CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS

DRAFT WORKING PAPER

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Executive summary

This paper examines fragility, capacity development and education and the links between these by analysing relevant research and policy literatures. The paper proposes ways forward for action and reflection at national, regional and international levels.

Setting the scene through a review of the debate on the characteristics of fragile states and education within them in Chapter One, the paper identifies state-building as a priority concern. The capacity challenge is especially acute in these contexts and the paper considers how administrative systems and education institutions can enhance accountability, trust, civic participation and social capital as well as human capital.

Chapter Two looks at the nature of fragile states and possible reasons for their fragility. Fragile states are understood as those that lack the capacity and the willingness to perform key government functions, and in which the ‘public’ is weak or missing altogether. While conflict and natural disasters are often a cause of state fragility, the situation is often made worse by political and social events. Fragile education systems are both an effect and a cause of fragility. If the state provides an education system in which people have lost faith, the education system is less able to foster change in the political system. It is a challenge to develop education systems so that they can change the dynamics of fragility, so in turn the state can bolster its legitimacy by providing mass education that delivers what it promises.

Capacity development in education systems in such contexts requires a broad definition. It clearly goes beyond the knowledge and skills of individuals into the realm of governance. Effective capacity development strategies will also depend on the social, economic and political context of the country or region in question.

Chapter Three put the elements of the fragility, capacity development and education together. It examines which elements of capacity development should be focussed on in education, putting state building as the primary objective. Administrative systems and education institutions have different but complementary roles to play. In terms of administration, capacity development is examined in terms of policy making and planning, regulatory functions, including anti-corruption measures, and strengthening local capacity and leadership, including gender concerns. The development of teachers, curricula, skills and analytical capacity are all priority areas for the development of education institutions, but in specific ways that address state fragility. Learner-centred teaching, labour market analysis, entrepreneurship skills, skills for employment, adult education, civic education and political literacy are all identified as areas for action.

Donor involvement, methodologies for capacity development and possible ways forward are discussed in Chapters Four and Five. The OECD/DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations are discussed in terms of choices over the allocation of resources and the skills needed to prioritise. Process considerations, such as whether to target specific levels of an education system or whether to adopt an issues-based approach to mobilize diverse stakeholders from all levels are also important.

In terms of donor alignment the aim is to match donor strategies, policies and budget planning with local requirements and needs. These can vary depending on specific circumstances, for example towards preventing human rights abuses and exerting a democratic influence on authoritarian or oppressive governments. The issue of involving stakeholders outside the state system in both urban and rural areas to reinforce the development of civil society is also examined, although the question of who participates is a big one. Should stakeholders from the non-formal sector or opposition groups or parties be included? In fragile situations it is important to ensure mediation to create a climate of cooperation rather than competition among all those involved.

An important element of capacity development in education systems is the establishment of education standards and indicators, which means the development of country-wide and local indicators of both fragility and recovery as well as indicators of success. Although in such contexts the provision of services is likely to be a higher priority, it is important to collect data and establish indicators as early as possible. Building capacity locally to collect,
analyse and report on key indicators is also an important step. Reporting and monitoring should not be used to assign blame, but viewed as a learning activity to allow innovation and experimentation with new ideas.

Regional cooperation can play a significant role in peer learning and stakeholder exchange to improve knowledge management and exchange good practice. For example in labour migration and refugee situations the accreditation of learning across borders can become an issue for capacity development. There may also be a need to consider capacity development for local staff to enable them to deal more effectively with multiple international and donor organisations.

Key messages

Areas for action

Capacity development for education in fragile situations must analyse and work within the specific constraints of the security and development needs of the social, economic and political context. The long term aim should be to rebuild the state and restore the functions of the state.

Capacity development goes beyond the technical skills of individuals. In education, it should contribute to greater equity, cohesion and trust in the system.

Planning, regulatory and accountability functions need to be strengthened within ministries of education and relevant local authorities. Issues such as workplace culture, nepotism, creative accounting and corruption should be tackled.

Education personnel require capacity development to ensure greater and more equal participation in education. Where education is decentralised, then capacity development at all levels is necessary, including understandings of decentralised power itself.

Capacity development is also needed for those involved in youth employment policies and programmes, women’s groups and adult literacy as a means of strengthening civil society.

Capacity development in the area of labour market analysis is essential to ensure the relevance of vocational education.

Capacity development for teachers must include how to promote political literacy and media understanding as well as the capacity to deal with controversial issues. Teacher education in areas such as citizenship and legal education is needed.

Accurate situation analyses are needed, along with a description of how the education system is affected. Assistance in the generation of reliable indicators and standards for the monitoring and evaluation of education is required, as is support for coordination.

The creation of regional networks can support cross border topics such as the education of refugees and migrants as well as helping to address national issues in a less politically sensitive way.

A network of international experts on capacity development in fragile situations could be created, but care should be taken that such expertise builds on local cultural and political knowledge.

Areas for reflection

Which focus points, dimensions, actors, stakeholders and methodological responses should be considered? How can a research programme to study the impact of capacity development combinations be put into practice?

In what ways can the management of education institutions be improved? Should new regulatory bodies be created in this regard?

What could be the short and long term indicators of success in capacity development in education for state building?
Could cross-sectoral capacity development be more effective in tackling the issue than capacity development confined to the education sector? For example, in agriculture, employment, health/sanitation, justice or communication?

Capacity development is socio-psychological as well as political and systemic: there must be incentives for people to change behaviour. How can incentives for those on the receiving end of capacity development be ensured, including security and status?

Should the Fast Track Initiative be further extended to fragile states to support education planning? Ensuring ownership at national and local levels is essential, but whom?
1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the paper

This paper was prepared to address the concerns of the European Training Foundation (ETF) with regard to human capital development and social cohesion in what have been termed ‘fragile states’. Capacity development is also a priority focus for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in its involvement in the Working Group on Education and Fragility of the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). This convinced both institutions to engage in a partnership around the present project which is represented by this paper.

1.2 The fragility, capacity development and education nexus

There have been many papers and manuals on education and fragility, as well as on capacity development and fragility; there have been fewer that combine these. This paper attempts to summarise and problematise the connections. Capacity development is in itself ‘educational’ in that it relates to learning and unlearning. Capacity development in the education sector therefore has a complex role: it may relate to individuals and organisations who see themselves as enabling others to learn, rather than learning themselves. Adding in the fragility dimension requires acknowledgement that education may have contributed to that fragility in a way that other sectors (health, transport) have not. Putting together capacity development, education and fragility requires a very nuanced and political approach if it is to move beyond simple lists of prescriptions for skills training or organisational reforms.

Capacity development generally remains a substantial challenge. In recent years, it is reported that about a quarter of donor aid, or more than USD 15 billion a year, has gone into technical cooperation, the bulk of which ostensibly aims at capacity development, although not only in education. Despite the magnitude of these inputs, evaluation results confirm that development of sustainable capacity remains one of the most difficult areas of international development practice. This is even more so for fragile states, and even more so for capacity development in education. There can still be reluctance to see education in general as a priority in humanitarian or development aid, and the very reasons for fragility are those making donors less eager to engage.

Investment in capacity development is seen as not leading to quick or easily measurable returns. This paper aims, in contrast, to demonstrate the considerable direct as well as indirect benefits of capacity development in education for reducing fragility.

1.3 Scope of the paper: audience and objectives

The primary audience for this paper comprises members of the INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility; the ‘partners’ of the Working Group; and the INEE member community as a whole. Based on their review, and the Global Consultation in April 2009, it could potentially be adapted for other audiences; however, the paper assumes and acknowledges much existing knowledge and expertise amongst the initial audience. It is intended not to suggest firm answers, but to stimulate debate and help future strategy and policy development. Its objectives are therefore to provide a review of existing literature on capacity development, education and fragility; and to identify what could be done at country, regional and international levels, and how development partners such as ETF and GTZ might support this.

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1 OECD 2006
2 Evidence for Education 2009
3 ETF 2006
The central questions of the paper are:

- Is capacity development in fragile contexts qualitatively different from capacity development in other development contexts?
- How is capacity development for education in fragile contexts different from capacity development in other sectors?
- What therefore are the meaningful strategies, priorities and combinations and of capacity development interventions?

To address these questions, in Section 2, the paper first examines the nature of fragility and the ‘fragility debate’; it then briefly identifies the particular characteristics of education in fragile contexts; and finally delineates the boundaries around capacity development which will be used in this paper. Section 3 raises the issues around intervention and interruption of cycles of fragility: which dimension to tackle and which entry point or sector in education to focus on. Section 4 examines the role and relationships of donors and other actors; and Section 5 looks at ways forward at country, regional and global levels. The focus throughout is primarily on formal schooling together with its governance and administration, but the implications apply also to non-formal education, vocational and higher education.

2. Setting the frame: fragility, capacity development and education

2.1 The fragility debate

Discussions of fragility appear to fall into three areas: the phase or categorisation of fragility, the features of fragility and the causation of fragility. The categories, firstly, are often represented as fourfold:4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested development</td>
<td>Prolonged crisis or impasse; stagnation with low levels of effectiveness and legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration</td>
<td>Declining levels of governance effectiveness leading to lower legitimacy, rising risk of violence or collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict transition</td>
<td>Low levels of effectiveness, transitory legitimacy, recent violence, humanitarian crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early recovery</td>
<td>Gradual improvement; rising levels of effectiveness and legitimacy, declining aid needs, emergence from conflict or other crises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Sources: OECD 2008; DCD/DAC 2007
A fuller discussion of these and other categorisations can be found in Appendix 1: for examining capacity development in education, it was found more pertinent to look at features and histories, as follows.

First, no single definition of a ‘fragile state’ has been adopted by international consensus, but some common features can be identified from various sources which will be seen to impact particularly on capacity development decisions:

- Deficits in governance that hinder economic development; the political apparatus haunted by uncertainty, contradiction and technical ambiguity
- Inability to maintain security across its terrain
- Inability to ensure that the essential needs of its population are met; conditions too unstable for long-term planning and investment, with society focusing on short-term coping strategies to secure basic needs.
- Spatial polarisation of identities and ethnic or other tensions
- Ungovernable flows of aid and people across boundaries; aid volatility twice as high as it is in low-income countries
- Education accorded less of a development priority than in low-income countries
- Opaque decision-making by a small elite; interdependencies or reliances on other elite groups
- Erosion of the people’s trust in the state’s formal institutions

Operative definitions of fragility used by the DAC and several aid agencies emphasise both the lack of capacity and the willingness to perform key government functions for the benefit of all.

Capacity means having the core features that enable the state to mobilise resources for such key objectives as economic development and poverty reduction. These core features include territorial control and presence, effective exercise of political power, basic competence in economic management and sufficient administrative capacity for policy implementation.

Willingness refers to an explicit political commitment to policies supporting human welfare. It is reflected in actions and outcomes that are implemented following an inclusive approach (non-discrimination). Legitimacy concerns the sources of support for the state and the regime.

It will be important to stress that capacity development refers not just to tackling the first of these, but also to enhancing political will. As the OECD points out, the state is built and maintained through the collective action of the public; in a fragile state the ‘public’ is missing or weak. Although self-serving and perhaps market-based provision of goods may be possible, the more public aspects of service delivery tend to crumble or disappear (e.g. vaccinations, school curricula, teacher training, law enforcement and water utilities). All these would weaken civil society as well as the legitimacy of government. Brinkerhoff also picks up on the particular issue of inclusivity:

In fragile states, citizens are polarised in ethnic, religious or class-based groups, between whom there is a history of distrust, grievance and/or violent conflict. Civil society lacks the capacity to cooperate, compromise and trust each other. When these capacity deficits are extreme, states move towards failure, collapse, crisis and conflict.

