TRANSLATION.

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The investigation of Karl Hermann Frank continues on 10 June 1945. The investigating officer: The Judge Advocate Colonel Dr. B. Ečer. : Captain Hart, Hq 12th Army Group, JA Present

Section, War Crimes Branch. Dr. Ernest Hochwald.

Question: Do you have any information concerning the fate of the two children of Professor Jaromir Samal, Jiri Samal, born 23 March 1933, and Alenka Samal, born 5 March 1937, who or 17 July 1942 were arrested in the German Childrens Hospital and abducted therefrom.

Answer:

This is the first time I hear about this matter. Unfortunately, I cannot give any information which might lead to the discovery of the location of the children, for until today I had no knowledge of the incident. When and under what circumstances did you and your family

Question:

leave Prague?

Answer:

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Although many German women and children left the Protectorate during the last weeks preceding the surrender in order to seek an abode in the Reich territory, I had agreed with my wife that she and the children would stay with me to the end, lest a panic of flight be created. That is what we did. On 9 May 1945 at 2.30 AM we left together my official residence at 11 York Street in two armored passenger cars in order to drive toward the West direction PLZEN /PILSEN/ to meet the American troops.

I wanted to surrender to the Americans as a prisoner of war, but prior to that I wanted to accommodate my wife and children with a farmer somewhere in Bavarian territory. I do not have any acquaintances or friends in that region, but I believed that nevertheless I could find modest quarters for my wife and children. As luggage we had in our car only the barest necessities of clothing, underwear and the children's belongings. In Rokicany, an American First Lieutenant who had awaited me apparently suddenly separated me from my wife and my three children, Edda, 3-3/4, Wolf-Dietrich, 2-3/4, and Holle-Sigrid, 1, who were following me in the /translator's note: second/ car. I could not speak a word to my wife. Then and there on the highway on 9 May 1945 at 1300 hours, I lost my family and have not heard a word from them since. Upon my repeated requests to several American officers, who immediately took me to Plzen /Pilsen/, my former aide-decamp Police Major Hoffmann and SS Brigadefuehrer /SS Brigadier General/ Voss, who happened to be with me, I was assured that my family and luggage immediately would follow to Plzen /Pilsen/ and that I and my family would be together in captivity. This did not happen. On 10 May 1945 I was taken to Wiesbaden.

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Upon further questioning, Karl Hermann Frank states: Erna Friebe was the nurse, Emmi Pleissig the maid and Anna Tutschner was the cook. In case of increased danger the three

women, together with my wife and children were supposed to go to the home of the industrialist Muchlig, which had been chosen by the International Red Cross as a shelter for women and children. They already had brought some belongings into that house, including the food and milk ration books of the family. At the departure from Prague the nurse Erna Triebe was in the car with my wife and the I have no information either concerning the fate of my children. two sons: Harald Frank, 19, SS Panzer Grenadier of the Leibstandarte /personal guard regiment/ Adolf Hitler, whose left leg was amputated near the hip; and Gerhard Frank, 14. The last trace leads to Vimperk /Winterberg/ in the Bohemian Forest; it was runored that Harald was there in a hospital and that Gerhard was with him. Occurrences connected with the students demonstration in October 1939. Question: Did the danger of a general strike arise on the occasion

of this demonstration?

Answer:

Question:

There was a distribution of leaflets which contained the requests not to buy any newspapers, not to use the street-car and to strike. For several days the first two of the three demands were complied with. But no strikes were reported.

Do you remember that in 29 October the members of the Government of the Protectorate were summoned to Neurath, and did you participate in this meeting?

Answer

I cannot remember. But if such a conference took place, I probably was present.

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Question:

Answer:

Assuming that such a conference took place and that you participated in it, did you communicate to it the threat of Hitler that all Germans had been ordered to leave Prague, that Prague would be bombed, that the machines in the factories would be removed and that the "Betriebsraete" /union representatives/ would be executed? Even if such a conference should have taken place, and if I should have participated in it, of which, however, I have no memory - it is absolutely impossible that I should have communicated the above-mentioned threat of Hitler's to the members of the government of the Protectorate. I never had any knowledge of this threat.

The role of the Czech intellectuals and of the Czechoslovak officers in the resistance movement.

According to my opinion the Czech intellectuals played a strong part in the resistance movement.

Question: Did you receive an order or did you hear of an order issued in Berlin that the Czech intellectuals should be exterminated?

