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US FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 655

INTERMEDIATE INTERROGATION REPORT (IIR) NO 3

PRISONER: SS Standf SANDBERGER, Martin

DATE: 8 July 1945

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1. REFERENCES

PIR dated 23 June 1945, issued by Interrogation Center, 12th Army Group.

2. REASON FOR REPORT

The interrogation of SANDBERGER has temporarily been suspended pending arrival of documents and previous interrogation reports. This report contains information of immediate interest.

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3. REPORT

a. Introduction

O/Reg Rat SANDBERGER, Martin, was head of Amt VI-A in the RSHA. He was selected by KALTENBRUNNER to help with the reorganization of the GIS for operation in territory occupied by the Allies.

b. Plans for a German Secret Intelligence Service in Occupied Germany

Early in 1945 HITLER asked HIMMLER whether an occurrence in US occupied German territory, which had been reported by the Allied radio, actually happened. HIMMLER in turn asked OHLENDORF, the head of Amt III, who did not know. As a result of such failure a conference was held by SANDBERGER, Standf SPENGLER, Chief of III-C, and O/Stubaf KIELPINSKY, Referent in III-C, to discuss plans for a secret intelligence service which would operate in territory occupied by Allied troops.

Amt III was to establish the intelligence service, using former SD employees and persons without previous GIS connection. Amt VI was to supply the W/T sets. The plan fell through when it was discovered that Amt VI could not spare the sets and that Amt III had no trained W/T operators. The only result of the meetings was an agreement between Amt III and Amt VI to divide their spheres of work in Allied-occupied territory. Amt III was to work in Germany proper and Amt VI in foreign countries occupied by the Allies. Alsace-Lorraine was made an exception; both Amt III and Amt VI were to work there. In Alsace-Lorraine Amt VI continued its activities through Leitstelle SIEGFRIED, under Stuf BICKLER.

SANDBERGER states that no plans were formulated by Amt VI to organize an intelligence service within German territory and that the plans made by Amt III were never carried out.

c. Reorganization of Amt VI

During March 1945 SCHELLENBERG formed a plan to cut the organization of Amt VI to about 30% of its original size. At the same time informal discussions were held between SCHELLENBERG and his Gruppen Leiter: SANDBERGER, STEINLE, PAEFFGEN, RAPP, and BOENING regarding measures to maintain a secret intelligence service when only islands of military resistance would remain in Germany.

According to SANDBERGER these plans dealt only with preserving a secret intelligence service to report on foreign countries. Communications from abroad were to be transmitted by W/T and receiving and transmitting stations were to be established in the future redoubt areas.

The organization of communications between the North and South redoubt was also discussed. A North-South courier-relay line was suggested, with courier-relay stations located 30 to 40 km apart in apartments and business offices of persons having no previous connections with the GIS and the NSDAP. No definite steps were taken to do this. The various Gruppen Leiter were told to work out their own plans and preparations.

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The only part of the plan carried out, according to SANDBERGER, was the payment of Reichs Mark and foreign currency to himself, RAPP, STEIMLE, and PAEFFGEN for use in future operations. Part of the funds was later cached near REIT in Winkel/Austria. SANDBERGER says that the money was found by DAF workers and turned over to US authorities. He has given detailed information to the CIC at SALZBURG.

Discussion of the plans was based on the assumption that there would be enough time to make complete preparations. None of the plans was carried out, but a last-minute streamlining of Amt VI was attempted toward the end of April 45 by KALTENBRUNNER with the aid of WANECK. SCHELLENBERG was no longer available. SANDBERGER had left BERLIN in mid-April on SCHELLENBERG's order to evacuate to the South some elements of Amt VI which were temporarily in Thuringia.

While engaged in this mission, he was summoned to a conference with WANECK and SKORZENY. On 27 Apr 45 WANECK showed SANDBERGER a signed directive from KALTENBRUNNER to the effect that KALTENBRUNNER was personally taking over the reorganization of the secret intelligence service. WANECK was appointed head of Gruppe B, C, D, E, G, and of Mil B, C, and F; SKORZENY was appointed head of Gruppe F, S, and Mil D, E, and G. Departments A, W, T, and Mil A were dissolved.

WANECK explained to SANDBERGER in SKORZENY's presence why the reorganization was necessary and ordered SANDBERGER to attend a conference in ALT AUSSEE on 30 Apr 45, which STEIMLE and PAEFFGEN also attended. At this conference WANECK said that although Germany had been split in two, resistance was to continue to the last in accordance with the Fuehrer's orders. Local military and civilian commanders were to take steps necessary according to their own judgment. Through the power of attorney given him by HIMMLER, KALTENBRUNNER had become civilian commander-in-chief of the Alpine redoubt area.

To meet KALTENBRUNNER's need for a small but compact secret intelligence service, Amt VI was dissolved and replaced by two Gruppen headed by WANECK and SKORZENY. SANDBERGER remembers that someone referred to SKORZENY's Gruppe as the "Geheimer Zerstoeungs Dienst (Secret Sabotage Service)".

WANECK ordered SANDBERGER to discharge and send home most of the personnel of Amt VI. STEIMLE, PAEFFGEN, MEISSNER, and SCHUBACH, the deputy of RAPP who was somewhere in the North, were to report to WANECK; LASSIG, KRUEGER, SIMON, and Maj PORETTGEKIN were to report to SKORZENY.

Dept VI Mil F was ordered to be taken over by the army, and Obst BUNTROCK, its chief, was told to report to Gen WINTER. SCHULLER stayed as finance officer with WANECK and SKORZENY.

The consensus of opinion was that a secret intelligence service could not be built up at such a late stage of the war. SANDBERGER learned by phone from SPENGLER in MUENCHEN that Amt III had not made any preparations.