5 The definition of ‘state’ used here is that of OECD/DAC (2007), with a broad definition which includes the executive branch of the central and local governments within a state but also the legislative and judiciary arms of the government
7 OECD 2008, p14
8 Brinkerhoff 2008, p1
This divisiveness will be crucial in education, as explored later.

The features of fragility link to the second question of assessing the causation of fragility and hence the goals of donors in intervention. While natural disasters are often a causal factor, they can be linked to, or exacerbated by political, social failure - which will be the main concern of this paper. Fragility can be transnational, in that the causes may be generated elsewhere, as for the current economic crisis. Some political economists would also cite oppressive trade relationships as undermining economic growth or stability – as well as political will. One way therefore to look at fragile characteristics is to determine what would be needed for ‘turnaround’ – a reduction in fragility. This has been defined as having three components: a durable cessation of violent conflict; sustained economic growth; and sustained improvements in human development indicators. These are a proxy for an improving policy context which enhances pro-poor growth potential. In addition to direct poverty reduction strategies, programmes and projects can contribute to turnaround through bringing about a change in governance; catalysing change outside the area of the original intervention; and stemming negative spillover effects from one region or country into the other regions or a neighbouring country.

Cammack et al have a useful paper written for JICA surveying donors and the ‘fragile states’ agenda. The international development community came to this agenda from three different directions (i) an emphasis on human security and peacebuilding, (ii) a concern with poor development performance and state effectiveness and (iii) a belief that underdevelopment and insecurity (individual and international) are related. The paper summarises the emphases of particular donors (see Appendix 2), and details the agendas of US, UK and Germany, as well as giving case studies of Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nepal to show how the fragile states agenda has been operationalised by different donors. As well as the now obvious conclusions about the need for donor coordination emerges the need to understand the underlying assumptions of different donors about causes and outcomes of fragility and hence priorities for intervention – in particular the mix of security and development goals. Brinkerhoff cites two factors that intensify the politicised nature of donor response: a) that fragile states engage other interested constituencies beyond the development assistance community (for example relying on local warlords in Afghanistan to maintain security) and b) that the high visibility of fragile states mobilises public opinion and puts a media spotlight on intervention efforts. All these intricate interconnections would signal the need for a distinct response from donors. The OECD is clear that ‘we need approaches, instruments, skill sets and international architecture that are different from those applied in better performing countries’. The difference, and the central argument of this paper, is the need to build the state. For fragile contexts, the OECD highlight the value of focussing on core state functions, particularly those whose performance directly affects the likelihood of state collapse or further conflict. This means the desirability of joint planning across the range of security, diplomatic and development actors, the importance of fostering country leadership even where the conditions appear unpromising; and taking care not to undermine existing, even dormant capacities. Debiel claims that ‘the key to both socioeconomic success and efforts to stabilise fragile states must be sought in efficient, transparent and accountable governance structures that pave the way to real citizen voice and participation’. He builds on Clapham’s assertion that ‘the state remains the only plausible building block on which any project of global governance can be constructed’. Restoration of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is a sine qua non, as well as restoring the rule of law and consistently combating corruption.

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9 Capacity development for dealing with emergencies might be only one part of broader capacity development as a response to fragility.
10 Institute of Development Studies 2006
11 Cammack et al 2006
12 OECD 2007 p4
13 OECD 2006
14 Debiel 2005, p2
15 Clapham 2001, p2
From this discussion, three working assumptions can be made:

- that it is essential to look at the political context of fragility, in particular the role of the government in the exacerbation or mitigation of fragility, and hence how to engage with government
- that it is more appropriate to replace ‘fragile state’ with ‘fragile context’ or ‘fragile characteristics’, in order to assess what precisely is ‘failing’ and where failure is generated
- that fragility will imply distinctive policies and strategies for capacity development responses, with the need to rebuild the state being paramount.

2.2 Education in fragile contexts

The next question centres round the nature of education in fragile contexts, and again, whether this is distinctive. Educational fragility is both an effect and a contributor to wider state fragility. Rose and Greeley\(^\text{16}\) provide a useful breakdown of the international agenda for support to education in fragile states, distinguishing

- the security agenda (for example negative and positive political use, disaffected youth, religious schooling);
- the humanitarian agenda (community engagement, schools as safe spaces);
- EFA agenda (for example a rights-based approach, active citizenship) and
- MDG goals (national growth and poverty reduction, focus on primary schooling).

The agendas all interlock, although having a range of time scales and transitions. This paper contends that capacity development would be crucial to all agendas. Some characteristics will of course be shared with other ‘poor’ but relatively stable development contexts: a poor quality of provision, lack of qualified teachers, inability to reach EFA targets and so on. In fragile contexts, these deficiencies will be surrounded by four other main problems: legitimacy, contribution to conflict, extreme inequality and the features of weak governance reflected in education governance. These are now briefly elaborated on,

2.2.1 Legitimacy of the state and of state education

As defined earlier, one of the characteristics of fragile states is the legitimacy of the state itself, and degree of trust in it. State policy on education is part of that legitimacy. As long ago as 1991, Bruce Fuller talked of the ‘rocky romance’ of the fragile state with the school. Mass education perhaps more than any other sector is subject to competing and almost irreconcilable goals. It is selective and rationed, especially at higher levels, and not all can succeed. For state legitimacy, this disjuncture between what every client might want and what is actually possible has to be disguised under the name of meritocracy or equal opportunity, or, as Fuller pointed out in the context of Malawi, through symbolic trappings of modernity\(^\text{17}\). In this sense, capacity development may just be about making the game marginally less unfair and marginally more transparent.

The OECD argues that justice/security and education appear to be the most transformative kind of services in a fragile setting, but they are also the most prone to polarisation and manipulation. The OECD points out how different groups in society will have different visions about what makes ‘good’ service delivery in the education sector. Clients (parents/learners) want low-cost, easy-to-access, safe, high-quality schooling that improves their children’s life chances. Policy makers and political leaders want to deliver social benefits at low cost, with high propaganda value and

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\(^{16}\) Rose and Greeley 2006  
\(^{17}\) Fuller, 1991
political rewards. The providers (teachers) care about technically sound curricula, relatively high salaries, respect and safety. Thus the effectiveness of service delivery – and in turn, the legitimacy of the political order – depends on addressing competing goals and expectations in ways that satisfy the stakeholders’. The OECD make a further, very important point: 

The source of legitimacy for the state may be the leaders’ ability to deliver economic growth, national prestige or public services. Alternatively (a more partial) legitimacy might derive from signals of special allegiance to certain traditions or ethnic groups. Thus, legitimacy may or may not relate to equitable service delivery.18

This has huge implications for questions of partnership, stakeholder involvement etc, returned to below.

In richer or more stable states, the contradictions of mass schooling and opportunity can be and are being massaged through ideologies of choice and markets; more brittle states, with even deeper questions of legitimacy, cannot even provide the basics from which consumerist choices could be made. Also, in terms of cohesion and control, they cannot necessarily risk the diversification into different cultural and religious educational sites which is now being advanced in the West. The vicious circle is when the state provides an education system in which people have lost faith, and in turn, the education system is powerless to foster change in the political system. The challenging task is to create a more virtuous circle, whereby education can change the workings of the fragile state and in turn, or simultaneously, the state can bolster its legitimacy through providing a mass education which can actually deliver what it promises.

2.2.2 Conflict and security

The notion of ‘two faces’ of education with regard to conflict is now well documented and discussed19. The OECD is clear that education appears to offer the greatest possibilities for addressing sources of fragility. It can protect children and prevent further harm by providing curricula on health, sanitation and human rights. It can identify and assist those with special needs or post-traumatic stress; it can protect against recruitment into armed combat or forced labour, drug trafficking and prostitution. It affects the socialisation of youth, the understanding of public issues, political participation, women’s empowerment and health20. However, while education post-conflict can contribute to peace-building, there is no guarantee that it will, and education can have been contributory to the lack of, or breakdown in social cohesion. This can have been because of inequality in access and opportunity, and hence frustration, but also through ethnic, caste or religious discrimination by schools and teachers, bias in curriculum and textbooks and so on. In the case of Rwanda for example, there is evidence to suggest that the didactic methodologies of teaching which smothered critical thinking and questioning, affected people’s response to the genocide21. Violence in schools, whether corporal punishment or gendered violence22, also contributes to cultures of violence and acceptance of violence as a solution to problems. How education is actually used – or manipulated - by government, religious groups, local politicians or oppositional groups needs continual surfacing. Smith and Vaux for example mentioned in the context of Nepal how schools may be targeted to undermine government legitimacy.23

The global security agenda has added an additional urgency, requiring an education to challenge extremism and violent radicalisation, and prevent young people joining extremist groups. Professional development for teachers and teacher trainers here would cover how to promote acceptance of alternatives to single truths or missions, skills in media education and comparative religious education, as well as how to confront violence.24

18 OECD 2008 p15
19 See Buckland 2005, Bush and Salterelli 2000; Davies 2004; Seitz 2004
20 OECD 2008
21 Bird 2003
22 See Leach and Mitchell 2006
23 Smith and Vaux 2003
24 Davies 2008
2.2.3 Extremes of inequality and inequity

Extreme and glaring inequalities in education provision and access can also contribute to conflict and instability. The FTI Progressive Framework under the heading ‘service delivery’ talks of the technical core of education support (trained teachers, materials etc) but that in fragile states there is a particular need to emphasise throughout the system (my italics) attention to human rights, gender and other equity, diversity and inclusion issues, protection and psycho-social needs, and the principles of the rule of law. This would have huge implications for capacity development, not just in the training of teachers and supervisors, but also local authorities. It is difficult to achieve a national policy on human rights education in relatively stable states, and in fragile states this may well be seen as threatening to government and to classroom teachers alike. Yet it could be argued that it is a core aspect of ‘turnaround’ and of the return to stability.

The previous function (or dysfunction) of education in fragility then suggests shifts from competitive and divisive schooling to one which builds social capital, cohesion and security. One cross-national study by Putnam of the determinants of social cohesion found that the best predictor of high social capital is simply years of formal schooling. More educated people have wider, deeper, stronger social networks and participate more in social, community and political life. Yet in fragile contexts, schooling would most likely need to have a redistributive function in terms of income inequality and of gender inequality, as well as reduction of discrimination, if cohesion is to be enhanced.

2.2.4 Governance

General cultures within administration are clearly reflected in educational governance. There may be weaknesses in accountability, planning, financing and the location of decision-making. A particular need within the turnaround mentioned earlier is that of democratic governance. Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa reveals that education plays an important role in building support for multi-party democracy and challenges to autocracy. However, in fragile contexts, there can be disjunctures at all levels regarding learning about democracy, with civic education in schools at odds with the authoritarian or even violent ways it is transmitted. Democratic skills would also need to be reinforced within civil society organisations, but these may also be undemocratically run, living simply on donor funding, accomplishing some immediate tasks of local development without truly offering an arena for democratic discussion of political, social and economic development. In the African context, Antal and Easton therefore argue for a civic education drawing on patterns of democratic governance within African cultures, and a communication between the two spheres of formal education and informal learning in the surrounding culture. The failures of civic education to impact on political culture mean re-examination of methods of ‘instruction’, looking at radio, street theatre and local traditions of satire; it also means analysis of the trade-offs in costs between the formal training of elites and mass outreach to communities.

As elsewhere, in education governance, a lack of transparency ranging from creative accounting in order to make ends meet through to full scale corruption may be endemic. Hallak and Poisson in an interesting review report that leakage of funds from ministries of education to schools represent more than 80% of the total sums allocated (non-salary expenditures). The IIEP project on Ethics and Corruption in Education has three assumptions: that monopoly power and lack of accountability mechanisms favour the development of corrupt practices in the education sector; that actors’ behaviour (intangible inputs) have a significant impact on problems of access, quality and equity in education; and that facilitating access to information and promoting a

25 Quoted in Barakat et al
26 OECD 2007.7
27 EFA 2008
28 Harber, 1999
29 Antal and Easton 2008
30 Bratton and Alderfer
31 Hallak and Poisson 2005
32 Rose 2007
'citizens’ voice’ are essential for improving transparency and accountability in the use of educational resources. This has important implications for capacity development planning.

