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May 14, 1945

TO: Dr. Isidor Lubin

FROM: Moses Abramovitz

SUBJECT: Trip Through Western Germany

This memorandum is a report of a trip to SHAEF Forward Headquarters at Rheims and then through Western Germany. The trip was made in the company of Mr. Burke Knapp, acting economic advisor to Ambassador Murphy, and of Major Arthur Strong of the Economics Division, SHAEF, G-5. Knapp is on temporary detail from Washington where he is Emile Despres' assistant. General McSherry sponsored the trip, secured our orders and clearance, and gave us a sufficiently powerful recommendation to gain us a very cordial reception at all lower headquarters.

**Gist of Impressions**

Subject to qualifications obviously required because of the brevity of the trip, the special section of Germany visited, and most important, the recency of establishment of military government, we gained several fairly strong impressions. These are stated briefly at this point and developed in the body of the report.

1. Devastation in the larger cities of the area is intensive and widespread. Its heaviest impact is on housing, commercial establishments, and transport. Industrial facilities are less heavily hit.

2. Variation in the extent of damage to industrial facilities is so great that no sample or local surveys, such as now exist, can establish the order of magnitude of destruction. This will have to wait on a systematic compilation of evidence. Even now, however, it is clear that a very substantial portion of German facilities can be put in order in a very short time.

3. Economic activity in urban areas is at a virtual standstill. No substantial recovery can be expected until coal and transport can be supplied.

4. The chief immediate problems are food, coal and transport. Of the three, transport is basic. Coal mines, facilities and labor will support coal output as high as 60 per cent of prewar levels if transport were available. Special rations for the miners may, however, be required. SHAEF estimates, however, are substantially less optimistic.

Food imports will be necessary. This again depends on repair of transport. There is, as yet, no general plan for the repair of railroads and waterways, no established organization to execute the repairs, and no reliable estimate of the time required to do the job.

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5. The control of German economic life is now hampered by a long and complicated chain of command, by necessary movement of troops, which causes the tactical command of areas to change frequently, and by shockingly inadequate staffing of civil affairs functions below the highest levels.

A hopeful sign organizationally is the recent organization of a Production Control Agency in G-4, SHAEF. Neither the Agency or its subordinate bodies is staffed as yet.

6. The attention of virtually the entire civil affairs organization is now fixed on restoration of German economic activity. Some degree of restoration is clearly necessary before other policies for the control of Germany can be implemented. There is reason to fear, however, that, in reaction to local problems and conditions, the military may set standards of recovery unduly high and exaggerate the period required for minimum recovery.

Itinerary

We visited the following headquarters: SHAEF Forward (at Rheims), 12th Army Group, 15th Army, which controls all of the Rhine Province including about a third of the Ruhr, XXII Corps (15th Army), which controls the northern half of the Rhine Province and the 15th Army's Ruhr areas, the 94th Division (Duesseldorf), the 17th Airborne Division (Hamborn, near Duisburg). We interviewed Commanders and officers concerned with civil affairs at each of these headquarters.

Our route, together with side trips took us through Saarbruecken, Kaiserslautern, Mainz, Wiesbaden, Frankfort, Koblenz, Bonn, Cologne, Duesseldorf, Duisburg, Mulheim, Krefeld, Essen, and Gladbach. We interviewed members of MG detachments in seven of these cities. We also had interviews with two German business men, Dr. Stieht, who has been appointed President of the Reichsbahn in the Ruhr and northern Rhine Province, and Prof. Hudemann, general manager of the Krupp works.

Our very brief trip thus took us through a fairly large area and a number of important cities. We saw officers concerned with civil affairs at every level. It is important to remember, however, that the trip was very brief and our impressions had to be gained rapidly. Most of the effective time that we had for observation was spent in Frankfort, and the Ruhr, which have many special characteristics. They were the scene of fairly heavy ground fighting and were bombed more heavily than were the cities further east. On the other hand, the major industries of the Ruhr, steel and coal, have equipment that is harder to damage than is that of other types of industry. Both the state of economic activity and the operation of military government reflect the short time - 3 to 4 weeks - that had passed since fighting in the area had ceased. Some detachments had been installed for even shorter periods. Everywhere, attention is focused on the most immediate problems of overcoming the effects of physical destruction and economic paralysis. Only at SHAEF, and there only in some quarters, is there disposition to consider the situation as it is likely to be six months hence.

