

SECRET

on

C.

Last appointments:-

1. Naval L.O. to the RSHA - Mil Amt
2. Attached to OKM - 3 SKL
3. German delegate to C-inC The NORTH
4. Naval L.O. to N.O.I.C. KIEL

Arrested:- On 24 May 1945 on board HMS Oranjestein, KIEL

Description: Born 26 Aug 1902
Height 1.74 m
Build slim and erect
Eyes grey blue and green
Face oval, long upper lip
Hair dark, high forehead

C O N T E N T S

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Det C.S.D.I.C. (UK)
B. L. A.
TPB/VKy-WH
3 Jul 45.

REPORT on
Kapitaen zur See Theodor Freiherr von MAUCHENHEIM, genannt BECHTOLSHEIM.

INTRODUCTION:-

Von BECHTOLSHEIM was known from earlier C.I. cases to be a liaison officer between the See-Kriegs-Leitung and the RSHA-Mil.Amt. He was placed under arrest whilst serving as German Naval L.O. to N.O.I.C. Kiel on 24 May 1945 on board HMS "Oranje-fontein", and placed in KIEL-WIK prison. Von BECHTOLSHEIM was interrogated by 2 naval officers on 26 May. On 5 June, von BECHTOLSHEIM was again interrogated in the 'British Military Office' at 22 Goltz-strasse KIEL and, from there, was transferred to the prison at NEU - MÜNSTER. On 18 June von BECHTOLSHEIM was transferred to BAD OJENHAUSEN on 19 June 45, he was brought to Det. CSDIC(UK) BLA where interrogation has produced the following information :-

RELATIONS :-

Wife:- Ruth nee LOTZE moved in May 45 to Gut NEUDORF near LUETJENBURG.

Children:- Sophie Charlotte b. 18.3.1933 {
 Franz Georg b. 22.8.1936 { at Gut NEUDORF.
 Rainer b. 12.9.1944 {
 Clemens b. 2.4.1945 {

Brother:- Anton Freiherr von BECHTOLSHEIM b. 1896, Military Attache in LONDON until outbreak of war, lastly a General in Command of N. NORWAY (NARVIK). Home address:- Schloss MAINSONDHEIM, bei DETTELBACH, MAINFRANKEN.

Sister-in-law:- nee Freilin Von NOTTHAFT, at Schloss MAINSONDHEIM

Cousin:- Karl-Ludwig von GUTTENBERG married to a Princess SCHWARZENBERG, served as a Sonderführer in Agram and was imprisoned after 20.7.1944.

Also alive:- 2 Aunts, 4 female cousins & 1 male cousin

EARLY LIFE:-EARLY CAREER.

1902 : Born at Schloss MAINSONDHEIM, bei DETTELBACH, MAINFRANKEN on 26.8.1902 of Franz Freiherr von BECHTOLSHEIM and Sophie nee Freilin von GUTTENBERG. Father died in Nov. 1902

1908-12 : Attended the "Institut ADAM" in WUERZBURG.

1912-19 : Attended the "Realgymnasium" in WUERZBURG.

1919-20 : Belonged to the HUEBNER detachment of the Freikorps EPP and took part in actions in VOGTLAND against the Communist leader Max HOELZ : later belonged to the "March-Group" WUERZBURG of the 'ESHERICH' organisation.

1920-22 : Attended the "Institut SCHOENHERR" in Munich.

1922-23 : Returned to the 'Realgymnasium' in WUERZBURG and passed the final examination in early 1923. Von BECHTOLSHEIM learned English during his boyhood, having an Irish Governess at home.

NAVAL CAREER:

- 1923-25 : Joined the Navy on 4.4.1923: trained normally as Sea Cadet on land & on ship 'BRAUNSCHWEIG', sailing ship 'NIOBE' & cruiser 'BERLIN' on which he did a cruise to S.America.
- 1925 : April: appointed Ensign at Flensburg-MUERWIK.
- 1927-30 : Autumn: appointed Leutnant z. See, served as Torpedo officer and attended artillery courses (ship & AA) in WILHELMSHAVEN and KIEL.
- 1929 : Took the English interpreter exam & spent 3 weeks in the UK.
- 1930-32 : Served on the Torpedo Boat 'FALKE' of the 4th T.B. Flotilla in WILHELMSHAVEN & cruised to Central & Southern Norway, STOCKHOLM & LIBAU for the Latvian Navy's 10th anniversary.
- 1932-34 : Instructor at the WILHELMSHAVEN A.A. school.
- 1934-35 : Served as 3rd AA officer & watch officer on the pocket battleship 'DEUTSCHLAND' and cruised with her to EDINBURGH and in S. Atlantic on fuel trials (two fuels were experimented with, one of which was called 'ARIBA').
- 1935-36 : Appointed Kapitän-Leutnant and attached as AA liaison officer to the Air Ministry in BERLIN.
- 1936 : Autumn: studied destroyer construction at the Germania Docks at KIEL.
- 1937-38 : Served as 1st officer on the destroyer 'MAX SCHULTZ' & cruised with it to Norway & Sweden.
- 1938 : Attended further AA course at KIEL and in autumn went to study destroyer construction at the Weser Docks of 'Deschimag' (Deutsche Schiffs & Maschinenbau A.G.) in BREMEN.
- 1939 : March. Promoted Korvetten-Kapitän and given command of the newly built destroyer 'KARL GALSTER' - carried out running in and a training cruise to Norway. Summer. Came to LONDON with his wife for 2/3 weeks to visit his brother Anton, then Mil. Attache at the German Embassy.

WARTIME NAVAL ACTIVITIES :-

SERVICE IN THE NORTH SEA & CHANNEL AREAS.

- 1939 : Following the outbreak of war Von BECHTOLSHEIM with his destroyer 'KARL GALSTER' formed part of the 6th Dest. Flotilla and carried out extensive minelaying in the N. Sea opposite the English East Coast and off the S. Norway coast.

SECRET.

- 1940 : During the Norwegian Campaign the 6th Dest. Flotilla was engaged off Norway in the HARSTADT & TRONDHEIM areas. In Aug. the Flotilla moved to Brest as did Admiral BEY the F.D.Z. (Admiral Destroyers) and the 'KARL GALSTER' became his Flag-ship. The Flotilla carried out much mine laying off the English S. Coast and had one engagement. In Dec. Von BECHTOLSHEIM took the 'KARL GALSTER' back to BREMEN for overhaul.
- 1941 : Von BECHTOLSHEIM points out that each annual overhaul involved an absence from operations for 2/3 months since there was always an extensive change in crew, large drafts being needed for submarines, and consequently the crew had to have a training cruise & exercise before being able to resume an operational role. Until April the 'KARL GALSTER', still part of the 6th Dest. Flot. served in N. Norway in the TROMSØ & KIRKENES area & carried out mine laying in the WHITE SEA returning then again to Germany for a refit. Von BECHTOLSHEIM asserts that when serving in Norwegian Waters it was well known that movements of ships were reported to England within 2/3 hrs and when one of his ships once had an accident within sight of land, British aircraft were searching for it within a few hours but fortunately failed to notice it.
- 1941 May : STAFF JOB IN ATHENS: With his ship in dock, Von BECHTOLSHEIM was sent in May to replace a sick officer in Greece and found himself for 4/5 weeks during the operations against CRETE as A1 to Admiral STOSCH in ATHENS. Here he met, working in the same building an Abwehr officer named OBLADEN: this officer apparently interrogated a British Naval Officer rescued from a cruiser sunk to the N. of Crete but obtained no more than confirmation of the cruiser's sinking: he also had a small W/T set in a satchel with which he claimed to be able to contact the Russians.

SERVICE IN NORTHERN WATERS AGAIN:

In Late June Von BECHTOLSHEIM returned to his ship and completed its refit and a training cruise in the Baltic.

- 1942 : Returned to the N. Norway station and remained there till Aug/Sep when he was appointed as Flag Officer (Admiral-Stabs-Offizier) to the F.d.Z. (Adm. BEY) now at Trondheim. In Oct. the F.d.Z. and Adm. SCHNIEWIND (C-in-C Fleet) on board his HQ tender 'HELA' moved from TRONDHEIM to KIEL and shortly afterwards the F.d.Z. and his staff moved again, this time to SWINEMUENDE. Von BECHTOLSHEIM's post was that of A1 to the F.d.Z. but this name was later changed to F.1. (Fuehrungs-Stabs-Offizier)

CHIEF OF STAFF TO ADMIRAL DESTROYERS:

- 1943 : Promoted to Freg. Kapitaen on 1 Jan and appointed to the new post of Chief of Staff to the F.d.Z. in April 43, remaining in this job until March 44.

During this period Von BECHTOLSHEIM made 2 journeys - the first was for 5 days to COPENHAGEN to confer with Adm. STOHWASSER, the B.S.O. (Befehlshaber Sicherung u. OST) regarding minefields and cleared passages, and the second was with Adm. BEY to St. NAZAIRE to see the Docks as regards repair facilities and to persuade the dockyards to complete the half-built French Torpedo Boats: they failed to get these T.Boats built largely because it was known that the shape of the French bows was superior to the German equivalent and as a result French T.Boats had drier bridges, and it was not therefore policy to provide the German Navy with tangible proof of this defect in German design. Whilst at St. NAZAIRE, Von BECHTOLSHEIM paid a hurried visit to his brother at BORDEAUX where he was Commander of the 1st Army.

In Oct. he was promoted Kapitän zur See.

DESTROYER FLOTILLA COMMANDER.

1944 March: In March Von BECHTOLSHEIM was replaced as C.of.S. to Adm. BEY by a Freg.Kapt. SALTZWEDEL and appointed as Commander of the 8th Dest. Flotilla 'NARVIK', also called Destroyer Group 'BISCAY', then based on BORDEAUX: he remained in command of this flotilla until July 44. In the period up to D-Day, Von BECHTOLSHEIM trained his flotilla as best he could, but fuel oil was hard to get and he only ventured out into the Bay of BISCAY 3 or 4 times, being immediately spotted on each occasion by Allied aircraft: most of the flotilla therefore remained inshore and lay off La ROCHELLE. Throughout his period of command Von BECHTOLSHEIM asserts that no blockade-runner reached French ports or that any attempted to. The last blockade-runner to make such an attempt was sunk in action on 26 Dec 43, when Kapt.z.S. ERDMENGER the former Commander of the flotilla 'NARVIK' was killed attempting to escort the blockade-runner home.

1944 March - May : Visits of Von BECHTOLSHEIM to his superiors included three of note: one to Adm. SCHIERLITZ's HQ near ANGERS (Befehlshaber Atlantic Coast) a second to Kapt.z.S. ROESING of the F.d.U. West also near ANGERS, and a third to St. NAZAIRE to arrange for his ship Z.32 to be repaired.

1944 June : The Invasion at this time was in everyone's mind and the official appreciation as known to all senior officers was that it must take place on a shallow coast, at high tide and at a new full moon. On June 5 Adm KRANKE, C-in-C of M.O.K. West, lunched in the naval mess at LA ROCHELLE with Adm MICHAELIS & his staff (BORDEAUX area command) on the way to BIARRITZ for a brief holiday: ROMMEL was also apparently in Germany undergoing a cure. The 6th of June thus came as a shock to everyone concerned. On 6 June Von BECHTOLSHEIM in Z.32 was ordered to BREST with 3 other destroyers ZH1, T24 & Z24, and between the 7th & 10th of June several naval engagements ensued between BREST & CHERBOURG as a result of which Von BECHTOLSHEIM claims to have sunk 2 or 3 British destroyers & damaged 1 British cruiser, whilst ZH1 was badly hit & then scuttled, T24 & Z24 were driven back to BREST and Z 32 was finally forced onto the rocks near MORLAIX, out of ammunition.

For these actions Von BECHTOLSHEIM received the Ritterkreuz on 1 July 44.

From the wreckage of Z 32, Von BECHTOLSHEIM made his way to MOLAIX & BREST, made numerous reports and visited M.O.K. West in PARIS.

On about 20 June he was ordered to report to Adm. KREISCHE the F.d.Z. (Adm. BEY was killed on the 'SCHLARNHORST' when replacing another officer on leave) at SWINEMUENDE. This he did after which he had a few days at home

in RENDSBURG with his family, visiting the C-in-C Fleet Adm. SCHNIEWIND at KIEL, & his flat at 75 Kaiserstrasse (3rd floor) at WILHELMSHAVEN as well as the OKK (Kleider Kasse) there.

1944
July

: On 3 July Von BECHTOLSHEIM received a telegram ordering him to report to the 1st S.K.L. (See-Kriegsleitung) at BERNAU: here he was interviewed at length by Grand Admiral DOENITZ regarding the recent operations and the Allied accounts of them, he being in no way blamed for the loss of his ship; he was then sent to see Adm. BALTZER, head of the OKM-MPA (Marine Personal Amt).

FIRST CONTACT WITH G.I.S.

Von BECHTOLSHEIM asked Adm. BALTZER to send him back to BORDEAUX to rejoin & reassemble his flotilla, but instead BALTZER told him he was to take over the post of Liaison Officer between the O.K.M. and the Mil. Amt of the R.S.H.A. Von BECHTOLSHEIM insists that he protested at this and demanded to see DOENITZ himself about it: he did, only to hear DOENITZ explain why he must do this job: - the Mil. Amt under CANARIS had not apparently dealt with naval matters as well as it should, and now that the direction of Mil Amt had been taken over by HANSEN it was more necessary than ever to have a first-rate naval representative there who could tackle and deal diplomatically with SCHELLENBERG and KALTENBRUNNER. DOENITZ added lastly that he had specially selected Von BECHTOLSHEIM for this job and had decided that he was the most suitable, his runner-up being a Kapt. z. See REINICKE of the 'PRINZ EUGEN'. This left Von BECHTOLSHEIM with no option: he accepted his new appointment.

In a discussion with Adm. HEYE, the A.d.K. (Admiral der Kampfverbaende) von BECHTOLSHEIM learned that the political hierarchy were making efforts to take over the control of the Mil. Amt, but that in the view of the Services this Amt should at all costs under the control of a Service officer.

SERVICE WITH R.S.H.A.

THE MIL. AMT AT BARUTH.

On 10 July, in accordance with orders, von BECHTOLSHEIM reported to the RSHA in the Berkaerstrasse, BERLIN and there enquired for the Mil. Amt; hearing that this was at BARUTH he made his way there and the next day he was received by HANSEN, who explained to him the organisation of Mil Amt and introduced him to his work.

The old Abwehr organisation with its I-M, I-H and I-L had by now practically vanished and the whole of the former Abt. I had been fused into one 'Mil Amt' with subdivisions lettered 'A', 'B', 'C' etc. exactly corresponding to the subdivisions of the RSHA Amt VI in BERLIN. There still remained, however, a small section of the former Abt I-M comprising a Freg.Kapt. GARTMANN, who was due to retire in 2 months time, and a Lt WUNDER. Von BECHTOLSHEIM set to work with these two, with the intention of taking over the functions of GARTMANN, so that, on the latter's retirement, the Abt I-M would disappear and he (von BECHTOLSHEIM) would carry on its work within the new Mil Amt organisation.

Within the new Mil Amt there were three "Ia" officers who acted more as "Ia" (i.e. Ops staff) than as pure liaison officers.

Von BECHTOLSHEIM assumed the title & rôle of "Ia Marine" whilst his Army counterpart was an Oberst-Lt i.G. von KNESEBECK who also worked in a section of "Mil F" and his air force equivalent was, at first, an Oberst-Lt i.G.d.LW. OHLETZ, who was at the same time the head of "Mil C", and later ~~Ost H.d.LW~~ RANDEL; of these 4 officers, von BECHTOLSHEIM was the senior. These three "Ia's" were only attached to the RSHA-Mil Amt and remained on the strength of their respective services.