2.3 The capacity development debate and challenge

The interlocking nature and breadth of the problems around education in fragile contexts means an equally broad concept of ‘capacity development’ is needed. An OECD/DAC definition is cited as ‘the ability of individuals, organisations and societies to make effective and efficient use of resources, in order to achieve their own goals on a sustainable basis’32. For Brinkerhoff, capacity means ‘having the aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions that are necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose’, and he adds in ‘sustainable capacity’ as involving the endogenous processes that exist within a country apart from what donors do.

‘Capacity’ clearly goes beyond the knowledge and technical skills of individuals, and depends crucially on the quality of organisations within which they work and in turn the influence of ‘the enabling environment’ – the structure of power and influence and the institutions in which they are embedded. ‘Capacity is not only about skills and procedures; it is also about incentives and governance’.33 Capacity development cannot be disconnected from rights and responsibilities, and should not be limited to the public sector. A key point to stress from Brinkerhoff is about relationships – how capacities at local level are influenced by relationships with Ministry and other partners, whose capacities are in turn determined by relationships with national government and donors, by policies, by the degree of corruption, by what kinds of services societal elites want and so on.

UNESCO defines capacity development as a ‘process’, with four dimensions:

- Improving the competencies and performance of individual officers
- Improving organisational performance (mandate, structure, international management of organisational units)
- Improving public administration to which these units belong (role of public service, rules of civil service management, formal and informal incentives)
- Improving the social, economic and political context (limiting the constraints and strengthening incentives)34

This last dimension seems critical in fragile contexts. The FTI Progressive Framework talks of the interim strategy as needing consensus on actions that are ‘prioritised according to the context and take into account the range of issues relating to education and fragility’ (my italics).35 There would be a distinction however between taking something into account in considering capacity development (which could be everything from the rewards and pay outside the public sector to a situation of conflict and inter-group hostility) and actually improving a ‘context’ as UNESCO states. Is the social, economic and political context just analysed as a ‘risk’ factor on a logframe, or are there attempts to intervene in this, directly or indirectly, using capacity development? In the view of this paper, this is a major but under-evidenced area.

This broadening of capacity development from the technical skills of individuals however means a difficulty in definition and boundaries of what exactly is meant by capacity development. Given that the ‘capacity to achieve goals’ would include the physical resources to do this, then virtually all educational aid and intervention could come under this banner – building and equipping schools, paying teachers’ wages, curriculum reform and legislative reform. Clearly they need to go hand in hand. Respondents in Rose’s study proposed that resources spent on upgrading

33 OECD 2006 p7
34 UNESCO 2008
35 FTI 2008 p1
skills without attention to improving salaries can be counterproductive.\textsuperscript{36} Local staff may want to improve the system but are hampered by lack of resources or transport to get to visit schools, again implying the need for coherent policy.\textsuperscript{37}

However, even within a broad scope, it would seem important for this discussion to limit capacity development to human and system improvement \textit{outside} the provision of the supporting financial and physical resources. Watson and Yohannes’ study of \textit{Capacity Building for Decentralised education service delivery in Ethiopia} for example, describe how the national capacity building strategy there had three elements: human capacity; systems and procedures; and organisational structures and relationships. The major components were the range of educational levels, including technical and vocational education, but also civil service reform programmes around finance, ethics and the justice sector. This capacity building strategy was ‘intimately related to the democratisation process, to help deliver the principles enshrined in the constitution’.\textsuperscript{38}

Indeed, capacity development overall would relate to democratisation, in terms of the principles of equity, transparency, participation and rights, cutting across all sectors.\textsuperscript{39} Reformists would argue this for Palestine, for example, contending that quality entails a full shift in educational philosophy, with schools supporting democratic and participatory aims\textsuperscript{40}. From this we could conclude that capacity development is ideally cross-sectoral (not just education) and, more controversially, political (not neutral in values).

Nonetheless, and returning to the argument for identification of fragile characteristics in Section 2.1, capacity development will have to have targets as well as philosophies. The OECD suggest practitioners would begin by asking ‘capacity for what?’ and focus on specific capacities needed to accomplish clearly defined goals – a ‘best fit’ approach. This links to the need to avoid the trap of providing generic training on broad topics, disconnected from the capacity and performance of specific organisations. One challenge is to identify governmental departments for capacity development which will have the maximum spill-over benefits for the rest of government.

Another helpful focus is that of determining the ‘absorptive capacity’ (AC)\textsuperscript{41} to manage aid flows, which may relate to labour market conditions but also to technical, managerial or planning skills. In terms of aid effectiveness, some countries reach a point where the benefits from increases in aid start to diminish – or even become negative. Education in particular absorbs large proportions of budgets and for some countries would require large scaling up in aid to reach MDG and EFA targets; yet Rose finds that some agencies are cautious about increasing their commitments significantly, citing AC constraints as the reason.

AC would direct our attention to the \textit{timing} of aid intervention – whether capacity development would have to precede any injection of new textbooks, computers or other educational resources, or at least be simultaneous. It also draws our attention to the ‘amenability’ of addressing AC constraints – should one focus on those which have high amenability to change (e.g. weak supervision of teachers, which can be addressed through training and incentives, but which may not have high impact) or on those with low amenability (e.g. weak, over-centralised planning and management), but which nonetheless have high impact on all areas of the system?

This paper will take a broad version of capacity development in education as being about education system development but also about teacher professional development, as these are interdependent. While in theory it would be possible to include all learners in capacity development, this paper restricts the discussion to education ‘providers’ – although this will inevitably mean forays into their learning about what is provided, that is, curriculum.

\textsuperscript{36} Rose 2007
\textsuperscript{37} Harber and Davies 2003
\textsuperscript{38} Watson and Johannes 2005
\textsuperscript{39} See Harber; Davies, Harber and Schweisfurth;
\textsuperscript{40} Nicolai 2007
\textsuperscript{41} See Rose 2007
3. The fragility-capacity development-education nexus

We now put together the three singularities. First, because the state is fragile, efforts must be made to rebuild it, and yet the very fragility of the state means such efforts are likely to be countermanded in a range of predictable and unpredictable ways. Second, education is the most complex and politicised sector in which to attempt change because of its ideological basis as well as its function of deciding people’s future destinations. Third, capacity development in such contexts is not about filling ‘capacity gaps’ or seeing people as ‘resources’. The language of deficits, lacks and gaps masks the agency of actors and their agendas for survival and status. As well as providing opportunity for people, capacity development is about unlearning previous behaviours or at least regulating behaviours which have contributed to fragility. Donors may have focussed too much on the supply side of capacity development without seeing if there is a demand side which would sustain change.

This means the education-fragility-capacity development nexus is especially complex. The notion of ‘knowledge transfer’ applies only at the very lowest level of technical assistance. Capacity development may imply an unequal relationship between one who knows and one who does not know. Yet ‘recipients’ of capacity development have vast knowledge, particularly of their work and political context, and their discourses will be central to the impact of a capacity development intervention. Strengthening mechanisms for donors to listen to intended beneficiaries could be a valuable starting point. Any capacity development planning will have to make choices about targeting of people: those who may embrace it as an opportunity for progression or satisfaction, but who have little power? Or those who have the capacity and positioning to create change but can see little personal gain, or even see it as a threat to their ideological or power position? Planning capacity development in education in fragile contexts is a series of decisions, and a constant process of delving under the surface of what appears to be acceptance or progress. This paper delineates some of the choices to be made.

3.1 Which dimension to tackle?

First, similar to UNESCO’s four-way ‘process’ of capacity development, this section distinguishes the different dimensions for consideration: individual, organisational, institutional and political/contextual. In distinguishing them, it will however be making the obvious point that they interlock and it is risky to tackle one in isolation.

There would now be agreement firstly that a pure focus on individuals is problematic. Capacity development can have inconsistent effects, especially concerning the capacity development that leads to qualifications and enhancement of a few individuals – who may retire, or move on and use their new skills to get more money and status elsewhere. Capacity development can lead to the exodus of trained staff to other sectors, even to the NGOs and donor agencies themselves. Or ‘trainees’ may find their organisation lacks the policies, procedures or leadership for them to apply what they have learned, or no incentive to improve their performance as a result of the training.42 Similarly, study visits and educational courses leading to prestigious qualifications are often requested by Ministries, (who also try to specify who goes) but have questionable long term value in terms of reducing fragility unless the selection and course is tightly matched to problems and real opportunities for reform on return.

The focus therefore needs to be on the organisational, institutional and broad contextual dimensions (summarised in Table 1 below). Organisational change relates to greater regulation and efficiency in places such as Ministries of Education, while institutional change tackles the more hidden cultures of work which may militate against turnaround. The OECD refer to the third dimension as the ‘enabling environment’, which one could also, as UNESCO, label the ‘social, economic and political context’.

42 Bethke 2008
Organisational capacity development, firstly, includes generic skills such as report writing or computer use, but much focus on financial management and implementing decentralisation systems. The underlying budgetary systems within the education sector (and generally) are critical to how donors seek to engage with states affected by fragility and design their levels of support. Abolition of school fees means aid or capitation grants to schools to compensate for lost fee income, but this needs skills in managing resources, as well as transparent procedures for purchasing materials. The extension to fragile contexts is suggested of public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) that have been adopted in countries such as Uganda, Zambia and Peru to help monitor and reduced leakage in the financial flow from top to bottom of the system. In Uganda and Kenya, full details of funds received and expenditure are posted on a public notice board to ensure transparency.

Another organisational capacity development need relates to the hiring of staff: in Palestine, this would be an essential part of the shift from political movement to government. MoE staff were first chosen in the Occupied Palestine Territories by willingness and ability, with a transparent process ‘perhaps taking longer than it should be to have been put in place’. Supervision is also important – declining resources may mean the number of supervisors or their visits are cut, which leaves schools unsupported and isolated, and their work not recognized. Yet supervision and inspection itself needs capacity development.

With regard to the second dimension, the institutional cultures surrounding capacity development, a EuropeAid paper discusses how ‘institutions’ (formal and informal) are not synonymous with organisations, but denote ‘resilient social structures formed by norms and regulations which provide solidity and meaning to social life’. The paper lists several important factors:

- Norms for exertion of power and authority from the family level to the state level, including gender aspects
- Socially embedded norms for what government authorities should and should not do, and how public management should be performed (‘how we do things here’)
- The status and rank accorded to ‘carriers of public authority’, (be it elders, teachers, doctors, clerics, ministers or presidents)
- Norms governing reciprocity in exchanges (favours and gifts)
- Norms governing how formalised, official laws and rules are considered and used compared to informal sets of rules.

All these apply to institutions of education, whether schools, district offices or central Ministries of Education. They would rarely be revealed through old-fashioned forms of SWOT analysis – and often taken for granted. Yet they would need to be admitted and understood, and then decisions made about whether capacity development would try to challenge or change these, and if so, which ones - and who would resist or subvert attempts to change. This means anticipating the responses of relevant actors and the weight of expectations and habits – or path dependencies – issuing from the choice of action. The question raised in Harber and Davies’ study of decentralisation in Malawi was whether the ‘allowance culture’ which permeated the district office was in fact a vital one in a context of poverty and a salary insufficient to live on.