Answer:

I do not know anything about an order of that kind. I can only confirm that Heinrich Himmler ordered me repeatedly either by phone or in person on the occasion of our meetings in Prague or in Germany to watch the Czech intellectuals with special severity and to clamp odown ruthlessly in the case of anti-German activities or acts of resistance. I add that according to my

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opinion the Czechoslovak officers participated very actively in the resistance movement and that they did a good job for the movement. This became apparent during the critical days preceding the surrender when a Czech army emerged suddenly and to my surprise. I do not know the number of Czech intellectuals and of Czechoslovak officers who were deported or executed for their participation in the reistance movement.

The last period of the Protectorate.

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During the latter part of March or in the beginning of April, I had several discussions with Czech gentlemen whose names I do not want to mention. I inferred from their discussions and from reports submitted to me that these gentlemen feared the bolshevist danger and that in another aspect they had strong anglophil leanings. Ι used this information and the inclination of these gentlemen for an effort to change in an orderly way the situation which appeared to me untenable and that in view of the military and political situation of the Reich, the Treaty of Protection concluded with Dr. Hacha and the pattern of the Protectorate could not be maintained Therefore I decided to inform Adolf Hitler of fully any longer. this situation prevailing in Bohemia and Moravia, and after five months of attempts I succeeded in obtaining an interview with him. This interview tpok place on 5 April 1945 in the Reich Chancellery building in Berlin; it lasted for about forty minutes. I explained shortly to Adolf Hitler what I have mentioned above and added that with the assistance of suitable Czech personalities one should try 54

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to contact the Western powers with the goal of bringing about the reorganization of the Protectorate with the aid of the Western powers. Adolf Hitler interrupted me briskly before I had a chance to finish my statement. He definitely rejected any such attempt and said literally: "I should keep my fingers out of this, he would bring about the military turning point". Hitler impressed me as a man possessing his physical and mental powers. Thus I returned without In spite of this rebuke on the part of Adolf Hitler,'s any success. I decided to act on my own in view of the constantly deteriorating situation. I brought together a Czech delegation composed of the then Prime Minister Bienert, the then Minister of Agriculture Hruby, General Klecanda, and the president /general director/ of the Skoda works, Vambersky. I selected Klecanda because I knew that he is an officer well skilled, diplomatically trained and known to the Western powers. At that time he was active in some private business enterprise. I selected president Vambersky only because he represented the Skoda works. In the middle of April 1945 I sent them by airplane to General Kesselring's headquarters near Munich, accompanied by Dr. Adolf, President of the Industrial League, and University Professor Raschhofer, both Germans. The reason for my sending them to Kesselring was that shortly before, Albert Speer, German Minister for War Production in answer to an inquiry of mine sent to me by courier a written message to the effect that Kesselring already was in the position to maintain communications with high American and English authorities. The purpose of the delegation was to induce the Americans and English to a speedy 65

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occupation at least of Bohemia. This attempt failed. While Kesselring received the delegation, he did not make any concrete promises to it as far as I remember from the report later made to me. My explanation of his action is that he had not received from Berlin at that time the consent of any such step. He made the delegation wait a little, probably made an inquiry in Berlin and after the receipt of a confirmation from Berlin he made the following plans to send General Klecanda together with Raschhofer south to General Vietinghof /translator s note: misspelled Witinghof by Frank/, in order to get in touch there with the Western powers, through the intermediary, as I believed, of the Archbishop of Milan. The rest of the delegation was to be brought together with captured American and English generals, so that with the aid of these captured generals, contact could be established with the Western powers. This plan failed. My explanation for this failure of this scheme is the disorganization of General Kesselring's headquarters. The Czech collaborators.

According to my opinion, the Czech people were on the whole realistic politicians. At the same time the Czech people stuck fast to their national existence, and I must declare that I had the greatest respect for the national attitude of the Czech people. As the result of my experience I must declare that there was not a man among the leading personalities of the Czech people who could be called a conscious traitor to his nation, with the exception of a few instances of denunciations by Czech agents of the Gestapo. Thus I consider the former Prime Minister Bienert a patriotic

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Czech, as well as the other members of the then government, such as e.g. Kamenicky, Kalfus, and Krejci. If the fate of the Czech nation had been at stake as for instance in consequence of an order of extermination, evacuation or starvation, none of these men would have lent himself to it. I must, however, add that as to Emanuel Moravec I am somewhat doubtful. I never quite could understand that man. He was an ice-cold and calculating man, who through his speeches and articles had identified himself with the Reich to such a degree that it justified the impression that he was a convinced adherent of a policy designed to fulfil all demands presented by the Reich. None of the Czech leaders denounced any of his compatriotes to me. I do not know whether such denunciations were made to the Gestapo.