VON BECHTOLSHEIM WORK IN THE MIL AMT .

July 1944 - Feb. 1945

The normal function of von BECHTOLSHEIM was to receive all intelligence questionnaires and requests from the OKM (3rd S.K.L.), to translate these into simple & non-technical German and to distribute them to the relevant branches of Mil Amt, from whom, in due course the answers might or might not be forthcoming: in the event of questions remaining unanswered a long time, reminders would be sent to von BECHTOLSHEIM by the 3.SKL: 2nd echelon which was stationed somewhere in central Germany & which was responsible for collecting & collating intelligence reports and acting as a record office & registry. Replies to the OKM questions had to be sent both to the 1st & 2nd echelons of 3 SKL to the 1st for action & to the 2nd for digestion, evaluation & recording.

To assist him in his work, von BECHTOLSHEIM used Lt. WUNDER, after GARTMANN had retired, and a Kapt KEMPF, a merchant navy captain, who was an expert in technical matters, who could help to 'translate' technical naval terms and who went to various HQ's (Kdo Melde-Gebiet) lecturing on the nature of information required from agents.

In addition, von BECHTOLSHEIM was allowed a car and in this he made frequent trips between BARUTH (the Mil Amt camp there being known as 'BELINDE'), BERNAU where the OKM (1st echelon) camp known as 'KORALLE' was and the RSHA in BERLIN.

As a central office, von BECHTOLSHEIM utilised a certain Freg.Kapt. DISCHLER who lived in BERLIN and had an office first in the Tirpitzufer and later, when bombed out there, in the Potsdamerstrasse: here messages could be left by the 3.SKL or himself and the courier car running between BERNAU/KORALLE and BARUTH/BELINDE called there on its way through BERLIN. DISCHLER an elderly and sick man was nominally von BECHTOLSHEIM predecessor as L.O. but in actual fact GARTMANN had done most of his work for him.

Much of the detailed work was however carried on by telephone direct between the officer in the Mil Amt to whom Von BECHTOLSHEIM had 'farmed out' the question through the department chief and the 3. SKL, so that once a question was 'placed' or a scheme was set in motion, Von BECHTOLSHEIM heard only a portion of the subsequent details. The officers at 3. SKL with whom von BECHTOLSHEIM dealt were K. Adm SCHULTZ, Kapt. z. See ALLEWELDT and Kapt. z. See SOKOLOWSKI and the head of the 3. SKL 2nd echelon in Central Germany was a Kapt. z. See PRANSE.

EFFECTS OF THE 20 JULY 1944.

1944 Aug.

The immediate effects of the plot against HITLER, only 10 days after von BECHTOLSHEIM's arrival in the Mil Amt was that both HANSEN and his Chief of Staff, Oberst-Lt ENGELHORN were arrested and executed whilst the head of 'Mil B', an Oberst-Lt i.G. KUEHBART was imprisoned; he was later released and dismissed from the service. For a few weeks an Oberst-Lt KLEYENSTUEBER took over the task of Chief of Staff, but he was then sent to MADRID as the 2nd Air Attache and the post remained vacant as did that previously held by HANSEN. 'Mil B' was taken over by the head of Amt VI B, a Standartenfuehrer Dr. STEIMLE.

Since SCHELLENBERG only visited the BELINDE camp once or twice a week, the lack of a central controlling head was felt and von BECHTOLSHEIM suggested to SCHELLENBERG that one of the officers there be appointed nominally in charge, if only for camp & administrative reasons: SCHELLENBERG took up this idea and put forward von BECHTOLSHEIM's name for the task, he being the senior of the 3 liaison officers, but the proposal was quashed by KALTENBRUNNER. Thereafter the camp remained under the care of the Camp Commandant Major KUNKEL, but each department chief (of Mil A or B or F etc) dealt direct with his opposite number in the RSHA, entailing much travelling to & from BERLIN.

THE G.M.D..

It soon became evident that it was not intended to appoint a new chief of Mil Amt and from this time, it came directly under the command of SCHELLENBERG. Von BECHTOLSHEIM later heard how this acquisition of Mil Amt was in fact only his first step in a plan to form a united Intelligence Service. SCHELLENBERG had apparently conceived the idea some months before and presented it to H. HIMMLER who in turn put it up to HITLER who agreed with the scheme and decreed that it should be called the "Einheitlicher Deutscher Geheim Melde Dienst", more usually referred to as the 'G.M.D.'. HIMMLER, as von BECHTOLSHEIM heard, had apparently disclosed this plan at a conference in SALZBURG in April 1944. The formation of this G.M.D. was to be gradual so as not to upset work in progress and was finally to have four divisions :- 1. Political, 2. Economical, 3. Technical and 4. Military. SCHELLENBERG had now got the basis of divisions 1 & 4 under his control and with it he wished to free himself from KALTENBRUNNER and establish himself as the Intelligence Service chief, directly under Heinrich HIMMLER. This scheme had been accepted by the Services as a sound scheme; the old name 'ABWEHR' being dropped as a misleading and defeatist title was a popular move, and it was hoped the Military Division would be put in the charge of a Service officer.

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE:

Von BECHTOLSHEIM disclaims all knowledge of details of the sources of the intelligence reports produced by Mil Amt departments, insisting that these sources were not in general known either to the officers of Mil Amt but only to those of Amt VI : certain sources however made themselves obvious:-

1. Mil F. controlled three naval F.A.T's (Front Aufklaerungs-Trupps) of which one, commanded by a K.Kapt BENDIXEN was in Denmark; another under a Kapt-Lt SCHUCHMANN was in Holland and a third one which was disbanded in August 1944 was in Norway. The first two were operationally controlled by the Leitstelle West.
2. Main W/T stations were at :- BELZIG- central station and location of 'Mil E' under Major PORETSCHKIN.
HAMBURG-WOHLSDORF-'WEST' station.
3. Two files were circulated daily at BELINDE: one headed "Chi.N" contained intercepted extracts of foreign broadcasts, and the other bearing a red band round the edge & with the heading "V.N." contained decoded WT intercepts of all sorts. From this second file it was evident that the Polish Intelligence Service was widespread & active as 60-70% of the contents were of Polish origin : the Polish Int. Service was held in high esteem;
4. Sweden : A good channel of information ^{existed} from England via Sweden : the channel is unknown to von BECHTOLSHEIM, but the information was very rarely naval and generally gave details of contingents leaving the U.K. for France.
5. SCHELLENBERG: At a reception at the State Guest House on the WANNSEE, SCHELLENBERG told von BECHTOLSHEIM that he had an excellent privat channel for political information from England, but that his source had told him once " SCHELLENBERG..... SCHELLENBERG.... you do everything half a year too late ".
6. "TAGESMELDUNG": This was a daily summary of all types of Intelligence started by SCHELLENBERG in Oct 44 for the benefit of the FUEHRER, HIMMLER and a few such important persons. It was two months before von BECHTOLSHEIM managed to be allowed to see it and just before Xmas he succeeded in arranging to receive 2 copies daily, one of which he sent to the 3.SKL. On this summary von BECHTOLSHEIM makes the following general comments :- It contained very little of interest to the Navy : information from Yugoslavia on TITO & his bands was excellent, as was that from Roumania & Bulgaria; information from N. France with many details of regiments in action was good : so was military information from Italy : reports on construction of Liberty ships in the USA were plentiful and good, but there were none on warship construction: information from Sweden scarce and none from Suez Canal area (apparently an agent was due to go there by sailing boat from the Piraeus in March 45 but he did not reach there). Information from Turkey, especially on the Turco-British political moves was excellent because the Turkish WT code had been captured, but it was not known whether the British knew this & whether traffic was therefore reliable.
7. Submarines: reports from U-Boats were the main source of information of the Allied air coverage; of particular interest were reports from some in the White Sea on Russian summer shipping between 3 Siberian ports & Archangel with the annual mineral production from the Urals : this shipping was regarded as normal.

DECEPTION WORK.

Soon after von BECHTOLSHEIM became the 'Ia Marine', SCHELLENBERG ordered the 3 Service L.O's to make every effort to assist an OKW branch known as 'Truppenabwehr' which specialised in deception work, and which was mainly concerned therefore with the Services. As KNESEBECK was busy with work in Mil F and OHLETZ with work in Mil C, this task fell mostly on the shoulders of von BECHTOLSHEIM.

Von BECHTOLSHEIM found the Truppenabwehr dept. in some barracks near POTSDAM : its cover name was 'Tanne' and was staffed by two Colonels called Oberst MARTINI and Oberst SCHAEFER and a Lt. NABER, who kept and ran a large card-index of all the sources & channels (persons) by means of which false information was 'fed' to the enemy and who therefore deserved protection from being regarded as traitors of the State. Details of the work done by this dept and the contacts in the services which they used are shown in Appendix III.

As time went on it became clear that from an Intelligence angle it would be preferable to have this dept. as an integral part of Mil. Amt. Von BECHTOLSHEIM pressed this point and in about Dec. 1944 Lt. NABER and his card-index were transferred to Mil A, from where much the same work was done as before : Oberst MARTINI remained at 'Tanne' near POTSDAM but von BECHTOLSHEIM knows no more about his work.

As part of Mil A, a dept with no Intelligence-active counterpart in Amt VI, Lt NABER had difficulty in carrying on his work and after much effort von BECHTOLSHEIM succeeded in establishing NABER as a separate department -Mil I, but this was not until late March 45 when the evacuation of depts to the South had then reached a point where it became impossible to undertake any fresh schemes.

NABER did most of his work in direct touch with officers of RSHA Amt IV, OKW Ic and Ic Fremde Heere Ost & West and as such von BECHTOLSHEIM did not come to know many details; he further insists that no naval deception schemes were attempted beyond the putting-out of under-estimated figures for the submarine building capacity- these figures he cannot recall and maintains they would in any case be meaningless as the capacity varied according to the frequency & intensity of our bombing raids.

VISITS TO MIL AMT & SD ESTABLISHMENTS:

1944 Oct.

Having got settled in his job at BELINDE, von BECHTOLSHEIM set out to visit a number of the Kdo-Melde-Gebiet; he in fact visited very few, the first two being to HAMBURG and BREMEN.

In HAMBURG he met the chief, Kapt. WICHMANN, the I-H a Oberst-Lt PRETORIUS, the I-M a Lt Dr MANDT and a Major PIEPER. Von BECHTOLSHEIM conversed with WICHMANN mainly on the subject of the Unternehmen 'Nord' & 'West' which are described in Appendix V. These schemes were also known to Dr MANDT.

Continuing from HAMBURG to BREMEN, von BECHTOLSHEIM visited a O/Insp FRISCHMUTH, who belonged to I-Wi/T of HAMBURG, in order to discuss technicalities of some naval questionnaire regarding submarine detectors. FRISCHMUTH had made von BECHTOLSHEIM's acquaintance before in BELINDE, where he paid several visits to KEMPF on technical problems, and he acted in the West as KEMPF's disciple for explaining the technical points of questionnaires given to agents.

1944 Nov.

In approx. Nov. Von BECHTOLSHEIM paid one visit to BELZIG to see PORETSCHKIN but as he only went there to acquire a wireless valve he did not meet any instructors or pupils.

In Dec. von BECHTOLSHEIM was requested to come and lecture to a course of officer- students at the school run by the Lehr-Regiment KURFUERST at KAMENZ. He duly went and delivered a lecture on the requirements of Naval Intelligence: at KAMENZ school he met Oberst-Lt von RIESEN, Major d LW MEISSNER & •/Feldrichter SCHOEN.

Another brief visit was to the Leitstelle OST with KNESEBECK where von BECHTOLSHEIM met the chief, an Oberst-Lt BAUN ? This Leitstelle was then in a village near HECHTELBURG.

At about this time von BECHTOLSHEIM recalls attending a reception given to the Japanese mission at the Wannsee Guest House- the naval section of the mission apparently comprised some 30 officers: he never came into direct contact with them but admits that all information of possible value to them, such as ships reported moving through the Suez or Panama Canals were passed on to them through Hptmn PLAGE of Mil c.

1945 Jan/Feb.

Without being able to recall when or where, von BECHTOLSHEIM does remember meeting the chief of Kdo Melde-Gebiet STETTIN- a Kapt. WIEBE who retired in early 45 and was replaced by a former member of Mil c named Kapt. von HERTZ. WIEBE told von BECHTOLSHEIM of a plan he had prepared for evicting the Allies from SPITZBERGEN but complained that it had never been used.

1945 Feb.

In late Feb. 1945, it became necessary to visit KIEL and ESBJERG in Denmark to ensure that the ships of Unternehmen West & Nord were receiving all the facilities & provisions they required. Von BECHTOLSHEIM therefore travelled first to KIEL where he visited Korv.Kapt. WEISSHUHN, who, under the orders of HAMBURG and of M.O.K. West was responsible for these WT ship schemes. WEISSHUHN also ran a school for GSS agents known as SEEHOF near KIEL. From here von BECHTOLSHEIM continued to Esbjerg where he met Korv.Kapt. MEYER who was in charge of the detailed arrangements for these ships operating from ESBJERG

LOCATION & MOVES OF RSHA DEPARTMENTS.

1944 Aug-Oct.

From the time that von BECHTOLSHEIM took over his appointment in the Mil Amt until Oct. 44 the various departments known to von BECHTOLSHEIM were located as follows :-

RSHA Amt VI in Berkaerstrasse, Berlin.

Mil A, B, C & D at BELINDE Camp near BARUTH.

Mil E at a camp in a wood near BELZIG.

Mil G was spread over BERLIN including a section in the

Institute on the Wannsee.

In addition there was a camp in Thuringen known as WIDBURG which was the cover-name for the Wirtschaft-stelle located there until it became RSHA Amt VI/Wi.

1944 Oct.

In Oct. 44 it was decided to evacuate BELINDE camp and whilst Mil A remained there, von BECHTOLSHEIM moved with the other L.O's and depts Mil B & C to a camp named "WALDBURG" near KOLPIN near FUERSTENWALDE where they were joined by RSHA depts VI B & C

1944 Nov.

Mil D moved shortly afterwards to ORANIENBURG .

1945 Feb.

Owing to the Russian advances, this time to the ODER at FRANKFURT, it was decided now to evacuate WALDBURG; RSHA depts B & C therefore returned to BERLIN, & Mil B & C to BELINDE, but

Von BECHTOLSHEIM remained at WALDBURG with about 95-100 officer students from the G.S.S. school at KAMENZ & with orders to defend the camp to the last man: these officer-students who included a Hptmn TRUXA and an Oberst-Lt LIENHARDT were in fact the total of two officers' courses which, whilst overlapping had been evacuated from KAMENZ to KOLPIN. After about a week in this 'stand and die' role at WALDBURG, von BECHTOLSHEIM managed to persuade SCHELLENBERG that scheme of defending the camp with a mere handful of valuable G.S.S. trainees was puerile and von BECHTOLSHEIM was then allowed to rejoin Mil Amt at BELINDE camp. 1945 March.

Very soon after von BECHTOLSHEIM's return to BELINDE all active intelligence work there ceased: the daily files of 'Chi N', 'V.N.' and 'Tagesmeldung' ceased to circulate and though it was now that the new deception dept 'Mil I' was formed its conception was still-born owing to the moves which followed its formation.

In about mid-March Mil A & B depts left BELINDE and moved to the Thuringian camp near LAUENBURG, formerly known as WI-BURG and now renamed SEEDORF (SD): it would be more accurate to say that these depts occupied a group of villages near LAUENBURG & the area was known by that name. Later in March Mil G also moved to SEEDORF followed by Mil F in the last days of March or early April.