A recent study of decentralisation of education in Indonesia revealed officials finding creative ways round attempts to prevent the generation of ‘bonuses’ by simply renaming routine activities as ‘projects’ and hence retaining the incentive system related to project management under the official rules. Jobs were unofficially reserved for members of similar ethnic groups. There were huge grey areas between nepotism and actual corruption; the links between education officials

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43 Brannelly and Nduruhurstse 2008
44 Rose 2007 p112
45 Nicolai 2007:133
46 Europeaid 2005
and private sector contractors for educational construction revealed a range of complex reciprocal relationships – but these were not always illegal, again more about creative accounting, and hence in fact less open to challenge. 47

Table 1 below sums up the particular needs and issues in fragile contexts when considering capacity development in education. It could equally well be presented as concentric circles.

The question is of the ‘entry points’ to change, which can be in any of the three dimensions. Sometimes it is more effective to change regulatory frameworks so that the institutional behaviour has to follow (e.g. audits for financial transparency, or guidelines on gender equality in pay and conditions). It is possible that capacity development to establish legal frameworks is more effective than ‘awareness’ courses on gender or ethnicity. Sometimes ways can be found which enhance service delivery even when serving clientelist goals (with the classic example being the drilling of wells in rural areas in Pakistan which help political supporters as well as the overall population). Museveni’s decision to go for Universal Primary Education in Uganda is often cited as another example of reconciling a number of political imperatives and benefits.

Issues related to conflict also cut across all dimensions. Ensuring that textbooks do not have inflammatory material or discriminatory messages can be used as a capacity development strategy as well as an equity goal. As part of the national policy on education for peace and social cohesion, the Ministry of Education in Sri Lanka has a unit within the curriculum department to scrutinise textbooks for representation of particular groups, that is, Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim, but the Unit for Peace and Social Cohesion also uses the new manual *Learning to Live Together* 48 to work with teachers and education officers to examine textbooks themselves in workshops. In Brčko in BiH, the EU strategy post Dayton was to bring together previously separated teachers from the 3 entities to develop the new harmonised curriculum 49. Capacity development here again impacted throughout..

47 Fahturrahman 2009
48 Sinclair et al 2008
49 Davies 2001
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension of Institutional culture</th>
<th>Need for:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial systems and information systems</td>
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<td>Basic accounting for schools on fees, levies etc</td>
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<td>Job descriptions</td>
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<td>Regulatory frameworks for decentralised levels</td>
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<td>Understandings of the meanings of decentralisation and power-sharing</td>
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<td>Transparent teacher appointments</td>
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<td>Reporting and report writing</td>
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<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<th>Existence of:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hidden Rules, norms, values</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creative accounting and allowance culture deriving from history of poverty</td>
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<td>Contexts of hierarchy meaning deference, fear and possible abuse of power</td>
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<td>Patronage, clientelism, gendered power</td>
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<td>Norms governing reciprocity in exchanges (favours and gifts)</td>
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<td>Lack of initiative or concern about improvement resulting from decades of conflict or oppression</td>
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<td>Need to combine personal incentives with institutional improvement</td>
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<th>Problem of:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political elites in contestation over education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absence of genuine political will around social cohesion or social, caste or gender equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic or religious conflict may have been exacerbated by education. Need for capacity development in non-discriminatory curriculum materials, civic education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Questions of what constitutes ‘the community’, and possible divisions and contestation within and between communities</td>
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<td>Endemic corruption as a norm</td>
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### 3.2 Which focus points in education?

The 3\textsuperscript{rd} of the OECD principles for working with fragile contexts is ‘focus on state building as the central objective’. In parallel to deciding dimensions is seeing which sector(s) within education offer the most power to do this. Table 2 below shows the twin aspects of administrative systems and educational institutions which each have different but complementary roles to play. The administrative aims at central and local levels are efficiency and transparency; the education institution aims are to build social and human capital. Both involve questions of participation and trust.
Key aspects of these in terms of the capacity development implications are now elaborated below.

Table 2

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS</th>
<th>EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aim: Ministry of Education efficiency and transparency</td>
<td>Aim: Locality efficiency and transparency</td>
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<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Local planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning and policy making</td>
<td>Citizen or community participation and ownership of education</td>
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<td>Financial management</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
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<td>Information flows</td>
<td>Innovation</td>
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<td>Market analysis</td>
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<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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### 3.2.1 Administrative systems

a) Planning

A study by Malik\(^50\) on the role of donor intervention in the education sector in Pakistan pointed to how capacity building measures had focused on increased decentralisation as a core objective and conditionality; yet that all analysis of educational outcomes had ignored political economy issues of elite capture and structure of school administration. Policy making and planning were inconsistent. Targets set in one policy term were revoked or abandoned in the next only to reappear some years later with extended deadlines. Policies did not complete their term, often being overtaken by new or parallel policies resulting in resource wastage or multiple initiatives. New donor projects may actually be contributory to this wastage, but capacity development could in contrast assist in realistic planning and policy making which included risk assessment of the likelihood of targets being achieved. Poor or rhetorical policies undermine rather than increase trust in government. Existing power relations, along with dominant discourses, impact on the direction and outcomes of policy making, and the fact that policy is the result of a continuous contest needs acknowledging\(^51\). Particularly in fragile contexts, policy and planning cannot be reduced to a technical exercise, solved by technical capacity development.

b) Regulation

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50 Malik, 2007

51 Hoppers 2008
Regulatory functions, the building and enforcement of rules of engagement, are one of the first prerequisites for a functioning state. While these should be harmonised across all public sectors, it is possible to engage in capacity development specifically on regulation in the education sector. This includes all the legal frameworks on roles and responsibilities as well as the issues of appointments, allocation, promotions and teacher codes of conduct. It further includes accountability and auditing on how moneys are spent.

Accountability is an important factor in absorptive capacity, particularly if receiving large amounts of money with insufficient trained personnel or clear procedures for handling funds. As a USAID paper pointed out

‘What may start as unintentional misallocation may quickly shift to intentional misallocation when those in charge realise there are no sanctions for their actions. One way to reduce corruption is to better align the flow of development assistance with capacity to effectively manage those funds and the project activities those funds buy.’

In fragile contexts, corruption usually goes beyond petty corruption to become systemic and an integral component of the system – particularly in neo-patrimonial regimes of Sub-Saharan Africa and Caucasian successor states, where even NGOs are part of it. This has implications for capacity development in education. Public relations campaigns against corruption are not sufficient, and institutions (ombudspersons, inspectors, dedicated authorities, transparent tendering procedures, legislative measures, support for watchdogs, rules requiring transnational corporations to make public whatever they pay to government institutions) are needed, as well as support for the ratification of the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption.

While public-private partnerships are sometimes mooted in education to minimise public sector expenditure, it is doubtful in fragile contexts whether the private sector would engage on its own in large scale capacity development for education (except for its own trainees). One model which has been advocated however is Independent Service Authorities (ISAs), which would separate the function of setting policy from the function of implementing service delivery. This is similar to the model adopted by the Palestinian Authorities. The role of an ISA would be to contract with a range of suppliers of the core public services, health care and education, channelling money to them in return for the supply of services to users. It would not itself attempt to supply services at the retail level to avoid issues of ‘moral hazard’. Collier gives detail of how this would work and the possible agencies involved, and makes the point that in addition to contracting with suppliers, the ISA would conduct rapid and continuous evaluations of performance: indeed ‘this would be its core role’. One legacy of conflict is ‘opportunistic behaviour’ which flourishes during weakened administration, so that the payoff to spending on monitoring and scrutiny is likely to be higher. Supervision is indeed differentially effective in fragile state conditions, and worth spending on.

c) Local capacity

Strengthening local leadership and capacity appears an indisputable strategy. Rose and Greeley review papers which point to the importance of community-level initiatives in fragile states, particularly for education interventions. Wirak and Lexow report that community-based schools in Afghanistan, promoted through UNICEF’s ‘child-friendly schools’ programme, have been successfully recognised, moving from being seen as emergency responses to being formalised as part of the system. Similarly, UNICEF’s Child-Friendly Community Initiative in the Sudan has aimed at community empowerment, organizing communities to identify high-priority problems that affect children and women, and then to build their members’ capacity to plan, implement and monitor a local development initiative that will address these problems. Significantly, government structures at the state and locality levels are also trained in participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation, communication and community management.

A project in Angola worked directly with schools in a remote area to enable them to identify and work on small improvements that could be achieved without injection of funds. Capacity

52 Chaoman 2002
53 Collier, 2007
54 Wirak and Lexow 2008
55 Moreno-Torres 2005
development with the heads promoted democratic engagement with teachers, parents and students to identify changes, and the formation of task teams in schools. Changes in teachers’ professionalism such as attendance, punctuality, lesson preparation, and collaboration, were noted. This is now being scaled up.56

Berry focuses on mechanisms for holding schools to account, and finds that community-based approaches are an important mechanism for strengthening the accountability of schools to communities and local authorities. However, they require complementary side investments to sustain their impacts over time. In Yemen, parent councils were established, but the challenge was for the Ministry of Education and donors to jointly identify how this could be taken up nationwide.

Capacity development in Ethiopia was helped by the traditional practice of gemgema, which uses group feedback to individuals regarding their performance and behaviour in relation to the group and the organisational objectives. Developed during the period of armed struggle in the civil war, it has gradually begun to be practised by all branches of the civil service. This does not involve written assessments, but is regular (several times a year) and complementary to formal performance evaluation. Gemgema is based on objectives, tasks accomplished, problems encountered and solved, interpersonal communication and attitudes to the group. Teachers would be invited to evaluate the role and performance of the regional bureau and the education office in implementing their policies, for example.

However, ‘the community’ is not without divisions or contest, and should not be romanticised. Communities that are ethnically divided, or dominated by one ethnic group causing problems of marginalisation, may not help social cohesion. Also, understandings of what decentralisation actually means are important for capacity development. Who exactly has power to determine, for example, teacher deployment or expenditure on training? Lack of clarity over whether the policy is deregulation or devolution can mean unintended duplications or vested interests seizing power at particular points. Also, there is the question of sustainability after international NGOs have withdrawn support and whether there is a ‘malfunctioning bureaucracy’ to coordinate community involvement. Challenges to the Mozambiquan decentralisation project have included weak or non-existing financial management skills of headteachers and schools staff, as well as mismanagement of funds and weak community involvement. As the 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report points out, transferring responsibility to communities, parents and private providers is not a substitute for fixing basic education systems.

Clearly, any decentralisation or community sharing policy should involve capacity development, especially in understanding of finance, accountability and power. For BMZ, it also requires learning about bottom-up quality control, which requires developing the capacities of local governments, which should in return have the ability to delegate responsibility to schools.

3.2.2 Educational sites

a) Teacher professional development

Given the ultimate aim of education reform is student learning, teacher development – including training paraprofessionals - is often seen as the key part of or entry point to education reconstruction. Major elements are pedagogy, supplemental content (HIV and AIDS education, peace or civics education) and often resources development. As with community initiatives, the question in fragile contexts is sustainability and scaling up. Burde comments how while there is not much evidence to demonstrate a measurable impact on practice, short training sessions help

56 EAI 2008
57 Berry 2007
58 Watson and Johannes 2005, p5
59 See studies on Malawi and Indonesia: Harber and Davies, 2003, Fahturmahan, 2009
60 Brannelly and Nduruhutse, 2008
61 EFA 2008
62 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007
63 Burde, 2005

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to build professional ties across groups (with Bosnia cited) and also build teacher morale. Bethke similarly describes how back-to-school campaigns in fragile or post-conflict contexts often consist of a short-term teacher training component to train tens of thousands of teachers quickly. As well as learner-centred teaching, there may be stress on a rights-based approach to education or an introduction to the psycho-social issues children may be facing. These are often a ‘cascade’ method from the expert international consultants to master trainers and downwards. However, without supervision and follow-up after the training, the impact in most classrooms is likely to be minimal. This doubt about impact was also reported for the cascade in-service training programme in Afghanistan. Follow up support is possible in small states: a project on democracy and professionalism in the Gambia found that while teacher trainees were often enthused, the sustained impact on practice was questionable unless supervisors were also trained – and this project did reach every single supervisor. Yet this would not be possible in a large country, or one more fragile. In Palestine, teacher development is reported as lagging behind the curriculum in terms of the contribution to quality. There is little quality assurance across pre-service training programmes, and the emphasis is on the delivery of separate courses rather than being built around a comprehensive skill set. There is still emphasis on rote learning; and while schools remain viewed by communities as one of the safest places, little is done to discuss to openly address violence in them. The 2009 EFA report states categorically that increasing the supply of teachers while lowering quality standards is false economy, and also addresses ‘perverse’ effects of performance-related pay in terms of narrowing the subjects being taught and excluding children less likely to succeed. The academic success of students in Pakistan appears to be improved much more by process variables (what teachers say and do) than by their own qualifications – even though reward structures are based mainly on the latter rather than the former. The INEE Guidance Notes on Teacher Compensation in Fragile States, situations of Displacement and Post-Crisis Recovery stress not only adequate financial rewards but suitable non-monetary support mechanisms and incentives which will help prevent attrition.

