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Report of Interrogation #5827

24 October 1945

I/O : Capt. HALL

P/W : : Von Rintelen, Emil
Rank : Ambassador at Large
Unit : Foreign Office, Berlin
Capt'd : 7 May 1945, Garmisch-Patenkirchen.

Veracity : Believed reliable.

Report : Answers to Questionnaire submitted by War Crimes Commission, Oct 45.

Q.1. Secure personal biography of P/W from birth in Stettin 10 January 1897 to his capture 7 May 1945 in Garmisch-Patenkirchen, including all official positions held, beginning with the appointment as Attache in the Foreign Office of Berlin 1 July 1921, (all as covered in Report of Interrogation " 8509 by G-2).

A.-1. Civilian History :

10 Jan 1897 : Born in Stettin. Took his Abitur in Berlin in 1915.
1915 - 1919 : Fought in World War I - Fought on all fronts and was discharged in Feb 1919 as a Lt in the Reserve.
1919 - 1921 : Studies law and political science at the universities of Berlin and Kiel.
1 Jul 1921 : Was appointed attache in the Foreign Office and remained in Berlin for 2 years.
Jan 1923 : Was appointed Legations secretary to the German Embassy in Paris.
Dec 1928 : Appointed Legations councillor at the German Legation in Warsaw.
Sep 1932 : Recalled to Berlin and was appointed head of the Western European section. In his early activity in this dept, the countries that came under this section were France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. In 1936, Great Britain and Ireland were also included.
Jun 1940 : Was appointed Assistant Chief of the Political Section of the Foreign Office which included all countries. At the same time, he was appointed 1st class envoy.
Mar 1943 : Was appointed Ambassador at large.
Apr 43 to Jan 1944 : Because ill with a liver ailment, was not active in any Foreign Office work. P/W describes his ailment as largely due to working with Ribbentrop who apparently was a very difficult man to get along with.
Jan 1944 : Published a weekly secret report that was distributed to various Government agencies. The material for this report was obtained from radio monitoring, foreign press notices and reports coming into the Foreign office. At the same time, P/W was a sort of coordinator who acted as a mediator between the different departments seeing to it that the various departments of the foreign office did not duplicate each others work. Was in Berlin until
14 Apr 1944 : at which time he was ordered to go to Garmisch-Patenkirchen where about 50 members of the Foreign Office were to be sent

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in order that the Foreign Office could continue to function even if Berlin was taken by the Russians. The plan never was carried out since it was started too late. Only a very few department heads reached this destination.

7 May 1945 : P/W was captured at Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

Political History : P/W is a Catholic and as he says, tried to stay out of the Party. However, in the late 1939, he was told that unless he became a Party member, he would not be advanced in the Foreign Office and furthermore, that he would be suspected of being a member of the opposition. P/W became a member of the Party in 1940.

Q.-2. Give the nature of the work you did in each of the official positions you held, the jurisdiction you exercised in each, and the opportunity you had in each to observe and become familiar with the development and carrying out of German foreign policy from 1921 until the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939.

A.-2. P/W was an Attache in the Foreign Office from 1921 to 1923 and was an Assistant in the subdivision for the occupied areas of the Rhineland. As a secretary at the German Embassy in Paris from 1923 to 1926, he likewise was occupied with problems of the occupied Rhineland, as well as minor matters of the conference of ambassadors. As a councillor of embassy at the German Embassy in Warsaw he took care of all problems of German-Polish relations. There he was in an independent position as charge d'affaires representing the German Ambassador in his absence. Rauscher and Von Moltke, both of whom have since died, were the German Ambassadors to Warsaw at that time. P/W was in charge of Western European affairs in the political department of the Foreign Office from 1932 to 1940. He handled the problems in the relations of Germany to the Western European countries, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and after 1936 also Great-Britain and Eire. He also took care of the daily routine with the Berlin Embassies of the above-mentioned countries. In his position, P/W had no authority for decisions, which were made by the head of the department (Ministerialdirektor Koepke later on the Ministerialdirektors Dieckhoff and von Weissaecker and after

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1938, Unterstaatssekretär Weermann). Even during his activity as deputy head of the political department, from 1940 to 1943, P/W was not supposed to make final decisions. His job from 1941 to 1943 was to keep up liaison between Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop's field headquarters and the different divisions of the Foreign Office. He was to submit incoming documents to the Foreign Minister and forward the Minister's orders, but he had no decisive authority. P/W's authority as Ambassador-for-special-tasks from 1943 to 1945 was limited to gathering of information on foreign policy for the high authorities of the Reich without having any competence for decisions. A member of the Foreign Office he was able to observe the development of German foreign policy from 1921 to 1939. He became acquainted with the facts causing the German Government to sign the Locarno agreement when P/W was a member of the German Embassy at Paris. During his activity in Warsaw, P/W's knowledge of foreign policy was limited to the German-Polish relations. When P/W was the specialist for Western European affairs from 1932 - 1939, his insight into political developments was limited to problems which were either questions of open discussions or questions of negotiations with Western European governments. Since the beginning of the Nazi regime the decisive actions of foreign policy such as the departure from the League of Nations, the breaking of the disarmament clauses of Versailles, the occupation of the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, were all products of Hitler's surprise tactics and previously unknown to P/W as well as to the German people.

Q.-3. What is your religious or church affiliation ?

A.-3. P/W is a Roman-Catholic and has brought up his children in this faith.

Q.-4. When did you become a member of the Nazi Party and under what circumstances, that is what influences led you to join the Party ?

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A.-4. P/W did not become a member of the Nazi Party until the early part of 1940, and only then because Ministerialdirektor Kriebel, at that time the head of the personnel section of the Foreign Office, stated positively that if he did not join he would no longer be able to count on being promoted, in view of the regulations published in 1939 regarding the recommendation of officials, and not only that, but also that he would place P/W under suspicion of being against the government. He therefore thought it necessary to join the Party, since he could only say that in the face of the terroristic character of the Nazi regime, which became more and more evident after the outbreak of the war, the failure to take this step could make the Axis doubt his political reliability and wreak the certain ruin of him and his family without doing the public interest any good.

Q.-5. Were you in sympathy with the aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and with the means used by it for the accomplishment of those aims and purposes, when you joined the Party?

A.-5. Neither did P/W agree with the goal and ideas of the NSDAP when he became a member of the Party in 1940, nor did he sympathize with the means used to reach the goals and purposes.

Q.-6. If the answer to question 5 is the negative, give in detail the reasons why you were not in sympathy with those aims, purposes and means.

A.-6. P/W considered the goals and purposes of the Nazi Party described by Adolf Hitler in "Mein Kampf" as eccentric, unjustified, and unobtainable through normal policies. He saw in them a discrediting of the basic tasks of government: the securing of free prosperity for its citizens and keeping the country out of dangers from abroad. Hitler's intention to make the German people in their majority narrow-minded, inhuman, hateful, and hostile to all liberal thinking, seemed naive and without reality. His fanaticism and intolerance were in straight contrast to P/W's own belief. A convinced

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follower of the idea of a state based on law and order, of the principles of freedom of personality and individual responsibility, P/W could only deeply regret and condemn the Gestapo and terror-methods of the Nazi regime, the persecution of the Jews and opponents of the regime. P/W never believed that the Nazis would succeed in convincing the majority of Germans of their philosophy of life. On the contrary he expected an increase in the hidden opposition against the Nazi doctrines and hoped that this would some day result in a change of government. It was clear to P/W that the so-called totalitarian system would suffocate Germany's cultural life. Hitler's goals in foreign policy seemed wrong to him and destined to fail. This goes especially for the intention to acquire new regions in the east for the German people as described in "Mein Kampf". Even before the war, P/W was convinced that a further policy of conquest in the east would not be allowed by the other powers. He only could detest the methods, which were nonetheless used by Hitler to start the war and by which Germany became the aggressor in the eyes of the world. This must be regarded as a serious sin against the German people and a frivolous play with the fate of millions, without regard to the end in view. P/W's wife can testify that he came home one evening with the words : "These criminals ! They do not seem to know what they are doing. We will have war". P/W said this in August 1939 when he became convinced that the Polish crisis was intentionally being pressed by Hitler and Ribbentrop to start the war. The action of the Nazi government seemed inconceivable to P/W and he often quoted the Latin epigram : "Quos deus vult perdere prius dementat". (God first maddens those whom he intends to destroy). P/W was obsessed by the beginning of a new world war leading to a catastrophe for Germany to such a degree that he could not have any sympathy for the regime

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committing such a crime, not even to mention all other facts. His conviction always branded the regime as a horrible one.

Q.-7. How soon after world war I did the ruling powers in Germany form the determination to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany and to re-acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of World War I.

A.-7. P/W has no doubts that at least until the resignation of Chancellor Brüning in 1932 the responsible governments in Germany always intended to effect improvement or change in the regulations of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means in conferences with the victor-nations. None of these governments considered a one sided withdrawal from the regulations from the Treaty or an armed attempt to regain the territories lost in 1920. During the chancellershops of von Papen and Schleicher the situation in domestic policies as well as in economy became strained to such a degree that the idea of withdrawing from the Versailles Treaty and its regulations could not possibly have grown stronger. P/W believes that the resolution for the one sided withdrawal from the regulations of the Treaty dates back to the entering of Hitler into the Government. Before, the German policy repeatedly mentioned this point of view only in connection with the stalemate in the Geneva disarmament conference, and claimed that disarmament under the Versailles Treaty was mandatory for all its signatories and that not Germany alone could remain disarmed for a long time. The disarmament of Germany was supervised by the inter-allied military control commission in Germany until January 1927. If after this time and before 1933, offences against the rules of disarmament were committed and if, with the knowledge and approval of the German Government, P/W doesn't know about them.

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Q.-8. Do you recall political activities of the German officer's corps, in line with the determination referred to in question 7, prior to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933?

A.-8. Political activities in the German officer corps before Hitler became chancellor, as well as the aims of these activities, mentioned in question 7 are not known to P/W. P/W wants to emphasize that he was continually abroad from 1923 until September 1932, and did not have any opportunity to get acquainted with those matters.

Q.-9. Tell what you recall about the super-nationalist government in Bavaria in 1923, under General Ludendorff and his follower, Adolf Hitler, which broke with the Government of the Reich and contended for local power in Bavaria using organizations marching under the swastika symbol.

A.-9. Hitler's and Ludendorff's attempt to set up a super-nationalistic government in Munich in 1923 is known to P/W only by the commentary in the newspapers. He was in Paris at that time, where the German Embassy was very busy settling the Ruhr conflict between Germany and France. As far as he remembers, Hitler first tried to compel the Bavarian Government, especially both the General State Commissar von Kahr and the Land Commandant General von Lossow, to join his "Putsch" to which both had at first agreed at the meeting in the "Buergerbrau Keller" on 8 November, but then immediately changed their mind. The next day the march to the Feldherrnhalle took place, which was led by Hitler and Ludendorff, and ended with total failure and the death of 19 participants. The swastika banner is said to have been carried by Julius Streicher during this march.

Q.-10. What, if you know, were the aims of the super-nationalistic government in Bavaria referred to in question 9?

A.-10. P/W does not know the goals Hitler and Ludendorff had in November 1923. He cannot imagine that they felt strong enough to seize the power in Germany at this time. The Bavarian Government then, was in an acute conflict with the Central Government in Berlin. It is possible that Hitler and Ludendorff thought

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they would assume power in Bavaria and to use it as a springboard for the power in Germany.

Q.-11. Tell as much as you can about the activities of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, in 1923, in stabilizing the Mark.

A.-11. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht's activities concerning the stabilization of the Reichsmark in 1923 are not known to P/W in detail as he was at the Embassy in Paris, as above mentioned, completely occupied with other questions. P/W knows only that Schacht, at that time, was Reichs-Währungs-Kommissar (Commissar for the currency of the Reich) and that he became President of the Reichsbank. He played an important role in stabilizing the Reichsmark.

Q.-12. Give any ideas you may have as to why the mark was previously allowed to run through the course of inflation until one pre-stabilization mark came to be worth only one-one-trillionth of the value of one new Reichsmark.