## General Toussaint.

Before the war in the years of 1936, 1937 and 1938 he was military attache to the German legation at Prague. In 1940 he relieved General Friderici as "Wehrmachtsbevollmaechtigter" /representative of the German armed forces/ to the Reichsprotector. In this capacity General Tousmint was the military advisor of the Reichsprotector. He was not responsible for police and other actions against the Czech resistance movement. Later on when the partisan activities increased to such extent that it came to fighting he gave military assistance at the request of a combat staff established for the suppression of partisans, at the head of which stood an SS and Police Leader, the name of whom I do not remember at present, appointed by the Reich head SS Heinrich Himmler.

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He did this in his capacity as corps area commander of the corps area Bohemia and Moravia, created, as I believe, in 1943. I do not know of any cruelties for which General Toussaint could be made responsible. He was not a brutal man, rather a diplomat. The expropriation of the Czech farmers.

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I can only repeat what I have already said on this point, namely that farmers whose farms were requisitioned by the army for the establishment of troop training camps were well compensated in cash as far as I have been informed.

> Do you have any information about the way in which these expropriations were carried out in the Moravian districts of Viskov, Prostejow and Boskovice?

Answer:

Question:

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I do not know any pertinent details, except the general information received in connection with the expropriation for the purpose of the armed forces.

Question:

Do you know that German farmers from Bessarabia were settled in the stead of farmers of Czech nationality who were expropriated as a result of such a proceeding?

Answer: I do not know anything about this. <u>Treatment of foreign women workers and of their children.</u> Question: Do you know of any decrees issued by the German government or by any other German authority concerning the treatment of foreign women workers and of their children?

Answer:

I do not know anything about such decrees, because I successfully resisted the employment of foreign men and women workers in Bohemia and Moravia. Only in the very 56 last period foreign workers /French and Russian/ temporarily came to Tisnov, near Brno /Brunn/, and this was done over my head by special order of Martin Bormann. I know, however, an order of Heinrich Himmler's issued at the very beginning, probably in 1939, and which prohibited under penalty all members of the SS from having sexual intercourse with foreign women. Excepted were women of the so-called Germanic races. Sexual intercourse of members of the SS with Czech women was punished.

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Question:

Answer:

Do you know anything about the existence of an office for the strengthening of the Germanic race?

I only know a so-called "Rassen- und Siedlungsamt" /main race and settlement office/ under the supreme leadership of Reichfuchrer SS /Reich leader SS/ Heinrich Himmler existed within the SS organization. In Bohemia and Moravia the function of this office existed in the requirement that every SS man had to obtain its consent before he could marry. This consent was given after a medical examination in reference to physical and racial traits.

Question:

Do you know a speech of Heinrich Himmler's, held in October 1943 at Bad Schachen befpre higher officers of the armed forces, in which Himmler also entered into the treatment of the children of foreign women workers?

Answer: This speech is unknown to me.

Question: Did you not learn later that Himmler justified in this speech the taking away of the children from their mothers and their eventual destruction?

Answer: I never heard of such statements.

Question: Is it not known to you that in other provinces of the Reich official instructions were issued concerning the sterflization of foreign women and the taking away of their children within two to five months after their birth?

Answer: I have no knowledge concerning such instructions. Certainly they were not issued in Bohemia and Moravia.

## Exportation of art treasures.

I memember exactly that Martin Bormann issued the following three orders to the Riechs protector in the name of the Fuehrer: 1/ To remove to Linz from Bohemia and Moravia several especially valuable paintings of old masters. I remember that this order was executed and that about a million Reichsmark were put at the disposal of the Reichs protector for the purchase of substitute paintings. As I believe with certainty these paintings were taken from the possession of the state. It is possible that one or the other picture came from private property. I do not remember the date of the order. I only know that several pictures were actually brought to Linz.

2/ To transfer the Army Museum from Prague to the Reich. This order was issued in 1944. This museum had been established by

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the armed forces. The objects had been collected from Bohemia and Moravia, from several castles to be sure, as I know, for instance, from the castle of Konopiste. I do not know whether any objects of that kind which had been the property of the state were also transferred to this Army Museum. As far as I know this order was executed only in part; first in view of my strong protests and second because the facilities of transportation were already very bad at that time.

3/ The third order directed the transfer to Linz of the musical collection Lobkovic. It was transmitted to Prague early in 1945. I successfully prevented the execution of this order and I personally placed on the letter of Martin Bormann's containing the order of the Fuehrer the notation: "Will not be executed, but is expressly prohibited".

I remember also that the "Auswaertige Amt" /Foreign Office/ liquidated the Malthesian Order in Prague in 1939, that it confiscated its property and that out of this property it sent some valuable tapistry probably to Fuschl on the lake of Fuschl, Salzburg /the then summer residence of Joachim von Ribbontrop/. Against this the then Reichs protector Neurath raised in vain the strongest protest. He desired as well as I did that these objects of art bound to the country and created in the country should remain in the country.