All these issues point to capacity development not just as teacher education itself, but in quality assurance, incentives to enhance teacher professionalism, and planning of professional development programmes as linked to national goals of equity, non-violence and active civil society.

b) Curriculum development

It is most probable that curriculum enhancement or radical change is warranted to ameliorate fragility. Enhancement might be in Disaster Risk Reduction programmes which enable immediate survival; more radical but controversial long term change relates to the areas of designing human rights programmes for schools, where curriculum developers themselves may need training. Many agencies advise on citizenship education programmes after conflict; clearly these have to include ministry personnel and teachers as designers, not just as recipients of external programmes. The fault lines between different stakeholders in how history can be represented then emerge, as in Rwanda. It is argued in the context of Darfur and of Northern Uganda that even in vocational training programmes there should be inclusion of life skills and civic education components so that young people develop coping strategies and positive leadership, as well as awareness of their civic rights. The argument for greater entrepreneurship to kickstart fragile states by writers such as Ghani and Lockhart would require a number of different curriculum

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64 Bethke 2008. Leu (2004) also confirms the ineffectiveness of cascade or multiplier approaches to teacher in-service, but also finds that evidence on the cost and sustainability of school-based and cluster–based approaches is scarce.  
65 Wirak and Lexow 2008  
66 Davies, Harber and Schweisfurth 2005  
67 Nicolai 2007  
68 EFA 2008  
69 Aslam and Kingdon, 2008  
70 INEE 2008  
71 Freedman, Weinstein, Murphy and Longman 2008  
72 Robinson 2008; Columbia SIPA 2008
routes, but one would be the need for legal education. As was pointed out for Tajikistan, it is difficult for people to start their own business, not just in financial terms but in knowledge of administrative processes (licensing, taxation, export-import regulations etc), and legal literacy is needed. Capacity development for vocational school heads would also be required, with the argument to give them more independence to trace labour market needs and interests of students and develop a flexible curriculum policy.

c) Skills and capital

This leads to the direct question of capacity development in youth and vocational education. For fragile contexts, the conventional assumptions about investment in human capital helping economic development are often questioned. We know that education generally improves individual income and individual human capital through qualifications and accreditation for employment, but the evidence that national levels of education directly influence economic growth is much less solid and more disputed. Yet a focus on skills for employment appear to bring together the human capital aspect of skills together with social capital, both needed for state building. The World Development Report (2007) on youth notes the central importance of engaging (or re-engaging) with young people in fragile states and investing in ‘second chance’ opportunities. This would be because of the link to the economy and also to lack of economic opportunities. Collier argues that in post-conflict countries economic growth lowers risk of further conflict, and a likely route to this is through employment. His thesis is that rebellions are highly specialised in their recruitment, being dependent almost entirely upon young men, and therefore that if unskilled young men can be employed, they are less likely to be recruited into violence. He talks particularly of employment in the burgeoning post-conflict construction industry, rather than in the expensive and irreversible public sector or in military employment. Collier talks more of apprenticeships outside the formal sector rather than vocational education; but the FTI Progressive Framework also refers to engaging youth in educational processes that drive them away from gangs, recruitment into armed militia or anti-social behaviour (although not specifying what these processes might be).

While the thesis of a ‘youth bulge’ which links to conflict is contested, there is overall much emphasis on vocational education as meeting needs for relevance and alleviating frustration and unemployment. The conclusions from various studies are however that a) this must have labour market relevance and b) in spite of all efforts to fund and extol this, it has secondary status to ‘formal’ academic education. The capacity development implications are not just about training of vocational teachers, but about the creation of professional systems for TVET. In contexts such as the Gaza strip, employers’ capacities for human resource development (HRD) are cited as limited, and in Gaza, the TVET strategy was also hindered by the absence of efficient, professional and most importantly empowered bodies that could push the strategy forward. The ministries concerned, and other stakeholders, lacked the necessary will, and were unable to let go of any of the powers they had inherited – which kept the system fragmented.

In terms of social capital, the parallel to any focus on young men is of course a focus on young women. The OECD for example talk of ‘strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts’. A gender focus is very much part of any capacity development, in terms of who receives it (for example women teachers or leaders), and whether there is awareness of the links between fragility and discrimination and the need for voice of excluded or marginalised groups – which may include women and girls. A study of capacity

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73 Asiurov et al 2007
74 Barakat, Karpinska and Paulson, undated
75 Collier 2007
76 Urdal 2004. Urdal concludes that the youth bulge is explosive only in combination with economic stagnation.
77 ETF 2006
78 Asiurov et al (2007) for example report that in Tajikistan, the system of vocational education and training in its present condition is far from becoming a real tool for poverty reduction and socio-economic development by virtue of its present nature, content, approaches and quality.
79 ETF 2006
80 OECD 2007: 7
building in the Ministry of Education and Sports in Nepal state that ‘there is no significant constituency prepared to promote the view that women are as competent as their male colleagues are. Rather, women are viewed as lacking the qualities often associated with leadership’. Widespread social prejudice was reinforced by the self-interest of the male elite. The OECD talk of improving women’s wellbeing and economic opportunities, pointing out that women’s organisations often play key roles in maintaining services, in supporting social cohesion and in negotiating safe space between communities in conflict. While females may suffer more in emergencies, for example, women are often key to enabling children to return to school post-emergency. At the same time, issues such as early marriage, domestic violence, obstacles to educational opportunities and discriminatory family laws need to be addressed to enhance women’s contributions. It would appear that at least three sorts of capacity development are important here: capacity development for teachers on raising gender capacity development for those in women’s organisations in advocacy skills, and capacity development for those in government in how to work with non-formal organisations and groupings.

Another sector therefore which might be targeted in fragile contexts would be adult education and adult political literacy. With regard to political reform in fragile states, Chauvet and Collier hypothesise that this might be blocked by three impediments: the power of an elite who might lose; citizens who are so poorly informed that they would oppose it even though in reality they would benefit; and lack of capacity of the civil service. Whereas in post-conflict situations, it may be that citizens better appreciate responsible governance, or at least want change, and therefore lack of knowledge is less of a constraint, it could be argued that an informed public would be vital in real and lasting legitimacy of government. This implies adult education, as well as media education and the political education in schools discussed earlier.

As with the different dimensions in the previous section, in fragile contexts the key issue for choosing sectors is that there is little point in just tackling one. Civic education for example which provides citizens with evaluative skills to question government accomplishments has been found to have a negative effect on trust in government; simultaneous efforts to build the credibility of government need to take place. Vocational training without capacity development in TVET systems will not be sustainable. And corruption should ideally always be tackled at all levels.

4. Roles and positioning of donors

For development partners the parallel decisions to choice of dimensions and sectors are who to work with and how. The Paris Declaration of 2005 committed to the notion that countries should lead and donors support, an ‘endogenous process’ requiring country assessment and country ownership. However, the challenge is that of enabling ‘interruption’ of any vicious circles whereby ownership and capacity have become eroded. Questions are equally raised about whether capacity constraints may relate to donor practices, with government officials too busy managing donor requirements for procurement, reporting and monitoring to actually deliver. This section examines firstly some of the methodological responses by donors to date and then issues of partners.

4.1 Methodological responses by development partners

Methodologies for action can firstly be in terms of principles: the OECD/DAC ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ for example are:

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81 Bista and Carney 2001
82 OECD 2008, p6
83 Davies et al 2008
84 Chauvet and Collier 2005
85 Brattan and Alderfer 1999
86 OPM/IDL 2008
- Take context as the starting point
- Do no harm
- Focus on state-building as the central objective
- Prioritise prevention
- Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives
- Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
- Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
- Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
- Act fast….but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
- Avoid pockets of exclusion

It is claimed that in nine pilot countries, the Principles have started to catalyse behaviour change among donors, even in the most challenging contexts\(^{87}\). It would be a worthwhile exercise to take each of these principles and see its relation to capacity development in education. The principles of country assessment and country ownership could perhaps be added. An interesting briefing paper from Berry looking at the delivery of education aid in fragile states develops an analytic framework based on the three principles of ‘coordination’, ‘state building’ and ‘do no harm’. For state building, he concentrates on the systems for the payment and training of teachers, and the mechanisms for holding schools to account. The ‘do no harm’ principle is examined in the light of the need to have equitable access to education services and inclusive policies, which are crucial to long term efforts to build robust institutions in fragile states. The paper found that pilot projects for this can be successful at the local level, but that stakeholders need to work hard to get these pilot approaches integrated into government policy – especially if the state is using the education system for its own political or ideological ends. Curriculum content and access may be skewed to privilege one group (as was the case in Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Burundi). The paper raises the question, can the state be supported to promote equitable access to education services and to implement policies that tackle exclusion at school level?\(^{88}\) The example of Nepal is given, that successfully made progress towards EFA even in the midst of serious armed conflict between government forces and Maoists. Similarly, the recent study for UNICEF on educational vulnerability in South Asia\(^{89}\) included Nepal, and explored when groups vulnerable to educational loss (dalits, girls) should be targeted specifically (through scholarship programmes for example) and when the focus should be more on quality provision that reached all groups. The capacity development implications of ‘do no harm’ relate to these decisions and prioritising. Capacity development is not just about resources, but skill in where to allocate them, and for how long – particularly in compensatory programmes.

Secondly, is the delineation of the process of capacity development decision-making. The EFA-FTI approach is one of ‘steps’:

1. Setting the stage for participatory dialogue around a capacity development strategy
2. Understand and build on the country context for an effective education capacity development strategy (establishing base lines, analyzing the institutional context, embedding in broader reforms)
3. Conducting a capacity gap analysis
4. Designing the capacity development strategy (mobilizing resources, setting priorities, defining time-bound implementation)

\(^{87}\) OECD /DAC 2007
\(^{88}\) Berry 2007
\(^{89}\) Davies et al 2008
5. Defining a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the capacity development process (learning from experience and sharing lessons)\(^{90}\)

The major objective of this approach was to facilitate national strategy and enable capacity development to be agreed and implemented. Discussions around this may revolve around the assumption of a clear linear process, but also the notion of a ‘capacity gap’ (there may be excellent capacity, but in fragile states in particular it is used in directions which are counterproductive to social cohesion or equality).

Third is the analysis of the relevant ‘level’ of application (individual, organisational, institutional, political), as outlined in Section 2.1. In fact, capacity development builders have tended to focus on ‘deficits’ in resources, skills/knowledge and organisation than on politics, power and incentives\(^{91}\). This is because outsiders have access to resources, can provide training and technical assistance, can develop managerial systems and can support service delivery. National counterparts may also view capacity development as a technical issue which deals with training of individuals or strengthening organisations financially or managerially. Providing technical capacity development enables funders to meet performance targets.

