CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

WORKING PAPER

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Executive summary

This paper examines fragility, capacity development and education and the links between these by analysing relevant research and policy literature. It proposes ways forward for action and reflection at national, regional and international levels.

Chapter One sets the scene with a review of the debate on the characteristics of fragile states and education within them, and the paper identifies state building as a priority concern. The capacity challenge is especially acute in these contexts. The paper considers how administrative systems and education institutions can enhance accountability, trust, civic participation and social capital as well as human capital.

Chapter Two looks at the nature of fragile states and possible reasons for their fragility. Fragile states are understood as those that lack the capacity and the willingness to perform key government functions, and in which the ‘public’ is weak or missing altogether. While conflict and natural disasters are often a cause of state fragility, the situation is often made worse by political and social events. Fragile education systems are both an effect and a cause of fragility. If people have lost faith in the education system provided by the state, that education system will be less able to foster change in the political system. The challenge is to develop education systems that can change the dynamics of fragility. This in turn will allow the state to bolster its legitimacy by providing mass education that delivers what it promises.

Capacity development in education systems in such contexts requires a broad definition. It clearly goes beyond the knowledge and skills of individuals into the realm of governance. Effective capacity development strategies will also depend on the social, economic and political context of the country or region in question.

Chapter Three puts the elements of the fragility, capacity development and education together. It examines which elements of capacity development should be targeted in education, with state building as the primary objective. Administrative systems and education institutions have different but complementary roles to play. With regard to administration, capacity development is examined in terms of policy making and planning, regulatory functions, including anti-corruption measures, and strengthening local capacity and leadership, including gender concerns. The development of teachers, curricula, skills and analytical capacity are all priority areas for the development of education institutions, but in specific ways that address state fragility. Learner-centred teaching, labour market analysis, entrepreneurship skills, skills for employment, adult education, civic education and political literacy are all identified as areas for action.

Donor involvement, methodologies for capacity development and possible ways forward are discussed in Chapters Four and Five. The OECD-DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations are discussed in relation to choices over the allocation of resources and the skills needed to prioritise. Process considerations, such as whether to target specific levels of an education system or whether to adopt an issues-based approach to mobilise diverse stakeholders from all levels, are also important.

With regard to donor alignment, the aim is to match donor strategies, policies and budget planning to local needs. These can vary depending on specific circumstances, for example towards preventing human rights abuses and exerting a democratic influence on authoritarian or oppressive governments. The issue of involving stakeholders outside the state system in both urban and rural areas to reinforce the development of civil society is also examined. However, the question of who participates is a big one. Should stakeholders from the non-formal sector or from opposition groups or parties be included? In fragile situations it is important to ensure mediation to create a climate of cooperation rather than competition among all those involved.

An important element of capacity development in education systems is the establishment of education standards and indicators. This entails the development of countrywide and local indicators of both fragility and recovery, as well as indicators of success. Although the provision
of services is likely to be a higher priority in these situations, it is important to collect data and establish indicators as early as possible. Building capacity locally to collect, analyse and report on key indicators is also an important step. Reporting and monitoring should not be used to assign blame, but should be seen as a learning activity that allows innovation and experimentation with new ideas.

Regional cooperation can play a significant role in peer learning and stakeholder exchange to improve knowledge management and exchange good practice. For example, in labour migration and refugee situations the accreditation of learning across borders can become an issue for capacity development. Capacity development for local staff might also be needed to enable them to deal more effectively with multiple international and donor organisations.

**Key messages**

**Areas for action**

Capacity development for education in fragile situations must analyse and work within the specific constraints of the security and development needs of the social, economic and political context. While different forms of alignment may be necessary in the short term, the long-term aim should be to rebuild the state and restore its functions.

Capacity development goes beyond the technical skills of individuals. In education, it should contribute to greater equity, cohesion and trust in the system.

Planning, regulatory and accountability functions need to be strengthened within ministries of education and relevant local authorities. Issues such as workplace culture, nepotism, creative accounting and corruption should be surfaced and tackled.

Education personnel need to develop capacity to ensure greater and more equal participation in education. Where education is decentralised, capacity development is needed at local levels to enable decentralised education governance to work. Yet across all levels, there is a need for understanding and consensus on decentralised power itself.

Capacity development is also needed for those involved in youth employment policies and programmes, women’s groups and adult literacy. This will help to strengthen civil society.

Capacity development in the area of labour market analysis is essential. This will help to ensure that vocational education is relevant.

Teachers’ capacity development must include the ability to promote political literacy and media understanding and to deal with controversial issues. Teacher education in areas such as citizenship and legal education is needed.

Accurate situation analyses are needed, along with a description of how the education system is affected. There is a need for help in generating reliable indicators and standards for monitoring and evaluating education, and for support to coordinate these.

Regional networks can support cross-border topics such as the education of refugees and migrants. They can also help to address national issues in a less politically sensitive way.

A network of international experts on capacity development in fragile situations could be created. However, care should be taken that such expertise builds on local cultural and political knowledge.
Areas for reflection

Which focus points, dimensions, actors, stakeholders and methodological responses should be considered? How can a research programme to study the impact of capacity development combinations be put into practice?

How can the management of education institutions be improved? Should new regulatory bodies be created to do this?

What could be the short- and long-term indicators of success in capacity development in education for state building?

Could capacity development across sectors be more effective than capacity development only in the education sector? Should it be applied, for example, across agriculture, employment, health and sanitation, justice and communication?

Capacity development is socio-psychological as well as political and systemic. So there must be incentives for people to change their behaviour. How can incentives be introduced for those who need capacity development? How can their needs for security and status be fulfilled?

Should the Fast Track Initiative be extended to fragile states to support education planning?

Ensuring ownership at national and local levels is essential. But how can effective ownership of capacity development overall be ensured?
1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the paper

This paper was prepared to address the concerns of the European Training Foundation (ETF) about human capital development and social cohesion in ‘fragile states’. Capacity development is also a priority focus for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in its involvement in the Working Group on Education and Fragility of the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). This has led these two institutions to work together on the current project.

1.2 The fragility–capacity development–education nexus

There have been many papers and manuals on education and fragility, and on capacity development and fragility. However, fewer papers have combined these. This paper tries to summarise the connections and highlight the problems in making the links. Capacity development is in itself ‘educational’ in that it relates to learning and unlearning. Capacity development in the education sector therefore has a complex role: it may relate to individuals and organisations who see themselves as enabling others to learn, rather than learning themselves. Adding in the fragility dimension requires acknowledgement that education may have contributed to that fragility in a way that other sectors (health, transport) have not. Putting together capacity development, education and fragility requires a very nuanced and political approach if it is to move beyond simple lists of prescriptions for skills training or organisational reforms.

Capacity development generally remains a great challenge. Around a quarter of donor aid, or more than USD 15 billion a year, has gone into technical cooperation in recent years. Most of this money was intended for capacity development, although not only in education. Despite the size of these inputs, the development of sustainable capacity is still one of the most difficult areas of international development practice (OECD, 2006). This is particularly the case for fragile states, especially for capacity development in education. There is still reluctance to see education in general as a priority in humanitarian or development aid, and the very reasons for fragility are those that make donors less eager to become involved (Evidence for Education, 2009). Investment in capacity development is not seen as leading to quick or easily measurable returns (ETF, 2006). This paper aims to challenge this view by showing the considerable direct and indirect benefits of capacity development in education for reducing fragility.

1.3 Scope of the paper: audience and objectives

This paper is mainly aimed at:

- members of the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility;
- the ‘partners’ of the Working Group;
- the INEE member community as a whole.

From their review, and that from the Global Consultation in April 2009, it could be adapted for other audiences. However, the paper assumes a great deal of existing knowledge and expertise on the part of the reader. It is not intended to suggest firm answers, but to stimulate debate and help the development of future strategy and policy. Its objectives are therefore:

- to review existing literature on capacity development, education and fragility;
- to identify what could be done at country, regional and international levels, and how development partners such as ETF and GTZ might support this.
The central questions of the paper are as follows.

- Is capacity development in fragile contexts qualitatively different from capacity development in other development contexts?
- How is capacity development for education in fragile contexts different from capacity development in other sectors?
- What are the meaningful strategies, priorities and combinations of capacity development interventions?

In order to address these questions, in Section 2 the paper looks at the nature of fragility and the ‘fragility debate’. It then briefly identifies the particular characteristics of education in fragile contexts. Finally, it draws the boundaries around capacity development that will be used in this paper. Section 3 looks at intervention and interruption of cycles of fragility. It considers which dimension should be tackled and which entry point or sub-sector of education should be targeted. Section 4 examines the roles and relationships of donors and other actors. Section 5 looks at ways forward at country, regional and global levels. The focus throughout is mainly on primary and secondary general education and its governance and administration. However, the implications also apply to vocational and tertiary education, and non-formal education and training.
2. Setting the frame: fragility, capacity development and education

2.1 The fragility debate

There is a growing debate about the use of the term ‘fragile’ to describe a country. The word is seen as having paternalistic or negative connotations. As the President of Burundi recently pointed out, it has political, economic and emotional implications, and gives a negative image to foreign investors (Nkurunziza, 2008). However, as yet there is no agreement on a replacement term, and it is more than likely that any label chosen will come to take on the same connotations. This paper therefore continues with the notion of fragility, but talks mainly of ‘fragile contexts’ rather than the blanket ‘fragile states’, which appears to condemn a whole country.

Discussions of fragility appear to cover three areas:

- the phase or category of fragility;
- the features of fragility;
- the causes of fragility.

Four categories are often used (OECD, 2008; OECD-DAC, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrested development</td>
<td>Prolonged crisis or impasse; stagnation with low levels of effectiveness and legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration</td>
<td>Declining levels of governance effectiveness leading to lower legitimacy, rising risk of violence or collapse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict transition</td>
<td>Low levels of effectiveness, transitory legitimacy, recent violence, humanitarian crisis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Early recovery</td>
<td>Gradual improvement; rising levels of effectiveness and legitimacy, declining aid needs, emergence from conflict or other crises</td>
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A fuller discussion of these and other categories can be found in Appendix 1. When examining capacity development in education, it was found to be more useful to look at features and histories, and these are described below.

First, no single definition of a ‘fragile state’\(^1\) has been adopted by international consensus. However, some common features that have a particular impact on capacity development decisions can be identified from various sources:

- deficits in governance that hinder economic development; the political apparatus is characterised by uncertainty, contradiction and technical ambiguity;
- inability to maintain security across its territory;

\(^1\) The definition of ‘state’ used here is that of OECD-DAC (2007), with a broad definition which includes the executive branch of the central and local governments within a state but also the legislative and judiciary arms of the government.
- inability to ensure that the essential needs of its population are met; conditions too unstable for long-term planning and investment, with society focusing on short-term coping strategies to secure basic needs;
- spatial polarisation of identities and ethnic or other tensions;
- ungovernable flows of aid and people across boundaries; level of aid volatility twice as high as it is in low-income countries;
- education given a lower development priority than in low-income countries;
- opaque decision making by a small elite; interdependence or reliance on other elite groups;
- erosion of the people’s trust in the state’s formal institutions (Fuller, 1991; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; OECD, 2008; Turrent and Oketch, 2009).

The definitions of fragility used by the DAC and several aid agencies emphasise the lack of both capacity and willingness to perform key government functions for the benefit of all.