VON BECHTOLSHEIM'S SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES:

1945 April DEPARTURE FROM BERLIN.

In the first days of April the RSHA ordered all its officers to destroy their existing pay-books and to be provided with new ones: von BECHTOLSHEIM does not know whether these new books were in the owners true names or in new names, nor does he know whether they gave false "background history": for himself von BECHTOLSHEIM obtained a new pay-book from the OKM/MPA on 4. 4. 1945 and certainly this pay-book does not include any details of service either actively in the Navy or with the RSHA, neither does it show promotions, past payments or pay-rates, medical information, leave periods or anything which could give a clue to his past activities.

In the period leading up to April it was generally known that in the event of the Western Allies pressing through and cutting Germany in half it was HITLER's intention to remain in the North, whilst KESSELRING was due to become C-in-C and Governor of the South; later the plans seemed to change and HITLER was supposed to be going South whilst DOENITZ would take over command in the North.

When the various parts of Mil Amt had left BELINDE, von BECHTOLSHEIM asked Adm. SCHULTZ of 3. SKL for his advice as he himself could not see any object in remaining with RSHA: SCHULTZ urged him to leave the RSHA and come to the OKM. With this in mind von BECHTOLSHEIM in mid-April, went to the Berkaerstrasse to see SCHELLENBERG and obtain his release but found him away. After waiting two days in vain to see SCHELLENBERG, von BECHTOLSHEIM explained his intentions to Standartenfuehrer RAPP, namely that he was now going to rejoin the OKM which had moved to PLOEN. In the RSHA at this time von BECHTOLSHEIM saw, besides RAPP, Ostabafue Dr SCHMITZ, SCHELLENBERG's deputy, Frl SCHINKE, his secretary, a Korv. Kapt JAECKEL and Stubafue REICHERT, the chief of the transport section.

AT PLOEN AND VIEHBURG GEHOELZ:

1945 April 20(ca)

RAPP asked von BECHTOLSHEIM to reserve camp accommodation for an RSHA staff of 50-60 in Northern SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN, and having promised to do this, von BECHTOLSHEIM & NABER, who accompanied him from the time he left BELINDE until after Surrender, left for PLOEN where they reported to the 3.SKL which had moved there after a halt in SENGWARDEN. As these two left BERLIN the Russians were already beginning to shell the city.

In the course of the next week, von BECHTOLSHEIM and NABER busied themselves preparing for the 50-60 RSHA staff and found accommodation for them in the 2nd Naval Smoke Unit camp in VIEHBURGER GEHOELZ, S. of KIEL. Close liaison with the MOE Ost KIEL helped a lot in accomplishing this, whilst liaison between there and 3.SKL proved of value also. Von BECHTOLSHEIM heard at this time that of all the various Kdo.Melde-Gebiete, WICHMANN's at HAMBURG was the only one which had remained intact, and which had a plan to evacuate itself to WEISSHUHN's G.S.S. school 'SEEHOF', S. of KIEL; he therefore made efforts to get a communication line between VIEHBURG-GEHOELZ and HAMBURG and SEEHOF and succeeded in having himself connected to the GAF network "LV36". After he had arranged this, two GAF doctors, sent by RAPP (who had moved with SCHOEN and other parts of the RSHA to TRAVEMUENDE), brought him a list of the transmission times & frequencies for W/T traffic with SEEHOF in case this should be needed.

April 25-30.

In the last days of April von BECHTOLSHEIM paid a visit to TRAVEMUENDE in the hope of seeing SCHELLENBERG and finding out whether or not the RSHA staff would be coming to VIEHBURG-GEHOELZ. SCHELLENBERG was away on a secret mission, which von BECHTOLSHEIM later understood to be the meetings between HIMMLER and Prince BERNADOTTE of Sweden, and he only saw there Stubafue REICHERT and SCHOEN. Whilst in TRAVEMUENDE he took the opportunity to visit Adm HEYE, whose HQ had also moved there, before returning via PLOEN to VIEHBURG - GEHOELZ: in PLOEN he found that most of the OKM had now moved to FLENSBURG.

From what von BECHTOLSHEIM heard the military plan at this time was to hold the line of the KIEL Canal and to form a new Government in the area north of it: this Government would thus be running concern in nucleus form and when peace had been declared this Government would be able to gradually spread its influence & take over Germany: this plan was only envisaged so far as the Western Allies were concerned as DOENITZ was directly opposed to any settlements with the Russians.

In view of this and because his family was living in RENDSBURG (at 3. Bastion) on the KIEL Canal, von BECHTOLSHEIM spent a few days visiting his wife & children and moving them to greater safety-to Gut NEUDORF near LUETJENBERG.

IN FLENSBURG-MUERWIK

Early May

In the first days of May it became clear that the RSHA staff would never move to VIEHBURGER GEHOELZ, more especially now as the area including the fortress of KIEL was due to be surrendered to the British.

Von BECHTOLSHEIM and NABER therefore left their camp and moved to FLENSBURG to rejoin the OKM and in particular the 3.SKL. Here von BECHTOLSHEIM reported to Adm. BALTZER, the head of the MPA and his deputy Kapt.z. See WOLFF that he was back with the 3.SKL and pointed out his knowledge of English in case it could be of use.

One day a large parade was held in the naval barracks at FLENSBURG-MUERWIK & DOENITZ announced that he had been ordered to form a new Government and that he would be succeeded as head of the OKM by Adm FRIEDEBURG.

Other personalities whom von BECHTOLSHEIM met in these last days at FLENSBURG included Adm. BREUNING, THE FORMER BSW (Befehlshaber der Sicherung West), Kapt.z. See GERLACH, Chief of Staff of the OKM, K.Ad, Hans MEYER & Freg. Kapt. ZENKER (mines) both of the 1.SKL., K.Adm. Otto SCHULTZ, Kapt.z. See ALLEWELDT and Kapt.z. See SOKOLOWSKI all of 3.SKL, Korv. Kapt. MELLIN in the M.P.A. and Kapt.z. See PETERS who commanded the 6th Destroyer Flotilla. In addition von BECHTOLSHEIM also saw Kapt.z. See DAVIDSON the former OKM Chief of Staff and V.Adm WAGNER (Adm.z.b.V.) who was DOENITZ's "shadow" and personal link with the Fuehrer's HQ.

In the new Government's HQ in MUERWIK von BECHTOLSHEIM caught sight of Heinrich HIMMLER, SPEER, Gauleiter BOHLE, Grufue OHLENDORF and Graf SCHWERIN-KROSIGK who, with one secretary, constituted the Foreign Minister and entire Foreign office.

In spite of meeting all these people, von BECHTOLSHEIM never met SCHELLENBERG again, though he made several efforts to do so: SCHELLENBERG was still supposedly engaged on a special mission and the last news von BECHTOLSHEIM had of him was that he intended going to Sweden.

AIR TRIP TO C-in-C THE NORE.

13 May.

Following the surrender, orders had been received to send 2 officers without delay to the C-in-C NORE with the plans of the minefields in the North Sea, one to travel by sea and one by air to MANSTON airfield. Adm. BREUNING, as former BSW, was despatched with 2 MTB's and von BECHTOLSHEIM was ordered to fly in a Canadian aircraft from FLENSBURG to MANSTON on 13 May.

On arrival at MANSTON, von BECHTOLSHEIM found himself unawaited; a telephone call to The NORE produced no results, and so he was placed in custody on the airfield for the night.

14 May.

On the morrow a LtComdr Mc PHERSON fetched von BECHTOLSHEIM & took him to the Naval Barracks, CHATHAM where von BECHTOLSHEIM handed over his plans and was interviewed by many officers including Admiral TOVEY & Commodore LINDSEY.

Two or three days later von BECHTOLSHEIM was flown back to FLENSBURG via Holland in a Fleet Air Arm plane accompanied by a naval Lieutenant.

IN FLENSBURG AGAIN :

17 May

Whilst in FLENSBURG-GLUECKSBURG von BECHTOLSHEIM met Stafue RAPP again and was asked by the latter if he could arrange to attach a group of 8 or 10 professors to some naval experimental establishment.

The idea was that these professors, who themselves formed some special G.S.S. establishment but whom von BECHTOLSHEIM never met, should 'disappear' by becoming ^{part of} a perfectly normal type of research establishment - the establishment suggested by RAPP was a naval technical research station run by a Professor KIPFMUELLER on the coast of a small bay just S. of ULLERUP (S. of KIEL) and which had formerly been near BERLIN. Von BECHTOLSHEIM went to this research station and put the proposition to a certain BECKER, and 18 May, the next day von BECHTOLSHEIM heard from Adm. SCHULTZ that it had been turned down; von BECHTOLSHEIM duly informed RAPP of this decision.

Whilst at GLUECKSBURG von BECHTOLSHEIM heard that Korv.Kapt. JAECKEL was there and that he was probably going to SWEDEN, but he never met him: he did however meet a certain Freg. Kapt. CELLARIUS who had been with RAPP since early in the month having joined forces with him in TRAVEMUENDE where he had been conducting intelligence work against the Russians in KURLAND and Russian U-Boats in the Baltic after his former job as assistant Naval Attache in Finland had come to an end with the break between Finland & Germany in Sept. 1944. CELLARIUS was apparently no close friend of RAPP and was endeavouring to part company with him.

AS L.O. TO N.O.I.C. KIEL.

19 May.

After this work, von BECHTOLSHEIM reported again to the OKM, was received by Adm. FRIEDEBURG, who in view of von BECHTOLSHEIM's knowledge of English, appointed him as 'Senior L.O. to N.O.I.C. KIEL'. Von BECHTOLSHEIM was ordered to take over this job at once as his predecessor Kapt. z. See JECK had been dismissed as he had not the confidence of the British, and the OKM laid great value on this job as they wished to show their willingness to carry out the terms imposed on them.

20 May

Von BECHTOLSHEIM therefore promptly reported for duty to Captain CAMPBELL, N.O.I.C, KIEL, on board HMS 'ORANJEFONTEIN', but, contrary to the opinion of the OKM and its Ob.d.M. Capt. CAMPBELL did not apparently hold this post in esteem and in the course of the next few days never once sent for von BECHTOLSHEIM, normally dealing with the 2nd L.O. a certain Kapt-Lt MOHR.

24. May On 24 May, von BECHTOLSHEIM was arrested on board HMS 'ORANJEFONEIN', and, after being brought before a Major MORGAN, at the Garrison HQ was put into KIEL-WIK prison.

DOCUMENTS:

1. Driving licence issued to Fr. v. BECHTOLSHEIM, Theodor of 75 III Kaiserstrasse, WILHELMSHAVEN in FLENSBURG on 8th May 1945.
2. Naval Soldbuch issued to Kapitän zur See Theodor Freiherr von MAUCHENHEIM gen. BECHTOLSHEIM of the OKM/MPA on 5 April 1945.

CONCLUSIONS:

Von BECHTOLSHEIM is a regular naval officer and comes of a good family : his bearing is accordingly good and he realises that imprisonment and interrogation is an evil necessity.

Under interrogation, von BECHTOLSHEIM talks willingly: he persists, however, in seeming vague or ignorant of many details of information which passed through his office: there is good reason to believe that as a senior officer with one or two assistants he would not trouble himself with details, but it is unlike any sharpwitted, alert man at the peak of life to be unable to recall any of the many conundrums, successes, red-herrings and other high-lights of intelligence work that must have come to his knowledge during his tenure of office in Mil Amt, whilst he can recall detailed naval operations and the names & histories of naval officers encountered months & even years earlier. It is probable therefore that, faced with detailed questions he could supplement much of the information contained in Appendix VI.

Such information as von BECHTOLSHEIM has been urged to provide both as regards himself and others would seem to be reliable.

Throughout his contacts with the British, both in CHATHAM and later as L.O. to N.O.I.C. KIEL, von BECHTOLSHEIM made no apparent effort to disclose his connections with the R.S.H.A.; a man of his mental calibre should not be allowed to get away with the excuse that he did not realise this interested us.

Det. CSDIC,
BLA.
1. July 1945.

TPB/HKy.

T.P. Boyle

Captain. R.A.

APPENDIX I - A

Card 16-31

G.I.S. Personnel in the RSHA BERLIN

AMSINK or AMSING

Major d.R. Lived in HAMBRUG. Worked in Mil B;
last seen in WALLBURG camp Jan-Feb 45.

Desc. Age 45-50, 1.80 m, slim but good build, brown hair, thin face, dark eyes, slightly hook nosed, pointed chin, cleanshaven, well turned out.

BOEHNING

Oberst-Lt. Head of sections VIG/ Mil G and possibly Mil E with offices spread round BERLIN. Last seen in the RSHA on 8.4.45; later movements unknown but did not come to N. Germany.

Desc. Age 47-50, 1.75 - 1.80 m, strong and powerful build, corporation, broad shoulders, short dark hair cut in military style, round face, dark eyes, broad nose and chin, cleanshaven, large fleshy hands, strong but quiet voice.

Von BOHLEN

Oberst-Lt d. Lw. Worked in Mil B covering all matters in SPAIN, PORTUGAL and S. AMERICA. Was responsible with HUMPERT for GARBER's 'MERCATOR' expeditions. Moved to 'SEEDORF' with Mil B, Mar 45.

Desc. Age: 52-55, 1.70 m, normal build, broad shoulders, stoops, grey hair, long face, watery and rather protruding eyes, wears glasses to read and write, cleanshaven, speaks Spanish well.

BOHNY

Korv. Kapt. Prior to the war was abroad a lot, probably in SPAIN & PORTUGAL & certainly in S. AMERICA where he did civil engineering (bridges etc). He was ? an asst. Attache in BRAZIL and was involved in the German S. American intelligence network about which an article appeared in 'LIFE'. On return to GERMANY (1942-3) worked in 3. SKL with ALLEWELDT; in late '44 was sent as asst. naval attache to MADRID where he was connected with operational reporting system from GIBRALTAR area; had to leave SPAIN at end of 3 months as permit not renewed and English pressed SPAIN to this end. Took up post in Mil B in Feb 45, replacing Von REDL and thus taking over part of Unternehmen WEST & NORD. Last seen in BELINIEcamp and moved to 'SEEDORF' with Von THAYSEN in March 45.

Desc. Age 50-55, 1.70 m, stocky build, thin fair hair, going bald, round rosy cheeky face, small light coloured eyes, broad nose, round chin, wears glasses for work, cleanshaven, speaks good Spanish and ? Portuguese.

BUNTROCK

Oberst i.G. Head of Mil F since its inauguration in about Feb 1945. He moved with section to 'SEEDORF' and then S. of MUNICH in late Mar 45.

Desc. Age: 38-42, 1.68 m, stocky build, brown hair, narrow face, light coloured eyes, straight nose, pointed chin.

CARGANICO

A Lt. officer working under FREUND in VI-Z; believed to command a special air unit (?) KG 200 which used to drop agents and to take food and medical supplies to besieged garrisons on French coast. Never seen.

DISCHLER

Freg. Kapt. Was liaison officer to Mil Amt before Von BOHLEN, but owing to illness lived at home in BERLIN and had several offices being bombed from one to another; last one with the Marine Attache Group - in BERLIN, STEINLATZ. He attended this office 2-3 days a week and was either in bed the remainder or visited BELINDE or WALDBURG camps. His office was used as a link between Mil Amt and 3. SKL and courier car called there daily. Remained in BERLIN.

Desc. Age: 55-60, 1.70 m, slim, sloping shoulders, fair hair going bald, square face, light coloured inflamed eyes, broad nose, round chin, cleanshaven, wears glasses, suffers from nerves and stomach causing face to redden or fingers to look like chilblains.

