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Ref No SAIC/29
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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

BRIG GEN MAKATO ONODERA,
IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM

1. SOURCE

VOECZKOENDY, Ladislas, a 49-year-old Hungarian diplomat who was Asst Military Attache at STOCKHOLM from Dec 43 to Nov 44. Owing to the fact that he speaks very good Russian he was able to make friends with Gen ONODERA, who speaks no other European language well and who therefore had few friends in STOCKHOLM. Source talked freely and appears to be entirely sincere and truthful.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See text Interrogator: G.W.G.

2. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN ONODERA

Gen ONODERA, who is 43 years old, comes from a family of the Japanese nobility. His wife belongs to a Japanese family of the highest nobility and is said to be related to the Emperor, a fact of which the Gen is very proud. They have three sons; the eldest, who is 15 years old, is at a cadet school in Japan. They apparently live a modest, harmonious family life, go out rarely, and receive few guests. Gen ONODERA is a moderate man, drinks very little and does not smoke. He suffers from low blood pressure. Once or twice a month he communicates by telephone with his sons and relatives in Japan.

The Gen is a diligent and tireless worker. He speaks and writes good Russian, speaks and writes German poorly, and understands some English. He deliberates for some time before making a statement. He has frequently told source that the Japanese General Staff, as well as the Emperor, was highly satisfied with his work in STOCKHOLM, and on several occasions he has given source to understand that he was a future candidate for the post of Chief of the Japanese General Staff. He has never spoken to source in detail about his career, but during the course of frequent conversations between Feb and Nov 44 source was able to obtain the following information about the General's history:

- 23 Graduated from War College, where he had learned to speak Russian.
- 24-27 Various assignments with higher commands.
- 28-30 Served as Capt (Intelligence Officer) on General Staff with troops opposing the Russians in Manchuria. There he perfected his knowledge of the Russian language, and is said to have done excellent work.
- 30-36 Assigned to various higher commands. Also served as instructor of tactics at War College.
- 36-37 Organized the pro-Japanese "National Chinese Movement" in China. According to his own statements, he did a "perfect" job and received great credit for this work.
- 40 ? Commanded an inf div fighting in China for an entire year. Source believes it was in 40.
- 40- ? Returned to War College as instructor.
? Assigned to STOCKHOLM as Military Attache.

3. OFFICE OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM

a) Location

This office is located on the fifth floor at LINNE-GATAN 38, adjoining the General's private apartment. In Nov 44 Gen ONODERA told source that he intended to rent another small apartment so that he would not have to receive visitors in his office. Source believes that this move was contemplated in order to safeguard the security of the work at the office.

b) Mission

The function of this office is to furnish military intelligence to the Imperial Japanese Government. Its importance was considered so great that it took precedence over the Japanese Legation at STOCKHOLM. Gen ONODERA's reports

SECRET

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/29
28 May 45

went via German military transmitters in BERLIN directly to the Emperor, whereas the reports of the Minister went to the Prime Minister, who submitted to the Emperor only such portions of the reports as he considered of particular importance. Furthermore, Gen ONODERA claimed that he had orders to check the Legation's security measures, and that he could request the recall of the Minister if he did not consider him suitable for the post.

After the successful Allied invasion of France, Gen ONODERA told source that he had received orders to remain at his post after Germany's collapse in order to take charge of the Japanese intelligence system for all Europe. In source's opinion he already has a very considerable network of espionage agents at his disposal.

c) Office Duties and Personnel

Gen ONODERA and his wife do all the code work themselves in a special room of their private apartment. No one else has access to this room.

Two engineer specialists, whom source describes as co-workers, work at this office. One of them, SATO, is supposed to be an authority on aircraft construction. He is about 32 years old, and speaks very poor English. During 44 he made frequent trips to Germany. The other, name unknown to source, is said to be a naval construction engineer. He speaks German fluently. Gen ONODERA remarked that this man was very familiar with the composition of the Rumanian and Russian Black Sea fleets.

Two Esthonian women, one of them the wife of a Swedish cavalry Capt, work in an ante-room. They translate Swedish newspaper articles and do general office work.

During 44 source frequently saw three or four other young Japanese in the office. ONODERA stated that they had been studying in Europe and were unable to return home, so he had given them employment in his office. In early Nov '44, ONODERA mentioned that he was expecting three additional Japanese for his office, and that five more would be added to the Legation Staff. At that time he was also trying to get a Japanese radio technician, as well as equipment, in order to have effective communications with Japan after the anticipated collapse of Germany.