General Condition of the Cities

Our general impression of the cities visited was the common and obvious one of great devastation. Of the cities visited only Wiesbaden escaped heavy damage. The larger cities, Frankfort, Cologne, and Essen are utterly destroyed in their centers. Cologne and Essen suffered very heavy damage even in their outskirts. The center of Cologne is utterly deserted. In all three cities, many of the streets are still largely blocked, some to the point of being indistinguishable. The water supply, except for special outlets is not yet in order; there is no local transportation of any variety. Only in Duesseldorf, among all the cities visited, were a few streetcars in evidence.

The major impact of the bombing and ground fighting, however, was on housing, commercial establishments, and transport. Industrial facilities (see below) were in better shape. This reflects the concentration of RAF bombing on city centers, of US bombing on special rather than general industrial targets, and the efficiency of the German system of industrial repair. Transportation was badly damaged as a result of bombing in preparation for and during the ground battle, and because of the widespread destruction of bridges and other transport facilities by the Wehrmacht in the course of its retreat.

Economic Activity

Productive activity throughout the urban centers is at a virtual standstill. We were told almost uniformly that only enough coal is being distributed to support such vital economic uses as public utilities and bakeries and a few other food processing plants. A very few other establishments have been authorized to open. Lack of coal, power, transport, communications and orders would prevent any considerable increase of activity at the present time even if the MG authorization were tendered.

The urban population at present seems to be engaged chiefly in solution of the simplest problems of personal existence: clearing rubble, bringing their belongings back home if these had been dispersed, moving to their old homes by foot if they had left, seeking MG authorization for movement, standing in food queues, etc.

This contrasts with activity in the rural regions. Observation and information both indicate that farms are being cultivated in fairly normal fashion, though, as indicated later, crop prospects are not bright.

The State of Industrial Facilities

No reliable evaluation of the present condition of industrial facilities is now available in any quarter. It is generally agreed that, given transport, coal, certain other raw materials, a usable monetary system, and government authorization, the recovery from the present desperately depressed condition could be rapid and substantial. No information is yet at hand, however,

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which would enable one to say whether the facilities now available or repairable in a short time would allow recovery to 50 per cent or 80 per cent of war time levels.

The evidence we encountered varied in extreme fashion. A preliminary survey of facilities in Cologne made by MG showed that most establishments were completely destroyed; very few were given a damage rating less than 80 per cent. A similar survey of plants in the Duesseldorf area employing more than 250 workers showed few plants destroyed, and the rest either undamaged or partially damaged. In Frankfort the appearance of industrial destruction was widespread. We visited several machinery and metal fabricating plants that are complete losses. On the other hand the three large I.G. Farben plants in Frankfort, including the great works at Hoechst, are almost completely untouched. The coal mines in the Ruhr area, according to the officers of the Rhine Coal Control, are largely undamaged and could be restored to close to full production within a few months so far as operating facilities are concerned. We were assured by Prof. Hudemann, the Krupp director, that taking the Ruhr steel facilities overall, production could be raised to two-thirds, or even three-quarters, of wartime levels within four months provided coal, labor, and transport were available. The surprisingly good state of the Krupp works, lying in the center of devastated Essen, and in the nearby community of Borbeck, makes this evaluation appear not unreasonable. Coal and steel works, however, are particularly difficult to damage and generalization from this evidence is hardly possible. At the present time, it is only safe to conclude that, while a great quantity of valuable industrial property still stands in western Germany, a systematic survey will be necessary to determine even its order of magnitude.

