However, more than two decades after the end of apartheid the legacies of past policies remain, and much of the physical landscape of apartheid has undergone very little change. Perhaps the biggest challenge has been that the inequalities have become normalized and accepted as given within policy pronouncements. The main casualties of this normalization live on the fringes of urban development, where they remain peripheral to development and integration. Despite de-racialization of the distributional system, white privilege bound up as social class is the main basis of discrimination and has continued largely unabated.

The education system mirrors the inequalities and legacies of apartheid. For example, in 2012 South Africa invested 6.8% of the Gross National Product (GNP) and 20.6% of total government expenditure in education (which is much higher than the world average), yet children from more privileged backgrounds continue to be given a higher chance of reaching matriculation by the age of 19 or 20 than children from poorer backgrounds. Statistics show that 88% of privileged students reach matriculation compared to only 17% of those from poorer backgrounds (SAHRC and UNICEF 2014). Learner repetition is also quite high in South Africa compared to other developing countries, with geography, language and race having a huge influence on who repeats a grade and who does not. It is not as much an issue of inefficiency and wasted resources as about an impoverished population being further disadvantaged by a system that does not treat their needs fairly. Furthermore, the racially segregated school system under apartheid retains a hold over current schools, with a small number of well-resourced schools located in urban areas and accessed mainly by the privileged minority while poorly-resourced schools mainly cater for black learners (all those disadvantaged under apartheid). Differential learning experiences generate disparate academic outcomes with consequences for learner opportunity, and which construct different learner identities. These have serious implications for social cohesion, and for realizing sustainable peace in South Africa.

Picture: 14 years old Mbasa Mengzuva in his classroom in the Bijolo School, situated in a disadvantaged rural area of Eastern Cape, South Africa. “When I finish school, I want to become a pilot or at least work in aviation. It is not an easy thing to achieve and that is why I need to be a very good student” – says Mbasa.
The ANC government after 1994 attempted to redress many of these inequalities and to bring about effective and meaningful structural changes. In so doing it reorganized the system according to key debates related to decentralization, values, languages of instruction, learner safety, minimum norms and standards for public school infrastructure, and affirming the rights of all learners. The ANC government recognized the need to both engage with inequalities and social fragmentation inherited from apartheid and to identify emerging needs. It further recognized that social cohesion in the context of such deep-seated patterns of inequities and fractured social relationships would be difficult to attain. Yet, despite the attention given after 1994 to address issues of access to education and the equitable allocation of state funding (seen in further policies such as the Manifesto on Values, Education, and Democracy in 2001 and the National Policy on Religion and Education in 2003), the main inhibitor to social cohesion has been in how to transform and unlock an institutional framework that continues to perpetuate a variety of inequities.

Research undertaken in South Africa focused on understanding national interventions that address various aspects of social cohesion in the country that included concerns about violence, social development and employment. While the majority of the case studies selected for the project centered on the Western Cape, the individual interventions were chosen on the basis that they reflected the diversity, nature, and size of interventions that exist in other regions, and thus could be seen as illustrative of much broader overall experiences of social cohesion initiatives.

“Most current South African conflicts are firmly rooted in a history of colonialism and apartheid that not only fractured social identities along the lines of race and ethnicity, but solidified them in unequal relations that continue to separate the population across unequally resourced spatial areas.”
Uganda

Uganda is located in East-Central Africa, bordered by Kenya (East), South Sudan (North), Democratic Republic of the Congo (West), Rwanda (Southwest) and Tanzania (South). With a population of 37 million people, Uganda is not only the world’s second most populous landlocked country (after Ethiopia), but is also home to the world’s youngest population (with over 78% below 30 years). It is a low-income country with a GDP per capita equivalent to 3 per cent of the world’s average, though the situation is slowly improving. Whereas Uganda’s GDP per capita averaged $274.65 from 1982 until 2014, it reached an all-time high of $422.36 in 2014. In 2015 Uganda’s literacy rate is 73.9% (80.8% male and 66.9% female, a gender difference of 14%). Public spending on education was at 2.2% of the GDP in 2013.

Uganda’s history of state formation, as well as the conflict in the northern region, has created divisions within the country. Since 1986, Uganda has experienced at least seven civil wars, located mostly in the northern regions. More than 20 militant groups have thus far attempted to displace President Museveni’s government both within and beyond the Ugandan borders. External diplomatic incidents and/or armed incursions occurred with Rwanda, (South) Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia (Insight on Conflict 2014). Probably the most prominently debated conflict in the media, but also in scholarship and policy practice, is the civil war in the north against Joseph Kony’s LRA (Lord Resistance Army) since the 1990s. Between 1987-2007 Uganda resembled a “war with peace” model, suggesting that the government in power embraced the antagonisms of conflict (in the north) alongside peaceful coexistence and development (in the south), in one country at the same time (Shaw & Mbabazi 2007). Whereas southern Uganda emerged as a showpiece for Western donors to highlight remarkable successes in combating HIV/AIDS rates or fostering economic growth and development, conversely, northern Uganda’s developmental progress has been challenged by two decades of war (ibid.). In 2015, Uganda still ranks 23rd amongst the world’s most fragile states. Regional instability within the country persists, driven by factors such as: economic disparities and unequal distribution of wealth, resource competition, land-disputes, cattle raiding, poor governance and democratic deficits, human rights abuses and erosion of civil liberties, lack of truth, reconciliation and transitional justice, the politicisation of ethnic identity, corruption and tensions between cultural institutions and the government (ACCS 2013; Knutzen & Smith 2012).
As in many other conflict-affected countries, education in Uganda was initially seen as an essential ingredient for economic and social development. More recently a few policies, address to some extent, the integration of peacebuilding into the education sector. Remarkable achievements in addressing the EFA agenda and issues of inequality in education notwithstanding, the role of education in peacebuilding continues to be challenged by slow and weak policy implementation in areas such as: teacher training and capacities, infrastructure, socio-psychological support for both teachers and students, and education and livelihood generation for youth. In addition, ineffective decentralization processes and the emergence of low versus high quality schools (or privatisation), as well as corruption, challenge equality and social cohesion within and through education. Within the curriculum peacebuilding is approached and used as a pedagogical tool towards conflict prevention or establishing a sense of ‘inner peace’ at the individual or communal level, but not as a means to coming to terms with a conflict-shattered past.

The data used in this synthesis report is based on fieldwork conducted in Uganda between January and April 2015 working with local researchers from Makerere University in the capital Kampala, and Gulu University in the north of the country across three research areas. Research was undertaken at a variety of sites in the country, comprising rural and urban environments and diverse geographical regions of the country, namely Kampala, Gulu, Adjumani and Karamoja. Two senior research assistants from Gulu University were employed, alongside 5 local research assistants in Kampala, Karamoja, Gulu and Adjumani. In total 60 interviews with a variety of stakeholders took place alongside 13 Focus Groups Discussions (FGD) and 259 student teacher questionnaires were completed. For each research area government officials, education planners, teacher education providers, teaching professionals, student teachers, local and international NGOs, and local communities were interviewed.

“Uganda’s history of state formation, as well as the conflict in the northern region, has created divisions within the country. Since 1986, Uganda has experienced at least seven civil wars, located mostly in the northern regions.”
Synthesis of Findings
Synthesis of Findings

This section is a synthesis of our findings on the integration of education and peacebuilding across four country case studies: Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa, and Uganda. On the basis of a recently conducted literature review on education and peacebuilding (Smith and Ellison 2016) the following key areas were examined in terms of education policy and peacebuilding:

- Governance
- Equity
- Social Cohesion
- Reconciliation

Each of these key-areas will be discussed separately before they are put into a relational analysis in our concluding section. We begin our synthesis with a brief elaboration on how the case studies conform to global trends, their main peacebuilding challenges and varying degrees of state fragility, and, lastly, the relevance of education in the peacebuilding context of all countries. Data from all four countries is retrieved from country reports (see: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015).
1. Global Trends and Country Contexts

At the global level, according to the MPI (Multidimensional Poverty Index) nearly half of all poor people (736 million out of 1.6 billion) experience no more than one year of education (OPHI 2015). In other words, no household member aged 10 or older has completed five years of schooling. While the majority of MPI affected people, that is 69.6% (OPHI 2015) live in middle-income countries, poverty is increasingly concentrated in fragile states (New Deal 2013). In 2013, one third of the world’s poor lived in fragile environments, and it is estimated that this proportion could rise to one half in 2018 and to nearly two thirds in 2030 (UNICEF 2014b)

As shown in Figure 1, 22% of the primary school age population and half of the world’s out of school children (28.5 million) live in conflict affected environments (UNESCO 2015).

Latest data suggests that the proportion of children out of school in fragile environments, increased from 30% in 1999 to 36% in 2012 (UNESCO 2015). According to the OECD just one fifth of fragile states and economies are on track to achieve universal primary schooling, compared to nearly half of non-fragile developing countries (OECD 2015, p.37).

In countries classified by the FSI (Fragile State Index) as ‘very high alert’ (these include: South Sudan, Somalia, CAR and Sudan), in total 72% of people are affected by multidimensional poverty affecting educational attainment and years of schooling.

As indicated in Table 4, the four country case studies broadly conform to those global trends (with minor deviations) in that mean years of schooling also decrease with the grade of state fragility and multidimensional poverty.
Table 4: Context of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD 2015 States of Fragility</td>
<td>among the 50 most vulnerable countries in two or more dimensions of fragility</td>
<td>among the 50 most vulnerable countries in two or more dimensions of fragility</td>
<td>not included</td>
<td>among the 50 most vulnerable countries in two or more dimensions of fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index (see OPHI.org.uk)</td>
<td>0.154 (38.1% poor, 9.4% severe poverty, 13.4% vulnerable to poverty)*</td>
<td>0.237 (44.2% poor, 23.7% severe poverty, 15.1% vulnerable to poverty)</td>
<td>0.021 (11.1% poor, 1.3% severe poverty, 17.9% vulnerable to poverty)</td>
<td>0.359 (69.9% poor, 38.2% severe poverty, 19.0% vulnerable to poverty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Years of Schooling</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Drop-out (primary)</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing for Education</td>
<td>2.1% of GDP</td>
<td>2.5% of GDP</td>
<td>6.0% of GDP</td>
<td>2.2% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.0% of ODA</td>
<td>13.0% of ODA</td>
<td>4.0% of ODA</td>
<td>6.0% of ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GPE: no funding but strong WB support</td>
<td>GPE: two implementation grants in 2014, one grant for the Sindh government ($66 million) 2015-2017 one grant for the Balochistan government ($34 million), 2015-2017</td>
<td>GPE: no funding</td>
<td>GPE: received grants totalling $100 million.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Myanmar figures from 2000 as no recent data available

Strikingly, school drop-out rates seem to be only marginally lower in the upper-middle income country South Africa if compared to Myanmar which is considered as a LDC (Least Developed Country). With regards to the latter, it has to be noted that there is a considerable lack of recent data on educational attainment and access in Myanmar, including the non-state educational sector. South Africa’s greatest challenge in basic education is still to overcome the legacies of apartheid, causing poor quality learning outcomes and inequalities in education that continue to persist (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming). Township schools in South Africa remain economically deprived, rely entirely on government for funding, face restrictions in charging school fees, largely accommodate disadvantaged learners, have little or no education facilities, and generally produce sub-optimal results (Rakabe 2014, p. 105). Notably, poor quality education and segregation based on social class or wealth thwarts equal opportunity and social transformation in all four case studies. The sections on equality and social cohesion refer in much greater detail to this finding.
Uganda’s extremely high drop-out rates (75.2% in primary education) can be in part explained as a result of high poverty rates and an educational system that, despite UPE and USE, is not entirely free. In many instances food, textbooks, uniforms or any other necessary equipment have to be provided by parents or guardians (Datzberger et al. 2015, pp. 42-45). In 2011 only 53 per cent of Ugandan children finished primary school. The majority of Ugandans still have either no formal education or only some primary education. One in five females (20 per cent) and 13 per cent of males age 6 and older have never had any formal education (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2012, p. 22).

In Myanmar, on the other hand, efforts are under way to making education truly free. Acknowledging the ‘hidden costs’ of attending school, the government has since 2012 provided all primary students with free textbooks and exercise books, and granted them 1000 Kyats to purchase stationery costs (NESP 2015, Draft Chapter 8). It still remains to be seen however, whether and how these reforms take root in the long haul. As at 2015, almost 50% of children did not complete primary education, and a large vulnerable youth population lacks important livelihood and literacy skills (ibid).

Pakistan has one of the highest incidences of children who are excluded from education, with 6.2 million children at primary level who are not attending school (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming). This is despite the fact that since 2004 there are no tuition fees for public schools and textbooks are provided free of cost. Within the age span of 5-16 years, the compulsory education age, approx. 25 million children and adolescents are denied the right to education (Alif Ailaan 2014). Out of the 25 million, 70% have never been to school and 30% were enrolled but have dropped out (Alif Ailaan 2014). In line with OPHI trends, children from poorest households (57.1%) are more likely to be out of school compared to those from the richest households (10%). On a positive note, the education index increased in all four countries over the past two decades. Table 5 below, suggests that global reforms such as EFA (Education for All) have had an impact to a certain extent, though there is room for improvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>increased from 0.222 (1980) to 0.371 (2013).</td>
<td>increased from 0.161 (1980) to 0.372 (2013).</td>
<td>increased from 0.468 (1980) to 0.695 (2013).</td>
<td>increased from 0.174 (1980) to 0.479 (2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“On a positive note, the education index increased in all four countries over the past two decades. Table 4 below, suggests that global reforms such as EFA (Education for All) have had an impact to a certain extent, though there is room for improvement.”
2. The Inclusion of Education in Peacebuilding and Development

Each of the case studies is embedded in a different stage and process of peacebuilding, development and state fragility. Uganda increasingly presents itself as a developing and not a post-conflict country despite persisting regional instabilities. Myanmar is a country that is still in the midst of negotiating national ceasefire agreements with multiple ethnic armed groups. Pakistan, considered as a ‘high alert’ fragile state, continues to suffer from various armed attacks and suicide bombings. In South Africa, more than 20 years after apartheid, issues of social cohesion dominate discourses and policy agendas aimed at social transformation to overcome social and economic inequalities. In terms of the role that has been given to education in all these different contexts, it is striking that in Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda, education is hardly perceived by policy-makers or government officials as a tool to come to terms with or address past and present grievances, and legacies of conflicts or war. Whereas South Africa’s TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) explicitly acknowledges this link, in all three other countries, the positive potential that education can play in mitigating conflict drivers does not feature significantly in policy rhetoric and planning. In the following section we discuss whether and how education has been included in peacebuilding and development processes. In doing so, we pay attention to the key dimensions of conflict, direct and indirect forms of violence and the extent to which external actors have been involved.

The Inclusion of Education in Peacebuilding Processes

In all four cases there is a noticeable difference in the degree of external involvement during the transition from conflict to peace and development.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, 9/11 and the ‘Global War on Terror’ led to political and strategic interest in particular from the US (Durrani et al. forthcoming 2016, p. 6-7). Between 1948 and 2014 the United Sates spent $75 billion on aid to Pakistan, including military, economic, humanitarian aid and social development, the latter also includes education (Center For Global Development 2015). Yet, suicide bombings, armed attacks, and killings by various Islamist armed groups (involving attacks on schools) continue to claim hundreds of lives, with further violence inflicted by security agencies in counter-terrorism operations (Amnesty International 2015). In particular, 2014 was one of the deadliest years for militants fighting against the state, claiming the lives of 2451 people, with most of the victims and attacks concentrated in KP (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming, p. 7). Unlike other countries (such as Uganda), Pakistan’s peacebuilding framework largely comprises a ‘National Internal Security Policy’. The policy is mainly steered by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) with little or no input from the international community. The primary focus of the policy is on counter-terrorism strategies and legal support for law enforcing agencies. Apart from protection and stability it aims to promote pluralism, freedom, democracy and a culture of tolerance. The National Internal Security Policy makes reference to education under ‘reintegration’ (p. 7-8), envisaging a youth engagement strategy (YES) imparting technical and vocational education, job creation and loans to ensure
livelihood opportunities. It also refers to “integrating the mosques and the madrassas in the national and provincial education establishment by mapping and thereafter mainstreaming the existing and new madrassas and private sector educational institutions” (p. 9). No reference is made with regards to the role of education in relation to extremism and terrorist groups.

Uganda exemplifies how after the war against the LRA in the Northern regions (1987-2002) local political power structures used and abused the rhetoric surrounding donor-driven liberal peacebuilding reforms and agendas for the benefit of their own agenda (see for instance: Fisher 2014; Shaw & Mbabazi 2007). Critics allege that the GoU (Government of Uganda) frequently projects itself in two ways when approaching the international community. When appropriate, it plays the card of the “fragile state” by pointing to the sources of conflict and instability in its northern and western regions. It thus appeals to the security agenda of western donors in representing the country as a counter to security threats. At the same time, the developmental progress of the south (in particular with regards to combatting HIV) allows the government to depict the country as a successful example of development, one worthy of investment (Fisher 2014). Over time the GoU managed to maintain its incoming financial assistance even if not necessarily allocating those funds for peacebuilding or any other intended purpose. As in many other post-conflict environments, corruption is widespread. For instance, in 2012 the OPM (Office of the Prime Minister) misappropriated in total EUR 11.6 million of donor funds intended for the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) in Northern Uganda (Irish Aid 2014).

Despite three respective PDRPs (PDRP-I, PRDP-II and PRDP-III in draft), the overall political agenda remains more concerned with development related issues than peacebuilding. Within all peacebuilding frameworks reviewed for the purpose of this study, education is by and large seen as a vehicle towards strengthening Uganda’s human capital in order to achieve the country’s overarching economic developmental goals.

Interviewees further highlighted a general fear of reviving past tensions and potential conflict, if cultural differences or conflicts are subject to debate in schools (Datzberger et al. 2015, pp. 54-57). Surprisingly, none of the PRDPs refer to education as a tool to transform the lives for former child soldiers or how education could promote re-integration into their communities. However, there have been more recent efforts to change this approach. For instance the UNICEF PBEA programme has played a role in integrating aspects of peacebuilding into current and future education sector policies (e.g.: targeting early childhood education and peacebuilding or addressing violence against children in schools), but it is too soon to assess its impact in the longer term.

“Within all peacebuilding frameworks reviewed for the purpose of this study, education is by and large seen as a vehicle towards strengthening Uganda’s human capital in order to achieve the country’s overarching economic developmental goals.”
Myanmar’s political changes can be regarded as mainly internally driven, representing a peacebuilding process that is ‘locally owned’ and not externally enforced or steered (Higgins et al. 2016, pp. 35-43). According to the International Crisis Group one of its great strengths has been that it is a home-grown process without any international mediators (2015, p. 2). However, not all of the peace negotiations between the government and multiple ethnic armed groups (EAGs) are completed, and unresolved issues persist after six decades of fighting. In total 8 EAGs have agreed to sign NCAs (National Ceasefire Agreements), falling short of the 15 the government had hoped would sign (out of a total over 20). The NCAs fuel hope for a potential transition from military to civil government and democratisation. Free and fair elections were held on November 8th 2015, resulting in a landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD (National League for Democracy). Myanmar’s complex political system is the brainchild of former military junta, which has incrementally loosened its grip in recent years with stark changes, including releasing political prisoners and welcoming foreign investment (ibid.). At an overt level, education has not featured prominently in the text of peace agreements for the bilateral ceasefires or the NCA. Though references to the need to consider social service provision feature in these documents (NCA draft, 2015), there is an expectation that issues of service delivery (including education) will be dealt with through the political dialogue process after signing the NCA. If education were to be included within current bilateral ceasefire agreements or future peacebuilding frameworks, the regional context would have to be taken under consideration. States such as Kayin, Kayah and Mon have established parallel systems of education closely linked to the EAGs. They may prioritise education issues within peace agreements more so than Chin state, which does not have such equivalent non-state education structures. Myanmar’s recent history of isolation and lack of international, or at least Western, engagement amplifies the challenges for new international connections. It makes it incredibly difficult for international partners to influence the process (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2014, p. 94). There is a danger that international donors will be perceived to be allied with state authorities because of their participation in bilateral trade agreements simultaneously with their aspirations to be involved in the wider peacebuilding and development process. This might have implications for education policy, where the same international partners (including the EU, JICA, the World Bank) are participating in the formulation of education reforms as well as funding peace initiatives. Hence within the wider peacebuilding process, education reforms are clearly politically charged.