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SANDBERGER, PAEFFGEN, and STEIMLE were surprised and shocked by WANECK's assumption of complete control and considered it a blow to themselves and to SCHELLENBERG. However, he carried out WANECK's orders during the first days of May. He does not know whether anyone was able to report to either WANECK or SKORZENY. HITLER's death and the military situation prevented the plans from being carried out further.

The following persons were retained in an active capacity:

KRUEGER	Stubaf	VI-F
LASSIG	Stubaf	VI F
MEISSNER		VI Mil C
PAEFFGEN	O/Stubaf	VI-D
POLETTCHKIN	Maj	CO, Nachrichten Regt 506; deputy chief VI Mil
SCHUBACK	Stubaf	Deputy to O/Stubaf RAPP VI-C
SCHULER	H/Stuf	VI Mil A/2
SIMON	U/Stuf	VI-F and VI-H
STEIMLE	Stuf	VI-B and VI Mil B

d. Surrender Policy

The question uppermost in the minds of members of Amt VI during the months immediately preceding the final defeat of Germany was whether to surrender to the Western Allies or to Russia. By surrendering to one of the two it might be possible to negotiate alliance against the other. SANDBERGER describes SCHELLENBERG as a politician rather than a dogmatic National Socialist, and as being favorably disposed towards the Allies.

The possibility of placing the German secret intelligence service, including Amt VI, at the disposal of the Allies was discussed privately by SANDBERGER, STEIMLE, and PAEFFGEN. It was thought that Amt VI might be absorbed by the American IS. Toward the end of April 1945, in Austria, the three considered surrendering to the US troops and offering them their services. STEIMLE and PAEFFGEN favored the idea but were afraid of being turned over to the Russians, because both had been employed in German-occupied Russian territory.

4. CONCLUSIONS: None.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SANDBERGER appears to be more intelligent and better educated than the other Amt VI figures who have passed through USFET Interrogation Center. It is proposed that SANDBERGER and WANECK give a complete account of each other's moves during the last months to throw some further light on the hopes, plans and fears accompanied the last minute reorganization of Amt VI.

The recipients of this report are requested to submit special briefs of any subjects upon which this prisoner should be interrogated and to indicate the desired distribution of the resultant report.

For Colonel PHILP:

Harry K. Lennon
HARRY K. LENNON
Captain, Inf
B & E Section

DISTRIBUTION: "B"

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A N N E X

Relocation of Amt VI

PRISONER: SS Standf SANDBERGER, Martin

DATE: 8 July 1945

The following is a list of places to which departments of Amt VI/RSMA have been evacuated and persons whom SANDBERGER saw or heard were there during the period April - May 45:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DEPT OR ORGN</u>	<u>LAST LOCATION</u>
SCHMIDT	Hptn	Regt KURFUEERST	FRITZENS nr INNSBRUCK
Elements of		Regt KURFUEERST	Hotel Fritzener Hof (15 km ENE of INNSBRUCK)
PFENNIG	Hptn	Mil Amt-A/5	
STECKHAN	H/Stuf	Ant VI-F	Truppen Uebungs Platz
Dr OGILVIE	Stubaf	Ant VI-Wi/T	WATTENER LIZUM
BELLING	O/Stuf	Ant VI-C	(20 km SE of INNSBRUCK)
WOITHE	Hptn	Mil Amt-A/1N	
DAEHNE	Obst	Ant VI-Wi/T	WATTENER LIZUM or RUM
PINT	O/Stuf	Ant VI-Wi/T	(5 km ENE of INNSBRUCK)
RIEDL	U/Stuf	Ant VI-Wi/T	RUM (Truppen Uebungs Platz)
Elements of		Ant VI-A, B, C, D, F, Wi/T	WATTENER LIZUM
Elements of		Mil Amt-B	
Elements of		Mil Amt-C	SEEBRUCK/Chien See
Elements of		Mil Amt-E	
OESTERLE	O/Lt	Nachr Regt 506	OBING/Chien See
Radio Station			
RAHN	Maj	Amt VI-A/1KFZ	VOLDERS (12 km E of INNSBRUCK)
SCHAEFFNER	H/Stuf	Ant VI-F/H	EICKART nr RUM
Radio Station		Ant VI-F/H	
PERSON	Maj	Mil Amt-A/3	
WACKS	Hptn	Mil Amt-A/3	Hotels in INNSBRUCK
MENGE	O/Stuf	Ant VI-Wi/T	
FREUND	Obst/Lt	Ant VI-Z	Hotel in BREGENZ

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DEPT OR ORGN</u>	<u>LAST LOCATION</u>
Elements of		KdM STUTTGART (Code Name: Rue- stungs Kommando V, Aussen Stelle BREGENZ)	BREGENZ (Roemerstr nr Weisses Kreuz Hotel)
Elements of		KdM STUTTGART	HOHENEMS (10 km S of BREGENZ)
Elements of		KdM STUTTGART	St ANTON am Arlberg 55 km SE of BREGENZ)
Elements of		KdM WIEN	St ULRICH nr BRIEN
SCHUBACK	Stubef	Amt VI-C	
MEISSNER	Maj	Mil Amt-C	ZELL am See
SIMON	U/Stuf	Amt VI-F/H	(60 km SW of SALZBURG)
Elements of		Amt VI-B	ENAG Heim in ROTTACH-
Elements of		Mil Amt-B	EGERN/Tegern See
Elements of		Mil Amt-D	WINKELMOOSALM nr REIT im Winkel (36 km W of SALZBURG)
Front Aufklaerungs Leit Stelle II Ost or possibly Sued Ost			PERTISAU nr Achen See (35 km NE of INNSBRUCK)
RR train of		Amt VI-S	Markt PONGAU (nr St JO- HANN, 60 km S of SALZ- BURG)