A.-12. In answer to this question P/W can only say what he still remembers about the connection between the development of the currency policy and the development of politics in the years from 1921 to 1923. At the London Conference in March 1921, the then German Foreign Minister Simons refused to accept the so-called Paris Plan for the payment of German reparation debts. Because this refusal, the Rhineland cities of Duisburg, Duesseldorf and Elberfeld were seized as measures of enforcement and the Reparation Commission in Paris fixed the German reparation debt at 132 billion Goldmarks without giving the Germans a hearing. Early in May 1921 the German Government was driven to accept this decision through the so-called London ultimatum which threatened the occupation of the Ruhr in case of non-acceptance. The acceptance was made by the newly formed cabinet under Wirth. Under him the "Complying Policy" started. But in December 1921 the German Government had to ask the Reparation Commission for a postponement

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of the payments. At the Cannes Conference, the German Minister Rathenau warned the Premiers of Great Britain and France, Lloyd George and Aristide Briand, of the consequences of a continued reparation policy which compelled Germany to live on its capital.

The first threatening symptoms of inflation appeared after Rathenau's assassination in the summer of 1922. In July 1922, the Mark was at a level of 360 Mark to the Dollar, and early in August 1922 the Dollar was already at 800 Marks. This devaluation increased and, in November 1922, the Mark was at a level of 9,000 Mark to 1 Dollar. France's occupation of the Ruhr sector in January 1923 and the effort of the French Premier Poincare to force the payment of reparations by military power sped the fall of the Mark still more, so at the end of January 1923, the Dollar had reached the number 48,000. This development was not favorable for a policy of passive resistance. At the time of Cuno's Chancellorship, in March 1923, strong efforts were made to raise the value of the Mark. This only succeeded so far that in the second half of March the Dollar had decreased to 22,000 Mark. In April the downside again gained momentum as it became clearer that the passive resistance policy could not be maintained. In August, the Cuno cabinet resigned and made place for the Stresemann cabinet which in September proclaimed the end of passive resistance. Next, Poincare refused to let this proclamation pass and adhered to the policy in accordance with which he had occupied the Ruhr. In October 1923 he finally agreed to a commission of finance experts for a new examination of the reparation question, because of American and British pressure. In December 1923, he was willing to enter discussions with the German government over the settlement of the Ruhr-conflict. Meanwhile, the Mark had reached its lowest

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value of 4,200,000,000 Marks for 1 Dollar, a point where the currency was worth nothing. In November 1923, the stabilization of the Mark on the basis of 1 Billion (Trillion) paper Marks to 1 new Mark seemed only to be a theoretical solution but proved successful. Present visualization of the relation between the Mark devaluation and the development of the reparation problem : the low level of the Mark in summer 1923 was closely connected with the collapse of the passive resistance in the Rhineland and the Ruhr area. The stabilization was in connection with Poincare's agreeing to bring the reparations problem before an international commission of experts. This commission, known as the Dawes-Committee met in January 1924 in Paris.

Q.-13. Was not the inflation thus allowed to run its course for the deliberate purpose of enabling Germany to repudiate the reparations payments called for by the Treaty of Versailles ?

A.-13. The assumption that the inflation in Germany was created to justify a refusal of the reparation payments according to the Versailles Treaty is contrary to the fact that no such refusal took place. At that time, the question was not whether Germany was able to pay the reparations but only how the reparations were to be made. The German Government left no doubt that it considered Poincare's policies wrong, but Chancellor Cuno and still more the later Chancellor Stresemann were willing to pledge production as security for the reparation claims of the Allies. This German proposal induced the British Government to demand the consent of France to an examination of that pledge-offer by the Allies. The exchange of notes between London and Paris over that question was the basis for the meeting of the Dawes Committee. The result was the Dawes Plan of April 1924 which was accepted as the future basis for the regulation of the reparation problem by the powers taking part in the London conference in August 1924.

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Q.-14. Tell what you know about the abortive Munich beer hall putsch of 1923 including a statement as to what were the aims and purposes of that putsch?

A.-14. The information which P/S has on the Munich Putsch of 1923 is given in questions 9 and 10. He was in Paris at that time, and thus only knows about it from the newspapers.

Q.-15. Was not the aim of the Munich Putsch of 1923 to overthrow the Weimar Republic by direct action and violence?

A.-15. It is P/S's personal opinion that it was the purpose of the Munich Putsch 1923 to liquidate the Weimar Constitution by direct action. Ludendorff and Hitler thought to come to power as legally as Hitler was able to in 1933. P/S does not know what the considerations of the rioters were because he was living abroad and believed the Munich events of little importance as did the rest of the world. The Putsch in Munich seemed to be a badly prepared repetition of the Kapp Putsch of Berlin in 1920 which also was unsuccessful. Ludendorff had his hands in that Putsch too.

Q.-16. After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923, how did the Nazi Party set about seeking to acquire power in Germany -- was it not by the use of terrorism by the use of which the Nazi Party sought to acquire power by legal forms?

A.-16. P/S himself was little able to observe how the Nazi Party attempted to win power in Germany after the failure of the Munich Putsch in 1923., since he was in Germany only for short periods of time up to fall of 1932. He knows only that they made a lot of propaganda for their cause and thereby attracted an increasing amount of public attention. He could not say to what extent the Nazis committed acts of terrorism in coming to power, but in the years in question no elections were held without there being violence between the members of the radical right and the radical left. Hitler laid down the rule that one could answer leftist terrorism with a terrorism of one's own.

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and necessarily brought it about that the Nazis used their terroristic methods everywhere they met resistance. Hitler had very evidently learned from the failure of 1923 that he could not come into power under legal forms until he succeeded in building up a party electorate which was so strong that the party would have to be taken into consideration in future formations of the cabinet. This state of affairs came to pass when the economic crisis began to exert its full effect in Germany. The great mass of those affected by the depression went over to Hitler, believing in his promises and contributing to the growth of a strong Nazi faction in the Reichstag.

Q.-17. Tell as much as you know about the creation of the "SA" (Sturmabteilung) and its early use, following the Munich Putsch as an instrument of terrorism by the use of which the Nazi Party sought to acquire power by legal forms.

A.-17. P/W can say little about the creation of the SA and its use for terroristic purposes after the failure of the Munich Putsch in 1923, since P/W lived mostly abroad until the end of 1932. At the end of 1932 and particularly in the first months of 1933 he was able to observe in Berlin that the SA units were continually holding demonstrations and going on marches to impress the populace and convince them of the irresistible power of the Nazi Party. And at that same time, right after the so-called "Machtergreifung" of January 1933, terroristic methods became evident, passers-by on the streets who did not meet the Swastika banners of the SA units with the Hitler salute exposing themselves to mistreatment.

Q.-18. Who were the leading spirits in the Nazi Party at this time, that is immediately following the Munich Putsch?

A.-18. P/W has no personal knowledge as to who the principal people in the Nazi camp were after the Munich Putsch. In accordance with what was to be heard later, Julius Streicher, Rudolf Hess, Alfred Rosenberg, and Alfred Roehm were among the close followers of Hitler at a very early date.

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At the time of the Munich Putsch Colonel Kriebel was especially close to Hitler, he being specially made general consul in Shanghai by Hitler after the seizure of power, and several years later becoming Ministerialdirektor and head of the personnel section in the Foreign Office, until he died in 1944.

Q.-19. Tell what you know about how Hitler happened to become Chancellor of the German Republic on 30 January 1933 and about what part, if any, Franz von Papen played in causing Hitler to be named Chancellor.

A.-19. The events which led to Hitler's being named Reichskanzler are not known to P/W in detail. He knows only from what people said later that this selection was made on the basis of a rapprochement between Hitler and von Papen which was brought about by Ribbentrop. P/W does not know who suggested to Reichspräsident von Hindenburg that Hitler be named Reichskanzler, or whether von Papen had very much to do with it. He suspects that Papen was involved only because it was well-known that Reichspräsident von Hindenburg relied greatly on the judgment of Papen, and probably quite a bit of influence had had to be exerted on Hindenburg to persuade him to name Hitler to the post of Reichskanzler.

Q.-20. Tell what you know about the relationship at this time between Hitler and Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Alfred Rosenberg, Martin Bormann, Fritz Sakel, and Baldur von Schirach.

A.-20. The P/W has no personal knowledge concerning the relations between Hitler and Göring, Rudolf Hess, Alfred Rosenberg, Martin Bormann, Fritz Sauckel, and Baldur von Schirach at the beginning of 1933. P/W was a strong opponent to the Nazi camp, so that he knew very little about what went on in it. The fact that Göring was immediately entrusted with the most important functions of the state may allow one to conclude that he was particularly close to Hitler at that time. Rudolf Hess, Baldur von Schirach and Fritz Sauckel retained their important party positions as representatives of the

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Fuehrer, Leader of the Hitler Youth, and Gauleiter of Thuringen. P/W remembers of Gauckel that in the early part of 1933 he made a speech from which the newspapers picked as the leading phrase "I now order intolerance of all else". At first Alfred Rosenberg continued to work as editor of the "Voelkischer Beobachter", the official organ of the Nazi Party, and in addition as head of the foreign political section of the Nazi Party sought to gain influence on foreign policy. Since Hitler soon made him "Director of all Philosophical Indoctrination", he was beyond doubt specially trusted by Hitler. In 1933, Martin Bormann was almost unknown. He did not assume importance until the years of war.

Q.-21. Tell what you know about the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933 and about the subsequent trials.

A.-21. P/W was a witness of the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, since at that time he lived quite nearby, but of course he knew nothing of the surrounding circumstances. But no more than two or three days later there was a rumor going around in Berlin that the Nazis had laid the fire themselves, which rumor received general credence, since the Nazis were considered capable of anything. P/W for his part believed this rumor because the way in which the state represented the affair to the public seemed suspicious. This impression could only be strengthened when the trial of the alleged arsonist began in Berlin. At that time, and also later, P/W met one of the judges in the trial, Reichsgerichtsrat Froelich from Leipzig, and this man stated that the conduct of the trial was by no means above question. He would doubtless be able to give important information on this subject.

Q.-22. What is your best judgement as to the relationship of the Reichstag fire and the trials to the aims and purposes of Hitler and the Nazi Party, at the time, to acquire political control in Germany?

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A.-22. P/W is convinced that the Reichstag fire and the subsequent institution of process against the man who allegedly set it were for the purpose of creating a feeling in the German people which would help discredit the Communists and furnish pretext for the later step of prohibiting first the leftist parties, then finally all parties except the Nazi Party. The Reichstag fire, if P/W remembers right, was about a week before the elections to the Reichstag; it was beyond doubt intended to influence them by decrying the Russian leftists as arsonists and common criminals. Insofar P/W believes that the Reichstag fire was a milestone along the way from the legal naming of Hitler to be Reichskanzler to the illegal goal of putting the Nazi Party in absolute power. The Nazis had held political control in Germany since 30 January 1933. What they wanted to attain was the complete removal of all other political factions.

Q.-23. After the Reichstag fire do you recall that the Nazis suspended clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the Press of associations and assembly and do you recall which articles of the constitution they were and how they were suspended?

A.-23. P/W does not remember that certain articles of the Weimar Constitution were expressly invalidated after the burning of the Reichstag, but it could probably be clearly seen at that time that the Nazis were not concerned to keep to the conditions of the constitution. Since fanaticism and intolerance became the official commandments of the Nazis, one could expect anything of the except respect for individual freedom, or freedom of speech for those who were of different views. To P/W's knowledge the Weimar Constitution was never specifically set out of force, either in whole or in part. It was simply removed from practical effect by contradicting laws and regulations of the government, finally becoming obsolete. Its former validity was used only to show the legality of the seizure of power, which appearance of legality Hitler probably valued for reasons of propaganda and the effect abroad.

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Q.-24. Are you familiar with the fact that after the Nazis secured the passage by the Reichstag of the "Law for the protection of the People and the Reich", giving Hitler and the members of his then Cabinet plenary powers of legislation, they retained those extra-ordinary powers after having changed the members of the cabinet ?

A.-24. P/W is familiar with the fact that the Nazis made the Enabling Act much more the legal basis for their government, although the composition of the cabinet had changed. The law was relied upon for propagandistic purposes, and probably also to present to the old Reichspräsident von Hindenburg the appearance of the continuation of the old constitutional conditions. In reality the Nazis considered themselves to be masters of Germany out of their own revolutionary right. This belief received definite expression in that in the jargon of the Party one spoke always of the seizure of power, and never of the assumption of constitutional functions by members of the Party. After the death of Reichspräsident von Hindenburg hardly anyone saw need for justifying any measures as constitutional any more.

Q.-25. What changes in the cabinet membership were made at this time ?