In the case of South Africa, regional and international pressure contributed, among internal forces, to the end of apartheid (1994) and a preceding NPA (National Peace Accord) in 1991. South Africa “experienced a reasonably peaceful transition from repression to democracy” (TRC South Africa 1998, p. 5) often referred to as a political miracle. There was never a full-scale civil war, with all its implications, that needed to be addressed after 1994 – due to separation by geography and fear. Today, the international community frequently refers to South Africa as a successful example of peaceful democratisation and social transformation, although many problems (including social segregation within the education sector) remain unresolved (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming). As for education, Chapter 3 of the NPA refers to measures to facilitate education on citizens’ rights (see 3.7.4). In addition, Chapter 5 of the NPA (1991) entitled “measures to develop socio-economic reconstruction and development” mentions the facilitation of equal access to education. No mention is

“Today, the international community frequently refers to South Africa as a successful example of peaceful democratisation and social transformation, although many problems (including social segregation within the education sector) remain unresolved.”
made with regards to aspects of the role of education in reconciliation, recognition as well as representation in decision-making processes. Also South Africa’s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 does not include education as a theme or area of intervention. Notably, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) explicitly stated that special arrangements are needed for those whose education had been interrupted as a result of engaging in resistance against apartheid. The TRC further recommended that human rights curricula should be introduced in formal education and that schools are regarded as spaces where the memory of the past ought to be kept alive. In addition, it urged the transformation of the education sector in South Africa to prevent future human rights violations. Today, all schools and tertiary education institutions are meant to have a copy of the TRC report. While there has not been civil conflict prior or after apartheid, in 2008 and 2009 the country’s fragile state index worsened significantly due to a sharp recession and an outbreak of xenophobic violence killing dozens of foreigners (Messner et al. 2015, p. 29). The situation has improved since but several challenges towards social transformation persist.

Table 6: Key dimensions of conflict, direct and indirect forms of violence

Note: based on data and literature sources summarized in: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Myanmar</th>
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<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Struggle of armed ethnic groups for greater self-determination</td>
<td>Unequal access to resources and power along ethno-linguistic, regional, and gender lines</td>
<td>After apartheid, 213000 people filed petitions of gross human rights violations with the Truth And Reconciliation Commission (established 1996) – yet, security related issues due to a large scale of violence, was ironically not the main priority after 1994 among peacebuilding actors in the South African context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-democracy movements resisting practices of military-dominated state</td>
<td>Democratic development is challenged by heavy-handed military interventions</td>
<td>The main challenge for social cohesion after 1994 was that the geographies of old structures largely determined where different communities resided, which were further reinforced by levels of income inequality that were among the highest in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent resurfacing of inter-religious tensions</td>
<td>Although 96% of Pakistanis are Muslims, within this Muslim nation great ethnic and cultural diversity exists, along with differences in Islamic thought and practice</td>
<td>Although democratisation brought in a government with a clear commitment to pro-poor policies and to mitigating inequality, it remains difficult to promote cultural diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disparities in income distribution</td>
<td>“Islamisation” of Pakistan’s political system coincided with religious extremism</td>
<td>Over 20 years after apartheid, SA continues to be separated by geography and by fear – bearing the brunt of neoliberal reforms in relative isolation from each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic reconciliation</td>
<td>The legacies of conflicts with India</td>
<td>The physical landscape of apartheid has not been altered significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat is still active, most intensely in Kachin and northern Shan states with multiple EAGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Uganda

- Regional and national security, tensions between political and cultural authority
- Concerns about political inclusion
- Shrinking space for civil society
- Uneven infrastructure development, economic development, natural resource management, land disputes, equitable government service delivery, youth demographics, politicised reconciliation process, social norms related to violence
- Widespread corruption in the public sector
- Economic growth has not always led to poverty reduction
The different challenges in terms of security, development and key dimensions of conflict and state fragility have been accompanied by direct and indirect forms of violence in the educational system of each country. In Myanmar, the Education Under Attack (2014) report (see GCPEA 2014) highlighted numerous incidences of sometimes extremely violent attacks on students and teachers in recent years - emanating from on-going conflict between the state and armed groups, as well as sectarian violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities. The case of Pakistan tops the list of countries with terror attacks perpetrated against educational institutions. Out of 3400 attacks spread over 100 countries between 1970 and 2013, around a fifth (n = 724) took place in Pakistan (START 2014). Other sources report even higher figures in pointing to a total of 838 militant attacks on Pakistani schools (GCPEA 2014). While there are no such attacks reported in South African or Ugandan schools, their systems are not violence-free. In South Africa school-based violence is multi-dimensional and takes on various forms, including: bullying, theft, sexual and gender-based violence, assault and fighting, gang-related violence, cyber-bullying, xenophobia, corporal punishment or homophobia (Burton & Leoschut 2013; Mncube & Harber 2012). According to Burton and Leoschut (2013) one in five secondary school learners (22.2%) had experienced one or more forms of violence while at school, such as threats of violence by peers (12.2%), assaults (6.3%), sexual abuse or rape (4.7%) and robbery (4.5%). In the context of Uganda, no nationwide, rigorous and representative prevalence data exist, but anecdotal reports and a survey conducted in 2006 by Save the Children indicate that more than 80% of children have experienced physical punishments such as caning and slapping by teachers (Devries et al. 2013). In addition, in a sample study (comprising 40 primary and 10 secondary schools across eight districts and four regions in Uganda) commissioned by the MoESTS (Ministry of Education Science, Technology and Sports), as many as 74.3% of children surveyed reported they had experienced caning by an adult in school (UNICEF 2013).

Even though there are dissimilarities in the key dimensions of conflict calling for context-specific and culturally sensitive peacebuilding approaches; all four countries also reveal commonalities that are relevant to the role and potential of education in transitioning from conflict to peace and sustainable development. These include:

- Uneven levels of development (also and within the education sector), challenge social cohesion and equality. Although all of our case studies have invested in and improved their education system to some extent over the past two decades (see Table 5 on p. 40), their political-economy context undermines efforts to promote nationwide equality, social cohesion and reconciliation through education – though in varying degrees (see section on inequalities and social cohesion). What all four countries have further in common is that they display segregation in education based on wealth and social circumstances. The latter varies by country, ranging from segregation along the lines of ethnic background, religion, urban-rural divide or degree of multidimensional poverty.

- Education is predominantly embraced as a means towards economic development and employment generation and only marginally seen as a means towards reconciliation and social transformation after conflict and war. South Africa slightly deviates from this trend, as the country’s TRC explicitly denotes education as a tool towards reconciliation. However, the country’s’ development frameworks (see Table 6 below) place much stronger focus on education to strengthen human
capital and combat unemployment than social cohesion.

- Indirect and structural violence pervades the educational system in several ways. In Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda unequal distribution of wealth and widespread poverty are concomitant with access to either low or high standard education thereby hampering equal opportunities for disadvantaged societal segments. Similarly, in South Africa pervasive structural violence is attributed by some scholars to the legacy of apartheid, which did not leave the education sector unaffected as a result of decades of state-sponsored violence and repression.

- Lastly, in all four cases youth are framed in an ambivalent way as being both, a threat but also bearer of hope towards sustainable peacebuilding, social cohesion, transformation and development. Education, vocational training or skills training for youth is perceived as a means towards employment generation and economic growth. However, the success of formal and non-formal educational programmes for youth cannot be detached from the political-economy context of a country as a whole. An in-depth discussion is provided in the synthesis report on formal and non-formal education for youth in relation to peacebuilding (Lopes Cardozo et al. 2016).
The Role of Education in Development Frameworks and Implicit Forms of Peacebuilding

Table 7: Education within Development Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Role of Education (4Rs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> based on data and literature sources summarized in: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Myanmar**
- Both UNDAF’s for Myanmar (2012-2015) place strong emphasis on redistribution (access to education), some reference to social cohesion (mitigating differences among ethnic communities and their access to education); no mention regarding the conflict-affected context and the potential role education could play therein (in particular: reconciliation, recognition)
- Reforms in the education sector coincide with peacebuilding agendas, in stating that “most of the provisions are the foundation of peacebuilding from an education perspective”

**Pakistan**
- MDTF (Macro National Development Framework) objectives are primarily seen through the lens of the MDGs and human capital theory without an explicit engagement with the changes or transformation that would be needed to bring about internal and external peace, not to mention the role of education therein
- UNDAF (2013-2017) places strong emphasis on redistribution (access to education), to an extent, acknowledges representation (provision of social services to marginalized/vulnerable populations)
- Pakistan Vision 2025 views education primarily as a means of enhancing human capital of the nation and as an instrument of economic productivity. However, unlike previous MDTF, it does focus on social cohesion, justice, tolerance and harmony between different groups.

**South Africa**
- The RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) 1994 acknowledged the deep scars of inequality left by the segregated education system. It considered education to be crucial to facilitate people’s effective participation in a democratic society, in reducing inequalities, increasing employment and economic growth.
- The RDP was followed by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) 1996 which had a strong neoliberal competitive market-driven focus;
- The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa ASIGSA, 2005, emphasised ‘skills and education’ and building a developmental state.
- The New Growth Path (2010) and then later the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2013 has a chapter on social cohesion and education highlighting the need to enhance the quality of basic education (redistribution). Although the plan recognises the importance of social cohesion – education is more equated with economic growth and mainly conceived as developing human resources and skills for the labour market.
- UNSCF (the Government of South Africa United Nations Strategic Cooperation Framework 2013-17) focuses on access to education (redistribution), ‘improved quality of education’ as strategic outcome 1, recognises that the standard of education for black learners is still of low quality. Acknowledges that the education system does not prepare youth for the job market. Emphasises aspects of redistribution and to a minor extent recognition, no focus on aspects of the role of education in reconciliation and representation

**Uganda**
- In all documents, these include NDP (National Development Plans I and II), PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan and all UNDAFs (United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks), education is either depicted as service delivery to be provided to the public and/or as a means to empower the marginalised and poor, but not explicitly as a means towards social transformation (e.g. through representation in decision making processes, recognition of social segregation or reconciliation by addressing causes).
- In the main education targets areas such as access to education and the overall quality of education.
- Rhetorically, there is a notion of education as a means to empower the grassroots level (e.g. promoting human rights education, but mainly through informal settings and trainings)
- As in Uganda’s peacebuilding framework, virtually no attention is given to the causes of conflicts or the historical and contemporary economic, political and cultural injustices that underpin conflict in Uganda.
Placing Table 7 above into the context of our theoretical and analytical framework of the 4 Rs (see: Novelli et al. 2015), all macro-development plans reviewed for the purpose of this report prioritise aspects of redistribution over representation, recognition and reconciliation. This may not come as a surprise, in view of the many development challenges all countries face. Thus on a list of priorities, countries like Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda place increased access to education on top. This is followed by enhancing the quality of education institutions and the system at large. The latter, quality, is also a priority in South African frameworks. In all countries under our assessment, education is generally perceived as a significant catalyst towards human capital development, employment generation and the economic prosperity of the country as a whole. As far as aspects of recognition are concerned, South Africa’s frameworks seem to be the most elaborate. Concretely, they relate education to aspects of social cohesion, and especially earlier plans acknowledge the deep scars apartheid rule has left within the education sector. Even so, equating education with economic growth dominates the language of South Africa’s plans (e.g. UNSCF or NDP). On a very superficial level, recognition is also featured in other country plans in that some refer to human rights education or mentions are made to improve service provision (also in education) to marginalised, vulnerable or certain ethnic communities. For instance, Myanmar’s UNDAF (2012-15) aims at mitigating differences among ethnic communities through the provision of access to education. While such an agenda could be also considered as contributing towards redistribution, implicitly, awareness of minorities (religious or ethnic) can have an effect on social cohesion as well. While all frameworks perceive social inequities in education as a hindrance in the transformation of a socially just society, two main elements appear to be missing. First, there is hardly any mention of how representation in decision-making processes affecting the education sector can be increased. Second, none of the frameworks thoroughly reflects upon the potential of education in mitigating the conflict drivers in the long-term. Correspondingly, there is hardly any consideration on the role of education in reconciling or dividing societies (with the exception of South Africa).

Figure 3: Weight of 4Rs within Development Frameworks

“All macro-development plans reviewed for the purpose of this report prioritise aspects of redistribution over representation, recognition and reconciliation. This may not come as a surprise, in view of the many development challenges all countries face.”
3. Education Governance

The Role of Education Governance in Peacebuilding
All of our ensuing areas under examination – equality, social cohesion and reconciliation – share one essential feature. They can only contribute to peacebuilding and social transformation through education if they are embedded in an enabling political-economy context that creates space for effective governance. The latter reflects on who is doing what, where, with what outcomes, and for whom. This requires sensitivity towards the multi-scalar and functional division of these processes in contemporary contexts (Dale 2005). Hence, not only are equity, social cohesion and reconciliation closely intertwined areas, but governance across all these sectors can create both enabling or disabling conditions to constructively manage conflict and to overcome inequalities among groups (Smith & Ellison 2016). The overarching question that informs this section is therefore what aspects of governance make education policies more effective or ineffective in contributing to sustainable peace?

We pay attention to the following two dynamics. The first concerns the political control of a system and the context this creates, with governance defined in terms of the policy-making process (e.g. how the rules of a political regime provide the context for policy-making). The second dynamic refers more to technical capacity and the ability to implement policies (Smith, 2010, 2014). Both require a shift from the idea of the government as the unitary source of educational governance (that funds, provides, regulates, and owns the education system) towards a more “coordinating” and facilitating role involving a range of actors operating at multiple geographical scales. We commence our synthesis with a short overview on resource allocation for education, and then continue with a critical discussion on how macro education policies and reforms implicitly and/or explicitly address aspects of peacebuilding and social cohesion. We consider whether and how processes of decentralisation in education enhance redistribution and representation in education sector planning and implementation.

Financing for Education
One of the targets within the EFA agenda is to increase public spending on education to 6% of a country’s GDP and 20% of total government spending. Thus far, only South Africa seems to have reached that goal while all other three countries still lag far behind.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (%)*</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending (%)** in 2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA (%)***</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPE (Global Partnership for Education)</td>
<td>No funding but strong WB support</td>
<td>Two implementation grants in 2014, one grant for the Sindh government ($66 million) 2015-2017 one grant for the Balochistan government ($34 million), 2015-2017</td>
<td>No funding</td>
<td>Received grants totalling $100 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Myanmar, the education budget has been increased from 0.6 GDP in 2009-2010 to 2.1% of GDP in 2013-14. The government signals this as part of their commitment to financing free and compulsory education at primary level and possible extension to middle and secondary (NESP 2015, Draft Chapter 7). Efforts are underway to making education truly free. Acknowledging the ‘hidden costs’ of attending school, the government has since 2012, provided all primary students with free textbooks and exercise books, and granted them 1000 Kyats to purchase stationery costs (NESP 2015, Draft Chapter 8). Data on the percentage of total public expenditure on education is currently not available. Since 2007, the government has made a commitment to providing free primary education to all children, yet reports suggest that due to the chronic under-resourcing of the education sector, many families are still required to pay fees or purchase texts/uniforms as a precondition for sending their children to school (Watchlist 2009). According to a UNICEF report (2012, p.86), these costs prevent up to 30% of children from attending school. Ethnic parallel education systems receive very little or no external funding and consequently the costs of these schools, including teacher stipends is largely born by the communities they serve. Inequalities in teacher salaries across the different education sectors has also been a point of grievance, with ethnic education providers questioning why government sector teachers are paid higher salaries in their regions compared to local teachers (Higgins et al. 2016, pp. 54-55, and pp. 81-82).

In Pakistan, while actual educational expenditure has remained far below the 20% target, it is comparatively greater at provincial level with 21.3% in Punjab, 15.5% in Sindh, 21.5% in KP, 16.6% in Balochistan (National Plan of Action 2015-16 p. 15 cited in: Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming, p. 31). The bulk of provincial education budget is spent on recurrent costs, particularly salaries, although all provinces have increased allocations for educational development programmes in the fiscal year 2004-15. Overall (though allocations per provinces vary), 89% education expenditure from 2014-15 comprises current expenditure such as teachers’ salaries, while only 11% comprises development expenditure which is not sufficient to raise the quality of education (MoF Pakistan 2015, p. 9). Overall, public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP is the lowest in Pakistan compared to other South Asian countries (UNESCO 2015).

In comparison to all other countries, South Africa has not only the highest rates of public investment in education, but complies with the targets set by the EFA agenda. Public expenditure decreased slightly from a total of 20.6% in 2012 to 19.2% in 2013. Within the education sector, 72% is allocated for basic education, while university, skills development and adult education, as well as student state funding receive about 10% each. Schools are funded from provincial education budgets, determined largely by their own legislatures. Provincial budgets are financed via grants and transfers from the national treasury. In short, a school does not receive money from the DBE (Department of Basic Education). A school receives money from the provincial education department in which it is located. The provincial department in turn receives money directly from Treasury. These transfers do not stipulate how much each province must spend on education (though subsequent legislation stipulates guidelines for spending 80% on salaries and 20% on non-teaching inputs). These are multi-sectorial block transfers driven by the ‘Equitable Shares Formula’, a formula that is largely population driven. Importantly, the formula does not produce absolute amounts of funding, nor was it originally based on a sense of ‘adequacy’ or ‘costed
norms’ approach to meet specific needs. It simply produces shares of revenue that are then divided amongst claimants on that revenue in what is hopefully an equitable manner (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming, pp. 50-51). After 1994, the ANC paid significant attention to address historical disparities in resources for education. It introduced the National Norms and Standards for School Funding (NNSSF), which remains the central instrument for redistributing resources to date. The quintile of schools (Q1-Q5) is used to determine funding, with each school allocated funding according to a set of per-learner allocations applicable to each quintile. Schools in Q1-Q3 are non-fee schools, while schools in Q4-5 are fee paying schools. The former group (Q1-Q3) receives a larger norms and standards allocation to compensate them for their lack of income from fees. Besides, the differentiation between quintiles and fee and non-fee paying schools, a National Poverty Distribution table is used to account for the stark difference between provinces. Allocations are determined according to the poverty of the community around the school as well as certain infrastructural factors to determine the proportion of learners within each province that will be accommodated within each of the five quintiles. Despite its clear pro-poor nature the current funding formula is not problem-free (ibid. pp. 61-62):

- Per pupil expenditure model based on public recurrent expenditure
- After covering personnel costs few provinces can adequately fund schools as per the national policy guidelines
- Formula does not produce absolute amounts of funding, it simply produces shares of revenue that are then divided
- Despite pro-poor redistributive mechanism, education budget remains very limited, with an over-dependence on private expenditure in education.