ELTING

Major d. Lt. Pilot in first World War, factory manager in civil life. Deputy and right hand man of OHLETTZ in MILE; moved with majority of Mil C to 'SEEDORF' where he commanded this staff in OHLETTZ's absence and later moved to S. of MUNICH. Last seen by Von BECHTOLSHHEIM in WALDBURG in Jan 45.

Desc. Age: about 55, 1.76 - 78 m, broad strong build with corporation, very grey hair, lightly coloured round face, bright eyes, straight broad nose, wears glasses at work, cleanshaven.

FREUND

Oberst-Lt. Head of VI-Z. Had various WT contacts with the enemy and used these to 'feed' false information. Last seen in BELINDE camp end Feb 45 - moved with section to 'SEEDORF' and South.

Desc. Age: late 40's, 1.70 m, broad and strongly built, dark hair, narrow face, thick eyebrows, dark piercing eyes, straight nose, square chin, cleanshaven, energetic.

GARTMANN

Kpt. z. See. Head of remaining part of I-M in July 1944 and only remained to hand over work to Von BECHTOLSHHEIM. Went on leave and retired w.e.f. 1 Jan 45, returning to home in LEI ZIG where he had a book business.

Desc. Age: 60, 1.65-67 m, slim and small build, almost white short hair, thin face, blue eyes, straight nose, round chin, cleanshaven, wears glasses for work, speaks some English, takes very short steps.

GRESSLER

Oberst-Lt. Was head of Mil A until after 20.7.44 when SANDBERGER took over, GRESSLER remaining until Sept and then dismissed.

Desc. Age: late 50's, 1.70 m, powerful figure, corporation, very grey hair, round red face, broad nose, heavy chin, wears glasses at work, cleanshaven, large fleshy hands.

HERZLIEB

Oberfeldrichter Dr. Chief legal adviser of Amt VI and worked as such in VI-A. Moved with VI-A section to 'SEEDORF' in March 45 and ran it on behalf of SANDBERGER; later replaced by an officer or S.D. Führer and last seen in BERLIN in early April 45.

Desc. Age late 50's, 1.76 m, heavy broad build, plentiful bristle-like grey hair, heavy broad dark coloured face, broad nose, wears glasses, has moustache and beard, loud voice.

HOESTERMANN

Hptm d. Lw. Worked in Mil C. Possibly Major now.

Desc. Age: 40-45, 1.70 m, slim, stoops slightly, thin fair hair, cleanshaven, keen sportsman (shooting).

HUEBNER

Oberst-Lt d. R. Personnel offr of RSHA Amt I. Last seen in BELINDE Camp March-April 45 when his wife and children were evacuated from the East via there.

Desc. Age: about 55, 1.78 m, looked thin, light brown hair going grey, thin long face, pointed chin, light-coloured watery eyes, cleanshaven.

HUMPERT

Korv. Kapt. Worked in Mil B concentrating on S. AMERICA and as such dealt with GARDNER's 'MERCATOR' trips. Moved South with Mil B.

Desc. Age: early 50's, 1.75 m, normal build, broad shoulders, round back, brown hair, high forehead, narrow face but broad temples, large hook nose, pointed chin, wears glasses for work, speaks English and Spanish, one finger missing from the right hand.

HUPTENKOTEN

Stubaf. or Ostaf. Only seen once early in '45 etc on S.D. conference. Worked in RSHA Amt IV. Had dealings with the political arrests after 20.7.44. Connected with KOPKOW. Description not possible.

Von KELLER

Korv. Kapt. In S. America pre-war. Worked in Mil B until autumn 44 and was then released to Navy at his own request. Last appointment was as Harbour commander in NORWAY.

Desc. Age: early 50's, 1.74 m, broad and strongly built, fair hair, rather thin, broad fleshy face, light coloured eyes, broad round chin, cleanshaven, speaks ? Spanish.

KEMPT

Major d. Lw. Family lived in KOENIGSBERG (wife & 4 children) but moved to Central Germany to evade RUSSIANS. Worked for Hugo STINNES & Co commanding a salvage ship. Took part in the invasion of Norway. Became assistant to Von BECHTOLSHED in Jul 44, being already a member of Mil Amt and having great technical knowledge and experience. Worked in Mil B from Feb 45 onwards. He made many journeys half on business (to carry on Hugo STINNES' sabotage work) and half on duty to attend conferences and lecture on technical requirements of Naval Intelligence.

A particularly astute knowledgeable and pleasant offr. Moved South with Mil B.

Desc. 41 years, 1.74 m - 1.76 m, strong and thickset, thin dark hair, fleshy, round and healthy face, lively and clever eyes, broad nose, round chin, cleanshaven, speaks English, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and perhaps French.

KLEYENSTUEBER

Oberst-Lt d.G. d. Iw. Formerly in Navy but joined GAF during its expansion, became ? Ic of a Flieger Korps. Already in Mil Amt in July 44, and had possibly been chief of staff of Mil Amt prior to KUEHBART. On KUEHBART's arrest after 20.7.44 became chief of staff for 1/2 weeks. Also took over for 1/2 weeks Mil Amt I A, formerly run by ENGELHORN under HANSEN until both arrested, liquidated IA section as not required by SCHELLENBERG. Sent on leave in Mid-Aug, and then flown to MADRID as Asst Air Attache; returned to BERLIN for 2/3 weeks for conferences in winter 44/45 when last seen by Von ECHTOLHEIM and then returned to Spain.

Desc. Age: 35-36, 1.70 m, slim but broad shoulders, very black shiny long hair, pale complexion, narrow face, broad temples, dark eyebrows, piercing light coloured eyes, narrow sharp nose, cleanshaven, often wears dark sun-glasses to conceal short - or long sightedness, speaks Spanish and perhaps English.

Von KNESEBECK

Oberst-Lt d.G. Family lived nr BRESLAU and withdrew to S. central Germany to escape the Russians. Was (?) Ic in the Balkans until appointed Ia Heer in Mil Amt in autumn 1944. Was foremost in taking over the Front Aufklärung matters and instituting Mil F in which he later worked under Oberst BUNTROCK. Last seen in BELINDE camp early Apr 45. Moved with Mil F to South. Three other Oberst-Lt KNESEBECK'S in the Army.

Desc. Age: early 30's, 1.86 m, very slim, stooped and round shouldered, brown hair, narrow face, wide flat nose, square chin, cleanshaven, very long finger nails, seems on account of his height, overbearing, wore black uniform of the Panzers.

KOPKOW

Stubaf. Worked in RSHL Amt IV on deception work and had channels communication with the enemy. Last seen in Feb or early Mar 45. Amt IV intended then to move to the area of HOF.

Desc. Age: early 30's, 1.70 m, slim build, thin pale face, cleanshaven.

KUEHBARTH

Oberst-Lt d. G. Family lived in E. Prussia and moved to South of BERLIN prior to 20 Jul 44. On about 10-13 July he was transferred from a Frontkommando to run Mil B. On 21 July he was called to BERLIN and arrested; two months later he was tried by a people's court and for this reason dismissed from the army though he was acquitted. Later worked in some armament industry.

Desc. Age: early 30's, 1.70 m, slim but broad shoulders, noticeably militarily cut brown hair, energetic appearance. light coloured eyes, straight sharp nose, pointed chin, cleanshaven, quick in the uptake and energetic in carrying things out.

KUNKEL

Major d. R. Camp Commandant at BELINDE and WALDBURG. Last seen in BELINDE in early Apr 45.

Desc. Age: mid-50's, 1.72 - 75 m, thin long figure, fair hair greying, thin face, darkish eyes, prominent chin, wears glasses at work, cleanshaven.

NABER

Oberlt d.R., Dr. Formerly a legal adviser at a bank in HANOVER. Worked in OKW Truppenabwehr section (cover name "RANNE") near POTSDAM. Work consisted of deception schemes. Mil Amt took over this work and NABER joined Mil Amt (Mil A) at WALDBURG in late 1944 with his card index of persons in contact with enemy. In Mar 45 with Von BECHTOLSHEIM's help, Mil I was formed for this work; NABER's contacts mainly KOPKOW & OKW Ie or OKH Ie. Accompanied Von BECHTOLSHEIM from BELINDE to FLENSBURG in Apr and May 45.

Desc. Age 42, 1.85 m, big thin long figure, stoops, pale face, prominent cheek bones, broad forehead, thin fair hair growing well clear of temples, large hook nose, pointed chin, wore glasses in office and car-driving, cleanshaven.

NAUMANN

Major d. G. Was already head of Mil D and accommodated in the 'Schloss' at BARUTH/MARK. Later Stubafü SKORZENY was put in charge of the section over his head and the two did not get on. In Nov or Dec 44 was released to a fighting command on East Front.

Desc. Age: early 30's, 1.70 m, slim and upright figure. of a cavalry man, narrow face, bushy eyebrows, round chin, cleanshaven.

OGILVIE

Ostubafü, a shipbuilder or engineer by trade. Claimed to have built a Dutch destroyer in a Dutch dockyard. Works in VI/T of which section he was head and had his office in the BERLINER Str. Last seen before Xmas 1944.

Desc. Age: 40, 1.80 m, medium built, dark hair, heavy broad face, with dark lively eyes, broad nose, round chin, cleanshaven.

OHLETTZ

Oberst Lt d.G. d. Lw, head of Mil c and I a Luft at the same time, had good liaison with Gen Ritter von BREIM, chief of Air Staff. Took an operational portion of Mil c staff to BELZIG in Mar 45, but later rejoined main staff and moved out.

Desc. Age: 35-40, 1.74 m, strongly built, stoops, reddish hair, round face with some freckles. straight nose, round chin, wears large signet ring on left hand; family lives in Central Germany.

PAETZGEN

Ostubaftl. Dr. Head of Vi-D. Last seen in WALDBURG camp in Feb 45.

Desc. Age: 30-35, 1.73-80 m, fine slim built, upright, very fair hair, narrow square face, light coloured eyes, straight sharp nose, square chin, slender hands, cleanshaven.

PLAGE

Hpt d.R. Worked in Mil C under OHLETZ as liaison offr to the Japanese mission, had an office in BERLIN, FRIEDRICH Str, seen in BERLIN in WALDBURG camp and at a reception given KALTENBRUNNER to the Japanese in the Guest House on the WANNSEE (winter 44-45)

Desc. Age: 50-55, 1.66 - 68 m, small build, grey hair, thin face, darkish eyes, sharp nose, cleanshaven, wore glasses at work, wore civilian clothes, spoke fluent Japanese.

PORETSCHKIN

Major. Head of Mil E and commander of 606 Nachr. Regt. H.Q. at BELZIG. Last seen at a conference of section chiefs in BERLIN, late Feb or early Mar 45.

Desc. Age: 30-35, 1.75 m, good slim figure, stoops a little, fair hair, light coloured eyes, pointed chin, cleanshaven, light swinging step.

RANDEL or
RENDEL

Oberstlt d.G. d. Lw. This is only the first half of a double-barrelled name. Came from the Front as new Ia Luft in the last weeks (Mid-end Mar) in succession to OHLETZ who was busy with Mil E. Had an office in the BERLINER Str. for 1/2 weeks and had dealings with K.G. 200. Last seen in FLENSBURG in late May 45.

Desc. Age: 35-40, 1.70 m, powerful stocky build, very dark hair, bushy eyebrows, healthy complexion, cleanshaven, powerful broad hands.

RAIP

Staf. Head of VI-C and acted as SCHELLENBERG's representative in the latter's absence in Apr 45. Seen later in TRAVEMUENDE & FLENSBURG. Approached Von BECHTOLSHEIM to get a group of 8/10 professors taken on by a naval experimental establishment run by a Prof KIFFMUELLER as cover for them but 3 SKL refused permission. Left FLENSBURG in mid-May.

Desc. Age: 35-40, 1.70 m, normal build, fair hair, pale face, light coloured eyes, sharp nose, pointed chin, wears glasses, cleanshaven, very short neck.

Von REDL

Korv. Kapt. Worked in Mil B and dealt with Unternehmen SUEB, WEST & NORD until relieved by BOHNY in Feb 45, when he went to THURINGIA to prepare for Mil B's evacuation. Was Viennese, rather slow and easy going, also a rich man, was therefore given leave and then attached to Kdo Meldegebiet where his wife lived and as his father had recently died. Fell ill in THURINGIA and never took up a new post.

Desc. Age: 52-57, 1.76 m, slim, broad shouldered, hair very grey, thin sickly face with deep lines, dark complexion, sharp nose, pointed chin, wears glasses at work, cleanshaven,

REICHEL

Stubafü. Worked in VI-B and in STEIMLE's absence acted as a political deputy. Visited WALDBURG camp and organised social evenings with outside speakers or concerts with outside players; tried to gather a choir within the camp. Last seen early Feb 45.

Desc. Age: 30-35, 1.72 m, normal build, brown hair, round face, lively light colour eyes, round chin, cleanshaven, uses his hands a lot when speaking.

REICHENHART

Stubafü or O/stubafü, was in charge for Amt VI as all transport and Mil Amt and worked in VI-A as such. Organised all the evacuation to THURINGIA and then left BERLIN in Apr 45. Last seen in TRAVEMÜNDE and then in FLENSBURG/GLUECKSBURG.

Desc. Age: 32-37, 1.70 m, slim build, fair hair, reddish face, watery eyes, broad nose and chin, wears glasses (? very shortsighted), pale complexion.

ROEDTER

Stubafü or Ostubafü. Only seen in Feb and Mar 45 at conferences, acted then as liaison officer of Amt VI and Mil Amt to the Foreign Office.

Desc. Age: 32-37, 1.76-78 m, slim build, very round shoulders, very fair hair, light coloured eyes, cleanshaven.

SANDBERGER

Staf. Former chief of VI-A; took over Mil A also after 20 Jul 44. Was SCHELLENBERG's staff organiser and as such told all plans. Moved with his section to THURINGIA in good time and later further South.

Desc. Age: 36-38, 1.74 m, normal figure, reddish fair hair, round face, light coloured watery eyes, wide nose, round chin, cleanshaven, sharp and high pitched unpleasant voice.

Frl SCHINKE

Secr. to SCHELLENBERG. Visited BELINDE and WALDNURG Camp, last seen in BERLINER Str in mid-Apr 45

Age: 38-40, 1.68 m, slim or almost thin, dark brown hair with a bun, narrow pale face, very protruding and often inflamed eyes, pointed chin, speaks very distinctly, quietly with a slight sing-song.

SCHMIED

Staff, Prof. Dr., head of VI-Wi/T with H.Q. in BERLIN; not seen since winter 1944/45.

Desc. Age: 42-47, 1.70-72 m, large build but not fat, dark almost black hair, thick eyebrows, narrow face, clever-dark eyes, pointed chin, dark complexion, cleanshaven, very deaf in left ear, comes from VIENNA, speaks with a Viennese accent.

SCHMITZ

Ostubafü. Dr. Worked in SCHELLENBERG's ante-room, was liaison officer to all RSHA officers and between sections of Amt VI and Mil Amt, knew everything that was done, thought and said by SCHELLENBERG. Acted as infm centre for all officers of the branch. Last seen in the BERLINER Str. on 8 or 10 Apr 45.

SCMITZ (contd)

Desc. Age: 40, 1.76 m, very powerful, thickset, broad built, corporation, fair hair, rather thin and going bald, round fleshy face, light coloured eyes, broad nose, round chin, cleanshaven, speaks with a SWABIAN accent.

SCHOLVIN

Lt. z. Sec. Had been in Americapre war (?), attached to the German Consulate in New York. In Jul 44 worked under Von RELL in Mil B and later under BOHNY. Steady, careful and tidy worker but devoid of ideas and drive. Moved with Mil B to THURINGIA and further South.

