

Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter

By Lt. Col. S.W. Brookhart

Time 13 November 1945, AM & PM

Schellenberg stated that Kaltenbrunner was certainly able to influence conditions in concentration camps from November 1944 until the end of the war, as he saw Hitler daily. Kaltenbrunner participated in the Fuehrer's conferences and often stayed with Hitler from three or four o'clock in the afternoon until four o'clock in the morning. Schellenberg accompanied Kaltenbrunner to the Chancellery and also reported to him there a couple of times.

Himmler gave assurance to Musy in February 1945 that 1,200 Jews would be sent to Switzerland by train, every two weeks. Schellenberg had to organize the whole thing for Himmler. When Hitler learned of the arrangements, he threatened all those who helped Jews reach Switzerland with the death penalty. Himmler's assurance to Musy that no concentration camp would be evacuated was given after Hitler forbade further transfers of Jews. Musy had instructions from Himmler to inform Allied Western Powers of these assurances. Musy left Berlin 7 April 1945 with this instruction. On 10 April 1945, Musy Jr. returned from Switzerland to take care of a Jewish family in Buchenwald. He arrived in the middle of the evacuation of the camp contrary to Himmler's assurances, and hurried to report to Schellenberg. Schellenberg first telephoned Himmler, then discussed the matter with Kaltenbrunner at lunch. The next day Kaltenbrunner stated that this evacuation was done on order of Hitler and the camp had to be evacuated. Mueller was present and said: "You, Kaltenbrunner, told me already three or four days earlier that I should evacuate the most important Jews from this camp to the South". Then Kaltenbrunner said: "Yes, yes, that is correct. Besides, there is a general directive of Hitler's to the effect that all camps should be evacuated and especially Jews should be regarded as hostages and brought to the South". Kaltenbrunner then stated to Schellenberg: "There are still enough people remaining in the camp so that you can console Musy with that."

Schellenberg is unable to remember details about Einsatz Groups as he only participated in the first discussions and in the draft of the agreement. However, he knew the set up in relation to the military organization was as follows:

- | | | |
|------------------|---|------------|
| a. Einsatz Group | - | Army Group |
| b. Kommando | - | Army |
| c. Squad | - | Division |

At a large OKW meeting, about the end of May or the beginning of June 1941, the new set up was disclosed and discussed. Present were all I-C and I-CAO from Armies and Divisions, as well as the Einsatz Group and Kommando Chiefs. The war plans were shown on big maps and the sectors were

(Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter - - - 13 November 1945 - - AM & PM con'td)

distributed to the groups. Special emphasis was given to the so-called Rollbahnen (Main Supply Lines), and one of the main tasks of the Einsatz Groups was to keep these lines open.

Schellenberg, by way of correcting his testimony of the previous day, stated that QM General Wagner represented OKH instead of OKW. Wagner was present at this meeting and witness assumes that OKW was represented by Admiral Canaris. RSHA was represented by Heydrich.

Schellenberg had participated as Heydrich's assistant in the discussions preceding the conclusion of the agreement. Furthermore, Mueller from Amt IV and Streckenbach from Amt I, took part. Together with Wagner, Schellenberg handled technical matters as for instance supply problems. The Sipo and SD did not like to be completely subordinated to the Army, but Schellenberg agreed to Wagner's suggestion that members of Einsatz Groups should be completely under Army control in the front area, as they were to work in close co-operation with the Wehrmacht.

There was no apparent opposition to the agreement from OKW, on the outside, but probably from the inside. Schellenberg knows that the agreement had been signed by Heydrich on behalf of the RSHA and by Wagner on behalf of OKH, but does not know of any other signatures.

Himmler's directives to the Einsatz Groups and Kommandos must have been distributed shortly before the invasion of Russia, as Schellenberg had heard that the sealed orders were opened by Streckenbach right at the start.

Schellenberg does not know anything as to figures pertaining to executions contained in document R-102, but does know that things described in the report took place. Schellenberg was unable to give anything definite regarding Stahlocker's report upon Einsatz Group A between 22 June and 15 October 1941 concerning the liquidation of 135,000 Jews. Schellenberg stated that activities of Einsatz Groups were only of interest to him so far as they founded supply strength points which he (Schellenberg) used in 1942, for separate Einsatz Kommandos under Action "Zeppelin". As to Himmler's second order for complete liquidation of Jews and Communist Commissars (in September 1941), Schellenberg stated he only knows that this kind of directive existed but can recall no written orders.

