

Phenomenology of Perception Table of Contents

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Preface: i / vii / vii

INTRODUCTION: The Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena

I. ‘Sensation’: 9 / 3 / 3

1. *As impression.* 9a / 3a / 3a
2. *As quality.* 10b / 4b / 5a
3. *As the immediate consequence of an excitation.* 12b / 6b / 7b
4. *What is sensing [le sentir]?* 17b / 10b / 11b

II. ‘Association’ and the ‘Projection of Memories’: 20 / 20 / 15

5. *If I have sensations, then all of experience is sensation.* 20a / 13a / 15a
6. *The segregation of the field.* 22b / 15b / 18b
7. *There is no “associative force.”* 25b / 17c / 20c
8. *There is no “projection of memories.”* 26b / 19b / 22b
9. *Empiricism and reflection.* 30b / 22c / 26b

III. ‘Attention’ and Judgment: 34 / 26 / 30

10. *Attention and the prejudice of the world in itself.* 34a / 26a / 30a
11. *Judgment and reflexive analysis.* 40b / 31b / 37a
12. *Reflexive analysis and phenomenological reflection.* 46b / 36b / 42b
13. *“Motivation.”* 56a / 45a / 53a

IV. The Phenomenal Field: 64 / 52 / 60

14. *The phenomenal field and science.* 64a / 52a / 60a
15. *Phenomena and “facts of consciousness.”* 69c / 57b / 66b
16. *Phenomenal field and transcendental philosophy.* 73b / 60b / 69b

PART ONE: The Body

17. *Experience and objective thought. The problem of the body.* 81a / 67a / 77a

I. The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology: 87 / 73 / 84

18. *Neural physiology itself goes beyond causal thought.* 87a / 73a / 84a
19. *The phenomenon of the phantom limb: physiological and psychological explanations equally insufficient.* 90b / 75b / 87b
20. *Existence between the “psychic” and the “physiological.”* 92b / 77c / 89c
21. *Ambiguity of the phantom limb.* 95b / 80b / 92b
22. *“Organic repression” and the body as innate complex.* 98b / 82b / 95b

II. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology: 106 / 90 / 103

23. *“Permanence” of one’s own body.* 106a / 90a / 103a
24. *“Double sensations.”* 109b / 93a / 106b
25. *The body as affective object.* 109c / 93b / 107b
26. *“Kinesthetic sensations.”* 110b / 93c / 107c
27. *Psychology necessarily leads back to the phenomena.* 110c / 94b / 108b

III. The Spatiality of One’s own Body [corps propre] and Motility: 114 / 98 / 112

28. *Spatiality of position and spatiality of situation: the corporeal schema.* 114a / 98a / 112a
29. *Analysis of motility according to the Schneider case of Gelb and Goldstein.* 119b / 103c / 117b
30. *“Concrete movement.”* 120b / 103c / 118b
31. *Orientation toward the possible, “abstract movement.”* 124b / 107a / 122b
32. *The motor project and motor intentionality. The “function of projection.”* 127b / 109b / 125b
33. *Impossible to understand these phenomena by causal explanation and by connecting them with visual deficiency, or by reflexive analysis and connecting them to the “symbolic function.”* 130b / 112b / 129b
34. *The existential ground of the “symbolic function” and the structure of the illness.* 145a / 124b / 143b
35. *Existential analysis of “perceptual disorders” and “intellectual disorders.”* 152b / 130c / 150c
36. *The “intentional arc.”* 155b / 133b / 154b
37. *The intentionality of the body.* 160b / 137b / 158b
38. *The body is not in space but inhabits space.* 162b / 139b / 161b
39. *Habit as motor acquisition of a new significance [signification].* 166b / 142b / 164b

IV. The Synthesis of One’s own Body: 173 / 148 / 171

40. *Spatiality and corporeity.* 173a / 148a / 171a
41. *The unity of the body and that of the work of art.* 174b / 149b / 172b
42. *Perceptual habit as acquisition of a world.* 177b / 151b / 175b

V. The Body as a Sexed Being: 180 / 154 / 178

43. *Sexuality is not a mix of “representations” and reflexes, but an intentionality. Being in a sexual situation.* 180a / 154a / 178a
44. *Psychoanalysis. An existential psychoanalysis is not a return to “spiritualism.”* 184b / 157b / 182b

45. *In what sense sexuality expresses existence: by realizing it.* 187b / 160b / 185b
 46. *The sexual “drama” is not reducible to the metaphysical “drama,” but sexuality is metaphysical. [Sexuality] cannot be “superceded” [“dépassée”].* 194b / 166b / 192b
 47. *Note on the existential interpretation of dialectical materialism.* 199b / 171b / 198b