Desc. Age: 32-37, 1.70 m, very slim build, greying short hair, pale face, straight nose, round chin, cleanshaven, speaks English and Spanish (?)

SEEBERG

O/lt z. O., perhaps Kapt Lt. now. Was withdrawn from the front in the winter 1944 and put to work under Korv. Kapt. Von HERTZ in order to be trained in Eastern front matters preparatory to working in Mil C. He proved to be slow and ponderous and therefore unsuitable. Intended to release him in Navy again, but was not heard of since Feb 43.

Desc. Age: 32-37, 1.70 m, stocky and broad shoulders born in Balt and therefore slow and ponderous. Broad strong face, sleepy eyes, round chin, cleanshaven, (?) speaks Russian. Unkept appearance, giving an Eastern impression.

STEIMLE

Staff, head of VI-B and since 20.7.44 head of Mil B, also deputy and confident of SCHELLENBERG. Moved to THURINGIA and to South of MUNICH with sections in March 45.

Desc. Age: late 30's, 1.80 m, good slim figure, broad shoulders, fair hair, narrow face, clear eyes, large hooked nose, wears glasses, cleanshaven, one or two fencing scars on his face.

Von THAYSSEN

Major d. G. Came to Mil Amt in autumn 44, as STEIMLE's military deputy in Mil B. Moved with Mil B to South in Mar 45.

Desc. Age: 30-33, 1.70 m, slim and delicate appearance, dark brown hair, pale thin face, dark eyes, thin nose, wears glasses, cleanshaven, wears Africa ribbon and suffers from stomach trouble as result of campaign in Africa.

TSCHIRSCHKY

Oststabführer or Oststaff. Was head of VI C prior to RAPP. Was released from Amt VI in May 44.

Desc. Age: 35-40, 1.75 m, round shouldered, little brown hair, very pale face, rather prominent watery eyes, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

VOSSKOEHLER

Korv. Kapt. Transferred on medical grounds (stomach) Dec 44 - Jan 45 to Mil Amt and put under von HERTZ to train preparatory to a post in Mil C in replacement of SEEBERG. Did much travelling on duty, then took leave and evacuated his mother from an estate in the East and was later released as unsuitable to the Navy. Last seen in PLOHN, or FLENSBURG, GLUECKSBURG.

Desc. Age: 30-33, 1.75 m, very dark smooth hair, round white face, large brown eyes, round chin, cleanshaven.

WADEL or WADL

Stubafü. In autumn 44 worked in VI-A BELINDE Camp. Then transferred to VI-Kultur as liaison offr to the Foreign Office, until dismissed by Stbafü ROEDER in Dec 44; then went to Io staff of one of HIMMLER's staffs on West front.

Desc. Age: early 30's, 1.70 m, well built, slim, fair hair, round face, light colour eyes, nose and chin rounded, cleanshaven.

WAGNER

Oberrst. Was in STOCKHOLM until end Feb 45, when, owing to pressure from the British he had to leave Sweden. Seen in BELINDE Camp on return to Germany..

Desc. Age: 52-57, 1.78 m, good broad build, sparse and very short dark hair, growing bald, pale fleshy face, clear watery eyes, round chin, cleanshaven. Speaks (?) Swedish.

WANNECK

Hauptstufü or Stubafü. Worked Mil D and represented SKORZENY 2 or 3 times during conferences during the latter's frequent absences.

Desc. Age: 30-33, 1.66-170 m, stocky flabby build with corporation; little fair hair, reddish flashy face, light coloured watery eyed, broad nose, round flabby chin, cleanshaven. speaks with S. German dialect.

WEHNER

Korv. Kapt. d.R. Had been a long time in South America, worked in Mil B, last seen there in Jan 45.

Desc. Age: 52-57, 1.76-78, slim built, upright, very grey-almost white hair, growing bald, thin face, grey eyes, pointed chin, cleanshaven, speaks Spanish.

WENZLAU

Major d. Lw. Worked in Mil C during winter 1944, and sent in late Dec 44 to STOCKHOLM as assistant air attache.

Desc. Age: 50-52, 1.66 -68 m, small stocky figure, broad shoulders, dark hair, greying, narrow face, dark complexion, pointed chin, cleanshaven, strong smoker, never without a cigar.

WIRSING,
Giselher

Stubafü, is a well-known author of books on economics and America. Brought to Amt VI by SCHELLENBERG in Dec 44, was to collect&collate and memorized all possible infm, so as to act as a walking Baedeker on intelligence to SCHELLENBERG. See once at a reception at the WANSEE Guesthouse.

Desc. Age: 35-40, 1.72 m, powerful build, sparse fair hair, rosy round face, round nose and chin, cleanshaven.

WUNDER

Lt d. R. Already in Jul 44 was the assistant and general run about ~~and~~ clerk in "Ia Marine". He dealt with all correspondence, registration, accommodation, and A & Q problems in general. In WALDBRUG Camp he was A.R.P. offr as well, then went to THURINGIA, returned to BELINDE in Mar 45 and again went South to join Mil B or Mil F.

Desc. Age: 38-40, 1.76 - 78 m, slim build, round shouldered, fair hair, narrow face, light coloured eyes, slightly hook nose, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

G.I.S. PERSONNEL
in places outside BERLIN.

ALIEWELDT. Kapt. Z. See Worked in 3. SKL throughout period July 44 to May 45 and last seen in FLENSBURG-GLUECKSBURG on 17 or 18.5.45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 50-55, 1.70m, slim, stoops a little, short white hair, darkish complexion, dark eyes, round chin, clean-shaven, wears glasses at work, quiet step & speech.

BALTZER. Freg. Kapt. Cousin of the Admiral, head of M.P.A.; seen once at WALDBURG camp in Winter 44: worked in Italy and belonged to "DIENSTSTELLE ENGELMANN".

DESCRIPTION:

Age 52-56, 1.70m, broad stocky build, stoops & looks tired, little fair hair greying, rosy face, light coloured watery eyes, round chin, clean-shaven.

BAUN. Oberst-Lt. Head of the Leitstelle Ost, working under Mil F. (note: Von BECHTOLSHEIM probably means Leiter of Abt II). Only seen once in Dec 44.

DESCRIPTION:

Small & stocky.

BECKER. Kapt. zur See Dr. An old member of the OKM research & experimental establishment, working on the optical & wireless side. Last seen at Prof. KIPFMUELLER's OKM establishment in May 45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 42-43, 1.69m, broad but thick set & stocky, short neck, dark greying hair, small dark eyes, pointed chin, dark complexion, clean-shaven, suffers from asthma and unfit for active service.

BENDIXEN. Korv. Kapt. Commanded the Naval FAK in Denmark: was due to be replaced owing to age & to be given a job in Copenhagen but von BECHTOLSHEIM believed this never happened. Seen once in WALDBURG camp in winter 1944/45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 48-50, 1.71m, slim, grey hair, dark complexion, dark eyes, pointed chin, clean-shaven.

Von BEHLEN. General Major. Head of a staff section of OKH Fremde Heere Ost and supposedly the most knowledgeable person on Russian affairs. Took part in the deception schemes and known to NABER and probably KOPKOW. ?Dismissed by HITLER after the fall of BUDAPEST for incorrect predictions in that area: dismissal disapproved of by the army.

CELLARIUS. Freg. Kapt. Was in NEU MUENSTER prison in June 45 - Formerly Ast Attache in Finland until Germany's break with Finland in Sept. 44. On return to Germany was attached to Mil Amt. & ordered by SCHELLENBERG to intensify means of getting intelligence from NE enemy territories.

ENGELMANN Oberst d.LW. In summer 44 was in Sweden or Denmark: was ordered to the Mil Amt at BELINDE and given task to coordinate & control the intelligence work in Italy. After a lengthy examination of problems in Italy he returned to WALDBURG and was then empowered to form the "Dienststelle ENGELMANN": returned to Italy after Xmas.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 48-52, 1.85m, big fine & slim build, well turned out, sparse & short fair hair greying, bald on top, large face, high forehead, clear pale blue eyes, large hook nose, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

FRISCHMUTH Oberinspector. Belonged to BREMEN and ran agents abroad. Main task was to find out the novelties and developements of enemy radar & U-Boat direction finding apparatus: in this capacity visited Major KEMPF at BELINDE & WALDBURG & seen once by von BECHTOLSHEIM in BREMEN.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 33-36, 1.82m, large, strong broad build, short dark hair, thick eyebrows, darkish eyes, powerful face, sharp nose, broad chin, cleanshaven.

GARBER. Lt.zur See. Family lives in BREMEN or HAMBURG: pre-war was an amateur yachtsman & once crossed the Atlantic. In wartime made 3/4 Atlantic crossings from French ports to South America to dump or pick up agents and to bring them money & wireless sets. After his last trip, he returned to Germany in Dec 44 his ship lost. A second ship was planned for further crossings but the plans were still-born. Received Ritterkreuz from KALTENBRUNNER for last trip. Last seen in Jan 45, then supposedly went to SCHUCHMANN's naval FAK in Holland to try and bring supplies to the Germans garrison at DUNKIRK. Atlantic trips known as Unternehmen MERCATOR and run by Mil B & by HUMPERT & von BOHLEN in particular.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 30-33, 1.70m, small slim build, brown hair, thin face, large eyes, round chin, cleanshaven.

Von GRASSMANN Korv.Kapt. A Balt by birth, worked in Mil C but was slow: in Jan or Feb. 45 sent to DANZIG to examine the Russian areas which had been neglected since the retreat and to renovate & stimulate the intelligence organisation there. OHLETZ not pleased with results.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 48-50, 1.76-78m, big slim build, slightly round shouldered, sparse fair hair, pale thin face, rather bored expression, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

Von HERTZ. Korv.Kapt. Had formerly been in S. America or Spain & Portugal. Worked in Mil C: held in esteem for energy, action & honesty: given special tasks of putting disputes etc. in other stations in order; was in VIENNA in winter 44/45 to get rid of useless officials & in Jan/Feb was in STETTIN to settle a dispute between WIEBE & OHLETZ: ran STETTIN for a while after WIEBE had left: next went with operational section of Mil C staff to BELZIG and last seen in FLENSBURG-GLUECKSBURG in mid May 45.

SECRET.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 50-52, 1.71m., normal figure, upright, greying hair dark complexion, looking rather Southern, dark eyes, hook nose, round chin, cleanshaven, speaks Spanish, prominent teeth, some gold. Is Viennese & speaks German with a Viennese accent.

JAECKEL. Korv.Kapt. Seen in the Berkaerstrasse in early April : not ? attached to RSHA. Last seen in FLENSBURG - GLUECKSBURG.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 33-36, 1.80m, big powerful build, fair hair, rosy face, light eyes, broad nose, round chin, cleanshaven.

KIPFMUELLER. Prof. Not known to von BECHTOLSHEIM. Ran a special experimental establishment for OKM for furtherance of submarine warfare and development of anti-submarine measures.

KRUMMACHER Oberst. Worked in OKW W.Fu.St.Ic. See once by von BECHTOLSHEIM and contacted 2/3 times by phone regarding deception work. ? had dealings with NABER, FREUND & KOPKOW. Last seen in FLENSBURG-MUERWIK in early Mar.45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 58-60, 1.70m, powerful & broad, corporation, short white hair, full healthy face, dark skinned, prominent nose, round chin, cleanshaven.

LIENHARDT Oberst-Lt. Came with the 2 officers courses from the GSS school KAMENZ to WALDBURG in Feb.45 & took over command when von BECHTOLSHEIM left. Last seen in PLOEN.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 50-53, 1.66-68m, stocky broad build, grey hair, narrow dark face, grey blue eyes, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

MANDT Lt or Oberlt. - in June 45 was in NEU MUENSTER prison - Was I-M at HAMBURG under WICHMANN- knew about Unternehmen SUED, WEST & NORD. Seen once by von BECHTOLSHEIM in HAMBURG in Oct.44.

MARTINI Oberst. Head of OKW 'Truppenabwehr' near POTSDAM cover name 'TANNE'- did deception work.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 53-56, 1.81m, very slim figure, dark hair, thin face, cleanshaven.

MEISSNER Major d.LW. Instructor at G.S.S. school at KAMENZ and came to WALDBURG with 2 officers' courses in Feb.45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 48-50, 1.76-78m, upright broad build, grey hair, dark chiselled face, light coloured eyes, cleanshaven, round chin.

MEYER Korv.Kapt. Worked in ESBJERG (Danish W.coast) under HAMBURG's orders and ran Unternehmen WEST & NORD. Seen once by von BECHTOLSHEIM in ESBJERG in March 45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 52-55, 1.68m, stocky build, wide pleasant face, wide nose, round chin, cleanshaven, speaks ? Danish.

OBERMUELLER Korv. Kapt. Appeared to have served in MADRID or LISBON and returned to Germany about Xmas 44 & came to WALDBURG. Sent on leave by Mil B who were to give him new post byt details unknown.

DESCRIPTION:

Age:48-50, 1.80m, very slim & tall, stoops & appears a little condescending, grey hair, thin dark face, dark eyes, pointed chin, cleanshaven, uses glasses at work, speaks & Spanish & Portuguese.

OBLADEN Kapt-Lt. In NEU-MUENSTER prison in June 45. Is a Hamburger and ran a factory of pharmaceutical goods. First met in ATHENS in 1941 during Crete operations when he was either I c or Abwehr. Seen again in recent months as serving on staff of Adm HEYE (A.d.K.) at TRAVEMUENDE. Has been severely injured recently in a car crash.

PIEPER Major d.R. Was I.H. at Kdo.M.Geb. HAMBURG. Held in NEU-MUENSTER prison in June 45.

PRETORIUS Oberst-Lt. Held in NEU-MUENSTER prison in June 45 Was deputy head of Kdo.M.Geb.Hamburg.

Von RIESEN Oberst-Lt.d.R. Instructor at GSS school in KAMENZ and seen visiting WALDBURG & BELINDE camps: last seen at BELINDE in late March 1945.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 55-58, 1.70m, slim bent figure as of an old cavalryman, white hair, lined face, sharp nose, round chin, cleanshaven.

ROKITTA ?Oberst-Lt. Never seen by von BESVHTOLSHEIM. Name mentioned in connection with difficulties created by WIEBE at STETTIN.

SCHAEF(F)ER Oberst-Lt. in OKW 'Truppenabwehr'. Only seen fleetingly once- known to NABER & MARTINI. Description impossible.

SCHOEN Oberfeldrichter, Dr. Was a member of Amt VI-A but worked largely at the GSS-school at KAMENZ. Last seen with RAPP in TRAVEMUENDE & FLENSBURG.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 45-50, 1.75m, broad shoulders, narrow hips, short brown hair, triangular face, pale face, dark eyes, pointed and prominent chin.

SCHUCHMANN Kapt-Lt. Commander of the naval FAK in Belgium and Holland & under the orders of Leitstelle WEST and Mil F. Last seen in Jan 45 in WALDBURG camp.

DESCRIPTION:

Age:37-40, 1.68m, powerful & stocky build, fair hair, reddish healthy face, wide nose, round chin, cleanshaven, is connected with the well known HAMBURG boatbuilders called SCHUCHMANN.

SCHULTZ, Otto. K. Admiral. Was naval C-in-C in CRIMEA until its evacuation, then became chief of 3. SKL 1st echelon at BERNAU ('KORALLE' camp). Moved with his staff first to SENGWARDEN near WILHELMSHAVEN, then to PLOEN & then to FLENSBURG - GLUECKSBURG. After the surrender he was taken on by a British Commission. Last seen and spoken to by von BECHTOLSHEIM on 17 or 18 May in GLUECKSBURG.

DESCRIPTION:

Age: 47, 1.75m., broad strong build, corporation, well fed, fleshy face, light coloured eyes, pale complexion, wide nose, round chin, cleanshaven, high-pitched voice, has 4 or 5 children.

