SECRET # 500

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 3114.8

NAZI PLANS FOR DOMINATING GERMANY AND EUROPE

AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES AGAINST FOREIGN LABOR

Approved by the Prosecution Review Board - Draft for Use of the War Crimes Staff

3 August 1945

Copy No. 2

SECRET

SECRET

Table of Contents

	The state of the s	ag
I.	Policies Behind the Crimes	1
	A. Long Term Policies	1
	B. War Policies on Foreign Labor	15
II:	The Types of Crimes Involved	12
III.	The Responsible German Agencies and Institutions	17
4	A. Introductory Remarks	17
10		21
	1. The Ministerial Council for the Defense	
	of the Reich	21
	2. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan	22
	3. The Reich Ministry of Labor	23
	4. The Commissioner General for Labor	
	Allocation	24
	5. The Reich Commissioner for the Total	
	War Effort	28
	6. The Speer Ministry	29
	7. The Reich Ministry of the Interior	29
	8. Other Ministries of the Reich	32
	9. Central Military Authorities	36
	10. Organization Todt, etc	36
	11. The German Labor Front	39
		44
	C. German Agencies in Various Occupied Territories A	47
	1. France	47
	2. Belgium	55
		51
	4. Protectorate of Bohenia-Moravia	57
		74
7.	6. Occupied Russian Territories	77
IA.	The Available Evidence	31
Appo	endices	
		errari.
		90
	B. List of Sentences Imposed upon Foreign Labor 9	1
	C. Potential Sources of Information in Territories	
	Formerly Occupied 9	15

Crimes Committed Against Foreign Labor

I. The Policies Behind the Crimes

A. The Long-Term Policies

By her military victories during the first years of the war, Nazi-Germany acquired mastery over millions of non-German workers in all parts of Europe. The crimes it committed against these millions, and against other millions of men, women, and children later recruited for the German war economy were not isolated incidents. They served to implement general criminal policies aiming at the ruthless exploitation of foreign populations, their political subjection, and in a large measure also their physical extermination.

These rolicies spring directly from the long-term plans that Hitler and his accomplices had for the future of Europe. An important element in these plans was the depopulation of large portions of the continent. As Hitler himself stated:

"We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation. I mean the removal of entire racial units. ... Nature is cruel; therefore we too may be cruel. If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the spilling of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin. 2"

- 1. For a statistical estimate of foreign workers employed in the Reich in 1944 see "Foreign Labor in Germany", R&A No. 1623.
- 2. Hermann Rauschning, "Hitler Speaks", p. 140; to be verified by interrogation of Rauschning.

Hitler goes on to explain that "remove" does not necessarily mean "destroy"; that a "comparatively bloodless" way to the same goal is "to keep their men and women separated for years".

The influence that this plan had upon German policies in relation to foreign labor is evident. It explains why the Germans for years treated Polish and Russian workers, and, of course, Jews and Gypsies with extreme brutality, though it would have been to the Germans immediate advantage to have treated cerefully every worker from abroad. It explains also why they so frequently removed laborers from their homelands instead of using them with much better economic results at their regular jobs and in their accustomed surroundings.

The German plans for the future economic structure of Europe had a similar slant. These plans provided for the concentration of all higher types of industry within the Greater Reich. "Germany will become Europe's tool forge".

A leading German economic writer assigned to the east and southeast of Europe, in addition to their main function as agricultural producers, only the manufacture of cheap consumer goods and simple industrial products, based upon a permanent low wage stendard. The west and north of Europe also would also be reduced in their industrial activities.

The Reich, on the other hand, would, according to the German plans, continue to need and to use the uprooted labor of Europe. As Dr. Stothfang, then of the Reich Ministry of Labor,

Völkischer Beobachter, 20 August 1940
 Dr. Kastenholz in Berliner Borsenzeitung, 17 December 1940
 Münchener Neusste Nachrichten, 22 September 1940

SECRET

SECRET later with the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation, stated in 1940;

"After the victorious conclusion of this war a further increase /In the import of labor, will occur as a continuous shortage of German workers is to be expected."

Or, as Dr. Galland, also of the Ministry of Labor, wrote in the official periodical of this agency:

"In future, the employment of foreigners, not only in agriculture, but also in industry, will acquire an importance hitherto unknown." 2.

The Germans considered their wartime policies on foreign labor not only as temporary measures of emergency character, but also as a testing ground and pattern for the post-war period. This is, without doubt, one of the reasons why with such consistency they insisted upon the segregation of German from foreign labor and upon the inferior status of the foreign worker. As the Frankfurter Zeitung put it:

"For the mass of foreign workers there will always be the principle that they are only assistants for the German stock of workers". 4.

Or, as stated in the Schwarze Korps, organ of the SS:

"After the war, when we shall have to use foreign labor to an even greater extent than we have hitherto, it is obvious that in more responsible and difficult, but also better paid, technical and skilled work, preference ought to be given to the German workers. Let the foreigners be used for unskilled work. It is quite wrong that there should be foreigners doing skilled work and Germans merely carting bricks or breaking stones. Where one needs a foreigner, it is more fitting on racial grounds that he should in all circumstances serve the German even if the latter has to be retrained." 5.

Deutsches "Nachrichtenburo, 20 August 1940;"
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 April 1941
This attitude changed to a certain degree during the last phase of the war, but only for reasons of expediency.
Frankfurter Zeitung, 10 October 1940
Das Schwarze Korps, 21 November 1940

The economic advantages of this approach were pointed out by the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Funk, when he said:

"After the victorious conclusion of the war, the problem of war indebtedness could be solved in a relatively short time, since we can count on cheap labor and raw materials for the German economic system on a large scale. The price of the goods manufactured in this way will be considerably lower than the general German price level. The difference thus resulting will serve to redeem our war debts and thus also to conserve the value of our currency. In this way the high standard of living of the German people will be ensured." 1.

The right to these higher standards was proclaimed by Dr. Ley, the head of the German Labor Front, in very simple terms:

"The higher a nation stands racially the greater must be its requirements. The German needs more housing space and a better standard of life than the Poles and the Jews. If it should be asked by what right, the answer is, by right of self assertion." 2.

In the latter phase of the war, when the military outlook for Germany darkened, the same leading Nazis tried to veil the real German objectives behind socialistic slogans. Fritz Sanchel, the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation asserted that Germany wanted "the new Eurore to be built upon the basis of a national-minded socialism which was the dream of every worker of the continent." 3 Dr. Ley wrote in a Christmas message to all foreign workers:

"I trust that in the coming year you will collaborate with us voluntarily as before in our common cause; for a Europe free from interference and tyranny from anticontinental Powers, a Europe which can fulfill the inner desires of our time in a peaceful competition of peoples and a free development of their national life; that is, the realization of true socialism." 4

^{1.} Speech at Klagenfurt, quoted by <u>Deutsches Nachrichten</u>
<u>Buro</u>, ?5 October, 1942.

2. Speech quoted in <u>Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</u>, 10 November 1940
3. Speech quoted in <u>Velkischer Beobachter</u>, 12 June 1943
4. German-European Service (in Dutch), 17 December 1944

One of his subordinates in the Labor Front stated that Germany "will make all its social achievements the common property of all European countries". And Minister Dr. Funk claimed that the Germans, by their labor policies in the occupied territories, had abolished the class struggle, established social justice, and assured willingness to work and opportunities for work -all this with the main objective of enhancing "the economic strength of the occupied countries and of using this strength in the service of a European economic policy."

B. War Policies on Foreign Labor

Official statements defined the immediate German aims with greater frankness, particularly after the German outlook upon the war had darkened with the disaster of Stalingrad. tone was set for these statements by Hitler's proclamation of 26 February 1943 and by a speech of Goebbels on 19 February of the same year. Hitler's announcement went:

"We shall consider it a matter of course not to husband foreign lives at a time which is enacting such hard sacrifice from our own life. Joined insolubly and loyally to our allies we shall carry out a mobilization of spiritual and material values of Europe such as our continent has not hither to experienced in its several thousand years' history." 3

Goebbel's stated:

"We are now about to tap the rich war potential, not only of our own country but also of the important countries of Europe, which are at our disposal. We are not to do this haphazardly and superficially. It must all be executed as quickly and as thoroughly as it is possible to conceive. Any further consideration would be entirely out of place here. Europe's future depends upon our battle in the East. We are ready to

Max Tiedbohl in pas Angriff, 12 March 1944 <u>Volkischer Beobachter</u>, 14 January 1945 FCC Surplement, 26 February 1943

"protect Europe. The German people offer their precious national blood in this battle. The rest of Europe should make available at least its labor." l

Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, who, with his appointment in the spring of 1942 as Commissioner General for Labor Allocation² became the main figure in the German manpower drive, proclaimed in the same vein that "Germany's great sacrifices gave her the right to mobilize the labor potential of Europe".3 His closest collaborator, Ministerial Counselor Walter Stothfang, repeated this claim again and again. He told a Dutch (collaborationist) interviewer that:

"Germany finds herself in an emergency situation and is therefore justified in mobilizing the necessary manpower in occupied countries, regardless of the regulations of international law". 4

In a German newspaper, Stothfang wrote:

"As champion and leader in this war, Germany has not only the moral right but has indeed the moral duty of ensuring that all European labor reserves are mobilized.... It is impossible to do too much in this matter Compared with Germany's own very heavy sacrifices in blood, the sacrifices in-labor that the European nations have had to accept are comparatively small. They must therefore be made all the more readily and rapidly... Germany must demand the employment of foreigners in Germany; the demand is not unfair in view of the blood sacrificed by German soldiers." 5

In an evidently inspired comment to Stothfang's statements and to the measures of conscription and deportation that were applied in Holland the "Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" wrote:

FCC Supplement, 19 February 1943
See below. III B4
Speech quoted in Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden.

²¹ January 1943.

Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 8 February 1943

Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, 22 February 1944

"It is a fruitless task to test war measures by international law, for it is agreed that in wartime necessity always settles the matter. When the necessity arises, there are few regulations in international law which do not leave room for interpretations, not originally intended by which people can adapt these regulations to new circumstances."

Sauckel himself in the speech in Amsterdam mentioned above proclaimed "the conqueror's right to use all the power he Sauckel's public statements needs for his own preservation." are surplemented by appeals and instructions that he directed to administrative branches subordinated to him, notably to the Labor Allocation Administration (Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung), the main governmental machinery for labor mobilization and exploita-In a statement of his program he said that his administration "has entirely cast off any liberalistic-capitalistic reminiscences and is fanatically consecrated to the philosophy of the Führer.... We shall fulfill the glorious task which the Führer has set us as fanatical National Socialists."3 He added:

"The German worker is being treated in a hard, honorable and strict manner. It goes without saying that these principles are also applied to workers of foreign nationality." 4

A short time later, he declared:

"The political, moral, and economic principles of the German system of labor administration are dictated by the laws of war, by German justice, and by National-Socialist conscience". 5

In reviewing the first period of his leadership, Sauckel stated:

"The labor allocation services at my disposal have fulfilled their functions under the most trying circumstances But there must be no slowing up.... The Führer has ordered that the demand for manpower, both in Germany and in the occupied territories, must be met in all circumstances. This command will be

SECRET

Quoted in Friesche Courant, 13 March 1944 See below TII B 4 Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Oct/Nov. 1942, p. 148 Ibid., p. 45 Ibid., Jan. 1943, p. 9

fulfilled in the future as it was in the rast, in srite of all resistance and difficulties. There is no word as 'imrossible' for the Labor Administration". 1

In his New Year message for 1944, Sauckel insisted "on even more speed and efficiency than in the past, in spite of all difficul-"ties". In a meeting with the regional administrators in May 1944, called for "calmness and harshness" in the "distribution, direction, and guardianship of Europe's "manpower 3 And in an address · to his front-line officials, the representative of the German recruitment services in the East, he admonished them:

"to be guided by the maxim of loyalty and love for the Fuhrer and the people which justify even harsh recruiting measures for the greater good of our people". 4

The "harsh" character of these recruitment measures has been amply illustrated by various notes of the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, particularly his notes of 27 April 1942 and 11 May 1943. The second note quotes instructions by Sauckel as evidence that these crimes reflected the general rolicy of the Nazi regime and that this policy was bent upon two objectives: the physical destruction of great portions of the Russian civilian population, or their use for compulsory labor within or without their homelands, under conditions of serfdom.

The notes of Mr. Molotov also contain evidence that Sauckel's policies of enslavement conform with directives formulated earlier already by Reichsmarshal Herman Goering. The note of 11 May 1943 refers to a secret conference held in Berlin 7 November 1941 b at which Geering presumably in his capacity

Reichsæbbeitsblatt 1942, p.1-475. 2. Ibid. 944, p. 113

Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, 22 February 1944. 4. Völkischer

Beobachter, 8 Jan. 1943 5. Soviet War Doeuments, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D.C., December 1943

These instructions of Goering are mentioned also by German official sources; see Order of the Minister of Labor of 8 April 1942, cuoted in "Der Auslandische Arbeiter", p. 943, and the article by "Ministerialdirigent Dr. Rachner in Reichsarbeitsblatt 1942, p. 130."

as Delegate for the Four Year Plan 1 instructed the German officials in the east to utilize Russian civilians as forced labor for the German war effort. Characteristic statements of Goering were:

"Russian workers have proved their ability in building a colossal Russian industry. Now they are able to be used for Germany This is a task for the appropriate authorities and the secret police."

"The Russian must be used primarily on the following jobs: mining, road construction, munitions industry (tanks, guns, aircraft equipment), agriculture, building work, large workshops (footwear shops), and for special squads in unforeseen emergency tasks."

"Use of the civilian workers and their treatment should not differ in any respect from the use of war prisoners and their treatment."

"When applying measures for the maintenance of order, the decisive consideration should be swiftness and severity. Only the following varieties of punishment should be applied without intermediate grades: deprivation of food and the death penalty by decision of court martial."

In the treatment of Russian civilian workers, the German labor policy reached its extreme degree of depravity. But even the more privileged ropulations were treated again and again with utmost brutality, and not because of the overzealousness of local administrative agents, but in accordance with general policies and instructions. A characteristic document is the secret "Instructions for the Allocation Staffs (Einsatzstabe) in France" issued by General Commissioner Sauckel on 31 August 1943 for the! so-called Fourth Program for France. Under this program additional French workers were to be mobilized "immediately" (in kurzester Frist), 100,000 for the armament industry in Germany and 200,000 for French plants working for the German war effort. These workers were to be mobilized partly by voluntary recruitment, partly by

^{1.} See below III B 2
2. OSS Documents.... surplied by the Free Germany Committee West
in Paris.