Immediate Problems in the Area

Regardless of the state of industrial facilities, we were impressed at every stage of the trip with the fact that the beginning of reparation deliveries on even a modest scale depends on the solution of more immediate problems related to the basic sustenance of the German people and the restoration of a faint semblance of normal existence. These problems are usually compressed into a trite trinity of Food, Fuel and Transport, although it is clear that many other problems are involved in these. It may be necessary to consider also whether Housing does not rank with the first three as a major problem, a minimum solution of which must precede substantial reparation deliveries.

Food, fuel and transport now appear to engage the attention of every officer concerned with economic affairs at every level. Valid as this may be for the moment, there is reason for concern, as pointed out below, that long-term policies, attitudes and organizational arrangements may be solidified on the basis of these immediate problems, the effective solution of which, on the scale required, may be no more than six or eight months distant.

Food

The food situation in the Lower Rhine-Ruhr area was best presented to us by Maj. Oetjens, the officer in charge of food in G-5, XXII Corps (15th Army). The pres

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ration being delivered to the population is something in the neighborhood of 1000 to 1100 calories per day per capita. Present consumption is thought to be about 1600 calories, the difference being provided by stocks of potatoes and preserved foods held by most families. Minimum rations, though no more, are, therefore, now being provided.

Stocks now in commercial channels, however, will be exhausted in almost every locality and for almost every commodity within six weeks, in many instances sooner. Even after allowance for the discovery of additional stocks and for replenishment for our farms in the area, very large imports into the Rhine-Ruhr region will be required between July 1 and September 1, after which the new crop will be available for the fall and winter months.

The situation is aggravated by the gradual exhaustion of stocks now in consumers' hands and by return of population to the region.

The longer-term prospects of the region are not favorable. Food imports into the area normally amounted to 50 per cent of consumption. Such large imports will, of course, not be necessary because of lowering of standards and reduction of population from prewar levels. This, however, is offset by the poor harvest prospects in the region. Planting in the Fall of 1944 was disturbed by battle in the Aachen region; planting in the Spring of 1945 was disturbed by battle in the whole area west of the Rhine. In addition, there is some farm labor shortage because of the time-gaps between the disappearance of foreign workers and the demobilization of the German army.

Of equal, perhaps greater, importance for urban supplies is the anticipated reduction in collections from farms and the reduction in the efficiency of the rationing system. Plans for meeting these difficulties have not yet been formulated. At the present time, these problems are especially acute because the German food organization is only in process of reestablishment. Local food offices are in operation, but provincial offices are only now being reorganized and neither the administrative system nor the transport is available even for intra-provincial equalization of supplies.

The problem of redistribution of the Ruhr population is receiving thought at SHAEF, but neither plans nor decisions are prepared. We were offered a British estimate that the feeding of the present population of the Ruhr would require the continuous operation of 16,000 trucks from the nearest railheads or ports. If the present population were reduced by 30 per cent, transport requirements would, after an initial period, be greatly reduced, partly by bringing the people to the farms, partly by providing more equitable distribution of food. Greatly increased food production would not be anticipated. The population that would then remain in the Ruhr is expected to be sufficient to work the mines, utilities and transport.

Coal

The activity of German industry as a whole will remain close to its present virtual standstill level until supplies of coal begin to move within and out of the Ruhr. Coal shipments on reparation account similarly depend on a renewed flow of Ruhr coal supplies.

Our information about the coal situation was secured from officers of the Rhine Coal Control (see below). We interviewed the Commander of the RCC

as a whole and the Commanders of Rhine Coal Districts #1 and #2.

The mines themselves, the mining machinery, and surface works are largely intact. In District #1, the western most part of the Ruhr, including some territory west of the Rhine, 14 out of 23 mines are already in operation. By May 20, operating mines will be increased to 20. Only two or three mines in the district cannot be restored to production without major repairs. A similar situation exists in District #2.

The current output of coal, however, is limited to the small supplies required to furnish power for the mine pumps and other machinery. Larger output is precluded by the fact that pit-head stocks that cannot be moved are already so large as to constitute a storage problem.