**Capacity** means having the core features that enable the state to mobilise resources for such key objectives as economic development and poverty reduction. These features include territorial control and presence, effective exercise of political power, basic competence in economic management and sufficient administrative capacity to implement policies.

**Willingness** means an explicit political commitment to policies that support human welfare. It is reflected in actions and outcomes that are implemented in an inclusive way (non-discrimination). Legitimacy concerns the sources of support for the state and the regime. (OECD, 2008, p. 14)

It is important to stress that capacity development refers not only to tackling the first of these, but also to enhancing political will. As the OECD points out, the state is built and maintained through the collective action of the public, but in a fragile state the ‘public’ is missing or weak. Although the self-serving and market-based provision of goods may be possible, the more public aspects of service delivery tend to crumble or disappear (e.g. vaccinations, school curricula, teacher training, law enforcement and water utilities). This situation will weaken civil society and the legitimacy of government. Brinkerhoff (2007) also picks up on the issue of inclusivity:

In fragile states, citizens are polarised in ethnic, religious or class-based groups, between whom there is a history of distrust, grievance and/or violent conflict. Civil society lacks the capacity to cooperate, compromise and trust each other. When these capacity deficits are extreme, states move towards failure, collapse, crisis and conflict. (Brinkerhoff, 2007, p. 1).

This divisiveness is a crucial factor in education, and this will be explored later.

The features of fragility link to the identification of the causes of fragility and hence to the goals of donors in intervention. While natural disasters are often a causal factor, they can be linked to, or made worse by, political and social failure. These failures will be the main concern of this paper. Fragility can be transnational, in that the causes may be generated elsewhere, as is the case in the current economic crisis. Some political economists would also say that oppressive trade relationships undermine economic growth or stability. Critiques of the OECD-DAC definition of a fragile state focus on the fact that it is ‘state-centric’, rather than including international or regional phenomena, or on the use of the term ‘lack of political will’, since this could be harmful to diplomatic relations, and is difficult to apply: how is a lack of will measured or documented, and whose notions of the ideal state apply (Engberg-Pederson et al., 2008, pp. 21–22)?

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2 Capacity development for dealing with emergencies might be only one part of broader capacity development as a response to fragility.
One way to look at fragile characteristics is to determine what would be needed to turn the situation around – that is, to reduce fragility. Three components have been identified:

- a lasting cessation of violent conflict;
- sustained economic growth;
- sustained improvements in human development indicators (Institute of Development Studies, 2006).

These would create an improving policy context that would enhance pro-poor growth potential. As well as direct poverty reduction strategies, other programmes and projects can contribute to turnaround through:

- bringing about a change in governance;
- catalysing change outside the area of the original intervention;
- stemming negative spillover effects from one region or country into the other regions or neighbouring countries.

Cammack et al. (2006) wrote a useful paper for JICA surveying donors and the ‘fragile states’ agenda. The international development community came to this agenda from three different directions:

- an emphasis on human security and peace-building;
- a concern with poor development performance and state effectiveness;
- a belief that underdevelopment and insecurity (both individual and international) are related.

The paper summarises the emphases of various donors (see Appendix 2). It gives details of the agendas of the USA, UK and Germany, and provides case studies of Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nepal to show how the fragile states agenda has been put into practice by different donors. The need for donor coordination is obvious. But there is also a need to understand different donors’ assumptions about causes and outcomes of fragility, and hence their priorities for intervention, particularly the mix of security and development goals. Brinkerhoff (2007) cites two factors that intensify the politicised nature of donor response:

- fragile states engage other interested constituencies beyond the development assistance community (for example relying on local warlords in Afghanistan to maintain security);
- the high visibility of fragile states mobilises public opinion and puts a media spotlight on intervention efforts.

All these intricate interconnections signal a need for a distinct response from donors. The OECD is clear that ‘we need approaches, instruments, skill sets and international architecture that are different from those applied in better performing countries’ (OECD-DAC, 2007, p. 4).

That difference in approach – and the central argument of this paper – is the need to build the state. For fragile contexts, the OECD (2006) highlights the value of focusing on core state functions, particularly those whose performance directly affects the likelihood of state collapse or further conflict. This entails:

- joint planning between all security, diplomatic and development actors;
- fostering country leadership even where the conditions appear unpromising;
- taking care not to undermine existing, even dormant, capacities.

Debiel claims that ‘the key to both socioeconomic success and efforts to stabilise fragile states must be sought in efficient, transparent and accountable governance structures that pave the way
to real citizen voice and participation' (Debiel, 2005, p. 2). He builds on Clapham’s assertion that ‘the state remains the only plausible building block on which any project of global governance can be constructed’ (Clapham, 2001, p. 2). It is crucial to restore the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, restore the rule of law and consistently combat corruption.

From this discussion, three working assumptions can be made.

- It is essential to look at the political context of fragility, and in particular the government’s role in increasing or reducing fragility (and hence how to engage with government), but also the wider regional or international political context.
- It is more appropriate to replace ‘fragile state’ with ‘fragile context’ or ‘fragile characteristics’, in order to assess what precisely is ‘failing’ and where failure is generated.
- Fragility calls for distinctive policies and strategies for capacity development responses, with the need to rebuild the state being paramount.

2.2 Education in fragile contexts

The next question is about the nature of education in fragile contexts, and again, whether this is distinctive. Educational fragility is both an effect of and a contributor to wider state fragility. Rose and Greeley (2006) provide a useful breakdown of the international agenda for support to education in fragile states. They identify:

- the security agenda (for example, negative and positive political use of schools, disaffected youth, religious schooling);
- the humanitarian agenda (community engagement, schools as safe spaces);
- Education for All (EFA) agenda (for example a rights-based approach, active citizenship);
- Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) (national growth and poverty reduction, focus on primary schooling).

The agendas all interlock, although they have different time scales and transitions. This paper contends that capacity development is crucial to all agendas. Some characteristics will be shared with other ‘poor’ but relatively stable development contexts. These include poor quality of provision, a lack of qualified teachers, and an inability to reach EFA targets. In fragile contexts these deficiencies are accompanied by four other main problems:

- lack of legitimacy;
- contribution to conflict;
- extreme inequality;
- weak governance reflected in education governance.

These problems are described in the following sections.
2.2.1 Legitimacy of the state and of state education

As defined above, one of the characteristics of fragile states is the lack of legitimacy on the part of the state itself, and the degree of trust that people have in it. State policy on education is part of that legitimacy. As long ago as 1991, Bruce Fuller talked of the ‘rocky romance’ of the fragile state with the school. Mass education perhaps more than any other sector is subject to competing and almost irreconcilable goals. It is selective and rationed, especially at higher levels, and not everyone can succeed. For state legitimacy, this gap between what every individual might want and what is actually possible has to be disguised under the name of meritocracy or equal opportunity, or, as Fuller pointed out in the context of Malawi, through symbolic trappings of modernity (Fuller, 1991). In this sense, capacity development may just be about making the game marginally less unfair and marginally more transparent.

The OECD argues that justice/security and education appear to be the most transformative type of services in fragile setting. However, they are also those that are most prone to polarisation and manipulation. The OECD points out how different groups in society will have different visions about what makes ‘good’ service delivery in the education sector. Clients (parents/learners) want low-cost, easy-to-access, safe, high-quality schooling that improves their children’s life chances. Policymakers and political leaders want to deliver social benefits at low cost, with high propaganda value and political rewards. The providers (teachers) care about technically sound curricula, relatively good salaries, respect and safety. ‘Thus the effectiveness of service delivery – and in turn, the legitimacy of the political order – depends on addressing competing goals and expectations in ways that satisfy the stakeholders’. The OECD makes a further, very important point:

The source of legitimacy for the state may be the leaders’ ability to deliver economic growth, national prestige or public services. Alternatively (a more partial) legitimacy might derive from signals of special allegiance to certain traditions or ethnic groups. Thus, legitimacy may or may not relate to equitable service delivery (OECD, 2008, p. 15).

This has huge implications for questions of partnership and stakeholder involvement, which will be examined below.

In richer or more stable states the contradictions of mass schooling and opportunity can be and are being massaged through ideologies of choice and markets. More brittle states, where there are even deeper questions of legitimacy, cannot even provide the basics from which consumer choices can be made. Also, in terms of cohesion and control, fragile states cannot necessarily risk the diversification into different cultural and religious educational sites that is now being advanced in the West. A vicious circle occurs when the state provides an education system in which people have lost faith, and in turn, the education system is powerless to bring about change in the political system. The challenging task is to create a more virtuous circle, in which education can change the workings of the fragile state, and in turn, or simultaneously, the state can bolster its legitimacy by providing mass education that can actually deliver what it promises.

2.2.2 Conflict and security

The idea of ‘two faces’ of education with regard to conflict has been well documented and widely discussed (Buckland, 2005; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004; Seitz, 2004). The OECD view is that education offers the greatest possibilities for addressing the sources of fragility. It can protect children and prevent further harm by providing curricula on health, sanitation and human rights. It can identify and assist those with special needs or post-traumatic stress. It can protect against recruitment into armed combat, forced labour, drug trafficking and prostitution. It affects the socialisation of young people, the understanding of public issues, political participation, women’s empowerment and health (OECD, 2008).

However, while education after a conflict can contribute to peace-building, there is no guarantee that it will. Education can contribute to a lack of, or breakdown in, social cohesion. This might be because of inequality in access and opportunity, which causes frustration, but also because of such factors as ethnic, caste or religious discrimination by schools and teachers, and bias in
curriculum and textbooks. For example, in Rwanda there is evidence that didactic teaching methods, which smothered critical thinking and questioning, affected people’s responses to the genocide (Bird, 2003). Violence in schools, whether corporal punishment or gender-based violence (see Leach and Mitchell, 2006), also contributes to cultures of violence and to an acceptance of violence as a solution to problems. How education is actually used – or manipulated – by government, religious groups, local politicians and oppositional groups needs to be constantly examined. For example, Smith and Vaux (2003) have described how schools in Nepal may be targeted to undermine government legitimacy.

The global security agenda has added an additional urgency. This requires education to challenge extremism and violent radicalisation, and to prevent young people joining extremist groups. Professional development for teachers and teacher trainers needs to cover how to promote acceptance of alternatives to single truths or missions, skills in media education and comparative religious education, and how to confront violence (Davies, 2008).

2.2.3 Extremes of inequality and inequity

Extreme and glaring inequalities in education provision and access can also contribute to conflict and instability. The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Progressive Framework, under the heading ‘service delivery’, talks of the technical core of education support (trained teachers, materials, etc.), but points out that in fragile states there is a particular need to emphasise, throughout the system, attention to human rights, gender and other equity, diversity and inclusion issues, protection and psychosocial needs, and the principles of the rule of law. This has huge implications for capacity development, not only in the training of teachers and supervisors, but also for local authorities. It is difficult to achieve a national policy on human rights education in relatively stable states, and in fragile states this may well be seen as a threat both to the government and to classroom teachers. Yet it could be argued that it is a core aspect of ‘turnaround’ and of the return to stability.

The previous function (or dysfunction) of education in fragile contexts suggests a need for a shift from competitive and divisive schooling to one that builds social capital, cohesion and security. One cross-national study by Putnam of the determinants of social cohesion found that the best predictor of high social capital is simply years of formal schooling. More educated people have wider, deeper, stronger social networks and participate more in social, community and political life (quoted in Barakat et al., undated). Yet in fragile contexts, schooling would need to have a redistributive function in terms of income inequality and gender inequality, as well as reduction of discrimination, if it is to enhance cohesion.