4. ASSOCIATIONS

In addition to his many meetings with source, Gen ONODERA frequently associated with the following:

The Finnish Military Attache and his Staff
The German Military Attache and his Staff
The German Air Attache and his Staff

Less frequently he associated with:

The Rumanian Military Attache
The Swiss Military Attache
Gen KELLGREEN, Director of the Swedish Attache Group
Maj PETERSON, Director of the Swedish Communication Group

He never made any mention of his relations with the Russian Military Attache.

Gen ONODERA visited his own Legation several times weekly. He sometimes made derogatory remarks about their work, such as, "These people don't do anything. They only read the newspapers, translate them, and that is what they send to Japan." He mentioned that he had often argued with the Minister about this type of work and also that he had found negligence in the code work.

Ref No SAIC/29
28 May 45.

5. SECRET AFFILIATIONS

a) Intelligence Concerning Russia

An Estonian, who according to repeated statements did excellent work, was a chief source of Gen ONODERA's intelligence on Russia. After the capitulation of Finland, Gen ONODERA established connections with Finnish intelligence officers who had escaped and who were anxious to work against the Russians.

b) Intelligence Concerning the Allies

ONODERA boasted of having an agent in the British Passport Dept in the BIRGEL-JARS-GATAN, STOCKHOLM. He claimed that he regularly read the reports of the Secretary of the British Legation, CHESHIRE, who is said to be a Capt and chief of the British Intelligence Corps. This was a source of considerable amusement to ONODERA, which is illustrated by the following story:

One day a Swedish journalist, Capt Goesta MELIN, invited VOECZKOENDY (source) to luncheon at the RICHE Restaurant. The journalist asked VOECZKOENDY several political questions; among others he asked him what would be the reaction of the Hungarian Army to an Allied landing in the Balkans. Source replied that Hungary would be very pleased about it, but stated that such an operation would require at least 20 divs, as the Germans were very strong in the Balkans. On the following day source visited the general's office and noticed immediately that ONODERA was suspicious of him. Just as source was leaving ONODERA suddenly asked him how he happened to know Capt MELIN. In reply source asked, "How do you know that I know him? Did you perhaps see me with him at the RICHE?" ONODERA replied that he had read the report which CHESHIRE had received from MELIN. Source then told the Gen what he had told Capt MELIN. ONODERA then stated, "The report which CHESHIRE sent to LONDON was not the same; apparently he had worked it over."

Gen ONODERA always waited for the British courier plane, and frequently he stated that he had received "something interesting" from England. He also sent money to England, as he inadvertently revealed to source on more than one occasion by such remarks as, "People say I am stingy, but I believe my men in England are satisfied; I always send money." Source believes that ONODERA's informants were British journalists, because he once mentioned knowing newspaper reporters formerly stationed in STOCKHOLM who had been recalled to England.

c) Intelligence Concerning Germany

As ONODERA frequently remarked, he knew practically everything about the disposition of German military forces. He and his assistants often travelled to Denmark, Norway and Germany to meet German officers.

6. GEN ONODERA'S OPINIONS ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS

a) Reliability of ONODERA's Deductions

Gen ONODERA is a fine example of the Intelligence Officer. He is industrious, discreet, suspicious, and intelligent. He spares no effort in building up his net of agents. His deductions concerning the military situation in Europe were correct, and his predictions have been borne out by events. From information received from England regarding the buildup of supplies, he was able to estimate the date of the invasion of the Continent to within a month of the actual landing. After the landings in Normandy, he predicted that the Germans would not be able to repel Allied forces. Based upon his experiences in the Far East, he declared that the bridgehead would be destroyed within the first 24 hours, or not at all. He anticipated the destruction of Germany soon after the bridgehead was successfully established, and by early 1945 he was making every effort to revamp his espionage network accordingly.

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/29
28 May 45

b) The European Situation after Allied Victory

At the end of Aug 44, ONODERA declared that all Europe would be exposed to the dangers of Bolshevism after Allied victory. Russia is slowly but surely gaining control of the Continent. In Scandinavia she is already at the Atlantic, and from there and from the Baltic Sea she already surrounds Sweden and threatens Denmark. After conquering Northern Germany, she will be able to work her way to the English Channel. Russia already dominates the Balkans, and from there she threatens the Middle East. The smoothly functioning Soviet propaganda machine will do everything possible to provoke revolutions in the Iberian Peninsula, in France, and in Italy, and then to tackle Europe from the Southwest. Soviet activities in North Africa are becoming more and more dangerous. Ultimately England will confront Russia alone, because the US will have no time to attend to Europe once she is fully committed in the East. Japan will confront the US with ever-increasing difficulties, and will tie down US forces completely.