VI. The Body as Expression and Speech: 203 / 174 / 202

48. *Empiricism and intellectualism in the theory of aphasia, equally insufficient.* 203a / 174a / 202a
 49. *Language has a meaning [sens].* 205b / 176b / 205b
 50. *[Language] does not presuppose thought but completes it.* 206b / 177b / 206b
 51. *Thought in words.* 209b / 179b / 209b
 52. *Thought is expression.* 211b / 181b / 211b
 53. *The understanding of gestures.* 215a / 184b / 214b
 54. *The linguistic gesture. There are neither natural signs nor purely conventional signs.* 217b / 186b / 216b
 55. *Transcendence in language.* 221b / 190a / 220b
 56. *Confirmation by the modern theory of aphasia.* 222b / 190b / 221b
 57. *The miracle of expression in language and in the world.* 230b / 197b / 229b
 58. *The body and Cartesian analysis.* 230c / 198b / 230b

PART TWO: The Perceived World

59. *The theory of the body is already a theory of perception.* 235a / 203a / 235a

I. Sensing [*Le Sentir*]: 240 / 207 / 240

60. *Which is the subject of perception?* 240a / 207a / 240a
 61. *Relations between sensing and conduct: quality as concretion of a mode of existence, sensing as coexistence.* 241b / 208b / 242b
 62. *Consciousness bogged down [engluée] in the sensible.* 246b / 212b / 246b
 63. *Generality and particularity of the “senses.” The senses are “fields.”* 249b / 215b / 250b
 64. *The plurality of the senses. How intellectualism goes beyond [dépasse] this plurality and how it is correct against empiricism. How reflexive analysis nevertheless remains abstract. The a priori and the empirical.* 251b / 217b / 252b
 65. *Each sense has its “world.”* 256b / 222b / 257b
 66. *The communication of the senses. Sensing “before” the senses. Synesthesias.* 260b / 225b / 261b
 67. *The senses distinct and indiscernible like monocular images in binocular vision. Unity of the senses through the body.* 266b / 230b / 267b
 68. *The body as general symbolics of the world.* 272b / 235b / 273b
 69. *Man is a sensorium commune. The perceptual synthesis is temporal.* 274b / 237b / 275b
 70. *To reflect is to recover the unreflected.* 278b / 241b / 280b

II. Space: 281 / 243 / 283

71. Is space a “form” of knowledge? 281a / 243a / 283a

A) The high and the low.

72. Orientation is not given with the “contents.” Not however constituted by the activity of mind (esprit). 282b / 244b / 284b

73. The spatial level, anchoring points and existential space. 287b / 248b / 289b

74. Being has meaning only through its orientation. 291b / 251b / 293b

B) Depth.

75. Depth and breadth. 294b / 254a / 297a

76. The alleged signs of depth are motives. Analysis of apparent size. 296b / 256b / 298b

77. The illusions are not constructions, the meaning of the perceived is motivated. 303b / 261b / 305b

78. Depth and the “transition synthesis.” 306b / 265b / 308b

79. [Depth] is a relation between myself and things. 307b / 266b / 310b

80. The same goes for height and breadth. 309b / 267b / 311b

C) Movement.

81. The thought of movement destroys movement. 309c / 267c / 311c

82. Description of movement by psychologists. 313a / 270b / 315b

83. But what does this description mean [veut dire]? The phenomenon of movement or movement before thematization. 315b / 272b / 317b

84. Movement and mobile object [mobile]. The “relativity” of movement. 320a / 276b / 322a

D) Lived space.

85. The experience of spatiality expresses our fixation in the world. 324b / 280a / 327b

86. The spatiality of night. Sexual space. Mythical space. 328a / 283b / 330b

87. Do these spaces presuppose geometrical space? They must be recognized as original. 333a / 287b / 335b

88. They are nevertheless constructed on a natural space. 337b / 291b / 340b

89. The ambiguity of consciousness. 340b / 294b / 343b

III. The Thing and the Natural World: 345 / 299 / 348

A) Perceptual constants.

90. Constancy of form and size. 345a / 299a / 348a

91. Constancy of color: the “modes of appearance” of color and lighting. 351b / 304b / 354b

92. Constancy of sounds, temperatures, weights. The constancy of tactile experiences and movement. 362b / 313b / 365b

B) The thing or the real.

