Education in emergencies and reconstruction: 
Bridging the funding gap

By Eli Wærum Rognerud
Matr. Nr. 1775682
UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning
7-9 Eugene Delacroix
75116 Paris, France

c.rognerud@iiep.unesco.org
+33 633 847891

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this work was written entirely by myself and has never before been presented to any university for an academic award. All sources of material used for this work have been duly acknowledged.

Paris, 10 November 2005

Eli Wærum Rognerud
Acknowledgements

The preparation of this thesis has been an arduous and intense but extremely interesting process. I owe my thanks to all of those who have contributed to making it also an enjoyable one, through their sharing of knowledge, experiences and ideas, through their support and encouragement and constructive criticism. Special thanks to those of my colleagues and friends who found time in their very busy schedules to participate in interviews and conversations on the thesis topic. Thanks to Dr. Elke Grawert for her supervision of this thesis and her professional inspiration at a critical time. Thanks to Katie Savage for her proof reading, her fearsome serve and her friendship, and to Rui da Silva for his support and for sharing his crisp bread. Thanks also to Jacqueline de Groot for her backing and for her courage. Thanks to my mother Kari and my grandmother Inga for being such wonderful role models of strong and capable and open-minded women.

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Abstract

More than half of the world’s 103.5 million out-of-school children live in countries affected by, or recovering from, emergencies. Conflict and wars are among the greatest barriers to reaching Education for All and the second of the Millennium Development Goals. This thesis focuses on one of the most serious impediments to the provision of quality education in situations of emergency and reconstruction: the lack of donor commitment and funding. It summarises recent literature and research explaining education not only as a right, but also as a necessity that can be both life-sustaining and life-saving, providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection in times of emergency and calamity. It documents how and to what extent the artificial dichotomy between humanitarian relief and development assistance nonetheless hinders effective delivery of education in emergencies and reconstruction, preventing both the conceptual and practical framework necessary to ensure adequate and consistent donor support for education in emergencies. Using the example of the Norwegian Government—one of few donors committed to including education in their humanitarian response, this thesis analyses why and how donors should bridge the gap between their humanitarian assistance and development agenda. The thesis documents how the Government of Norway conceive of education in emergencies and reconstruction in terms of relief and development, and questions to which extent this approach can function as a policy and programming model for other donor and assistance agencies. With reference to the ‘Norwegian model’, the paper suggests policy and funding structures that could more effectively bridge this dichotomy to guarantee that the support corresponds to the actual needs in this crucial field.
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<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for the Development of Education in Africa</td>
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<td>AERC</td>
<td>Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Programming</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment</td>
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<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Revolving Fund</td>
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<td>CHAP</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Disasters Emergency Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECHA</td>
<td>Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>EHI</td>
<td>Emergency Humanitarian Initiative</td>
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<td>EMG</td>
<td>Emergency Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)</td>
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<td>FCU</td>
<td>Field Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>FHT</td>
<td>Field Humanitarian Team</td>
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<td>FTI</td>
<td>Fast Track Initiative</td>
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<td>GDHI</td>
<td>Good Donorship Humanitarian Initiative</td>
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<td>GoN</td>
<td>Government of Norway</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Accountability Project</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HIL</td>
<td>Humanitarian International Law</td>
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<td>HPN</td>
<td>Humanitarian Practice Network</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HRR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>IACU</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IAWG</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBE</td>
<td>International Bureau of Education</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRCRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIIEP</td>
<td>International Institute of Educational Planning (UNESCO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency of Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOREPS</td>
<td>Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector-Wide Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDRC</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDRO</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United Nations Under Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme (UN)</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Throughout the world, wars, conflict and natural disasters sometimes deprive whole generations of access to education. Of the estimated 103.5 million children and youth currently out-of-school, more than half live in countries affected by conflict and calamities (UNESCO, 2004: 224). These children and youth are denied not only one of their fundamental human rights, but also the vital knowledge and the many opportunities that education can provide. Education in situations of emergencies, chronic crises or early reconstruction1 must be seen in its broadest context: It is education that protects, that teaches survival techniques and life skills and nurtures the general social, emotional, cognitive and physical development of people affected by conflicts and disasters (INEE, 2005; Sinclair, 2002: 27).

1.2 Focus and scope of the research project

Despite its well-researched and well-documented merits, education in situations of emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction is severely under-prioritised and under-funded. Traditionally, education has been seen as a long-term development activity and not as a humanitarian priority. Some donors consider it sufficient to prevent emergency-affected people from dying and care for their physical health, and hence consider it inappropriate, unnecessary or impossible to include education in their humanitarian response (Sinclair, 2002: 27). The same ‘physical bias’ prevails amongst the organisations charged with providing relief during and following conflict and disasters. The ‘educationalists’ in the development community, on the other hand, are reluctant to put their resources to use before a country is at peace and displays prospects for steady progress towards long-term development. Natural disasters are perceived to be less politically charged and thus more attractive for immediate educational investments. Also in post-disaster situations however, support for education receives relatively little attention. The support provided again tends to reflect the same physical bias, with an almost exclusive focus on reconstruction of school infrastructure, and supply of so-called ‘kits’. These are pre-packed supplies of school materials such as
blackboards and notebooks, usually flown into the emergency area from Europe or North America.

Thankfully, attitudes towards education in emergencies are changing. A growing pool of research, and a gradual re-orientation amongst the donors and agencies that operate in education and humanitarian settings have generated recognition for education in emergencies both as a discipline and as a real priority in situations of crisis. Awareness is growing for the need also to provide a minimum level of educational quality in these situations, and for the importance of linking the emergency response effort to a longer-term strategy for peace, reconstruction and development.

The Government of Norway (GoN) has been one of the strongest advocates for education in emergencies within the donor community. The GoN has made a policy commitment to include education as part of its humanitarian response, and also to advocate for other governments and agencies to do the same. However, attitude change takes time. In a government or a large multinational funding body, political and administrative change to align with policy commitments may take even longer.

Against this background, the guiding research question for this thesis has been the following:

**How can donor agencies bridge the gap between their humanitarian assistance and development agenda? An analyses of ‘the Norwegian model’**

This thesis will document how the GoN conceive of education in emergencies and reconstruction in terms of relief and development, and will ask if this approach can function as a policy and programming model for other donor and assistance agencies. The thesis will summarise recent literature and research, explaining education not only as a right, but also as a necessity that can be both life-sustaining and life-saving, providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection in times of emergency and calamity. Greater understanding for the critical function of education in and following emergencies is central to the furthering of appropriate policies. This thesis will document the many gaps in the provision of education in emergencies, and the reasons for these gaps, with a special focus on the artificial dichotomy between humanitarian relief and development assistance, and inadequate funding arrangements. It will examine how and to what extent the GoN fulfils its commitment to

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1 Throughout this thesis, the short form ‘education in emergencies’ will be used to when referring to education in all these situations. A definition of the term and thorough treatment of the typology for the different phases of an emergency will be given in chapter 2.
education in emergencies, and how it seeks to bridge the relief-development gap. The thesis will then analyse national particularities that must be taken into consideration when examining the appropriateness of Norwegian policy and strategy as a model for other donors. Whilst leverage on the international community is a top priority for the GoN, the structures and motivations underpinning Norwegian aid policy in general cannot be instantly transferred elsewhere.

1.3 Aims of the research project

The overall aim of this research project has been to increase the understanding of one of the most serious gaps in the provision of education in emergencies – the lack of predictable and adequate funding arrangements. As a means to this end, the thesis synthesises the most compelling arguments for education in emergencies, and the constraints which this emerging sector suffers as result of the artificial and inflexible classification of emergencies, and of education and humanitarian assistance.

Specifically, the thesis aims to:

1. explain the nature and importance of education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction;
2. explain how the dichotomy between humanitarian relief and development assistance impede the effective delivery of education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction;
3. examine how the GoN as a donor conceive of education in emergencies and reconstruction in terms of relief and development, and how this perception is manifested in administrative arrangements; allocation of funds and personnel, and programme execution;
4. determine the strengths and weaknesses of the Norwegian approach as a model for other donor agencies and providers of humanitarian relief and development assistance.

1.4 Methodological approach

The research has been conducted using a combination of methods and approaches. The steps in the research have been as follows:
1. A review of recent literature on education in emergencies and reconstruction, to provide a summary of the importance and functions of education in such situations.

2. A review of the current provision of education in emergencies, including its shortcomings and the most important on-going debates.

3. A review of donor policies towards education in emergencies in Norway and other OECD countries.

4. Semi-structured and informal interviews with researchers, policy makers and practitioners.

5. Consultation with staff at UNESCO, UNESCO’s International Institute of Educational planning (IIEP-UNESCO), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD).

1.5 Chapter overview

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background to the research question, outlining the development of the ‘education in emergencies’ sector. The chapter defines the term education in emergencies and presents a typology for the different types and phases of emergencies, and the population groups affected. It outlines the fundamental arguments for the need for education in situations of emergencies and reconstruction, and the particular features of that education. Finally, it examines the various gaps in, and constraints on, the provision of education emergencies, and establishes how these gaps and constraints link with the relief-development dichotomy and corresponding financial limitations. Chapter 3 elaborates the nature of the relief-development dichotomy and asks whether humanitarian relief and development assistance are founded on fundamentally competing visions. Arguably, the relief-development ‘gap’ still defines and dictates the way in which education in emergencies is theorised, funded, organised and delivered. The chapter gives an account of the theoretical relief versus development debate. An example from Sudan illustrates how the issues can manifest themselves in the field, highlighting the implications of the current gap beyond those explained in the rhetoric. Similarly, a review of the educational response of three UN organisations in emergency situations reveals the shortcomings and dilemmas the dichotomy creates at an organisational level. Arguably, the relief-development divide weakens all actors, whether providers or recipients of relief and development assistance. Chapter 4 examines Norwegian donor policy, policy commitment and administrative and funding arrangements for humanitarian assistance and education in emergencies in particular. An analysis shows
how the GoN’s commitment to education as a humanitarian response is closely linked with the GoN’s perception of the role of education in development in general; the GoN’s attempt at wider international leverage and the promotion of more holistic aid forms. The closeness between the state and national NGOs, and the role of Norwegian NGOs in pursuing the education in emergencies agenda is also examined. Chapter 5 elaborates on these issues, and explains how history and national particularities must be accounted for when examining a country’s donor policy and funding procedures for ‘model transferability’. Norway’s role as a humanitarian Great Power and the role of aid in the formation of national identity underpin and shape the perception of aid in Norway, and inform the way in which aid is administered and channelled. Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of previous findings and analyses. It reiterates the right to, and the urgent need for, education in emergencies, and the many shortcomings in the provision of education in such situations. Norway’s policy model on education in emergencies is exemplary, but cannot be separated from the particular role of civil society in the formulation and execution of policy, and Norway’s strategic self-interest in pursuing a particular aid agenda—an interest that may not apply to other donor governments.
2. Education in emergencies, an emerging sector

Education has traditionally been seen as a development activity. In the context of humanitarian relief, it is has been considered a ‘luxury’. Compared to food and water, shelter and health care, education is neither indispensable nor required for subsistence, some argue (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003: 12). Over the past decade, however, education has received increased recognition as a humanitarian concern. This development parallels the establishment of education in emergencies as a field of academic research, policy research and teaching, and the compilation and systemisation of case studies and best practices. This development must also be seen in the context of a slow but significant shift within both the relief and development communities: At both ends of the emergency to development continuum, theorists and practitioners are calling for more holistic forms of aid and more flexible interventions.

This chapter will define the theoretical framework underpinning the emerging sector of education in emergencies. It will define the term education in emergencies and the typology used to identify the challenges related to the various types and phases of emergencies. It shall also discuss the apparent problems related to the use of a rigid typology, as well as the needs and responses that are likely to be found in these different contexts. In emergencies as in ‘normal’ situations, access to education is closely linked to quality of education, but the measures applied during and following emergencies do have their particularities. Taking into account the contextual needs and the shortcomings of the typology, the chapter will outline three basic arguments in support of the provision of education in emergencies: the rights-based approach; education as a mechanism for protection, and education as a potentially conflict-exacerbating or conflict-mitigating tool. Arguably, there are ample moral, legal and practical arguments in support of an immediate and substantial raise in the attention given to this field. Finally, the chapter will introduce some of the most significant gaps in the provision of education of emergencies; that of mandate confusion and lack of coordination, and that of insufficient donor commitment, predictability and support. Despite its well-documented merits, the provision of education in emergencies nowhere near corresponds to the needs of emergency-affected populations, or the commitments formally expressed by governments and the international community.
2.1 Defining education in emergencies

For millions of people around the world, emergencies are simply part of everyday life. 2004 accounted for 32 wars and almost 10 million refugees (Sources: Project Ploughshares; UNHCR). Recent statistics estimate that there are more than 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world (Global IDP Project, 2005). At the same time, many million refugees and IDPs are currently returning home to countries and areas still in ruin after years and sometimes decades of war and calamities. Millions more are caught in, or are recovering from, the devastation caused by natural disasters, be it floods, earthquakes, droughts or tsunamis. Demographic statistics from these areas are incomplete, but it is estimated that at least half of all forced migrants are children and youth (Sommers, 2002: 3; WCRWC, 2005). Only the lucky few have access to quality education. In 11 major conflict-affected countries covered by the first Global Survey on Education in Emergencies, 27 million of 52 million children and youth living in these 11 countries were found to be out of school (Bethke and Braunschweig, 2004: 1, 9).

In this thesis, both ‘education’ and ‘emergencies’ are referred to in the broadest meaning of the two terms. The term ‘education in emergencies’ has deliberately been preferred over ‘emergency education’, as the latter may imply that the education itself is ‘emergency-like’. Unfortunately, that may be the case in many interventions, but it should not. Quality education is as much a right in emergencies as in ‘normal’ situations, and it is certainly more of a need. Education in emergencies includes formal education, non-formal education and informal education. ‘Formal education’ refers to regular schooling following a normal pattern of admission, yearly promotion from grade to grade and the use of a broad and officially recognised curriculum. It comprises primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational education. The term ‘non-formal education’ is used for targeted educational activities outside the formal system: courses, workshops and apprenticeships aimed specifically at particular individuals or groups of individuals. Activities can be geared at literacy and numeracy, health and hygiene promotion, life skills such as conflict management, human rights and environmental education or training in particular business skills or crafts. ‘Informal education’ is used to describe to the use of learning channels such as the media or public information campaigns aimed at the broad masses or larger groups of a society. (IIEP-UNESCO, 2005/forthcoming).

Parts of this section is drawn from two chapters prepared by the author for the Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction: Chapter 1 “Introduction” and chapter 3 “Challenges in education in emergencies and reconstruction”. (IIEP-UNESCO, 2005/forthcoming)
### 2.1.1 Emergencies: Types, phases and population groups

The definitions of education given above apply in most emergency situations as well as ‘normal’ situations. However, emergencies create particular challenges and needs, and as a consequence, require particular interventions. The challenges in the provision of education in emergencies range from destruction of school buildings to lack of funding, materials and qualified teachers, from discrimination against minority groups to security issues or problems of coordination. Issues of increased sexual violence and psychological or physical trauma will also determine what education must be provided and through which means. For example, the provision of education for former child soldiers will pose different challenges compared to education for children with disabilities. Generic challenges, such as poverty or security, all add to these specific challenges.

The particular challenges and interventions related to education in emergencies are normally categorised according to type of emergency, the population group concerned and the phase of the emergency. The cube below is an illustration of this typology.

**Figure 1: Emergencies: types, phases and population groups**

Emergency scenarios, here called ‘types of emergencies’, include civil conflicts, complex chronic emergencies involving multiple civil conflicts with international involvement, natural disasters and development-induced displacement³.

Recent years have seen a dramatic rise in the number of civil conflicts, usually referred to as armed conflicts within countries. Most of the world’s 32 conflicts in 2004 were civil conflicts (Project Ploughshares, 2005). The challenges these conflicts place on educational authorities and the agencies supporting them are enormous. Because the unequal or biased provision of education is often one of the elements that provoke civil conflict, schools, teachers and students may themselves become targets. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), military occupation forces must facilitate institutions devoted to the care and education of children. Its first Protocol (1977) states that schools are guaranteed protection from military attack. Yet physical destruction, damage and looting are commonplace, and widespread displacement often creates acute teacher shortages.

Some countries suffer chronic insecurity and recurring civil conflict, with international intervention. Also in these situations, the education suffer under immediate fighting or declining security, increased poverty amongst students and their families, and through the wider economic impacts that reduce the funds available for education.

Natural disasters also carry serious challenges for the education system. The devastation of floods, droughts, earthquakes, landslides, storms, tsunamis and other natural disasters can cause the destruction of schools and other educational institutions, and may kill or isolate a large number of teachers and students.⁴

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³ Development-induced displacement, and so-called silent emergencies such as HIV and AIDS are not referred to specifically in this thesis, as responses to these types of emergencies rarely spur relief operations. However, the principles and strategies discussed for other types of emergencies will also apply to these situations.

