

Report of Interrogation # 5759 of

P/W : von Rintelen, Emil
Rank : Ambassador at Large
Unit : Foreign Office, Berlin
Capt'd : 7 May 1945, Garmisch-Partenkirchen

~~Admiral~~
7 September 1945
I/O : Capt. Halls

witnesses

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Veracity : Believed Reliable.

Report : Answers to Questions submitted by Political Branch MIS.

- Questions : Western Europe .
- a. Estimate the extent to which the French regime established at Vichy willingly collaborated with the Nazis.
 - b. Estimate the role of the parties of the right, the parties of the left including the Communist Party, the Catholic parties, and the Army in resistance to German occupation.
 - c. Estimate the extent of collaboration of these groups.
 - d. Estimate feeling toward and influence of the USSR in France and western Europe generally.
 - e. What was the extent of the infiltration of German agents into the various Spanish Governmental ministries--particularly the Ministry of Justice?
 - f. Name the Spanish high officials upon whom Germany depended most.
 - g. Give instances of official Spanish cooperation with the Germans.
 - h. What was the relationship of former Foreign Minister Lequerica to the Germans, both before and after he took office?
 - i. To what extent did the Spaniards collaborate with the Germans in securing intelligence?
 - j. What did France request in return for a declaration of war? Why did he never declare war?
 - k. Name any German agent still in Spain.

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Answers :

(a) An estimate of the degree to which the French regime established in Vichy was voluntarily ready to collaborate with National Socialist Germany is difficult because there was violent argument over the matter in Vichy itself. The decisive figure was, of course, Marshal Petain. He was a gentleman already over 80 who showed his age very much and was therefore very much dependent on the influence of his entourage. These influences were of a very contradictory nature. The consequence was a permanent play of intrigue in Vichy which made it very difficult for the German overseers to see clearly the direction matters were taking. The course was particularly hard to judge during the period from the end of 1940 to the middle of 1942, during which Admiral Darlan played the leading role in Vichy. When Laval became chief of government again the picture was clearer as far as Laval himself was concerned, but it remained always in doubt whether there would not be a new rupture between him and Petain. At the end of 1943 an energetic step in the form of a rather unfriendly letter by Ribbentrop to Petain was taken to bar such a new rupture. Petain himself had the desire to keep the armistice with Germany loyal because a break would have enabled Germany to take immediate steps which would have been very detrimental for France. But Petain didn't want to go beyond the armistice. His goal was doubtless to give France a kind of neutral position between the fighting parties. When he met Hitler in Montoire in October 1940 he and Laval wanted first of all by supporting German-French collaboration, in principle, on the basis of the armistice, to get the promise that Germany would leave the French colonial empire untouched. Collaboration with Germany meant for Petain essentially only economic support of the German anti-bolshevist propaganda in and by France because this suited his anti-Communist attitude. But as far as France later overstepped these limits, Petain probably has agreed to it only reluctantly, the decisive factor for him in most cases being the conviction that greater evil would thereby be prevented. The German attitude towards Petain was marked, during the war, by a steadily increasing distrust. Ribbentrop always suspected Petain to be a "traitor" in principle.

In the beginning of 1944 he attached to the person of the Marshall as a special envoy the minister von Reuth-Fink, who lived together with the Marshall in the Hotel du Parc in Vichy and had to see to it that the Marshall did not make any sudden decisions contrary to the German interest. At the last Petain knew enough to make a declaration to the Nuncio before he was taken away from Vichy, that with his departure his activities as chief of state should be considered as terminated.

Outspoken opponents of collaboration with Germany were believed to be a number of persons belonging to the immediate entourage of the Marshall, e.g. the chief of his civil cabinet Dumoulin de la Barhete, whose dismissal was later forced by the Germans, and particularly the physician of the Marshall, Dr. Menstrel, who also functioned as his private secretary. He was arrested by the Gestapo in Sigmaringen in 1944.

Admiral Darlan, as mentioned before, was difficult to see through. He, together with a considerable part of the French Navy command showed an increased willingness to collaborate with Germany after the attack on French warships by the

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British fleet at Mers/el/Kebir and Bakar. On the occasion of a visit to Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berchtesgaden in the beginning of 1942 Darlan made a relatively favorable impression on the leaders of Nazi politics. The greater was the indignation later on when Darlan ordered the French troops to cease hostilities against the Americans and British in Algiers in the end of 1942. This was believed to be a game previously planned with Petain and Darlan was at once put into the category of a "traitor".