Colonel Ker, commanding the Rhine Coal Control, considered that improvement in transportation would not permit output to rise above an annual rate of 40,000,000 tons by September 1. This compares with a prewar rate of about 125 million tons from Ruhr mines. If this estimate is valid, the rate of recovery of Germany industry and the flow of coal to western Europe will both be very small during 1945.

Availability of labor does not constitute a problem for the next few months. It is well to note, however, that presently available labor probably would not permit the operation of the mines at greater than 60 per cent of previous high levels of output - say 75,000,000 tons annually - even if miners worked old hours of work and were fed their usual high ration. SHAEF estimates of presently available labor are, indeed, substantially lower. The fact is, however, that miners now receive the same low ration as the rest of the population. The working day now set is approximately one hour less than that worked under the Nazis. On the grounds of their extremely low rations, however, the miners are asking for a further reduction in the working day. Thus coal is required to bring food to the Ruhr; and extra food may be needed to allow effective use to be made of mine labor. Problems raised by emergent labor organizations in coal are discussed at a later point.

When output rises the supply of pitprops may become a problem. It is expected, however, that the transport that takes the coal away will also be available to bring pitprops to the mines.

As already indicated coal production in the lower Rhine and Ruhr regions is now a responsibility of the Rhine Coal Control. This is a military organization attached to the Advance Section of Communications Zone, thus heading back to SHAEF. The present commander is an American engineer officer but the heads of the various districts and the largest part of the staff are British. This anticipates the fact that this region lies entirely within the British zone and will presumably soon come under British control. (Our impression is that the staff is technically very competent.)

In principle the Rhine Coal Control is supposed to be in charge of all matters affecting the operation of the mines and the scheduling of production. SHAEF G-4, Solid Fuels Branch, is supposed to deal with allocation

to claimants and with transportation. We were told, however, that this division of authority is now in dispute.

Transport

The possibility of feeding the population of the area and that of taking coal out of the area both depend on a certain degree of restoration of the German transport system, both rail and waterway. Rail and water transport facilities, however, have been destroyed on a huge scale, partly by Allied bombing, and partly by German destruction. The smashing of bridges has blocked not only the railroads, but also the rivers and canals. Allied pontoon bridges carrying army motor transport are a further barrier to water traffic. In addition many barges have been sunk or beached or otherwise put out of operation.

As a result of this destruction, traffic on waterways is completely halted, local ferrying excepted. Civilian freight traffic on railroads is extremely small and confined to very short hauls.

No estimates of repair time required, based on study and carrying conviction, came to our attention. The Transportation officers of G-5, XXII Corps, who now control the area insist that no general plan for the repair of transport facilities has yet been furnished. This may be due, in part, to the brevity of the interval since cessation of hostilities in the area. In the interim, these officers were operating under a directive requiring them to treat the XXII Corps area as an island, giving priority to repair of facilities required for transport within the area over transport between this and other areas.

Subject to the supervision of XXII Corps, 15th Army, the railroads of the area now operate under the management of a reinstalled Reichsbahn official named Stieht. The transport officers we interviewed are convinced of his ability and energy; our own interview with Dr. Stieht seemed to us to confirm this view. It appears that on his own initiative and out of existing Reichsbahn supplies, he has gone a considerable distance in reorganizing personnel and in executing the smaller repairs of tracks, signals, bridges, etc. The chief obstacle to further progress is the need for larger bridges. No general authorization to allow the Reichsbahn to contract for such bridges had yet appeared at the time of our visit. The Corps has itself authorized a contract for one bridge, and the transport officers were hopeful that this restarting of a bridge building company might enable Reichsbahn to secure a larger number.

Organization and Staff of the Civil Affairs Agencies

The solution of these immediately critical economic problems is hampered at present by a number of organizational and staff difficulties.