A.-25. The changes in the composition of the cabinet after Hitler was named Reichskanzler P/W cannot remember in detail any longer. Important events in any case were the quick withdrawal of Hugenberg from the cabinet and the withdrawal of Papen as Vizekanzler in 1934 owing to his having been appointed Ambassador to Vienna, because thereby the basic character of the cabinet, in which Papen and Hugenberg had served as representatives of those rightist groups which did not belong to the Party was changed.

Q.-26. Do you recall how the Nazis caused all other political parties than the Nazi Party to be prohibited and when this was done ?

A.-26. If P/W remembers right, the Nazis banned the Communists without loss of time, and shortly thereafter the Social Democrats Party, in the first half of 1933. In both cases the reason was probably that these

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parties had acted very hostile to the Party. P/W no longer remembers with certainty when the other parties were dissolved. No one who has read Hitler's book Mein Kampf could doubt that the Nazis applied the one-party system after the model of Italian Fascism from the very beginning.

Q.-27. How has the Nazi Party coordinated with the Government and given governmental powers and extraordinary privileges?

A.-27. The coordination of the Nazi Party and the state was accomplished, if P/W remembers right, by a special law for assuring the unity of Party and State. He can no longer recall the circumstances. It is to be noted that the Nazi Party claimed authority over the entire apparatus of the state from beginning, and enforced their authority to an even greater extent in the course of the years. This was particularly the case after the time when appointment of any executive civil servant was made dependent upon the approval of the Party Chancellor.

Q.-28. Is it not the fact that by these means the Nazi Party acquired complete control of the machinery of the German State?

A.-28. It is incontestable that the Nazi Party succeeded by these means in bringing the machinery of the German state completely under its control, as the years went by.

Q.-29. After the Nazis thus acquired control of the machinery of the German state, is it not the fact that they thereupon set about the consolidation of their position of power within Germany by exterminating potential internal resistance in Germany to the aims and purposes of the Party?

A.-29. It is pertinent to note that the Nazi regime made use of the position of power which they had won to stamp out every conceivable form of resistance to the goals and purposes of the Party. The concentration camps and the constant supervision of and spying on the population by the Gestapo and other Party functionaries certainly served this purpose. The utter lack of restraint to which the Nazi Party finally came in this respect found expression in a

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radio speech of Goebbels toward the end of the war, in which he said : "Whoever lets it be known that he does not share our views, around his neck will be put the rope, coldly and without forgiveness". The true character of the Nazi regime could not have shown itself more plainly than in this way, through the lips of its most able mouthpiece.

Q.-30. What control did the Nazi Party acquire over the Reichstag and how was that control secured ?

A.-30. F/W does not know whether the Nazi Party took special measures to supervise the Reichstag, and how this supervision was assured. After the dissolution of all the other parties, the Reichstag was purely a Nazi affair without any resemblance to a real parliament whatever, and also lost all the respect in which it had been held by the population, becoming the subject of many jokes.

Q.-31. In what ways and to what extent did the Nazi Party curtail the freedom of popular elections throughout Germany ?

A.-31. After the prohibition of all parties except the Nazi Party there could no longer be any talk of freedom of election. The plebiscites prescribed by Hitler which he availed himself of in the first years of the Nazi regime, but later did not resort to, probably for quite good reasons, and the majorities for him of from 88 to 98 % which they brought in, are generally regarded by the German people as very questionable reflections of the true feeling of the German people, because there was no assurance that these elections involved a secret vote.

Q.-32. What did the Nazis do with respect to depriving the several states, provinces and municipalities of their previous semi-autonomous powers and transforming them into mere administrative organs of the central government ?

A.-32. After Hitler had been named Reichskanzler, the so-called coordination took place in all the Laender in Germany, as well as in the provincial units and municipalities. This catchword meant that all other autonomous governing

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bodies had to surrender the power to the Nazi Party just like the Reich cabinet. For the most part this process of coordination was put through by the use of brute force by SA units. When once the coordination had been carried through, the further execution of the Nazi program was an easy matter. The independence of the Länder and the other units became bare fictions, the functions of superior power being everywhere in the hands of the Nazis. In the course of time the state of affairs arose that all governmental powers outside the city of Berlin were exercised more or less by the Gauleiters. All national and other positions in the Gaue acquired a relationship of complete subservience to those Gauleiters.

Q.-33. How and when were the offices of the President and the Chancellor united in the person of Hitler?

A.-33. The merger of the offices of the Reichspräsident and the Reichskanzler was completed with the death of Reichspräsident von Hindenburg, who died on 2 August 1934. As P/N remembers, Hitler had this merger resolved upon by the Reich cabinet, then ratified by plebiscite in the middle of August 1934. He thereby became the head of the German state, and thereupon had not only the army but all civilian government employees take their oaths in his name.

Q.-34. Tell what you know about the purging of civil servants by the Nazis?

A.-34. The purge of the body of civilian employees by the Nazi regime was completed gradually, in several stages. At first the Party went to work guardedly, because it did not have in its ranks enough people to be able to replace all those employees who seemed undesirable or questionable. The Party therefore made an initial effort to indoctrinate the civil service in National Socialism. In Berlin, P/N was compelled to take part in a whole succession of such classes of indoctrination. These classes were far more calculated to

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disgust one with the new government than to inspire one with respect for it. At the same time thorough-going supervision and spying activity was imposed on all government offices and employees. The next step was the removal of all Jews from the civil service on the basis of the so-called Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which was soon followed by the removal of all those who could not furnish proof of pure Aryan extraction. Further criteria for exclusion were then found in membership in the lodges of Freemasons, and in other organizations such as the Rotary Clubs; employees who belonged to these organizations were regarded as suspicious and were removed so far as possible. From 1939 on, executive civil servants could only be appointed and promoted if they belonged to the Party. During the war still further regulations were promulgated, which were intended to remove those government employees who had married women of foreign citizenship. Toward the end of the regime, all executive civil servants were regarded suspicious who were Catholic or in any way had church affiliations. The Nazi Party attempted to expand this continuing powers of mopping up by attempting to introduce increasing numbers of people from the Party, especially from the SA and the SS, into the more important official positions, in which it succeeded only to a very limited extent, at least, in all those classes of employees which demanded any special training.

Q.-35. How widespread was such purge and how did it further contribute to complete control by the Nazi Party?

A.-36. As far as P/W could observe, the purge of the civil service of those who were undesirable to the Nazis extended to all its branches. This purge naturally contributed essentially to extending the Party's supervision over all administrative agencies to the fullest, because no administrative body remained unsupervised in the carrying-out of the purge, but had to allow the Party to install special agents for the purposes of furnishing it with

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information. Thus nothing which went on in an office could remain hidden from the Party.

Q.-36. What was done by the Nazis to restrict the independence of the judiciary and to render it subservient to Nazi aims?

A.-36. At first the independence of the judiciary was disputed by public attacks on the judges in the Nazi newspapers. In particular, the organ of the SS, the "Schwarze Korps" several times printed articles which could only have been intended to intimidate the judges and make them cater to the wishes of the Party. F/N could not say what regulations were later made, since he has not followed these matters very closely.

Q.-37. Tell what you know about the use by the Nazi Party of a system of terror against opponents or suspected opponents of the regime by such means as arrest without judicial process, holding them in "protective custody", and putting them in concentration camps where they were persecuted, degraded, despoiled of property, subjected to enforced labor, tortured and murdered.

A.-37. As early as 1933 came the appearance of the terroristic methods used by the Nazi Party or come under suspicion of opposing it. In the course of the years one heard again and again in Germany that this man or that man had been taken by the Gestapo and sent to a concentration camp. The fear of being visited with such a fate lay upon all of Germany like a heavy weight during the entire period of the Nazi regime. It certainly became well-known through the German people that the Gestapo did not adhere to the laws, and not only claimed its victims without the use of judicial process, but even robbed them of their freedom after they had been acquitted by the courts. One of the most well-known examples of such occurrences is the case of Dr. Niemöller, which excited great attention even in other countries. In general one knew that there were large concentration camps in Dachau near Munich and at Oranienburg near Berlin. The horror of these establishments was heightened further by the fact that even those who had been released from the concentration camps kept quiet about what went on in them, most likely out of fear at being returned to them if they opened their mouths. A worse feature was that it was

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not possible to obtain a clear picture of these things during the existence of the Nazi regime, but rather one of the methods of the Gestapo was to prevent news of these things from becoming public. Thus, P/W did not learn of the horror which raged in the concentration camps until the occupation of Germany by the Allied Armies.

Q.-38. What connection, if you know, did Hermann Goering have with the establishment of these concentration camps in 1933 ?

A.-38. P/W does not know what Hermann Goering had to do with the setting-up of concentration camps in 1933. At that time he was Ministerpraesident of Prussia, and as such was the highest executive authority in Prussia. If P/W remembers right, the Berlin Gestapo was first established by Goering as a Prussian state institution. It is therefore quite possible to trace the establishment of the first concentration camps in Prussia back to Goering.

Q.-39. What connection did the "SS" and the Gestapo have with the use of the concentration camps for these terroristic purposes ?

A.-39. The concentration camps set up for terroristic purposes were subordinated to the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler at a very early date, which P/W does not remember, and were from then on, during the entire existence of the Nazi regime, the sphere of the SS. Nonetheless, P/W does not know how the authority for the concentration camps was apportioned within the SS, in particular, to what extent the Gestapo or the Reichssicherheitshauptamt was solely responsible for the concentration camps.

Q.-40. What other organizations, if any, had a hand in these terroristic methods carried out in the concentration camps ?

A.-40. P/W has no information to the effect that other organizations outside of the SS had any part in the terroristic methods which were used in the concentration camps. P/W does not believe that the High Command of the SS allowed any other organizations to have a look at the happenings in the concentration camps. When the SS did acquire other personnel for these

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purposes it usually made them members of the SS. The SS had members and people in its pay in all organizations, positions and professions.

Q.-41. What was done by the Nazis to destroy free trade unions in Germany, confiscate their properties, and persecute their leaders?

A.-41. The Nazi regime dissolved all unions in Germany. P/W has no positive information about the confiscation of union property, but he does not doubt that such a confiscation took place. P/W does not know what happened to any particular union leaders. Undoubtedly their fate was the same as that of all people who were suspected of opposition to the Nazi regime. The German labor front (DAF) directed by Robert Ley took the place of these labor unions. This organization was of course built on the principles of the Nazi regime.

Q.-42. Explain in detail the Nazi doctrine known as the Führerprinzip or leadership-principle?

A.-42. The so-called leader principle (Führerprinzip) meant that the will of the Führer Adolf Hitler was the only decisive authority in Germany, and that every person who held any position of authority in Germany had to consider himself only as an executor of the will of the Führer and had to act accordingly. Thus this idea meant that all responsibility was to the superiors, that is to the leaders of the state and the Party. This is the exact opposite of the democratic principle, where the leaders of the state have a responsibility towards the people. The purpose of the establishment of the leader principle in Germany was the building up of blind obedience in all realms of public life. In 1941 or 1942 the foreign minister von Ribbentrop once set forth in a very excited tone that the leader principle meant that the responsibility for the decisions and actions of the government to the German people and to history lay exclusively on Adolf Hitler. Ribbentrop's only responsibility was that he conducted the German foreign policy strictly according to Hitler's commands and, as far as the officials of the German foreign service were concerned, their responsibility

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was to execute his instructions promptly and exactly, no other responsibility existed for these officials.

If strict adherence to orders is to be considered a basic principle of military life, one can state that the absolute observance of the leader principle in all realms of public life in Germany had the complete militarisation of life in Germany as its ultimate purpose. This was actually realized to a great extent.

Q.-43. How did the Nazis apply the Fuehrerprinzip to employer-employee relations

A.-43. Although P/K was not directly active in Germany's economic life, he made the following observation in regard to the application of the leader principle in labor relations : the concept that employer and employee were the two factors who had to agree on the conditions of work was removed. The expressions employer and employee were replaced by the expressions factory leader (Betriebs-fuehrer) and followers (Gefolgschaft). This does not imply that the factory leader was the exclusive master of his enterprise, but rather that he too was - according to the leader principle - the executor of will of the Fuehrer, which meant strict observance of the instructions and directions he received from the corresponding authorities of the state and the Party.

Q.-44. What effect, if any, did this treatment of labor unions and the application of the Fuehrerprinzip to employer-employee relations have in frustrating any potential resistance of German workers to the program of the Nazis ?