2.2.4 Governance

General cultures within administration are clearly reflected in educational governance. There may be weaknesses in accountability, planning, financing and the location of decision making. There is a particular need for democratic governance in order for the turnaround mentioned previously to take place (OECD, 2007, p. 7). Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa shows that education plays an important role in building support for multi-party democracy and challenges to autocracy (EFA-FTI, 2008). However, in fragile contexts there can be gaps at all levels in learning about democracy, with civic education in schools being at odds with the authoritarian or even violent ways it is conducted (Harber, 1997). Democratic skills also need to be reinforced within civil society organisations. These bodies may be run undemocratically, existing on donor funding alone, and accomplishing some immediate local development tasks without truly offering an arena for democratic discussion of political, social and economic development (Antal and Easton, 2008). In the African context, Antal and Easton argue for civic education that draws on patterns of democratic governance within African cultures, and for communication between formal education and informal learning in the surrounding culture. The failure of civic education to impact on political culture calls for a re-examination of methods of ‘instruction’, including radio, street theatre and local traditions of satire. It also calls for an analysis of the trade-offs in costs between the formal training of elites and mass outreach to communities (Bratton and Alderfer, 1999).
In education governance, as in other sectors, a lack of transparency may be endemic. This can range from creative accounting in order to make ends meet through to full-scale corruption. Hallak and Poisson (2005) report that leakage of funds from ministries of education to schools represents more than 80% of the total sums allocated (non-salary expenditure). The IIEP-UNESCO project on Ethics and Corruption in Education has three assumptions.

Monopoly power and lack of accountability mechanisms help corrupt practices to develop in the education sector.

The behaviour of actors (intangible inputs) has a significant impact on problems of access, quality and equity in education.

Facilitating access to information and promoting a ‘citizens’ voice’ are essential for improving transparency and accountability in the use of educational resources. This has important implications for capacity development planning.

2.3 The capacity development debate and challenge

The interlocking nature and breadth of the problems of education in fragile contexts means that an equally broad concept of capacity development is needed. An OECD-DAC definition is ‘the ability of individuals, organisations and societies to make effective and efficient use of resources, in order to achieve their own goals on a sustainable basis’ (Rose, 2007). For Brinkerhoff (2007), capacity means ‘having the aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions that are necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose’. He adds ‘sustainable capacity’ as involving the endogenous processes that exist within a country that are separate from donor activity.

‘Capacity’ clearly goes beyond the knowledge and technical skills of individuals. It depends crucially on the quality of the organisations in which they work and in turn on the influence of ‘the enabling environment’ – the structure of power and influence and the institutions in which they are embedded. ‘Capacity is not only about skills and procedures; it is also about incentives and governance’ (OECD, 2006, p. 7). Capacity development cannot be disconnected from rights and responsibilities, and should not be limited to the public sector. A key point made by Brinkerhoff is about relationships. It refers to how capacities at local level are influenced by relationships with ministries and other partners, whose capacities are in turn determined by relationships with national government and donors, by policies, by the degree of corruption, by the kind of services that societal elites want, and so on.

UNESCO (2008) defines capacity development as a process with four dimensions:

- improving the competencies and performance of individual officers;
- improving organisational performance (mandate, structure, international management of organisational units);
- improving public administration to which these units belong (role of public service, rules of civil service management, formal and informal incentives);
- improving the social, economic and political context (limiting the constraints and strengthening incentives).

This last dimension seems critical in fragile contexts. The FTI Progressive Framework states that the interim strategy needs consensus on actions that are ‘prioritised according to the context and take into account the range of issues relating to education and fragility’ (FTI, 2008, p. 1).
However, there is a difference between taking something into account in considering capacity development (which could be anything from rewards and pay outside the public sector to a situation of conflict and intergroup hostility) and actually improving a ‘context’, as UNESCO (2008) states. Is the social, economic and political context simply seen as a ‘risk’ factor on a logframe, or are there attempts to intervene in this, directly or indirectly, using capacity development? This is an important area, but one in which there is a lack of evidence in terms of impact.

Broadening capacity development from the technical skills of individuals creates difficulty in the definition and boundaries of what exactly is meant by capacity development. Given that the ‘capacity to achieve goals’ would include the physical resources to do this, virtually all educational aid and intervention could come under this banner, including building and equipping schools, paying teachers’ wages, curriculum reform and legislative reform. Clearly these elements need to go hand in hand. Respondents in Rose’s study proposed that resources spent on upgrading skills without attention to improving salaries can be counter-productive (Rose, 2007). Local staff may want to improve the system but be hampered by a lack of resources or transport to visit schools, again implying the need for coherent policy (Harber and Davies, 2003).

However, even within a broad scope, it would seem important to limit this discussion to human and system improvement outside the provision of the supporting financial and physical resources. For example, Watson and Yohannes describe how the national capacity building strategy in Ethiopia had three elements: human capacity; systems and procedures; and organisational structures and relationships. The major components were the whole range of educational levels, including technical and vocational education, but also civil service reform programmes on finance, ethics and the justice sector. This capacity building strategy was ‘intimately related to the democratisation process, to help deliver the principles enshrined in the constitution’ (Watson and Johannes, 2005). Indeed, capacity development overall does relate to democratisation, in terms of the principles of equity, transparency, participation and rights, cutting across all sectors (see Harber, 1997; Davies et al., 2005). Reformists would argue this for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, for example, stating that quality entails a full shift in educational philosophy, with schools supporting aims of democracy and participation (Nicolai, 2007). From this it can be concluded that capacity development should ideally be cross-sectoral (and not just education) and, more controversially, political (not neutral in values).

Returning to the argument for identification of fragile characteristics presented in Section 2.1, capacity development must have targets as well as philosophies. The OECD suggests that practitioners should begin by asking ‘capacity for what?’, and would focus on specific capacities needed to accomplish clearly defined goals – a ‘best fit’ approach. This links to the need to avoid providing generic training on broad topics that are disconnected from the capacity and performance of specific organisations. One challenge is to identify government departments for capacity development that will have the maximum spillover benefits for the rest of government.

Another helpful focus is to determine the ‘absorptive capacity’ (AC) (see Rose, 2007) to manage aid flows. This can relate to labour market conditions but also to technical, managerial or planning skills. In terms of aid effectiveness, some countries reach a point at which the benefits from increases in aid start to diminish, or even become negative. Education in particular absorbs large proportions of budgets and for some countries would require a large scaling-up of aid to reach MDGs and EFA targets. Yet Rose finds that some agencies are cautious about increasing their commitments significantly, citing AC constraints as the reason.

AC highlights the importance of the timing of aid intervention. Would capacity development need to precede any injection of new textbooks, computers or other educational resources, or at least happen simultaneously? It also draws attention to the ‘amenability’ of addressing AC constraints. Should the focus be on those constraints that have a high level of amenability to change, such as the weak supervision of teachers, which can be addressed through training and incentives, but which may not have high impact? Or should it be on those constraints that have a low level of amenability, such as weak, over-centralised planning and management, but which nonetheless have high impact on all areas of the system?
This paper will use a broad version of capacity development in education, which is about education system development but also about teacher professional development, as these are interdependent. While it would be possible in theory to include all learners in capacity development, this paper restricts the discussion to education ‘providers’. However, this will inevitably touch on what is provided for learners, that is, the curriculum.
3. The fragility–capacity development–education nexus

In this section the three elements are brought together. First, because the state is fragile, efforts must be made to rebuild it. Yet the very fragility of the state means that such efforts are likely to be disrupted in a range of predictable and unpredictable ways. Second, education is the most complex and politicised sector in which to attempt change because of its ideological basis and its function of deciding individuals’ future destinations. Third, capacity development in such contexts is not about filling ‘capacity gaps’ or seeing people as ‘resources’. The language of deficits, lacks and gaps hides the actions of actors and their agendas for survival and status. As well as providing opportunity for individuals, capacity development is about unlearning previous behaviours or at least regulating behaviours that have contributed to fragility. Donors may have focused too much on the supply side of capacity development without seeing if there is a demand side that can sustain change.

This means the fragility–capacity development–education nexus is especially complex. The notion of ‘knowledge transfer’ applies only at the very lowest level of technical assistance. Capacity development may imply an unequal relationship between one who knows and one who does not know. Yet ‘recipients’ of capacity development have vast knowledge, particularly of their work and political context. So their involvement will be central to the impact of capacity development interventions. Strengthening mechanisms that allow donors to listen to intended beneficiaries could be a valuable starting point. Any capacity development planning will have to make choices about those who are to be targeted. Should it be people who may embrace it as an opportunity for progression or satisfaction, but who have little power? Or those who have the position and ability to create change but can see little personal gain, or even see it as a threat to their ideological or power position? Planning capacity development in education in fragile contexts is a series of decisions, and a constant process of delving under the surface of what appears to be acceptance or progress. This paper describes some of the choices to be made.

3.1 Which dimension should be tackled?

In an approach similar to UNESCO’s four-way process of capacity development, this section will first distinguish four dimensions for consideration:

- individual;
- organisational;
- institutional;
- political/contextual.

In distinguishing them, it will also be making the obvious point that they interlock, and can therefore not be tackled in isolation.

There is general agreement that a pure focus on individuals would be problematic. Capacity development can have inconsistent effects, especially capacity development that leads to qualifications and enhancement for a few individuals, who may retire, or move on and use their new skills to earn more money and status elsewhere. Capacity development can lead to the exodus of trained staff to other sectors, including to the NGOs and donor agencies themselves. ‘Trainees’ might find that their organisation lacks the policies, procedures or leadership that would allow them to apply what they have learned, or they might have no incentive to improve their performance as a result of the training (Bethke, 2008). Similarly, ministries often request study visits and educational courses, and also specify who participates. However, such activities have questionable long-term value for reducing fragility, unless the selection and the courses are closely matched to problems and real opportunities for reform on participants’ return.

Hence, the focus needs to be on the organisational, institutional and broad contextual dimensions (summarised in Table 1 below). Organisational change relates to greater regulation and efficiency
in places such as ministries of education. Institutional change tackles the more hidden cultures of work which may militate against turnaround. The OECD refers to the contextual dimension as the ‘enabling environment’, which could also be termed the ‘social, economic and political context’ (as it is by UNESCO).

Organisational capacity development includes generic skills such as report writing and computer use, but also focuses on financial management and implementing decentralisation systems. The underlying budgetary systems within the education sector (and generally) are critical to how donors seek to engage with states affected by fragility and how they design their levels of support (Brannelly and Ndaruhutse, 2008). Abolition of school fees calls for aid or capitation grants to schools to compensate for lost fee income, but this needs skills in managing resources, as well as transparent procedures for purchasing materials. The extension to fragile contexts of public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) is proposed. These surveys have been adopted in countries such as Uganda, Zambia and Peru to help monitor and reduced leakage in the financial flow from top of the system to the bottom (Rose, 2007, p. 112). In Uganda and Kenya, full details of funds received and expenditure are posted on a public notice board to ensure transparency.

Another organisational capacity development need relates to the hiring of staff. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, this would be an essential part of the shift from political movement to government. Ministry of Education staff were initially chosen in the Occupied Palestinian Territories for their willingness and ability, with a transparent process ‘perhaps taking longer than it should be to have been put in place’ (Nicolai, 2007, p. 133). Supervision is also important: declining resources may lead to a reduction in the number of supervisors or their visits, which leaves schools unsupported and isolated, and their work not recognised. Yet supervision and inspection itself needs capacity development.