"combing out plants, industries, and whole groups of the population, particularly by the conscription of unemployed part-time employed, and French women". The mobilization was to be carried out by the French authorities under the direction of the German allocation officials. Whenever the French authorities were found to be wanting, the allocation officials were instructed to report their neglect immediately to the German field commands. These military authorities in turn were to "take the strongest measures to enforce the mobilization". The final paragraph of the Instructions stated:

"Only when from the beginning every resistance from French agencies or individuals is met with the greatest severity will the task be fulfilled. ... All means must be used by the German officials to enforce their demands."

The policy of ruthless exploitation that Sauckel and his Labor Allocation Administration followed in their dealings with foreign labor animated all the other agencies of government and party functioning in the same field. To give one final example, a statement may be cuoted originating with a high official of Robert Ley's Labor Front, the Party institution with the broadest responsibilities for the treatment of foreign labor. In the final phase of the war when official statements on foreign labor adopted mostly a conciliatory tone Gauobmann Bangert in Düsseldorf wrote in an article:

"Special attention must be paid to the complete exploitation of the arm and leg muscles of foreign workers... Everyone who employs, instructs, or looks after foreign workers must always remember that their presence in Germany can only make itself felt if they use every hour for full efforts for the food surply, armament production, or transport.... In order to turn the prescribed working hours of prisoners of war, Poles, and Eastern workers into hours actually worked it is necessary to introduce the rrinciple of supplying them with food according to the output (Leistungsessen)." 2

See below.III B 11
 Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, 26 August 1944

Bangert then proposes that some supplementary food be given to foreign workers whose output exceeds the output of German workers, but to take these surplements from foreign workers who "are not willing to produce enough." To understand the full brutality of this suggestion one must remember how entirely inadequate the food rations of foreign workers were. 1

1. See below III B 8d

II. The Types of Crimes Involved

The innumerable crimes committed by Nazi Germany in carrying through the criminal policies described above may be summed up under the following major categories:

- Germany used the people of the occupied territories for every phase of her war effort, in fortification work as well as in the armament industry, and in every other war-connected economic activity. This utilization was in millions of cases based upon compulsion and violated therefore the recognized rules of warfare. In many cases the workers were compelled to work on projects hostile to the interests of their own countries. Where the workers resisted, the Germans tried to break down this resistance by severe punishments and by all forms of violence. In mobilizing and in utilizing foreign labor, the Germans acted with the greatest disregard for the interests and life plans of their victims. They tore them away from their homes, their families, and their jobs assigned them to work that in many cases had nothing to do with their regular occupations or their training and was detrimental to their health and even led them to their death. In the case of Poles, Russians, Jews and Gypsies, this mass murder was an avowed objective of the Nazi labor policy.
- C. For the majority of foreign labor employment meant enslavement. It was enslavement because these workers were:
 - (1) Recruited either by indirect pressures, like withdrawal of food rations or of public assistance; by threat; or by legal compulsion, like conscription and compulsory labor service; or by impressment of individuals or of whole groups (used notably by the Organization SECRET
- 1. The evidence available for proving each one of the types of crimes enumerated here is discussed in Section IV of this paper.

Tedt and similar paramilitary organizations); or by other acts of violence, like raids by police and soldiers on factories; on theaters, on whole city quarters;

- (2) Funted and arrested and severely punished if they tried to avoid the recruitment;
- (3) transported to places of work in Germany or other German-occupied territories in mass transports under police control, frequently in locked wagons, and otherwise restricted in their freedom while travelling;
- (4) distributed among employers without consideration for their own demands; women and children, notably those from the East, were disposed of in real slave markets;
- (5) either given no contracts of employment at all, or contracts they had to sign on the dotted line, and in the later phase of the war usually contracts without a time limit;²
- (6) detained in their jobs against their will and for an indefinite time; under German regulations a man wishing to quit his job needed the approval of the public employment office, which was not forthcoming; in any event, his employment contract could at any moment be replaced by legal conscription, and actually was; 3
- (7) subjected without reservation to the orders of the manager, the German foremen, the plant representatives of the German Labor Front, and the work-police; kept under a most severe discipline; exposed for every offense to

^{1.} See below III B 10
2. See the surprisingly sober statement by the Labor Front Official Franz Mende in Völkischer Beobachter, 21 August 1944
3. Ibid. SECRET

harsh renalties, including transfer into "education" or concentration camps; and strictly segregated from other workers;

- (8) housed in mass camps under strictest controls by camp-leaders and by police;
- (9) restricted in the use of their leisure time, frequently excluded from places of recreation, public means of transportation, and personal contacts with outsiders;
- (10) frequently cut off entirely from their home countries and from their families, notably in the latter period of the war when all home-leaves were suspended.
- D. Closely connected with this enslavement was economic exploitation through underpayment, excessive hours of work, work at night and on holidays, and the "speed up".
- E. In their personal life -- foreign workers, particularly those utilized in Greater Germany or in other territories remote from their home countries -- were subjected to every form of maltreatment, including being housed in unhealthy, overcrowded and badly equipped camps; being given insufficient and unhealthy food and inadequate clothing; and being deprived of medical and religious care and abused by hostile physicians.
- F. The workers were deprived of all means of presenting their grievances to the authorities and employers. Democratic forms of labor representation, like trade unions and shop councils, were surpressed. The Germans and their various quislings tried to impress foreign workers into totalitarian organizations shaped after the pattern of the German Labor Front. Such organizations cooperated with the German authorities in exploiting SECRET

SECRET

and enslaving foreign workers instead of protecting them against criminal actions.

The Nazis committed crimes against all national groups and in all occupied territories. There was, however, during the first phase of the war, substantial variation from territory to territory in the application and timing of specific measures, such as legal conscription or unconcealed deportation. There was substantial variation also in the treatment that different national groups received after their importation into Greater Germany. All these differences reflected:

- (1) the racial ideology of the Nazi regime, which gave each of the conquered nationalities its specific rank in the "hierarchy of blood," with the "Nordic" peoples on the top of the ladder and most of the Slavs at the bottom;
- (2) the plans that the conquerers had for using the various territories after the final victory;
- (3) a diversity of legal status given to the various occupied territories, ranging from unrestricted German authority in the former Russian provinces and the General Government of Poland to the toleration of native Quisling governments as in France, in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, and in Norway;
- (4) the types of labor involved, ranging from untrained farm hands, who in the beginning at least seemed to be abundant, to highly skilled metal workers or mechanics.

Racial ideas and plans for post-war Europe lost something of their importance when the military outlook began to darken for Germany and the German need for manpower reached its peak. The turning point was marked by the appointment of Gauleiter Sauckel

as General Commissioner for Labor Allocation in Spring 1942.

After that, and particularly after Sauckel's Order of 22 August 1942, the German policy concerning labor from the occupied territories narrowed increasingly to a single aim: the full mobilization and exploitation of manpower. This orientation led to greater uniformity of approach. Brutal measures that before had been applied only in the eastern territories were now used also in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. On the other hand, Russian workers in Germany were lifted, legally at least, from the inferior employment status imposed upon them during the earlier phase of the war.

1. See below III B 4

III. The Responsible German Agencies and Institutions

A. Introductory Remarks

Nazi crimes against foreign labor occurred in the homelands of the workers as well as within the Greater Reich and in territories under German domination. Men, women, and children were "mobilized" where they lived. They were transported to places of work remote from their regular residences and housed at these places or near to them under the conditions indicated above. The instances of enslavement and maltreatment were therefore scattered throughout all of Nazi-controlled Europe. This wide geographical dispersion of crimes against foreign labor distributes responsibility for them among a great number of German agencies and institutions, some of them located within the Reich, others within the various occupied territories.

Over-all planning and fundamental legislation were the functions of agencies located in the Reich itself. Some of these central agencies, like the Reich Ministry of Labor and later the General Commissioner for Labor Allocation, were represented by regional and local agencies in the Reich and the occupied countries and had in this way a direct responsibility for the methods by which their general directives were carried out. Others functioned only on the central level.

The German crimes, as previously catalogued, affected all aspects of personal and economic life; numerous agencies, consequently specializing in various fields were responsible. Primary responsibility for dealings with foreign labor was vested in a small number of authorities and organizations whose main province was labor matters. Most important among them was, as SECRET

far as the government was concerned, the

Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung (Administration of Labor Allocation), the German counterpart to a national employment service system, headed up to March 1942 by the Reich Ministry of Labor, and since then by the General Commissioner for Labor Allocation; las for the Party, its representative was the Labor Front.²

Since labor problems were, however, from the beginning of the warrecognized as essential to its victorious termination, they received the continuous attention not only of specialized agencies but of all authorities that were responsible in a general way for war and victory. They were particularly the concern of the Ministerial Council for Defense in which the top leaders of civilian and military administration joined, and of the Delegate for the Four Year's Plan, Hermann Goering.

The over-all policies which the German home agencies formulated in relation to foreign labor were carried out in every occupied territory by a set of German agencies and institutions, each one different from the others. The great variations in the character and organization of these territorial set-ups reflected differences in the general policies carried out by the German Government in these several territories.

In most occupied countries, after the first phase of military occupation had passed, problems of foreign labor were handled mainly by civilian agencies and institutions. Occupied France and Belgium were the outstanding examples of territories

^{1.} See below; III B 4
2. See below; III B 1
3. See below; III B 1
4. See below; III B 2

^{4.} See below, III B 2 5. For a detailed discussion of the variations see Franz Meumann, Behemoth, 2nd ed., pp. 5.53 ff.

SECRET

in which these problems remained in military hands practically for the entire time of occupation.

The German territorial authorities were not only responsible for administrative actions of criminal character. They also issued regulations and statutes, introducing, for instance, conscription for labor, extending work hours, or abolishing democratic labor unions. In all this, however, they obeyed directives they received from the central German authorities, and even in their administrative functions, they were controlled and frequently superseded by the territorial representatives of central agencies, notably by the organs of the Labor Allocation Administration in their areas.

The existence of native governments in some of the occupied territories, (Protectorate, France, Norway) of native administrations, at least, in some others, (Belgium, Holland) present a special issue. There was a general tendency on the part of the Germans to burden these native agencies as much as possible with responsibility for the execution of the German labor policies. Under the pressure, however, of a growing need for manpower, the German authorities deviated again and again from this line and appeared in the open as the instigators of compulsory labor mobilization and of deportation. The relation between the German agencies in France, on the one hand, and the Vichy government, on the other, offer striking instances of this development.²

The following survey of German agencies and institutions starts from the assumption that the indictment of territorial German authorities will be left to separate procedures, probably under the auspices of the various national governments. Never-

^{1.} See Sauckel's statement of 31 August 1943. quoted below in B4. See below. HII S 1

theless, some material is given in subsection C of this section concerning the structure and the criminal activities in the field of labor of the German territorial authorities in the six occupied territories from which the greatest numbers of enslaved workers have been token. This material might help in exploring the cuestion of how far the responsibilities of the central German agencies and institutions cover the execution of their over-all policies by territorial institutions.

Subsection B dealing with these central organizations should be of greater direct importance. The main responsibilities for crimes against foreign labor wherever committed rest with the Government and Party agencies discussed in this subsection. It is not intended to give in this paper a complete picture of their activities. Decrees and directives quoted below should be considered only as significant examples selected to indicate the area in which their peculiar responsibilities developed. The sources where the complete sets of such regulations can be found are indicated in Chapter IV of this paper, particularly in subsection A

B. Agencies and Institutions within the Reich.

Responsibility for crimes against foreign labor rests, as far as the Government is concerned, particularly with the following agencies:

l. The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich (Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung.)

The Council was established for the duration of the war by a Führer Edict of 30 August 1939 (RGBL, I 1539) for "the unified direction of government and the economy". This definition of its duties extended the authority of the Council to all fundamental matters of labor, foreign as well as German. The Council used this authority to issue basic legislation concerning foreign labor. Examples of this are:

- a. The Decree Concorning the Levy of a Social Equalization Tax" of 5 August 1940 (RGBL., I 1077), which imposed a discriminatory tax upon Polish workers employed in Germany;
- b. The "Decree Concerning the Employment Conditions of Eastern Workers" of 30 June 1942 (RGBL., I 419), creating an inferior employment status for non-German workers from the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic States. A significant feature of this Decree was the stipulation of especially low wages.

The Ministerial Council was composed of: 1. Hermann Goering, Delegate for the Four Year Plan, as Chairman; 2. Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Fu hrer (later replaced by Martin Bormann, the chief of the Chancellery of the Nazi Party); 3. Dr. Walter Frick (later Himmler), as Commissioner General for Reich Administration; 4. the Commissioner General for the Economy, Werner Funk; 5. the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Heinrich Lammers; 6. the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Keitel.1/

^{1/} Taschenbuch Für Verwaltungsbeamte, 1943 p.4

Decrees of the Ministerial Council were signed by Goering as its chairman. The active part that other members of the Council took in its decisions, however, is indicated by a letter of 15 January 1942 from the Party Gauleiter for Westfalen. It refers to statements of Bormann dealing with the discriminatory rules applied to Eastern workers. 1/Regional representatives of the council within Greater Germany were the Reich Defense Commissioners. They shared responsibility for labor policies and administration.2/

2. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan (Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan).

The Führer Edict of 30 August 1939 establishing the Ministerial Defense Council expressly reserved to Goering the powers given to him by the "Decree for the Execution of The Four Year Plan" dated 18 October 1936 (RGBL., I 887). Goering had already used his powers as Delegate for the Four Year Plan in pre-war times for the issuance of fundamental regulations in the field of domestic labor, such as his "Decree Establishing Labor Conscription for the Inhabitants of the Reich" of 13 February 1939 (RGBL., I 206). During the war, Goering, in his two positions as Delegate and as Chairman of the Defense Council, ranked high in the group of men responsible for German over-all policies in relation to foreign labor. He retained this supreme responsibility even after manpower policies were formulated in detail by his special Commissioner General for Labor Allocation, Fritz Sauckel. 3

While no actual fundamental statutes in the field of foreign labor, are known to have emanated from Goering as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, there is ample evidence that he directed the policies in relation to this labor by instructions to the highest civilian and military authorities. An example of such evidence is an 'Order of the Labor Minister", dated 8 April 1942.4/ This Order referred to a secret instruction by Goering issued in November 1941, according to which Russian civilian laborers were to be treated like war prisoners. Such a demotion meant not only the reduction of their wages to a point far below the level necessary to maintain ordinary activity, but also their subjection to the harsh disciplinary rules provided for war prisoners from

^{2/} OSS, CID 131629 Z/ Taschenbuch für Verwaltungsbeamte, 1943 p. 8 gives the list of these Commissioners.

^{3/} See below, III B 4.

4/ Der Auslandische Arbeiter in Deutschland, p. 943. For the official character of this publication, see below IV A 1.