⁴ According to the World Disasters Report published by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRC) (2004), the number of natural and technological disasters (broken dams, chemical water pollution causing widespread death etc.) is on a dramatic increase. From 1994 to 1998, reported disasters averaged 428 per year. From 1999 to 2003, this figure shot up by two-thirds to an average 707 disasters each year. The biggest rise was in countries of low human development, which suffered an increase of 142 per cent. There is also strong correlation between a country’s level of development and that country’s vulnerability in natural disasters. In other words, people living in conflict or poverty-ridden countries are likely to suffer the most when a catastrophe strikes. Over the past decade, disasters in countries of high human development (HHD) killed an average of 44 people per event, while disasters in countries of low human development (LHD) killed an average of 300 people each (IFRCRC, 2004).
**Population groups** affected by emergencies include refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and non-migrants—people whose lives and schooling are disrupted by conflict, but who do not flee.

According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country...” (UNHRC, 1951: Art. 1A, §2).

In theory, it is the responsibility of the host government to provide education for refugees, at the same level as for the population of the host country. UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, has the mandate to support education for refugees, as a contribution to a durable solution to their problems, and to help the host country government meet its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other human rights instruments. (UNHCR, 2003). In reality however, the host government often refuses or is unable to admit refugee children to local schools. When refugee children are admitted to local schools, there may be access problems. Local schools may already be overcrowded, especially in urban areas, the refugee population may be too large or teachers may not speak the same language or the languages of instruction may be different. Practical problems and considerable political tension may also rise over which curriculum to use.

UNHCR’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” (UNHCR, 1998)

Like refugees, IDP families have suffered forced displacement and sometimes traumatic circumstances. In addition, security concerns are usually considerable, both for the IDPs and for agencies supporting education programmes. IDPs may not be welcomed by the local population or government. Critically, no UN body has the mandate to ensure education for IDPs, in camps or dispersed throughout the country. As a result, there are even fewer resources available for IDP education, both from the international community and the government (IIEP-UNESCO, 2005/forthcoming; Global IDP Project, 2005). Statistics are incomplete, but it is estimated that more than half of the world’s refugee and IDP children and
adolescents are out of school (Bethke and Brownschweig, 2004: 9).

Another group included in this typology are those who live in an emergency-affected area, but who may be unable or unwilling to leave their homes during conflict or insecurity. Non-migrants are often too poor, too old or too sick to migrate, or are trapped by warfare. Non-migrants’ access to education is frequently completely cut off for reasons of security, the flight of local teachers, lack of school materials, or the lack of resources to sustain education in the community. Resentment may occur if agencies give particular assistance or preferable treatment to refugees, IDPs or returnees – those who ‘stayed behind’ may feel they carried the brunt of the burden of the emergency.

A fourth group that must be considered when dealing with education in emergencies are returnees – refugees or IDPs who have come back to their home country or area. Some returnees may not want to return to their original home areas for reasons of safety and security. This may concentrate the number of students into fewer areas of return, causing increased pressure on facilities in those areas. Considering the point about tensions with non-migrant above, international agencies providing resources for returnees will need to direct their assistance to broadly-defined returnee-receiving areas.

**Phases of emergency** include contingency planning and emergency preparedness, the acute onset of an emergency (sometimes cynically referred to as the CNN-phase and lasting normally from three or four weeks to a maximum of 18 months), protracted emergencies, return and reintegration and early reconstruction. Organisations concerned with humanitarian response and development assistance have their own definitions of an emergency, covering a period of a few weeks during the onset of a crisis, through to the return to normalcy after a period of reconstruction. (Sinclair, 2002: 21-23).

### 2.1.2 Problems with categorisations and typologies

As the cube above illustrates, there are close relationships between types of emergencies (scenarios), affected populations and phases. More importantly, the different categories used in this typology are neither fully exhaustive nor discrete. The phases of an emergency are very rarely sequential or chronological. International conflict may be entangled in civil conflict. A natural disaster may be exacerbated by a conflict rising in its aftermath. IDPs may become refugees as the emergency evolves, or vice versa. Both refugees and IDPs may eventually become returnees. Moreover, one population group that is not specified in this categorisation
are those who are neither migrants nor themselves living in an area directly struck by the emergency, but who are nonetheless affected by it. These can be inhabitants of a neighbouring country or province suddenly faced with a large influx of refugees or IDPs.

Similarly, emergency phases overlap and recur. An acute emergency may turn into a so-called protracted emergency, or into what some humanitarian agencies call the ‘care and maintenance’ phase. This phase can again be disrupted by the sudden outbreak of a new, acute crisis. One part of a country is sometimes facilitating the return of its inhabitants and organising efforts at reconstruction, whilst another part is faced with a new upsurge in the conflict, or is hit by another natural disaster.

Despite its shortcomings, the three-dimensional categorisation outlined above is nonetheless basis for much of the theorisation and the delivery of education in emergencies. Agencies operating in emergencies and reconstruction will almost always be using some variation of this categorisation in their work. Some agencies and organisations have a mandate to work in the early phases of an emergency only, or with one particular population group, such as refugees. Their entry or exit strategies and their funding and evaluation mechanisms are likely to be built on some form of categorisation of emergency type or phase, or population group concerned. The typology and examples given above thus also help to demonstrate how phases, types and groups overlap, recur and/or blend. More importantly, they point to the obvious complexity of emergencies and reconstruction, and the need for holistic approaches to these challenges. Quick fixes, short-term strategies or strategies that address the challenges of one emergency-affected group or one phase only, will never meet the overall challenge of providing Education for All in emergencies and reconstruction.

2.1.3 Providing education in emergencies –meeting which needs?

Providing access to education in emergencies is of course about more than getting children into school. Relevance, equity of access and outcome, and proper observance of individual rights are central to the meaningful provision of education –anywhere. (UNESCO, 2004: 30). Access to education is thus intricately linked to the quality of education. As Pigozzi (2004) describes, there is no universal definition of the term ‘quality’, but one common misperception is that access to education must precede attention to quality. Surely, one cannot have quality without access, but access without quality is also meaningless. Without quality, children will drop out of school. Children who feel that they are not learning or that what they are learning is irrelevant, will leave even if their fees are paid for and there are places
available. Likewise, parents will weigh the benefits of sending their children to school against the opportunity cost. If there are no teaching and learning materials, if the teachers are mostly absent or only have limited teaching skills, or there are no post-primary education or employment opportunities available, parents are likely to regard the opportunity costs as too high for education to be worthwhile.

Box 1: Inclusive access to education

Access to education, especially in emergencies and during reconstruction, is concerned with formal access, but also

Non-discrimination: all children having access to education, regardless of ethnicity, religion, political persuasion, citizenship, gender, disability or social class.

School ambience: the environment children encounter when they get to school – whether children feel safe and supported.

Curriculum: what children learn when they are in school – whether it is relevant to their current situation and provides them with relevant skills for their future, whether it is taught in their mother tongue, at least in the lower grades of schooling, and free of divisive messages etc.

Teaching and learning processes: whether teaching methods are effective and pupil-centred.

Attendance: whether children attend school on a regular basis.

Retention: whether children progress through various grades once enrolled in school.

Alternatives: whether non-formal education opportunities exist for children and young people who cannot – for whatever reason – enrol in a formal school, or for whom many years of education have been missed as a result of conflict or displacement.

Source: IIEP-UNESCO (2005/forthcoming)

The principles embedded in ‘quality education’ in ‘normal’ or peaceful situations broadly apply also in emergency situations, yet particular challenges require particular interventions. Some examples of these particularities are given in Annex 1. Educational responses in emergencies are focused on the meeting the actual needs of the affected population, as well as on formal schooling (INNEE, 2003). As already indicated by the typology outlined above, the needs will vary depending on the phases and the situation. Over the last decade, the consolidation of research and systemising of field experience have produced a collection of best practices, tools and principles for delivery of education in emergencies. In broad terms, the context-specific needs and possible responses include the following:

In the acute/flight/displacement phase, educational initiatives will need to focus on disseminating crucial information and messages on for example landmine awareness, health and environmental risks, or HIV/AIDS prevention. There should also be considerable emphasis on psychosocial and recreational elements. In the chronic or coping phases of an emergency, responses are likely to take form of more organised learning: formal and non-formal schooling. In situations of displacement, messages and topics are included to prepare for return. Strong emphasis is generally placed on the role of education as preparation for the
future, with inclusion of lessons in risk and conflict management, peace building and human rights education. In the return, reintegration and rehabilitation phases, interventions must explicitly address long-term needs and potential strategies for rebuilding and upgrading the whole school system. Without disregarding the devastation that may have been caused to the education system, this phase should make use of the positive opportunities that may follow in the aftermath of an emergency. These opportunities may involve the development of more equal gender policies and practices and the revision of previously divisive curriculum and teaching practices. This requires that sufficient time is given for curriculum development, training of teachers and the gradual development of new system approaches. (INEE, 2003; Talbot, 2002; UNESCO, 2004: 30-37).

2.2 Why education in emergencies?

At a rhetorical level, the pledge for the inclusion of education in humanitarian response is most often dismissed by a comparison with more immediately life-saving types of assistance, such as food and water, shelter and medical care. Advocacy for the inclusion of education in humanitarian response is based on two broad premises: firstly, that education can in fact be both life-saving and life-sustaining, and secondly, that effective humanitarian response, from a moral and a practical point of view, requires a consideration of both its causes and long-term consequences. The case for education must thus be argued with reference to the rights-based approach, to its function as a protection tool and to its potential as both a conflict-exacerbating or conflict-mitigating tool.

2.2.1 The right to education

Education is a right. This right is expressed in a number of international humanitarian and human rights instruments, including the Geneva Conventions, the Convention of the Rights of

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5 Whilst each emergency situation has unique attributes, successful reconstruction and recovery after a conflict will at a minimum require a “triple transition”. The three phases, according to Forman et.al (2004: 14) involve a security transition from war to peace, a political transition from authoritarianism (or totalitarianism) to a more participatory form of government, and a socio-economic transition, including the rebuilding of economic capacities and, often, the movement from a controlled to a market economy. As a result, the types and modalities of aid needed by societies emerging from conflict reflect simultaneous needs for emergency and reconstruction assistance, as well as development assistance. As education plays a role in these transitions, support for educational interventions must be found in the emergency as well as the reconstruction and development strategies. Educational interventions must come early and they must be provided within a long-term strategy or at least with the perspective of catering for needs and challenges that will come in the future. Finally, they must be undertaken with the necessary scope and resources to support real changes, not just immediate material needs.
the Child, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various regional rights instruments. It is reiterated in the second of the Millennium Development Goals and in the six Education for All (EFA) Goals. (World Education Forum, 2000: § 7, United Nations, 2000: 5). The right to education is not relinquished during calamity and crises. On the contrary, conflict and emergencies, together with HIV/AIDS and corruption, have been identified amongst the main barriers to reaching EFA. The fifth of the eleven objectives adopted by the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children in emergencies. It stresses the importance of meeting “… the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct[ing] educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict” (World Education Forum: 2000: §8 (v)). The Dakar Framework for Action calls for national Education for All plans to include provision for education in emergency situations, and for the international community, including UN organisations and NGOs to support the same process. Recently, the United Nations 2005 World Summit (Millennium Development Goal +5 summit) reaffirmed States’ commitment to timely and effective humanitarian assistance, singling out education as a key element of that assistance. In §118 of the outcome document, signatories spelled out their affirmed commitment in the following pledge: “We therefore call upon all States concerned to take concrete measures to ensure accountability and compliance by those responsible for grave abuses against children. We also reaffirm our commitment to ensure that children in armed conflicts receive timely and effective humanitarian assistance, including education, for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.” (World Summit, 2005: §118). This document, agreed upon by all Member States of the United Nations, indisputably links education to humanitarian response. As shall be discussed in further detail later in this and the following chapters, however, the commitment is not translated into practice.

**Box 2: Education for All (EFA) plans**

EFA plans show donor agencies that governments have made long-term plans for the development of the education sector. According to the Dakar Framework for Action, all States should have “develop[ed] or strengthen[ed] existing national plans of action by 2002 at the latest” building on existing national education sector development strategies. EFA plans should be integrated into a wider poverty reduction and development framework, and should be developed through transparent and democratic processes, involving all relevant stakeholders, especially peoples’ representatives, community leaders, parents, learners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society.

Source: IIEP (2005/forthcoming); World Education Forum (2000)
2.2.2 Education that protects

The rights-based approach to education transcends legal documents and policy statements. The humanitarian and human rights instruments listed above are in essence reflections of what we believe are fundamental and universal values: respect, dignity and fairness, to mention some. The right to education thus encompasses education’s positive furtherance of these values. The right to education must also be viewed in light of its ‘enabling’ function. Fulfilment of the right to education will foster equality, dignified and secure lives, and social development –also stated as basic human rights.

In the context of education in emergencies, one of the most significant facets of the rights-based approach is the role of education in the protection of children and adolescents (Baxter, 2002: 28-29; Sinclair, 2005: 27-31, UNESCO, 2005:30-31). Between 1990 and 2000, more than 2 million children died as a direct result of armed conflict. It is estimated that an additional 6 million children were gravely injured or permanently disabled and more than 1 million orphaned or separated from their families (UNICEF, 2002: 42). Millions more suffer the indirect consequences of conflict and disasters: increased poverty and loss of livelihoods, the disruption of social and economic support structures, diseases and increased levels of abuse and exploitation. In her landmark report from 1996, Graca Machel describes the devastating physical as well as social and emotional impact of armed conflict on children: “Not only are large numbers of children killed and injured, but countless others grow up deprived of their material and emotional needs, including the structures that give meaning to social and cultural life. The entire fabric of their societies –their homes, schools, health systems and religious institutions, are torn to pieces” (Machel, 1996: 9). The report induced a significant increase in the attention paid to child protection by the humanitarian community. Child protection now features prominently in humanitarian law and also in the declarations and mandate statements that address children and youth in conflict and emergencies. In this context, education in emergencies must be explained as a necessity that can be both life-sustaining and life-saving, providing physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection. Save the Children are among the organisations that have articulated this point: “While assuring the physical safety of children is crucial, child protection encompasses more than stopping attacks or moving children out of harm’s way. It includes measures that promote children’s physical and emotional well-being, provide them with equal access to basic services, and safeguard their legal and human rights. After a conflict, protection programs provide long-term support
to those who have suffered” (Save the Children, 2005:3). Alongside protection from physical harm therefore, protection from exploitation and gender-based violence, psychosocial distress, family separation and abuse related to forced displacement, as well as protection from denial of children’s right to quality education are included in the definition of child protection.

Education can sustain life by offering structure and stability. Victims of conflicts and emergencies may have been through the most appalling suffering. Yet in the midst of crises, in settlements, camps, villages and towns all over the world, education is looked to as a real, and often the only, hope for the future. As described by Nicolai and Triplehorn (2003: 9), education can inherently protect children by fostering a feeling of self-worth and identity as a student and learner; the establishment and development of social networks and the provision of adult supervision and access to a regular and structured daily schedule. Regular homework, defined goals and rewards, such as certificates and school ceremonies, offer children short-term and long-term objectives and the prospect of real achievement. In situations of prolonged conflict, where children may never have seen stable family or community functions, this structure may become a pillar of their very existence. Education can help heal trauma and convey the skills required in conflict resolution and peace-building, thereby laying the fundament for future peace and stability. At the same time, education in emergencies saves lives by directly protecting against exploitation and harm, and by disseminating key survival messages on for example landmine safety or HIV/AIDS prevention (INEE, 2004: 5-6; INEE, 2005). Nicolai and Triplehorn (2003: 11) exemplifies how the ability to read allows children to gather information about their environment, from signs, newspapers, health brochures or medicine bottles. Writing skills may enable them to sign for services or write letters seeking assistance. Education is thus both a service to be supported, and an ‘enabling right’ (Pigozzi, 1999: 2). Resumption of educational activities or the creation of some alternative form of schooling is also amongst the highest priorities of emergency-affected communities themselves. As soon as their minimum needs have been covered for food, water and sanitation and shelter, emergency-affected communities request the resumption of educational activities. Communities often themselves take the initiative to start up some kind of education or school during an emergency, and from their very scarce resources, are able to mobilise substantial educational support for their children. (Brown, 2001; Midttun, 2000a; Sinclair, 2001; Talbot, 2002). For families, children’s school attendance can help to structure the schedule of the whole family, and may provide parents with the time and space to resume income-generating activities, or simply to process their own trauma.
2.2.3 The two faces of education

A third argument for prioritising education in emergencies can be derived from the close links between education and conflict. In the words of Emily Vargas-Baron (2001) “in every failed state, there is a failed education system.” One assumption that can be derived from this argument is the possibility that education systems themselves reflect the conflict risks of a society: “An analyses of education structure and educational processes from a conflict perspective could therefore be an important component of a conflict ‘early warning system’” (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 28). Similarly, education systems may exacerbate or mitigate a society’s conflict potential. Children and youth have enormous potential, for learning, for cooperation and for contributing to society. This potential can be constructive or destructive, and children and youth without meaningful opportunities and positive influences are easily recruited or attracted by alternative and often negative activities. “Every society depends on the next generation that is gradually taking over, and no society can afford to lose this constructive potential. It must be protected and stimulated even in crisis situations” (INNE, 2005). Education may become embroiled in problems that spurred the emergency in the first place. Education is not a panacea. The assumption that “whatever is done to ensure more education, contributes to promoting democratic attitudes” (Schell-Faucon quoted in Seitz, 2004: 17) has been fiercely opposed. Counter-arguments are found in, amongst other places, numerous analyses of the two faces of education in the context of ethnic conflict (Bush and Saltarelli: 2000; Smith and Vaux, 2003). Of course, “simply providing education does not ensure peace” (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 10). The denial of education to certain groups within a society may be used as a weapon of war, or education may be used to suppress certain languages, traditions, art forms, religious and cultural practices. Textbooks can be manipulated for political purposes. Therefore, while education can play a crucial role in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction, care must be taken to address its potentially negative power. (Anderson and Rognerud, 2004: 11-12; Smith and Vaux, 2003: 28-32). Early and targeted educational interventions, from the onset of a crisis are central. Moreover, education interventions must be supported by the necessary resources and strategies to ensure equal and inclusive access and a minimum level of education quality. Education in emergencies must take into consideration the special psychosocial and protection needs of children, youth and adults. Most importantly, it must “fulfil...the prerequisites for societal reconstruction and reconciliation” (Seitz, 2004: 17).
2.3 Gaps in the provision of education in emergencies

There are many gaps in the provision of education in emergencies, some of which have already been touched upon in the previous paragraphs. The reasons are complex and range from lack of access and quality to coordination issues or exclusion of specific groups, such as certain ethnic groups, girls or adolescents. One gap that perpetrates all of these issues is that of inadequate and unpredictable funding, and a corresponding problem with mandate confusion and lack of international coordination (Crisp, 2001; Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003; Talbot, 2002). The following section will introduce these issues in some more detail.