The second dimension comprises the institutional cultures that surround capacity development. A EuropeAid paper (2005) discusses how ‘institutions’ (formal and informal) are not synonymous with organisations, but denote ‘resilient social structures formed by norms and regulations which provide solidity and meaning to social life’. The paper lists several important factors:

- norms that exert power and authority from the family level to the state level, including gender aspects;
- socially embedded norms on what government authorities should and should not do, and how public management should be performed (‘how we do things here’);
- the status and rank given to ‘carriers of public authority’ (be it elders, teachers, doctors, clerics, ministers or presidents);
- norms on reciprocity in exchanges (favours and gifts);
- norms on how formalised, official laws and rules are considered and used compared to informal rules.

All these apply to institutions of education, whether schools, district offices or central ministries of education. They would rarely be revealed through old-fashioned forms of SWOT analysis, and are often taken for granted. Yet they would need to be recognised, admitted and understood. Decisions would then need to be made on whether capacity development would try to challenge or change these, and if so, which ones – and who would resist or subvert attempts to change. This means anticipating the responses of relevant actors and the weight of expectations and habits – or path dependencies – issuing from the choice of action. Harber and Davies’ (2003) study of decentralisation in Malawi raised the question whether the ‘allowance culture’ in the district office was in fact essential given the context of poverty and the fact that salaries were insufficient to live on.

A recent study of the decentralisation of education in Indonesia revealed that officials had found creative ways around attempts to prevent the generation of ‘bonuses’ by simply renaming routine activities as ‘projects’, and hence retaining the incentive system related to project management
under the official rules. Jobs were unofficially reserved for members of similar ethnic groups. There were huge grey areas between nepotism and actual corruption. The links between education officials and private sector contractors for educational construction revealed a range of complex reciprocal relationships. These were not always illegal: again it was more about creative accounting, and hence such activities were less open to challenge (Fahturahman, 2009).

Table 1 summarises the particular needs and issues in fragile contexts when considering capacity development in education.

**Table 1: Organisational, institutional and political dimensions of capacity development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational dimension</th>
<th>Need for:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial systems and information systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic accounting for schools on fees, levies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulatory frameworks for decentralised levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Understandings of the meanings of decentralisation and power-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparent teacher appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting and report writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional culture dimension</th>
<th>Existence of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hidden rules, norms, values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creative accounting and allowance culture deriving from history of poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contexts of hierarchy meaning deference, fear and possible abuse of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patronage, clientelism, gendered power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norms governing reciprocity in exchanges (favourites and gifts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of initiative or concern about improvement resulting from decades of conflict or oppression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to combine personal incentives with institutional improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling environment/ political context</th>
<th>Problem of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political elites contesting nature of and power over education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absence of genuine political will around social cohesion or social, caste or gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic or religious conflict may have been made worse by education; need for capacity development in non-discriminatory curriculum materials and civic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Questions of what constitutes ‘the community’, and possible divisions and disputes within and between communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endemic corruption as a norm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a question of the ‘entry points’ to change, which can be in any of the three dimensions. Sometimes it is more effective to change regulatory frameworks so that the institutional behaviour has to follow (e.g. audits for financial transparency, or guidelines on gender equality in pay and conditions). It is possible that capacity development to establish legal frameworks is more effective than ‘awareness’ courses on gender or ethnicity. Sometimes ways can be found to improve service delivery even when serving clientelist goals (the classic example being the drilling of wells in rural areas in Pakistan, which helps political supporters as well as the general population). Museveni’s decision to introduce Universal Primary Education in Uganda is often cited as another example of reconciling a number of political imperatives and benefits.

Issues related to conflict also cut across all dimensions. Ensuring that textbooks do not have inflammatory material or discriminatory messages can be used as a capacity development strategy as well as an equity goal. As part of the national policy on education for peace and social cohesion, the Ministry of Education in Sri Lanka has a unit within the curriculum department that
scrutinises textbooks for representation of particular groups, that is, Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim. The Unit for Peace and Social Cohesion also uses the new manual Learning to Live Together (Sinclair et al., 2008) to work with teachers and education officers to examine textbooks themselves in workshops. In Brčko in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU strategy following the Dayton Agreement was to bring together teachers from the three entities (Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia), who previously worked separately, to develop the new harmonised curriculum (Davies, 2001). Here again, capacity development had an impact throughout.

3.2 Which education sectors should be targeted?

The third of the OECD principles for working with fragile contexts is ‘focus on state building as the central objective’. As well as deciding on which dimension should be addressed, there is a need to identify the sector(s) within education that can achieve this end. Table 2 shows the twin aspects of administrative systems and education institutions, which have different but complementary roles to play. The aims of administrative systems at central and local levels are efficiency and transparency. The aims of education institutions are to build social and human capital. Both involve questions of participation and trust.

Key aspects of these in terms of the capacity development implications are elaborated below.

Table 2: Parallel supports for state building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS</th>
<th>EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim: Ministry of Education efficiency and transparency</td>
<td>Aim: Locality efficiency and transparency</td>
<td>Aim: Trust and participation in government; social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Local planning</td>
<td>Political literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Citizenship education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and policy making</td>
<td>Citizen or community participation and ownership of education</td>
<td>Legal education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Media education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information flows</td>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Human rights education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Empowerment of women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Generic technical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Problem solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Health education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Specific vocational training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1 Administrative systems

a) Planning

A study by Malik (2007) examined the role of donor intervention in the education sector in Pakistan. It pointed to the way that capacity building measures had focused on increased decentralisation as a core objective and conditionality. However, all analysis of educational outcomes had ignored the political economy issues of elite capture and the structure of school administration. Policy making and planning were inconsistent. Targets set in one policy term were revoked or abandoned in the next, only to reappear some years later with extended deadlines. Policies did not complete their term, often being overtaken by new or parallel policies resulting in resource wastage or multiple initiatives. New donor projects may actually contribute to this wastage, but capacity development could in fact assist in realistic planning and policy making, including risk assessment of the likelihood of targets being achieved. Poor or rhetorical policies undermine rather than increase trust in government. Existing power relationships and dominant discourses have an impact on the direction and outcomes of policy making, and the fact that policy is the result of a continuous contest needs to be acknowledged (Hoppers, 2008). Particularly in fragile contexts, policy and planning cannot be reduced to a technical exercise, to be solved by technical capacity development.

b) Regulation

Regulatory functions – the building and enforcement of rules of engagement – are one of the first prerequisites for a functioning state. While these should be harmonised across all public sectors, it is possible to engage in capacity development specifically on regulation in the education sector. This includes all the legal frameworks on roles and responsibilities as well as the issues of appointments, allocation, promotions and teacher codes of conduct. It also includes accountability and auditing how monies are spent.

Accountability is an important factor in absorptive capacity, particularly when large amounts of money are received, with a lack of trained personnel or clear procedures for handling funds. This was highlighted by USAID:

What may start as unintentional misallocation may quickly shift to intentional misallocation when those in charge realise there are no sanctions for their actions. One way to reduce corruption is to better align the flow of development assistance with capacity to effectively manage those funds and the project activities those funds buy (Chapman, 2002).

In fragile contexts, corruption usually goes beyond petty corruption to become systemic and an integral component of the system. This is particularly the case in neo-patrimonial regimes of sub-Saharan Africa and Caucasian successor states, where even NGOs are involved. This has implications for capacity development in education. Public relations campaigns against corruption are not sufficient, and institutions (ombudsppeople, inspectors, dedicated authorities, transparent tendering procedures, legislative measures, support for watchdogs, rules requiring transnational corporations to make public whatever they pay to government institutions) are needed, as well as support for the ratification of the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption.

While public–private partnerships are sometimes mooted in education to minimise public sector expenditure, in fragile contexts it is doubtful whether the private sector would undertake its own large-scale capacity development in education (except for its own trainees). However, one model that has been advocated is Independent Service Authorities (ISAs), which would separate the function of setting policy from the function of implementing service delivery (Collier, 2007). This is similar to the model adopted by the Palestinian Authorities. The role of an ISA would be to contract with a range of suppliers of core public services, health care and education, channelling money to them in return for the supply of services to users. It would not itself attempt to supply services at the retail level, to avoid issues of “moral hazard”.
Collier gives detail of how this would work and the possible agencies involved, and makes the point that in addition to contracting with suppliers, the ISA would conduct rapid and continuous evaluations of performance: indeed, ‘this would be its core role’. One legacy of conflict is ‘opportunistic behaviour’, which flourishes during weakened administration. This means that the pay-off to spending on monitoring and scrutiny is likely to be higher. Supervision is indeed differentially effective in fragile state conditions, and worth spending on.

c) Local capacity

There is an unquestionable need to strengthen local leadership and capacity. Rose and Greeley review papers that point to the importance of community-level initiatives in fragile states, particularly for education interventions. Wirak and Lexow (2008) report that community-based schools in Afghanistan, promoted through UNICEF’s ‘child-friendly schools’ programme, have been successfully recognised. Such schools have moved from being seen as emergency responses to being formalised as part of the system. Similarly, UNICEF’s Child-Friendly Community Initiative in the Sudan has aimed at community empowerment. It has organised communities to identify high-priority problems that affect children and women, and then to build their members’ capacity to plan, implement and monitor a local development initiative to address these problems. Significantly, government structures at the state and local levels have also been trained in participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation, communication and community management (Moreno-Torres, 2005).

A project in Angola worked directly with schools in a remote area to enable them to identify and work on small improvements that could be achieved without an injection of funds. Capacity development with headteachers promoted democratic engagement with teachers, parents and students to identify changes. Task teams were also formed in schools. Changes in teachers’ professionalism were noted, including increases in attendance levels, punctuality, lesson preparation, and collaboration. This is now being scaled up (EAI, 2008).

Berry (2007) focuses on mechanisms for holding schools to account, and finds that community-based approaches are an important mechanism for strengthening the accountability of schools to communities and local authorities. However, these approaches need complementary side investments to sustain their impacts over time. In Yemen, parent councils were established, but the challenge for the Ministry of Education and donors was to jointly identify how this could be extended nationwide.

Capacity development in Ethiopia has been helped by the traditional practice of gemgema. This uses group feedback to individuals on their performance and behaviour in relation to the group and the organisational objectives. It was developed during the period of armed struggle in the civil war, and has gradually begun to be practised by all branches of the civil service. It does not involve written assessments, but is regular (several times a year) and complementary to formal performance evaluation. Gemgema is based on objectives, tasks accomplished, problems encountered and solved, interpersonal communication and attitudes to the group. For example, teachers are invited to evaluate the role and performance of the regional bureau and the education office in implementing their policies (Watson and Johannes, 2005, p. 5).

However, ‘the community’ is not without divisions and disagreements, and should not be romanticised. Social cohesion may be difficult in communities that are ethnically divided, or where one ethnic group dominates, causing problems of marginalisation. Also, understandings of what decentralisation actually means are important for capacity development (see studies on Malawi and Indonesia: Harber and Davies, 2003; Fahturahman, 2009). Who exactly has the power to determine, for example, teacher deployment or expenditure on training? Lack of clarity over whether the policy is deregulation or devolution can cause duplications or can allow vested interests to seize power at particular points. There is also the question of sustainability after international NGOs have withdrawn support, and whether there is a ‘malfunctioning bureaucracy’ to coordinate community involvement. Challenges to the Mozambican decentralisation project have included the weak or non-existing financial management skills of headteachers and schools staff, the mismanagement of funds and poor community involvement (Brannelly and Nduruhutse,
2008). As the EFA Global Monitoring Report for 2009 (UNESCO, 2008) points out, transferring responsibility to communities, parents and private providers is not a substitute for fixing basic education systems.