Witness stated Einsatz Group Leaders were selected by Heydrich in co-operation with the Chief of Amt I, but the Chiefs of Amts II and IV also played a role.

Schellenberg had the feeling that an attempt was made to put all higher leaders of the Secret Police and SD in as leaders of Einsatz Groups in order to commit them morally. It was rumored at the time appointments were being made, that they would involve mass liquidations and atrocities.

Attempts were made repeatedly to give Schellenberg a command at the front, and every time Schellenberg was in bad grace, it was tried again. Mueller, Ohlendorf, Nebe, Heydrich and possibly other forces from the outside

(Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter 13 November 1945, AM & PM cont'd)

were active in trying to give Schellenberg a front command. Schellenberg avoided such command, first by making himself irreplaceable in his work and secondly by help of Mrs. Heydrich. Mrs. Heydrich knew that her husband wanted Schellenberg removed, but she spoke against it. Schellenberg stated Mrs. Heydrich liked him very much, but nothing else. Heydrich always had a bad conscience towards her (Mrs. Heydrich). Mrs. Heydrich was not responsible for witness avoiding service, but the atmosphere created by her influence was in favor of his not being sent to the front.

As to actual operational orders, Schellenberg was unable to pass judgement on the extent Army, Corps, or Division Headquarters directed Einsatz Groups in their activities. On the basis of what he was told by Six and Nebe, he came to the conclusion that very much depended upon the individual personalities of the commanders as to the connection between Army units and the Einsatz Groups. Einsatz Groups were always in Russia and also participated in the withdrawal. They often fought together with the regular troops and on certain occasions and places they were even put into action in order to bolster up resistance of regular troops. Witness assumes the structure of the organization remained throughout the war.

Witness states the Kommandostab in RSHA was an attempt to balance the professional competition between Amts III and IV. The other Amts also were supposed to have representatives on Kommandostab, but they were of no professional significance.

Witness believes Kommandostab met once a week. For a time he had a representative on the staff because he was interested in the Action "Zeppelin", but he personally never participated.

In the afternoon session Schellenberg described the so-called Zeppelin mission. This mission was started in 1942 for the purpose of picking from Russian Prisoners of War, intelligent and suitable people to be employed behind the Russian lines. The Prisoners were selected with the help of all Kommandos and turned over for training at the rear. They were specially trained in wireless communication. Schellenberg laid down the policy, but did not participate in the execution of the mission.

January 1943, Schellenberg called a meeting of Kommandos from the Zeppelin mission in Breslau. After the defeat at Stalingrad and the general withdrawal it became increasingly difficult to recruit agents and it was decided to turn from planned mass action to individual activity. Prisoners of War were secured from the camps and sent to Russia after training.

Schellenberg said the German Intelligence failed completely to obtain any information about the American atomic bomb. The only thing known in Germany was that experiments with atom smashing were being carried on. Schellenberg had planned to get in touch with the Hungarian professor, Heussy, who lived in Stockholm and was a friend of Professor Nils Bohr, whom he knew was in the States. Nothing came of this plan. From Lisbon and Madrid Amt Mil received some magazine articles. Schellenberg gave as reasons for the

(Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter 13 November 1945, AM & PM cont'd)

failure of the intelligence service (a) Amt VI was only concerned with political matters; (b) Amt Mil did not have technical persons qualified for an investigation in this highly scientific field. When Schellenberg recruited engineers and scientists, they showed no understanding for secret service.

By the end of 1944, Schellenberg had sent new people into Spain and Switzerland, but no reports were received. In the States, he had no active intelligence service. All efforts failed from the beginning. The so-called special U-Boat Kommandos were a complete failure; one U-Boat was believed to have been sunk because nothing was heard from it, and the agents who landed from another were captured almost immediately by the FBI.

Other efforts in neutral countries, so-called "Glacier" countries, in order to gain information about North America, also failed completely.

Schellenberg believed that before he took over Amt Mil, it possibly attempted to obtain information from the States, but does not think these attempts were successful. There was a wireless connection with a secret station near New York, but this station probably was under the control of the FBI.

Amt Mil had a certain success in its attempts to send agents money and supplies to Argentina. Two shipments by sailboat were made in the spring of 1944. Another shipment planned for Spring 1945 never materialized. The Naval technical preparations were made by Captain Schuchman. Johannes Siegfried Becker, the so-called Chief Commissioner to Argentina, and the Chief Wireless Operator Franzoch received the shipment.

At the end of 1942, an arrangement was made with Telefunken through which assets this firm had in Argentina were turned over to agents there and Telefunken received the equivalent in Reichsmarks in Germany.

