

## TIM CRANE'S CONFABULATIONS ON THE MIND

### CHAPTER 1: MIND

#### perspectives and points of view

One of the most salient differences between minded creatures (us) and non-minded creatures (daffodils) is that we have POVs, we see/understand/think about things from a certain perspective. The world seems to us a certain way. The fundamental question is what it is that we are thinking about when we do think about something. Having perspective isn't tantamount to having a mind, but it's a good starting point to defining intentionality.

#### perspectives and their objects

There are 2 features of a *perspective*: 1) *directedness*: a perspective is one that's ON things, intentional objects, and 2) *aspectual shape*: things are presented to us in a certain way. These are the two elements of intentionality. Brentano's/Crane's thesis is intentionalism: all mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. Any kind of mental activity, be it states or events or whatever, is subsumed under this thesis. By phenomena, Crane means phenomenal appearance, or how minds seem to those who have them.

#### intensionality and extensionality

A context is extensional if *substitution of co-referring terms* (from "a" and "a=b" infer "b") and *existential generalization* (from "a" infer "there exists x such that...") apply. Intensional context is where one or both of these aren't truth-preserving, like "Bike helmets provide safety" and "Hallett believes he should wear a bike helmet to school" does not entail "Hallett believes wearing a bike helmet provides safety", because it involves belief of a subject. Whether an intensional context is T/F depends on the way the extension is conceived.

#### directness and intentional objects

Directedness is the idea that mental events are directed upon something, i.e., intentional objects. Crane defines an intentional object in a *schematic* rather than *substantial* sense - an intentional object is that which the mind is directed on when in an intentional state. Intentional object of thought is the answer to "what are you thinking about?" This is schematic in the same sense that the object of a sentence is schematic - it plays a certain role in the sentence. This is a preferable conception of intentional object than a substantial conception, which is a metaphysical theory that there are kinds of objects that have certain kinds of nature. If we were to use this conception, we'd have to define intentional objects as being of a certain kind. This is problematic because intentional objects can be states, events, ideas, ordinary objects (people, physical items, etc), things that don't exist, properties, indeterminate entities, etc... Instead, we conclude that intentional objects have no nature of their own. They just play a role in the schema/structure of intentionality.

#### aspectual shape and intentional content

Aspectual shape = in any intentional state, the objects on which the mind is directed are presented in a certain way. Similar to Frege's sense, which is the way one thinks about a reference (however, reference not directly transliterable to intentional object, so the analogy only goes so far). Aspectual shape implies that there is no such thing as a "bare" representation of an intentional object, thought it is possible to report on an intentional state without capturing aspectual shape ("Oedipus wanted to marry his mother" is still true even if he wouldn't have put it that way himself). This doesn't mean that there are two kinds of intentional state or directedness, but rather that there are two ways of reporting/ascribing intentional states (intentional way, which takes into account Oedipus' POV, and extensional). The link between intentionality and intensionality is that *when ascriptions of mental states are intensional, that is an expression of their intentionality*. Lack of existential generalization = we can think of non-existent objects; lack of substitution of co-referring terms = having aspectual shape.

#### problem of intentionality

Crane asserts that we can have intentional states (like thinking) about things that don't exist by saying that some intentional objects do not exist. The problem of intentionality is that we have the three following assertions in logical tension: (1) All thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. (2) The existence of a relation entails the existence of its relata. (3) Some thoughts are about things that don't exist. (2) - since the *relation* exists, then what it relates must exist too. This is taken to be obvious. Crane's solution is to deny (1). (3) isn't up for dispute because we obviously think about things that don't exist. We could deny (2) by saying that relations uphold the realness of their relata, rather than their existence; i.e., real != existing, some objects exist and some don't but all are real. But when we try to reason further about what differentiates the existent from the non-existent, it seems that we associate existent with real. Crane's conception of non-existent is that of an empty referent. When we talk about Pegasus and Zeus, we're referring to *nothingness*. But still, thoughts about Pegasus are different from thoughts about Harry Potter! Intentional objects as defined schematically resolve this tension, since intentional objects are simply what our thought is about. Relations must relate real things, but intentional objects aren't real/existent because they aren't "things." *So not all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about*. *Externalism* is the idea that intentional states are *broad* (there ARE thoughts that involve relations between thinkers and real things; if a mental state S is broad, then the existence of S entails the existence of its object). *Internalism* is the idea that intentional states are *narrow* (existence of thought does not entail the existence of its object, so we can think "that apple looks tasty" without there actually being an apple in front of us).

#### structure of intentionality

Crane's thesis: All mental phenomena have intentionality; have intentional object (what are you thinking about?) and intentional content (what are you thinking?). Intentional content is the way an intentional object is presented, so content is related to aspectual shape while object is related to directedness. Giving the content of your intentional state is sufficient for describing the intentional state because it involves relating the object in a certain way - but objects are not redundant, because there can be many ways of thinking about the same object. We can be thinking about Eric Blair and George Orwell, both of which involve thinking about the 1984 author in slightly different ways. [Crane rejects the view that all content must be propositional (i.e., that all intentional modes are *propositional attitudes*, which have *propositional content*), because propositional content involves a proposition, which can be evaluated as true or false. Defends this later on due to object-directed states such as love/hate.] Content does not entirely *individuate* intentional state. Need both aspectual shape and directedness. The structure of intentionality is thus: *subject --- intentional mode --- intentional content*. *Intentional mode* = relations you stand in to the content of your intentional states (ex: belief, hope, perception, love, fear, etc). So *intentional state* is individuated by *intentional mode and intentional content*, and intentional content fixes *intentional object*. So intentional object is co-opted into content. Intuitively, we can think of it this way: there is a sense in which we can say that we're thinking about nothing in that if we're thinking about something like Harry Potter, what we're thinking about points to an empty referent in the world. But we can't say that we're thinking nothing.