93. The thing as norm of perception. Existential unity of the thing. The thing is not necessarily object. 366b / 317b / 370b

94. *The real as identity of all the givens [données] among themselves, as identity of givens and their meaning.* 372b / 322b / 375b
95. *The thing “before” man. The thing beyond anthropological predicates because I am in the world [au monde].* 376a / 325b / 379b

C) *The natural World.*

96. *The world as typic. As style. As individual. The world shows itself in profiles but is not posited by a synthesis of understanding. The transition synthesis.* 377b / 327b / 381b
97. *Reality and the incompleteness of the world: the world is open. The world as kernel of time.* 381b / 330b / 385b

D) *Counter-proof by the analysis of hallucination.*

98. *Hallucination incomprehensible for objective thought. Return to the hallucinatory phenomenon.* 385b / 334b / 389b
99. *The hallucinatory thing and the perceived thing.* 389b / 338b / 394b
100. *Both arise from a function deeper than knowledge. “Originary opinion.”* 393b / 341b / 398b

IV: Others [Autrui] and the Human World: 398 / 346 / 403

101. *Intertwining of natural time and historical time.* 398a / 346a / 403a
102. *How do personal acts sediment themselves? How is the other possible?* 399b / 347b / 405b
103. *Coexistence made possible by the discovery of perceptual consciousness.* 401b / 349b / 406b
104. *Coexistence of psychophysical subjects in a natural world and of men in a cultural world.* 406b / 353b / 411b
105. *But is there a coexistence of freedoms and I’s? Permanent truth of solipsism. Solipsism cannot be overcome “in God.”* 408b / 355b / 414b
106. *But solitude and communication are two faces of the same phenomenon. Absolute subject and engaged subject: birth. Communication suspended, not broken.* 412b / 359b / 418b
107. *The social not as object but as dimension of my being. The social event outside and inside.* 415b / 362a / 421b
108. *The problems of transcendence.* 417b / 363b / 423b
109. *The true transcendental is Ur-Sprung of the transcendentals.* 418b / 364b / 425b

PART THREE: Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World [L’Etre-au-Monde]

I. The Cogito: 423 / 369 / 429

110. *Eternalizing interpretation of the cogito.* 423a / 369a / 429a
111. *Consequences: impossibility of finitude and of the other.* 426b / 372b / 433b
112. *Return to the cogito. The cogito and perception.* 429b / 374b / 435b
113. *The cogito and affective intentionality.* 432b / 377b / 439b
114. *False or illusory feelings. Feeling as engagement.* 433b / 378b / 439c
115. *I know that I think because first of all I think.* 437b / 382a / 444b

116. *The cogito and the idea: the geometrical idea and perceptual consciousness.* 439b / 383b / 446b
117. *The idea and speech, the expressed in expression.* 445b / 388b / 451b
118. *The intemporal is the acquired.* 450b / 392b / 457b
119. *Evidence, like perception, is a fact. Apodictic evidence and historical evidence.* 452b / 395b / 459b
120. *Contra psychologism or skepticism. The dependent and indeclinable subject.* 456b / 398b / 464b
121. *Tacit cogito and spoken cogito.* 459b / 400b / 466b
122. *Consciousness does not constitute language but takes it up.* 461b / 402b / 468b
123. *The subject as project of the world, field, temporality, cohesion of a life.* 463b / 404b / 470b

II. Temporality: 469 / 410 / 476

124. *Time is not in the things.* 469a / 410a / 476a
125. *Nor in "states of consciousness."* 472b / 412b / 479b
126. *Ideality of time? Time is a relation of being.* 474b / 414b / 481b
127. *The "field of presence," the horizons of past and future.* 475b / 415b / 483b
128. *Operant intentionality.* 477b / 417b / 484b
129. *Cohesion of time by the very passage of time.* 479b / 419b / 486b
130. *Time as subject and the subject as time.* 481b / 421b / 489b
131. *Constituting time and eternity. Ultimate consciousness is presence to the world.* 483b / 422b / 491b
132. *Temporality as self-affection.* 485b / 424b / 493b
133. *Passivity and activity.* 488b / 426b / 496b
134. *The world as place of significations.* 489b / 428b / 497b
135. *Presence to the world.* 492b / 430b / 500b

III. Freedom: 496 / 434 / 504

136. *Total or nonexistent freedom.* 496a / 434a / 504a
137. *Then there would be neither action, nor choice, nor "doing."* 499b / 436c / 507b
138. *Who gives meaning to motives? Implicit evaluation of the sensible world.* 501b / 439b / 510b
139. *Sedimentation of being in the world.* 503b / 441b / 512b
140. *Evaluation of historical situations: class before consciousness of class. Intellectual project and existential project.* 505b / 442b / 514b
141. *The For Itself and the For Others, intersubjectivity.* 511b / 448b / 520b
142. *There is some meaning [sens] in history.* 512b / 448c / 521b
143. *The Ego and its halo of generality. The absolute flux is for itself a consciousness.* 513b / 450b / 523b
144. *I do not choose myself starting from nothing.* 515b / 452b / 525b
145. *Conditioned freedom.* 517b / 453b / 527b
146. *Provisional synthesis of the in-itself and the for-itself in presence. My signification is outside of me.* 519b / 455b / 528b