Soviet Russia. 1/

Until March 1942, a special Section for Labor Allocation (Geschaftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz) functioned under Goering in the Four Year Plan Office. This section was directed by and staffed with officials of the Reich Labor Ministry. 2/After Fritz Sauckel's appointment, Goering, by the Order of 27 March 1942 (Reichsarbeitsblatt, I, p. 257), dissolved this Section and turned its functions over to Sauckel. Goering, however, reserved to himself, by this same order, the right to issue fundamental regulations in the field of labor and to be informed beforehand of all major measures to be taken by Sauckel. In this way he established the continuing final responsibility of the Four Year Plan Delegate.

3. Reich Ministry of Labor

Even in the pre-Nazi period, general policies connected with foreign labor were handled by the Reich Labor Ministry (Reichsarbeitsministerium) in Berlin. After 1927, the recruitment and placement of foreign labor became the responsibility - and after 1933 the monopoly - of the Reich Institute for Placement and Unemployment Insurance (and its regional and local public employment offices), a semiautonomous public corporation under the supervision of the Labor Ministry. By an Edict of the Führer on 21 December 1938 (RGBL., I 1892) the Institute was incorporated into the Labor Ministry. Its president, Dr. Friedrich Syrup, became one of the Secretaries of State in the Ministry of Labor and retained this position to the end of the Nazi regime. His responsibility for administration, was, however, shifted in 1941 to Ministerial Director Mansfeld, who then was replaced by the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation, Sauckel. The regional and local employment offices became agencies of the Ministry and were covered by the term: "Reich Labor Allocation Administration" (Reichsarbeitseinsatzverwaltung).

In this way, the Minister of Labor became directly responsible not only for the formulation but also for the execution of war-time policies in relation to foreign labor. His power was, however, limited by the powers of the Reich Defense Council and the Office of the Four Year Plan, mentioned above, whose directives he had to obey.

2/ Head of the Section was first Secretary of State, Friedrich Syrup, later Ministerial Director Werner Mansfeld.

Concerning Goering's instruction, see also Foreign Minister Molotov's Note of 11 May 1943 (Information Bulletin of USSR Embassy, Washington, 15 May 1943). See above, I B.

^{3/} Two other Secretaries of State of the same Ministry were in wartime Werner Mansfeld and Dr. Hans A. Engel. SECRET

Within these limits, the Minister of Labor (who, throughout the period of Nazi rule was Fritz Seldte) was responsible, prior to the date of Sauckel's appointment, for the criminal methods used by the German Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung in the recruitment and treatment of labor from occupied territories. An example of regulations issued by the Reich Minister of Labor is his Order of 5 October 1941 (RABL., I 448). According to this order, Polish workers were not considered to be working under a regular labor contract. They were paid only for actual work performed (unlike German workers, if a shortage of material halted work, they went unpaid), certain types of wage bonuses were not permitted, maternity allowances were not granted. In the words of the order: "The Polish workers are not to share in the benefits of Germany's social advancement."

The Ministry of Labor was also, prior to the appointment of Sauckel, responsible for the activities of its subordinate officials, the Reich Trustees of Labor (Reichtreuhänder der Arbeit), notably for their regulation concerning employment conditions. These regulations frequently discriminated against foreign labor particularly labor from the occupied Eastern territories.

4. The Commissioner General for Labor Allocation.

The direction of manpower policies both at home and in German-occupied territories was shifted in 1942 to a newly-created office, the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation (Generalbevollmachtigter Für den Arbeitseinsatz).

Reichstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel was appointed to this post by a Führer Edict of 21 March 1942 (RGBL., I p. 179), countersigned by Field Marshal Keitel. This edict defined his functions as being:

- a. "To direct the allocation of already available manpower, including recruited foreign workers and war prisoners"; and
- b. "To mobilize still unused labor reserves in the Greater German Reich, including the Protectorate, the General Government, and the occupied territories."

The edict also provided that Sauckel should function within the framework of the Four Year Plan and be subordinate to Goering. 1/Goering himself recognized this relationship by the Order of 27 March 1942 cited above. By this same order he expressly delegated to Sauckel his power to issue directives to all agencies of the Federal Government and of the Party, and to civil and military administrators of

SECRET

occupied territories. Goering reserved for himself the right to issue new statutes or change existing regulations. By another Decree of 25 May 1942 (RGBL., I 347), Goering empowered Sauckel to use in his field the authorizations given to the Minister of Labor by laws and decrees.

On the basis of these powers, the Commissioner General became mainly responsible for the criminal policies of the Reich in relation to labor, German as well as foreign, and for the execution of these policies. As far as known, Sauckel had only a small staff of immediate collaborators, headed in 1942 by the Secretary of State Ortlepp, but his power extended over all parts of Europe dominated by Nazi Germany. His position is clearly defined in a secret instruction issued on 31 August 1943 to the "Agencies of the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation in territories occupied by the German armed forces." According to this statement, "Manpower and wage issues in the Greater Reich and in all occupied territories are the exclusive responsibility of the Commissioner General and of his organization. His directives are to apply to the occupied countries. While his representatives and officials must respect the German territorial authorities, military or civilian, and subject themselves to their leadership, they are to insist upon their independent responsibility in the field of labor, in view of the vital task with which they are charged. This task is defined in the statement as the "unified direction of manpower in the European countries protected by Germany."

Sauckel's agencies in the occupied territories were an integrated part of the German Reich Labor Allocation Administration (Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung). This whole organization was transferred from the Ministry of Labor to the Commissioner General. So were the Reich Labor Trustees who were the German public authorities for wage issues and other employment conditions. Their functions were more and more merged with the functions of the manpower agencies. The Main Departments III (Labor law, wage policy, etc.) and VI (European Office for Labor Allocation) of the Reich Ministry of Labor also came under Sauckel's direction. Questions of foreign labor were handled in particular by the director of Department VI, Dr. Max Timm, and his sub-chiefs Letsch, Hubert, Hildebrandt, and Kaestner. Another outstanding staff member was Ministerial Counselor Walther Stothfang.

4/ Taschenbuch für Verwaltungsbeamte 1943 p. 61

^{1/} Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenheife 1940 p. 140. Inother important member of this staff was SS Gruppenführer Rudolph Jung.

^{2/} OSS Source X 3/ See above III B 3.

The members of the Arbeitseinsatzberwaltung in the occupied territories were called "Labor allocation staffs" (Arbeitseinsätzstabo); they wore uniforms 1/. These officials operated in different ways. Sometime they ran public employment agencies, as in the former Russian territories and in Belgium. Sometimes they worked through German military or civilian authorities, or even through native agencies, as in the Protectorate.2/ In some territories, Sauckel was represented by a special delegate, such as Minister Bertsch in the Protectorate or the Commissioner General for Special Tasks in the Netherlands.3/

Sauckel issued an enormous body of regulations and instructions. They form the main basis for the enslavement and maltreatment of foreign labor. Some of these directives applied only to German labor, others to German and foreign labor employed within the Reich, and still others directly to foreign workers in their home countries. As far as these home countries were concerned, the Commissioner General preferred on the whole, to lay down general lines of policy and leave it to the authorities in the various territories to issue the corresponding regulations.

^{1/} Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhaife February 1943, p. 17 2/ For some details see Section III C of this memorandum.

^{&#}x27; See below III C .
The available evidence is indicated in section IV.

In this way Sauckel proceeded to his most fundamental regulation dealing with foreign labor, his Order No. 10 of 22 August 1942 (RABL., p. I 382), applicable within the Reich as well as in all occupied territories. By this regulation, Sauckel:

- a. Established priorities for the use of foreign labor. They were to be employed first "to satisfy the important war needs within Germany itself." Within the occupied territories, manpower was to be used primarily for the German armed forces, the occupying authorities, and for German armamemt contracts.
- b. Inaugurated a policy of maximum exploitation of foreign labor by prescribing minimum working hours, insisting upon incentive wages as primary forms of compensation, and introducing the most severe work discipline.

While this order did not call directly for conscription of labor in the occupied territories, it was the signal for such conscription measures as were issued by German or native authorities in territories where such legislation had not previously existed. In addition, the occupying authorities regulated employment conditions in accordance with the principles of this order.

Another significant measure taken by the Commissioner General in the field of foreign labor was his agreement with the German Labor Front, dated 2 June 1943 (RABL., I, p. 588). He entrusted to the Labor Front the well-being of all foreign workers employed in Germany, but retained at the same time a full share in the supervision of these welfare measures. The Commissioner therefore remained

SECRET

^{1/} See below, III B 11

responsible for any maltreatment of foreign labor which occurred outside of their place of work.

5. Reich Commissioner for the Total War Effort.

By an edict of 25 July 1944 (RGBL. I 161), Hitler appointed Reich Minister Goebbels as Reich Commissioner for the Total War Effort (Reichsbevollmachtigter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz). Goebbels main task was to rationalize the whole public administrative apparatus and other public services, and thereby to free male German workers for military service. His task extended also to the occupied territories. The Commissioner General for Labor Allocation, like all other central agencies, came under Goobbels' general direction. One of Goebbels' decrees the order of 24 august 1944 1/ - extended the 60 hour week to all sorts of office work and covered foreign labor as well as German. Actually, the great majority of foreign labor in plants, offices, and farms had worked for years at least 60 hours per week, and in many cases more than that .2/ On this point as on others, the appointment of Goebbels did not diminish the responsibility of existing agencies, particularly Sauckel's.

Deutsches Nachrichten Buro 24 August 1944 2/ Essener National-Zeitung, 11 November 1944. A working week of 72 hours prevailing for Dutch workers billeted in camps was reported by the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 19 July 1943.

6. Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production. ("Speer Ministry")

The functions of this Ministry were defined by the Führer in an edict of 2 September 1943 (RGBL., I 529).

The objective of the Ministry was to maximize war production. One of its instruments was a special organization with the task of increasing output of workers in the armament industry by the "speed-up" and similar devices, all leading to a more ruthless exploitation of foreign labor. 1 The organization was headed by the Reich Labor Allocation Engineer, was of Gotthard Friedrich, and/composed/34 Regional Labor Allocation Engineers, and 10,000 Labor Allocation Engineers in individual plants.

The responsibility of Minister Albert Speer and of his agency for the conscription and the deportation of foreign labor and for many incidents of maltreatment results from their connection with the Organization Todt. This organization, after 1943, was integrated within the Ministry for Armaments and Munition. Its headquarters were headed by the Ministerial Director Dipl. Tag. Dorsch and his substitute Dr. Fränk.2/

- 7. Reich Ministry of the Interior (Reichsministerium des Innern)
- a. Police Functions. In the field of foreign labor the responsibility of this Ministry (headed

Decree of 26 June 1943 (Berliner Boersenzeitung, 25
December 1943)

^{2/} For further mention of the Organization Todt, see below III B 10.

first by Dr. Wilhelm Frick and later by Heinrich Himmler) resulted mainly from its function of being the supreme police authority of the Third Reich. Toreign workers were subjected to three sets of police controls:

- i. Controls that applied to every inhabitant of the Reich, to Germans as well as foreigners;
- ii. Specific controls over foreigners in the Reich, labor or non-labor;
- iii. Special controls over foreign labor as such.

 Special police controls in relation to foreign labor concerned particularly the following matters:
 - i. The identification of the various nationalities among foreign labor by compulsory wearing of certain badges. The Poles, for example, were compelled under a police decree of 8 March 1940 (RGBL. I 555) to wear a violet letter "P" on a yellow background on the right side of every one of their garments.
 - ii. The maintenance of a stern shop discipline among foreign workers at their places of work. This discipline included measures against absenteeism, lateness, slow work, suspected sabotage, refusal to do Sunday and holiday work, etc. Punishments as defined by an Order of 20 July 1942 (RGBL., I 341) ranged from

^{1/} For details concerning organization of function of police, see Report on the Gestapo.

warning up to imprisonment and/or money fines of an unlimited amount. Other forms of punishment were confinement in so-called "education camps" (Erzie-hungslager) and special camps for "loafers" (Arbeitsscheue). The police intervened in the interest of shop discipline on request of the employer.

- iii. The forcible return of escaped foreign workers according to an Order of 10 March 1944 (RABL., I 138). In certain cases this action extended also to foreign workers who had returned to their native countries.
- iv. The supervision of foreign labor in public
 work projects, especially in fortification work.
 v. The control of camps housing foreign workers
 and the maintenance of rigid restrictions upon
 their personal lives.

b. Other Functions

Certain other functions of the Ministry of Interior in relation to foreign labor grew up from its position as the central agency for matters of "Civilian Reich Defense" and matters concerning the occupied territories. In this capacity, the Ministry had a voice in defining German policies on foreign labor within the Reich and outside of it. These matters were treated particularly in the Department IR of

the Ministry, headed in 1943 by Ministerial Director Ehrensberger and his three section chiefs Jacobi, Pabst, and Danckelmann. This department was subordinated to the Secretary of State, Stuckart. 1/

The Ministry of Interior was also the highest German authority in health matters; as such it bears the final responsibility for the medical neglect under which foreign workers in Germany suffered. This responsibility must be placed particularly upon Reich leader Dr. Conti as Secretary of State for Health, and upon the President of the Reich Health Office, Professor Dr. Reiter. 2/

8. Other Ministries of the Reich.

Practically every one of the Reich Ministries had some share in policies that led to criminal actions against foreign labor.

(a) The Reich-Minister for Foreign Affairs (Reichsminister der Auswärtigen), von Ribbentrop, participated through
his diplomatic representatives in some of the occupied countries in the extortion of foreign labor from the satellite
governments. The outstanding example is France, where the
negotiations with the Laval regime over the use of French
labor for Germany were, partly at least, conducted by German
diplomatic representatives (Ambassador Abetz, Ministers
Rahn and Schleier, and Counciler Gottschieck of the German
Embassy in Paris).

^{1/} Taschenbuch fur Verwaltungsbeamte 1943 p. 13 2/ International Labor Review, March 1943, pp. 312 et seq.

