

**THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS**

FORMAL OPINION 2017-5: An Attorney’s Ethical Duties Regarding U.S. Border Searches of Electronic Devices Containing Clients’ Confidential Information*

TOPIC: Duty to protect clients’ confidential information from disclosure that the client has not authorized; disclosure when border agents claiming lawful authority request access to clients’ confidential information; obligations upon disclosing clients’ confidential information.

DIGEST: Under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”), a New York lawyer has certain ethical obligations when crossing the U.S. border with confidential client information. Before crossing the border, the Rules require a lawyer to take reasonable steps to avoid disclosing confidential information in the event a border agent seeks to search the attorney’s electronic device. The “reasonableness” standard does not imply that particular protective measures must invariably be adopted in all circumstances to safeguard clients’ confidential information; however, this opinion identifies measures that may satisfy the obligation to safeguard clients’ confidences in this situation. Additionally, Under Rule 1.6(b)(6), the lawyer may not disclose a client’s confidential information in response to a claim of lawful authority unless doing so is “reasonably necessary” to comply with a border agent’s claim of lawful authority. This includes first making reasonable efforts to assert the attorney-client privilege and to otherwise avert or limit the disclosure of confidential information. Finally, if the attorney discloses clients’ confidential information to a third party during a border search, the attorney must inform affected clients about such disclosures pursuant to Rule 1.4.

RULES: 1.1, 1.4, 1.6

QUESTION: What are an attorney’s ethical obligations with regard to the protection of confidential information prior to crossing a U.S. border, during border searches and thereafter?

OPINION:

I. Introduction

This opinion considers attorneys’ ethical obligations in the context of the following scenario:

An attorney traveling abroad with an electronic device (such as a smartphone, portable hard drive, USB “thumb drive,” or laptop) that contains clients’ confidential information plans to travel through a U.S. customs checkpoint or

* After the opinion was issued in July 2017, U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a revised Directive on Border Search of Electronic Devices (CBP Directive No. 3340-049A), dated January 2018, to “provide guidance and standard operating procedures” for border searches of electronic devices; and federal policy may continue to change. The general principles set forth in the opinion nonetheless remain applicable.

border crossing. During the crossing, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agent claiming lawful authority demands that the attorney “unlock” the device and hand it to the agent so that it may be searched. The attorney has not obtained informed consent from each client whose information may be disclosed in this situation.¹

Searches of electronic devices at the U.S. border when travelers enter or leave the U.S. may include not only a physical inspection of these devices but also the review of information stored on them, such as emails, text messages and electronically-stored documents.² CBP policy permits U.S. customs agents to review any information that physically resides on travelers’ electronic devices, including those of U.S. citizens, with or without any reason for suspicion, to demand disclosure of social media and email account passwords, and to seize the devices pending an inspection.³ In recent years, searches of cell phones, laptop computers, and other electronic devices at border crossings into the U.S. have become increasingly frequent. According to the Department of Homeland Security, more than 5,000 devices were searched by CBP agents in February 2017 alone. By way of comparison, that is about as many U.S. border searches of electronic devices as were undertaken in all of 2015, and just under a quarter of the approximately 23,877 U.S. border searches of such devices undertaken in 2016. Further, border agents have access to software tools that increase the effectiveness and thoroughness of device searches, and they have the ability to copy the contents of such devices to be reviewed later. To be sure, the 5000-plus individuals whose devices were searched in February 2017 amounted to only a fraction of the 1,069,266 individuals entering into the United States *daily* as reported by the CBP.⁴ However, depending on the extent of the search, border agents’ review of information

¹ This opinion does not address the potentially more difficult questions regarding an attorney’s duty to protect confidential information while in, or crossing into, foreign countries. While the principles described in this opinion regarding safeguarding clients’ confidential information are broadly applicable, efforts reasonably necessary to protect clients’ confidences at foreign borders and in foreign countries will vary depending on the laws and practices of those countries. Lawyers must therefore familiarize themselves with those laws and practices and determine what safeguards to adopt before transporting clients’ confidential information abroad.

² In this respect, border searches apparently differ from Transportation Security Administration (TSA) searches of electronic devices in connection with domestic air travel. This Opinion only addresses ethical issues in connection with international travel.