A.-44. The dissolution of the unions and the fact that the German Labor Front was the only organization which workers could join to safeguard their interests and that the organization was an institution of the Party and depended on its decisions and could therefore never enter into any conflict with the Party, effectively prevented any organized resistance of the working classes to the Nazi regime. Thus the only possibility for resistance was the resistance of individuals or small groups. Such undertakings were bound to fail

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because of the terroristic methods of the regime.

Q.-45. What steps did the Nazis take to subvert the influence of the churches over the people, particularly over the youth of Germany, to substitute Nazi beliefs, and to persecute priests, clergy and members of monastic orders.

A.-45. The Nazi regime applied strong propagandistic and terroristic methods to resist the influence of the church on the people and in particular on the German youth. At the beginning, the Nazi Party proclaimed that its program was based on the principles of Christianity, but a strong anti-clerical attitude became evident even before 1933, and strong lasting conflicts between the Party and the Catholic church resulted at that time. Once the National Socialist Party had gained power it used all the means at its disposal to replace the teachings of Christianity with its own teachings, and force these particularly on German youth. The church and particularly the clerical estate were constantly subjected to threats, insults and ridicule; faithful Christians were considered suspicious individuals. Frequently the threat was made in Germany that payments to priests would be stopped. (These payments were made in Germany through the tax-collecting agencies of the state which collected the church taxes and paid the salaries to the members of the clerical estate). The Party conducted a very unpleasant propaganda campaign against the Catholic church in its morality proceeding against members of the order of St. Francis. During the war, permission to print was not given to any religious publications, such as church and diocese newspapers. In addition church properties, particularly cloisters, were seized, announcements in press and over the radio by the church were suppressed and many priests were removed to concentration camps. A question of particular friction between the Nazi regime and the church was of course the question of the education of youth. The religious schools were closed and by steps the teaching of religion was suspended completely. In order to remove the influence as far as possible, formations of the Hitler-Youth, membership in

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which became obligatory during the war, were fixed for Sunday morning to prevent the young people from going to church. It is of course a well-known fact that all school-books published under the Nazis were written along the lines of Nazi doctrines.

Q.-46. With what beliefs did the Nazis indoctrinate the youth of Germany in substitution for Christian doctrines, and how did they use for these ends the organization known as "Hitler Jugend", or "Hitler Youth"?

A.-46. The fields in which the teachings of the Nazi ideology were to replace the teachings of Christianity to the greatest extent included particularly History and Biology. Religion was replaced by a very general completely colorless concept of a "belief in God", without any religious education of the youth being connected with it. History and Biology were instruments to propagate the ideas of race among the youth, ideas according to which the Nordic man alone can be the creator and real bearer of culture. It is a well-known fact that anti-Jewish hatred was aroused by these teachings. They found their particular expression among the Hitler Youth in the "Blood and Soil" (Blut und Boden) slogan. German history was taught in a light developed by Nazi literature, which presented unproved theories and hypotheses about the early history of the ancient Germans as facts and which gave the impression that the Nazi Party was the exclusive saviour of the German people in modern times. The "Reichsorganisation fuer Jugend" (Reichs Organization for Youth) the so-called Hitler Youth played a major part in the propagation of these teachings. It was the originator of the idea of "Blood and Soil" and of a greatly exaggerated concept of honor, which it tried to inject into the youth in order to prepare for absolute self-sacrifice for the Nazi-regime. These ideas were propagated extensively during the so-called home-evenings of the Hitler-Youth, during which lectures and speeches, community singing, films and similar activities were presented. The so-called Adolf Hitler schools and the

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Ordensbuerger of the Nazi Party were places where this education of the German youth was particularly fostered. These institutions were to train the coming leaders of the Nazi Party in all the teachings of Nazism.

Q.-47. Tell what you know about persecution by the Nazis of pacifist groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses.

A.-47. P/W has no information about the persecution of such pacifist groups as Jehovah's Witnesses. P/W knows only that all such groups were dissolved and their members considered as suspicious persons and treated accordingly.

Q.-48. What was the meaning of the Nazi doctrine of Herrenvolk or the Master Race?

A.-48. The master race doctrine which the Nazi Party adopted originated from the concept that among all the races of the earth the only one capable of creating culture was the Nordic race. The only culture considered as culture is that developed by European peoples. Since this culture first appeared in Greece, the ancient Greeks' origin is deduced from Nordic emigrants. Similar Nordic influences are pointed out wherever any higher culture has appeared. This theory is expanded in A-dolf Hitler's Mein Kampf with amazing naivete and has gone from there into all of Nazi literature. The conclusion drawn from this idea is that it is the mission of the Nordic race to dominate the whole earth since only it can spread culture. At the same time the idea is presented that the German people are the main representatives of that Nordic race. Under closer examination this theory proves itself to be a typical pseudo-scientific product, distilled from theories on the history of culture, the evolution of the human being, Anthropology and Philosophy of the last half of the 19th Century. Nevertheless this doctrine was used extensively to win the scientifically unschooled masses over to the teachings of Nazism.

Q.-49. Pursuant to the Herrenvolk doctrine, what steps did the Nazis take with respect to persecution of Jews in Germany and attempt to exterminate them?

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A.-49. Adolf Hitler tried to spread feelings of hatred against Jews ever since his first appearance in public life. His book Mein Kampf contains a great number of utterances against the Jews which are filled with unrestrained hatred. Thus the spreading of hatred against the Jews was one of the mainstays of Nazi-propaganda even before 1933. Naturally this had its immediate consequences after the Nazis gained control in Germany. As early as the spring of 1933 large scale boycotts against all Jewish shops were initiated, the SA staged anti-semitic processions, pickets were placed in front of all Jewish stores and their windows were marked. Whoever bought in Jewish stores nevertheless or consulted Jewish physicians, or tried social intercourse with Jews became the subject of denunciation and was obliged to take the dire consequences. The so-called Nuremberg laws of 1935 removed all Jews from official positions and half-Jews followed soon afterwards. At all points of recreation, bath-houses, etc. signs were put up, forbidding admission to Jews. It finally came to grave excesses in 1938 after a member of the German Embassy in Paris had been murdered by a Jew. The Nazis utilized this event to call their SA units to so-called spontaneous demonstrations. Synagogues were set on fire, the windows of all Jewish stores were destroyed and other wild excesses took place. In order to defame them even more the Nazis forced the Jews to wear identifying badges. During the war, the persecution of Jews finally resulted in mass deportations, and as is well known today, in mass murder.

Q.-50. What special connection did Alfred Rosenberg, Julius Streicher and Robert Ley have with the Nazi program of persecution of the Jews?

A.-50. Alfred Rosenberg, was Hitler's personal trustee in charge of the development of the National Socialist concept of life in the Party, and as such had particular influence on the attitude of the Party towards the Jews.

P/W does not know whether Rosenberg played an important role in the actual execution of measures against Jews. Julius Streicher on the other hand was

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undoubtedly one of the worst mongers of hatred against the Jews one can imagine. His paper "Der Stuermer" reeked with hatred against the Jews and could fill any decent thinking reader only with disgust. Robert Ley's part in the Jewish question was mostly the great many speeches he made before the workers of German factories in order to win them over to the Nazi Party. F/W does not know anything about any particular task he had in the connection with the persecution of Jews.

Q.-51. What controls did the Nazis impose over cultural activities, dissemination of information and expression of opinion within Germany and the movement of intelligence from and into Germany.

A.-51. In order to control the main media of cultural activity, namely the propagation of information and the expression of opinion in Germany, the Nazis created various chambers such as the Reich chamber of Culture, the Reich Chamber of the Theater, the Reich chamber of Literature, etc. These chambers were directly under Goebbels' supervision, that is under the Reich propaganda Ministry. F/W believes that membership in these organizations was obligatory for everybody active in the corresponding fields. Whoever did not join these chambers, thus refusing to be supervised by them, could no longer practice his profession as author or artist. The entire book market was controlled by these organs, and thus the only foreign literature which could be sold in Germany was that that was permitted by the authorities. The same applied of course to all German publications. By the same token the appearance of foreign artists, scientists, etc. in Germany was subject to control by these authorities. Another field to which the Propaganda Ministry paid particular attention was the propagation of German literature in foreign countries and the visits of German artists, scientists, etc. to foreign countries. Persons not acceptable to the Nazi regime were unable to obtain permission to leave the country. On the other hand the Propaganda Ministry would promote tours of

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persons who were expected to make propaganda for Germany in general and for the Nazi regime in particular.

Q.-52. Tell what you know about the setting up of propaganda machines and the use of propaganda by the Nazis to indoctrinate the German people with Nazi doctrines.

A.-52. Propaganda was the chief means which the Nazis worked to gain power in Germany, and propaganda was the predominant means the Nazis used to win the German people after they had gained power. The center of propaganda activity in Germany was of course the Reichs Propaganda Ministry headed by Doctor Joseph Goebbels who simultaneously held the position of National Socialist Propaganda Director of the Reich in the Party. The Propaganda Ministry had an extensive organization. There was a regional propaganda office in the capital of every Gau. Thus the arm of the Propaganda Ministry reached everywhere. The media of that propaganda were the Radio, the newspapers, and public events, as well as the great Reichsparteitag (Annual Nazi Party Convention) in Nuremberg and many small political assemblies which reached even the smallest villages. Broadcasting was centralized under the Reichs und Funkgesellschaft (Reich Broadcasting Association). All German stations belonged to this organization. The German press was controlled with equal strictness by the Propaganda Ministry. It too served a definite purpose in the constant propagation of the Nazi doctrines among the German public. Films should also be mentioned as an effective medium of propaganda. The films too were subject to the control of the Propaganda Ministry, through the Reich Chamber of Motion Pictures (Reichsfilmkammer).

Q.-53. What did the Nazis do about putting their subsidiary and dominated organization on a military footing with a view to their ultimate transformation and use as instruments of war?

A.-53. As far as F/W remembers, the SA and SS were created as fighting units for the political struggle in Germany. He was able to observe these organization

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only after 1932, after his return to Germany from abroad. The military appearance of the SA and SS struck him in 1932 and even more in 1933 after Hitler took over the power. P/W cannot say to what extent it was planned to use these organizations as instruments of war. It is well-known that the SA, especially Roehm and his circles, planned to take the place of the Reichswehr in the early days of the Nazi regime. One heard offhand by the leaders of the SA to dispose of the Reichswehr and supplant its officers corps with the leaders of the SA. The SA had finished preparations for the Putsch in 1934, when Roehm was shot and his conspirators were arrested. Afterwards the SA lost its importance as a military instrument and was only seen unarmed at demonstrations "spontaneous uprisings" and national festivities. The SS, and especially Hitler's body guard were a strictly military organization and was known as the elite of the Nazi regime.

Q.-54. What such organizations were militarized or put on a semi-militarized footing?

A.-54. Semi-military organizations, besides the SA and SS, such as the NS Motor Corps and the NS Aviation Corps, were both uniformed and drilled according to military principles. The same goes for the Reich Labor Service and the Hitler Youth. The Labor Service with the spade instead of the rifle and the Hitler Youth were of great importance in the pre-military education of the German Youth.

Q.-55. In what ways did the Nazis use organizations of German business as instruments of economic preparation and mobilization of war?

A.-55. P/W never had anything to do with the question of economical preparation for war, but he has no doubt that the Nazi regime has used the German economy for this purpose.

Q.-56. How did they direct German's economy toward preparations and equipment of the military machine?

A.-56. Same as to 55.

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Q.-57. Tell what you know about directions of finance, capital investments, and foreign trade toward preparation and equipment of the military machine?

A.-57. P/W never heard about directions for the budget, for the investment of funds or for the export of goods with a view to the preparation and development of the armament industry. He is not informed about any measures taken for the supply of the industry with raw material from abroad and for making foreign exchange available for the purchase of raw material.

Q.-58. What stockpiles of goods and supplies for war were laid up and how was this done?

A.-58. P/W does not know anything about the extent and kind of goods and food stuffs stored for war purpose. In the Foreign Office, all questions of export-trade were handled by the export-trade department. P/W never worked in this dept.

Q.-59. When was the large re-armament program inaugurated and how was it carried out?

A.-59. P/W never heard when the plan for large scale rearmament was begun either officially or unofficially.

Q.-60. What connection, if you know, did Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach have with the industrial rearmament program?

A.-60. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach's connection with the industrial reconstruction program is unknown to P/W. It is largely self-evident to P/W that the Krupp plants as one of the largest and most productive enterprises of German heavy industry were given orders for the rearmament.