2.3.1 Mandate confusion and lack of coordination

The lack of clarity over which agencies are responsible for providing education in situations of emergency and reconstruction is evident at the highest levels of the international system. Amongst the United Nations agencies that currently are involved in educational activities in such situations, there is an apparent and unresolved problem with mandate overlap. UNESCO, whose mandate is education, UNICEF, whose mandate is child protection, UNDP, whose mandate is to eradicate poverty and UNHCR, whose mandate is to protect and assist refugees, could all justify taking the role as the lead United Nations agency for education during a crises. (Sommers, 2004: 17). The conflict over United Nations mandates is a source of highly destructive and seemingly avoidable confusion, duplication and power struggles. In reality, which UN agency end up doing what in a given situation may be determined by chance, by the order in which the agencies arrive at the scene, the level of presence of the agencies prior to the crises, the geopolitical significance of the crises and indeed the funding arrangement and donor support each agency negotiates for their programmes. UNESCO’s Coordinator for Emergency response, Ms. Louise Haxthausen, is blunt about this ‘first-come-first-serve’ predicament. Asked why UNESCO often seems to contradict itself with an official ‘development-only’ policy and yet a low but significant activity in emergency and post-emergency situations, Haxthausen admits that other organisations are simply faster at getting there: “UNESCO’s mandate is in fact very clear [we should be ‘doing’ emergencies], the problem relates to the realities on the ground. We do not have the necessary field presence to

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6 Parts of this section are adapted from two chapters co-drafted by the author for the Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction: Chapter 4 “Education for All in Emergencies and Reconstruction” and Chapter 37 “Coordination and communication” (IIEP-UNESCO, 2005/ forthcoming)
take prompt action at country level… UNESCO has not made enough early investments.” (Haxthausen, personal communication). Similar kinds of tension can be seen among the international NGOs. The first one to arrive on the scene is likely to be the one who receives the greatest attention, the greatest responsibilities and often the largest amounts of funds. This does not mean that the NGO in question is the most qualified for the job, or the one with the largest capacity. As Sommers (2004: 18) notes, UN agencies as well as the NGOs are acutely aware of the benefit of flagging their particular agency in a crisis. A high media profile and/or status as a lead or coordinating agency increases the agencies opportunities for fund-raising. Simple competition for recognition and funds thus often impede coordination efforts from the beginning.

So what should UN agencies and NGOs be doing to increase their coordination? What would they be doing if they were coordinating? Various definitions exist for the meaning of coordination. The Cambridge international dictionary of English (Cambridge University Press, 1995: 303) defines coordination as “to make (various different things) work effectively as a whole”. This is not to say that coordination necessarily implies harmony or equity amongst the participants. With reference to humanitarian interventions, and education in emergencies in particular, Larry Minear identifies a number of concerns. The most serious is the fact that “coordination is easier to advocate than to achieve” (quoted in Sommers, 2004: 26). This fact is intricately linked with the relief-development gap, as “the political economy of the humanitarian enterprise –that is, the perceived institutional needs of donors and operational agencies and the power-based dynamics of their interaction –work against it”. The first dimension of this problem has to do with power. Who has the power to pull a humanitarian operation together? At present, the answer is no-one. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) play important roles that will be examined in some more detail in chapter 3. The sentiment still prevails however that “coordination is ... reducing the profile of individual aid-groups” (Minear, 2002: 48). A further problem concerns the difficulty of devising effective coordination structures and the question of leadership. Whilst OCHA holds a clear mandate for this task in the UN family, the agency struggles with limited staff, budget and authority. Under the present funding arrangements, therefore –where individual agencies are left to compete for scrambles of money and short-lived media attention, agencies’ ‘territorial’ preferences are likely to pervade any debate on work-share arrangements. Clearly, NGOs are also “no more willing than United Nations agencies to accept direction” (Minear, 2002: 49). It
follows that even the most effective leader or lead agency, however indispensable, depends on institutional support and the buy-in of all the actors involved if coordination is to succeed. A final, and central problem is cost, as coordination is an expensive undertaking. As Sommers discusses, even poorly coordinated operations require that agencies meet. The time, travel, subsistence allowances and venue costs associated with conferences and meetings are likely to be substantial. At the same time, it is extremely difficult to raise funds for coordination work. This is especially the case of education in emergencies. The time frame of operations is at best vague, and agencies involved are likely to diverse in their view as to where on the humanitarian-development scale operations should start and finish.

2.3.2 Funding and donor commitment

Although a growing amount of research and a number of recent publications clearly document both the importance of, and the constraints on, access to education in emergencies, donors especially lag behind in their response to this crucial field. The issue of coordination is already discussed above, and will be treated in more detail in Chapter 3, but is intricately linked with that of funding. One of the most acute problems with regard to funding stems from the approach adopted towards education in emergencies by major donor governments and international assistance agencies –UN agencies and NGOs alike. An overwhelming majority of donor governments still have a structure that splits policy and operational responsibility between development programmes and humanitarian relief activities (Seitz, 2004: 15, 42–43; Talbot, 2002). Their funding mechanisms tend to follow that division. The perception of education as ‘development luxury’ or at least a secondary priority compared to that of purely biological and physical needs has meant that as a result, education in emergencies ‘falls between he cracks’. Whilst the attitude towards education in emergencies is slowly changing, institutional mandates and funding cycles make it difficult for donors and relief agencies with even the best of intentions to support necessary long-term investments in the education of children of youth affected by emergencies, especially among displaced populations. For similar reasons, the development agencies on their part have difficulties extending their educational assistance to populations affected by disasters. Development

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7 The term ‘donor’ normally refers to a wide range of actors, all with different outlooks, and often with different objectives and modes of operation. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘donors’ shall refer to government donors. Similarly, the term ‘financial aid’ normally covers many various types of aid including balance of payments support; general budget support; aid-funded debt relief; sectoral budget support; project aid using government systems; project aid using parallel systems; project aid through NGO/private providers and multilateral aid. (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005: 7-9; IIEP-UNESCO, 2005/forthcoming). ‘Aid’, when used in this thesis, includes all these types of financial assistance.
agencies are further prohibited from involvement in humanitarian situations for practical reasons such as security and the need for rapid responses.

2.4 Time to act

Education in emergencies is gaining ground as a field of academic research and as an operational sector. Agencies and donors concerned with both relief and development will find evidence to support education in emergencies as a life-saving and life-sustaining endeavour. By now, the field has accumulated experience and shared best practices which should guide interventions in various situations and phases of emergencies, addressing the very real needs of affected populations. However, education in emergencies still falls between the cracks. Lack of coordination and appropriate funding is exacerbated by inflexible institutional mandates and procedures. The fact that discrepancy is great between the needs and the deliverables cannot be separated from the discrepancy between the promises of the international community and structures put in place to fulfil these promises. Before the international community addresses the relief-development gap, neither of these discrepancies will be corrected.
3. Humanitarian relief vs development programming: Competing visions?

The previous chapters have outlined what is meant by education in emergencies, and some of the most serious shortcomings in both the theorisation and delivery of education in emergencies. Many of the gaps, it has been argued, relate either directly or indirectly to an artificial dichotomy between relief and development. This chapter shall further develop the argument that the relief-development gap still defines and dictates the way in which education in emergencies is funded, organised and delivered.

The last five years have seen a number of initiatives aimed at bridging the relief-development gap. These include attempts at providing both theoretical and operational frameworks that better correspond to the situation on the ground, and to the real needs of those millions of people living in countries in or emerging from conflict and emergencies. The process is slow, however. In the case of education, both the acute emergency phases and the often prolonged transitional and early reconstruction phases following an emergency are marked by severe shortcoming of funds, personnel and appropriate services. First of all, a closer look at the portion of aid requested and spent on education in relief operations shows how dire the financial insufficiency in fact still is. Secondly, an analysis of the theoretical underpinning of the relief-development dichotomy explains some of the conceptual challenges to bridge the relief-development gap. One small but significant example from an early post-war donor conference on Sudan illustrates how the gap manifests itself in the field. An examination of the policies of three major UN agencies; UNICEF, UNHCR and UNESCO further shows how implementing organisations and the relief and aid system at large grapple with issues essentially rooted in the same dichotomy. Finally, the chapter will give an account of some of the recent developments in education in emergencies: the role of agencies such as OCHA in the relief coordination; the strengthening of INEE and the development of minimum standards for education in emergencies, and the Humanitarian Response Review. Looking at the very latest policy statement on humanitarian response, the chapter will examine the introduction of a clusters approach in relief operations and the implications for education in emergencies in particular.

3.1 Traditional donor policy and educational interventions in emergencies

The formal definition of an acute emergency is usually confined to a maximum of 18 months (Adolfini et.al., 2005: 23). Accordingly, humanitarian assistance for emergencies is normally
short-term and project oriented. “Relief organisations must be able to respond quickly and must give priority to urgent needs” (Lexow, 2002: 8). Implicitly, this refers to immediate needs for food, water, shelter and medicines. Development assistance, on the other hand, is commonly accepted as a means to further the general economic, social and political environment in a country. Now conceptualised in the term ‘development co-operation’, it is usually defined by its long-term objectives and is always based on some agreement between the donor and the government in questions. The procedures and mechanisms for providing development assistance are usually much slower than for emergency relief.

Chapter 2 suggested that an analysis of ‘education in emergencies’ must address the full spectrum of types and phases of emergencies. There is no such thing as linear progress from relief to development. Where conflicts or emergencies persist or re-erupt over longer time periods, relief and developmental efforts will co-exist and replace each other on a fluctuate basis. In all emergency situations and throughout all phases however, educational interventions must relate to one focussed and consistent objective: the facilitation of quality education and learning for a better future. In the words of Mary-Joy Pigozzi, an influential advocate for education in emergencies, “education is not a relief activity; it is central to human and national development and must be conceptualised as a development activity” (Pigozzi, 1999: i). In terms of funding, the relief-development gap represents at least two shortcomings therefore: Firstly, in humanitarian relief, education is severely under-prioritised and under-funded, and when provided tends to focus on physical materials and ‘stop-gap’ activities. Secondly, as a reflection and exacerbation of the first issue, there are virtually never sufficient funds to maintain and develop activities in so-called transitional phases after the acute emergency and before ‘normalcy’, where development projects come into play.

3.1.1 Let the numbers speak: Education in Flash Appeals and CAP

“While several organisations respond to education in emergencies, that response is ad hoc. This is a sector where there has been no clear lead in humanitarian response operations, and where there is a dearth funding for education activities” (Anderson, personal communication). As the Focal Point for the recently developed Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction (MSEE), Anderson has given countless variations of this statement. Still, nothing illustrates the ‘funding gap’ more clearly than a few basic statistics.
At international level, humanitarian relief is currently organised and funded through Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeals Processes (CAP) facilitated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA carries out its coordination function primarily through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which is chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC)\(^8\). Participants include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to the Red Cross Movement and NGOs. The CAP is just one of IASC’s coordination mechanisms and provides the framework for establishing a common strategy in a given region or country as a response to an emergency (Cotterrell and Harmer, 2005: 5). Launched as part of the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991 (OCHA, 1991), it is meant to strengthen coordination and promote effective responses to emergencies. Between the regular CAP launches chaired by the UN Secretary-General, Flash Appeals and donor conferences are convened within the same framework to respond promptly to new emergencies or crises. A comprehensive Financial Tracking System (FTS) provides systematic statistical information on the amounts requested, pledged and covered in different emergencies, as well as the sectoral distribution of funds.

(Source of all tables and figures in chapter 3: ReliefWeb, 2005)

\(^8\) “The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), along with the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), assists the Emergency Relief Coordinator as strategic coordination and consultation mechanisms among key humanitarian actors. The IASC was established in 1992 following General Assembly Resolution 46/182 that called for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is a unique inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. Under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian response, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. A single Secretariat in OCHA serves the IASC and the ECHA. This arrangement ensures that parallel discussions in the two Committees are based on a common understanding of the problems and on effective decision-making processes. The Secretariat has a strategic role in supporting the Emergency Relief Coordinator in his capacity as the chairman of both committees, and the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator in his capacity as the chairman of the IASC Working Group, to ensure that they function effectively and in a coordinated manner.” (OCHA, 2005d)
Table 1: Education as portion of total required in the CAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total requested Million USD</th>
<th>Education Relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>136,0</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>209,9</td>
<td>11,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>119,0</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>165,5</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya and Neighbouring Republics (RF)</td>
<td>61,42</td>
<td>5,02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>64,20</td>
<td>3,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>162,60</td>
<td>2,72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR of Korea</td>
<td>208,80</td>
<td>3,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>125,54</td>
<td>2,05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>85,46</td>
<td>0,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada Flash Appeal</td>
<td>27,64</td>
<td>9,58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>36,04</td>
<td>0,31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>35,80</td>
<td>2,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti Floods</td>
<td>37,36</td>
<td>5,49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>40,45</td>
<td>2,57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>32,67</td>
<td>3,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>83,25</td>
<td>1,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>138,02</td>
<td>6,44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>15,72</td>
<td>0,41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>300,48</td>
<td>9,35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6,40</td>
<td>0,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>60,94</td>
<td>2,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>120,03</td>
<td>14,83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>726,64</td>
<td>14,81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>39,16</td>
<td>0,62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>38,77</td>
<td>2,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>142,88</td>
<td>1,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>97,32</td>
<td>4,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>90,05</td>
<td>4,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,417,5</td>
<td>128,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2004, CAPs were launched for 31 countries and emergencies. Of the 3.4 billion USD requested in these appeals, only 128.5 million, or some 3.8% was requested for education\(^9\). More importantly, the under-funding for education in these appeals is much graver than for any other sector. In 2004, 64% of the total relief requested was actually covered. For education, only 28% was covered.

**Table 2: CAP per sector in South Asian earthquake 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total requested Million USD</th>
<th>% of total request</th>
<th>Commitments/Contributions/carryover Million USD</th>
<th>% covered</th>
<th>Uncommitted pledges Million USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and support services</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic recovery and infrastructure</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sector</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection/Human Rights/Rule of law*</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector not yet specified</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and non-food items</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>549.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.9</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 3 million USD of this were earmarked for activities that include non-formal education.

Similarly, two weeks after the recent earthquake in South Asia, agencies requested 549.6 million USD in a Flash Appeal. 29.2 million, or only 5% of the total request was earmarked for education. Of the 29.2 million, only 2% were actually covered. Donors are clearly reluctant to promise funds for education in emergencies, and when it comes to actually paying up, education is one of the first sectors to be taken off the budget.