According to the second UNDAF from 2006-2010, education used to be severely underfunded in Uganda. Over the past few years, however, some notable improvements have been made. Significant reforms led to a reprioritisation benefitting education sector budgets (Guloba et al. 2010). Across sectors, education emerged as one of the top priorities and received the second highest proportion of the annual budget 2013/14 by the GoU after infrastructure investment (“roads and works”) and before security (MoFPED 2015, p 43). However, Uganda remains highly dependent on external development assistance (MoFPED 2015, p. 40-41). More than 40 development partners or donors provide financial support to the country. Out of the $1.669.6 billion of ODA, in total $99.7 million (6%) were allocated for education in 2012-13. Notably, funding for education decreased from $312.4 million in 2009 to 99.7 million in 2013 (OECD StatExtracts 2015). However, Uganda joined the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2011. While no official data is available on how funds for education are allocated across regions and districts, contradictory statements were made during interviews, when asked whether funds for education are distributed evenly. According to the MoESTS, funds are transferred to the districts based on the number of students enrolled in schools (Interview with MoESTS, April 2015). Yet unequal patterns of resource allocation occur because of the system of capitation grants. In short, poorer districts receive less funding if the population is also lower, and wealthier districts with a higher population are receiving more resources. This, in part, explains why regions like Karamoja are continuously perceived as marginalized areas, as population figures are not as high as in other regions of the country, and (according to a new census) even decreasing. In addition, as pointed out by UNICEF regional office, it is no exception

“According to the second UNDAF from 2006-2010, education used to be severely underfunded in Uganda. Over the past few years, however, some notable improvements have been made.”
that once UPE grants to schools have been allocated, more children enrol in school at a later date leading to additional costs which are not accounted for. A different way of allocating funds, so it was argued during interviews, could be to align resources available with the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) of a region. According to the MoESTS, discussions are also on-going as to whether funding allocations for schools in richer districts should be reduced (thereby shifting more responsibilities to the parents) to the benefit of schools in poorer districts (Interview with MoESTS, April 2015).

This brief review of financing for education across the four countries suggests a number of tentative conclusions from a peacebuilding perspective. Firstly, three of the countries (Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda) seem to follow the pattern in other conflict affected contexts whereby the percentage of GDP and allocation of government spending to education falls below recommended levels. This means that even if peacebuilding were prioritised, it would struggle to compete with other demands on education budgets – a vicious circle where countries most in need of peacebuilding efforts are also those with least resources to implement peacebuilding policies. Secondly, even where there is a higher percentage of GDP and allocation of government spending on education (as in South Africa), this does not necessarily mean that transformation is achieved and deeper structural challenges in terms of segregation and inequality persist. Financing therefore is only part of the solution and there may be additional political economy factors that make it more difficult to effect change. Finally, all four countries share a characteristic common to most countries which is that by far the largest portion of the education budget goes towards salaries. From a peacebuilding perspective this may suggest that, rather placing an emphasis on securing additional funding for new peacebuilding programmes, more thought could be given to working in cost effective ways with existing teachers and education personnel. This is the focus of another research output on teachers and peacebuilding (Sayed & Novelli 2016).

Macro Education Policies and Reforms

Key Education Sector Plans in each of the four countries were reviewed as part of this synthesis. In Myanmar the primary rationale for education reform at present is driven by the imperative to ‘modernise’ an education system that is perceived to be antiquated and irrelevant to Myanmar’s current position in the regional and international global political economy. Especially, Myanmar’s democratisation process as well as accession into ASEAN have led to a desire to construct citizens and a state that are perceived to be able to participate in this new political economy. The education reform strategy and development plan sits within a national development process that is focused on poverty alleviation, rural development and decentralisation (Higgins et al. 2016).
In Pakistan, within policy texts, social cohesion (and implicitly aspects of peacebuilding) is predominantly understood as inequalities in wealth and location alongside dominance on homogenisation of values and behaviours through Islam. It can be argued that this not only excludes religious minorities but also closes the possibilities of different ways of being a Muslim. While the NEP (National Education Policy) 2009 seems to have opened up the discourse to recognise and respect multiple identities, the spirit of the policy does not appear to have translated well into implementation. A new policy is on the horizon (2016/17) but it remains to be seen how social cohesion will be reflected. In the past one and a half decades, there have been two major education and policy interventions in Pakistan: the National Education Policy (NEP) 1998-2010, and the NEP 2009 (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming).

Given the historical context of the anti-apartheid movement, South Africa pays much closer attention to aspects of social cohesion. Since 1994 the South African government has worked to transform all facets of the education system. The fragmented and racially duplicated institutions of the apartheid era have been replaced by a single national system including nine provincial subsystems. Policies have been developed for all aspects of education, including those for school governance, school funding, post-provisioning, conditions of service for teachers and the curriculum (UNSCF 2013). The period from 1994-99 was arguably the most significant era in terms of policy formulation in recent South African history as frameworks were needed to completely restructure the education sector. Transformation in education was particularly singled out in wider reform discourse for its social transformative potential (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming).

In Uganda, since independence in 1962, there have been several attempts to reform the country’s education sector. The 1989 Education Policy Review Commission Report in conjunction with the 1992 Government White Paper on Education in Uganda laid the foundation for education reform over the last two decades. Uganda’s educational reforms and curriculum changes have to be placed in the wider political-economic context pertaining in Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1990s. Forces of globalisation including international pressure to introduce multi-party elections led states to commit, rhetorically at least, to the concepts of liberal democracy and market openness. In this endeavour, education is mainly perceived as an essential ingredient for economic and social development, and less explicitly in terms of a contribution to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This is evidenced by education sector plans, financing and marco-reforms such as decentralization (Datzberger et al. 2015).
**Table 9: Macro Education Reforms and Policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</table>
| Myanmar         | The CESR (Comprehensive Education Sector Review 2012-2014) is part of a broader package of reforms the MoE agreed to undertake a CESR considering issues of access, quality and management within all levels of the sector. This led to the development of a National Education Sector Plan (NESP) supported by actors such as ADB, UNESCO, GIZ, WB, DFAT (Australia). Integration of Peacebuilding Issues:  
  - The CESR led to the National Education Law (2014). The law turned into a highly political issue, large segments of the society feel that the law does not go far enough to challenge the status quo. This led to student demonstrations, reaching their height in March 2015 met with police response and dozens of arrests.  
  - There were disagreements with NNER (National Network for Education Reform), a coalition of civil society groups (e.g. teacher unions, Buddhist monks and ethnic education groups) that review and critique the current Education Law reform process. Main issues of critique include:  
    1. Extent of access to free education  
    2. Extent to which local languages are used  
    3. Extent of greater curriculum autonomy in local schools and communities  
  - There is contention over the existence and independence of student and teacher unions.  
  - The Draft NESP (National Education Sector Plan) was not launched at the time of writing but overall participation and voice within reform process was/is mixed. Expectations of an inclusive process may have been unrealistic due to severe time constraints, political pressure to deliver, and the fact that Myanmar has not been exposed to inclusive decision-making processes for the past 50 years. |
| Pakistan        | In the scope of the Education Sector Reforms (ESR) (2001-06), education was integrated into the PRSPs to use it as a catalyst for economic growth. In the last decade, there have been two major education policy interventions in Pakistan: the National Education Policy (NEP) of 1998-2010 and of 2009. In addition all four provinces have formulated Education Sector Plans (ESPs), namely: KP (2011-15, 2015-20), Sindh (2014-18), Balochistan (2013-18), Punjab (2013-17). Integration of Peacebuilding Issues:  
  - The targets set by the ESR have the potential to contribute to strengthening social cohesion and human capital, but do not explicitly address social cohesion or justice or deal with issues of recognition. Moreover, the recommendations of ESR were only ‘partially implemented’, with ‘political instability’ cited as one of the challenges that constrained the realisation of the ESR targets (Bhatti et al. 2011: ix)  
  - Within the NEP (1998-2010) Islam is offered as the basic discursive framework. Commitment to Islam is seen as “Educating and training the future generation of Pakistan as true practicing Muslims who would be able to enter the next millennium with courage, confidence, wisdom and tolerance. However, the existence of multiple identities (and multiple forms of Islam) is not spelled-out. Thus, the policy denies the existence of and legitimating any other identities except for the Islamic identity of Pakistanis.  
  - In the ensuing NEP (2009), inclusive development is seen as the key solution to deal with the unprecedented social upheavals. Emphasis on access (redistribution) and improving the quality of education, including the promotion of child-friendly education.  
  - The policy stresses the ‘Islamic ideology’ in the pursuit of educational objectives. Unlike the NEP (1998-2010), it acknowledges the significance of multiple identities and the need for cultural recognition while maintaining that the curriculum should infuse ‘Islamic and religious teachings’. Thus, it opens up the discourse for ethnic and regional identities, though not fully endorsing multiple religious identities.  
  - NEP (2009) proposes to widen the scope of curricular provision to include emerging topics, such as: life skills based education, environmental education, population and development education, human rights education, school safety and disaster and risk management, peace education and inter-faith harmony, detection and prevention of child abuse.  
  - In the current devolved structure, two provinces—Sindh and Balochistan—have integrated social cohesion in their ESPs. |
South Africa

The education sector’s foundational document, based on the constitution, is the Education Policy Act (1996) NEPA, which sets out the concurrent legislative competence in education where national and provincial governments share responsibility for all education issues, except tertiary, education. The DBE has long-term vision statements, two medium term plans and an annual sector plan. The Action Plan 2014 - 2019: Towards the realisation of 2030, is a strategic medium term plan, containing 27 goals alongside targets and indicators. There is also a five year strategic plan 2015/16-2019/20 which is an operational medium-term plan. These plans guide annual plans of the DBE (Department of Basic Education) as well as each of the nine Provincial Education Departments’ Plans.

Integration of Peacebuilding Issues:

- Social cohesion is well reflected in the broader national policy discourse into DBE policy texts and interventions. This is also discernible from the establishment of the ‘Directorate for Social Cohesion and Equity in Education’ in 2011.
- Within the MTSF (Medium Term Strategic Framework), reference to social cohesion remains limited apart from language of instruction policies.
- By and large, within the DBE’s sector plans, components of social cohesion programme seems to be a mere addition of ad-hoc activities to the DBE’s non-educational services and not organically integrated. Education is predominantly embraced as a tool to achieve economic growth. The same applies to social cohesion more generally, which is seen as an important factor in promoting economic growth required to reduce poverty and inequality. Ironically, that the economy itself may be the driver of inequality is not taken into consideration (in particular in the NDP).

Uganda


Integration of Peacebuilding Issues:

- The above mentioned plans/reforms stress the need to increase access to education – in particular for disadvantaged groups (redistribution) and address peacebuilding to some extent. Implicitly through a strong focus on redistribution, curriculum reform targeting critical thinking or citizenship education explicitly through recognizing disadvantaged youth in conflict-affected regions, new curriculum includes themes on conflict and peace, policies for refugee education.
- The MoESTS has created a careers guidance and counselling department with a mandate that includes the provision of counselling services as well as the training of teachers to handle issues of conflict.
- Recently UNICEF’s PBEA programme played a serious role in integrating aspects of peacebuilding into recent and future education sector policies. Efforts included programmes targeting early childhood education and peacebuilding, or addressing violence against children in schools and teacher training for peacebuilding at primary level. In addition, UNICEF joined the OPM-chaired Platform for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, a forum that brought together more than 20 government departments, development partners and CSOs working on conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. Besides, UNICEF, began to support children/youth and education-sector engagement in the National Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy (which is currently in a draft stage and still needs to be enacted by Parliament).

Despite very different in-country contexts, when synthesising macro-educational policies and reforms throughout all four cases, one can detect two main commonalities:

- The analysis of macro-development plans and national education policies and reforms, to varying degrees prioritise aspects of redistribution over representation, recognition and reconciliation. However, South Africa (at least rhetorically) places a much greater emphasis on the transformative role of education than all other countries.
- Aspects of inequities in education dominate the language of policies and reforms. Education is in the main perceived as tool towards eradicating poverty and advancing social and economic development. Again with the exception of South Africa, inequalities in education are not related to aspects of social cohesion, representation or how grievances are deeply rooted in the history of state formation.
Decentralisation in Education

In theory, devolution has become a concept for tackling under-representation and deepening the democratisation process of the state to grass-roots level. As such, the decentralisation of power has emerged as a central tenet of any liberal peacebuilding project. The literature also shows that the effects of policies relating to redistribution and decentralisation in post-conflict contexts may be an important element in (re) legitimising the state, but it may also be a source of conflict and needs to be managed sensitively (Smith & Ellison 2016). Qualitative research reveals that it can have varying impacts at different levels of society, with important consequences for state legitimacy and long-term peacebuilding. The key message from a peacebuilding perspective seems to be that decentralisation policies need to be carefully implemented and monitored to ensure that the overall impacts do not result in greater politicisation of the education sector (ibid.).

As far as this synthesis is concerned, it is worth highlighting that Myanmar’s decentralisation process is yet to be fully negotiated as part of its peace process. Within the broader political discourse of ‘democratising’ and strengthening stakeholder participation at the sub-national level, initial efforts have been taken to begin this work in the education sector. Specifically, the focus of activity to date has been on capacity building and systems strengthening at the subnational level. With the stated intention of eventually devolving greater control and authority to the subnational level, the government has ‘upgraded’ the status of state/regional education offices, increased the number of staff allocated to these offices, and provided training on basic educational management to state/regional officers, township education officers, and head teachers. Overall, the fragmentation of social service provision (based on more autonomy granted to ethnic regions and groups) is seen by the state as a threat to national unity. Also, for the government, educational provision under the auspices of the state is deemed critical to the notion of a unitary, federalist system of power sharing. What is occurring, is an interesting pull towards recentralising control over a system that has become fragmented along identity-lines (by religion and ethnicity) alongside discourses, at least in current reform efforts to then decentralise control of education back to regions, states, townships and schools (Higgins et al. 2016).

By contrast, Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda have progressed significantly in decentralising the education sector, but with mixed success. On a positive note, decentralisation has reportedly increased representation in all three countries. To give a few examples: Pakistan’s school councils widened participation to marginalised members of the community to participate in school governance or introduced a school specific budget approach (though level of inclusiveness and participation remain questionable). South Africa’s first White Paper on Education and Training (1995) introduced the concept of participative management and proposed that state involvement in school governance be minimal for legal accountability purposes. Lastly, in Uganda district education officers stated that, decentralization has increased local political representation in central government. On a negative note, in all three countries several challenges remain, such as:

- Politicisation of the decentralisation process (e.g. in Uganda and Pakistan).
- Quality of learning remains low (Pakistan, South African and Uganda).
- Over decentralisation has led to lack of capacities (South Africa, Pakistan and Uganda).

7. That the way in which education is governed can also reproduce inequities thereby aggravating pressures for conflict and perpetuate a political economy that does not support sustainable peace and development was (among others) also found in the case of Kenya. For the Kenya case study see: Smith, A., Marks, C., Valiente, O., Scandurra, R., Novelli, M. (Forthcoming), Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Kenya, Research Report Prepared for UNICEF Eastern and Southern Regional Office (ESARO),
It is also worth highlighting that Uganda's decentralization process in education has also been critiqued for reinforcing parallel administrative structures. Alongside locally elected leaders, administrators are appointed from the 'centre' and exert more power than locally elected leaders. In short, the leeway given to the district management of the education system in order to respond to local educational priorities and needs largely depend on the approval of the central government. This has led to a notion of what Namukasa & Buye (2007) termed as “centralised decentralization”, in that local decision-making processes (also in education) are not fully autonomous or detached from the central government. In addition, heavy and costly bureaucratic structures are detrimental to educational infrastructures and the quality of education.

### Table 10: Decentralisation process and effects on peacebuilding through education

**Note:** based on data and literature sources summarized in Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key dynamics:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key dynamics:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key dynamics:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key dynamics:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Process in early stages</td>
<td>• Pakistan has undergone two phases of devolution reforms: The Local Government Systems (2001-2008), transferred powers from the Federal to the district level, bypassing provincial level. Second phase of devolution began with the passage of the 18th Amendment of the Constitution by the National Parliament in 2010. Devolution of powers to the district level seems to have had some positive impacts on inequalities (in terms of slightly improving access, quality and outcomes)</td>
<td>• The process of educational decentralisation in post-apartheid SA comprised two shifts with separate rationales: The first aimed at redrawing the map of governance. The second shift is concerned with an education system predicated on grossly unequal and fragmented development. The first rationale argued for educational decentralisation as it allowed for greater control of schooling to those who had to pay, to enhance efficiency, effectiveness and quality. The second rationale was one of democratisation, participation and liberation.</td>
<td>• Uganda’s devolution process was praised as one of the most far-reaching local government reform programs in the developing world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Balance between central and local control not decided</td>
<td>• Devolution has had some negative impacts in terms of greater politicisation of education, e.g. in terms of interference in teacher employment, but also in terms of content of curriculum and influence of faith on education. Overall, curriculum development remained the remit of the Federal Ministry.</td>
<td>• It remains to be seen whether tighter bureaucratic control is able to mitigate against inequality and enhance integration in education via schools.</td>
<td>• On a positive note, all education-sector officials feel that, decentralisation increased local political representation in central government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government wary of decentralisation undermining central authority and ‘national unity’</td>
<td>• Despite moves to decentralisation the legacy of highly centralised governance hinders localised responses including recruitment, deployment, and training – abetted by misuse of newly gained local decision making power.</td>
<td>• The current Policy on Districts recognises that district offices have been unable to fulfill their core functions due to overcrowding of districts, unclear lines of accountability, a lack of delegated authority for planning and uneven post-provisioning.</td>
<td>• Critics point out that even though Uganda seems to have exceeded expectations in the decentralisation process, it is among the worst performing countries when it comes to accountability and service delivery in education,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Degree of autonomy afforded by decentralisation very important to minorities in terms of extent to which their language, identity is recognised through education</td>
<td>• Districts recognise that their core functions include educational planning and uneven post-provisioning.</td>
<td>• While decentralization increased representation in the education sector it led to further politicisation; uneven implementation of policies (e.g. teacher education remains under central control), and corruption.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 10 implicitly indicates, devolution of the education sector affects the wider peacebuilding processes of a country in several ways. Given that the lack of representation was clearly one conflict driver (out of many) in all of our case studies, increased representation in decision-making processes is expected to positively impact a country’s shift from conflict to peacebuilding and development. As shown in some of our cases, devolution does not necessarily lead to context-specific approaches that are needed in regions affected by conflict or natural disasters. Hence, there is a need for greater consideration of regional differences. Moreover, decentralisation can be both a means towards greater agency from the grassroots level, while being at the same time misused as a tool that reinforces processes of politicisation or neo-patrimonial power structures in the education sector. Such weaknesses are not a direct threat to the peacebuilding process in itself, but they can still impede processes of social transformation in the long run. Therefore, more research and data is needed on whether and how there is a causal relationship between decentralization (and the type and structure thereof) and equity within a society. Questions about what new mechanisms could be put in place to ensure that decentralisation in education does de-facto lead to greater representation and redistribution should be discussed among a wide range of actors.