Clearly, any decentralisation or community-sharing policy should involve capacity development, especially in understanding finance, accountability and power. For the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung – BMZ), it also requires learning about bottom-up quality control. This calls for the capacity development of local governments, which should in return have the ability to delegate responsibility to schools (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 2007).

3.2.2 Educational sites

a) Teacher professional development

Given that the ultimate aim of education reform is student learning, teacher development – including training paraprofessionals – is often seen as the key part of, or entry point to, education reconstruction. The main elements are pedagogy, supplemental content (HIV and AIDS education, peace and civic education) and often resources development (Burde, 2005). As with community initiatives, sustainability and scaling up are important issues in fragile contexts. Burde comments that while there is little evidence to show a measurable impact on practice, short training sessions help to build professional ties across groups (Bosnia is cited as an example) and to build teacher morale. Similarly, Bethke (2008) describes the way that back-to-school campaigns in fragile or post-conflict contexts often consist of a short-term teacher-training component to train tens of thousands of teachers quickly. As well as learner-centred teaching, there may be stress on a rights-based approach to education or an introduction to the psychosocial issues children may be facing. These are often ‘cascaded’ from the expert international consultants to master trainers and downwards. However, without supervision and follow-up after the training, the impact in most classrooms is likely to be minimal\(^3\). This doubt about impact was also reported for the cascade in-service training programme in Afghanistan (Wirak and Lexow, 2008).

Follow-up support is possible in small states. A project on democracy and professionalism in the Gambia found that while teacher trainees were often enthused, lasting impact on practice was questionable unless supervisors were also trained – and this project did reach every single supervisor (Davies et al., 2005). Yet this would not be possible in a large country, or one that was more fragile. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, teacher development is reported to be lagging behind the curriculum in terms of its contribution to quality. There is little quality assurance across pre-service training programmes, and the emphasis is on the delivery of separate courses rather than on building training around a comprehensive skill set. There is still emphasis on rote learning.

In addition, while schools are still seen by communities as one of the safest places, little is done to openly address violence in them (Nicolai, 2007). The 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report states categorically that increasing the supply of teachers while lowering quality standards is false economy. The report also addresses the ‘perverse’ effects of performance-related pay, namely narrowing the subjects being taught and excluding children less likely to succeed (UNESCO 2008). The academic success of students in Pakistan appears to be improved much more by what teachers say and do than by the teachers’ own qualifications, even though reward structures are based mainly on the latter rather than the former (Aslam and Kingdon, 2008). The INEE Guidance Notes on Teacher Compensation in Fragile States, Situations of Displacement and Post-Crisis Recovery (2008) stress not only adequate financial rewards but also appropriate non-monetary support mechanisms and incentives to help prevent attrition.

\(^3\) Leu (2004) also confirms the ineffectiveness of cascade or multiplier approaches to teacher in-service training, but also finds that evidence on the cost and sustainability of school-based and cluster-based approaches is scarce.
All these issues point to capacity development not just as teacher education itself, but as quality assurance, incentives to enhance teacher professionalism, and planning of professional development programmes linked to national goals of equity, non-violence and active civil society.

b) Curriculum development

It is likely that curriculum enhancement or even radical change is needed in order to reduce fragility. Enhancement might include disaster risk-reduction programmes to ensure immediate survival. More radical but controversial long-term change relates to designing human rights programmes for schools, in which curriculum developers themselves may need training. Many agencies advise on citizenship education programmes following conflict. Clearly these must include ministry personnel and teachers as designers, not just as recipients of external programmes. Fault lines then emerge between different stakeholders as to how history should be represented, as in Rwanda (Freedman et al., 2008). It is argued in the contexts of Darfur and Northern Uganda that even in vocational training programmes, life skills and civic education components should be included so that young people develop coping strategies and positive leadership abilities, as well as awareness of their civic rights (Robinson, 2008; Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, 2008). Writers such as Ghani and Lockhart argue for greater entrepreneurship to kickstart fragile states. This would require a number of different curriculum routes, one being the need for legal education. As has been pointed out for Tajikistan (Asiurov et al., 2007), it is difficult for people to start their own business, not only in financial terms but also in terms of a knowledge of administrative processes (such as licensing, taxation and export–import regulations), and legal literacy is needed. Capacity development for vocational school heads would also be required, to give them more independence to follow labour market needs and the interests of students, and develop a flexible curriculum policy.

c) Skills and capital

This leads to the direct question of capacity development in youth and vocational education. For fragile contexts, the conventional assumptions that investment in human capital helps economic development are often questioned. It is accepted that education generally improves individual income and individual human capital through qualifications and accreditation for employment. But the evidence that national levels of education directly influence economic growth is much less solid and more widely disputed (Barakat et al., undated). Yet a focus on skills for employment brings together the social capital and the human capital aspects of skills, both of which are needed for state building. The World Development Report (2007) on young people notes the central importance of engaging (or re-engaging) with young people in fragile states and investing in ‘second chance’ opportunities. This is because of the link to the economy and also to the lack of economic opportunities.

Collier (2007) argues that in post-conflict countries economic growth lowers the risk of further conflict, and that employment can provide a route to this. His view is that rebel groups are highly specialised in their recruitment, almost exclusively targeting young men. Therefore, if unskilled young men can be employed, they are less likely to be recruited into violence. In particular, Collier discusses employment in the burgeoning post-conflict construction industry, rather than in the expensive and irreversible public sector or in military employment. He talks more of apprenticeships outside the formal sector than of vocational education. But the FTI Progressive Framework also refers to engaging young people in educational processes that divert them from gangs, recruitment into armed militia or anti-social behaviour (though without specifying what these processes might be).
While the idea of a ‘youth bulge’ that is linked to conflict is questioned (Urdal, 2004), there is much emphasis on vocational education as meeting needs for relevance and alleviating frustration and unemployment. However, various studies have concluded that:

- vocational education must have labour market relevance;
- in spite of all the efforts to fund and promote it, vocational education has secondary status in relation to ‘formal’ academic education (ETF, 2006; Asiurov et al., 2007).

The capacity development implications are not just about training of vocational teachers, but also about the creation of professional systems for TVET. In places such as the Gaza Strip, employers’ capacities for human resource development (HRD) are limited. In addition, the TVET strategy has also been hindered by the absence of efficient, professional and, most importantly, empowered bodies that could push the strategy forward. The ministries concerned, and other stakeholders, have lacked the necessary will, and have been unable to let go of any of the powers they had inherited. This has kept the system fragmented (ETF, 2006).

In terms of social capital, any focus on young men needs to be matched by a similar focus on young women. The OECD talks of ‘strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts’ (OECD, 2007, p. 7). A gender focus is very much part of any capacity development. This is relevant to the question of who receives it (for example women teachers or leaders), and also to whether there is an awareness of the links between fragility and discrimination and the need for voices of excluded or marginalised groups – which may include women and girls – to be heard.

A study of capacity building in the Ministry of Education and Sports in Nepal found that ‘there is no significant constituency prepared to promote the view that women are as competent as their male colleagues are. Rather, women are viewed as lacking the qualities often associated with leadership’. Widespread social prejudice is reinforced by the self-interest of the male elite (Bista and Carney, 2001).

The OECD (2008, p. 8) refers to ‘improving women’s wellbeing and economic opportunities’, stating that ‘women’s organisations often play key roles in maintaining services, in supporting social cohesion and in negotiating safe space between communities in conflict’. Females may suffer more in emergencies, for example, women are often key to enabling children to return to school after an emergency (Davies et al., 2008). The OECD points out that ‘at the same time, issues such as early marriage, domestic violence, obstacles to educational opportunities and discriminatory family laws need to be addressed to enhance women’s contributions’. It would appear that at least three types of capacity development are important here:

- to enable teachers to raise gender issues;
- for those in women’s organisations in advocacy skills;
- for those in government in how to work with non-formal organisations and groupings.

Therefore, another sector that might be targeted in fragile contexts would be adult education and adult political literacy.

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4 Urdal concludes that the youth bulge is explosive only in combination with economic stagnation.
5 Asiurov et al. (2007), for example, report that in Tajikistan the system of vocational education and training in its present condition is far from becoming a real tool for poverty reduction and socioeconomic development because of its present nature, content, approaches and quality.
Chauvet and Collier (2005) put forward the view that political reform in fragile states could be blocked by three obstacles:

- the power of an elite who might lose;
- citizens who are so poorly informed that they would oppose it, even though in reality they would benefit;
- lack of capacity of the civil service.

In post-conflict situations, it may be that citizens better appreciate responsible governance, or at least want change, and therefore lack of knowledge is less of a constraint. However, it could be argued that an informed public is vital for the creation of real and lasting legitimacy for government. This implies the need for adult education, as well as for media education and the political education in schools that was discussed above.

As with the different dimensions in the previous section, in fragile contexts the key issue for choosing sectors is that there is little point in tackling just one. Civic education, for example, which provides citizens with evaluative skills to question government performance, has been found to have a negative effect on trust in government (Brattan and Alderfer, 1999). Hence, simultaneous efforts to build the credibility of government need to take place. Vocational training without capacity development in TVET systems is not sustainable. Furthermore, anti-corruption strategies need to be put in place at all levels if they are to have any impact.
4. Roles and positioning of donors

As well as choosing the dimensions and the sectors for capacity development, development partners must also decide who to work with and how. The Paris Declaration of 2005 endorsed the idea that countries should lead, and donors should support (OPM/IDL, 2008), an ‘endogenous process’ requiring country assessment and country ownership. However, the challenge will be to interrupt any vicious circles through which ownership and capacity have become eroded. Questions are also raised about whether some capacity constraints may relate to donor practices, with government officials too busy managing donor requirements on procurement, reporting and monitoring to actually deliver. This section first examines some of the methodological responses by donors to date, and then discusses the issues of partners.

4.1 Methodological responses by development partners

Methodologies for action have been outlined in various ways: in terms of principles, processes, cross-cutting issues, questions to be asked and opportunities for rethinking.

In terms of principles, the OECD-DAC ‘Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations’ are as follows.

- Take context as the starting point.
- Do no harm.
- Focus on state building as the central objective.
- Prioritise prevention.
- Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.
- Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.
- Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.
- Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors.
- Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.
- Avoid pockets of exclusion.

It is claimed that in nine pilot countries, these principles have started to bring about a change in the behaviour of donors, even in the most challenging contexts (OECD-DAC, 2007). It would be useful to look at the relationship between each of these principles and capacity development in education. The principles of country assessment and country ownership could perhaps be added.

In an interesting briefing paper on the delivery of education aid in fragile states, Berry develops an analytic framework based on the three principles of ‘coordination’, ‘state building’ and ‘do no harm’. For state building, he concentrates on the systems for the payment and training of teachers, and the mechanisms for holding schools to account. The ‘do no harm’ principle is examined in terms of the need for equitable access to education services and inclusive policies, which are crucial to long-term efforts to build robust institutions in fragile states. Berry finds that pilot projects for this can be successful at the local level, but that stakeholders need to work hard to get these pilot approaches integrated into government policy, especially if the state is using the education system for its own political or ideological ends. Curriculum content and access may be skewed to privilege one group (as was the case in Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Burundi).