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\(^9\) A requirement is the amount requested by the humanitarian community to cover the identified needs in a humanitarian crisis. A pledge is a non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor. A commitment is the creation of a legal, contractual obligation between the donor and recipient entity, specifying the amount to be contributed. A contribution is the actual payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity. The % covered represents the relation between the amount requested and the amount contributed in response to an emergency.
Compared with the situation four years ago, there are few changes to this trend, as illustrated in Table 3. The total covered for education has gone up with 1% point from 27% in 2001 to 28% in 2004, but this is in fact a negative trend when compared to the increase seen in the percentage covered for humanitarian relief in general. The percentage covered for humanitarian relief in general went up from 56% in 2001 to 64% in 2004. Put simply: education, which is already both neglected and disproportionately under-funded in the relief appeals seems to be missing out on the one positive development registered in terms of donor fulfillment of pledges overall. The following paragraphs will look at some of the causes and implications of this situation.
Table 3: Developments since 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Relief</th>
<th>Portion of education in appeal</th>
<th>Education Relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total requested Million USD</td>
<td>Commitments/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>contributions/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>carryover Million USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global CAP requirements and contributions 2001</td>
<td>796,3</td>
<td>552,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global CAP requirements and contributions 2004</td>
<td>3404,6*</td>
<td>217,9*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Where these figures diverge slightly from the totals given in Table 1, this is due to inconsistencies in the OCHA’s own FTS. The sum of pledges listed per individual CAP in 2004 does not correspond perfectly with the total given for all CAPs that year.

Box 3: The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)

The CAP is a mechanism used by aid organizations to plan, implement and monitor their activities. In 1991, following a problematic response to the plight of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in the wake of the first Gulf War, the United Nations General Assembly created the Consolidated Appeals. As a planning mechanism, the CAP is supposed to foster a more strategic approach to the provision of humanitarian aid and closer cooperation between governments, donors, aid agencies, and a range of other humanitarian organisations. Working together in the world's crisis regions, aid organizations produce a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and an appeal, which they present to the international community and donors. Consolidated Appeal documents provide a snapshot of a situation and present aid agencies’ financial requirements. In 2005, 100 NGOs, the International Federation of Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, and 20 UN agencies are part of the CAP.

Source: OCHA (2005b)

Box 4: Flash Appeals

Flash Appeals are used in breaking emergencies to attract attention to people’s needs, structure a coordinated response, and outline agencies’ immediate financial requirements. During the last quarter of 2004, the IASC Sub-Working Group on the CAP reviewed inter-agency flash appeals and developed new guidelines that have been disseminated to Humanitarian Coordinators and to Resident Coordinators in countries where flash appeals could be needed. In essence, flash appeals include a snapshot of what happened, humanitarian consequences, a prioritised response plan, and financial requirements. Since disseminating the new guidelines, flash appeals have been issued for various crises affecting people in: Angola, Benin, Djibouti, Guyana, the Indian Ocean, Niger, and the Philippines. In most cases inter-agency flash appeals now take only 72 hours to issue.

Source: OCHA (2005b)
3.2 The relief-development dichotomy: theoretical and practical challenges

According to Talbot (2002), donor institutions have over the past years been lamenting the division between relief and development—a division that their own aid policies have largely been responsible for creating. Closer alignment between humanitarian and developmental approaches is not, however, straightforward.

3.2.1 Bridging the gap—which way?

“Education in emergency situations has frequently been viewed as a short-term response that is a stop-gap measure until normalcy can be restored: a relief effort. This concept must be challenged (...). Any emergency education programme must be a development programme and not merely a stop-gap measure.” (Pigozzi, 1999: 3). Elaborating on the statement referred to previously in this chapter, Pigozzi here summarises the twofold argument applied by the strongest advocates for education in emergencies: interventions must be part of the early relief effort and must be provided with the perspective of long-term reconstruction, reconciliation and development. Pigozzi’s statement sums up the essence of the bridging approach, but how is it achieved in practice? Do we ask the humanitarian community to build the bridge into the developmental community and plan for the provision of educational services long term, or vice versa? Both ‘camps’ seem reluctant to do so.

“There are legitimate concerns within the humanitarian community that the more explicit politicisation of welfare interventions like education in conflict or post-conflict states threatens to undermine long-established principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, or at least the public perception thereof” (DFID, 2005/forthcoming). At the same time, there is also a perception within parts of the mainstream development community that what is seen as humanitarianism’s relatively short-term, project based approaches may be harmful to longer term development. There is concern that “humanitarian agencies’ over-emphasis on commodity-driven approaches that bypass government structures and fail to build local capacity make it much more difficult to re-engage developmentally” (DFID, 2005/forthcoming).

An example of the first dilemma is reflected in a working paper on the strategy of UNHCR’s longer-term emergency interventions (UNHCR, 1999). The author, a senior UNHCR official, argues vehemently against the refugee agency getting entangled in ‘drawn out, development oriented’ engagements. As an illustration, he applies the following allegory:
If the CEO\textsuperscript{10} of Ford motors proposed moving into the production and promotion of baby food, shareholders and investors would seriously doubt the wisdom of that decision. In other words: the refugee agency should stick to what it knows best, namely the provision of basic commodities for refugees! The argument appears sound, but the point is that the choice is not between cars and baby food. If we imagine Ford motors engaging in the promotion of road development or stabilisation of oil prices, shareholders would think it not just appropriate but mandatory. \textit{That} is the allegory we should apply to education in emergencies, and to the continuum of interventions in relief and development. Likewise, developmentalists who await the establishment of ‘normality’ before they intervene could be waiting for very long time. It is no good starting closer to the target (development) if that means you miss your ride. Conflict and wars last for decades, and the idea of staring ‘afresh’ rebuilding an education system after years of neglect is an illusion at best. Needless to say perhaps, people have only one life and will not have the time to wait decades for education for their children.

\textbf{3.2.2 ‘Waiting for peace’ in Sudan: old legacies die hard}

That many donors still take a ‘wait and see’ approach is nonetheless apparent. On 29 July 2002, a seminar on education in Sudan was held at the DFID Headquarters in London. The opening speaker, Sally Keeble, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, welcomed progress towards peace in Sudan with the following statement: “Over the war years, DFID’s programme focused on meeting humanitarian needs and did not offer support to education as such. DFID considered that peace must come first”. She then underlined DFID’s commitment to “act now. We will invest in the future of Sudan through scholarship programmes … support projects in areas where there has been a significant breakthrough on peace … [and] strengthen our partnerships with NGOs and international organisations working in Sudan, so that when peace comes, we can move quickly to make a major contribution towards rebuilding Sudan, through education and other programmes” (UK DFID, 2002: 3–4). The statement caused a major outcry amongst the seminar participants, especially NGOs and Government representatives. Dr. Sulef Al Din, State Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Government of Sudan, strongly urged that “donors must reject the view that there can be no schools without a final peace settlement. Development projects will help to build the peace” (UK DFID, 2002: 4). Dr. Elijah Malok Aleng, Executive Director, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (the principal humanitarian relief coordination agency of the

\textsuperscript{10} Chief Executive Officer
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement), communicated a similar sentiment, noting that “just because there is a war, it does not mean that you can do nothing. Even in war, there are peaceful areas where development projects are possible.” He clearly disagreed with the view that “the guns must be silent before aid can be given” (UK DFID, 2002: 4-5). The following paragraphs will outline how also implementing agencies in both the relief and the development camps must take responsibility for the continued dichotomy.

### 3.2.3 Organisational challenges

The term ‘humanitarian agencies’ encompasses a myriad of agencies and organisations. Likewise, countless organisations of varying legal identity, size, objectives and operational procedures define themselves under the umbrella term ‘development agencies’. This paragraph will look briefly at three UN agencies all involved in education in emergencies and their position with reference to the dichotomy and the dilemmas described above: UNHCR, UNICEF and UNESCO. The experiences of these agencies may not be representative for the humanitarian or development community at large. However, they exemplify some of the central dilemmas that many agencies face at an organisational and operational level. The issue of mandate confusion has already been discussed in Chapter 2 –arguably, the confusion pervade also at an operational level.

**UNHCR**’s Executive Committee requested already in 1992 that “the basic primary education needs of refugee children be better addressed and that, even in the early stages of emergencies, education needs of refugee children be identified so that prompt attention may be given to such needs” (UNHCR, 1992 § 31(d)). Over the years, several policy papers, such as the *Guidelines on Protection and Care* for refugee children (UNHCR, 1994) have reinforced the equal right to education for refugee children and nationals, and the need to maintain a minimum level of quality of that education. Educational activities under the agency’s auspices are provided with a view to refugees’ eventual repatriation and the rebuilding of their home societies. A full examination of the many complex challenges in this process is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a few points must be noted. The question over which curriculum and language are to be used in refugee education is highly controversial and persistently one where the agency finds itself formulating procedures on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, it is essential that refugee children receive an education, and formal recognition of that education, which facilitates their return to, and the eventual integration
into, their own societies. At the same time, integration of refugees into the host society, through the introduction of local languages in the refugee curriculum for example, is a priority as the situation may become drawn out (Sudan) or even semi-permanent (Palestine). This is often opposed by the host government, and may force UNHCR to divert from its own guidelines for a two-pronged approach (Crisp, 2001; Sinclair, 2001: 39). A further pressing problem is that of funding. “Assistance provided to education is very much lower than the minimum standards recommended by UNHCR, due to limited funding. From the funding available, we hardly succeed to supply the programme with teaching and learning materials, uniforms and furniture” (UNHRC Official Working Group in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Reference in Brown, 2001: 111). The shortage cannot only be blamed on the donors, however. World wide, the refugee agency has no more than 50 persons working exclusively with education in emergencies. At the agency’s preparedness unit, there is only one regular staff position for education (Talbot, personal communication). Within parts of the agency, education is still perceived as a secondary priority in humanitarian assistance. As a result, education is often the first public service to be cut during times of funding crises or restructuring (Aguilar and Retamal quoted in Lexow, 2001: 11).

This thesis has argued that education must indeed be conceptualised as a development activity, but that its provision is equally essential in relief operations. Through the so-called Brookings Process, UNHCR has initiated reforms to bridge the work of relief and development agencies through better coordination in early post-conflict settings. Its proponents will have to overcome profound resistance also from within the organisation, however. In one of the papers prepared for the Brookings Round Table, a senior UNHCR official suggested “it is doubtful whether UNHCR should be involved in something as complex as development processes” (UNHCR, 1999). More importantly, criticism has been raised that this bridging approach actually overlooks the real problem with the gap—the fact that relief and development are not distinct and sequential activities. David Moore, an academic who has contributed to UNHCR’s policy research activities, seriously questions the potential achievement of the Brookings Process. “The notion of post-conflict has emerged and taken flight within humanitarian and development discourse, as if by linguistic fiat a ‘sustainable’ peace will ensue and the traditionally separate realms of western third world-aiding agencies can come together and reconstruct war-torn societies in their image. The humanitarian dispensers of ‘relief’ can, it seems, join with the long-term implementers of ‘development’ in the long march from conflict to peace, if only they can cooperate to work out the division of labour which has separated them in the past” (Moore, quoted in Crisp,
2001). For education in emergencies, the implication is the clear: Improved organisational and operational procedures will only bridge the relief-development gap insofar they are underpinned by a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the purpose and nature of relief and development activities.

**Box 5: The Brookings Process**

In 1999, UNHCR and the Brookings Institute launched a new initiative to study ways of bridging the gap between relief and development. The initiative attempts to ensure broad and systematic cooperation and coordination between relief and development agencies form the very beginning of the recovery phase. Attempts are made to let relief and development agencies carry out joint analyses and needs assessments and prepare joint action plans and project evaluations.

Source: UNHCR (2000: 14)

UNICEF’s involvement in education in emergencies dates back to the early 1990s. A large portion of its funds are spent on educational activities, and education is consistently included in the agency’s CAP appeals. Mary-Joy Pigozzi, whose ‘developmental approach’ to education in emergencies has been discussed earlier, was until 2000 UNICEF’s senior education advisor in New York. From within the agency therefore, strong calls have been made for both the early inclusion of education in relief efforts, and for more holistic thinking about the purpose of the activities delivered. In the field however, UNICEF’s response is surprisingly logistics-oriented. The pillar of the agency’s educational response in emergencies is the provision of so-called ‘School-in-a-box’-kits: 50 kilos’ aluminium cases containing basic educational materials such as blackboards, chalk and simple exercise books. These cases are stored in a warehouse in Copenhagen and are flown out en masse in acute emergencies (Van Kalmthout, personal communication). In the first few weeks following the earthquake in South Asia, 1,750 of these kits were provided, catering for some 140,000 children (UNICEF, 2005). Whilst there is often urgent need for basic education materials in emergency situations, critical questions can be asked as to how the kit-strategy fits into the ‘re-conceptualisation’ called for above. Possibilities for local procurement, context-specific needs and cultural issues as well as the need for teacher training in the use of kits are issues that seem to have been neglected in this part of UNICEF’s response strategy.

UNESCO’s response to emergencies has until recently been, at best, ad hoc. A number of units within the organisation work directly and indirectly with emergency and reconstruction: the Science Sector through its work on early warning systems, the Communication and Information sector through its work with press freedom and journalists in war zones, and the
Education sector through its Programme for Reconstruction of Education Systems and its Programme on Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction at IIEP, to mention some activities. Still, the official position of the UNESCO is that “we do not do emergencies”\textsuperscript{11}. There is no mechanism for deploying staff from Headquarters or the field to emergency situations at short notice. The coordination of UNESCO’s post-emergency response is handled by a one-woman unit within the Bureau of Field Coordination. However, through its extensive network of almost 60 field offices, UNESCO is often involved in emergencies ‘by default’, and specialised units in the organisation are frequently requested to provide assistance in emergencies. Recently, the field offices and these emergency-oriented units have brought increased attention to the consequences of the discrepancy between policy and practice. In education, UNESCO’s mandate and expertise rightly lie not in the provision of education services such as school reconstruction or textbook supply, but in the \textit{planning and management} of education in emergencies and \textit{the reconstruction of education systems} at large. However, because UNESCO is rarely sufficiently present at the donor conferences when strategies and funding is discussed, the Organisation rarely has the funds or the mechanisms to step into its niche further down the line. Louise Haxthausen, the head of UNESCO’s one-woman coordination unit, admits that “UNESCO has not made enough early investments”. An organisation that ‘does not do emergencies’ may get away with relying on biannual programming and funding cycles, but “in the field, UNESCO is frequently called upon in emergencies and reconstruction” (Husain et al., 2005). Within the organisation itself therefore, there is an urgent need for the formulation and communication of an organisation-wide emergency response policy and strategy. Equally dire is the need for flexible administrative arrangements that guarantee rapid financial support, additional staffing and programme approval in emergencies. That again will require a ‘re-conceptualisation’ of both the relief-development dichotomy and the nature of these relief and development activities, as before mentioned. An initiative is underway within UNESCO to establish a roster of emergency personnel that can be deployed to crises zones at short notice, for example. According to Haxthausen, the success of the roster will ultimately require cultural change in the Organisation at large. “The roster is one tool among many. Some sectors already have mechanisms for deploying staff in crises situations, and there it is a matter of formalising the arrangement. In other areas, it really requires a change in organisational culture. Many within UNESCO see themselves as being part of a development organisation.” The idea of education

\textsuperscript{11} UNESCO Deputy Director Françoise Rivière during strategy meeting for UNESCO’s response in emergencies on 15 October 2005.
being a development activity and therefore not a priority in the relief operation, she says manifest itself in several areas of the Organisation’s work. “Culture, much like education, is seen as a luxury, and not as a tool for recovery and reconstruction. The resistance [against including cultural activities in the emergency response] is in fact greatest within the UN system itself –communities are often very supportive. This is paradoxical, because cultural issues are accepted as being a cause of conflict. It is vital to take this into consideration when assisting in emergencies or reconstruction.” (Haxthausen, personal communication).

3.3 Recent developments: A change for the better?

A number of major donor countries are currently reviewing their strategies on emergencies and so-called transitional environments. A few have expressed at least nominal support for conceptualising emergency support in a development perspective. With regard to education, most of these reviews focus on the role of education in conflict prevention, reconciliation and peace building. In the UK and the United States, a number of recent policy notes discuss the concept of fragile or difficult environments, and possibilities of providing more flexible frameworks for working in these environments (DFID, 2005/forthcoming). The UK has also created two special funding pools, one for Sub-Saharan Africa and one for the rest of the world, which finance interventions at the intersection of security and development (Lockhart, 2005: 5). In Canada, a paper on Peacebuilding Education and a Peacebuilding Framework that highlights education have been prepared as reference for the Peacebuilding Fund under the Canadian International Agency for Development (CIDA). CIDA’s action plan on Basic Education from 2002 highlights war, conflict and natural disasters as major challenges to EFA. The agency also contributed financially to the development of the Minimum Standards discussed below. (CIDA, 2005: 15-16). In Germany, the development agency Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) has established two sector projects on education in emergencies: Innovative Approaches in Formal and Non-Formal Education and Education and Conflict Transformation. A GTZ policy paper published in December 2004 (Seitz, 2004) analyses the role of education in the creation, prevention and resolution of societal crises, and the consequences for development cooperation. Whilst these country developments are welcome, they cannot be seen in isolation from the relentless advocacy efforts carried out on part of a few but well-organised actors. More importantly, their merit will ultimately be measured against the extent to which policy commitments actually inform operational arrangements and funding levels. According to The Global Campaign for Education (Global
Campaign for Education, 2005), a coalition of organisations tracking progress towards Education for All, suggest these countries mentioned above are still missing the mark. According to the Coalition’s last report, the UK contributed only 56% of its ‘fair share’\(^{12}\) of the amounts needed to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015. 4.1% of UK’s contributions to the CAP last year went to education. The USA comes out ‘bottom of the class’ in overall investment in education in relief and development, contributing only 8% of its fair share to primary education and not disclosing how much of the amount is actually tied aid. Less than 0.1% of the funds contributed by the USA in the CAP in 2004 went to education. Canada, which does relatively well in terms of its investments in education overall, performs poorly in the lowest-income countries, and still has conditions tied to part of the aid provided. 5.9% of Canada’s contributions to the CAP in 2004 went to education. For Germany, 7.3% of the 2004 CAP contributions went to education. In terms of investment in education in emergency and development aid in general, however, Chancellor Schröder’s ‘report card’ reveals a 15.6% coverage of his fare share only, and poor performance in the areas of both coordination and untying of aid.

