

Defendant Albert Speer

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Speer joined the Nazi party in 1931. (1) In 1932 he was commissioned to remodel the Berlin Gau offices and other Berlin party buildings. (2) In 1937 he was made General Inspector of Building for the Reich capital, was given the honorary title of Professor, and awarded the Golden Badge of Honor of the party. (3) In October 1939 he organized the Baustab Speer and the Transportflotte Speer. (4) In February 1942 he succeeded Fritz Todt as Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, and chief of the Organization Todt. (5) In March 1942 he was appointed General Plenipotentiary for the Armaments Office on the Board of the Four Year Plan. (6) By May 1942 the functions of the Armaments Office of the OKW had been transferred to Speer, (7) and in September 1943 he was entrusted by Hitler with the entire German war production for the duration of hostilities as Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production. Speer's high position in the party hierarchy is reflected by the fact that he was chief of the Main Office for Engineering (Hauptamt fur Technik) of the NSDAP, one of the twelve supreme party authorities. (9) He was also Oberbefehlsleiter of the NS-Bund Deutscher Technik, an "affiliated" organization of the NSDAP, which represented a virtually compulsory organization of all German engineers. (10)

1. As chief of German war production, Speer made a major contribution to the Nazis' struggle to retain their domination of Europe. (11)

2. Speer shares responsibility for the organized industrial spoilation of occupied territories. (12)

3. As administrative head of the Organization Todt Speer is responsible on the highest level for the conscription and utilization of labor obtained from occupied countries, and used, inter alia, for construction work in connection with the operations of the German army. (13) This responsibility extends also to the barbarous and inhuman treatment (14) of Allied nationals employed in this para-military organization.

4. Under the basic decrees establishing and enlarging his jurisdiction Speer exercised extensive powers in connection with the utilization of manpower, including slave labor (15) in Germany and occupied Europe. (16) Agencies of the Speer Ministry stated manpower requirements for German industry to Saukel. (17) Speer's allocation engineers enforced the barbarous speed-up system in German industry under which foreign workers were overworked and often cruelly exploited (18) Speer's representative negotiated with Fohl (Chief of the SS Wirtshafts-Verwaltungs Hauptamt) for the employment of concentration camp victims for German production. (19).

Notes

1. Who's Who in German and Austria, Part II. (FO biography indicates he became party member in 1932.)
2. FO Biography of Speer
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. RGBI. 1943, Vol. I, p. 529. (Ref. no. taken from FEA Study EIS-13 (The Reich Ministry of Armament and War Production) p. 9.
9. FEA Study EIS-13 (The Reich Ministry of Armament and War Production) p. 26.
10. Ibid.
11. See Intelligence Reports Nos. EW-H-9 and EF/AM/2 summarizing interrogations of Speer on the expansion of War Production under his regime.
12. OOS Study--Nazi Spoilation in Occupied Europe, pp. 70 et seq. tracing Speer's administrative responsibility for exploitation and removal to Germany of industrial equipment from occupied Europe. Also, in this connection, the ROGES corporation, named in Speer decree of October 29, 1943 (§ I, 3, c) as one of the corporations controlled by the Speer Ministry, had as its function arranging for transfer of industrial plant and equipment from occupied countries to Germany. It is understood that a branch manager of ROGES, plus all its records, have been located by the 3rd Army center at Freising.
13. United Nations War Crimes Commission. Summary of Information, No. 7. - Also, OOS Study; Nazi Plans for Dominating Germany and

and Europe: Agencies involved in the Commission of Crimes against Foreign Labor (R & A No. 3114.8), pp. 36-37.

14. United Nations War Crimes Commission. Summary of Information,

No. 7. Also, R & A No. 3114.8, p. 29

15. Speer documents (Flensburg) 11 November 1944. Vol. 2.

Letter to Hitler dated 11 Nov. 44, on situation in Ruhr area:

"My Fuhrer;

.....

4. Reichsleiter Bormann has at my request, made 50,000 foreign workers available for the repair of the transport system. These have been engaged in the building of fortifications (Schansarbeit); another 30,000 will be released by the German armaments industry (Rüstung) for the same work, and also to restore the badly injured Industries of the Ruhr area.

....."

signed Speer (Ref FD 2690/45  
Vol. 21)

Speer document (Flensburg) Four reports covering trips to the Western territories.

"Section III.

Report on trip by Speer to Rhine and Ruhr,  
15th-23rd Nov. 1944.

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16. The 50,000 workers for repairing transport damage authorized by Bormann have not yet arrived. Only about 28,000 have arrived so far. Repairs to the Reichsbahn could be undertaken much more quickly if 50,000 men were available for some time. Further delays would cause unforeseeable consequences both in the Ruhr and elsewhere."

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16. (a) See charts indicating position of Speer Ministry in labor controls in Germany and occupied Europe.



(b) Speer's decree of September 16, 1943 (translation found in EIB-13, p. 91) provided that the Planning Office (established under Speer's jurisdiction by Goering decree of September 4, 1943) should submit to the Central Planning Office "proposals for the allocation of all manpower within the sphere of Greater Germany to the various main sectors of the economy...."

(c) Speer's decree of October 29, 1943 provided, inter alia, in respect of labor that:

, (§ I, 3, b) "The Armament Bureau (Rüstungsamt), headed by General-lieutenant Dr. Ing. e. h. Wagner: (has the following functions):

to secure the preparedness of enterprises in armament and war industries with respect to personnel and materials, particularly in the fields of

manpower  
labor conditions  
supply of power and motor fuel....."