The Chain of Command

At every level of the civil affairs organization there is complaint that higher headquarters fails to furnish policy directives, that instructions

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are not forthcoming, that no general plan is available. This is true at SHAEF which complains about Washington. It is true in heightened degree in local MG detachments which stand many steps removed from the level at which policy is determined.

Many instances of this trouble were cited to us. The most serious and widespread complaint concerned the absence of instructions concerning the industries that might be authorized to start operations. A directive covering this question had been approved at SHAEF level sometime before we left. It was unknown even at Army level during our trip.

This situation has been aggravated so far by the constant movement of the troops. Hence, while the MG detachments have remained fixed in their localities, the tactical command of many areas has been shifting rapidly. Thus the regimental, divisional, and even Corps G-5's have not had even as much time as the local detachments to become acquainted with their regions. This difficulty is likely to be of diminishing importance, but it will continue to be troublesome during the coming months while the redeployment of our troops is in progress.

**Staff**

Below the level of the Army there was ample indication that neither the G-5 staffs nor the MG detachments were adequately staffed for their jobs either in numbers or in quality of officers.

The G-5 of XXII Corps is responsible for civil affairs in the Northern half of the Rhine province. He is a recently converted commander of a tank destroyer regiment. He was pathetically frank about the strangeness of the various economic and other non-military problems to him.

The Transportation officer in G-5, XXII Corps is a 30 year old ex-commander of a reconnaissance company. He had some small scale railroad experience in Colorado, and he is very energetic and clearly capable in a general way. He was assigned to his present job, however, only about three weeks ago; he knows no German.

The G-5 section of XXII Corps was so inadequately staffed for its civil affairs responsibilities that these functions have been spread over the other four staff divisions. Thus the functions of military government, which were the subject of two years of training for many local MG officers and for the staffs at higher headquarters, are being administered at corps, divisional and regimental levels by men who are now attempting to read the civil affairs handbook.

We found similar evidence of undermanning in local MG detachments. Frankfurt is one of the few major cities in the American zone. In Frankfurt, there is a single officer for Trade and Industry. He is a 2nd Lieutenant. (He was one of the few MG officers we met with a speaking knowledge of German, and he was obviously a capable person, but he was literally swamped by the size of his job.) There is a single officer for food and civilian supplies. He is a warrant officer.

It is cited by way of extenuation that U. S. forces are now holding a far larger area than the American zone. This situation, however, has been relieved to some extent by the introduction of British MG detachments into US held areas. The stretching of available MG detachments in any case hardly explains the size and character of the team assigned to such an important city as Frankfort.

Production Planning

Up to the present time no functioning organization for the comprehensive control of German industry has existed within the SHAEF organization. As indicated above, the lack of such an organization with efficient channels of communication to subordinate levels is already keenly felt.

The most hopeful aspect of our occupation planning, from the standpoint of organization, therefore, is probably the very recent establishment within SHAEF G-4 of a Production Control Agency. This unit is to be headed by Col. James Boyd who was Gen. Clay's assistant for WPB work in Washington. The agency is to have jurisdiction over all German production other than agriculture, fishing and forestry.

At the time we passed through Rheims the basic directives had only just been signed and tentative organization charts were going through final stages of approval. It is a SHAEF organization now. It will be an American zonal organization after the SHAEF period is concluded.

The PCA is planned to function in much the same way as WPB theoretically was to do at home. Subject to the overriding authority of the Supreme Commander (in the SHAEF period) or of Gen. Clay and The Control Council later, the PCA will make final allocations of all resources, determine capacity to produce, and schedule production.

Responsibility for initial collection and presentation of requirements to PCA will be divided. G-5 will present requirements for German civilian end products and for all the claims of liberated areas. G-4 will present the requirements of the armed forces and all groups for whom the Army may be responsible. PCA will itself estimate requirements for raw materials and intermediate products needed to support the production programs authorized in Germany.

Data on plant capacity is to be sought first from CIOS, IIIC, Bombing Survey reports and special surveys by G-4 branches (e.g. the Solid Fuels Branch). As soon as possible, however, more comprehensive surveys will be made by a group of Industry Control Sections provided in the organization.