3.3.1 INEE and the development of minimum standards

One of the most important actors in the promotion of education in emergencies with governments and donors has been the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction. Constituted as one of the ‘flagship initiatives’ at the World Education Forum in 2000, INEE is an open network of UN agencies, NGOs, practitioners, academics, donors and governments. More than 1000 individual members and 300 organisational members work to share knowledge and experience, develop tools and resources and lobby donors and governments to take seriously the very urgent need for real investments in this field. Although INEE has been widely praised for both its mission and as an exemplary model of real and effective inter-agency collaboration, the ‘flagship’ now sways in the battle against rigid donors perceptions and funding arrangements. Both the Secretariat and several core tasks teams must raise funds shortly or scale down. The Network Coordinator, Mary Mendenhall laments this seeming paradox: “There are at least two problems. One is that donors still don’t understand what we mean when we say education in life-saving. The other is their very rigid funding arrangements. They say they want us, but in order for them to

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\(^{12}\) Measured by the amount each donor gives to basic education relative to the amount each donor should contribute to the UPE funding gap, according to its national income.
support our activities, we need to force donors to become creative within their own organisations. Their arrangements do not fit with reality”. (Mendenhall, personal communication)

One of the most significant achievements of INEE has been the development of the Handbook for Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction (MSEE). The process was initiated in repose to two defined necessitities: the need for increased recognition for the importance of education in emergencies, and the need to ensure a certain level of quality in the education provided (INEE, 2004: 5-6). Over a one-year period, more than 2,250 persons from over 50 countries participated in the development of standards, indicators and guidance notes in areas covering community participation and assessment, access and learning environment, teaching and learning, teachers and other education personnel and education policy and coordination. The standards, published in December 2004, represent the input of academics, UN agencies, NGOs, affected governments and most importantly; affected populations. They are a crucial tool for advocacy, as well as a functional programming and monitoring tool. Initial evaluations demonstrate their use and impact on the scope and quality of the education provided in some of the direst corners of the world (INEE, 2005b:x). In regard to the dichotomy here in question, the MSEE process has also brutally highlighted some of the shortcomings already discussed in this thesis. The MSEE process was conceptualised and built on The Sphere project, an already existing framework for guaranteeing that a minimum level of quality in the emergency response provided by the humanitarian community. Published 1998 and revised last year, the Sphere handbook sets standards and indicators for services in the sectors of food, water and sanitation, health care and shelter (Sphere project, 2004). Notably, despite repeated and intense negotiations with the Sphere board, education has not yet been included in the Sphere process.

3.3.2 The World Summit and the Humanitarian Response Review

As described in chapter 2, the United Nations 2005 World Summit reaffirmed States’ commitment to timely and effective humanitarian assistance. The outcome document underlines children’s right to assistance, including education (World Summit, 2005). The Summit coincided with a process within the international community to assess and reform structures and mechanisms for the coordination and delivery of international assistance in emergencies. The Humanitarian Response Review (HRR), published in August 2005 by
OCHA, summarises the capacities and shortfalls of the humanitarian system and recommends a number of concrete steps to improve effectiveness (Adolfini et.al., 2005)\(^{13}\). According to the HRR, the most significant shortcoming in humanitarian response is the “low level of preparedness of the humanitarian organisations, in terms of human resources and sectoral capacities” (Adolfini et.al., 2005: 9). Main recommendations include the preparation for a global mapping of humanitarian response capacities; the development and application of benchmarks and indicators to measure performance, a marked increase in donors’ funding for emergency preparedness and the establishment of significantly larger and more flexible funds under the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). Moreover, the HRR report calls for a collective move towards more “inclusive system-wide coordination mechanisms” (Adolfini et.al., 2005: 14). Recommendations suggest this should take immediate effect through a cluster system where agencies involved in humanitarian response form strategic and long-term partnership at sector level. The IASC should identify and assign lead organisations for each cluster and equip these with the necessary funds and authorities to perform that lead role. Cluster leads should subsequently be responsible and accountable for the humanitarian response in their particular sector and coordinate reposes among all members of that cluster. (See Annex 3 for full list of recommendations).

The report has already spurred discussions across a wide range of decisive bodies in the UN. Recommendations have been addressed in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and will form part of the General Assembly’s debate on reform of the United Nations. The HRR notably highlights education as a ‘key sector’ in humanitarian response (Adolfini et.al., 2005: 75; Anderson, personal communication), and thus represents a significant reinforcement of the commitments made at World Summit. Sadly however, this proposition is not reflected in the ‘action plan’ outlined in the recommendations. Whilst cluster and cluster leads were recommended and have been established under the IASC for food aid, camp management and shelter, health and water and sanitation, no such cluster has been established for education. This is particularly regrettable in view of the HRR’s strong call for better inter-agency collaboration and for the assessment of performance according to benchmark indicators. Through INEE and the consultative Minimum Standards process described above, the education sector of the humanitarian community –albeit small, is in a

\(^{13}\) The rationale for the report is stated in the following: “The perception that humanitarian response does not always meet the basic requirements of affected populations in a timely fashion and that the response provided can vary considerably from crisis to crisis prompted the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to launch an independent Humanitarian Response Review of the global humanitarian system. The review was planned to assess the humanitarian response capacities of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), map the gaps and make recommendations to address them.” (Adolfini et.al., 2005: 8).
favourable position to promote and maximise the opportunities presented in this new system. There is relative consensus on the broad strategic principles and best practices in education in emergencies, benchmarks are already in place, and INEE already serves as an obvious framework for the scale-up of activities. Unfortunately, despite its laudable intentions, the review process seems to be confined by the physical bias of many humanitarian actors. In the view of the Minimum Standards Focal Point, Allison Anderson, the exclusion of education in the cluster approach is also an indicator that education may in fact be falling even more behind in the humanitarian community. “I believe that the inclusion of education within this new global benchmarking process is a key advocacy target for INEE. Its exclusion translates into the (still) pervasive belief that education is not a component of humanitarian response. We will need to move quickly on this and push education as a cluster.” (Anderson, personal communication).

Since the release of the HRR, INEE, the MSEE Focal Point and the agencies represented on INEE’s Steering Group and various working committees have been running an intensive lobbying campaign with the IASC and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to establish an education cluster and a formally appointed cluster lead. UNICEF has emerged as the agency most likely to lead the cluster. Interestingly enough, much negotiation has been required to shepherd the offer of this candidature through UNICEF’s own management. Debate over the relative importance of education compared to other child protection strategies in emergencies is still an issue within UNICEF, but financial and practical considerations have been equally difficult to counter. Senior management are uncertain about the cost of cluster coordination, and has expressed perhaps justified doubts about whether the international community represented by OCHA and IASC will actually provide the necessary funds and support to guarantee proper contingency planning and mobilisation efforts. Some senior officials argue that UNICEF should take act as lead but outside the cluster system (Van Kalmthout, personal communication). Similarly, persons close to the ERC have suggested that the ‘exception’ of education from the clustering process was a default solution more than a conscious decision –it was deemed obvious that UNICEF would take a lead in education in future humanitarian repose. The reasons may have been complex, but the result (although hopefully countered by the rapid addition of a cluster) is the same: Educational responses in the humanitarian response are left at laissez-faire. As clearly stated in the previous chapters, coordination costs money and investment, and so does quality. The neglect of education in the HRR and reform process not only perpetuates ‘previous sins’, but threatens to undermine the progress that has been made in education in emergencies at a critical point. As was learnt with
the Sphere project, those who miss the boat in the reform process may have to wait long for the next one.

3.4 Inherent contradictions - striking the right balance

Education in emergencies is under-prioritised and under-funded, amongst donors and international agencies. Funding structures, but also organisational procedures make it difficult for those with even the best of intentions to respond adequately to the needs in this sector. The fundamental problem is one of concepts. The long-standing dichotomy between relief and development prevails in organisations and in people’s heads. Advocates for education in emergencies must also be cautious to take this dilemma into account. Donors are giving increased attention to the role of education in emergencies, and advocates do right in taking a pragmatic view toward the very divergent processes behind these changes. Donors will insist on formulating a rationale that fits their political environment and particular aid tradition. Yet an unconditional embrace of all notions of support will be short-sighted. The argument that education is life-saving, when supported with facts and properly explained, resonates well with the humanitarian community. However, it will be counter-productive if all it brings are stop-gap measures such as the increased stockpiling of kits in a warehouse in Copenhagen. Similarly, a more development oriented argument for education must not provide an excuse – directly or indirectly, for the ‘wait and see’ approach. The provision of quality education in emergencies requires the ability to think two thoughts at the same time. In effect, with donors, advocates should ‘let the money talk’. Bridging the relief-development gap requires flexible and sufficient funding arrangements for the early emergency response, presented jointly with financial commitments for support to transitional and reconstruction efforts.
4. Norwegian donor policy

The approach taken by the Government of Norway (GoN) towards education in emergencies is widely regarded as exemplary, amongst both advocates and practitioners in the field. As this chapter will examine, Norwegian policy commitment and strategy, as well as funding arrangements, administrative procedures and programme execution represent an important reference point when discussing the role of donors in ensuring real progress towards Education for All in situations of emergencies and reconstruction. The purpose of this analysis is not to commend the GoN for its position as “the best government in the world in this field” (Talbot, personal communication), but to document and examine some of the underlying political and historical assumptions and practices that inform current aid practice in Norway. In chapter 5, this will provide the basis for an analysis of the appropriateness and the ‘transferability’ of the Norwegian model as an example for other donors. Chapter 4 will first give an overview over the policy commitment to education in emergencies as articulated by the GoN through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD). The GoN has announced education as ‘job number one’ in the development discourse, but the creation of international leverage, and the strengthening of aid modalities in transitional environments are also key priorities that will inform the GoN’s support to education in emergencies. Furthermore, the chapter shall examine administrative and funding arrangements for the GoN’s support to education in emergencies: funding mechanisms and actual financial contributions, personnel support and support to international networks. Finally, it shall outline one of the most significant features of Norwegian aid policy and practice: the close relation between the government and civil society institutions and the large amount of aid channelled through national NGOs.

4.1 Policy commitment and state of the art

In its policy paper Education –Job number 1, the Government of Norway (GoN) recognises wars and disasters as main barriers to reaching Education for All. As a consequence, “when Norway provides humanitarian assistance in such situations [of emergencies and conflict], education will be a major priority” (MFA, 2003a: 11). In 2003, when the policy paper was produced, this commitment was reflected in a vow to double the amount of total aid spent on education by 2005. The GoN’s support for education in situations of emergency and reconstruction must therefore be seen in the context of the government’s support to education
for development in general\textsuperscript{14}. By international standards, the GoN places great importance on both humanitarian and development assistance, as will be discussed shortly, and particular importance on the role of education as a means to development. Norway spent 0.92\% of its Gross National Income (GNI) on aid in 2003 and ranked first amongst members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that year. World wide, 9 countries\textsuperscript{15} have committed to increase their aid to 0.7\% of their GNI. Sweden and Norway are planning to reach 1\% within the next few years. (OECD, 2004)

### 4.1.1 Education –Job number 1

Norway’s policy towards education and development is outlined in a number of policy documents, policy statements and strategy papers published since the Millennium Declaration and the Dakar Declaration\textsuperscript{16} in 2000 (Norad, 2000; Norad, 2004\textit{a}; Norad, 2004\textit{b}, Norad, 2005; MFA, 2002; MFA, 2003\textit{a}). The most comprehensive and explicit summary of Norway’s strategy for achieving Education for All by 2015, and the document that still provides the basis for GoN’s policy, is the 2003 strategy paper \textit{Education –Job number 1} (MFA, 2003\textit{a}). The title of the paper itself indicates the relative importance that education holds in the predominant relief and development paradigm in Norway. The strategy document reiterates people’s \textit{right} to education and the international community’s commitment to the two UN Development Goals related to education as well as the six goals outlined in the Dakar Framework of Action (World Education Forum, 2000). Education, according to the GoN “is a precondition for economic, social and cultural development. It promotes health and plays a major role in combating HIV/AIDS”. Most notably, in the view of the GoN, “ensuring Education for All is the most important measure in eliminating poverty” (MFA, 2003\textit{a}: 1).

\textsuperscript{14} Also in terms of data analysis this wider perspective has been important: For funding purposes it is not clearly defined what is considered emergency aid and what is development assistance, and few sector-specific statistics exist which compare the two. The total spent on education, when coupled with a strong commitment to provide education also in humanitarian aid has therefore been the starting point of this analysis.

\textsuperscript{15} These are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK.

\textsuperscript{16} The importance of these two events in furthering Education for All is described in chapter 2. The GoN and a number of Norwegian humanitarian as well as development agencies played a significant role in the development of the Dakar Framework in particular, and in including its specific reference to education in emergencies and reconstruction. The GoN’s commitment and Norwegian agencies’ particular emphasis on education thus goes back long before year 2000. For the purpose of this theses however, attempt has been made to present the current status of Norwegian policy in this field. When the historical perspective is referred to both in this chapter and in chapter 5, it is as an illustration of how country-specific social and political features inform policy and thus must be taken account of when promoting policy models.
4.1.2 A bridging philosophy: Addressing transitional needs and calling for coordination

Previous chapters have described how the relief-development divide is one of the most significant impediments to the effective provision of education in emergencies and to its funding support in particular. This divide is both a conceptual problem and a practical one, as the very complex and often prolonged transitional periods between an acute emergency and ‘post-conflict’ or ‘post-disaster’ rarely receive adequate funding or attention. Education in emergencies is particularly constrained. This thesis has attempted to present education both as a humanitarian priority and essentially a development activity –the reality is that it often falls in the crack in between. The GoN already in 1999 promised “take the lead in developing a fully integrated approach to humanitarian assistance, peace and reconciliation, and development” and to “help to develop new financial mechanisms that will fill the critical resource gaps between acute emergency relief and more long-term development activities” (MFA, 1999: Summary point 4, 7).

Within the GoN’s policy on education in humanitarian situations, the transitional phases are also given particular attention. Its Guiding principles state that “Norway will support efforts to ensure that education is provided in emergencies and from day one in post-war rehabilitation situations” (MFA, 2003a: 3). In light of the debate about the true nature of ‘transitions’ accounted for in chapter 3, the apparent reference to a defined starting point for post-war recovery efforts in this statement is ambiguous. In the context of the larger policy framework of the GoN, however, and the actual funding arrangements for transitional environments discussed shortly, this statement must be understood as support to the ‘education in emergencies developmental approach’: Norway’s support to education in emergencies is closely linked to its attempt at more holistic forms of aid and support to long-term development. It is also closely linked to the GoN’s position on peacebuilding: “There will be particular emphasis placed on the provision of prompt and flexible support to peacebuilding in countries working their way out of violent, internal conflict. ... Norway shall be a competent, reliable and diligent actor in peacebuilding. The role of women and children in conflict and in peace shall receive increased attention”. (MFA, 2004: 71). The wider implications of this peacebuilding policy are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it should be noted that education is singled out as one of the key components of the corresponding strategy. As explained in chapter 2, education can be a powerful tool both in both the
exacerbation and mitigation of conflict. That position is reflected in the statement above, and in the emphasis the GoN places on education in both conflict and post-conflict reconstruction.

Similarly, the GoN’s policy on education in emergencies must be viewed in light of its ambitions as a role model and forerunner in this field. The GoN’s strategy papers on education in emergencies stress that Norway shall be a “strong international advocate for the rights of children and vulnerable groups in both normal situations and emergencies” (NORAD, 2005d). With reference to Norway’s role as Co-Chair of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), the aid budget for 2006 confirms that Norway will continue to play a lead role in mobilising resources for basic education in poor countries, and countries affected by emergencies. Reference is also made to Norway’s strong presence in other multinational forums on education such as the editorial committee for the Global Monitoring Report, which measures progress towards EFA. (NORAD, 2005: 11). Strong emphasis is placed on collaboration with agencies such as UNESCO and the Word Bank, and on linkages between education assistance and wider strategies on for example poverty reduction (MFA, 2003: 61). This year’s DAC Peer Review confirms that Norway “has taken a leadership role with respect to donor’s effort to harmonise practices and align with national poverty reduction strategies of developing partner countries” (OECD, 2005).