### CHAPTER 2: BODY

#### interaction between body and mind

Dualism is the idea that minds and bodies are separate entities that causally interact. Cartesian dualism is *substance* dualism.

#### substance, property, event

A *substance* has *properties* and persists through time despite changes in its properties and is capable of *independent existence*; properties inhere in a substance. Substance dualism says that the mental and physical are composed of different substances. Spinoza: God is the only substance because is the only thing capable of independent existence, mental/physical things are dependent upon God (substance monism). Descartes: mind and body are joined together but *could* exist separately, i.e., could be disembodied. Through by substance he doesn't really mean that minds are made of some kind of "stuff," since in his view minds are not divisible. *Property dualism* says that mental/physical properties are of one substance, but differ from each other - so a human is of one substance but has mental and physical properties. A *particular* is something that exists in one place at one time, an unrepeatable singular entity. *Events* take time, are unrepeatable, dated, and have temporal parts. *States* are constituted by some particular having a property at a time. Mental events are *particulars*, so can have properties but don't consist in being an instantiation of those properties. Objects do not have temporal parts. Crane assumes the existence of properties. *Important question*: can any kind of dualism explain causal interaction?

#### intelligibility of mental causation

Two accounts of causation: *counterfactual* (A causing B = If A had not existed, then B would not have existed), and *properties have causes*: certain properties of cause something to happen (ex: brick hitting a window; brick's properties of having certain mass and velocity are what cause it to break the window). We have no real problems with these accounts, so the problem of mental causation either derives from the physical or the mental. Fodor: non-physical things aren't located in space, and if a non-physical thing is to have causal efficacy, its occurrence must have preceded/occurred at the same time as the occurrence of what it caused. But how can it be temporally located if it's not spatially located? However, a substance is defined as something that can have independent existence, which doesn't mean it can't exist in space, so maybe humans are a mixture of physical/non-physical, where both just coincide in the same space (the space your body takes up). Two physical things can't occupy the same place in space, but perhaps a physical and non-physical can...so basically Fodor's point is invalidated. Another point against substance dualism is the principle of the completeness of physics (causal closure). Which we will see!

#### physicalism

Monism: the world is of one substance (materialism=everything in world is made of matter). Physics, however, admits of matter, forces, waves, etc - lots of different kinds of "substances." Physicalism abides by two principles: (1) *The generality of physics*: all objects and events in space-time have physical properties and are governed by the laws of physics. (2) *The completeness of physics*: Every physical event is determined, or has its chance determined, by purely physical causes in accordance with physical laws. This doesn't mean that physics can explain everything, since there may be things outside the physical domain. But everything inside the physical domain is governed by physical laws (physics is causally closed). This doesn't imply determinism because things can still happen with a certain probability, but whether or not they happen is determined physically. Physicalism cannot deny (2) because this would amount to saying that some physical events can be brought about by non-physical means, which also amounts to saying that physics no longer has the unique epistemological/ontological authority that physicists (?) so cherish, so (2) is a necessary component of any physicalist view.

#### problem of mental causation for dualists

Dualism denies epiphenomenalism, so some form of mental causation must be necessary! There is a tension between the following claims: (1) Mental phenomena have effects in the world. (2) Completeness of physics - all physical events have a necessary and sufficient physical cause, and (3) No causal overdetermination, i.e., mental and physical causes do not overdetermine their physical effects. An example of overdetermination would be to attribute the cause of someone's death to two assassins, when each assassin's shot would have killed the person had the other assassin not shot. Death is overdetermined. A counterfactual analysis of causation also does not admit to overdetermination. Problem of mental causation for dualism = how to reconcile mental events being able to have causality given (2) and (3)? *Identity theory* solves this problem; would make mental and physical event the same cause of an effect, so there would be no overdetermination.

#### identity theory

*Functionalism*: mental phenom. individuated by causal roles they play, so since the nature of a mental phenom is to play role, there can't be epiphenomena, so need to invoke identity theory to avoid completeness/overdetermination. *Token identity*: identity theory about mental and physical events (particulars). *Type identity*: identity theory about mental/physical properties-based on "properties have causes" view of causation (Crane's sympathetic with this view, so will focus on this). Identity theory says that mental properties are identical to physical properties -- this doesn't deny the existence of mental properties (this would be *eliminative physicalism*-denies that any physical things are mental, there is nothing to reduce), denies the idea of a separate mental substance. Identity theory is a reductive theory (reduction != elimination).