³ See June 20, 2017 Due Diligence Questions for Kevin McAleenan, Nominee for Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), *available at*: <http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/170712-cpb-wyden-letter.pdf>. According to this policy statement, CBP agents do not condition U.S. citizens’ reentry on the provision of passwords; nor do they currently review information that, although not physically resident on the devices, is accessible on remote servers via electronic devices. According to CPB, inspections may reveal that electronic devices contain contraband (*e.g.*, child pornography), or that information on electronic devices reveals a threat to national security. CBP reserves the right to cooperate with other investigative agencies, which may seek other kinds of information on travelers’ electronic devices.

⁴ U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, SNAPSHOT: A SUMMARY OF CBP FACTS AND FIGURES (2017), available at <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-Mar/CBP-Snapshot-UPDATE-03022017-FY16-Data.pdf> (citing daily statistic of 1,069,266 average daily arrivals in February 2017; only 326,723 were by air). Based on these figures, only approximately 0.017% of all individuals

stored on, or accessible via, individuals' electronic devices may lead to the disclosure of substantial information, and therefore constitute a significant intrusion for the selected individuals.⁵ Under these circumstances, attorneys would benefit from guidance regarding their ethical obligations prior to crossing a U.S. border and when confronted with a border agent's request to search electronic devices containing clients' confidential information.⁶

This Opinion addresses an attorney's ethical obligations under the Rules with respect to U.S. border searches of electronic devices containing clients' confidential information at three points in time: before the attorney approaches the U.S. border; at the border when U.S. border agents seek to review information on the attorney's electronic device; and after U.S. border agents review clients' confidential information.

Before crossing the U.S. border, both Rule 1.6(c), which requires "reasonable efforts to prevent . . . unauthorized access to" clients' confidential information, and the duty of competence under Rule 1.1, require an attorney to take reasonable measures in advance to avoid disclosing confidential information in the event border agents seek to search the attorney's electronic device. The "reasonableness" standard does not imply that particular protective measures must invariably be adopted in all circumstances to safeguard clients' confidential information; however, this Opinion identifies measures that may satisfy the obligation to safeguard clients' confidences in this situation.

At the border, if government agents seek to search the attorney's electronic device pursuant to a claim of lawful authority,⁷ and the device contains clients' confidential information, the attorney

entering the United States on a given day are subject to an electronic device search, even with the increase in such searches in 2017. There are no available statistics evidencing how many of the 5,000 searched devices belonged to members of the bar.

⁵ See, e.g., *Riley v. California*, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (describing range and extent of information stored on, and accessible via, individuals' cell phones).

⁶ These circumstances have prompted the ABA to seek changes and clarifications to existing regulations and practices regarding the treatment of confidential and privileged materials during border searches. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRESERVATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY FOR U.S. LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS DURING BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (May 5, 2017), available at <https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/0921000/921316/letter.pdf>.

⁷ The legality of a border search of an electronic device is apparently unsettled. See *Abidor v. Napolitano*, 10-cv-04059 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2013) (dismissing claims challenging authority of CBP and ICE to detain electronic devices at borders, even absent reasonable suspicion); *United States v. Cotterman*, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (border agents need reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before they could conduct a forensic search, aided by sophisticated software, of the defendant's laptop but a manual search of a digital device is "routine" and so a warrantless and suspicionless search is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment); *United States v. Kim*, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 52 (D.D.C. 2015) (suppressing evidence found during a search of a laptop at the border after border agents made an exact copy of the laptop's hard drive and searched it with forensic programs). See generally Patrick G. Lee, *Can Customs and Border Official Search Your Phone? These Are Your Rights*, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 13, 2017) <https://www.propublica.org/article/can-customs-border-protection-search-phone-legal-rights>; U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049, BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC

may not comply unless “reasonably necessary” under Rule 1.6(b)(6), which permits disclosure of clients’ confidential information to comply with “law or court order.” Under the Rule, the attorney first must take reasonable measures to prevent disclosure of confidential information, which would include informing the border agent that the device or files in question contain privileged or confidential materials, requesting that such materials not be searched or copied, asking to speak to a superior officer and making any other lawful requests to protect the confidential information from disclosure. To demonstrate that the device contains attorney-client materials, the attorney should carry proof of bar membership, such as an attorney ID card, when crossing a U.S. border.

Finally, if the attorney discloses clients’ confidential information to a third party during a border search, the attorney must inform affected clients about such disclosures pursuant to Rule 1.4.