4.2 Administrative and funding arrangements

When the policy paper Education –Job number 1 was published, 9% percent Norwegian Overseas Development Assistance (ODI) went to education, then the equivalent of some 850 million NOK, or 129 million USD (OECD, 2004). The promise to increase this to 15% was fulfilled in 2003. With an increase of 1,6 billion NOK in the total aid budget in 2005, and a further increase of 1,9 billion, or a further 11,9% increase planned for 2006, the percentage for education has dropped back down under the 15% mark. (MFA, 2004: 68; NORAD, 2005c: 7). However, in real terms, spending on education increased with one billion NOK between 2002 and 2005. The budget proposal for 2006 reconfirms the GoN’s intentions to spend 15% of total aid on education (MFA, 2004: 68).

As before mentioned, there is often institutional separation between the departments and organisations that provide humanitarian assistance and those engaged in development cooperation. Despite the bridging approach described above, this is reflected in Norwegian aid structures as well. Until 2004, the responsibility for Norwegian aid was shared between the MFA and NORAD as an independent department under the MFA. The provision of
humanitarian aid has been vested within the MFA, which also has had responsibility for aid channelled through international organisations such as the UN, the World Bank and IMF (multilateral aid). (NORAD, 2005f). NORAD has had the responsibility for long-term bilateral aid, although a number of NORAD’s partner countries could be classified as emergency-affected, or under reconstruction, according to the broad definition of emergencies utilised in this thesis. In Norway’s case, however, the separation seems not to have impeded the support to education in emergencies and transitional environments. The 15% target concerns total aid, and Norway compares very favourably with most countries as far as support to education in the CAP is concerned. In 2001, Norway contributed 14% of the total contributed to education in the CAP (Lexow, 2002: 39). Because a large portion of Norwegian emergency aid is channelled through Norwegian NGOs, there is no accurate data available for how much of the humanitarian assistance goes to education.

Reminiscence of the relief-development dichotomy is still found in the Norwegian aid apparatus, however. Especially the MFA questions the possibility of a smooth transition from humanitarian assistance to development cooperation: The relevant MFA departments maintain a stronger geographical focus than NORAD; not all countries targeted for humanitarian assistance will be prioritised for long-term development cooperation; humanitarian appeals are not subject to in-depth appraisals with strategic long-term development as funding criteria, and finally; there have been no formal institutionalised mechanism for communication between the MFA and NORAD to ensure hand-over of transitional programmes and projects. (Lexow, 2002: 41).

4.2.1 The threefold path to Norwegian funding

Accurate tracking of Norway’s financial contributions to education in emergencies is difficult. Funds have until recently been raised from one or more of the following three sources: i) allocations from the MFA, Department of Human Rights/Democracy and Humanitarian assistance; ii) contributions from the bilateral and multilateral departments of the MFA and iii) NORAD funds through state-to-state agreements or in repose to requests from NGOs. (Lexow, 2002: 37-38).

For emergency aid channelled through the MFA, it must be noted that investments in education are unintentional. Humanitarian aid from the Department for Human Rights/Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance is deliberately not earmarked by sector, and it is up to the recipient agency to prioritise spending. (Lexow, 2002: 40). No comprehensive
data exist for how much of the aid from the MFA’s bilateral or multilateral departments together is spent on education. Of the bilateral aid channelled through NORAD in 2004, 15.1% was spent on education. It is also not clear how much of this bilateral aid was spent in emergency-affected countries, but the amount is rising. NORAD is registering an increasing number of requests for educational support to countries in conflict and post-conflict areas such as Gulu/Uganda, Afghanistan, Angola, Sudan and Nepal. Funds are provided for example through the Norwegian Education Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank, to which other major donors are now contributing.

With reference to the relief-development gap discussed in previous chapters, and the ‘bridging philosophy’ described above, it should also be noted that a relatively large portion of the Norwegian aid budget is earmarked for transitional phases. Between 2003 and 2005, this so-called GAP funding increased from 366,2 million NOK to 471,5 million NOK, an increase of 28.8%. Burundi, DR Congo, Sierra Leone and Sudan were among the countries that received the largest amounts from the GAP budget. A significant portion of aid to these countries went to education: in DR Congo, almost half of the 27,4 million NOK given on the GAP was channelled through the Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) programme for education in emergencies and reconstruction. In Sierra Leone, almost all of the 25 million NOK of the GAP funds went to educational programmes run by UNHCR and UNDP. NRC’s Accelerated Learning Programme also received funding from GAP. (MFA, 2004: 72,176-179). In the budget for 2006, which has seen a great increase in overall aid, transitional aid is considered the ‘winner’. The post will receive a further increase of 50.9% compared to 2005, totalling 711 million NOK next year. Sudan will receive the biggest increase on this budget post, followed by Afghanistan, a number of countries in the Horn of Africa, Central and West Africa, Iraq and Gaza (NORAD, 2005c). These are countries and regions where education has been prioritised and traditionally has received more than the promised 15% (NORAD, 2005d).

4.2.2 Secondment of personnel

One further mechanism through which the GoN has provided support to education in emergencies has been the emergency standby forces managed by the Norwegian Refugee Council. With a total or more than 600 persons from more than 30 different professions spread out on four different forces, the roster arrangement helps to strengthen UN organisations’ personnel capacity in humanitarian operations and contributes to the rapid
deployment of human expertise in emergency situations. Roster personnel are recruited and given pre-service training by NRC, and are in theory deployable to anywhere in the world at 72 hours’ notice. The agreement between the MFA and NRC maintains that the secondment of personnel from the roster is a central component of Norwegian support to humanitarian operations in emergencies. Over the years, many of the secondees have been education specialists. Personnel has been seconded to the INEE Secretariat, and to UNESCO’s Programme for Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction, which currently holds the Chair of the Working Group for the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction. Both UNICEF and UNHCR have received several dozen educationalists each, filling both field and HQ positions. Especially at the refugee agency, where the investment in education has been relatively low, the Norwegian support has been critical in enhancing the agency’s capacity (Talbot, personal communication). NRC has a direct arrangement with UNHCR’s emergency preparedness unit, where the secondment of education specialists creates leverage on both policy and overall education programme management. Due to the relatively short duration of the secondments (usually up to 12 months), however, questions can be asked to what extent the support helps to institutionalise increased awareness and support for education in other parts of the organisation.

4.2.3 Contributions to INEE

One further area where the GoN has made significant contributions to education in emergencies is through its support to INEE. There are two reasons why networks are particularly important in this field. First of all, within this emerging sector, both formal and informal networks have played a crucial role in ensuring the collection and systemisation of data, in avoiding duplication and in focussing advocacy efforts. Secondly, the nature of the places in which practitioners work, leaves few other alternatives for information sharing and collaboration. Emergency response is an extremely complex endeavour, involving a myriad of actors in often isolated and dangerous locations. The absence of conventional partners, such as central and/or local governments means that NGOs and INGOs or international agencies in practice are responsible for much of the educational service as a whole. Those working in education in these settings usually have few immediate colleagues to draw on and/or have a different background than education. Through INEE, the first and still the most significant network for education in emergencies, more than 1000 individuals, many of whom are in the field, are provided with regular information updates via an email listserve and the opportunity
to exchange and link up with colleagues far away but in very similar situations. Norway has been an active supporter of INEE; financially, politically and through Norwegian NGOs. The GoN supported the development of the MSEE through financial contributions and contributions in-kind. Through the NRC roster, as mentioned, the GoN has previously provided an Assistant Network Coordinator, and also an assistant to the Chair on the MSEE Working Group. Eldrid Kvamen Middtun from NRC served as the first Chair of the INEE Steering Group, and Birgit Willumstad from Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is currently in charge of the MSEE Training Group. The home pages of both NORAD and the MFA refer to INEE and the Minimum Standards.

4.3 NGO and state collaboration

Civil society is probably the most important channel for Norwegian aid, and Norway is one of the OECD-countries that channel the largest portion of national aid through NGOs (NORAD, 2004e: 17). In 2004, 62,6% of NORAD’s bilateral aid was channelled through Norwegian NGOs. If one includes international NGOs, as much as 68,5% was channelled through NGOs (NORAD, 2004e: 7). More than 30 NGOs have an agreement with the Government about channelling of aid, but almost 80% of the funds go through the so-called ‘big five’ NGOs: Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Norwegian Red Cross, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Save the Children Norway (SC-N) (MFA, 2004: 282). The portion of total aid channelled through NGOs varies between different sectors and countries, and no sector-specific breakdown could be found on the data above. Both in humanitarian response and in development programming however, most of the GoN’s support to education is channelled through NGOs. The examples from DR Congo and Sierra Leone mentioned earlier are two illustrations of this. 39,9% of the total NORAD aid channelled through NGOs had children as a target group, and most of this probably went to education (NORAD, 2005e: 18).
5. Is there a ‘Norwegian model’?

The previous chapter described the policy framework of the GoN’s support to education in emergencies, and some of the ways in which this policy is translated into practice. No other country in the world is as explicit in its commitment to education in emergencies as Norway, who also links its support to a wider strategy for more holistic aid forms in general and for greater coordination in the international community. Although the statistics are incomplete, it appears that the GoN’s policy commitment is reflected in the volume of financial aid and human resource support provided to education in emergencies, and in the GoN’s attempts at creating appropriate funding mechanisms for that critical ‘gap’ between relief and development. This chapter poses the question whether other donors could and should do the same. Whilst the commitment to education in emergencies and the especially the conceptually more holistic approach taken by the GoN towards relief and development would be one to duplicate, there are shortcomings to the ‘Norwegian model’. More importantly, aid history and national social and political particularities have informed aid policy and practice in Norway – as they do and will do for any other donor government. The chapter will examine the role of civil society organisations in setting policy in Norway, and the role of aid in the formation of national identity and as a geo-political consideration in Norway. Apparent international leverages, recent restructuring of the administration of aid in Norway and possible policy shifts in wake of the recent change of government will also be addressed. An understanding of these national particularities will help to determine how and to what extent ‘the Norwegian model’ could be used to lever other donors.

5.1 History and national particularities

5.1.1 The role of civil society in promoting the education in emergency agenda

The portion of aid channelled through NGOs shows how the GoN to a large extend rely on NGOs to execute their humanitarian policy. Similarly, the formation of Norwegian policy on humanitarian response and education in emergencies in particular must be attributed in part to the work of advocates and practitioners based in civil society. Norwegian NGOs have played an active role in consolidating the GoN’s inclusion of education as part of its humanitarian response, and now also act on behalf of the GoN to promote the education in emergencies agenda internationally: “NRC has contributed actively to this process and proposed already in
1998 to the Ministry of Foreign affairs that education should be the fourth component in humanitarian assistance” (Midttun 2000a: 4). “NRC has a strategy for how to meet education emergencies rapidly based on the four areas: personnel, material, principles/procedures/tools and networking. Teachers and educators have been recruited in the NRC Emergency Standby Force and are offered training to assist in acute emergencies” (Johannessen 2001: 5). Similarly, core staff or secondees from Norwegian NGOs directly or indirectly represent Norway in key positions in INEE and the UN.

The GoN also draws heavily on NGOs in the national promotion of their aid agenda. Large amounts of resources are made available to NGOs for information campaigns related to humanitarian and development aid projects. The ‘big five’ received 10 million NOK for such campaigns in 2004, of which 35% was spent on the joint initiative ‘Involve yourself’. In this broad national information campaign, people were encouraged to support humanitarian and development projects through financial contributions and participation in voluntary work. Other than the ‘big five’, a further 34 actors received a total of 22 million NOK for their information work in 2004. One-off support totalling 4 million NOK was given to 80 information projects aimed at increased understanding and engagement for development and humanitarian aid. Many of these projects are school-based, and a separate programme supports school exchanges between Norwegian upper secondary students and students in NORAD’s partner countries. (NORAD, 2005e: 19). In other words, the centrality of education in Norwegian humanitarian and development aid policy must be viewed in light of the ‘educationalist’ approach taken to aid issues at home. Education is in itself considered a common good in Norway (98% of all children attend state schools, and education is free up to and including university). Most importantly, formal and informal education is utilised to promote common ownership in the GoN’s aid agenda. Previous sections have explained how Norway’s support to education in emergencies must be linked to the support given to education in development in general, but due consideration must also be given to the role of civil society in promoting education on the aid agenda, and the way in which the Education for All concept finds resonance with a well-educated and in educational terms very egalitarian population.

5.1.2 Aid and the formation of national identity: Geopolitical considerations

An analysis of Norwegian aid policy (or any aid policy for that matter) must question the impact of aid, not just on aid recipients, but also on the donor and the donor community. The
closeness between the state and civil society in the formulation and execution of aid policy in Norway is one indicator of the importance of aid in Norway. To Norway, a country with just 4.5 million inhabitants, the ‘aid business’ is not just big business, it is in fact a pillar of national identity and one of the country’s most powerful foreign policy tools.

In 2003, more than 1000 persons in the public service and several thousand employees in almost 150 NGOs, hundreds of information advisors and more than 1000 government employed researchers were engaged in the aid system, what Terje Tvedt, a national historian, terms the ‘Southern project’. Between 1993 and 2003, almost 200 billion NOK in aid have been channelled through this system, and the aid budget is steadily rising. Unconditionality, solidarity and support for human rights are central principles of the Norwegian aid profile, but so is the attempt at creating international leverage and increased coordination. According to Tvedt, however, this reveals a “cultural and ethical paradox… The intellectual decency… is suppressed in the excitement about spreading to the rest of the world the fruits of the project elite’s self-declared contribution to the global political culture –the symbiotic relationship between research, organisations or the state: The Norwegian model” (Tvedt, quoted in Udgaard 2003). The last three years have seen a rising debate in Norway about both the value and the sustainability of this model. Whilst abstract and principled in nature, it provides important points also on the question of the transferability of the Norwegian education in emergencies model. The Norwegian ‘goodness regime’ and the comfortable depiction of ‘the Norwegian Samaritan’ seem startlingly naive and may undermine attempts at addressing the real challenges in international aid policy. When attempting to create international leverage, the GoN depicts the Norwegian model as apolitical support to basic human rights. Critics of the ‘goodness regime’ point out that there is no such thing as apolitical aid, yet in Norway, it seems difficult not to be “overwhelmed by this system’s position and power and aura of moral-ideological invincibility” (Tvedt, quoted in Udgaard 2003). Jonas Gahr Støre, recently appointed as Foreign Minister, provided an unintentional illustration of this sentiment: As president of the Norwegian Red Cross two years ago, Støre was asked to comment on Norwegian companies’ apparent ‘competition’ for devastating catastrophes. In their eagerness to demonstrate ‘corporate responsibility’, one company will bid higher than the other in response to NGOs’ calls for emergency support, and invest large sums to secure the better long-term deal with the more credible emergency relief agency. Støre claimed this competition in fact was no problem, as there is “suffering enough for everyone”. Whilst cynically accurate, the comment seems to overlook the inherent ‘natural law’ of any business, the aid business included. Commercial companies, NGOs and governments clearly operate on
different rationales and objectives. However, common to them all is that their success and survival to some degree depend on their ability to position themselves in a larger context, and the presentation of some ‘comparative’ advantage. In Norway, the euphoria over the ‘Southern project’ threatens to conceal this fact. According to Tvedt, the process is furthered by what he calls the ‘strategic communication regime’ which, with its “huge financial resources, large amount of staff and well-established legitimacy, has filtered the world to all Norwegians” (Tvedt, quoted in Udgaard, 2003). Tvedt documents how almost a billion (!) NOK has been spent on Government-financed information about the development policy, thereby building broad popular and NGO support for what is at essence a political agenda. The examples of all-encompassing and government-supported information campaigns given above provide further illustrations of this ‘regime’.

The ‘goodness regime’ it is also important to note, is not just about individual feel-goodness. It is power politics, as part of a strategy for positioning Norway internationally: As the fifth biggest oil producer in the world, Norway is a small but significant economy. A strong social model, low unemployment, high GDP and high gender equality has placed Norway at the top of UNDP’s Human Development Index several years in a row. However, in real terms, its economic influence internationally is insignificant, and since the end of the Cold War, Norway’s absolute and strategic importance as a military power is even smaller. Arguably, the ‘aid business’ is one niche where Norway can assert international influence. Politicians, academics and critics all use the term ‘humanitarian Great Power’ about Norway’s role in this field. In its presentation of the overall aid strategy for 2005, the GoN confirms this analysis as it places its national information campaign on aid in a larger international context: “The Government will place priority on strengthening Norway’s reputation abroad. A positive and nuanced picture of modern Norway will contribute to increased understanding for Norwegian values and political priorities, and will increase the possibilities for Norwegian industry, business and tourism internationally” (MFA, 2004:31).