- The Reich Finance Ministry (Reichsfinanzminis-(b) terium) - headed by Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk and after the Secretary of State, Reinhard had the lead in matters of discriminatory taxation against foreign workers. minority of married workers from abroad, among them workers from the Protectorate of Bohemia - Moravia, were privileged; they were considered as not residing in the Reich and as therefore exempt from German taxation. 1 Other workers, with the exception of Poles and Russians, were taxed like German workers. 2/ Polish industrial workers and Russian ("Eastern") workers were subject to special taxes; the Poles, under the Decree of 5 August 1940 (RGBI, I, p. 1094), to the "wage equalization tax" (Lohnausgleichsabgabe), amounting to 15 per cent of their earnings in addition to their regular wage taxes; the eastern workers, under the Decree of 20 January 1942 (RGBL, I, p. 42) to a much more severe taxation, the "Eastern Levy" (Ostabgabe). This tax was abolished by the Decree of 25 March 1944 (RGBL, I, p. 68) and the Russians then subjected to the same tax as the Poles, though under somewhat more unfavorable conditions. In the final phase of the war, the special taxation on eastern workers - not on Poles - was reported as entirely abolished.
- (c) The Reich Ministry of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsministerium), headed by Walther Funk, was responsible for the rations of goods, clothing, and shoes issued to foreign

Dr. H. Ofterding in Der Auslandische Arbeiter p. 278

Decree of the Reich Minister of Finance, of 14 May 1942
(RGBL., p. I 297)

^{3/} Nachrichten-und Pressedienst, 7 March 1945 SECRET

workers. Foreign workers were required to bring their own clothing with them. They were not entitled to a clothing card or to a shoe coupon in Germany. $\stackrel{\perp}{=}$ Many of the workers from the east were very poorly equipped, while even the western workers needed replacement sand repairing when their periods of employment - frequently against their will - were extended. The Ministry of Economics and its subordinate agency, the Reich Director for Clothing and Related Industries, did not satisfy these needs. The clothing standards of foreign workers dropped well below the minimum level of the German popu-The clothing situation of "eastern" workers, lation. indeed, was recognized as an "emergency situation" by Sauckel himself. $\frac{2}{}$ But the measures finally taken by the Ministry of Economics were entirely inadequate; many workers, not only "eastern" workers, worked barefoot and in ragged clothes.3/

(d) The Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture (Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft), headed first by Darre, later by Backe, and the Secretary of State, Werner Williken, defined the policies in

Manual for Foreign Industrial Workers (RGBL. 1942,
 I, p. 285)

^{2/} Der Jusländische Arbeiter, p. 1010, supplement; see also Oberregierungsrat F. H. Schmidt in Reichsarbeitsblatt 1943, p. V 75
3/ Gosta F. Block (Swedish Broadcaster) in his book

Gosta F. Block (Swedish Broadcaster) in his book "Tyksland Inifrau" reporting upon a visit to Dessau in July 1942 (quoted in ILO Study C25, p. 195).

relation to food rations of foreign labor, industrial as well as farm labor. Through its subordinate agency, the IRsichal Food Estate (Reichsnährstand), the Ministry was in general charge of what was called the well-being of agricultural foreign workers, but which actually meant their distribution, exploitation, and political control.

Feeding of foreign industrial labor, was wherever possible, organized on a mass basis. The food rations for foreign labor lodged and fed in camps were, according to the decree of this Reich Ministry of 22 March 1942, substantially lower than those for German workers. 2/ A decree of 6 October 1942 fixed the rations for eastern workers on a still lower level. 3/ Foreign workers were frequently restricted in the purchase of non-rationed food. 4/; the wages of "eastern" workers were in any event too low to enable them to buy such food. Begging, stealing, and starving were the inevitable reactions of "eastern" workers.

^{1/} See Below III B 12.
2/ Der Ausla ndische Arbeiter, p. 222, supplement
3/MinisterialratDietrich in Kommentar zur Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung, Part V, Allg., p. 565.
4/ International Labor Office, Study C25, p. 98.

9. Central Military Authorities.1/

The central military authorities were involved in crimes committed against foreign labor in two ways:

- (a) They participated in over-all planning and in fundamental regulations; in particular, the military was represented in the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich 2/ by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel.
- (b) They gave directives to the military commanders in the occupied territories which were especially important in territories where the military commanders retained responsibility for administration beyond the initial phase of occupation, as in France and Belgium.

10. Organization Todt and Other Para-Military Organizations.

(a) The Organization Todt, (OT) was established in May 1938 as a public organization for the purpose of building German western defenses. During the war it was used throughout occupied Europe for the eraction of other fortifications, and for similar tasks. 3/ The number of workers employed by OT varied considerably; its peak was probably 2,000,000.4/ At its inception OT operated mostly with conscripted German labor, but after the war began more and more foreigners were drawn into its ranks until the percentage of German

I/ For details concerning Organization of the Military Authorities, see Table on Military Agencies.

^{2/} See above B l
It had its outposts in the various occupied territories where it operated; such outposts were, for instance, established in 1942 in Poland under Von Zastrow; in the Protectorate under Hölzle; and in the Netherlands under Dr. Beck.

^{4/} Alfred Vagts, HitlersSecond Army (Penguin Special)p.118-9.

to foreign workers was only about 20 per cent. the later phases of the war, some women were even included. 2/ By a Fulrieur Edict of 2 September 1943 (RGBL., I 530) official status was given to the OT and it was subordinated to the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, Albert Speer. Its head was a Ministerial Director of this agency. 3/

The foreign workers were recruited partly by regular hiring, partly by conscription, and partly by impressment. A significant example of impressment is given in an Order of the Military Commander in France of 22 September 1942.4/

See Statements of Reich Labor Trustee Dr. Schmelter in Neue Deutsche Zeitung, 7 May 1943: Oberregierungsrat in OT Alex. Jungfleisch in Soziale Praxis, February 1943 p. 79.

Aftentidningen (Stockholm), 4 April 1944

See above III B 6 Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen des Militarbefahlshabers in Frankreich, Neue Folge, Nr. 48, p. 42.

This order instructed regional military commanders to raise certain quotas of labor needed for OT construction projects by every possible means and based the legality of this instruction upon Article 52 of the Hague Convention.

Employment conditions of the foreign Todt workers were regulated by wage orders (Tariford nungen) issued by a special German Labor Trustee, Dr. Schmelter, who belonged to the headquarters staff of OT. Their compensation was below the wage rates paid to comparable German workers and was further reduced whenever their performance did not reach certain minimum standards. They were, moreover, subjected to rigid military discipline. 2 A German member of the OT staff stated in a radio talk that foreign labor on some projects of the OT worked 12 hours a day, with only 3 short pauses totalling 70 minutes, and had to work on Sundays and other holidays. This sort of continuous work went on for many months.3

During military operations the OT stood wholly at the disposal of the theater commander, with the result that foreign labor was drawn directly into the sphere of military operations.4

Some special directives of the Einsatzgruppe West of the OT, dated from April 1944, illustrate the inferior position of the Russian workers in the OT and the severe. discipline applied to them.

Published in Reichsarbeitsblatt 1943 pp. IV 381 ff German regulations quoted from French paper L'Ouest Eclair

⁶ July 1943. Die Zeitung (London) 19 August 1941, from Deutschland-Sender

OSS CLD 719941 and 19943.

b. Technical Emergency Corps

SECRET

Another para-military organization, the Technical Emergency Corps (<u>Technische Nothilfe</u>) also employed foreign labor. It may be assumed that the recruitment and treatment of foreign labor employed by the <u>Nothilfe</u> involved the same criminal actions as in the case of the OT. The Technical Emergency Corps was a part of the Order Police (<u>Ordnungspolizei</u>) headed by SS <u>Oberst-Gruppenfuhrer Daluegs</u>. Leader of the <u>Nothilfe</u> was SS <u>Gruppenfuhrer</u>

c. There is some evidence that youth from occupied territories was compelled to join a third para-military organization, The Reich Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst), notably in the later phases of the war. The Reich Labor Service was first a section of the Reich Ministry of Interior but becamee independent when Himmler replaced Frick as Minister. Chief of the Reichsarbeitsdienst was Reichsleiter Konstantin Hierl: his substitute was Ober-General-Arbeitsführer Decker.

To the government agencies discussed above must be added two Party institutions as particularly responsible for crimes against foreign labor.

II. The German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront)

The German Labor Front (DAF) headed by Dr. Robert Ley, was an affiliate of the Nazi Party. The official and exclusive organization of German workers, salaried employees, and employers not engaged imagricultural pursuits, it was established mainly for the political control of German labor. This objective, however, was camouflaged by a great number of specific activities ranging from "Strength Through Joy" and other compulsory leisure programs to

industrial training and labor research. During the war these last activities predominated. In the last phases of the conflict, the only objective of the DAF, according to Dr. Ley, was "the mobilization of unused labor potential in the plant, the rational use of cach worker, and the maximum of human performance." This meant the imposition of the most rigid shop discipline (harsh penalties for absenteeism, lateness to work, slowdowns, disobedience of orders, etc.) and a general increase in the tempo of work. Foreign workers in non-agricultural enterprises in Germany were subject to particularly severe controls by the Labor Front, and suffered especially from the speed-up measures enforced by the DAF as the war drew to its close.

In addition to its political control over labor, the DAF had specific responsibilities in relation to foreign workers. The DAF, in fact, more than any other organization, is accountable for the maltreatment of foreign labor in Germany outside of their places of work. Evidence of this responsibility consists in:

An order by the Leader of the DAF on 15 August
1940 (Amtliches Nachrichtenblatt der DAF 25
August 1940. p. 28) concerning care (Betreuung)
of foreign workers in mass camps (Gemeinschaftslager).
According to the order, this is the exclusive
task of the Labor Front. It includes: housing,
feeding, work clothes, medical care, use of
leisure time, general political indoctrination,
and welfare measures. Foreign workers are to
be segregated from foreign workers of other
nationalities.

^{*1.} Quotation by Werner Scheunemann in <u>Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft</u>
August 1944. p. 694.
SECRET

- b. An order of the DAF of 25 September 1941 which emphasized the diversity of tasks facing the Labor Front in its job of caring for foreign workers in Germany. This job was assigned to one of the central bureaus of the Labor Front, the Office for Labor Allocation (Ant fur Arbeitseinsatz), headed by Franz Mende and subordinated (in 1943) to Marrenbach as the leader of the "War Main Department" (Kriegshaupt-arbeitsgebiet)
- c. The agreement between the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation and the Leader of the DAF of 2 June 1943 (RABL. 1943, I 588). This significant statement concerns the responsibility of the DAF in the field of foreign labor. Dr. Goebbels, as Reich Minister for Propaganda and Enlightenment, and Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, were also parties to this agreement. In it, the DAF was charged with exclusive authority over the well-being of all foreign workers in Germany, except agricultural laborers. In practice, its jurisdiction included both the control and the welfare of foreign labor.

l. Der Ausländische Arbeiter in Deutschland, p. 212.

^{2.} Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, 7 October 1943.

The joint organization formed to carry out this agreement bore the title "Central Inspection for the care of Foreign Workers" (Zentralinspektion für die Betreuung der Ausländischen Arbeiter). It operated through fifteen Area Inspectors who regularly visited camps and factories and reported to the headquarters of the Central Inspection. They were ordered especially to note whether a clear dividing line was being maintained between foreign and German workers. Their main objective, however, was to help in achieving the highest possible output of foreign labor.

Attached to the Office for Labor Allocation of the DAF were foreign liaison men (Verbindungsmänner) who represented their national compatriots on local, regional, and national levels. These liaison men were supposed to serve as intermediaries between their fellow-nationals and the machinery of the DAF. Their duties included the political control and the indoctrination of their wards. The liaison men, especially on the higher levels, were selected from Nazis or Nazi-sympathizers in their homelands.

Originally, the operation of housing facilities for foreign labor was not a function of the Labor Front.

Workers from western countries were allowed to live in private quarters, while workers from the east were housed in camps. These camps were to be erected and run by their

Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, 2 November 1943.
 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 October 1943.

employers. Later on, however, the German authorities

became more and more opposed to private housing even of

1/

western workers, both for political reasons and because it

was found that "Foreigners work harder under the strict

discipline of camps". Permission to live outside the camps

came to depend upon special permission by the Labor Front.

A growing number of camps were operated by sub-organizations of the Labor Front, the so-called social guilds or cooperatives (Sozialgewerke). These "cooperatives" of employers were actually nothing other than agencies of the 3/ Labor Front, a fact which further establishes the direct responsibility of the Labor Front for conditions found in many of the foreign worker camps. While officially the functions of the Labor Front did not concern mobilization and allocation of labor and the regulation of its employment conditions, the Labor Front represented the Nazi Party in all labor matters and had great influence upon the labor policies of the government. The Labor Front should therefore be considered as co-responsible for crimes committed by other government agencies, such as the Labor Allocation Administration, against foreign labor.

The Labor Front was instrumental in creating parallel organizations in the majority of occupied territories.

It was thus co-responsible with the authorities in these occupied territories for destroying democratic forms of

labor representation in these territories. Membership in 1. Franz Mende in Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 July 1942 p. I 332

^{2.} Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, 22 December 1942.

^{3.} Nachrichtendienst Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, 31 January 1943.

the Labor Front was open to foreign workers only when they belonged to these corresponding organizations set up by the Front in their own country. Nevertheless, many foreign workers who were not members were compelled to pay regular dues to the Labor Front, without receiving corresponding benefits in return.

12. Reich Food Estate (Reichsnahrstand).

The functions that the German Labor Front performed with respect to foreign industrial labor were exercised by the Reich Food Estate and its territorial subdivisions, the peasant associations. The Reich Food Estate was established by an Act of 13 September 1933 (RGBL., I p. 626) as an autonomous public corporation. Membership in it was compulsory for all persons engaged in agriculture, including farm operators as well as laborers. "It had jurisdiction over all matters affecting agricultural production and agricultural marketing, farm labor, German as well as foreign. During war-time, the Reich Food Estate and all its subordinate organizations were placed directly under the Ministry for Food and Agriculture whose chief at first was Walter Darre, and later Herbert Backe by a decree of 27 August 1939 (RGBL., I 1945). The Nazi Party exercised a strong influence upon the Reich Food Estate through its National Office for the Rural Population also headed first

^{1.} The regulations on this point are not quite clear. See Organisations buch der NSDAP 1943. p. 225 "
2. For further details concerning the Reichsnahrstand, see the report on the "Principle Nazi Organizations Involved in War Crimes, Part III" R&A 3113.7.

by Darre and later by Backe. This office may have taken over functions covering foreign labor from the Food Estate during the last phase of the war.

The recruitment of foreign labor for agriculture was a function of the Labor Allocation Administration. The representatives of the Reichnährstand, notably the county and local peasant leaders (Kreis-und Ortsbauernführer participated, however, in defining the need of farm operators for foreign labor, according to an order from Sauckel of 13 December 1943 (RABL., 1944, I 36), and in all probability also in the distribution of foreign labor among individual farm operators. In this way, the Reichsnähstand and its subordinate organizations share responsibility for crimes committed in the importation of foreign labor into Germany, and in the criminal methods by which this labor was distributed via slave markets to individual farmers.

The "care" of foreign agricultural labor was made an exclusive function of the Reichsnahrstand by an agreement concluded in October 1939 between the Food Estate and the Labor Front. This distribution of functions was confirmed by the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation in his agreement with the Labor Front of 2 June 1943 (RABL., 3/I 588) Unlike the industrial workers, most foreign

^{1.} Liaison man between this administration and the Food Estate was State Councillor Rudolph Peurkert.

^{2.} Der Auslandische Arbeiter in Deutschland, p. 6083. See above III B II

agricultural laborers did not live in mess camps, but on the farms where they were employed. However, cases of maltreatment of foreign agricultural workers were numerous. Responsibility for these crimes must be placed at the door of the Food Estate.