#### reductionism

A reduction: start off with target X, and find a reason for identifying X with Y. This works when doing this reduction tells us something *new* about X (that it is Y), makes X more

comprehensible or intelligible by showing that it is in fact the same thing as the 'reducing phenomenon'. Reduction claims are identity claims.

#### anti-reductionism

Based on Hilary Putnam's *multiple realizability argument*. If any two creatures are in the same mental state, must be in the same physical state, so if we can find one psychological predicate that is shared between two creatures that have different physical correlates, the identity theory collapses. Suggests instead that rather than having identity relations, mental states are *realized* by physical-neural substrates, which can vary from creature to creature. *Possible response*: identities could be relevant to a species. But if we take a functionalist assessment of this, "pain" is defined by the causal role it plays, and if this role is the same across creatures that have different physical realizers, then identity is invalidated again. Crane accepts Putnam's argument, so rejects identity, which means is committed to (some form of) dualism. However, says that *property dualism* is consistent with *non-reductive physicalism* (basically *role functionalism*): 1) *supervenience* (A supervenes on B when there is no difference in A without a difference in B -- so looser than an identity claim) -- mental supervenes on physical, 2) acceptance of completeness of physics, and 3) *causal efficacy of mental*: mental needs to be able to cause things to happen (so as to avoid epiphenomenalism, since mental could still supervene on physical without actually having causality). This would require an *explanatory reduction*: if supervenient were shown to be a consequence of some other physicalist relation between mind and body. (One example of a potential supervenience relation would be constitution -- ex: a statue is constituted by marble, so there can be no change in the statue without a change in the marble, but if you took away the marble, you would take away the statue, so this is a closer dependence relation).

#### problem of mental causation for non-reductive physicalism

Problem so far: how can mental phenomena have causation if we accept completeness of physics and no causal overdetermination? Identity theory solves this (token-events are identical, type-properties are identical). Non-reductive physicalism denies identity. How can NRP deal with the claims in tension? Must accept completeness, since it's a form of physicalism. Two strategies: 1) deny there's a conflict by saying that what matters is the kind of explanation you give of events (ex: can describe cause of hitting a ball in terms of physics laws or in terms of desire of hitter to hit the ball). But this is irrelevant because the problem is how can mental events have causation, not the merit of an explanation of events. 2) Add another claim: the supervenience thesis: physical necessitates the mental because given the way things actually are physically, the mental facts could not be otherwise. More specifically, given counterfactual conception of causation, we have: mental cause M causes physical effect E if E wouldn't be there if M hadn't been there. P=physical cause=M's supervenience base (M supervenes on P; i.e., if M hadn't been there, P wouldn't have been there). P causally determines E and metaphysically determines M. So if M hadn't been there, E wouldn't be there, because if M weren't there, P wouldn't be there. *Problem*: rules out possibility of zombies (since mental events are necessary for physical events).

#### emergence/emergerism: Crane's solution

Crane has so far rejected non-reductive physicalism (zombies) and identity (multiple realizability). So how to deal with tension between (1), (2), (3)? Basically the only option is to deny completeness of physics (2). Approaches: *Monism/downward causation*: Denies (2). This doesn't commit us to substance dualism, because could still be a substance monist and just say that all substances are physical but not all physical effects have physical cause, mental events could have causality (would be physical, but have mental properties of some sort). Called downward causation because saying that higher-order mental events cause lower-order physical events. We can understand DW causation in terms of *configurational forces*: forces that can only be exemplified by matter which has a certain complexity. This doesn't oppose itself to traditional physics, because classical mechanics doesn't offer an explanation of how/why motion is produced, for example - motion just has to conform to laws, and can still be acted upon by other configurational forces. This is similar to *emergentism*: mental properties are emergent properties (emerge from properties of matter that have a sufficient degree of complexity), and can't be predicted from knowledge of parts. This enables mental properties to be distinct from physical properties and have their own causal efficacy. *How emergentism denies (2)*: These counterfactuals are true: (M) If I had not had a headache, then I would not have gotten aspirin. (P) If I had not had brain state B, I would not have gotten aspirin. Use possible-worlds theory of counterfactuals: (M\*) In the closest possible worlds where I did not have a headache, I did not get aspirin. (P\*) In the closest possible world where I did not have brain state B, I didn't go get aspirin. Not clear that (P\*) is true -- different brain states could realize a headache. B may be sufficient for *action*, but M should be regarded as *cause*. If there is a world in which we have slightly different brain state but still get aspirin because have a headache, and this world is *closer* than world in which had same brain state but didn't get aspirin, then mental event is more of a cause than B! *Difference between non-reductive physicalism and emergentism*: both believe in a supervenience relation, but NRP believes this relation must be explained, whereas emergentism holds that the reduction is an empirical question; we don't have to bother trying to investigate it philosophically.

#### physicalism as the source of the mind-body problem

Physicalism might be the source of the problem rather than the solution because omits certain facts - knowledge argument says Mary gains a new fact about colour red when she emerges from the monochromatic room. Basically physicalism misses out on certain facets of mentality.

#### Summary

Potential solutions to causal role of mind: 1) identity, 2) non-reductive physicalism, and 3) emergentism (Crane's view). However, committing to one of these doesn't necessarily answer what kind of physical/non-physical or emergent properties these would entail and what their features are => saying that the mind is physical or not doesn't answer what kind of physical thing it is or isn't.