The self-appointed role as a model donor and a strong advocate for more effective and well-coordinated aid forms is thus not unique for Norway’s support to education. In areas such as debt relief, aid to least developed countries (LDCs), anti-corruption work and donor coordination, the Government policy makes it an explicit aim to be ‘top of the class’ and a lever for these issue in the international community. The increasing number of donors having committed to expand their aid budgets to 0,7% of GNI, in the GoN’s view “shows the importance of setting a good example” (MFA, 2004: 61).
The ‘aid niche’ is also closely related to Norway’s role in international diplomacy and conflict negotiation, where the GoN is far more active than the size of the country should indicate. Over the past years, the GoN has been active as an official facilitator of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka and the Philippines; as the sponsor of a back channel for secret negotiations in the Middle East and as an actor in international coalitions of peace negotiators in Sudan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, Colombia and Guatemala, to mention some examples. According to the MFA, Norway’s prominent role as a peacemaker must be considered a “continuation of … our long-standing support for the UN mandate for peace and security, and of our tradition of humanitarian action and development coordination” (MFA, 2005). Elaborating on this statement, Jan Petersen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, also makes explicit reference to the broad political consensus on Norwegian peacemaking policy, and the GoN’s cooperation with national and international NGOs. Significantly, a “common denominator for the many peace processes in which we have been involved has been the interaction between diplomatic and humanitarian assistance…. We are also regarded in many quarters as being impartial. Norway has no colonial past, and we are usually perceived as having no hidden political agendas” (MDA, 2005). Whether this is an accurate observation or wishful thinking within the framework of the ‘goodness regime’ is beyond the scope of this discussions. It is, however, a position that in itself is unlikely to motive or inform aid policy of other governments.

5.2 Latest developments: Apparent leverage, potential and threats

5.2.1 Utstein and like-minded donors

Returning to the level of administration and actual funding mechanisms for education in emergencies, one apparent success of the ‘Norwegian model’ deserves attention. At a conference in Utstein, Norway in 2001, Norway, the Netherlands, the UK and Germany agreed to arrangements aimed at greater donor coordination, planning and reporting in the provision of humanitarian and development assistance. Later joined by Denmark and Sweden, these so-called ‘like-minded’ donors are in the process of transforming these principles into action at an international level. ‘Special pools’ have been pioneered as a way to secure funding in transitional and insecure environments. Education has also been especially targeted for increased donor coordination: a number of joint evaluations, including the 2004 Joint evaluation of external support to basic education have helped to streamline evaluation
procedures and reporting mechanisms on part of both donors and recipients of education aid. (Alao et al, 2005: 9). In Nepal, a country in chronic crisis, a lesser evaluation of the education support provided by the Danish Agency for Development (DANIDA) and DFID has documented important lessons and challenges of donor coordination in unstable environments. The Utstein Group is currently planning a joint study of exit strategies in humanitarian assistance. (NORAD, 2005e: 16; Seitz, 2005: x). A number of other governments look to this group of donors as they currently explore possibilities of developing administrative and financial structures that better corresponds with identified priorities and needs in emergencies, reconstruction and development. If the Utstein initiative can urge associated members to increase their support to education in emergencies, or if longer-term strategies can be found for coordination and hand-over of humanitarian and development projects internationally and inter-agency, this would be a great mark of progress in the sector. (Alao et al., 2005: 9; Lockhart, 2004: 3).

5.2.2 All people to the power? NORAD and MFA reform

When examining the ‘Norwegian model’ previously, this thesis pointed to the divide between the MFA and NORAD in the administration of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. The past two years have seen a fundamental reorganisation of the aid administration in Norway, aimed at bringing greater harmonisation between the two aid forms, and more consistent and holistic formulation of aid policy. The external evaluation leading up to the reorganisation “recognised that aid to an increasing degree is part of a political process where several foreign policy tools must be seen in a larger context” (NORAD, 2003). In 2004, responsibility for all embassies charged with the administration of aid was moved from NORAD to the MFA. At the same time, responsibility for programme management was decentralised to these individual embassies. In April 2004, responsibility for the long-term bilateral development cooperation was also moved from NORAD to the MFA. NORAD took over the administration of aid to international organisations. The official objective has been to ‘purify’ NORAD as an independent professional advisory body, and to concentrate the day-to-day administration of all aid forms at the MFA, closer to policy makers and foreign policy strategists. Responsibility for assessments, evaluations and quality assurance of both humanitarian and development aid is still vested within NORAD. The reorganisation is intended to create within both NORAD and the MFA a more holistic approach to the full spectrum of aid interventions, and to ensure that at the MFA, aid
interventions are linked with the larger spectrum foreign policy interventions, including diplomacy and other forms of bilateral cooperation. A number of MFA positions, especially at the embassies, increasingly require sector-specific assistance. As part of the reorganisation, more than half of NORAD’s previous budget and almost half of the staff have moved to the MFA. The critical question is whether institutional memory can be so easily transferred from one institution to another. The GoN may have moved the ‘people to the power’, but these people are not stepping into a vacuum. Even in the ‘Norwegian model’, a national diplomat is likely to see other priorities than the manager of a particular development programme. Sound professional judgement on a subject matter concerning an aid programme will not always correspond with the need to present Norway and Norway’s position in international forums. In addition to their technical expertise, the ‘new’ Norwegian aid workers at the MFA will therefore need to acquire substantive competencies in the areas of policy dialogue, diplomacy and macroeconomics. This is already an ambitious goal. There is a danger that instead of tying short-term objectives, such as those of humanitarian relief, to long-term development objectives and to wider foreign policy objectives of for example peacebuilding, the reorganisation will in fact silence the critical voices of those with aid-technical competencies. Similarly, the transfer of funds and personnel from NORAD to the MFA may render the formal irrelevant, with political leadership viewing consultation with NORAD’s expertise as a ‘detour’, and as getting in the way of rapid political decisions. (NORAD, 2005: 2). It is too early to assess the impact of reorganisation at this point, but the potential barriers to closer relief and development alignment which the process reveals at a departmental level should inform policy makers elsewhere.

5.2.3 New government, old cards

The reorganisation of the Norwegian aid administration was initiated under the former Minister for International Development, Ms. Hilde Frafjord Johnson, who has also been responsible for the policy document Education –Job number 1, and the explicit inclusion of education in Norwegian humanitarian response. Following elections in September 2005, power has changed from a centre-conservative coalition to a labour-left coalition. The new Minister for International Development, Erik Solheim, has repeatedly expressed that very few fundamental changes will be made to the current relief and development policy. The aid budget proposed by the resigning government will be implemented with only a few changes to the mechanisms for funding. It has been signalled that a larger portion of aid will be
channelled through UN organisations rather than the World Bank, to present a Norwegian alternative to the Bank’s and IMF’s conditionally of financial liberalisation. As before mentioned, the total aid budget constitutes some 18.5 billion NOK, an increase of 11.1 percent from last year. The post for humanitarian assistance receives an overall increase of almost 19.3 percent to 1.96 billion NOK compared with last year. Whilst it has not been specified how much of this will go to education, it is expected that the new government will continue the previous government’s strong commitment. (NORAD 2005a: 6-7). In terms of the relief-development dichotomy, and with reference to the recent reorganisation of the Norwegian aid structure, it is interesting to note that the composition of the new government signals increased alignment of aid and foreign policy objectives. As a former MFA diplomat, the new Minister of International Development, Mr. Solheim is expected to resume greater responsibility for activities previously administered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs: peacebuilding activities, diplomacy and humanitarian aid. Similarly, Mr. Store, as a former president of the Norwegian Red Cross, is expected to draw on his network in the humanitarian community in his role as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. (NORAD, 2005a: 7; NORAD, 2005b: 5; NORAD, 2005c: 5). Time will show these expectations translate into practice.

5.3 Model ‘transferability’

Considering the size of the country, the GoN spends more money, and more flexible money, on aid than any other country in the world. The GoN’s policy on education in emergencies appears particularly exemplary: Education is made an explicit priority in humanitarian response, and is placed within a framework of long-term objectives for reconstruction and development. Education in emergencies is conceived of both as a right and a humanitarian priority, yet is conceptualised essentially as a development activity. This model corresponds with recommendations made by the advocates for education in emergencies, and is one that other donors should take note of. A number of initiatives aimed at increased donor coordination, and better funding arrangements for so-called transitional environments are also features of Norwegian aid policy that, if duplicated, would significantly improve the conditions for the provision of education in emergencies and reconstruction. It must be noted however that the formation of the GoN’s policy is relatively recent. More importantly, the GoN’s policy is closely linked with a particular civil society model, and a particular emphasis on education in the Norwegian development discourse overall. Most importantly, the ‘Norwegian model’ must be seen in the context of Norway’s self-appointed role as a
humanitarian Great Power, and a largely unquestioned belief in the power of good examples. In terms of administrative arrangements and actual funding, the GoN appears to have fulfilled its commitment to education in emergencies, but rather in spite of its own aid structures. Until recently, the divide between the MFA and NORAD has in fact been a prime example of how the relief-development dichotomy manifests itself in institutional arrangements. The reorganisation of the MFA and NORAD will bridge the most apparent divide, but may not solve all underlying issues. Certainly, to other donors and also to international implementing agencies, the reform of funding structures and aid modalities will require a fundamental re-conceptualisation of relief and development. Norwegian rhetoric is likely to be more helpful to advocates and lobbyist for education in emergencies than to reformers and strategist charged with reorganising administrative structures and funding procedures.
6. Conclusion

“People have only one life. Children need quality education whether they are living in peaceful or conflicted societies.” (Talbot, 2002).

Education is a right. In emergencies, it is still a right, and even more of a need. Education in emergencies saves lives, providing children and youth with physical, cognitive and psychosocial protection. In the midst of chaos, it sustains life by providing structure and stability and positive learning opportunities. It furthers life skills required for constructive participation in peaceful and dynamic societies. Perhaps most importantly still, in emergencies, it offers children and their families hopes for a better future.

An increasing amount of research and literature documents the many challenges faced by education systems during emergencies and reconstruction, and best practices in the provision of education in particularly difficult circumstances. Despite its merits, education in emergencies is severely under-prioritised and under-funded. Gaps in the provision of education in emergencies range from lack of access and quality to lack of coordination and severe funding deficits. Many of these shortcomings can be directly or indirectly linked to an artificial dichotomy between relief and development. Education has traditionally been perceived as a development activity and therefore not a priority in humanitarian response. Humanitarian relief has traditionally been conceptualised and delivered as a stop-gap measure, aimed at providing a minimum of food, shelter, water and sanitation and medical care required for subsistence. As this thesis has demonstrated, this short-term and purely logistical approach does not address the realities on the ground or the expressed needs of emergency-affected populations. ‘Emergencies’ can last for decades. The various phases are neither chronological nor sequential – they cannot be analysed or addressed in isolation from a wider development perspective. Similarly, no holistic development policy can ignore the global challenges posed by wars and natural disasters, or the threats of such. The Millennium Development Goals rightly presents Education for All as a key to poverty reduction and global development. Disregarding the more than 50 million out-of-school children currently living in emergency-affected countries would render the EFA goal no more than a hollow pledge. Socio-economic development must be considered as a single process that includes emergencies, responses to them and recovery from them. Education must be prioritised from the earliest emergency response. Funds and services must at the same time be geared towards
making the education provided in emergencies a building block for reconstruction, recovery and long-term development.

This thesis has explained how and to what extent the relief-development dichotomy impedes the effective delivery of education in emergencies. The relief-development gap manifests itself in policy formulation, as well as in administrative and funding arrangements amongst donors and service agencies alike. In terms of funding, the conceptual gap translates into a dearth of funding for education in humanitarian relief operations, as well as a critical lack of funding for transitional environments.

The Government of Norway stands out in the donor community as a strong advocate for the inclusion of education in humanitarian response. Its vow to spend 1% of GNI on aid, and 15% of this aid on education, including education in emergencies, is a clear and significant commitment. More importantly, the GoN’s effort at improving donor coordination, and funding conditions for those critical and often prolonged phases between an emergency and stable peace, are equally important initiatives. A re-conceptualisation of the purpose of relief and development, coupled with administrative and funding arrangements that can cater for the complex realities of emergencies and reconstruction will be necessary to secure the appropriate support for education in these situations.

When examining the ‘transferability’ of the Norwegian model, however, it is clear that also the GoN to some extent grapples with the relief-development dichotomy. More importantly, the GoN’s support to education in emergencies is not institutionalised, as humanitarian relief rarely is sector-specific. The division between the MFA and NORAD has been compensated for by other mechanisms and momentums in the aid system, for example. These mechanisms are not all appropriate examples for other donors. An exceptional closeness between the state and civil society, a particular tradition for support to education, and a strong geopolitical interest in promoting holistic and coordinated responses in both humanitarian and development assistance inform Norwegian aid policy, and also the way the GoN conceives of and supports education in emergencies. These are particularities that cannot be simply ‘copied’ by other donors. The use of aid to further the image of Norway as an honest and apolitical broker in the international system is neither feasible nor desirable as a strategy for most donor governments. For advocates of education in emergencies, the ‘Norwegian model’ is still a useful reference point when lobbying donors and agencies to
increase their support to education in emergencies: The share volume of support and the clarity of policy commitment are exemplary.

Support for education in emergencies is not just the concern of individual donors, however. International agencies should set an example with policies and strategies for bridging the relief-development gap, and enhanced support to education in emergencies in particular. The expanded use of CAP, and the development of benchmark mechanisms for the assessment of humanitarian performance are important and laudable initiatives that should impact positively on the attention and support provided for education in emergencies. The further promotion of minimum standards, and the inclusion of the MSEE in the Sphere project will be critical. Provided that education is established as a cluster within the reform following the Humanitarian Response Review, this reform will enforce greater coordination amongst providers of education in emergencies and will help to shed light on the exceptionally low priority placed on education when it comes to actual funding. Improvement of stand-by arrangements for humanitarian response, and larger pools of funding for transitional environments would also improve conditions for the provision of ‘softer services’ such as education in the relief effort.

A colleague recently reported from her duty station in North West Pakistan, where a ‘second wave of death’ is expected with the onset of winter in the wake of the South Asian earthquake. “I have a confession to make”, she said. “If I were in charge, I would not prioritise education now, but winter tents and blankets”. My colleague, a fierce advocate for education in emergencies, did not surrendered her conviction, but simply underlined the complexity of and urgent need for increased attention to this critical field. Surely, if someone is about the freeze to death, you offer her a blanket before you run a course on psychosocial support in education. The point is that is should not be a question of either or. The international community, and donors in particular, can no longer hide behind that kind of moral conundrum. The humanitarian community has committed to providing relief that ensures people’s right to a life in dignity. Education is an integral part of both the immediate life-saving enterprise, and the longer-term support to sustainable development. The Norwegian model points to some of the ways in which this supposition can be transformed into action, but provides no blueprint for bridging the relief-development gap. The GoN could do well in playing down its glorifying image as ‘top of the donor class’. The humanitarian community should think bigger than meeting the imminent physical needs of
emergency-affected populations. Saving lives today is not an excuse for letting people die tomorrow.
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### Annex 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Mainstream education</th>
<th>Emergency Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing</strong></td>
<td>Long term interventions</td>
<td>Rapid response, flexible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-makers/actors</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Education/partners</td>
<td>Government body responsible for humanitarian affairs/ OCHA/ international community/relief agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policies</strong></td>
<td>National Education for All policies, sector wide programmes or other nationally formulated policies.</td>
<td>Refugee education as per international humanitarian law. UN policies applicable for internally displaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>National budget+ external assistance. Long-term financing perspective.</td>
<td>External assistance or financed by voluntary contributions from the communities themselves. Short term financing perspective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curriculum</strong></td>
<td>National formal– often conventionally subject based.</td>
<td>Varies- but should normally be based on the country of origin. Formal, non-formal or informal depending upon the circumstances. Usually incorporating various elements of peace education and efforts to heal traumatized children. Life skills are often incorporated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td>National (not necessarily mother tongue).</td>
<td>Varies- but usually language of country of origin unless pupils are integrated in national education system of a host country with a different national language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Student population</strong></td>
<td>All children have access in principle</td>
<td>Specially organised for refugees or internally displaced. May be located in several countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School cycle</strong></td>
<td>Follows regular patterns for starting the school year, class hierarchy etc.</td>
<td>Flexible. Classes may start anytime of the year. Accelerated learning programmes for older children who have missed schooling etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers</strong></td>
<td>Usually government employed, formal pre-service and in-service training.</td>
<td>May be government employed, often recruited from the community in question and trained specially. Sometimes involving externally recruited staff without formal pedagogic background. Different policies between external agencies regarding teachers’ salaries, compensation and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School management and administration</strong></td>
<td>Formal government authorities, PTAs.</td>
<td>Usually separate administrative systems with procedures established by the external agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pedagogic</strong></td>
<td>Often teacher centred.</td>
<td>Child centred methods often introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Following national policies- usually permanent classrooms.</td>
<td>Varies from very temporary solutions to more permanent classrooms. Often concern to avoid permanent buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material supply</strong></td>
<td>Follow national policies- students often have to buy materials. Materials usually locally procured and distributed.</td>
<td>Education material provided for free- externally financed- often pre-packed kits distributed with the assistance of external agencies. Supplies also produced locally by NGOs. Very often programmes have no access to materials at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fees</strong></td>
<td>Follow national policies.</td>
<td>Usually no fees required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination</strong></td>
<td>National responsibility.</td>
<td>In principle OCHA or UNHCR, or other UN agency, delegated to implementing NGO partner, sometimes fragmented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Sustainability</strong></td>
<td>Reasonable- if national budgets are adequate.</td>
<td>Funds for these projects usually depend on the donor community. Short-term commitments and often with fiscal or political conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal recognition and certification</strong></td>
<td>Nationally recognised examinations.</td>
<td>Varies, often negotiated with agencies and governments concerned post-emergency and on ad hoc basis. Critical problem of emergency education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Lexow (2002: 7)
ANNEX 2

1. Types of financial aid

**Balance of payments support** provides finance in support of a programme of policy reform, usually agreed upon by the government with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The emphasis is put on the policy actions which the government has agreed to implement, with little if any attention to how the finances would be used. No restrictions are placed on the use of the foreign exchange, and there is no formal accounting for how the aid is used.