In spite of their inferior status, foreign agricultural workers were made to become compulsory members of the Reich Food Estate and, as such, had to pay the same fees or dues as German agricultural workers.

^{1.} Der Ausländische Arbeiter in Deutschland, p. 608

C. German/Deputies in Various Occupied Territories

1. France

(a) German responsibility for crimes committed by Vichy.

Native government and administration had a broad share in labor policies and labor administration in France during war time. This is true not only for the south of France, where German Military Government was established only in the final phase of the war, but also for that part of the Northern zone which was not separated from the political body of France and put under the German Military Commander for Belgium. The Vichy Government was, of course, continuously subjected to the strongest German pressures, dictated by an insatiable German demand for French skilled manpower. Nevertheless, many of its labor policies conformed not simply with the conquerors' needs but with its own fascist ideology. Examples are the suppression of the National Confederations of Trade Unions by the Vichy decree of 16 August 1940 and the attempt to create a totalitarian scheme of labor representation by the French Labor Charter of 4 October 1941.

On the other hand, it can scarcely be denied that German influence could be felt in every phase of Vichy's labor policy. In matters in which the Germans were directly interested, such as compulsory mobilization, deportation and exploitation of labor, the Nazis established complete domination over Vichy and its administrative agents, extending it to the whole of France long before they occupied the South. Their policy was, in fact, to act wherever possible, through their Vichy puppets. There were, however, many instances during the occupation of direct legislative and administrative intervention by the German authorities, such as the decree of the Military Commander in France of 6 November 1941 (Verordnungs-sblatt p. 320) concerning the Protection of Peaceful Labor Relations, introducing the most severe sanctions against strikes and look-outs; his decree of 10 September 1942 (Besonders Wirtschaftsanordnung No. 47) extending into France Sauckel's fundamental order of 22 august 19422; and his decree of 18 December 1942 (Besonders Wirtschaftsanordnung No. 51), freezing agriculture workers in their jobs.

 $[\]frac{1}{2}$ See below C 2. See above III B 4.

b. German Agencies Involved.

The mobilization and transfer of French manpower developed into one of the central political issues in Franco-German relations. Important decisions were, therefore, prepared in discussions between Hitler and Laval and negotiated (extorted may be the better expression) by the Commissioner General of Labor Illocation. German diplomatic representatives in France frequently intervened; and some major issues were settled by the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden (Germany), headed first by General Otto von Stülpnagel, and later by General Vogl.

In the non-occupied South of France, authorities deriving their power from the Armistice Commission supervised the French labor policies. The Special Economic Commission (headed by President Hemmer) organized under the German Armistice Commission and located in Paris, had a subsection dealing with labor. This Commission was represented in the South by a central inspectorate serving all sections of the Armistice Commission and by smaller administrative units in more important towns.

The authority of the Armistice Commission extended also to the North. There, however, labor problems were handled mainly by the German military commanders. These activities were directed in accordance with the policies established in Berlin by the Military Commander for France (Militar-befehlshaber Frankreich) General von Stülpnagel in Paris

For the detailed history of this development see International Labor Review, March 1943 pp. 312-342; Jan. 44, pps. 38-51. For the German Administrative set-up in France see R & Report No. 2500-3. SECRET

2 / See above III B 4

through his Administrative Staff (Verwaltungsstab), headed by Dr. Jonathan Schmidt, Group VII of this staff, called ; "Arbeitseinsatz" (Labor Allocations), specialized in manpower problems. It belonged to the Economic Branch, headed by Dr. Michel, and was itself headed by President A. Glatzel. The German Field Commands (Feldkommandanturen), of which a whole hierarchy existed, acted primarily as regional and local agencies. In order of the Military Commander in France of 6 January 1943 (Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen No. 51) placed the main responsibility in manpower problems upon the so-called Field Commands (R). These commands were located at the seats of the regional prefectures and dealt directly with the most important agents of the reorganized French manpower administration, the regional employment offices, and the regional labor inspectorates. The other Field Commands received their directives from the regional commands. The highest intermediary authorities, the five Military Administrative Districts (Militarverwaltungsbezirke), were currently informed about manpower developments but played only a minor roll.

in a less obvious fashion than the field commands in the North. In 1944, these liaison headquarters were gradually replaced by field commands, and German intervention in manpower matters became more open and direct. SECRET

In the early phase of occupation the German authorities organized special recruitment agencies called Werbestellen. In June 1942 it was estimated that 150 such agencies were operating in the two zones. The Military Commander in France instructed the field commands by an order of 3 February 1942 (Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen No. 36) to help these agencies in every possible way. He mentioned that German labor allocation experts, belonging to the Labor Allocation Administration, were assigned to these agencies and were financed by the Reich Ministry of Labor. Until spring, 1942, recruitment for Germany was carried out exclusively by these German agencies, with French employment offices instructed by Vichy to cooperate with In June 1942, German and French agencies were closely coordinated by an agreement between the Military Commander for France and the French Secretary of State for Labor. 2/ French officials were attached to the German agencies, while German labor allocation experts worked in the French offices. Medical examinations were made by French physicians but supervised, and frequently corrected, by German military doctors, in accordance with directives issued by the Leading Army Physician on the Staff of the Military Commander .3/ Transportation to Germany of the recruited workers was organized by the German agencies.

^{1/} International Labor Review, March 1943, p. 331, note 1. 2/ Published in Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen 1942

No. 47.
Published in Besondere Wirtschaftsanordunungen 1943
No. 55.
SECRET

The German police, military as well as civilian, cooperated with the Vichy police in hunting down workers who tried to escape from recruitment and later from conscription and compulsory labor service. A characteristic order by the Military Commander in France of 17 October, 1942 (Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen No. 49) stated that:

"Persons who do not appear for transportation to Germany should be apprehended by the French or German police and brought to the German recruitment agency to receive a warning. Resistance should be broken by French or German police, if necessary with the support of the German military police (Feldgendarmerie)."

The German police was also, according to the same regulations, to control French stations and trains during the transport of workers - though in an inconspicuous way. A small police escort was to travel with every transport.

c. German and French Interplay in the Conscription of French Labor

Conscripton for employment in Germany and in the homeland was introduced in France by a sequence of Vichy laws and decrees. Outstanding among them were the Act of 4 September 1942 concerning the Allocation and Utilization of Manpower and the Act of 16 February 1943 introducing a Compulsory Labor Service. All these legal measures were formerly Vichy products, but were conceived and promulgated under German dictation and prepared and executed in close cooperation with German authorities.

The secret economic bulletin of the Military Commander in France ("Special Economic Instructions"-Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen) portrays clearly the degree of this continuous German interference. On the one hand, the German military authorities were instructed to assist the French agencies in every possible way in their conscription procedures. On the other hand, the Germans protected enterprises in which they were particularly interested. Characteristic of this second tendency was an order of the Military Commander of 6 November 1942 (Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen No. 58) advising French armament plants to report to the German field commanders manpower needs that resulted from conscription. These commanders were then to direct the French labor inspector to assign. the necessary replacements to the plant. Another Decree of the Commander (dated 4 February 1943-Besondere Wirtschaf tsanordnungen No. 52) interdicted conscription of agricultural workers.

The methods used in carrying out the conscription were described by the International Labor Office in the following way:

"Recalcitrants were handfuffed. In factories ringed beforehand by the police, requisition orders were issued to workers, foremen, and engineers, who were then sent to the German placement offices, and from there to special camps pending dispatch to Germany, without even being allowed to return

to their homes. Quarters, blocks, streets, trains, railway and subway stations were raided by the French police or by the police of the occupation authorities, and able-bodied men were taken to the placement offices by force.

"Young men called up for compulsory service were sent to Germany as soon as they had been registered and passed as fit by medical examination. Those at the end of their term of service in the Youth Service, in particular the class released at the end of May, were sent away without being given the chance of seeing their families." 1

These revolting measures were primarily carried out by the French police, but with the support when necessary of the German police force.

d. The German Policy of Exploiting French Labor in France

Prior to conscription, the Vichy Government, under the more or less concealed pressure of German demands, tried to produce labor recruits for Germany by indirect means, such as the rationalization of industry, the extension of work hours, and insistence on higher performance. 2/

The German authorities were particularly interested in the introduction of longer work hours in France. In this question they intervened openly. The Vichy legislation

^{1/2} International Labor Review, January 1944, p. 41 Z/ Ibid, March 1943, pp. 326 ff.

empowered the French authorities to fix minimum hours for all kinds of undertakings. In order of the German Commander of 8 August 1942 (Besondere Wirtschaftsanord-nungen No. 46) instructed the field commands to secure applications from employers for the establishment of longer work hours in their plants and to request current reports from the French prefects on the hours actually worked. Then, by an order of 8 December 1942 (Besondere Wirtschaftsanordnungen No. 51) the Military Commander instructed the field commands to withdraw labor from all onterprises that were not working 54 hours per week and to refuse to assign new labor to such plants until they had lengthened their work time.

2. Belgium

(a) Use of Native Agencies by the Germans

Belgium, like France, was during the whole period of occupation placed under German Military Government. The responsibility of this government in labor matters was, however, not obscured by the complicity of a native government of the Vichy type. Although the native admini, strative apparatus had remained intact in the field of labor as in other fields, and was used and even further developed by the occupying power, the heads of the various ministries had withdrawn and in only a few instances could be replaced by collaborationist assistants the Secretaries General of the Belgian Ministries. Consequently, in the field of labor the Germans arranged the creation of new central native agencies, such as the National Labor Office (Office National du Travail) for manpower administration and the Delegate General for Labor (Délégué Général à la Réglementation du Travail) for the regulation of engloyment conditions, and were successful in shifting responsibilities to these collaborationist authorities. Nevertheless, the German Military Commander for Belgium could not avoid issuing all labor regulations of political significance in his own . name. Measures like those ordering the conscription of

^{1.} In the final phase of the war, the supreme military commander was replaced by a civilian Reich Commissioner. The character of the Gorman administration, however, was not influenced by this change.

labor for Germany or the dissolution of trade unions which in France originated with the native government were in Belgium introduced by decrees of the German
Military Commander. The most unpopular of these measures
conscription, had to be administered in most of its
phases exclusively by the local German agencies, since
almost every Belgian agency refused to participate.

(b) The Responsible German Agencies

For the Germans, responsibility in labor matters was concentrated in the military hierarchy. This hierarchy was headed by the Military Commander for Belgium and Northern France, Alexandox von Falkenhausen, who was represented in minor matters by the Chief of the Administrative Staff (Verwaltungsstab) SS Obergruppenführer Eggert Reeder. Under the Commander functioned commands (Kommandanturen) for larger and smaller areas, in a similar set-up to that prevailing in occupied France.

The mobilization of Belgium manpower for Germany was the task of German recruiting agencies (Werbestellen).

Part of the German military administration, they were at the same time outposts of the German Labor Allocation 2

Administration and were staffed with experts from this administration. Thus, a direct responsibility for the methods by which Belgian workers were mobilized and falls deported clearly/apon the German Ministry of Labor and

⁽¹⁾ See above III C I (2) See above III B 4

upon the German Commissioner General for Labor Allocation. While the Belgian public employment offices cooperated with these German recruiting agencies to the extent of sending applicants for work to the agencies, they tried, however, not to participate directly in the process of conscription. Medical examinations and the transport to Germany were handled exclusively by the Germans.

- (c) Responsibility for Conscription in Belgium

 Conscription of Belgian labor was established in two
 phases: (1)
- (i) The decree of the Military Commander of 6 March 1942 concerning the Provision of Manpower for Porticularly Important Projects (Verordnungsblatt, p. 844) authorized the German field commands and according to their decision also the Belgian employment offices to conscript Belgian inhabitants for work inside of Belgium. The same decree established far-reaching controls over hiring and firing. Administration of the above decree was regulated by a decree of 30 April 1942 (Verordnungs-blatt p. 894). Another decree, dated 8 May 1942 (Verordnungsblatt p. 907) restricted the payment of unemployment assistance to Belgians subject to conscription.
- (ii) The decree of the Military Commander of 600ctober 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1059) amended the decree of 6 March 1942 by authorizing conscription for work also in the Reich of men between 18 and 50 years and of

unmarried women between 21 and 35 years. A compulsory work book was introduced for men. Then, according to a decree of 7 October 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1062) conscription for the Reich was made the exclusive function of the German field commands.

Further German decrees developed grave sanctions against persons who tried to dodge the conscription for work in Germany. The degree of 5 March 1943 (Verordnungsblatt p. 1250) directed the Belgian food offices towithhold ration cards from workers reported to have broken their labor contracts, refused to comply with conscription orders, or given evidence of unwillingness to work. The decree of 28 June 1943 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1340) authorized the seizure of property belonging to persons who did not obey conscription orders issued by the German commands. Relatives of the conscriptees, or any other persons who assisted them in their disobedience, could be subjected by the field commands to financial or personal sanctions. Another Decree issued under the same date (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1352) made admission to advanced studies dependent upon at least one year of prior work in Belgium or in the Reich, or upon participation in a voluntary labo service in Belgium.

Permission to be excused from conscription for work in the Reich could be granted only by the German field commands. According to a decree of 28 June 1943 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1348) this permission could be

combined with an assignment to work in Belgium.

gium great

In spite of protestations from all quarters in Belnumbers of Belgian workers, particularly male workers,
were actually conscripted and transported to the Reich.
The rounding-up of these persons was frequently carried
out in a brutal manner.

(d) Exploitation of Belgian Labor within Belgium

As in other occupied territories, the German authori ties in Belgium tried to assure the maximum exploitation of labor in the home country in order to squeeze out additional labor for employment within the Reich. They used for this objective the newly created Belgian Delegate General for Labor who was authorized to regulate employment conditions in the various Belgian industries. The Military Commander however, also dealt, directly with employment conditions in Belgium, particularly in regulating work hours. In a decree of 6 October 1942 . (Verordnungsblatt p. 1055) he established the eight-hour day and the forty-eight hour week as minimum work periods and prohibited any hoarding of labor that could be spared wherever work hours were extended. A decree of 30 October 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1069) fixed the maximum hours for men at 11 hours and for women at 10 hours per day. Three months later an official newspaper of the Nazi Party stated that the actual weekly worktime had already reached in many cases 60 hours.

⁽¹⁾ Das Reich, 14 March 1943.

e. Destruction of Democratic Trade Unions in Belgium

Dealing with the trade unions, as in other matters, the German military authorities in Belgium intervened in a more direct way than they did in France. There was a movement, originating with a minority of Belgian trade unionists under German influence, to replace the traditional democratic labor organizations by a single organization, similar in its activities to the German Labor Front. The movement resulted in the creation in November 1940 of the Union of Manual and Intellectual Workers, called the UTMI. The response that this new organization found among Belgian labor apparently disappointed the German authorities. They dissolved the the largest group of democratic trade unions by an order of 26 August 1942. Their property was confiscated and provision was made that it could be transferred to associations formed to replace them. The activities of the other surviving groups of trade unions were sharply restricted, particularly by a decree of the Military Commander of 10 December 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 1109) concerning the Maintenance of Peaceful Labor Relations. According to this decree, strikes, lockouts, and other disturbances of industrial relations were punishable by heavy penalties, including even the death sentence.