A more focused entry point may therefore be ‘issues-based’. DFID has recognized that change tends to happen when broad alliances across civil society, often supported by media attention and the private sector, and linked into reform elements within government, coalesce around an issue of political importance. DFID is now taking this issues-based approach in Nigeria\(^{92}\). Taking an issue such as equity or peace, this can be traced through all levels or sectors, including teacher education and community development, potentially increasing country ownership. Similarly a broad security issue can also be tackled in the education sector, looking at human security (such as violence in schools) as well as economic security.

USAID in Guinea saw a key issue and barrier as governance, so the strategy is cross-sectoral, improving governance and strengthening civil society. In the education sector, this has included projects centred on civic development, supporting adult literacy programmes and the development of civic curriculum and teacher training, with the complementary aim of strengthening participation of women, marginalised groups and youth in governance processes. Similarly, as part of the governance goal to address corruption within education, this has focused on examination reform\(^{93}\).

The location of governance as an issue is also found in the broader typology of the USAID Education and Fragility Assessment tool\(^{94}\). The methodology here is around a set of questions that try to establish links between general and specific root causes of fragility and education. The tool identifies ten fragility patterns or domains of concern: Governance domain; Economic Domain; Security Domain; Social Domain; Corruption/Rent-seeking; Exclusion/Elitism/Factionalism; Insufficient Capacity; Transitional Dynamics; Organized Violence; and Public Disengagement. Within each of these, the tool uses the same five categories: access, quality, relevance, equity and management to look at the education-fragility nexus. The matrices and the questions enable identification of needs, and the capacity development relevant ones would cut across all domains, not just the ‘Insufficient Capacity’ one.

A particular response is to see crisis as not just a threat but an opportunity, linked to the notion of ‘building back better’. This is not just in physical reconstruction of schools, but in rethinking the content of that schooling. The study for UNICEF on risk reduction for vulnerable groups in education in South Asia proposed a three-way response in the supply of education: schools that are child seeking, child friendly and child enabling\(^{95}\). The capacity development needs would relate to all three; for schools to be ‘child-enabling’, for example, capacity development involves

\(^{90}\) EFA-FTI 2008
\(^{91}\) Brinkerhoff
\(^{92}\) OECD 2006
\(^{93}\) Brannelly and Nduruhtuse 2008
\(^{94}\) USAID 2006
\(^{95}\) Davies, Harber, Schweisfurth, Williams and Yamashita, 2008
teaching skills of conflict resolution and how to deal with controversial issues which would range from HIV and AIDS education to swimming lessons for Muslim girls. ‘Child enabling’ also addresses both human capital (e.g. skills for employment or self-employment) and social capital (participation in civil society, or skills to claim rights after, for example, industrial disaster).

Crisis also creates spaces for intervention: in Myanmar after the cyclone, UNICEF was able to create a ‘humanitarian space’ with the government, and the field office has been sustained. The presence of 130 national staff was important in this access.

Planning capacity development then can be informed by principles, by a step-wise approach, by an issues-based approach, by a needs assessment tool or by an opportunistic creation of space, or some combination of all of them.

4.2 Choices around donor alignment

All the above strategies or principles will hinge around the relationship with government. The strategic choice about the engagement of donors with the state is whether to help reform and rebuild, or to work in parallel with it, in the absence of a willing and capable state. Withdrawing support from the state can be a sanction and a signal of distancing. Other delivery models are possible, such as contracting out, INGO provision, co-production, community based approaches or market provision. The different types of ‘alignment’ with the state are detailed in Appendix 3 – whether systems, policy or shadow alignment. The aim with alignment is to match donor strategies, policies and budget planning with standards and procedures subscribed to by recipient governments. The intention is on the one hand to promote ‘ownership’ and on the other to support the effective implementation of measures provided.

For some countries (currently Zimbabwe and Myanmar) even shadow alignment may be questionable, and support for ‘change agents’ may be preferable (see next section). This is so if a government is actively denying the rights of some of its citizens, or the education system is deliberately designed to marginalise certain groups (e.g. Kosovar Albanians under Serbia). Here, capacity development might be less about building trust in government and more about building resistance to authoritarian and oppressive rule. Bethke discusses how in situations where government policies are against human rights or equal opportunities, short-term service delivery to provide children with opportunities becomes the over-riding imperative. However, the end is often to hope for greater alignment. There is a need to build in transition planning, with a sequencing that leads to the handback of functions. As WRWC report for Sudan, centuries of struggle for political dominance by remote governments, and even humanitarian interventions during its bloody civil war, have left Southern Sudan with a legacy of dependence on outside agencies for leadership and services. Today, some local leaders believe that many Southern Sudanese view schools as owned by UNICEF or NGOs rather than their communities. One official interviewed observed that in the collective memory of the Southern Sudanese “…any government in Southern Sudan has been a foreign government. The challenge we face is how to convince people that this is their government”. UNICEF’s Child-Friendly Community Initiative (CFCI) in Sudan has been very successful, and not created parallel structures, but the question is always how to scale up and hand back full responsibility to the public administration. CFCI is a rights-based approach, and this means that scaling up should increase the advocacy role played by this initiative.

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96 OECD/DAC 2004
97 Sommers and Buckland 2004
98 Bethke 2008
99 WCRWC 2007, p7
100 Moreno-Torres 2005
4.3 Working with different stakeholders

To support the state, the OECD\textsuperscript{101} stress the need to work with non-state actors in ways that reinforce the development of public sector capacity in the longer term. This can be where government is weak or corrupt and it makes more sense to support ‘change agents’. The World Bank and OECD/DAC have been arguing more and more openly for a policy of addressing representatives of civil society and reform-minded forces in government (e.g. technocrats open to change). These would include scientists, scholars and external actors who have a degree of independence, who would speak up for freedom of information and other civil rights, supporting parliamentarians, independent judges, journalists, union representatives and professional associations in their efforts to combat abuses of power. ‘The work of political foundations and academic exchange programmes can also contribute to qualifying such reform-oriented forces’.\textsuperscript{102} The FTI Progressive Framework talks of addressing exclusion and equity through civic engagement at different levels. They mention cases and education plans ranging from Uganda in Idi Amin’s regime to El Salvador following the end of civic hostilities, as well as the use of local school committees to assist in collective conflict resolution and local governance.\textsuperscript{103} GTZ cite elected popular representatives, political interest groups, the private sector and civil society as part of key decision-making and dialogue and accountability.\textsuperscript{104}

Yet sensitivities in identification of stakeholders with whom to take forward capacity development initiatives are common in fragile contexts. Firstly, this has to acknowledge the possibility of conflict within and between stakeholders which might be based on long-standing ethnic, religious or caste roots, and which are not simply about ‘opposition to change’ nor resolved by clarifying the roles of working groups. Education may have exacerbated divisions as well. Debiel points out that it is important to ensure that support of change agents serves to overcome cleavages, not deepen them. In predominantly Islamic countries, for instance, religious fundamentalist forces are often arrayed against secular forces. Would the press for rapid change damage social capital in the sense of mutual trust between individuals and social groups? In supporting democratically oriented forces it must be ensured that these forces are capable of bridging ideological divides.\textsuperscript{105} Cooperation rather than competition between elites is crucial, perhaps with external actors providing mediation forums and conflict resolution.

Support for non-state actors should also not just focus on the capital city or urban areas, as regional and local levels are integral elements of statehood, but unequal development between urban and rural areas may be part of fragility. Such support should also not exacerbate gender divides in power, as mentioned earlier.

Fragility in state legitimacy may also lead to problems of the legitimacy of particular NGOs. National conflict reduces the space for flexibility by linking local activities to the potent and polarizing discourses of the conflict and bringing NGOs under scrutiny. If these are overtly promoting peace-building, this may be threatening to government.\textsuperscript{106} In Sri Lanka, government has been very suspicious of NGOs as they were seen to be promoting a federal solution, and because some were going directly into schools with peacebuilding programmes interpreted as pro-Tamil.

Working directly with various teacher constituencies may be important. The ETA/FTI document cites the resistance of teacher unions to major deployment of teachers to rural areas, and the need to recognize legitimate motivational issues.\textsuperscript{107} The IIEP project on Ethics and Corruption in Education\textsuperscript{108} on the other hand has had some successful experiments on improving

\textsuperscript{101} OECD 2006
\textsuperscript{102} Debiel 2005, p10
\textsuperscript{103} FTI 2008
\textsuperscript{104} Zimmermann 2007
\textsuperscript{105} OECD /DAC 2003
\textsuperscript{106} Walton, 2008
\textsuperscript{107} EFA-FTI 2008
\textsuperscript{108} Hallak and Poisson 2005
transparency and accountability – for example, public expenditure tracking (PET), formula funding, teacher codes of conduct, and the regulation of private tutoring. For the reforming teacher management project in Bogota, the most important aspect was probably the ‘cleaning up’ of the list of employed teachers, and this meant involving as much as possible representatives of the teacher unions.

Collaborating to provide capacity development with those working directly in the non-formal sector can be a viable approach. In Sudan, the Sudanese Red Crescent and the NGO Accord have collaborated with the Child-Friendly Community Initiative in providing education on first aid and popular forestry management. Non-formal education would be the most appropriate for street children, cited as a growing phenomenon for example in Tajikistan, and long-standing elsewhere. Vocational training centres can be appropriate for ex-combatants to facilitate reintegration. Nicolai established in terms of Palestine, that when a formal system has broken down, non-formal education can be an important strategy in maintaining learning: during the first intifada ‘popular education’ was an attempt to make up for a collapsing education system, made possible through grassroots organisations, charitable societies and NGOs. Non-formal education was of course crucial in the ‘shadow system’ for Albanians in Kosovo under the Serbs. In these contexts, capacity development would possibly be achieved ‘on the job’, and would be original and valuable.

A more contentious issue would be providing capacity development for opposition groups and parties – part of the debate on the timing of a push towards democratisation, that is, whether a functioning state is needed before democratic reform, or whether efforts towards a democratic process, such as opposition parties and elections, would help build a functioning state. There can be considerable violence potential in democratisation processes, and strained states often lack conflict-negotiation institutions. As Debiel points out, civil society is not necessarily liberal in orientation, and may also be marked by intolerance and may polarise democratisation processes. ‘Ethnic entrepreneurs’ are capable of instrumentalising existing social cleavages to propagate and deepen nationalist ideologies. This might relate to a very current problem of working with opposition movements which have been providing services to under-served populations (e.g. in Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Sudan). Support would be especially difficult if designated a terrorist organisation: Nepal Maoists had established schools and curriculum, and are now in government, for example.

As always, such decisions on stakeholders can only be made a country level – to which we now turn.

5. Ways forward by development partners

5.1 Country level

The operational steps at country level begin with analysis in order to clarify the choices which have been discussed above, which then call for indicators of their achievement.

5.1.2 Analysis

The role of development partners would relate not just to the provision of capacity development but to assistance from a comparative perspective on analysis of fragility and on decisions on what can be done at particular points or in particular combinations to mitigate this and to build resilience. Analysis relates to the first of the OECD/DAC principles: ‘Understand the context’. Examples are illustrated in the table below. Not all boxes are complete, as these are illustrative only.