### CHAPTER 3: CONSCIOUSNESS

#### conscious and unconscious

If intentionality is really the mark of the mental, needs to give an explanation of consciousness! Intentionalism says that all conscious states are intentional. Ned Block: *phenomenal consciousness* = experience; what it's like to be in that state. some states are clearly intentional (desire - you desire something). *access consciousness*: if states are poised for reasoning and direct use in other cognitive modules (like verbal reporting, etc) -- propositional attitudes. By this definition, access consciousness is intentional since prop. attitudes are intentional (duh). HOT = Higher-order thought = state is conscious when it is the object of a HOT (when it is being thought about). So this would also qualify it for intentionalism, by definition (being about something). *Salient question*: are there non-intentional states that are p-conscious?

#### distinction between intentional and qualitative

Not all intentional content is propositional, so not all ground is covered. *Qualitative states (Kim)*: states that feel/look/appear a certain way, have a distinctive feel; basically equivalent to qualia. Kim+others classify perceptual experiences as phenomenal since there is something it is like to feel/experience something sensory. But perceptual experiences can also have propositional content. But some propositional attitudes are unconscious, so now have to distinguish between non-conscious and conscious qualitative states. *Qualitative (Crane)*: mental states whose conscious character is either sensory or like that of bodily sensations. *Phenomenal (Crane/Block)*: intentional or non-intentional states for which there is something it is like to be in them. Broad notion: conscious thoughts, perceptions, sensations, emotions, etc. all have phenomenal character. Phenomenal character of a state of mind is its conscious character.

#### qualia

Crane's definition of qualia = non-intentional conscious properties whose instantiation (partly?) explains phenomenal character of qualitative states (i.e., don't have intentional structure). *Weak intentionalism*: all mental states have some intentionality, but some of those states have qualia-properties. *Strong intentionalism*: denies that qualia are properties of mental states (higher order properties; properties of mental states, not properties of the subject). So must show that what we take to be qualia are actually intentional properties of mental states.

#### intentionality of bodily sensation

*Pain-state*: state of being in pain; *pain-object*: object related to the subject when the subject feels pain. Searle: says that pain isn't intentional because pain doesn't represent anything beyond itself. But being in pain can mean three things: 1) *awareness* of being in pain (in which case is intentional because HOT). 2) If being aware of pain means being aware of pain-object, then even if pain-object isn't intentional, the mental state is intentional. 3) being in pain might simply mean *being in pain*. Crane's view on intentionality of sensation: intentional and other sensations feel like they're located in a certain part of the body. Non-intentionalist might say that "felt" location involves sensation (qualia) and belief that sensation is located somewhere, so location is content of *belief*, not sensation, so sensation isn't intentional. But Crane counters that belief is revisable and different from having a feeling => even if believed that pain was all in your head, you would still feel it in your knee (ex: phantom limbs). Pain is a form of awareness, so we can derive an intentional structure: intentional object = answer to what your mind is directed on when in pain (like ankle/location). aspectual shape = transitive form of awareness, going from not being in pain to becoming aware of pain. Phantom limbs + not knowing where your liver is but feeling like your liver hurts shows that we must have aspectual shape. Intentional mode = way of feeling one's ankle (might be through proprioceptive feedback). Intentional content = content of the feeling (that one's ankle hurts; might be "my ankle hurts"). Why not use pain-objects? They have nebulous characterization. For example: (1) The pain is in my hand. (2) My hand is in my pocket. (3) Therefore: the pain is in my pocket. If pain were objects, nothing would be wrong with this. A better notion is to have intentional object of pain state, rather than a pain-object. Could be problem with usage of "in": Hole is in my trousers, trousers are in my laundry, therefore the hole is in my laundry. The first "in" makes hole ontologically dependent on trousers, whereas the second "in" just refers to location. But this doesn't apply to (1)-(3) because phantom limbs, for example, don't have to ontologically/necessarily depend on an actual hand. Instead, pain state is *intentionally individuated* by the hand. So the root of the problem is that (1)'s "in" makes hand intentionally individuate pain, while (2)'s in is just for location. Intentional individuation is not *relational*, so the hand doesn't need to exist - the awareness needs to exist. (For a pain to be IN a body part means that the body part intentionally individuates the pain!!!) So you can get away with saying there are no pain objects.

#### strong intentionalism and weak intentionalism

w/r/t pain => *weak* says that pain is an intentional state with additional qualia that contribute to how pain feels, where qualia are *properties*. But intentionality and qualitative character of pain don't seem separable => when have ankle pain, it's not like there's intentional awareness of ankle AND of pain, seems to be an awareness of one thing, of it hurting. *strong* says that phenomenal characteristic consists entirely in the state's intentionality (so no qualia). *Tye's representationalism*: pain = representation of damage to the body (conscious states are representations). But "damage" is limiting and specific. *strong* says that consciousness is fixed in intentional mode and content, so have to find these. *Perceptual theory*: consciousness is in intentional mode and content (phenomenal content is also fixed by mode + content). How does this account for fact that pain seems like property of body? Hurting has relationship with the subject - when we are in pain, we hurt, but we don't just hurt, what is causing the pain is hurting us. So becoming aware of pain = becoming aware that something is hurting us - this is an intentional mode because there is a relation between subject and pain ('hurting oneself' rather than just hurting, hence the perception of location). Phantom limbs show that relation must be one between subject and content, not object. Furthermore, even if you said that intentional object were *cause* of pain, cause could be something you're unaware of, so this would break intentional relationship held together by awareness of content. Perceptual theory tries to capture how things seem. Novel because locates phenom. character of state partly in *intentional mode*.