Q.-61. Tell what you know about the establishment of the office of the Four Year Plan, with Hermann Goering as its Plenipotentiary.

A.-61. The nomination of Hermann Goering as Deputy for the Four Year Plan in 1936, P/W believes, was made after the demand for the creation of a supreme office for the decisions on economic measures. Until that time, several ministries of the Reich, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Food and Agriculture, the Foreign Minister (for matters of foreign trade) and the Minister of War (for matters of military economy) had been coordinately

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responsible. The cooperation which had formerly existed between the ministries and the Cabinet did not function anymore. Hitler had abolished all cabinet meetings. Voting among the Ministers was disliked by the Nazis as a democratic procedure. According to the leadership principle, one man, Hermann Goering, as deputy of the Fuehrer was to take over the entire responsibility for the economy. He was to have all power of decision.

Q.-62. What kind of controls did Goering have over German economy, under the Four Year Plan, and how did he conduct that plan in preparation for war?

A.-62. As far as P/W knows, Hermann Goering as Deputy for the Four Year Plan had complete control over the German economy. In view of the fact that re-armament was in full swing, it is certain that this economic measure played a role in the preparation for war. P/W does not know in detail how Hermann Goering used this delegated power in the economic preparation for war.

Q.-63. Tell what you know about the appointment of Walter Funk about 28 August 1939, as "Plenipotentiary for Economics" and about what he did in that office in preparation for offensive war against Poland.

A.-63. P/W no longer remembers anything concerning the nomination of Walter Funk as plenipotentiary for economics questions, which took place on 28 August 1939. P/W cannot say what the consequences of this nomination were and what its connection with the attack against Poland was.

Q.-64. What do you know about the appointment, about 30 August 1939, of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich to act as the War Cabinet; and who were the members of that War Cabinet?

A.-64. On the eve of the outbreak of war, Hitler created the Ministerial Council for the Defense of Germany out of the desire to create an institution under the chairmanship of Hermann Goering which had the authority to carry out the necessary economic measures inside of Germany, while Hitler took care of the military operation in the field. The Ministerial Council for the Defense of Germany had the primary purpose of taking some of the duties of Government from Hitler's shoulders. As far as P/W could see, the council

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handled his task incompletely and incompetently, first because Hitler reserved the final decision to himself in all important questions, and second, because the Hq of the Fuehrer gradually became the central office for decisions on all questions. Later on in the course of the war the Ministerial Council for the Defense of Germany had little power because of these circumstances. P/W can no longer remember all the individual members of this Ministerial Council for the Defense of Germany. Besides Chairman Goering, Rudolf Hess, Minister of Economy Walter Funk and General Keitel the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command were members.

Q.-65. Going back now to the middle of the year 1933, when the Nazis had acquired governmental and economic control over Germany, and were in a position to enter into further and more detailed planning with reference to foreign policy. I believe you at that time held the position in the Foreign Office of head of the Western European section, is that right?

A.-65. In 1933, P/W was in charge of the western European section which included France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Switzerland. This section was part of section II of the Foreign Office, which included the countries of western, southern, and south-eastern Europe. The head of this section was the Ministerialdirektor Gerhard Koepke, who withdrew in 1936 because of his non-Aryan ancestry. His deputy was the Reportorial Counselor of the Legation von Friedberg, who was of Jewish ancestry and committed suicide in 1934. In 1936, Sections II, II, IV of the Foreign Office were consolidated into a single Political Section. P/W kept the western European section, to which Great Britain and Eire were added.

Q.-66. In that position you were intimately familiar, were you not, with developments in foreign policy of the Nazis as they affected Western Europe?

A.-66. P/W's position at that time didn't make him familiar with the foreign policy of the Nazis as far as Western Europe was concerned. The character of the leading men of Section II of the Foreign Office, mentioned in the preceding answer will easily make it clear that the Nazis did not want to let such men

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know about their foreign policy. There were no changes in this regard later on, so that P/W did not know all the Nazi plan concerning Western Europe until they had been realized.

Q.-67. Tell all you know about the Nazi plan to re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and other subsequent treaties, and how that plan was carried out?

A.-67. Hitler's plan to reoccupy the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland and to fortify it was not known to P/W before it was officially announced. As far as P/W remembers, the German troops marched suddenly into the demilitarized zone. Hitler announced this fact to the world briefly and attempted to justify this move before the foreign governments concerned.

Q.-68. Tell what you know about secret re-armament of Germany by the Nazis, between 1933 and March 1935, including secret training of military personnel, production of munitions of war, and building of an air force, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and other subsequent treaties.

A.-68. P/W knows of no secret German rearmament under the Nazi regime between 1933 and March 1935, nor were any facts about secret training of troops and about production of war materials known to him.

Q.-69. Tell what you know, from your position in the Foreign Office, as to the Nazis leading Germany to leave the International Disarmament Conference and to withdraw from the League of Nations?

A.-69. P/W did not learn beforehand of the German withdrawal from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, although he was a member of the Foreign Office. He still remembers that he learned this fact from a newspaper which he bought in Berlin at the Bollendorf-Platz and that this news astounded him.

Q.-70. What discussions, if any, did you have about these steps with the Foreign Minister and who was your foreign Minister at that time?

A.-70. P/W did not have any discussions with the Foreign Minister concerning German withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The German Foreign Minister at that time was Constantin Freiherr von Neurath.

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Questions regarding the League of Nations as well as disarmament were not within the scope of P/W's sub-section for western Europe. A special subdivision of the Foreign Office concerned itself with these problems. P/W believes that Reportoria Counselor of Legation Frohwein was in charge of it.

Q.-71. Who gave the instructions for the withdrawal from the disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations ?

A.-71. Adolf Hitler and the then Foreign Minister von Neurath are the only ones who could have given the direction for Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference in the League of Nations. P/W does not know any details about this directive.

Q.-72. Are you familiar with the announcement the Nazis made to the world on 21 May 1935 that they would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty and would comply with Germany's obligations under the Locarno Pact ?

A.-72. P/W no longer remembers exactly the Nazis' announcement to the world on 21 May 1935 that they would respect the territorial boundaries of the Versailles Treaty and Germany's obligations under the Locarno Pact. He believes, however, that this was announced in one of Hitler's speeches which was designed to soothe the world regarding the announced rearmament measures of March 1935.

Q.-73. What discussions did you have with the Foreign Minister or others in the Foreign Office, or what papers or communications did you see, or what facts do you have knowledge of, which lead you to believe that that announcement was falsely made to deceive other nations and to allay their fears of aggressive intentions of Germany ?

A.-73. P/W never talked with the Foreign Minister about the declaration of 21 May 1935, and he does not remember with whom he discussed it in the Foreign Office. At any rate, he has not seen documents or reports or been informed about facts which could lead to the conclusion that the announcement of 21 May 1935 was given to mislead other nations. He does not doubt that it was designed to dispel fears about the aggressive intentions of Germany. This, of course, is the case only if it occurred as mentioned in the answer of question # 72.

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Q.-74. After the Nazis re-occupied and fortified the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno of 16 October 1925, they announced to the world that "we have no territorial demands to make in Europe". What information do you have as to high policy planning of the Nazis at that time which may lead you to believe that that announcement was falsely made to deceive other European nations and to allay their fears as to the aggressive intentions of the Nazis and of Nazi Germany?

A.-74. P/W knows nothing about the high political strategy of the Nazis of March 1936 which could lead to the conclusion that Hitler's declaration "We have no other territorial demands in Europe" was made to mislead other European nations or to dispel their fears about the aggressive intentions of the Nazis and Nazi Germany. From the later behavior of Hitler, P/W concludes that he did not act in good faith when making the declaration. He also believes that Europe was at that time considered that Hitler's declarations were sedatives, and that no great political reliability could be assigned them.

Q.-75. It is not the fact that at that very time the doctrine of Lebensraum was a fundamental Nazi doctrine of the Nazi Party and a cardinal doctrine of German foreign policy.

A.-75. The doctrine calling for "Lebensraum" always played an important role in the political imagination of the Nazis. The discussion in Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* clearly pictured this. This book is the basic representation of the Nazi philosophy of life and served as the guide for the propaganda of the Party. Hitler's discussion of the Lebensraum doctrine in *Mein Kampf* clearly shows the designs on additional territory in the east. The public propaganda of the Nazi Party obviously could express this demand only with great care. It could not be publicized as the goal for German foreign policy. It was pushed into the background by the emphasis on the ideological contrast to the Soviet Union and by the unrestrained denunciation of that country as an enemy of the world. Hitler's intention of realizing the claims for Lebensraum through conquest became apparent after the war against Russia broke out. Reading his *Mein Kampf* it is beyond all doubt that such a conquest was the Nazi goal from the very first days of their

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existence.

Q.-76. Just what was meant by the Nazi doctrine of Lebensraum and what was the historical connection between the doctrine and older Pan-German expansionist doctrines, such as the Drang nach Osten, and the later Haushofer doctrine of Geopolitics? Explain this fully.

A.-76. The Lebensraum doctrine tried to explain the necessity of giving a large nation with a population such as Germany's the space it needed for satisfactory living conditions and for the existence of its people. The doctrine also pointed out that other nations had space enough within their boundaries or in their colonies. With regard to that, the Lebensraum doctrine was an expression of the well-known difference between the "Have's" and the "Have Not's" which has often been dealt with in political propaganda. Nations like Russia, America, England, France, China and even Belgium and Holland have sufficient Lebensraum according to the doctrine, whereas Germany, Japan and Italy have not. The political conception of the Mediterranean area as belonging to the Italians, large parts of Central, North and Eastern Europe as belonging to the Germans, and large parts of East Asia as belonging to the Japanese arose during the war. The doctrine was very similar to the idea of autarchy that every great power can take everything it needs for its people from its area of sovereignty. The association of ideas which makes such an autarchy a political claim is based upon the consideration that a large country is unable to become self-sufficient if it depends on other countries in the import of any vital raw-materials, agricultural or industrial products. The study of the necessities which thus have to be taken into consideration by every large power, as well as the valuation of the individual countries as power-factors, is known as the science of "Geopolitics". Such ideas were held by the Swedish geographer Rudolf Kjellen, who published several books about these problems during and after World War I. He also included such factors as access to the high seas and existence of natural borders in the scope of his evaluation system for individual countries. Professor

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Karl Haushofer took up and further developed Geopolitics in Germany.

The Lebensraum doctrine as well as the science of Geopolitics are of recent date and are not to be compared with the former German expansion policies known under the slogan : "Expansion to the East". P/W believes that this slogan characterized the foreign policy of Emperor Wilhelm II, and resulted in the well-known plan for the Bagdad railroad line. The plan of the Berlin-Bagdad line was of the same importance under the then Staatssekretär von Aussen-
Wachen, as the plan of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle under Hitler. The result of Germany's pre-World-War-I policy was the alliance of Germany Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey during World War I. Since Hitler planned the German demand for more territory chiefly in the east and even professed this to the whole world in his book Mein Kampf it was only natural for the old slogan of the "Drang nach Osten" to be revived in this new sense.

Q.-77. Was not another cardinal doctrine of Nazi foreign policy the doctrine of the "deutsches Volk", that all persons of German blood, wherever located, should be joined together in one racial community under the control of Nazi Germany ?

A.-77. Nazi propaganda widely publicized the demand that all Germans in the neighboring countries of the Reich should be returned or incorporated to the Reich. At the beginning of the Nazi regime this propaganda led to naive demonstrations and speeches of the Party oracles in the border regions of Germany. P/W remembers that the French Embassy complained once about such a demonstration in Alsace. The Swiss legation likewise complained about remarks by Party speakers in Baden, who stated that the German inhabited part of Switzerland should be incorporated into Germany. At that time the Foreign Office tried to stop this propaganda, which subsequently diminished, but the dream of having all Germans within the Reich lived on and was constantly nursed by the Nazi Party. Before the outbreak of the war Hitler gave the idea of "One Reich" a larger scope by including the Czechs in the Union, which already meant a

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realization in part of the Lebensraum doctrine. During the war, Germany's name was officially changed to Greater Germany. Hitler visualized and tried to establish the Greater Germanic Reich, which was to include such nations as the Danes and Dutch and thus was to go beyond the scope of Greater Germany itself. The Reichsfuehrer SS opened a special office for Greater Germanic matters, which was to spread this ideology.

Q.-78. That doctrine was epitomized, was it not, in the Nazi slogan "Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Fuehrer"?