The paper raises the question of whether the state can be supported to promote equitable access to education services and to implement policies that tackle exclusion at school level (Berry, 2007). The example is given of Nepal, where successful progress was made towards EFA, even in the midst of serious armed conflict between government forces and Maoists. Nepal was also
included in the recent study for UNICEF on educational vulnerability in South Asia (Davies et al., 2008). This explored the question of when groups vulnerable to educational loss (dalits, girls) should be specifically targeted (for example, through scholarship programmes), and when the focus should be more on quality provision that reaches all groups. The capacity development implications of ‘do no harm’ relate to these decisions and prioritising. Capacity development is not just about resources, but also about the skill in deciding where to allocate them, and for how long, particularly in compensatory programmes.

Secondly, the process of capacity development decision making can be described. The EFA-FTI approach is one of ‘steps’:

- setting the stage for participatory dialogue on a capacity development strategy;
- conducting a capacity gap analysis;
- understanding and building on the country context for an effective education capacity development strategy (establishing base lines, analysing the institutional context, embedding in broader reforms);
- designing the capacity development strategy (mobilising resources, setting priorities, defining time-bound implementation);
- defining a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the capacity development process (learning from experience and sharing lessons) (EFA-FTI, 2008).

The major objective of this approach is to facilitate national strategy and to enable capacity development to be agreed and implemented. Discussions around this might question whether there can be a clear linear process of steps, but also question the assumption of a ‘capacity gap’ (there may be excellent capacity, but in fragile states in particular it is used in directions which are counter-productive to social cohesion or equality).

The third aspect that needs to be analysed is the relevant level of application (individual, organisational, institutional, political), as outlined in Section 2.1. In fact, capacity development builders have tended to focus on ‘deficits’ in resources, skills/knowledge and organisation rather than on politics, power and incentives (Brinkerhoff, 2007). It is common for the focus to remain at the individual or organisational level because outsiders have access to resources, can provide training and technical assistance, can develop managerial systems and can support service delivery. National counterparts might also see capacity development as a technical issue that deals with the training of individuals or the strengthening of organisations financially or managerially. Providing technical capacity development enables funders to meet performance targets.

An issues-based approach may therefore be more focused. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has recognised that change tends to happen when broad alliances across civil society – often supported by media attention and the private sector, and linked into reform elements within government – come together around an issue of political importance. DFID is now using this issues-based approach in Nigeria (OECD, 2006). An issue such as equity or peace can be traced through all levels or sectors, including teacher education and community development, potentially increasing country ownership. Similarly, a broad security issue can be tackled in the education sector, looking at human security (such as violence in schools) as well as economic security.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Guinea recognised governance as a key issue and barrier, so its strategy is cross-sectoral, improving governance and strengthening civil society. In the education sector this has included projects on civic development, supporting adult literacy programmes and the development of civic curriculum and teacher training. The complementary aim is to strengthen the participation of women, marginalised groups and young people in governance processes. Similarly, as part of the
governance goal to address corruption within education, this has focused on examination reform (Brannelly and Ndaruhutse, 2008).

The location of governance as an issue is also found in the broader classifications of the USAID Education and Fragility Assessment tool (USAID, 2006). A set of questions is used to try to establish links between general and specific root causes of fragility and education. The tool identifies ten fragility patterns or domains of concern:

- governance domain;
- economic domain;
- security domain;
- social domain;
- corruption/rent-seeking;
- exclusion/elitism/factionalism;
- insufficient capacity;
- transitional dynamics;
- organised violence;
- public disengagement.

Within each of these, the tool uses the same five categories to examine the education–fragility nexus:

- access
- quality
- relevance
- equity
- management.

The matrices and the questions allow needs to be identified, and those that are relevant to capacity development would cut across all domains, not just the ‘insufficient capacity’ one.

Finally, one particular response is to see crisis not only as a threat but also as an opportunity, linked to the notion of ‘building back better’. This is not just about the physical reconstruction of schools, but also about rethinking the content of schooling. The study for UNICEF on risk reduction for vulnerable groups in education in South Asia proposed a three-way response in the supply of education: schools need to be child seeking, child friendly and child enabling (Davies et al., 2008). The capacity development needs would relate to all three. For example, in order for schools to be child enabling, capacity development involves teaching conflict resolution skills and ways of dealing with controversial issues, from HIV and AIDS education to swimming lessons for Muslim girls. ‘Child enabling’ also addresses both human capital (such as skills for employment or self-employment) and social capital (such as participation in civil society, or skills to claim rights after, for example, an industrial disaster).

Crisis also creates spaces for intervention: in Myanmar after the cyclone, UNICEF was able to create a ‘humanitarian space’ with the government, and the field office has been maintained. The presence of 130 national staff was important in achieving this.

So planning capacity development can be informed by principles, by a step-wise approach, by an issues-based approach, by a needs assessment tool or by an opportunistic creation of space, or by some combination of these.
4.2 Choices around donor alignment

All the strategies and principles described above hinge on the relationship with government. The strategic choice relating to the engagement of donors with the state is whether to help to reform and rebuild, or to work in parallel with it, in the absence of a willing and capable state. Withdrawing support from the state can be a sanction and a signal of distancing. Other delivery models are possible, such as contracting out, international NGO (INGO) provision, co-production, community-based approaches and market provision.

The different types of alignment with the state, namely systems, policy and shadow alignment, are described in Appendix 3. The aim of alignment is to match donor strategies, policies and budget planning with the standards and procedures of recipient governments. The intentions are on the one hand to promote ownership and on the other to support the effective implementation of the measures provided (OECD-DAC, 2004).

For some countries (currently Zimbabwe and Myanmar) even shadow alignment may be unworkable, and support for change agents may be preferable (see Section 4.3). This is the case if a government is actively denying the rights of some of its citizens, or where the education system is deliberately designed to marginalise certain groups (e.g. Kosovar Albanians under the Serbs) (Sommers and Buckland, 2004). Here, capacity development might be less about building trust in government and more about building resistance to authoritarian and oppressive rule. Bethke (2008) discusses the way in which short-term service delivery to provide children with opportunities becomes the overriding imperative in situations where government policies are against human rights or equal opportunities.

However, the outcome is often a hope for greater alignment. There is a need to build in transition planning, with a sequencing that leads to the handback of functions. As the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children reported in the case of Sudan (WCRWC, 2007, p. 7), centuries of struggle for political dominance by remote governments, and even humanitarian interventions during the bloody civil war, have left Southern Sudan with a legacy of dependence on outside agencies for leadership and services. Today, some local leaders believe that many Southern Sudanese people see schools as being owned by UNICEF or NGOs rather than by their communities. One official who was interviewed observed that in the collective memory of the Southern Sudanese, ‘...any government in Southern Sudan has been a foreign government. The challenge we face is how to convince people that this is their government’. UNICEF’s Child-Friendly Community Initiative (CFCI) in Sudan has been very successful, and has not created parallel structures, but there is always a question of how to scale up and hand back full responsibility to the public administration (Moreno-Torres, 2005). CFCI is a rights-based approach, and this means that scaling up should increase the advocacy role played by this initiative.

4.3 Working with different stakeholders

The OECD (2006) stresses that in order to support the state there is a need to work with non-state actors in ways that reinforce the development of public sector capacity in the longer term. This might be where the government is weak or corrupt, and where it makes more sense to support ‘change agents’. The World Bank and OECD-DAC have been arguing more and more openly for a policy of addressing representatives of civil society and reform-minded forces in government (for example, technocrats who are open to change). These would include scientists, scholars and external actors who have a degree of independence, who would speak up for freedom of information and other civil rights, supporting parliamentarians, independent judges, journalists, union representatives and professional associations in their efforts to combat abuses of power. ‘The work of political foundations and academic exchange programmes can also contribute to qualifying such reform-oriented forces’ (Debiel, 2005, p. 10).

The FTI Progressive Framework talks of addressing exclusion and equity through civic engagement at different levels. It cites cases and education plans in countries ranging from
Uganda under Idi Amin’s regime to El Salvador following the end of civil hostilities. Another instance given is the use of local school committees to assist in collective conflict resolution and local governance (FTI, 2008). GTZ cites elected popular representatives, political interest groups, the private sector and civil society as being part of key decision making and dialogue and accountability (Zimmermann, 2007).

Yet there are often sensitivities in identifying stakeholders who should be involved in capacity development initiatives in fragile contexts. Firstly, this has to acknowledge the possibility of conflict within and between stakeholders. Such conflicts might be based on long-standing ethnic, religious or caste roots, rather than simply being about opposition to change, and they might not be resolved by strategies such as clarifying the roles of working groups. Education may have also have made divisions worse. Debiel points out that it is important to make sure that support of change agents overcomes rifts, not deepens them. In predominantly Islamic countries, for instance, religious fundamentalist forces are often arrayed against secular forces. Would the push for rapid change damage social capital in the sense of mutual trust between individuals and social groups? In supporting democratically oriented forces it is essential to make sure that these forces are able to bridge ideological divides (OECD-DAC, 2003). Cooperation rather than competition between elites is crucial, perhaps with external actors providing mediation forums and conflict resolution.

Furthermore, support for non-state actors should not simply focus on the capital city or urban areas, as regional and local levels are integral elements of statehood, and unequal development between urban and rural areas may be part of fragility. It is also important that such support should not make gender power differences worse, as mentioned above.

Fragility in state legitimacy may also lead to problems of the legitimacy of particular NGOs, particularly in the government’s eyes. National conflict reduces the space for flexibility because it links local activities to the powerful issues of the conflict and brings NGOs under scrutiny. If NGOs are overtly promoting peace-building, this may be threatening to the government (Walton, 2008). In Sri Lanka the government has been very suspicious of NGOs because they were seen to be promoting a federal solution, and because some were going directly into schools with peace-building programmes that were interpreted as pro-Tamil.

Working directly with various teachers’ groups may be valuable. The ETA-FTI document (2008) cites the resistance of teachers’ unions to the major deployment of teachers to rural areas, and the need to recognise legitimate motivational issues. On the other hand, the IIEP-UNESCO project on Ethics and Corruption in Education (Hallak and Poisson, 2005) has had some success in improving transparency and accountability, through such initiatives as public expenditure tracking (PET), formula funding, teacher codes of conduct and the regulation of private tutoring. In the project to reform teacher management in Bogota the most important aspect was the ‘cleaning up’ of the list of employed teachers. This meant involving representatives of the teachers’ unions as much as possible.

Collaborating with those working directly in the non-formal sector to develop capacity can be effective. In Sudan, the Sudanese Red Crescent and the NGO Accord have collaborated with the Child-Friendly Community Initiative to provide education on first aid and popular forestry management (Moreno-Torres, 2005). Non-formal education would be the most appropriate type of education for street children, who represent a growing phenomenon in countries such as Tajikistan (Asiurov et al., 2007), and a long-standing issue in other countries. Vocational training centres can assist ex-combatants to reintegrate into society. With reference to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Nicolai (2007) established that when a formal system has broken down, non-formal education can be an important strategy for maintaining learning. During the first intifada ‘popular education’ was an attempt to make up for a collapsing education system. Such education was made possible through grassroots organisations, charitable societies and NGOs. Non-formal education was also crucial in the ‘shadow system’ for Albanians in Kosovo under the Serbs (Sommers and Buckland, 2004). In these contexts, capacity development could be achieved ‘on the job’, and would be original and valuable.
Providing capacity development for opposition groups and parties is more contentious. This is part of the debate on the timing of a push towards democratisation. The question is whether a functioning state is needed before democratic reform can take place, or whether efforts towards a democratic process, such as supporting opposition parties and elections, would help to build a functioning state. There can be a considerable potential for violence in the process of democratisation, and strained states often lack conflict-negotiation institutions. As Debiel points out, civil society is not necessarily liberal in orientation. It may also be marked by intolerance, and may polarise democratisation processes. 'Ethnic entrepreneurs' can use existing social divisions to spread and deepen nationalist ideologies. This might be relevant to the very topical problem of working with opposition movements that have been providing services to under-served populations (e.g. in Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Sudan). Support would be especially difficult if such an opposition group was labelled a terrorist organisation. For example, Maoists in Nepal previously established schools and curricula, and are now in government.