II. Before Crossing the U.S. Border Attorneys Must Undertake Reasonable Efforts to Protect Confidential Information

Attorneys have a duty under Rule 1.6 to protect clients’ confidential information.⁸ Rule 1.6(a) provides that an attorney may not knowingly use or disclose confidential information without the client’s informed consent or implied authorization. Few principles are more important to our legal system.

Additionally, an attorney’s obligation to safeguard clients’ confidential information against unintentional or unauthorized disclosure is implicit in the duty of competence under Rule 1.1. *See* ABA Formal Op. 11-459 (Aug. 4, 2011) (an attorney’s duty to “act competently to protect the confidentiality of clients’ information . . . is implicit in the obligation of Rule 1.1 to ‘provide competent representation to a client’”); *cf.* NYCBA Formal Op. 2015-3 (April 2015) (“In our view, the duty of competence includes a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying and avoiding common Internet-based scams, particularly where those scams can harm other existing clients.”).

Further, the obligation to safeguard clients’ confidences is now codified in Rule 1.6(c), as amended January 1, 2017, which specifically requires attorneys to “make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized use or disclosure of, or unauthorized access to,” confidential information obtained from prospective, current, and former clients. *See* Rule 1.1, cmts. [16] & [17]. The duty to protect client confidences from “unauthorized access” refers to access that is not authorized by the *client*. *Cf.* Rule 1.6, cmts. [5] & [13] (indicating that “authorization” must be given by the client, not the lawyer). Consequently, just as lawyers must take reasonable measures to prevent third parties’ unlawful access to client confidences, attorneys must refrain from conduct, including otherwise permissible disclosures, that may result

DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION (2009) *available at* https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf.

⁸ Rule 1.6(a) defines “confidential information” as “information gained during or relating to the representation of a client, whatever its source, that is (a) protected by the attorney-client privilege, (b) likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, or (c) information that the client has requested be kept confidential.”

in third parties' *lawful* access to a client's confidential information without the client's consent. *See, e.g.*, NYCBA Formal Op. 2017-2 (Feb. 2017) (an attorney may not report attorney misconduct to the disciplinary authority where doing so might lead the disciplinary authority to require the production of a client's confidential information without the client's consent).

Prior opinions have recognized, in particular, that the duty to safeguard clients' confidences includes a responsibility to take reasonable protective measures when engaging in electronic communications with clients and in electronically storing clients' confidential information. *See, e.g.*, ABA Formal Op. 477R (May 11, 2017); ABA Formal Op. 11-459 (Aug. 4, 2011); ABA Formal Op. 99-413 (March 10, 1999); Cal. Ethics Op. 2010-179 (Jan. 1, 2010); NYSBA Ethics Op. 842 (Sept. 10, 2010); NYSBA Ethics Op. 709 (Sept. 16, 1998). To be "reasonable," protective measures need not be foolproof: making reasonable efforts "does not mean that the lawyer guarantees that the information is secure from any unauthorized access." NYSBA Ethics Op. 842, *supra*. Further, the adequacy of an attorney's efforts to protect clients' confidences depends upon a multitude of facts. *See, e.g.*, ABA Formal Op. 477R, *supra* ("Recognizing the necessity of employing a fact-based analysis, Comment [18] to Model Rule 1.6(c) includes nonexclusive factors to guide lawyers in making a 'reasonable efforts' determination."); ABA Formal Op. 11-459, *supra* ("particularly strong protective measures are warranted to guard against the disclosure of highly sensitive matters").

Rules 1.1 and 1.6(c) require attorneys to make reasonable efforts prior to crossing the U.S. border to avoid or minimize the risk that government agents will review or seize client confidences that are carried on, or accessible on, electronic devices that attorneys carry across the border. Except in the unlikely event that an attorney has each affected client's consent to disclose confidential information during a border search, such disclosure would be "unauthorized" under Rule 1.6(c) and the attorney would be obligated to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent such disclosure from occurring. In the above hypothetical, the attorney has not obtained informed consent from the clients whose confidential information would be affected, as is required to obtain authorization under Rule 1.6(a)(1). Further, it is hard to imagine a situation where disclosure to a government official during a border search would "advance the best interests of the client" and therefore be "impliedly authorized to advance the best interests of the client" under Rule 1.6(a)(2).