A.-78. It was pertinent that the propaganda of the Nazi Party used a slogan "Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Fuehrer" (one nation, one people, one leader) which had the goal of consolidating all Germans in one country under the leadership of Hitler.

Q.-79. Is it not true that the doctrine was not limited to the theory of ein Volk, or the demand for a unified German race, but also included the concept of the Herrenvolk, whereby it was contended that the racial Germans were a master race, entitled by their blood and qualities to dominate other supposedly inferior races?

A.-79. It is true that next to the desire for the unification of all Germans in one Reich, the concept of the master race played a major part among National Socialist political concepts and the propaganda of the Nazi party. The idea that the German people has a special qualification for domination is derived from the wellknown Nazi doctrine according to which only Nordic men can create culture. This doctrine is laid down with particular thoroughness in Hitler's book Mein Kampf. At the same time it was always assumed that the German people are the main representatives of that race. Simultaneously with this intentionally propagandized high valuation of the German people the peoples who did not belong to the Nordic race were considered inferiors. This was done to particular extremes of defamation in the case of the peoples of eastern Europe who lived in areas considered part of the German Lebensraum and who were thus subject to German domination, who were stigmatized as inferior peoples whose mission it was

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to be governed by the Nordic man. There are clear connections between these concepts and the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche of the second half of the 19th century. His teachings about the "superman" and his contempt for the "slave souls of the much too many" furnished adequate slogans for the racial doctrines of Nazism.

Q.-30. It is true, is it not, that within the Nazi concept of "racial Germans" they considered the Austrians as of the same Volk as the Germans and hence formulated as one of their basic aims the incorporation of Austria into the Reich?

A.-30. It is absolutely true that one of the main demands of Nazi policy was the inclusion of the Austrians in the German Reich as part of the policy which demanded the unification of all Germans in one Reich. In this case the racial doctrines of Nazism overlapped those of the older so-called Great-German movement. This movement aims at a general strengthening of nationalistic feelings, had its origins during the first half of the 19th century, and had fought even then against the unification of Germany under Bismarck, labelling that unification a "little-German solution" (Kleindeutsche Lösung). It was probably Hitler's original plan to create such a strong National Socialist movement in Austria by means of adequate propaganda that the power in Austria would just fall into the hands of the Nazis eventually anyway. It was of course expected from such a government that it would request that Austria be accepted as a member of the greater German family. The policy of the chancellors Dollfuss and Schuschnigg prevented the realization of that plan, and Hitler therefore decided in 1938 to use force against Austria.

Q.-31. How early did the Nazis begin to plan the taking over of Czechoslovakia?

A.-31. P/W does not know at what time Hitler decided to annex the main regions of Czechoslovakia. It is a well-known fact that this plan was realized in two steps; the first one consisted in the annexation of the Sudetenland, which was approved at the Munich conference, in September 1938; the second one consisted in the March on Prague and the proclamation of the protectorate over Bohemia.

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and Moravia in March 1939. P/W does not know whether the latter step was included in the original Nazi plan, or whether the favorable development of the conference at Munich encouraged Hitler to take it. Should the latter be true, then the decision to annex the other Czech regions was probably made during the winter of 1938/39.

Q.-82. In their planning with regard to taking over Czechoslovakia, it is true, is it not, that the Nazis constantly treated German minorities in Czechoslovakia particularly in the Sudetenland, as part of the German Volk, who ought to be incorporated into the Reich, together with the ~~Slovakian territories~~ which they occupied?

A.-82. The demand for the inclusion of all Germans who lived in the bordering regions in the German Reich did of course include the German population in the Czech border regions, the so-called Sudeten Germans. This question was approached through propaganda at first in the form of a conflict between the minority leaders in Czechoslovakia and the government in Prague. This conflict was used for the assertion of certain demands. When this situation finally reached the form of a serious crisis Hitler could declare that he had to interfere in the conflict.

Q.-83. Tell what the military strength and power for resistance against aggression of Czechoslovakia was, from 1937 to 1939, as compared with the military strength and power of resistance of Austria.

A.-33. P/W is unable to make an adequate comparison between the relative military strength and ability to resist attack of Czechoslovakia and Austria, because he had never seen any documents on the subject, but it is generally known that Austria was subject^d to the disarmament provisions of the treaty of St. Germain and was therefore considerably weaker than Czechoslovakia, which was not bound by any disarmament treaties and was rather well-armed. The military ability to resist was dealt a serious blow through the treaty at Munich. With this treaty Czechoslovakia lost not only a considerable part of its territory but also the fortifications located in that area. In the opinion of military

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experts these fortifications had great strategic value.

Q.-34. Was the Czechoslovakian power of resistance also strengthened by military alliances with Great Britain and France so that an invasion of or assault against Czechoslovakia was a much more hazardous game for the Nazis than an invasion of or assault against Austria?

A.-34. It is true that an invasion or an attack on Czechoslovakia was a politically much more dangerous game than a similar action against Austria, since the former country had a treaty of alliance with France. On the other hand there was no treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Czechoslovakia. Britain's only obligation toward Czechoslovakia was that of assistance provided by article 16 of the League of Nations. Incidentally Austria being a member of the League could have claimed such assistance for itself. But the happenings during the Italian-Abyssinian war and the Chinese-Japanese incident made it quite evident that the League of Nations could not be relied upon.

Q.-35. What role did Italy and Mussolini play, prior to 1938, in preventing Nazi Germany from taking over Austria or forming an Anschluss with Austria? Give us this history in some detail please.

A.-35. Because neither Italy nor Austria in the time before 1938 was in his field of activity, P/W can give only the general characteristics of the development in the attitude of Italy and Mussolini toward the Austrian question before 1938. The foreign policy of Fascist Italy had been governed for 20 years by the encouragement of political relations with Austria as well as with Hungary to create a balance against French influence in south-eastern Europe based on the alliance of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia in the so-called little entente. This good neighbor policy toward Austria was carefully furthered by Italian foreign policy before and after the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany. Rome believed the existence of Austria represented a line of defense in the north and did not desire it to fall into the hands of a growing Germany. The Dollfuss government, a thorn^{to} the Nazis, was supported by the Italian government in Rome. Before the Putsch against Dollfuss in Vienna, the opposition

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between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on the Austrian question was of a sub-surface nature. The establishment of close friendship with Italy was one of the points of the Nazi policy, clearly expressed in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

Early in 1934, a conference between Hitler and Mussolini took place in the castle of Stresa. As was learned in Berlin shortly afterwards, it did not turn out very well. Dollfuss was assassinated in an uprising the origin of which was to be found in Nazi circles. Mussolini displayed an almost threatening attitude toward Germany and sharply opposed Hitler's plans for the Anschluss. He strongly expressed this attitude in speeches and in the press. The conference of Stresa early in 1935 showed Mussolini in union with Great Britain and France on this question.

Italy's attitude toward the Austrian question changed during the war with Abyssinia. The League of Nations decreed economic sanctions against Italy. Germany's non-support of the sanctions made it possible for Mussolini to wage the Abyssinian war. He also wanted the political support of the Nazi regime, and in 1936 he proclaimed the existence of a Berlin-Rome-Axis. Italy's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the cooperation between Germany and Italy displayed in the Spanish Civil War created a close friendship between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Mussolini therefore no longer resisted the annexation of Austria by Germany. After the Abyssinian war, P/W doesn't believe that Italy attempted to bolster Austria's sovereignty any longer.

Q.-86. Give as much as you know of the events leading up to an culminating in the assassination of Dollfuss especially giving any facts known to you which would indicate responsibility of the German Nazi Party for his assassination.

A.-86. P/W does not know anything about the proceedings which eliminated Dollfuss' assassination except the published news. P/W remembers exactly that Hitler put much emphasis on the presentation of this putsch as Austria's private affair. He made this clearer by recalling the German Ambassador in Austria.

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Dr. Kurt Rieth, immediately after the ambassador had taken measures in favor of the Austrian Nazis participating in the Putsch. Dr. Kurt Rieth is one of those persons competent to give information on the proceedings in Austria of that time. He knew the relations of the Nazi Party in Austria to the Nazi regime in Germany.

Q.-37. It is the fact, is it not, that the leadership of the German Nazi Party recognized that it was strategically impracticable to attack Czechoslovakia without first having secured control over Austria, so as to flank Czechoslovakia on the South as well as on the North and West?

A.-37. P/W does not know whether the Nazi leadership considered it strategically unfavorable to attack Czechoslovakia before having gained control of Austria, so as to be in a position to encircle the Czech territory on the north, south and west. As stated in the answer to question # 81, P/W does not know when Hitler decided to attack Czechoslovakia.

He therefore cannot say whether there were plans directed against Czechoslovakia at the time of the invasion of Austria.

Q.-38. What discussion did you hear, either in the Foreign Office, or among the leaders of the Nazi Party, prior to March 1938, regarding plans for the taking over of Austria and regarding a broader plan for the successive taking over first of Austria and then of Czechoslovakia? Give approximate times of the discussions, names of those present, and details of the discussions.

A.-38. P/W remembers no discussions in the Foreign Office or among the Nazi leaders before March 1938 regarding the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. It is true that everybody in Germany expected that Hitler would make certain plans after the changes in the composition of the cabinet and among the supreme military leadership early in 1938. It is also true that the development of the situation in Austria gave rise to the idea that Hitler would try to turn it to his own ends, although P/W never heard about those plans.

Q.-39. What documents did you see in the Foreign Office dealing with such plans regarding Austria and Czechoslovakia and give the substance of such documents?

A.-39. P/W never saw any documentary evidence of plans with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia in the Foreign Office.

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Q.-90. It is true, is it not, that by the autumn of 1937 practically all opposition to the Nazi program had been crushed within Germany?

A.-90. The open opposition to the Nazi regime in Germany was completely neutralized in the autumn of 1937, but large parts of the population maintained a secret opposition to the Nazi regime.

Q.-91. Tell what you know about military preparations specifically directed at the carrying out of the Austrian Venture and what was the state of those preparations by the autumn of 1937?

A.-91. No details were known to P/W about military preparations for the Austrian annexation. Thus he cannot describe the state of preparation in the autumn of 1937.

Q.-92. Tell whatever you know about a meeting of an influential group of Nazis with Hitler on or about 5 November 1937, in which the then situation of Europe was reviewed, the Nazi demand for Lebensraum at the expense of neighboring countries was discussed, the danger that the conquest of Lebensraum might precipitate general war was considered and discounted as a risk worth taking, and three possible plans, for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia were outlined

Q.-93. Were you present at that meeting?

Q.-94. If so, who else was present?

Q.-95. If you were not present at that meeting, did you ever see a report of what occurred at the meeting?

Q.-96. What were the three possible plans for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia formulated at that meeting, the choice between which was to depend on developments in the political and military situation in Europe?

Q.-97. What consideration was given at that meeting to the increase in the population of the Reich to result from the taking over of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the consequent ability to increase the army of the Reich by some 12 divisions?

Q.-98. What consideration was given to the shortening and improvement of the eastern frontiers of the Reich to result from the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia and with particular reference to the flanking of Poland along the Polish-Slovakian border?

A.- 92 to 98. Up to now, P/W has heard of no meeting of influential Nazis with Hitler on or about 5 November 1937 when foreign policy was discussed.

Therefore, he cannot give any answers to questions 92 to 98.

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Q.-99. Tell what you know about the conference between Hitler and Chancellor Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden on 8 February 1938, and give the sources of your knowledge, whether written reports or documents in the Foreign Office or elsewhere, or oral statements by any person present at the conference.

A.-99. P/W did not get any information about the conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden on 8 February 1938 except for the publicly announced proceedings. P/W did not get to see either reports or documents in the Foreign Office which were concerned with these discussions nor did he review oral reports from any person participating in the conference.

Q.-100. What was the position of Seyss-Inquart in Austria at this time?

A.-100. Seyss-Inquart was in the Schuschnigg cabinet as Minister of the Interior, if P/W remembers correctly. P/W knows nothing more about his position as of early 1938.

Q.-101. Tell what you know about agitation within Austria by Austrian Nazis at this time, for an Anschluss with Germany, and tell what part the Nazi Party in Germany played in fostering such agitation in Austria.

A.-101. P/W knows nothing about details of the propaganda of the Austrian Nazis for incorporating Austria into the Reich early in 1938. They were doubtless quite active in this respect. P/W knows nothing about the efforts of the German Nazi Party to further such a development.

Q.-102. What did Hitler do when Schuschnigg, on 9 March 1938, announced a plebiscite for the following Sunday on the question of Austrian independence or Anschluss with Germany?