Laval is known to have been the person who supported collaboration with Germany in France most strongly. He probably believed that Germany would win or at least hold her own. He probably believed also that such an end of the war was in the interest of Europe and with it of France too, and was therefore convinced that he would serve French interests best by making himself the mouthpiece of collaboration with Germany. If he had not the approval of Petain and his colleagues in the cabinet he would probably have been ready to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and with it to line up France even more solidly with Germany. He may have thought that he would get the most favorable conditions for France this way. But the Germans did not enable Laval to follow such a political course; on the contrary, they made his work very difficult. Hitler and Ribbentrop did not trust him either. They considered him rather a sly fox always to be watched carefully in order that they might not be taken in. But they believed that he had exposed himself so much as a pro-German that he could not possibly revert to being French. So Laval was used by them for putting everything into the guise of French laws and state decrees that Germany requested of France, i.e., the most far-reaching economic support of the German war machine, as well as the establishment of forced labor which took many Frenchmen into Germany. The concessions made to him in turn were as meager as can be imagined, such as the conversion of a part of the French prisoners of war in Germany into civilian workers who had to remain in Germany.

The real possibilities for Germany of a policy of collaboration as imagined by Laval were never utilized by Hitler, because he distrusted the French too much and therefore could not decide on terminating the Draconic and coercive regime of the Gestapo with its arrests, shootings of hostages, etc., but on the contrary considered it the only guarantee for the security of the German occupation.

In the field of economic policy Laval had a willing assistant, the very able minister of production, Bichelonne, who agreed with Laval's political opinions and was mainly interested in keeping the French economic life in full swing and in not giving rise to unemployment. Bichelonne died in Germany in the winter of 1944/5. There were a number of other personages in the Vichy regime who were ready for the closest collaboration with Germany, the most unlimited collaborationist of them being perhaps the last secretary for security matters, Darnand, who finally joined the SS himself and held the rank of General. To sum up, it can be said that, according to a general impression on the German side, in the Vichy regime the army command was the least favorable to the idea of collaboration whereas the navy command was much more inclined towards it from feelings of rancor against the British. Among the civilian elements there were strong differences. But the limit to which things were carried under the slogan of "collaboration" was not in the least determined by the French, but was set by the German policy

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and to reach it political pressure was eventually applied. It would be an overestimation of the independence of the Vichy regime to assume that the French Government in Vichy ever possessed a real freedom of decision in this respect.

(b) P/W does not know of any detailed evidence concerning the participation of the different parties and the army in the resistance movement against the German occupation forces in France during the war. Political parties as such probably did not have any decisive influence on the existence and extension of the resistance movement. They were banned by the Vichy regime and therefore have not been active during the period of occupation. The resistance movement has grown rather out of the union of many small groups of a more local origin, formed by single activist elements and less by party activity. That this has been the case can be seen from the fact that when the French consultative assembly convened in Paris the resistance movement was by no means represented by the old parties but by a separate block composed of many small single groups with the most varied names.

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In regard to the question from which spheres the French resistance movement drew its largest contributions, we have to distinguish well between two groups, the so-called Maquis and the "armee secrete". The former grew up spontaneously, largely from the flight into the woods of men about to be conscripted for labor in Germany and trying to escape this fate by defending themselves if necessary. These men probably came from all parties, but must have belonged mainly to the Socialists and Communists or even to the Catholic rural population, because generally sons of middle class and socially better off families are less likely to flee into the woods than members of rural population and the working class. The later picture of the Maquis confirms this too; at any rate, it had a radical leftist character, particularly in the French Alpine regions. Different from it was the "armee secrete". This was organized secretly by former or even by still active officers of the French army and without any doubt partly patronized by the central administration in Vichy. It can be assumed that the propaganda of this "armee secrete" appealed more to members of the parties of the right and center than to those of the left. In all likelihood it was primarily the "armee secrete" which secured the secret message service and the permanent communications from France with England and later with Algiers to General de Gaulle. Later on the attempt was made to unite everything connected with the resistance to the Germans into one unified organization, the "Forces Francaises de l'Interieur" and to put it under one unified command. How far this actually could be accomplished P/W does not know.

