

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Gerhard Ruchle, 40, married, since 1939 in charge of the 'radio-political' section of the Foreign Office with the rank of 'Gesandter' (ambassador). Member of the NSDAP (membership No. 594) since 1925, member of the Prussian State Parliament since 1932, member of the Reichstag since 1933, and SS-Standartenfuhrer.

Functions of the "radio-political" section in the Foreign Office:

- 1) Monitoring of foreign stations (in the 'Seehaus' on the Wannsee, where 500 employees of all nationalities were working). The entire foreign radio production was recorded daily in 8 large volumes.
- 2) International radio matters of a technical nature, such as determination of wavelengths etc..
- 3) Collaboration with similar offices in friendly, and, in some cases, neutral countries (dispatch of so-called 'radio attaches').
- 4) Broadcasts in 50 different languages. The latter was actually part of the task of the "Reichsrundfunk" Corporation, but the issue of directives on foreign policy was entrusted to the 'radio-political' section of the Foreign Office.

The last few weeks:

These last weeks were dominated by only one thought "Wo willst du dich uberrollen lassen?" (where are you going to allow yourself to be caught). Just as all other sections of the Foreign Office the 'radio-political' section was constantly on the move - from one "Ausweichstelle" to the next. R. left Berlin on April 21st in order to reach the "Ausweichstellen" in Southern Germany. Oberlauterbach - Kaufburen - Kitzbuhel - (where Envoy Neubacher was in charge of a branch of the Foreign Office) - Fuschl near Salzburg (where Ribbentrop had his home) - these were the respective stations and stops. Ribbentrop did not participate in any of the 'southern cruises', and R. believes that he stayed up North and perhaps went to "Schleswig-Holstein".

Since May 4th the primary question for Ruchle was by whom 'he should allow himself to be captured' (uberrollen). He did not decide in favor of the Russians, who were not much further off than the Western victors, neither did he favor the French, who marched into the town of Hintersee while R. was there, but he decided in favor of the Americans. R. says that he wanted to see his family once again - they were living in the US-occupied zone in Fischbach-Au.

He therefore asked the French authorities to give him a pass in his name, entitling him to travel to Fischbach-Au. The French town commandant had, of course, no idea who Ruchle was, and R. admits that he did not tell him who he actually was. He actually saw his family again when he arrived in Fischbach-Au, where he was later arrested by American occupation authorities assisted by FAB-men. "This was entirely in accord with my wishes", Ruchle says, as he intended to give himself up to the Americans anyway, after he had seen his family again.

Collective Responsibility:

R. does not attempt to deny his part of the guilt as far as a collective responsibility for the developments is concerned. He said: "If the Party is guilty, which she probably is, then I am guilty too. The Party as such is responsible for the catastrophe in Germany." R. admits that he participated most actively in all Party activities since 1925. His conception of the mission of

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the NSDAP was "to achieve a balance between capitalism and socialism in order to prevent the 'sliding off' into Bolshevism."

He believed that only Germany had suffered an economic crisis during the thirties, and that, unlike in other "happy lands", the basis for an experiment, like the national-socialist one, existed in Germany.

Ruehle claims that his rank in the SS was merely an honorary one, and that he had neither received nor executed any directives from the SS.

The great mistakes:

Ruehle further states that Hitler's responsibility for the disastrous errors he committed, could not be denied. He lacked any sense at all for human values. We had no knowledge of human nature, around him immeasurable Hybridism and frightful human mistakes were allowed to spread. All tasks in the Regime were dominated by one sentence, which, as he claims, was tacked up in many official places; "No one must know more than the things he actually needs to know in order to do his job." To go beyond this would have been dangerous, R. goes on to say. This is how Ruehle explains to us and to himself, he was able to believe in a miracle until the very end. He had had no idea about the actual potential war strength of Germany, and he had greatly over-estimated it - along with hundreds of thousands of other people - almost up to the last day of the war. He claims too, that he knew nothing of the things that went on in the concentration camps, although he admits that he knew of the existence of such camps. He further states that he had never found out whether the omission of the invasion of England had been a strategic mistake of the first order, or whether it had simply been impossible to undertake such an invasion. It was claimed, Ruehle says, that the German Navy had declared in 1940 that such an undertaking was an impossibility. The effect of Goebbels' brilliant "calming-down and deceiving propaganda" had been especially disastrous.

The Enlightenment:

The Enlightenment, Ruehle says, had come to him, when people finally broke down at the end, and when they were beginning to speak. About this time Ambassador Wewel told him for the first time just how terrible it looked in the "circle" around the Fuhrer. Only then he had realized the material and moral hopelessness of the situation.

Look into the Future:

Ruehle still thinks that the task of European politics is the creation of a balance between capitalism and socialism. This will no longer be up to the Germans, but will become the task of the Western Powers. He would consider it a catastrophe, greater yet than the present one, if the United States would withdraw from Europe. But this he prophesies: "You too, will not be able to solve the European Problem without taking authoritarian measures. As a matter of fact, you are already starting to use them."

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