The necessary degree of precaution depends on the circumstances, including the sensitivity of the confidential information that is at risk. *See* Rule 1.6, cmt. [16] (listing relevant considerations). "Reasonableness" by its nature depends on the multiple facts and circumstances of a given situation and does not lend itself to categorical or bright-line rules. If in doubt, an attorney may, and would be well-advised to, take more cautious measures than what is minimally required by Rule 1.6(c).

Comment [16] to Rule 1.6 provides guidance by identifying the following non-exclusive list of factors relevant to the reasonableness of an attorney's efforts:

1. The sensitivity of the information;
2. The likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed;
3. The cost of employing additional safeguards;
4. The difficulty of implementing the safeguards; and

5. The extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the attorney’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or software excessively difficult to use).

Thus, the various facts and circumstances bearing on whether protective efforts are “reasonable” to avoid disclosing client confidences at the border – and therefore minimally required by Rule 1.6(c) – may include the type and nature of the confidential information involved; the need to bring the information across the border in the first instance; the safeguards used by the attorney; the availability, costs, and challenges associated with implementing additional safeguards; an attorney’s resources and capabilities; and any factors that may affect the likelihood of disclosure, such as the jurisdiction from which the attorney is returning. Among other things, these considerations suggest that an attorney should not carry clients’ confidential information on an electronic device across the border except where there is a professional need to do so, and especially that attorneys should not carry clients’ highly sensitive information except where the professional need is compelling.⁹

Given the rapid pace of technological development and the disparities between the practices, capabilities, and resources of attorneys, it would be difficult or impossible to identify a list of minimum mandatory prophylactic or technical measures for an attorney to adopt before crossing the U.S. border. Not only would such a list run the risk of quickly becoming obsolete, but it would also be of limited use, since “reasonableness” standards are not amenable to a one-size-fits-all analysis. Moreover, expectations regarding reasonable efforts are likely to evolve over time as the relevant technology changes, as practices regarding border searches and knowledge of those practices develop, and as attorneys become increasingly aware of the risks of disclosure and the available means to avoid them. However, as discussed below, an attorney must generally (i) evaluate the risks presented by traveling with confidential information and (ii) based on the risk analysis, consider what safeguards to employ to limit or reduce the risk that confidential information will be accessed or disclosed in the event of a search. While no particular safeguard is invariably required by the Rules as long as the attorney’s protective efforts are “reasonable,” we recommend that attorneys consider adopting the following safeguards to protect confidential information or to reduce the risk of its disclosure.

i. Evaluating the Risk of Disclosure and Potential Harms that May Result

An attorney must evaluate the risks associated with crossing the U.S. border while in possession of clients’ confidential information, including the likelihood that border agents will demand and secure disclosure of clients’ confidential information, the sensitivity of the information carried, and the harm that would result if the information were disclosed. This requires familiarity with the relevant laws and practices regarding border searches of electronic devices whenever an attorney opts to carry a device that contains, or can access, clients’ confidential information. *Cf.* NYSBA Ethics Op. 782 (Dec. 8, 2004) (requiring lawyers to use “reasonable care” to stay

⁹ An attorney whose client outside the United States provides electronically-stored confidential information (e.g., on a thumb drive) must “reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.” Rule 1.4(a)(2). The attorney should consider whether this obligation triggers, under all the circumstances, the need for a discussion concerning the manner in which the client’s confidential information will be transported and the attendant risks.

abreast of technological advances and the potential risks associated with using, storing, maintaining, accessing, and transmitting confidential information).

Although, as noted above, U.S. border searches of electronic devices (at the time of this opinion's publication) are relatively infrequent, any unauthorized disclosure of a client's confidential information entails a violation of the client's expectation of confidentiality and is presumptively harmful, regardless of whether the unauthorized recipient otherwise uses the information to the client's detriment. *See, e.g.,* NYCBA Formal Op. 2017-2, *supra* (attorney may not provide client's confidential information to the disciplinary authority without the client's consent, even if the client would not be "embarrassed or harmed if the information were disclosed to the disciplinary authority specifically"). Moreover, even if a border search seems highly unlikely, that consideration should be weighed against the amount and sensitivity of the information held and any additional harm that may result from its disclosure without the client's consent.¹⁰ For certain lawyers, practices, organizations, or clients, providing government agencies with access to sensitive confidential data can cause significant harm, which would strongly suggest in such circumstances that it would be unreasonable to carry confidential information that may be disclosed to border agents, even for legitimate professional reasons, if avoidable.

ii. Implementing Safeguards

Attorneys must also evaluate the efficacy, cost, and difficulty associated with implementing safeguards to prevent or limit confidential information. Rule 1.6, cmt. [16].¹¹ As discussed above, whether safeguards are ultimately required as minimally "reasonable efforts" depends on the circumstances of each such situation.