From the fact that during the end of the liberation period of France the present Foreign Minister Bidault appeared as a leader of the total movement of resistance and from Bidault's affiliations with the outspokenly Catholic world, the conclusion may be reached that the Catholic element was perhaps of some special importance in the resistance movement.

(c) The reverse question as to the importance of the same French groups for the policy of collaboration with Germany and the extent of this collaboration has to be answered probably in the same way, in that none of the old French parties

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played a leading part in it. Only individual personalities like Laval, Deat, Marquet, Flandin placed themselves at the disposal of Vichy for collaboration, and they drew their personal followers with them. They came rather from the parties of the center and the right than from those of the left, since Communists and Socialists would not even have been allowed to collaborate by the German occupation authorities. Besides, the Vichy regime did not depend on the parties for support; in this regard it had no or very little backing. Its real supporters were in the public administration machine headed by the ministerial officials and prefects whose orders the population was accustomed to obey. The Army supported the collaboration with Germany so far as the orders of Marshal Petain were given for it. But it was always considered by the Germans as an unreliable element which might jump off at any time and perhaps was only waiting for the chance.

French Catholicism is known to have had rather strained relations to the French State as represented by the Third Republic since the first part of this century. After the first World War they had improved considerably but in the middle 20's it proved to be a rather difficult operation for the Vatican to untie the intimate relations of a large part of the French clergy who were connected with the Anti-Republican and royalist "Action Francaise". It can be easily assumed that under these circumstances many a French prelate sympathized inwardly with the regime of Marshall Petain and its authoritative tendencies as expressed in the official substitution of the words "Etat Francais" for "Republique Francaise".

The German representative in France, particularly the members of the embassy in Paris, were not permitted to enter into contact with the higher French clergy. An unequivocal stand for the Petain regime was taken by the leader of the "Action Francaise", Charles Maurras, who could not avoid being accused of collaboration, although he was an old enemy of the Germans.

Three groups are worth mentioning as supporters of collaboration in France: The Legion of Volunteers to Combat Bolshevism, which actually sent one unit of volunteers to the Eastern Front, where according to reports, it did not distinguish itself; the militia of Darnand, which finally came under the influence of the SS; and most of all the PPP (Parti Populaire Francais) of M. Jacques Doriot, a former Communist mayor of the Paris suburb of St. Denis, who had even tried before the war to organize an anti-Communist movement in France and who was killed during a dive bomber attack in the beginning of 1945. From which spheres the support of these organizations came and whether particularly the old "Croix de Feu" of Colonel de la Rocque, who was later imprisoned by the Germans, played a part, is unknown to P/W. Altogether only some 10,000 men were involved in it.

The bulk of the French people during the occupation did not take part either in collaboration or in the resistance, but followed the so-called "Attentisme". They said to themselves that the years of war would pass and that then it would be time to rearrange the French house. They were not unfriendly to the Germans as long as they stayed in the country, and acclaimed the Americans and British as liberators when they came. For whom this great army of attentists will vote now is the big secret of the French elections. Presumably they will put up the old accustomed parties again with a tendency towards the Left.

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(d) The masses of voters of the French left had been until the middle thirties rather solidly behind the French Socialist Party, the SFIO (Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere), whereas the Communist Party was able to gain only a few supporters. This picture changed only when the influence of the Spanish Civil War began to be felt. Even in the election of 1936, which brought the government of the Popular Front into power, a clear gain of the Communists was scored. But the government of the Popular Front itself under Leon Blum was undoubtedly still led by the Socialists. The anti-Fascist wave then rolling through the French population became still more accentuated when not only Hitler and Mussolini supported General Franco in Spain, but also in Italy the claims for "Gizza, Tunis, Corsica" were voiced louder and louder; this led to an increase of esteem and popularity of the Soviet Union, the strongest antipode of Fascism, especially among the workers. Another factor contributed to it considerably. Since 1931 the French foreign policy had attempted to strengthen the position of France in Europe by a pact of assistance with the Soviet Union. This endeavor had been aroused by this project of a German/Austrian customs union in 1931. The Quai d'Orsay saw in it such a threatening sign of possible coming developments that the then Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, Philippe Berthelot, went to see the Soviet ambassador Dvorkin, who was sick in bed, to urge upon him the idea of the pact of assistance. Even then it took four years to conclude the pact; this long delay can be explained by the unfavorable attitude of the Center and Right in the French Parliament, who at first did not want to have anything to do with a political alliance with the "Bolsheviks". But when these obstacles finally were overcome because of the effect of the total development in Europe (the Nazi regime in Germany and Italian aggression in Ethiopia) and when therefore Laval as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was able to conclude the pact of assistance in Moscow in 1935 the Soviet Union appeared in a new light to the French public forthwith. Especially Edouard Herriot has contributed considerably to make the Soviet Union popular in France through the great personal esteem which he enjoyed among the general masses of the French populace. Besides, the French Communist movement expressed new opinions chiefly through the Secretary General of the French Communist Party, Maurice Thorez. The world revolutionary and anti-militarist program of Communism was put in the background in France and was replaced by expression of patriotism, claiming that the anti-fascist policy finds its most reliable standard bearers just in the rows of the Communists who did not let themselves be surprised by any other Party as good Frenchmen.