#### physicalism, consciousness, and qualia

Can physicalism give an account of consciousness? If Crane's view is correct, could physicalism have an easier time at it since don't have to explain qualia? Not really, because no qualia doesn't make it any less problematic, and would still have to explain intentionality. The real problem of consciousness remains. Physicalism can't seem to account for what we *know* when we know what it's like to be in a conscious state. Still need to deal with zombie argument (physically identical, no phenom. consciousness), knowledge argument (we can know what it's like to be in a phenom. conscious state), explanatory gap (need to explain gap between brain and phenom. consciousness). Intentionalism can't really help with physicalism's battle with qualia because intentionality dismisses qualia

#### explanatory gap

Crane doesn't agree that explanatory gap is a good refutation of physicalism, because explanatory gap tasks physicalism with providing an explanation. This argument assumes 3 things: 1) physicalism entails that physics must be explanatorily adequate, 2) explanation must be deductive, and 3) zombies are metaphysically possible. The first two are strong claims and Crane doesn't think physicalism has to answer to them. Third is just the zombie argument.

#### knowledge argument

(1) Mary knows all physical facts about seeing red without having ever seen red. (2) Mary comes to know something new when she sees red for the first time. (3) Therefore not all facts are physical. Meaning of *physical fact*: physical meaning anything that can be stated; fact meaning object of propositional knowledge (X knows that p). (Problem of meaning of physical is that would target emergentism too, since emergentism doesn't tell you how to "learn" the fact of seeing red.) *Challenges to knowledge argument*: 1) *Ability Hypothesis*: indicts validity of argument, saying that "know" is used incorrectly. Mary doesn't come to know a new fact, she comes to learn a new ability. This presupposes that a) knowledge-how and propositional knowledge aren't the same and can't reduce one to the other, and b) when gain an ability, don't gain propositional knowledge. Crane argues that ability-knowledge can involve propositional knowledge. Plus could express your knowledge "red looks like this," which is propositional given a context (could have been false given a context in which red doesn't look "this." So *argument is valid. But what about premises?*) 2) *New Presentation*: Physicalism doesn't want to deny first premise, since don't want to say that there are physical facts that can't be known. So challenge 2nd => Mary doesn't learn a new fact, a fact she already knows is presented to her in a new way. From a Fregean perspective, this amounts to saying that reference is the same, but sense is different - but would just be learning a new sense, so you are learning something new! However, Crane still doesn't accept knowledge argument as rejection of physicalism because physicalism doesn't have to be a thesis about knowledge: physics doesn't need to state all the facts. In fact, there are pieces of knowledge that can only be known from certain perspectives, like knowing "I am here!" while pointing at a map. So as long as there is way of acquiring knowledge through new POV's, doesn't have to reject physicalism.

#### zombies

Zombie argument: (1) zombies are conceivable (2) if zombies are conceivable, they are metaphysically possible (3) if zombies are metaphysically possible, physicalism is false. (4) therefore physicalism is false. Valid argument. Could attack premise (2): could be situations which are conceivable but not truly possible - could conceive of a situation in which water is not H<sub>2</sub>O, actually has some other chemical structure. But this is different -- you're conceiving of something that only *seems* like water but isn't. But we can't imagine zombie that only *seems* like it's not in pain, because what we're conceiving of is a zombie that *cannot be in pain*. So Crane rejects physicalism due to 1) problems of mental causation and 2) zombie argument!

#### prospects for explaining consciousness

Emergentism is the solution! Suggests a *lawlike* connection between consciousness and the brain where consciousness supervenes upon the physical state of the brain. Supervenience is contingent: mental is distinct from physical but supervenes nomologically on it (in a law like way). Alternative to this is that consciousness metaphysically supervenes on physical, but this has to be rejected if believe in zombie argument.

### CHAPTER 4: THOUGHTS

#### thoughts and beliefs

thoughts can be acts or intentional content. rejects PAT (believes that not all intentional states are propositional attitudes). Furthermore, not all thoughts involve the same intentional mode - there are different ways of thinking, such as wondering, obsessing, reminiscing, etc. *thought=mental event/act*; *belief=mental state* (a disposition). Crane believes that there is no such thing as a conscious belief -- beliefs have form "believe that p", where p can be evaluated as true or false. Belief is a commitment to a certain state of affairs in the world. an *assertion* is the linguistic expression of a belief. We would never make an assertion "I believe that p, but not p" (*Moore's paradox*) even if we might hold beliefs that are false. This isn't the case with other attitudes - "I want p, but not p" is fine. Beliefs have *actual and potential consequences* - they don't have direct consequences, but if coupled with another mental state like desire, they have a consequence (if you have the belief that it is raining AND you desire to jump in puddles, you will try to go puddle jumping). People acting on beliefs and desires resists functionalist characterization, since functionalism typically either gives reductive definition or sees mind as causal mechanism (with causal/functional roles). Not all your beliefs must be conscious - even if you are to act on them - so there is a difference between *dispositional* (non-conscious) and *occurrent* (conscious) beliefs