#### IV. The Functions of Agencies on the Regional Level

The concentration of all tasks of war production in the hands of the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production makes it necessary to coordinate his authority over the regional agencies with the authority of the Minister of Economics. Whether and in what form the agencies of both Ministries on the regional level may be consolidated in the future, will be decided at the proper time.

For the intermediary period, I herewith provide, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics, as follows:

.....

3. The future functions of the members of the Armament Board are defined in the following list, which supersedes the distribution of functions as laid down in the First Executory Decree issued by me on October 10, 1942 under the decree of the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich and Deputy for the Four Year Plan, of September 17, 1942.

.. .. .

b. The Armament Inspections and Armament Commands (Rüstungsinspektionen and Rüstungskommandos) are my field agencies which have intimate knowledge of all armament enterprises within their

district and the situation of these enterprises with regard to orders to be filled and manpower available. They supervise and guide (betrauen) the entire armament industry including the manufacturers of auxiliary materials and subcontracts... Supervision and guidance (Betreuung) include the right and duty to examine the needs of the enterprises as determined by the production tasks assigned to them, and to act as claimants, in accordance with the results of these examinations vis-a-vis other agencies concerned with labor supply, transportation, and communication.....

They collaborate in the supervision of labor regulations in the enterprises under their jurisdiction.

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g. The Gau Labor Offices (Gauarbeitsamter) and their subordinate agencies have the following functions:

They carry out labor mobilization as a whole for the armament industry. In doing so they have to fill the manpower demands of the armament industry in accordance with the requirements of the Armament Inspections and Armament Commands. They shall see to it that manpower is shifted to bottlenecks; they shall also supply foreign workers and place these foreign workers as well as war prisoners.

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(d) In an article published in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" on 30 March 1942, it was reported that Saukel

".....will cooperate closely with all industrial officers, and especially with the Reich minister for armaments and munitions, who is at the same time Plenipotentiary General for Equipment, within Four Year Plan [Speer]. The appointment of Gauleiter Saukel was also made in view of the immense importance of manpower in the war industries and at the wish of the Reich Minister Speer....."

A note appended by Capt. Harris indicates that "this article indicates that Saukel and Speer worked hand in glove on the Nazi labor policy. We have a photostat of this article in our possession.

A consolidated report on Speer interrogations (Intelligence Report No. EF/Min/1) indicates:

".....When I took over Army armaments production in 1942, labor supply was directed by Staatssekretar Syrup of the Reich Labor Ministry. He was old and spent, and although

industrious, he played no active part. Ministerial-director Mansfeld, who was also Commissioner for Labor Supply under the Four Year Plan, was virtually in charge. I found that it was impossible for Mansfeld to mobilize labor systematically for employment in the armaments industry, since the Gauleiters, using their political power, adopted an uncooperative attitude towards such mobilization, and were particularly opposed to the movement of labor out of their own Gaue. Labor mobilization thus became a problem of political power, and in our political structure it could not be solved by officials of the Labor Ministry alone. It was necessary to strengthen the central authority in order to provide backing for the Regional Labor Offices and enable them to assert themselves against the Gauleiters. I reported this situation to Hitler and asked him to appoint a special Commissioner for labor supply, my own non-political authority being insufficient for this task. I proposed Gauleiter Hanke for this appointment. He had been one of Goebbels' close collaborators for many years, but had to leave owing to serious personal differences. I considered him a suitable candidate, since he knew the Berlin political scene and simultaneously, as Gauleiter of Lower Silesia, was familiar with the regional problems. Hitler, at first, was in full agreement with my proposal. The next day, however, I learnt that Saukel would be put in charge of labor supply, and not Hanke. It was explained to me that the old Gauleiters could not be expected to take orders from a young Gauleiter like Hanke. Saukel would be more capable of asserting his authority, and he had also displayed ability in economic matters as director of the Gustloff-Werke.....

This report goes on to detail the differences between Speer and Saukel.

17. Intelligence Report No. EF/IM/2, p.3.

"Q: How did the Main Committees enter the labor control picture?

"A: The Main and Special Committees had appointed a representative to Schmelter of the Rustungsamt (armament bureau). They reported their consolidated requirements of labor to him. This then was the basis for our demand for labor to Saukel. The Main Commission gave us regularly reports on the labor supplied to them. Aside from that, the Rustungsinspektionen recorded the total figures of employment and requirements."

18. R & A No. 3114.8, p. 29. FO Biography of Speer.

19. Interrogation of Speer, June 1, p. 1.

"As part of their campaign, the SS attempted to make it a condition in allocating labor from concentration camps

that plants receiving such labor should pass under SS management, and that the profits should go to the SS. Speer opposed this scheme because he feared the inefficiency that would result from technical management passing into the hands of the SS. Finally a compromise was arrived at whereby the Speer Ministry was to retain control as regards technical management, while the SS would be in charge of labor management and conditions of work. No labor other than from concentration camps was to be employed in such plants. Speer thought there were quite a number of factories run on this basis, including BMW-ALLACH and Daimler-Benz-MITTELWERK. The head of Speer's Arbeitsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz, Herr Schmiedler, was in charge of the negotiations with the SS and knows the details.

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3. The SS Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs Hauptcamp existed already in 1942 when Speer became Minister. He confirmed that it was in full charge of SS industrial activities. Its chief, Pohl negotiated with Schmiedler on the supply of concentration camp inmates for work in industry....."