This pre-war development has to be taken into account to understand the situation formed in France during the war. First the attitude of the French towards the Soviet Union naturally suffered a bad shock when the hope of counting on Moscow as a sure ally in case of war evidently waned and instead Ribbentrop was seen to conclude treaties with Stalin in the Kremlin, and when thereupon Germany and the Soviet Union divided between themselves the country of Poland, France's ally of many years, on behalf of which she had entered the war. This impression has probably contributed to diminish the force of resistance and confidence in victory of the French army in 1940, not only because the anti-Fascist fighting spirit of the leftist elements was considerably reduced by it, but also because generally the whole

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pressure of the big German war machine was known to be directed exclusively against the Western Front from now on. But this picture changed again completely when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. From then on the French Communists could proclaim themselves champions of the resistance against the German invaders and could find also a common basis with General de Gaulle, whom they had originally suspected of being a reactionary. Later, from 1942 on, things even developed in Algiers in such a way that General de Gaulle became almost dependent on the strong Communist wing of the local French consultative assembly. This had the following causes: For once the Communists were naturally the most fanatical enemies of the Petain regime in the French homeland, not only because Petain had made a pact with Hitler, but also because his authoritarian regime made him appear as a "Fascist" and thus particularly odious to the Communists. They became, therefore, the most radical and intransigent wing in the fight for the Allied cause inside consultative assembly. But later on General de Gaulle himself together with his then foreign minister Massigli attempted to balance the difficulties which he encountered in London and Washington in his efforts to get recognition for a full fledged provisional French government by entering into closer relations with Moscow.

The Kremlin proved itself very accessible to this attempt and sent to Algiers the ambassador Bogomolov, a man who stepped forcefully into the political limelight there, so that the tendencies in favor of the Soviet Union were considerably strengthened from their side also. The Communists claimed to be the champions of the cause of freedom, pointing to the great part being played by the Communists in the resistance movement inside France.

In the French Homeland the situation was a little different. The outspoken anti/Soviet and anti/Communist propaganda of the Petain regime found probably a certain echo in all the propertied classes of the French population, and succeeded perhaps even in discrediting the de Gaulle committee in Algiers with a part of the French population, alleging that it was drifting in Communist waters. In France itself, on the other hand, the increasing resistance movement and the steadily decreasing authority of the Vichy government had of course the contrary effect. Finally, up to the invasion of the French homeland by the Anglo-Americans in June 1944 the advance of the Red Army in Eastern Europe was a common index of the coming collapse of the Nazi regime, a factor which strengthened the reputation of the Soviet Union very much in the eyes of the French people.

The answer to the question how far the pre-Russian tendencies in the French populace and other experiences of the war have driven them toward the Communists will not be given before the next elections in France. The esteem of the Soviet Union as a decisive factor for future developments is certainly not limited to the Communists, but will be very great in France quite generally. Besides, the French foreign policy has still the tendency to promote France's political interests and regain France's position as a great power by playing up Russian support; this was made clear by de Gaulle's journey to Moscow immediately after France had reacted rather bluntly declining the proposal made by England to create a block of Western European countries. In all likelihood those in Paris did not intend that a new Soviet-French treaty should be signed in Moscow right

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away, for that would have shifted the balance a little heavily in the direction of Moscow and away from London.