A.-102. P/W does not doubt that Schuschnigg's announcement of a plebiscite in Austria was Hitler's signal for action against the Schuschnigg government. P/W followed the later developments but had no knowledge of the measures which Hitler took on 9 March 1938 and on the following days.

Q.-103. How many ultimatums did Hitler send Schuschnigg and what were they?

A.-103. P/W does not know whether Hitler sent one or several ultimatums to Schuschnigg at that time and what the content of these ultimatums was.

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Q.-104. Did Schuschnigg resign upon receipt of the second ultimatum?

A.-104. It is generally known that at that time Schuschnigg had retired. Although P/W does not know under which circumstances the retirement took place and if the retirement can be led back to a second ultimatum.

Q.-105. Who succeeded him as Chancellor of Austria?

A.-105. P/W believes that Seyss-Inquart succeeded Schuschnigg as chancellor.

Q.-106. What did Seyss-Inquart do about inviting Hitler to send German troops into Austria?

A.-106. P/W recalls that the new Austrian Government under Seyss-Inquart supposedly called for the help of the German government at that time to restore law and order; but P/W is not sure whether this actually happened.

Q.-107. When did the invasion of Austria begin?

A.-107. P/W believes that the entrance of German troops into Austria occurred the night of March 11 to March 12, 1938.

Q.-108. After Austria was annexed to Germany, it formed the lower jaw of the wolf, so that the main part of Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia was completely encircled and caught in the jaws of the wolf, is that right?

A.-108. It is true that after the annexation of Austria most of Czechoslovakia that is the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia, were almost completely encircled.

Q.-109. Is it not true that the Nazis, simultaneously with the annexation of Austria, gave assurances to Czechoslovakia that they would not attack that country?

A.-109. P/W recalls that during the days of the German invasion of Austria, the various representatives of foreign powers in Berlin were given reassuring declarations. P/W does not know whether any such declarations were given either to the Czech ambassador in Berlin or to the Czech government in Prague through the German ambassador in Prague, or whether this declaration contained a promise that Czechoslovakia would not be attacked, but P/W believes the latter to be probable. Hitler and Ribbentrop were not in Berlin at that time. Hitler had gone to southern Germany in order to enter Vienna later, and Ribbentrop was

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in London to make his tour of visits taking leave as German ambassador. P/W recalls Baron Neurath was commissioned by Hitler to answer foreign inquiries about the German entry into Austria during Hitler's and Ribbentrop's absence from Berlin.

Q.-111. What information do you have, from your position in the foreign office or from other sources, that leads you to the conclusion that at the very time these assurances were given to Czechoslovakia the leading Nazis were actually planning the conquest of Czechoslovakia?

A.-111. P/W possesses no information received either from the German foreign office or any other sources, which would warrant the conclusion that the leading Nazis were already planning the conquest of Czechoslovakia, while reassuring in March 1938 of their peaceful intentions.

Q.-112. I believe that von Ribbentrop succeeded von Neurath as Foreign Minister on or about 5 February 1938. Is that right?

A.-112. It is true that von Ribbentrop was named German foreign minister in early March 1938 to succeed Baron von Neurath.

Q.-113. And you were still, at that time, head of the Western European Section of the Foreign Office, were you not?

A.-113. P/W was still director of the Western European Section of the political department of the Foreign Office at the time.

Q.-114. Did you have any discussions with von Ribbentrop, or did you hear him have any discussions with anyone else, in which plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia were discussed, between the date when von Ribbentrop became Foreign Minister and about 21 April 1938, and if so give in full the substance of such discussions?

A.-114. P/W did not have any discussion with Ribbentrop between his nomination as foreign minister and 1 April 1938, nor did he hear about any discussion in which the conquest of Czechoslovakia was discussed.

Q.-115. Tell all that you know about a meeting of leading Nazis on or about 21 April 1938, at which they made definite plans to attack Czechoslovakia not later than 1 October 1938.

A.-115. P/W does not know anything about a meeting of the leading Nazis on or about 21 April 1938, where definite plans for an attack on Czechoslovakia no later than October 1, 1938 and the leading Nazis certainly visited him on that

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occasion. But P/W does not know anything about a conference of the nature mentioned

Q.-116. Did you attend that meeting ?

A.-116. No.

Q.-117. Did von Ribbentrop attend that meeting ?

A.-117. P/W does not know anything about this.

Q.-118. Did he tell you what took place at that meeting or did you see any minutes or report of what took place at that meeting and, if so, give the substance of what he told you or of what you read in such minutes or report ?

A.-118. No.

Q.-119. Who else was present at that meeting ?

A.-119. P/W does not know anything about this.

Q.-120. What discussion was had at that meeting or elsewhere at about the same time, among the leading Nazis, with reference to creating an "incident" to be used as the pretext, or supposed justification, for a German attack on Czechoslovakia?

A.-120. P/W does not know anything about any discussions among the leading Nazis at the meeting mentioned or another one which took place approximately the same time, where the creation of an "incident" which was to serve as a pretext or justification for a German attack on Czechoslovakia was discussed.

Q.-121. What discussion by von Ribbentrop or statement by him, regarding such a proposed incident, did you hear at any time ?

A.-121. P/W never heard any utterance of Ribbentrop about the planning of an incident of this kind.

Q.-122. What consideration, if any, was given by the leading Nazis to engineering the assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague, so as to create the necessary incident to be used as the pretext or justification for a German attack on Czechoslovakia?

A.-122. P/W does not know whether or what considerations were made by the leading Nazis concerning plotting of the assassination of the German ambassador in Prague in order thereby to create the necessary incident to justify a German attack on Czechoslovakia.

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Q.-123. What, if anything, did you ever hear von Ribbentrop say about such a proposed assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague?

A.-123. P/W never heard Ribbentrop say anything about a planned assassination of the German Ambassador in Prague.

Q.-124. Did you ever hear Hitler or Goering or von Papen or von Neurath say anything about such proposed assassination and if so what was said by either of them?

A.-124. P/W never heard any utterance from Hitler, Goering, Papen, or Neurath about such a planned assassination.

Q.-125. Did you hear any statement by either of them or by Ribbentrop at about that time, that is about 21 April 1938, or shortly therefore or thereafter, indicating a determination on the part of the leading Nazis to attack and conquer Czechoslovakia, and if so what was said and by whom?

A.-125. P/W heard no expression which would show a determination to attack and conquer Czechoslovakia from any of the above-named persons or from Ribbentrop at that time, that is, around 21 April 1938.

Q.-126. Tell all that you know about military plans prepared on or after 21 April 1938, designed to carry out an attack on Czechoslovakia at an opportune moment.

A.-126. P/W is unable to give any information about any military plans which were drawn up on or after 21 April 1938 for the purposes of attacking Czechoslovakia at an opportune moment, because he did not have access to any such plans.

Q.-127. Trace the development of military plans for such an attack during the months of May, June, July, August and September 1938.

A.-127. P/W does not know anything about a development of any such plans during the months of May, June, July, August and September 1938.

Q.-128. Trace the development during those months of foreign affairs, and particularly as to relations between Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia, as bearing on the Nazi selection of the "opportune" time for the projected attack on Czechoslovakia.

A.-128. P/W recalls that the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia were mostly determined by negotiations between Berlin and London rather than

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between Berlin and Prague during these months. The most important event of these developments were the visit of the British Prime Minister in Berchtesgaden, the mission of Lord Runciman as a British observer in Prague, the meeting between Hitler and Chamberlain in Bad Godesberg and finally the conference in late September 1938. P/W does not know what particular influence these various events had on the choice of the "opportune moment" for the attack planned on Czechoslovakia. The developments made it of course quite evident that Hitler was determined to take military steps against Czechoslovakia immediately upon his demands at the Godesberg conference not being met.

Q.-129. Describe how the Nazis, throughout this period, agitated the question of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the Sudetenland, as a pretext for an assault upon Czechoslovakia.

A.-129. At this time, as P/W remembers it, the protagonist of German demands in Prague was not the German government, but the German minority group in Czechoslovakia itself. Their leaders, of whom the most famous were Henlein and Frank, formulated a number of demands which they presented to the Czech government. P/W no longer recalls the individual points of these demands. The publication and the spreading of these demands naturally caused a strong wave of excitement among the German minorities, and also in Czech circles, so that the entire situation became increasingly critical. It goes without saying that the newspapers in Germany which were controlled by the Nazis came out as strongly as possible for the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Hitler made the crisis which thereby arose the occasion for telling British Prime Minister Chamberlain in Bad Godesberg that he had resolved to start military operations against Czechoslovakia if his demands were not accepted.

Q.-130. Tell all that you know about the use that Hitler and other leading Nazis made of Konrad Henlein, the so-called leader of the Sudeten Germans, in this connection.

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Henlein and Frank were the most prominent representatives of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. If P/W remembers right, they were among the representatives of the German minority in the Czechoslovakian parliament. The P/W's ignorance prevents him from saying what the special connections were between Konrad Henlein and Hitler and what use of him was made by Hitler and other leading Nazis during these events.

Q.-131. Tell what you know about the events immediately leading up to the capitulation of Czechoslovakia at Munich on 29 September 1938 and all that you know about the capitulation itself, in which Czechoslovakia ceded the Sudetenland to Germany.

A.-131. P/W was not told in detail about the course of the Munich conference of 29 September 1938, and therefore cannot tell from his own knowledge what happenings led to the capitulation of Czechoslovakia at that time. Only from the course of events in general was he able to conclude that this capitulation, which consisted in the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, though postponing the exact determination of the new borders, stemmed from the fact that neither Great Britain nor France was at that time ready to give military assistance to Czechoslovakia in event of war.

Q.-132. Outline the events following immediately the Pact of Munich and leading up to and including the seizure by the Nazis by the armed forces of Germany, of Bohemia and Moravia, in violation of the terms of the Pact of Munich itself.

A.-132. The further development of events after the conference at Munich which led finally to the occupation by German troops of Bohemia and Moravia is known to P/W only in general, not in detail, since the question involving Czechoslovakia and the matters relating to her were not in his sphere of activity. At first, right after the conference at Munich the position of Czechoslovakia was weakened further, because now both Hungary and Poland made territorial demands against Czechoslovakia. The issue between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was settled by arbitration by the foreign ministers of

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Germany and Italy meeting in Vienna in an award which compelled Czechoslovakia to cede a strip of territory to Hungary. As to the Polish demands, P/W believes that there was an agreement between Prague and Vienna which resulted in a further loss of territory to Czechoslovakia. And then it became evident after the separation of the German minority that the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks was the disturbing factor which would not let Czechoslovakia rest. P/W is unable to give details of this development, but he remembers that it was this problem which led Macha, the President of Czechoslovakia, to make a trip to Berlin which was immediately followed by the occupation of all of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops.

Q.-133. Did the Nazis thereafter again give assurances of peaceful intentions and of absence of intention to commit further aggressions and, if so, what such assurances were given?

A.-133. P/W can no longer remember whether after the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the proclamation by the Nazi regime that those areas were a German protectorate there were renewed assurances of peaceful intent and the lack of any intention to commit further acts of aggression. This last statement would certainly not have been made, since the Nazi regime would not have characterized the occupation of Austria, Bohemia and Moravia as acts of aggression.

Q.-134. What discussions by von Ribbentrop did you hear about this time indicating an actual Nazi plan to invade Poland?

A.-134. At this time P/W never heard von Ribbentrop say anything indicating the existence of plans to invade Poland.

Q.-135. What discussions by Hitler or Goering or by any other of the leading Nazis did you hear about this time indicating an actual Nazi plan to invade Poland?

A.-135. P/W did not hear Hitler, Goering, or any other leading Nazi say anything indicating the existence of plans to invade Poland.

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Q.-136. Tell what you know about a meeting of leading Nazis on or about 23 May 1939 at which the European situation was reviewed and the decision was made to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity, regardless of the risk that Great Britain and France would comply with their treaty obligations to Poland and fight in her defense.

A.-136. P/W knows absolutely nothing about any meeting of leading Nazis on or about 23 May 1939 at which the European situation was discussed and the resolution made to attack Poland at the first favorable opportunity, regardless of the position taken by Great Britain and France.

Q.-137. What in your opinion was the real reason for the attack on Poland?