The Industry Control Sections are to be staffed by personnel drawn from the staffs of the various Chiefs of Service in ETO (Quartermaster, Engineers, Surgeon General, Chief of Ordnance, etc.) The Sections are to remain under the administrative control of the Chiefs of Service, but it is hoped that, in fact they will function in a similar way as parts of the Production Control Agency. This arrangement was adopted because it was considered that only the Chiefs of Service had or could secure the personnel necessary to staff the Sections.

Colonel Boyd indicated that this was also the reason for setting up the agency under G-4 rather than G-5.

The Industry Sections will determine the capacity of the various industries under their respective jurisdictions. They will also handle procurement, schedule production, attempt to ensure the efficiency of their industries, and so on.

Colonel Boyd is keenly aware of his dependence on reliable information as the basis of his work. His organization provides a prominent place for a unit to assemble and check estimates of requirements and supply and to plan allocations. Ray Fisher, of the Munitions Assignment Board, is to head the unit.

The planned staff of the agency is some 1400 officers and 5000 enlisted men. Recruitment, however, had not yet begun when we were in Rheims and it is expected to be a very difficult problem.

Formal planning and the language of the present directive does not contemplate permanent G-4 responsibility for production control. In the language of the directive, G-5 will assume responsibility when "civilian requirements" become more important than "military requirements". This is, of course, a provision of studied vagueness. It was explained to us that the intention of this provision was that control should pass to G-5 either when the Control Commission was established or when German civilian agencies could once more be used as adjuncts of military government. This, however, is itself not clear, and it is evident that it is intended to leave the matter unsettled.

Attitudes and Intentions of the Occupation Authorities

The trip afforded an opportunity to gain impressions about the attitudes and emotional bent of the officers who will be governing Germany. It is clear, of course, that on matters like these, it is especially easy to go astray because of the accidental sample of officers whom we saw and the short time we had to talk with them. The observations that follow are, therefore, put forward in the most tentative way.

Control of German Industry

We found evidence of two ~~faintly~~ partly conflicting tendencies. The most generally expressed sentiment, met at every level of the organization from Generals Clay and McSharry down to local MG detachments, was that German economic activity must be restored. This is put forward in a general way and without specification of the kinds of activity to be permitted or their proportions.

The sentiment seems to stem from a number of different motives and considerations. One is the conviction that employment and a certain standard of life and normal activity must be forthcoming if we are to have an orderly and successful occupation period. The question raised is, of course, how much is necessary and who determines that quantity. The answer in military circles is that the Control Council and the American Zonal Commander must have a free hand to determine the necessary standards. There is every reason for concern that the standards thus set may be widely divergent from those which broader political

considerations might indicate.

Bearing on the question of standards is a second motive which we found strong and widespread. This is the instinctive constructive bent of officers faced with machines not running, railroads idle, people unemployed. They find it unnatural and painful not to try to put things right and not to try to raise the level of performance of the area or activity for which they are responsible. Our limited observation leads us to feel that it is important not to minimize the capacity that local officers have for finding ways around the obstacles that high policy may set in their way.

A third fairly obvious motive is the understandable sympathy of administrators for any people living in the desolate conditions in which the Germans now do. Except for clothing, there is no aspect of German urban existence (in western Germany) that is not shockingly bad by any standards, a fortiori, by American standards.

In conflict with this strong pull for the restoration of economic activity, there is a weaker, more restricted sentiment for limitation of German output. Surprisingly, however, this stems from fear of German competition with the US and UK in world markets rather than from security considerations. We often heard the conviction expressed that we must be careful not to restore Germany's ability to export in competition with us. We heard no strong conviction that Germany's economic potential might be a security threat. (It was, however, understood that some special industries, e.g. aircraft and synthetic oil, might be suppressed on security grounds).