SOKOLOWSKI Kapt. zur See. Joined staff of 3. SKL in autumn 44 and called himself 3. SKL/Abw. He was in touch with DISCHLER in BERLIN as well as with Amt VI & Mil Amt. He remained at 'KORALLE' as a report centre when staff moved to SENGWARDEN but rejoined them at PLOEN. Last seen in FLENSBURG-GLUECKSBURG on 17 or 18 May 45.

DESCRIPTION:

Age: 45-50, 1.75m, big & slim, dark hair, dark sunburnt complexion, square face, darkish eyes, wide nose, round prominent chin, cleanshaven, walks smartly with his shoulders back.

TORNOW Korv. Kapt. Once seen in WALDBURG camp: served on staff of naval C-in-C Denmark, Adm. WURMBACH. Description not possible.

TRUXA Hauptmann. Said to be of a diplomatic family- several times wounded in battle: attended a shortened course at G.S.S. school at KAMENZ and due to join Mil B staff: came to 'WALDBURG' camp in Jan 45 as defence officer. Probably demobilised as the HPA's plan to send him abroad as an assistant Attache: probably cancelled by the trend of the war.

DESCRIPTION:

Age: late 20's, 1.86 - 88m, very tall slim upright figure, dark brown hair, long face, dark eyes, hook nose, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

UNTERBERG ?Freg. Kapt. Believed to be the name of a man in civilian clothes who accompanied 'OBERMUELLER' at WALDBURG on the latter's return from Spain & Portugal. Thought to have been then sent on leave as he had been serving abroad for a long time. Description impossible

WEISSHUHN Korv. Kapt. Lives in KIEL. Belonged to Kdo. Melde Gebiet HAMBURG and ran an out-station in KIEL where he was attached to the M.C.K. Ost. He also ran a school for GSS Agents between KIEL and NEU-MUENSTER known as SEEHOF, to which the HAMBURG staff intended to evacuate themselves. Seen by von BECHTOLSHEIM in KIEL in March 45 concerning arrangements for Unternehmen WEST & NORD.

DESCRIPTION:

Age: late 40's, 1.78m, big broad shouldered, well built broad top of head, triangular face, sharp nose, pointed chin, cleanshaven, wears glasses, very short-sighted.

WICHMANN

Kapt zur See. Trained for Navy in same 'crew' as V. Adm HEYE. Was head of Kdo. Melde Gebiet HAMBURG and planned to evacuate self, staff and the W/T station at WOHLSDORF to SEEHOF near KIEL.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 47-50, 1.74m, upright & well built, grey hair, sunburnt complexion, lined face, young and light coloured eyes, large hook nose, round chin, cleanshaven; nearly always wears glasses.

WIEBE

Kapt. zur See. Until Feb 45 was head of Kdo. Melde Gebiet STETTIN, then fell out with SHELLENBERG and sent back to the Navy, who had no active employment for him and so released him. Remained at home in FLENSBURG.

DESCRIPTION:

Age 50-55, 1.78m, well built and well turned out, grey hair, dark square face, light coloured eyes, sharp nose, pointed chin, cleanshaven.

WIESER

Oberst. Never seen by von BECHTOLSHEIM. A name heard in Mil C and connected with VIENNA and PRAGUE.

Appx II

HISTORY, ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL

of

RSHA Amt VI and Mil Amt

1. Events leading up to the final Organisation:

The original RSHA Amt VI run by SCHELLENBERG had for a long time been a rival in many spheres to the Abwehr run by Adm. CANARIS, especially in the sphere of the Abwehr Abt I. In the early part of 1944 Adm CANARIS was deposed of his command and Abt I of the Abwehr was taken over by Obst HANSEN.

SCHELLENBERG, running the only Int organisation of international interest in the RSHA, felt that working under KALTENBRUNNER was an unfair yoke and the rivalry between his Amt VI and the Abwehr Abt should be eliminated; thus he conceived the idea of the united intelligence service in which there should be four main intelligence divisions, all working under one direction and with the benefit of centrally pooled information; these divisions should be:-

- | | | |
|-----|---|-----------|
| I | = | Political |
| II | = | Economic |
| III | = | Technical |
| IV | = | Military |
- in that order of importance.

This idea SCHELLENBERG put to Heinrich HIMMLER in about Mar 1944 with the suggestion that he, SCHELLENBERG, should be its Chief with direct access to him. HIMMLER put this scheme before the Führer and HITLER sanctioned it insisting that the service should be known as "DER EINHEITLICHE DEUTSCHE MELDE-DIENST" (THE UNITED GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE), by which title von BECHTOLSHEIM frequently heard SCHELLENBERG refer to later, though it became commonly known by the initial letters of the last three words:- G.M.D. The new org, however, was to remain part of the R.S.H.A. and SCHELLENBERG therefore was to continue to be subordinate to KALTENBRUNNER.

At a conference on intelligence matters at SALZBURG in Apr 1944 HIMMLER announced the intention to form this new united service and Von BECHTOLSHEIM heard that the Service representatives had accepted the plan willingly, expressing the opinion that the Military Division should be under the command of an offr of the Wehrmacht. In the course of conversations with him, Von BECHTOLSHEIM heard SCHELLENBERG say that though he was most desirous of forming this new Service within the R.S.H.A. he was hoping to free himself from the command of KALTENBRUNNER; in addition SCHELLENBERG made it clear that the formation of this service must be gradual as it would otherwise upset work and progress.

Note:- Von BECHTOLSHEIM can quote no mention of SCHELLENBERG being moved to form this service from a Partyspirit, i.e. so as to centralise more power into the hands of the SS and thus reduce that of the forces, as an insurance against the forces being a potential menace to Party aspirations.

By July 1944, Abwehr Abt I had already been renamed "Mil Amt", Oberst HANSEN coming under the general supervision of SCHELLENBERG. Within the Mil Amt, the old Abwehr organisation of Army, Navy and Air Force sections had been amalgamated and redivided into geographical and technical sections exactly corresponding to those of RSHA Amt VI; also, instead of the head of each of the Army, Navy and Air Force sections being responsible for liaison with their respective services, proper Liaison Officers were appointed with the title of Ia Marine, Ia Heer and Ia Luft.

On the 10 Jul 44 there was still a remnant of the old I-M section functioning under that name and comprising only the elderly Freg. Kapt GARTMANN who was due to retire in a few months and his assistant Lt WUNDER; this was only really so because the official liaison officer to the O.K.M., a Freg. Kapt DISCHLER who was also an elderly and rich man and was confined to bed in his house in BERLIN on about 3 days a week and GARTMANN did his work. Von BECHTOLSHEIM's appointment as Naval Liaison Offr on 10 Jul ensured the solution of this anomaly as soon as he could ably take over the work in progress.

The 20 Jul 1944 gave SCHELLENBERG a golden opportunity and he took it. CANARIS was already in disgrace, HANSEN was removed, tried and executed, as was his deputy Oberst-Lt ENG LHORN, whilst another senior Abwehr I offr, Oberst Lt i.G. KUEHBART, was arrested and tried but only dismissed the Services at a later date.

THE FINAL ORGANISATION in APR 45

Departments and their functions:

<u>Amt VI</u>	<u>Mil Amt</u>	<u>Function</u>
VI-A	Mil A.	All matters concerning the organisation of the two Amters, the Secfet Service schools, accommodation, welfare, education, arrangement of evacuation camps and 'works'.
VI-B	Mil B.	Western Countries:- DENMARK, NORWAY, FRANCE, ENGLAND, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, ITALY and the AMERICAS.
VI-C	Mil C.	Eastern Countries:- SWEDEN, FINLAND, RUSSIA, the BALKANS, CHINA & JAPAN.
VI-D	-	Task not clear but believed to be mainly directed against AMERICA.
-	Mil D	Training, equipment and launching of Sabotage groups.
VI-E	-	Function unknown
-	Mil E	The running of Nachr. Regt 606. Training and placing of all signals personnel, ordering and delivering of small types of communications equipment, security of signal communications between metropolitan stations, the running of the Central WT station at BELZIG.
VI-F	-	Task unknown
	Mil F	A new section inaugurated in about Jan 45. All matters relating to FAKs and FATs.

VI-G	Mil G	The equipment of the FAK & FAT's and other troops of Mil D, Mil F and all Amt VI with weapons, ammunition, apparatus, clothing, food including special concentrated foods, money including foreign currency, special wireless apparatus, S/W materials, false documents and ? codes and ciphers.
-	Mil I	A new section inaugurated in late Mar 45. Schemes to deceive and mislead the enemy
VI-Kultur	-	Task unknown
VI-Wi	-	Economic reports, surveys and evaluations, as well as technical questions of all natures.
VI-Z	-	Deception work and special air-borne undertakings.

3. PERSONNEL AND MOVEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS:

Chief of Amt VI	-	SS Brigfñ & Gen.Maj.d.Pol SCHELLENBERG
Personal Staff	-	Ostubafñ SCHMITZ, nicknamed 'POLITRUK' Stubafñ ROEDER, L.O. to the Dipl. Corps & Foreign Office Gisolher WIRSING, walking "Bädekor". Frl. SCHINKE, Secretary.
Liaison Officers	-	Oberst-Lt i.G. Von KNESEBECK Ia Hoer Kapt z. See Von BECHTOLSHEIM Ia Marine Oberst-Lt i.G.d. L. OHLETZ Ia Luft
<u>Amt</u> <u>VIA</u>		<u>Function</u> Stafñ Dr. SANDBERGER Stubafñ REICHERT - transport officer Remained throughout at the BERLINER Str., BERLIN until it moved to SEEDORF camp in March 45 and then to the South of MUNICH.
VIB		Staf Dr. STEIMLE. Stubafñ REICHEL. Was very closely connected with Mil B and was responsible for the offices (Kdo Melde-Gebiet) at HAMBURG, WIESBADEN and ope in ITALY. Moved in Oct 44 to WALDBURG camp nr FUERSTEN-WALDE, returned to BERLIN in early Feb 45, moved to 'SEEDORF' camp nr LAUENSTEIN, THURINGIA in mid-March 45, and later moved further South beyond MUNICH.
VIC		Stafñ RAPP TSCHIRSCHKY - RAPP's predecessor Moved from BERLINER Str. to WALDBURG Camp in Oct 44, back to BERLIN in early Feb 45, then to SEEDORF Camp in midpend Mar 45 and later to South of MUNICH.
VID		Ostubafñ Dr. PAEFFGEN Not known whether this section ever left the BERLINER STR.

<u>Amt</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Function</u>
VI & F	-	No details known
VI	-	Quartered in numerous places in and around BERLIN, including the HAVEL Institute, WANNSEE. Moves not known.
VI-Wi/T	-	Staf Prof. Dr SCHMIED. OGILVIE. In the BERLINER STR. - movements unknown.
VI-Kultur	-	Hstufu WADEL or WADL. In the BERLINER STR - movements unknown.
-	Mil A	Oberst-Lt GRESSLER. Oberfeldrichter HERZLIEB - Legal matters. Major KUNKEL - Camp Comdt. Remained at BELINDE Camp throughout.
-	Mil B	Oberst-Lt i.G. KUEHBARTH - until 20.7.44. Major i.G. Von THAYSEN. Oberst-Lt Von BOHLEN. Major KEMPF. Major AMSINK. Korv. Kapt. HUMPERT. Korv. Kapt. BOHNY. Korv. Kapt. Von REEDL. Korv. Kapt. WEHNER. Kprv. Kapt. KELLER. Lt. SCHOLVIN. Moved from BELINDE Camp to WALDBERG in Oct 44, back again in early Feb 45 and then in two portions to 'SEEDORF' in March 45 and later South of MUNICH.
-	Mil C	Oberst-Lt i.G. d.L. OHLEITZ (also air L.O.). Major ELTING. Major WENZLAU. Hptm. HOESTERMANN. Hptm. PLAGE. Korv. Kapt VOSSKOEHLER. Lt. SEEBERG. Same movements apply as to Mi; B.
-	Mil D	Ostufafu SKORZENY. Ostufafu WANECK. Major NAUMANN. Moved from BARUTH to ORANIENBURG in ? Dec 44.
-	Mil E	Oberst-Lt BOEHNING. Major PORITSCHKIN. Quartered in a hutted camp in a wood nr BELZ
-	Mil F	Oberst i.G. BUNTROCK. Oberst-Lt i.G. Von KNESEBECK (also army L.O.). Moved from BELINDE Camp to SEEDORF in Mar 45 and later to South of MUNICH.
-	Mil G	Oberst-Lt BOEHNING (also in Mil E). No movements known.
-	Mil H	Lt. NIERER.

APPENDIX IIIDESCRIPTION WORK AND SCHEMES1. Personalities involved:-

- a. Truppenabwehr section of OKM known as 'TANNE'

Oberst MARTINI
Oberst-Lt SCHAEFFER
Lt NABER

- b. RSHA Amt IV, Stubafu KOPKOW
" HUPPENKOTEN

- c. RSHA Amt VI-z Oberst Lt FREUND
" CARGANICO

- d. OKW I-c Oberst KRUMMACHER

- e. OKH I-c (Fr. Heer Ost) Gen. Maj. Von GEHLEN
Major? SCHEIBE

2. Organisation and Contacts:

In July 1944 SCHELLENBERG ordered the three Ia's of Mil Amt to interest themselves in the OKW branch called Truppenabwehr; KNESEBECK and OHLETZ being both busy with departmental duties in Mil Amt, the lot fell on Von BECHTOLSHEIM. He made contact with the Truppenabwehr branch (TANNE was its cover name) in some barracks nr POTSDAM. MARTINI's main task at this time was to obtain information on the effects of V 1's and V 2's and to find out where they were landing - information on this point was unobtainable and it was suspected that we were exploding many V 2's permanently in the air. This dept, on the information supplied by the Services, i.e. Ic staff of OKW, OKH etc, were responsible for feeding false information to the enemy. To this end they had a large card-index giving all the names and details of persons used for feeding out this information and who therefore might need protection in case of arrest as traitors. In addition the main 'out' channel for information was Stubafu KOPKOW who had extensive dealings with 'turned' Russian agents and 'returned' German PW, and in particular knew agents in BULGARIA and RUMANIA who sent messages by WE to a station in or near MOSCOW.

Another sphere of activity was Amt VI-Z of the RSHA. FREUND had his own contacts, but his dept, through CARGANICO, is thought to have been responsible for many special airborne undertakings such as the dropping of agents in AFRICA, the BALKANS and elsewhere.

In order to facilitate the deception schemes of Amt VI, SCHELLENBERG succeeded in acquiring Lt NABER and his card index and incorporating him in Mil A, 'TANNE', remaining where it was and just decreasing its activities. In doing this reorganisation SCHELLENBERG had to pacify KOPKOW and FREUND, since both wanted to have NABER and his card index in order to make their work predominant. SCHELLENBERG insisted that NABER and his infm should remain as a central pool available to both.

As a part of Mil A, deception work would inevitably become sidetracked and Von BECHTOLSHEIM who had taken NABER under his care finally managed in late Mar 45 to persuade SCHELLENBERG to form a new section - Mil I; No senior offr was ever appointed to run this section and owing to the disintegration of Mil Amt, was never able to commence work as a new section.

3. Deception Work and Schemes:

a. When Von BECHTOLSHEIM met KRUMMACHER, he understood that the latter had two schemes already under way which he intended to complete; he gave no details.

b. Some schemes operated direct by KOPKOW in conjunction with Fremde Heer West and Ost.

c. Intercepts of British WT messages showed repeatedly that we wished to know (i) the location of Adm FRIEDBURG's HQ at KIEL, (ii) the submarine construction capacity of KIEL U-Boat yards. A reply was 'sent' quoting an underestimate of the capacity of the KIEL U-boat building yards. Von BECHTOLSHEIM cannot recall the figure but states that it was pointless as the capacity varied with the frequency and intensity of air raids.

d. Intercepts of Russian WT messages showed that they repeatedly wished to know who was the German C-in-C East Front.