#### consciousness and belief

Crane: no such thing as *consciously believing* - instead, we become conscious of our beliefs (as opposed to worrying, where we can consciously be actively worrying about our finances, but also not be consciously worrying about them but our actions indicate that we have financial woes). This means that there's no phenomenology associated with belief - since belief is unconscious (so belief doesn't seem a certain way at all) or when it's conscious we become aware of it, and that involves the qualitative character of awareness rather than belief. Similarly rejects phenomenology of desire because its qualitative character is irrelevant to individuation. Being conscious of one's belief isn't just being conscious of propositional content (since you could be conscious of prop. content without actually believing it). We can be conscious of our beliefs but this isn't the same as consciously believing because beliefs aren't events, they're states. *occurrent belief = myth*.

#### propositional attitudes

Crane: propositional attitude = intentional state or event. Russel: prop attitude = "S x's that p". Propositions must be T/F. *Truth value gaps*: sentences appear to express proposition but aren't T/F (ex: empty referent). We can either allow truth value gaps OR deny that these sentences are propositions (which seems dumb because then we'd have to have some notion to explain how the sentence can say something, so we'd end up employing a notion similar to propositions). Instead, can say that not all propositions have truth values > Crane is kind of partial to this view since doesn't want to be concerned about truth value of sentence (and probably goes back to him taking seriously the claim that we can think about non-existent things). *Russel's account of propositional individuation*: if A=B, "A is F" and "B is F" express the same proposition - a sentence is true if things are as it says they are. (this is *extensional*) *Fregean account of propositional individuation*: sense + reference. propositional attitudes relates proposition to a subject - Pope and John XXIII have different senses even if have same reference. (This is *intensional*). This makes it harder to determine how meaning of sentence arises from sum of its parts, but the Russellian approach has difficulty explaining our intuitions about prop. attitudes (Ex: Oedipus wants to sleep with his mother). In conclusion, propositional attitudes can take the form "S x's that p" but can also take format "S x's whether/considers/speculates that p". PA's are individuated functionally AND by the way they connect to other PA's - for example, "belief" is individuated by how it connects to desire and action - if we desire something and believe that the conditions to attaining it obtain, then we act to fulfill our desire.

#### propositional attitude thesis

= All intentional states are propositional attitudes. Crane rejects this by using example of *object-directed* emotions, especially love and hate. These are intentional because have intentional object/mode/content/etc. BUT their contents aren't propositional - can't evaluate "S loves that p...". Potential objections: 1) deny love/hate (dumb + desperate). 2) deny love/hate as too vague of concept. but by definition love and hate aren't vague in this example, are defined as emotions oriented on an object of your affection or dislike. 3) give reduction of love/hate to "S x's that p" format. Crane believes this is impossible. 4) claim that truth value of love/hate supervene on those of belief - but this is confused because if you're claiming that the truth value of a love/hate proposition is the same as that of belief that you love/hate, you'd be reducing love/hate to a belief.

#### de re and de dicto attitudes

What about intentional states that aren't propositional attitudes? Mental states can be extensional but intensionality is expression of intentionality. *de dicto belief ascription*: - "S believed that p" - subject is related to a dictum (expression that can be T/F) by "that" clause. Ex: "Oedipus believes that the old man in the road is a nuisance." can be reformulated externally: "That old man in the road: Oedipus believes he is a nuisance." *de re belief ascription*: relational belief ascription - the latter sentence. This is an extensional context because existential generalization holds up (there exists an old man who Oedipus believes is a nuisance). Ex: de re: "Concerning Jocasta, Oedipus' mother: Oedipus wanted to marry her" (doesn't imply Oedipus believes he wanted to marry his mother); de dicto: "Oedipus wanted it to be the case that he married his mother" - the ascription of this belief is concerned with truth value of proposition... basically Crane points out that there are different types of belief ascription - de re relates the subject to the belief in an *extensional way*; de dicto relates the subject to the belief in an *intensional way*. De re: there is an object x, such that x = a, and S believes that x ... this isolates a from the proposition, so that a is outside the scope of the psychological verb... object of belief is mentioned out of scope of "believes" clause.

#### internalism and externalism

Crane's an internalist but his goal is to show the internalism is coherent, not to reject externalism. *Externalism*: thoughts are individuated by the objects they are about, and since these are often found in the outside world, externalism must hold up. But this ties in with the thesis of intentionality - thoughts (intentional states) are about objects, but aren't *relations* between subject and object. This is what internalism must defend to be coherent -- need to show that individuation still makes sense even without such a relation. *Russel's theory of descriptions*: correct analysis of a sentence of type "the F is G" (involving description) is a quantified sentence ("there is exactly one F which is G") = meaning of sentence is proposition it expresses. Allows you to give truth conditions to statements containing non-referring descriptions (Ex: "the present king of france is bald." meaningfulness of this sentence doesn't depend on the reference of "present king of france," only its truth --so we can still derive meaning from a sentence like this. thought is only contingently true or false - true if there is exactly one bald king of france, false otherwise. so thinkability of belief doesn't depend on existence of king, and *hence a relation* between thinker and object. King = intentional object of thought; relation is between intentional content, not object. *Potential objection*: specification of existential proposition refers to properties (*being a king, being bald*), so theory still involves relations to properties if not to objects. *Responses*: 1) weak internalism: object internalism, not property internalism. thought might not be dependent on objects, but is dependent on existing properties. 2) strong internalism: empty property terms are possible. think of predicates as being enmeshed in a network of predicates - we can then replace predicates by variables bound by quantifiers.