⁽¹⁾ Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, 1942. second issue.

3. The Netherlands

(a) Responsible Agencies

Responsibility for crimes committed against Dutch workers in their home country rests mainly with the German civilian authorities established in Dutch territory during its occupation. These authorities were headed by the Reich Commissioner (Reichskommissar). for the occupied Netherlands, Reich Minister Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and his four Assistant Commissioner Generals. One of them, the Commissioner General for Finance and Economics, Hans Fischboeck, had charge of social affairs, including most labor issues. Other labor issues, like the compulsory labor service for youth and the organization of employers and employees were placed under another of the Commissioner Generals, called the Commissioner for Special Tasks (Hauptdienstleiter Fritz Schmidt, later Dienstleiter Willi Ritterbusch). This Commissioner General was also the Delegate for Holland of the German Commissioner General for Labor Allocation, Fritz Sauckel; in this way, he shared with the Commissioner General for Finance and Economics responsibility for the recruitment of Dutch labor and for its transport to the Reich.

The German Military Commanders in France and in

^{1.} This section is condensed from the Civil Affairs
Handbook on the Netherlands; Section 9, Labor. Also
from Civil Affairs Handbook, German Military Government over Europe- "Section 21, The Netherlands."

Belgium headed a whole network of regional and local agencies, called the field commands. The German civilian authorities in The Netherlands had no comparable organization. They established, however, a specialized labor administration, the "Main Department Social Administration" (Hauptabteilung Soziale Verwaltung - HSV) under the Commissioner General of Finance and Economics, first by Böning, later by D. Apitz. The HSV dealthparticularly with manpower and wage problems; it supervised the Dutch agencies in these fields, particularly the public employment offices. The HSV was composed of three sections in its headquarters and of four regionals outposts (Aussenstellen): Rotterdam, 's-Hertogenbosch, Utrecht, and Groningen. Apart from the outposts, German recruitment bureaus (Werbestellen) funetioned in the Dutch local employment offices.

With all these controls, the Germans dominated the Dutch labor authorities and used them to achieve German objectives. Head of the Dutch labor administration was, in the absence of the pc itical Minister, the Secretary General of the Ministry for Social Affairs. He was closely controlled by the Germans, like the Secretary Generals of all other Ministries. By a decree of 24 September 1940 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 500), the German Reich Commissioner created the National Labor Office (Ryksarbeidsbureau -RAB) as a section of the Dutch

⁽¹⁾ See above III C I and III C 2

Ministry. This office, and its regional and local agencies, were on the Dutch side primarily responsible for manpower issues; they replaced the existing national employment service. Two years later, by a decree of 13 October 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 493) the Reich Commissioner established a second new labor agency, the National Trustee for the Regulation of Labor Conditions (Gemachtigde voor den Arbeid) with power to regulate wages and other employment conditions. Through these two new offices, in which Dutch quislings were placed, and also through the conniving Secretary General of the Ministry, the German authorities directed the Dutch labor administration. They are thus responsible for all its activities. The German authorities found it necessary as well to issue fundamental regulations in the field of labor in their own name.

(b) Conscription of Dutch Labor by the German Authorities.

In the Netherlands conscription for work passed through the same phases as in other occupied territories in the West, in accordance with the general policies laid down by the German central agencies. The decree of the Reich Commissioner of 28 February 1941 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 122) introduced the obligation to work but in the homeland only and under the administration of the Dutch employment offices. These offices were authorized to compel employers to set their employees free for such

obligatory work.

on 23 March 1942 a German decree (Verordnungsblatt, p. 155) extended the leability to work to areas outside of the Notherlands and thus opened the way for conscription for work within the Reich. Even before this, as German decree of 20 Fobruary 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 72) had ordered the registration with the employment offices of all men and unmarried women between the ages of 18 and 40. Violations of all these regulations were punishable by jail sentence or fines.

The German mobilization measures were confirmed and pointed up by a set of supplementary regulations in 1943. Such regulations were:

- (i) the German decree of 19 February 1943 (Verord-nungsblatt, p. 77) authorizing any action necessary for the distribution of manpower, including the compulsory assignment of individuals to jobs;
- (ii) the German decree of 15 March 1943 (Verord-nungsblatt, p. 135) ordering the shut-down of all Dutch enterprises not needed for war or "national subsistence" and prohibiting a number of occupations that the Germans considered unnecessary. Police authorities and employment offices controlled the observance of this order.
- (iii) the German decree of 6 May 1943 (<u>Verord-nungsblatt</u>, p. 173) renewing the obligation for men of working age to register with the employment offices.

With all the measures, the German authorities and

collaborating Dutch agencies created and nurtured a continuous flow of Dutch workers, men and women, into Germany. The mobilization was carried out often violently against strong resistance from the Dutch population, particularly in the final phase of the war.

In this last period of the war, new deportation measures were introduced, for political rather than manpower reasons. An example was an order of the SS, published in the Dutch press of 16 September 1944 which provided for the immediate arrest and transfer to Gormany of Netherlanders aged 15 to 60 "visibly engaged in no occupation and spending their time standing and gaping about".

(c) Exploitation of Dutch Labor within mne Notherlands

The German authorities subjected wages and hours in Holland to rigid controls. According to a decree of 288 November 1940 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 628,) increases of wages by collective agreements had to be approved by the authorities. The decree of 30 October 1942 (Vorordnungsblatt, p. 512)pprohibited individual wage increases. Violations were punishable by severe penalties. A decree of 20 February 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 70) introduced minimum work hours of 48 per week. In April 1943 this minimum was increased to 54.

Numerous individual reports of the official Notherlands News Agency Aneta in the winter 1944/1945 and from underground sources.
OSS source D, Berne, 27 September 1944.
Neue International Rundschau der Arbeit 1943, p. 320.

^{2.}

(d) <u>Destruction of Democratic Forms of Labor Representation</u>.

The spirit of repression with which the Gormans attacked the traditional rights of labor was indicated by a decree of the Reich Commissioner of 19 May 1941 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 364) by which strikes and lock-outs were put under most severe penalties, including the death sentence.

On the other hand, German policies in relation to Dutch labor were influenced by the assumption that the Notherlanders were close racial relatives of the Germans and therefore more responsive to Nazi ideologies than other European nations. For this reason, the German authorities attempted consistently to shape labor relations in Holland according to the Nazi pattern as established in the Reich itself.

Their efforts concerned labor relations in individual plants as well as industries. The decree of the Reich Commissioner of 13 October 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 493) deprived the Dutch workers of all such forms of democratic representation in individual plants as had been developed before the Nazis. The decree introduced instead the German system of labor relations; the employer became the "leader" of the enterprise, the workers his "followers" (Gefolgschaft); employment conditions in the plant were regulated by the employer alone. By the same decree labor relations and employment condi-

Authority, the Trustee for the Regulation of Lobor Conditions (Bovollmächtigter für die Ordnung des Arbeitslebens) who on paper was subordinated to the Ministry for Social Affairs, but actually was directed by the Germans.

The democratic trade unions in Holland were either dissolved or compelled to join a single totalitarian labor organization, shaped after the German Labor Front. The final step was a decree of 30 April 1942 (Verord-nungsblatt, p. 211) by which the Reich Commissioner gave official recognition to this Dutch Labor Front (Neder-landische Arbeitsfront - NAF). This organization exercised political control over the Dutch workers by representatives in the individual plants, called social stewards, who had to be consulted by the employers before regulating employment conditions.

The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia

a. Responsible Agencies

Labor regulations in the Protectorate were in most cases issued by the Czech Government; administration of them was entrusted to Czech agencies. All major policy decisions were, however, made by the German authorities, and these authorities also supervised all administrative measures taken by the Czechs. The Germans carried out this control partly by special agencies, partly by the infiltration of German officials into the Czech administration. The German influence in the field of labor

became particularly manifest after the Czech cabinet had been reshuffled in January 1942; the Czech Minister of Economics and Labor in the new cabinet, Dr. Walter Bertsch, was a German national who had been chief of a department in the office of the Reichsprotektor.

The German authorities in the Protectorate, consequently, must be considered as fully responsible not only for the general policies applied to Czech labor, but also for all crimes committed in the course of executing these directives.

Defined in this way, responsibility for labor policies in the Protectorate must be assigned primarily to the Reichsprotektor (first Freiherr von Neurath, then Dr. Frick), to those who acted in his name, and to leading officials who followed the directives given by the central German agencies in Berlin. In August 1943, most functions of the Protector were shifted to the German Minister of State, SS Obergruppenführen Karl H. Frank). His control over the German as well as the Czech agencies was as complete as possible. Undersecretary of State was Dr. von Burgsdorff. Labor affairs were handled in Department V of the German Ministry. On the regional level, the Czech administration was supervised by subordinates of the Ministry, the Oberlandräte.

As in other occupied territories, a direct channel existed between the Commissioner General for Labor

Allocation, Sauckel, and the territory's labor administration. Some of Sauckel's fundamental regulations, like the decree of 5 August 1942 (RGB1, I, p. 341) concerning Breach of Labor Contract, etc., applied directly to the Protectorate. The Minister of Labor in the Czech Government was Sauckel's Delegate for the Protectorate. The Czech public employment offices -- which had been reorganized by a Czech decree of 25 July 1939 (Amtsblatt No. 193) cooperated closely with the German Labor Allocation Administration in the mobilization of Czech labor and its deportation into the Reich.

The Conscription of Czech Labor

The great majority of Czech laborers were used in one way or another for the German war effort, particularly in the armament industry. They were employed mostly in the Protectorate itself, though a substantial number, were transferred to the Reich.

Conscription was first introduced in the Protectorate by the German decree of 25 November 1939 (RCB1., I, p. 2300). This decree made the inhabitants of Bohemia-Moravia liable to "emergency service in the public interest" (Notdienst).

See above III B 4
 A conservative estimate gives the figure of Czech workers employed in the Reich as 230,000 on 1 February 1944 R&A Report No. 1623, ("Foreign Labor in Germany", p. 38).

A Czech decree of 4 May 1942 (Gesetzessemplung
No. 154) introduced conscription on a much broader basis,
corresponding to the system of labor conscription in
Germany itself (the so-called Dienstverpflichtung).

Administered by the public employment offices, it could
be used to conscript labor for work in war industries of
all sorts. Liable for work were all inhabitants of the
Protectorate who were able to work, female as well as
male, without age limit and with few, narrowly defined
exemptions. The decree provided expressly that Czechs
could be conscripted for work in the Reich. Resistance
to conscription could be punished by the employment
offices with disciplinary fines (Ordnungsstrafen) and
by the general administrative authorities with fines or
with jail.

The exact extent to which these compulsory devices were actually used is not yet known. They were, without doubt, frequently applied, particularly at times when additional labor reserves were mobilized in the Reich itself. Intensive programs of "combing out" Czech surplus labor for employment in the Reich were announced in February 1943 and in November 1944. Women up to the age of 50 were called up for work. True, the Minister for Economics and Labor protested in 1943 that recruitment for Germany would "continue to be voluntary".

2. OSS 22901

^{1.} Minister Bertsch in "Die Wirtschaft", 14 February 1943 and Dr. Josef Bös in "Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft", November 1944, p. 877

Anti-Nazi sources, however, reported as early as 1942 that cafes in Prague were being raided by the Gestapo for forced labor.

e. Exploitation of Labor in the Protectorate through Rigid Controls.

There was a deep-rooted tradition in the Protectorate of regulating employment conditions by collective agreements. This democratic process was gradually strangled by rigid government controls. A Czech decree of 21 December 1939 (Gesetzessammlung No. 330) forbade new collective agreements and authorized the Czech Government to fix wage rates and to determine other employment conditions, particularly the length of the work time and the right to vacations. Using this authorization, the Minister changed in an arbitrary way a great number of the existing agreements. Sauckel's 1 Order No. 10 of 22 August 1942, for example, gave rise to the Czech decree of 7 December 1942 (Gesetzessammlung No. 404) concerning Assurance of Stable Wages and Salaries and Maintenance of Labor Morale. This decree:

- i. froze wages at existing levels;
- ii. forbade workers to refuse work assigned to them by the employer, including overtime, Sunday and night work; to slow down in their work; to absent themselves; to break shop discipline; or to quit their jobs prematurely;

^{3.} Czechoslovak Press Buro, 5 August 1942

^{1.} See above III B 4

iii. empowered the employer to enforce rigid discipline over his workers.

Violations were punished with money fines by the employment offices or with jail or fines by the general administrative authorities.

A Czech decree of 13 August 1942 (Gesetzessammlung No. 287) authorized the employer to extend the regular work period to ten hours per day and in certain cases to twelve hours. Even juveniles and women could be employed as much as ten hours per day and 56 hours per week. Rest periods were reduced. Night work was permitted for juveniles. Under a decree of 26 June 1941 (Gesetzesammlung No. 241) a work book of the German type became obligatory for all workers and employees in the Protectorate.

d) Destruction of Democratic Labor Unions

The democratic labor unions of the Protectorate were during the first years of the occupation, undermined and systematically weakened, particularly by the prohibition of collective bargaining and by the transfer of unemployment compensation to the public employment offices.

Finally, a Czech decree of 14 August 1941 (Gesetzessamm-lung No. 347) authorized the administration to dissolve or merge the existing unions. The Government tried - with limited success - to bring all Czech workers into a totalitarian labor organization, called the NOUZ, shaped after the model of the German Labor Front. The

German Labor Front itself had already under a German decree of 14 September 1939 (Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors p. 142) been charged with the exclusive care of German workers in the Protectorate.

5. The Covernment General

a. The Responsible Agencies

In the occupied countries of the east - the parts of Poland organized by the Führer Edict of 12 October 1939 (RGBI.I p.2077) as the General gouvernement, and the former Russian territories -the lines of command and of responsibility for labor crimes are not obscured by any serious instance of participation by native agencies. The Germans treated these countries as colonies; the Slavic inhabitants belonged, according to the Nazi ideology, to the most inferior races. The Germans allowed only very restricted forms of local selfgovernment in the more privileged territories, like the Baltic States and the Ukraine, and kept all serious responsibilities, including those for labor mobilization and exploitation, in German hands.

Even when acting apparently on their own authority, the German territorial governments in the East obeyed the directives and executed the policies set by the central agencies in Berlin.