The strongest statement about the need to restrict German competition came from General Clay. He had had a recent talk with Bernard Baruch and had been much impressed by a statement by Baruch that if German and Japanese export competition could be suppressed, it would be possible for us to pay off our national debt within a limited number of years.

At the present time, the personnel administering civil affairs has no policy line and no indoctrination to control and guide their own instinctive but strong sentiments. It seems evident that the clearest sort of policy directive, combined with an effort to explain and justify that policy, will be necessary, if personal reaction to local conditions is not to outweigh whatever deliberate decisions are made at higher levels.

Denazification

Overt expressions concerning the dismissal of Nazi personnel are, of course, uniformly in favor of a strong policy. It was not surprising, however, to encounter instances in which officers betrayed impatience with the workings of CIC, and indicated that they were being denied the help of Germans whose special knowledge or experience would be useful to them. We found reason to think that the spirit of the denazification directives was being evaded in certain instances. One such case, concerning coal mine management is described below.

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**Labor Unions**

We were able to secure some knowledge of administrators' attitudes in a potentially very important case of labor relations. The problem concerns union organization, working conditions, and de-Nazification in the coal mines.

We secured our information from Colonels Burgess and Stobart, the Rhine Coal Commission Commanders of Coal Districts #1 and #2, and from Major Giroux, Commander of the MG detachment of Gladbach, which controls district #2. The first two officers are British, the third American.

Very soon after the occupation of the Ruhr, delegates claiming to represent the workers of individual mines appeared before MG officers and later before the officers of the Rhine Coal Commission to present certain claims. The more important claims were for permission to organize unions covering more than one mine; for the dismissal of certain mine managers charged with being Nazis; and for shorter hours of work consistent with the present low scale of rations.

Asked about the political leanings of the delegates, both RCC officers said that the largest number of delegates claimed to represent Communist workers. Both officers, however, were inclined to doubt that the men were really Communists. They considered that the delegates were simply "agitators of the usual sort". Col. Stobart indicated that he would have given the delegates short shrift had he not been aware of the political implications of a settlement of labor relations in Ruhr mines. His experience with coal miners had led him to believe that if one began by making concessions to them one would be borrowing no end of trouble for the future.

Having received no general directive whatever on the subject of labor relations, Col. Stobart, in whose district the matter had come to a head, prepared a special directive and secured for it the signature of the appropriate officer in G-5, XVI Corps (9th Army). The directive provided (1) that no inter-mine union organization be permitted, (2) that delegates of workers of individual mines be approved by the military authorities, (3) that notices on bulletin boards be approved by the military authorities, (4) that the interests of delegates be restricted to working conditions, welfare matters, etc., (5) that wages and hours be determined by the military authorities without negotiation, (6) that the appointment of mine managers be determined solely by the military authorities.

On the basis of this directive, Col. Stobart, in consultation with the other officers of RCC, has refused to lower the hours of work below the level previously established by the RCC. (This was a reduction of about one hour from the old German workday). He also has rejected all demands for the dismissal of allegedly Nazi managers. He announced the terms of the labor relations directive and told the delegates that any resistance to them would be repressed by the strongest measures.

Colonels Stobart and Burgess both defended the decision with respect to hours on the ground that further reduction would mean working Ruhr miners fewer hours than miners in U.K. and U.S. Col. Stobart indicated that he had no

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patience with the plea that rations were not now sufficient to support an eight hour day.

We secured some check on the validity of two of these decisions in an interview with Major Giroux, MG commander at Gladbach. Major Giroux was inclined to believe that rations might, in fact, now be too low to support a full 8 hour day in the mines. He also indicated that while the miners' claims that certain managers were Nazis were, in general, unsupported by the kinds of factual evidence required by MG for dismissal, such evidence did exist in one case. In this instance, the manager was a pre-1933 party member who is alleged to have been particularly brutal to foreign workers. Major Giroux stated that the evidence was sufficient to have justified his ouster, but that RCC had requested his retention for the time being on the ground that he was essential to the management of his mine.