#### argument for externalism

Twin Earth argument: twin earth = XYZ instead of H<sub>2</sub>O. Premise (1) (*content determines reference (CDR) principle*): content of a thought determines what the thought is about. (2) when twins refer to water refer to two different things and hence are thinking different thoughts. since they're physically identical, this difference cannot come from the inside - so their thoughts cannot be "in their heads." Argument is valid. (this is better illustrated by Twin-Vlad argument). *Attacking (2)*: if we were to figure out that there were different forms of water with different microstructure, we wouldn't stop calling them water. Twins are in fact using a single common concept when they use the word water. However, this is problematic because water is kind of a bad example - could just qualitatively indistinguishable dopplegangers (Vlad and Twin Vlad). they are physically indistinguishable but we seem to think they're different people and when we think about them we are thinking of different people. *Attacking (1) CDR*: Indexical thoughts. Alice and Bob thinking "It's really hot here" in two different places - differ in reference, so CDR thinks must differ in content as well. However, there is an obvious sense in which they don't differ - in sense. so CDR loses general applicability - which means that there isn't necessarily a difference in content in twin earth case. Crane says we need to modify CDR to say that content determines reference only *relative to a context*. So in one sense, the twins' thoughts have the same content, and in another they don't. This then leads to debates about which sense is the best. Not a knock-down argument against internalism, but shows that it's coherent. Twins share *narrow intentional states with narrow content*, but this isn't special kind of content that's all in the head -- narrow content = what thoughts are once we abstract from their contextual features. In summary since Twin Earth depends on CDR, doesn't refute internalism. But this also doesn't prove there are no broad intentional states....

#### demonstrative thought

demonstrative = "that F" (broad); descriptive = "the F" (narrow). common idea is that descriptive can be internalistic but demonstrative can't; this section provides an internalist account of demonstrative thoughts. "that pineapple is rotting": demonstrative can't be reducible to descriptive because will always end up with some demonstrative component if you're to keep

the original cognitive significance and truth value of the thought. (ex: "the pineapple that is on the counter at the 45/55 latitude is rotting" is not equivalent because speaker might still have reason to doubt that you're thinking of the same thing). Plus, if all references were pure descriptions, how could you ever distinguish between what you were talking about and what your twin were talking about on twin earth? *Two claims*: 1) no purely descriptive thought is equal in content/cognitive sig. to demonstrative thought - this refutes global internalism (all thoughts are narrow). 2) even if there were, descriptive thoughts wouldn't be anchored to the world. Crane says internalist can accept 1) and 2) by providing internalist account of demonstrative thought. Demonstrative thought = descriptive + indexical terms. "That F is G" = "the F which is related to me in such-and-such way is G." Example: Alice looks at pineapple; Bob hallucinates pineapple. Both think "that pineapple is rotting." Externalist conception is that Alice is having a real demonstrative thought; Bob isn't (truth conditions come into play). Internalist conception is that Alice and Bob have same *kind* of thought - the truth conditions are given by the proposition "the pineapple in front of me is rotting" - Bob thinks *that* pineapple is rotting. Indexical component is the relation to *you*. This takes into account POV - content of thought could be what is the same in thinkers across different contexts. (content in this case is "the pineapple is rotting", beliefs are different).

#### prospects for explaining thought

Crane hasn't given an account of the intentionality of thought in physicalist or naturalist terms. This usually comes down to giving necessary (and usually sufficient) conditions for one thing to represent another in terms of their causal interrelations. Crane discusses this in *Mechanical Mind*. He hasn't discussed it here because he rejects physicalism. However, this rejection doesn't remove the *appeal* of explanatory reductionism, which would represent an advance in knowledge. However, we should be sceptical because causation is a relation between cause and effect, and Crane has rejected relations generally holding between thoughts and their objects. Crane doesn't think the prospects are good for making the reductive project work within the context of intentionality as he has outlined it here.

## CHAPTER 5: PERCEPTION

### problem of perception

problem of the intentionality of perception is a phenomenological one (not a psychological/epistemic one). 2 intuitions about visual perception that might be in conflict: 1) *immediacy*: we are *immediately* aware of things we perceive. smell/sound/etc can be intentional objects. 2) *Phenomenal principle*: when we experience something as F, there is something F that we are experiencing. Hallucinations give rise to conflict.

### argument from illusion

*Direct realism*: we perceive objects immediately (genuine perception and hallucination do *not* involve common state of mind - only genuine perception involves relation to perceived, real object). *Sense-data*: we don't perceive material objects at all, they are constructed via sense data, which is what is presented to the senses during perception (perception + hallucination involve *common* state of mind). argument from illusion says that it's never a physical object that is directly presented to the senses/mind.