The Russians, on the other hand, will receive military reinforcements from the 40 millions Germans in the occupied areas, and will also engage in strong propaganda activities among the impoverished German masses. Once Soviet Russia has had time to reorganize her disrupted agriculture and to bring her factories into full operation again, she will be so strong that she will tolerate no counter power in Europe.

c) Russo-Japanese Relations

ONODERA spoke frequently of Japanese hatred of the Russians, but he pointed out that Japan's primary enemy was the USA. In 44 he was firmly convinced that Russia would not attack Japan. He based his reasoning on Russia's need to rehabilitate her industrial and agricultural systems. Russia, he stated, must reorganize her KOLHOS and SOVKOS (collective farms), build more and more tractors, and generally revamp her agricultural set-up, which had proved a failure during the war. The Russian farmer would have to take to scythe and shovel to escape starvation. If the US had not shipped vast quantities of food to Russia in 43, a major disaster in the food situation would have occurred.

d) The USA

ONODERA stated in Oct 44 that he expected the European War to end in Feb 45. He declared that the US had already won the "American War" by binding to herself Canada, Central America, and South America. With the acquisition of numerous air and naval bases, the US had gained unquestionable superiority over impoverished Britain. However, Soviet propaganda in South America will greatly increase, and aside from the problems created for the US by Japan, the US will have to face others provided by Russia in Scandinavia, the Balkans, and the oil regions of the Middle East. With the discharge of many American soldiers after the European War, the US will be faced with severe labor troubles. All these factors, ONODERA hoped, would prevent the US from deploying all her forces in the continuation of the war against Japan.

e) German Policies

At the end of May 44, source had a lengthy conference with ONODERA, during which the latter severely condemned German policies. ONODERA stated that KOCH, German Plenipotentiary for Eastern Territories, had so conducted affairs in the occupation of the Ukraine that he might as well have been working for the Soviets and deserved the "Order of STALIN". The Ukrainians, who had greeted the German Army as liberators in 41, had already turned their backs on the German civilian occupational authorities as far back as 42, simply because of maltreatment and the transgressions of a few subordinates. The German civilian authorities, through their immeasurable lack of understanding of the people and through their ignorance concerning the Ukrainian question, had made enemies of the Ukrainians, whereas with understanding and cooperation they could have gained an army of three million men.

Gen ONODERA went on to say that the treatment of Japan by the German High

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/29
28 May 45

Command had been equally stupid. No conferences were held concerning coordinated conduct of the war. The last thing that the Japanese wanted was the German attack upon Russia. The Japanese High Command had a quite different plan. They wanted Germany to drive through the Balkans, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran to the Persian Gulf, and finally to link up with a coordinated Japanese drive in India. ONODERA said that it was high time, in these last hours, to try to work together. He had received word from TOKYO that conferences between the two high commands would shortly take place at the FUEHRER's Hq. Immediately afterwards, the German newspapers announced that extremely important conferences were pending concerning the common conduct of the war in future operations. Ten days later the subject was dropped completely, and no further word was published or spoken regarding the conferences. When source questioned ONODERA on the matter, the latter answered evasively, merely stating that Japan would continue the war to the end, regardless of the outcome in Europe. Source believes that the Japanese offer of common action in the conduct of the war was intended to mislead the German High Command and to influence Russia to conclude a "special agreement" with Japan, a different form of agreement from the "Five Year Non-Aggression Pact". Gen ONODERA appeared very pleased when he mentioned this pact.

7. CONCLUSION

From that time onward, ONODERA mentioned again and again that he would have to stay in STOCKHOLM for a long time. Prior to Nov 44 he had been receiving additional sums of money from various sources, including 150,000 Swiss francs from the Japanese Attache in Finland. Source believes that, owing to the present European situation and to the disruption of communications, there may be loopholes in ONODERA's organization; but he declares that a man of ONODERA's perseverance and ability would be able to repair them without great loss of time. He is convinced that Gen ONODERA has built an espionage and intelligence service which from henceforth will be the center of such Japanese activity in Europe.

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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

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