The simplest option with the lowest risk is not to carry any confidential information across the border. One method of avoiding the electronic transportation of clients' confidences involves using a blank "burner" phone or laptop, or otherwise removing confidential information from one's carried device by deleting confidential files using software designed to securely delete information, turning off syncing of cloud services, signing out of web-based services, and/or uninstalling applications that provide local or remote access to confidential information prior

¹⁰ Traveling attorneys should also be aware that many customs and border protection agencies may demand that the attorney provide access to any information stored on a device (including information that may be otherwise protected or encrypted), and in addition may have access to software tools that allow them to copy the entirety of a device and/or permit the recovery of deleted information that has not been securely deleted using specialized tools. *Test Results for Mobile Device Acquisition*, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/mobile-device-acquisition> (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).

¹¹ Comment [16] further recognizes that a client may "require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule, or . . . give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule." As this Comment reflects, an attorney may not forgo "reasonable efforts" to protect the client's confidential information, as required by Rule 1.6(c), unless the client gives informed consent. Further, especially when it is necessary to travel with highly sensitive information, an attorney would be well advised to discuss with the client whether to adopt special security measures, beyond those required by Rule 1.6(c) in the situation.

crossing to the border.¹² This is not to say that attorneys traveling with electronic devices must remove all electronically stored information. Some electronic information, including many work-related emails, may contain no confidential information protected by Rule 1.6(a). Even when emails contain confidential information, the obligation to remove these emails from the portable device before crossing the border depends on what is reasonable. As previously discussed, this turns on the ease or inconvenience of avoiding possession of confidential information; the need to maintain access to the particular information and its sensitivity; the risk of a border inspection; and any other relevant considerations.

A lawyer with access to greater resources or who handles more sensitive information should consider technological solutions that permit secure remote access to confidential information without creating local copies on the device; storing confidential information and communications in secure online locations rather than locally on the device; or using encrypted software to attempt to restrict access to mobile devices.

While attorneys thus have various available alternative means of safeguarding clients' confidential information from disclosure at the U.S. border, whatever measures an attorney adopts must, under all the facts and circumstances, be "reasonable" to protect this information.¹³

III. At the U.S. Border Attorneys May Disclose Clients' Confidential Information Only to the Extent "Reasonably Necessary" to Respond to a Government Agent's Claim of Lawful Authority

Assuming an attorney has made reasonable efforts to protect clients' confidential information before crossing the U.S. border, in many cases the attorney will entirely avoid carrying clients' confidential information in an electronic device. In other cases, when attorneys' electronic devices do contain clients' confidential information, the information will be limited to what is professionally necessary, and ideally limited in significance, so that clients would not be significantly harmed by its disclosure. But regardless of how limited or insignificant the information may appear to be, attorneys subject to a border search may disclose clients' confidential information only to the extent permitted by Rule 1.6.

Rule 1.6(a) prohibits attorneys from knowingly disclosing "confidential information" or using such information to the disadvantage of the client, for the lawyer's own advantage, or for the advantage of a third person, unless the client gives informed consent or implied authorization or the disclosure is permitted by Rule 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b), in turn, permits, but does not require, an attorney to use or disclose confidential information in specified exceptional circumstances, of which only 1.6(b)(6) is relevant to the above-described border-search scenario.

Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits an attorney to "reveal or use" confidential information to the extent the attorney "reasonably believes necessary . . . when permitted or required . . . to comply with other

¹² Prior to any such deletion, however, an attorney should ensure that the information deleted is securely backed up so that the attorney may use the information at a later date.

¹³ See, e.g., NYSBA Ethics Op. 1020 (Sept. 12, 2014); NYSBA Ethics Op. 1019 (Aug. 6, 2014); NYSBA Ethics Op. 939 (Oct. 16, 2012); NYSBA Ethics Op. 842 (Sept. 10, 2010); N.Y. State 782 (Dec. 8, 2004).

law or court order.” Comment [13] to Rule 1.6 recognizes that this exception permits the disclosure of a client’s confidential information insofar as reasonably necessary to respond to an order by a “governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to . . . law to compel disclosure.” The exception applies even when the validity of the relevant law or court order, or its application, is subject to legal challenge, although, in ordinary circumstances, compliance is not “reasonably necessary” until any available legal challenge has proven unsuccessful. *See* Rule 1.6, cmt. [13] (“Absent informed consent of the client to comply with the order, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client nonfrivolous arguments that the order is not authorized by law, the information sought is protected against disclosure by an applicable privilege or other law, or the order is invalid or defective for some other reason.”).