As always, such decisions on stakeholders can only be made at country level. This will be explored below as part of the discussion on ways forward for development partners.
5. Ways forward for development partners

5.1 Country level

The operational steps at country level begin with an analysis to clarify the choices discussed above. It is then necessary to formulate indicators for achievement of goals within those choices.

5.1.1 Analysis

The role of development partners relates not only to the provision of capacity development. It also relates to assistance in the analysis of fragility (often using a comparative lens) and in arriving at decisions on what can be done to mitigate this and to build resilience. Analysis relates to the first of the OECD-DAC principles: understand the context. Examples are given in Table 3. Not all boxes have been completed, as these are for illustration purposes only.

This exercise is however not simply a question of filling in the boxes. Rather, it is about seeing how attempts at change in one box will be jeopardised by a fragile characteristic in another. Corruption and endemic gender or caste discrimination are classic examples of such characteristics. It is important that interventions complement one another, with NGOs, donors, communities and government perhaps taking on different aspects, but all working towards the same overall 'turnaround' or transition goal. Analysis will also have to be done with relevant stakeholders, and possible divisions and tensions between stakeholders taken into account.

Brinkerhoff (2007) highlights one major characteristic of fragile states that affects capacity development decisions. In societies that have been fragmented by deteriorating or conflict conditions, individuals’ trust and tolerance levels tend to be lower and their suspicion levels are heightened. They are less willing to cooperate across societal groups and to give others ‘the benefit of the doubt’. There is then a risk that capacity development efforts that fail to bring quick results or that deliver benefits to one group and not another may be seen as intentionally unfair or demonstrating favouritism.

Analysis should include the questions of which interventions will build or compromise trust, and how ‘trust gaps’ can be closed.

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6 Sommers and Buckland (2004) report that international reform efforts in Kosovo did not prioritise either building capacity or building trust. ‘The choice ultimately came between actions that intentionally pressured local leaders and more patient, and perhaps more painstaking, capacity-building work. In the end, trust was not built because trust was not sought.’
<table>
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<td>Refugee and IDP education</td>
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5.1.2 Standards, indicators and monitoring mechanisms

An important part of capacity development for the education sector is the establishment of standards and indicators. This involves the development of countrywide, localised and education-specific indicators of both of fragility and recovery, as well as indicators of success in relevant education programmes. For capacity development in education, this is a two-way process:

- developing skills to formulate indicators;
- indicators of the success of capacity development.

The Transitional Results Matrix principles promote the use of outcome indicators and monitorable targets. These can be used as a management tool for strategic planning as well as an umbrella for donor coordination (Rose and Greeley, 2006). Country-level indicators could build on the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction, as has been recommended for looking at education and livelihoods in Southern Sudan (WCRWC, 2007). There is a role for international NGOs here. The establishment of norms for safe schools is also critical in terms of school and classroom design, particularly in earthquake and flood areas7. Everyone needs to be involved in health awareness, including the need for water and latrines.

However, there also need to be national-level standards on safe schools in the sense of non-violent schools. This includes codes of conduct for teachers and encouragement for students to draw up codes of conduct for themselves. The need for indicators of violence in education is sometimes ignored. One extensive proposal for internationally comparable indicators of violence, while excellent on the link between violence and human security, made no mention of schools, and focused only on community, work and household (Diprose, 2008).

There is a debate about priorities for data collection, monitoring and evaluation in fragile states. This is particularly the case during and after a disaster, when the immediate provision of services will be a higher priority. Clearly, it is desirable to have data immediately after a crisis (whether natural disaster or conflict) to identify who is not attending school and what needs to be provided. UNICEF’s Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces (RALS), which is part of its back-to-school campaign, has been valuable in assessing school structures in areas such as Southern Sudan, Northern Uganda and Afghanistan. However, putting energy into household surveys in a very volatile situation is of doubtful value, as who goes to school and who does not can change daily, depending on the distance to the learning centre, safety, the opportunity costs of returning to school and the availability of work (Davies et al., 2008).

Yet the processes of identifying key indicators, collecting and processing data and utilising the findings to track progress is especially needed in fragile states where official sources of information are often limited. According to the Progressive Framework, the target for this work in terms of capacity development must be to build public and official capacity to report regularly on key indicators of education progress, including learning outcomes.

In Darfur it was reported that monitoring and evaluation of vocational training programmes was weak. It was not known how existing programmes benefit young people in the medium to long term, nor whether vocational training programmes actually lead to employment and income generation (Robinson, 2008; Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, 2008). For Afghanistan, UNICEF was able to strengthen the monitoring capacities at provincial and district level through workshops and joint monitoring exercises. There is a particular need to improve monitoring in order to identify drop-outs and non-functional teachers more consistently (Wirak and Lexow, 2008).

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7 INEE is developing Guidance Notes on School Construction.
Above all, monitoring and reporting must be seen not as a way of assigning blame for failure, but as a learning activity that allows innovation and experimentation with new paths. Providing feedback to citizens on progress towards the overall vision and specific goals (the annual 'Report Card') gives legitimate interest groups a voice. This is an essential part of building the sovereign state (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008).

The revolution in information technology must be mentioned here, including the possibilities for e-governance, even in impoverished states. In the Indian states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, individual citizens can follow their legal cases on-line, bypassing bureaucracy, with its tendency to withhold information. Karnataka has included education in e-government, which enables concerned citizens to monitor government action through collaborative auditing.

State-building initiatives relating to trust and participation in government are less easy to monitor and establish indicators for than human capital ones, and may benefit from assistance. The manual *Learning to Live Together*, cited on p. 24, relates to the monitoring and evaluation of such programmes. It also tackles difficult issues in the evaluation of outcomes, where any long-term impact on peace or stability is difficult to assess. But, as the guide points out, the collaborative processes towards deciding indicators and targets can be as important as the actual monitoring (Sinclair et al., 2008).

Another key question is that of who should do the monitoring. There will be a need for capacity development in research methods, and also for the creation of a research culture. The literature on emergencies gives interesting examples of children being involved in researching their community in a crisis, finding out who should be at school as well as encouraging them to attend (Save the Children, 2007). This is usually instigated and encouraged by NGOs rather than teachers, although joint efforts in disaster risk reduction have occurred.

5.2 Regional level and regional cooperation

Disasters and emergencies do not respect national borders: refugees, rebel groups, and humanitarian, natural or economic crises can all spill over national boundaries. Intergovernmental organisations, the UN, donors and INGOs are well placed to take a regional rather than national perspective when this is appropriate. This applies when considering education for cross-border families and migrants, as well as when dealing with child trafficking. Ghani and Lockhart argue that the failure to address the needs of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants has been a factor in perpetuating criminality and ongoing conflict. Better mechanisms to encourage integration and inclusion could thus have an immense payoff (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Chauvet and Collier (2005) point out that the benefits of stemming negative spillover, which is a neglected but substantial cost of fragility, are an important justification for aid interventions.

In its examination of sustainable capacity development, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (2007) cites regional networks as being important for peer learning and multi-stakeholder exchange to improve knowledge management and to share good practice. Regional networks can help to promote leadership and to support advocacy efforts by promoting educational issues on the national policy agendas. The BMZ gives examples of regional institutions and networks, including RED KIPUS, the teacher network of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA). These provide valuable regional forums for advocacy and policy dialogue. They also share good practice on EFA and capacity development, training, academic studies and research. Networks such as the Forum for African Women in Education (FAWE) also carry out advocacy and research.

Training may need to take more than a national approach to address issues such as labour migration and returnees. One issue for assessing and building on capacity is the need to accredit the educational experience and achievements of both teachers and students across borders (Davies et al., 2008). Questions of certification and equivalence are crucial for refugees, as has been reported for Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2007). Oh and van der
Stouwe (2008) found that international NGOs and funding agencies such as UNHCR had an important role to play in fostering social inclusion in Burmese refugee camps on the Thai border, with local NGOs being too close to the power structure in the camps. This links to one rationale for regional approaches, that of apparent neutrality. In the Western Balkans, the ETF has found a regional approach towards the social inclusion of ethnic groups in education and training to be beneficial, as it can depoliticise sensitive issues which would be difficult to address at the national level.

5.3 Global level

The need for donor cooperation is not usually disputed. It is obvious that agencies should not compete with one another, should not compete for staff, and should avoid taking people out of government and paying them more (Bethke, 2008). It is important to establish whether there is anything specific about cooperation and international strategies that relate to capacity development in education.

INEE is a well-known global network. The INEE Minimum Standards can be used by a range of actors to extract implications for capacity development, for example in the supervision of education staff, in participatory appraisal, or in drawing up of codes of conduct for teachers. Also, as Burde points out, many NGO reports which are written as internal documents to be circulated within the agency and to potential donors remain hidden from the public, but INEE has made them more widespread. ‘The recent collaborative efforts of INEE have been helpful in making such information available more broadly; but some have advocated for grey literature to be made available through a public database’ (Burde, 2005). Another international initiative is to produce manuals and guidelines on capacity development. While these should be generated, or at least tested, at country level (and producing a manual is a concrete outcome in which people can participate as part of capacity development), they can be used more widely and adapted for different situations.

Save the Children highlights the Inter-agency Standing Committee ‘cluster’ approach which was approved at the end of 2006 as part of the humanitarian reform agenda, and was eventually extended to education as the Global Education Cluster. The aims of this approach are:

- to ensure consistent sectoral leadership and accountability at the global level;
- to strengthen mechanisms for system-wide preparedness and enhanced technical capacity;
- to produce enhanced partnerships and agreed common standards.

The cluster capacity building funds were to be used for activities such as national capacity building and documenting education responses in selected countries. However, global cluster capacity building remains significantly underfunded. Only 27% of its requirements have been being met, through the contributions of four donors – Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden (Save the Children, 2008). The Education Cluster Update of January 2009 reported that Education Clusters are active in 22 countries, led by UNICEF and Save the Children. Details of the activities of the task team at global level on capacity building are also reported.

Bethke (2008) raises an interesting and relevant point about providing capacity development in terms of working with international organisations themselves. Country officials may lack confidence when dealing with requests from international organisations, since they may be unfamiliar with the jargon and frameworks of the international community. Ghani and Lockhart (2008) give the example of a civil society leader in Nepal who talked of the Nepali leaders spending time learning the languages of the aid system and the criteria of the moment, only to find that these had changed. ‘As soon as they have mastered them, and rewritten their

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8 For example, the Education Action manual for Angolan heads, and the Gambian Professional Development manuals.
documents, the approach changes, and the cycle begins all over again’. Bethke (2008) suggests that one way to transfer languages is to focus on specific outcomes. This would enable people to learn by doing, perhaps by being involved in a national education strategic plan or annual operational plan.