No reply was ever sent as the OKW could never decide who to name as holding this non-existing appointment.

e. At the time of the Russian advance to the Oder at FRANKFURT, it was known that the Russian front to the North of KUESTRIN was relatively thinly held, because many Russian troops were still occupied in KURLAND and N.E. PRUSSIA. Gen von GEHLEN and Major ? SCHEIBE worked out a scheme whereby the Russians were informed that a German Panzer Army was concentrating in the North (opposite their weak sector), this Panzer Army was in fact the 6th commanded by Sepp DIETRICH which was being switched from the offensive in the West to the BUDAPEST area (Jan 45).

f. On information supplied by Fremde Heer West, a scheme was evolved to produce a false Army Group in Western Holland in Feb 45. The mechanics of this scheme were that existing units in the area were all made to represent higher units and formations, dummy WT traffic was employed and dummy road and rail moves were organised.

g. In Apr 45 minor attempts were made to mislead the Russians on the Eastern Front South of BERLIN by initiating false road traffic, but the menace of the Allied airforces was such as to preclude the usefulness of such attempts.

h. Throughout the siege of DUNKIRK, Von BECHTOLSHEIM understood that CARGANICO utilised his special unit (? KG 200) to fly food and medical supplies to the garrison. Von BECHTOLSHEIM recalls no mention of this section (VI-z) or unit attempting to evacuate important personalities from any of the besieged areas at DUNKIRK or on the Atlantic coast.

When the Commander of the besieged area 'GIRONDE SUED' was killed, an Oberst was flown there from Germany to replace him; Von BECHTOLSHEIM thinks this was the work of CARGANICO's unit.

j. In late 1944 and early 1945, the Atlantic coast garrisons were urgently in need of supplies. The OKW tried all official channels but failed to arrange for a supply ship to be sent. The problem was then turned over to Mil Amt - in this case Mil B. The MOK West - now in LINDAU on the BODENSEE - and in WT contact with all the besieged garrisons, obtained a list of their requirements and their priorities and gave these to Mil B. Mil B with the help of VI-B bought these goods in SPAIN or despatched them by air to SPAIN and arranged for a ship to be ready and loaded advising Von BECHTOLSHEIM when the stage was set for the voyage to begin.

Von BECHTOLSHEIM advised MOK West who in turn warned GIRONDE area (Adm MICHAELIS) and gave Von BECHTOLSHEIM the navigation instructions for the ship which he passed on to Mil B. The ship duly arrived and delivered 4 months' supplies for which Adm MICHAELIS sent a WT message of thanks.

A second similar voyage was planned and prepared up to the point of the ship awaiting its sailing orders to bring supplies to LORIENT, but the whole plan was cancelled as it became known that the Allies knew of it.

APPENDIX IV.G.S.S. SCHOOL AT KAMENZ.

Von BECHTOLSHEIM paid one visit to this school, to lecture on the requirements of Naval Intelligence, in Dec. 1944.

The school was run by the Lehr-Regiment-KURFUERST and ran two sets of courses : one for officers and one for N.C.O's. The object of these courses was to supply ready trained personnel to the FAK's, FAT's and to fill Abwehr staff appointments.

Officers attending these courses were largely of low medical category or were men who had been wounded and, though well, could not be sent to the Front.

Training included:-

W/T, S/W, languages, foreign economics
parachute jumping and recognition of enemy troops and equipment.

The duration of a course was normally 15 weeks but this was reduced to 12 weeks in 1944/45 and in 1945, in order to increase the output (normal capacity 45-50 officers per course) courses were made to overlap : thus when the school had to evacuate in Feb 1945 two courses of officers moved to 'WALDBURG' camp near KOLPIN.

PERSONALITIES:

Oberst-Lt	Von RIESEN.	{	Instructors
Major d.LW	MEISSNER.		
O/Feldrichter	SCHOEN.		

The following were evacuated with the school or the KURFUERST Lehr.-Regt:-

Major	PARTL (believed Commandant.)	{	never seen
Major	VERBEEK		
Oberst-Lt	LIENHARDT		
Hptm.	TRUXA		(The senior officer student of the two courses evacuated to KOLPIN.

APPENDIX V.UNTERNEHMEN SUED , WEST AND NORD.

1. On arrival at Mil Amt on 10 July 1944, von BECHTOLSHEIM found the three schemes "Unternehmen SUED, WEST & NORD" already in operation. They had been instituted apparently at the request of O.K.M. and were operated by Mil B in close conjunction with the M.O.K. Ost at KIEL.

The objects of these schemes was to provide warning of the approach of British naval or invasion fleets.

2. To achieve this object the three schemes were organised as follows :-

- (a) SUED : based on DELFZIJL, operated by Kdo Melde Gebiet HAMBURG with some 6/8 ships including 2/3 with W/T on board : area to operate in:-the North Sea eastwards of the English Channel as a protection for the coast of N.W. Germany.
- (b) WEST : based on ESBJERG, Denmark, operated by M.O.K. Ost under HAMBURG's supervision: operating area:-The North Sea towards the DOGGER BANK & a little to the North of it so as to protect the West coast of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark.
- (c) NORD : based on ESBJERG also and operated in the same way as WEST. Operating area:-The North Sea to the North of WEST's area so as to protect the S. Norway Coast and the approaches to the Skaggerak.

WEST & NORD employed a total of some 12/15 boats, of which 3/4 would be out for each of WEST & NORD, each such group having one W/T set & operator.

3. Unternehmen SUED came to a gradual end in about Sep 1944 as being somewhat ineffective and unnecessary. Late in 1944 & early in 1945 the Danes organised strikes and urged ship's captains to sail their craft to England : to counteract this, the Germans forbade any ship to leave port thereby bringing these schemes to a close. 3.SKL however requested Mil B that these trawlers be allowed to continue their operations and be provided with the necessary fuel & provisions (these had also been 'frozen' to prevent ships leaving port). Mil B in late Feb. 1945 issued orders to HAMBURG to cover 3.SKL's request and in early March 45, von BECHTOLSHEIM himself made a trip to KIEL and ESBJERG to see that all was well.

4. In the course of this trip and his previous visit to HAMBURG, von BECHTOLSHEIM met the following personalities:-

- | | | | |
|-------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| (a) HAMBURG | Kapt
Korv. Kapt. | WICHMANN
Dr. MANDT | the Leiter
the I-M. |
| (b) KIEL | Korv. Kapt | WEISSHUHN | |
| (c) ESBJERG | Korv. Kapt. | MEYER | |

Those responsible for this work in Mil B were:-

Korv. Kapt.	von REDL	until Feb. 45
Lt.	SCHOLVIN	
Korv. Kapt.	BOHNY	in succession to von REDL.

APPENDIX VI.NAVAL INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONNAIRE.

Whilst von BECHTOLSHEIM was 'Ia Marine' at the Mil Amt, most of the information required from secret sources by 3. SKL was passed to von BECHTOLSHEIM who in turn had the technical matters translated into plain German & then distributed the questions to the correct geographical or technical depts. of Mil Amt. In many cases von BECHTOLSHEIM claims not to have seen the answers which, in any case, came piecemeal so that it is hard to gauge the time required for the two way traffic between Mil Amt & the agent on the spot; many matters were answered by the officers of Mil Amt sections direct to the 3. SKL, thus by-passing von BECHTOLSHEIM.

The following is a list of the 3. SKL's questions during the period 15 July 44-late Feb. 45 as remembered by von BECHTOLSHEIM; after each question are such notes as von BECHTOLSHEIM can provide on the reactions to that question. So far as these latter notes are concerned von BECHTOLSHEIM is of course unaware of the reliability which could be given to the information as it was generally 'single source' information & seldom collated or evaluated when he saw it.

Note: The term 'B-Dienst' used below stands for 'Beobachtungs-Dienst' of W/T intercept service & was run by the 4. SKL.

A. INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM ENGLAND.

- 1.Q. Building capacity of dockyards as regards warships, auxiliary warships & landing craft. Details of newly built ships, launchings & intended uses. Details of merchant ships.
 - A. Replies few and fragmentary; reports on landing craft & repairs of warships-good; reports on ship building and merchantmen rare. Infm. channels: mostly written via Spain and Portugal taking 4-6 weeks, a little by W/T, ? a channel via Holland.
- 2.Q. Armament of new ships with weapons and apparatus, especially radar and submarine locating gear.
 - A. Good fragments of infm. from Gibraltar via Spain to Mil B.
- 3.Q. All information on new weapons of sea-going vessels, with special emphasis on radar & submarine locating gear in ships as well as aircraft.
 - A. Reports were good but did not go into details. Infm. channel via Spain and Holland. Timelag unknown.
- 4.Q. Testing of new weapons & apparatus in the U.K.
 - A. Nil replies ^{except} concerning radar stations on the English S. Coast. Such infm. came via France & Spain: timelag unknown.
- 5.Q. Information on English coastal harbours:- their capacity, loading capacity, piers & their installations, moorings & anchorages, traffic of warships and merchantmen and transport connections with the interior.
 - A. More recent infm. received through GSS was fragmentary.
- 6.Q. Reports of conspicuously (large) assemblies of warships merchant ships and special ships, more especially in the English E & S. coast harbours.

SECRET.

A. From July 44 onwards isolated reports were received on this point which led the Germans to believe that there were new invasion projects aimed at Norway & Denmark; these were regarded as part of a deception plan.

7.Q. Preparations for intended landings.

A. As in 6 A.

8.Q. Disposition of warships & merchantmen.

A. Dispositions of the Home Fleet at Scapa were always very well known, more especially by means of the 'B-Dienst': the dispositions in the Channel were well known (?via the 'B-Dienst') as also the movements of shipping along the East coast during the first years of the war. Later, when the GAF ceased its operations from Norway, this last information ceased to come in. The GSS failed to bridge this gap.

9.Q. Composition of the individual Fleets (SCAPA FLOW, Home Fleet, Mediterranean).

A. Less information was received through the GSS than through the 'B-Dienst'. Reliable information on the Mediterranean Fleet came from observers near GIBRALTAR, such information being transmitted from Spain by W/T within a few hours. Difficult to obtain information from the Suez Canal.

10.Q. Details of ships in dock for repairs with probable duration and extent of repairs.

A. Same as I.A.

11.Q. Losses of ships through battle, mining, air attacks & losses and damage sustained by ships through accidents without any warlike connections.

16 Nil infm. forthcoming during period July 44-Feb. 45.

12.Q. Details of Fleet exercises, tactical exercises, artillery and torpedoe firing exercises, practice in anti-submarine warfare including the adoption of new methods of firing and new tactics.

A. No infm. forthcoming.

13.Q. Main supply harbours and harbours used to receive goods from overseas.

A. Occasional useful reports received: timelag 3-4 weeks: channel unknown but ? Portugal/Spain.

14.Q. Turn-about time of convoys, composition of convoys (a) in coastal waters & (b) on the high seas; nature & composition of convoys escorts.

A. In period July 44-Feb 45 only little information received & was sent direct to B.d.U. to avoid delays. At the B.d.U. the turn-about time was also well known through the 'B-Dienst'. New and supplementary information was however wanted at all times both to appreciate any changes as well to check previous infm.

15.Q. Reports of intention to sail & the actual sailing, more especially regarding naval units and convoys and the probable direction in which they would sail.

SECRET.

A. Information from GIBRALTAR was good: no other reports received through G.S.S.

16.Q. Submarine patrols in English coastal waters, the N. and S. exits to the Irish Sea, the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic.

A. Fragmentary reports received: amount of information received from sources other than the GSS was greater (Evaluation by 'B-Dienst')

17.Q. Air cover provided by the British Fleet Air arm: strength & composition of squadrons & formations taking part: equipment of aircraft with location gear & armament.

A. No reports on air cover: regarding equipment both older and more recent+ available:-channels via Spain & Sweden, timelag 3-10 weeks. +reports

18.Q. State of British W/T technique, of W/T and transmission procedures, the codes in use and their construction or the construction of only parts of them.

A. This question was often raised as penetration of the Allied W/T procedure & codes became scarcely possible in the later stages of the war. It was also impossible successfully to break (the codes) by means of the GSS.

19.Q. Application and taking over of American W/T apparatus in the British Navy and Fleet Air Arm.

A. Nil reports.

20.Q. Information on operational intentions and plans.

A. Nil reports.

21.Q. Tactical knowledge & battle experiences of the English.

A. Nil reports.

22.Q. Best convoy routes, covering of convoys from overseas by the RAF based in U.K.; convoy speeds.

A. Information received from England, from America and via Portugal, which served to check the information already available and completed the information required for U-Boat operations. Timelag (4-14 days) was too great for operational or tactical use to be made of reports.

23.Q. Details of tonnage of tankers and of construction of new tankers.

A. Insufficient information received except from America.

24.Q. Personnel questions regarding the British Navy, reserves, age groups, morale, and state of readiness for war.

A. Nil reports.

25.Q. Details of searchlights used by aircraft & the penetration of water by these searchlights: this question was based on reports of U-Boat encounters with such equipment.

A. No reports received.

25.Q. Attempts by enemy(Allied) countries to experiment with Thermal Locating Equipment(Waerme-Peill-Geraet. WPG) and stage of development reached. (von BECHTOLSHEIM does NOT recognise name ('Donau Geraet')). This question came from a naval experimental station and not from the 3.SKL.

A. ^{-E+1-} No reports received.

B. INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM
GIBRALTAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN .

1.Q. Details of the entire traffic-warships & merchantmen-through the GIBRALTAR Straits in both directions.

A. Reports via Spain were quick & reliable: in addition to the normal channel of reports to BELZIG W/T station, reports also sent direct to German Navy so that countermeasures by the U-Boats could be taken when possible.

2.Q. Details regarding GIBRALTAR itself:- harbour installations, fortifications, strength of air forces based on it, composition & armament of air force units, camouflage of fortifications, camouflage painting of warships & merchant ships, repair facilities, details of warships present, sailings from GIBRALTAR & direction taken.

A. Information was continuous and sufficient in quantity, so that fresh reports only served to verify or correct previous reports: timelag short.

3.Q. Movements of Allied warships & merchantships in the Mediterranean

A. Reports on movements were fairly complete-timelag varied, depending on whether observations emanated from Europe or Africa. Timelag ^{enable} should have been as short as possible and indeed so short as to U-Boats to take action. In isolated cases this happened. Observation in the Suez Canal area was bad.

4.Q. Reports on Mediterranean harbours especially MALTA, TUNIS ,ALEXANDRIA & SUEZ.

A. Reports from MALTA & ALEXANDRIA good, but from Suez & TUNIS were defective. Timelag unknown; channels via Italy and the Balkans.

5.Q. Coastal traffic in the Mediterranean.

A. Traffic reports from coastal waters of Italy,Dalmatia and the Aegean were good and rapid.

6.Q. Most favourable points for U-Boats to carry out attacks.

A. Reports from GIBRALTAR were used to plan tactics of U-Boats- no special reports.

7.Q. Air cover & dispositions of Allied Air Forces; density of coverage over particular areas.

A. Reports only on air force units based on GIBRALTAR.

SECRET.

8.Q. Intentions in the areas of Italy, Adriatic Sea & the Aegean.

A. A large number of false & misleading reports received which complicated the survey, and which contained every possible type of conjecture. The imminent Allied landing in S. France was correctly appreciated by the German Navy both as regards time and place, in contrast to the other branches of the Wehrmacht.