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109 Moreno-Torres 2005
110 Asiurov et al 2007
111 Nicolai 2007
This is of course not just a question of filling in the boxes, but seeing where attempts at change in one box will be jeopardised by a fragile characteristic in another – with corruption or endemic gender or caste discrimination being classic examples. Complementarity of interventions is needed, so that NGOs, donor, communities and government take on different aspects, but towards the same overall ‘turnaround’ or transition goal. Analysis will also have to be done with relevant stakeholders, as well as including consideration of possible divides and tensions between stakeholders discussed above. Brinkerhoff draws attention to one major difference in the environment of fragile states which affects capacity development decisions. In societies that have been fragmented by deteriorating or conflict conditions, people’s trust and tolerance levels tend to be lower and their suspicion levels are heightened. They are less willing to cooperate across societal groups and to give others ‘the benefit of the doubt’. Capacity development efforts that fail to yield quick results or that deliver benefits to one group and not another risk being seen as intentionally unfair or demonstrating favouritism

Analysis includes that of where interventions will build or compromise trust, and how to alleviate ‘trust gaps’.

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112 Sommers and Buckland recount how in Kosovo, international efforts in reform did not prioritise either building capacity or building trust. ‘The choice ultimately came between actions that intentionally pressured local leaders and more patient, and perhaps more painstaking, capacity-building work. In the end, trust was not built because trust was not sought’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragile characteristics</th>
<th>State/central capacity development</th>
<th>District/ community capacity development</th>
<th>Civil society/ NGOs capacity development</th>
<th>Capacity development for teachers/ curriculum developers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Weak state              | Policy planning  
Regulatory functions  
Working with donors  
Teacher compensation and motivation | Understandings of decentralisation  
Assignation of decision rights to appropriate level  
Political literacy in schools | Strengthening civil society organisations  
Adult literacy to enable participation | Teaching of political literacy |
| Lack of government legitimacy and/or public disengagement | Understandings of democratic governance  
Realistic target setting  
Developing equitable financing formulae | Demands for information flows on education spending and policy | Mechanisms for holding governments to account | Education for democracy  
Media education |
| Inter-group conflict or inequity | Education for ethnic harmony  
Conflict resolution  
Monitoring and evaluation of peace education | Civic education in schools and HE  
Child-friendly schools  
Training of disadvantaged or minority groups in school governance | | Civic education  
Controversial issues  
Conflict resolution |
| Violence and/or extremism | Education for human rights, non-violence  
M and E of peace  
Codes of conduct for teachers | Civic education  
Alternatives to corporal punishment  
Tackling gender violence | Education of police  
Children’s ombudsman | Human rights, critical thinking  
Non-violent discipline |
| Poverty and inequalities of wealth | Poverty Reduction Strategy  
Education for employment; market-driven programme planning | Child enabling schools  
Child-seeking schools | Planning vocational projects  
NFE for street children & child labourers | Vocational teacher training  
HIV and AIDS education |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Corruption                      | Examination reform  
Curriculum on corruption  
Training of ombudsmen etc |  |  | Corruption education |
| Lack of account-ability/trust   | Accounting systems.  
Report writing | Transparency in revenue mobilisation |  |  |
| Poor technical know-how         | Accounting, redistributive financial systems, | School-based accounting, computer use |  |  |
| Cultures of nepotism or hierarchy | Job descriptions & appointments  
Incentives  
Assertiveness training | Allocations of scholarships  
School-based ownership | Assertive-ess training, especially for women |  |
| Natural disaster                | Physical safety of schools, construction | Monitoring  
Child seeking schools |  |  |
| Volatile population             | Polices on education for refugees, migrants and IDPs | Child seeking schools |  | Refugee and IDP education |
5.1.1 Standards, indicators and monitoring mechanisms

An important part of capacity development for the education sector is the establishment of standards and indicators. This means the development of country-wide, localised and education specific indicators both of fragility and recovery, as well as indicators of success in relevant education programmes. For capacity development in education, this is a two way process: Capacity development in skills of developing indicators, and indicators of the success of capacity development. The Transitional Results Matrix principles promote the use of outcome indicators and monitorable targets, functioning as a management tool for strategic planning as well as an umbrella for donor coordination. Country level indicators could build on the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction, as has been advised for looking at education and livelihoods in Southern Sudan. There is a role therefore for international NGOs here. In fragile contexts, the establishment of norms for safe schools is also critical in terms of norms for school and classroom design, particularly in earthquake and flood areas. Everyone needs to be involved in health awareness, of the need for water and latrines. However, there also needs to be national level standards on safe schools in the sense of non-violent schools, with codes of conduct for teachers and the encouragement of students to draw up codes of conduct for themselves. The need for indicators of violence within education is sometimes ignored: an extensive proposal for internationally comparable indicators of violence, while excellent on the link between violence and human security, did not mention schools at all, focussing only on community, work and household.

There is a debate about priorities for data collection, monitoring and evaluation in fragile states, particularly in and post disaster, where the immediate provision of services is likely to be a higher priority. Clearly, data are desirable immediately after a crisis (whether natural or conflict) to identify who is out of school and what needs to be provided. UNICEF’s Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces (RALS) as part of their back-to-school campaign has been valuable in assessing school structures in contexts such as Southern Sudan, Northern Uganda and Afghanistan. However, expending energy on household surveys in a very volatile situation is of doubtful value, as who goes to school and who does not can change daily, in terms of the proximity of a learning centre, safety, the opportunity costs of returning to school and the availability of work.

Yet the processes of identifying key indicators, collecting and processing data and utilizing the findings to track progress is especially needed in fragile states where official sources of information are often limited. In terms of capacity development, the target for this work, according to the Progressive Framework, must be to build public and official capacity to regularly report on key indicators of education progress, including learning outcomes. In Darfur, it was reported that monitoring and evaluation of vocational training programmes was weak, and it was not known how existing programmes benefit youth in the medium to long term and whether vocational training programmes actually lead to employment and income generation. For Afghanistan, UNICEF was able to strengthen the monitoring capacities at provincial and district level, through workshops and joint monitoring exercises. There is a particular need to improve monitoring to identify drop-outs and non-functional teachers more consistently.

Above all, monitoring and reporting has to be seen not as a way of assigning blame for failure, but as a learning activity that allows innovation and experimentation with new paths. Feedback to citizens on progress towards the overall vision and subordinate goals (the annual ‘Report Card’) provides voice to legitimate interest groups – an essential part of building the sovereign state.

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113 Rose and Greeley 2006
114 WCRWC. 2007
115 INEE is developing Guidance Notes on School Construction
116 Diprose 2008
117 Davies, Harber, Schweisfurth, Williams and Yamashita, 2008
118 Robinson, 2008; Columbia SIPA 2008
119 Wirak and Lexow 2008
120 Ghani and Lockhart 2008
The revolution in information technology has to be mentioned here, and the possibilities for e-governance, even in impoverished states: in the Indian states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, individual citizens are able to follow their legal cases on-line, bypassing bureaucratic tendencies to withhold information. Karnataka has included education in e-government, enabling concerned citizens to monitor government action through collaborative auditing.

The state-building areas relating to trust and participation in government are less easy to monitor and establish indicators for than the human capital ones, and may benefit from assistance. The manual Learning to Live Together, cited earlier, related to monitoring and evaluation of such programmes and tackles the difficult issues in evaluation of outcomes, where any long-term impact on peace or stability is difficult to assess. But as the guide points out, the collaborative processes towards deciding indicators and targets can be as important as the actual monitoring.  

Key questions as well are who should do the monitoring. Capacity development in research methods would be implied; and also building a research culture. The emergencies literature gives interesting examples of children being involved in researching their community in an emergency, finding out who should be at school as well as encouraging them to attend. This is generally instigated and encouraged by NGOs rather than teachers (although there can be collaborative efforts in disaster risk reduction).

5.2 Regional level and regional cooperation

Disasters and emergencies do not respect national borders as refugees, rebel groups or humanitarian, natural and/or economic crises all spill over. Intergovernmental, UN, donors and INGOs are well placed to take a regional rather than national perspective when appropriate. This applies when thinking about education for cross-border families and migrants as well as child trafficking. As Ghani and Lockhart argue, failure to address the needs of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants has been a factor in the perpetuation of criminality and ongoing conflict; better mechanisms to provide integration and inclusion could thus have an immense payoff. And as Chauvez and Collier point out, the benefits of stemming negative spillover, which is a neglected but substantial cost of fragility, are an important justification for aid interventions. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, in examining sustainable capacity development, cite regional networks as important for peer learning and multi-stakeholder exchange to improve knowledge management and to create the exchange of good practices. Regional networks can help promote leadership and support advocacy efforts by promoting educational issues on the national policy agendas. They cite regional institutions and networks such as RED KIPUS, the teacher network of Latin America and the Caribbean, and ADEA, the Association for the Development of Education in Africa. These provide valuable regional forums for advocacy and policy dialogue, and share good practices on EFA and capacity development, training, academic studies and research. One could also add networks such as FAWE (The Forum for African Women in Education) which also engages in advocacy and research.

Training may need to take more than a national approach, with labour migration in search of work, as well as returnees. An issue with capacity development may be the need to accredit educational experiences and achievements of teachers as well as students across borders. Questions of certification and equivalence are crucial for refugees, as found for Liberian refugees in Cote d’Ivoire. Oh and van der Stouwe found International NGOs together with funding

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121 Sinclair et al 2008  
122 Save The Children 2007  
123 Ghani and Lockhart 2008  
124 Chauvet and Collier 2005  
125 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Dialogue 2007  
126 Davies, Harber, Schweisfurth, Yamashita and Williams (2008)  
127 Chelpi-den Hamer
agencies such as UNHCR had an important role to play in social inclusion in Burmese refugee camps on the Thai border, with local NGOs too close to the power structure in the camps.\footnote{Oh and van der Stouwe, 2008} This links to one rationale for regional approaches as that of apparent neutrality. In the Western Balkans, ETF has found a regional approach (towards the social inclusion of ethnic groups in education and training) to be beneficial, as it can depoliticise sensitive issues which would be difficult to address at the national level.

### 5.3 Global level

There is not normally much dispute about the need for donor cooperation. It is an obvious point that ideally agencies should not compete with each other, should not compete for staff, and should avoid taking people out of government and paying them more.\footnote{Bethke 2008} We need to establish whether there is anything specific about cooperation and international strategies which relate to capacity development in education.

A well-known global network is INEE, and the INEE Minimum Standards can be used to extract many implications for capacity development, for example in supervision of education staff, or participatory appraisal, or in drawing up of codes of conduct for teachers. Also, as Burde points out, many NGO reports remain hidden from the public, written as internal documents to be circulated within the agency and to potential donors. ‘The recent collaborative efforts of INEE have been helpful in making such information available more broadly; but some have advocated for grey literature to be made available through a public database.’\footnote{Burde, (2005)} Another international effort is in the production of manuals and guidelines on capacity development. While these should be generated or at least tested at country level (and the production of a manual is a concrete outcome in which people can participate as part of capacity development), their use can be more widely spread or adapted.\footnote{For example, the Education Action manual for Angolan heads, and the Gambian Professional Development manuals}

Save the Children mention the Inter-Agency Standing Committee ‘cluster’ approach approved at the end of 2006 as part of the humanitarian reform agenda – which was eventually extended to education as the Global Education Cluster. This is to ensure predictable sectoral leadership and accountability at the global level; strengthen mechanisms for system wide preparedness and enhanced technical capacity; and enhanced partnerships and agreed common standards. The cluster capacity building funds were to be used for activities such as national capacity building and documenting education responses in selected countries. However, the global cluster capacity building appear remains significantly underfunded, with only 27% of its requirements being met, through the contributions of four donors – Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden.\footnote{Save The Children 2008} The Education Cluster Update of January 2009 reports Education Clusters active in 22 countries, led by UNICEF and Save the Children, as well as the activities of the task team at global level on Capacity Building.