**Peacebuilding and Education Governance**

In broad terms, we argue that the political-economy context of a country determines the extent to which peacebuilding plays a role in education and vice versa. Education governance is therefore a reflection of these politically and economically driven dynamics and processes. Our case studies help to better illustrate this point. In Myanmar, for example, it has been suggested that one reason the peacebuilding agenda has not been pressed more strongly in education reforms was a concern that it could politicise the process even more. Among key actors involved in the CESR, peacebuilding was perceived as a likely side effect from efforts to improve service delivery in education. In interviews with a wide range of experts, peacebuilding in education was frequently described as being ‘everywhere and nowhere’. Thus, while peacebuilding is implicitly part of a broader discourse on equity and redistribution, it is not explicitly perceived as a tool towards social transformation in education sector reforms. Besides, lack of coherence and a clear conceptual framework amongst the multitude of actors and sectors have undermined a comprehensive and strategic vision of change. The same applies to teacher education initiatives which are operating within a highly politicised and challenging context which determines what is feasible (Higgins et al. 2016).

Even though Pakistan’s ESP refers to social cohesion to varying degrees, its implementation and the extent to which it is politically articulated (implicitly and explicitly) depends largely on the region and its political context.

For instance, Balochistan’s ESP makes no explicit reference to the term social cohesion, but acknowledges in a short paragraph inclusive education (p. 68) as well as ethnic diversity, inequities of wealth and gender gaps and notes that intolerant attitudes can provoke violence. Sindh’s ESP, on the other hand, includes social cohesion as a cross-cutting theme and outlines specific objectives, strategies, targets and activities (e.g.
for curriculum and textbooks to address social cohesion), but has been critiqued for being ‘over-ambitious’. In Punjab reference is made to peace and tolerance, but it does not specify how these values are going to be put into practice or achieved through education. Overall, there seem to be tensions, at times even disjunctions, between the agendas and priorities held by actors at different levels of the education system, which undermine the potential of education to be truly transformative. Over the last fifteen years, Pakistan has a series of education policy formulations mostly driven by international development agendas and responses to EFA and MDGs targets, with only an implicit focus on social cohesion and consequently also peacebuilding. The national and international agendas have not always converged and where this has been the case, policy implementation has lagged behind and strong resistance from national actors has been counterproductive (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming).

In South Africa policies to foster processes of social transformation through education are in place, but not properly or only poorly implemented. Some go even as far as to argue that policy overload led to fragmentation, incoherence and lack of co-ordination. What is more, even though education policy has attempted to address disadvantages in education (and many recognise this as important progress), the overlap of persisting class, race, and racially divided housing undermines the efficacy of these policies (FHI 360 2015c, p.34). Also policies, including incentives for teachers, have sought to rationalise the deployment and recruitment of teachers since 1994 to make the system more equitable by addressing mismatches in rural to urban, racial, economic background, language access and gender distributions. So far success has been limited by imbalanced structures inherited from apartheid, market forces, teacher resistance and inconsistencies caused by decentralisation (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming).

Despite positive commitments in Uganda, the potential of education for peacebuilding is undermined by slow and weak policy implementation in areas such as, teacher training capacity, education infrastructure, social and psychological support for both teachers and students, and livelihoods education for youth. Moreover, ‘peace’ as a cross-cutting theme in the curricula is more about conflict prevention as opposed to grappling with past conflicts and persisting grievances. Generally, there is a challenge in formulating peacebuilding policies which, are both inclusive at national level and also appropriate to address regional conflicts. This also affects the education sector. As far as teachers are concerned, structural factors relating to ministerial authority, decentralised control and levels of institutional autonomy impact on the voices represented in teacher education policy and practice, affecting the manner in which policy is implemented (or not) and the extent to which diversity is recognised in reality in the teacher education curriculum and, subsequently, in teachers’ practice in schools. Policy emphasis on literacy, numeracy and vocational skills (and reliance on knowledge focused examinations) leaves peacebuilding (including teacher education) heavily reliant on donor funding. There is official commitment to “peace education” in teacher education but there is a lack of clarity of definition, initiatives are seen in isolation, are imperfectly understood in the context of wider peacebuilding objectives or are interpreted to suit existing practice. Finally, teacher education is low on the education priority list and has not been prioritised within different levels of teacher education (ECD, primary, secondary, BTWET, pre-service / in-service). Reliance on public/private funding for trainee teachers also favours those from wealthier backgrounds at the expense of more equal access (Datzberger et al. 2015).
In summary, even though all four countries face their own context-specific peacebuilding challenges through education governance, what they have in common is a lack of coherence and poor implementation practices. This reinforces the notion of peacebuilding being ‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere’ (not only in the case of Myanmar), thereby blurring the lines between an explicit development agenda (in terms of redistribution) and more implicit efforts towards social transformation, that include clearer goals and measurable targets for specific changes in terms of equity, social cohesion and reconciliation.
4. Addressing Inequalities in Education

Education Inequality and Peacebuilding

The literature review on the integration of peacebuilding in education, conducted prior to this study (see: Smith & Ellison 2016), highlights that unequal access to education between groups is related to an increased chance of civil war in cases where populations value education as a means of social mobility and economic opportunity (Stewart 2008). While it is not possible to determine the exact causality, i.e. that education inequality between groups is the de-facto cause of violent conflict, there is some evidence from the literature that suggests possible avenues by which education inequalities may directly or indirectly lead to conflict (FHI 360 2015). This synthesis report builds on the hypothesis that conflict or political instability is generated out of grievances8 based on ‘horizontal inequalities’ (HI’s) between cultural groups (see for instance: Stewart 2008; Gurr 1993; Barrows 1976). In short, it is argued that the likelihood of a civil war increases, the higher the inequality in education (Stewart 2008). What is more, education inequality not only fosters indirect and structural forms of violence (e.g. socially and economically inefficient persistence of inequality), but can also lead to inter-generational power imbalances (c.f. Rutaremwa & Bemanzi 2013). Researchers have also examined inequalities in access to education in relation to peacebuilding and gender. For example Kazianga et al. (2013) assessed the effects of a girl-friendly school in conflict-affected Burkina Faso and arrived at the conclusion that after 2.5 years, investment in infrastructure and basic facilities increased girls enrolment to up to 5 per cent. Similarly Burde & Linden (2013), found that community-based schooling in Afghanistan proved successful in increasing access to education for girls. Evidence also reveals better indicators of gender equality from Alternative Learning Programmes (ALP) in conflict-affected environments, particularly in relation to young mothers who appreciate the flexibility of ALP and the proximity of classes to their homes (Save the Children 2012). In the case of Uganda, ALPs or non-formal education programmes also proved to be the most beneficial to female learners (Datzberger et al. 2015, pp. 47-50).

The implications of inequalities in education and how they relate to peacebuilding are multifaceted and affect several issues of redistribution such as: access to education, resource allocation, actual and perceived benefits to different groups in terms of education outcomes (Smith & Ellison 2016). While these issues may not pose an immediate threat towards peace, they may hinder processes of sustainable peacebuilding, social transformation and cohesion in the longer term.

Against this backdrop, we review the interplay of inequality in education and peacebuilding across the four countries in three ways. First, we outline data on access to education, resources, outcomes and challenges towards educational attainment. Secondly, we pay attention to education infrastructure and how this impedes or enhances equality in the peacebuilding process of the four countries. Third, ‘low’ versus ‘high’ quality education and privatisation is discussed in relation to social transformation and equal opportunity.

8. For a detailed discussion on the ‘greed and grievance’ debate in peacebuilding processes see: Keen 2012.
Table 11: Enrolment and Drop-out rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment Primary 2013*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment Secondary 2013 **</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop-out Rates (primary) 2013</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition
** Ibid.

As already noted in the section “Global Trends and Country Contexts” of this report, all four countries have made some progress towards the EFA and the former MDG (Millennium Development Goal) agenda. These positive achievements notwithstanding, all countries face severe challenges in regard to high dropout rates, particularly in Uganda. In the following we briefly elaborate on each case.

In Myanmar some important steps have been taken since 2011 to address inequalities in the form of scholarships, school grants, raise in teacher salaries, and implications of move from central to local control of teacher policies due to lack of support for teachers in rural areas. There are also serious efforts underway to make education truly free and relieve parents from all recurring costs. However, there are concerns about these intentions, due to politicisation of this process. There is a perception by the different ethnic groups that the international community is facilitating the expansion of problematic state education into these autonomous often conflict-affected areas. Other concerns include sustainability and whether the newly-elected government can continue to deliver in the future (Higgins et al. 2016, p. 80).

Pakistan’s progress has been severely lagging in achieving MDG Goal 2 (UPE). In particular the completion rate has declined rapidly, implying that more than a quarter of the students enrolled in primary schools do not complete their education (Alif Ailaan 2014). Net primary enrolment ratio in Pakistan was 42% in 2001 which rose consistently to 56% in 2006-07, but halted at this ratio during 2011-12, implying that, initiatives undertaken to address UPE gradually lost their momentum. Among others, the following factors contribute to low educational attainment: insufficient education services (especially in rural and conflict-affected areas), severe lack of infrastructure, lack of political commitment and good governance as well as damage to school buildings and closure due to militancy and conflict in FATAs (Federal Administrative Tribal Areas) (Durrani et al. 2016, forthcoming pp. 20-31).

South Africa is the only country in our study that is currently on track to achieve the EFA agenda on access to primary education (former MDG 2). Gross enrolment rate in primary education (Grades 1-7) is 98% and in secondary (Grades 8-12) the figure is 85% with gender parity. However, around 15% of the learners do not complete Grade
9 as many learners repeat grades and drop out at age 15. Data shows that out of 100 pupils that start grade one, 50 will drop-out before grade 12 (most of which happens in grade 10 and 11), 40 will pass the NSC exam and 12 will qualify for university (Spaull 2013). This trend suggests the need for targeted interventions in policy and planning in the years when drop-out rates are greatest across country contexts.

Moreover, there are significant differences among provinces. The likelihood of a child from a poor socio-economic background reaching matric by age 10 or 20 is 17% compared to 88% for a child from a more privileged background (SAHRC and UNICEF 2014). Distribution of qualifications with respect to social class in South Africa is deeply unequal. In addition, there seems to be a correlation between academic success and language of instruction. Learners whose home language is English are far less likely to repeat a grade than other children whose home language is different. Lastly, ‘no-fee’ schools have not reduced inequalities in education outcomes (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming pp 53-64). All of these phenomena pose impediments towards equal opportunity, social cohesion and transformation.

Recent data suggests that Uganda has made significant strides in improving equal access to education over the past two and a half decades, in particular with regards to UPE and enrolment of girls. After the launch of the universal primary school access policy in 1997, enrolment more than doubled in that it increased from 3.1 million in 1997 to 7.6 million in 2003 (ODI 2006). Recently introduced education reforms have been very gender responsive. More females than males were found to benefit from the government subsidy at higher levels of household income percentiles (Guloba et al. 2010). Despite these considerable achievements, inequalities persist, such as (FHI 360 2015b): regional inequalities, followed by ethnic inequality (defined by language spoken or self-reported ethnicity). Concretely, the conflict-affected region Karamoja displays the greatest degree of ethnic inequality, as already-low schooling levels for all groups in this region are compounded by particularly low levels among the Karamajong and related tribes. The North and West Nile regions (both are also conflict-affected) further exhibit high degrees of horizontal inequality. In all conflict-affected and northern regions infrastructure needs remain high, with pupil-classroom ratios as high as 108/1 in Karamoja, and 70/1 in North and West Nile. Moreover, USE has failed to reach the poorest students, unable to secure even minimal support from families for their schooling. With only a fraction of tuition costs covered by the USE grant, post-primary education remains beyond the reach of disadvantaged families in the North (ibid.).

Inequalities in Resources for Education

Despite a significant amount of school construction in Myanmar over the past decade, (including the implementation of multi-grade classrooms in areas where teacher shortages and/or classroom space shortages have been acute); overcrowded classrooms are still the norm. While nationally student to teacher ratios are suggested as being 34:1 (CESR 2013), this masks the disparities in class sizes that exist in rural/remote settings where up to 100 students in a single classroom may be a normal occurrence. Conversely, in remote areas class size may be very small, resulting in multiple grades being taught together with one teacher. While the government has
managed to get more students into school using existing infrastructure through such multi-grade classrooms, teachers remain poorly equipped to manage instruction in such settings. Teacher shortages in remote or conflict-affected areas as well as adequate preparation for low-resource settings remain under-addressed (Higgins et al. 2016, p. 66).

In Pakistan, school facilities differ by school type as well as location. Among public as well as private schools there is an urban-rural divide. While a greater proportion of private schools have toilets, drinking water, playground and boundary wall compared to government schools, basic facilities were more available in urban compared to rural areas across the private-public divide (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming p. 64-71). According to the WB Pakistan's national pupil-teacher ratio is currently 43:1. Strikingly, numbers differ tremendously per source and when data is further expanded to the provinces. In an article published by Pakistan's largest English newspaper (The News International 15.08.2015), it is stated that one male teacher is in average deployed for 81 students across the country in rural areas⁹. Furthermore, a greater proportion of primary schools in the public sector in rural areas are multi-grade due to the shortage of teachers (Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi 2015).

In South Africa, the minimum norms and standards for public school infrastructure became legally binding in November 2013, making it law that every school must have water, electricity, internet, working toilets, safe classrooms with a maximum of 40 learners, security and thereafter libraries, laboratories and sports facilities. Even so, former apartheid structures continue to have an impact on education infrastructure to this day. Former Model C schools are historically invested with high-quality facilities, equipment and resources. They can augment state funding with school fees, enabling many of them to add to their facilities, equipment and learning resources, and to expand their range of cultural and sporting activities. With regard to school infrastructure, pro-poor funding from the South African government has not resolved the stark differences between the small number of privileged public schools and the majority of poorer schools. This has not been helped by a very high backlog in school infrastructures. For instance, in 2015 only 17% of schools have stocked libraries, 29% had a pit as their only sanitation facilities and 4% do not have electricity. A further 81.73% have no laboratories and 59.1% had no computer rooms (DBE 2015, p.4). The Eastern Cape was named as one province that had the largest school infrastructure deficit (Department of Basic Educaiton 2015, p.4).

In Uganda, according to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics’ website¹⁰ the average size of a single grade class in Grade 1 of primary schools is 63 pupils. The average number per textbook in primary education amounts to 2.9 (reading) and 3.1 (mathematics) pupils. 90 per cent of primary schools have no access to electricity. No data is available with regards to access to potable water or, more generally, infrastructure in secondary education. The World Bank states that Uganda’s pupil teacher ratio for primary education is currently 48:1 – though numbers vary from districts to regions. For instance, in a small scale study conducted in Kampala, Altinyelken (2010) observed a teacher/pupil ratio of 1:70 at level P1 and 2. During interviews with the MoESTS, school officials and civil society actors, the following factors were identified: Curriculum reform did not go hand in hand with the development and dissemination


of instruction materials, many schools still lack access to safe water. In many schools there are no latrines for girls, food shortage, sanitary pads for girls (so that they don’t have to miss school once a month), at the regional level, in conflict-affected Karamoja, reference was made to the lack of boarding schools. If education inequalities ought to be reduced, such facilities are essential to suit the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the local population and ensure that children can go to school. The government passed a policy but it has not been implemented so far. Currently, external donors such as Irish Aid are providing some support (Datzberger et al. 2015, pp 42-50).

Moreover, all countries (in varying degrees) display shortcomings in providing access to basic facilities, which can be considered as an indirect and structural form of violence.

No exact figures are available for Myanmar and Uganda but it has been reported that for example in Uganda, yearly 30% of girls drop out of school because of the lack of a separate latrine (Interview with MoESTS). In both countries UNICEF WASH (Water Sanitation and Hygiene) programmes are either in place or in planning to improve access to safe water and sanitation in schools – though there is still much to be done. More generally, infrastructure constraints in conflict affected and/or remote areas in Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda result in overcrowded classrooms, teacher shortages and the lack of most basic facilities.

**Educational Outcomes**

Table 12 (below) shows that within all four case studies, educational outcomes are challenged by high dropout rates, low quality education, regional divides (e.g. urban-rural, conflict-affected regions or disadvantaged areas), and the emergence of a two-tier educational system in favour of wealthier societal segments.
### Table 12: Challenges to Equal Educational Attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Education Index 2013*</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Myanmar   | 0.371                 | - Almost 50% of children do not complete primary education, and where the vulnerable youth population may lack important livelihood and literacy skills, hence also participation in secondary schooling remains low.  
- 95.3% of those children who do successfully complete the last year of primary transition to lower secondary, gross enrolment rates for secondary school stand at approx. 53%.  
- Regional and socio-economic differences are more pronounced at secondary level than they are at primary. E.g. 28.2% of children from the poorest households are at secondary school, whereas 85.5% from the richest households attended secondary school  
- Regionally secondary school attendance was 74.7% in Yangon but only 30.9 per cent in Rakhine  
- Reasons for drop-out include: economic factors, perceived lack of education quality / relevance, conflict/natural disasters, and access-related issues |
| Pakistan  | 0.372                 | - Pakistan has one of the highest incidences of children excluded from education (6.2 million children at primary level who are not attending school).  
- Among 25 million children and adolescents are denied the right to education  
- Out of the 25 million, 70% have never been to school and 30% were enrolled but have dropped out.  
- Children from poorest households (57.1%) are more likely to be out of school compared to those from the richest households (10%)  
- A greater proportion of OOSC live in rural areas (57%) compared to urban locations (43%).  
- Girls (55%) constitute a greater proportion of OOSC compared to buys (45%).  
- In 2012, nationally 65% of people have completed primary school (15-24 year olds), and 44% have completed secondary school (20-29 year olds) |
| South Africa | 0.695               | - The greatest challenge in basic education toady is poor quality learning outcomes and the inequalities that exist across the basic education sector.  
- SA inherited a dual public education system in which historically advantaged schools (Model C schools) co-exist with township, rural or poor schools. Former Model C schools are well resourced, have better facilities and have better qualified teachers, can augment state funding with school fees, and thus produce better outcomes.  
- Township schools are economically deprived, rely entirely on government for funding, face restrictions in charging school fees, largely accommodate poor learners, have little or no facilities, and generally produce sub-optimal results  
- Inequalities persist in access to high quality education and higher education. |
| Uganda    | 0.479                 | - More than 662,000 children are OOSC in Uganda and in 2011 only 53% of children finished primary school.  
- The majority of Ugandans still have either no formal education or only some primary education. One in five females (20%) and 13% of males age 6 and older have never had any formal education.  
- Education inequality is the highest between subnational regions followed by ethnic inequality.  
- Compared to the rest of the country, Karamoja is the region with the greatest degree of ethnic inequality - already low schooling levels for all groups are compounded by particularly low levels among the Karamajong.  
- Males (14%) have attended but did not complete secondary education.  
- Only 4% of females and 6% of males have completed secondary or higher education  
- Inequalities persist in access to high quality education and higher education. |

*Calculated using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling (from Human Development Index).*
**Education, Equity and Peacebuilding**

Figure 4 below is indicative of the combination of access, quality and education outcomes in education which contribute to unequal opportunities that may have a detrimental impact on peacebuilding processes. However, there is a significant gap in research that demonstrates how these and other factors may be related to the occurrence of violent conflict, either as a cause or consequence. However, it does suggest that an understanding of the multiple factors that contribute to inequalities (access, quality and education outcomes) is important for policy makers when assessing how education can contribute to peacebuilding processes.