In general the situation seems to be that the Soviet Union today enjoys great authority as a political factor and is therefore able to exercise a considerable influence. To do this she has at her disposal especially the French Communist Party with its leader Thorez, who will be very accurately informed about the desired and thoughts of Moscow, having spent the greater part of the war in Soviet Russia. Regarding the effects of this state of affairs on future French domestic policy, it does not necessarily mean a threat to the whole social structure or to the parliamentary-democratic system in France. The parliamentary system has been made to the measure of the French people's character that it will not be easy to extinguish it in this land where the revolution was born on the European continent. Even Marshal Petain in 1943 examined the possibility of convening a national Assembly to change the structure of his regime and was prevented from following this idea further only by a sharp protest of Kippentrop. And in the French social structure there can be observed such strong conservatism, the French people having always been fond of showing enthusiasm for revolutionary slogans and following them without changing the traditional style of life, that French Communism has actually poor prospects for being accepted integrally and practically in France. The ideal of every Frenchman is basically to be so far as possible the independent and self-sufficient owner of a small fortune which permits him at least in his old age to live as he pleases. Besides, the French are still today predominantly a peasant people. The outspoken individualism characterizing the Frenchman is most unsuitable for being pressed into any collective forms of life peculiar to the soviet system.

These fundamental traits of the French people's character are the probable limits of the ability of the Soviet Union to establish her political doctrines in France.

Regarding the other Western European countries, it may be stated of them quite generally, except for Spain, that the political authority of the Soviet Union has increased strongly in all of them and with it also the influence which Moscow can exercise in them today. This should be the case particularly in Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, where also a perceptible increase of strength of the Communists may be observed if compared with the prewar period. In Switzerland, which has not maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union up to now, a change of attitude towards Moscow and the latter's increasing influence was visible even some months ago, when the Federal Council and the Foreign Minister Pilet-Golaz tried to resume diplomatic relations. The failure of this attempt owing to Moscow's refusal did not only cost M. Pilet-Golaz his position, but has made the problem in Switzerland just that much more acute. Communism has not any great future in Switzerland, since in spite of the activity of M. Nicole in Geneva the weight of the workers' class favorable to Communism is not big enough in Switzerland to prevail upon the fundamentally conservative farm and city population, which should be in an overwhelming majority.

A separate case in this connection is presented by Spain. Here the Civil War and its end has aggravated the situation so much that a split exists between the Franco regime and the Soviet Union. The government therefore does not admit

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any other comments on the Soviet Union than those of complete refutation; it strives to bar any influence of the Soviet Union in Spain by all effective means. How the situation looks under this surface is another question. It is known that the Spanish emigres, who have gathered mainly in Mexico, set their hopes very much upon Moscow. If it comes to an early downfall of the Franco regime in Spain this factor may gain strong significance for the future Spanish policy, unless Franco still succeeds in combining his departure with a restoration of the monarchy, of which he has obviously thought before. The development in Spain will be also of a decisive importance for Portugal. The government of Salazar has consistently prevented the rise of trends friendly to the Soviet Union in this country up to now, so as not to give room to any Communist tendencies in the population. But it may yet be that some strong pro-Soviet trends exist under the surface, which could enable the Soviet Union to influence the political development in Portugal.

(e) In order to answer this and the following questions concerning Spain, P/W states first that on the basis of his official activity he has indeed a reliable knowledge of the general development of the Spanish-German relations during the war, but that details concerning the work of the German representatives in Spain and especially the activities of agents are unknown to him. Naturally these matters were considered top secret, thus only those persons who handled them personally can give information on them. Among them we have to include first the men in charge of the "Abwehr", the military attaches and the police attaches who have been at the German embassy in Madrid. P/W does not even know the names of the people who have held those positions during the war. P/W knows nothing about the proportions of the infiltration of the German agents into the departments of the Spanish government, particularly the Department of Justice.

(f) In Berlin, the impression increased as the war progressed that in Spain whenever any question of any importance arose there was only one person to be considered, a person very hard to influence, Generalissimo Franco himself. His brother in law, Serrano Suñer was his foreign minister during the first years of war, and for a time he certainly exerted the greatest influence on German-Spanish relations and his advice was heeded by Franco. Suñer showed definite friendship towards Germany, but Hitler and Ribbentrop did not trust him. They took him for the man who thwarted at the end Spain's entry into the war on the side of the Axis, thinking that influences from the Vatican determined Suñer's attitude. They thought that Suñer, being a former pupil of the Jesuits, was particularly accessible to those influences. Hitler and Ribbentrop did not think much of Count Bordana, Suñer's successor; They believed he limited himself to following Franco's orders without positively using his influence with Franco for German wishes. Of the other Spanish cabinet members the minister of commerce, Carcelles, and the minister for the Falange, Varresa, were believed to be favorably inclined towards Germany, but even these two persons remained strictly inside the limits drawn for them by Franco's directions.