Bethke raises an interesting and relevant point about providing capacity development in terms of working with international organisations themselves. Country officials may lack confidence when confronted by requests from International Organisations, often unfamiliar with the jargon and frameworks of the international community. Ghani and Lockhart cite a civil society leader in Nepal who talked of how the Nepali leaders spent their time learning the languages of the aid system and the criteria of the moment, only to find them changing: ‘As soon as they have mastered them, and rewritten their documents, the approach changes, and the cycle begins all over again’.\footnote{Ghani and Lockhart 2008} Bethke suggests that one way to transfer languages is to focus on specific outcomes so that people learn by doing, being involved perhaps in a National Education Strategic Plan or annual operational plan.\footnote{Bethke 2008} There is also a cultural question: for example, the notion of...
‘risk’ as demanded in logframes is alien to a planning ideology which simply sets targets. In fragile contexts, it is seen as either impossible to predict the risk or there are so many it is not worth building into planning.

Ways forward might include a network of ‘experts’ on capacity development in education in fragile contexts, who have experienced some of the lessons and pitfalls. This could include national officials and people from diasporas, as the diasporas created by past outflows of human capital have been analysed as having a role to play in rebuilding or developing capacity in their native countries and communities. Reservations have been expressed earlier about the discourse of capacity development ‘experts’, and a more equitable name might be needed to capture the notion of capacity development as a relationship.

Finally is the use of globally agreed conditionalities and incentives. The Fast Track Initiative provides a global framework for the coordination of international inputs into the education sector, for those countries that have a satisfactory plan but are deemed under-funded. The Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) is designed to build planning capacity in advance of catalytic funding. Although the FTI does support some fragile states, it is generally oriented towards ‘good performers’. Berry asserts that the impact of FTI at country level in fragile states has not been systematically evaluated. A report in 2005 indicated that the FTI could add value in three areas: coordination of donor efforts, capacity building for the development of plans, and increased funding. However, significant changes would need to be made in its approach if it was to make a difference in fragile contexts where government systems cannot be used. Berry claims however that ‘there is little appetite amongst FTI partners for revisiting the indicative framework to orient it towards fragile states’ – which would go against the spirit of this paper. The EPDF could add value in terms of capacity building, but only if the rules are changed to allow proposals to be made by agencies other than the World Bank. FTI in deteriorating environments may mean that it is only possible to work at central level for safety and security reasons.

6. Conclusions

In fragile contexts, it has to be acknowledged that the results of capacity development in education are in themselves going to be fragile. Capacity development attempts need to survive and be resilient. From this paper, it would appear that the most sustainable are:

- Those that are begun by honest analyses of fragility across organisational, institutional and political dimensions. Capacity development is not neutral in terms of values and objectives (such as the political motivation for rights and equity within improved governance). At the very least the political dimension must be taken into account in capacity development planning; at best, capacity development attempts to improve the political or ‘enabling environment’. The work and planning with national and local stakeholders demands honesty and transparency in itself and not denial about institutional cultures, elite capture, gender disparities and ethnic relations. This analysis has to be done within the context of diverse donor agendas, for example the balance between security and development, and the degree to which alignment with the state which is seen as suitable.

- Those that are linked to targets of breaking cycles and severing intersections and amplifications of fragility, and hence restoring core state functions. This means that the more sustainable are those that tackle more than one dimension or sector and that seek cross-sector, multiplier influence (for example promoting democracy, or transparency or anti-corruption in both administration and educational curriculum, albeit building on local traditions of democracy and accountability where appropriate). This also means seeking

135 WCRWC, 2007. SKILLS for Southern Sudan recruits professionals from the diaspora for short-term job placements, mostly into government-level positions, to encourage them to return.
136 OECD 2006
137 Berry 2007 p6
138 Bethke 2008
complementarity of interventions as between NGOs, donors, communities and the government.

- Those that recognise that capacity development in education is social-psychological as well as political: Although capacity development is seen to be about ‘systems’ it is actually about people and their behaviour. People’s existing agendas for survival and status, individually and collectively, are key to finding entry points. Such analyses with stakeholders can be seen as part of capacity development itself. The changes that are to result from capacity development must have incentives for those receiving it.

- Those that target people who have themselves both the capacity and will to effect – or block – change. This may mean capacity development for educational elites, and/or it may mean people at the chalkface centrally and locally, as long as they have some power and autonomy. Capacity development cannot afford to be simple or piecemeal injections of technical knowhow, unless it can be thought that this small effort can have a multiplier or interrupting effect. In fragile contexts a focus on social capital and social cohesion will be at least as important as individual human capital and qualifications.

- Those that try to have interlinked criteria for success. Small-scale, innovative and experimental change efforts by such actors can be useful for investigating the possibilities for scaling up; but there should be an emphasis on indicators for achievement which are linked to the broader indicators related to state building as above. Important aid from development partners is not just in the provision of capacity development itself but in research and analysis, in identifying indicators, in monitoring and evaluation and providing legitimacy for radical curriculum and other change which will help state building.

### 6.1 Areas for action

- Capacity development for education in fragile situations must analyse and work within the specific constraints of the security and development needs of the social, economic and political context. The long term aim should be to rebuild the state and restore the functions of the state.

- Capacity development goes beyond the technical skills of individuals. In education, it should contribute to greater equity, cohesion and trust in the system.

- Planning, regulatory and accountability functions need to be strengthened within ministries of education and relevant local authorities. Issues such as workplace culture, nepotism, creative accounting and corruption should be tackled.

- Education personnel require capacity development so ensure greater and more equal participation in education. Where education is decentralised, then capacity development at all levels is necessary.

- Capacity development is also needed for those involved in youth employment policies and programmes, women’s groups and adult literacy as a means of strengthening civil society.

- Capacity development in the area of labour market analysis is essential to ensure the relevance of vocational education.

- Capacity development for teachers must include how to promote political literacy and media understanding as well as the capacity to deal with controversial issues. Teacher education in areas such as citizenship and legal education is needed.
Accurate situation analyses are needed, along with a description of how the education system is affected. Assistance in the generation of reliable indicators and standards for the monitoring and evaluation of education is required, as is support for coordination.

The creation of regional networks can support cross border topics such as the education of refugees and migrants as well as helping to address national issues in a less politically sensitive way.

A network of international experts on capacity development in fragile situations could be created, but care should be taken that such expertise builds on local cultural and political knowledge.

6.2 Areas for reflection

Which focus points, dimensions, actors, stakeholders and methodological responses should be considered? How can a research programme to study the impact of capacity development combinations be put into practice?

In what ways can the management of education institutions be improved? Should new regulatory bodies be created in this regard?

What could be the short and long term indicators of success in capacity development in education for state building?

Could cross-sectoral capacity development be more effective in tackling the issue than capacity development confined to the education sector? For example, in agriculture, employment, health/sanitation, justice or communication?

Capacity development is socio-psychological as well as political and systemic: there must be incentives for people to change behaviour. How can incentives for those on the receiving end of capacity development be ensured, including security and status?

Should the Fast Track Initiative be further extended to fragile states to support education planning? Ensuring ownership at national and local levels is essential, but whom?
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Appendix 1

Categories of ‘fragile state’

There have been a number of endeavours to identify the phase or ‘scenario’ of fragility. Debiel makes a distinction between fragile and failing states, with the latter ‘caught up in the vortex of state breakdown’. The term “fragile states” does not cover failed states whose public institutions have come close to total collapse and which are virtually unable to provide services. Barakat et al talk of a ‘continuum of severity’ moving from weak, fragile, failing, failed to collapsed. The OECD and DCD/DAC on the other hand use a typology which distinguishes ‘declining’ states (with arrested development or deterioration) and ‘stabilising’ states (in post-conflict transition and early recovery).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>Prolonged crisis or impasse; stagnation with low levels of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration</td>
<td>Declining levels of governance effectiveness leading to lower legitimacy,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rising risk of violence or collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict</td>
<td>Low levels of effectiveness, transitory legitimacy, recent violence,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>humanitarian crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early recovery</td>
<td>Gradual improvement; rising levels of effectiveness and legitimacy, declining international resource requirements, emergence from conflict or other crises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OECD 2008; DCD/DAC 2007

It is pointed out that transitions are in themselves fragile. Nearly 50% of countries that emerge from conflict revert to hostilities within 10 years. Bethke reminds us that it is often difficult to place a state in a specific category. She quotes the World Bank’s (2007) assertion that a definitive list of fragile states is impossible to draw up, that some countries have more fragile characteristics than others, and for many countries, fragile status is a phase. The Bank defines the set of countries exhibiting the most extensive fragile characteristics as low-income countries ranking among the lowest on the Country Policy and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA). These are ranked against 16 criteria in four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity and public sector management and institutions.

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139 Debiel, 2005, p5
140 Hanushek and Wößmann (2007); Willms, 2006; Barakat, Karpinka and Paulson, undated
141 Ghani and Lockhart 2008
142 Bethke 2008
## Appendix 2

### Main components of the fragile states agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus/emphasis and goals</th>
<th>Underlying assumptions and views on causality</th>
<th>Type of ‘external actors and approaches</th>
<th>Donors emphasising a particular component of the FS agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local peace, human security and basic needs</td>
<td>Politicisation of ethnic and religious divisions and of resource constraints causes conflict: conflict undermines development</td>
<td>Post-/conflict resolution specialists, peacekeeping agencies focusing on IDPs and refugees, security sector reform, DDR and development and humanitarian workers</td>
<td>DFID&lt;br&gt;UN peacekeeping&lt;br&gt;BMZ&lt;br&gt;EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development and good governance</td>
<td>State failure, collapse, weakness underperformance causes poor developmental outcomes and vice-versa&lt;br&gt;Differences in emphasis on:&lt;br&gt;- Economic/political development&lt;br&gt;- Governance as primary driver of economic growth&lt;br&gt;- Short-term humanitarian needs or longer-term development aims</td>
<td>Range of development and humanitarian professionals, donor agencies, including bilateral agencies, UN, IFIs, economic analysts, governance and human rights workers</td>
<td>DFID&lt;br&gt;AusAID&lt;br&gt;USAID&lt;br&gt;UNDP&lt;br&gt;IFIs&lt;br&gt;OECD -DAC&lt;br&gt;BMZ&lt;br&gt;Netherlands agencies&lt;br&gt;EC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global security</td>
<td>The poor quality of governance and the economy in some weak states generates organised crime (e.g. drug trade), terrorism, immigration and social cohesion concerns, WMD threats, etc.&lt;br&gt;Development and good governance in these countries are instrumental to reducing global security threats</td>
<td>Foreign policy/diplomacy, security and defence actors, police, anti-drug trafficking, money laundering, arms specialists</td>
<td>US (DoD, State Department and USAID)&lt;br&gt;UK (FCE and MoD&lt;br&gt;AusAID&lt;br&gt;UN Security Council&lt;br&gt;OECD&lt;br&gt;EC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3

Alignment

The notion of alignment relates to discussion of the ‘two-track problem’, whether to set up separate service delivery mechanisms to government, which have fundamentally different strategies, resource levels and timeframes. The dilemma is diminished when capacity development support is ‘aligned’ to government, in order to

- capitalise on existing sources of capacity, however small, to demonstrate coordination
- structure service provider contracts to create incentives for local capacity building
- develop linkages to community groups to build their capacity for oversight and make their voices heard.

Whether external actors align with government or not depends on the effectiveness of state institutions and their political legitimacy. Debiel contrasts four scenarios:

**Systems and policy alignment** (where the state is functioning reasonably well and legitimacy is more or less high). Budget support would be possible

**Systems alignment** (where governments lack legitimacy and where priorities between donors and governments differ) Budget support would not be considered, and sector programmes would involve strict conditionality and monitoring

**Policy alignment** (where institutions have disintegrated, but government have embarked on reforms supported by the population)

**Shadow alignment** (where institutional and political breakdown is far advanced, but DC measures design support measures to gear them as far as possible to existing budget classifications, planning cycles, reporting procedures etc, or to established administrative units.

Sources: Brinkerhoff (2008)
Debiel (2005)