**Figure 4: Education, Equity and Peacebuilding.**

Data retrieved from: World Bank, Human Development Report 2015

**Quality**

- **Pupil-Teacher Ratio Primary**
  - Myanmar (n/a), Pakistan 43:1
  - South Africa 32:1, Uganda 46:1

- **Schools with no / basic sanitary facilities**
  - Myanmar (n/a), Pakistan (10% female schools + 6.5% other schools), South Africa (29% only a pit), Uganda (n/a)

- **Schools with no Electricity**
  - Myanmar (n/a), Pakistan (60%), South Africa (4%), Uganda (90%)

**Access**

- **Enrollment (primary):**
  - Myanmar (N/A), Pakistan (92), South Africa (101), Uganda (107)

- **Drop-out rates:**
  - Myanmar (N/A), Pakistan (37.8%), South Africa (23%), Uganda (75.2%)

**Outcomes**

- **Completion rates (primary):**
  - Myanmar (N/A), Pakistan (73%), South Africa (N/A), Uganda (54%)

- **Education Index:***
  - Myanmar (0.371), Pakistan (0.372), South Africa (0.695), Uganda (0.479)

*Calculated using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling (from Human Development Index).
From a peacebuilding perspective the issue of equity is extremely important for education policymakers for a number of reasons:

- The distinction between equality and equity is often poorly understood, but of crucial importance for peacebuilding since it determines whether education policies (e.g. to address access, resources or outcomes) are applied equally to all regions and populations (thereby replicating existing inequalities), or are applied in an equitable way (that is in a differential and targeted way, to redress historical inequalities).
- The case studies also suggest that there are political economy reasons why the implementation of equitable education policies is resisted, or more difficult to implement because they are perceived to favour one section of the population or region more than others. However, without such targeting there is replication of inequality rather than redistribution which suggests that intensive work at political level is necessary if the importance of equity for peacebuilding is to be promoted.
- From a monitoring point of view there are a number of points that arise from the case studies. Firstly, the monitoring of education inequalities at the sub-national and sub-group levels is extremely important from a peacebuilding perspective. Secondly, it is also important that inequalities are monitored in terms of access (enrolments and retention), resources (pupil / teacher ratio and infrastructure) and outcomes (completion, attainment and employment).
- However, building on the previous point, there are two main shortcomings within current approaches that are vital for the link between equity and peacebuilding. One is that rarely is education data is collected and disaggregated by religious, cultural or ethnic background (yet it is these identities that are often mobilised around conflict). The reason for not collecting this data is often cited as concerns about causing intergroup tension and sometimes district or region are used as proxies for these identities. A second shortcoming is that education policies do not currently monitor links between education inequalities and levels of violence at sub-national levels, for example, through cross referencing with other national datasets such as crime statistics and social surveys. On both these fronts, it is difficult to see how the linkages between education inequalities and education policies that support peacebuilding can be evaluated.
“Among all four countries different standards and qualities of education thwart equal opportunity within and beyond education thereby intensifying structural forms of violence and unequal opportunities. Wealth is significant in determining learning levels, and consequently future opportunities. In the past decade, there has been the emergence of low-fee private schools (or programmes) in developing and post-conflict countries. This trend has generated a highly polarised debate in the literature around the right to education alongside acknowledged shortfalls in education quality (Srivastava 2013). Proponents of the system argue, that low-fee private schools are more efficient and of better quality, calling for the state’s retreat in education provision (The Economist 1-7. 8. 2015, pp. 17-20). Critics counter-argue that the right to education confers the ultimate responsibility for education for all on the state, with the imperative to increase access and quality (Srivastava 2015; Srivastava 2013). Research on the quality of low fee-private schools has shown that one of the ways to keep costs at a minimum level is to hire unqualified, short-term contract teachers (ibid.). For instance, in Myanmar the number of supplementary or shadow education providers in the primary and secondary sector has grown tremendously in recent decades. In rural Pakistan across the country, rich children in government schools learn more than poor children in private schools (Alcott & Rose 2015). In Uganda, the distinction between private and public schools is not as clear-cut as it appears in Western countries. In the main, the GoU distinguishes between “government funded schools” and “government grant aided school” (MoESTS Uganda 2008). The latter refers to schools not funded by the government but which receive statutory grants in the form of aid from the GoU and are jointly managed by a foundation body and the GoU. This led to a legal structure in the educational system in which public schools are heavily subsidised by foundation bodies. Consequently, the quality and services provided by a public or private school in Uganda depend heavily on the funds, management and engagement by their respective foundation body but also parents and community. Concerning South Africa, there is much debate about the role of the sector not just its size or growth but about the future shape of schooling. What is envisaged by some is a system of provision in which the logic of school choice is extended to encompass free movement of learners from public to independent schools (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming). As Table 12 below illustrates, questions about new, emerging forms of education governance and the role private actors arise in all four countries.

Privatisation and “Low” versus “High” Quality Education
Among all four countries different standards and qualities of education thwart equal opportunity within and beyond education thereby intensifying structural forms of violence and unequal opportunities. Wealth is significant in determining learning levels, and consequently future opportunities. In the past decade, there has been the emergence of low-fee private schools (or programmes) in developing and post-conflict countries. This trend has generated a highly polarised debate in the literature around the right to education alongside acknowledged shortfalls in education quality (Srivastava 2013). Proponents of the system argue, that low-fee private schools are more efficient and of better quality, calling for the state’s retreat in education provision (The Economist 1-7. 8. 2015, pp. 17-20). Critics counter-argue that the right to education confers the ultimate responsibility for education for all on the state, with the imperative to increase access and quality (Srivastava 2015; Srivastava 2013). Research on the quality of low fee-private schools has shown that one of the ways to keep costs at a minimum level is to hire unqualified, short-term contract teachers (ibid.). For instance, in Myanmar the number of supplementary or shadow education providers in the primary and secondary sector has grown tremendously in recent decades. In rural Pakistan across the country, rich children in government schools learn more than poor children in private schools (Alcott & Rose 2015). In Uganda, the distinction between private and public schools is not as clear-cut as it appears in Western countries. In the main, the GoU distinguishes between “government funded schools” and “government grant aided school” (MoESTS Uganda 2008). The latter refers to schools not funded by the government but which receive statutory grants in the form of aid from the GoU and are jointly managed by a foundation body and the GoU. This led to a legal structure in the educational system in which public schools are heavily subsidised by foundation bodies. Consequently, the quality and services provided by a public or private school in Uganda depend heavily on the funds, management and engagement by their respective foundation body but also parents and community. Concerning South Africa, there is much debate about the role of the sector not just its size or growth but about the future shape of schooling. What is envisaged by some is a system of provision in which the logic of school choice is extended to encompass free movement of learners from public to independent schools (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming). As Table 12 below illustrates, questions about new, emerging forms of education governance and the role private actors arise in all four countries.
### Table 13: Low versus high Quality Education and Privatisation

*Note: based on data and literature sources summarized in: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of ‘low’ and ‘high’ quality education</th>
<th>% of Private Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Myanmar</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Private schooling is not officially sanctioned by the state, but the number of supplementary or shadow education providers in the primary and secondary sector has grown in recent decades.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rise in private education as a response to low standards in public education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Attending private tutoring, has become commonplace amongst the middle class, particularly in urban centres.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anecdotally, the underpayment for teachers’ wages through the state payroll, has led many teachers to offering up their services to teach these classes, often at the expense of their regular waged employment in state schools.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recognising the importance of these extra education classes to children’s academic success, a number of NGOs and university students have established and operated low or no-cost schools for children from poor backgrounds. In practice, however, under/unqualified people and large class sizes, among others, challenge the purposes for which they were set up.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Pakistan**                                          |                      |
| • PPP (Private-Public-Partnership) models claim to expand access to education and reach children from disadvantaged backgrounds through channelling funds for education to low-cost private schooling. |                      |
| • Independent schooling sector includes low-fee paying faith-based or religious schools or those in remote areas. |                      |
| • Harmonised policy framework for PPP is lacking, remains questionable how PPP contributes to equity. |                      |
| • Since 2006 private schools are expanding rapidly especially in rural areas. Enrolment in private schools among the poorest households in 2014 was 19% compared to 53% in the richest households |                      |
| • Difference between low-cost and expensive private school. Private schools are extremely diverse in terms of fees structures, language of instruction. |                      |
| • The education system in Pakistan has three parallel strands, government schools, private schools and the Madrassa system. The largely insular nature of the three parallel strands, raise major questions for equity in access. |                      |
| • NEP outlines the expansion of the private sector as a policy strategy. |                      |
| • Tendency of government system leaning towards the private sector is prevalent in the provincial education sector plans. |                      |
| • Difficult to estimate the size of the private education sector, as not all private schools register with the Education Department. |                      |
| • 37% are enrolled in the private sector, 36% enrolled at primary, 39% at middle and 41% at secondary level in private institutions |                      |

| **South Africa**                                      |                      |
| • While there is much heat to the debate about the independent (private) school sector in South Africa, it caters to no more than about 4-5% of all SA learners |                      |
| • According to School Realities 2013, since the collapse of apartheid, the number of independent (private) schools increased from 550 to 1584 schools in SA. |                      |
| • Traditional high-fee independent schools are a minority in the sector (with estimated 15% of schools charging fees of more than R50000 per annum). |                      |
| • Semi-private ‘Model C’ schools: There are non-fee and fee-paying public schools. The latter usually providing a better quality of schooling. From 1991 onwards white schools were required to select one of four models, ‘Model C’ was a semi-private structure with decreased funding from the state and increased autonomy for schools. By 1993 almost 96% of white public schools became model C schools. Today, schools in Q1-Q3 (lower quality) are non-fee schools, while schools in Q4-5 (high quality / standard) are fee-paying schools. |                      |
| • 4-5% enrolled in private schools |                      |

| **Uganda**                                            |                      |
| • Distinction between private and public is not clear cut. Private schools can still receive a government-aided grant through PPPs (Public Private Partnerships), difference between low-cost and expensive private school, PPP claims to expand access to education and reach children from disadvantaged backgrounds through funding to low-cost private schooling |                      |
| • Strong PPP in the provision of education in the secondary sub-sector |                       |
| • Quality of school depends largely on its foundation body. Generally private schools were depicted as being better. |                       |
| • Due to weak state capacities, misappropriation of funds and lack of public resources in education, non-state and private actors play increasingly a greater role within the education sector. |                       |
| • 64.09% of all USEs are private or PPP schools 32.5% off all UPEs are private |                     |
In Pakistan as well as in Uganda a range of actors have voiced concerns that the private sector is creating a two-tier society. Although in the case of South Africa private schools are not the main reason for social segregation, access to ‘low’ and ‘high’ quality public education creates unequal opportunities. All public ordinary schools are categorised into five groups, called quintiles, largely for purposes of the allocation of financial resources. Quintile one (Q1) is the poorest quintile while quintile five (Q5) is the least poor. The National Planning Commission report stated that ‘Learners within the bottom 4 quintile schools generally receive a significantly poorer quality education relative to those in the highest quintile schools (2011, p. 24). Some studies further suggest, that the gap between Q3 students and other students widen at higher grades and success and failure compound with each school year (Spaull 2013). Despite some improvements in the past, the legacy of apartheid still impacts the landscape of quality education. For example, in the Eastern Cape schools from previous Bantustans struggle the most, while in the Western Cape the increase in test scores occurred mainly in previously advantaged schools and echoed what happened during colonialism and apartheid in urban centres.

In summary, there are various reasons why large societal segments are deprived of the right to high quality education, including: lack of financial means to send children to better schools; poor quality in low-cost private schools, despite the hope to pay for better services; and location (e.g. rural, remote areas or as in the case of South Africa townships). Unequal access to high quality education may not pose an immediate threat to the peacebuilding process of a specific country, but it has an impact on social cohesion and sustainable development in the longer term in that it lays the foundation for societal grievances. From a peacebuilding context, the question arises to what extent we should be concerned about the impact of (semi-)privatisation of education, or low-quality private education:

• Firstly, there are arguments from both sides about whether private education increases or reduces inequalities. This is normally framed in terms of the gaps between rich and poor, but such gaps may also map on to identity differences between groups and therefore also have added implications for social cohesion.
• Secondly, the move towards non-state providers of education also raises questions about the type of education that children receive, particularly where the private providers are religious institutions that may be more concerned to educate children into a particular faith to the detriment of education about broader diversity within the society (which may have implications for social cohesion).
• Thirdly, there are arguments that the financial motivation for some providers may lead to a narrow concentration on academic results to the detriment to broader social development which is important from a peacebuilding perspective. All three of these arguments are important but there have been virtually no research studies that focus on these implied links between privatisation and peacebuilding.
Inequalities Based on Gender

Existing research literature suggests that peacebuilding can be more effective if built on an understanding of how gendered identities are constructed through societal power relations between and among women, men, girls, boys and members of sexual gender minorities (see for instance: Myrttinen et al. 2014). In terms of peacebuilding and gender equality in education, the unique political economy context of each country has to be taken into consideration in order to understand patterns of inequality. All the same, one has to acknowledge that quantitative data may not necessarily reflect the real situation on the ground in that enrolment lists based on gender are not always concomitant with actual school attendance rates.

With that said, Myanmar is notably the only country in our study, where females display longer mean years of schooling than males\textsuperscript{11}. This can be in part explained by the fact that during British Colonial rule access to education improved tremendously for young girls (Ikeya 2008). Overall, however, increased violence and oppression of the past decade worsened the status of women in the country (Social Watch 2010). Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda have made significant progress towards gender parity, but challenges remain. In Pakistan gender hierarchies are still reinforced through deeply rooted societal and political orders (Durrani 2008). In both Pakistan and Uganda reasons for high school drop-out rates among females vary from: early pregnancy, early marriage, hidden costs of school, family responsibilities or lack of interest. According to an interview with the MoESTS (April 2015), boys are at equal risk to drop out of schools as girls in Uganda. Even though South Africa almost reached gender parity in school enrolment, gender-based violence is one big factor that militates against gender equality in education.

Table 14: Gender Inequalities in Education

Note: based on data and literature sources summarised in: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean years of schooling in years (2014)</th>
<th>Political-Economy Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Myanmar</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: 3.8</td>
<td>Gender-based forms of inequity are notably absent from mention in the reform process, or tend to solely focus on quantitative parity in enrolments and completion. This is not to imply, however, that there are not gendered forms of bias, discrimination and (structural and indirect) violence that the education system and structures have imposed on learners and communities for decades, and are not appropriately considered and rectified in current reform efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female: 4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>Although the Constitution of Pakistan grants equal rights to men and women, with the exception that a woman is barred from becoming the head of state, in practice, profound gender inequalities exist with respect to human development and access to services, economic opportunities, and political participation and decision-making. Since the early 90s, achieving UPE included a particular focus on girls’ schooling. While girls may have access to schooling, the teaching and learning environment and resources, may still exclude girls from recognition and promote gendered and masculinised identities and norms that foster hierarchical social relations and propensity towards violence. Durrani (2008) found strong parallels between the gendered curriculum messages and students’ identifications in ways that supported internal and external violence. She contends that ‘education is a means of maintaining, reproducing and reinforcing the gender hierarchies that characterise Pakistan.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: 6.2</td>
<td>Since 2010 teacher education is no longer gender segregated – but equality of access is not necessarily equality of representation. Overall, government funding on education is tilted in favour of males and there are more boys’ schools compared to girls’ due to a gender-segregated schooling system. The number of female teachers in public sector is also smaller compared to male teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female: 3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>Policies have led to gender parity in enrolment and girls outnumber boys in upper secondary schools and universities. However, the quality of educational experience remains poor for most learners and schools continue to be the context for gender inequalities. Need for improvement in changing behaviour within educational institutions, and teacher trainings on integration and equality. Provisions for girls to remain in school, and to achieve in examinations are in place in policy and law but men continue to dominate managerial positions despite gender parity at professional and technical levels. This bias is most marked in rural areas. Male and female learners experience school violence differently. Female learners (7.6%) were found to experience this violation at rates substantially higher than their male counterparts (1.4%). A UNICEF study (Molestsane 2010, p. 31) concludes that gender-based violence is ‘one big factor that militates against gender equality in society in general and in education in particular.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: 10.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female: 9.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uganda</strong></td>
<td>Several programmes and initiatives are presently in place (by the GoU, aid agencies and CSOs) to promote positive models and norms of femininity and masculinity through education. This is also reflected in the language of the revised ESSP. One of the most recent efforts by the MoESTS includes a Teacher Handbook on Gender, Conflict and Peacebuilding, published in July 2015. It is still too early to assess how recent efforts take root in the longer haul. There are still some gender imbalances in school completion and attendance. Latest data from UBOS (2012) reports that 20% females and 13% males age 6 and older have never had any formal education. There is almost gender parity in provision for primary education – though with regional imbalances. Karamoja has the highest proportion of females (79.8%) and males (64.8%) with no education. Girls and boys are at equal risk of dropping out of school. Non-formal education and flexible learning programmes have proven to be most beneficial for the girl child. Gender policies are succeeding in re-dressing the imbalance in teacher recruitment at primary level but not at higher levels of the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: 6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female: 4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, all four countries experience different levels of gender equality revolving around issues of femininity as well as masculinity, be it reinforced through religious beliefs or local/ethnic cultures (as it is for instance the case in Pakistan), or socio-historical rooted disparities (e.g. Uganda, South Africa or Myanmar). What they have in common, however, is that gender-responsive approaches to peacebuilding have traditionally been based on the assumption that women face greater levels of vulnerability and marginalization. In practice, little attention is paid to the multiple conflict roles and experiences of men and women as both survivors and perpetrators of violence, or as change agents, and how their gender intersects with other sociocultural identities (see also UNICEF and Learning for Peace 2016, p. 3). For instance, interviews with the MoESTS in Uganda revealed that boys are currently at higher risk of dropping out of school than girls (Datzberger et al. 2015, p. 58). Data collected for all four cases also suggests that gender-based violence in schools affects girls to a greater extent than boys. Overall, the interplay of gender, education and peacebuilding requires approaches that go far beyond providing equal access to educational services. In this regard, educational institutions and programmes have to be regarded as unique platforms that develop and re-negotiate identities and reflect upon deeply seated cultural norms. In other words, schools are an essential entry point to enable boys and girls to contribute equally and positively to peacebuilding and social transformation.
5. Education Policies Relevant to Social Cohesion

As mentioned earlier, higher income inequality has been associated with lower social cohesion, and more equitable societies tend to have greater social and political trust and less violence and crime (Pickett & Wilkinson 2010). Thus, educational equality has been linked with greater social cohesion across a number of measures, with educational inequality positively correlated with violent crime and political unrest and negatively correlated with political and civil liberties (Green et al. 2006). Improving social cohesion therefore requires addressing structural, inter-personal, and inter-group domains (also within the education sector). Consequently, research on inequalities, conflict and education cannot be detached from an analysis of educational segregation based on ethnicity, religion, geographical location or language. What is more, education can be both, a powerful means for managing diversity or to fuel tensions and inequalities based on group allegiances (Bush & Saltarelli 2000). In addition, one must also take into account the broader context of whether educational institutions and programmes are perceived to be reinforcing assimilation, separate or shared development (Smith 2014). Education therefore plays an implicit and explicit peacebuilding role in creating a sense of national identity alongside either acceptance or ignorance of cultural, ethnic or religious diversity (McCandless & Smith 2011; Davies 2004). In a more narrow perspective, literature usually focuses on the following education policy areas: segregated schooling, intergroup contact programmes, peace education and language of instruction policies. Evidence on the impact of these approaches on social cohesion tends to be highly context specific and there is a general critique that social cohesion programmes may have little impact if they focus on interpersonal relations when the underlying causes of conflict are institutional and systemic (Smith & Ellison 2016).