Cultural factors can also be an issue. For example, the notion of ‘risk’ that is used in logframes is alien to a planning ideology which simply sets targets. In fragile contexts, either it is seen as impossible to predict the risk, or there are so many risks that it is not worth building them into the plan.

There are a number of possible ways forward. One is to create a network of ‘experts’ on capacity development in education in fragile contexts, who have experienced some of the lessons and pitfalls. Such a network could include national officials and people from diasporas, as the diasporas created by previous outflows of human capital have been shown to have a role in rebuilding or developing capacity in their native countries and communities (WCRWC, 2007; OECD, 2006). Reservations have previously been expressed about the designation of capacity development ‘experts’, and a more equitable name might be needed to capture the notion of capacity development as a relationship.

The final issue is the use of globally agreed conditionalities and incentives. The FTI provides a global framework for the coordination of international inputs into the education sector, for those countries that have a satisfactory plan but are deemed to be underfunded. The Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) is designed to build planning capacity in advance of catalytic funding. Although the FTI does support some fragile states, it is generally oriented towards ‘good performers’. Berry asserts that the impact of the FTI at country level in fragile states has not been systematically evaluated. A report in 2005 indicated that the FTI could add value in three areas:

- coordination of donor efforts;
- capacity building for the development of plans;
- increased funding.

However, significant changes would need to be made in its approach if it was to make a difference in fragile contexts where government systems cannot be used. Berry (2007, p. 6) claims that ‘there is little appetite amongst FTI partners for revisiting the indicative framework to orient it towards fragile states’. This goes against the spirit of this paper. The EPDF could add value in terms of capacity building, but only if the rules are changed to allow proposals to be made by agencies other than the World Bank. Implementing the FTI in deteriorating environments may mean that it is only possible to work at central level for safety and security reasons (Bethke, 2008).

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9 SKILLS for Southern Sudan recruits professionals from the diaspora for short-term job placements, mostly into government-level positions, to encourage them to return.
6. Conclusions

It must be acknowledged that in fragile contexts the results of capacity development in education will themselves be fragile. Capacity development attempts need to survive and be resilient. From this paper, it would appear that the most sustainable are as follows.

- **Those that are begun by honest analyses of fragility across organisational, institutional and political dimensions.** Capacity development is not neutral in terms of values and objectives, such as the political motivation for rights and equity within improved governance. At the very least the political dimension must be taken into account in capacity development planning. At best, capacity development attempts to improve the political content or ‘enabling environment’. The work and planning with national and local stakeholders demands honesty and transparency. It should not ignore issues such as institutional cultures, elite capture, gender disparities and ethnic relations. This analysis must be done within the context of diverse donor agendas, for example the balance between security and development, and the degree to which alignment with the state is appropriate.

- **Those that are targeted at breaking the cycles and disrupting the connections that amplify fragility, and hence at restoring core state functions.** The most sustainable capacity development initiatives will be those that tackle more than one dimension or sector, and that seek cross-sector, multiplier influence (for example promoting democracy or transparency, or preventing corruption in both administration and curricula, even if they are built on local traditions of democracy and accountability). It is also important to make sure that interventions of NGOs, donors, communities and the government are complementary.

- **Those that recognise that capacity development in education is socio-psychological as well as political.** Although capacity development is seen to be about ‘systems’, it is actually about individuals and their behaviour. People’s existing agendas for survival and status, individually and collectively, are key to finding entry points. Such analyses with stakeholders can be seen as part of capacity development itself. The changes that are to result from capacity development must have incentives for those receiving it.

- **Those that target people who have themselves both the capacity and the will to bring about – or block – change.** This may mean capacity development for educational elites, and/or for teachers centrally and locally, as long as they have some power and autonomy. Capacity development should not take the form of simple or piecemeal injections of technical know-how, unless it is thought that these small efforts can have multiplier or interrupting effects. In fragile contexts a focus on social capital and social cohesion will be at least as important as individual human capital and qualifications.

- **Those that try to have interlinked criteria for success.** Small-scale, innovative and experimental change initiatives can be useful for investigating the possibilities for scaling up. However, there needs to be an emphasis on indicators for achievements which are linked to the broader indicators related to state building, as discussed above. Development partners can provide important assistance, not only in the provision of capacity development itself, but in research and analysis, in identifying indicators, in monitoring and evaluation and in providing legitimacy for radical curriculum and other changes that will help state building.
6.1 Areas for action

- Capacity development for education in fragile situations must analyse and work within the specific constraints of the security and development needs of the social, economic and political context. While different forms of alignment may be needed in the short term, the long-term aim should be to rebuild the state and restore its functions.

- Capacity development goes beyond the technical skills of individuals. In education, it should contribute to greater equity, cohesion and trust in the system.

- Planning, regulatory and accountability functions need to be strengthened within ministries of education and relevant local authorities. Issues such as workplace culture, nepotism, creative accounting and corruption should be tackled.

- Education personnel require capacity development to ensure increased and more equal participation in education. Where education is decentralised, capacity development is needed at local levels to enable decentralised education governance to work. Yet across all levels, there is a need for understanding and consensus on decentralised power itself.

- Capacity development is needed for those involved in youth employment policies and programmes, women’s groups and adult literacy, as a means of strengthening civil society.

- Capacity development in the area of labour market analysis is essential to ensure the relevance of vocational education.

- Capacity development for teachers must include how to promote political literacy and media understanding, and how to teach controversial issues. Teacher education in areas such as citizenship and legal education is needed.

- Accurate situation analyses are needed, along with a description of how the education system is affected. Assistance in producing reliable indicators and standards for the monitoring and evaluation of education is required, as is support for coordination.

- The creation of regional networks can support cross-border topics such as the education of refugees and migrants, as well as helping to address national issues in a less politically sensitive way.

- A network of international experts on capacity development in fragile situations could be created. However, care should be taken that such expertise builds on local cultural and political knowledge.

6.2 Areas for reflection

- Which focus points, dimensions, actors, stakeholders and methodological responses should be considered? How can a research programme to study the impact of capacity development combinations be put into practice?

- In what ways can the management of education institutions be improved? Should new regulatory bodies be created in this regard?

- What could be the short- and long-term indicators of success in capacity development in education for state building?

- Could cross-sectoral capacity development – for example, in agriculture, employment, health and sanitation, justice and communication – be more effective in tackling the issue than capacity development that is confined to the education sector?
• Capacity development is socio-psychological as well as political and systemic. There must therefore be incentives for people to change their behaviour. How can incentives for those on the receiving end of capacity development be ensured, including their need for security and status?

• Should the FTI be further extended to fragile states in order to support education planning?

• Ensuring ownership at national and local levels is essential, but how can effective ownership of capacity development overall be ensured?
Bibliography


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Appendix 1: Categories of ‘fragile state’

There have been a number of attempts to identify the phase or ‘scenario’ of fragility. Debiel makes a distinction between fragile and failing states, with the latter ‘caught up in the vortex of state breakdown’. ‘The term “fragile states” does not cover failed states whose public institutions have come close to total collapse and which are virtually unable to provide services’. Barakat and colleagues refer to a ‘continuum of severity’ moving from weak, fragile, failing, failed to collapsed. The OECD and DCD/DAC use a classification that distinguishes ‘declining’ states (with arrested development or deterioration) and ‘stabilising’ states (in post-conflict transition and early recovery).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Declining</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested development</td>
<td>Prolonged crisis or impasse; stagnation with low levels of effectiveness and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration</td>
<td>Declining levels of governance effectiveness leading to lower legitimacy, rising risk of violence or collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilising</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict transition</td>
<td>Low levels of effectiveness, transitory legitimacy, recent violence, humanitarian crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early recovery</td>
<td>Gradual improvement; rising levels of effectiveness and legitimacy, declining international resource requirements, emergence from conflict or other crises</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Transitions are in themselves fragile. Nearly 50% of countries that emerge from conflict revert to hostilities within ten years. Bethke reminds us that it is often difficult to place a state in a specific category. She quotes the World Bank’s (2007) assertion that it is impossible to draw up a definitive list of fragile states, that some countries have more fragile characteristics than others, and that for many countries, fragile status is a phase. The World Bank defines the set of countries with the most extensive fragile characteristics as low-income countries ranking among the lowest on the Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA). These are ranked against 16 criteria in four clusters:

- economic management;
- structural policies;
- policies for social inclusion and equity;
- public sector management and institutions.

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10 Debiel, 2005, p. 5.
11 Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007; Willms, 2006; Barakat et al., undated.
12 Ghani and Lockhart, 2008.
13 Bethke, 2008.
## Appendix 2: Main components of the fragile states agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus/emphasis and goals</th>
<th>Underlying assumptions and views on causality</th>
<th>Type of external actors and approaches</th>
<th>Donors emphasising a particular component of the fragile states agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local peace, human security and basic needs</td>
<td>Politicisation of ethnic and religious divisions and of resource constraints causes conflict: conflict undermines development</td>
<td>Post-/conflict resolution specialists, peacekeeping agencies focusing on IDPs and refugees, security sector reform, Disaster Risk Reduction and development and humanitarian workers</td>
<td>DFID UN peacekeeping BMZ EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development and good governance</td>
<td>State failure, collapse, weakness, underperformance causes poor developmental outcomes, and vice versa Differences in emphasis on: - economic/political development - governance as primary driver of economic growth - short-term humanitarian needs or longer-term development aims</td>
<td>Range of development and humanitarian professionals, donor agencies, including bilateral agencies, UN, IFIs, economic analysts, governance and human rights workers</td>
<td>DFID AusAID USAID UNDP IFIs OECD-DAC BMZ Netherlands agencies EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global security</td>
<td>The poor quality of governance and the economy in some weak states generates organised crime (e.g. the drug trade), terrorism, immigration and social cohesion concerns, weapons, threats, etc. Development and good governance in these countries are instrumental to reducing global security threats</td>
<td>Foreign policy/diplomacy, security and defence actors, police, anti-drug trafficking, money laundering, arms specialists</td>
<td>US (Defense Department, State Department and USAID) UK (Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence AusAID UN Security Council OECD EC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cammack et al., 2006.
Appendix 3: Alignment

The notion of alignment relates to the ‘two-track problem’. This is the question of whether to set up service delivery mechanisms that are separate from government, which have fundamentally different strategies, resource levels and timeframes. This is less of a dilemma if capacity development support is ‘aligned’ to government, in order to:

- capitalise on existing sources of capacity, however small, to demonstrate coordination;
- structure service provider contracts to create incentives for local capacity building;
- develop linkages to community groups to build their capacity for oversight and make their voices heard.

Whether external actors align with government or not depends on the effectiveness of state institutions and their political legitimacy. Debiel contrasts four scenarios:

- Systems and policy alignment (where the state is functioning reasonably well and legitimacy is relatively high): budget support would be possible;
- Systems alignment (where governments lack legitimacy and where the priorities of donors and the government differ): budget support would not be considered, and sector programmes would involve strict conditionality and monitoring;
- Policy alignment (where institutions have disintegrated, but government has embarked on reforms supported by the population);
- Shadow alignment (where institutional and political breakdown is far advanced, but design support measures to gear them as far as possible to existing budget classifications, planning cycles, reporting procedures, etc., or to established administrative units).

Sources: Brinkerhoff, 2007; Debiel, 2005.