*Hallucinations* show that one's experience could be the same even if no object exists, so a physical object can be the direct object of one's perception. So sense data can't be physical objects. *Objections*: 1) phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations are impossible. BUT hallucinations are only supposed to be metaphysically possible. 2) hallucinations aren't true perceptions. externalists - same phenomenal quality != same thought, so someone hallucinating isn't really perceiving. 3) deny that there's *any* object seen in *any* kind of hallucination. *Phenomenal Principle (PP)*: if there appears to a subject to be something that possesses a particular sense-related quality, then there is something which the subject is aware of that possess it (sense-data theory - sensory experience requires object to be present). *Genuine Perception Principle (GPP)*: for something to be a genuine perception, something must exist with certain properties. (object needs to exist for something to be *genuinely* perceived). *Both* of these presuppose that perception is a relation between perceiver and objects of perception. Crane doesn't think either theory is truly acceptable; wants to describe a compromise.

### perception as a form of intentionality

PP and GPP both treat perception as relation (whether with sense data or physical objects). Crane denies that perception is a relation to a real object; it is a relation to an intentional content. Intentional mode of perception = 5 sensory modalities. Intentional content can be objects/events, facts/states of affairs (ex: I saw the light vs. I saw that the light was orange).

### phenomenal character of perceptual experience

Strong intentionalism denies qualia (since these are non-intentional properties of mental states). There is a *transparency* of experience - when you see something blue you aren't aware of intrinsic properties of your experience, you see through to the blueness itself. *Argument from introspection (Tye, Harman)*: an experience *represents* an object as blue; when you have a delightful experience of a blue flower, the delight is in specific aspects of content of experience. introspection reveals facts about content of experience - what is represented and how it is presented. Crane: why qualia? Do they even exist? To show that they exist, can appeal to two types of cases: 1) *actual* cases of things universally agreed upon in experience and show that these are qualia, 2) *possible* cases and deduce that these are actual cases of qualia (inversion scenarios). 1)=> ex: double vision - doesn't represent the world to us.....????

### inverted spectrum, inverted earth

=> are supposed to show the existence of qualia. *Inverted spectrum*: Invert sees something as green when Norma sees it as red even though still calls fire engines "red" and grass "green." argument is that the are the same in their intentional content and differ not *intentionally* but *w/r/t* qualia of experience. Problems: 1) showing that qualia exist via this argument was originally directed against functionalism - Norma and Invert are functionally identical by psychologically different. 2) Why attribute difference to qualia? Since things do *seem* different to Norma and Invert, this is also an *intentional* difference. Crane thinks difficulty arises in the way we try to express the difference - we can't use public-language words due to construal of the scenario. Solution is to say that Invert's experience represents a fire engine as green, whereas his belief represents it as red. He has a true belief about fire engine's colour, but false belief about how it looks to him. Content of his experience = fire engine looks green. So intentional content IS different (don't need to make use of qualia). Crane acknowledges that this could be difficult to argue about if half the population had inverted spectrum and other half didn't (argument relies on notion of minority) - but this is a problem for colour theory, not intentionalism. *Inverted Earth*: qualia are the same, intentional content changes. Inverted earth = everything is same but colours are inverted and the way people talk about them. fire engines are green, but "red" means "green." Someone from earth goes to inverted earth with color-inverting lenses, so would see green fire trucks as red and call them red. Block=> intentional content of this guy's thoughts has changed since he's using the "red" of earth, not inverted earth, to refer to green fire trucks. however, as he starts to causally interact with inverted earth, his red comes to mean the same thing as inverted earth red, so his intentional content changes. What remains the same is the qualia of his experience. Therefore qualia + intentional content are distinct. *Crane's rebuttal*: 1) argument was invented against functionalism, not intentionalism. 2) the way things "look" to someone is part of intentional content (aspectual shape), so when things still look the same to the traveler, intentional content actually stays the same. 3) Block assumes a broad conception of intentional content, where intentional content of beliefs = a property of the world. Crane rejects externalist theory of intentional content; what's common between person and inverted self is narrow content of visual experience - narrow content seems the same to traveler or to Norma/Invert. 4) but why should the same intentional content be brought about by such different conditions? Because what an object looks like depends not just on the object but on the light it reflects and visual system. So neither inversion scenarios can refute intentionalism of (visual) perception.

### perception as non-conceptual

Crane thinks that perceptual experience is *non-conceptual*, i.e. content of our perception outruns our modes of description of it. *conceptual vs non-conceptual*: to *believe* that a certain pig is flying you have to have concept of a pig. but to *see* (perceive) that pig is flying, you don't. Is having a concept the simple matter of having language? Crane rejects this, saying that having a concept depends on capacities such as recognition/inference, which don't necessarily require language (ex: thinking of someone without knowing their name). Non-conceptual state is one where world is presented in a certain way. for example, we don't need a distinct concept of each shade of colour.

reductive functionalism = realizer functionalism  
non-reductive functionalism = role functionalism

token physicalism = about events  
type physicalism = about properties

realizer /machine functionalism = gets around multiple realizability by positing roles/causal functions