This particular section identifies some commonalities while elaborating on the context-specific nature of social cohesion and education in each peacebuilding context. There is a focus on different forms of segregation in education, policies that are in place that either hinder or strengthen vertical and horizontal forms of social cohesion, and challenges that all four countries face. There are many different ways to measure social cohesion using indicators related to trust, inclusion, participation or solidarity (Jensen, 2010). This section concentrates on four education policy areas in each of the case studies that could be seen as contributing to social cohesion. Firstly, it can be argued that language of instruction policies have an influence on social cohesion because they often determine whether children are educated together in the same school or classroom and whether there is recognition of their right to education in their mother tongue. Secondly, the extent to which curriculum promotes national unity, and whether this is done in a way that also acknowledges diversity, may be reflected in approaches to civic and citizenship education and the way in which ethnic, religious and cultural diversity is recognised as part of teaching and learning. Thirdly, depending on the nature of non-formal education, it may provide opportunities for the interaction and engagement of diverse communities in a way that contributes to social cohesion, or it may simply reinforce separation. Fourthly, there are legal obligations and increasing demands on education authorities to make appropriate education provision
for refugees and displaced persons. Such policies and how they are implemented carry broader messages about the inclusion and integration of newcomers that have implications for social cohesion within each of the societies. Whilst it should be possible to develop a more comprehensive list of education policy areas that affect social cohesion, the fieldwork provided an opportunity to explore the relevance of these four areas in each of the country contexts.

Language of Instruction Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Spoken Languages</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Approx. 71</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Approx. 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Languages</td>
<td>Burmese (+ 7 recognised local languages)</td>
<td>Urdu and English*</td>
<td>11 (Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Northern Sotho, Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu)</td>
<td>English and Swahili (+ 9 vernacular local languages)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language of Instruction in Schools</td>
<td>Burmese/Myanmar</td>
<td>Urdu in public schools, English in private schools</td>
<td>“Language-in-Education Policy 1997” (LiEP) intends to unpack multilingualism enshrined in the Constitution at the school level.</td>
<td>FP1-P3 pupils are taught in one (out of 7 recognised) local languages. P4 transition year to English, English in private schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The government announced in 2015 to remove English and make Urdu the main official language, no decision has been ruled at the time of writing.

Whereas in Pakistan and Uganda language of instruction policies in schools are not a driver of conflict in schools, in both countries children are still believed to be disadvantaged if their first medium of instruction is not English and their respective language of instruction policies are highly debated. Similar patterns can be observed in South Africa. Notwithstanding progressive policies that acknowledge the multilingual nature of the country, English remains predominantly the main medium of instruction in schools. In Myanmar, on the other hand, language of instruction policies led to student protests in 2014. The lack of educational resources and opportunities in the local language is perceived as a frustration and unfair treatment of those who speak minority languages, while conversely the reinforcement of local languages through various forms of education can support lessening such frustrations.

With regards to Uganda, the revised education sector plan (2007-2015) endorses the use of 7 local languages as the language of instruction in years P.1 to P.3 with P.4 as a transition year to English. This is justified less on political grounds of recognising cultural and ethnic diversity, but more on its potential contribution to the quality of
education. Interviews with school and government officials, teachers, civil society actors and students repeatedly referred to one main reservation among parents and communities against this policy. That is, children are believed to be underprivileged if their first medium of instruction is not English (Datzberger et al. 2015). Similar patterns can be observed in Pakistan, where Urdu is the medium of instruction in government schools and English is the medium of instruction in elite private schools. Of the 71 other indigenous languages only Sindhi has an official role as medium of instruction in primary schools in Sindh and Pashto is used in government schools in KP Province. English is a compulsory subject from Year 1. In practice, however, it much depends on the availability of teachers. The policy on medium of instruction is a contentious issue contributing to social schism because for parents and students English is the preferred language of education with its perceived benefits as the language of the elite and the ruling class. Current policy interventions in KP to teach mathematics and science in English are driven by the objective to guarantee equity and quality but may in turn have unintended outcomes of exasperating marginalisation and constraining cultural cognition (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming).

Historically, language was always foundational to questions of education in racially segregated South Africa. The apartheid government changed the language-in-education policy that affected black students in a way that was economically and socially disadvantageous, forcing them to learn the majority of their subjects in Afrikaans and English. Language has remained a major factor in issues of social inequality as well as economic and political mobility. The post-apartheid government included in the Constitution section 29 (2), that “Everyone has the right receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonable practicable.” South Africa’s “Language-in-Education Policy 1997” (LiEP) was intended to unpack multilingualism enshrined in the Constitution at the school level. It advocates flexibility in terms of the medium of instruction; dependent on differing needs of schools and their surrounding communities (DoE 1997). In addition the policy makes a provision for learners and parents to find schools that can best suit their linguistic needs. Despite the government’s commitments, in reality most schools choose English as first additional language during foundation phase, and start using it as the language of learning and teaching in Grade 4 if not before (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming).

In Myanmar, many EAGs (Ethnic Armed Groups) want schools with teachers that are allowed to train or teach in their ethnic languages. This has led in some states (not all) to parallel systems of education by local state parties (e.g. Mon state has its own Mon national Education Committee, prioritising Mon history). Since 1962 Burmese is the main language of instruction, with occasional variances, and little space was given to the inclusion of other indigenous vernacular languages. Despite the intention to acknowledge and create space for the utilization of languages other than Burmese (and English) within the state education system by civil society and the international community, many would argue that multilingualism is far from being embraced in what has come out of the process. The lack of acknowledgement and support for mother-tongue instruction remains a grievance. The promotion of Burmese/Myanmar to the exclusion of other languages is seen by the state as a powerful tool of promoting national unity and ensuring political stability. This has led to student protests that followed passage of the Education Law in September 2014, as children’s
The promotion of national unity in schools while simultaneously respecting cultural or ethnic diversity appears to be a difficult challenge (though to varying degrees and circumstances) across all four countries.

Myanmar’s current national state curriculum remains rigid, subject/content driven, inflexible to adaptation to different contexts and backgrounds, and devoid of a developmental approach (Higgins et al. 2016). Content has pushed a singular national identity through the dominance of Bamar cultural and military history as well as the association of national with religious identity. Under the banner of developing moral character amongst the student population, Buddhist cultural courses and rituals have increased in schools since the late 1990s along with content in textbooks. By contrast, references to other religions have been entirely omitted from schoolbooks. A specific concern has been the utilization of textbooks (in particular history texts) as a mechanism of legitimating the military regime through an anti-colonial, nationalistic discourse. Teacher education reform promoting active pedagogy has emerged as a particular national priority. There is an influx of international ‘experts’ which has led to the import of western methods in inappropriate conditions causing frustration at lack of contextualisation. Agencies tend to work short term and independently, lacking a collective rationale, thus distorting priorities. There is a lack of coordination in the ministry between teacher training and curriculum development (Higgins et al. 2016).

In the wake of 9/11, Pakistan saw increased interest in its national curriculum by the international community. Before the new curriculum (2006) was introduced, textbooks ignored civic values, critical thinking, civic participation and freedom of speech. A National Curriculum Council was established in 2014 because of concerns regarding the perceived need for representation of a cohesive national identity in educational discourses and the assurance of uniform standards due to the devolution of education portfolio to provinces. Materials that would have instigated violence in previous curricula were removed, although some materials are still problematic. In addition, the multiple versions of Islam that are practiced in Pakistan are not recognised. Textbooks play a crucial role in attitudes towards India. Overall the new curriculum is still seen as a major reform to promote social cohesion through encouraging inclusive values and discouraging exclusion and discrimination. Yet power struggles over the
process limited the scope of the curriculum reform, resulting in politicisation and weak implementation. Despite financial and human resource investment, there are still political battles to be won to implement it in earnest. The teacher-training curriculum, drawing on euro-western sources, emphasises reflective practice and critical thinking without an explicit focus on peacebuilding issues relating to language of instruction, gender inequality, religious and sectarian differences and economic inequality are missing. The teacher standards framework has a technical, rational orientation unlikely to modify teacher behaviour or encourage innovation related to peacebuilding. Teacher education programmes are mainly donor sponsored. They need to target social cohesion and be integrated within the curriculum (Durrani et al. 2016, forthcoming pp. 58-64). Though various steps in that direction are now being taken, such as for instance a peacebuilding module to train teachers and officials.

In South Africa, The Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy of 2001 identified ten fundamental values: democracy, social justice and equity, equality, non-racism and non-sexism, Ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability, the rule of law, respect and reconciliation. This was supported by sixteen strategic actions to instil democratic values in young South Africans, including among others to nurture a culture of communication and participation in schools as well as making arts and culture part of the curriculum. To concretise the ideals of the Manifesto, a reference group on History and Archaeology in Education was appointed. One of the project’s key publications included a 6-volume series “Turning Points in SA History” in collaboration with the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. The aim was to develop materials which could be used in teaching South African history in the national Curriculum (grades 10-12). It won the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education 2008. Overall, the South African curriculum has responded positively to the dual (sometimes conflicting) roles of developing human capital and fostering reconciliation – yet there is a danger of being over directive thus taking away teacher independence and lacking flexibility for individual contexts. As far as teacher education is concerned, courses have moved to a mixed race and language basis. The term social cohesion is not used specifically in teacher frameworks, but practice observed had a transformative dimension in that personal issues of social justice were being addressed, if not national ones of nation building, justice and reconciliation. The government has introduced strategic efforts to improve Continuing Professional Development – a national policy framework for teacher education and development 2006, and an integrated strategic planning framework for Teacher Education and Development 2011, which have peacebuilding potential if implemented properly (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming).

Uganda’s curriculum places a strong emphasis on nation building with some recognition of the value of respect for diversity. There are references to national unity, patriotism and cultural heritage ‘with due consideration to internal relations and beneficial interdependence’, and the inculcation of a sense of service, duty and leadership for participation in civic, social and national affairs through group institutions (NCDC 2010). In light of Uganda’s history of state formation and past conflicts, it is a challenge to promote national unity while respecting cultural diversity. Peace and Security is a crosscutting theme in P1 and P2, and P3 includes ‘keeping peace in our sub-county division’. In upper primary and secondary, the peace dimension is mainly found in the Social Studies component and crosscutting themes such as Life Skills. With regards to the latter, it has to be clarified that in some contexts
the term life skills is mainly concerned with sexual and reproductive health based on agency interventions whereas in other instances it can also promote peacebuilding competencies as noted above. Notably, and this is also discussed later under the role of education in reconciliation, peacebuilding is generally regarded as a tool of conflict-prevention, or solving conflicts at individual, group and community level, rather than a means of coming to terms with past conflicts. A lack of coordination exists between government stakeholders – the ministry, curriculum body, pre-service institutions and in-service in the districts – thus impacting on commitment and implantation. Textbook selection for government schools is dictated by cost rather than quality. There is also a tension in teacher education / curriculum policy between fostering national unity and acknowledging diversity and the drivers of conflict. Modernising policies cause tension around the interplay between traditional values and liberal norms within teacher education governance (Datzberger et al. 2015).

Social Cohesion and Non-formal Education Programmes

The benefits and limitations of non-formal education (NFE) are neither new nor unknown among educationalists or development experts (Shlomo & Schmida 2009; van der Linden 2015), but there is a striking paucity of research on their implicit and explicit peacebuilding potential. In most conflict-affected countries the main objectives of non-formal education are usually to eliminate or lower illiteracy levels among the masses and enhance the EFA agenda. In doing so, there is a potential to eradicate structural forms of violence such as inequality or societal marginalisation and segregation based on educational attainment and wealth (e.g. Myanmar and Uganda). At the same time however, NFE can also be misused as a political or religious tool to radicalise young people. Given that NFE-programmes are not common in South Africa, this section refers only to findings from Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda. In doing so, it is important to clarify that we understand alternative or non-formal education as any organized educational activity outside the established formal system – whether operating separately or as an important feature of some broader activity, which is intended to serve identifiable learning clienteles and learning objectives (Coombs et al. 1973)

“The benefits and limitations of non-formal education (NFE) are neither new nor unknown among educationalists or development experts (Shlomo & Schmida 2009; van der Linden 2015), but there is a striking paucity of research on their implicit and explicit peacebuilding potential.”

12. Notably, under the PBEA and other peacebuilding interventions (such as the UNPBF, United Nations Peacebuilding Fund), there have been also types of non-formal education programming in other country contexts that are not covered in this particular report; that explicitly focused on strengthening social cohesion at the community level through the development and application of peacebuilding competencies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Types of NFE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Myanmar</strong></td>
<td>• Monastic Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethnic Minority Run Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NGO/Charity supported schools</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In view of high drop-out rates (50% of children do not complete primary education), and where the vulnerable youth population lack important livelihood and literacy skills, the fact that access to alternative education pathways is limited is a concern. There has been no NFE budget or dedicated directorate within the ministry set up to support this. Instead, provision has largely fallen on civil society, in particular NGOs and the international community. Many target poorly educational school leavers or dropouts, and aim to support these individuals entry into the labour market. These programmes often lack recognition within government and are vulnerable to funding ebbs and flows from international donors. In addition, parallel education systems are in operation (monastic and ethnic) that do not fall under the authority of the government and public education sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>• NFBE-programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Madrasa Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan has an extensive network of Non-Formal Basic Education (NFBE) institutions with an estimated enrolment of at least 2.5 million students. Graduates from non-formal schools are mainstreamed to formal schools. In addition more than 13,000 basic education community schools (BECS) are in place (total enrolment of 0.6 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uganda</strong></td>
<td>• Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic Education for Urban Poverty area (BEUPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Complementary Opportunity for Primary Education (COPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Child-centred Alternation, Non-formal Community Based Education (CHANCE); and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accelerated programmes for the conflict areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-formal education programmes in Uganda are usually put in place to enable children, youth and adults to learn and acquire knowledge in circumstances and environments which reinforce unequal access to formal education institutions. Such circumstances, according to the MoESTS may include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Remote locality with weak educational infrastructures (urban-rural divide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Parent’s attitudes towards education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Semi-nomadic lifestyles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Domestic duties carried out by children that are essential to a family’s survival and therefore conflict with school attendance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conflict-affected environments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The purpose of Table 16 is to highlight how non-formal education either enhance or pose a serious risk towards social cohesion in conflict-affected settings. In doing so, our synthesis revealed that across all countries NFE did increase access to education. At the same time the type and design of NFE programmes / institutions did affect a society (or regional community) in various ways - ranging from posing a potential threat to social cohesion, being misused by military groups, to creating a communal platform that brings together different segments of a population who would have otherwise not reconciled. At deeper look at each country will better substantiate this point.

After 9/11, in Pakistan, the gaze of international security and development agencies fell upon the country’s madrasas (madaris). Although Madrasas have a century-long tradition and history in South Asia, we opted to include it to our definition of non-formal education in that the madrasa sector runs in parallel to the state sector and follows its own curriculum. It attracts less than 5% of educational enrolments, catering to around 1.836 million students, enrolled in 13,405 Madaris (NEMIS-AEPAM, 2015). However, this figure largely underestimates the true reach of madaris as a huge number of madaris are not registered. Furthermore, children and adolescent may attend a school (private or public) in the day and a madrassah before or after the school. Deeni Madaris are playing an important role in enabling access to education to predominantly ‘poor, needy and deserving children of rural and remote areas of the country’ (MET&SHE 2013, p. 11). Some of them also teach formal education subjects such as Urdu and English or mathematics and general science in addition to religious subjects. Madrassas are usually managed by local communities and are either financed in part by the state, donors or through charity and donations. Efforts to bring this sector under some level of state control have had only little success. Generally, Madrasa education often comes under criticism in terms of the curriculum provided, that it does not prepare its graduates for the demands of contemporary society or enable them to enjoy sustainable livelihoods, for preserving the religious curriculum and for its rejection of modernity. However, some madaris also teach formal education subjects such as Urdu and English languages as well as Mathematics and General Science in addition to the religious subjects (MET&SHE, 2013). The pedagogies used by teachers such as rote learning and memorisation are seen as thwarting critical thinking and developing an open attitude towards knowledge seeking. It is yet worth noting, that in regions where a formal school exists, enrolment to Madrassa is usually around 1%. According to Durrani et al. (2016 forthcoming, pp. 71-79) links between madrassa and militancy appear largely exaggerated. An examination of the backgrounds of 79 terrorists involved in five of the worst anti-Western terror attacks revealed that all were university graduates (Fair 2009).

In Myanmar monastic schools operate in all states and regions, across 230 townships. There are around 1,400 schools registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, serving around 180,000 children. Most monastic schools offer primary education but some cover the middle and high school grades. Because no fees are charged and food is provided, these schools are able to reach some of the poorest children, including orphans and children of migrant workers. Some schools are also able to teach children to read and write in their own ethnic languages making them an attractive alternative for minority groups. Although monastic schools are important in improving access to
education, the same issues around educational quality (as also discussed earlier in our section on privatisation and low versus high quality education) in terms of class sizes, teacher qualifications/capacity and curriculum materials that exist in the state system, also manifest themselves in this sector. Some are concerned that Christian or Muslim children have to convert to Buddhism. In remote areas of the country a number of community, quasi-state or (I)NGO established ethnic minority educational schools have also been setup, which are not officially registered or recognised by the state. There are at least 2,420 ethnic schools across primary, middle and high school levels serving upwards of 228,000 students. These community-based schools are increasingly of interest to donors, particularly UNESCO, who have pushed for the strengthening of these establishments as a mechanism of promoting non-formal education at the local level. Lastly, in many ethnic minority areas, resistance groups have managed to set up and administer their own schooling system. In this alternative schooling system, the teaching of the identity, language and history (and in some cases religion) of the ethnic group are stressed within the curriculum. This curriculum also aims to valorise the ethno-nationalist struggle against the state. Teachers who could teach these subjects were locally recruited and employed, relevant curriculum resources and texts developed, and separate education departments established (Higgins et al. 2016, pp. 48-51).

In the case of Uganda, non-formal education programmes (ABEK, BEUPA, COPE, CHANCE and accelerated programmes for the conflict areas), were found to have the potential to embrace all four aspects of redistribution, recognition, representation and in part also reconciliation in that (Datzberger et al. 2015, pp. 47-50):

- They have either a specific curriculum designed to fit into their regional and cultural environment, thereby addressing peace and security issues in the region or make use of an accelerated curriculum
- Increase access to education for marginalised and/or disadvantaged segments of the population
- Are frequently designed to make room for flexible learning hours, which allows learners to engage in income generation activities and/or pursue household duties
- In many instances, teachers are from, known to, and trusted by the community, or (in some instances) involved in curriculum development
- Some programmes, such as ABEK or CHANCE have been demonstrated to change people’s attitudes towards education
- Interviewees indicated (for this study and in reviewed evaluation reports) that programmes help to mitigate direct and indirect forms of violence.
- However, several challenges in practice remain such as: lack of qualified and trained teaching personnel, weak infrastructures or no consistent funding strategies. Besides, learners are still not in a position to freely move from non-formal to formal education without being stigmatized, in particular when it comes to employment. The non-formal policy Act (which still needs to be passed by parliament once funding is secured) would be one step towards that direction in creating an enabling environment. In some areas, such as Karamoja, efforts are currently underway to downsize non-formal education centres and increasingly enrol children in formal schools.
To conclude, non-formal education is a multi-facetted endeavour and its success largely depends on the country context, history of conflict and political as well as religious motivations by its implementers/designers. More research is necessary on whether and how NFE programmes address societal transformation and peacebuilding more explicitly than nationwide formal education initiatives at regional and country level. More importantly, the implications for formal education sector planning in post-conflict environments need to be further explored. This includes discussions on the limitations of appropriating a Western-style educational model to non-Western contexts, conflicts and everyday realities.