Of all the Spanish ambassadors in Berlin during the war only General Tapinosa de los Monteros acquired the reputation of being really friendly towards Germany, and it was known in Berlin that he had very little influence in Madrid. The ambassador Vidal y Saura (?), who represented Spain in Berlin during the last years of the war was already preceded by the reputation of being an anglophile;

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his attitude in Berlin did not contradict this since he maintained an unbroken, coal reserve.

Germany without any doubt had quite a few sympathizers among the Spanish Generals from the time of the Civil War, such as the Generals Moscardo and Queipo de Llano, but the first did not have any political influence and the second had broken with France and during most of the war had lived in Rome in a kind of exile. Actual importance was attributed by Hitler and Ribbentrop to only one man out of this sphere, General Múñoz Grandes, who led the Spanish Blue Division successfully on the Eastern Front and who was believed to be able to exercise strong political influence even on France. This influence however remained rather meager and unsatisfactory in comparison to the desires entertained by Hitler and Ribbentrop.

(g) As examples for official Spanish collaboration with Germany the following are mentioned: In the field of foreign politics Spain showed herself to the world principally by her partnership in the Anti-Komintern pact. When Ribbentrop invited all foreign ministers of the Anti-Komintern pact countries to Berlin in the end of 1941 to be present at a celebration of the entry into the pact of some additional countries like Finland and Denmark no less than the Spanish Foreign Minister Sener appeared in the capital of the Third Reich. Furthermore Spain, like Turkey, though leaning to the other side, did not call herself "neutral" but "non-belligerent" in the first years of the war. Later, however, when the chances of victory for Germany were vanishing more and more, France returned purposely to neutrality.

In regard to military collaboration between Germany and Spain, in the sphere of the Navy, Spain's attitude was very valuable for Germany, because German submarines could count on assistance in Spanish ports, and the stipulations of international law about the entrance into neutral ports of warships of belligerent parties were interpreted by Spain in ways favorable to Germany. But Spain became more and more reserved, rather than friendlier, in the course of the years, so as not to give cause to any complaints by the countries at war with Germany.

In the field of economic policy Germany had a special interest in Spain on account of tungsten imports essential for the German war economy. Therefore, after the French armistice and the reopening of the overland communications with Spain a lively exchange of goods developed between Germany and Spain in which the Spaniards showed special interest in deliveries of German war material. But this exchange of goods probably did not really satisfy the wishes of either side. For the German imports from Spain, in any case, considerable difficulty arose in the calculation of prices and payments, till they stopped altogether in 1944 following the protest of the US and Great Britain against the tungsten deliveries. In connection with the Spanish desires for war material deliveries Adolf Hitler wished as late as the beginning of 1943 to enlarge the talks about them to German-Spanish General Staff talks for a possible common conduct of the war. But France agreed to this wish only for appearance's sake; actually nothing ever came of it.

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To a greater extent collaborations with Spain developed in the field of press and radio. Here the German departments in Spain succeeded in the first years of the war in getting positive results in the form of effective influence on the Spanish press and in the mediation of Spain to work more intensively on the countries of Central and South America. In the further course of the war, however, France found this inconvenient and collaboration became thinner and thinner, until finally direct orders were given in Madrid to make the Spanish press appear completely neutral. In the field of public relations, incidentally, there were even occasional clashes between Berlin and Madrid. Franco, who felt uneasy about the end of the war, liked to have appear in the Spanish press occasionally articles or even a series of articles advocating a compromise peace between the belligerent parties. In 1943 Count Jordana and Franco himself expressed this idea even in public speeches, which then were taken up and circulated widely by the Spanish press and radio. This was thoroughly embarrassing to Hitler and Ribbentrop. They were afraid that in countries at war with Germany these Spanish utterances could be taken as German peace feelers and seen as a sign of weakness of Germany. The German ambassador in Madrid was ordered in each of these cases to protest to Franco personally; he was to declare that for Germany there existed only one goal in this war --- victory --- and that Spanish suggestions for a compromise peace were contrary to German interests, because they could be interpreted as though Germany were tired of war and looking for possibilities of peace, and that was entirely out of the question.