Schellenberg stated that the German Intelligence Service failed badly in intelligence about D-Day. Schellenberg described in detail how the Allied Intelligence Service fooled the Germans by spreading an incredible number of misleading rumors.

Through co-operation from the end of 1943, of Himmler's Doctor Kersten, Schellenberg gained astrological influence over Himmler. The astrologer Wulff of Hamburg was introduced to Himmler and soon won his confidence. Schellenberg then worked through Wulff. Wulff made a horoscope of Hitler which turned out to be quite true, and Himmler came more and more under the influence of Wulff and thereby also under Schellenberg. Schellenberg's objective was to influence Himmler to remove Hitler.

After 20 July 1944, Kaltenbrunner and Fegelein did their utmost to undermine Himmler's position with Hitler. Schellenberg suspects that Himmler had known of the plot of 20 July 1944 and that this was learned during the course of interrogations made under Kaltenbrunner's direction. Schellenberg bases his assumption on the fact that Himmler's influence declined and Kaltenbrunner's increased. Schellenberg had the impression that Himmler was under pressure from Kaltenbrunner.

(Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter 13 November 1945, AM & PM cont'd)

On 28 April 1945, Schellenberg returned to Luebeck from Copenhagen where he had been negotiating with Count Bernadott. The negotiations concerned Himmler's offer of surrender to the Western Powers. The offer was rejected.

The negotiations in connection with Himmler's surrender offer were widely broadcast by the Western Powers and were brought to Hitler's knowledge. Obergruppenführer Dr. Rapp, VI C, told Schellenberg that Hitler ordered Himmler's arrest and that it was announced over the German radio Himmler had been deprived of all offices. When Schellenberg met Himmler he did not show signs of having taken any notice of this. On the contrary, he was displeased with the fact that he was not already Hitler's successor as he had told Schellenberg three days before that he would be. Schellenberg felt that something had gone wrong with Himmler's plans to remove Hitler.

When Schellenberg saw Himmler on 1 May 1945, 9 a.m., he found him a nervous wreck. Himmler could not comprehend that Doenitz was now Chief of State. Himmler tried to help Schellenberg in his plans to prevent Norway and Denmark from becoming battle grounds; also Himmler advised Doenitz to appoint Schellenberg State Secretary in the Foreign Office or at least advisor to Schwerin-Krosigh.

Schellenberg states that during the last month a complete political change in Himmler had taken place, so to say, a break with his past and a regret that he had put all his hope in Hitler. Himmler's plans to remove Hitler involved the creation of a new Government, disillusion of the Nazi Party, creation of a new Party.

Schellenberg stated that it is possible Steiner, Hildebrand and Gottberg (who also wanted to remove Hitler) also had influence on Himmler.

To the end, Ohlendorf declined to take part in any conspiracy against Hitler as he considered it un-German.

Bormann was as always the strong and evil spirit near Hitler.

Kaltenbrunner was to the end a faithful follower of Hitler's. Kaltenbrunner considered Himmler's plan as weakness. On 24 or 26 April 1945, Kaltenbrunner removed Schellenberg from his posts in Amt Mil and Amt VI and appointed his friends Wanneck and Skorzeny as new Chiefs. After the new Chiefs took over, they told the personnel of the two Amts that Schellenberg had been removed because he was politically unreliable together with Himmler.

Schellenberg repeated that Kaltenbrunner took regular part in the daily discussions at the Führer's Headquarters in the afternoons and at night. Others present at the conferences were Jodl, Keitel, Winter and Fegelein.

Schellenberg had never seen document 498-PS, Hitler Order of 18 October 1942, re treatment of commandos and parachutists, but he identified Hitler's signature. Schellenberg had heard of this order but had never known

(Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter ... 13 November 1945, AM & PM cont'd)

the details. He had heard through group leader from VI D or through Skorzeny from IV S that commandos would no more be treated as PW's. For that reason Schellenberg considered it very important that members of his commando missions always carried uniforms.

Schellenberg said that it was the first time he was introduced to problems discussed in document 540-PS.

Schellenberg stated that he had never seen any documents showing Kaltenbrunner had direct communication with OKW, but Kaltenbrunner's position from 1944 to the end was so powerful that he certainly could have dealt with the highest echelon of the State set-up.

Schellenberg stated that the draft of document 2519-PS was not in Kaltenbrunner's handwriting and after some perusal he stated that the handwriting had a resemblance to Scheidler's.