**Refugees and IDPs**

In Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda, refugees have the exact same rights to education as nationals and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In practice, however, national laws are not always implemented (see Table 16), affecting access to and quality of education to refugees and IDPs.

"In Pakistan, South Africa and Uganda, refugees have the exact same rights to education as nationals and internally displaced persons (IDPs)."
### Table 17: Refugees and Education

**Main Sources: UNHCR, OCHA, Refugee Law Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Refugees / IDPs</th>
<th>Education for Refugees / IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Myanmar</strong></td>
<td>Internally, up to 300,000 are displaced in IDP camps. The majority as a result of ethnic conflict and religious violence, with Kachin State and Rakhine State seeing the highest levels of displacement.</td>
<td>Mainly IDPs (approx. 300,000) fleeing in-country conflict.</td>
<td>With regards to education it is mainly the UN and international NGOs that coordinate their response in Rakhine, Kachin and northern Shan through clusters and sectors, including the shelter/NFI/CCCM, education, food, health, and nutrition clusters and the protection working group. They focus mainly on IDPs in camps, but also assist those outside camps and their host communities. Restricted humanitarian access in Rakhine, and in areas of Kachin and northern Shan not under government control, is a challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>The second largest refugee hosting country in the world, but not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention</td>
<td>1.5 million registered Afghan refugees. 1.8 million IDPs due to insurgencies, 14.57 million IDPs due to natural disasters</td>
<td>De-jure: Refugees are entitled to free education in state schools, De-facto: Human Rights Watch (2015, p. 34) highlights flaws in guaranteeing the right to quality education for Afghan refugee children. Roughly 1/3 of Afghan refugees are concentrated in 76 refugee villages. 2/3 live in (semi-)urban settlements. Primary education is offered across 54 refugee villages, 127 local NGOs, UNHCR supported schools catering 59,000 children. High dropout rates (70% in total, and 90% of all girls). IDPs are entitled to the same rights applied to all Pakistani citizens under the institution. Several challenges in practice remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>The majority of refugees and asylum-seekers in SA have fled the conflict in the DRC, or instability in Somalia. Others claim to face persecution in Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>65,000 are recognized refugees. In addition, 230,000 people were seeking asylum and awaiting decision in 2013.</td>
<td>De-jure: legislation incorporates the basic principles of refugee protection, including access to basic social services and education. De-facto: Some public institutions do not recognise refugees’ permits, preventing them from benefitting from their rights. In April 2015, UNHCR voiced serious concern about xenophobic violence in SA. As of 2009, at least 24% of asylum seekers and refugee children were out of the school system, and there is margin for error with the lack of documentation and tracking data available on these persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uganda</strong></td>
<td>Refugees usually arrive from conflict-affected countries such as: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia or South Sudan.</td>
<td>Uganda is currently home to approximately 400,000 refugees and that number constantly rises (UNHCR 2015).</td>
<td>De-jure: Refugees have the same rights as Ugandans to access education. De-facto: Progressive policies notwithstanding, several challenges remain: • Language barriers • School fees • Different educational background • Need for more psychological counselling in schools • Some refugee children report they are discriminated against in school • Need to deploy more refugee teachers in schools • Infrequent provision of education for accompanied minors • Almost no secondary schools within settlements, scholarships for secondary education are rare • Hardly any provision for adult education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By international law, IDPs should remain under the protection of their own home government. In the case of Myanmar, however, the existence of international laws and regulations as to how IDPs ought to be treated and protected by the government proved to be problematic in the past. This is simply based on the fact, that the exact same military troops that are involved in fights are then also in charge of protecting people that have been displaced because of combat. Such circumstances also affect access to public education. In fact, the vast majority experience hardly any protection or aid, apart from some local ethnic organisations that mostly operate from across the border from Thailand (Burma Link 2015).

Constitutional law stipulates refugees’ rights to education in Pakistan. IDPs have the exact same rights as nationals. Then again, in practice some of these rights are not put into practice. For instance, it has been observed that IDPs were denied freedom of movement in Sindh and Punjab (Din 2010 cited in: Mosel & Jackson 2013, p. 14). Education for Afghan refugees in Pakistan is receiving limited attention from international donors and Pakistani authorities, particular in the context of massive IDPs in KP over a prolonged period of time. There are noticeable efforts by national and provincial authorities to meet the needs of the IDPs (e.g. the first ESP recommends the use of community and religious scholars to mitigate hostilities towards education, particularly to female education), though long-term comprehensive policies are missing. Besides, one of the biggest challenges that IDPs face is concerned with the official recognition of their qualifications and certification in order to continue their studies, as they are changing from institution to institution in the face of displacement and constant movement. The KP government has yet instructed schools to accept IDPs without any documentation. As a result, however, institutions are now being overburdened and do not have the resources and capacities to support everyone who enrols in school. In other words, while access to education for IDPs is not the main problem, the high increase of IDPs in schools of host communities is becoming a concern. What is more, given that schools are frequently used to offer shelter for IDPs, children from host communities are negatively affected with regards to access to education. Overall, there is a pressing need to provide quality education both to IDPs and refugee children in host communities (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming).

In South Africa, despite a sound legal framework benefitting refugees, xenophobic acts and reservations among migrants challenge their integration - also in the education sector. Some argue, that xenophobia is a political, state-level discourse in SA that stems from its history of perceived foreign threat, and the failure to address this adequately after 1994, challenges social cohesion and integration. Moreover, the current socio-economic environment, high unemployment, poor service delivery, and economic inequality has strained relations between refugees, asylum-seekers and host populations (Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming).

In Uganda, the right to education for refugees is stipulated in the Refugee Act 2006, the Refugee Regulations 2010 and the Ugandan Constitution (1993) specifying that for elementary education, refugees “must receive the same treatment as nationals, and in particular, regarding access to particular studies, the recognition of foreign certificates, diplomas and degrees and the remission of fees and charges” (Refugee Act 2006 point 29 / iii). The OPM (Office of Prime Minister) jointly with the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) coordinates refugees’ educational needs. In practice,
lack of funds and capacities challenge the country’s open door policies. According to the Refugee Law Project, it is hard to advocate for refugee education if Ugandan children/youth face similar problems in one of the world’s least developed countries (Datzberger et al. 2015).

Taken as a whole, the following challenges towards integration of refugees through education persist:

- Different educational backgrounds, in some instances language barriers, disadvantage refugee children in their educational progress.
- Advocacy work for special treatment of refugees in providing them better access to education is challenged by the fact that many nationals frequently struggle with poverty or low socio-economic status as well.
- There is a scarcity of resources for urgently needed psychological support in schools.
- With the exception of Uganda, tensions with local host communities affect social integration of IDPs and/or refugees in Myanmar and South Africa (also through education). In the case of Pakistan Afghan refugees can be a source of tension because of militant attacks on schools and educational institutions which according to some alleged reports were planned from Afghanistan.

Challenges to Social Cohesion

While it has to be acknowledged that all countries under our examination do have their own context-specific and socio-historical causes of segregation in education (see Figure 5 below), we found that they share two broad commonalities that impact processes of social cohesion through education in several ways.

The first commonality is segregation based on socio-economic status which largely reflects what has been already discussed in the section under ‘equality’, namely that the political context of a society determines equal opportunities in education. Restricted access to high quality education widens social segregation based on wealth and the creation of a two-tiered society in all of our case studies. Perhaps even more important, it shows how inequality and the lack of social cohesion within and through education are closely intertwined.

Restricted access to high quality education widens social segregation based on wealth and the creation of a two-tiered society in all of our case studies. Perhaps even more important, it shows how inequality and the lack of social cohesion within and through education are closely intertwined.

Whereas in Uganda and South Africa religion does not appear to be a major conflicting impediment towards social cohesion within and through education, in Myanmar and Pakistan religion can be a basis of discrimination. Also the exclusion of ethnic minorities varies from country to country. In Myanmar minority ethnic groups who live in remote or border areas are most frequently marginalised from society and this is also reflected in the education sector. In the case of Pakistan, Afghan refugees are affected, as well as children in conflicted-affected regions and those in rural areas. South Africa not only continues to struggle with integration based on race lines but also xenophobia in schools. By contrast, Uganda has a very open-door policy for refugees but several challenges towards integration through education persist.
Figure 5: Summary of Challenges for Education that Affect Social Cohesion
Based on: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015

Notably, Figure 5 is only indicative of the many influences and challenges on social cohesion through education. For example, more data and research is necessary on how distribution and allocation (or the political economy) of humanitarian and development aid towards education can affect aspects of social cohesion as well.
6. Reconciliation

There is a growing body of literature pointing to the role of education in post-conflict recovery as a means to help successive generations understand and cope with (violent/political) events that took place within their own society (Smith & Ellison 2016). In this context, the role of reconciliation in education is seen as:

...a process that addresses historical and contemporary injustices that are linked to past and current conflicts. This may occur in the form of ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ teachings about different narratives of the past, and their relevance to the present and the future. At the same time processes of integration or segregation in education systems (e.g. common institutions) can have an effect on reconciliation through establishing vertical trust in schools and education systems, and horizontal trust between identity-based groups.

On the basis of this broad framing, there are two main aspects to the role of education across all four countries in terms of a contribution to reconciliation. First, the extent to which education has a role towards reconciliation as part of the political context and transitional justice process of a country (e.g. if existent as a tool of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, or any other political framework/institution). Second, the curriculum such as the way in which history education can contain values that either promote division or encourage peaceful management of diversity.

Reconciliation Process and Challenges in Each Country

Figure 6: Reconciliation Process Across all Four Countries.
Based on: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015

**Myanmar**
Considering the security and economic focus of the current government’s peacebuilding agenda, actual transformations towards a more sustainable peace are volatile. The question of how to offshoot reconciliation is hardly addressed in any of the available literature, perhaps also considering the early and unfinished stages of transformation Myanmar finds itself in currently. If such process would occur, ethnic reconciliation has to be the starting point for any national reconciliation.

**South Africa**
The approach to reconciliation in South Africa after 1994 can be raced back to how the TRC framed the term and defined its parameters. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 was followed by the TRC constituted in 1996. The former makes no reference to education. The TRC was constituted in three separate committees, ‘Committee on Human Rights Violations’, ‘Committee on Amnesty’ and ‘Committee on Reparation and Reconciliation.’ As such it was not a unitary mechanism. Critiques allege that the TRC failed reconcile white with black communities.

**Pakistan**
The country faces currently four levels of reconciliation, namely: among diverse Muslim groups, between different ethnic groups, between Muslim and non-Muslim groups and bilaterally with India. No political/legal instruments are in place to address these issues.

**Uganda**
Uganda’s reconciliation process is highly politicised. Whether or not the country should have had a TRC remains a highly debated point. In 2008 the government established a Transitional Justice Working Group, which released a draft of a transitional justice policy in 2014. The policy acknowledges that reparations, among other measures, are needed to reintegrate victims back into society and to deal with issues common to post-conflict situations, such as land disputes and children born in captivity.
Each country is at a different phase and framing of a reconciliation process. In Myanmar one of the key challenges for any reconciliation initiative – be it at the regional or the national level - is the very different states of conflict that affect different regions in the country. While populations in Kachin and Northern Shan states are experiencing active fighting, continued casualties and on-going displacement, Mon state has seen relative stability since the 1994 ceasefire agreement. In short, efforts towards reconciliation are confronted with a political environment that is in the midst of securing nationwide peace agreements. While the need for reconciliation is acknowledged, now that initial steps to ceasefires, democratization and (initial) reform have been taken, the focus and approach on how to foster processes of reconciliation have yet to be agreed (Higgins et al. 2016).

Pakistan faces not just one, but several reconciliation processes internally as well as bilaterally. With regards to the latter, the country’s absent reconciliation process with India is rooted in a deep fear of an assertive Hindu majority, nurtured by a substantial proportion of Muslims to reject a united India. Instead of pursuing a reconciliatory approach to move on from the traumatic partition of India the two countries have remained permanent adversaries. Particularly, the unresolved dispute of Kashmir has led to an arms race between the two states and on occasions it has been a cause of war. Internally, the essentialisation of Islam and Muslims through rigid definitions in policies and national actors’ discourses fracture the Pakistani/Muslim nation from within as it renders any deviation from these official definitions liable to repression and direct or indirect forms violence. Such divisions undermine both, any political attempt towards reconciliation at the national or regional level as well as the cohesive potential of Islam in forging unity and solidarity (Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming).

In Uganda, several internal conflicts since 1986 were not followed by a nationwide reconciliation process or far-reaching mechanisms. Following a cessation of hostilities in 2006 the GoU and the LRA entered peace negotiations which led to the signing of a number of agreements. Among others, an agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation was signed, recognizing the need to promote reconciliation, prevent impunity for serious crimes, and deliver justice to victims of gross human rights violations. To this end, it envisages an overarching justice framework comprised of both formal and informal justice mechanisms, including truth seeking, criminal prosecutions, traditional justice mechanisms, and reparations programs (Otim & Kasande 2015, p. 3). In order to meet some of its obligations under the agreement, the GoU established a Transitional Justice Working group (TJWG) under the JLOS (Justice Law and Order Sector) in 2008. In September 2014, the government’s Transitional Justice Working Group released the latest draft of its national transitional justice policy, covering acts committed from 1986 to the present throughout the country. However, the majority of ordinary Ugandans are not even aware of the policy’s existence and the absence of a proper TRC or nationwide reconciliation process remains subject to critique (Datzberger et al. 2015, pp. 54 -56).

The process of reconciliation in South Africa is most poignantly tied to the figure of the late President Nelson Mandela, the work of the TRC led by Archbishop Desmond tutu,
and captured in the symbolic power of the ‘Rainbow Nation’. The ‘Rainbow Nation’ was founded on a trajectory of reconciliation manifest in the work of the TRC whose genesis was the Interim Constitution (1993) and the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. The TRC has been praised and critiqued at the same time. Some lauded it as ‘the most ambitious and far-reaching of the attempts at catharsis and justice’ (Ignatieff 2001, p. 15). Others counter-argue that after twenty years since the end of apartheid, the physical landscape of separation has not been altered. Under democratic rule, even with the de-racialization of the distributional system, current systems continue to pave the way for white privilege, albeit with social class becoming the main basis of discrimination (Sayed et al. 2016, forthcoming pp. 36-41).

The Role of Education in Fostering Reconciliation

With the exception of South Africa, whose TRC made explicit mention of the role of education towards social transformation; all three other cases share first and foremost one commonality. That is, that school curricula fail to thoroughly address the historical and contemporary injustices linked to conflict and structural forms of violence. In a broader sense, educational systems and programming do not embrace peacebuilding as a process that comes to terms with past and present grievances and conflicts. This may change in the course of the peace process in Myanmar, but requires more time in Pakistan, where social injustices, past and current grievances are still silenced in schools. With regards to the former, it is still too early to tell if Myanmar’s pathways towards reconciliation through education will take root. There is a sense of political will and dialogue that acknowledges the role of education in the country’s peacebuilding process, but overall peacebuilding is still presumed to automatically occur from efforts to improve service delivery of education. This implicit approach towards peacebuilding risks side-lining aspects of recognition, representation, and reconciliation in policy texts, if not within the policy development process as a whole. The situation in Uganda is similar, but slightly differs in that peacebuilding is a cross-cutting theme in the national curriculum. As such it can serve mainly as a pedagogical tool envisaged as conflict prevention and not as a means of coming to terms with or addressing a conflict affected past. The history, as well as past and present causes of conflict in various regions, remains by and large unaddressed.
Table 18: The Role of Education in Reconciliation
Based on: Higgins et al. 2016; Durrani et al. 2016 forthcoming; Sayed et al. 2016 forthcoming; Datzberger et al. 2015

**Myanmar**
There are demands from youth/students for education that supports critical awareness of the historical/present socio-political and economic situation and to enhance agency in terms of employment, political empowerment and inclusive forms of socio-cultural identity formation. Thus far only ‘potential’ routes towards reconciliation through education have begun to emerge in the peace and reform process - but are not manifested as yet. These potentials include:
- Recognition of the contribution of education and social service grievances to conflict
- Acknowledgement among international, state and non-state actors of the key position of education within the peace process
- Building trust in commitment to both peace agreements and education reform that benefits all parties
- Participation of actors across educational sectors (state, ethnic, monastic and community) and all (school-community-state-national-international) levels in dialogue processes
- Increased support for teachers within all educational sectors through (conflict-sensitive/peacebuilding) training, and fair compensation for well-being

**Pakistan**
Within the ESR (Education Sector Reform) from 2001-06, the thrust of social cohesion appears to be on the homogenisation of behaviour and values that make Pakistanis distinct to the ‘other’. What appears to be silenced is an acknowledgment of social injustices of the past or contemporary times and issues of reconciliation.

**South Africa**
- The TRC report acknowledged that most South Africans were denied the right of access to suitable education in the period of 1960-1994 (TRC 1998c, p. 170).
- Given that many submissions to the TRC suggested reparations relating to educational activities, the TRC felt that special arrangements needed to be recommended for those whose education had been interrupted as a result of engaging in resistance against apartheid.
- The TRC recommended that human rights curricula are introduced in formal education, that schools are regarded as spaces where the memory of the past is kept alive. In addition, it urged to transform the education sector in SA to prevent future human rights violations. All schools and tertiary education institutions in SA are meant to have a copy of the TRC report.
- The report notes that the TRC set the tone for the role of education interventions in peacebuilding and social cohesion in SA. It states that the government should give urgent attention to the transformation of education (TRC 1998b, p. 308).
- Inter-class integration may have receded in the aftermath of apartheid. It is worth noting that the reconciliation barometer indicates that more SAs regard class (27.9%) as the biggest division than race (14.6%) (FHI 360 2015: 32)

**Uganda**
- The current national curriculum incorporates aspects of peace education to some extent. Great emphasis is placed on inter-personal relationships, attitudes of peace at the individual level, or within school and community environments. Peacebuilding is approached and used as a pedagogical tool towards conflict prevention, but not as a means to coming to terms with a conflict-affected past.
- The history of violent conflict, past and present causes of conflict in various regions, remain largely unaddressed by education. This may be partly due to Uganda’s highly politicised reconciliation process and a general fear of generating new tensions. Interviews with experts and organisations working on reconciliation voiced frustrations about the lack of a reconciliation process that ideally embraces the national, regional and communal levels.
- The draft national transitional justice policy approaches education once again as a means towards conflict prevention as opposed to coming to terms with the legacies of the past. It stipulates under point xxi. that the MoESTS should (p. 38): Identify and propose measures to the TJC to mitigate the adverse effects of the conflict to the education sector; Promote the development of education and training programmes on culture
- In addition, point xxii urges to “undertake civic education on religious values that foster peace and reconciliation (e.g. tolerance, respect, equality, peace, and love). Notably, the transitional justice policy is still pending. According to Otim & Kasande (2015, p. 3) “considerable resources and political will be required to successfully push it through cabinet and parliament.”
- Hence, the implicit as well as explicit role education can and should play as a tool to addressing previous conflicts in the course of Uganda’s reconciliation process, still needs to be further discussed and debated among educationalists, practitioners and policy-shapers advocating for a thorough integration of peacebuilding into the education sector.
In reflection of Table 18, the socio-historical context that surrounds Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda and therefore the need for political sensitivity towards unresolved tensions and grievances should not be under-estimated. Concretely, the way in which the root causes of past and/or present grievances and conflicts are subject to (public) debate could potentially generate new tensions if not revive former divisions. This is not to imply, however, that there is no space for educational approaches to co-create a ‘social truth’ that acknowledges multiple experiences, narratives, perspectives and interpretations of past and present conflicts and grievances. In fact, there is a pressing need to move away from a sheer preventative ‘peace education’ approach and come to terms with the drivers and root causes of conflicts also through education. Probably, the biggest challenge towards this endeavour is the political context in which curricula reform or educational programming are formulated, as well as the difficulty to acquire skilled and ‘neutral’ teachers or facilitators that are not perceived as a threat by those in power.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions and Recommendations

Throughout the report we have highlighted that the integration of education in peacebuilding processes is not only a complex endeavour but also highly context dependent. While we clearly refrain from policy recommendations based on a universal ‘one-size fits all’ approach, some general conclusions can be drawn. These findings reflect key observations that have arisen from the synthesis across our four country contexts. Whenever appropriate we will refer to our framework of the 4Rs in terms of understanding the contribution of education to peacebuilding through redistribution, recognition, representation and reconciliation.