A.-137. The real reason for the action of the Nazi Government against Poland is to be found P/W believes, in the so-called "Dynamic quality of the Nazi movement" of which the Nazis were always especially proud. The political situation in the summer of 1939 was such that the Nazi government could make no further progress along the way which they followed in the penetration of Austria, of the Sudetenland, of Bohemia and Moravia, and finally of the Memel area, without committing themselves to war. They were clear in their own minds about this. If, therefore, they had not wanted to run the risk of war, they would from then on have had to confine themselves to a defensive and conservative policy. The jump in war, production which they had gotten over the other powers would have had to remain unexploited. It was not the intention of the men who were determining German policy in 1939 to let this happen. After disposing of the Czechoslovakian question they turned themselves to the Memel question, and after this one too had been solved, to the question of Danzig and the Polish corridor. The reason why they happened to choose these questions as the next points on their program was probably because they knew that the German people would go with them on these questions. The great mass of the German people would certainly not have been willing to hear anything of war as the instrument of solving nationalistic questions; but they did not

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consider the danger in the piling-up of those questions, merely hoping that all would turn out peacefully, as it had in the past.

Q.-138. The Danzig issue was a mere pretext for the attack on Poland, was it not?

A.-138. P/W does not believe that it is entirely correct to characterize the Danzig question as a mere pretext for the attack on Poland. It is true that the removal of the so-called corridor and the incorporation of Danzig into Germany were goals the achievement of which the Nazi regime desired to consolidate in the war with Poland. But it can be very well questioned whether these were the only reasons why Germany made war on Poland. P/W cannot say what other designs the Nazi regime may have had on Poland in the event of Germany's being able to fight a war against Poland alone.

Q.-139. Trace in detail the diplomatic handling between Nazi Germany and Poland immediately preceding and leading up to the invasion of Poland by the armed forces of Germany.

A.-139. Diplomatic negotiations between Nazi Germany and Poland prior to the German invasion of Poland were conducted exclusively by Hitler and Ribbentrop. P/W is therefore unable to give any detailed information on these negotiations from his personal experience. P/W observed during the development of the crisis in late August 1939 that negotiations with the British Ambassador Sir Neville Henderson were much more extensive than those with the Polish government. To be sure Ribbentrop handed extensive proposals for a peaceful settlement of the corridor question to the Polish ambassador in Berlin Mr. Lipski, but these proposals were received at such a late moment that they could no longer affect the development of the situation. P/W also had the impression that Hitler and Ribbentrop were more anxious at that time to persuade Great Britain not to interfere militarily in case of a conflict between Germany and Poland than to prevent a German-Polish war. They made such a conflict inevitable in fact by the pushing of the development in Danzig which undoubtedly was directed by

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directed by Hitler himself.

Q.-140. Tell what you know about the diplomatic handling leading up to the signing of the non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 between Germany and the U.S.S.R.

A.-140. P/W subsequently received the following information about the diplomatic developments preceding the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939. During discussions in Berchtesgaden in early or middle August 1939 the idea arose that an attempt should be made to clarify the position of the Soviet Union and to inquire in Moscow whether a visit of Ribbentrop would be acceptable. Hitler gave his consent to this proposal and the answer from Moscow was favorable. Ribbentrop flew immediately to Moscow, returning after the non-aggression pact had been signed. This would prove that the conclusion of this pact was not preceded by long negotiations, but was agreed upon after a very short period of time.

Q.-141. Give any information you have indicating that when the Nazi leaders entered into the non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939 they did not intend to comply with the obligations of that pact but in fact intended to attack the U.S.S.R. at some favorable opportunity.

A.-141. P/W has information that Hitler would have intended to attack the Soviet Union in August 1939, but rather intended to attack the Soviet Union at an opportune moment. P/W is of the opinion that Hitler did not have any concrete plans to attack the Soviet Union in August 1939, but rather that such plans took definite shape in 1940. On the other hand it cannot be denied that Hitler had declared in Mein Kampf that the Lebensraum of the German people had to be insured by the conquest of territory in Eastern Europe. This aim was undoubtedly inconsistent with the maintenance of peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. But P/W does not know just how Hitler thought in the summer of 1939 that these plans could be realized.

Q.-142. Was any ultimatum sent or any declaration of war sent or any notice

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given to Denmark or Norway prior to their invasion by German armed forces on 9 April 1940.

A.-142. As far as F/W knows the memoranda of the Nazi government about the entry of German forces into Denmark and Norway were given to the respective governments in Copenhagen and Oslo on the day of the invasion and before 9 April 1940.

Q.-143. Was any ultimatum sent or any declaration of war sent or any notice given to Belgium, the Netherlands or Luxembourg prior to their invasion by German armed forces on 10 May 1940.

A.-143. Similarly the declarations to the governments of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg about the invasions of those countries were rendered on May 10th, 1940, that is on the day of the invasion itself and not before that date.

Q.-144. Was any ultimatum sent or any declaration of war sent or any notice given to Yugoslavia or Greece prior their invasion by German armed forces on 6 April 1941?

A.-144. No ultimatum or declaration of war was sent to either the Greek or Yugoslav governments before the attack on these countries on 6 April 1941.

Q.-145. Tell what you know of events leading up to and culminating in the Nazi attack of the U.S.S.R. on 22 June 1941, including in full any discussions you had with von Ribbentrop or you heard him have with any of the leading Nazis or with anyone else about these events.

A.-145. The events which led to the attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, really include the entire development from the end of 1933 to the summer of 1941. F/W observed that no specific events immediately before June 22nd, 1941 precipitated the German attack. The decision for this course of action evidently ripened gradually in Hitler's mind during the period of time between the summer of 1940 and the spring of 1941, until that plan was finally put into action. F/W is of the opinion that the following events were major factors in the development of that decision :

- 1) The course of the war between Russian and Finland in the Winter of

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1939/40 : The progress of this campaign left the impression that the military strength of the Soviet Union had been greatly overestimated. P/W is unable to judge to what extent this conviction was held by the leaders of the Nazi Party, but P/W does not doubt that the progress of the war between Russia and Finland was observed closely by the Nazi leaders and that Hitler greatly underestimated the military strength of the Soviet Union at the time he attacked her. P/W therefore assumes that this false estimate was based essentially on the war in the winter of 1939/40. This was a decisive factor in the formation of Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet-Union.

2) The course of the campaign in Western Europe in the spring of 1940 : P/W is convinced that the favorable development of this campaign was a major factor in strengthening Hitler's conviction that he could make himself the exclusive master of Europe, leaving only a Fascist Italy a position of predominance in the Mediterranean. This campaign and those in Poland and Norway undoubtedly gave Hitler such a feeling of the superiority and invincibility of the Wehrmacht that he believed it to be absolutely unnecessary to pay any attention to the wishes of the Soviet-Union relative to the developments in Europe. On the contrary he considered the expression of any such wishes an encroachment upon his own position of power against which he had to defend himself.

3) The fact that the plan for an invasion of the British Isles could not be realized. In the summer of 1940 Hitler became convinced that he was unable to invade successfully the British Isles, that the Luftwaffe alone was not enough to force Great Britain to its knees, and that a long war with England was therefore to be expected. Considering the increase of tension between Hitler and the Soviet Union, as will be shown in some of the next paragraphs, Hitler probably had fears that sooner or later British policy

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would come to an agreement with the Soviet Union on concerted action against Nazi Germany. This probably gave him the idea of preventing such a course of events by taking away from Great Britain her last chance for a continental attack on Germany. This idea was supported by the fact that Great Britain would be unable to land any considerable number of troops on the continent for at least two years. Hitler therefore had his entire forces at his disposal for attacks in other parts of the continent.

4) The attitude of the Soviet Union against Rumania. When Rumania had to cede Bessarabia and part of the Bucovina to Soviet Russia after having received an ultimatum, Bulgaria and Hungary also began to press their territorial demands against Rumania. This development could not be without significance for the German conduct of the war because Germany depended on the Rumanian oilfields, and was greatly interested in the fate of Rumania. Hitler therefore decided to intervene in this question and with the award at Vienna on 30 August 1940 he divided Transylvania between Hungary and Rumania. At the same time Hitler guaranteed the Rumanian frontier, thus engaging Germany politically with a country which belonged to the Black Sea area. Since the Soviet Union had a particular interest in this region, a collision of the political interests of Germany and the Soviet Union was inevitable.

5) Molotov's visit to Berlin. This collision of interests became even more evident at the time of the visit of the Soviet Foreign Commissar Mr. Molotov in Berlin in November 1940. At that time the Soviet Union presented a number of political wishes, nearly all of which were answered by Hitler either evasively or into the negative. He had evidently concluded that the Soviet Union had designs in Europe which ran contrary to his own plans. It may be assumed that Hitler was planning even then to meet the demands by aggression.

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6) The military security measures taken by the Soviet Union. The military security measures taken by the Soviet Union prior to the outbreak of hostilities played a major part in the developments as an alleged threat to Germany. It is well-known that the Nazi government thus attempted to justify the attack on the Soviet Union. P/W is unable to judge exactly to what extent the deployment of Soviet troops along Russia's western frontier took place at that time, and to what extent German military preparations before the outbreak of hostilities had a bearing on these developments.

It is to be added to the above presentation of the developments prior to the attack on the Soviet Union that they represent the P/W's personal impressions; he is in no position to prove the accuracy of these statements in all details. It is to be emphasized that no statements by Ribbentrop or other leading Nazis would confirm the accuracy of the above description of developments. In late April or early May 1941 Ribbentrop made the first remark to P/W to the effect that Hitler might have to resort to military measures to deal with the Soviet Union. The German Ambassador in Moscow Count Schulenburg was called for a conference with Hitler and Ribbentrop at about the same time, and it was generally being assumed that this conference had to do with the decision whether or not to resort to war. But P/W has no information on the actual content of these conferences with Count Schulenburg. P/W also heard Ribbentrop remark at a later date that Molotov had expressed the interest of the Soviet Union in free access to the Baltic Sea during his visit to Berlin. Ribbentrop cited this as an example of how impossible it was to listen to the Russian demands. Outside of this P/W had no discussions with Ribbentrop on this subject, nor did he hear anything about any discussions between Ribbentrop and leading Nazis or other personalities. It remained to be mentioned that Ribbentrop commissioned Ambassador von Moltke shortly before the outbreak of the war with the Soviet Union to

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compile all the material on the development of the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany since 1939. Ambassador von Moltke died in 1943 in Madrid.

Q.-146. At this time and since June 1940 I believe you were Assistant Chief of the Political Section of the Foreign Office, which included all countries, and that you were also Gesandter (Envoy) 1st Class, is that right?

A.-146. It is true that P/W was the Deputy Director of the Political Section of the German Foreign Office and was ambassador 1st class at that time. He was nominated to that position in June 1940.

Q.-147. Tell what you know about the events and negotiations leading up to and including the signing in Berlin on 27 September 1940 of the German-Italian-Japanese ten year military economic alliance, and particularly give the details of the part played by von Ribbentrop in the making of that alliance.

A.-147. P/W had no part in the negotiations which led to the signing of the so-called Three Power Pact on 27 September 1940 and is therefore unable to give any detailed information. The fact of the conclusion of this pact came as a surprise to P/W. P/W heard later that this treaty was prepared in secret negotiations which were conducted for Germany by Von Ribbentrop.

Q.-148. Tell what you know about any Nazi efforts or negotiations to incite Japan to attack the United States and especially give the details of the part played by von Ribbentrop in such efforts or negotiations.

A.-148. According to the treaty of Berlin of 27 September 1940, Germany, Italy and Japan were bound to support each other with all their political, economic and military means, if any of these powers were attacked by a power which was not yet involved in the European conflict or the Sino-Japanese war. According to this agreement Japan could only demand German and Italian assistance if it were to be attacked by the USA. Japan made an inquiry in early December 1941, that is a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, as to whether Germany and Italy would be willing to come to an agreement about joint conduct of the war by the three powers, if hostilities were to break out between Japan and the USA. Hitler was in the southeastern Ukraine at the front at that time and this inquiry was

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joint conduct of the war by the three powers, if hostilities were to break out between Japan and the USA. Hitler was at the front in the southeastern Ukraine at that time and this inquiry was referred to him immediately. Hitler's answer which was an unconditional assent was returned without delay. The Italian government likewise agreed. The agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy about the joint conduct of the war was signed immediately after Pearl Harbor on December 10th, 1941 in Berlin by Ribbentrop and the Japanese and Italian ambassadors. R/ knows nothing about any special diplomatic moves Germany made to persuade Japan to attack the USA outside of the developments mentioned.