This is evident from the timing and the contents of territorial regulations; it will, without doubt, be confirmed as soon as the files of the various agencies become available. In addition, the Labor Allocation Administration, under the direction first See below IV A 1

of the Ministry of Labor and later of the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation, had the same semi-auto-nomous status in the eastern occupied territories as in the west.

responsibility for labor policies was vested in the 2
Governor General (Reichsministor Dr. Hans Frank) and carried out according to his directives by the Main
Division "Labor" in his office, headed first by Albert 3
Stamm, la by Dr. Max Frauendorffer. Labor regulations for the General Government were issued over the signature either of the Governor himself or of the Director of this main department. On the regional level, the five district chiefs were responsible for labor policies in their territories.

Specialized agencies of labor administration were the public employment offices. There were twenty-one employment offices with eighty-two branch offices and some three hundred auxiliary agencies. They formed a part of the German Labor Allocation Administration.

b. Mobilization of Labor

Mobilization of labor for work within the General Government and for work in Germany was only partly carried out in legalized forms. Particularly in the

See above III B4.

Secretary of State was Dr. Buhler.

Other high officials specializing in labor issues in the General Government were Ministorial Councillor Rhetz, Wilhelm Struve, Dr. von Gschliesser, and Dr. Joseph Buhler

initial phase of military occupation labor was recruited and deported to Germany by acts of pure force.

Conscription of labor had been established by a decree of 26 October 1939 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 6). Under this decree and under a second decree of 14 December 1939 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 224) the obligation to work was extended to men and women from 14 to 60 years. A new basis for compulsory labor was established by the decree of 13 May 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 255). Under this regulation all Polish inhabitants of the territory, without consideration of as or sex, could be called up for work in the German interests.

"construction service" had been introduced in 1940 and regulated in detail by a decree of 22 April 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 218). His function was to construct public works such as roads and waterways. Liability extended to all non-German inhabitants between eighteen and sixty. The directing personnel of the Service was taken from the officers of the German Labor Front, whose chief was Heinrich Hinkel.

c. Exploitation of Polish Labor in the Home Country.

In accordance with policies defined by the central authorities, particularly by Commissioner General Sauckel

 See the chapter on "Organization and Practice of Recruitment" in Tirm, Einsatz-Ausländischer Arbeitskrafte, p.55 in his decree of 22 August 1942, the territorial government made every effort to exploit Polish labor within the home country. Wages in the General Government were frozen at the level of 31 August 1939 by a decree of 31 October 1939 (Verordnungsblatt, p.13). The District Chiefs were empowered to issue "Tarifordnungen" (literally, wage regulations) "fixing rates of wages, hours of work, and other working conditions for individual enterprises or for industries."

The hours of work were fixed at a minimum of 48 by a Decree of 13 June 1949 (Verordnungsblatt, p.200). The directors of enterprises were authorized to increase the daily hours to ten. Work on Sundays and holidays and nightwork were introduced by a decree of 15 March 1943 (Verordnungsblatt, p.150) employment office as the agency of factory inspection.

The same decree established severe rules on shop discipline corresponding to those introduced within the Reich and provided for grave penalties for violations.

6. The Occupied Russian Territories

a. Responsible Agencies

The major portion of the occupied Russian Territories was governed by German civilian authorities. Certain areas behind the military front, however, remained under a military government of the rear-zone type, with army commanders at the top and field, county, and local

commanders under them. Labor issues were handled in these areas by the Economic Staff for the East, a specialized military agency, with three Economic Inspectorates--North, Center, and South--corresponding to the break-down of the German Army Groups on the Russian front.

The civilian authorities responsible for the major (western) portion of the occupied Russian territories were headed by a central agency, located in Berlin, the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsministerium für die Besetzten Ostgebiete). agency was headed by Alfred Rosenberg and by his permanent substitute, Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Dr. Meyer. In this ministry, the direction of economic matters, including labor issues, was placed under a Leadership Staff for Economic Policy; the special Group "Labor Policy and Social Administration" of this Staff was headed first by an official of the Labor Allocation, Ministerial dirigent Dr. Rachner, and later by the State Councillor Peukert, who at the same time was the territorial delegate of the General Commissioner for Labor Allocation.

Within the territories, a whole hierarchy of Commissioners functioned; at the top were the two Reich-kommissäre: Gauleiter Heinrich Lohse for Ostland, including Estonia, Lettonia, Lithuania, and White Ruthenia; and Gauleiter Erich Koch for the Ukraine.

As in the General Government and other occupied territories, the authority of the territorial governments was much smaller than appeared. They issued regulations and gave directives, but always along lines fixed by over-all agencies in Berlin, Particularly in the field of labor, the central agencies directed all territorial activities, and the agencies of the Labor Allocation Administration in the East acted for the most part independently of the general administrative authorities in the territories.

b. Phases of Labor Mobilization

The mobilization of manpower for work in the interests of Germany started immediately after occupation. It was carried out partly by legal compulsion and partly by a so-called "voluntary" recruitment. This "voluntary" recruitment was based on compulsory registration of all males and females between the ages of 15 and 60 and 15 and 45 respectively. The registrants were given the alternative of unemployment and starvation at home or accepting work for the German war effort at home or abroad.

The first phase was followed by the "legal" conscription of labor, introduced by separate decrees of the various commissioners, all with conspicuously similar contents. The general basis of all these regulations was

Werner Rechner in Reichsarbeitsblatt 1942 pp. V 130ff. The certificate of employment served as bread card; Monatshefte für NS-Sozialpolitik, March 1942,

given by a Decree of the Reich Minister for the Eastern territories of 19 December 1941 (Verordnungsblatt 1942,

The Sauckel decree of 22 August 1942 started a new phase in the compulsory mobilization of Eastern labor. An example of a regional regulation that introduced this over-all decree in the East is a decree of the Ostland Commissioner of 25 January 1943, establishing compulsory labor service within or without the Eastern Territories for unlimited periods of time.

The selection of eastern workers to be shipped to Germany was made by German recruitment committees in cooperation with public employment offices. Transportation - almost always in large groups - was carried out quite inhumanly.

Exploitation Within the East

Employment in the Russian territories was subject to rigid controls similar to those applied in Germany itself. Decrees such as that of 20 December 1942 (Verordnungsblatt, p. 170) issued by the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine made any absenteeism, slow-downs, or violations of shop discipline punishable by imprisonment or fine. No worker was allowed to leave his job without administrative permission. Every worker, employed or unemployed, had to

Sec above III B4'

Kaueaser Zeitung, 6 February 1943.
Molotov's note of 11 May 1943, quoted above.

have a work certificate, according to the decree of 5 March 1943. Camps for work-shy persons were established in various regions as the most extreme disciplinary measure against workers who did not satisfy German requirements. In some of these "Camps for Incorrigibles", workers were kept indefinitely.

The only form of compensation allowed in the Russian territories was the payment of piece rates or other types of incentive wages. Work hours were legally fixed at a minimum of fifty-four per week; however, workers were often obliged to work beyond this minimum period, particularly on Sundays and holidays.

Destruction of Democratic Unions

In the Ostland, the German authorities subjected the existing trade unions to close control by official German trustees. By a decree of 16 April 1943, the Reich Commissioners for the Ostland abolished unions and replaced them with a single official organization modelled after the German Labor Front.

Neuc Internationale Rundschou der Arbeit 1943 p.255 Nationalsozialistische Landpost 7/12/42/ See, f. 1., the Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine of 20 December 1942 (Verordnungsblatt <u>RKU</u>, p. 170).

Ibidem

Neuc Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, 1943, p.327.

IV THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

The criminal activities of the German Government and the Nazi Party in the field of foreign labor might be grouped as follows:

A. Criminal plans and policies

- B. Statutes and other law-making regulations
- C. Administrative Instructions
- D. Criminal practices, including not only administrative activities of routine character, but also innumerable individual incidents.

The evidence should be found in

- A. German material
- B. Material from collaborationist sources
- C. Material from countries hostile to Germany
- D. Material from neutral sources

A. Evidence from German Material

1. Documents

Statutes, regulations, and instructions published by the German agencies could be found in the following publications:

Reichsarbeitsblatt (official organ of the Ministry of Labor)
Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe (official organ of the Labor Allocation Administration)
Monatshefte für NS Sozialpolitik (official organ of the German Labor Front)
Der Ausländische Arbeiter in Deutschland (a looseleaf collection of official regulations concerning foreign labor with official comments, published in Berlin from 1941 onwards; particularly useful because it contains regulations from many agencies, is compiled by experts, and gives documents not published elsewhere)

All these publications present regulations issued by the central German agencies. Regulations issued by the German authorities in the various occupied territories were published—those that were published—in special law gazettes.

l. See Appendix A

The four publications mentioned on the preceding page contain not only regulations but also official comments, statements of programs, and official reports.

Nevertheless, they are far from giving any complete picture of German policies and plans of of their regulations and practices. It is quite significant that Goering's fundamental directives on the treatment of Russian civilians have never been published. Another set of secret instructions dealing with the interplay between, on the one hand, German civilian and military agencies in France and, on the other, the Vichy authorities has been used elsewhere in this memorandum.

It is most revealing. Despite all their statements to the contrary, the Germans were, without doubt, conscious of the illegal character of many of their 4 measures. They knew of the abhorrence that the inhuman treatment of subdued populations elicited in the whole civilized world, and as the prospects of victory began to decline, the Germans attempted to hide many of their doings.

A complete picture of German criminal activities
can therefore be gained only from confidential German files
Every effort should be made to uncover the files of the

^{1.} See in particular Part V of the Reichsarbeitsblatt and the periodical Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe

^{2.} See above III B2

^{3.} OSS Document supplied by the Free Germany Committee Wes

^{4.} In the case Lorieux vs. Etat Allemand, the German-Belgian Mixed Tribunal had decided 3 June 1924 that the deportations of Belgian workers during World War I constituted "the gravest violation of the law of nation Quoted from Study C No. 25 of the International Labor Office, p.286

following central bureaus:

Main Department IX ("Europa-Amt") of the Ministry of Labor, since 1942 under the Commissioner General for Labor Allocation
Office for Labor Allocation (Amt für Arbeitseinsatz) of the German Labor Front Central Inspectorate for the Care of Foreign Workers

The files of these agencies should give information also on the activities of the other central agencies enumerated above. (German civil servants are very methodical in exchanging and collecting copies of regulations and instructions and in keeping detailed minutes of interdepartmental meetings.) The same central files should further contain reports from subordinate agents within the Reich and within the occupied territories, particularly from the fifteen inspectors working under the Central Inspectorate, the "liaison men" under the Office of Labor Allocations of the Labor Front, and Sauckel's Delegates and the Labor Allocation Staffs in the various occupied countries. Most of the time the files were probably in Berlin; however, they may have later been transferred.

Supplementary confidential material of a more specialized character might be found in the files of other central agencies mentioned above. Particularly important should be the files of the Police and of Department IR of the Reich Ministry of Interior.

Less complete, but still very valuable, particularly in the hands of experts who knew how to interpret them, would be the confidential files of regional and even local

agencies within the Reich, such as the Gauarbeits mter and Arbeits mter, and of the various territorial agencies of which examples have been given above. Special attention may be given to the pertinent files of the Gauarbeits mter (regional employment offices) in the American occupied zone. Such offices functioned, for instance, in Frankfort, Kassel, Koblenz, Stuttgart, Wurzburg, Nuremberg, Bayreuth, Munich, and Augsburg, and also in the Austrian cities of Linz, Innsbruck, and Salzburg.

2. Newspapers

Gorman newspapers published during war-time contain abundant material concerning foreign workers. It is, of course, controlled and consored but still useful, as the quotations in this memorandum may indicate. German news-papers have been collected and digested by numerous Allied agencies. Digests and in many cases also the originals, are available in OSS.

Newspapers were up till now the most comprehensive source for the severe court sentences by which the Germans tried to terrorize the foreign workers in Germany, Examples of such sentences, partly from German papers, partly from other sources, are given in Appendix B.

3. Witnesses

It might be possible to find among the officials of the Labor Allocation Administration and of other public

1. Authentic material should be found in the files of the German district attorneys and of the German courts.

agencies and individuals who in accordance with the German concepts of civil service and patriotic duty carried out policies they did not agree with, or who for other measons would want to testify now about policies, instructions, and practices of Government and Party. It is accordingly suggested that the following officials (who all, of course, share responsibility for the crimes) be examined:

- Dr. Timm, Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry of Labor;
- Dr. Alexander Wende, President of the Gau Employment Office of Upper Bavaria in Munich; former Labor Attache with the German (Republican) embassies in Washington and London;
- Dr. Franz Mende, Director of the Office for Labor Allocation with the German Labor Front;
- Dr. Hupfauer, Director of the Department for Social Self-Responsibility with the Labor Front.

According to many reports, substantial numbers of German workers disagreed with the official policies on foreign labor. Particularly former union members both Social-Democrats and "Christian Trade-Unionists", might be trusted and might prove useful as witnesses. Names could be found by systematic questioning of foreign workers.

B. Evidence From Collaborationist Sources

As explained in Section III of this memorandum, native governments, or at least native administrative agencies, had in many of the occupied territories fairly broad share in the execution of German criminal policies. Their official

publications, but more still their confidential files, are, without doubt, full of evidence. The same should be true for the files of the various totalitariam labor organizations that the Germans, or their quislings established in those countries.

Undoubtedly, the present governments of France,
Belgium, Netherlands, etc., have already seized those
materials or are in the process of doing it. They should
be willing to give access to those documents as far as they
are needed for establishing Gorman responsibilities,

Newspapers that appeared in the occupied territories, either under German control, or with direct German origin, did not differ in character from papers appearing in the Reich itself. They are available and should be similarly used.

C. Material from Allied Sources

The German crimes committed against foreign labor have been closely watched and currently registered by the governments in exile and by the diplomatic representatives and other official agents of the Allied Nations in adjoining neutral countries. The sufferings of labor from conscription, deportation, and other forms of enslavement were of direct vital concern to leaders staying in the occupied territories themselves, leaders of resistance movements, labor unions, and religious groups, and to loyal public officials who in the one or the other country were tolerated for a time by the Germans—such as the

members of the government in Denmark and some of the secretaries of state of the Belgian and Dutch ministries.

Parts of the material that all these agencies and men collected were currently published in bulletins and papers some of them were underground papers. Other material is: contained in open or classified reports. Many of these publications and reports are in the files of OSS and have been digested in numerous studies and memoranda, among them the series of Civil Affairs Handbook on "German Government over Occupied Europe". Other parts of the material from these sources could be made available, either by direct contact or through the medium of the present governments. Men who observed the German crimes inside the occupied territories would naturally be outstanding witnesses; they would, at least, be well qualified to indicate persons who should be called as witnesses. A list of persons in a number of occupied countries belonging to these categories is enclosed as Appendix C. --

The most important witnesses, however, would be the foreign workers themselves who have gone through all the phases of enslavement, exploitation, and maltreatment.