In general, disclosure of clients’ confidential information is not “reasonably necessary” to comply with law or a court order if there are reasonable, lawful alternatives to disclosure. Even when disclosure is reasonably necessary, the attorney must take reasonably available measures to limit the extent of disclosure. *See, e.g.*, ABA Formal Op. 10-456 (July 14, 2010). For example, compliance with a subpoena or court order to disclose confidential information is not “reasonably necessary” until the attorney or the attorney’s client (or former client) has asserted any available non-frivolous claim of attorney-client privilege. *See, e.g.*, NYCBA Formal Op. 2005-3 (March 2005). Likewise, a lawyer must ordinarily test a government agency’s request for client confidential information made under color of law. *See, e.g.*, NYCBA Formal Op. 1986-5 (July 1986) (“[I]f presented with a request by a governmental authority for production of information pertaining to escrow accounts when a client is a target of an investigation, a lawyer must, unless the client has consented to disclosure, decline to furnish such information on the ground either that it is protected by the attorney-client privilege or that it has been gained in the course of a confidential relationship. . . . If disclosure is [subsequently] compelled [by a court], it will not breach a lawyer's ethical obligation with respect to his client's confidences or secrets.”).

At the same time, attorneys need not assume unreasonable burdens or suffer significant harms in seeking to test a law or court order. *See, e.g.*, NYSBA Ethics Op. 945 (Nov. 7, 2012) (indicating that “when the law governing potential disclosure is unclear, a lawyer need not risk violating a legal or ethical obligation, but may disclose client confidences to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to comply with the relevant law, even if the legal obligation is not free from doubt”). For example, although an attorney must consult with the client about an adverse ruling, *see* Rule 1.4, the attorney need not finance an appeal of the court’s ruling much less intentionally defy the trial court and accept a contempt-of-court order. *See, e.g.*, ABA Formal Op. 473 (Feb. 17, 2016) (“Requiring a lawyer to take an appeal when the client is unavailable places significant and undue burdens on the lawyer.”); NYCBA Formal Op. 2005-3, *supra* (“Should the court overrule the objection or assertion of privilege or other protection, the attorney may then testify about the privileged or protected material”).

Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits an attorney to comply with a border agent’s demand, under a claim of lawful authority, for an electronic device containing confidential information during a border search. While legal challenges in court might be made to the relevant law or its application, it would be an unreasonable burden to require that attorneys, having made reasonable efforts to protect clients’ confidential information, forgo reentry into the United States or allow themselves to be taken into custody while litigating the lawfulness of a border search. Unless court rulings

forbid such border searches, an attorney may ultimately comply with a border agent's demand. Likewise, in this unusual circumstance, it would ordinarily be impracticable and of no utility for attorneys stopped at the border to consult with the affected clients before complying. (The obligation to consult thereafter is addressed below in Part IV.)

That said, compliance is not "reasonably necessary" unless and until an attorney undertakes reasonable efforts to dissuade border agents from reviewing clients' confidential information or to persuade them to limit the extent of their review. *Accord* Rule 1.6(c) (requiring "reasonable efforts" to protect clients' confidential information). Such efforts would include informing the border agent that the subject devices or files contain privileged or confidential materials, requesting that such materials not be searched or copied, asking to speak to a superior officer and making any other reasonably available efforts to protect the confidential information from disclosure. To add credence to the claim of attorney-client privilege, an attorney should carry and be prepared to present some form of attorney identification, such as a court-issued identification or in the very least a business card, when crossing a U.S. border. An attorney should know the relevant law and practices and should consider bringing a printed copy of a given customs agency's policies or guidelines regarding searches of privileged information.¹⁴

The practical significance of clearly informing the border agent of the presence of confidential or privileged information arises from the regulations of the CBP and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau ("ICE"), which each recognize the sensitivity of legal materials. The regulations require a border agent confronted with a claim of legal privilege to seek an additional review or authorization prior to conducting a search of the information that the attorney claims is confidential or privileged. This obligation to obtain further review applies "only to the extent that the agent Officer suspects that the content of such a material may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction of" CBP or ICE, respectively.¹⁵ Although it is uncertain how border agents apply this "suspicion"

¹⁴ U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Directive No. 3340-049, Border Search of Electronic Devices Containing Information § 5.2.1 (2009) *available at* https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf; U.S. Customs and Border Protection Policy Regarding Border Search of Information (July 16, 2008), *available at* https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/search_authority_2.pdf.