1. The Role of Education in Peacebuilding and Development Frameworks

We acknowledge that any assessment depends largely on the degree of state fragility and peacebuilding process as well as actors involved. As outlined earlier, Uganda’s peacebuilding frameworks were to a large extent steered by the international community. In South Africa regional as well as international pressure contributed to the country’s national peace accord. Myanmar is still in the middle of peace negotiations and Pakistan’s peacebuilding focus mainly revolves around counter-terrorism strategies.

These divergent circumstances notwithstanding, our review of existing peacebuilding and macro-development frameworks suggests that, no matter the degree of state fragility and concomitant peacebuilding process, education is in the main equated with aspects of redistribution. This trend is accompanied by an underlying assumption that processes of recognition and reconciliation will automatically occur once issues of redistribution in education are tackled. What is more, education is generally perceived as a significant catalyst towards human capital development, employment generation and the economic prosperity of the country as a whole. As such it is predominantly embraced as a means towards economic development and employment generation, and only marginally seen as a means towards reconciliation and social transformation after conflict and war. At first sight, South Africa appears to deviate from this trend as its TRC explicitly denotes education as a tool towards reconciliation, but the dominant discourse in the country’s development frameworks perceive education as a tool to strengthen human capital and combat unemployment.

Two main elements could be strengthened in all four country contexts and their respective peacebuilding and/or development frameworks:

- **Agency and voice**: In short, who, when and where ought to be represented in decision-making processes that affect the education sector are often neglected.
- **Processes of social change**: With the exception of South Africa, the potential of education to support processes of long-term social transformation and reconciliation in deeply divided societies remains largely unacknowledged. None of the frameworks we reviewed considers the potential of education in mitigating past and persisting conflict drivers in the long-term, not to mention strategies or macro-educational policies.
A key finding from the analysis of peacebuilding, development frameworks and education policies is that there is no common set of criteria across all documents. Education is usually acknowledged as important for economic development, but rarely seen as a tool for transformation such as reform of the education system to address structural segregation or inequalities, or even less so as a tool for reconciliation beyond the involvement of children and young people in reconciliation programmes at the interpersonal and intergroup levels (rather than institutional and systemic levels).

**Recommendations:**
- More attention should be given to the potential of formal and non-formal education to contribute to political, cultural and socio-historical change in the process of developing peacebuilding frameworks. This would necessitate moving beyond the perception of education as mainly a driver of economic development.
- Ensure greater participation of actors in decision-making and planning processes of peacebuilding frameworks including inputs from education experts and the participation of under-represented groups (e.g. minorities).

**2. The Role of Peacebuilding Within Education Sector Plans and Macro Reforms**

Similar to our findings on peacebuilding and macro-development plans, our synthesis revealed that national macro-education policies and reforms prioritise aspects of redistribution over representation, recognition and reconciliation – with South Africa (at least rhetorically) placing a much greater emphasis on the transformative role of education than all other countries. Education sector plans place strong emphasis on access to free education (in particular Myanmar and Uganda) or portray education as a key ingredient towards economic growth (see for instance Pakistan and South Africa). Education is in the main perceived as a tool towards eradicating poverty and advancing social and economic development. Again with the exception of South Africa, inequalities in education are not related to aspects of social cohesion, representation or how grievances are deeply rooted in the history of state formation. Aspects of inequities in education dominate the language of policies and reforms in all four countries.

**Recommendations:**
- Ensure greater alignment of education sector plans with peacebuilding frameworks and policies, including a stronger focus on the potential of education to contribute to social cohesion and reconciliation.
- Moreover, education sector plans can be also strengthened and further substantiated, if they are based on an analysis that correlates education data with data on levels of violence or crime.
3. Financing for Education

The brief review of financing for education across the four countries suggests a number of tentative conclusions from a peacebuilding perspective. Firstly, three of the countries (Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda) seem to follow the pattern in other conflict affected contexts whereby the percentage of GDP and allocation of government spending to education falls below recommended levels. This means that even if peacebuilding were prioritised, it would struggle to compete with other demands on education budgets – a vicious circle where countries most in need of peacebuilding efforts are also those with least resources to implement peacebuilding policies. Secondly, even where there is a higher percentage of GDP and allocation of government spending on education (as in South Africa), this does not necessarily mean that transformation is achieved and deeper structural challenges in terms of segregation and inequality persist. Financing therefore is only part of the solution and there may be additional political economy factors that make it more difficult to effect change. Finally, all four countries share a characteristic common to most countries which is that by far the largest portion of the education budget goes towards salaries. From a peacebuilding perspective this may suggest that, rather placing an emphasis on securing additional funding for new peacebuilding programmes, more thought could be given to working in cost effective ways with existing teachers and education personnel.

Recommendations:
- Financing for peacebuilding elements of national education sectors plans will always be difficult to secure against other competing demands. This suggests that more attention needs to be given to effective use of existing resources for peacebuilding through education.
- Countries most in need of peacebuilding efforts may also be those with least commitment of funding to education, therefore better advocacy mechanisms and more sustained work with education authorities are needed to secure resources for peacebuilding efforts.
- The politics of funding distribution and resource allocation and their impact on peacebuilding efforts should not be underestimated.
4. Explicit and Implicit Approaches to Peacebuilding Through Education

Recognising that peacebuilding is multidimensional, we found that the distinction between explicit and implicit approaches to peacebuilding through education is extremely important, particularly when a country is exposed to different levels of intervention. To be more specific, it became evident from our case studies, that any explicit language about peacebuilding can be regarded with suspicion (e.g. based on political motivations) or is exposed to competing definitions (e.g. peace on whose terms, peace versus justice, peace with amnesty etc.). In such contexts, other language may be used, such as the predominant use of ‘social cohesion’ in the context of Pakistan and South Africa.

Moreover, there is a tendency to approach explicit forms of peacebuilding in education, merely in terms of ‘peace education’ or in the form of a cross curricular focus on changing individual values, attitudes and behaviours (among others, this narrow perception has been also critiqued by Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Lopes Cardozo 2008). Whilst this approach is worthy and well-intentioned, it is only part of a much larger picture and can be criticised on at least two fronts. Firstly, the emphasis on individual change may be overly optimistic about the potential of individual agency to overcome violent conflict if the underlying causes are deeply structural and rooted in systemic inequalities, the political-economy context of a country or discrimination between groups. Secondly, the focus on children and young people at the individual or community level is important, but frequently limited to peace education programmes or small-scale initiatives (e.g. peace huts or clubs in schools). This is sometimes justified as a long term strategy to influence ‘future citizens’, whilst elites with much more power to effect change (at communal, regional or national level) are rarely the priority for peace education programmes. One interpretation may be that there are political economy reasons why participants in a conflict are happy to focus peace efforts on the least powerful groups in conflict-affected societies (such as women, children, minorities or refugees), as long as the outcomes do not challenge existing power relations at the level of institutional and systemic change. Third, the implicit and explicit role teachers and parents play in peacebuilding and education needs to be further explored (see also Novellii and Sayed 2016).

Overall, this suggests that a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding through education needs to adopt implicit, as well as explicit initiatives for change at individual, institutional and systemic levels. However, the lack of political will, poor implementation practice as well as the overall political-economy context of a country frequently impedes systemic and institutional change and therefore long-term transformation through education.

Recommendations:

- Policymakers should be encouraged to think beyond explicit approaches to peacebuilding that simply involve ‘peace education’ programmes, but also consider how implicit approaches that promote equity, social cohesion and reconciliation can be implemented. This may mean they are not explicitly called peacebuilding.
- Policy makers should be encouraged to consider where policies that promote peacebuilding are targeted at individual / inter-group level, or institutional and systemic level. This will require different approaches to implementation and will have different implications for funding, monitoring and likely impact.
5. Education Governance

In contexts where education policies are developed to support peacebuilding through equality, social cohesion or reconciliation, one has to acknowledge that these are unlikely to be successful when they are undermined by a political economy that is resisting transformation and change. Donors and multiple national actors involved in education sector planning are aware of this problem but faced with the challenge that education programming frequently occurs in a silo detached from the overall country context. This may prevent the most well intended ministries and reforms from succeeding. In such situations, it is important to prioritise a focus on creating education governance that recognises that redistribution is also about social cohesion as well as economic inequalities, and is also receptive to transformative policies tackling issues of representation, recognition or reconciliation. However, this may be complicated by the following factors.

- First, no country is immune to political or elite capture. Better strategies are needed to ensure greater accountability in implementation and practice.
- Second, aspects of representation need to be more in the foreground when it comes to education governance strategies and planning. It is questionable, however, whether increased decentralisation is the sole solution towards that goal. While processes of devolution may increase local representation in central governments (see for instance Uganda), several challenges remain. These range from politicisation of the decentralisation processes to increased capacity and infrastructure deficiencies due to ‘over-decentralisation’ or a ‘centralised’ decentralisation system that is in reality less autonomous than its de-jure structures would suggest.
- With regard to growing privatisation, questions have still to be addressed about the likely impact of multiple providers and their motivations on social cohesion and peacebuilding.
- Lastly, there is a striking absence of policy strategies addressing the weaknesses of conflict-affected governments to coherently implement education policies that foster implicit and explicit peacebuilding in the longer term.

Recommendations:

- It has to be acknowledged that, in peacebuilding contexts, education governance is likely to be highly politicised. This will have an impact on any peacebuilding plans for education in terms of prioritisation and funding as well as the implementation of macro-reforms such as decentralisation. Planning at the technical level needs to take into account the political perceptions of peacebuilding.
- The debate about ‘high’ versus ‘low’ quality education, or the consequences of low-cost private schooling is still in its infancy. The long-term consequences of how unequal access to high quality education impacts social transformation in conflict-affected societies need to be examined and debated among a wide range of actors.
- As far as decentralization processes in the education sector are concerned, thorough assessments are needed on existing and missing capacities and resources, concomitant with national training strategies in order to enhance governance of and representation within education sector planning.
Our synthesis suggests that, poor quality education and segregation based on social class or wealth thwarts equal opportunity and social transformation in all of our four case studies. Structural violence pervades the educational system in several ways. In Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda unequal distribution of wealth and widespread poverty are concomitant with access to either low or high standard education thereby hampering equal opportunities for disadvantaged societal segments. Similarly, in South Africa pervasive structural violence is attributed by some scholars to the legacy of apartheid, which did not leave the education sector unaffected as a result of decades of state-sponsored violence and repression.

Our report suggests that both, horizontal and vertical forms of inequalities hinder sustainable peacebuilding through education. With regards to horizontal forms of inequality, persisting social, economic and political grievances impede equal access to education and educational outcomes. In South Africa, the legacy of apartheid is still reflected in that fact that geography, language and race have a huge influence on educational outcomes and access to high quality education. In Myanmar as well as Uganda, ethnic minorities continue to be discriminated in the education sector. Also, refugees in Pakistan do not experience the same treatment as nationals/locals. Even though these trends may not pose an immediate threat to the peacebuilding process of a country as a whole, they prevent sections of a society overcoming past and present grievances.

In all four countries vertical forms of inequality in education are expressed through the effects of multidimensional poverty that coexists alongside wealthier social segments and small elites. In other words, children from poorest households are more likely to be out of school (be it primary or secondary) compared to those from the richest households. Here it is worth repeating that in Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda school dropout rates are much higher regions that are affected by conflict and or national disasters. In Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda infrastructure constraints in conflict-affected regions (e.g. overcrowded classrooms, lack of electricity or basic facilities) impede equal learning experiences in education. Similarly, in South Africa, township schools continue to be severely disadvantaged in providing the same services and learning environment than former Model C level schools. Taken as whole if vertical and horizontal forms of inequality are not addressed, it remains questionable to what extent education can have an implicit and long-term impact on the peacebuilding process of a country.

Recommendations:

- Current approaches to equity in education tend to focus on wealth inequalities but a common feature of peacebuilding contexts is that these often map onto horizontal inequalities between groups. Whilst there are sensitivities, there needs to be more commitment to gathering and monitoring data related to horizontal inequalities as well as income differentials as a means of monitoring peacebuilding impacts.
- More knowledge is required on the key factors, for example in terms of inequalities in access, resources and educational outcomes that are most relevant from a peacebuilding perspective.
7. Social Cohesion

In synthesising findings from all four country contexts, we identified two broad commonalities that have an effect on processes of social cohesion through education in several ways. These include segregation based on socio-economic status (building on our findings in the section about equality, thus vertical forms of social cohesion) and the balancing between fostering national unity alongside the recognition and respect of cultural diversity (thus horizontal forms of social cohesion). The dilemma of promoting national unity despite cultural diversity is a challenge for several policies and implementation practices – the fieldwork considered four particular areas:

- **First**, language of instruction policies may threaten social cohesion across all cases, yet national policies and context-specific challenges vary tremendously per country. Here the key issue may be as much about whether language of instruction policies have been politicised in the sense that they do not afford recognition to minorities. And, where this is not the case provides a potential for grievances to be mobilised for political purposes.

- **Second**, school curricula (with the exception of South Africa) do not address social grievances (e.g. of particular minorities or ethnicities). There is hardly any critical reflection on how present social structures evolved over history and time, and importantly, contributed to regional and/or national conflicts.

- **Third**, non-formal education programmes have been shown to increase access to education in conflict-affected environments but their design and modes of implementation can affect social cohesion in positive as well as negative ways. While in Myanmar non-formal education programmes have been occasionally misused by military groups, in Uganda some programmes managed to create a communal platform that brings together different segments of a population who would have otherwise not have reconciled. Yet, underfunding remains one of the biggest challenges. Notably, in all three countries (Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda) where non-formal education programmes play a significant role, access to education increased. More importantly, the implications of successful NFE programmes for formal education sector planning in post-conflict environments need to be further explored. This includes discussions on the limitations of appropriating a Western-style educational model to non-Western contexts, conflicts and everyday realities.

- **Fourth**, even though refugees and IDPs have the same rights to education as nationals, in practice several implementation challenges remain. In Myanmar minority ethnic groups who live in remote or border areas are most frequently marginalised from society and this is also reflected in the education sector. In the case of Pakistan, Afghan refugees (but not IDPs) are most affected whereas South Africa not only continues to struggle with integration based on race lines but also xenophobia in schools. By contrast, Uganda has a very open-door policy for refugees but several challenges towards integration through education persist.

- **Fifth**, whereas in Uganda and South Africa religion does not appear to be a major conflicting impediment towards social cohesion within and through education, in Myanmar and Pakistan religion can be a basis of discrimination.

- **Lastly**, more research is necessary on how horizontal and vertical inequalities in education are different from or relate to horizontal and vertical social cohesion in education?

**Recommendations:**

- There is a need to thoroughly interlink aspects of inequality in education with social cohesion and to analyse them as complementary challenges to peacebuilding.
- This study looked at four aspects of social cohesion, but much more work needs to be done on which aspects of education policy are most relevant to social cohesion from a peacebuilding perspective. This would be beneficial for policymakers in terms of areas that might need prioritised, but it should also identify relevant indicators for education and peacebuilding as a means of monitoring the impact of policies.
The use of education to address issues of truth and reconciliation is extremely limited in Myanmar, Pakistan and Uganda. Education is not perceived as a means to create space for and co-create a ‘social truth’ that acknowledges multiple experiences, narratives, perspectives and interpretations of past and present conflicts. Challenges include the political context of each country, but also the difficulty of developing skilled teaching personnel that are not perceived as a threat by those in power. The South African case suggests a reverse trend, in the view that the TRC explicitly refers to the role of education in peacebuilding. However, critiques claim that despite new history books, there has been little fundamental change to the education landscape since the end of apartheid.

8. Reconciliation

Recommendations:

- For education to contribute towards reconciliation as part of a wider truth and reconciliation process, it is crucial to secure political commitment from various actors.
- If education is to be used as a tool towards reconciliation, one has to move away from a strict ‘peace education’ approach (e.g. sole emphasis on attitudes of peace at the individual level or within school or community environments). In order to fulfil education’s potential in co-creating a ‘social truth’, attention should be given to multiple experiences, perspectives and interpretations of past and present conflicts and grievances.
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Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam
The AISSR Programme Group Governance and Inclusive Development (http://aissr.uva.nl/programmegroups/item/governance-and-inclusive-development.html) consists of an interdisciplinary team of researchers focusing on issues relating to global and local issues of governance and development. The Research Cluster Governance of Education, Development and Social Justice focuses on multilevel politics of education and development, with a specific focus on processes of peacebuilding in relation to socio-economic, political and cultural (in)justices. The research group since 2006 has maintained a particular research focus on education, conflict and peacebuilding, as part of its co-funded ‘IS Academie’ research project with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Centre for International Education, University of Sussex
The Centre for International Education (CIE) (www.sussex.ac.uk/education/cie) was founded in 1989 on the premise that education is a basic human right that lies at the heart of development processes aimed at social justice, equity, social and civic participation, improved wellbeing, health, economic growth and poverty reduction. It is recognised as one of the premiere research centres working on education and international development in Europe. The Centre has also secured a prestigious UK ESRC/DFID grant to carry out research on the Role of Teachers in Peacebuilding in Conflict Affected Contexts, which aligns directly with the research strategy of the PBEA programme and will form part of the broader research partnership.

UNESCO Centre at Ulster University
Established in 2002 the UNESCO Centre (www.unescocentre.ulster.ac.uk) at the University of Ulster provides specialist expertise in education, conflict and international development. It builds on a strong track record of research and policy analysis related to education and conflict in Northern Ireland. Over the past ten years the UNESCO Centre has increasingly used this expertise in international development contexts, working with DFID, GIZ, Norad, Save the Children, UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank, providing research on education and social cohesion, the role of education in reconciliation and analysis of aid to education in fragile and conflict affected situations.

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