The available documents contain a limited number of names of such people. It might not be easy to locate these individuals now, and the selection would in any event be quite haphazard. Millions of displaced workers are now available in Europe, some them still on the roads and in camps, ethers already back in their home countries. It 1. More up to date still are the OSS studies R & A No. 2500

should be possible to take depositions from large groups of such workers, through the medium of their governments, their unions, or of other organizations, and to select in from these depositions a small but representative group of victims that could be brought into the trial itself. Or the court might find it possible to hold some of its meetings in camps of uprooted workers to give to the judges and to the public the direct and full evidence of the wrongs done by the Germans to the workers of Europe.

D. Material from Neutral Sources

Witnesses from neutral countries might be found among the journalists who represented Swiss, Swedish, and Turkish papers in Germany during war-time, particularly individuals who were expelled from Germany toward the end because of their resistance to Nazi pressures and threats. American diplomatic representatives in neutral countries might be asked to propose such persons.

More promising might be the selection of men from neutral countries who worked during the war in Germany and became in this way direct witnesses of the treatment meted out to labor from occupied territories. They could best be identified with the help of their unions. These unions might be approached either by American diplomatic representatives or through their international federations.

Appendix A

List of German or German-sponsored official law gazettes in German-occupied countries

- 1. Baltic. States
 Verordnungsblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ostland.
- 2. Belgium
 a. Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien
 und Nordfrankreich für die besetzten Gebiete Belgiens
 und Nordfrankreich.
- b. Moniteur Belge.
- 3. France
 a. Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich, Besondere
 a. Wirtschaftsanordnungen (Neue Folge).
 b. Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in
 - b. Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich.
- 4. Netherlands.

 a. Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete.
- 5. Norway Norsk Lovtidend
- 6. Poland Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement
- 7. Protectorate
 a. Amtlicher Anzeiger des Reichsprotektors (Anlage der Zeitung "Der Neue Tag")

b. Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in Bohmen und Mähren.

- c. Amtsblatt des Protektorats Böhmen und Mähren
- d. Sammlung der Gesetze und Verordnungen (des ehemaligen tschechoslowakischen Staates bzw. des Protektorates)
- 8. <u>Slovakia</u> Slovensky Zakonnik
- 9. <u>Ukrainė</u> Verordnungsblatt des Reichskommissars für die Ukraine:
- 10. Yugoslavia
 a. Croatia Narodne Novine
 b. Scrbia (1) Verordnungsblatt des Befehlshabers Serbim
 (2) Amtsblatt der Serbischen Ministerien.

(chronologically arranged)

Appendix B

Sentences Imposed Upon Foreign Labor

- 1) A Dutch worker returning from Germany advised his fellow workers not to take jobs in Germany. He was sentenced to eight months' penal servitude. Zeesen radio, 29/11/40.
- 2) A Czech worker in Germany has been sentenced to three months imprisonment for changing his employment in Germany without consulting the employment office. Die Zeit, Reichenberg, 9/1/41/
- 3) A special court at Dortmund has sentenced a Pole to death for secretly leaving his job in Germany and trying to escape from prison after his arrest. Essener Allgemeine Zeitung, 16/1/41.
- 4) The 21 year old Czech, Miloslaw Adam, has been sentenced to six months' imprisonment by the Oldenburg Special Court for saying that Czech workmen in Germany were being ill-treated. Oldenburgische Staatszeitung, 6/4/41.
- 5) The Belgian, Gaston van Rabebeke, aged 31, working in Germany, has been sentenced by the Oldenburg court to one year's improper somment for insulting the Führer, for trying to incite others to revolt. Oldenburgische Staatszeitung, 6/4/41.
- 6) A Dutchman was sentenced to four months' imprisonment for leaving his employment in Germany without permission and for offering resistance to the officials of the occupying forces when crossing the Dutch-German frontier. Algemeen Handelsblad, 20/4/41.
- 7) Three women farm workers were given sentences varying from eighteen months to two years' improsonment because they hit back when a German beat them. Westfalische Landeszeitung Rote Erde, Dortmund, 25/4/41.
- 8) The Special Court at Bielefeld has sentenced to ten years' imprisonment a Polish civilian farm labourer who had refused to do extraordinary overtime work, and when attempts were made to compel him, he threatened his employer's son with a fork. Essener Allgemeine Zeitung, 4/5/41.
- 9) H. W. van der Mader, a Dutchman, has been sentenced to three months' imprisonment for not appearing before a medical board which was to decide whether or not he should be recruited for labor in Germany. De Tijd, 20/5/42.

- 10) Michael Lason received the death sentence for assaulting his employer Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten, 11/7/42.
- 11) A Pole, Edmund Graczyllowski, aged 21, was sentenced to death for "economic sabotage" because he had injured two horses and a cow belonging to his German master. Deutsche Rundschau, Bydoczsz, 13/7/42.
- 12) Three Frenchmen have been sentenced to long hard labor terms for having penetrated into the pantry in the basement of their barracks. Die Weltwoche (Zurich) 4/9/42.
- 13) A Croat has been condemned to death for having stolen a travelling bag. Die Weltwoche (Zurich) 4/9/42.
- 14) A special court in Hamburg sentenced to death a 29-year-old Dane, Ejler Lorentzen, who while under arrest had attempted to escape and had assaulted the guard. Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, 16/10/42.
- 15) A Pole, Edward Sobkowiak, who refused to work for the Germans, was arrested during "a police raid against idle Poles," resisted his captors and attempted to escape; a German court sentenced him to death for violence against German labor office officials. Ostdeutscher Beobachter, Poznan, 2/11/42.
- 16) The Provincial Court of Schwerin, Mocklenburg, on 23 August 1943 sentenced a Czedh to death for listening to and spreading foreign broadcasts. Rundfunkarchiv, 3rd quarter, 1943.
- 17) The Konigsberg Special Court has sentenced the Poles Wypniewski and Siwinski and the Russian Semzov to death. Wypniewski, with the help of Semzov and Siwinski, had sold at excessive prices 60 centhers of butter, which he had stolen from his former employer. Preussische Zeitung, Koenigsberg, 16/3/44.
- 18) The Eastern worker Trochim Besnikoff, of Stalino, was sentenced to death in Dortmund on March 3rd, 1944 for rallying other Eastern workers during an air attack and attacking the camp leader and seriously wounding him while visiting an Eastern Workers' camp on January 30th. Westfälische Landeszeitung, Rote Erde, Dortmund, 4/3/44.
- 19) After the terror attack on Hagen on October 1, 1943 the Ukrainian tailor's apprentice Ilko Wachula stole a wireless set and materials from the dwelling of his master. He returned half the goods and took the rest to Halle where hewas arrested. A Dortmund Special Court has sentenced him to death. Westfal. Landesz., Rote Erde, Dortmund, 8/3/44.

- 20) The Düsseldorf Special Court has sentenced to death the Russian Vassilli Novikov, 29, for breaking into a widow's bomb-damaged house in Mülheim-Speldorf on the night of 14/9/43 and stealing clothes from the bedroom. Der Mittag, Düsseldorf, 24/3/44.
- 21) Ivan Shavaronkov, an Eastern worker, has been shot for stealing a watch and a bundle of leather during clearing up work after the attack on Klagenfurt on 16/1/44 Karntner Zeitung, Klagenfurt, 28/3/44.
- 22) The Dortmund Special Court sentenced the Dutchman Wilhelmus Verschuren, of Oudenbosch, to be executed as Volksschädling for having stelen field post parcels intended for foreign OT workers between 11/43 and 1/44, using the contents for his own benefit or selling them at exorbitant prices. Westfalische Landeszeitung, Rote Erde, Dortmund, 15/5/44.
- 23) The Berlin Special Court has sentenced the foreign worker Josef Klaric, 22, of Schlachtensee, to death for stealing a suit, shirts and soap from a bombed house during clearing-up work. Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, 14/5/44.
- 24) Three male Eastern workers have been executed for escaping at the end of January from their place of work in Lettmarcke, Kreis Altena, committing robberies at night with the help of two female Eastern workers, who have been sent to a concentration camp for complicity. Arrests were made on April 5th. Westf. Landesz, Rote Erde, Dort., 21/5/44.
- 25) The Magdeburg Special Court has sentenced to death the Eastern railway worker Michael Borowski, 19, and his accomplice Andreas Subarev, 19, of Kiev. Borowski stopped working and committed 30 railway thefts alone and with other Eastern workers, mostly Subarev. Der Mitteldeutsche, Magdeburg, 2/6/44.
- 26) The Hamburg Special Court has sentenced to death the French worker Jules Pierre for looting after an air attack. Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 8/6/44
- 27) Josef Pokorny and Anton Stiburck, nationals of the Protectorate, had formed a gang with fugitive criminals and jointly stolen trunks from Berlin stations under cover of the blackout. In addition, Pokorny had also stolen rabbits, also under the cover of the blackout. The Berlin Special Court sentenced them to be executed as Volksschädlinge, Berlin Nachtausgabe, 13/6/44.

- 28) The Cologne State Police have announced that the Eastern workers Alexander Vlasenko, 19, Nikolay Savin, 19, Michael Agorov, 20, and Nikolay Filatenko, 27, have been hanged for repeated thefts of railway goods. National Zeitung, Greater Essen edition, 16/6/44.
- 29) The Königsberg Special Court has sentenced to death the Lithuanians Montiula and Sabavicius who escaped from their places of work in Germany and, after being arrested while illicitly crossing the frontier, attacked and severely injured two officials at Ebenrode prison in order to escape. By order of the Reich Minister of Justice they were hanged on the day of the sentence while a third accomplice, the Lithuanian Kalasaitis, was sentenced to six years' penal servitude. Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/6/44.
- 30) The Czech citizen Oldrich Sedlacek, a railway worker, has been sentenced to death by the Hamburg Special Court for plundering freight cars. Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 8/7/44.
- 31) During the summer of 1944, the Special Court at Königsberg sentenced to death a "racial German", Zielski, who issued leave slips to Poles who did not return to their work. Preussische Zeitung, 28/7/44.
- 32) Two Frenchmen, G. Berthe, 26-year-old typesetter, and J. Musilli, 23, have been sentenced to death by the Berlin Special Court for forging butter coupons. Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, 28/1/45.

Appendix C

List of Sources of Information

The Netherlands

- 1. J. A. Ringers, Minister of Public Works and a well-known underground leader, can be found in the Hague.
- 2. Frans Goodhart, editor of the Amsterdam newspaper Het Parcol, can be found in Amsterdam.
- 3. Willow Drees, present Minister of Social Affairs, can be found in The Hague.
- 4. K. Suurhof, an underground Socialist trade union leader, can be found either in Amsterdam or The Hague.
- 5. Van Randwijk, leader of the National Advisory Committee to the Resistance, can be found in Amsterdam.
- 6. E. Kupprs, head of the Netherlands Trade Union Movement (Socialist Association of Trade Unions --- NVV), can be found in Amsterdam.

Bolgium

- 1. J. Bondas, Socialist labor leader, can be found in Brussels.
- 2. Paul Finet, Socialist labor leader, can be found in Brussels.
- 3. Henri Glineur, Communist labor leader and recently released from Buchenwald, can be found in Brussels.
- $\dot{\mu}_{\bullet}$ H. Pauwels, leader of the Catholic labor unions, can be found in Brussels.
- 5. Jef Rens, Socialist labor leader, is now with the ILO in Montreal.
- 6. Fernand Baudhuin, an outstanding economist who lived under the Nazis but who kept himself aldof from any collaboration, is a professor in Louvain.
- 7. Dispy, a Communist, Fernand Demany, Dr. Marteaux, and Marcel Gregoire, are former leaders of the underground Independence Front now living in Brussels.

- 8. Paul Struye, a conservative Catholic and editor of La Libre Belgique, can be found in Brussels.
- 9. Col. de Borchgrave, a Belgian underground leader, is now Military Attache at the Belgian Embassy in Washington.
- 10. Baron de Launoit, Director of the Ougree Marihay steeliron-coal works and a collaborationist whose guilt is not yet proven, can be found in Liege.

France

- 1. Leon Jouhaux, leader of the Confederation Generale du Travail Paris, (CGT), may be found in Paris.
- 2. Louis Saillant, Albert Gazier and Henri Raynaud, executives in the CGT may be found in Paris.
- 3. Gaston Tessier and Marcel Poimboeuf, leaders of the Christian Trade Union Movement, can be found in Paris.
- 4. Paul Charlin, an industrialist who lived under the Nazis but who did not collaborate, can be found in Paris.
- 5. Pierre Lefaucheux, now President of the Renault Motor Works and a former engineer and underground leader, can be found in Paris.
- 6. The Michelin family manufacturers of tires who resisted the deportation of their workers to Germany.
- 7. Alexander Parodi, Minister of Labor and Social Security, can be found in Paris.
- 3. The National Resistance Council and the Ministry for Prisoners of War and Deportees may be further sources of information.

<u>ltaly</u>

- 1. Giovanni Roveda, the Mayor of Turin and a Communist labor organizer, can be found in Turin.
- 2. Alesandro Pertini, a Socialist underground labor organizer, can be found either in Milan or Turin.
- 3. Gennaro Barbaresci, Minister of Labor, can be found in Rome.

SECENT.

- 4. Rodolfo Morandi, president of the Committees of National Liberation, can be found most likely in Milan.
- 5. The Italian General Confederation of Labor in Rome (GGIL) may be a further source of information.

Poland

- 1. Jan Stanczyk, Minister of Labor in Warsaw.
- 2. Kazimierz Witaszewski, General Secretary of the Central Trade Union, can be found in Lodz.
- 3. Marjan Czerwinski, President of the Lublin Trade Union Committee, can be found in Warsaw.
- 4. Wladyslaw Kuszyk, Secretary of Trade Union Federation of Lublin, can be found in Lublin.
- 5. Wiktor Trojanowski, Former Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, can be found in Warsaw.
- 6. Stanislaw Szwalbe, socialist member of the Presidium of KRN, can be found in Warsaw.
- 7. The Polish Labor Group in New York is made up of refugees (socialists) and has been in existence since the war. It is located at 55 W. 42nd Street, New York City.

Czechoslovakia

- 1. Antonin Zapotocky, the chairman, and Eugene Erban, a leading member of the Central Council of Trade Unions (URO), can be found in Prague.
- 2. Vaclav Nosek, Minister of Interior and a Trade Union Leader, can be found in Prague.
- 3. Echumil Lausman, Minister of Industry, can be found in Prague.
- 4. Josef Smrkovsky, former chairman of the Bohemian National Committee (underground) can be found in Prague.
- 5. Kopriva, present chairman of the Bohemian National Committee and a leading underground figure, can be found in Prague.

- 6. Josef Belina, a former Trade Union leader, is now in London
- 7. Vaclav Patzak, former chairman of the Workers' Academy (Social Democratic workers' educational institute in Prague), can be found in Prague.