¹⁵ Section 5.2.1 of CBP Directive No. 3340-49, provides: "Officers may encounter materials that appear to be legal in nature, or an individual may assert that certain information is protected by attorney-client or attorney work product privilege. Legal materials are not necessarily exempt from a border search, but they may be subject to the following special handling procedures: If an Officer suspects that the content of such a material may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction of CBP, the Officer must seek advice from the CBP Associate/Assistant Chief Counsel before conducting a search of the material, and this consultation shall be noted in appropriate CBP systems of records. CBP counsel will coordinate with the U.S. Attorney's Office as appropriate." U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049, BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION (2009) *available at* https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf

Section 8.6(2)(b) of the parallel ICE Directive similarly provides: "Special Agents may encounter information that appears to be legal in nature, or an individual may assert that certain information is protected by the attorney-client or attorney work product privilege. If Special Agents suspect that the

standard in actual searches, attorneys should take advantage of this possible avenue for preventing the disclosure of clients' confidential information.

IV. If Confidential Information Is Disclosed During a Border Search, An Attorney Must Promptly Inform Affected Clients

If an attorney's electronic device containing clients' confidential information is reviewed or seized at the border, the attorney must notify affected clients of what occurred and of the extent to which their confidential information may have been reviewed or seized.¹⁶ This obligation arises out of the general duty under Rule 1.4 to communicate with the client about the status of a matter and about decisions that the client faces in the representation. *See* Rule 1.4(a)(1)(i) & (a)(3); *see also* Rule 1.6, cmt. [13]; *compare* NYCBA Formal Op. 2015-6 (June 2015) ("Given that lawyers have a duty to preserve client files (at least for some period of time), it follows that an attorney may have a duty to notify the client or former client when such files have been inadvertently destroyed."); NYSBA Ethics Op. 1092 (May 11, 2016) ("a lawyer must report to a client a significant error or omission by the lawyer in his or her rendition of legal services"). Disclosure will provide the client an opportunity to determine whether to file a legal challenge, assuming one is available, or to undertake any other available responses. Whether attorneys have legal obligations in this situation independently of the Rules is a question outside the scope of this opinion.

CONCLUSION:

Before crossing the U.S. border, an attorney must make reasonable efforts to protect against the disclosure of clients' confidential information in response to a demand by border agents. Because "reasonable efforts" depend on the circumstances, no particular safeguards are invariably required. However, attorneys should generally (i) evaluate the risks of traveling with confidential information and (ii) consider what safeguards to implement to avoid or reduce the risk that confidential information will be accessed or disclosed in the event of a search. At the border, if government agents seek to search the attorney's electronic device pursuant to a claim of lawful authority, and the device contains clients' confidential information, the attorney may not comply until first making reasonable efforts to assert the attorney-client privilege and to otherwise avert or limit the disclosure of confidential information, e.g., by asking to speak to a superior officer. To add credence to the claim of attorney-client privilege, an attorney should carry attorney identification and be familiar with the customs agency's policies or guidelines

content of such a document may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction of ICE, the ICE Office of the Chief Counsel or the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office must be contacted before beginning or continuing a search of the document and this consultation shall be noted in appropriate ICE systems."

¹⁶ In the context of responding to disclosures as a result of hacking, legal data security experts recommend, where possible, applying forensic analysis to systems after a breach occurs since the appropriate response must be guided by the scope of the breach. A similar approach may be warranted when an electronic device has been confiscated, i.e. a lawyer should take available steps to learn what was disclosed. *See* Allison Grande, *5 Steps to Take When Your Law Firm Is Hacked*, LAW360 (Jul 22, 2014 3:16 PM EDT), <https://www.law360.com/articles/556398/5-steps-to-take-when-your-firm-is-hacked>.

regarding searches of privileged information. Finally, if the attorney discloses clients' confidential information to a third party during a border search, the attorney must inform affected clients about such disclosures.

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