**General budget support** can be thought of as a sub-category of balance of payments support except that instead of providing foreign exchange support for outstanding payments, the aid is used to increase the domestic currency balance of the receiving government. These funds are then freely available to the government and can be used to raise spending, reduce borrowing, or reduce taxes. The conditions typically include agreement to the overall budget priorities as defined by a medium term budget and expenditure framework.

**Aid-funded debt relief** reduces the accumulated debt obligations which governments are expected to meet in the future. This can encourage private sector investment and decrease government dependency on donor funds. Debt relief permanently increases the financial resources available to the government. It can be subject to conditionality, but, once granted, it can not be reversed, and the Government is free to decide how to allocate the additional resources.

**Sectoral budget support** is earmarked to help finance an agreed sector expenditure plan. Donors normally require an agreed policy and expenditure plan for the sector but the funds are allocated and accounted for through government systems.

**Project aid using government systems** provides more specific earmarking for a discrete set of activities. Donors will expect that coherent objectives, inputs and outputs be defined for each activity. This form of aid can be a part of government budgets, subject to government policy conditions, and disbursed and accounted for by government systems.

**Project aid using parallel systems** involve spending proposals for which donors have taken the lead, decided the inputs that are to be provided, and use their own disbursement and accountability procedures.

**Project aid through NGO/private providers** involves subsidising activities carried out by non-governmental organizations. This type of donor involvement is used in situations of market failure, or when NGOs propose projects that are cost-effective and provide better access to an important service. This implies using competition to ensure that the “user” benefits from the subsidies.

**Multilateral aid** is disbursed by “International Financial Institutions” such as the IMF and the World Bank. These are financed and controlled by their member countries. The IMF promotes development through an expansion of world trade whilst the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and IDA (International Development Association) which are grouped as the World Bank provide low-interest loans, interest-free credit, and grants to developing countries. With the UN Millennium Declaration, there has been increased commitment from the IFIs to be more poverty focused and provide greater volumes of ODA (Official Development Assistance) with enhanced developing country participation/ownership in IFI funded projects.

Sources: DFID (2005b); Foster and Leavy (2001); IMF (2005); OCHA (2005b)

2. Different funding mechanisms

**The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)** is a mechanism used by aid organizations to plan, implement and monitor their activities. In 1991, following a problematic response to the plight of Iraqi Kurdish refugees in the wake of the first Gulf War, the United Nations General Assembly created the Consolidated Appeals. As a planning mechanism, the CAP is supposed to foster a more strategic
approach to the provision of humanitarian aid and closer cooperation between governments, donors, aid agencies, and a range of other humanitarian organisations. Working together in the world's crisis regions, aid organizations produce a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and an appeal, which they present to the international community and donors. Consolidated Appeal documents provide a snapshot of a situation and present aid agencies' financial requirements. In 2005, 100 NGOs, the International Federation of Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration, and 20 UN agencies are part of the CAP.

Flash Appeals are used in breaking emergencies to attract attention to people's needs, structure a coordinated response, and outline agencies' immediate financial requirements. During the last quarter of 2004, the IASC Sub-Working Group on the CAP reviewed inter-agency flash appeals and developed new guidelines that have been disseminated to Humanitarian Coordinators and to Resident Coordinators in countries where flash appeals could be needed. In essence, flash appeals include a snapshot of what happened, humanitarian consequences, a prioritised response plan, and financial requirements. Since disseminating the new guidelines, flash appeals have been issued for various crises affecting people in: Angola, Benin, Djibouti, Guyana, the Indian Ocean, Niger, and the Philippines. In most cases inter-agency flash appeals now take only 72 hours to issue.

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is a comprehensive approach to debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries pursuing IMF- and World Bank-supported adjustment and reform programs. Countries' continued efforts toward macroeconomic adjustment and structural and social policy reforms - including higher spending on social sector programs like basic health and education - are now central to the enhanced HIPC Initiative. To be considered for HIPC Initiative assistance, a country must:

- Face an unsustainable debt burden, beyond traditionally available debt-relief mechanisms;
- Establish a track record of reform and sound policies through IMF- and World Bank-supported programs; and
- Have developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a broad-based participatory process (an interim strategy is sufficient to begin the process).

Poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) were introduced by the World Bank and the IMF and constitute a framework for development assistance beyond the operation of the international financial institutions. Based on the principle of country self-help and support from the international community, they integrate poverty analysis, public policy, macroeconomic policies, budgetary process and monitoring systems in a participatory manner. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as external development partners, including the IMF and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs that a country will pursue over several years to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources of financing.

Education for All (EFA) plans show donor agencies that governments have made long-term plans for the development of the education sector. According to the Dakar Framework for Action, all States should have "develop[ed] or strengthen[ed] existing national plans of action by 2002 at the latest" building on existing national education sector development strategies. These plans should be integrated into a wider poverty reduction and development framework, and should be developed through transparent and democratic processes, involving all relevant stakeholders, especially peoples' representatives, community leaders, parents, learners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society.

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) was launched in 2002. It was designed as a major donor initiative to help countries achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of Education for All (EFA) by 2015. The initiative provides additional and better co-ordinated external assistance to countries that may lack financial resources and capacity, but have development plans that demonstrate a serious commitment to implementing policy and institutional reforms. The Fast Track Initiative encompasses all major donors for education—more than 30 bilateral, regional and international agencies and development banks. It requires countries to have:

- An approved national poverty reduction strategy, or a similar national strategy that would help ensure that education strategies are anchored in country level consultative and budgetary processes;
• A sector-wide program for education agreed with in-country donors and including a strategy for HIV/AIDS, gender equality, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation;
• Agreement to monitor benchmark indicators.

A Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) implies that all significant public funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector. SWApS aim to use government procedures to disburse and account for all public expenditure, however funded. The working definition focuses on the intended direction of change rather than just the current attainment.

Sources: Brown, Foster, Norton, and Naschold (2000); DFID (2005b); Foster and Leavy (2001); IMF (2005); OCHA (2005b); Caillods and Hallak (2004)
ANNEX 3

Humanitarian Response Review: Main recommendations

i. The humanitarian organizations should continue, in an appropriate framework, including at the level of the IASC, the mapping exercise to cover more completely the capacities of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and the NGO community, as well as to address deployable capacities of other actors, such as the private sector and the military.

ii. The IASC organizations should actively pursue and measure the reform processes in their respective organizations, as well as the improvement of the CAP process, through the establishment and the application of different sets of benchmarks. Priority should be given to
   - internal management benchmarks related to the organizations’ preparedness as well as their assessment and planning capacities, in particular at field level. (Action: All – immediately)
   - a limited number of process and impact benchmarks for the CAP or other forms of appeal. (Action: All – immediately)

iii. The IASC should develop a strategy to promote cross-fertilization amongst organizations on best practices related to the use and the development of benchmarks and to ensure appropriate coherence in particular in preparedness and in the CAP process (at country level).

iv: The IASC and the donors should establish a limited set of benchmarks (and indicators) to be implemented in the first period of a new emergency up to a maximum of 3 months and addressing in priority
   - access and coverage of population in need
   - identification of responsibilities in delivery of assistance and in coordination
   - resources mobilization (human, assets, financial)
   - identification of relevant lifesaving activities
   - protection aspects, where needed.

Organizations and donors should agree on it and test it over a 3-year period, starting in 2006, before becoming the reference set. (Action: ERC/IASC with Donors – immediately)

v. Humanitarian organizations should reassess continuously, through an extended mapping of material and human resources in all sectors, their declared response capacities as compared to credible thresholds, below which a declared capacity becomes operationally irrelevant. (Action: All/IASC for threshold definition)

vi. The IASC should identify and assign lead organizations with responsibility at sectoral level, especially in relation to IDP protection and care and develop a cluster approach in all priority sectors. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

vii. The IASC should accelerate the establishment of common standards and guidelines at sector level, in recruitment or training policies, as well as for material assets in order to facilitate interoperability in the different networks and between networks. It should establish a work programme with identified issues and a timeframe for results, on a yearly basis. (Action: ERC/IASC Principals for decisions on priorities before end 2005; IASC WG for implementation, starting in 2006)

viii. The IASC should establish a functioning relief stock positioning system, in addition to the present registration, among UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the IOM and the NGOs, governments and other stakeholders, aimed at increasing preparedness, reducing costs, increasing access and assuring stock rotation. (Action: IASC)

ix. The IASC should take the lead in establishing the clear understanding that organizations must measure their surge capacity according to a consistent and predictable standard. A reporting mechanism should be developed by the IASC Working Group with special attention being paid to the NGO community.

x. OCHA should promote the expansion of surge capacities through the progressive establishment of pre-identified modules at national or regional level, building, inter alia, on new
initiatives such as the European Union mechanisms and the French Proposal to establish a standing International Humanitarian Force (Action: ERC/OCHA to engage in discussions in order to agree on modalities for cooperation and implementation – immediately)

xi. The IASC should accelerate the development of common services. (Action: IASC to identify priority sectors before end 2005; design implementation modalities before end 2006)

xii. Organization Field Directors should clear and establish agreements with operational partners on matters pertaining to local hiring and procurement in particular. (Action: All)

xiii. Non-UN networks, such as those organized by IFRC and the Interagency Working Group, should make liaison with the HC a priority. (Action: Red Cross/Red Crescent members; NGOs)

xiv. The ERC should consult with the IASC Principals and major stakeholders to agree on designating operational accountability for the various sectors and crosscutting areas to respond to the protection and care of IDPs. A similar approach should be followed in order to designate lead organizations in sectors where this is missing and would seem appropriate. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

xv. In an integrated mission with significant humanitarian component, the DSRSG should be vested with the authority to make major decisions on humanitarian matters as well as delegated the functions of the Designated Official (DO) for security for the mission. (Action: ERC/IASC - immediately)

xvi. The IASC and country teams should accelerate the establishment of the IASC at the country level, to be named the Field Humanitarian Team (FHT). (Action: IASC - immediately)

xvii. The ERC should review the composition, functions and decision-making process of the IASC based on the following elements: i) memberships to be based on substantive involvement in humanitarian operations; ii) major leadership to be ensured in monitoring and promoting the reform process through cross-fertilization amongst organizations; iii) organizations to agree on an appropriate system of empowerment of the IASC in making its decisions binding for the members in pre-identified situations (Action: ERC with IASC for proposals before end 2005)

xviii. The IASC should establish a joint consultative UN/NGOs/ICRC/IFRC forum at the level of Directors of Emergencies, which should meet at least every quarter or as the need arises, with a rotating chair, to take common orientations on urgent humanitarian issues, using as a basis for discussion the “Early Warning Mechanism” being developed by the IASC. (Action: IASC before end 2005)

xix. The IASC should review the roles of the ERC and Humanitarian Coordinators and make recommendations to strengthen them in order to better reflect the broader basis of the humanitarian community they serve in their coordination functions (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

xx. The IASC should review the selection, training and management system for the Humanitarian Coordinators as well as develop a career path for this cadre, including the establishment of a preselected roster of candidates, coming from the different networks part of the IASC.

xxi. The IASC should establish criteria (such as independence from any agency, neutral position vis-a-vis host government, strong humanitarian experience, a mix of operational and diplomatic skills) which the Resident Coordinator would need to meet to be selected as a Humanitarian Coordinator. In cases in which the Resident Coordinators do not meet these criteria, the system should consider a stand-alone HC. A stand-alone HC to be appointed also in case of failed states, uncommitted governments with no degree of accountability and obligations to their citizens and countries at the height of emergencies/disasters without any development opportunities. (Action: ERC/IASC – immediately)

xxii. OCHA should assess the coordination capacities of the HC offices in the field, in preparedness, planning, needs assessment and resource mobilization and to draw up a time-bound plan of action for equipping them with the necessary tools and mechanisms. (Action: OCHA with IASC)
xxiii. IASC should increase coherence in the appeal mechanisms, especially where networks exist. The CAP process should be the tool, with the IASC taking a stronger leadership and establishing by end 2005 a plan of action to speed up the process. (Action: Organizations/IASC)

xxiv. Organizations should develop stronger advocacy for forgotten or neglected needs, through a shared “communication” strategy, established through the IASC, addressed in particular to public opinions and media in the current and potential donor countries. Donors’ policy should be challenged on the basis of sound needs assessments. (Action: All/IASC)

xxv. Humanitarian organizations should review their financial systems, with a view to use available funds in a way that anticipates donor disbursements and prevents loss of funds.

xxvi. Humanitarian organizations should identify, in the framework of existing networks or at the level of the IASC, the preparedness activities including recruitment and training that could be part of a common plan to be presented to donors for financial support; exploring in particular the opportunity offered by such an approach in engaging with the private sector. (Action: All/IASC)

xxvii. Humanitarian organizations should agree to use a common funding appeal system managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, when as members of a Field Humanitarian Team, they have contributed to establish a Common Action Plan for the initial phase (12 weeks) of a new emergency.

xxviii. Donors should make substantial progress in addressing the acknowledged imbalance in support to different emergencies (forgotten or neglected needs) (Action: All - through inter alia the GHDI – immediately with clear objectives fixed for 2006 budgetary exercise)

xxix. Donors should actively support humanitarian organizations efforts in enlarging the donor base (institutional or private), while preserving respect for the established humanitarian law, principles and practices.

xxx. Donors should introduce only progressively and after appropriate preparation, new funding mechanisms, such as country pooled funding, to prevent negative effects on the financial capacities of humanitarian organizations. (Action: concerned donors)

xxxi. Donors should review disbursement procedures in order to reduce the time span between pledging and disbursement to a maximum of six weeks. (Action: All)

xxxii. In the framework of the GHDI, donors should rapidly agree on the possible simplified reporting approaches (annual reporting of organizations or common format) and establish the common format by end 2005. (Action: donors in the GHDI - for decision before end 2005 and implementation in 2006)

xxxiii. Donors should consider an increase of the present level of funding for humanitarian assistance in the framework of the debate on the MDG. (This should be a priority for the GHDI)

xxxiv. A larger group of donors, including the private sector, should engage in support of preparedness or rapid reaction- through establishing financial mechanisms covering these types of activities at the levels of organizations and, complementary, at central level, such as a revised CERF. Donors should consider devoting at least 5 to 10 per cent of their annual funding to preparedness activities of the organizations.

xxxv. Donors should agree on the revision of the CERF in order to increase its size (between 350-500 M $), to enlarge its scope (support to start up and preparedness activities), to modify its modalities (a large grant element) and the role of the ERC in managing it.

xxxvi. Donors should engage to channel funding, in the initial (12 weeks) phase of a new emergency, through the common appeal which will support the Field Humanitarian Team' Plan of Action and will be managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator

Source: OCHA (2005: 16-18)
Annex 4

List of interviewees

Semi-structured or informal interviews and conversations were held with the following persons:

Allison Anderson
Focal Point for the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Reconstruction. (IRC, New York)

Pamela Baxter
Former Peace Education Coordinator at UNHCR and Senior Technical Advisor for Peace and Human Rights at UNESCO (UNESCO, Paris/field).

Susan Dardon
Regional Advisor, Education (6 SEARS country and Afghanistan). UNICEF

Louise Haxthausen
Coordinator for post-conflict and post-disaster operations, Bureau of Field Coordination, (UNESCO, Paris/field).

Ellen van Kalmthout
Programme Officer, Education Programme Division, UNICEF (UNICEF, New York). Chair of the INEE Steering Group.

Eldrid Kvamen Midttun
Educational Advisor, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC, Oslo). Former Chair of the INEE Steering Group, now SG representative for NRC.

Mary Mendenhall
Network Coordinator, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE, Paris)

Margaret Sinclair
Former Senior Education Officer at UNHCR

Christopher Talbot

Marit Vedeld
Senior Advisor, NORAD (NORAD, Oslo)