9.Q. Violation of Turkish territorial waters by British ships.

A. Two reports only received.

10.Q. Traffic through the Suez Canal in both directions.

A. Great value attached to reports on traffic in the Suez Canal, but reports were fragmentary, hard to obtain, and their accuracy was not guaranteed; time lag 8-14 days; channels:-via Turkey and Greece.

11.Q. Dispositions and concentrations of British & Free French naval units as well as of merchantmen, transports and special landing craft in order to make a timely appreciation of Allied landing intentions and to provide an early realisation of the probable direction of attack.

A. Very good reports via Spain and from Italy: regarding landing intentions see 8.A. above; time lag short, transmission mostly by W/T.

12.Q. Anti-submarine measures in the Mediterranean.

A. Nil reports with new information received from GSS.

13.Q. Protective measures for coastal convoys in the Mediterranean and in home waters (U.K.) against attacks by midget craft.

A. After the first midget craft attack after the Invasion in the Bay of the Seine, great importance was attached to the further developments of this type of craft. Different reports were received from the French zone about the protective measures outside the Allied landing places in the Bay of the Seine; similarly reports were later received from the Belgian and Dutch zones after attacks by these craft in those waters. Reports were speedy and accurate & mostly received by W/T.

14.Q. Protective measures against the effects of acoustic, magnetic and contact mines.

A. No new information received in period July 44-Feb 45.

15.Q. Minesweeping apparatus & tactics especially in the Channel and UK home waters.

A. No new information received.

16.Q. Raids. Planning of small Commando raids;-composition, armament, equipment and point of attack (Italy, S. France, Greek Islands and Norway).

A. Few reports received and these were after the raids in Norwegian and Italian zones and based on results of interrogation. No warning messages received from enemy occupied territories except some conjectures regarding raids from Italy on the Dalmatian coast.

C. INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM AMERICA.

1.Q. As regards America, the Germans were interested in most of the same questions as detailed for England (para A). The following additional questions were of interest especially regarding submarine warfare.

A. Reports from N. America were better and more varied than those from England. Reports regarding the building capacity of landing craft and liberty ships were fairly accurate but could have been better and quicker in regard to convoys. Reports on transport of ships and Air craft to the European theatre were nevertheless obtained but largely through the 'B-Dienst' of the German Navy & not through the GSS.

2.Q. Turn-about time of convoys sailing from America to England, their strength, speed, projected routes, destinations & strength of escorts, both air & sea (a) in American waters (b) in the Atlantic & (c) in European waters.

A. The overall information in earlier reports would not have sufficed for the launching of a newly-planned submarine offensive. Continual requests therefore made for fresh information on this subject. Satisfactory reports and reliable information could no longer be obtained through the GSS so that knowledge in this sphere remained incomplete and more reliable information could only be obtained from isolated areas such as the Irish Sea and GIBRALTAR.

3.Q. American anti-submarine measures & methods.

A. Reports were complementary to those received from England.

4.Q. Strength and main centres of American Coastal defences - N. & S. American coasts and the Caribbean.

A. No new information received July 44-Feb. 45: earlier reports from Caribbean especially confirmed & completed reports from German U-Boat Commanders.

5.Q. American Fleet Movements to East Asia.

A. No replies recalled.

6.Q. Supply system to East Asia:- strength & main centres of protection. routes round Africa and in the Pacific.

A. No replies recalled.

7.Q. American Radar apparatus, their developments & success, production of valves (Cathode Ray Tubes).

A. Isolated reports from N. America: time lag long: channels:- via Spain & Portugal and ? Sweden. Reports were valuable since better information was not obtained from captured American apparatus.

8.Q. Capacity of American dockyards to effect repairs, and allocation to American and Allied vessels.

A. Reports of repairs of Allied merchant ships & warships were frequently received both by W/T and letter.

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9.Q. Details of all harbours.

A. These reports were very easily obtained but were most regarded as attempts by agents to give satisfaction in a convenient manner. Reports were sent to Portugal by sea or air mail.

10.Q. Movements from America towards Greenland.

A. No reports recalled.

11.Q. Convoys to N. Russia.

A. No reports from America.

12.Q. Supplies to Russia based on Agreement:- routes, quantity, nature and composition of deliveries as well as their priority.

A. Isolated reports appear to have arrived via Amt VI/W1/T but von BECHTOLSHEIM thinks they by-passed his office: the German Navy was informed but method unknown.

13.Q. Supplies for England.

A. Reports emanated mostly from unloading harbours in England and less from loading harbours in America. They provided the Wehrmacht with a very good overall picture with the apparent shortages of the Allied. Channels: From England via Sweden, Holland & Belgium, Spain & Portugal.

14.Q. Dispositions of the American Fleet units in the European, E. Asian and home theatres.

A. Reports on disposition in E. Asia & home theatres was incomplete. Reports of american units in European waters were sufficient; timelag sometimes long.

15.Q. Quantities & types of aircraft supplied to Europe - transport by sea and air.

A. The general survey regarding this matter was good, but channel of information unknown, probably through 'B-Dienst', as no reports received through GSS channels accessible to von BECHTOLSHEIM. Some reports withheld from von BECHTOLSHEIM and only shown to the I a Luft.

16.Q. General supplies to Europe, harbours of arrival & departure: quantity and nature of supplies.

A. See 2 A. above.

17.Q. Morale in America and American Navy.

A. Information only obtained through press-reading, but isolated reports received through political channels of Amt VI and these were ? not forwarded to the German Navy.

18.Q. Shipment of contingents of troops.

A. Reports from America never arrived punctually & for the most part were only received after contingents had landed at their journeys end. Channels:-From E. Mediterranean via Turkey or else via Italy or GIBALTAR (Spain); from England via Sweden, Norway, Spain & Portugal & sometimes Switzerland.

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D. INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM RUSSIA.

For the main work against Russia three areas were defined namely :- The Arctic Ocean and White Sea, The Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea. The missions and questions related to these areas.

1.Q. Composition & disposition of the Russian Arctic fleet.

A. Very accurate and quick reports were received both from German air reconnaissance over Murmansk and the Murmansk coastal waters and round the Fisherman's Peninsula, and through the GSS from ARCHANGEL. Channels & timelag unknown but much information received via ? Finland.

2.Q. Capacity to effect repairs, especially in Murmansk and Archangel.

A. See 1.A. above.

3.Q. Protection of Fishermans Peninsula, the Murmansk coast & the entrance to the White Sea.

A. In addition to replies as in 1.A. above reports received from reconnaissance by units of Gen. DIETL's army.

4.Q. Meetings of convoys from the West and their destinations.

A. In judging these matters the German Navy relied exclusively on observations of earlier convoys as reports from the GSS were rare and always too late. They were only of use as confirmation, German air reconnaissance being better & quicker.

5.Q. Traffic through the N.E. Passage. (See note at end)

A. Only 1 or 2 reports can be recalled: channels & timelag forgotten. The German Navy however also had available observations made by U-Boats which operated in areas to the E. of the N. entrance to the White Sea in the short ice-free period.

6.Q. Movement and transport of naval units from the Baltic (LENINGRAD) to the Arctic area.

A. Movements through the Canal were observed and were confirmed when the units appeared in the Arctic area. Channels:- From reconnaissance units on N. sector of E. Front and via Finland. Timelag short (a few days) .

7.Q. Natures of cargoes transported in English convoys from the West.

A. Some information received from U-Boat commanders when ships were sunk; other reports were received from observation of unloading in ARCHANGEL and were evaluated by Amt VI-Wi/T.

8.Q. Repair capacity of docks in Russian harbours in the Gulf of Finland.

A. Reports received from visual and air observations at the Front and later through FAK's and agents via Finland. Information finally dried up completely.

9.Q. Details of possible imminent Russian naval activity in Finnish Gulf, the direction of attack in the Finnish or German coastal zones.

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A. See 8.A. above. After the German retreat, the break with Finland and the closing of German offices in Finland, no further information was forthcoming. Information was received as a result of naval engagements in the Baltic and from German coastal locators. The intention to acquire more information in the Gulf of Finland was still-born.

10.Q. Effects of German mine-fields in the Finnish Gulf & Russian losses from (a) these minefields, (b) coastal & army artillery.

A. Information from agents in Leningrad and district completed and confirmed earlier visual observations: reports also received via Finland.

11.Q. Strength & preparedness, both navigational & operational, of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and its dispositions,

A. No reports received during the period July 44-Feb 45.

12.Q. Russian intentions with regard to the Dardanells.

A. This question was especially watched by political channels. No results known.

13.Q. The attitudes of England & Turkey to this question. (12Q.)

A. Information on these matters was obtained from deciphered WT intercepts. No reports were received through the military section of the GSS as there were no communications with Turkey after they had joined the Allies.

14.Q. Examination of political events in connection with a possible Russian penetration into the Aegean and from there into the Mediterranean and the attitudes of the Western Allies and Turkey in this respect.

A. Attempts to answer these questions were made by the political branch of Amt VI. SCHELLENBERG expected a serious clash between Russia and the Western Allies over the Mediterranean question; both in Oct. 44 & Jan./Feb 45 he thought that the war, as a result of this clash, would take a decisive turn in Germany's favour. Other officers of Mil Amt disagreed with this view held by SCHELLENBERG and the heads of Amt VI but their sources of information were unknown.


15.Q. Capacity for new construction in Russian docks, the completion of Russian Fleet units from the resources of the Western Allies.

A. Some older reports from ARCHANGEL and from the Black Sea about construction capacity were available many month ago, whilst there were no reports from LENINGRAD and the accuracy and value of the former are unknown.


Not:- Re. 5.Q. above: A German auxiliary cruiser apparently sailed through this channel under comd of an Adm EISSNER in the summer of 1941 or 1942.

APPENDIX VII.
NAVAL ORGANISATION

A. The Fleet



B. The O.K.M.



LEGEND TO APPENDIX VIIA. The Fleet.

- Notes:-
1. Only one Kampfgruppe existed throughout the war in N. Norway with the Scharnhorst.
 2. A second Kampfgruppe was formed with the 'Prince Eugen' as flagship in the Baltic in early 1945.
 3. Training Group comprised all ships ex dockyards & refit yards or ships with partly new crews undergoing training or naval exercises.
 4. Comprised before D-Day 4 Destroyer Flotillas & 4 Torpedo-boat flotillas, with the following types of craft:-

4th Dest. Flot.	-	Type	36B	bearing only a number as identity.
5th "	"	"	34	" " name " "
6th "	"	"	34 & one 36	" " "except for the 36"
8th "	"	"	36A	" " number " "
2nd Torp. B. Flot	-	"	35 (Elbing)	
3rd "	"	"	35	"
4th "	"	"	39	"
5th "	"	"	"	Old Wolf-Moeve class.

5. B.d.S. West ceased to exist when France was overrun by the Allies.

B. The O.K.M.

Notes:-

- SKL = See-Kriegs-Leitung.
- MPA = Marine-Personal-Amt.
- Tra = Truppen-Amt.
- MOK = Marine-Ober-Kommando
- KdU = Kdo der U-Boote.
- KdK = Kdo des Kleinkampfmittels.

APPENDIX VIII.SENIOR NAVAL PERSONNEL .

BALTZER	V. Adm.	Head of M.P.A. until surrender.
BEY, Erich	K. Adm.	Killed on the "Scharnhorst". Former F.d.Z.
BONTE	Cmdore.	Former F.d.Z. Killed on the "Wilhelm Heidkamp" at Narvik.
BREUNING	K. Adm.	B.d.S. West until its dissolution
CILIAX	Adm.	Former head of M.O.K. Norway
DAVIDSON	Kapt z S.	Former Chief of Staff of OKM.
ERDMENGER	" "	Former Comdr of 8th Dest. Fl. : killed in Dec 43
FOERSTE	Adm.	Head of M.O.K. North.
GERLACH	Kapt z S.	Former Comdr of 8 Dest Fl. then Chief of Staff to O.K.M.
GODT	K. Adm.	Head of 2. SKL .
HENNE	K. Kapt.	Former Comdr. of 3rd Torp. Bt. Fl. Killed.
HEY E	Adm.	Head of K.d.K. (A.d.k.) .
HOEPNER	K. Kapt.	Last Comdr of 4th Torp. Bt. Flotilla.
HOFFMANN	K. Kapt.	Former Comdr of 5th Torp. Bt. Flotilla
JOHANNESSEN	Kapt z S.	Former Comdr of 4th Dest. Flotilla.
HANSEN-NOOTBAHR	Kapt z S.	Last Comdr of 3rd Torp. Bt. Flotilla.
KOHLAUF	K. Kapt.	Former Comdr of 4th Torp. Bt. Flotilla.
KOPPENHAGEN	" "	" " " " " " " "since killed.
KOTHE	Kapt. z. S	Former Comdr. of 6th. Dest. Flotilla.
KRANKE	Adm.	Formerly head of MOK West & then of MOK Norway.
KREISCH, Leo	V. Adm.	Adm. Destroyers (F.d.Z.) until surrender.
KUMMETZ	Gen. Adm.	Head of MOK Ost.
LANGHELD	Kapt. z. S.	Last Comdr of 5th Dost. Flotilla.
LUCHT	K. Adm.	B.d.S. North until surrender.
LUETJENS	Adm.	Earlier F.d.Z. Killed on the "Bismarck".
M. RSCHALL	Gen. Adm.	Head of MOK West until surrender.
MEISEL	Adm.	Head of S.K.L. until surrender.
MELLIN	K. Kapt.	Member of OKM/MPA - last seen in FLENSBURG.
MEYER	K. Adm.	Head of 1. S.K.L. Last seen in FLENSBURG.

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MAX-FEKKHARDT, Wolff, Kapt. z.S. Member of OKM-MPA. Last seen in FLENSBURG.

MARKS Kapt. z.S. Former Chief of Staff to C-in-S Fleet.

OEHRN Freg. Kapt. Member of 1. SKL- ops section.

PAHL Kapt. z.S. Chief of Staff of the 'F.d. Minsch'.

PAUL K. Kapt. Last Comdr of 2nd Torp. Bt. Flotilla.

PETERS Kapt. z.S. Last Comdr. of 6th Dest. Flotilla.

PETERSEN Comdre. F.d.S. until surrender.

DOENITZ Kapt. z.S. Former Comdr of 8th Dest. Flotilla.

PRAUSE Kapt. z.S. Head of 3. SKL 2nd Echelon.

Von PUTTKAMER K. Adm. Attached to Fuehrer's HQ.

ROTHER-ROTH K. Adm. Chief of Staff to C-in-C Fleet.

SALTZWEDEL Kapt. z.S. Chief of Staff to F.d.Z. until surrender.

SCHEMMELE Kapt. z.S. Former Comdr of 5th Dest. Flotilla.

SCHMIDT, Moritz, K. Kapt. Former Comdr of 5th Torp. Bt. Flotilla.

SCHULTZE-HINRICHS, Kapt. z.S. Former Comdr of 6th Dest. Flotilla.

SCHUMANN Kapt. z.S. Member of Truppenamt (OKM).

THIELE V. Adm. Comdr of Kampfgruppe.

VERLOHR K. Kapt. Former Comdr. of 2nd Torp. Bt. Flotilla.

VISS V. Adm. Attached to Fuehrer's HQ.

WAGNER K. Adm. Adm. z.b.V. & DOENITZ' personal deputy & aide.

WAGENHEIM Kapt. z.S. Last Comdr. of 4th Dest. Flotilla.
Freiherr von

WEGENER Kapt. z.S. On staff of C-in-C Fleet.

ZENKER Freg. Kapt. Member of 1. SKL (mines) Last seen in FLENSBURG.