Question: Do you have any knowledge concerning the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg" /mobilisation staff Rosenberg/?

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I heard of this "Einsatzstab Rosenberg" on the occasion of my journey to Zhitomir and Kiev in the fall of 1942. At that time I was informed that the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg" had effected large purchases and sequestrations of Ukrainian objects of art at the Laura cloisters at Kiev.

医桡骨上的 意义的 建分离气管理

I have only a very general knowledge that certain leading party members, whose names I cannot recollect, purchased objects of art out of the so-called enemy property and out of the confiscated Jewish property. As for me, I never acquired a single object from such a source.

Addition to the statement on the final period of the Protectorate.

I should like to make the following addition to my previous statement: After the failure of the attempt of the delegation Bienert, Klecanda, Vambersky, Hruby to establish contacts with the Western powers, I sent a letter to Mr. Burkhardt, President of the International Red Cross, in the latter half of April 1945 through the good offices of Mr. Dunant. Mr. Dunant was accredited to me as the representative of the International Red Cross against the wishes of the German Foreign Office and Reich Main Security Office. In that letter I expressed my readiness to comply largely with Mr. Dunant's requests concerning the protection of the ghetto in Terezin and of the political prisoners. Mr. Dunant took the letter to Zurich in a special plane which I placed at his disposal. He delivered the letter to Mr. Burkhardt and brought a reply of the addresses back to the effect that my interesting statements

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Answer:

would be the subject of a conference. By word of mouth Mr. Dunant told me that Mr. Burkhardt had discussed the contents of my letter with the American and British envoys. I do not know the further fate of my letter. On 2 May 1945 I flew to Flensburg on orders of the then Chief of State, Great Admiral Doenitz. I described the situation to him and suggested a solution which was to consist in an orderly transfer of the power. I received the necessary authorization from him and Count Schwerin-Krosigk. Unfortunately as a result of several breakdowns of my plans I returned to Prague a day later, viz. on 5 May 1945 at 5 AM. While I had started negotiations in my office with the then Prime Minister Bienert about the further steps, the armed revolt broke loose in My plan had been to dissolve the government of the Prague. Protectorate and to hand over the power to the National Council legalized by the Czechoslovak Government at Kosice. I was interested in a quiet and orderly transition into the new conditions. Bienert left my office because of the shooting which had increased, hence he decided to intervene personally. The following day, I believe, the manager of the Prague radio network visited my office. His appearance I believe was a result of mr notice to the government and above all to the Red Cross that I was still ready to negotiate. I wanted to ascertain who was the authorized speaker for the Czech nation in this situation. Thereupon, the manager of the radio network informed me of the existence of a National Council, headed by the University Professor Prazak, whose deputy was Dr. Koterly, and that this 63

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council was deriving its authority from the Czechoslovak government in Kosice. Then I gave the message through the intermediary of the manager of the radio network that I requested the visit of those two gentlemen, as well as of other members of the Professor Prazak transmitted a message to me National Council. to the effect that he expected me at his office; this, however, was impossible since the government district around the /Hradcany/ castle was already encircled by the patriots. On the other hand, Dr. Koterly visited me twice, once accompanied be General Kutlvasr, who was introduced to me as the chief of the Czechoslovak Army. He came also in the old uniform of a Czechoslovak The conferences failed because in the meantime general. Fieldmarshal Schoerner, as commander-in-chief of the "Heeresgruppe Mitte" /Central Group of Armies/, had assumed the executive power and had refused to accept the conditions of the National Council, viz. to declare Prague an open city. Thereupon I assembled the officials of my government and declared to them that the German Ministry in Bohemia and Moravia had ceased to exist and that in view of the fact that Fieldmarshal Schoerner had assumed the executive authority, I no longer considered myself minister of state. Later on, General Toussaint conducted the final negotiations with the National Council, he also signed the conditions of surrender.

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Ended and signed at Wiesbaden, this 10th day of June 1945.

/8/ /t/

Karl Hermann Frank KARL HERMANN FRANK

/s/ Dr. Ecer
/s/ Bernard E. Hart, Capt. Ord.
/s/ Dr. Hochwald

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1. 考慮的工業調整的一個構成的工作。1. PRALEEEEEEEEEEEE

han san dan da

I solemnly swear that I have made a true translation of the statement in German of Karl Hermann Frank to the best of my knowledge and belief, so help me God.

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HERMAN MARCUSE Tec 4 12155745 Hq Det 12th Army Group

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June 1945.

JOSEPH C. BRECKINRIDGE Lieutenant Colonel CMP