(b) The Spanish Foreign Minister Lequerica was Spanish ambassador in Paris (or, Vichy) before he took over this office. He disclosed a pro-German attitude during his term. When he became Foreign Minister Franco was already resolved to remain neutral under any circumstances during the progress of the war and not to give any possible cause for complaints to the US and Great Britain, so that Lequerica also had to conform strictly to this direction. P/W believes that he did so, though preserving the appearance of friendship. At any rate, Germany did not get any further with him than had been the case with Jordana.

(i) For reasons mentioned above under (e) P/W cannot say how far the Spaniards collaborated with the Germans in the field of information gathering services. The development was probably the same here as generally in the character of German-Spanish collaboration; the Spaniards showed themselves more reserved as the war went on. Finally they made even the request at the instance of the British to withdraw from Spain numerous Germans who were supposed to be active in the information gathering service. A special chapter was the activity of the German consulate at Tanger, which after the landing of the Americans and British in French North Africa in the end of 1942 and after the move of the de Gaulle committee to Algiers was naturally an important outpost of observation for Germany. This agency had finally to discontinue its activities at the request of Spain.

(i) The question of an entry of Spain into the war on the side of the Axis powers was the subject of a personal talk between Hitler and Franco in the presence of Serrano Suñer and Ribbentrop in Hendaye at the end of October 1940. Hitler then went to the Spanish border solely to persuade Spain to enter the war; he considered it, so to say, as an obligation of Spain in returning her thanks for the aid which France received from Germany and Italy during the Spanish Civil War. As far as P/W knows the Spanish desires, announced even before the conference of Hendaye, were the restitution of Gibraltar, the acquisition of all of Morocco and a part

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of the Department of Oran with the city of Oran, which was once a Spanish possession in centuries gone by. Besides, the Spaniards named several conditions on which their entry into the war had to depend; these conditions comprised extensive deliveries of material and food. In regard to the territorial desires no definite promise was given to the Spaniards by Hitler in Hendaye. He should hardly make such a promise because in the days preceding and following the conference at Hendaye he had the talks with Petain and Laval in Montoire in which the French as a compensation for a policy of collaboration wanted the promise of Hitler that the French colonial empire in Africa would remain untouched. It was unfitting under the circumstances to assure the Spaniards of a realization of their desires and simultaneously to keep the French in line, all the more so as the Italians had also announced aspirations to the French colonial empire in Africa. Spaniards and French therefore had to be satisfied with vague and guarded assurances.

Besides, Franco himself was not ready to commit himself in Hendaye, beyond vague and guarded assurances. He presented the point of view that Spain was so exhausted by the Civil War and in such a dire economic position that this situation had first of all to be improved before she could enter the war. The determination of the time for this was to be reserved to himself. With it Franco actually reserved himself his further freedom of decision. The conference went on into the late night hours, and the fight over the written text of the agreement took the rest of the night until the next morning, when Hitler and Franco had already departed. Both parties probably looked back on this conference with a certain anger; Hitler, because he was not able to dissuade Franco from his reservations, and Franco because he had seen himself facing a pressure inconvenient to him and contrary to his deliberate character. P/W does not know whether Franco later on really and sincerely still followed up the idea of Spain's entering the war, or whether he only put up an appearance for Germany of doing so. He probably just wanted to see how the war was going to develop. Later on he certainly was afraid that the cessation of grain and oil deliveries from America would again give rise to a desperate situation in Spain; and again later on, with the landing of the Americans and British in French North Africa in November 1942, he gained the conviction that Hitler and Mussolini could not win the war any more after all.

As a desirable goal he then thought of a compromise peace and changed resolutely from the policy of a non-belligerent to the policy of neutrality. Hitler and Ribbentrop thereupon considered Franco as more or less a man who broke his word. In their minds they were not friendly to him any more but utterly reserved. Actually it was a severe setback for Hitler to have lost by Franco's attitude the possibility for blockading the Straits of Gibraltar from both shores after the Mediterranean had become a theater of war by Italy's entry into the war. This could have become of greatest importance for the whole further development of the war. As late as the spring of 1943 Mussolini came back to the idea of winning Franco over to entering the war after all. But by this time Franco was definitely against joining the Axis.

(k) P/W can not answer this question.

SECRET